would consider such and to warn those who may have engaged such that we are on the case we have eighty cases ongoing these are now ten persons that have been caught up in this scheme that occurred during c p a and helo involved sadly the controller of the south central region military officers working in that office millions of dollars in development fund for iraq money that was stolen used for bribes kickbacks and these people are going to prison robert stein was sent to prison the controller week before last for nine years philip bloom the contractor will be sentenced next week and for justice forthcoming for the rest of those that participated in this criminal scheme last friday fights salaam a contractor who we caught in a sting operation was sent to prison so we're carrying out the mission you've assigned us on the investigative front with respect to the eight point eight billion issue that you alluded  that was about accountability audit that was carried out two and a half years ago and reported two years ago and and it did not allege fraud it's simply acknowledge the fact that that more should have been done to account for how that money was used and that was examined in a hearing on wednesday in front of chairman waxman ranking member wolf you're exactly right we need to learn our lessons and apply them in iraq and that is that's something that i have pursued accumulating data and producing reports on lessons learned we've done we've produced two so far one on human capital management and with six recommendations that are that have been applied to varying degrees to the to the program wreck but more still need to be done on ensuring that we have skilled employees working in iraq by that i mean skill sets that match the mission they're signed to in the p r t issue is the one most apt that secretary rice testified to yesterday we've also done a lesson learned report on contracting and and a number of those recommendations have been applied to the trying to get a single coordinated contract database which seems like a simple concept but one that simply was not arrived at in the course of this program is something that must going forward be a point of departure for any further contingency relief and reconstruction operations and we will release our third lessons learned report on program and project management at the end of march and finally we're we're calling from that all the work done in those three and looking at a variety of other issues and we will produce at the end of the years something that we now call the stor reconstruction which is a stem to stern accessible and informed report on on what happened over the course of the several phases reprogramming and adjustments in iraq reconstruction that i hope will help adjust the system and service as a place from which the congress can propose legislation to ensure that we do this better next time embassador bremmer said wednesday in front two thousand and three when he took on this operation with respect to our continued work we just issued our lead our twelve quarterly report it's a very significant a watershed report howard turman it's the end of the iraq relief and reconstruction fund  hundred percent of that twenty one in that congress generously appropriated for the program in iraq is under contract eighty five over eighty percent is spent almost ninety percent of the projects are done and the message there and really the message to the government of iraq is this the period the phase during which the united states will bear the preponderance burden of funding the recovery of that country is passed the baton is passed to the iraqi government and and thus their ministries must execute and their own program for the recovery of that country twelve billion was left in the iraqi treasury at the end of last year on spent because of lack of capacity our latest quarterly has an audit on the ministry capacity development programs within the iraqi government and finds frankly them wanting and the need for more emphasis but but  but the impetus for that is now because the international community must engage but that's going to be a short bridge the ultimate recovery of iraq is an iraqi burden something that the ministry of oil primarily has to as to engage  that and that drives home another point that that that i have spoken of and that's the need for the passage of the hydrocarbon legislation because that defines investment in iraq and distribution of the funds we produced over eighty audit's now we have visited ninety projects across iraq and reported on site inspection reports baghdad police colleges is a problematic one in this last quarter but let me emphasize that three quarters of the projects that we visit meet standards and is and a simple axiom evolved out of that experience namely if there are good quality assurance programs which is the government side of oversight that ensure good quality control programs which is the contractor side of oversight then you end up with a good project that's a fairly simple concept but one of quarter of the time observed in the breach m and some of those breaches have been agreed just in frustrating frankly and the baghdad police college being the most question that the congress has is what has been wasted well the congress has asked my office in this lynn the latest legislation to perform a forensic audit and that will be a complete review of the use of the iraqi relief and reconstruction fund that will give the data on that question but also i have ongoing now reviews of contractors are our first review of bechdel which is looking at everything they built how much it cost what the what the budgeting was what the delta is and what the reconstruction gap was what security costs were we'll begin to answer the questions i know that you all have about how we've done in iraq and so with that i look forward to answering your questions and thank you for your  time the u s agency for international development and then finally howard krongard the i g of the state department and again feel free to summarize your statement so that we have more time for questions and your statement will be entered into the r thank you mr again the t s a thank you chairman lower ranking member will members of the committee it is an honor to appear before you today to testify on behalf of the office of inspector general for the u s agency for so like make a few comments that are not included in my statement i have been inspector general at usa id for about a year and in that period of time i have developed a great appreciation and respect for the employees of usa id especially our office inspector general employees the men and women of the usa i d r individuals whose life work is committed to the betterment of those less fortunate around the world many of these dedicated professionals live in work in places that are sometimes challenging and at times dangerous unquestionably iraq is one of those places where usa id employees are risking their lives every day during our discussions today we will undoubtedly comment and make reference to reconstruction and development programs in iraq have not been fully successful so certainly no reflection on the dedication and talent of the men and women who are trying to implement these programs under the most dire conditions i'm especially proud of the auditors and investigators currently working in iraq and those who have served there in the past all of whom volunteered to work in this very dangerous place they certainly have my support and gratitude as outlined in my written statement our office has completed a significant body of work in iraq over the past three years our auditors have completed thirty three performance audits and reviews and our investigators have closed twenty six investigations and are currently working three open thirteen open cases fraud awareness training has been provided to us idea employees and implementers of the programs and defense contract wadded agency under contract with our office has completed eighty six financial audits we have issued fifty four recommendations to improve u s eighty programs have questioned fifty seven million dollars in program costs our investigations have resulted in adverse employment actions and financial savings and recoveries of u s taxpayer dollars additionally department of justice is currently reviewing four of our cases for possible  prosecution continue to work cooperatively with the special inspector general for iraq reconstruction the state department office of inspector general and other agencies to ensure proper oversight of reconstruction development funds being spent in iraq  we ranking member wolf and members of the subcommittee thanks very much for the opportunity to discuss the department of state office of inspector general's view of audit and oversight activities related to iraq though i g s approached oversight in iraq h been through a lot of inspections investigations assessments and surveys to identify and recommend ways in which state department programs can operate more efficiently and economically these are programs affecting the various operations of embassy baghdad including the construction of the new embassy compound as well as iraq reconstruction governance and security all of which are critical elements to ensuring stability in iraq with resources did due to statutorily mandated audit and inspection requirements and decreased budgets in an increased cost environment so i g has nevertheless conducted high value projects that have included an assessment of iraq's police training and inspection of rule of law programs in iraq a survey of any corruption programs in iraq a survey of the bureau of international narcotics and law enforcement funding for rock and a recently completed  large dying corp contract for iraqi police training support i'd like to note that i have been a strong proponent of inner agency inspector general undertakings as a way of leveraging my limited resources and among the three i g r this is before you today as well as others in that vein the assessment of iraq police training was done jointly with the d o d zero i g b the survey of any corruption programs in the audi funding and of the dying for contract were done in conjunction with the seeger and parent that equation assessment of the police training program in afghanistan was done with the o d and an assessment of afghanistan counter narcotics programs is now being done jointly with the o d and d o j in addition to the foregoing reports i've personally traveled to iraq to accomplish the civic objectives for example during my visit this past september i met with all twenty nine iraqi inspectors general and i said to them among other things each of your prime minister and deputy prime minister have recently identified corruption as one of the two greatest threats along with violence to the stability and long term success of iraq as a free and democratic country indeed violence and corruption go together corruption seeds and funds the insurgency and contributes to an environment where both can thrive you are in the very front line of this great battle against corruption and i look forward to seeing how we can assist and support you in this crucial fight for your country to assist them for example i undertook to identify someone experienced in the u s inspector general community to become a senior advisor to iraqi i g s you know embassy baghdad i subsequent identified such an individual he has been processed and he's leaving for baghdad next monday i would also note that i participated in the quarterly meetings of the iraq inspectors general council which is a bully chaired by mr bowen which reviews planned and ongoing oversight activities to exchange ideas of boy conflicts to assist their rocky counterparts with respect to the needs of oh i g i would point first to the limited resources available to my office the work in iraq i've described to you is funded by an allocation of one point three million from the f zero five supplemental and one point seven million from the f y two zero zero six supplemental that three million dollars over two years was intended to provide for our work in both iraq and afghanistan as for two zero zero seven we have received no supplemental funds for iraq or afghanistan by way of contrast i believe seeger's initial and supplemental funding have approximated one hundred million plus another thirty five million in the two zero zero seven supplemental report which is just really just released so at a time when the costs and risks attributable to the state department programs in iraq have continued to increase though i g s resources have actually decreased additionally so i g like other u s government entities operating in iraq shares the same problems of recruiting and retaining qualified staff willing to work in iraq unlike some other entities however including i believe each of the other two entities here today though i g does not have the legal authority to hire thirty one sixty one term employees or personal service contractors who are used by others to fill staffing needs and were in in iraq we continue to seek legislative or other relief that would provide similar authority to ameliorate the foregoing difficulties so i g has wanted to establish a middle east region office perhaps in qatar where we could share costs with t s office which is already there and we would specifically provide oversight for crisis and post conflict state department programs in iraq and elsewhere in the region however the requested one point three million funding for this office has not been made available and congressman wolf if i could address the issue you raised as to an example of things that could be done the congress generously appropriated five hundred ninety two million dollars for the new embassy compound in iraq perhaps with the addition of one million dollars to that they could have provided for mandatory oversight and periodic reporting by my office for example to brief the appropriate committee in the congress with regard to the progress of that new embassy compound so in closing madam chairwoman i would like to recognize the brave and dedicated military and civilian personnel in iraq who are making enormous efforts to bring about a safe secure and democratic government where rights and liberties of individuals are protected this is a difficult challenge and we know i g want to do our part in assuring that u s resources are used to the optimum possible efficiency and effectiveness in such trying it's a seven minute so you get an extra two minutes for all of us will have seven minutes ok i'm going to begin with the provisional reconstruction teams as we know secretary of state rice seeking to deploy hundreds of additional civilians across iraq in the form of p r ts and then the president's january tenth surge announcement he included plans to double the p r t xna p r t civilian personnel in iraq and integrate the p r t zimm brigade combat teams in most areas the president has asked congress to provide funding to support and secure our expanded civilian presence i'm really concerned about whether these p r t's can operate meet their goals expand in the current security environment that is an article in today's paper that essentially says mr kronk old you probably are aware they're having trouble finding civilians to serve in the p r ts because of the security situation so most of the responsibility in the p r ts will be with the know it you didn't see that snow washington post but i'll show it to through so let me put out there a few questions and if you could whoever would like to respond i'd be appreciative she made a statement that there are real security concerns and it would be difficult for the civilians to be recruited and to operate that's first secondly responsibilities on the p r t mission military commanders and forces able to concurrently train and support iraqi security forces and provide security and operational support to the p r ts so why don't we begin in reverse if you can comment on on this this is today's washington post and frankly what we've seen in afghanistan based upon my last trip the militaries are zooming the majority of the responsibility in the is there as well and we were concerned about what kind of coordination is going on so if you can respond yes i'm not familiar with that particular article but and again this is just my understanding it isn't that i've done an audit on this but my clear understanding is that with respect to the state department needs to fill the civilian side of the p r t's i think it's something like eighty eight percent of those positions have already been filled so i'm not quite clear where that information would have come from the secretary  i believe i heard her this morning tell the senate foreign relations committee something similar a similar number to what i just said so i don't think that that would have accurately come from her with respect to the p r t as a whole as i pointed out in my statement on the one hand i have personally visited several p r t one in hillah twice the one and baghdad and i've met with a lot of the p r t people but i have not done a formal report mr bowen has done a very good report on p r t is one of his people who was doing that actually accompanied me on a couple of the trips that i made to p r ts so i would gladly let him follow up with respect to that we do have a planned assessment of the effectiveness of p r ts and how the embassy plans coordinates and communicates with them but that is subject to the receipt of funding to be able to carry that out but that is on our planned agenda for this year if we're able to do it we're under the gun of the continuing resolution and the commitments that we have under our mandated requirements but that would be another example of something that could be done e which my understanding is that they have volunteers for the majority of those of those positions as far as review or oversight of p r t is we have not done anything yet but our ost seven audit plan  capacity building local level program in iraq there's no no doubt about that and it is it is the place where provincial councils governors mayors are being trained in  how to execute their democratic responsibilities and we did an audit of the p r t program last quarter and there were problems that we found primarily security and resources security problem overlays everything so there's no surprise there but nevertheless with respect to the parties because they are across the country and there were there were nine operating at that time they they had difficulty getting out and meeting with their counterparts frequently their counterparts had to come to them and that was dangerous as well and so simply carrying out the mission was a challenge there's no doubt about that second the second component of that issue was working out relationships between the department of state and the department of defense with with respect to providing security to those personnel at the p r ts and that continues to be an issue and it was there were issues about whether p r p was located on a foreign operating base a military installation or an embassy  compound and so that there were issues details that were still needing to be worked out and those are being worked out we also found is as you pointed out madam chairwoman that three quarters of the personnel in the p r t were military civil affairs recruitment for the next phase of the p r t program is moving forward and she testified before chairman lantos that that they are staffed up the department state has the people they need for the next six months to get the program moving forward so that addresses the resource issue that we identified in our audit last october in my business is that is left did you evaluate just staff or did you also look at performance the results it was too early to look at results the p r t program was just getting off the ground but we have a follow up audit on that is ongoing in iraq now to look more carefully at that i did visit the baghdad  green zone so it was it was a little the security issues were not the same but but also that the usefulness of the p r t became evident to me at that meeting and that it provided insight into how operations were how operations were doing within the local governments and that's that's a key issue that i think the iraq study group raised and that is the need for a new prevention elections we're building capacity but there needs to be democratic balance at the local levels in the provincial councils that new provincial elections would bring thank you very much and i look forward to the next audit and then we could talk again about the performance and whether they he's there and operating in both she and this more civilian agency step down step forward quickly to carry out because they want to see the complaints reflect fresh tensions between the pentagon and the state department over personal demands that are full and mostly on heavily on the military and then it goes on your comments about that that was an issue that has dogged that is an issue that has dogged the program from the start our lessons learned report on human capital management uncovered some of the sources of it namely that was directed at the at the dept and the c deputies committee meeting that the agencies must come forward with the personnel that they need but then as ambassador bremer testified just a day before yesterday when he called for those resources they were not forthcoming and thus he was he was he was never able to staff adequately the p r t issue is another example of exactly that issue who provides the security for the military  depends on whether it's a on a forward operating base or on an embassy installation and if it's on a f o b then it's the military if it's on an embassy installation then the state department rules apply and that is a point of contention that needs to be resolved and has been for quite a while it has been yes sir so that's why you need one person who can make that decision tim carney was appointed as the reconstruction coordinator whether he has a lot of responsibility whether he has sufficient authority is a question second you would just cover how is security if you're moving up to nasri or someplace how is the security how difficult it is of the decision is made to go and if it is difficult as here would not consolidation make sense on if you don't know personnel there know not not you but the other is how can they know what's going on if you don't know a person well our oversight over the site is more than just knowing what's going on we bring people in to do surveys and assessments on a  but how will how difficult is it to move around i have today you're going to go you're going to go to he'll go and how how how difficult would it be to get out there about half of our inspection trips that we schedule today and being canceled because of security situations for let me give an example al fatah the pipeline very serious issue that we looked at regarding the installation of a pipeline underneath the river there i want to go back up there and follow up on what we initially learned seventy five million dollars didn't achieve the goal but in order to go back in november when i was when i was back they said we're going to have to deploy a battalion of troops and three cobras and i said for we're not going to do that because that's a that's a waste and so we had to use other means to get some follow up on that on that issue but today i've got e mails from people that are working in in the green zone and it's as dangerous as it's ever been right now and i think travel will this we were able to eventually get it in i think the i g has to look at the embassy so i will make a motion when we begin to mark up the bill they give you additional resources to do that but have has no one looked at that embassy no no i've been there twice i have reviewed it twice my deputy who sitting behind me join me for one of those and we've also used other resources military auditor's as well to look at certain issues and how has been going i  think are you talking about the construction or no i know but i mean from what you look at costs that every on the house the reconsider the construction of the embassy going it's as of now on time and on budget ok and you have something to says that on paper well i attend a monthly p p r which is held by o b o project performance review in which every stakeholder we want to is going to have people involved in the new embassy attend and all of the major people from the program are brought over from baghdad to report and i believe they report i think to this subcommittee on a monthly basis but i know that general waymouth reports to a congressional committee on a monthly basis there's a large number of joint committees bot here and in baghdad that oversee it so i've looked closely at the process now we can't evaluate every engineering and every construction and every brick and mortar that's put in there on an ongoing basis it would be too intrusive what your job is to look at embassies yes and the i know you look at this embassy the way you do other embassies yes and no we when we look at how this could be the most expensive one we've had for a long while so that's why we are not the one you should look at well we'll do we'll do we'll do that and i would urge you to suppress or maybe in the supplemental here may be willing to take a look at that but i think we should give you the resources in the supplemental to make sure because one eye is broke and so i feel a little bit more of an investment than others do and so i'd like to see begin doing that maybe you can tell them that we will give them the resources to look at i appreciate that comment i'd be interested in knowing whether you've requested it in the budget yes both in the supplemental and the budget how much have you requested a started i think it was we put everything together all the things i'm talking about for both iraq and afghanistan it wasn't specifically denominated for the new embassy compound but we were down to a million one point three five one point three two five million has been our request for this middle east regional office which would do that and we could make it do with that money and we certainly should have additional conversation with the last question i would have is do we need from your own personal experience particularly the ability to say this is done we're going to move on then almost like general macarthur did in japan after world war two it's it's an issue that that i have been looking at in the course of my tenure in n s p thirty six tried to address this when the president signed it as c p a was going away and the and ambassador negroponte was coming to take over and a speedy thirty six thought sought to empower the ambassador the chief of mission with that authority but the language was not specific enough not strong enough and more importantly d o d had thirty you know charge over thirteen billion of the iraqi the iraq relief and reconstruction fund the twenty one billion dollars and and they reported they were to do reporting that the project contracting office that operated in the in the corps of engineers reported to the secretary of the army but you have a chief of mission over here trying to coordinate through the iraq reconstruction management office  coherent strategic plan for the for the relief and reconstruction of iraq to do reporting i think attenuated the efficacy of what n s p thirty six attempted to to create and that is one person in charge and how is it  now well erf is over and so when our moving into new sources of funding i think those funds those sources coming from this committee or are more under the aegis of the ambassador there needs to be improved coordination between a idea department of i am for winning i am for being successful so could not the committee then conditioned to say that we believe the based on what the iraq study group said based on what you're saying based or we are now conditioning the money if you want to have this money which we want you to have you have one person whether he or she be in the white house wherever that they are the decider everyone needs to decide or would that make sense yes  let me just say before i turn it over to mr jackson i think that is something we should be talking further because i was on the phone with mr carney general carney not general  and we got into that discussion as to who's in charge and he was it three days trying to sort that out he's been given a lot of responsibility i'm not sure what his authority is behind it exactly so i think that chairperson of this subcommittee i have a couple of questions that i want to submit for the record mr bowen regarding security and corruption and i'd appreciate if you would consider responding to my  it but as i listen to this this dialogue i want to talk about the impact of our assistance since we have all three of you here maybe the three of you can answer these questions i understand that most of the work being done in iraq is by contractors and contractors are providing communication services interpreters base operations support weapons maintenance intelligence analysis  functions going to read all my questions and then ask for your all three of your responses i'm wondering is the management and oversight of these contractors a high or low priority secondly are we able to obtain reasonable assurances that contractors are meeting contract requirements and that contract costs are not excessive and managed appropriately and finally is the impact of our systems being lessened because of the over use of contractors and one of the reasons i wanted to ask these questions i have obviously have an interest in minority owned businesses and concerned here in the united states on domestic contracting with the federal government and as a the something i'd like to add to these three questions i'm wondering if any of the inspector generals who are present if any of you have con you've confronted or you've seen a woman owned firm doing business in iraq yet is there a minority owned firm in iraq doing business yet and as inspector generals of these reconstruction funds and projects i'm interested in your thoughts on what the barriers are for minority participation in iraq reconstruction within our own government system here domestically you know there are enormous hurdles that minority owned firms in terms of waste fraud and abuse for federal contracting have to go through when they have an outstanding record those who do receive federal contracts i'm wondering what what the standards are whether or not they're any participating at all in iraq reconstruction and as inspector generals i'm sure given the project that you've been suspected you know in very specific terms who they are and what they're doing i think the chair for yielding the time and i look forward to their answers you first of all in your the contracting areas that you outlined to beginning of your questions it sounded like you were focusing on the military side of the equation and i think that that for instance intelligence supports security support and that that issue is within the purview of the department of defense inspector general and so i think that he should be given those questions as well second you asked whether management oversight is a high priority and it is for me and that's that's what we are there to do to push for that as i mentioned in my opening statement a simple axiom elicited from the course of our inspections is if you have good quality assurance programs followed by good quality control programs you get good projects a quarter of the time that we find find failed projects those are missing and but i think the presence of oversight on the ground in iraq has helped promote it more on the operational side there's two forms of oversight oversight operationally by management and oversight of how that's being executed and having the second piece in place from the beginning is a lesson learned for future programs  you asked about the management of costs that's a that's an issue that we identified in our contracting lessons learned program that the overuse perhaps of cost plus contracts the failure to defend it ties those costs there are federal requirements that require after one hundred eighty days of his station they were observed in the breach we did an audit last summer d o d decided that in iraq those would be voluntary department defense general counsel said that was an incorrect conclusion but the water was over the dam at that point so that is a lesson learned right now but and we've moved away from from using the big design build cost plus contracts as a result of these lessons learned but it's been an issue that concerned me for a long time and we've reported on it over use of contractors i don't that's a policy question kellogg brown and root is supporting the military as the price tag of sixteen billion but that's that is how we shelter and feed our troops in the field and  question is is the impact of our assistance being lessened by the otos of the over use of these contractors although i think reeling are the people feeling our assistance with the iraqi people now that's a different question we provided a  lot twenty one billion has as built and refurbished thousands of school drains tens of thousands of teachers got rid of polio improve water treatment across the country and and trained spent billions on building a security force training t hundred twenty five thousand but from my interaction with the rockies and the iraqis are largely unaware of how we've benefited so i don't think it has to do with the use of contractors has a question of getting that message out  and then finally as to minority firms it's not something that that that is sort of within my purview an improviser in to carry out my oversight but i bet i'm come across it in the course carrying out my work and there are many minority firms employed in and carrying out contracts in iraq and i know that's also an emphasis within the joint contracting command iraq so that and that has been there that was an emphasis in c i think the  the majority of the work there is being conducted by by the contractors we i've asked my staff to actually look at this very issue of what can be done there as far as improving the delivery of services from or what the agency can do to improve what they're doing more than just issuing a lot of reports and saying there were so many outputs that you try to achieve a new chief some you didn't achieve others but what are the underlying causes of not achieving some of these we are going to study that issue sir first addressing the issue of the ownership of the contractors it is difficult for us to tell who actually owns a contractor for the most part because they can be small ownership they can be subsidiaries they can be partnerships or a lot of different ways that make it hard with respect to the new embassy compound however which is the thing i know the most about i can tell you that there were seven major contracts that were let the there was one contract that was what to an american firm the other six all went to a kuwaiti construction company so as far as the ownership of the kuwaiti construction company i'm not familiar and the contractor who's doing the classified  i'm not certain who the ownership is but i can tell you for example of my own knowledge the contractors who are the management of the project team because i meet with them and i visit with them and i would say without having counted it but certainly from my thinking about it right now a majority far more than half of those people are women or minority and in fact the two the project director is an african american and the deputy project american is a woman so those particular contractors i think  i can speak to with respect to the management oversight being a high priority absolutely that is what we do the most of we tended because of the way we're set up and because of the mandate that we have from the foreign service act of one nine hundred eighty which requires us to do inspections of every embassy on a five year rotating basis we tend to look at management more than we look at financial performance so that is something we give a high priority to and lastly with respect to how it's received delivered to the local people i don't think whether it comes from a contractor or comes from a non contractor has an effect there are other things which go into whether it's well done or not whether it's useful or not but the fact of whether the person is a contractor or the group that's delivering it i'm not sure it matters because i said in my written statement we all face the problem getting people to go over to iraq on a more or less full time basis and we use i don't have the authority but the others use contracting as a way of hiring people as a way frankly of paying them more because they demand more in order to live under the conditions they have to live and being able to do it as a contractor allows that to take place so in some places it's just a way of getting people thank you mr jackson and death for my colleagues i'll be calling on members based on seniority of the members that we began the hearing and then in order of appearance before i turn to mr kirk i just want to follow up on mr wolf very good point as i was clarifying for myself we have consideration perhaps as you evaluate what's happening here i think mr wolf made a very very cogent point i mean it's one of the person the mission director for us and ideas well that's right i apologize thank you  for working with him and i know i wanted to ask the panel here about a clear view on one key project which kind of tells the story of maybe the rest of the problem here and that is we all know that the generation of electricity is is one of the key measures we use for progress and my understanding is we are generating a net of about forty two hundred mega a day in iraq which is still below the forty five hundred that was generated under the saddam hussein regime and far below the eighteen thousand megawatts a day that would meet the total demand baghdad you know capital of iraq city with only six and a half hours of electricity per day long after the entry of the coalition it had been sixteen hours a day in the  saddam administration my understanding is that about twenty three percent of the u s foreign assistance funds and even sixteen percent of the d o d funds the commanders emergency response program funds saddam hussein government contracted to upgrade units five and six that had not moved forward in the corruption of the hussein administration usa id undertook that project with bechtel in two thousand three and to upgrade with the cooperation with siemens we are now three and a half years later and have yet to see even unit five and six come on line that would only generate about two hundred eighty additional megawatts of electricity if we can't get one power plant up and running in four years of continuous work  what does that say about the rest of our efforts what can you tell me about al dura and why one plant has not been improved and brought on line the electrical sector has been a problem for a lot of reasons with respect to al dura it was a change in contractors and pieces of it have gradually come online it hasn't been finished and it's due to be finished this spring  admittedly a year late as we've reported on in our quarterly the other issue in al dura is putting the wrong fuel in the generators that are that we do have installed and that's that's an issue that that it's about ministry capacity development the ministry of oil and the minister of electricity have not worked out an agreement for the provision of the right fuel to the right places for the running of these generators and al dura the wrong fuel has been put in the frame nine i think it's called repair crews out to fix the baghdad grade because they're being shot at so much at this point and so the insurgents and whoever they may be are have identified clearly as part of their strategy hitting the baghdad grid and pushing down that daily  hours per day of electricity available indeed tobar it went down to below three and and so we continue to look at it we'll continue to report on and let me give you if i'm a  written report on the story of al dura we'll pull together all our data i'll get over to the corps of engineers and get the most up to date i i got some information today that will supplement the issues there and so i will give you a complete report on that i think you because we have  equated availability of electricity to control of the government a b we have decided that baghdad is the center of gravity and see this is the number one electrical generation plant in baghdad and so it's just a that there's a lack of show that and and we had investigations related to that as of raising that issue about fifteen months ago three hundred twenty five million was appropriated just for this purpose but it finally got syrian border are christians a huge number and so i am concerned the usa id just gave me this a lot of work that they've done what's happening in this one province but it does seem that while we may have done some work in this one province the effect of the coalition in iraq has been the decreased uniting of the whole country which seems ironic in the extreme have you looked into this issue at all of how while there may be some id projects somewhere near the christian villages actually we're not working in any one of them at all in any meaningful way and not protecting this community i have i looked into it i have met with the representative from the syrian christian community several times and and i know he has some concerns about the constitution and ensuring that that that province that you're talking about when when when the right to form regions occurs in now fourteen months that they are able to form as a region and govern themselves because they they are oppressed as you as you point out and and as oppressed as they've ever been and it was bad before and but they have some hope in the constitution if they can get that region's regional right accorded them but it's but as you know it was delayed eighteen months by a vote in november you know it would just seem to me that i understand some people concerned c p a except to say we shouldn't allocate funding along sectarian lines i understand that but from the ground truth from these christian villages zero funding has thank you what i'm going to do is turn the michael did this to israel he's been patiently waiting and it looks like the latest report is that we're going to have an hour with vote so i think after this to israel speaks we're going to have to endure in the hearing and i hope we can very brief and specific question for mr crone guard going back to the budget issues you said in your testimony that our professionals are bravely dealing with violence and dealing with corruption which is hampering reconstruction they shouldn't have to deal with the o m b they should have to fight the o m b and they shouldn't have to fight bureaucratic inflexibility that might be hampering the mission can you tell me what the justification was for not fulfilling your request for the one point three million dollars what was the pushback that you received or what will we be told when we ask why that one point three million dollars was not obligated wasn't a question of not being obligated was never authorized or appropriated we weren't included and i i mean i couldn't answer i'd the chairwoman said there need to be some discussions on this subcommittee to make sure that you all do have the resources that you need to perform the mission as i said before you know we i understand that violence hampers the mission and i understand that corruption hampers the mission those are external issues we shouldn't allow ourselves to hamper the mission and i'm committed to working with you towards that and i very much appreciate that and i don't want to i'm here to answer your questions to help you not to appeal for your assistance but since you've been good enough to ask there are actually three things which i have alluded to there's our ability to use either contractors or thirty one sixty one's that's in your hands and the mandate under section two zero nine of the foreign service act which requires us to spend most of our assets on a five year cycle reviewing all embassies and missions around the world two hundred sixty of them and that law was passed in one thousand nine hundred eighty when we didn't have embassies in many of the places we now have them and all of the kabul and baghdad we didn't have embassies and yet we're still being held to that same kind of use of our resources and not being able to use them toward the priorities of the day now i should add that the house of representatives and the senate in the appropriations bills normally each year tried to waive that but for example in this year there is no appropriation bill there is no waiver and we are obligated to follow the law as it exists which is that we have to do that i understand completely and we will work with you on that i came from the armed services committee under the subcommittee we spent a considerable amount of time on the armed services committee talking about goldwater nichols two that focuses on interagency coordination on another problem that is hampering our progress in iraq and i hope that in a later time we'll be able to really delve into that i'm convinced that one of the things we really do need to focus on is making sure that we have that kind of cross pollination and that we are learning that we are teaching our agencies to cooperate more security environment how much responsibility tribute to the private contractors as opposed to the government's responsibility for the conditions they were working in or the management of those projects there's no doubt the security situation inhibited travel to project sites and that barred oversight sometimes of certain projects but at the same time contractors have agreed and included in their cost in the cost plus program counts for that provision of security in the environment that is iraq and and they've taken on the mission and they and frankly the work is mostly being done by iraqi subcontractors and that's part of the problem they need oversight in baghdad police college is a good example and it's a microcosm of shortfalls by both government oversight and contractor oversight that permitted unacceptable shoddy work to be performed there but the security situation is what i hear i mean that when i when we raise concerns about lack of oversight the answer virtually always is is security prevented us from executing it well thank you i look forward to furthering that discussion with you and any thoughts you might be able to share in addition to writing at this point i want to thank our witnesses for their testimony this concludes today's hearing