do them on par with the promotion boards adopting pretty much the same procedures and the same rule in fourteen twenty point one a the instruction which is the which implements all this the secretary has adopted the same rules and notably disclose the information and which if the d c circuit properly read is a black and again disclosure and is a dead end at the closure and the purpose of it behind it protecting the full frank deliberations is only meaningful as i don't know any better i suspect is probably the case that the regulations adopted by the secretary of defense track so that the two different kinds of boards or three different kinds of boards are all alike you have any authority for the proposition that something not suppose the realisation that six to eighteen s it was a realization it didn't fit came as somebody who's actually writing the petition at that point you could put in the petition at least we have a better understanding of the argument but you'd still be facing the problem that on mandamus we're supposed to give the district court some some room and i understand it is a surely futile act to expect the district  change her mind with regard to an argument powered by regulations when she didn't buy onto the argument hired by a purported statute but still our problem one mandamus is what is that we're reviewing you're not asking is really to review the decision that she made you're asking  have proper delegation of powers i don't know the rules of statutory construction six eighteen grants in no authority to restrict from which he tried to argue where the government did argue that regulations have been promulgated which track the provisions of sixty six eighteen f and the regulations pertinent to the promotion boards but i didn't hear an argument that said navy follows from that argument that only the secretary of the navy can determine whether or not the constitution has been highly if you look at the inspector general's report which was cited here's examples of  that the secretary a power that it cannot have essentially the petitioners argument is that the secretary can and can down more than eighty cannot allow unconstitutional conduct to take place on these boards he talks about aggrieved officers are disgruntled officers if you change the word to link terms of unconstitutional religious bias or gender bias or racial bias or national origin or employment opportunities influenced by religious or other on authorized right because you're saying marriage there may be a marriage claim somehow that has a constitutional toward basis although i don't know exactly how that fits here but we're dealing with a discovery issue is there a class additional right to discovery because it sounds to me what your argument is is that there is a constitutional right to discovery and it trumps everything else so congress can never say no discovery of the cause of action applied webster and what it said was that webster teaches us that we must avoid every hour that there must be an opportunity to address constitutional claims that then went on to address  congress somehow delegated to the secretary or desired it to preclude consideration of discovery and and when and when wilkins  raised constitutional claims and religious freedom restoration their argument is that the secretary by because he thought not granted him the authority to fashion regulations and somehow construe those regulations to preclude discovery when constitutional claims are raised and that's the essential  also barred discovery of those issues in a court proceeding such as this taking place in a district court i would agree that the secretary through his  can say that these proceedings will not be discussed if the issue is the oath you don't challenge the government's authority or the secretary's a very to restrict the discussions of the board the issue has to do with whether or agreed to i guess i don't need to go there