group this case involves two issues and first impression under the driver's privacy protection act the d p p a appellant respect fully requests the court to reverse the district court's decisions on liquidated damages and attorneys fees more specifically we asked the court to articulate the following rule of law under the plain language of the d p p the lowest possible liquidated damages award for a violation is twenty five hundred dollars and that cumulative liquidated damages are not only permissible they're required whereas here the jury found one hundred one violations section twenty seven twenty four of the d p p first part part talks about a cause of action a person who knowingly obtains uses or discloses shall be liable and a person may bring a civil action in us district court so there is liability for a violation of the d p p a shell then the court then the statue goes on in section b to remedies the court may or ward actual damages but not last and liquidated damages in the amount of twenty five hundred dollars that  it does know how to write a statute your honor and there are a plethora of examples many sides of this case regarding how congress may or may not fill the silence of whether there are cumulative liquidated damages we saw that from a police brief as well as the brief submitted by him last the international minister polaroids association but as we point out in our reply brief the statutes  cited by both apple e as well as in law are not apis or controlling here mainly because the language of those statutes is different as would the court may award as vested in the district court and i think you need to show that the listen abuse of discretion no your honor not when there was an error of law based on statutory interpretation and our position here your honor is that the district court did not properly construe the requirements of the d p p a absolutely you're missing the point suppose we adopted that twenty five hundred dollars minimum that dorothy for every every violation you still have to deal with the word may your honor there are several places again this has just deal with the word may and how do we deal with the work you have to write an opinion for us dealing with the word may so let us tell it how to do may the absence or a silence in the statute should not be filled with language or interpretation in a manner that let's get back to may tell us about may in key whoa this court again oh no don't tell me keyhole you just tell us how we deal with may lies a degree of discretion the discretion lies in the list of remedies a court may authorize it doesn't give discretion regarding actual damages and liquidated damages clause a section b put the word shall tell us where the statute they put it your honor the fact that there the word shall is not there does not mean that the word may is not mandatory that was the th  but it doesn't say what the judge has to do your honor there are many reasons why the court should order that cumulative liquidated damages are not only permissible under the statute but are required here first again the text of the statute requires that there is a cause of action if there is a violation of the statute and then there is a list of remedies this court in key host said the word may we first had discretion as to it says may fashion what it deems to be an appropriate award so that the court in its discretion may fashion what it deems to be an appropriate award and then your honor that the court goes on to say that one of the options that the district court has is to award quote actual damages but not less than liquidated damages in the amount of twenty five hundred dollars and that doesn't say for each violation and if the court wants to award mrs cullom more money he had could do so under subsection four which gives the court the discretion to order such other preliminary an equitable relief as the court deems to be appropriate and three reasonable attorney's fees and then subsection four such other preliminary and equitable relief and then these are the key words as the court deems to be appropriate so that suggests a certain measure of discretion on the part of the even if this court concludes that the award of kimmo to liquidated damages is discretionary and is not mandated by the d p p plain language the district court abused that discretion and not awarding regardless of whether or not you prove them you get twenty five hundred dollars so the district court as i understand it said basically you have no damages but i'll give you twenty five hundred dollars which is what the statute requires and that was an error of law or an abuse of disc it did and that does not preclude relief under the d p p a because as this court already has how doesn't preclude but doesn't mandate it either louise would be ironic to find old actual damages and then multiply twenty five hundred by a hundred and one it would really notify the jury's finding and your honor they opposite result would be achieved if the court didn't award cumulative liquidated damages here because the jury was had evidence in front of it up two hundred sixty six access time if you don't talk about it regardless of what the court dirt term ends i know whether cumulative liquidated damages were appropriate or not the district court abused its discretion in terms of awarding only ten percent of the attorney's fees the reasons are set forth in the brief but mainly this is a classic abuse of discretion be course the court did not consider all the factors set forth in johnson and also when bevan's and evaluating whether the lodestar reasonable moreover there was no reason to believe that the lodestar was unreasonable the court had a fundamental misunderstanding of what constituted success below liquidated damages are not nominal damages they are presumed damages and the court discounted the liquidated damages by designating it as such in addition actual damages are only one factor and under the d p p a and under key ho actual damages are not a prerequisite for liquidated damages so that when the problem with the opinion that the district were never determined the lodestar  error before we get anywhere the other factors is that the issue that is here that's correct iow the first step is to determine what the lodestar is in the district court didn't do that what are you asking for remained for this record to figure out what it is and then apply all the other factors we are asking the court to do that your honor however we're asking the court to also provide instructions to the district court since this is an issue a person impression regarding award of niece fees under the d p p a the quote district court emphasis on actual damages is inappropriate where as here liquidated damages presumed damages constitute the essence of success and the jury found one hundred one violations of the d p p a the second thing is that this case was not as dunk for a palate ella this case was vigorously defended by desta fido throughout the proceedings three years worth of litigation including challenges to the constitutionality of the d p p a and so forth a three year three year course of litigation that finally your honor the court in appropriate blamed for the costs of this and we would ask the court to comment in provide direction to the district court regarding the ability of the plaintiff to bear the burden of  egregious violation of the d p p and substitute it is preferences for those of congress congress has decided to protect driver's privacy whether a district court or this court believes otherwise well aimed that my client and only violated the d p p but also that she was damaged in the amount of more than one million dollars  mean only issue is whether or not i agree or are it let me get to the heart of the matter the heart of the matter in this appeal is a disagreement over the remedies affordable under the d p p i specifically eighteen u s c section twenty seven twenty four subsection big as a residential a just interpret ing the statute and you can see how they are based on the questions we're looking at the word already gives the court regimen in determining how much that she's entitled to and liquidated damages that is correct you're right and she says there were a hundred one violations and so the way you look at this statute is you get twenty five hundred dollars for each hour and why is that a reasonable interpretation of the statute i'll tell your honor as the court has already pointed out what the statute says is the court may award actual damages but not less than liquidated damages in the amount of twenty five hundred dollars the d p p a does not say the court must  actual damages but not less than liquidated damages in the amount of twenty five hundred dollars per each violation in order for this core to believe that the court that the appellants argument is of a statute you start by looking at the statute itself because it is presumed that congress knows what it says and means what it says when it enacts the statute congress did not use the word shall use the word magic and there is no basis under the plain language of the d p p that would support an argument that it's an abus discretion for the district court to not award twenty five hundred dollars for each violation or if you violate this act by looking at someone's driving record without a warrant for the purpose you will pay for your first violation of all the rest are free no your honor i believe that it is within the course discretion based on the key or use of the information that was viewed by my client and if you look at some of the case a lot side the jurisdiction whether in the information that is viewed  also used and disclosed it may make a difference but under the keogh case this court had the discretion to do exactly what it did and the court considered word ignore her argument that every time she looked bet my private information she violated my privacy in the court ignore that argument that she made and she same i'm injured every single time she opened up my driving record my privacy was violated every single time so she could argue that the court abused this discretion by failing to take that into consideration in  determining what the court took into consideration with the evidence at this case i mean i can understand why the appellant wants to create out of thin air a use or disclosure of well of this information but that was not the evidence was the end to that question wasn't her privacy violated every single time she opened up a driving record your honor the the the d p p does in fact create a right to privacy each time she viewed that information she violated the statute but that's not the issue here the issue is not how many times she violated the statute but whether this court abused its discretion in following the plain language of the d p p essay and it wording only twenty five hundred dollars i think the court took into consideration all the to talladega the circumstances in this case in awarding what it awarded  you know the court also took into consideration that there was no vindication of any public interest in here this was a lawsuit filed by the appellant against her ex husband's wife because she viewed but never used or disclosed information on a governmental website showing driver's license infor was a lawsuit that vindicate only personal interest not public interest the court took that into consideration we know that based upon the court's order the court took into consideration that it was the information was never used or disclosed and there is no basis for the argument that the district court abuse distance kruschen in following  information that she viewed every time yes your honor the unequivocal evidence at the trial this case was that not only did she never use or disclose the information but she used she viewed the same information over and over and over again now at the trial admittedly she could not give an explanation russia did that but i guess what i'm still struggling with as if she opened it up one hundred one times her argument was my my privacy was violated one hundred one times and that one time you don't you know get the open it up one time and then you get carte blanche to open it up as many times as you want after that well certainly the jury found that she violated the statute one hundred  one times the jury also found that she was not harmed in any way by those alleged breaches of or right to privacy so that you can get liquidated damages in the absence of harm absolutely there is a technical violation of the statute is that your argument there was no harm well the kio case does say that you don't need actual damages to get liquidated damages and in this case the court took into consideration that and took into consideration that the court did find that she violated the statute one hundred one times she said as she say and yet the jury said no actual damages but i was still harmed there's a difference between being actually damaged harm and there if i was harmed one hundred one times well the jury didn't agree with that she she put on lots of evidence the church try to say this harmed by each of these views when the jury did not agree with that the jury said she was not harmed in any way now that does not mean that she's not entitled to a liquidated damage and in fact that's exactly what the district court did the district court exercised its sound discretion in awarding twenty five hundred dollars based upon the plain language of the d p s so you can get liquidated damages without harm that's what the kyoko says you can get liquidated damage without actual harm she did not have actual harm she got a liquidate damage based upon the clear language of the d p p i guess i'm trying to figure out is there a difference between harm and actual damage your argument is that there's no difference i think the statute speaks to that dispatch uses that she talks about actual damages and actual damages i believe are compensatory damages i think i understand let me ask you about attorney's fees that's for a lawyer only got compensated for forty eight hours of work the court did not abuse its discretion by following the clear pronouncements of this accord and what the court did was first of all they consider the case law f did not do that i did not see within the order that the court did it i don't know what all we can do is review the order so the question becomes whether that's it said jule and there are precedent this particular case i'll just it as a general proposition as a lodestar essential yes i'm all right you can explain why it is not in this case i will you're over this court in its prior precedent has approved the utility of across the board percentage cuts by district courts and even the number of hours claimed or in the final lodestar figures in this particular case the plaintive provided a forty nine  from this court and the court also took into consideration that this case was one with very limited success on the part of the appellant was that it when they trial or  got compensated for forty eight hours of work where our it's not an abuse of discretion for the court to apply across the board cut in a case in which the plaintiffs claimed more than a million dollars in compensatory damages if you don't know the hourly rate would have been in thousand dollars an hour i dollars an hour i don't know your argument as not best sorry but you well you have to tell us why it's not necessary in this particular case i don't think was cut down what what's the rationale why is it not necessary because this court has approved the utility of across the board we have or set of stars not necessary and i'm sorry if they to begin by addressing the argument of opposing counsel that viewing the same information over and over again was not necessarily to be seen as a serious violation of the d p information regarding how and she wanted to see if the status changed and so she was obtaining new information each time she was to obtaining new information about whether the status changed in addition i'd like to point out that the d p p a in evaluating whether this is a technical violation or not a serious violation or something that justifies a gross discount of not only attorneys fees but the liquidated damages award the district seemed to place weight on the fact that this was some sort of personal relationship or dispute but the d p p a doesn't create an exception for personal reasons when those personal reasons drive the acce isn't it factor will or not you commercially benefited from the violations and that is reasonable fact take into account whether or not you were just satisfying your own curiosity your honor the d p p makes no such distinction those are the those are the purpose let me ask a question here because a your argument i was looking at the statue which you think it really reads the course shall award instead of may award than liquidated damages and so the court shall award either actual or liquidated damages no court in the country has said that if you have a violation of the d p p you get zero damages if at the district  point of view that was advocated by would you want to apply one a one twenty five hundred dollars you think this mandates twenty five hundred dollars per violation regardless of actual damages yes because in ky ho this court said that actual damages is not a prerequisite for getting liquidated but you more over your honor the district court abused its discretion awarding twenty four dollars and seventy five cents per violation we have one hundred and one separate access it is awarded twenty five hundred for one violation it did but given that there are one hundred and one if you divide that by one hundred one we're talking about as essentially twenty five dollars per violation the court abused its discretion in driving its analysis of liquidated damages based on actual damages and for that reason it was error thank you your honors