defend by showing that none of the facts upon which it realized could be resolved differently in the underlying action in this case we presented evidence to the trial court haven't seen the state of mind we him to defend on the merits i don't understand your statement that it didn't reach that point in with somebody makes the decision to enter a plea whether it's no contest alford or guilty something that the courts routinely do because this was a family court matter and the records were sealed we don't have a transcript of the actual changes played but i assume that that in fact happened because that is what action part where we were disputing whether or not he intended to commit the act of striking her with a sword so from the point of view of the change of the no contest plea yes we did not dispute the fact that to do harm intended to murder so why doesn't that bind in the civil case you believe getting back to the issue of whether or not it can be used in the civil court in court only saying that it's a no contest plea but you're still not getting to the oldest question i would ask that i don't care how the mental defect is a defense that you're entitled to read litigate that in the civil case but the conclusion that it's a crime has little or no bearing on whether there you know the supreme court has told us at least in the police officer liability situation and i'm referring to hecht versus humphrey that you can't bring a civil action if an element of the civil case just to show coverage in a deck action act that was was committed it is not conclusive evidence so we would be judge talking some evidence that shane committed attempted murder but it is not conclusive evidence of that and she was the effect of the commission of guilt we've alleged intentional conduct and negligence conduct and he's taking the position that he didn't act intentionally he only acted negligently when we submitting the sections of evidence on the motion for summary judgment northern insurance violated the rule of more insureds i believe grandma wins because i believe it's been ambiguous one or more insurance i would agree is probably closer to any insured than the insured and there is plenty of case law we sell you to it that suggests even under those circumstances reasonable expectations of the insured might be that you're going to look at me stubbornly because of the severability clause and even though it's any insured you're only looking at me because there's two lines of cases out there interpret ing this this type of language b and c what we cited to the cases from supreme court of massachusetts the was services more now that under the phrase any insurance which there is a great deal of case law that that's not the case that reasonable expectations of the one particular i'm sure you're looking at is that you're only going to look at that in short and so my point being is that if there's any beauty in the case law and if that and if the courts can agree on what it means run of the courts don't have an agreement on your precise question it's a client came  my office this afternoon and put this policy in front of me and said i think that negligently my comments were directed intentionally what is the result i would have to say i can't tell you for sure because the courts can't even agree and if the courts can agree there's an ambiguity and the ambiguity should be cases interpreting our own state law and i know i've done far over in response to questions i thank you for the extra time th nothern not under the language of this policy right because this policy excludes coverage that is for the bodily injuries that are expected or intended intended or expected by one or more insurance and we know that under hawaii law when applying that kind of a provision in an insurance coverage context the court must apply must look at the object of intent of a this the dr says he was out of touch with reality of the time would you concede that at least there's a factual issue on whether shane intended for her and i we can see there's a factual issue as to whether shane make that very clear because they obviously knew that they were firing a gun in the vicinity of other people one was a rifle fired in the general direction of a neighbor barco and one was a be delusional may be maybe not understanding what he's doing and harms another person as an iran or it is not materially different because a swor and a gun hangry need their weapons the purpose for using a gun in the way it was intended to be used is to inflict injury and purpose for using a stored and that issue wasn't really reached in the firearm cases your honor it wasn't specifically reached but what i was getting to is that in this case there is no dispute at some level your honor because of the undisputed way the injuries were inflicted at some level he intended for his arms to raise and for the sword to come down and dana yet and and and the way cases stand for the proposition that when someone commits of alicia no act in the use of a weapon they are no matter what their subjective intent was in doing that a reasonable person in the insureds position should have anticipated or expected in your group in determining whether there was an occurrence the hawaii courts look to whether a reasonable person in the position of the insure no inference that we can take in favor of  to remove any ambiguity if your position is not yes it is but the exclusion doesn't apply to the nature of the insurance condom exclusion applies to whether the bodily injury that resulted was expected or intended by any just by y or my question that question is isn't there a way to write that in a way that says that explicitly that removes absolutely any ambiguity well your honor i first of all i don't apply that's first party property coverage so just because it is true that the court should construe the policy as a whole but it's not correct if a court need apply every single provision if it doesn't apply what the severability provision reason in that case very briefly because i only have two and a half minutes the state of hawaii retained a general contractor to construct an intersection there was an accident at the intersection the state of hawaii and the contractor were both sued  negligent design and negligent signage the contractor was sued for negligent construction the state had a contract with a contractor that required the contractors insurance company to defend and then the finest from the state's liability for the contractors way the state tendered the carrier declined actually the carrier said we're we're defending you by providing a defense counsel to the contractor but by the time the state the case got up to the supreme court the court said that because the allegation in the complaint against the state was that it was vicariously liable for the acts of the contractor and that would be covered under the policy if it were proven duty to defend the state that kerry said we did because we defended the contractor and if we got the contractor off the state would have no cover liability so we did our job supreme court said no they didn't specifically mention the severability provision but the effect of the severally position provision is what the court must have relied on when it said first insurance had to provide separate counsel for the state its appointment of counsel for the general contractor did not act to discharge first insurances to defend th it if you intend that result why don't you say it in that way and insured or any insured the courts are clear on what that means but what you've got in this policy is one or more insurers and you tell us not an issue for the court to decide about why the words one or more insurance were used but the court is tasked to do in this case is to determine whether  free one or more insurance is ambiguous and we submit one or more insurance clearly contemplates a situation where there are multiple insurance and if one or more of them expected a bodily injury to happen then none of them are covered under the policy right thank you and that's just state that i know that the least one of and the person requesting insurance said i intended to fire the weapon and likewise incurring although it wasn't stipulated fact it was an admitted fact i intended to fire the weapon we are as this court noted one big structure moved from that we could not ha