the court counsel in order to affirm one must ignore at least four things one must ignore the judicial admissions of these plaintiff lawyers in the underlying divorce case in their sworn affidavits and in their petition for fees in which they described their agreement with irene richardson and never once mentioned any agreement for the payment of interest on the fees second one must ignore book no no it was a fair question you are out of it but they were filed after this alleged agreement occurred and made no mention of a second you must ignore clear public policy that such agreements should be in writing for one must ignore that they did not at trial rebut the presumption but any agreement was the product of under influence between lawyers and a client who was clearly in  vulnerable position firth one must ignore the jury's combining of two calculations that are irreconcilable in order to reach their verdict as i started to to mention that the in the underlying divorce case mr richardson's lawyers asked mrs richardson's lawyers these plaintiffs to set forth their agreement because in divorce proceedings mr richardson could not be compelled to pay this is richardson's fees and why she was obligated to pay her lawyers those feats so they had to set forth their agreement with her so he would understand what potentially he was obligated to pay  you right that's correct that there were some statements the big contain interest and the testimony was that the statements contained interest because the whole lawyers intended to ask mr richardson for interest that's what they intend to do they never asked her to pay a dime of fees or interest in submitting those statements to her of the deal was if he has to pay interest applies but if i have to pay interest doesn't they did not intend it ask mrs richardson to pay interest and they never set forth in any sworn statement that their agreement with mrs richardson included the payment of interest by or listen to their own and i'm correct me if i'm wrong but something and in that amendment two for the petition which raise for the first time interest asking mr bush to pay interest they didn't say that mrs richardson had agreed to pay interest they asked and that fee petition  that the interest should be paid as a matter of equity by mr richardson they never said in that he petition and then amendment to keep titian that they had a deal with mrs richardson but she was going to pay interest that was not a part of that petition was if first mentioned interest at all was first mentioned in court in the divorce proceeding in that amendment to the fee petition in one thousand nine hundred five and the alleged role agreement with mrs richardson occurred by their testimony of equity that kind of argument whether the courtroom done so or not is a bit different matter but i don't think it's a public policy concert but i do think it's a public policy concern for them to never claim in a diverse proceeding that they had an of records that's their record she knew that interest was being applied on he's she knew she was getting statements that reflected interest periods so radically and she went on further and testified it was but it was her belief i'm sure there was a bill of particulars that the lawyers filed in the underlying divorce proceeding describing to mr richardson's lawyers what their what the terms world of their agreement with mrs richardson billing rates how frequently should we build that sort of thing so that he would know what he was potentially liable for if he had to pay her face in that sworn bill particulars was presented after they allege this agreement was entered into they did not anywhere in those both bet those tickers which was defense exhibit forty to set forth that i mean richardson had agreed to of every motivation to put interest in there if in fact there was an agreement but didn't do so is far more weighty evidence than their testimony in front of this jury now when they had every at of the under the influence aspect and the related issue of the jury instruction this was a transaction between lawyers and their client at a time she was very vulnerable she just lost and very important hearing she was facing loss of everything and even if you believe every word that they say that she came up to them said i'll pay you nine percent interest they still as a matter of law have the obligation to rebut the presumption that this agreement was the product of undue influence and there are three elements as set forth in the jury instruction one of the contract was fair to the contract was not the product of on do influence and three that mrs richardson had independent advice had independent advice is t and the jury seem to the court modified during struction to say had independent advice or had the opportunity to have independent advice it notified all of the case law that says that the standard is head independen that client because you are representing them in case in a situation in which they are seeking your advice they have and again you feel that is it is the case now who's standing the fact herself that's the concept of a fiduciary just as if a beneficiary of a trust went to a trustee and said i want to hundred thousand dollars invest in a penny stock now maybe it's good he needs a bad idea but the trustee doesn't get off the hook if he does that simply by saying well the beneficiary wanted that because it's the fiduciary that has the obligation to protect the client from herself well why is the additional language in the jury instructions so so re i mean was the lawyer forced in some banter was the lawyer required to for certain get a second opinion circumstance the lawyer was required because in less you have a gun pointed to one's head in the in the concept in the context of the agreement you always have the opportunity to get advice the yes yes absolutely mancow case for example for the report point the lawyer there advised the client to get independent advice the client didn't do so the court there found that that was insufficient because the client so trusted the lawyer that it didn't matter simply that the lawyer recommended that the client get independent vice it found that the standard was that the client had to have had independent advice and found that it was lacking there even when the word did recommend it but didn't insist on very briefly back on the public policy argument there was an i askey a opinion that was clearly in place contrary to what plaintiffs have said we have never argued that the i s p a union is a staple of the wall of illinois we do have argued however based on the first national bank and ben cases that i think it's our valuable source of public policy guidance for the court and ought to be taken into consideration and should have been here to put those two i think it's good practice i don't think it's the best practice i do think it's common practice and i think it has been common practice for many many years and of course what's interesting is that when  when the legislature got a round to regulating this aspect the requirement for writing it did not do so generally it did so only for the purpose of section five or wait f hearings in the marriage court in the divorce court better to call it marriage courts more optimistic but if the divorce court the there is simply no question that the o place it's now twenty two years that this litigation has been in the richardson case has been in the courts and nothing nothing not one motion in any of this litigation has been easy everything was fo tooth and nail and now we have despite trying this case and i will concede to this court as i have conceded to my clients that we were w in seeking for three years to maintain this case as an equity case and to avoid the contract claim to avoid a jury i mean i'll be very candid with the choir we were afraid very much afraid that a jury would say a pox on both your houses but the jury didn't they heard the evidence they heard the evidence of the contract they heard the evidence on undue influence they were instructed instructed that undue influence must be rebuffed would by clear and convincing evidence and they said it was listening to the arguments today you wouldn't know that this case was tried for almost a week to a jury and the jury came back with a perfectly rational sensible folk can you address that question counsel's consul suggested that it's not really us rational or something like compromised you do not you clearly whatever you have here this doesn't even come close to a compromise verdict a compromise verdict under the case law is where and it's a judgment call always for the court is where a close question of liability where the court feels that it's a close call the jury could go either way or it's a very weak point of liability and the damages irrationally low so that the inference that arises between a questionable liability and irrationally low damages if there was a compromise between the liability and the damages you don't have that here you and then the jury and if you look at the numbers off of the charts it's to the penny the jury then awarded five percent after the principle was fully paid  what the jury did and it's to the penny it's not like you have to guess here if you're running the numbers which we did afterwards we tried to figure out what the jury did and it was very clear you have the numbers up as to the penny so that's what the jury did and it's a it's not everything we asked for but it's a pretty fall for that so you don't have any think there's no irrationality here and there's no it and sensibly lol verdict that would even suggest a compromise you don't have a compromise here and you have especially in iraq a tory here the jury found that contract this is richardson's defense at this trial was really one thing she said there was no agreement which of course what have you that have to believe that these and for eleven years and worked for nothing trying to get some fees from the husband along the way and all the while their client i three hundred and twenty something thousand dollars a year inmate it's from her husband and not paying them a dime that's what you have to believe the jury didn't and with all due respect it is not for this court to upset this j any of the grounds here i would like to briefly address two or three things until well because what you have here is they attack the contract and the jury verdict on three grounds the public policy ground with with all due respect is absolutely groundless the i s p a paintings do not say what they claim the i use to be a pain is are not a source of i want my public policy any more than oh a lawyer you article written by a law professor might persuade  court but it's not law and it's not policy secondly their whole argument oh and by the way just so we don't forget there's not one case not one judicial pronouncement that we have found or that they have cited that says that an attorney client agreement must for interest must be in writing that one case zero the same thing is true absolute don't you agree that that been better and today would be better if it were and bright i don't think it's a legal question i think it's a question of sound practice i don't think it's legal or ethical and not one case has been cited to this court which suggests that it is mandatory not run nor is there a supreme court rule which there might be but there isn't the same thing is true of the issue and really the whole report all of one to influence comes down to one argument in this case that the in the court inquired of my worthy opponent on this issue is there a requirement requirement mandate that a client who's negotiating a new fee agreement with their existing lawyer must have independent advice from a lawyer or from an envoy and the answer very simply is no there is no such case not run the the in this case the first district appellate court has multiple times and we didn't cite them but subsequent to the guy i know you've got justice freeman when he said on this court in anderson versus kansas and eighty nine he it's simply not required so only be clear the instruction issue in this case the one might say the one genuine issue in this case he first part you have two parts as i it's a good idea it's a good idea if you suggest it but i courts have even said that the lawyer is not obligated to recommend although i would certainly agree i'm guessing just as cunningham would say isn't that the better practice and it absolutely is but it's not mandatory and it is not an obligation that would call for this product to be reversed finally counsel makes a point tries to make a point about the ninety five petition and he claims there are a few dishes admissions there are no she dishes missions on the interest in this case there is no sworn statement by any of these plaintiffs anywhere that says that interest was not to be charged it doesn't exist what counsel is trying to do is elevate silence and an issue that for tactical reasons was not raised at that point in time and converted into a traditional mission it's not but even if it were his final argument i'm this point was well it's stronger evidence where you know they had the chance to argue with the jury that's the jury's province as to what's the better evidence and the jury found there was an agreement not forget and send the wrecker twenty two years ago when she promised nine percent interest and she paid them at the end of the case the prime rate was ten percent she agreed to pay them of the rest than the prime rate now here we are twenty two years later nobody thought at the time that this case was going to go eleven years year two years three years they knew they had to go to the appellate court nobody thought eleven years or so back when the petition was written and you know the original feet petition was in ninety three it was at the same as me back in ninety this was not an issue that it is an issue now the jury passed on it and we asked this court to a farm and then you don't have to reach the cross  brief read understood your honor as to the i p a consistency there's no inconsistency the opportunity to obtain advice language is in the paragraph describing what a jury may consider in determining whether there is under influence under influence is only one element out of the three that must be rebutted first being fairness second being under the influence and first being had independent advice there's no way consistency whatsoever second point with respect to the maintenance issue it was very clear a trial in the testimony of mr zero one of the plaintiff's records cite page five a way that mrs richardson could not use her maintenance to pay her legal fees because that maintenance was coming from mr richardson already if she used for maintenance the court determined maintenance to pay legal fees mr richardson's lawyers could have gone to the court to say she doesn't need just for her maintenance for her monthly living expenses she used to pay her royals and they would have cut her maintenance that was mr sorrels testimony as to right he was wrong when he initially thought that they could use the maintenance and they've been arguing that throughout the case and they've been at it at all as with their own client agreeing to an order a court order in which the independence judge reviewed analyzed and determined that the order regarding fees was a fair agreement so that was even better than having some private independent lawyer comment on the fairness of the transaction you had a judicial approval of that agreement if they had done that in this case we would we certainly wouldn't be standing here today that includes th