all right well counsel on people versus crawford please approach tell us who you are who you amended in two thousand and ten specifically to broaden and expand the types of conduct that could be punishable under the law and that statute as it currently exists is facially unconstitutional because the term threat is overbroad and because the of intention to inflict evil injury or damage black's law dictionary defines it as a communicated intent to inflict harm or loss on another on another's property and these are the definitions of the state provided in its own gr appeals in seals versus me the recently stated the definition of threat is broader than truth rights the st amendment of st amendment allows legislations to prescribe true threats not threats in general to break up with someone rights to fire someone threatens to kick a child out of the house and those are not describable acts under the st amendment and now that the legislature knows how to describe truth rights it violence on another person those are the acts that can be prescribed under the st not as section c provides there are plenty of examples of threats that are not true threats but nonetheless fall under the scope of this i was like a statue as the supreme court in relic purposely pointed out a communication or two or occasion directed at someone a business owner to boycott their business it could easily be safety so there is no such limitation here in this particular all of the provisions were separate are several ball in their cyberstalking statute but we maintain that the only theory of prosecution and the only theory of conviction in this case was on the preparation under the st amendment to recklessly transmit a threat or to rely on someone's feelings about someone else's words that would sweep in far too much is a cop to uphold a statute many states and many against public officials and the court determined what is required to constitute a true threat and in both of those cases the court stated that true a true threat requires subjective intact and again we do acknowledge that there is a split however in the absence of an express legislative intent to set forth a strict liability of acts under section or dish three a court must infer a mental state and here in doing so is it the solution is easy because the stock is statute provides the per the proper mental state and it's not rewriting the statue if the legislature expressly allows for it and the legislative history also includes the subject references to  to prevent you know that the harm of victims of stalking by allowing the police to intervene before they it's their are they are injured or killed and as well as to prevent the charity it's produced by harassing actually going also in for a knowing from the course of conduct definition yes which requires an amped right and the mental status should be and that the benefit knowingly engage in of course conduct which limits the stature there was no intent of broad someone and a dash five deals with harassment so it's different offenses but they are significant in the size that they inform what the legislature meant by the term threatens such in a five dash sections set out a different cyberstalking offense again they inform what they meant by the term threatens when they listed in the course of conduct they have to define threatens because it's already clear from the statute that it is just included threats of violence honors there is no st amendment violation defendant's theory of unconstitutionality is based on a broad incorrect interpretation of the term frightens however rather hurt recognize that the fact provision was limited to true threats in and today that the five prescription includes threats to perform a lawful act like breaking up with his girlfriend calling for a bike high for a boycott of these hypotheticals are nothing more than distressing communications that were statute is based on the fact that he sent numerous times tax threatening to kill the victim that mere distressing communication and certainly now threats to perform a law act and so it so again his  hypotheticals are irrelevant as to what is required where whether true threats requires intentionality the people totally disagree with that with that position defending knowing was not a sufficient mental state so st we have to address whether that's correct right and i was incorrect he lacked the diary light i'm i'm black and black the only reason black discussed intent was because that statue know those tough ok from the perspective of the speaker the century requires that a mental state of knowledge and so can you be evaluated under the subject or objective he know he was threatening the victim with respect to the to the listener a jury c instructed that the people must prove at the victim was actually emotionally distressed and really fear for her safety the fact that the statue sets forth a reasonable standard also that it must the motion of distress could be is to be perceived from the victim in her situation with all the knowledge that she has of defendant in his prior acts so that's a that's pretty subjective so it's amenable to subjective but we all the state would also have to prove that her know the his stress for clearly threats to kill she call the police before she went home the officer listened to one of the over the phone or the speakerphone listened to two of those rights she was visibly upset although she took back how upset she was at trial she at the time she was her distress was observed by the police officer the detective who interviewed her as well as the state's attorney so there was overwhelming pro that she suffered significant emotional distress and it would be reasonable on those circumstances any woman would say you know who has a person at home waiting for me to kill or tell her she's going to meet her maker  with suffer such distress that's that demeans the stature has a couple mental state when properly construed under section four dash three now the fact that the legislature applied a negligent standard to the injury or harm caused by defendants knowing of course a comic that doesn't knew or should know that that course of conduct would cause a reasonable person to suffer significant emotional stress or fear for her safety there's nothing wrong with this doesn't dilute the mens rea your honour's of the criminal act rather it limits the scope of the statute because it holds a defendant responsible only for the foreseeable consequences of his knowing conduct it's a foreseeability component that connects defendants knowing conduct to the resulting harm that the legislature wanted to address and this to a mental state as i point out in my brief or more detail is found in other statutes for example child pornography aggravated arson aggravated discharge all these statutes have the knows or should know language and  no there is no substitute due process i lay ssion however the honors if this court does have constitutional concerns we would agree that this court should wait for the illinois supreme court to decide people section forty three does not get this or a magic pen to write in words that the legislature omitted and has not amended to include in the past nine years that allows other states will take a conviction on the general intent crime  proving either intent knowledge or recklessness at trial moreover even if this court were to find that the conduct must be engaged knowingly here that still allows  not support the state's interpretation of the state also does not provide any buyable explanation as to why if threats of boycott a business that causes the business owner emotional distress does not fall under the statute it would require a completely different statute or the state's theory to my mind it's just the distinction between a communication that isn't a threat we could call the communication it is also a communication but it's also a threat it is an expression of an intention to inflict injury or damage in that case it would be economic loss of but it's still a threat and it still falls under the statute  we cannot rely and there are cases that states for stevens that said we cannot rely on the government's position that they will not prosecute a justified a statute so to fill because we don't have the way people to be prosecuted or leave it up to individual when officers or prosecutors to prosecute certain answers that technically do statute and but here we're talking about threats of the media or future badly harm sexual assault confinement restraint and the threat is directed towards a person or a family member of that person yes on that section eighty three but the threats of what kind of business but easily fall under section a with the course of conduct inspections see that as a threat it's not a threat for bodily harm so it cannot prosecute as a true threat and also can't be prosecuted at all because that is a protected speech a parent who threatens who says i will threaten i'm threatening you to kick you out of my house if you continue dating this other person that is a