resonant to a particular just weren't just conviction and were pickle circumstances stanched were excluded would provide for compensation for pre conviction incarceration in the case of someone unjustly convicted and i conviction sentence mr cook it would not have been in jail between two thousand and four and two thousand and seven right there's an argument that once you had died in two thousand and seven for the rice and charge of the threat charge that you would have been you know incarcerated at that point between two thousand and four and two thousand and seven but for this unjust conviction he wouldn't have been in prison during that time whenever i disagree because we he was older then he couldn't have been incarcerated for that charge until he was indicted and he wasn't indicted till two thousand and that's that's true that he could have been course free but he would have been indicted earlier from were not already present ultimately we have a we do have the data we do have the date of the dive in two thousand and seven that's correct you know and the indictment refers to the prior offenses we have the so just we have we also have about accepting my premise that he could not have been  incarcerated for that just conviction and sentence until two thousand and seven at the earliest just accept that form right then you would agree that but for the unjust conviction based on the the firearms conviction that's correct i mean but again the statute also focuses on and it ultimately you know what you are convicted of and and you know as we know you know he would be a pretrial think who knows if that's right or wrong but applying that to the facts here it looks like in terms of but for causation of this particular period of time it's the unjust to fiction that is driving the period  trial again that's not based upon a conviction because you haven't been convicted yet so until he's actually convicted on the silencer charge you can't say that period is attributable to anyone with a conviction is convicted before that two thousand and seven conviction it's based upon a regulatory need that the government may have on future in prison for a reason such as dangerousness to the community flight risk something along those lines and it's not actually tied to we would disagree that they lock it in because at the end of the day he ultimately i mean if you're talking about but for causation you know we just we would disagree with that in any event you know as we've noticed in pretrial conviction is is different and the statute itself you know requires a conviction for pretrial damages and one of the convicted not merely an arrest or charge we do believe that as a general matter thirty five eighty five for most plaintiffs would provide that puck effectively to propel out for damages for pretrial in prison but in those particular you know when you're using thirty five eighty five the problem run into this in this case is that all the for our theory that right the sentencing credit comes over and takes away this period of incarceration attributed to the unjust conviction that's your theory or what i'm trying to understand is does it matter in know sir this is more akin to someone who's been sentenced on consecutive sentences and he did not you know ultimately get out of present he was in prison this entire time period you know where there might be a gap thirty five eighty five would also come to play but facts might be a little bit different and we do acknowledge in a different facts you know might have a slightly different result more importantly you know under the under status you there are some facts clearly would marry differently say we had a two different kinds of convictions one of which was a capital crime one of which was a non capital crime statute itself distinguishes between two of those and one simply by having a into the longer time for the conviction that was valid and how do you how do you do that statutorily is there a basis for you to stop that  d all for as as a time when he could have been charged or me but for now i don't think statutorily statute talks about what for thirty five eighty five is what ties these things together that has not been credited against your sense and the problem is we know as ultimately as a matter of law all that time is now credited against a first against a separate chapter saying he gets the credit under the unjust conviction and imprisonment act is entitle to up to fifty thousand dollars per year for each and every year that he served while he was serving that you are separate they serve totally separate purposes and as the judge at the court of federal claims found those purposes are very different operation of walk through the attorney general back up just for a second in most criminal cases eight an individual is tried convicted  where you go how long you go thirty five eighty five provides an automatic crediting process as part of the crime control has nothing to do with the unjust avoid double punishment you're already been in jail for a while for some other reason and we're going to give you credit for that and shorten the length of your sentence in the sense that you're going to be able to get out earlier duty or just conviction over at the same time it seems a little nonsensical just as the congress is trying to avoid double punishment if it doesn't seem like it would authorize double recovery and that's what we have here if you're getting paid for the exact same time you're getting sentencing credit for that seems a bit logical and that's why i'm over here trying to figure out if maybe that time that was originally attributed to that i'm just conviction  now thanks to the sentencing credit stature is now being attributed to the just conviction and i don't that i don't believe that is i understand as chain your concern and i think that i think that serving a period of incarceration and that is not in fact a fungibility between time served and compensation he's going to be a free man earlier than he otherwise would be right he's going to outside of the process of actually setting the sentence but also consider what is the value of serving time at age seventy or does not does not account for the injuries that occur while you're incarcerated you are incarcerated unjustly you are an innocent individual and the court was fairly clear in its early part of this decision saying that the government does not deny that during this time in detention mistress kooker suffered a number of injuries regulatory systems they come out they come out of two different statutory scheme one the unfair compensation act that the justice for all act which is very clear that we want to compensate individuals who were unjustly compensated and the effort and and their reform where we are in the crime control act attempting to drive justify and rationalize sentences  and the fact that the two were in play here is seen in the plea agreement in the toxin case where the united states government and mr croker agreed to both agreed that he could continue the case in the in the butt of claims court and that he would get the credit under thirty five eighty five in fact this expression we provided in the plea agreement it would get the credit and that he could maintain because the way the credit works in the beginning when when he was charged with sentencing case he was he was in fact given credit and there would be one for the time that he had s so he gets credit for the from the moment you know went to jail that the time that you get out a credit occurs in this case when he was finally convicted of the tax and case that credit then converted from the b one relating to the science link case to a credit for that for the instances that he's in jail today for and then is coxon case so then the answer to my question has there is no period of incarceration that mr crocker's experienced that is credited to that unjust in the sense of where we are today  least until the race in case indictment was unsealed in january said an additional fifty five days finally mr crocker's position is that back when they indicted mr crooker in december two thousand and seven he was already in jail he's already in prison i mean there was no way to say ok now that you've been indicted we're we're putting you in post conviction status that means is that he was forced to work he believed and there are there is a case and  chooses to this a fact that he should not have been forced to work that but for is silence or conviction following indictment in the rice and case he would have been in pre trial holding and that would have run and till he was convicted in the race and case and that would have at least run through september tenth of two t court's decision below is well reasoned and in fact highlight the fact that it is not fungible between these credits and unjust conviction for the simple reason that the end just convection deals with a liberty interest a loss of liberty which you cannot by which you do not get to trait time for time that you have actually you have lost your ability act was amended there was a there was a effort to increase the amount to fifty thousand dollars and it is clear from the legislative history cited in the that there was any attempt to in fact compensate people who had been and justly convicted and for part of it of his existence and the federal system mr corker clearly as then unjustly convicted i think that the the court below masterfully dealt with the balancing i think had there not been a resident case this would have been an easy claim before the federal court of claim a single day will not have served a single day in prison that he will not that he would not have served in terms of period of course ration mean he will be in prison because of the credit that he received for the is not going to spend a single additional day in prison he's going to be out much earlier than otherwise would have been the case the plaintiff incorrectly provides that the plea agreement agrees that he could continue the court of federal claims case that's a little inaccurate the plea agreement which we haven't relied upon doesn't mention the court of federal claims case all it does is it requires the dismissal of claims currently pending in the district court against that particular a u s a in massachusetts on that the a u s a in massachusetts was the founding it says nothing either way about the court of federal claims case so we can't rely on it say he meant to dismiss it but it would also be incorrect rely on to say that meant he could continue  lot easier that actually was including pretty green we'd be having a very different discussion here today a couple of notes on the cross appeal again a lot of this is in our briefs i'm not going to go over it again but the pla unsealed either early or as has occurred here or ultimately when you're arrested becomes unsealed because you have to have some idea often of the charges against you and within a short period of time and as for his other claims you know again we talk about this in brief we believe it's primarily the thirteenth amendment claim which we need to have been pursued you just record and his arguments about causation of damages don't answer the trial court's point which was causation of incarceration the court presumed he would be damaged for the