direction from the new true worth on legal policy issues even after this court affirmed them and while they have slipped back to their original position about a month ago we're not raising that here today as our primary issue the question is did they justify the outcome and i submit to the answer is or is ownby no in fact it proved a point and let me explain that by starting with the price effect estimates yes he has one paragraph on this ubiquitous page forty one of his testimony one forty one of the j f k it has some sort of assumptions and conclusions that now we've been ninety six you'll see them dense with numbers and at the end with the commission's doing is they're taking two options that occurred after all this was filed numbers nine and ten in there saying well we see evidence here effects one of the experts blows discussion are brief mr schnitzer had alternatives and he actually was spot on with the commission's figures starting with a low number of twenty eight cents per kilowatt month identical to his  ninety five and he says in unrebutted fashion never deals with this this is a five to symptom percent price effect reduction you could size it if you look at our brief on page seventeen one hundred million maybe up to six hundred million dollars and we're told that that's ok because the price effect is quote limited which i guess means taken directly it's not unlimited it could've been worse but it's still substantial while this case was pending on remand for adopted a new demand curve which actually makes matters worse about forty two percent worse and their answer to us upon complaining about this increased injury to say yes well but the m turned negative while this case was pending and by the time it got back on remember which means that paper that the page forty one j one forty one turned upside down on briefing on the orders and remained first started to focus attention differently and said when retirement still exists there are big so that's the horse will ride now that there's some problems with that one problem is they're turning back to th introjects and tell you not decision firms because that's how we get prices to clear at the cost of a new entry that's how they stay competitive in that would be in that all of these exempted resources don't affect things very much but if you move retirement over to the renewables exemptions side of the ledger you rode that assumption and first sort of glynn's and matches retirements and so one might think it can be a free agent and they say in their brief that low growth even if even a flat plus retirements the orders never say that the orders never say load growth is not a given or a retirement is enough standing alone and you're being asked to violate chivalry by affirming if that's what you hear today come pounding matters and to demonstrate that we're times is not the only pillar to this collapse temple for says surprisingly that well the low growth assumption that we adopted at the beginning of this case and hold still true to the end was based on the best projections available at the time in two thousand and  finally when it comes to justification is the commission says something i find actually really surprising a central mainstream element of economic thought ceteris paribus holding all else equal they claim it six twenty two twenty three that our expert analyses aren't valid because we have all things constant only measure one thing what happens if you don't have the two hundred megawatt exemption of year or you do that's how science works that's how they tell whether blood pressure medication absent works or not that's how the scientific revolution gained traction says the government will approve what price changes should occur upon changes on quantity it holds all else constant itself we can't test it by holding all is constant how can for ever figure out whether anything it's doing in these markets is the physical or has just unreasonable outcomes this is an example i think of the a n c going so far beyond the realm of what what would be rational economic thought that  remember the twenty a j letter we put in actually validates what the last two pages of our reply brief say which is you know we've of librium and because we've had negative load growth so now we're in a situation where nothing if you're said this holds true they just told the commission that the commissions just approve bottle i'd like to give you some more time for thank you say it was unjust and then reasonable they said they had come up with a better way which is exactly what we told them to do we repeatedly said if load growth doesn't pan out in accordance with the best estimates the system operator going to revisit it so that least one time that we continue to encourage the system operator to work with the stakeholders to improve the process that's just what happens in all of these capacity markets they found something that they've think will be more effective for a variety of reasons going forward of course under section two of five they don't even have to think it was that are they in this case they did say to the commission we believe this is superior in any event the commission at least in the initial order which is now pending a rehearing agreed that it was just a reasonable i don't think the commission had to decide whether it was better and no one declared that the previous mechanism was unjust and unreasonable it's just moving forward with what they consider to be an improvement that's completely fair and it's indeed exactly what the commission always tells the system operators monitor how this is working if it's not working out the way you thought it would revisit it specifically in this case the commission was very sure to say that a number of times and if you can improve the process with your stakeholders by all means bring us another two or five filing with that so there's nothing unusual in it really doesn't have any significance for with this was just in reasonable at the time that it was approved so going to what the commission had at the time it was approved in front of it in support of the tool five filing by the system operator it's not just the portion of one paragraph by dr ethe here that the petition is point to doctorate your had extensive testimony most of which was about the this is the s these market forces are expected to work how i just thing i demand curve this way and the supply curve this way is expected to play out based on what the system operator knows about their own system so one relevant part even though he was talking about slope demand curve i'd point to the court today one zero eight and one hundred nine at the the paragraph that begins on that page and carries over he talked about how if there was a deep pool of competitive entran whether the demand curve a true net cost of new entry is a little short or a little long i'm paraphrasing there will have only a small effect on prices because the competitive entrants will create a relatively flat so what he's saying is that if there is a pool competitive entrance you're not going to have the steep supply curve that the commission discussed the partitioner is experts having relied upon it will flatten around th intersects with the slope demand curve in a way that the vertical demand curve was more of an all or nothing proposition so the prices won't very much as much around that intersection and that's actually what happened in auctions eight and nine the commission pointed out i believe it's somewhere around twenty six thirty two but i'll get that free exactly it's in the footnotes discussing what happened in those options and i don't remember commission was just looking to what happened in the options to substantiate the the evidence i had before earlier tonight usual stance we don't usually look to later evidence when we're really further explaining things that we should've maybe explained more fully at the outset but the commission said impair in the for the ninety five and six thirty two there was an additional thousand megawatts of supply available at pretty close the same clearing at let me go back one more order but i can explain what the commission says it evolved to bowers there's just one other say oh i don't know five five six and five five seven now if we take if we take the finding the critical finding that this was this exemption was going to be limited both by the slope demand curve and the cap the commission is then balancing it against of i'll lay out exactly what it says it's balancing it's balancing its responsibility to promote economically efficient prices and it's talking about the price signals what the effect of the renewa everyone knows it's false so it has no meaning so the commission wants the price signals generated i mean this is about making sure the capacity market is a just and reasonable mechanism and that includes is it sending accurate price signals is it incentivizing new entry that the system needs and is it ensuring fair prices for consumers and these all go into the mix and what the commission is saying it evolved on is if state if the system operator wants to accommodate legitimate policy objectives of its states and the commission is willing to look at that balance again it's not throwing away the idea of of  price suppression this is very much tied to the finding that it would be limited and would not be significant price suppression without that the rest of this balance doesn't happen it's not just oh we want to accommodate the states so so that case by case exemption and what happened here is their thinking evolved to support a broader exemption which is the one that the sr operator filed and that was based on a specific record before them that included a significant design change the slope demand curve being implemented in the region as well as supporting the record from the system operator describing the its estimate of the potential impact that the rule would have on the on the system as well in addition i've no going back even further that far from being inconsistent with precedent has always kept the door open to this exemption going back roughly ten years they've considered some form of exemption again going back some time now they've always kept the door open emphasizing that the proper vehicle for bringing this rule forward was through the state or the process which is what happened here in this case and it came through a balanced package of rules some of which were more favorable to suppliers and some of which are more favorable  consumers in that in addition your honour's i just i'd like to briefly also add to the response regarding the the more recent for quarter around the capacity market which was filed with the court this week it also clarified that that the genesis of that proceeding was not this question of low growth the early paragraphs of that order tell the tale really the genesis of that was a collaborative discussion among the system operator market participants of the new england states and if you read the early paragraphs that order it was driven by changes in state law where new resources were coming online pursuant to state programs and there was a concern that those resources might not be counted as  capacity and wouldn't be included under the existing renewable exemption definition or as well as could have could be at a level that that wouldn't come under the two hundred megawatt cap the prices were definitely at issue in price protection was at issue and that proceeding similar to this one talked about a balance between supplier and consumer interests and ultimately that was that when the i still made that filing it was also attempting to balance those interests and accommodate state policies while at the same time ensuring that the market price signal judges and helen randolph were asking i was going to do it topside but i ran out of time what changed because the position change and if you look at by the way paragraphs twenty one and twenty two of you were a session on monday see is changed back now price suppression preventing it is really important thing one of the things that changes the commission decided is our brief colorfully explains acquiescence is a defense if they're going to do it anyway we were just bluffing and we won't mitigate them we submit to that's a bankrupt reason at the outset yes it implies that new entry will occur and not be reflected in the capacity market bu  because we need to prevent prices from being artificially suppressed which is economically inefficient and as we said in brief one thing hasn't changed can't change the law of economics that is an inefficient outcome they said that before they just said again one final point what is really happening here is not pain twice for zero one hundred megawatts it may be ten million dollars with a capacity the renewable hit it does the incoming generator get it which really happening is that the state gets to have the benefit of one hundred two hundred six hundred million dollars of annual price suppression to subsidise the investments they want to make that's really the question because you can make back your in tree on volume with