step back a moment the accommodation she requested was to remain employed at juvenile hall and not to have to tell kids that they should use condoms and that they should have abortions and there really isn't i mean and that that wouldn't have been a reasonable yet your honor that's correct so i just mean she could pick the stage of the hall that was her preference seems to me that what we have to benchmark this evidence against is are there enough inferences that the accommodation they did give her one and a reasonable accommodation i think that that's correct and if a jury could find that instead of giving her reasonable accommodation they transferred her to a position they knew she wasn't qualified to do they failed to give her an orientation there and they wanted her to make an error so efficient to allow them an excuse to get rid of her so now you're this really does focus on the second job yes a given that she's filed a complaint weisser also a natural response on the part of the county to say she's filed a complaint and we're going to have to be more careful if we're unhappy with her itself or unhappy with her performance she did a probationary period she has one year appropriate sexual behavior and how to avoid the risks of age id if you are not willing to and to do that which which we as a county have decided to do then you may not work as a nurse at this is still and if you are unwilling to do that then you are no longer qualified to be a nurse here and we would have to fire you now that doesn't have anything to do with religion does it well neither does requiring people to work on saturday it's a matter of saturday instead of hearing so i think the point  merely that of course employers can have requirements for the job and one of those requirements similarly could be that you have to work on saturday and not to find that there is no commonality in the county's policy that they cannot issue that  require that an employer merely refrain from firing you because of your religion it requires that the employer not use for me against you based on the terms of your employment and then in the section what  her on the basis of who religion they were discriminating against her the fact that she might ultimately have been fired for some other nondiscriminatory reason doesn't owe me a dime of the duty to accommodate with this accommodation that the combination was a sham that they sense they sent over to orange wood and put on a staff of which she was not qualified to give her an orientation knowing that she would fail and that and that and that she would be that she would be done but i'm still struggling to it was the evening shift where ordinarily we had class to class three nurses she was not a class to our class three nurses so we were putting on a stamp where ordinarily she wouldn't she might have been qualified on the other hand she got a pay increase when she was accommodated but i'm still t record but the issue is is there any have been time the other side that the jury could have believed to bring a verdict in for the plaintiff and the plaintiff is rogers has pointed to a number of things right one you know this comment about we ca than a reasonable accommodation well and so you have in effect are asking is literally to determine as a matter of law on this record that it was a reasonable accommodation  and until this morning and then it is actually i still believe that the police concedes that a page thirty five of the brief he states quote appellant conceives that are transferred to orange which sufficiently accommodate her religious beliefs being signed to be a doctor i'm being assigned to be a nurse but not the kind of nurse that i have training for so it's a little bit different so that's how i thought that's what i thought her claim was but every listen to you maybe you're  the county notwithstanding the reasonable accommodation failed to quote preserve her employment status and that's where i depart and say that all those all these complaints about the night shift and she wasn't just any class he was very high school but that was because she was still on probation and i don't think that anyone wanted to change her status especially given the fact that she had had it was it was it was pretty clear that accommodated her religious beliefs which is true in other words if you move over here she doesn't have to do with counseling so she's saying it accommodated her religious beliefs and she follows that in her brief with the postal workers case up about you know the night shift to training that sort of thing and we have conflicting testimony on this correct well i'm not sure this conflict the we have we have the plaintiff's testimony right but she didn't like any interest there's employment status was a director because she says it was inappropriate for c c unlined to be on the night shift plus she didn't want the night shift because of her child care and then she goes on and i don't know if it is or not but if she  i know you don't think this is her case that let's just say that they are trying to figure out what the law is providing if you get transferred as a basis for esoteric consequence of your accommodation they transfer you to a job that you're not qualified excellent question if you are transferred to a job that you are not qualified to do that tells me that you have had a change in your status as an employee  because presumably your status as an employee are related in some way shape or form to your qualifications and your training now i suppose a case could come up where a physician is working as a mechanic and then because of a religious issue or something some as you gets transferred back could be being a physician that would clearly be a chang know the exchange you have with jamie killing me comes down to the fact that maybe the issue here is whether or not the employee status was preserved by this accommodation which is a separate issue from whether or not there's no evidence that would allow it to go to the jury in hear hear the only arguments near our viewers that have been made are these three things and i don't think they go to as a matter of law they don't go to status employer that's that's our view on it now of course i don't think you get to that unless unless i'm wrong on and jeff and judge hatter was wrong on the directed verdict on the threshold to give up on that point at all i do believe judge had to meet the correct call on that i do believe that part and parcel of that analysis is whether or not a judge looking at the record as a whole believes a reasonable