on review of a decision by the trial court granting of petition to modify maintenance that was filed by mr walker and in that particular petition to modify mr walker was seeking to modify a maintenance provision on the basis of a substantial change in circumstance including his financial assertions of a change as well as the change in the statutory maintenance provision in the state of illinois i would honor's that the trial court erred in a finding that the playing a language of the marital settlement agreement executed by the parties in may of two thousand and eight was ambiguous and i believe your honour's have the ability to review that issue on a dyno both cases the trial court found that there was ambiguous in the parties marital settlement agreement with respect to what each of them in tended with respect to maintenance i would draw your honour's attention to paragraph nine of the marital settlement agreement where the parties specifically bargained for maintenance being for a particular period of time and at a particular amount in fact a maintenance provision provides that mr walker shall pay maintenance and it shall be done in the manner that it will be paid twice her mom three thousand dollars each month that it would be or shall be taxable to the petitioner and deductible to mr walker and that it shall terminate in accordance with the statutory provisions set for forth under five ten c and it goes on to indicate those statutory provisions would include remarriage cohabitation or death i would assert to your honor's that that particular language providing that the maintenance payments would be paid for not longer than one hundred twenty months was a durational term that met its maximum and last the petitioner that committed any three of the contingencies set forth under the statute so if ms mcleod had cohabitate it if ms mcleod had remarried or she had become deceased prior to the expiration of that hundred twenty month period then the counsel argued that because that particular paragraph nine doesn't state with specificity this paragraph is non modifiable that in fact it can be modified and i would suggest to the contrary i think this court's decision in the schweitzer case certainly validated that a party doesn't have to state in each and every paragraph of an agreement that in last we stated in this paragraph the agreement is going to assumed to be out of five will in this particular case the marital settlement agreement negotiated between these parties within a three day period did provide that the terms of the marital settlement agreement were only modif e by mutual agreement and consent of the parties that's in paragraph thirteen of the agreement also the recitals to the agreement specifically state on the first page of that agreement that the parties are for have or determining maintenance so i would assert your honour's that if we consider the entirety of the language of the marital settlement agreement that in fact it shows by the plain language of the agreement that it was not modifiable that these parties negotiated as part of their property settlement agreement in their marriage in two thousand and eight that ms mcleod was going to be entitled to and we asserted that the plain language of paragraph nine of the agreement was not open to interpretation the trial court found that there was an ambiguity in the language i would assert here honors that there is no ambiguity but aside from that the trial court decided that we had to look beyond the agreement and look at the intent of the parties i would assert your honour's that intent is not even relevant and last we can't give meaning to the plain language of the of the agreement and i think in this instance it's very easy for the parties to move forward and conclude the maintenance obligation as anticipated june of twenty eighteen and last one of the three conditions under the statute that is specifically referenced in the agreement a curse now the trial court decided we needed to put on evidence i renewed my objection to going beyond the plain language of the statute when we went to trial there was however testimony put on with respect to the intent of the parties relative to this paragraph nine of the maintenance agreement and i would assert to your honor's that even if we considered the intent of the parties the evidence that was offered a trial established that this particular maintenance provision appeared in the same fashion in the same language in each of the three marital someone agreements that was exchanged between the parties and that it clearly comports with the other terms of the marital sat on the agreement with respect to modify them i lost that argument at the trial court the trial court decided that there was an ambiguity and that in fact there was a provision of paragraph nine that was subject to modification now the trial court agreed but mean that the amount of maintenance could not be modified and that the language of paragraph nine prohibited any modification to the six thousand dollars per month and yet the trial court sad there's an ambiguity with this provision that says not longer than one hundred twenty months i would suggest that there is no ambiguity of that phrase if you read it in the context of paragraph nine and the only reason that that durational limitation was put into the agreement is because of the three contingencies that the parties recognized i think it is significant that when this agreement and the maintenance provision was drafted that subject to graft a of paragraph five ten of the dissolution act was not even mention with respect to allowing modification in instances of a substantial change and if we take the prop the trial court's decision allowing only the duration to be changed and going that one step further and saying the duration is the only term that can be changed it can only be modified and frankly the only way that it can be modified is down versus up so if miss mcleod found herself today or in june of next year completely disabled and unable to work under the provisions that the trial court utilized in reaching its conclusion in its  if a particular term is subject to modification i would assert it has to be modifiable in its full instance you can't simply say ok we have a ceiling in this agreement and the plain language of the act or the agreement makes the ceiling one hundred twenty baht if we're going to consider substantial change a circumstance to lower the ceiling then the counter has to be true and  allow for that ceiling to be lifted and modified in the event of a substantial change of circumstance from his last so it's my belief and i would assert that the plain language of the marital settlement agreement is not open to  interpretation it's not modified which is consistent with paragraph thirteen which is also this that would be initial provisions of the agreement indicating the parties with maintenance and it's also consistent with paragraph eighteen that says or is reserving jurisdiction to enforce the terms of the parties agreement the persian does not say that the court shall retain subject matter jurisdiction which is generally the eight and in fact there was a subsequent proceeding that took place before judge casey where the parties had an issue with respect to the purchase price of the home and so they were in front of judge pacing on three different occasions ultimately the modification that occurred on the price of the home was stipulated to by agreement of the parties but i would assert your honour's that if either of them had any issue with the on on sion ability of that agreement that would have been their opportunity to raise it at that time and certainly miss mcleod is not trying to back out of the agreement that she made in june or in may of two thousand and eight the parties negotiated as part of their property settlement agreement each of them were essentially taking half of a multitude of residences bank accounts for a one k accounts and as part of that global resolution of all the issues i would assert that they in a manner that is set for them paragraph nine as to what the maintenance was going to be so i do not believe that there is any evidence to establish that either one of them asserted that this was unconscionable and you know there's a voluntary undertaking set it's modifiable because the deal i made back then doesn't comport with the finances that i have currently just very briefly your honor so i don't believe there's any reason to look beyond whether or not this agreement is modified however if we do and we give consideration to the assertions that mr walker made about a substantial change in circumstance i do not believe that the evidence that was proffered at the trial supports the finding by the trial court that there was indeed a substantial change certain speed i understand my burden is high in having that overturned by this court but i do believe the absence that was offered is against the manifest weight of what the trial court found here very clearly the trial court agreed that this was not rehabilitative maintenance that this was maintenance for a specific period of time but in reaching that conclusion th trial judge did consider the change in circumstance that mr walker asserted essentially mr walker claims that in two thousand and eight his portion of the family's earnings was about about two hundred thousand dollars and fifteen his portion of the family earnings at that point was one hundred thirty five thousand that certainly is a change in his annual income but historically over that seven year period h been floated and i think what the trial court ignored is that in june of two thousand and eight mr walker was a ringing under the terms of the agreement to carry all of the expenses with respect to one residence and he was also paying other credit card debt other debt of the marriage when he testified and twenty fifteen or vendor twenty fifteen he indicated that he was only obligation for his household expenses with his new wife were minimal he paid his car payment he paid two hundred ten dollars to his for a one k and he occasionally contributed to groceries so if we're going to consider the change in his income then i think correspondingly we also have to consider the change in the extent of the expenses that he was i would further assert here on ars that the change in the financial picture for him is completely within his own control he did now have office personnel that he was required to tire that was not the case when he was married to m mcleod because she was doing a lot of the leg work in his office and so a portion of the family earnings was attributable to what she was between but she wasn't getting those wages on a w two so she did not receive any social security benefit as a consequence of that is further support for the maintenance provision that was agreed to between these farms because ms macleod when she bought the marriage not the spouse who was sharing expenses with her but she also lost her employment that she had been working for a four year period this was a twenty year marriage these parties within a free to a period of filing the dissolution negotiated the terms of the marital settlement agreement i would assert your honour's that the agreement was drafted by mr walker there is evidence that was offered at trial that three different drafts went back and forth and that mr hammer had attended the hearing for the court to affirm and grant the judgment of dissolution of marriage three days after the divorce was filed but i would suggest your honour's that the fact that there was no change made in this marital settlement provision supports our assertion that the parties agreed to it that the parties understood it and that it's now unfair for mr walker to be able to gain an advantage by now asserting that that's i used over the course of the years of practicing law when i intended for a non modification of language of maintenance is language directly in the paragraph related to make sense that's essentially the genesis of the court indicates that was the intent to deviate under five to have there is no language in paragraph and the maintenance provisions here indicating that were co opting out provisions of the marital settlement  indicate to this court i through i directly disagree with some of the facts that we represent first and foremost the language of this particular agreement says commencing with the first payment on june fifteenth two thousand and eight the respondent sh the petitioner as in for spousal support the sum of six thousand dollars per month per period of not more than one hundred twenty months and show be paid so i'm monthly installments of three thousand dollars it's that language of not more than one hundred twenty months what's been omitted is that frankly there was a reason why there was concerns about you know the security of the income that would be coming into the firm post divorce my parents both passed away prior to that by thirty eight for my father and by fifty four for my mother there was some uncertainty as to life expectancy there was also a great deal depends upon an advertising and marketing regimen that was folks the reality of it is in this particular case instead inside which was taken up by this supreme court also not only it dealt with the third district case where they said you know something you need language pacifically in that holds that that's sufficient to demonstrate a player and you know by the rules don't say things you don't really know how that works you are i'm going to be i'll confess now that this issues raised in front of me i recognize that it would have been a better practice for us to not it was not my spent expectation then nor it is now that that language would trigger that maybe this would be not modified we may disagree but also please there's still the language saying not more than one hundred twenty months there there indicating that there was a specific intent to modify this particular maintenance now with pesach i want to get on both the secondary aspect in two thousand and seven i had  down my overhead i literally would have had fifty thousand dollars to pay the entire maintenance also to the maintenance costs eighty two thousand dollars a year seventy two thousand for the maintenance and ten thousand dollars for social security and medicare front in two for period of eight months despite the fact that this was pending before the court instead she was given free christian based mentor counseling with the hope that she would then be over monetized sat or collect royalties upon that the book that she had signed a publication contract in january two thousand sixty ultimately that publication would live and maybe it was supposed to go live in may of two thousand and sixteen this court afforded her the opportunity both recognize and she could make money from as demonstrated by her jobs she went four years without working it off in two thousand and eight to two thousand and twelve in two thousand and twelve she worked it between twelve and fifteen she worked at three different employers and ultimately left each and every employer she you an opportunity for another eight nine months from the march quarter all the way to the end of two thousand and sixteen to be self sustaining and get yourself on your foot in terms of your publication of your novel your your certification and montages in her christian base counselling and ultimately to return to the workforce that she essentially had a parent in this particular instance there's been now six hundred eighteen thousand dollars and maintenance paid over the course of even half years it's not an insignificant amount or opportunity for her to have been able to make her self sufficient this was a nineteen year eight month marriage this was a twelve year on the testimony in trial was that she received favorable referral hadn't we were previously she graduated with honors from c s a you with a degree in not marketing and advertising in this particular instance your honor it's my assertion this court did not abuse its discretion and commit an error as a matter of law as it fireball and that would be asked to amount and determine that ultimately the duration was subject to modification frankly if the court had modified her maintenance of three thousand dollars a month and given me thirteen months not the only difference was instead of being paid three thousand dollars a month less access for retroactive relief for the period of essentially march and tell june two thousand and eighteen the court said i'm going to give you six thousand dollars a month through the end of two thousand eight hundred sixteen and you're on your own after that effectively put her in exactly the same position is if the court had modified the amount to three thousand dollars a month and moved it back to when the petition was originally filed it gave the people the parties and also an opportunity to get through this process over here that i don't believe that this or miss the boat we can disagree on that particular aspect but i believe that ultimately when it comes to the nominee to five below the of maintenance it ought to be in the paragraph that is the better language that even was referenced within this writer decision in this particular instance that is schweitzer to say you have it's ridiculous to have the every single paragraph it is ignoring the fact that they have a specific provision paragraph that directly say here is a basis for non modification and if that's the scenario in this instance that relates to ultimately whether or not they would also if there's no excising out the less than one hundred twenty months if it was intended if it's just simply said i'm going to pay maintenance for one hundred twenty months it's six thousand dollars a month frankly there'd be no argument here it would be you know the argument would be a lot stronger on the other side of the fence and i think frankly judge hill would have turned around and granted that motion to dismiss and tonight are clearly but that's not what it stated and it was there for obvious reasons because ultimately that the fates of law practices change there was a study that was admitted into the evidence that indicate that solo practitioners have gone down by as much as forty percent bankrupt by the reality of it is i couldn't sustain then nor now in fact the of the expenses that are related to my financial affairs affidavit what was noted is exactly on point there is no excess had an obligation to rehabilitate her earning capacity and mitigate her needs for maintenance and frankly she didn't do that by taking four years off and then pursuing a theology degree and she got here half into before quitting and then ultimately taking jobs she quit eight years to seek my patient like i did ok he had a reduction of his income from forty thousand to twenty five thousand but basically that his mean its obligation represented by take eight percent of his income when we were divorced it represented twenty eight point three percent of his my income and ultimately now it represents fifty five percent of what i took to the new statute in part with a change of aipac considered that and made it demonstrably exhibits to demonstrate how much i would have paid had gone over the course of time and often overpaid to the tune of about one hundred eighty thousand dollars the reality of it is that water over the bridge that ultimately would go to the back i would have a longer term of maybe if it was also under the statute it would actually be fifteen years eight months give or take now with that said the point it demonstrative exhibit was also to show the decrease over the time income and how much was paid even though there is no twenty percent off t for the petitioner for many years when she's unemployed earning theologies in this particular instance i believe your honor the facts are divergent miss sense when meakins was originally said the change of circumstances for me occurred over the course of eight years as opposed to what happened and done so there was no findings of contempt that dozens of court found in dozens of the courts said he's constantly attacked because he's not getting the child support he took on his girlfriend gave her job was giving her raises although he was asking for the maintenance drop and for courtesy it's a gross misrepresentation by petitioners council to say i did not have a secretary in two thousand and eight that i doubt misstated i had a disclosures job and he's making about forty six forty seven thousand dollars a year if you adjust from two thousand and eight to two thousand and sixteen three percent that anyway and take into account the issue responsibilities it's not even a marginal comparison the points in which individuals and practitioners are turning around and ordering and setting out nervous of immigrants they're not doing it based on some catch all category paragraph saying this entire thing is not in my file now i can tell instance to interpret this paragraph the way it's being heard is going to open up a pandora's box it's going to create that slippery slope and in this instance it's going to create an inequitable interpretation interpretation of an agreement from your honors i think it's significant that counsel makes reference to the fact that this provision in paragraph thirteen providing that this agreement is only modifiable by agreement or consent of the parties only applies to property rights but that's exactly where the maintenance provision is so if we take counsel for his assertion that that is only applicable to the property rights he then is trying to ch pick in this agreement so we can't make any changes with respect to the law code here it's we can't make any changes and last there agreed to with respect to the marital residence yes but that particular provision in paragraph thirteen isolation doesn't apply to paragraph thirteen and i don't believe that this court has ever condone and that we should only look at the maintenance provision and not look at the other provisions of the agreement and in fact in brant inch whites or when this court was considering the print decision it was let's look at the entirety of the party's intent and in this instance i wasn't in the courtroom in two thousand and eight i didn't trap this agreement i didn't have input into this agreement but mr walker did and mr walker provided in paragraph thirteen that the parties were reaching an agreement that was only to be modified by agreement or consent of the to prepare for no longer having maintenance but as the trial court i think correctly determined this was not a circumstance where maintenance was ordered on a rehabilitat miss mcleod agreed as part of a property settlement agreement that she was going to receive the sum of six thousand dollars three thousand twice monthly until june of twenty eight team and she testified at comported with that timeline and yet now counsel says because of his change of circumstance financially in his earnings she is supposed to go from six thousand dollars in income her mom as of december thirty one twenty sixteen to zero this mom if the trial court's decision is not and so counsel can say well he was only having the ability to spend about fifteen hour fifty percent of his earnings this month cloud is going to go from six thousand a month to zero and when she negotiated this deal in june of two thousand and eight she understood that she had a ten she agreed not to seek permanent maintenance she agreed to not see a longer time period than the ten years that was provided in the agreement and these parties negotiated that i would further mention that counsel did during his testimony at trial eg now i do that at one point there was a provision in the agreement but sad it was modifiable due to a substantial change of circumstance and that language was taken out so i believe we have to be governed by the plain language of the agreement i don't believe there was any evidence to suggest that there was any ambiguity that required anybody to go behind the agreement and consider what the parties into them was but in this instance the plain language and the evidence at trial showing the intent was one in the same the parties agreed to a ten year term and last one of the three conditions specifically mentioned in paragraph nine occurred finally i will just mention counsel suggests that i was somehow misrepresenting the facts with respect to what linda did i only mentioned her service to the law firm a value council but at forty thousand she herself said sixty thousand because i do believe that is significant with respect to council saying i was earning two hundred fifty four thousand in two thousand and eight well that isn't true because then macleod and credit in their family for some of those earnings even under his testimony so i certainly didn't mean to suggest that there were no other personnel in his office in two thousand and eight but certainly lynn's contributions to the office were significant in two thousand and eight because you had to back bad out of his earnings but he is serving his earnings in no way were up about one hundred ninety eight thousand based on his stature are based on