interested parties by allowing their brief to be filed as an amicus as opposed to as a party we did your honor should that and so i believe the record is complete in terms of what position your part your before this court all right and eyes as i indicated i was giving you a very we're giving you we are giving you a very short period of time because i think your brief is is very complete i think you articulate exactly what you want us to consider appeal step forward introduce yourself and you can begin there are a fifteen minute free side ordinarily and we will try to keep the parties to those with the understanding eventually we have a lot of questions will certainly make allowances for that as well we are attempting to take a break at ten fifteen no later than ten twenty let's say but we made sure earlier to thank you your honors again as i what what really distinguishes this case from the case that was before the basically the seventh circuit why does this case why is this case  and the lack of justification it never looked at be as why did they by you think that is if you say that they never did address those issues never did address those issues why do you think they did  procedure whereby a minor could go to court and prove that she was mature enough to make her own decision or that it was in her best interest not to do so and that that had to include had to be an expeditious and a confidential process and that had didn't reach certain issues that you think may have missed should have been reached but the question is why why didn't you ask that it be remitted if those issues were viable if there was m doesn't make it so or enhanced your argument one bet we know what the rulings were below or rulings were in federal court so i ask you to just leave it to that as opposed to characteriz doctrine of constitutional interpretation we are by the illinois courts determine the relationship if any between the meaning of the u s constitution and the meaning of illinois when you when you say it doesn't like the  te court doors by virtue of federal court rulings is it fair to say that the circuit court read it a little differently the circuit court did and we believe that the circuit court error you know the circu court but a bit of litigation had ensued prior to that moment and i'm just wondering what what what what what would be involved in the decision on the restraining order and actually repeatedly thereafter that we were going to set a date for a luminary injunction hearing that we would bring our witnesses in that we would presume that the scientific evidence that forms the basis of the allegations here keep in mind that is there really any dispute regarding much of the evidence that you would have put forth in your work in your case your honor we believe that there are decades of scientific studies decade everybody makes assumptions you can't really make a decision and so you have least have somewhat of an understanding of what would be involved in the decision to make and see if you can't know it all so you have to assume some things and i don't we really simply require reasonable assumptions and if there are reasonable assumptions made and a decision is based on those reasonable assumptions then of deference is owed to a legislative body and making its  relevant to the proceeding in this procedural posture of what we've got is a situation where the court has to take the wealthy delegations as true and as the amicus brief believing psychiatric psychological medical and and pop health organization point out of page seven of our brief that court's decision goes quite a ways in describing exactly why this satisfies the act as a whole it satisfy me let me ask you will point out a point blank when when these the think but of course at the seventh circuit seen any kind of real merit to the equal protection or had it seeing a problem that might come up it could have briefs when you say that the only reason or are the only door that might be opened to the supreme court the illinois supreme court doing that again would be a conflicted opinions by the u s supreme court i don't think i don't think that the illinois supreme court said because the u s supreme court justices were conflicted on that point of whether actual innocence could be raised in a post conviction proceeding therefore we have the right to decide under the law in the wake of to should we have the right to recognize that as a constitutional relief i don't think the supreme required before work of the supreme court can deviate from the locks limited lock step back in and i just question why you would make that assertion because it can't be true but our position here all right thank you sets a fairly high bar for departing when the two are synonymous or close to synonymous as is the case for example if you process at the washington operating guarding washington was that these are the three factors that the court went to great lengths  explain why washington falls into that small category of cases where you ought to depart out to be sure that was the fact that heard that the herrera decision that washington reject the u s supreme court system error was deeply defied but there were two others that we also talk about and i think they're equally important one is the fact that the constitutional conventions regarding actual innocence claim which was the subject of washington were completely silent nothing to suggest that had been considered much less protected by the constitution of delegates so it was not a right to shore when you say the constitutional convention was silent on that issue yes you're right that necessarily means that the supreme court recognized a constitutional right that wasn't addressed during the constitutional convention and therefore suggests that the illinois supreme court is willing to recognize the work or work he fall our common law to do what is the like to address that be the third factor in washington also plays into this too to our situation here the third was that there was a legal tradition in illinois favoring the position of the innocent individual breyer freestanding claim let me contrast that why the illinois supreme court right i don't disagree with anything you've asserted i think you've done a blip that your brief is really well written but you know you're starting with the illinois supreme court decision in washington and we all know that it didn't start there it started with this court's decision in washington that recognized that that didn't necessarily address that issue in the same way that the illinois supreme court did and so to the extent that that the review in the first reviewing court decided that issue differently than the illinois supreme court suggest that that's part of the process that the first review court decides an issue and then the supreme court will depart from the u s supreme court when we have there's good reason to and to that extent i'm saying that cabala as can't be read as some sort of tying our hands you're you're right it says you can depart when there's good reason to but collins goes on to explain what those good reasons could be and it says one good reason would be if the convention debates suggest that's the way to go that's what the delegates had in mind as opposed to silence in washington as opposed to directly the opposite our case and it said that there's a legal tradition in illinois and i think it's important to remember here i like in the herrera context the washington context in the in this case in one thousand seventy eight when they passed w and it seems to me that when the opportunity arises for illinois jurisprudence to mature to develop that that opportunity should be taken and may be may be when the circuit full court feels bound by a federal court and we should say you know what that would be we don't dispute what the federal district  appellate court dead but we want you to decide this on illinois constitutional grounds even if even if those paths are our parallel from start to end why we think that for the way jurisprudence to advance that we should have cases decided on illinois wrong what's what's what's wrong with that honor if i could make two points in recent years that the first is our position is not contrary to the notion of closing below the courthouse door that is no opposition our position is that the courthouse door is open to handle the illinois state but that the first step on the a difference between saying you can't even come and argue for a departure from illinois law and that's not what we're saying it's a difference as you come in you say he has a circuit court address those departures it did you're out of the serbian ruling it doesn't concludes on page eight fourteen that there's no reason to that paragraph even read as they would like the court to read it which is reading in abortion right and the word privacy an article one section says contrary to the constitutional convention history even read that way the paragraph itself makes very very clear it's merely adopting before us regarded regarding limited lockstep application were pretty much the same arguments that were made before washington was decided in front of those two reviewing court either go with silence and a constitutional convention that allows the court to perhaps go beyond what was declared there or we can say that the statements that were issued were really meant to address this to do it it didn't washington even though the record from the convention and legal history doesn't support such a decision here i'm not sure where it would happen the privacy right itself under family life lee clearly and bought it indoor it brings in federal law limited lots that state we are in limited life under the protection and what that means is that we have a threat be applied the same analytical framework that way as the us supreme court it does not mean that the results in federal limited lockstep analysis again we're talking about the same analytical framework and so when you think about that there's nothing at illinois fundamental rights jurisprudence that said that you go up by anything other than strict scrutiny there is nothing there that says well look going to say this is a fundamental right that  the consent of medical procedures by minors at every pregnant minor in this state other than those who are choosing to terminate their pregnancy gets to make every medical and surgical decision on their own throughout that and see whether pregnancy related apart from terminations aren't those unavoidable and they are dated don't they just come out necessarily by virtue of the condition medical condition of that person so the really isn't any any any intervention it just happens your honor there are many interventions that happen during pregnancy and first of all i want to make the point that when a white person decides to carry a pregnancy to term they making a choice they're making a choice not to terminate and well that's even that's where that's where they make that choice not to terminate that's when the legislature stepped in and said when you make this choice here are the steps you allows minors who are pregnant as well as those who are parenting and other situations to make every medical decision whether they're pregnancy related or not she can set to a tonsilectomy she consented to open heart surgery she gets to make those justification here what we know is that the legislatures asserted purpose is in effect in minors and that the statute frustrates rather than furthers those purposes that the scientific evidence that is the underlying basis for the allegation consent process the the final thing i do want to mention is that the cost of a lot of things were said the constitutional convention and it think it's important that we know one thing for sure we did we did we do it was decided did the deed just the statement that the illinois privacy laws protect this fundamental right to terminate a pregnancy is absolutely a holding a bed he said and once the illinois supreme court does that then we have to give meaning to what that means