i'm sorry the first being the echoes licensing provision which prohibits any energy from operating in the state of illinois without a license and the provisions imposition of criminal and civil penalties for the practice as a debt collector in the state of illinois affects the public welfare and it also is the subject to regulation and control by the state and this could be regulated in a way of that  the third principle basis for the public course decision was reliance on this court's decision and for an order in that decision the this court continued the viability of the the the licensing of the of the of of the legal profession this court obviously has the authority in the power to fashion rules with respect to the on license practice of law it must however to fur the village feature when the legislature imposes rules and regulations as to how businesses operate in the state and in that forth standards that it would it would apply in a case of the licensing violation and those those particular standards include whether or not the the business  e expressly on was inactive for public policy purpose and third whether or not this the licensing provision included a criminal or civil penalty provision now the place and supervision was intended to protect the public that's fairly met here because the dakota states in section one a but this is a public policy statute it's supposed to protect the public by two things doing doing two things one is to instill confidence in the public that only qualified that collectors are operating in the state and secondly to protect the public against any at any sort of  clearly stated that unlicensed that collection activity is it is harmful to the public or for welfare and this court has acknowledged that if those with that languages then is in the statute along with a express or not the plumbing license or statute was what was the appropriate to bar any activity by plumbers who are licensed the court indicated that even though we may not agree with you know the language of the statue may please the court i'm illinois assistant attorney general cliff earle on behalf of the attorney general's office which intervened in this case to defend the constitutionality of the statute as this case is before the court as a direct appeal under rule three  wanted at least initially focus on the constitutional questions that got us here at this case has presented no fewer than six different constitutional attacks on the collection agency act and not one of them has any while ordinarily the appropriate place to begin would be with the circuit court's analysis this case is somewhat unusual in that not even l v nv has been willing to defend the circuit court's decision on the basis the circuit court provided so it seems that there is no dispute between the parties at all that the circuit courts constitutional decision it's constitutional reasoning simply cannot stand and there's good reason for that you cannot have an equal protection violation where a statute does not distinguish between similarly situated pardons a statute is not arbitrary or irrational as a matter of substantive due process because t conduct that it prohibits is unlikely to lead to physical injury or death indeed particularly given the long tradition of financial crimes in this country and a criminal statute is not implicitly big because it does not restate the common law rules that govern the way in which criminal penalties applied to corporations so since there seems to be unanimity here but the circuit court's decision here with wrong the most efficient most expeditious upon by the court below and so it would be entirely proper for the court in the interest of judicial economy to simply move on to say that the circuit court's decision here is fundamentally flawed and to let the circuit court without relying on these strained and novel constitutional theories for it to rule on these issues in the first instance rather than this court now having said that if the court chooses to proceed we believe that the issues that l v nv has sought to bootstrap into this case are no less straightforward than the issues of the circuit than the arguments the circuit court found so persuasive beginning with their normal commerce clause argument the simple answer to that is that you cannot have a violation of the commerce clause where a statute does not treat in state and out of state entities differently what the commerce clause prohibits is a state like illinois discriminating against a company that is from out of state for that in order to advantage an in state company here everyone has to play by the same rules everyone is subject to the same standard everyone has to be licensed and so where that's true there simply cannot be a dorman clearly define exactly what type of conduct is prohibited that's not correct there is a difference between statutory ambiguity or statute uses broad terms in terms of what's prohibited and does not provide a comprehensive list of every single type of conduct that fits within that broad phrase and something that's in premise of leave a big and ambiguous statute is one that is subject to multiple reasonable readings and it requires the courts to draw upon the various tools of statutory construction th the canons of construction legislative history legislative purpose overarching public policy all of those tools in order to strengthen what the best reading is in light of the legislature sometimes ambiguity exists only the statute is incapable of intelligent interpretation meaning even in spite of those tools a judge simply cannot to tremont what the statute means l the envy is seeking to transform the vagueness doctrine into the ambiguity doctrine is trying to conflate the two standards and that is as this court has said and numerous other courts have said is absolutely wrong and so that really leaves us at the end of the day with what the end the seems to believe is its strongest argument because it's what it devotes the majority of its brief to which is the argument that this is irrational statute it is arbitrary to require collection agencies to be license and it is particularly argument arbitrary in the as applied context of litigation up we cited in our reply brief the two thousand and ten report from the federal trade commission the chronicles in exacting detail the abuses that are uniquely associated with the debt collection industry and they are uniquely associated with the debt collection industry in the particular context of litigate asian debt collection cut and looming in the background here is the reality that in most of these cases somewhere between seventy percent and ninety percent of these cases end up need to fall judgment and so a collection agencies do is play the odds if they file enough lawsuits even if they are americans they will have a high enough percentage return where the other side doesn't it doesn't show up and say that this is america's lawsuit but they will be able to make money in the end given that history and that exceedingly unique history i might add of abuse in a very particular conduct it is entirely rational for the legislature to say a license should be required and that is not to suggest that every participant in the collection agency industry is a bad actor but that is not our burden under a rational basis test we need only show that the record of the legislature had a reasonable fear of these negative consequences to the public and it is free to exercise its police powers and act to try  restrictive approach requirement as about a rational basis so it may be that it is eight that the ethical rules are a reasonable it is hard at some level although i think the evidence and history suggesting that these lawsuits are filed voluminously around the country that are utterly meritless strongly suggests that it is not enough in another itself but setting that aside the legislature's burden here is not to demonstrate that some less restrictive or less intrusive means would be sufficient would be is necessary to  enact the law is only that this is a sufficient time given its police power the argument that the lawyer is not an extension this is something of the statutory argument they also make it in the context of the constitutional standpoint the attorney does on behalf of their client is fairly attributable to the principle and so the argument here that because they were changing an attorney they cannot be held accountable for the actions of their attorney is simply contrary true in extensive body of law and for this poor to accept that argument i think would run counter to what this court has said repeatedly and for many many years before many of you were even on this back if there are no other questions about these issues at this time i'll happily thank you appellate court's decision decision three years ago with show indicated it didn't really hold that we've committed to my client committed a crime it held it was proven my client committed a crime by bringing this lawsuit so there's really not only rules should that move light in the first place downtown disposal case which says where the court felt that there's no such thing as an automatic no what a rule and you had to examine for factors all of which by the way it needed a license even though the wire and by the way the inquiry was the department of financial professional regulation and they said you know senior counsel there said he doesn't want your question agency to me second to send it back to the appellate courts already ruled against my client it asked me to stay here ok and on all the other issues the trial court except on that one constitutional issue was also ruled against my client so i'm not sure where he wants it sent back to which have nothing to do with that buyers so i mean i think it's a leap to just assume that finally the lawsuit is is collecting the debt it's not no it's not it's not unreasonable for and you know and i have to go back and and mention again and i'm sure you've read that that people in this in the you know the position of my client did contact the department of so like i was saying we didn't seek counsel from the department and they didn't think or got a collector and there's this it you know there's this attorney general press release which also isn't doesn't have any real force a lawyer but it but it and of course i should say of course most importantly the statute was sure ambiguous enough that the legislature had to amend it again in two thousand and thirteen to finally move but what i'm trying to determine is whether or not the trial court order complied with the rule eighteen and i'm determined if the case could be resolved without reaching the constitutional issue if there is none constitutional grounds and that's what are really between re make specific findings at page eight thirty eight thirty one of the panics and i think if i don't know that they're all over going the unconstitutionality  got the department saying i don't have to register my client doesn't have to register we have you know the need for two thirteen amendments recognizing that statue was unclear so we really shouldn't it was you know we didn't need to register we've had phone with federal district court judges adopt our position with regard to the meaning of stand show and you know it gets the point were when there's this many people and you know you can to size and the question maybe what's reasonable and what's not but when a person of ordinary intelligence doesn't can't reasonably understand what's prohibited by it it's a violation of due process that was our best argument i do process judge mauls took an opinion a took a view which is not unreasonable either that or he says that doubt he read the statute section fourteen which rea for a crime that started going judgments that really does look at all but outrageous and on reasonable and irrational i think something like that but i really think the whole case should be disposed of by going in their papers they also conceded that they disagree with the judge's constitutional arguments or constitutional ones so in terms of ruling we would ask this court to rule on swofford basically about how this was a legitimate and i think there was a question about windfall earlier and you mentioned the public welfare how how is the public welfare promoted by your interpretation your honor in terms of requiring a license to collect that that's incredibly important and one of the requirements is that it be on the radar screen  of the state of illinois there's a lot of these tech lockers that you know come into the state they take aggressive actions because they buy these dust for pennies on the dollar and they don't register with the whip with the states nobody knows who's provision didn't change then it has to apply back to twenty or twenty away and the only change that was made in a twenty four two months was to carve out explicitly provisions that do not apply implicitly as a twenty already and those are provisions in section eight which only pertain to that's that were controlled or owned by creditors know that those provisions wouldn't but by by default not in terms of applying the the four factors that this court applied in downtown disposal the person council doesn't distinguish between the unlicensed practice of law vs the prior to standing to before the podium today even reliance on the trial court's reasoning in this case and has offered its own what it describes better version of the rational basis standard  they can't claim to be defending the trial court's decision on the bases that the trial court provide now the reason that we believe that it would be appropriate simply to vacate and remain and in light of that now explain where i think that the most expeditious way of the best use of judicial resources for resolving this sort of case would be simply to pass upon those arguments and to send the case back and not allow three zero to ebay to become a vehicle for bootstrapping along whatever other issues in the case you feel are appropriate to bring before the court now justice kilbride that is not to suggest that rule eighteen doesn't apply and that the doctrine of constitutional avoidance isn't relevant but up there and i will i will say provides particularly in this court is that the court should avoid a resolving substantial constitutional questions where there are non constitutional grounds presented where there is in essence very little if not no disagreement that the two tional questions presented should be resolved in a particular way that is not a substantial constitutional question is a straightforward issue and while the court certainly is free for not saying he's bound or precluded from passing upon these other issues that the voidness role of applies to judgments in favor of unlicensed that collectors back court has not ruled upon the argument that l v nv has made that the statute does not apply to the case was remanded back to the trial court the trial court balanced by the boy voidable rule agreed with mr trice regarding the application of the statute under these circumstances that issue has not been passed upon by the appellate court so presumably they would have a perfectly reasonable avenue eight to turn into some vehicles for expanding cases in front of the court this case presents now no fewer than nine different questions before the court three constitutional ones from the trial court three constitutional issues from the that from l v envies brief and a further three statutory issues from l v n v at some point this becomes abusive of the rule that's designed to require trial courts to be very cautious and careful before they pass upon the constitutionality of the state statute and that's all we're suggesting let me briefly conclude with just a brief note about the statutory argument l d n v has relied heavily on the two thousand and thirteen substance to thousand thirteen amendments i should say to the collection agency act it is very clear from the legislative history that those are intended as clarifying amendments that's why the presumption that those amendments change the prior law does not apply this court has repeatedly said that legislat direct statements in legislative history that show that there was not an intention to change the substantive law is sufficient to make an amendment it clarifying what's more that and that canon of construction applies that is correct and at that point asserted that assuming that the trial court didn't want to revisit it statutory determination that the statute applies here then they would have a right to appeal back question to the a