please the court counsel my name is barbara gobin and i represent the respondent roger as in the scipio of the involuntary medication order that with this appeal there's three issues that function were church of the three criteria for involuntary medication petition and the key issue here though is whether this appeal is under exception to the moon doctrine and that's the key issue that the state raises in the response so i'm going to focus on that with regard to the witness as you well know there's all metro health orders expire in ninety or one hundred eighty days so there's three exceptions to the min of a short duration which this was expired in ninety days the second issue is whether there's a reasonable expectation that that the individual will face the same conduct in the future so that you  look at true different parts on that the history of the person and site of her whether the issues presented are capable to be repeated so the first with regarding the history is  heritage basically in a three year period six involuntary medication petitions so the issue you know with regards that he would present with her going capacity and with her going suffering and threatening and deterioration believe function the criteria he would face again furthermore he had basically fixed illusions so even though hopefully he won't encounter this again it's more likelihood or not that he will encounter involuntary medication petition in the future and she's also had a sense of mental health history of over sixteen year no health history now the state's position is that you would have to have identical facts i think that's too narrow that would exclude most men on health appeals under those criteria so and then the second part is then whether these  america exception for the first time involuntary medication or mental health order but here i am but he so have to look at it case by case process here he had no so and basically this is an interesting case too because this petition referenced the five thirteen petition because they said a court order was anger against him for medication so it's not just speculative that the medication were she would have a future impact it was a previous one actually did have an impact in this case because the petition referenced the prior order  he was given the meds the doctor testified oh he's much better now does that only does the behavior in the past don't work does the court have to look at the current behavior then basically the doctor in her testimony really did not say much she testified that his health was not risk at this time there and also that his suffering was much less at this time and it doesn't really rise to the depth of the level of emotional distress so you know the thing is is it would be good if you know more can always continue to work or medication but that does a catch twenty two because then you always do from the first one of them patricia never has  opportunity to look at the current state and that's why the statute in the case law says a every first of your show every three months remove review and then six months and basically the dr phil to testify how  case given that this court did issue an opinion in there and a rule twenty three order in that case however the respondent still has not proven that the clitoral consequences exception of lies and that's because under the the owner supreme court case from two thousand and fourteen the court stated that application of backwater of consequences exception cannot rest upon the lone fact that no prior involuntary admission or treatment order was entered or on a vague and unsupported statement the collateral consequences might plague the respondent in the future and further that collateral consequences must be identified that could stand soley from present education now as a political matter i'd like to note that the state does not agree with the respondent that no involuntary no prior involuntary medication order has been entered and has been sustained against them what the respondent has proven or has attached to the briefs are a couple of orders in which prior involuntary medication petitions were denied so the respondents have submitted proof that some were denied but that's not proof that there was never at any prior at the end there's a record of some sector picked medication taken in the ninety's it's not stated in the record whether that was voluntary or involuntary so the state's not conceding that the respondent has clearly proven that no prior order was never entered but under rated p that actually wouldn't even matter because the respondent hasn't made a clear showing that there exists some collateral consequences that could stem solely from the present education respondent is only offering a vague and five thirteen zero five eight five was as respondent argues used against him in that the petition for involuntary medication that led to the order on appeal here today mentioned the start of court order psychiatric medications  consequence was not matter a consequence of that prior order the direct consequence of that prior order was that he took those medications and the january two thousand and fourteen petition for involuntary administration of medication which led to the order at issue here  details the respondents deterioration of the billeted to function and suffering and in the course of detailing those symptoms and behaviors the petition noted that although the respondent had been refusing food and drink quote since the start of court order medications on eleven twenty six thirteen he has been eating and drinking adequately that's what the respondent is referring to here what that shows is that the petition was not referring to the entry of an order as a reason to enter a new order the petition was referring t effect of court ordered medications on his symptoms i mean the effect of those prior ordered drugs is part of response medical history and it's always going to be but that doesn't mean that the fact of the entry of that order led to collateral consequences for the respondent that are capable of her dress and the point of the respondents claim that that prior order was used against them is because the respondent is ordering there is arguing that the order currently on appeal could be used against him if you chair mental health proceeding but the respondent cites no case in which an out of reviewing court held that the collateral consequences exception is or could be satisfied based on speculation that the order at issue could affect future mental health proceedings and what i want say is that the collateral consequences involve matters other than mental health matters such as for instance their driving privileges at issue in the deborah s case from the first district in tw and that's a post read a peak case in that case the appellate court held that the respondent proved the collateral consequences exception applied where the respondent had been employed as a substitute mail carrier and proved that the mental health order jeopardized her grabbing privileges thus her ability to seek employment further in the wake of rita p collateral consequences must be specifically proven to threaten the particular respondent under the madison case cited in the peoples br district case from two thousand and fourteen again post read of p and in that case the appellate court rejected a claim that the collateral consequences exception applied because a mental health order could affect the availability of void card or professional licensure and the reason that the appellate court rejected that argument is that there was no proof that the particular respondent in that case wanted to obtain a gun or professional license and if so except in support of that argument would have been h h stated that most mental health appeals would be will be reviewed alford a change actually also rejected a general accepted our proposed general exception for mental health cases and stated that there is no per se to the capable of repetition exception the state will stand on its brief as to the the history the respondents history issue that's played out pretty well i think in the states brief and move on to be  second requirement of the capable of repetition exception which requires that the respondent clearly prove that the present action and a potential future action would have a substantial enough relation that resolution of the issue in the present case would likely affect the future case involving the for spawn is now responding has two arguments substantively the first involving statutory compliance with the requirement of written notice of non medicinal forms of treatment or respondent is arguing that that's a statutory compliance issue that's not the same as the statutory interpretation issue second the respondent is arguing that this case involves the definition of the suffering and deterioration of ability to function criteria required for that exception now i suppose one could but one could argue that the that this case involves the sufficiency of the evidence to meet these criteria and the respondent is arguing exactly what those criteria require and in that respect the respondents arguing that it's a mix question of law in fact but it's his position that regardless of whether this court defines the issue as an issue of sufficiency of the evidence or an issue of respondent could not meet his burden of proving that any potential future action would have a substantial enough relation to the present case that the resolution of the present issue or issues could affect a future case involving the respondent and that's because the court's findings in this case the ones at issue here were based on evidence presented regarding that the respondents state as of february two thousand and fourteen that's three and three quarters years ago to the resolution of whether this evidence of respondents condition that long ago met the statutory standard for the theory aeration and suffering whatever it might be it would not could not eight respondent in any possible future litigation final note is that the state would note in response to the first bond its argument at the pages twelve and thirteen of reply brief in which the respondent asked this court to go ahead and consider the merits of the case even if he hasn't proven the illness instead of physical pain and what and i think it actually we probably mean a little bit more president of what constitutes the physical pain or what constitutes suffering and so if you face an involuntary medication petition the future one of the criteria is going to be suffering in teacher ratio of ability to function it doesn't have to be the exact facts it's actually the courts definition of what the not like quest interpretation of what threatening behavior it was the mission case what those criteria were here we were raise the issue of what constitutes curtis and what constitutes suffering that suffering can't just be suffering from a mental illness and that's those are the two issues on on that point there are no internists of the baby here but that right that's critical here factual question is the issue of the statutory interpretation and then basically with regard to that she read a p actually reviewed under the public interest exception to move this