statute is that this one applies to broker since well so let me have you start with kind of the plain language of the statute because it's preempted if the state law regulation is related to the service of a broker so why isn't your claim in this case directly related to the service of a broker well i think the edge of that question is that the terms service of a broker has to be construed in the same sort of public utility way that the court interpreted that term in the eighty eight cheroots saying that service doesn't mean literally everything that the broker does instead you have to juxtapose it construe that term next to the phrase press and rocked so that the expansive definition of service doesn't just sort of make the other and in sheriffs the court overruled that saying you can't really rely on this sort of literal interpretation you have to take into account the broader view of what congress is intending to do with carriers is very important in getting to this question about what's core and what's peripheral because a state ought to do me a pair operates the same way with respect to carriers that it does with respect to brokers that a duty of care tells carriers whose job it is is to transport freight with trucks to operate those trucks to use them reasonable that's what they're required to do by deduce the duty tells brokers in performing the job that they've been paid which is partially select carriers they have to make back selection reasons and if as robinson concedes telling carriers to operate their trucks in a reasonable way doesn't relate to prices routes or services then by parity of reasoning it doesn't apply to prices routes or services with respect propes it's not as if there are two preemption clauses in the f a a one for brokers and one for terrorists there's not there's one preemption clause and it says it all state laws are created if they are related to a price route or service of any motor carrier or broker with respect to the transportation of operators and there's no special carve out for negligence claims against carriers so to say that negligence claims against carriers escapes preemption which robins is to say that those negligence claims do not relate to the carrier's premises routes or services eg because the preemption standard is identical for carriers and brokers if negligence claims against  arriers don't relate to the crisis routes and services they likewise don't relate the prices routes of services growers now robinson does suggest two possible reasons that would support treating brokers and carriers differently carriers are only incidental to the transportation services they render whereas the negligence claims intrude on the core services of the broker and again i think it's a the misnomer the problem better argument is that it understates the effects of this state law of duty on carers it's not tangential or incidental to tell carers that they must operate their trucks and maintain their trusts reasonably using due care that is no different than telling voters that you must perform your service with due care so there really isn't a logical way to frame the impact of a carrier as incidental and yet treating the impact that same duty on brokers as whatever the the scope of the prevention from vision can't be measured by the insurance mandate for two reasons st of all the the prevention the scope of prevention is measured by the text of the preemption clause creates a mandate on one to purchase insurance you can't reason from that that everyone isn't subject to the mandate is immune from liability at california requires me as a driver to purchase liability coverage but it doesn't require me as a lawyer made it very clear that the issue isn't whether there's just some logical connection to say well do you care has some impact on what a broker does and therefore it's prevented the question is does it have a significant  factor those provisions into their decisions about the prices they set they use or the services they provide in some way to california trucking the court explained that preemption is not trigger even if the industry has to take  state law into account when arranging operations with respect to the safety exception because my time is limited i'm certainly going to rely on the briefing i would just say st of course you don't have to in the area of safety if the regulation is genuinely intended to do that and the police power robinson says well that's can't apply to common law rules but as we point out that in the vatican the courts are creatures directed and this claim is directed at reshaping what it is that brokers that reshaping the young the market forces of the marketplace to say that things should be done differently and and and judge who correctly concluded that preemption of law is because the statute we have here let me call it the f four and because it's just easier person that goes the apes for and is involved in a ranging for transportation by motor carrier so that is what it is that we do here shippers may contact carriers may tell us that they're available and we put the two of them together and we rely on the federal motor carrier safety administration which does the evaluation and the approval of they can take away their registration they can consider them to be un satisfactory and we wouldn't be able to use them in but the essence of what we do and the market forces that drive us have us look to registered motor characters and if we were to do it any other way if we were to allow state law to come in here and say well you know you could do that you could have done something else you have to do additional things it would have to have verification of the recipient you have to make certain checks of the products and the shipper and the u s supreme court said things that the market forces don't require them to do and freezing them into things that they may decide later they go up on that's what the state law would do we apply portable here  would go just even further bad bad and say we don't even know what the requirements are it's not as though we have a regulation that says if you're going to broker for a ship or any carrier you have to do x y z we don't know until jury comes so we would have different standards not only in different states but the different cases we don't know what they are in advance and that would be incredible i mean also i think together perhaps under the doctrine of a used engine heiress and decided to take the public utility of problems and said that service isn't just any possible service if it's not serving cocktails on the airplane it's looking at the frequency and scheduling of transportation it's looking at the selection of markets carriers would be liable still for those incidental conduct that don't go to the but what we are looking at is something that in the words of the supreme court in roe it's the essential details of the carriage itself though isn't whether you put your turn signal on when you turn left it's determinations of how you're going to perform the essential carriage that's for a carrier the decision for a broker i think it's much easier for a broker arranges for transportation though if we're if the state law is going to affect how we arrange for transportation over and about what market forces do and that's preempted insurance yes i do think that the fact that th provides that carriers have to have insurance in a sufficient amount to satisfy a personal injury or death claim and brokers do not are it is indicative of the fact that congress intended that carriers this court even the step that under the airline deregulation and the fact that congress said al airlines have to have insurance for personal injuries and is indicative of the fact that congress considered at the thing that we do as a broker it doesn't apply generally only laws of general public ability are things like stumbling all over the suitcase in the hallway of the airplane here i don't think you can make the argument that this has to do with safety but it certainly isn't with respect to motor vehicles it's it's geared to our independent act a broker industry well they argue that torkel has the force and effect of law that's the reason why it's preempted but that doesn't automatically fall of the regulatory regulatory authority of state this doesn't basically have the exception eat up the entire rule or at least but it also as we point out in the last section of our brave it also does not have to do with motor vehicles it's an attempt to take spic state tort law to regulate our behavior in the market and we're not responsible for the and we're not responsible for the drivers so this goes for two for let me end with a point that i made earlier and there is what it is that saying that carriers no longer operate they're the ones who look at this information they're the ones who make that decision we rely on that information to perform the tasks that we do and that's what the market forces  it's not our role to suspect and guess what it is that the federal government has done we rely on the federal government and that's what the forces do and under those circumstances we fall under the pro these deregulatory provisions both for the airlines and the trucking industry when under the regulatory approach every market that a airline could fly into or out of was dictated by the government every the services they provide their frequency was was regulated by the government and the prices they charge is regulated by the government and so the purpose of these statutes was to wipe away colleague makes a lot of discussion about the forces of competition but there's no conflict between negligence law up and liability and market competition all of the participants in the market have to be subject to negligence law there's nothing in conflict at all with that in fact the whole point of debate which this law is in some ways a bit of a counterweight to some of the downside of having sure market competition market competition which help trucking companies carriers don't spend as much on a chance for your trucks make your employees drive longer hours so you can all you know lower your costs but they're not allowed you tort law and you can compete in the marketplace but you have to do it reasonably so that's not an attempt by the state to return to the kind of regulation that congress intended to to wipe out with these statutes i think the impeding competition kind of fall away because of the the carriers have to participate in the market and if they're told that in performing their service of transporting freight that they have to act reasonably and that is not  how the job had to be done and that is not how the duty of care works here it doesn't tell anyone to do anything it just says if you act unreasonably you could be held accountable in court and without submit thank you thank you