this is we believe a rather unique case in which the district attorney who handled the case hijacked the system for his own personal either vendetta or intention to prosecute moana cancer he went and used the criminal justice system behind the back of tom spoto behind the back of the rest of the district attorney's and in violation of his own of the policy and custom of the office in the ones that matter all that why does that matter in this case in terms of then you know just the legal  s and it's a fair question your honor and one that we have looked at this case when you put it all together you start with the taking by  can violate state regulations and that does make it something that you don't have qualified immunity in at the federal level how does how does this differ from that it starts with an office policy then goes to the defective warrant using again going around the system and having it is measured by the affidavits that are filed in support of it the office policies of the fact that the da had earlier had turn turn it down but had the facts of the case before it i mean you're not you're not challenging that the the as i understand you're not challenging the content of the five considerations you think of as omissions right right that cab had been reluctant to seek a warrant that ledo took the case without caps knowledge that later instructed the s p s c a regarding the collection of witness statements at the s p c a would be investigating non animal abuse crimes and the two witnesses have been discredited now are the first three  witness statements no because the witness stated one of them was of course the child endangerment the only statement that was valid according to the all the district attorneys was the not the nine year old statement which led to the child in danger many which both spode and later only admit were not within the jurisdiction of the very organization the ledo directed not once again even if it wasn't live in their jurisdiction that is not a matter that makes something not subject to qualified immunity point where nine hundred eighty three comes into play where they have definitely violated state law resulting in the miss prosecution and search of six ninety eight which is what the search one says to police officer directed to a police officer no police officer did that search oh i see that's a different matter ok i thought you were talking about the the the internal policy the internal policy is not itself a violation it's what he did and how he took those system and used it i  was outside his jurisdiction it's an unusual case in that you have a district attorney who sort of using his own personal e mail took a case used the trappings of the system got a warrant and then got in and that is when is the basis if there is one in state law of malicious prosecution of abuse of process all sorts of things which may or may not be there under what new new york law does but why does any of that make the search warrant which is what you are your basis is invalid take everything out with the state law and thus making the warrant invalid i mean ultimately it comes down to the fact that nine hundred eighty three says if there's an invalid warrant you have a nine that too you say i went through three three of the five considerations that you point to and i was having trouble seeing their relevance to the magistrates of terminations or prob non animal abuse crimes and what it says an eight to seventy four very clearly i further it says in the bottom two seventy three it makes reference to evidence of endangering the welfare of a child so one can seal no but the fact that they were not authorized or empowered and that he so ok your two minutes of your time i am so if i may have a rebuttal if i find that may every bring our no no no i will honor your request for an already bottle thank allowed him to go forward he requested of us p c a to obtain an additional statement from the ten year old girl nine year old girl which was at which occurred a statement was taken from her that she had witnessed an injection of a but they were taken about two months before the application for the search warrant i see and they referenced events that happened over the previous fifteen months and some of which though was the abuse of animals in the bearing of animals on the farm so it's logical that the remains of the animals would still be on the farm and there is a continuing course of conduct as well i believe of the five initial witness statements the most recent events that were referenced in there were the the end of  nine so we're talking three months or so i don't necessarily yes in the record there is this discussion of stillness but i don't think we're talking about particularly still given the context and then when it came to the to the prosecution of the case later e execution of the search warrant i mean they're they're taking the position that the prosecutor really executed the search warrant later yes and if that's the case he wasn't acting in his  even putting immunity principles aside for a second i don't think a reasonable juror could credit the appellant's accounts of mr ladles conduct of the farm that day there is documentary evidence at eight hundred fifty eight the log in sheet of the crime scene that shows that mr ledo was at the farm for approximately twenty minutes he was there when he left the one twenty there's been no allegation that there is a he went out to get a renewal right to get the warrant extended to cover the house he did not go for somebody you know i believe officer northwind went mr leno's presence on the finding is very hard to make out any state case but abuse of process which probably should be even same as malicious prosecution in new york is hundred percent sure it's a different thing  why shouldn't we on that dismiss without prejudice to filing in state court and the state claims your honor i would say because under abuse of process there's been no there's no clearly established right that she has she has never clearly established right on the fourth amendment that only the s p c s can investigate animal cruelty she doesn't have a clue as i was right under the fourth amendment that only the police can excuse search warrant these please the court regarding defendant spota the first word that comes to mind is knowledge essentially the plaintiff's claims against the fund spota all based on what t was perfectly reasonable and that there was no one the underlying constitutional violation first place in terms of being aware of the search itself the press secretary  received notice right this warrant notice before the search right through an e mail is an argument that he received notice of the warrant your are that's correct there is no evidence that tom spota was aware that the press secretary received notice of that even if we were to make an inference which i don't believe is a reasonable inference but even if we were to say that a jury could find a reasonable inference that because just because his press secretary knew a warrant is being executed  spota had that knowledge there's no answer that he any knowledge that there is going to be any misconduct it's perfectly reasonable for a da to to make the presumption that a warrant that has nothing beyond that he has no personal involvement in the actual search of the property he has no knowledge of how the search was conducted or in the manner in which he was conducted the plaintive points to two other than the press secretary concept he points to responses the day of the warrant of the day after the next question is what was the basis of that awareness and ladles responses i don't know so just when the concept of whether evidence would be admissible before it can be considered for s judgment later saying i don't know what the basis of his awareness is indicates that initial question would be hearsay and would be admissible their initial effort on the part of the  was that known to sport or it was not there is a this is a if you follow a literally bouncing ball sport it doesn't become aware of the execution of the warrant or even the investigation of his cancer i'm doing this cancer case it's in that in the wake that of that joe blonsky contacts pota and is angry i want laitos doing so by the when you connect the dots spota doesn't know about this until after the grand jury presentation  the only thing i and i want to mention one thing regarding the concept of the validity of these warrants plight it was never argued in my as far as i can tell anything on the other than the validity of the warrant coming from the concept that  speciate was executing it not the police we're now hearing about attacking the validity or warrant through the content of the warrant that was presented to the magistrate we've never heard that argument before i don't think that's an argument they can raise now because it's never been raised i don't think it's even in the complaint and so i would argue they way that leslie even if we were to look at it and and presume that spota had knowledge of a warrant there's no knowledge of misconduct and he also is entitle a munity for anything x post or rayman a post grand jury he gets absolute prosecutorial munni he would get qualified immunity for the concept of host grand jury does he if he has anything to do with the continuing  prosecution because it's reasonable to expect that a grand jury to turn indictment there's a presumption of probable cause that presumption continues on because she was convicted although the conviction was overturned  and then last lastly i just want to mention plaintive talks about the concept of administrative conduct on the part of dealing with that would affect immunity that is an argument that does not have a relation or merit to this case and that a strain of conduct on the part of the district attorney refers to his role whether he's a state actor or a county actor when examining essentially my own health plan essentially whether a county can be liable for the conduct of the district attorney for to look at that and looked at