digic the basis for search coverage denial is the existence of a reciprocal coverage provision contained in the surplus ie the third policy is a standard form i assume that truckers policy that contains a general in light of the fact that key cartridges insurance policy did not provide reciprocal coverage to the search named insured there is no coverage under desert policy for keycards the first district ruled below that the reciprocal coverage provision violated the it was void against public policy and violated the on the bus insurance coverage requirement set forth in section three seventeen of the financial responsibility laws which are contained in the illinois vehicle code its search main contention in this case that the first district erred by applying section three seventeen of the financial responsibility law to two vehicles that were regulated as motor carriers of property under the commercial transportation law and this is particularly true when you look at the fact that these are separate statutes that have distinct legislative histories the commercial transportation law was first adopted by the legislature as the elderly truck act in one nine hundred thirty nine when the legislature a created the vehicle code in one nine hundred seventy this act was put into the vehicle code and it was renamed the commercial transportation i was putting in chapter eighteen c separately section three seventeen of the financial and if you take a look at the way that these statutes were put in there in the preamble to the vehicle code when it was adopted it makes clear that the coding compass is it says the code constitutes a consolidated  various early laws in acts including the elderly and motor vehicle law of nine hundred fifty seven it's our contention that there is no legislative support for the first district's decision that three seventeen of the financial responsibility law properly applies to motor carriers of property they're governed by the commercial transportation law and if you take a look at the insurance requirements of these two separate statutes a simple analysis bears that out under section three seventeen in addition to having an omni bus insurance coverage requirement the statute contains certain levels of liability insurance that are necessary in order to fulfill the minimally insurance requirements of the financial responsibility laws those requirements include twenty thousand dollars of limits of liability for a single injury forty thousand dollars of limits for act in the aggregate and fifteen thousand dollars for property damage if you take a look at those provisions and you compare them to the insurance requirements that are set forth in the commercial transportation law it becomes very apparent that these are two separate realms of regulation under the commercial transportation law you can obtain a license to operate as a motor carrier of property unless you first comply with the insurance requirements of the statute you must post proof of liability insurance with the i c c before you can even get a license or registration numbers to operate but that doesn't then eliminate the public policy concerns contention that the comprehensive regulations that are afforded under the commercial transportation law are entirely different from those under the financial responsibility law and in and of themselves provide the protection that's necessary for the  c absolutely you cannot qualify as a motor carrier of property unless you first process the post necessary insurance but it's also important to know that you can't operate either under i c c regulations unless you have the appropriate insurance on file so it's not just a matter of posting it and then going about your business this is a regular and very comprehensive area of regulation that is literally monitored on a daily basis if you take a look at those provisions and you compare the minimum insurance requirements on the commercial transportation law with what's a ford in three seventeen they bear no relationship whatsoever i mean you can't operate as a motor carrier of property unless you have at least seven hundred fifty thousand dollars and single occurrence limits if you haul not hazardous materials depending on the nature of the materials you haul the minimum requirements go up to five million dollars so these different provisions i think tell the court two things first the regulatory scheme under three seventeen is entirely inconsistent with the statute has been adopted for motor carriers of property and in addition to that fact there is no legislative support for the first district's determination that three seventeen should be read into the commercial transportation  exactly true your honor and it's our contention that the first district's interpretation of six a one b two is contrary to the express language of the statute in fact what the first district did was attempt to follow this course decision in state farm versus universal underwriters and its interpretation of a different provision in six zero one b which was six zero one b six and in effect what the first district held was that the exemption afforded to vehicles that are required to file proof of insurance with  commerce commission cannot be given effect unless the insurance requirements there exceed that set forth in the mandatory insurance requirement and they contain down the bus coverage but if you look at the plain language of six so to be as you've noted your honor there is no such requirement and i think also if you look at the legislative history of these two acts it becomes very clear that the first district's interpretation of the statues cannot be defended the only vehicle code was created in one nine hundred seventy and at that time the financial responsibility laws were put into it and the commercial transportation laws were put into it the mandatory insurance requirement the code was not adopted by the legislature until one thousand nine hundred ninety six zero one eight which mandates mandatory insurance was adopted at a time when mandatory insurance already existed for commercial truckers the commercial transportation law already existed so they believe the first district's interpretation of those sections you would have to believe that the legislature inconsistent regulatory scheme with respect to mandatory insurance and that it did so without a single word of explanation of what it intended to do it's our contention that there is just no reason interpretation of these statutes and obviously the better interpretation here is that six zero one a has no application to vehicles that are governed by the commercial transportation law because of the express exemption contained in six so one big yours we made an argument here which we think is valid based on the first district's interpretation that in effect if the first district's ruling is allowed to stand they've effectively mandated a new insurance requirement for commercial vehicles and vehicles in illinois it is not supported by any legislative support or statutory language in that that that would be a violation of separation of powers as you set forth in our briefs establishment of public policy is uniquely a legislative function and courts are not empowered to amend or enlarge statutes and in effect what the first picture has done is exactly that and the only justification of the first district is given for its ruling is its interpretation  reliance on this court's prior decision in state farm versus universal underwriters and i think that the the court here needs to clarify the holding in universal underwriters insurance requirements will not only be records who carry twenty forty fifty miles i think it's related your honor with respect to that could be an interpretation of the first district ruling with respect to the requirements of the on the bus insurance coverage for isn't under three years i have to admit i don't quite understand that argument because even in that here's why when the more specific requirements control over the general male will judge from my perspective the analysis of specific versus general presupposes a common legislative steam and schematic scheme and there simply isn't one you have two separate statutes that in that that govern two separate subject matters i would also know that the cases that my relies on are the district court appeal court cases that my point relies on i personally believe been called into question by this court's ruling in the state farm versus only farmers decision in that case the court  in force to step down provision that said while ensuring that insurance limits under a particular policy may be given at a certain amount to the named insured it's perfectly appropriate for coverage for permissive users to be restricted to the statutory minimum established by the legislature for permissive users under three seventeen that's where we think your honor that there could be a possible application but the point i was going to make about the state farm versus universal underwriters case is our contention that  case was correctly decided on its facts and each of this court's cases that follow it were correctly decided on its fact and their facts but that the case contains expansive language that's been misapplied by the first district here the court in its holding in universal underwriters interpreted a section three seventeen and its reference to the act three seventeen contains a definition for liability insurance policies and it says as that term is used in this act and in universal underwriters the court equated the term act with the vehicle code yet we know that at the time three seventeen was written by the legislatures are the law nine hundred fifty seven there was no oil in our vehicle code so whil issue before the universal quote was quickly decided the language of the court used is overbroad in that regard we think that that language needs to be clarified in this case so there is not used as it was used by the first district here to apply provisions of the financial responsibility law to the separately an act of commercial transportation law i have another point that i think is really important for this court to focus on its opinion and that's the first district in attempting to comply with injured by permissive users of trucks would be unable to secure payment for their damages yet we know this is not true i mean that conclusion is not true under the terms of the policy deserve policy contains a general grant of coverage to permissive users the exception or sceptical coverage provision exception is limited to truckers truckers as defined in his or col c is any person or organization in the business of transporting property for hire we know in illinois that you can't qualify for that deposition or see in that definition unless you comply with the requirements of the commercial transportation law you can't in illinois be in the business of transporting property for hire in less you comply with the commercial transportation laws and post the insurance limits required by the i c c and those limits far exceed those set forth in three seventeen so it's our position that the first district's the motivation of base is first determination  reciprocal coverage for vision should be void hence public policy was that the public was going to be left without protection but we know that's not true in this case in this case there is not a issue of uninsured loss there's an issue of which insurance policy responds to a loss and here the two policies work like this they should work they provide protection for the public and they make sure that coverage is afforded in this context there's just not coverage afforded under th your honors respectfully i like to reserve the rest of my time for this court and it's a case of first impression the issue is does the omnibus requirement found in the financial responsibility towards section seven three one seven vehicles operate on the road or two to carry insurance liability insurance and and then sets forth they had those the insurance policies must contain this statutory minimum as found in  section seven two or three and then session b goes on an exam certain vehicles from the requirements of that section six a one and the the there are six  that have are covered by liability insurance policies with limits greater than those called for in six a one a so we look at that that's what six someone says what this court said  universal underwriters it considered the same exemption argument there in recent memory were some underwriters the policy it involved a car dealership that the car dealership on paid the client and then one day after universal underwriters the garage liability policy and said you know pay us back the supreme court this court was then one of the issues they consider did the exemption that the garage policy had under six zero one be six exempt the garage policy from the omnibus requirement a three seventeen he to this court said no yet even though that exemption is found in six zero one the six policies still must comply with motor vehicle liability policies still of three seventeen b two which is the public policy of the state to provide coverage in all motor vehicle liability policies how do you how do you assess the fact that in illinois anyone who is in the business of transporting property for hire is required to maintain appropriate insurance is defined by the a c c as a precondition to license would that do away with the public policy problem with respect to a specific exemption of six a one b two i don't think it does away with with the it does away with  situation where in this court is acknowledged as much in progress of universal the fact that the owner of the right regulations require all vehicles to maintain motor well we know that the licensing requirements of four for obtaining a license to operate a truck in the state of illinois requires that the trucker provide proof or chance but there doesn't guarantee that at the time of the accident their policy hasn't lapsed even under the n s well the omnibus the omnibus provision ensures that there will be coverage available to the to those who are injured by the operator of the vehicle argument that xerox making here that d o t regulations the o t licensure ensures that we're not going to have an uninsured loss because in order to maintain to obtain and maintaining your maintain insurance is no guarantee that at the time of the accident that insurance policy will be in place the omnibus provision requirement applying to  policy in this case would ensure that there is coverage no place in place at the time is because the one b two then just written right out of the it's huge or when you come up with an example of one it would apply well i think it would apply the what the exemption one of the exemption one of the things the exemption does is it it allows you know it like trucks under  fifteen set forth and seven two or three and the exemption it's clearly states that for vehicles required to you know file proof of insurance with the i  important point to to make your to consider when and when we're talking about public policy and the requirement that the commercial trucks and maintain or include that requirement in their policies and that is we're talking about the construction of the statute that's what this court did in reversal of the writers in that opinion that's what the first court did in our case the law it looked at three seventeen and said that this provision provides a definition for the choir mintz of of motor vehicle liability policies and it applies throughout the act the commercial transportation law is part of that act and there's no reason to to now say that  though it the requirement for the discovered is found in three seventeen three seventeen applies throughout the act it doesn't apply to another chapter of the act which is the commercial transportation law that's what this regarding what the policies do it and then if we if we acknowledge and we accept that i'm remiss coverage is the public policy of the state that this court in reversal underwriters and state farm versus smith stay found versus omar farmers and progress of universal versus liberty mutual has acknowledged and held that i'm risk coverage must be written into every motor vehicle liability policy what zircon is done with reciprocal coverage provision is they have of voided the statutory requirement of on the writers and it looked at state farm versus meth and the court said it really examining those opinions and reexamining three seventeen b to the court said what three seventeen does is it removes from the coverage determination whether the vehicle is being operated by a permissive user and what the zurich policy has done is  the permissive user back into the covers terminations and under progressive universal that is inappropriate and the policy you know it violates public policies think one of the issues that is has been raised is well it's inconsistent with the regulatory scheme governing commercial truckers to incorporate  a pub of this requirement into their insurance policies covering truckers but the problem with that argument is number one there's the statutory basis for making if there's nothing in the commercial transportation law nothing in the only vehicle code that would suggest that it's doing consistent or in conflict to apply three has consistently stated that the purpose of our nervous coverage is to protect the public so there can't be a conflict or an inconsistency in applying an omnibus requirement to  trucker's liability policy based upon the regulatory scheme because the purpose of the regulatory scheme and the purposes of omnibus coverage of the say and finally the argument that makes to show this specific class of vehicles or type of operation it's that specific limit that will apply and not the more general limit that's wrong and seven to all three so you're not going to have a situation here where are british that two of the arguments that were has presented to this court are waived they're made for the first time in this court and now we dress the merits of both because obviously waiver is a restriction regulations adopted by the i c c show the inconsistency of including on the bas requirements for commercial trucks as we point out the argument was not not supported in the record it was first presented after oral argument in in the first district when zurich attempted to supplement the record by filing the d o t regulations that it relies on in this court  argument if the first district refused the motion to supplement the record so that argument the inconsistency conflict argument was waived is not supporting the record and the other argument that's waived is the separation of powers argument bad argument wasn't made to the judge can heard it wasn't made in the first district zork says it was created by the first district's opinion while there just i mean the the jews if the court system if the judiciary doesn't have the power to require commercial trucks to carry on of this coverage if that power rests with the i c c that's an argument that should be made to judge greer and judge canary the then address it should even if it was right there it should have been made to the first district it wasn't it wasn't made in either court it was first made here and so it's waived and i think it it really lacks merit because what the first district did well all in this case was is required for policies for commercial trucks that's a uniquely judicial function in a construing in applying statutes the first district  create public policy the requirement of on the miss coverage existed long before xerox versus keycards must spend came to the court's attention let me ask you this make sure i understand it that if we were to conclude the financial responsibility law does exempt commercial truckers we then left with a situation where this research proposal would provide no coverage or how does that play into this with the reciprocal well the i  both provide primary this is another insurance provision it's an exclusion the the trucker doesn't get permissive use coverage unless his policy covers those are named insured  your honour's i have a few points on rebuttal first and foremost the n l says this case has to be governed by statutory analysis the simple to simply say that you can extend the universal underwriters case to the facts and circumstances here is inappropriate if there is not a legislative support for the extension of ami bus coverage to commercial truckers we have set forth in detail both in our brief and our argument today that no such support exists and there is no counter to that conclusion the truth is the matter of the matter is the universal underwriter's courts it did not address the circumstances that is present in this case it did not interpret the crucial transportation model or the relationship or lack thereof that it has with the financial responsibility law and i think it's crucial to remember that the uniform or excuse me the only vehicle code is not a individual statute it is a conflict  occasion of separately enacted provisions and there is no statutory basis for the first district ruling here that three seventeen a finance responsibility law should apply to the commercial transportation law i think also insurance requirement uniformly across all the different factors that are referenced in sixty six to one b would lead to some very anomalous results we not only would you invalidate an express exception for vehicles that are required to file proof of insurance with the l r commerce commission one of the exceptions is for implements of husbandry that's farm equipment so in effect if the first district's ruling can be read to mean that now farm equipment has to comply with six  eight and it has to have i'm not just coverage and it's our contention that simply just isn't supported by what happens every day in this state and by the express language of the statute the other notion is west been vice this court to make public policy and to do so under the possibility that truckers are right operating in this state with canceled insurance policies and they cite an out of state case for that proposition  things that make royal and applicable to this case first under the new york traffic laws commercial vehicles are required to have amiya on the bus covers in new york that cited in the opinion here in illinois there's not that same proper legislative mandate by virtue of the arguments that we've made here today in addition to the royal court said that despite this comprehensive scheme of federal regulations that govern commercial trucking there may be canceled insurance policy out there i would submit that that's not possible in any reasonable circumstances under eleanor law in what i've done to intice a painting that the only real argument that west bank can make is that canceled trucker policy should be the basis for the extension on the bus coverage is just to take a look at the provisions that govern motor carriers of property and i'll note that chapter ninety two the only administrative code sets force the rules that implement the mandatory coverage requirement for commercial truckers if you take a look at section fourteen twenty five twenty it requires that a trucker post a certificate of insurance with the i c c not only before it's given a license to operate but that certificate of insurance has to be maintained during the course of operation under section fourteen twenty five ten that certificate of insurance has to remain in effect unless and until cancellation notice is given to the i so there's no circumstance where the regulatory somebody would be unaware of a commercial motor carrier of a property operating in this state without required insurance i also note that the federal regulations that are doctored under the statute and  insured with respect to issues that normally lead to a cancellation unless and until the agency receives notice and then notice is given to the carrier the carrier has to post new insurance or immediately its license and registration to operate a cancelled under that provision in addition the provision provides for civil fines of up to eleven thousand dollars per day for violations and also note that these provisions are forced both by the i c c and the  state police so the notion that this court should predicate its decision upon the possibility that a motor carrier of property is operating with a canceled certificate of insurance i think is a misnomer and certainly not something that this court should predicated a finally just with respect to waiver there's been a waiver here all of the information authority and arguments that zurich's missing in support of his position in this court were included in its petition for leave to appeal which was  granted this court has the discretionary authority to consider what ever it deems relevant in order to decide this case i'd also note that zurich was the apple league in the first district and as such did not frame the issues for purposes of that appeal and has a right to raise new issues or any issues that it deems appropriate that are supported by the record in this co the last point that i'd like to make is in response to a question it was raised earlier about whether or not the reciprocal coverage provision has a basis to apply if in fact six zero one the two applies argue that to the extent that the mandatory insurance provisions and six zero one eight do not apply to the question of transportation law by virtue of sixty one b two section three seventeen does not apply because this court previously ruled that case number one of seven for seven to retake