rcation and all of those factors supported by for cation in this case by the district court's own admission i want to address in my initial i'm remarks here the court's rationale why it was in the use of discretion how the having a conversation about continuance of my patients probably two or three pages before the transcript but then when he concludes his remarks he says it again he says so we didn't accept the idea of having the same jury decide both a fraudulent transfer and the defect claims fraudulent transfer obviously subsequent to the defect claims but we really need the extra time so again he's not saying we don't want to buy for cation he said what good would the back to back jury as long as we can get the continuance to pay and so i ask one question for clarification the court yes but i've ruled mr green yes as to the bifurcation is that your ruling that they would be taken up with the same jury but except for the fraudulent transfer of to the other claims four were  all being tried together the court will be all together you said earlier you'd be ok with that if you got your continuance well you got your continuance mr green thank you you're on the court so people got what they wanted a new government you wanted but they didn't get all they wanted and you didn't get all you wanted now isn't there an obligation on the part of council to correct a misunderstanding by the court and say no that's not what we agreed court's position altogether what they're hearing this the courts that i'm giving them something giving you something it's not just that you said you weren't interested in it and i really look it would have been great if he'd said wait wait wait judge i that's not what i said but i think when you read the court comments on context and they've been discussing this issue for so long it's not uncommon once the court has definitively rule for them to come back and continue to try to press the issue of the judges clearly made up his mind about what he was doing he was going to go from one thing to was one thing to evil valley and i want to make a really important point about that which is that's not a legitimate reason to deny bifurcation i mean clearly what the court was trying to do here was for some kind of compromise and that's a basis for which it good lawyer would object and there not call the invited here if you don't want but him band and that claim provide for occasion in order to get what you want because the fear would be that if you said no your honor i want to continue to have a bifurcation you wouldn't get a containment well you could have at least objected and said i want to preserve my objection to not getting barred for cation but that wasn't done well you're immediately just going to put this in context eagle valley has been asking for bifurcation from the very beginning of this case from the earliest pretrial conference they filed a motion that i don't see how we can possibly resolve the issue of prejudice in your favor so you're i think that the challenge with prejudice here is that it's so overwhelming everything that came in about the fraudulent trying to transfer claims was prejudicial to  of the fraudulent transfer claims was to show that these two men had been making fraudulent transfers in an attempt to defraud whelan's through their actions there was seventy pages of testimony from an expert witness from islands expert witness companies that legalized each of these individual transfers and whether they were legitimate or not none of that would comment on the trial the contract claims why didn't you say that so they could respond maybe i thought they had some sort of argument that most of this maybe they transfers all the testimony of that witness of that is for none of that would have come in the cross examination of mr osterman mr weight about the legitimacy or the reason for this transfer none of that would have come in on the question of presidents but how does it c anybody and on that issue but the point was the credibility of our two witnesses on the bridge contract was critical there were hotly disputed facts on those claims and we have half a trial devoted to evidence about fraudulent transfers friend said with respect to eagle valley's appeal appeal first with respect to forfeiture i have one other aspect of four for child like to urge that i think could resolve this case which is that eagle valley never asked for the kind of forfeiture they're complaining so i think it's a fundamental basis of preservation that you have to ask for the remedy that you're now complaining about in front of the court of appeals qualifying every three remedy that judge jackson puts forth and i mean i think that's a distinction without a difference i mean if he says well what this and they say all right that sounds pretty good to me i mean so what if they didn't ask initially you know i don't it seems to me that's foremost fair enough your honor but i think they nonetheless forfeited or ended that meant when mr green said as your honor said that he was ok with what the judge was doing and didn't object to tell the judge that he had a problem with respect to prejudice let me would you agree that the judge's decision was based on his understanding whether correct or not on this deal and that there are there wasn't there in the record there's not evidence that he really exercised his discretion in considering everything in deciding not to  bifurcate no i don't agree that your honor i think where you look to see judge jackson's rationale for his decision is in the post trial order denying their motion for playing that's post hoc he knew everybody was unhappy with the idea that time to me he did your honor very think that's the most definitive statement of judge jackson's views on this matter all the other i mean i can do that too i can make a decision without any reasoning and then when it's challenge  drum up a lot of reason and why it was a good idea certainly that's true your honor but i think it they would let me get let me help you tell them tell me if you got anything before the case was tried that shows that he exercised his discretion in making the decision not to bifurcate absolutely or i think the fact that first of all just jackson was thinking about this for months if you look at the two propre trial i for cation that there are he's contemplating how to narrow the claims how to deal with this problem he's posing hypotheticals to both sides to try to push them and i think he's thinking very hard about it the fact that they've cherry picked a couple comments he made during one of these extensive discussions i don't think means they didn't exercises russian i mean don't you think that the rate if we did if we dug into the record on this about what he was talking what he said on the record before this pretrial conference ever occurred i mean don't you think he was leaning toward bifurcation i mean the record transcripts i've seen suggest that he was he was leaning in favor of bifurcation so i mean how is that support that he exercised his discretion over the last minute to not bifurcate i think he was leaning more towards bifurcation in the first motion first hearing before a legal ballot filed a motion to bifurcate and then as he was thinking through it i think you started to understand what our point was about why we needed both of rajon transfer claims and our breach of contract claims in the same case and also i think you understood that most of this evidence would have come through anyway star charts was saying a few minutes ago because one of our theories of why there was a breach of contract on behalf of people valley was that they were happy with the plant until they got the government money and then they had a sudden change of attitude towards us after they got the government funding and when they realized their fuel prices were too high they were in trouble they started moving their money around and so i think judge jackson understood that that evidence was going to come in anyway and as he went through the colloquy with the counsel he came to that decision and you do you have a place in the record that you could direct us where we could look into reading it we would determine that judge jackson was leaning your way that he was that he was deciding not to listened to us he considered that when he was discussing it i think he understood that very well we said very specifically why we want this evidence in the last just a couple other points on prejudice a judge home said we lost the they can't point to a single page anywhere in the trial transcript where they stood up and they said your honor there's prejudice here and this is exactly the prejudice we were talking about when we fall in motion wife again i know that if you were going to make this argument bifurcation on appeal you'd be your actual prejudice argument if you cut through the rhetoric what is there prejudice argument in the reply agree and their argument is essentially there must have been prejudice because we lost  forfeited evidence or sufficiency that in final rule fifty motion at the end of trial and now they're trying to work that back into this case of the back door of bifurcation i don't think that's proper i think at the threshold you can reject that argument but even so i think one thing you'll take away from this record is that there was evidence going in all directions the jury could have come to any i think conclusion in our favor against us in favor of g q we think that evidence was heavily in our favor but that doesn't  mean we don't accept that there was evidence going in all directions and i don't think their argument that it was so overwhelming that the only reason well and one was because of prejudice makes any sense you know  because all of this is not particularly beneficial at the end of the day if we're not allowed to collect on the judgment and so that's why the two priorities in addressing the court today would be the mechanics lane and the charging order which at least provide us what difference does it make whether you have a kind exclusion i was just curious about that it's the most direct way to allow us to collect on the actual physical assets that we know exist obviously it would be the plant and the land that they  knew about the early there was actual knowledge of the court said that's irrelevant and and so i think what the court was saying was you need to be in order to comply with the statute need to personally serve notice that intent to file a lien statement and so you can acquire knowledge through some constructive means or through anything other than personal service and as i understand the arguments that were present if it ever was the way that the claimant was asserting that the debtor had knowledge was through their intervention in the lawsuit and that's at the very first sentence of the court's opinion was where they talked about the interaction of the parties in the lawsuit and so i don't think ever it really has any application to this case for the reasons that it's undisputed statute makes that clear on its face first the first sentence says in order to preserve a lien claim there must be a notice of intent of filing statements served upon the owner so the only thing the legislature is required in order to preserve the lane is the notice of intent it does subsequently require an affidavit but that's not what the legislature is requiring strict compliance with in order to preserve at least i think the affidavit serve whatever distributions will be made to limited partner countries tributed to the limited partner distributed to me the creditor of the limited partner how can you require the limited partnership to do that without getting an order against a limited partner it's seems to me it's like garnishment where if you want to collect the employees wages you get an order against the employer saying forty percent or whatever the wage needs to go to the spouse for child support wise and you seem to be arguing you can get a charging lien that's of use to you without going against without having an order against the limited partnership itself can you explain to two points your honor first i think there are two issues that are somewhat related but only one of them is before the court so the first issue is whether we can obtain a charging lien against the debtors interest and so i think that's be the perspective the court needs to look at it not so much from the alice sees what actions that need to go to charging the against the deaders interest you think that something you get against the debtor but it seems to me you have to get that believe against the limited partnership and and that's how they're going to statutes ferry across the country and as a general matter i think your honour's understanding of a charging order is correct it basically directs payment that would have went to the judgment better and sends it to the judgment creditor but in certain states including colorado specifically there is the option to foreclose on the judgment debtors interest in the l t and that's what's really a bit of are you getting that already in the in the limited partnership provisions of the statute correct the charging order specifically the statute specifically contemplates foreclosure of the members interest and so that's why you would look to be al are the members in foreclosure of the interest is europe would that the debtor will substitute in place to get a creditor will substitute in place of the debtor as the owner of the aisle seat so how do you and then how do you get authority to require the limited partnership to pay that then that would be the second step your honor there there are likely would have to be some domestication of that charge in order in a court of competent jurisdiction i think you have do you agree that the limited partnerships are not subject to colorado jurors to i do not and that was the both the parent and the subsidiary correct and the only was that i could be jurisdiction of the intermediate entity the only business activity used those two entities in the middle conduct or holding that property the legal valid point your honor and so they're only business activity is and is obviously centered in gypsum colorado where the plant is located and so to the extent that there's any business activity of those two it's in colorado it's going to the first step though i don't understand how you would be able to get a charging document as a relates to the debt or its interest when when in fact b l o seeds are not incorporated in colorado means it seems t continues with the rights and obligations specified in this article this article does apply to foreign entities in certain respects and so i think the intent when you read all of the sections together and not specifically just the all see do you have a case that says that been good law for thirty five years it's the exact same statutory requirement issue it's the exact same subsection of the statute and when you look here we know that there are aspects of the colorado  statute that are required to be strictly complied with and those relate to actually perfecting your lean this particular require this in subsection three which begins in order to perfect early so it is a requirement that is right in that  it is the first instance i think that that is not a basis for avoiding lunacy and i want to avoid it because i think they're pointing to a very hypothetical minor new wants differences and quite frankly their argument is based on an article intruding a dict from a united states bankruptcy or about what remedies might be available in college when you're conceding to them that they'll get any remedy in utah that they would have wanted in colorado i can't make that c well there i can then like them why should they make the config well let me let me point you though to the utah statute if you compare the utah subject to the colorado statute and this is the utah section forty eight three eight five zero three two b it rea exactly the same as the colorado statute both authorize the courts to make the necessary worst to effect the change in interest and if you're talking about some hypothetical other remedies down the road then i'd be singing here some slightly different ways these might be amended i that is considered under this colorado statute must be a members interests of an l l c that was of as part of this statue you know you're exactly right your honor and that's the argument you made me think the statute when you look at the definitions completely clear that this it only applies to colorado i'll see these and they can't reach beyond that and that really is the bottom line on the charge more argument the statute just does not support it and the fact that they were able to get the charge in order and you taught me that there's really no prejudice in that interpretation i see matt and the start go poking couple took an extra few minutes so if you need another minute they have to respond to improve the world if you fine can i ask your question is is lurking in the back ground of your argument this notion that the state of utah and companies organized under the laws of the state of utah i have an interest in controlling your can be members of l o z's and who can own interests in l o l c just the sort of the way i was thinking through this is you organize a company under the laws of the state of utah it would not seem right that a colorado court could say ok we're going to take this interest in a utah company and give it to somebody else based on our law when one of the purposes of incorporating or form an organizing under the laws of utah is you're trying to get the protections of that law you're probably not very clear and you get that not just of what i'm saying i do understand what you're saying but i think quite frankly the states vary and some allow them to do what whelan's wants to do here in sundown and the way the colorado statute is written it doesn't the law for it and again there's really no prejudice and here they were able to get the exact same charging order from stop it go let me pursue because i'm not sure i agree that certainly not in the specific chapter i'm not sure what the divisions are on the little seas but they have a foreign entity statute that was cited seven as no greater rights or privileges than and except as otherwise provided by this title is subject to the same duties restrictions penalties and liabilities oppose imposed upon a functionally equivalent to mystic you look at the defined terms that are used and that's the role of state you've got it backwards there you have all these different entities they have their own laws and they say what ever rights if you're doing business in colorado it's not just if they weren't doing business in colorado no application of the section but we're not going to define l l c for every other state but if an l l c is doing business in colorado the essential rights cities it's only more specific because of the terms used to action when it says l l c and then it took and it's a totally different section that defines l l c as one organized under colorado  w so that would mean that seven ninety eight zero five two doesn't apply to l c s because that's the definition for every provision in the l l c chapter he says is that your position then would be up by the way if you want to send a twenty j letter because one of their problems is they didn't cite to seven ninety eight zero five until their reply brief so you haven't had an opportunity to address that in