good morning honors and may please the court david this may for the united states with my colleague david james the government is asking the court to reverse the district court's order dismissing the government's indictment with prejudice  yes mr let is currently contesting deportation and his removal proceedings and are seeking asylum yes your honor he's seeking asylum for approximately a year and a half now he has availed himself of his right immigration court and is currently has successfully filed a petition as moved for parole before the department of homeland security several times and is contesting his removal as well as seeking asylum yes determining that the defendant was eligible for removal pursuant to the bill or form eligible for bail percent of the bill reform act that is there a form i came into conflict with the immigration and that nationality act and specifically granted kind of simultaneously with the order of removal that the immigration judge and the immigration proceedings and so he is contesting that order of removal and so he remains in detention a but they did not have the benefit of the three circuit courts from the th circuit the district of columbia and the rd circuit's reasoning and i think what's for several reasons outlined in those opinions mainly being pursued by separate agency and confronted with both of them and we have to decide which think precedent that's correct isn't that the case before us your honor i believe that they can they again as the other circuits are held that they proceed parallel detention thought that it was wasting she said this course resources along with the deal jay's resources and federal defenders resources if the intent of government is really to do poor mr let in the  the same efficiencies that the court the district court was worried about plays out regardless of the reading whether you read it the way that just a court read it or you read the statutes the way that the thirty six dollars in d c circuit read and that being that the th then and while the defendant was detained and being pursued by ice for removal proceedings and in that circumstance you still have the possibility that the defendant would consent to removal or would be removed prior to the completion of the criminal proceedings and so that same if that same inefficiency occurs even if the district court reading of the statute is correct so the same inefficiencies exist on both ends so it's congress's fault it's congress isn't tension that that  may be a possibility that arises and again that is that is reflected in the other circuits decisions your honor and to take your next question or with the ten days here the district court determined that the defendant was not a flight directed to then engage in a bail determination pursuant to the bell reform act notwithstanding that other detention regimes such as state or local authorities may ultimately wind up in play and i think i think  that the way to highlight that is certainly there are examples where an individual commits a federal crime is brought before a federal court that individual may be on state parole and to argue that certainly it cannot be that that a state act is is barred from detaining an individual for violation of parole simply because of the bill because of their bill determinations made in a separate federal court proceeding  agencies that can and were intended by congress to proceed in parallel and the bin reform act applies solely to criminal proceedings and in article three courts ability to oversee its criminal proceedings are not affected not really the question in this case we don't object to we don't maintain that loses the ability to pursue a removal proceeding against someone just because they're under federal indictment and t alvarez didn't hold that either the district of oregon case that most of that used in district cases that judge pooler referred to relied on our contention is that when the government chooses to indict someone in federal court the federal courts bail determined that the government submit to the federal courts bail determination so it's only the detention and parallel that violates mr lets rights under the mandated for mr let as an arriving alien although that is not in fact the case and judge brody had before her when this was argued in front of her the government represented to her she said how is your office handling these cases and the government said well case by case we talk to ice and figure out what we're going to do in other words the government admitted to her that case by case it was deciding whether to obey a bail release order or to  it and under those circumstances i think judge brody acted appropriately to vindicate her authority finding that the purpose of ice detention was clearly to do an end run around her release order order released pending the judicial proceeding or as it's put in three thousand one hundred and forty two a pending trial it doesn't say pending trial unless the executive has a different reason to detain so the government's complaint at page twenty eight dollars and that it's being asked to commit entirely to the criminal process was congress's design they made an exception they said if someone is subject to deportation then you can have i don't know i do know that the record in this case includes the fact that ga fourteen it was in the declaration of counsel from mr let below that she spoke to c b p and said why are you detaining him and c b p said we usually obey bail orders but we have a new instruction to detain people in this case that was after the bill the termination but my point is congress said ok if someone's amenable to immigration detention the government can vindicate that interest within the ten day temporary detention period by having i take custody of them what the b r a does not say is that after release order ice may do so and it doesn't mention immigration status or susceptibility to deportation as a factor the district court is otherwise to consider so i think you know the government argues well three thousand one hundred and forty two deal only applies when someone's found a flight risk or a danger to the community but that makes sense because if someone isn't a flight risk and isn't a danger to the community i think congress reasonably expected that the executive would obey a district court's release order and that would not act irrationally to try and deport and prosecute someone at the exact same time but if that is in fact what the executive wants to do then three thousand one hundred and forty two d provides a mechanism someone who  putting as reflected in the record in this case as reflected in our supplemental appendix of the most careers in the eastern district are granted bail so the view of the district courts at least which the government has not appealed to this court right it didn't appeal the bail determination in this case and argue that it was done in error and simply used a different authority to achieve the same result but i think you know district courts routinely grant bail in these cases and people are under electronic supervision or whatever ne can be read in multiple ways to sort of contemplate that that's the natural and logical order of change it is not the st judge who said this is crazy we're going to try him and incarcerate him and then we move why don't we the person and removal whereas here conference of the government's claims the detention was purely elective nothing prevented the government from obeying the bill room nothing in the eye and a prevented the government from obeying the release order there was a detainer but the detention authority that it was issued under allows c b p to simply transiently take custody of him and then release him on parole again that's not the case in every intention situation no the illegal reentry reentry defendants who were subject to mandatory detention and removal under a different immigration law provision than the one at issue here and so i don't think this court needs to address a sort of head on collision between the  logical way side by side in that there are there are some times and dates to detain under immigration law when those apply in the government has a means to effectuate them on a ten day period and then otherwise congress contemplated that the be r the motivation of why something is happening as opposed to the statutory argument where they can be read together in a way to overlapping authority yes i think that's correct your honor except that they were addressing a situation where there was more arguably a mandate to detain than there is here so you know even if the court were to agree with that statutory interpretation point i don't think this case presents that square conflict but i do think we argued below that the purpose of his detention was not to effectuate his removal which could have been done summarily with the stroke of a pen when he arrived at the airport the purpose of his detention was to obviate the bail release act ordered pursuant to whatever policy change c b p referred to so even if the court were doing agree with those circuits on statutory reasoning i don't think they need to reach that issue in this case and to the extent they detention relevant to the extent the court finds it unclear exactly what judge brody held i think every man similar to the one and two are for further clarification would be appropriate thank you the minutes for battle then your honour's explain for me the change in policy that opposing counsel alluded to and i think it's even from the public counsel's brief i think it's it's been clear that it is a case by case determination by i separate for whether or not to take an individual defendant into custody following release or not they change their procedure on this case by case analysis and some point when and if so did they have a bad experience they they from what we know is that they evaluate each case on its specific merits and then make the translation suggested and if he's wrong this is the time to tell me that in the past when someone was released under the b r m the ice didn't pursue their duty then they let him then let the defendant out under the conditions imposed by the b r right and waited until after conviction or acquittal to take the next step don't you tell me and he tells me that changed at some point two points i mean one is i don't believe that that blanket assessment applies across the board for previous or current actions of ice and secondly and i think critically there has been no finding there was no finding of pretext here there was no finding as to the actions of ice here this was completely as your as your honour's have from the record illegal finding by the district court below and so there was no question the issue of pretext and the reasons for ice attention was not raised below by defense counsel it was not a reason for the district court's determination and it is not in the record here are these other cases judicial officer determines an individual is going to be a flight risk or danger to the community and here the district court is to determine otherwise and so that and a period when the you're afraid of the obligation to act within ten days is certainly not your honor i think it was and lastly as i see my time ticks away i do want to i do want to highlight again this idea of the statutory interpretations here and that there is certainly no clear congressional intent for the veil reform act under anywhere but specifically under three thousand one hundred and forty two d to supersede either state or local authorities ability to detain and pursue their proceedings and also ice is ability to pursue its says it will statutory scheme