correctness of the district court's decision basically inches on a single issue plane structure does the term idea information stored on a debit card include the card number now philips tells us that the first thing we should consider is whether this is a case that involves a widely accepted meaning of the commonly understood terms if we think about debit cards if we think about id information on a debit card then the first thing that would occur to anyone is the card  that's printed on the card yet the district court in there dressed the possibility of construing this card in accordance with this commonly understood meaning but instead then straight to the specification now it's certainly proper to look to the specification to understand the context of the term but in this case there is no context there is no disclaimer of card numbers in the specification there is no let's a coffee language directed to the term i information in fact a time might be information isn't used in the specification but it is used in the prosecution history and it's used in a way that answers the question real source had originally presented claims when id property the examiner objected to that language he didn't understand how you could store a property in response to that with jackson real source and then did its claims to substitute idea information for id property consistent with ordinary patent prosecution procedure real source identified its basis in the specification for that amendment and what real source pointed to was a description of information on the part which in preferred preferably includes the card number philips tells us that we should consult the prosecution history to see how the inventor understood the term the district court didn't do this in this case and have the there's additional language there appears column for around line tanner's in which the card numbers and i corrected there are additional reasons for concluding that the district court's limitation of the cryptic is encrypted information so under the district court's construction if we construe the ip information in claim one is encrypted information then all of that language in claim three that talks about encrypted reach another curiosity because the term id information is used twice in first in reference to something that a debit card and second in reference to something on a terminal well the district court didn't find the terminal i help me out on this given the specifications where you pull out card number separately from what you now cool idea information given the prosecution history as to why the word id information was used aren't you trying to expand the language of the plane here to include the card car and if we look to the prosecution history or by golly the applicants confirm that plan in ordinary understanding of the term but there is additional information that's consistent with this construction if you information that is keep a bill of the used on a debit card it doesn't necessarily follow that it's the card number that's captured in claim one that's the turn the play by the information which was deliberately substituted by amendment in response to and will force it exactly as you say but it is to capture the the or it is to get a read on the concern of the examiner that the word property could not accurately reflect what this in invention was about and but now you want to read the word information broader than property there and roth enough to catch catch the card number though the specification talks about the card number something  case for this part specifically help that this very same type of and then made in response to an indefinite as rejection broaden the playing style that there is a dissent in that case that the dissent went to completely different issues well it might or might not it would depend on the on the particulars and the particulars in this instance are that the applicant said support for information is the following passage of the identify the specification for support for the term information in the passage that he pointed to doesn't mention properties it doesn't mention id properties it's awesome about information on the car hire that information is  analytically and i i just want to know where you are if we had really with the argument you are now making it follows we should both in the decision candor with respect to this database exclusion what the district court essentially is to find a prosecution disclaimer as to matching based on prosecution argument a separate limitation even invest five and see if that's what the district court did will go and get some cars and they will be programmed with with the various information merchant id number the card number phone number and then they are sent through up to the id property of the id information they were required to people practicing to be changing their terms i don't see why i just didn't understand that i'm sorry just possessor of the core of the possession of the car it was not intended to be used as an identifier for purposes of matching to determine whether or not the  y the patented invention is designed to make these cards work in a limited set of circumstances determined pre determined determined that various times by the retailer they don't particularly care who had the gift card what they do care is who is the possessor of the car what they do care is that this identical in what respect to say the sharing if you have a computer i can have that computer say that whenever you see the edge come true you can match it with the two  and get a relative match at that point so that still be a match depending on what in the context of the context of the patent this pemex talking about because there is no explicit definition to that nothing in their past lives matching any specific criteria and the people on the plane destruction preview they said this specification claims do not even attempt to define what constitutes a successful match id property and non matching in order for this case to go further you agree i take it that if we were implying to have firm on either of those grounds we should do so and stop id that critical piece of information which we all source is trying to identify and find infringement not of us store merchant id on the point of sale device not a one of us all of us store this critical piece id further upstream and servers that the either lead to the back of the store or only all the way up to corporate headquarters in some instances so for infringement to ground here based on what the claim language states the stretching of the term terminal needs to be included down to coombe servers and what we know for sure is that a terminal isn't a server we know that based on the com teachings of the time we know that based on the retail environment we know that based on the prosecution file history we know that based on that claim one which the challenge here for the plaintiff in this instance is to come up with a definition of terminal that includes a device that stores merchant id as i've indicated under that definition the definition of terminal under the plaintiff's definition of terminal it should include therefore the back office server the case goes for you nevertheless hope to succeed because if you do we would reverse the district judge and say on this record there is no way that since there's no literal infringement the terminal that the doctrine of equivalence is in this case i've got that right i believe so your honor i'll take it as it is pure speculation  well and i believe as you will see in the briefing there are four different theories by different reasons why this doctrine of acquittance should not be extended in this particular instance but the one that i would like us to spend some time with this morning and i replied together is one that really relates to the idea of prevention that really relates to the concept of foreseeability and here we're brian specifically on the glaxo wellcome case from this court in two thousand and four vexations particular is this court knows speaks to the notion of where dr booklet one should begin and if a concept was foreseeable if it was understood at the point in time the patent application was filed then it should be deemed as unplanned and passed on as opposed to the opportunity to come back with it through the process through the process of dr who is to try to recapture that which was forseeable but on point at the time we have that exact situation here in particular the record appendix a twelve twelve is a excerpt from real sources all own expert in this case a twelve twelve their own expert in this case identifies the fact that the client server architecture was well known in the retail industry at that point in time in which his patent application was filed a twelve twelve in particular your honor and i'm betting it's on pa all terminals dot dot dot because this infrastructure was already present when gift cards were introduced age twelve twelve forty nine of real sources own expert report it indicates very clearly that the terminal server architecture existed at the time that this patent application was filed it went on claimed and based on the glaxo wellcome case should not be permitted description of the term of those four elements with it those four on his with inside them around as we know figure five of course it is the entirety of the concept here in part because of the claim language used in describing that the description used for figure five and the summary of the descriptions and column two it begins with the language in the president of the language in the present invention and we know from the honeywell case that this court has heard that that if this court affirms the district court's construction as matching for equality we have race factor issues under the doctrine of equivalence for all defendants if this court firms matching this excluding matching via data tables the case over as to cosco in best buy but it goes back to discovery for the remaining defendants next i'd like to address a point that mr on the mandate with respect to whether card i'd be is transmitted to the computer and it's clear that it so we know that the computer receives the card number and back to the construction issue playing construction involves a process where you may have things that fall into one camp and things that fall in the other camp but what do we that's consistent with a carbon being part of an idea from a sion on a debit card we have a plan in ordinary meaning the defendant's contest that we have a prosecution history in which the applicant identifies a card number as being on a debit card we have a presumption of broader scope arising from claim differentiation and against all of that the only thing that the defendants have is a parsing in the specification of card number and id property which raised by mr fish concerning this this foreseeability business the glaxo case and you need to read it carefully concerns what you do to rebut the festa presumption arising from narrowing amendments that surrender subject matter it has absolutely no relevance whatsoever to terminal in this case the only and then meant of terminal was to change merchant terminal to terminal that amendment is certain it didn't surrender anything if amendment i don't think that there is any obligation for an applicant to say by this amendment we are broadening the scope of the claims all the applicant has to do is identify the written descriptions for that event in this particular instance that have the meant in context what the applicant was doing was an aggressive rejection in which the examiner had a concern as to whether property was something that could be stored in context with the applicant  doing was substituting language that is consistent with something that could be stored we're all familiar with the notion of computer storing information that's one of the things that computers so i'm father by the fact that you now say that was the intended to be and actually was a broadening amendment but i don't see the slightest slagging of that for the examiner and if it had been flagged i would have expected the examiner to have big problems about prior art or about enablement or about indefiniteness and there's no indication that the examiner had any such concerns applicant's stock process where the active and do it was doing was substituting language that wasn't subject to this objection of not being able to store it by substituting information for properties they had they came up with language that the examiner was able to accept as something that is stored on computers now what we have here but in the process of the spending in the process expanded it arguably expanded the plane in a way that is relevant to this dispute we have to get back to the question that we're trying to decide does the information include a part number and whether there was expansion or not is is peripheral to will perfect we will be perfectly free to raise all of the prior art that they want to none of us prior our defenses of been precluded by any of the proceedings now do we actually have a right the issue in front of us regarding indefinite motivated the the trial judge to do what he did by way of definition but as far as i could tell there was no if you take a sion regarding solidity for possible indefin so last what do you think we ought to do with our case law to prevent the kind of conundrum presented here with respect when everybody this is like three blind men trying to describe the same thing the examiner doesn't know what he's doing it doesn't understand what he's doing he it appears to me i'm not asking you to of agree with that but it looks to me like he doesn't understand what important changes been made by the minute as we are parent invalidity and he's trying like crazy to save the claim and gives it quite a narrow construction one might one might conclude well that's kind of understandable because he's he can only deal with what let's hand it to him and then it comes to us and and we're we're in this position where we have to say well and did he try too hard to save the client and construe it too narrowly or or was it or was it an accurate construction and then just to be a little more metaphysical you know was it the perfect construction and if our case la postulates that there's only one construction and it's that correct perfect straight from god construction and everything else is an error then what do we do with a decision like what we have in this case i think the perfect construction is a terrible construction is it really close to a an accurate construction but maybe five percent off is this something where there should be some deference to the trial judge who wrestled with this looks to me like  with considerable effort and time and intelligence or do we just get to start all over again pentagon or what he did and just to listen to you and the snippets of language you point out and quite have to do anything to narrow matching to save the lady our expert dr grossman had no difficulty applying that term the defendants are presented absolutely no evidence in the leg witness or an expert witness construing the term pre determined relationship well that term is definite then matching must be definite too because all that is is a test for a pre determined relationship as to the as to your question about  case follow those guidelines identifiers for their amendment plus i guess the thrust of my question is why shouldn't we defer to the trial judges clepe instruction if we think it was enough even if it wasn't perfect because i i would i would say that we don't have to just strive for perfection in instances where the boils down to whether a card number is included within the scope within the needs imbalance via the formation of a debit card and i don't see how you can resolve the case without answering that question yes or no thank you all the cases taken under advi