morning honest as i said michael casper k s p e r e courtney not it's on behalf of the appellant this case presents the issue of the meaning of the phrase qualified primary forward for purposes of becoming a candidate for the illinois general section eight that eight of the election code contains a clause that requires a candidate for the only general simply to execute a statement of candidacy claims that he or she is a quote qualified primary voter close quote of the political political party this case presents the question of what is the meaning of that phrase who's mr hostile mr haas felt is a registered voter who lives in the appropriate legislative district who brought a challenge to mr rushton berger's  this challenge based upon a consensus in his court correct or so the phrase qualified primary voter is susceptible to three different interpretations first it looks for whether or not you're eligible to vote in the next primary election however since cust case invalidated the twenty three month rule which restricted party changing by voters every voter is eligible to vote for whatever party they want to in the next election so it doesn't look for the next possible interpretation is it doesn't mean court to establish this one in the in the case that we rely on primarily in our papers that is the coaching case in two thousand and eight the democrats nominated mr coaching as their candidate in the general election for the same office  primary preceding the filing of the candidates statement that statement of candidacy close quote the most recent primary election he had voted as a republican therefore he was it all in trouble to become a democratic candidate ten correct exactly now this is this and this is where it gets complicated not complicated but there's a little wrench in that and that is that in order to run in the two thousand and ten primary you have to file a statement of candidacy that must be filed at least ninety two days prior to the primaries you know you have to get the ballots ready and things of that nature so mr rauschenberg executed his statement of candidacy in october on october twenty fourth two thousand and now let's assume mr colton wanted to do exactly the same thing the coaching court was coaching as a republican until february second two thousand and ten so that if he had executed a democratic statement of can on october twenty fourth two thousand and nine it would be invalid under the plain terms of politics right so i called to votes in the two thousand and eight primary and he can't run in the two thousand and ten primary because he still  a republican or democratic primary ballot so you saying he has to make the vote in two thousand and ten change they're not they cannot state his candidacy for him that's exactly right and the reason why i think that's the only in terms of being a candidate not a vote until the next primary the next primary could be less than three years in fact it usually is in fact in mr rosenberg years area it was less it was about here it was a little bit more than here because the three months was struck down for voters correct and i don't think that it is appropriate month period i think that you are free to switch your allegiance at each primary under the clear unmistakable terms of college as order but not as a candidate as a boy you're free to change as coaching because both say to these occurred in the same calendar year now the difference between this cycle business this the did mr or super lies upon is that your behavior should be limited to two thousand and eight the terms your two thousand and eight behavior in the general election only little bit in the face of the purpose of a primary does it not that you're locked in for forty eight months that's why we have primaries the idea of the evil we're trying to fight with the suggestion if there is such an evil is that you shouldn't even run in the general you should at least it for a candidate to file to be in eternal election you should either run in a primary or at least be a member of the party for which he's following in the general in the rosmer is most recent voting behavior in fact in the same calendar year is the same he switched parties in the same calendar year so if mr cochins most recent voting behavior dictates whether he can be a candidate we would suggest that mr rosenberg his most recent voting behavior should do the same thing from primary to primary that's what we believe the coaching case stands for that proposition so under that scenario we think that the british rule is inconsistent with colors and the state board of elections who had  the board's decision the board split along party lines for democrats voting all day always i'm not always no not not not always a sure they do they do so less than less than you would think but usually when mr olson reads all say people i'm sure anybody is really here but we think that that results in two separate rules we think they call it in cannot be read to permit callers in to be a candidate in the two thousand and ten primary because he would have had to execute a statement of candidacy that he was qualified during at a primary election back does not happen until february second so until february second he's a lot i think all told with twenty fourth he would have to execute a statement of candidacy but says he's a qualified primary voter constitutional case this is a case involving a constitutionally protected legree the liberty to freely associate with the political party of your choice this is a back to the future case where we go back to customer versus buy tickets and harriet legislation which is very important in this case was to render in operable those restrictions upon candidates in party primary and voters who signed nominate petitions concerning those individuals prior political said you can't put restrictions on candidates but who can put the restrictions and candidates the general assembly they write the laws the sample court and the supreme court interpret the laws you as a co restriction a constitutional acceptable restriction that you could register thirty days before the primary as a candidate of either party in a border of either party cicero's area or back in the seven these which was the point where for specific reasons he both in a democratic primary both as a democrat and then in the same year he you know puts in this candidate his statement candidacy for the next election cycle as well as the republican this is not a situation where you have time passed by or i mean he voted in the same year knowing he was going to run in two thousand and ten as a republican and if we that's that's the difference the stark difference between the cullerton case in this case mr coburn voted in february of zero eight is republican and fifty eight days later then the democrat party said we don't have a candidate let's take mr color  he used the he used the term during the election period and the election period going from february february of two thousand and eight to november when you voted in the general election during that election declared under oath that he was republican forget election cycle of february two thousand and ten november two thousand and ten that's a different election then february two thousand and nine when he declared as a primary by voting republican and then he was slated to be a democrat as their kid as an offshoot of the primary to run general election so the only restriction left is that restriction which it is mirrored in seventy s forty four case and that cases are very narrowly tailored to what happened and that's what judge will bryant said in the circuit court i don't see anything in color and i don't see anything in any other case that leads me to the conclusion that justice o'malley meant you can't time that's right and at that you took my next sentence he kindled but what we're saying here what mr casper saying is you can sign a petition and you can vote but you can't you can't well it's going back to the united states supreme himself has already voted early have something as as a republican which is the only party he could vote for this time because he declared himself in his act tobar two thousand and nine statement d n c does he have opposition just has come when you were discussing inspiring to quote ruled that there was a sentence in section seven time that type petition signers and candidates to the forty three months for the court specifically said if that restriction of petition signers is invalid the legislature responded to that by repealing that sentence so that if the restriction on party i petition signers no longer exists but what the the legislature responded by repealing the on several sentence but it left intact the service sentence the individual sentence for candidates and the court did say the restrictions on candidates are in fact more susceptible to lengthy or periods for obvious reasons and that the college in court talks about it you know this isn't our argument this is the decision of the color to a case the coaching case considered all these justice o'malley when he said that color to was a lock at all times since the two thousand and eight primaries and until the next party now scheduled for two thousand and ten your interpretation that we were talking about before says that he  position we have to be mr gasper that i don't follow we don't have to follow a second district case but i think we can say we can follow cullerton and say what i think it says which is you know you can run college and could run in the democratic primary as a candidate in two primary voter of your party and according to college and at what's back your most recent voting behavior mr russian berger's most recent voting behavior was that of a democrat and for that reason we think it is the same as coaching we think the board's decision should be reversed and if the rules that apply in the second district i do apply in the rest of the state as well candidates running for the general assembly and the political parties that recruit those candidates are to play by the same rules we think that the rules are different and in the second district universe of candidates the can be selected is limited by color thus far in in cook county and in the rest of the state it's not so limited and we think that that should not be the rule if the rules governing candidates for the general assembly are to be the same for that guy your position is that since nobody is running in the republican primary more in for two thousand republican party for the second which was the twenty second district of the state senate could just name mr rushing her as their candidate for the november two thousand and ten election