four one four zero eight four of five looks like we have lots of boyer's here well i'll tell you what i'm having a hard time discerning what i have referred to me as far as the breakdown white of everybody please identify yourself who you're here for and then more than you believe explain how you kind of split up as far as argument all right i see nothing clear did an excellent job actually it was all written down here it just went over my head and you must be mr form ok excellent i think ok i think that clears all of complaint was pleaded in such a way as to put the question of whether the new section of the new statutory section could be used as its own count and then the trial court decided that count and then the question was whether there could be appeal or not and discussions were whether that could come up under three a leader three or four we were very much against a three way to feel we had done that before and didn't lead to the conclusion of the case we really thought there should be a final judgment the court offered three or four and we accepted three of four a or we didn't raise any red flags or we suggest that would be appropriate now as well why is it that the other counts were addressed so we have a final judge from across the board i think that was the decision the plaintiff made he want judgment on even one of the tax years we would have a final judgment and at least we'd be able to talk about whether the hospitals entitle an exemption or not but because of the way the court resolved that question regret appeal under three or four and i still had to file that appeal i think because the judge made three or four a finding we didn't find if we didn't bring the appeal it would have been law the case fifty pages of that discussion forty nine of them i disagree with so we jurisdiction under the authority if in remarriage it pass that's the case that my opponent cites i think actually best is authority for my site your honor in best there was a divorce there was a claim that a premarital agreement was invalid and then there were the claims that go along with the divorce and the court faced the question of whether the premarital agreement the contract claim essentially was final or not the court decided it was final an my supreme court agreed that it was final so you had to claim to least in bass one of them was decided is this contract a valid contract and deciding that case was the claim so when that claim was decided there was  fiction in this case we have a split claim and judge leonard said it was a claim and i think my point to concede is this what plain meaning the law is in count two and the application of the law is in the other counts and declaration of what the law is going to be in deciding the rest of the case isn't the resolution to claim it's simply saying what the courts do when it gets claimed now makes an argument about the declaratory judgment act being an exception but it's it's at least that i'm putting words in my pants now i don't need to do that but i think it's going to declaratory judgment act gives the core authority to get here but it doesn't because the cases are crystal clear that under the declaratory judgment act you can't split a claim along one was the divorce case the divorce case where there was no declaratory action not coming back to you now they are ok it's where custody was grante the course to sit on the premarital agreement with then give a basis for the judge to make decisions concerning property disposition custody and why is it that with the  honor it doesn't do that there's no guidance here as to how the rest of the counts are going to be resolved and that brings me to the main point i wanted to at least make before my time runs out which is the department in this case is it really give guidance as to how to handle these type  charitable ownership is something that the general assembly is entitled to define and develop and that's what the statute does charitable use is not the cases do that mr gross or i suspect is going to point you properly to fifteen eighty six see the statute that says the department shall exempt right and the question becomes well that's got to be unconstitutional and that's his argument that that's unconstitutional because the department can't exempt without a showing of i think that's correct and we should use that and i think that should be the task in light after the constitution has statutory analysis is applied after section fifteen eighty six is applied and after the decision is made as to whether the property meets the task there's still the course and factors which are part of the analysis that's the constitutional part of the announces the statute doesn't really speak to that that's why i say the department needs guidance here because we have a lot of constitution we have only supreme court cases let's to reconcile the statute with the constitution which is to say that what the general assembly has done is unconstitutional my arguments are that this court should put additional costs on section fifty six and read it in a way that's consistent with the one or three or four i'd like to thank you very much me please the court counsel your honor to respond to your last question there is another case pending before this court now raising this issue there's another about it you can't interpret the statute and to let it it says what it says it is beyond the constitutional authority and therefore unconstitutional you just look at that don't work it's beyond their authority whether it's beyond their authority ten percent of it are one hundred percent of it beyond their authority and it's void and this came up most recently last may in the pension reform legislation cases where the supreme court talks about sovereignty which i did also in my brief this is between the courts and the legislature the people are the sovereign and they have put this limitation on the legislature and while the legislature i think their position of pension reform cases where it's really really important we can ignore the constitution well through court didn't agree with them going on to this the question made arise well if there's an attack set your argument if it exempts them without regard to whether it's a charitable primarily exclusively shareable organization under fifteen sixty five the longstanding and still in effect charitable exemption then it would be eligible for his exemption under that statute and th case was he didn't think a legislature did a very good job he can improve on it and that's how he improved on it when they really meant was that should apply to car well that's not what they say as i said the statute clear whether it's a good idea or bad idea  is not before us today but the road through activity of the ship itself is irrational because what it does it applies to any case where there's still a proceeding pending before the department of revenue if it's a proceeding pending for the department of revenue which in fact the situation with privy know who with present covenant medical center is called now it's had a number of names off the department of revenue can be awarding this tax exemption the hospital exemption for tax years preceding make that are to result in a decision that even the right activity provision has unconstitutional but that's not an issue specifically before you today my point is contrary to the concerts let me ask you this was the grocery or the discussion with the state let's suppose for jurisdiction three or four issue yes what's your position well in the trial court i was opposed to wants to do is force us to appeal to get the issue before this court and i believe under the rule he's perfectly entitled to that nothing slippery about it it's one thing you can do i haven't seen it happen very often in before this court and of course no matter how you decide somebody is going to aspirin court then we'll have the issue of constitutionality resolved if it's the term and somehow that fifteen eighty six his constitutional he can go back to the trial court and dismiss everything else you away with all the production of evidence and all those things you've got a nice neat case because you can get everything under fifteen eighty six include had under the original part through the third many complaint yes on the counts under fifteen sixty five because you've got issues there such as  is there a revenue strictly from shareable sources opposition areas their revenue is one hundred percent from business operations or crystal clear ok thank you you're out of time you have some measure of time creating a count to for declaratory relief were guarding a political of the section fifteen eighty six was expressly intended to follow the supreme court's the guidance that the supreme court provided to all of us in the marriage  parents marriage the best case made it clear that a claim for declaratory relief on an important threshold issue is a separate claim is one which a decision and they have to clear or twenty claim alone can be they matters if you hold that that was valid that he would other stuff goes away doesn't know your honor wouldn't resolve it but it would certainly lay the groundwork it would then become clear that when the trial court has to divide the marital property the the arrangement that was specified in the prenuptial agreement provides the ground rules and provides the basis on which have property would be divided so the prenuptial agreement didn't decide the heart of one of the coldest civil procedure in authorizing but the best case we had extant three states declaratory judgment we had that uniform premarital agreement  when you construe the statute really by itself is it going to turn in whether or not how you apply it in the given case but it is saying we can exactly originally what happened was this issue was framed and cross motions for summary determination major issue and we prevailed and the trial court felt i think just about everybody except for maybe some of the defendants felt that  tory review would be useful in expediting the ultimate decision of the case but no one on the other side was willing to move to rule three away so we as mr grosser said so nor did any  eighty six they wanted to try to throw all of the issues in the case before this court at the same time a lot of which will not have to be addressed by as a result of this court's determinate i'd be confused to say is that it well i think well i wouldn't i wouldn't will be relatively simple for the court to decide the foundations and title meant to exemptions under fifteen eighty six and they as a practical matter here in the facts of this case and in particular given the large amount of charity care foundation provides which to works the amount of the property value of the property tax exemption for most of the years in question it's going to be pretty simple i don't want to take up all your time and you determine it has jurisdiction otherwise why would it have been broken down into two different sections as it was and if i'm right doesn't that contradict your argument here today that you're basically saying a declar tory action less permissible and therefore it's automatically reviewed reviewable but couldn't we say ok the declaratory actions proper but it's still not reviewable because three or four a  where there is a proper separate cause baksh in for the clerk to a relief as a risk here involving the construction of a statute and and where the the clear tory relief would as it does here and as it did in marriage let me turn briefly if i can to the constitution a question and then i hope i may have a minute or two left to talk about what i think is really the central issue before the court which is the look ability of section fifteen eighty six to the in terms of the constitutional question all i really want to say just to make it clear again the state defendants are basically saying pretty much what we're saying they've read that the statute is spatially constitution so do we s come to terms but the law is very clear it's a you have a very heavy burden challenging the facial constitutionality of legislation you have to show that there is no set of circumstances in which the challenge statute would be constitution both satisfies the statutory criterion section fifteen eighty six and also satisfies the charitable use requirement in article one section six of the constitution it's used explicitly for charitable purposes absolutely the appropriate test constitutional test for charitable use it's a really interesting question it's one that's not before this court i don't what i was simple guy when it comes to reading statutes decision in the provision of case i think does the best job of analyzing what is really the constitutional test for charitable use because what's happened unfortunately is especially after the permian a case where we had a three to  decision on the constitution churl use question the precise meaning of the church will use that what constitution turtle uses is unclear but you really don't have to get really don't have to get there in this case and shouldn't get there in this case because their issue does not need to be decided in order to uphold the facial constitutionality of the statute they cannot show that every instance in which a hospital would receive an exemption under fifteen eighty six would violate the constitution they don't even claim that and we all know that there are instances in which hospitals have constitutionally received exemptions there's plenty of cases dating back to one nine hundred seven cited in our brief that do to authorize an exemption under certain circumstances but nevertheless has to be determined before an exemption is issued that the constitutional test is satisfied we don't dispute that the disagreement between the parties concern that's a standard that should be workable no set of circumstances no set of circumstances test again they have to show that every single time when an exemption gets issued under section fifty six that would violate the constitution they haven't done that they can't do that and that's really the end of the facial constitutionality question and everyone in the county defendants agree with that that's what they argued in their briefs the state defendants agree with that that's what they have acknowledged both here today and also in other litigation so the only one who's up there tilting at the window one facial constitutionality would be the township defendants but only one because they don't address the proper constitutional so what's eight by our say agreeing with you that  e to mean i would they say well they're not my words your honor it's it's precedent that what do you think i mean is exclusively mean primarily for you really means primarily on as interpreted by the seven people a couple blocks away that let me just and by i say this has been the central question will you start this the general assembly expressly intended section fifteen eighty six of the property tax code to address what it termed the considerable uncertainty about the test for it for charitable property tax exemption considerable uncertainty that existed after the supreme court decision in the question in this appeal is whether the tensions under section fifteen eighty six can be obtained in lawsuits under section twenty three twenty five the or whether he only way you can get an exemption under section fifteen eighty six is by following the administrative process under section fifteen that's five of the property tax code it was six years ago one week from today that this court issued its ruling establishing that section twenty three twenty five b constitutes one of the primary means of obtaining a property tax exemption when the applicant has a previously obtained it on comparable six he only exemption provision in the property tax code where you can't go directly to court under section twenty three twenty five the circuit court was right in entering summary judgment zero three zero for exactly this so the defendant's attempt to distinguish section fifteen eighty six from all of the other exemptions is inconsistent with the statutory language it's inconsistent with the with the use commonplace use of the term application that the relying on term it's not to find in the statute but that is commonly used to refer to court proceedings including in the property tax code it's inconsistent with this court's decision in the intent maybe most importantly general from his expressed intent of creating certainty in the law addressing this uncertainty after putting up and if we've got one standard in lawsuits under twenty three twenty five the involving hospitals him to look at every possible conceivable situation and second the reason i was opposed to a rule three zero eight appeal in the trial court in this case because certainly my question on the rule three fifty six does not apply to this case does not apply because the hospital applicant is defined by the statute in section six and eight if you look at section eighty six age you'll see that hospital applicant is not what they are they are  ok that's one reason another reason is that their whole case is highly under section ninety of forgive me the cigarette tax act i don't know why but i don't know why it's called that but if you read that language you'll you'll discover as it is all laid explicitly versus primarily very kind to me he's correct in that correct the illinois supreme court has turned exclusively into print marilee he said something that really bothers me and i want to make this point to he said there's been plenty of discovery in this case i really disagree with that we need to look in deciding what is primarily whether there's been primary use whether the hospitals how they've been using this money we haven't had the discovery we need to make that determination that's one of the things that judge leonard seemed to be saying all i'm sorry their request for an exemption before the department they waived that and they decided to pursue court action i signatures but there are cases in dover otherwise would not be but they