the state should have been permitted to were intervene for purposes of this appeal and centigrade should be added because it is contrary to state law and because that state law is neither preempted by federal law nor invalid  first with respect to the intervention question the district court was pother principally by two issues standing in time with respect to standing our position is that as a sovereign we get out article three injury when our laws are misinterpreted appeal but to think about what the consequences might be in terms of trying to get some other interpretation of state law on the subpoena the district judge thought that perhaps might happen there might be another court proceeding and indeed there are right now to court  state law should be interpreted if the end of the day we might have an indiana supreme court judgment for example that holds that this sort of honoring of detainers is required pursuant to state law that could then be used to obtain a state court injunction against the marin county share which would then find itself in the position of having conflicting injunctions one by way of this consent decree one by way of a state court judge and is that really a situation that we want to invite as opposed to permitting the to intervene now to try to get a straightforward federal you know interpretation adjudication of the statute that hopefully will be consistent with whatever happens with with state law down the road i don't think the state is certainly as a matter of article three barred from trying to in response to our motion to extend the time to appeal that the state was relatively blameless for creating the situation we found ourselves yet the court decided that the time for intervention should have been measured from the time the consent decree was proposed in july of two thousand and seventeen as opposed to when the judgment was entered in november of twenty seven there's no reason for taxing the state with that time period between the two we were never notified of the lawsuit until the it's not obvious to me that even then the issues of state law were as crisp as they later became once the court started to dive into the proposal and secondly why is that why what was what was lacking in christmas until you actually well i think when one raised the possibility that there might be some contravention of state law in the in the district court begin to dive into that in the analysis of the consent decree and then gauge both preemption and fourth amendment issues which perhaps were not obvious on the on the surface of the proposed grade at that point i think there was a responsibility notifies because certainly i think no matter how we look at it the constitutionality of state statutes were being called into question now that constitutionally sometimes what will shape up as sort of a binding very valid invalid distinction here perhaps that wasn't the issue but it certainly was an issue with respect to interpretation you know district courts will as all judges are supposed to do try to find ways to avoid constitutional issues to fit reasonable statutory interpretation is available well we think that if we'd been given the chance to argue about the constitutionality of the statute the interpretation given to avoid those issues would not have been necessary and in that circumstance we should have been notified we should've been invited in  reason for us to go in and ask for reconsideration because we already knew what the district court thought of the issues and so our view is fine will we just need to intervene for purposes of appeal to pursue these arguments down the road  now but that's all that's only where the consequence of vacating that relief would not actually change the circumstances on the ground where there's some other authority now so your point is it's the relationship between statute that affords any citizen a right of action against american sheriff's department statutes seals the deal because they i have to obey state law as a matter of principle but also as a matter of worrying about whether they're going to get grounds for this kind of sweeping relief this court has upheld that principle many times including michigan this want to get a case and it's really i think a critical piece of of understanding why this case never has been about this kind of consent decree in the court said well maybe that isn't weeks to ten years but wrap that into the preemption analysis relying on arizona and our position is all we're talking about here is when there is a specific request from the united states from ice to detain  a somebody is already in custody that is not an arizona type situation that is not unilateral state action and cooperated with the request from the united states i think you're also i want to get the difference between the facts of this detention that was arranged by for purposes of the relationship between ice and the marion county sheriff or you know i think there's a bit there sprogs a factual dispute about that and we're not interested in trying to sort that what we're trying to fend off is when there is a would you know regardless of the end of the circumstances a specific request from ice to a local sheriff or anything of police official in indiana to cooperate under the terms of the federal statute identification arrest attention removal that are statute requires that kind of cooperation and the statutes are fairly straightforward in that regard i just report also decided that permits local official to execute detention or arrest in that circumstance would violate the fourth amendment under the theory that acting under color of law would be different from acting under color federal law i don't understand where that distinction comes from i think  violation rather than a criminal violation that would somehow to get outside of what the fourth amendment commits again this part of specifically acknowledge that the fourth amendment permits civil unrest in the context of immigration and that was  be cited in the briefs so we don't think that there is a substantial fourth amendment issue there and we think that the cooperative nature of the relationship here and in the cases that we think would typically fall under these state statutes we're talking about something initiated by the federal government cooperated with by state level officials not a unilateral type situation that arizona was was targeted in terms of preemption but there's no questions at important very important case in terms of federal interests that you've morphed into something that are quite different from where the lawsuit started as into into a judgment that very sweepingly bars and declares invalid local and state er mechanism whatever could be said about some of the scenarios and in the arizona case about unilateral action to detain or mechanism as it currently stands is one very very solid ground preemption wise ott the concern in arizona concerning animating the course holdings in arizona where that local officers state officers could be pursuing their own kind of parochial state state agenda on immigration concerns that they could be detracting from the federal government ability to speak with one voice on foreign affairs matters which are implicated by immigration matters the detainer mechanism ensures that you don't have any of those concerns detainers are simply requests from the federal government that local officers help with a very significant folks give federal officers notification of release dates and if need be hold that person for a brief time so that the federal government can take custody of orderly way these are contemplated by federal law the federal law and u s c thirteen fifty seven ten expressly allows for this sort of informal cooperation where somebody you know local officers just offered this kind of assistance it's the kind of informal assistance that was contemplated in arizona a point of emphasis i'd like to detentions they need to have formal training and essentially become defacto immigration officers that's not correct what what the the two eighty seventy mechanism as it's called the formal training mechanism is good allows local officers after strict formal training and and that sort of thing to become defacto immigration officers who although still subject to the supervision of the federal government can go in kind of do things over there and under their own initiative that's not what happens with these informal informal agreements and a way to kind of draws the distinction here is that with the subpoena you don't have a situation where a state or local office there is just sort of going out into the field and making their own office like judgments on how to enforce immigration law what we're talking about here is that you have you have somebody who's already in state or local custody and we the federal government are simply saying hey you know we have probable cause to believe that this person is removable please just hold that person in custody for an additional little bit amount of time so that we have a chance to go pick them up that's you know that's kind of additional holding is something you know they're already in detention it doesn't require any formal immigration expertise or training to continue to hold somebody on that basis so that i think really draws out in kind of puts the bad to the meat of the concerns advanced by my friends on the other side about the need for these formal agreement if i can not shift very quickly to the fourth amendment issue the end of the fourth amendment analysis because what if the fourth amendment could mean the same thing as both the federal and state level it's reasonable for somebody the federal level to do that it's reasonable for somebody under the fourth amendment for somebody at the state level to do at the local level to do the only real question is that you know if there preemption problem and when you have a detain or mechanism where somebody just you know has the requisite request for approval up of the federal government you don't have any preemption problem once you're clear on that and once  nothing in indiana law requires that we explain in our brief reasons why we think that reading is a textual but i think the textual nature of that reading the comes really obvious when you look at chapter eighteen point two as a whole section one would have an article for injury but that speculation about whether that might happen in the future can't do away with the irreducible constitutional no i understand that it might might it bears on the nature of the injury now right if there's no way for the state and those sorts of are very likely unconstitutional obligations and on the other hand there's every reason to believe that had the general assembly actually intended to require detainers it were i'm sorry cooperation detainers it would have passed there is no indiana law requiring detention the court i remarked to part ways with the sheriff and his attorney here but i think that the article three question presented by this case is not whether the district court properly interpreted indiana law against the marion county sheriff's department tough challenge and the put the policy that forms the forms the basis for this case i think that's the sheriff's problem if the indian a supreme court came out with a contrary  supreme court under our federal theories and if we actually challenge the law at that point then i think that's when the state finally gets its i notice under rule five point one or twenty four zero three and there's a  an indiana court were to hold that the marion county sheriff is required to abide by the state statutes that we say require cooperation with ice teams and you at that sheriff's office were still incumbent by the the high level problem we see here which is that we have a state statute that a local government has seen fit to enter into a consent decree blessed by district judge to curtail the full breadth of that statute this is exactly the kind of scenario where the state needs to be able to intervene to to defend its interests now whether the statute is invalidated on its face or simply trimmed by reference to a constitutional analysis i think is irrelevant particularly for purposes of articles restamp how can it be that we article three permits defense of a statute that would be constitutional claim on by way of what the complaint says versus when the statute is being interpreted later and in the in the details litigation in a way that would just as well have been a constitutional determination terms of result so i don't see that there's any distinction between the two that rises to the kind of article three difference now the ca says well you really can just avoid the merits by addressing sandy but to address standing the city would require you to address the merits which of course is not the way this is supposed to work you're supposed to decide is there a in article three interest first then decide the merits of the case so i don't think that that method of analysis actually helps very much in this case because the merits themselves i think you can't get to until you address standing which on its face i think is  appealing there is this mechanism to permit intervention for purposes of appeal and if kendall jackson in the other cases were interpreted as broadly as my friend suggests playing jade would there be no point or never be a scenario where that could apply i think the distinction is manifest that things will change because american sheriff is required by law to comply with indiana law and cooperate with teenagers and there's a very specific unfortunate mechanism in place to ensure that that happens so i don't think there could be any question but that full article three caving in redress