case actually look gates as i understood as a consolidated who could work for purposes of this argument and the courts motion in the issues presented in those cases are identical to the time allotted i'd like to focus on the central issue on appeal in those cases which is the sco in reach of illinois supreme court rule two thirty seven b i'm of course ready to answer any questions and my questions from the panel but again in the absence of include not only persons who are officers directors or employees at the time of trial but also those persons with whom a party has a relationship or those persons over under or who are under the control of a party or those persons over whom a party may exercise some sort of leverage as this court held in its february two thousand decision a white starlog stealing technologies at three and i think it's instructive to consider the terms that both the plaintiffs and the trial courts below used when discussing mr charm never did they refer to mr charm terms continuing to provide services to his past employment with honeywell his situation with honeywell his role as a two zero six representative for honeywell and their brief they refer  to the arrangement between char and honeywell they referred to terms of work for honeywell and he referred to his depth of involvement with honeywell nowhere however in the record or in the preschool for you is there any simple statement that says will two thirty seven be applied here because mr charm is an employee of a part despite the clear and unambiguous language of two thirty seven  which again employs theory limited and specific terms terms that this court held and white guard aren't legal terms of art officer director or employee despite that their language not only like our life but also in such decisions as johnson the owens corning kearney the break kate and also at cop break eight and that position is this the rule is the an officer director or employee of a party at the time of trial it's a limited rule it's limited in terms of officer director and employee and it's limited in terms of when a person speaks it's those specific roles and then at the time so your argument is the laws of war even if it doesn't move me serves the law is written by p illinois supreme court rule two thirty seven b is clear and unambiguous and although there is no evidence on this record that that courts instructed honeywell you don't want to bring him fire him and so absolutely if you are not an employee at the time of trial he cannot be called and this case on this record here is  ike signal in one nine hundred ninety seven and thereafter form his own company called charm h s n e international he has performed consulting services for honeywell since one nine hundred ninety seven but he has not so we have produced him as a witness we have produced him as a two a sixth opponent he does bear five discovery under two thirteen both of which if you look at kind of the rules allow for somebody other than an employee officer director to form those by honeywell that he testified in the past that is correct we have produced him in response because at that time mr charm still operating under what was holding the consultants agreement still operating in his role as a consultant that has been established and followed hundred ninety seven when when honeywell would inquire of mr charm will you please come to as part of your services will you come and testify in response to this notice the answer has historically been yes as the record in this case makes clear mr charm in two thousand and eleven early two thousand and eleven indicated to honeywell he was no longer willing to perform certain services part of that including travel not just travel to illinois but travel anywhere outside of new jersey new york and his response was no i will not hop in the past he has said yes but in the past there's never been an argument and honeywell hasn't presented that argument that he wasn't subject to thirty seven the argument here is he is has consistently since his retirement from honeywell under the clear language of the rules certainly under the transition agreement that was in place in two thousand and eleven at the time of these trials not subject to two thirty seven because he was not an the record has testified over twenty times in different trials on basically identical allegations involving this festus conspiracy there are over forty five separate days of trial testimony from which a plaintiff could hold the transcript in the testimony that they wanted and of course the avenue was open to play into this as it is to ever any individual who is not subject to thirty seven ve which is first of all to ask somebody if if they're willing to come testify and if they're not to use the pe the point of could use the testimony from prior cases and indeed it is standard practice that we have used in the designate prior deposition or prior trial evidence deposition or trial transcript when a witness is unavailable certainly a witness not being record if the concern is the lack of a life witness again there is the availability of pursuing a videotaped evidence deposition that then can be played live quote unquote live scuse me to the jury absolutely a party kind of jacked but standard practice has been in the practices of the witnesses not available and the court concert has reviewed the transcripts there might be objections on a question by question basis or there might be objections as to fortune's the parties can cross designate testimony so there is a procedure in place to allow that to happen when the witnesses unavailable for live testimony and again a witness who is not subject to the personal jurisdiction of the court but has a prior trial testimony is somebody that we could go through that procedural process to designate prior testimony that has been done in the past the the the records in the brief indicate that mr haas i'm an individual that was also a former employee of the honeywell likewise retired from honeywell and then did provide some consulting services mr haas has fully retired from the company  garlock this court hold those are immaterial honeywell's position would be that the impact of a person's testimony the significance or lack thereof of that testimony is simply immaterial to a consideration under two hundred seventy he's either an employee officer director at the time of trial or he is not and again the court the supreme court and using rules and writing rules you into thirteen in the verification of discovery you can have an officer verify discovery or you can have an agent here if i discovery the terms agent managing agent other persons doesn't appear into thirty at the time of trial it doesn't say at the time of the incident or if there was ever a time when a person was an employee doesn't say even after receipt or upon receipt of a two of six notice  eight in this case we do in fact have a contract between honeywell and the syrian army and it was entered into in march of two thousand and eleven we know from the record he's had a consulting arrangement an agreement in place since one nine hundred ninety seven that allows him to act as an agent for the company and by plaintiff's own mission in the briefs those arrangements have been in place for some time and there is no evidence in this record that honeywell cho agent of the company and so we refinancing that agreement in march to march two thousand and eleven after the behest of mr charm did not change anything regarding his status with the company other than limiting the services that he performed as an agent in there is an affidavit in the record in both looking into her worth from mr charm indicating that he went to honeywell he said he needed to cut back on his services he had personal obligations that he wanted to meet and one of the things he was no longer willing to do as an agent for the company operating under a consultant agreement was to travel in that again and travel simple premise of this appeal which is the rules mean what the rules say they have to be applied as written they and will hear is officer director an employee hardy's in litigation in the state of illinois are  allowed and should feel comfortable relying on a clear application of those rules particularly when the rule is clear and unambiguous and when there's a controlling authority from the appellate court that that is in fact the old relationship he had been tendered as a rule to all six the polar gene rich twenty eight of two thousand and eleven before the february trial and after that deposition he's been given ten thousand more new documents  can tell there is nobody else in the world that can speak corporately for honeywell on these issues that was their position as of spray or was it someone that's not true but at the time you refused to do that we had i'm significant argument on motions to compel or to have six witnesses in cases that we're not going to try and do good work with in a different case there was a motion to compel it to a six witness again a corporate representative in that case and plaintiffs try to characterize that request as for somebody other than charm honeywell had an obligation at that time to produce the person that they understood  these two fellows rough tally well and establish their independent consulting businesses as have been the only people who have spoken in court for only well for twenty to do again rule two of six requires us to have a corporate representative and what you have to do at that point yes you know we think they have to know that the knowledge of the corporation and explain to us argued in their briefs certainly y there's nobody in the personal knowledge that we absolutely have to designate to a six i don't think that conflates with having to come up with an alternative to thirty seven the witness we either have an officer director employee subject to the or we don't we can't create one