may please the court johnson counsel you know there's this case comes before the court on an interpretation of the statute the key to this entire case is that statute the fact the most important part of the triggers everything in the statute is the fact that the money  was private money the issue is whether private money or public money the fact this is public money you don't have any case i think that is dispositive i do think that's dispositive and  if we if we look at the statute i think it becomes clear that this is not public money the statute backtrace is the money from the very beginning to the very end in in the trust fund the at the beginning the money is the insurers who who are the members of the plaintiff association deposit money directly into the trust fund this is not and the reason i make that specific point is that other cases involving the budget implementation act have have gone to the supreme court and i and we think that those that that case the abate case is completely different from this case based partly on the fact that that money was registration and licensing fees the posited with the secretary of state given to the secretary of state secretary of state then puts it in that account that is the difference there i think is the fact that this is private money this is this is raised by the insurers it is not raised by the state and so the fact that it is as as a result of private transactions between the insure insurers and me in people insured makes it private money and and i think if we follow th go a little farther if we follow the statute from the very beginning once it is the positive there are a lot of protections that are afforded that money first of all we think it never becomes state money from the very beginning of being deposited to the very end it never becomes state money why do we think that let's look at the statute we have after the  deposit into the trust fund at that point it is not considered general revenue of the state by the statute it is also gives a statute gives the insurance companies insurers a private interest in that money which cannot be changed or extinguished retroactively and there's also from the statute now sessions of the general somewhere in the same session general assembly can change the policy that sets forth that it is set forth and bypassing some that of what just lation the governor signing it but there's no way the general somebody can bind subsequent sessions or even so by passing legislation i mean they can always undo it they can always change it the only limitation upon what the general  is what the constitution prohibits is that correct i think that is correct and and because of that the the argument of this this was never amended by reference as is one of the arguments in this case that never happened because of that your honor because of that because i'm not sure i understand ok it was never meant of what by reference which is the argument of the defendants that th specific the amended act must be now in this in this instance we are saying that the as applied to us this the the budget implementation acts are unconstitutional the reason is that the act itself says it cannot be amended retroactively more to  point the money goes back to them even the assets of the council are liquidated and it all goes back to them but before that actually it's section eight out is the one that gives the property interest to the insurers now let me i think i think what what we need to talk about here is in under what circumstances can it be amended i think it can be amended i don't think it can be amended after the deposit of the money what could let me let me tell you exactly what i mean what the what they could do is say give a date and say the next time you know next next year or whatever day that is the next the positive money changes and it becomes the the money of the state i think that can be done but that's not what happened here here the money had already been deposited the the money did not change character from the time it was deposited until the time it was taken the only time that that that that can happen is if it's amended in the way that i that i have just said so so it's not the prevention of being amended it's the timing of the amendment they can't you can't as as your honor said you can't hog tie and a subsequent general assembly so can this be amended yes in this circumstance was it done properly no the plaintiffs would have any argument here if every penny in that trust fund had been used for purposes that are itemized within the act that i think that's correct that they don't have any interest  any ability to control how the money is spent at least for purposes that are spelled out in the act so you would you well  the council is the one that determines who gets the money and when and and all of that is not dictated by the state which i am putting that in there your honor because i agree with with you  in that if the money's gone the money's gone if it's done pursuant to the act of if it's if it's spent pursuant to the act i agree with your honor your if i read your brief correctly it seems to me the import of it is this section after that deals with unexpended money that's where you really find the most traction in terms of identifying a property interest into the fund that is not yet withdrawn and used for purposes set out in the act is unexpended so if i understand you correctly it would have to be only poor of those purposes spelled out in the act for it to be expended money could the legislature have changed the purposes for which the money  i think it might depend on what what purposes because i think i mean are you and i as your own are talking about the money that's already been deposited yes ok i think it depends i want to broaden its use for this anti theft whatever not as to the money deposited i think that the money is there the would be constitutionally prohibited from broadening the scope of what one general simply said the money could be used for i about refers to the whether the money has been deposit has to do with the money in the fun and and anything that is has not yet been deposited i think that's correct to say nothing i'm not sure i understand when the statute was originally written my my point is there were no limitations imposed on the legislature purposes a through g that the legislature would not be permitted to add purpose  i think that if the  if the purpose was for the well here's a look here's where i'm going to answer it no i don't i don't think because i think i mean i for which it was being used i think i think that's possible but i think that all that all of the rights under the act including the purposes for which it is use kick in upon deposit of that money so i'm so i'm not so what i'm saying is can they change it yes you can't hog a general assembly from year to year so they could say we're going to add money it's due to the act once once the once the money is deposited into the trust fund it has it can't be touched by the by anybody but the council it can be changed the following year prior to the deposit of the money i think that that money has a lot  and subject to our challenge and here it is and if we want our challenge we get it all back if we don't the state gets it how is that at all remotely similar to the situation in this way the the sh oil company case was cited because of because of an argument that if it's in the state treasury it's our money shell oil company case the protest tax oil any monies they treasure it belongs to the state that we got here this is no tax challenge this is not a desperate situation this is not this is not a tax challenge the the tax protest fund is a trust fund the money put in is private money this in our situation in in this case the money put in is private money the  not as if they're volunteers is it revenue to the state it is not revenue it is not revenue how do we know that we know that because the act says it and let let me let me let me point something out here we're trying to interpret the statute you can't and in any other exceptions in the other words in the other anything it's interpretations that statute sa that the money in the fund is not to be considered general revenue the state the statute says the money in the fund let's assume they said you know what we said about that stuff honor i agree with your honor once that money is in there so say this whole thing it was taken from the fund that's that's the that's the point here it is taken from the fun if if the thank you your honor and may it please the court hello my name is john schmidt i'm going to sr an attorney general for the state and i'm here on behalf of the governor and several of the other state defendants asking for a firm and of the circuit court's grant of the want to keep the money and i think their money anymore well our our point actually is it never was that they did have a contingent interest in it upon dissolution of the fund and the council but neither of those things have happened so and that's the only circumstance where they would be and hoddle to a return of the money is the act itself described or attempt to term the money as a fee as an assessment to where it would be clear as to whether or not this was private money or public money i don't believe the act really describes it as a fee or an assessment and perhaps i'll turn to the portion of the act liability policy that sold in the state but the word is not used the word fee is not used and the other point to which the association in the state disagree is whether this is public or private money this is money that the general assembly has authorized a public body to use for a public purpose and the general assembly also created that public body the council to spend that money it's true that the activities of the council the use of that money does benefit the insurers but it has a much broader public benefit too in terms of preventing motor vehicle we cited several cases that define what public money is and it's  the or each case that we cite in our brief says that special funds like this are public funds and we think under the circumstances of this case again the legislature has authorized the council to use this money for public purposes it's public money it can become private money but circumstances i suppose there would be the chance that there would be no money that the council would spend at all be other comparable acts comparable with them the state of illinois that  can look sued and see how it's been handled comparable language to such an app where you're talking about the disposition of an expanded funds in a trust fund or is this unique i think it is unique your honor i haven't been able to find similar file and or funds where there is language similar to section eight have so yes i pay i think that language is unique but i think if f and g are read together yes f does say there's a private property interest in the unexpended money but then g goes on to define what that interest is and that interest would only kick in again upon the events i've talked about dissolution of the fund itself or of the council and the supreme court it's when it's discussed what vested rights are in the armstead case they talk about rights that are fixed in immediate or rights that are complete and unconditional and that's simply not the case  here any right that the insurers would have to this money is indeed condition it's would not be complete so our position is the money is public money and that there are no vested rights and no contractual rights at this point i have a question council about the procedure or history of th trial court granted summary judgment but in doing so did so in part on the basis of the plaintiff's lack of stand we got that correct yes i was a part of on plaintiff lack of standing in two thousand and six when the rejected the two six nineteen motion to dismiss and subsequently the way that granted the department's motion for summary judgment on correct i'm not clear on the position that was an asserted well i don't think your motion to summer a judgment included as a ground that they had no standing i think that's right your honor but that's a basis with regard to the standing question one you lost that argument i would death problem i think the problem would be we have not argued it on summary judgment as your honor pointed out and i believe standing in illinois is something that a bowler for that of all in other words if it's not argued by the party where would we be committing error if we thought that the trial court standing analysis was sound and want to do on the basis i i think there are some association of standing principles that the trial court didn't take into account here so this was a thought of the trial court suicide by the changes mind of the standing question without telling anybody we're we're stating in our brief the trial court after saying there was no standing did taken an undertake an analysis of each of the constitutional claims and other claims that the association raised and on the merits stated that the state was entitle to a judgment as a matter of the law and that's the organisation to assert claims to be half of that its members basically if the members would all have very similar claims there would be no need to have pursued the claims on an engine individual basis and the association is an adequate representative and i think there are a network what extent does your motion it yes it did and seven years after the fact said you know i don't want to i was having a bad hair day i don't know what happened with the standings that well i think one thing that one thing that is responsible for the del association members well as a matter of fact they go pleading does that mean it's been abandoned even though you raised standing the first time in your roshan to dismiss that when you moved for summary judgment  have to do it again or it's a band and i guess they think not a better practice ok the better practice i thought to avoid some busybody judge raising questions like i am interest in that in the funds but they are asserting one and i think the fact that they're asserting one would give them standing and then the association would have standing to act  principals would address that part of it and your arguments though is if i understand correctly this is public money it's not theirs it is but i think because they are a private money that they would have that would have standing to at least make that assertion and then if it fall so far on the merits but i can see your honour's point where and i think if that point is correct i think if the fact that it's public money deprives them of standing then standing in the merits are pretty much in extra completely intertwined it is isn't that part and parcel of the trial courts of the terminations of standing doesn't the trial court the first make a determination as to whether it's private versus public bonds but if the trial court determines its public bonds can say no standing at dismissal that's and it sounds like that's what the trial court did it mean i suspect that's what your first argument isn't it is when you the trial counsels well no no i was public money and there were no best of rights in play here because because the council and the fund have not been dissolved and that's the only point at which the rights would vest and another important point is and the supreme court stated this in a debate and it stated in other cases there is no vested right in the continuation of the law  the abate court said that it's presumed the law a law an existing law is a statement of current policy but the abate court recognized that the legislature can change its mind and certainly one legislature is not cannot bind subsequent legislate the abate court also discussed constitutional problems that would exist if money that is public money and it up being used for private purposes if and i think councils argument comes close to saying this is a trust as harris mentioned or brought up the fact are there any other statutes that are that have the same types of things as our actually cite i took that to me as what your honor was saying the finance act does have a couple of sections in it which directly address our act the specifically those sections say that normally if a if it is public money normally any investment of that money any interest drawn on that money is deposited into the general revenue for that  i think that's a section that specifically says except as to the vehicle theft act which is our act secondly the finance act also  addresses section what would be similar to section eight g n r act which is the determination part and it it says that once a special fund is terminated the remaining money goes into the general revenue fund our access as not in our case and and in fact the finance acts as unless it's says so in an act and specifically in an act  then it will go into the general revenue fun both of those indicate that this is not public money this is this is private my excuse me private money because  says in and hacked yes b i yeah that that's exactly what it said also we didn't hear anything  from from the defendant about any constitutional constitutional issue everything in the brief of the of the defendant has to do with words such as ordinarily this would happen generally this is the case nothing is discussed and and again during argument nothing was discussed about this act and about why the budget of limitation act cannot constitutionally be applied to the plaint that the fact that well it might i mean is if there's no standing there's nothing you lose i was a little confused that the standing part of the order was on page nine of a nine pa order that's that should be the first issue is is there is there standing or isn't there is to do we have a right to bring a lawsuit or don't conclusion for you and what about i think that may be i think that maybe because that's the only way i was a little confused like i said but that seems to be a reasonable interpretation of what the court was saying that it's an obligation of the court to in the first instance decide whether there is stand it's so i so i think but what i think the problem i have is that was not an issue at the time of