almost two years often is very bright hardworking and personable and she's given me an insight into some places that i didn't have my own insight into and she has or i'll cast my vote orally you had a great privilege of clerking for real giant in this field and the words that he used to describe you were really amazing i hope that you will always take them with you to heart take your place in the public remove the admission of christian fellow the miller who was a member of the bar and good standing in the highest courts of new york i have knowledge of her credentials and i'm repeat basically the same thing i said before you are so lucky to have clark her judge laurie he's a tremendous judge and mentor and i'm sure that you will take many lessons with you and the practice  allen apply to this case that there are issues legal issues in this case that will directly affect and govern the remained proceedings and if reversed by this court would render those remaining proceedings except the good cause for dismissal is criteria for the reasonable those of the fee charged it has nothing to do with the appeal that was taken by mr brinkley to the board one hundred  goes to the front to merit question quite separate and apart from whether there was good cause to fire him it may well be that he is entitle to no for you at all if he isn't tied to a fee i would certainly agree with you that the amount of work that has been deemed reasonable if he is in fact entitle what has not been adjudicated by the board as found by the veterans court i think quite correctly is whether he's entitled to anything at all mr brinkley alleges that he did not his lawyer that was not return is from tolls his board opinion they did in fact decide the reasonable ness of the amount of the fee were he entitled to a fee but i see no discussion of the party question of whether he's entitled to anything at all and the question is your honor is whether or not this court's decision in skates which was b that is that he was entitle to have the secretary withhold his fee that was the decision that was appealed by mr brinkley separately congress provided under fifty nine zero four c for review for reasonable minds those are the only two statutory provisions that apply to fee review the now there is a contract in this case that applies and it's perfectly within the province of the board and seeing the city decide whether under the saturn entered into with his lawyer whether his lawyer was entitled to any seize at all given that they had terminated their relationship years before his award actually came respectfully your honor i do not believe that that is correct the only way is that board only games jurisdiction if there is a decision by the v a the only decision by the v a was that he met the requirements of fifty nine o four which mr brinkley contested under fifty nine zero four deep that contest was appealed to the board and the board affirmed the d a s decision saying that mr cox was entitled to a fee that doesn't make any sense to me i don't understand how you think the contract itself should be disregard argument well your honor with respect the argument is based upon the language of the statute the jurisdiction of the board the jurisdiction of the veterans court is controlled by what congress said they were limited to decide jurisdiction over this non final decision returning to the very point that judge laurie started with you happier stiction because the disposition of this legal question as to whether or not this is a valid remained to a board to make a decision for which it has no jurisdiction to make the way that the board gains its jurisdiction to make a decision viz of the discharge and the reasonableness of the fee which would include entitle mint to no fee whatsoever is under the provisions of fifty nine zero four c and fourteen point six three six small ata those are the only legal authority used for decisions by the v a there was no motion requesting review for the fee agreement to determine that question the regulation expressly provides that there must be such a motion no such motion was made in this case no such decision was made by the book  office of the general counsel and there was no appeal taken from that decision to the board the board's jurisdiction is clearly and unquestionably implicated by decisions of the secretary the secretary made no decision this court the scrutiny of the veterans court impermissibly applied the holding in skates that was made upon a different version of the law that existed at the time in which this appeal was fake and that imposed pacific requirements upon the veteran to file a motion for review of a fee agreement within one hundred twenty days he did not make that decision that regulation also provides that the secretary through his general counsel can make his own motion no motion was made by the secretary as a consequence without a decision of the secretary there can be no jurisdiction his argument seems to be that the v a and the board have absolutely no jurisdiction to determine whether it's appropriate to withhold an award attorneys fees pursuant to the contract entered into by the veteran and his attorney do you agree we do not agree your honor at the very terms of the contract state that he is going to have a position to monitor and ensure that the provisions divorces that from the ability to review whether any theory ought to be awarded at all under the terms of the contract ya know i don't i don't follow it either but try to give us your honor we would agree disagree with m the fee agreement particularly the discharge provision the board did not either the veterans court deemed a proper because there is an obvious just charge provision that states that if the client discharges the attorney with out  adequate cause that perhaps a quantum error would be maybe appropriate but that implies that if the client discharges the attorney with what inadequate cause that he is not entitled to a fee at all and the v a is not simply going to ignore that provision in the agreement so and if the a b c didn't seek to make that determination in the first instance they rightly sent it back to the fact finder to decide they rightfully sent it back to the board to determine or look at and take a look at this issue and ha henri manned the veterans court stated both the appellant and the intervenor may present and the board must consider any additional evidence and argument so certainly if mr cox has additional information regarding whether or not his discharge was without good cause or in it he may present those to the board but it would be unfair for the veteran to not have an opportunity to present this information  have the board consider this provision at all and the veterans court found that thus far neither the r o is the reviewing authority of the board had addressed this issue judgments now here as a first matter mr cox frames the legal issue as the veterans court having committed an error of law because the board has no authority to review the reasonableness of the fee but if we look at the veterans court decision it did not express the call on the board to address the reasonableness of the field rather it states remained as required for the board to address whether the appellant had good cause for discharging the intervenor and to and in that review determine whether or not the attorney is entitle to a few began way that's contrary to mr cox as a search and the veterans court did not render a clear legal holding concerning whether the board must undertake or has the authority to undertake  review of the reasonableness of the attorney's fees and merely reminded for examination of this discharge provision which it found no reviewing authority had taken a look at before now more importantly perhaps even in accordance with the strict rule of finality we would argue that the court should decline review of this non final decision and dismiss the appeal now going to mr carpenter's point that mr brin required to file a motion with with the border with the secretary before a reasonable honest review was undertaken that's not the case if you look at the language of the statue six version of section five nine zero four it doesn't state that the claimant need to make a motion and the same goes for the one thousand nine hundred six version of the statute it state the board upon its own motion or the request of either party may review such a fee agreement and here we have a situation where mr brinkley has done everything he could to preserve his rights and raise these issues with the r o he filed a notice of disagreement with the aro decision he appealed to the board and he appealed to the better in support raising all that these issues with respect to his concerns about mr cox's representation it would be unfair to hold as a technical requirement that because the board or mr brinkley had not actually buy it in motion in accordance with the regulation that he be barred from having the court take a look at the discharge provision in the v agreement if there are no further questions we respectfully request the court to decline review of this non final decision and dismiss the appeal or in the event the court elects true view the merits of mr cox appeal we ask the court to affirm the veterans the government's argument is circular the government says that the terms of the contract are entitled to be reviewed to determine whether or not they're reasonable then the government says that there is no requirement for a motion but it is the government that wrote the statute it was congress that said that fee agreements can be reviewed for a question of whether the the call for is excessive or unreasonable then the secretary promulgated a regulation at fourteen point six three six five and in that regulation it explicitly unambiguously says that a motion must be required for such review before the expiration of one hundred twenty days that hundred twenty days has come and gone there was no motion by the mr brinkley there was no motion by the be a general counsel as a consequence there was no v a decision on the matter without a v decision on the matter and an appeal of that v a decision by mr brinkley or if it was adverse to mr cox by mr cox there is no way to sue is on to a create jurisdiction by the board the version of the law that existed at the time of the scates decision did from congress give sue a sponsor the authority to the board to review fee agreements for excessiveness or unreasonable  under that statutory authority if this had taken place prior to the amendment of the statute then the board may have arguably had jurisdiction based upon that authority from congress but that it already from congress was taken away from the board quite congress to the given back to the secretary and the secretary delegated that authority by regulation in fourteen six three six small  to his general counsel it is the general counsel who is charged by the secretary to make a decision without a decision there can be no jurisdiction so what the for the first give me what the court did was on  lawful and improve earth miscible it was all for a virus it was in excess of its legal authority the war to give me the veterans court only has authority to review decisions of the board there was no decision of the board under five zero fifty nine zero four c e or fourteen six three six i as a consequence the veterans court cannot go beyond the four corners of that decision as a matter of l for the question from the panel thank you very much