the order dated april th two thousand and nineteen the complaint at issue in this case recites sat that bring into question whether blanket who works for the county fails to perform his is duties and with that i would like to point out that in this particular case my client quick places within the city of miscued were all alcohol is being sold her husband shared that she was drinking and driving and he sought the assistance convenience stores in the tom so my client is is telling the dispatcher trying to tell the dispatcher giving him directions and the dispatcher literally refuses repeat over and over gotta have an address gotta have an address gotta have an address and eventually just clicks off the phone call with my client says call him back when he's got an address in the meantime his wife who has been in the  convenience store exits gets in a car drives down the road and is found proximately thirty minutes later deceased by or vehicle off the road  when this complaint came before the circuit court of sank lower county on defendants motion to dismiss several arguments were raised two of the arguments involve and i'd like to dispose of them quickly to the arguments involved whether two of the entities that were named as defendants in the lawsuit could actually be named as defendants in the lawsuit does two entities  that dispatching point for the calls i argued that certainly they could be included as separate defendants from the county even though they are related to the county because in the statute controls the emergency telephone system act and the communities that are provided under the act or not provided under the act which is fifty i all c s fifty slash fifteen point one specifically names these entities as subject unless lawsuit in certain circumstances and if i may section fifteen point one says telephone system board or unit of the local government assuming the duties of an emergency telephone system board or carrier or its officers employees assigned or agents be liable for any civil damages o criminal liability that directly or indirectly results from or is caused by any act or omission in the development design installation operation maintenance performance or provision of eleven service required by this act unless unless the act or omission constitutes gross negligence recklessness or intentional misconduct it makes literally no since the statute that was enacted in january of two thousand and sixteen by the illinois legislature would specify all of these separate entities for the purpose of providing them with the munity unless the emission is gross negligence reckless since there is no way they would separately be named unless they were they were susceptible to liability and that is my argument as to dismissal of counts two and count three for the sin come point answering point and the emergency telephone system or moving on to the more intercut and really more important argument in this case is whether blanket ruling on this was in error and should be reversed for the following reasons their ruling is based if you read that war this ruling is based on cases that were overruled by the illinois that had applied a special duty exception to allow total immunity for police conduct that could be determined to be willful and wanton but wouldn't matter if it were willful and wanton unless it were a course of conduct involved that is how those cases had it is deferring to statutory changes that have occurred within the state of illinois that have eroded blanket immunity and there is another case that's that significant actually two more cases but in particular one official says which is it is similar to the chase before the court because it analyzes the effect of the domesticity violence act and how it interplays with tort immunity when police do not respond in a manner that lines up for writing for protection for a in more versus green decided in two thousand and six the supreme court of illinois was faced with a decision of whether the domestic violence act and the and the harming out of  munity by that would trump the blanket immunity support of police officers and am and responders and the toward immunity act and what the supreme court decided these laws and what was decided in moore versus green is stat the limited have munity provided in the domestic violence act should prevail over the blanket courts in illinois have the authority to question what the legislature has done by aggregate aggravated abrogating to a degree the went a little further and stated this case was in two thousand and eight where in the supreme court stated that when i general statutory provision and a more specific one relate to the same subject and there interpreted the language of the e m s act as opposed to that toward immunity act we will presume that the legislature intended the more specific statute to govern and they cited back to more vs grain based on the domestic violence at this very important further to say we will also person that the legislature intended the more recent provisions to control now in the case before the court the most recent appropriation of legislative then act in an act occurred in two thousand and sixteen at which time sam com who are dispatchers who by omission and this is very important to my argument by omission or con commits the act of gross negligen fifteen point one and based upon the rulings and coleman and the prior ruling and more versus green this language controls the scope of them unity provided to the dispatcher who refused who brief used to send a to send the police to intercept a woman who was not in her car driving drunk who was in a convenience store and i think the wisdom of the legislature in doing this is apparent because the dispatcher is the st in the link  anything because the st domino never fell the st domino never fell because an employee for whatever reason chose to make m jump through hoops that he couldn't jump through fast enough and the proposition that the argument that the dispatcher made with can be given if you run your car off into a pond somewhere off on route fifteen you're not going to have an address that you can get so that was nothing more than refusal for who knows what reason but it was a failure under the terms of the act it was reckless and it was all mission and omission the dismantling case is decided on a law that was overruled by coleman this man approaches those cases and applies governmental tort and unity accordingly we here by of polished the public duty rule and its special duty exception therefore in cases where the legislature has not provided immunity for certain governmental activities traditional dispatcher in failing to dispatch police to intercept address schultze before she got into her car it's clearly the allegations made in the complaint clearly fall squarely with the definitions or gross negligence recklessness intentional misconduct that are set forth and it came one and if i may the allegations specifically say who reported who reported that if the scene was under the influence of alcohol and while the dispatcher refused to dispatch police to set speedy check in the scooter at illinois after the nd nine hundred and eleven call from her the allegation that the dispatcher refused is made multiple times and sufficiently subject to proof of course but in the pleading stage sufficiently alleges a reckless disregard for the circumstances the plight that mr shelton looks in trying to prevent not only his wife from being injured but the general public i mean it's inconceivable that a dispatcher could refuse to dispatch police to a known location within a small community when if pete believes there's a person getting ready to get in her car and drive under the influence of alcohol who could injure numerous or kill numerous people wouldn't act on that and i guess from there i've got to go to the courts other reason for dismissing the complaint and that is that it found the act that is seeing its actions were the sole proximate cause of her injuries and death well  hurdles over the involvement of that spat stir whatsoever i mean the court refused to recognize that there was an opportunity had there just stature been doing his  job for this tragedy not to unfold and it's a very very unfortunate incident that occurred here but you cannot ignore the fact that someone working for the county of sinclair had an opportunity to prevent what happened and therefore to say that her driving while intoxicated which by the way never been proven where wife gets in her car drunk and drives off the road and in guys it is a situation where the issue is what did the dispatcher do did he do and not did he completed his duty did he have a duty certainly the legislature as i point out in my brief the legislature actually created a duty right before this asset occurred in two thousand and seventeen just months before this accident occurred the legislature stated it is the purpose of this act to establish the number nine hundred and eleven is the primary emergency telephone number for use and then and this in this state and to encourage units of local government and combinations of such units to develop and improve emergency communication procedures and facilities in such a manner as to be able to quickly respond to any person calling the telephone number nine hundred and eleven seeking police fire medical rescue and other emergency services the general assembly finds and declares that the most and the mergence the telephone system board of st clair county in his case which is before this court from the trial court's order granting defendants motion to dismiss and the trial court subsequent order denying plans motion to reconsider as after plant reported that his wife was driving intoxicated as opposing counsel indicated the planet's why if ultimately drove a vehicle off the highway into a ditch and was killed there are three points that i will address today which are the subject of plaintiff's appeal st that the trial court properly dismissed counts two and three of plants complaint against saying and the emergency telephone system board which i will i will refer to as the board d with prejudice because these entities are not separate legal entities with the capacity to be sued rather they are agencies of the county nd that the trial court properly dismissed plants complaint with prejudice because the defendants are immune from civil liability and as i will discuss in further detail contrary to plainest position the emergency telephone system acts or  board plaintiff cites two section fifteen point one a the e t f say for the proposition that these entities may be sued in their individual capacities this section provides that certain entit may not be held liable for civil damages unless their act or omission constitutes gross negligence however this language of the t s a does not afford plaintiff the right to sue these entities and their individual capacities  as plaintiff's counsel just admitted cincom is a public safety answering point which the e t s say defines as a set of call takers authorized by a governing body and operating under common management county section five dash one thousand and one of the l annoying counties code provides that the county is the body politic incorporated that may soon be sued and plead defend and be defended against in any court having jurisdiction of the subject matter likewise the e t s a defines the board as a board appointed by the corporate authorities of any county or that provides for the operation of a nine hundred and eleven system and this case that corporate authority remain st clair county which again under the l n y counties code is the body politic and corporate that may sue and be sued my brief i cite and ellen only attorney general opinion where the issue was whether the state's attorney has a duty to provide legal representation to the emergency telephone system board that is established by the county the attorney general concluded that the emergency telephone system board is not an autonomous independent unit of government or the capacity to be sued rather it is an agency of the county  manner of the appointment and the number of members of the board provided that the board shall consist of not fewer than five members section fifteen four goes on to state that the powers and duties is the denominated unit of government responsible for creating entities such as the board and accordingly these entities are not autonomous and dependent units of government with the capacity to be sued and because they are agencies of the county for these reasons this court should affirm the trial course dismissal of counts two and three against cent com and the board turning to the trial courts finding that defendants are entitled to immunity toward immunity act the language that plaintiff cites to is contained in section fifteen dollars of the e t s a which provides that a public body is exempt from civil liability from developing or operating any emergency telephone system unless the act or omission constitutes gross negligence recklessness or intentional misconduct dispositive this argument is a case that i  and which opposing counsel fails to recognize and that is a decision from your colleagues and carolan st the city of chicago and carolan the plaintiff sued the city of chicago for wrongful death based on the failure to timely dispatch police in response to a nine hundred and eleven call they reported an armed robbery in progress at a convenience store the court found that the city was immune from civil liability based upon section four dash one hundred and two of the reaching its decision the carolan court rejected the plants argument that section fifteen dollars on the e t s a provides a controlling immunity over the toward immunity act because it is the more specific immunity honor that and that's a distinction without a difference they may change the language they e t s say that was in effect prior to two thousand and sixteen provides immunity for a public body except for willful on one conduct and the e t s a amended after two thousand and sixteen provides immunity for a public body except for gross negligence and recklessness however the same analysis applies  carolyn court also rejected the plaintiff's reliance on our supreme court's decision in coleman which opposing counsel discussed and that is where the supreme court abolished the supreme public duty rule and reversed  remanded the case after concluding that the underlying purposes of the public duty rule are better served by application of conventional toward principles and the immunity protection afforded by statute then by a rule that precludes a finding of duty on the basis of the defendant's status as a public entity or going carolan is clearly dispositive of plants argument as it pertains to the controlling immunities afforded to defendants in his case as the immunity afforded under the tort immunity act is not supplanted by the and unity provided under the e t s say it is also important to note that the trial court in this case did not rely on the public duty rule and it's just and it's dismissal order and instead consider the relevant statutory immunities as instructed by our supreme court and coleman accordingly the trial court properly applied provisions of the toward immunity act which affords defendants immunity from civil liability in this case turning to the immunity afforded to the defendants under the toward immunity acts there are two provisions that apply first a section dollars which provides an relevant part a local public entity nor a public employee is liable for failure to establish a police department or otherwise provide police protection service or its police protection services provided for failure to provide adequate police protection or service failure to prevent the commission of crimes failure to detect or solve crimes and failure to identify or criminals the nd section of a tort immunity act that is a political to this case is section two dash to a law and which provides an relevant part a public employee serving in a position and valving the determination of policy or the exercise of discretion is not liable for an injury resulting from his act or omission in determining policy when acting in the exercise of such discretion  on appeal plaintiff does not engage in any and alice's whatsoever of these provisions of the toward immunity act rather plaintiff focuses on the trial court's alternative conclusion as sufficient facts were not alleged to avoid the application of absolute communities without qualification to defendants in this case for these reasons the trial court properly considered and applied the immunities afforded to defendants under the  routinely held that were facts are largely undisputed the issue of proximate cause may become a question of law determined by a motion to dismiss here in this case plan if acknowledges in his complaint that the deceit it was driving under the influence of alcohol basically administrative type things such as planning administration those talks of things there was none of the language that's contained and i think it's even mentioned in the opinion that the new section fifteen point one specifically applying points to x or omissions in the performance by all of these entities that are outlined there is no way to a board are not liable if these certain levels of behavior or omission were exhibiting such as gross negligence recklessness there would be no reason to include these two name them in this section unless they were liable and could be sued moving on from that i'm looking at the court's order and i heard of posting counsel's argument but i'm having a hard time reconciling it because in the course of order the court found that illinois law required a course of court's case of coleman again and that is the basis where in that trial court in st clair county said defendants were afforded i'm reading were forwarded absolute immunity under section fo that opinion is designated an informal opinion it is not to be relied upon for any ruling in any persuasion or in anything else in this state of illinois it is specifically listed as an informed opinion i notice it opposing counsel did not include that citation in his brief and i will also say that this opinion is old long before section fifteen point one was there nafta to say that fifteen point one could be hurled could be hurtled by the trial court ignores the function and the authority of the illinois legislature there was a purpose to putting fifteen point one and its purpose was and i commend the state for this to protect the citizens of the state of illinois the general public and it does so by broadening the liability to not only acts but also all missions which is what we have in the case before the court today had the dispatcher sent miscued of police officers to the scene my client's life might very well be a lot of i am not at the stage of summary judgment although that type of ruling was imposed on me my client deserves his day in court based upon the statute and to interpret this complaint and the statutory provisions that apply any other way will chill the protection of the citizens of the state of illinois because what point does a dispatcher reach a threshold where total immunity would not allow him to just decide if he's having a bad day and well you have i'm just not going to do my job so protect the citizens of the state of illinois st their ruling dismissing my client