have mr spock this court on two occasions has said in malicious prosecution cases that the necessary predi a conclusive terminations of the underlying criminal proceeding and the connecticut supreme court in the case found that there is a difference between a regular terminations which occurs at the moment for six weeks entered and what for practical purposes in that case the system case was a cunt clue siv terminations which indeed occurs thirteen months later sister laws a court room recalls was it involves a state statute which provides when a police officer is prosecuted for a crime committed in the course of his duties after the case is quote unquote dismissed he can seek reimbursement of his legal expenses from his department he cannot do that when a case is nothing but insists though the court held under the statute that when thirteen months passes and the ratio kicks in then the level of terminations is increased to what the system called a dismissal and at that point he can get compensation and we're say we're asking this court to hold in the case of first impression the same applies when the malicious prosecution a civilian rather than a police officer that there is a distinction between the favorable term a nation which occurs under roberts and under seaver scotland at the moment denali is entered and the  it doesn't preclude the prosecution from filing another indictment does it and if it files another indictment then in that sense the case was not conclusively determined by the knowledge a continuation of a prosecution albeit with a new indictment or you could look at it as a new prosecution with a new indictment and if it's a new prosecution with a new indictment and and ali is sufficient as a favorable determination that's the end of the right in other words of a if if indictment one is knowledge and then later on the prosecution decides to bring another file another indictment that first knowledge would be enough to support a malicious prosecution claim right in other words it was a favorable terminations well that precise question has never come up oh it's speculative to say that but but sis low drew a distinction between the denali that occurs at the moment it occurs and the effect of that knowledge thirteen months later and it seems to me that that distinction dovetails exactly with the concept that this court certainly has articulate question of federal common law what the federal common law would be as to whether or not only is sufficient and that does not require going back to the common law and as opposed to state by and certainly all of the federal courts hold that in militias prosecution cases determining what constitutes the favorable terminations involves looking at state law which this court did in roberts vs bad which to me as some confusion because you're looking at malicious prosecution under state law but are cruel is a matter of federal and if if the last element of the malicious prosecution plain is looked at in that way it's state law but if it's looked at as a cruel point then it's found and and that's that's have a cause of action in the first place but it is the final action upon which the action accrues well that's the question that is before this court because that precise issue has never before been decided in this court which is the only court that's going to put a federal take a federal look at a connecticut law and it has never been decided in connecticut they don't have it never had occasion to look at the cool issue under either state law or  it has a rule that says filing a knowledge sufficient york has a rule that says finally a knowledge is sufficient provided it's a it's a knowledge on the merits as opposed to for some other reason understood but then again it's not a cool then you then you end up with the second circuit having a different rule for connecticut than it would for new york which you do well if it's a matter of federal law it should be federal should it be a single rule again judge walker as you pointed out would to some extent i think or does it accrue after it matures into something more conclusive as pointed out which is thirteen months later and that's the issue that no state court has decided nor has this court decided it really is a case of first impression and i don't see why there should be a difference in the way you treat you decide the moment a police officer who's been acquitted gets to go ahead and get compensation and when a civilian knows why should a civilian have it have a shot at it earlier seems to me that consistency would say the thirteen months after the knowledge is the point of a cruel although than ali is the favorable terminations ok may please the court i'm james told word for the defendant appellee officer shane phillips the the district court's decision should be affirmed because it is a well reasoned and accurate statement of the law would be difficult to add much to the thoughtful enticed concise decision of judge meyer but i'll try first to respond to the argument you just heard judge walker i think you hit the nail on the head a cruel is a question of federal law and that was decided  bearing here it also if if you look closer if you were going to look at connecticut law you would look at weiner a two thousand and eight connecticut supreme court decision in which they the supreme court held that the statute on which the plaintiff appellant relies here you're a sure statute general statutes fifty four dash one forty two a c one governs the disposition of the records not the disposition of criminal charges as the district court here properly concluded it is simply a record keeping statute it ministre to any intent rather than substantive that's directly from is a district court recognized that are cool as a matter of federal law cato and page this is it should join appendix one sixty four the length of the statutes well that's a reference to the the three year statute of limitations but i'm certain that the district court properly perceived that your honor the second reason why the district court should be affirmed is that there are no reported decisions in the district of connecticut or the second circuit in which a court has accepted the argument that is pressed in this case by the plaintiff appellant we do have from the district of connecticut our chief judge janet hall has held that the entry of anomaly to that date the entry date is the date on which a malicious prosecution claim under forty two u s c nine hundred eighty three accrues that was in woodbury v johnson which was also relied on by the district court in this case a two thousand and fourteen decision in which  the six dismissal not binding but certainly persuasive third setting aside the law if you just look at this factually there is no compelling reason no reason at all really to adopt the rule that suggested here by the plaintiff appellant this point if i had more than three years to file this action under statute of limitations fifty two deaths five seven seven plaintiff has three years to file a prosecution claim the arrest warrant was june twenty fourth two thousand and ten the suit wasn't far old until three years four months later and you will not find anywhere in the record an explanation or an excuse as to why that is so there rather than adopt some new rule there would have been concepts from earlier to this district equitable tolling is a recognized legal doctrine in the second circuit that may have been argued  but for that to apply there would have been a need for rare and except exceptional circumstances you haven't heard any argument about rare or exceptional circumstances so there's really factually no good reason to adopt this statute of limitations which would be beyond even three years as the district court noted the other problem is if you adopt this rule what you're going to have is plaintiffs with worthy malicious prosecution claims that are not going to be right well you would right now a plaintiff needs favorable terminations to file a motion prosecution so they need to get a knowledge once they get the knowledge their claim is right they can follow claim they would have to wait an additional thirteen months beyond that state will still be we still have some freedom to to commence an option against this person no i mean that there is but there's always that there's always a as long as the yes and it would have to be a new case it's a new filing and you're our practice that's the distinction because traditionally the criminal law federal criminal law to the extent that there's a common law federal law in this area has said that the knowledge is sufficient judge walker is rare in any event that case is closed that criminal case because there has been a disposition finally we had an alternate ground disposition without prejudice yes that's correct i agree and then finally we do have alternate grounds i mean it would be futile for the court to remand this because we did press in our brief alternate grounds to affirm it wasn't an arrest be to based on speedy information it was an arrest by a warrant carries with it the presumption of probable cause the officer here is entitled to qualified immunity or at the very least probable qualified immunity for arguable probable cause and so if the court were to remand this back  or at the district court didn't reach our alternate grounds the qualified immunity analysis of the probable cause because he went straight to the statute of limitations i would argue here there's no need to get to it either because you just did a simple math and this claim was barred by the statute of limitations so unless there are any questions i won't belabor what should be an easy decision for this court there is no basis in fact or in law to reverse the district court's decision granting summary judgment to officer shane phillips and for all these reasons we ask that you please affirm the district court judge spent a lot of time in the criminal courts in connecticut over the last half century and it's been my observation that almost all defendants understand when they get a knowledge that they are that there's a string attached to them for the next thirteen months that's why a lot of them object to getting dollars in fact it's not at all uncommon for judges that time at the time and ali has entered to admonish defendants that you'd better be on your good behavior for the next thirteen months or you'll be back here i've heard it many times so in fact there is a general understanding among people who go into criminal courts in connecticut that the knowledge is a very nice thing to have but you really have to watch your step for the next thirteen months and indeed and it's certainly no part of the record in this particular case is exactly what mr spock understood and why he didn't in fact seek out counsel until more than three years after the entry of the knowledge that's what happened and  he had good reason to to feel that way for the reasons that i have pointed out i would just say with regard to the alternate grounds for as we all know in a malicious prosecution case it is not good enough that there be probable cause here only for some charge to be brought but specifically there has to be probable cause for the specific charge in question and in this case there were two such charges and i pointed out in my  particular with regard to the interfering statute why if you do read the act the affidavit in support of the warrant to remove the points that were challenged by mr spock sworn testimony you would remove probable cause at least for the interfering prosecution as to which there as that very broad statute has been narrowly construed by the state supreme court in such a way that it is very difficult to maintain a successful prosecution for interfering with an officer in this case i think that probabl