and that's what the president the secretary gates announced two weeks ago the new plan is comprehensive it's flexible it's designed to counter the most immediate threat posed by iran first and more quickly protect our allies our forward deployed troops in the region than previously planned and notably it contains important hedges of our intelligence estimates are wrong we'll be in a position to fortify the defense of europe as well as our homeland we know that iran is deploying significant numbers of a short range missiles more quickly than we had previously expected and deploying some medium range such as this job three that can reach israel also iran is developing medium and intermediate range missiles that can reach europe will moral responsibility to do more rapidly and to deploy defenses that can protect our nato allies and our forward deployed forces in places  away as twenty twenty that said we know that intelligence estimates can be wrong for that reason i'm pleased that the plan continues the testing of the interceptor that would have been played in the previous play and the administration plans to continue negotiating with the poles and the czechs to reach cooperate agreement to base missile defense systems in those nations the third or fourth  stage finally afford turned my ranking member as well as our witnesses let me make just a few comments about how this new plan might affect our relations with russia i find unlikely that calculations concerning our relations with russia played no part in the witnesses here today general cartwright secretary for noise general riley and protector i'd like to welcome extend a warm welcome back to the gentle lady from california our colleague and now undersecretary of state ellen tauscher my native california brant are hearing today pockets on the administration's decision to scrap plans for deploying a european missile defense capability in poland and the czech rip public to protect europe and the united states my colleague has voiced broad support for the administration's new support let me say i'm skeptical i think it has some merit but as i weigh all the costs and benefits of the decision quantitative and qualitative i do not come to the same conclusion i think there are questionable assumptions a lot of ifs and considerable geopolitical consequences  justification for the administration's decision is a new threat assessment which suggests that the threat from iran longer range ballistic missiles has been slower to develop while at short and medium range ballistic missiles are growing more rapidly than previously expected it is a sudden change and inconsistent with the frequent briefings intelligence reports and testimony the committee has received from intelligence and defense officials in march of two thousand and nine general craddock then commander of u s european command testified before the committee and i quote by two thousand and fifteen iran may also deploy and intercon a less continental ballistic missile capable of reaching all of europe and parts of the us and quote in may two thousand and nine and i'm classified intelligence report issued by the national air and space intelligence center stated quote  and information there seems to be this certainty within the administration that the iranians can't develop by two thousand and fifteen and that these aren't real threats to be worried about does this certainty consider foreign assistance because as we all know iran continues to work closely with north korea who themselves appear to be pursuing  certainty account for uncertainty intelligence is a fickle business especially when a country is determined to mask its activities friday's revelation that iran is building a culvert uranium enrichment facility is a case in point a december two thousand and seven national intelligence estimate judged that covert uranium enrichment efforts were halted less than two years later they're not  also highlighted intelligent information gaps and short so i'm skeptical when i hear administration officials talk in such absolute terms that the long range missile threat isn't as quick to develop are all concerned by the proliferation and growth in short and medium range missiles they are a threat to our allies particularly in the middle east in asia and to our forward deployed troops thus increasing our theater missile defenses is incredibly important however as i understood the previous plan ten interceptors in poland and radar in czech republic would be complemented by expanding her missile defense capabilities such as add patriot and allied systems to cover the shorter range areas all nato heads of state and government signed on to this basic approach at the april two thousand and eight bucharest summit the testimony submitted by our witnesses also emphasized that the new phased adaptive approach is more cost effective with proven technology and provides more comprehensive coverage of europe sooner than the previous plan proposal was the most cost effective solution to protect the us and europe another study done earlier this year by the congressional budget office examined and land based alternatives and came to the same conclusion as i understand it phase one phase two of the new approach provide only modest coverage of europe of course this depends on the number of ships available and locations where those ships would be deployed acquisition of new sensor technologies let's make one thing clear about this policy if this new approach is to match predecessor in terms of dedicated coverage we will either need new ships or we will have to  capability twenty fifteen or even twenty eight this new approach could leave parts of europe and the us vulnerable for several years are we offering to iran an open invitation to focus on a longer range missile development aside from the technical and cost concerns i'm particularly troubled by the geopolitical consequences of the administration's decision starting with this affect on our relationship with friends and allies  the czech republic and poland who have troops in afghanistan fighting alongside u s forces went out on a limb the us government made a commitment and we backed out i can express how strong my disappointment is over this so how did the administration inform prague and warsaw reportedly by a late night phone calls and hastily assembled diplomatic convoy apparently the czech prime minister was woken out of bed after midnight and the polish prime minister refused to answer the phone suspecting what the news might be on top of all this the announcement came on the seventieth anniversary of russia's invasion of poland at the start of world war two for a president who has repeatedly stressed the importance of multilateralism and diplomatic reengagement with the world the lateral action was abrupt occurring without the consultation promise to government what will be the second and third order effects of this there is what we believe and then there's what others the headline of a daily paper in the czech republic we are rightly afraid are we signaling to allies that we're willing to compromise our relations our relationships with them in order to better our relationship with russia or perhaps iran or north korea well our allies and friends  commitments more skeptically in the future well russia and iran use this as an opening to be more assertive in their foreign policy the administration's russia reset policy now seems to have morphed into a russia retreat policy that unsettles our allies and does nothing to discipline russian behavior though the administration has stated this is not a concession to russia it sure looks like one whether the timing was intentional or not on the eve of start negotiations in geneva the administration gave russia the concession it wanted and got nothing in return the president has also sought russia russian assistance to stop  iran's nuclear programs signaling that such assistance would lessen the need for the czech and polish sites that moscow has opposed yet we have no indications that russia will cooperate on iran and history should teach us to have very low expectations in fact prime minister putin remarked the day after quote the latest by president obama has positive implications and i very much hope that this very right and brave decision will unwise during his april fifth speech in prague the president stated as long as a threat from iran persists we will go forward with a missile defense system that is cost effective and proven let's take stock of where we're at the threat clearly and i am as yet unconvinced that the new approach is lower risk and more cost effective at protecting the u s and europe meanwhile the geo political implications resulting from the decision are significant finally perhaps the ultimate but the administration will be whether it is funded will program investments match the administration's new policy or not off to a good start with a one point two billion dollar reduction to the missile defense program in this year's budget i wait with interest the fiscal year two thousand and eleven budget request thank you mr chairman for holding this very important hearing members of the committee i appreciate the opportunity to discuss the administration's new approach in europe with you today we are confident that our new approach represents a dramatic improvement over the program of record under the old plan we were not going to be able to deploy a european missile defense system capable of protecting against iranian missiles until at least two thousand and seventeen under the new plan we will be able to protect vulnerable parts of europe and the tens of thousands of u s troops stationed with ratification of the missile defense basing agreement and the supplemental status of forces agreement we are also in discussions with the czech republic to ensure that they continue to play a leadership role in missile defense within the alliance we have several joint projects that are already underway and those will continue with our partners and we are discussing several more including the possibility of having the czech republic some of the new systems command and control element we certainly welcome russian interest in the new approach cooperation and sharing data from their radar but this is not about russia it never has been about russia regardless of the russian reaction we will continue to do whatever it takes to ensure our security architecture had a maximum capability to engage intermediate range ballistic missiles or medium range ballistic missiles aimed at europe or five continental ballistic missiles aimed at the united states from the middle east the most valuable component of the previous architecture to the defense of the u s homeland was a forward base sensor in southeastern europe which would provide early and precise tracks of threat missiles from the middle east heading towards the united states that's increasing the accuracy of the fire control instructions that are based at fort greely alaska and vandenberg air force base california we remain concerned about the future iranian i c b m threat therefore we are retaining the forward base sensor component in our new phased adaptive approach proposal to enhance the defense of the u s homeland moreover we also continue to develop the g m t system ground based midcourse defen and begin testing against i c b m targets using representative iranian trajectories a significant limitation of the previous european architecture was that the g b i were used in intercontinental attack of five iranians medium range ballistic or in or intermediate range ballistic missiles aimed at nato countries leaving no g b i to contribute to u s i c b m defense therefore the previously proposed european defense architecture was insufficient to protect nato and our forward based forces and provide redundant coverage of the united states homeland fortunately we have made significant advances over the last several years in missile defense technologies that enable a phased adaptive approach to defending europe the area of greatest potential is developing faster and more accurate control battle management communication systems using a network of many different sensors especially sensors that can track missiles in the early phases of their flight for example our intercept of the satellite in february two thousand and eight was made possible by combining data from sensors around world to provide a highly accurate track of the satellite to a modified weapon system and its s m three one a missile prior to the ship's radar even seeing the satellite although this was only a very limited capability operable satellite it demonstrated the significant benefit of networking sensors and the missile defense architecture another example is the most recent intercept test of the ground based midcourse defense system last december we combined the tracks of satellites early warning radar band radars forward based radar on land and sea to provide them with a very accurate track additionally earlier this year we demonstrated unmanned aerial vehicles as highly accurate for missile defense sensors and intercept tests furthermore last friday we successfully launched a pair of demonstration tracking and surveillance systems satellites that will detect and track ballistic missiles over their entire flight for the first time finally at our external sensors laboratory space colorado we continue to develop new algorithms and demonstrate combining new sensor data to achieve even more accurate than any individual sensor could produce we proposed standard missile three block one a as our primary interceptor in this architecture it is a very capable interceptor missile in june two thousand and six we've successfully intercepted a target in eight out of nine times and we've launched the interceptor of note the three threes are also more affordable than ground based midcourt ground based midcourse defense interceptors since you can buy four to seven production variants of the s m three for the cost of one g b i finally a key attribute is that we can launch s m three from sea or land sites on land which gives us great flexibility in placing the n s f there launcher between the threat and the area you are trying to protect a key enabler and intercepting threat missiles early in flight we are developing a new kill vehicle for the s and three interceptor the s m three one b which uses the same rocket motor as the s m three but has a more advanced seeker and fire control system that uses external sensors as well as the aegis radar we have already demonstrated the higher risk twice the range of an s and three block one b we propose defending nato in phases phase one would consist of ships with s m three block one a missiles deployed in the eastern mediterranean sea and a fo sensor in southeastern europe we propose by two thousand and fifteen the development and deployment of the s m three block one b missile which will have greater capacity to use a network of sensors and greater ability to discriminate prior to deployment decisions and additional advantage of the phased adaptive approach is its ability to missile defenses outside of europe finally the addition of radars and armor via russia and cooperative development of missile defense technology by russia and other countries are not necessary but would be welcome we are committed to fully funding this program as we prepare for the next budget submission to congress however it is important that we have relief from rescissions and the flexibility to spend on used f y o nine and some milk on military construction dollars associated with the previous european site proposal i note that both the house and senate authorizing committees have very precisely included provisions in this year's national defense authorization bill that permit the department to use two thousand and nine and fiscal year two thousand ten funding for an alternative architecture once the secretary of defense certifies that this architecture is as cost effective technically reliable and operationally available as the previous program with this re and some reductions redirections in the two thousand and ten funds we can pursue this new architecture with our fiscal year two thousand and ten budget request executing this approach will be challenging there will likely the setbacks but this architecture is no more challenging the development of other missile defense technologies in which we have been successful the engineering is executable and the development risks are manageable i thank you and look forward to your questions fighting requirements for over ten years now on the joint staff as a combatant commander and now as the vice chairman of the joint chiefs the congressionally directed ballistic missile defense review has provided the opportunity to review our objectives the threat the combatant commanders needs and the technologies available our recommendations are not a departure from the objectives the needs of the combatant commanders however reflect an adjustment to the balance of our capabilities in response to the threats they actually face today and that's threats that are clearly visible on the horizon my colleagues have lead laid that case before you allow me to address architecture and the broader implications of our recommendations across all of the combatant commanders the objectives have not changed as i said they remain defense of the homeland defense of our deployed forces friends and allies we still have a three tier approach here we defend the homeland and the principle weapon and systems that we use to defend the homeland are the ground based interceptors currently based in alaska and california we defend the theater and this is probably the newest capabilities that we're starting to field with the standard missile three and with the theater high altitude air defense missile called dad and we defend point defenses which are critical bases infrastructure where our forces are population centers things like that with the patriots so we have a three layered approach the homeland the theater and the point defense for critical assets that is still in place what we have now with the emergence of s m three and the thad system is a robust capability at the theater level which we did not have before each of these systems tend to believe over into each other so that the g b i can in fact work at the theater level which is what would have happened with the system that we would have put in europe it would have had the capabilities to work against medium range ballistic missiles and defend that theater but it is principally designed in a very sophisticated capability to defend the homeland sad and s m three can in fact defend the homeland if we put them there can in fact defend at the theater level and can in fact defend at the point level at bases and stations so each has a bleed across and that's some of the redundancy that's absolutely essential and is critical in the capabilities that the combatant commanders are asking for another words they don't want to require be required to rely on one system for each approach the emergence of the pac three and these theater capabilities really started about three years ago and we started to shift with the help of this committee our investment structure cross into s m three and sad most recently as it has started to base adaptive approaches we look at the threat from the basis of three points also it's a military thing we have to do everything in threes but but primarily we start with the terminal the it's the ability to  something at the end game so as the missile re enters the atmosphere and goes towards a target that's the terminal phase principally handled by patriot spice ad and by s m three the midcourse is the most challenging generally done outside of the atmosphere for long range ballistic missiles that is the terrain of the ground based interceptor that's where it works out is a very difficult place to work because you have to navigate and be able to operate in the atmosphere leave the atmosphere deploy the weapon and then close on the target had very very high speeds without the advantage of the air and then the terminal that's the re entry a very difficult phase and we use the patriot in principle to work that and along with the s m three and that the boost is where we have the most opportunity to be effective and it is the most difficult to field as a capability the boosters considered that phase from launch until we generally leave the atmosphere if you can catch a missile in boost phase from an operational standpoint it's before it can do much of anything it is any threat missile is most vulnerable in the boost phase there are many studies out there talking about the boost phase but it is very short it is a very kinetically active point in other words the missile is motors are running at that time and they're staging through it is a very difficult phase to beat and you've got to close very very quickly what is standing before us and twenty timeframe is an operationally relevant capability to start to close the boost phase that as the congressman said is to some extent paper today but we are on the breadboard we are testing the sensors and we are testing the missiles that we believe will give us the capability as a nation to get these missiles in the boost phase in the boost phase the missile doesn't care whether it's a short range medium range intermediate range or intercontinental r doesn't matter if you can catch it in the boost phase you can do something about it there very early in the game and that for us holds the greatest possibility we are focusing our r and d to try to come up with a relevant way and operationally relevant way to get at the boost phase that is that is the frost of a lot of our work as we move to the future we still remain the capability we remain and seek the capabilities to go after missiles that are either on a pad which is probably the easiest target and for which most i c b m s all i c b m s right now associated with iran and north korea had launched in other words they're very visible they're up above the ground and you can go after them before launch if  desire we don't we don't not advocating preemptive but it is a physical capability that we possess there is also the silo base that's a very difficult way and generally reserved for i c b m sophisticated countries but you put them in the ground and you launch them from silos and they come out of the ground it's very difficult to to go after that they can be hardened and it is a difficult target and the more more prevalent now direction that we see countries going is the mobile capability in other words we put these missiles on the tail drive them around to appear a point of advantage and then launch them from someplace remote so we still retain and want to retain the capability to go after pad based mobile based and silo based missiles we believe that's essential from the combatant commanders perspective to be able to get all three types of missiles this architecture allows us to do that and probably for the combatant commander the most significant change in the intelligence that's relevant to them and important to them is this idea of rate the number of missiles the systems that we have today such as patriot were designed to engage three maybe five missiles coming in and same for a ground based interceptor and yet what we're facing today and short range is hundreds and what we think we're going to face in the medium range by and in the very near future is hundreds not of the systems that we have today were really built for hundreds and that includes the s m three system which is the aegis radar that includes the patriot radar and the thad radars what is fundamentally different here is that we've added radar sensors and to take the existing weapons systems and make them effective against rates to be able to sort out and make sure that you're not wasting rounds multiple rounds against the same target because you're in different locations but to actually distinguish against rate this is what the combatant commanders are most  and this is what this radar in the southeastern part of europe the same radar that we deployed two years ago into japan and the radar we deployed dish here into israel the capability of this band radar is to sort through large raid numbers provide then to either the patriot or the s m three or the thad or the g b i exactly which target is assigned to which missile that is absolutely critical and something we've never had before that is fundamentally different and that is why it is so essential to the combatant commanders let me talk a little bit about adaptive in response to the command and control system that we have put together is not a company and a control system for europe only it is a command and control system that is global one of the biggest challenges we have today in the physical infrastructure and the physical industrial ability to field these systems is the missiles have far greater range than the sensors that are organic to them so a and aegis system and the s m three the s m three can fly much further than that system can see and guided the same is true for patriot the same is true for that obviously for the g b i as it goes around the ear what we're able to do today in this command troll system is used a sensor that dislocated from the weapon to actually guided to the interceptor that is the capability that will be fundamentally put together as we feel this system in two thousand and eleven but sure as we get to two thousand and fifteen a sensor completely dislocated from the system that is what we demonstrated when we shot down the errant satellite sensor on the ship never saw that satellite until last second or two  and being able to do that means that we do not now have to try to build on every ship or airplane or land base a huge as we call that aperture in order to see targets that are very very far away we can use netting of these sensors in a way that we could never do because we're in this digital age and move that data to the missile in a relevant operationally relevant way that's absolutely critical we want to be able to continue to hold at risk all of those targets that are fixed or relocatable or mobile but we also want to bring those attributes to our own capability once you fix a site that can only address a certain range of threats whether it's the missile or the sensor and so the system that we're looking at today in differentiation from the ground based interceptor is called relocatable in other words the threes that would be land based can be moved over probably think in terms of a couple of months and relocated if the threats been relocated so we can move them around by putting the system on the on the mobile platform which is the aegis system and the ship we can move to that threat if it emerges someplace that the intelligence didn't protect predict that would emerge and i love my intelligence counterparts but the one thing i have to live by as a rule is i can't rely on it i've got a thinking enemy out there they've got a vote they may emerg some place that we don't predict by having the system on yes on the ship we can close with the threat where ever it emerges no matter what the intelligence may have thought two or three years prior and that's just a fact the life we've got to be able to do that you will hold me accountable for doing that if we have to defend this nation and so we have to have a mixture between mobile relocatable and six sites the fixed sites actually are the cheapest once you build them it's  easier to to in fact sustain them and i think the congressman's point about ships and the cost of ships and their multiple missions is a fair point but understand that most of the aegis system depends on which when you look at have about one hundred forty two and in those tubes can be this kind of missile can be cruise missiles can be all sorts of different arm it is a very versatile and capable ship it depends on what mission u s sign it to as to what it goes and does but it's almost always ready to go do two or three other types of missions at any point in time we do not like to anchor a mobile ship to a fixed location for any extended period of time because it does in fact diminish its capability broader on a global scale but if that's what we need if that's what we need to get redundancy if that's what we need to move through a threat we didn't predict it is the most capable that we have capability that we have let me talk just a little bit more about weapons and sensors there's another thing here that's very fundamentally different for the combatant commander about this approach to weapons and sensors it is the ability to pair the right weapon with the right sensor and not have them owned by any one service not have them owned by any one country not have them owned by anyone may have been an ally yesterday may not be an ally today we can mix and match in ways that historically we've never been able to do we're trying to move to a s that we call any weapon any sense or we're not there yes but that's where we want to be for the vagaries of the intelligence that we have to deal with the real life fact that the enemy gets a vote in this and the reality that we're never sure who we're going to have to defend against tomorrow i would not have predicted that we were going to be in afghanistan five ten years ago i just it's it's a fact that we have to deal with on the combatant commander side the other part of this that's very powerful from our perspective is today many countries own the patriot system those patriots can be integrated into these sensors and this command and control very easily many countries own the aegis system we can integrate these missiles and their fire controls into this system very easily and the reality is many countries have weapons have sensors radars et have weapons that we can bring in for instance in israel we are integrating their aero weapon into this system we're enter grading other countries radars into this system we talked briefly about the she'll to get the two russian radars this system is ignatieff dick to the source it basically converts the data into something that can be used no matter how it was developed an awful what system the bulk of our radars that we're using for this system were fielded in the one nine hundred seventy s and we're using them today for modern weapons and modern threats because we can do that in the digital age and this starts to realize for us the ability to bring allies together in fundamentally different ways think about a system that you could not afford as a single nation because you can band together with your neighbors you can build a defense that is a different way of thinking ranking member mccain and thank you very much for the warm welcome to my distinguished members of the house armed services committee it is an honor to testify before you today let me say before the question start  that i miss you professionally and personally very much and i thank you very very much for your service and i thank you for the opportunity to testify before you today on the president's approach to missile defense and i know that the president's decision has prompted much discussion especially on cable talk shows and on from editorial pages restating what my very distinguished colleagues from the department of defense have already said i want to bring a sense of balance to the discussion and focus my remarks on the foreign policy implications of this initiative let me begin by stating very strongly that the obama administration is fully committed to deploying operationally effective and cost of sect of missile defenses to protect the  are deployed forces overseas and our allies after months of review and with the full support of his national security team president obama decided to bolster our national security and renew our approach to missile defense in europe  today based on the latest intelligence and what we understand the threat to be today the intelligence community found that the threat of a potential iranian intercontinental i c b m had been slower to develop than previously estimated while the threat from iran's short medium range ballistic missiles is developed me more quickly than previously projected the iranian missile launches earlier this week visibly demonstrate the nature of this threat our approach provides more effective defenses today against the threat the allegations that we decided to cancel plans for us european based missile defense deployments are simply not true from a foreign policy perspective our new approach has a number of advantages over the previous plan first as the threat of volves the system will evolve to protect all of our european nato allies we can't protect and leave others vulnerable second our plan missiles to overwhelm the system the greater number of interceptors under our new plan will complicate iran's plans to use or threaten to use their ballistic missiles as coercive weapon third the system is more mobile and can be deployed more quickly than the previous system plus we can tailor the number of deployed interceptors to the threat for us placing an ethicist on proven tape abilities such as the s m three interceptor will increase the credibility of the united states commitment in the eyes of our allies and i might say our adversaries deploying missile defenses with a demonstrated track record of success means that our allies will not have to wonder whether a system can be reliable and defending against a threat again this new architecture provides an improved opportunity for other allies to participate in the defense of europe so it's not a surprise that foreign leaders like chancellor merkel president sar and prime minister brown have praised our new approach we believe the response from the polish and czech governments has been positive since our trip to europe we will continue our efforts to strengthen our strategic relationship with our bilateral relationships have expanded in both depth and breadth and we consider both countries both of whom have participated in operations in iraq and afghanistan to be among our closest and staunchest allies we remain committed to implementing a range of security and defense dialogues that we have offered both countries the opportunity to participate in elements of our new missile defense architecture when we visited more for worse the last month we offered pole in the opportunity to host a land based s m three  r site we will further demonstrate our commitment to poland by ensuring in the near future that we have boots on the ground which is what the polish government really wants this could include plans to rotate a u s army patriot unit to poland with respect to the czech republic the united states will continue to identify areas where armed militia cooperation could be strengthened and broadened we hope to conclude soon an agreement that would provide a means for defense cooperation in many areas and we will continue to work on the ballistic missile defense research with the czech industry i want to make a final point regarding russia nothing that we did had anything to do with russian saber rattling or their consternation about the ground based interceptors or the czech radar the decision was not part of any trade off or quid pro quo as someone who participated in the senior level interagency meetings as part of the decision making process i can tell you that president obama based decision on the latest intelligence which calls for a stronger missile defense program that can be deployed if as a consequence of president obama's decision relations with russia went first to prague then to prague and then to the north atlantic council i think one of the things we had to deal with when we arrived there had been a number of leaks in the press or erroneous and speculative stories in the press so that we found despite previous consultations we found our allies expecting something different than what we were actually going to suggest to them so i think part of our meetings was really focused on explaining the new approach to them correcting misimpressions of what exactly the proposal was i think once they understood that particularly in poland we got very quickly got into discussions radar would not be part of the new architecture but we also hastened to reaffirm the fact that the agreement for cooperation on missile defense would continue we have a number of ongoing projects with them and that we would welcome finding new ways for them to participate in the new architecture and we are already having follow on discussions with them to identify specific play a leadership role in the new system lastly when we went to with in both countries poland and the czech republic where the same that i've been sitting across the table for four years i believe they're greatly comforted from the fact that what we're proposing is very minor changes to the ballistic missile defense agreement that we have already agreed to that we're waiting ratification for in the case of poland it's changing literally the reference to a ground based interceptor capital letters to a ground based interceptor lower we no longer see a requirement for the radar but there are many opportunities including facilities which they could host as we have a more distributed system across europe especially in our area of command and control and we have been following up reorient everyone to the fact that we were not killing missile defense in europe but in fact enhancing it and improving it so that took a couple of minutes but i think what you can see i met with my my polish counterparts just earlier this week  they were in town to finish the negotiations on both the agreement on the basing and on the supplemental so far which are important for not only pack three installations but for this for the future s m three installation that we hope that they are going to agree to and they're increasingly enthusiastic about this our friends and in the czech republic are very interested in a number of different things that we're talking to them about but i think the most important thing was very late in the day after after now going to two cities we arrived in brussels to meet with the nac and i think what you see is that our north atlantic council members our nato allies are very happy to see that we are nato allies seeing that this is a system that is now not going to protect some in nato but all of nato and that it's going to do it sooner against the current threat with proven technology and i think it's very clear that they are enthusiastic about this that they're happy to see that the commanding control system that they're developing very nicely with what we're proposing so i think that there is a net benefit to everyone that was it is being recognized i think the statements out of prime minister in poland and foreign minister sikorsky really state that this is something that they are very very happy to see and that we are working closely with them to go forward and provide more information chairman i've been following ballistic system and they're the radar and the launcher that the components they are the same there is some integration costs we spend when we integrated onto a ship it's about forty five million dollars to upgrade i need to ship  over eighty today to upgrade and have listed missile defense capability and a land based s and three to prepare the site there's about one hundred fifty million preparation and then the by the same components in total it's about three hundred fifty million for one of those sites without the missiles which would right now we're projecting a minimum of twenty four missiles site so that would be two hundred forty many million additional dollars in terms actual capability that we believe we have are our simulations verify that our independent assessments show that it actually covers parts of the water around europe so that means we have flexibility of where we can place them it doesn't have to be in one particular to build another system which would be far simpler the s s was designed against an old design where there would be hundreds of i c b m s in the air at any one time and it was able to cover the entire earth we're looking we're using these satellites now because they are available the two of them to be doing extensive amount of testing over the next couple years to verify the requirements to build a much simpler system that's focused on missile defense and would only cover really long range three stage kinds of bessel you've got to go to your is it s m three block to be that you're planning that's the and that that missile is going to be ready about what time tw sir we've used a very conservative planning factors that we completely test that system we would start testing the booster portion of it in two thousand and thirteen seven years ahead of time so we have laid in an extensive amount of time to test and deploy this but we would conduct much of the testing in the twenty sixteen timeframe a decision in two thousand and twelve twenty eighteen and then two more years we're projecting before we would deploy it so it's very conservative so in a way the first thing i'm hearing is there is a gamble and what you're proposing in the gamble is that iran is going to develop an i c b m before two thousand and twenty no sir we have the ground they go that other way i thought they were mostly aimed toward the but they go both ways they can go both ways and sir if you look at the earth from a polar projection from the north pole you'll see that actually the closest part of the united states to iran is and it's in a prime location for both threats and that forward base sensor that's why it was proposed in the previous architecture for keeping it in this one significantly contributes to our ability to track anything sub southeastern part of europe today is within the range of medium range ballistic missiles literally ranges between one thousand to two thousand kilometers class of missile and that stretches over more than half of nato  threats that we see the ones we're most concerned about right now are two thousand kilometer threats which today cover most of southeastern europe and that is the threat we want to address as general cartwright three works ok for  that ok so the second question i had is it seems like it's from endlessly effective i mean it cost very expensive to have whatever it is five or six ships on station all the time providing this kind of coverage it seems like t there there's a tremendous number of requirements for having those working in different places and now all of a sudden were absorbed in what is it six of the ships in order to do this particular proposal as opposed to a ground based kind of approach  doesn't that seem to be very cost ineffective i'll jump in if that's alright for the last five years we've been doing this in the sea of japan we don't put them on station primarily because what we're dealing with is a pad launch system we can see that very visibly and so we give ourselves a question but generally send two ships out it only takes a couple of days to get them out there so we don't tie down a mobile system which is very versatile we put it there when we know we need it the two ships are there one is on station the other one is protecting the ship and they just swap back and but that's generally the way we approach it we intend to do the same for this two thousand and eleven system have three different or six days one last question that is my understanding was that you were going to network all of these sensors and radars anyway and s m three is this anything new that what we were planning to do anyway it's only a maturation of the technology now to move it towards a production capability and an operational capability versus a pure test so this is always been on the drawing board to do this right has changed in the one thing that is technically changed is alluded to earlier the twenty about if you believe there is a potential opportunity for cooperation with russia including the possibility of russia radar data and do you believe that's a corporation would be in the best interest  you i want to restate that nothing that we did had anything to do with russia but we were obviously obvious knowledgeable of the ancillary benefits of working more closely with russia the russians have an agreement with us right now to go forward on a jet joint threat assessment a number of things that president obama agreed to when they were when they met in july  i will be meeting with my russian counterparts in about ten days in moscow to talk about a number of things but missile defense is one of those issues we have a russia nato council that had been moribund but that now has been restarted our nato allies are very interested in working engaging with russia russia shares the same threat that we do from short medium range and long range from iran so there are a number of pieces to this but i want to make it very clear that while we have an ambitious agenda with russia we are negotiating a new start treaty right now it is very clear that nothing that we did had anything to do with getting something from russia there was no quid pro quo but it is obvious as there are many things missile defense is one of those things and we will be talking to them about it in the next few weeks i would just invite perhaps to comment on the technical aspects of what would be gained from data from russian radars as part of the for tracking more detailed tracking you require more precise radar and the russians are building one an arm of the russia and that capability is similar to what we have in the u k and our other early warning radars so our architecture was designed without those radars in consideration but they're in a very good location for observation any missile activity in southwest asia and  conducting tracking on the same order of capabilities specially from arm of the arm of the or early unit of missiles flight heading towards the united states thank you so much thank you  it's important for us that when we have a difference of conclusion that we least go down the things that we agree and i think some of the disagreement comes from also a lack of understanding because the terms get confused we have short range medium range and in our immediate range and i confuses the discussion somewhat so let's go to what we agree i think we all agree that iran has a missile program they are seeking i c b m missile technology that would reach the united states they are  seeking missiles that are capable of reaching the major population centers of europe we all agree we all agree and i think we believe that iran is seeking nuclear weapon capability so we are looking at the future of missile technology that perhaps is  supposedly all this new threat assessment is based upon and i think we could all agree that there is nothing in that intelligence that says that they won't get that twenty five they could get it earlier in the intelligence certainly says that for the ground based missile system generally you previously testified that upon ratification it's four years for the radar to go in five years for the interceptors to go and i believe nobody believes that that's changed so we can all agree that under the best capability match go further than the white house plan though doesn't address the i c b m until twenty twenty it's right up on their website now that's not accounting for existing systems and existing programs that's just the alternate system to the one that was scrapped that's the comparative the comparative is what's being scrapped two thousand and fifteen and what is going to be provided as an alternative by the white house's own statements that's twenty twenty  major european population centers don't receive protection until twenty eighteen again there are twenty twenty of why house and twenty eight thousand is all compared to two thousand and fifteen now i love the words proven and tested we hear that all the time we need systems that are proven and tested now we all know that the three block has not been completed and has not been tested it's intended in this new proposal to be the population centers for your protection and we also know the s m three block to be which is supposed to provide the protection united states doesn't even currently exist again the comparative being to the g b i that would have been going into to europe which is does exist is a testing system and is expected in the two states to have its completed testing by  have in alaska were intended to be forty previously has been cut this year to thirty two as a backup for our protection from iran it is been reduced from forty to thirty ability has been reduced and we all agree that it's not really sufficient to protect the united states slowly or the alternative from the white house would include another plan that that the white house is still proposing a system that would with the to be that would support it what i want to know is in the two thousand and nine budget what is new if you look to two thousand and budget what is new and what is not new in what you are proposing because it looks as if that what was forecast in two thousand and nine includes substantially what the white house is now touting as a new system could you do that comparative for me please two thousand and nine  allies and those that we wanted to help with this threat of short and medium range missiles coming to europe or to the southern portion of russia so as i read the newspapers it surprises me that people think this is a new direction just sort of and i'm sorry i missed part of this because i'm also on homeland and we've had some other meetings going on but could you just talk a little to what were the  in the end it is the president's decision to make the change that has been made and i think that the congress certainly in a bipartisan way over the last few years realize that that there was a current threat of short medium range missiles targeting our nato allies our forward deployed troops our friends and family members and that that is why the congress who looked at the previous administration's budget submission made some changes e real change agents for for what has become this new architecture the first was the intel every administration comes in and orders a new new intel assessment on many different things are lots of reviews that go on the president ordered new intel and he ordered a new ballistic missile defense review and when he did that it was very clear that there were two new data points first was that the assumptions that the intel committee had made about the maturation of the long range ballistic missile capabilities of iran had not moved as expected in fact the short medium range had moved dramatically further than the long and medium range and knowing that we are protected by work really and by vandenberg for both the korean and the iranian threat the other second piece was that the maturation of the technology specially sensor technology over the arc of the last few years made it clear that there was a way to protect now with current proven technology current threat our nato allies into visibly as opposed to about a third of them being left out in the previous system so i think it was the intel and the ballistic missile review that really took  president to the place where the review also included for the first time the combatant commanders and which i think was very fundamentally new and as general cartwright spoke in the command combatant commanders have a list of requirements that they wanted to have missile defense meet so i think that those are the three different things that caused us to look at a change and i think the president was compelled by the fact that you could take the architecture to meet the threat to do it faster to do it more cost effectively you could bring nato when you could do all of nato and you could do it in a way that still protected the united states against the current threats and embed and the emerging threats and  were there meetings held all along for the last two three four years with our allies with our nato allies with poland with the czech republic at the congressional ministration level to talk about some of these changes that might occur if in fact the data came back and told us there might be a smarter way to do this or that our allies this get surprised by this well as i said in my testimony i think that there was lots of consultation and there was lots of there is also lots of speculation and there is also lots of domestic press and others potentially there might be a change and i think people got ahead of themselves and the reality is that this is a better system for the for the current threat and the future threat one that protects the united states and our allies in a way that is more cost effective thank you thank you m e let me take a stab at that i think the most pressing reason was that we felt that there'd been extensive inner agency discussion and the architecture that general riley and general cartwright have described so well was really emerging as a very strongest possible option and we realized we had an opportunity to not only shape the f y eleven budget to try to influence you know where things are right now and we didn't we didn't want to miss either of those budget opportunities and the truth is if we had waited all the way early next year when things were formally review  wouldn't have the same opportunity to make sure the money is flowing in the right direction in support of a new architecture was the primary driver but with regard to relationship to start i think both the president o and actually it was agreed by initialing instructions to the start and go shitters there is no linkage between start and more stick missile defense we refused to acknowledge or accept that language from the get go in these negotiations the truth even though that's not what drove the decision so there was no good time from that perspective so we what we did is too important not to miss the window very important we not miss the window on influencing the ten eleven budget appropriately in why are we cutting missile defense by one point two billion dollars just starting today within the last fiscal year that ended yesterday we have an annual deficit of about two trillion dollars you know fifteen hundred times one point two million let me clarify i think the timing of the decision the decision to go ahead and roll out this piece was influenced by the budget calendar the architecture was not driven by budgetary considerations it was driven by general cartwright and general describe is what best meets both the needs of the command commanders and the needs of the nation  clear up some misperceptions but we clearly have taken several issues out of q t r out of a ballistic missile defense review and out of the space review and brought them forward to get us to not lose a year  debate in moving to any direction change that the department might want to take that really gave us this opportunity we took advantage of it from the from the standpoint of the budget calendar not from the standpoint of cost to your issue of resources that you give us we're going to continue or we plan to continue to do the testing necessary to ensure that that ground based interceptor in fact is real not just paper and that if all else fails as congressman turner talked about we do in fact have a way to look at that which was along lines of the original program also that radar that we're going to put in the czech republic is physically  general cartwright and general riley the united states has already deployed a forward base radar in israel and we have cooperative missile defense programs with that country the main missile threat to  israel comes from iran's growing number of medium range missiles and the new architecture is intended to defend against the same kind of iranian missiles so my questions are overall how would you describe the impact of this new strategy the new architecture architecture on israel's security that's number one and number two can you tell us whether the new architecture will help improve the ability to defend israel against iranian missile threats or missile attack i'll i'll start and then i'll let general riley chime in the system was put there last year to allow us to begin to do the testing and the integration work that's going on not only with the patriot systems that we have historically deployed to israel but as we start to move as we speak today the command and control system for the fad is also now been moved out so that we can start to integrate those pieces and the aegis piece so what that radar brings to the capability to defend israel as we move to the future is as i talked about in my statement disability to get at the larger age number one and then so multiple missiles coming in towards israel and then number two to be able to see further than the organic sensors of any of those systems so now they can see out much farther sign inbound threats to specific weapons and specific sensors within israel's brand and defend the country much more effectively and that would also reduce the number of missiles that we have to build because now we don't have to build two and three for every threat coming in we can actually be much more efficient so from a war fighting standpoint that's what this is going to do the second piece is as we look to the future that ability to see further than the organic sensors is the testing that will go on in the integration that will go on so a sensor not necessarily associated with a weapon being able to see farther pass that information to the weapon or the sensor that supports that weapon and get that this architecture is one of the fundamental capabilities and attributes of this architecture to protect europe is a political tool to any theater in the world and it's mobile and our capability on  quickly move into that region we're already proposing them to be in the eastern med and they can provide an entire additional layer of defense over israel as well as the enhanced capability but you know our intelligence has never been one hundred percent and there needs to be a margin of error and so that and i hear what you're saying about we've got the backup systems in alaska we also know that no system is one hundred   for the i c b m threat our primary capability still resides in alaska and california that we've never seeded and you know not going to the systems that the iranians and the north koreans have demonstrated thus far had based so in other words there's only certain number of pads to a north korea you know through war in iran so their ability to generate large numbers is still very nascent and and will take  will take time the the capability to move from where they are today even with assistance and i and i i'm a worry wart so where you are on worrying about this the next steps ar visible in other words they have to occur up and up above the atmosphere where everybody in the world can watch them and those are the steps that allow you to take that last stage separated a weapon from that last stage get it to a stable configuration find a place over the earth to penetrate the atmosphere survived that penetration was with both the with the r v the vehicle and the contents and that's a very violent activity survive the heat in the re entry and then actually find something that you would impact each of those steps is very visible so we'll know when they they move forward the one that i probably were the most about is to is their ability to move from a pad system to a mobile system to an erector then they can be in places that we don't necessarily watch every day so if i'm to worry about something that would be it but again they'd have to go through these other steps before they can move to the mobile configuration as we set this new system up to clarify something when you say it's very visible in terms of testing yes yes and so unlike what we've done up until today which is much of this engineering occurs in labs or in test places this is something that has to be a launch it has to occur it's very visible and everybody in the world can pretty much watch it and watch the progress there because we can see that because actually general riley jump in but we're being conservative if we feel much as we did with the g b i because of the threat earlier than all testing is complete then we'll have to do that i'll certainly come here and recommend that because something is better than nothing  put forward in phase one the earliest part of this new architecture the forward based radar to enhance seeing what's coming from iran and three that we really focus on developing this new capability phase four that might give us that should give us the capability which is a game changer and finally that we keep the development of on the books as a hedge in case things come earlier in case there's any kind of technological the public record of our intelligence that iran has not demonstrated the capability to use an intermediate range missile let's assume that that's wrong let's assume we're completely wrong about that and that iran either is quickly demonstrating quickly developing that capability or has it now i want to compare the old plan that we were operating under meet our obligations to our interests and allies in europe central general the new option and the reason i proposed my recommendation to go forward with this phase adaptive approach was the rigidity which you're referring to of the previous america and so i hope you'll grant me diplomatic immunity there's no intent on my part to challenge anyone's motivation here because i believe you're all committed to this country and let me just start by saying  i completely embrace all that you're saying in terms of the geometric increase in the threat of short and medium range missiles and the complexity and the array that we face and some of the rate challenges is one greatest concern to me today is that this new approach has been juxtaposed with the old approach and i think that's a false dynamic because the new approach was essentially anticipated by the previous administration we've been moving in this direction i find quite sincerely very little in the new new approach that's truly new i think we've been moving in this direction again thanks a lot to general cartwright and his philosophy that he's embraced and along with generosity and so i don't see a great deal of new i think really what the debate here is is the elimination of the g b i site in europe which essentially was to provide a redundancy protection for the u s homeland and to be able to throw in some potential protection from europe was a was a freebie and a good thing and my greatest concern is a wrongs march toward becoming a nuclear armed nation and i truly believe that one of their great goals of course strategically and tactically is to be able to threaten and hold at risk american assets american homeland and that if indeed we were able bang correct the reality is that i believe that this new system that we talk about that was already on the books will still come too late to play much role in the calculus that iran has in moving forward with their nuclear program and i think that the european site would have devalued their program to an extent that perhaps perhaps some of our sanctions might have had some effect so i guess the concern that i have let me diminish quote the general right of the ballistic missile defense system is daily becoming more global the defense of deployed forces allies and friends again short to medium range ballistic missiles in one region theater will be buttressed by additional standard s m three interceptors more aegis b m d engagement capable warships the additional initial thought that fire units additional sea based thermal and interceptors tiny's assets to gather as mr cartwright said will be a global command control battle management communications capability unquote and of course the bush administration's budget turned over to the obama transition team includes plans to feel over four hundred three inside interceptors by two thousand and sixteen and i don't see in this new approach that it's going to be a lot of that by two thousand and sixty so my greatest concern is simply this in terms of protecting the homeland the european site would have offered us some redundancy protection from long range iranian missiles i think we all agree with that and i'm asking you generally  timeline are we having an additional risk to this country for any period of time because of the loss of the european site or no i i don't believe we're at greater risk because of the insufficiency as i just testified i believe of our previous architecture let me interrupt you testified to two thousand and fifteen in the last situation so you think that this new system is going to be able to provide the redundancy that the european site would by two thousand and fifteen i don't think the old system would provide that redundancy that you're referring to it's very questionable and the concern is as the intel assessments are showing that number intercon intermediate range missiles and medium range missiles has grown to an extent that just having ten interceptors over there it would very quickly be consumed and then the secondary launch at the united states was in vietnam and right after i got back from vietnam so my history's longer i'm certainly not as informed as mr spratt's but i've been in favor of missile defense for years and years now i happen to be a democrat and i think the  news that comes from this debate is kind of like mayors i was former mayor we used to talk about how there's not a republican or a democrat way to fill a pothole the good news that comes from this debate and that should be clearly understood by the country is that both democrats and republicans are in favor of missile defense technology has maturity to the point where we we don't argue about whether we should spend our money doing this we argue about what's the best system how should we spend our money doing this i think it's extremely unfortunate that the administration made a mistake well i guess it was in the administration i think  here in the house made the mistake of cutting the administration's request for missile defense for this year's budget that was a real tactical error because it you know to ordinary folks out there simply suggests that the current administration or at least the current congress isn't as committed as the prior congress was to the subject of missile defense and that's just not so but there's no way you can explain the cut any other way at least ordinary americans and this current congress is just not as committed in which of those so it's really unfortunate that we did the greatest somehow we could reverse that in the sort of waning days here and free up the money to let you all do what you want to do  accept this testimony that you're all sincere that you sincerely think this is the direction we should be headed in and frankly general cartwright you've been in your posts now for what three years so you're a pre and i just i think it's really unfortunate that we managed to cut the budget if i could i'd like to ask how the new architecture and i know this is focused principally in europe how the new architecture protects us from an e m p threat a scud missile launch from a scow somewhere in the ocean i think that that's something that we really need to be thinking about a lot one of the reasons why i requested language in the current authorization bill asking that the department of defense conduct a study of you know putting small nukes nuclear power facilities hardened nuclear power facilities in all of our military bases around the country i think that can be done actually with the private sector paying for it if they're sized in a way that gives power back into the grid so i think it's a win win basically for america but from a national security perspective i think it's very important given the p thread so comments about what the sort of new world that you all are talking about here that most folks couldn't possibly understand unless they spent years studying the subject this new world will enable us as far as protection against e m p threats or rogue missiles one missile like to touch on kind of both of those issues and then i'll cede to the other members here but i worry about this because the reality is rudimentary end and so much of what we are trying to accomplish in the current detailed defense review is to make sure that we are in fact looking at both ends of the spectrum at the at the terrorist stand which is generally the most challenging how do you handle someone who really doesn't value their own life much less the value of anyone else's life and generally clouds which you know  to take that objective away from the enemy and so much of what we're doing we put in the role of consequence management protection just by the daily way we do business how we build our buildings now these kinds of initiatives that w talk about protected and hardened power protected in howard and communications that would allow us to make sure that even if god forbid that occurs any enemy of the united states would understand that would not change our resolve our ability to carry out that all and that's that's the way i approach every day much of what we're doing in the quad and all defense review on this side of the question goes to these issues about how do you take the objective away often let me first say i don't think this should be a question of false choices let me say that what president obama has put forward is a system that will deal with current threats now we'll deal with our european allies now and protect them against what we saw just this week is a robust iranian short medium range threat the sense that we either have  so as general riley testified last year that the g b i is in poland we're a redundancy the system is going to include the opportunity to deal with a future iranian long range threat against the united states as a redundancy so i think that these false choices have got to be put aside in favor of what we think is a very robust system that deals with the current threat now and protects nato allies first and in a phased way and then indivi when we saw our european allies it was very clear that they had no idea what the bush of the but the obama administration's plan was going to be we explained it to them and as you can see from the comments by chancellor merkel president deployment the czechs were working on a number of different things so i think that what you see is universally our our european allies have moved past the debate about what is going on and have absorbed and have  really appreciate what we're doing and i think that that is really the opportunity for us to move forward on a system that can deal with current threats now general o reilly missile defense cooperation with israel and india have been mutually beneficial with technology we know how talented the people are of israel and india a large number of engineers in your view will the new missile defen deployments around the world what is key is our ability to integrate with the host nation command and control systems and what they're trying to contribute to missile defense and in the case of israel we have clearly shown over the last they're pretty similar it's kind of like a telephone pole going up it's a pretty easy shot now let's say that this system that the bush administration wanted to have which was going to shoot it as it goes up when the russians shoot a missile they have a lot of decoys and my understanding is that if the iranians happen to put a bunch of decoys on this missile and you don't get it in the sen that the bush administration's proposal the czech republic and poland wouldn't be able to handle that is that correct the radar first the combination of the radar missiles as originally planned which would be the ground based interceptors in poland and the radar in the czech republic the radar in the czech republic had one function that was to discriminate between  decoys as it left the atmosphere when they would be so that was the value of that radar at the time it really had no other function and that just one piece more piece on their intercept had to occur while it was in the range of that radar correct my understanding is you would have had a need a second radar site in order to do that discrimination not just one correction only from the standpoint that that radar has to be q and that's what radar  southeastern part of so you would have had to had to radar site so the system we were originally going to plan would have to have another radar there so that discrimination when we got to the point at which the iranians would be able to do that same question i have is multimission task  my understanding is navy ships tend to be able to handle handle summary threats missile threats from aircraft surface threats and others is just one more threat that a well planned crew could do a mission it is but to be fair also when you dedicate the radar when they set up the technical but when they set up the energy  something this architecture supports that and our focus is to have that first shot as early as possible i guess my question is as you go further down the road  you have thirty g b i's in alaska correct yes or if you wanted to i mean if you did get those two shots if you had to could you just add another thirty to get a three shots or does that you system that we're proposing for europe also is a mid course we would have to wait till after the highest part of the flight of a missile even coming into europe so if we had two opportunities  the first opportunity is a very limited one only against certain towards the united states that you could have had that intercept again as i testified before i'm  concerned about having those missiles available because there's a very large number of missiles that are threatening europe now that you would want to use every missile you possibly had an under the old architecture you would be engaging tho shorter range missiles actually with the g b i and set up a scenario where they wouldn't be there either shot so if i were to walk out of this hearing i think i only got four seconds  is i could walk out saying that in the first two years we will now cover israel the middle east troops southeastern turkey from shortly range in medium range which we short range me made which we wouldn't do under the two thousand direction tell me what the environment will look like when you go to the long range ballistic when they do develop one where missiles which we have intelligence that they are developing developing we will continue that work we're having a flight test work with the japanese to have our first flight test in two thousand and fourteen so they'll be funding for that program as well as other aspects of the missile defense capability including for a second because we are very pleased i think that that we have this inner agency approach today and there of a strong diplomatic piece to it and we understand that and i wonder then if secretary tells you you could particularly i think respond and if others want to join in we know through your prepared remarks quoting nato secretary general rasmussen the role that nato will be playing and i think part of the question is how is that going to be different what has changed what do we anticipate in their involvement and also what role do we think the nato allies will be playing in a kind of cautionary effort to ensure th the wealthier nations are contributing to the success of this strategy could you comment on that or thank you thank you congressman davis i want my colleagues from the defense department to talk about some of the burden sharing opportunities which which are important but i think suffice it to say that that there was a lot of criticism of the bush administration for what was considered to be bilaterally negotiating with what the polls in the czechs we're very grateful that the polls in the czech stepped up  that that was a criticism i think that was overblown the truth of the matter is is that we have article five considerations that are that are very very important to us we believe that the defense of new york is the same as the defense of warsaw an attack on prague is an attack so we know now because of the threat that the threat analysis that we have an assessment that we have that the short medium range threats that are holding at risk american forward deployed troops american assets in nato allies are significant just to test this week of the iranian short medium range missiles that that we have risks right now that we have got to put assets against and i think that we have a very robust engagement with our nato allies so nato wising this process not only gives us a chance to use indigenous technologies developed by our allies but also burden sharing but the kind of centralized command and control that's very necessary to protect our assets to work with our allies and to have we hope a future cooperation with russia through the russian council so that we have a very big network system that can protect everybody including our forward deployed troops against these threats perhaps i shall just add i mean one of the the real strengths appeals of this new system is it has a broad variety of ways that other countries can participate there are nato countries that are to have the aegis ships they could choose to upgrade those with missile defense capability and contribute that way there are countries who are interested in acquiring the kind of you that could be used designed which is going to link the sort of lower tier defense to this sort of middle and upper tier defense and of course there's opportunity for co development of systems going forward as other countries in asia participated with us so there's a lot of different ways that countries can chip in both individually and as part of one of the questions might be whether we are in fact getting greater leverage with the new architecture and bringing  site that was proposed it was a large complex it was a missile field that missile simply buildings and so forth had a large contractor support team that was there so the total number of the site personnel was around four hundred fifty people at any one time manning that site in contrast to land based three site is much smaller it is as far as prep goes i pads of concrete primarily and fences security and so forth it has an operational it's population and this is very early but our estimate is it's somewhere around seventy people so it's a significantly smaller footprint even though you have upwards you could have upwards of eighty interceptors at the same site previously had ten to build one of those missile fields for example a five year construction period  as i listen to this morning and read through the testimonies earlier and it brings home once again that you all are doing a great job and working through this very difficult challenge but the reality for iran is they are not safer by pursuing the nuclear program or not safer by pursuing their missile program and i'm one of those people that think there is a a lot that eventually americans iranians will do together as people that will be very very productive but defense that somehow we think that we set up a program that all these programs are multi year that we can never learn from the changing world or changing technology or i just don't i just don't get why we would think that somehow you are going to make changes that you can sit there and testify after years and years of service to your country that this enhanced u s homeland defense when in fact it weakened i don't get it and i don't get it i think is a lot of technological technological change i wanted to ask her i think i'll address you with this these questions to you as regards to the discussion that's been going on about poland and russia and i understand what you leaking and there was a sense that once the president made the decision that we had to get out there and do literally within hours of the president making the decision we were on planes going to see them  are enormously grateful that the polish government and the czech government worked with the previous administration on the what was called the program of record but things have changed they've changed significantly changed we have a big commitment in poland and the radar in the czech republic against public opinion public opinion in both countries was significantly against it so both governments used a lot of political capital to support the ally the united states and have problem they paid the price and now we're backing off as well i think what happened was in anticipation of the b m d review being released there was a lot of domestic us speculation as to what the characterization of that would i commend you because these nations that are now asking us to spend a lot of money in their country or one regime away from asking us to leave those huge investments on the part of the american people just like we saw in spain philippines panama puerto rico which of our fellow americans just go to waste obviously i come from ship building country obviously i was aboard many of these things because you don't have to ask so much permission to use the ocean  if you look at every potential threat out there on an ocean and from our colleagues who are rightfully concerned about iran i would remind you that the iranians don't have any carriers anywhere near our country  have any submarines anywhere near our country don't have troops on two countries bordering our country and i would think that the iranians are very much aware of the three things that i do and that that should be on their thoughts every day if they ever think of doing something is sending a missile towards the united states of america or any of our troops so having said that i'm just curious how much did those things we gave up in spain panama  puerto rico play into the decision not to make huge capital investments in somebody else's country before they could ask us to leave it anymore i'll start congressman i for me aspect of this and then the relocatable aspect gives us a really powerful land and we're talking today about europe but i am equally focused on the north korean threat obviously it's a part of this dialogue but there's not a lot of landmass out there and to be in the right place to defend this country is going to probably have to be and so as we look at the entire globe these mobile systems both in their flexibility to adjust to changes in the geopolitical side of the house but also to try to adjust to changes in the threat and where that threat will come from an essential element for me can't be compromised we've got to have  mobile a mobile system costs more than a fixed infrastructure but that investment is generally easily returned and it's flexibility our allies have stepped up and we are very aware of our article five commitments to our nato allies to the program of record would not have protected even in its final stages all of our european allies and our system begins to protect them now so i think we shouldn't get into the job of picking false choices this is a very comprehensive flexible system that's adaptive it deals with the current threat with proven technology now and i think that that is a characteristic that  the president understood i think that we hope that we get support from the congress but in the end it gives us the kind of flexibility not only to deal with the basing issues but also to the threat debate we just had today and how both sides are supporting missile defense we still have differences sadly i think some of our partisan sometimes i sit here thinking about being our allies and i understand that sometimes you have to move in in ways that take care of all of the problems but i hope we can reach out to them and make sure that they fully point two billion dollars in the budget if these new programs general cartwright just said the mobile system is going to cost more now there's been a lot of talk it's cheaper but it is going to cost more and if and if there was a change made in direction we should've kept the money in there and put it toward that because we haven't totally handle all of the money situation so thank you thank you for what you're