states by the provisions of the defense environmental restoration program statute congress used very broad language to express its clear intent  versus poland in our brief and in that case it was the united states air force court of criminal appeals although it was like looking at a case that involved in language in any child pornography statute the language was very that it's limited to damage within their kind of the borders of this country well we have a different situation here we're talking about military bases and that makes the provisions of the defense environmental restoration program statute are what governs and in section twenty seven or one of the statute they used the congress used this very broad language owned by least two or otherwise possessed by the united states that language is it or say someone in the philippines could be claiming it on the base or did the base whatever happened on the base could go into the surrounding area and there could be someone there either an american or a fellow philippine claiming it but syllabus that were owned by at least two or otherwise possessed by the united states at the time the pollution was created and that's precisely what we're talking about here that section twenty seven a one c not citizens right that's correct and place and we don't and and the property that you're talking about isn't owned by the united states at this point isn't participated was at the time the pollution was created which is what well the statute says it applies when the property was possessed by the united states at the time the pollution was created right now  expresses congress's clear intent there and that's were why we cited that united states versus poland case language very similar to that in the child pornography statute was held to apply to clark airbase in poland and i think it's important to note that my colleagues on the other side of this case still do not have not attempted to argue that poland was wrongly decided and in poland the air force court of criminal appeals so that language similar to that clearly expressed congressional intent to have the statute apply at clark air base outside the united states and we were struck to submit that if if the public case was correct and the defense in this case hasn't suggested otherwise that this case should be held in favor of the of helen's now there are other provisions inter in particular the section twenty seven ten of the statute which requires the secretary of defense to conduct an inventory of defense sites that contain unexploded ordinance and the defense sites in section twenty seven ten words exactly the same language as the program in section twenty seven or one as facilities that are owned by least to or otherwise possessed by the united states but congressman twenty seven ten went on to say that the unexploded ordinance inventory does not apply to locations outside the united states and it's our argument it's expressed in our brief that the failure to include an exemption in twenty seven zero one four locations outside the united states showed that congress intended that provision to apply extraterritorial or otherwise the exemption in section twenty seven ten is really becomes meaningless i understand that there may be diplomatic issues raised there and that's an issue that the united states the military could come back to if the philippines government of jack's but if there are diplomatic you can think better a matter for the executive now we've also made the argument that the where's the evidence that congress intended percolate to fort rights to foreign claimants ten years after the united states relinquished control where do we look for that well i think that's essentially what you're asking us to do but i think that the statutory analysis that i've suggested to you the plain language of the statute which makes circle applicable to bases that are were under the united states control expresses an intent to have the statute apply extraterritorial to both current and former military bases and so that that's where we would find the intention or honor i would say that surplus definition of the term person certainly doesn't preclude finding that my clients the philippine residents are persons and i think that was a point made in the unpublished decision in the could escape that's the term i think the it was a corporation a canadian corporation being sued there and the district court in that case said that the the terms used generically and certainly would not clued a finding that a person or corporation is someone outside the united states now we've also made the argument principle was simply to indicate that we believe circular should not be interpreted in such a way as to violate international law and here i think we have a case of first impression where we are saying that the refusal to give philippine residents the right to invoke united states domestic law as a remedy for this pollution would violate the principle of nondiscrimination against law aspect of our argument is that in a case where the refusal to give philippine nationals the right to seek redress under international law that the presumption against extraterritoriality should  be should not apply or at the very least should be relaxed to some extent to allow foreign nationals to seek redress for pollution that the united states created during the time that it exercised jurisdiction over these cases  we think that the adoption of a principle like this is in the interests of united states citizens a person in northern washington state for example who may be injured by transponder occlusion from canada  should have the ability under international law to go to canadian courts to seek redress and i think it's in the interests of the united states not to have united states citizens discriminated against  by foreign courts if they seek a remedy there merely by because of the fact that they the injury occurred in the united states rather than in canada so your argument here is basically if we go where no court has gone before it would be to the benefit of our citizens because then other countries would treat us better yes unless unless this court recognizes the international principle that we've argued i think it's far less far less likely that other question i would emphasize this is relevant not only to these particular doctors i just mentioned but also to the basic issue here of what did congress intend is it possible to ascribe to congress the intent to allow facilities makes perfect sense there's no reason why they were all would be in there in the first place if i wasn't talking about who would be responsible for particular actions not what their actions are are required in the first place getting you on that if we this court said in the corrie case when you're dealing with a statute of that sort it implicates concerns that are not inherently domestic cory similarly indicated that with regard to a statute that regulated this happened before nine hundred ninety two and i think it might be a harder question in terms of atmospherics i don't know if would be a harder question actually in terms of the basic legal questions here i mean still you'd be asking the supreme court emphasize there the presumption against actually charge her reality did not apply because the united states exercised complete jurisdiction and control complete if you look at the bases agreement that governed the conditions by which the united states operat did include the philippines that time cracked in one thousand nine hundred i don't believe so your honor if you look at the different definition of the united states in circle it talks about the several states the united states history club puerto rico virgin islands it goes on like in that case then every embassy for instance and every country in the world the united states has subject to circle which i don't think is a reasonable intention scrag congress and again even if that were possible reading that's not enough yet look at the presumption against extra congress has to have the affirmative intention clearly expressed it's not enough that the plausible reading that it could be rightful pli abroad that's not enough the supreme court has made that clear repeatedly and the or even american case i think that as a separate question your honor as we noted in our brief there's a special section within the circle of section one eleven al which addresses foreign claimants and claims by those people fourth particular conditions that foreign claimants must satisfy before they can bring cl court were to not decide that your position is that you could also fail on these individuals could not state a claim under circlet and we haven't made that argument i referred just a second ago say that but that's not actually made clear in their complaint and if we take the allegations in the complaint and make necessary inference to see what they think is any whether there is any set of facts that could be proven consistently to stand a claim we haven't made that are going out for that reason cannon now that attempt is unfounded for several reasons first they didn't do it in the district court so it's waived second the charring betsy shouldn't be right to extend the reach of domestic legislation into other countries i mean it's been used the opposite exactly  discussed under section twenty seven zero one see that this extends the reach a circle where circle wouldn't itself go as i discussed twenty seven at once he doesn't even imposing obligations it merely talks about which is a particular official circle itself i believe the plaintiffs think their best argument is the definition of the term environment and the fact that a refers to areas both within the united states and under the jurisdiction of the united states for that matter for reasons we discussed in her brief that doesn't  then the breach of that i think it would have a very far reaching effect i think you could earlier there are many different areas within the world over which the united states may have some degree of jurisdiction evidently the plaintiffs would apply circle that all of those every united states embassy every former military base there may be other examples i'm not really sure of the reach of that the argument not only that again we're talking about military bases that were closed to return to the philippines in one nine hundred ninety two who knows how far back the plaintiffs would extend their reach and there their argument temporally as well as geographically not only that as we discussed in our brief if in fact in the case that these areas these former military bases and close to nine hundred ninety two were subject to the reach of circling it wouldn't just mean that the united states government would be subject to actions it could mean that filipino nationals would be subject to actions under circle or brought by other filipino nationals merely because those films case it's just not reasonable to read the statute that way to subject the united states to the united states courts to claims between filipino nationals which we nationals of other countries where the only look  intergovernmental agreement you're talking about something within the realm of the political and diplomatic arms of the united states government this with all due respect not something that's a proper judicial resolution so even if we were to agree with everything that he much i'll try to respond just to a couple of points very briefly the united states has argued that the derp statute really is essentially does nothing it doesn't impose any obligation on the on the circle i think that's creating an obligation to comply with circle and i respectfully disagree with their characterization of that or simply assigning responsibility if one otherwise exists to the secretary of defense the attempt to distinguish poland the mere fact that we're talking about a criminal statute involving sexual misconduct there is the the role of the court is the same in interpret english statutes  language of the statute in deciding what the the language means and the whole in court found that language very similar to what used in the verb statute applied extraterritoriality and we submit that was correct the defendant suggested in their briefs otherwise standing here now that they've suggested to you that they would disagree with it we submit that it was correct polling properly interpreted that that statute finally a point raised by your honour's as to whether or not the circle indicated circle has any indication that it did not intend or in claimants to be able to bring this to this ensued under circle of we've my clients of student or section ninety six fifty any circle of the citizens who provision which allows any person to bring a claim against any other person including expressly the united states government and i don't think there's any indication in the statute that congress intended to presumption against number one comes from the fact that congress in circle didn't define the term environment in very in language that said define the environment to include lands water ground waters within the united states or under the jurisdiction of the united states and so i think they were indicating there that either ins inside the united states or outside the united states under the jurisdiction of the united states and that extra territorial intent is made specific particularly clear with respect to military bases under the jurisdiction of the secretary of defense by the dirksen so that's where the clear expression of intent to apply extra follow it will defend it would depend on the particular grounds on which this court from first but under the defense of the derp statute that statute is specific to facilities that are under the jurisdiction of the secretary of defense so it wouldn't necessarily apply to state department facilities embassies that type of thing it would apply only specifically to military bases under the secretary of defense's jurisdiction if you were to find that circle or her on the other hand did did apply well it depends again on the degree of whether you can find that under the church that you the area where the troops are located is is owned by least two or otherwise possessed by the government and under the jurisdiction of the secretary of defense and that's going to depend upon facts specific inquiry here we had bases agreements that clearly gave possession of the bases in the philippines to the united states government and were under