raised here have nothing to do with above with a challenge to the nature scope and seriousness of the coven one team and this case is exclusively about the power of the governor to address  that disaster specifically within the context of the state wide ban that he imposed in march of this year and residential vixens and enforcement of existing affection orders  yes the parties and we both d both plaintiff and defendant agreed that we would hear we would argue that issue in the in the case below but it was not raised in our in our complaint but the issue is we believe properly before the  e and my remarks so that the issue that there is really effectively to sort of to rather issue broad issues here is one is did the governor have the power under the illinois the court did not have the power to suspend civil laws and not have the power to prevent landlords from entering from going to the core using the court system to invoke their rights under the infection act and and and if he did have those powers justified by any provisions of the the emergency management agency act the governor invokes four separate provisions to justify the moratorium either which i think are convincing the st is that section two that he said that the moratorium is justified under the state resources power under center section two but a close reading of that refers to state resources here we have the court basically preventing private individuals from accessing the court system both in their rights under the law and more importantly we're dealing with private property not government state resources exception when it contends does not apply nor does us section ten which deals with the governor's right cobble together a temporary housing this is not a temporary housing situation these are their permanent units and temporary housing i think everyone would understand plies something that's important and permanent and transportable it's the rd provision that the court invoked was section twelve which is it's a catch all provision in a subsection of section seven that deals with  transmission and exchange of goods and commodities the governor takes the position that that there's a catchall language in there that say could do anything he wants in that context applies to anything the governor's position he can do that language against him the power to even if we agree that state resources would include the court system we have the court denying basically used them is not utilizing it he's basing preventing anybody access to it or anything i say are our plane of c more in keeping now with the c b c requirements how how does that factor into what we do here today and also if you could address the fact that when judge anderson issued his order the supreme court of our state also had an order in effect after march th stain consistent with the c b c required so yeah so i it is our my position it's really what we're talking about here but for for for want one it's certainly not moot for the for the enforcement moratorium because both the c d c order and the governor state recent state order do not the order that was entered in in march and then ultimately continued which is the fiction which is two thousand and twenty dash thirty and the reason i think we focus on that judges and the reason this isn't moot maybe i'll just jump to that point the reason that this appeal isn't moot with respect to the new order seventy two is that the governor has been very clear that he will do what he feels is necessary to address the pandemic and to continue things like stay at home order and these  even if the governor had the authority to issue the moratorium back in march this year constrain the act to allow the governor to extend it beyond the thirty days by proclaiming the same disaster over and over again it is our position that actually disregards the language of the statute and then adds language of the statute that isn't there and i think more critically it renders that limitation meaning the surely if the legislature was going to let the governor rule the state by executive decree it intended that power to be limited and that is our position why that thirty day limitation is in there i doubt that the attorney general's office prior to this fire to the copan one thousand pandemic took that position that it was a thirty day hard stop and when that thirty day expired in order to address emergencies and disasters that normal workings of government had to come into play the legislature had to deal with these problems and  if that legislature felt that it can give the governor more executive power to do so fine but i wouldn't let that was a legislative function the court i think it's a fair reading of the statute that legislature not intend to give the governor a carte blanche to r because you were working within the original thirty day as to whether it was permissible or not the law well well by the time we have filed the complaint the thirty days had lapsed but we just various reasons we weren't approaching the case that way ok but the mean time and you were directed by the trial or to address that issue right that's correct and where did the trial judge made a definitive ruling on that issue so the trial court's ruling is found in the record for seventy one second  part of the of the court order and underlying basis for why the act why our claims under the act fail we believe it's properly before this court yes we understand that that that we don't have the we don't have the authority to agree on jurisdiction on that issue but it is our plaintiffs position that because the trial court raised the issue and was argued and district recently came down your honour's i'm sure aware the with the foxfire tavern case where they ruled on this very issue i don't think anything i can basically the court in the nd district adopted the governor's est otherwise would effectively render meaningless that thirty day limitation again i think that i think one needs to step back and say what would the legislature trying to achieve  enacting the emergency management agency act and it certainly wasn't to give the governor a free reign to rule the state by executive decree by declaring disasters every thirty days for the same disaster and to that point just as justice definition of disasters under the act it's very clear the legislator understood legislature understood that if disaster can last more than thirty days but yet didn't say the governor can too could could issue successive declarations for the is not correct because one of the factors one of the elements let me injunctive relief is balancing the activities and the circuit court below found that the equities tilt strongly in favor of the governor and the public in order for this court to reverse the circuit court's decision and it would have to find that that finding was an abuse of discretion so the scope and nature of the pandemic is very much before th court and so far as that is balanced against the harm alleged by the plaintiffs and is also relevant with respect to justice rights question when she asked which executive order is properly before this court plaintiff's stock luminary injunctive relief which is forward looking at this time executive order seventy two is in effect executive order thirty is no longer in effect so this court should take into account not only the current status of the pandemic but also a current executive order that also though relates to the balance of the equities the governor has long expressed an interest and balancing the interests of the landlords and also the entrust of the public and the very very significant public health and safety risk posed by this executive order seventy two as well as the advent of the rental assistance program demonstrates that commitment and executive order seventy two landlords can now begin proceedings against not uncovered person however persons are those who attest and a declaration that they have an income below a certain level that they have suffered a coven related hardship that they have made best efforts on partial rent payments and also that if they were to be evicted they would be forced into a shared living space or would be rendered homeless now even plaintiffs and their opening brief on appeal said multiple times that they're not contesting a rule that would allow those who truly cannot pay their rent for and eviction related reason to be evicted they simply did not want a blanket ban executive order seventy two dollars does take those interests into account i would also like to note the updated status of the rental assistance program i spoke with the  housing development authority yesterday and as of yesterday they had approved thirty eight thousand six hundred and twenty nine dollars grants for emergency rental assistance of five thousand dollars each and that goes directly individuals could become addicted in illinois that means that those individuals would be showing up to court and they would have to be in contact with individuals outside of their household and not being able to socially systems or stay at home it also would set into a fact a chain of events that they would have to move out of their houses or their rental units living with others being rendered homeless and also coming into contact with  beyond that my posy counsel today focused a lot of his time on the thirty day argument that goes beyond the eviction moratoria if this court were to strike down the governor's authority to issue any disaster proclamation that all goes beyond egos seventy two because in order for the governor to get federal relief in order for him to send p p and other medical supplies where it needs to go he needs to have a state of emergency declared in illinois so if you look at the public harm and the harm to the governor on one side of the ledger and then the potential security hearing harm that is temporary and that the governor is attempting to relieve now and in the future the circuit court does not of these its discretion in concluding that the balance of equities tips in favor of the public and of the governor i'd like to also though turn to the likelihood of success on the merits because the governor believes that circuit court correctly decided the thirty day issue and the statutory count as well starting with the thirty day question i would note as the nd district did that there's no limit on the number of proclamations in section seven of the statute instead the only requirement is that a disaster exists when a disaster exists as defined in section four the governor may issue a proclamation it is upon that proclamation that the thirty day period is triggered the statute is very clear about that it's not upon the disaster it's upon the proclamation there's no limit on the number of proclamations that main issue i would also note as the nd district did that in the general assembly special session in the spring real laws were enacted each of which referred to the success of the proclamation which shows that the general assembly was aware that the governor was issuing successive disaster proclamations and did not believe it needed to clarify the law to limit it to a single proclamation or otherwise intervene beyond the thirty day question though i would note that the governor also has already under four separate subsection of section seven subsections to a ten and twelve and in response to a question about subsection two and exchange there the utilization of state resources if you continue on in that subsection it also references the resources of each political subdivision of the state so regardless of whether courts are a state government resource or another resource of the political subdivision and it would be covered by section t i would also note that i'm sure section twelve the rental of housing units or rental units is a commodity and section twelve does allow the gov to regulate economic transactions of the state government or resource of the local political subdivisions of the state so wherever the resources come from either the state or the local subdivision if it's a circuit court it would be covered by section seven too so that the state resources and not the limitation that my opposing counsel believes that it is because there is a history or you're suggesting asserted or is a creature over the local subdivision of this but well we would say that it is the state that was our position but to the extent by opposing counsel that it's limited to state resources that is not what the text of the statute says  other subdivisions under which the governor's actions are covered we have sections eight hundred and ten dollars twelve cents governors allowed to control and regulate the occupancy of the premises section eight also create temporary emergency housing and subsection ten and also as we've discussed under subsection twelve to regulate economic transactions including commodities which of course rental housing units a commodity turning to the separation of powers questions the circuit court was correct that the governor's executive orders do not usurp the legislative authority because each action that the governor has taken is authorized by the emergency management act and the emergency management act is a constitutional delegation because it provides sufficient standards for the governor to follow for example lists exactly what constitutes an emergency when the governor c such a disaster or emergency and then it identifies in section seven all of the powers that the governor may exercise it is quite clear it also is not of infinite duration there is a thirty day limit upon each proclamation so if thirty days the governor does have to reassess whether there is a disaster and then does have to determine which emergency powers he should use and we have seen that discretion exercise here as we all know the mitigation efforts and the executive orders have changed since march now we are back unfortunately and here three  more medications are imposed but it does show that the governor is assessing the situation every thirty days and is not exercising unbounded or unlimited authority the other separation of powers claim is that the governor has usurped judicial authority that also those not correct because the governor is not to siding or interfering with how cases are decided instead he is simply issuing orders governing when claims may be heard this is very similar to when a general assembly as it regularly does institute statutes of limitation a limitation say precisely when a court may hear a claim there are limits and there are timelines those have been upheld as valid as well here to those are more serious implications as i have discussed with respect to the evictions orders as opposed to other court proceedings in addition to the hundreds of thousands of individuals potentially showing up  court and having additional conduct there it also sets a causal chain into effect that does require an individual to have numerous additional contacts outside of their home irreparable injury or harm myself have also not shown that requirement here because all of their harm can be measured under a peculiarity standard monetary damages to touch on any other topics in my remaining time but i do have an additional question counsel to follow up with my question to mr noonan and that is with respect to the irreparable harm was there any allegations in the complaint for injunctive relief that these three landlords would have been able to move forward with them in fiction in spite of supreme court's  i am not aware of any such allegations and i'm also not aware of the current status of the landlord's properties if for example the tenants are covered person and or non covered persons under executive order seventy two whether they've had those conversations with their tenants or whether their tenants have applied for the rental assistance program or leave so there's a lot unfortunately that we don't know but isn't that required in order to show irreparable harm in terms of allegations of the complaint because the c b c restrictions existed at the time judge anderson was deciding whether irreparable harm was pres in addition if i understand the allegations of the complaint for injunctive relief they're not alleging that they're in danger of losing their property to foreclosure and i presume that's because there's also a mortuary among foreclosures so they're they have not alleged that they would be subject to foreclosure which certainly could be a different situation because property is unique right now they're just alleging that their renters are still in the units they're not being paid and they cannot take possession of the property all of which can be recovered by monetary damages in the future and can be measured under a the extent i can't think of what that would be that could not be remedied by monetary damages but then should they be able to show something of that nature it could go to irreparable harm and finally i don't mean to belabor the point but we're not allowed to give that size three opinions this is an interesting issue but is it moot is it will i don't think that your honors have enough information in the record to determine whether it is moot or not and we on the governor's side also do not have that information because i think it depends upon the particularly situation of each landlord so for example are they able to seek relief now under executive order seventy two dollars or because their tenants are posing a health and safety court right lines and that would mean that the governor's layer moratoriums would be stricter then the federal c b c more choice but so you don't think so you think we can opposing counsel does have additional information and that can be considered by the corps and the case might be rendered to justice wright's comments about the c d c order the c d c order did not come out until the ruling came out about a week after the ruling in this case that was issued on august th and judge anderson's ruling came down on the st so no party to the case had the benefit to call it that of the c d c order and there's nothing in there certainly nothing in the complaint which would anticipate that quest want to make sure because earlier and i may have missed you i thought you said earlier in your opening remarks that you were challenging seventy two you were not challenging seventy d two you were challenging thirty that's correct assistance program that she mentioned in her in her remarks ended on september th and asked today although the governor is apparently thinking about extending and renewing it there is certainly nothing  available to compensate the plaintiffs going forward on this case with respect to any current programs the the  except the fact that the new legist some new legislation ten came down recognizing the successive successive declarations but it is our position that what the what the legislature was doing in that case was basically recognizing the facts on the ground by the time that let those legislations in amendments to those legislated that those statutes have been affected the governor had already issued several disaster proclamation so it's not i don't it's not our position that is the is the invasion of the courts powers to control busy cases that come before it with respect to the invasion of the legislative powers in fiction action is a summary proceeding and the mere fact that there's a postponement of that is a rewriting or abolition or negation of the summary aspects of that piece of legislation so to the extent that the  prevents someone forgetting summary relief under the eviction act it is a invasion of the legislative province and interferes with that statute as far as the as the as the separation of powers function to state cases and in fact the supreme court in response to the pandemic authorized all the circuit courts to do just that and many of them did that many of them said we are going to suspend  taxes or whatever but it is unfair to make one class of citizens pay some fashion other than taxes to remedy this problem this is the state problem that the legislature should tackle and that was the purpose behind the emergency management act was to allow the sorry just you know one edition short question is a follow up to your closing remarks mr noonan in terms of your reparable harm i understand your argument that we are subsidizing low income people i allow in them in apartments or homes without paying rent however insurance there be reparable harm to your clients what's the likelihood that once the addiction goes forward in the apartment or home it's needed that they're again this is not part of the record of course but given the fact that there are tenants who have not paid rent particularly mr suppose mr donahoe us case for over a year now the likelihood that we're going to recover any money from that tenant i