behalf of the pac no one or has the authority to bring this he was given that of already why the ideal the associates the patent owner lou i'm sorry what do you think it means for purposes of owner to say i point you as my agent you sue in your own name although this was not a suit you wanted this was this was a continuation of that reexamination proceeding i mean that i mean they that the first time came into the united states the to the rest of em my question is what what's in it what in either one forty one or some rule or something allows the patent owner not to be named in court so he was acting he was acting in this in the in the stead but there's nothing that says that you can't do it is something insist you can do it either is does the is the patent owner before us in this proceeding in appearance and i don't see how the owner i don't see how you can say the owner is before us simply we've got us there was some private agreement between a private agreement d owner is here without impediment to the owner actually being painted itself even if this were in a district court i don't think the federal rules of civil procedure would allow a kind of representative capacity because of the suit because the real party in interest actually does have to be named so it's it's it's trouble was someone else going to address it if we have anything to address the rest yes yes it's a matter of law are you well known trademark office determines the scope of claims in patent applications not solely on the basis of quantum language but upon giving claims the broadest reasonable construction and in light of the specification the court stated during pending examination of pending claims must be interpreted as broadly as terms reasonably allow when the applicant states to mean that the claim terms or intended to handle the claims are examined with that with that tapered board couldn't move it wouldn't find on it has to be again and this particular pan specifically requires a gap so for the board to say getting are you saying that are you saying there should be only one standard for claim construction for namely the standards set forth in philips this court said in philips as recently as two thousand  and i'm not sure you're answering my question i don't know where you're saying that there should only be one standard for claim construction namely the standard set for themselves i'm saying a lot as we says they have a different standard but they also have to look at the specifications the states the panels the terms of still other claims in an application not solely on the basis of claim language but upon getting claims to produce reasonable description for guidance as to the meaning of the claims here the patent office said we don't have to look at that we can look at dictionary terms and it's entirely appropriate this court until it said yes you can look at the injured harmed by the diminution in the value of the stock that would be occasioned by taxation if it were upheld in that case that was a pretty broad view of standing that kind of went past everything to find even a minimal sort of injury was enough what was that reasoning apply here this case and distinguishable from that on a number of levels the first is that mr brown court cannot claim any injury he does not own the patent he has assigned the patent the patent has been found invalid by the board and that is an injury that is suffered by not mr vallance heart but the company or the third party request or in the event of a different outcome may bring the appeal and one of the questions that this court raised in its order on our motion to dismiss was whether standing should be treated differently in the case of a reexamine as opposed to a patent infringement case and the answer is no there are a few cases that this court has decided involving ex parte re exams the boeing case and the syntax case all cited in our briefs in those cases a third party request or of an annex parte read sam was found not to have standing to appeal because the statute does not give the third party request or an ex parte contex the right to appeal to the federal circuit this case is identical in the sense that mr valproate the non pan owner is not given the right to appeal by section one forty one more overseas acts constitutional standing given the lack of injury now that he has transferred the patent to another entity and there is no credential commanding can digest about that it seems to me that the analysis might be different depending on what you just identified as two different of standing inquiries with constitutional and the statutory now as the sole owner of a corporation that would be whose value would be harmed it's a little implausible to me to think that he would not be indirectly harmed and maybe or maybe not that's enough for article three standing to depending on whether one would consider that i think undeniable fact cruel injury who injury but let's not be in the stands statutory standing which i think here is pretty much the same thing as whether the one forty one cause of action applies to him is a different matter  was an owner of a corporation who was an inventor who did not own the patent he tried to bring a suit in forcing the patent and the court held that he could not that there was no standing because he was not the patent and that was an infringement context but at the same lacking here the concept of prudential standing at that one party should not be able to enforce the legal rights and interests of another party who is capable of doing that him or herself in this case the party that's injured the party that has the statutory right has argued that the that the patent office applied the inappropriate standard we disagree philip makes clear that ordinary meaning is the primary basis for a claim construction before you look to anything else and that precisely what the board did at pages a seventy seven four and seven seventy five of the appendix that is the board to claim construction analysis and the board was very clear that it was applying the ordinary meaning of the terms bore and septum sealed which are the claims that claim terms that that mr valspar focuses on his three the board found that the ordinary meaning of those terms was consistent with its construction and relied on the forth but of course it's a matter of practicality that first does hasn't happened in seconds not likely to happen because it changes the application of  damages law and intervening rights and so on and so forth looking just at the practicalities of keeping district court proceedings in line with the inner part of this review was there  story truong or argument in favor of having the same claim interpretation standard applied in both the administrative and the judicial proceeding well that that may or may not be the case if you amended the claims and then we're looking at new claims that it's not happened before it might be wise to use products reasonable interpretation but where that doesn't happen would you think there'd be wisdom in keeping the claim interpretation methods uniform well in this case it's difficult to answer that question because there are nesting kind of outside the realm of this case and might not outside the realm of this case that argument could be made but even if you apply the phillips standard the court construction is consistent with that the board excuse me the board found the ordinary meaning of it you don't want to talk to me about i would say in either standard broader standard is this opportunity to have a man but importantly and this case mr brown the court does not offer him the scipio did not offer before the board his own ordinary meaning of the terms that are in dispute here that again just hypothetically speaking what what is your understanding of what the broadest reasonable interpretation standard is because i'm not exactly sure what that says is seems to interpretations to suit that through the definition of ambiguity it may be in this case there are no competing interpretations i know you keep running back to this case i'm here i'm just talking apart from this case reasonable interpretation in this context the only reasonable interpretation has to be linked to the specification and what it says and the philips methodology as a  and therefore the broadest reasonable interpretation and the narrowest reasonable interpretation and order both to be reasonable are going to be the same and maybe we've got a board that's making significant errors in looking at the word brought us and stead of looking at the word reasonable does that make sense to you it makes sense to me that they could be the same and in fact in this case they are the same whether the board you've brought us reasonable interpretation consistent with the specification or the ordinary phillips framework the answer is the same it's based on the ordinary meaning mr that the courts propose constructions in this appeal are efforts to the prior art that he's referring to the forms the basis for the rejection is valid for seven six six patent that can be found figures one and two at page eight nine forty nine or also in our grief at page sixteen so one can see from figures wanted to item number fifty five is this septum seal called the valve membrane and you see from the figure that number fifty five when the devices and use gets crunched up for lack of a better word it moves toward the distal end of the device the board found that this slightly mounted requirement is satisfied sliding of the septum seal as a whole because it's moving forward now one portion of it if you focus on only a portion of the element does not move but the out the whole unit the separate steel uni membrane that moves and has has the effect of what the claim for requires and in this case there's nothing in the specification that requires a nearer meaning mr val court hasn't proposed an alternative as a whole moves whereas mr valve part was referring to portions of fifty five the fixed part toward the distal end of the device that didn't move so the issue that the board addressed was does a all right thank you very much