as testimony went far beyond what gets me authorized and i would st like to emphasize that the difference between what happened here and in jackson is that there was an objection gaz and i believe this is you know whether that's coded language based upon his you know expertise you know this is traditional p c p language or he figured out what they were saying based upon listening to all of these tapes he went far beyond i think with as an authorized then you know it is a pet explained what that was all about i mean obviously everybody knows that it's just so so so so count so counsel you know i mean i saw that you made that argument in your brief i agree everybody knows what  so i mean even if the theoretical e this lay expert testimony wasn't needed how could that possibly have prejudiced your client well and i get it there were other things that i think that d road to say that gadson doesn't apply here but under gadson why wouldn't the case agent be able to testify that for example the word stones which may well not be familiar to the members of the jury that i jury that he had a lot more information that the jury did not and that was not backed up by the evidence in the case of for example when he said when he went to get  that january twenty six so called by walk that mr brown was convicted of counts seven was not involved me you know no explanation as to how he would know that kind of thing conversation and i said well this is like they're trying to figure out you know how to get their story straight and in the objections the eliminate hearing the defense attorneys and what we're concerned that  going to go far beyond you know explaining you know using experts as money and or lay testimony and tell everybody what these people are really talking about and i think that's one of the big problems here convictions you know false statements that nobody really nobody saw anybody going in and out of these houses carrying anything and they had no idea where she got the stuff and she wasn't under surveillance and they don't have any idea how long she was out of sight and so i think that that's why the testimony of agents pavel and her getting what was going on was very prejudicial for mr brown and it was compounded when there was no school testimony instructions and i realize that there are i mean but how can there be a dual testimony instruction when he wasn't qualified as an expert well agents and had it was clearly getting is that i think gadson to me very clearly covers the testimony that was given here by the case agent and that your quarrel with any if at all is not with the trial judge did but if if at all with gadson and we have no authority to do anything about that and i mean i think that gadson is clear it's binding and i think that the district judge followed it here i'm not asking this court to ignore gas and obviously you know because i have argued that what happened here went beyond what jackson said is permissible it was  beyond what lay opinion testimony allows and you can have it with the fact that there was no dual testimony instruction which this court has repeatedly engage in a conversation with someone and that that in most circumstances doesn't constitute any implication of the th amendment it's not us it's not a seizure  and if you can if you can ask to talk to somebody why would standing next to the car effect the seizure it was under the to tell you the circumstance you are that standing next to the counsel is in our case law also very clear that in determining whether there was a seizure for th amendment purposes we don't look at subjective in that we look we took an objective way on what the  impact or effect is on the people who are puter typically sees it doesn't matter why the officer is doing what he or she is doing it only matters what the officer does write we don't look at the subject of motive motivation do reasonable inference to be drawn you don't have to eliminate every other possibility and isn't the fact notwithstanding the whole neighborhood may have smelled of p c p is the fact that there was a specific piece d p order coming from good afternoon your honor is a may please the court hearing capsule for the united states my attention or honors is to address the two topics that were raised by my posy counsels and then answer any remaining questions that the panel may have  first to defendants brown's argument regarding agents of pot is testimony first we contend that this court should review it on a plane error standard the reason is because the motion and filed by defendant brown was basically categorically trying to exclude agents a part of from testifying because defendant brown assume that any testimony interpreted in coded language would have to be expert testimony and that motion limon a argued that there had been insufficient expert notice given and on that basis agents of potus testimony should be categorically excluded that the motion limited did not address any particular topics that regulate what each is a part of was allowed to testify to that is why to the extent that defendant brown had any objections to the cat of the subject matter of agents upon his testimony they needed to preserve  ruled that agents of potter was untie don't offer an opinion based on his intimate experience with a particular subject matter and the district court early looked at the objection in the in the motion in l definitive ruling in doesn't that mean that we should review it under a normal abuse of discretion standard i don't believe so judge bennett the reason is because you can't just the defendant can't just make a catchall objection in a motion limited i don't believe so judge would lock in the reason is the language i just cited which is the judge writes that the agents a pot of would be able to testify about some subjects it wasn't and then it continued with the language the judge bennett error or an abuse of discretion review the st argument with regard to the interpretation the word snitch this is a slight mischaracterization of the record there was no question to asians a pod of asking half of p c p off of clarence taylor in a backpack he had on a bus what agents of pot it was explaining that they that he directed the officers when addicted him not to rest clearance taylor because they didn't want to disclose the wire at that point and so they wanted the investigation to continue and so there was what agents upon it was explained is that if you if someone is caught with a gallon in at quarter i believe p c p that person is typically arrested and if they're not arrested it can cause suspicion among coconspirators about whether somebody is cooperating with the police and so agents of pot it was providing context for the calls that we would later  clay in which they did in fact express that concern by saying that they were concerned that clarence taylor was a snitch but there was no question directed to agents of pot asking him to interpret the words with respect approached the confidential informant and this was after he had made calls to the informant saying that he was going to meet her at defendant hawkins residence and then the at that point and this is just an audio recording that we have at that point codefendant hester comes back and age as a part of testified delivered the p c p to the confidential informant this testimony exculpatory evidence because what the government wanted to ensure was that the jury could not infer from agent's upon his testimony that defendant brown had been the one to bring the p c p to the confidential whether codefendant hawkins was involved this was a question that arose on cross examination and it was basically clear or fine who even had spoken about under direct examination so in cross or find his prior testimony in talking about the specific individuals who he had referenced as being part of this deal he was not and anyway saying that he could definitively say that codefendant hawkins had no involvement in the deal that amendment suppression i think judge bennett has articulated the standards in his question about approaching a vehicle under this court's guidance and the supreme court's guidance approaching a vehicle does not warr t the tension i would st respond to my colleague's assertion that the government has abandoned any argument here or abandon any theories of reasonable suspicion that is not the case we simply view that there are myriad reasons for reasonable suspicion for the officers to have been able to approach defendant wilson and codefendant miles's vehicle that night with respect to the drinking while much has been made about whether the officers could have seen the individuals drinking in the bostic under and two cases that the defendant cites strife and in washington which defendant cites in the reply brief all of those cases say that officers are permitted to walk up to in a car and engage in voluntary conversation with the occupants without reasonable suspicion here and there was no detention at that point the only point i wish to tension occurred was asked the tension after they asked the occupants of the car to get out of the vehicle and that was after they had smelled drugs on the defendant and codefendant miles as closely with the officers testified specifically they could have specifically attribute to their clothing as opposed to an overall stench in the neighborhood and after they had discovered a p c p lab in the house in front in which defendant wilson had been parked in front of so we believe that there is near a basis for reasonable suspicion here and that there had been no detention up until the point that they were constitutional speedy trial court not the speedy trial act claim i do think it's clear that the motion even though it was brought under the constitution early on the fourteen months post indictment delay but the supreme court has told us that our constitutional purposes the delay is measured from the time of the  not the time of detention why didn't the government address the four years at all before the district court given that the defendant made a th amendment and a speedy trial act claim and the law instructs us that when a constitutional claim is raised the the period of time that's relevant is from the return of the charging document to trial not from arrest to trial so there was about a four year period here where there's nothing in the record that goes to why the defendant wasn't arrested is our right that's correct your honor and it's still even if it's a constitutional claim we believe it's still incumbent upon the defendant to raise the constitutional claim and tort securely i think you're right there is nothing in the record about the cause for the delay which we believe constitutes a waiver on the defendant's court is incapable of reaching a resolution on that time frame but i think there also could have been tactical reasons why and did not want to raise that claim there could have been tactical there could have been reasons that would have been prejudicial to and about why you took the government four years to arrest the defendant and he decided that tactically it was not to his benefit to raise that claim and so that is why yes very clearly limited evidence from the stop in march of two thousand and eleven and a speedy trial motion and so i am i feel confident that if this trial counsel believe that there was near it to a speedy trial claim involving a closed indictment is raised here in this motion is the fourteen months and no other time period in counsel for the defendant said nothing in response to that but i agree with judge woodlock that we may be seeing more the court may be saying twenty to fifty five i also agree with judge woodlock that irrespective of what the defendant's counsel's position is on the government perhaps the next time this support for that could possibly be p s r as i read it suggested that he was living with his father and collecting welfare benefits from the government prior to his arrest so that would seem to cut against his being a using it as a foundation for constitutional nevertheless i do think that the fourteen months to late celt as this court has to get laid it in many occasions is is more than sufficient to trigger