next piece is number twenty eleven twenty seven united states versus trek leather first the facts of the case are relatively simple mr schaffel portie is the president and sole shareholder of the corporate importer of record frederick leathers incorporated truck was found by the trial court court of international trade to have grossly through gross negligence violated the penalty provisions of section fifteen ninety two federal maintains in that trek omitted to holding however the court also found that mr sharp forty eight the president sole shareholder was jointly and severally liable with a corporate importer of record this is this is based on omission i believe it does not apply to any party other than the corporate importer of record in this case the formal importer of record with the following exceptions your honor as the statute define who is a person are a shareholder in this case a sole shareholder or corporate officer has been found alive regardless of the degree of culpability negligence gross negligence fr turkey go of a corporation hold it right there for a moment help me understand something do you understand and all the ego is the same thing as a pierced corporate veil or these two different times no they are synonym instances where the veil is so here's where the corporate shareholders is determined to be the mirror alter ego of the corporation corporate importer of record that shareholder can be personally upheld personally liable as was the corporate law one on one i formed a corporation in order and it's only myself from total personal liability my lie bill that is limited to my investment in the world i submit your honor that one can take that concept all the way to the conclusion that someone in new york city who purchased the one here from the government a any person means any person and see in your client's case he see all three go track and therefore since track is liable as a person who has done this and your client your individual right is equally libel because he's the all three go i was going to pierce the corporate veil although was that there were material facts an issue as to whether or not the omissions in question or occasion by proxy the trial court i think correctly found that their their material introduced for a ten to ensure introduce merchandise into the commerce of the united states in the statue simply does not support that contention when saying really is you saying that this statute is a penalty that section is entitled prohibition so it's a prohibition upon certain actions and the actions here that are prohibited are entering introducing we're attempting to enter or introduce merchandise into the united the questions and individual corporate officers do those things or only the board or record that has the corporation to set up an id and individual officer of the corporation can certainly do those things and in fact mr shouted  br in his reply brief mr show correa sensually contended that also he could not have introduced merchandise into the congress of the united states in the supreme court has construed the term introduced with respect introducing merchandise into the commerce of the united states about one hundred years ago in a case called united states versus twenty five packages of panama hats two thirty one us at three sixty one and in nineteen  nine congress amended the criminal forfeiture statute for similar violations where it added introduce to enter attempt to enter and the reason was exactly to close a loophole like the one that mr showed poor received six open in this case and the supreme court concluded that enter or introduce is necessarily much more broad incans can  and includes a number of actions that go far beyond simply posting an entry with customs far beyond simply providing entry documents to the agency now going back to section fift those smuggling cases those were fraudulent entry cases fraudulent valuation cases in fact the panama hats case involves undervaluation of invoices that were submitted to the u s consulate in a foreign country before the but i want to go back to the notion that that how can you be negligent for failing to this loan something unless there is a duty to this and the duty has to arise from something and the duty in this statements and if you look at the facts of this case it was only sent probation on behaving in negligent were fraudulent fans and you have to establish negligence in front first right and we established negligence by mr shouted korean in the the stipulated facts here very clear and the facts that the trial court relied on are very clear mr shouted tory using a different importer in two thousand and two entered a number sues and like this case failed to declare that the fact  this he has a duty to customs under section fifty ninety two a to to not act negligently when making statements to the agency and it's mr shouted koori who himself provided all of the d congress intend to prohibit from acting in these manner in this manner when it inactive statute that prohibited a person from taking certain actions and if you look at the golden ship case the court the trial court looked at the legislative history of the enactment of section fifty ninety two and tell that person has the same meeting as the those class of that class of people who could be liable under the previous statute which was any can sign or sell or own or importer consing the agent for other person or persons that's a very broad definition mr show before you never made that contention or cited sarbanes oxley and importantly here congress used the word person and it could have used importer of record in fact it you know as mr shut it portends an important record  consign or seller owner importer consignee agent or other person or persons why would it have been so broad it could have simply said an importer and then if any of those other individuals were taking on the role as importer they would have produce he would he would acquire the fabric another company would so the suit in real understand that but in relation to customs what did he do he would well first of all while the shipments were in transit he would decide which corporation would act as the importer of record that stipulation effect number fifteen so what wall the wall the suits were in a container on their way across the pacific ocean he would decide which of the corporations he controlled would act as import records then he would produce invoices which he would provide to his customers broker who then provided them to customs along with all of the other information for putting together entry documents he would then take possession of the suits once they reach the  is that your position well we do agree that the facts could lead to that conclusion but mr shouted corey was the person who was responsible for misrepresentations that were made to customs and he acted if you look at the history of previous customs cases when the government goes goes after corporate officers if you look at priority products there's a long line of cases which before this court before the court of international trade where corporate officers were personally a there was a long history of there was a clear duty that was owed by those people those people owed an actual duty and they were personally responsible for misrepresentation so what you're saying is that discretion that goes on but the alternative here is to come up with a bright line rule that says no corporate officers you don't have to really pay attention to the duty  that the trial court made the trial court applying this person to the single owner as a general proposition  consider the single owner and all through you what is it that you think the trial court did to get that client why how do you understand the trial court's decision the trial court's position was and this is what was argued below was that mr stoddard corey is not a person under section fifty ninety two a and therefore he cannot be personally liable unless he's aiding and abetting and knowingly aiding and its board unary meaning which can be anyone involved in the importation process and that the statute has a prohibition on certain actions and that mr shot of corey fell into that prohibition and in fact in the corporate line doesn't protect him from the fact that he is not the corporate importer doesn't help me is that your understanding yes a trial work because he was personally involved in other words someone doesn't of that that is absolutely true no kill someone is up and that was the trial court's understanding is that we're going to understand exactly the trial of course understanding was that mr chavez poori himself committed the violation he personally was warned not to import the merchandise in this manner and she is personally he provided the invoices that the false invoices was accustomed after he'd been warned not to do that that's exactly what occurred here and there's no basis in section five golden shipping i'm not going to reiterate our discussion of that fraud in the life i'm so proud the court did never dread i read those paragraphs what the trial court said original with kirk with president ford fifteen ninety two but i think as you pointed out we're talking about firmly fourteen eighty four allows owners purchasers and consignees which has been construed by custom said borders to include anyone any can sonny other than a nominal consignee that is this offense signing with a financial interest to act as importer of record does that in compassed the whole world i don't believe so i believe this is an overly broad statement that it encompasses anyone it's of so your view is that even if a corporate officer personally prepares the documents finds that false document