judge made a legal error or determined to not have jurisdiction to do this this court should make a good decisions and grant this petition this case presents one straightforward legal question of interpretation of the plain language of statute  plain language so and nd is your question it seems that there are sort of two questions floating around this case one is whether congress gave the attorney general the authority to grant these waivers and then the other was and this is what khan holds that even if the attorney general has the authority it hasn't been delegated to the individual immigration judges so this is a which question do you think is really in front of us where do we start with this use that end as a limiting principle rather than recognizing it as an additional principle memorisation judges have authority to do what the act sells and they can do as well as additional things that the attorney general allow  shall exercise the power not discretionary shall exercise the power and duties delegated to them by the act and then also by the regulations but and i'm sad i've taken too much of your time which of those two things are you were at it sounded at the beginning that you were saying the power to grant these waivers had been delegated by congress to so your be lying on the act were in that sentence but then when i asked you what was going on i asked you to explain it sounded like you were saying no no the attorney general delegated his his or her power to the  hope you're exactly right that the statute gives the attorney general power and the attorney general has in turn delegated that power with out limitation to immigration judges and  aliens and that is you status applicants there they don't they admit that under certain regulations they can the immigration judges have jurisdiction to hear d three waivers they just say they can't hear from you status applicants their primary together she has to work together and that's what the court's job is to do is to find a way to go so even if we except your argument that playing language of this do you three he does of her the attorney have pretty much given us death also yes or no i do think that the three provides concurrent jurisdiction and this is something we see throughout the immigration nationality act so here this court sample that exists i mean if you don't get it on one you can go to another in this particular circumstance i don't think that's an accurate representation but for example and you just missed us context absolutely you get follow from it and i mean it i mean that exists in the areas too i mean you have a state federal jurisdiction is concurrent and you can go to one of the other but in this instance your  client has not gotten knew the answer he wants from the u s c i s but he wants now in the j to exercise authority it now is the issue in this case fairly narrow because as i see it it's not a question of what the i j a will do it is a holding that was essentially that he didn't have the authority and so all we need to do is determine does he have the authority what happens from there have the authority then that's the end if it does then we just say ok you got to party you can do it but he's not you said some about mandatory but he's not required to rule in even to do it is it because the but it is he didn't have to do it i would think he could consider it's already been done on those things but that's that may be for another day to the sad but i'm just thinking thinking out in terms of what does it mean to simply say he has the authority appeal and again very narrow issue here are the decision on appeal so he was eligible for the actual you status but not eligible for the waiver and so all he would be doing is applying for a waiver in fro this court just wrote a very excellent decision last week thirty five pages in explaining kind of the it ministry given the eligibility criteria but essentially it comes out of this if you're used as applicant like my client who was brought here as a child and illegally into the country you have to apply for you status as well as a waiver of admissibility same type and under the you status regulations the agency the c i s cannot grant you status unless they also grant the waiver so they do the decision the same time so you have a essentially a joint decision and so if you get a court of your status that means they granted both the waiver as well as the status but you can't a decision like we have here where they said yep you're a victim of a qualifying crime you help the police you need all of these eligibility criteria but we're not going to grant a waiver because we're not granting a waiver we're denying you status and so it's only in graciously we're not arguing it's just this narrow issue of a waiver and we're not even suggesting that the immigration judge can do a d fourteen where he's more limited to the d three which is less expensive i'm sorry to tears it and nd i just i wan follow up on my judgment was asking and make sure i understand your position if we were to hold that the immigration judge has authority to consider this as this ability has been delegated by the a g to the emigration the government their nd big argument is this is just impractical right we're going to that he this is an area where people see things you don't have you status applications pending or some come in and ask for a waiver in such a situation i can see an immigration judge saying s didn't want to granted it was sort of a race to see who could get an opinion out st and then a lot of collateral litigation about which one was controlling and i think that's the that's sort of the concern i think that's front and center about this idea that you would have two competing determinations and then a lot of litigation trying to figure out which one of those would control your uncle yes harris mention for people seeking admission and admission is a legal term of art an immigration law people who regularly inside the united states seat at mission to the united states as a legal matter and that my st point the nd point is if you officer that is somehow inside of the united states and so they are taken into account people seeking admission from outside the united states in a different provision they separated out so the attorney general can do this too and so this idea that this is limited as they identify in the rd circuit and sunday to folks seeking admission i think it's a narrow view of the mission in immigration law that mission can only be from outside the united states i think that people seek admission from inside the united states all the time just for different legal mechanisms such as if you status applicant just just to put again back to the visa they get if you visa after three years as a new visa holder they can then apply for adjust that the that the necessary delegation here comes from a one thousand and three dollars some section a and i'm having i just want you to respond to the concern i have about this that when i look at this regulation at a whole the the st one a sub section a sort of describes what an immigration judge is the title is appointment and it just says this is what immigration judges are there the attorney general's delegates in cases but when but it's subsection b that talks specifically about water are the powers and duties of the i j a and in that one it seems to say you need what they can do in these hearings as the is what has been delegated to them through regulation and so i'm having trouble reading the regulation as a whole to mean that sort of b s or purfling as everything has already been delegated your honor i think regulation that you already told me i thought before that there is nothing in the act that delegates to the i g s the authority to do this that what the act does is give that authority to the attorney general and then as i read  waivers they do that they don't dispute that they say that that delegation of authority doesn't include you status applicants and i do not think they can both say it delegates authority of immigration judges to hear before you go there you made a point i think you are speaking to the three a guarding the attorney general saying attorney general may not whan waivers of admissibility is to non citizens already present in that the very gracious judge cannot grant a d three waiver for somebody who is already then it midden to the united states yes because that's good because the waiver language itself requires someone who is seeking admission miss c i s has and does rent waivers of business ability to individuals who are in this at all in the united states so that's not i think i don't think we're going to  that's not an argument it is of ours it has to do with individuals who are caught in this hole that is necessarily the case is one that the that's the division that's the dividing line between someone who's been previously admitted or someone who has the pitcher here hasn't previously admitted that's this this all goes to the point if i'm understanding right that the attorney general doesn't have this authority under the statute the right to grant waivers in this particular circumstance or talking about that it is a particular circumstance  delegated to the i j in the case before us all the b i a said is we're following common the i j hasn't been delegated this authority so how how is this ground which the agency didn't rely on available to us as a reason for denying this petition i don't understand why we're talking about this at all right your honor i think that this is in response to the particulars going to petitioners argument is full bore that the statute requires be that's what seems like you've been asked our good old time but i don't know where you go with with this now it is that it is the authority audigy has is that correct that is not correct because the a g can have the authority to grant that outside of the context of removal proceedings and say for example under the regulation it is possible for individual who hasn't been prom  broad or even at the border denied the deed three waiver not to go to immigration proceedings to contest it in fifteen days to go to the board to contest it outside the context of the rule procedures just because the immigration judge the attorney general has the authority to grant that waiver in some context does not mean it has the authority to grant that waiver in the context of the removal proceeding the sole purpose immigration judge grants that you three waiver that does it removal proceedings the immigration judge can then just go on to order the individual removed and then we wait your colleague says what are you talking about of course i js are authorized to grant these waivers and we know it and the government wouldn't contest that they're allowed to grant d three waivers and so your response to that as i understand it is what the conduct sickly which is no no they're authorized to grant them only outside the context of remove all proceedings this particular thing on review from the district director at the entry point but that's the only context in which they can grant it they're not authorized there's no regulation authorizing i js to exercise whatever power the a g might have in the context of a removal proceeding that's that's your response to what your  on that point on that point are you arguing that however we might need these regulations we would defer to the b i l s reading of the degree to which i js have been authorized to do this yes your honor this is a extent this delegation question turns on this regulation as kind of housekeeping regulation at one hundred thousand three hundred and ten i didn't see the b i a really construing that regulation are analyzing that so far as looking at identifying one thousand and three point one b as the source of delegation authority i think that it does that because it's i which provision has to do with delegation i don't think that every time the more i do it buys a particular provision that says this was relevant and we're taught you know these are the relevant provisions we're talking about b s you know that the implicit these aren't relevant somehow something that's not considered this court can actually consider it's so the court doesn't have to go through an eye up unless the unless there's some red that necessarily talks about this there's no reason for us to be looking at other to look at both regulations and construe them together rather than just saying the board the board's construction is unreasonable about it since it does but it can you tell me can you show me where the board construed any part of it's just cites point ten all together at the end of a series of quotes but there is no it's not like the b a a says let's look at the language here is how we read it i mean i just don't write what we would do her tail right on i think the considered has historically taken that it has generally considered that to just be a point a good point so it will cite it there is this history to it if this court needs me to further brief that history that's fine but this is to the background authority exists how in the world can we give deference to something to the situation that paid no attention to the language that came about in two thousand and eleven right right it doesn't it right but who lets i think the difficulty and the poor actually side out the problem in is the regulation right i mean there is is removal proceedings or about removal it in this is delayed portability determine whether determining whether or not an individual is removal removal granting that the three waiver doesn't appear to do anything with regard to that ambiguity there's a lack of clarity in the interplay here but then one comes as we don't have to resolve it because even if the a g has the authority it hasn't been delegated to the i j a so i have the same question for you i had from my colleague i don't see how the preliminary threshold question does the a g have the authority is before us they get wasn't relied on by the agency in this case or in common and we could not deny the petition on that ground granted on that ground it is not in granted i think based on prior seven circuit law that if the a g had this authority so did the i j a so the only question they had in front of them there was does the attorney general have the statutory authority i would point you to whatever the follow up circuit decision is where they say exactly what i'm saying now the a g came to court and started making all these statutory threshold arguments about the a g s authority when we're only reviewing the be amazed decision that if he  has the authority it hasn't been delegated to the i j a and we can't reach that in front of us if they want to raise that on remained in front of the b i a they're free to do that but the government can't rely on that in front of us so i just don't understand why i mean it's an it's got it right in there that makes no sense to me i don't know how you write out and see that's not consequential when it's realignment so so i don't have a serious problem with giving deference to come in this case so then we you know within look at the gu seem to have the main authority here and i think that's the the lesson from l t g and just a very quick last point i know your time is precious the government keeps raising this question of attenuation and i would just say we haven't seen the parade of impracticalities in the th circuit the th circuit that the government raises from these issues and secondly this idea that these they're going to have a waiver decided before that you status application is decided i think if you look at all of the facts and all of the case we're discussing that's just not presented and i think you know in our mind initial argument noted that if someone tried to raise a waiver for non pending your status application i think the immigration judge could say hey i have a thought of the reasons that occasion but it's not right it's not it's not exhausted whatever that answer is and frankly the in wait times are just another part of the new status program that is is unfortunately broken that it takes fifty seven months for us c i s to make a decision on one