please the court when a plaintiff challenges campaign contribution limits under the first amendment the government bears the burden to show with evidence that the limits are narrowly tailored to serve the government's interest in preventing actual or apparent corruption in this case the plaintiffs have alleged that illinois campaign contribution limits are not narrowly tailored to prevent corruption for several reasons one the act limits individuals to giving contributions that are half the amounts the corporations unions and other associations can give but those kinds of restrictions have not been upheld those kind in the sense of it is true that the court can that the state can limit contributions by individuals and it can limit contributions by those other groups that different caps have been approved this supreme court has said that you can limit to different types of entities differently based on the differences between those entities but nonetheless it's up to the state to justify the specific choice that is made in every case and then the second of reason the plaintiffs have argued that this scheme is not merely tailored to prevent corruption is because  statute removes all limits in a race or to an contributions to candidates in a race where independent expenditures or candidates sell financing has reached a certain threshold amount third the statute allows political parties to give unlimited amounts to candidates in a general election and much larger amounts than others in a primary election and fourth the statute similarly only allows legislative caucus committees controlled by the state's legislative leaders to give candidates unlimited amounts in general elections and much larger amounts than others in primary elections even though their contributions would seem to entail a threat of corruption that is similar to the threat of corruption posed district court disposed of those first three arguments as a matter of law impartially granting the state's motion to dismiss so don't we have a procedural issue is a threshold matter as to whether that was correct well of course we would argue that  dismissal of those arguments was incorrect that the court couldn't dispose of those arguments as a matter of law when the state had done nothing to meet its burden at that stage and show we could give you relief by simply remand in those to the district court and saying that he prematurely got rid of clothes on a plate yes your honor and that's precisely what we're asking for with respect to those three facets of plaintiff's claim those three facets of the claim should be remanded to the district court so that the district court in the first instance can apply the appropriate level of scrutiny what was the point of distinction in the district court's mind between those three and the one on which he were to try the district court consider the first three of facets of plaintiff claim to be controlled by supreme court precedent and it considered the fourth question to be more debatable and so it allowed the fourth question to proceed first to motions for summary judgment and then to a trial and then he relied on what  the discriminatory limits favoring corporations and unions over individuals the court said that buckley controlled the buckley up held a one thousand dollar limit for individuals contributions and a five thousand  dollars limit for contributions by pacs yes the court took that to mean that the supreme court had categorically approved higher contribution limits for entities than for individuals so the court thought book they controlled comparative question as well as the limits with respect to each group so her that's right the buckley doesn't control on that point one reason why is because buckley didn't can consider the disparity between the one thousand dollars limit and the five thousand dollars limit for pacs that wasn't an issue in the case and another more important reason why buckley doesn't control is because the higher limit in buckley was a limit placed on pacs not all entities and in fact the federal law at issue in buckley limited completely banned contributions by corporations and unions and it limited contributions by other types of groups to the same one thousand dollars a night that that's just a distinction between different forms of organizational associations legal principle is that individuals can individual contributions can be subjected to a lower cap that was imposed on organizational associations then are banned from receiving contributions here there's no such ban obviously based on citizens united sell that the basic principle of treating associations of all types point of their corporations  are other forms of associations is permissible categorically well there's a reason why buckley said it was ok to treat pax better it did consider the difference between pacs and other types of entities and it said you can subject pacts to  limit because they're subject to special rules that inge that involve reporting of who gives to those pacs and rules that ensure that people won't you can't use pacs to circumvent the limits posts imposed on individuals and other organizations so pacs are a special case where there's a specific justification the court recognized for giving them a higher limit now the state government might theoretically be able to justify a higher limit for corporations than for individuals but the burden is on it to do so and here the state simply hasn't met that burden has any how many of the other courts of appeals articulated the principle my sister just stated  categorically that you can always impose higher limits on entities than on individuals i'm not aware of any such decision category that all entities ought to be considered the same who are purposes  of comparison with individuals no and again the supreme court has repeatedly recognized that different types of entities might warrant different types of treatment at the district court kind of implicitly recognize that by going to trial and on ok to subject corporations and unions to a higher limit than individuals and in fact the federal government and many states ban corporate and union contributions entirely and no state except illinois a a corporation or a union to give more to a candidate than an individual can give so this is extraordinary and it calls for some explanation and the state has never even explained it never mind evidence they've never even explain why the state believes it's appropriate to restrict individuals more and so because the state has never done the first thing to satisfy its burden in this respect the district court erred in dismissing this facets of  small donor packs and large bruner packs can't be subject to different contribution limits and then there was an eastern district of kentucky case recently that said if i recall correctly that corporations and l l season similar organizations if you impose different limits on them that we should be subject to strict scrutiny of those cases decided on the pleadings you know not that i'm aware of when to at least summary judgment that's right and that only makes sense because the burden is on the state to justify the limits that it is imposed here and typically of course you can't meet that burden simply on the pleadings unless plaintiffs have made unusual allegations that would show that the limits are justified but that's not that's not what happened here the the state in the district court just pointed to buckley in the instance of the first argument and said that controlled and that was the end of the analysis the court never engaged in the kind of rigorous scrutiny that the supreme court has said is appropriate most recently  recall that buckley specifically said anything about this specifically but there was a developed record in buckley which the court could look to the government had presented explanations for why it had done what it did and i think w substantiated that in some way and any event decision since buckley such as the nixon case say that the government has to come forward with some kind of evidence to justify what it's done it can't just a certain interest in preventing  rationale well certainly a rationale and at least some modicum of evidence the court said in nixon that the amount of evidence the government has to present might vary up and down depending on how novel the scheme in question is but nixon makes clear that the government always has to present something specific to the situation in like that state that explains why would it chose to do was warranted in light of corruption issues in that state  and then with respect to plaintiff's next argument concerning the limit lifting provisions the statute here takes all contribution limits away when independent expenditures or a candidate cell financing reaches a certain amount and the district court rejected this argument out of hand saying that it was controlled by davis versus f e c because the supreme court said in that case that a plaintive can't challenge contribution limits for being expenditures or candidates sell financing hasn't reached the threshold amount the plaintiffs ability to exercise their first amendment rights the extent to which they can exercise their rights is controlled by an arbitrary factor that's outside their control whether other people are so financing or engaging in independent expenditures and of course whether people are doing those things has nothing to do with the state's interest in it we usually trying to do that when the supreme court well the cell use what would happen in the next case well the supreme court didn't talk about it under inclusiveness challenge it says you can't challenge limits for being too high but that's not what plaintiffs are doing here plaintiffs are arguing that because the state is willing to give up these limits completely in response to something that has nothing to do with its interest in preventing corruption then that undermines the state's argument that the scheme that it's  acted is necessary to prevent corruption and in fact and in the bennett case which came after davis the court emphasized that the purpose of the government is trying to serve with its limit lifting provision which is leveling the electoral playing field legit legitimate government objective at all not only is it not a compelling government interest it's not a legitimate government interest and it's undisputed that that's what the government is trying to do with this limit lifting provision it's in the legislative history the state hasn't denied it here and and bennett says pacifically that when the state is faced with a choice between preventing corruption or equalizing speech and it chooses equalizing speech  that casts a significant down on whether the scheme interesting question is actually designed to prevent corruption and of course that's that doubt is what if a plaintiff needs to show it under inclusiveness challenge it just because the state hasn't explained why it suddenly doesn't care about corruption at all when independent expenditures or self financing reaches a certain amount and it has to explain that doesn't care at all yes because it takes away all the contribution limits and so if it's all part of a much larger scheme that involves reporting correct that's true but in this is all you can just isolated individual provisions like there are there are a lot of why we this think that letting an individual give more than five thousand dollars presents an intolerable threat of corruption that we need to prevent and and that has to be the justification for the five thousand dollars limit on individuals and yet when these independent expenditures come in the state suddenly doesn't care about contributions above five thousand dollars and that doesn't make any sense if the state thinks that in one circumstance it should still think in the other and if it if it doesn't that at least calls for some explanation and the state hasn't provided that explanation and whatever explanation they give has to be stated in terms of the state's interest in preventing corruption it can't be stated in terms of leveling the state's interest and leveling the playing field because the supreme court has made clear that is not a legitimate interest and of course the merits of plaintiff's claim on this theory aren't before the court at this time all that is before the court at this time is whether the district court erred in dismissing this argument as a matter of law when the state had presented no evidence to satisfy its burden to show that the limits are narrowly tailored despite this provision and  in the state didn't meet that burden and so we ask this court to reverse this aspect of the district court's dismissal next the district court erred in dismissing the facets of plaintiff's first amendment claim based on the x treatment of political parties again the act allows political parties to give unlimited amounts to the candidates they support in the general election and much larger amounts than others in a primary election and here again the state didn't do anything to satisfy its burden all the state did was point to the supreme court's decisions in colorado too and mcconnell versus f e c and they're treated those as though they were controlling and then the district court treated them as controlling as well but those cases don't control here in colorado to the supreme court said that political party contributions to candidates can pose a threat of quid pro quo corruption and the  court and the district court pointed out that the limits on parties in that case were much higher than the limits on other donors but the disparity was not at issue in that case the only question in colorado two was whether the government could limit political parties contributions at all and the supreme court said yes because those contributions could harm the government's interest in preventing corruption the district court also cited the state that the government can treat packs and parties differently based on the real world differences between them but again that's not categorical approval of any scheme that treats pacs and parties differently what that means is the government has to justify the different limits that it's imposed based on the real world differences between pacs and parties and the government never did that here all it did was point to these other cases and acted that should be enough but it's not enough given the government's burden and the rigorous standard that the supreme court requires courts to apply to challenges to campaign contribution limits finally the district court also err in rejecting the plaintiff's fourth argument that the x treatment of legislative caucus committees is improper again legislative caucus committees our  committees that are controlled there's one controlled by each of the four legislative leaders in the illinois general assembly the speaker the house the senate president the minority leaders they each have one of these committees where they can give unlimited amounts to the candidates they support in a general election and much large amounts and everybody else except other party committees in a primary election and the plaintiffs argue that this isn't justified because the legislative leader is certainly in a position to make quid pro quo demands on someone who is getting money from the leader the leader is limited when he or she gives money through a candidate committee or through attack because the presumption is that their contributions above a certain amount could be corrupting and yet they're allowed to use their legislative caucus committees to circumvent those limits on them entirely and evidence in the record shows that they have done exactly that they've given money through their candidate committee then give money to their legislative caucus committee to give much more than they otherwise could give and the district court held a trial on this facet of plaintiff's claim and at that trial claim has presented testimony from an expert witness who testified that of that in fact legislative caucus committees are similar to pacs in their contributions potential to corrupt and the state on the other hand didn't present any evidence to contradict that the state tried to poke holes in the expert witnesses testimony but it never presented anything to affirmatively meet its burden and so for that reason alone the plaintiffs should have prevailed after trial because the burden was on the state and the state didn't do anything to mee because what should control here is that the state simply did nothing to meet its burden and it's interesting that in the district court's opinion after trial it says yes plaintiffs are correct that the burden is on defendants here but then it goes after that it says nothing about how the state medics burden it doesn't say the state medicine burden by showing this or that the district court just goes on to poke what it believes are holes in the plaintiff's expert testimony but that's not enough sort of conclude i want to emphasize that the burden in this case was on the state the supreme court has made that abundantly clear most recently  in the mccutcheon case that the standard in these cases is a rigorous one and the burden is on the state to justify what it's done and it's especially important for the state to do so in a situation where  is treated some participants in the political process more favorably than others because obviously that gives rise to the possibility that the government could be manipulating who succeeds and who fails an election depending on where they draw their support from and of course the government of the first amendment doesn't allow the government to be in that business at all and courts should guard against that and so for that reason we ask the court to reverse the dismissal of the first three fac their claim remand that so the district court can apply the appropriate scrutiny in the first instance and we also asked the court to reverse the judgment against the plaintiffs on the final facet of their claim th limits and again this supreme court has said very clearly that we don't there is no first amendment problem with having limits that are too high much lower or even unlimited contributions and in fact the district court was correct in finding first that the have no limits on self funders or their opponents is really mandated by davis what davis and the others and other supreme court cases have indicated is that you can't limit to some funder you can't limit the candidate to sell fund and once and when and you can't and you can't have a symmetrical this is what davis stands for you can't have a symmetrical limits so once you once you have to allow unlimited funding for the individuals or groups or pacs or so on you have to illinois had to do this illinois must allow cell funders to have unlimited contributions as that as well as their opponents so so that is why we didn't have to proceed to make affirmative evidence and appear at all evidence presentation this is as a matter of law illinois not only is permitted to but in but really it is required to by supreme court case law to have the unlimited contributions for self funded candidates regardless of what it does for others the limits on others and again the supreme court says the state only has to justify its limits and it doesn't have to justify having no luck it's again this is the same it hasn't held this the case hasn't come up to this but they but six justices will agree that there cannot be limits and that and so the control to not engage in character the right i'm sorry we've been told explicitly not to engage in that short of character of the head counting you know we've been told to the courts right you're not supposed to predict right now the law though you are supposed to learn i think from the supreme court's reasoning from the justices reasoning that is that again there's an identity of interest present for parties and their candidates that is not present for individuals and their candidates and there is that's that's why the sober inclusiveness argument they're under inclusiveness argument really doesn't work because you under inclusiveness works only when applies only when you have comparable comparable entities individuals say individuals to individuals individual to or corporation to package to corporations corporation pact back it doesn't apply when you have an individual and a pack versus a political party because or or for that matter itself under because there are very different animals this plaintiffs and here you just don't ever defend the plaintiffs and here you just don't have that you just don't have that in this scheme which as a court indicated has lots of moving parts everybody you know everybody gets different treatment everybody gets different  in contributions and disclosure and so on this is this this scheme illinois scheme also is very similar in to the federal scheme and in fact the limits in the illinois are higher than the federal plaintiffs and again the first amendment prohibits restricting without a not not with only a close you know prohibits restricting speech and contributions are  only sort of minor speech the buckley has made this clear the supreme court has said that restrictions on contributions are fundamentally different from restrictions on expenditures and so so the rule for limitations on evidence that this government has to present to support there with strict sions varies with plausibility and novel to these limits are not novel these limits are in fact higher than buckley they were in buckley it's only when when you know when a restriction on contributions is like the four hundred dollars for i think it is for alaska over two hundred dollars you know when they're really so low that you can't that a candidate is impaired in the ability to to advocate for electoral success and so here the plaintiffs are not arguing this the plaintiffs don't say that there's i don't think they're saying there is is too low they cannot say that the restrictions on other people are too high i don't it's not a randall kind of a claim it's as i understand it a claim about the difference in treatment between different classes of contributors right and the preferential treatment for parties and legislative committees in addition to the the waiver provision the lifting of the caps for self funded or or special interest funded candidates right but it's not i mean lifting the caps is again to putting the first memory on its head there aren't that we don't have to justify no caps we have to justify restrictions right there's no discrimination within classes of contributors that going on in the way for provision that waves contribution limits for all contributors if there's a self funded candidate above a certain amount or a candidate that gets special interest funding above a certain amount as i understand the code is that i think that's correct yes as i understand your question right so you know so again the only difference the only real difference that players can complain about is that they're being treated differently the individuals are being treated differently from corporations interesting lee they don't complain that individuals are being treated differently from pacs because one of them is in fact a pac and they're not complaining about the difference between the two p what's the disclosure regime for these different classes of contributors candidates have to disclose everything i'm sorry candidates have to disclose everything pretty much right and i think it depends on the sort of i haven't done a disclosure on time but as i recall it it has to do with the amount of the contribution itself it has to do with the source of the contribution and it also has to do with the nature of the whether it's an issue you know whether it's an issue independent expenditure super pac or whether it's a normal pac you know and not super pac and so on so they so they really vary depending on right but again you know and illinois doesn't make differences between corporations and unions doesn't make differences among pacs it really has a very streamlined unlike some other states it has a very streamlined scheme of regulatory restrictions on corporations and again it restricts only individuals entities union that that department you know sorry that the state had a burden of presenting affirmative empirical evidence but again when when you have a not novel restriction or a not novel no restriction and when you have a plausible reason which is corruption i mean surely it cannot be questioned that elena y has a significant interest in ending corruption in politics or at the very least it's appearance it cannot be questioned needed to have a trial on this question was whether a political caucus party could start a caucus committee is sufficiently similar to a party to have the same unlimited contributions that a party have it's that the party again the supreme court just to sum up with regard to the dismissal claims the state didn't have to present evidence because any affirmative evidence on the dismissed claims that is to say the distinction between individuals and corporations the distinction between plaintiffs and parties the distinction between plaintiffs excuse me and self funders because there are these are these are not novel  the anti corruption purpose of the restrictions is exceptionally plausible and so for the restrictions and so there they could be dismissed as a matter of law without any evidence you're hearing the district court found that one of plaintiffs claim it's more recent claims and this is why just to sum up for the last this is why i think the court found in illinois liberty peppe one the plaintiffs who are unlikely to prevail on the merits because they are many injunction appeal when they when this court summarily affirms because really there are these these restrictions on the plaintiffs and the lack of restrictions then and on the other groups on the two other groups and that slightly higher restriction on the other group really are not a first amendment violation as a matter of law and didn't require an average and sherry hearing the one question that did require the evidentiary hearing that the district court found was the caucuses like a political party should they was the risk of corruption which is in effect very low as the supreme court justices have indicated the parties i'm sorry for parties part there isn't any precedent on point a legislative caucus communicator controlled by party leadership in the legislature right so the question was are that should they be treated like parties or should they not was is is there enough is the risk of corruption sufficient or the lack of risk of corruption for the for a caucus committee similar to that of a party or similar to that of the pac right and the expert for the plaintiffs testify to what is fairly self evident to any political observer which is that legislative caucus committees stand in a different stead and political parties in terms of what they seek to accomplish with contributions a political party wants to increase its representation in the state house the leaders caucus committee wants to increase the number of compliant legislators who will do his bidding well that that's what i mean but but i think the i think every party wants to it's self evident that the right of the caucus committees and the legislative leadership stands in a different stead than does the larger the party writ large they have they have an additional interest that's true i mean this is this is what dr osborne said that the one of the things he said was that caucuses have a different have a sort of leadership interest in addition to the party interest but in fact they you know the the plaintiff's own testimony excuse me you know senator but i think that and again also the dr oz corn admitted that there are many many many other sources of contribution that that that individual legislatures into individual  was born also said that that in fact when you looked at the data dr oz when talked about generalizations in his initial opinion but every time he was asked about just the data to the data support your your generalization he pretty much had to say no he for example he or or it's data wasn't big enough for example with regard to this this question he only examined two leadership committees only the majority committees and one of them one of the two of them didn't didn't support his generalization i mean this was the problem with dr oz once testimony he testified about many generalizations which seem self evident and yet when he was asked to do the data supported are the donor base for example to the general base is different between a a party and he had to say no so so every time pretty much and the district court decision pointed this out and this is why the district court decision said the defendants met their burden because every time dr oz born was asked to do the data supports your generalization he had to say no or he had to say well only a little bit or maybe half and half and that that that's the problem with this expert testimony is that you have to and the whole idea of having expert testimony is that it it brings information to the court that to the fact finder that the fact finder wouldn't know but also the fact the expert has to justify dr osborne here his opinion with the data he can't just give generalizations he has to apply the generalizations generalizations to the data and and every time he did that it didn't work doesn't shift the burden it's the materially the same for a political party writ large as it is for a legislative caucus committee right well i think it's two sides of the same coin either either it's the same or it's different right and right your position is the same so we can treat them the same correct members yes of course right exactly there are there are many ways to deal with leadership problems and in addition i'd like to point out that quick how long has that happened in illinois or how often has that happened in illinois well in the republican party i think it happens quite often in the majority democrat party and not that often that hurt i'm not in the legislature state rights to the state chair although yes but but i'd also like to point out that that you call them leadership committees is not entirely accurate because in fact any five senators and any ten representatives how often i happen i believe the evidence tell us i believe there are six committees and there are only four leaders right so apparently there are two others i'm not sure where they can be which chamber they're at but yes it does happen and so so this is you know this is why but the historical evidence and maybe there isn't a record on this this is just anecdotal from observing it on my politics is that the with the leaders right yes yes i think i think that's probably true but again you know here are the the what what the state did was show through dr oz horn not through our own witness but but there's no duty to present affirmative evidence right that we showed through dr oz bourne's testimony his again he had he had three reasons for saying there was a a greater risk  corruption for for the caucus committees versus a party committee and in each of those three recent structure john our base contribution strategy each of those three didn't pan out i mean he had to admit he was wrong i mean in effect he was wrong for each on each of those grounds and you know and again the testimony in the records from the state senator the plaintiffs was that in fact it doesn't these these contributions had no influence on any voting again corruption is about either you know the idea of corrections defined in this context as either access or influence you know you pay money you get a vote and there there we showed in fact that there was no vote for money payment through the through from a caucus so so that completely undermined dr o testimony and in fact proved i mean it's hard to prove a negative but i suppose that was that was how we had to do it was to prove this negative there is no risk just as there is no risk for political parties so again just to recap unless the court has questions the district court found correctly as a matter of law that the distinctions between unlimited contributions from parties unlimited contributions to you know to sell funders and their opponents were as a matter of law not first amendment just under inclusiveness problems and the district court correctly found that under buckley and every other case that is up held every contribution limits for individuals for corporations for pacs that those limitations are in effect violative of the first amendment and lastly the district court committed no clear error in finding that caucuses caucus committees are sufficiently similar to parties in the lack of risk of corruption that they can be treated as parties under the first amendment we ask you a far thank you thank you you've got four minutes left thank you if the state believes it has a good reason for restricting corporations and unions less than individuals i think there's a good reason to allow them to give a candidate more one would think that the state could say we believe it's appropriate to have a higher limit for corporations and unions because and have something at the end of that sentence but there was nothing in the state's argument along those lines the state still even in this argument has not they say they shouldn't have to present evidence they haven't presented these scantiest explanation of why the state believes that difference in treatment is appropriate and the state argues as though plaintiffs can't challenge the state giving somebody else a higher limit well the problem isn't so much the higher limit for somebody else but on the lower limit on yourself when others are treated better it's not fair that somebody else can give more than me is the complaint and the state has to justify that because again this is the state can't play favorites among donors and if you could never challenge the states more tradeable treatment of somebody else there'd never be a way for a plaintiff to stop the state from doing this story of seem to setting up a behave favor certain people over others mr hubert would you agree that the burden that you say the supreme court puts on the state to justify these limits  is something of a sliding scale depending on novelty precedent extent of discrepancies in terms of the evidence the state has to present yes the supreme court made that clear in nixon the more novel the scheme the more the state has to do to come forward and justify what it's done and also if plaintiffs present evidence that may further add to the state's burden to justify what it's done the state argues the doctor us boys testimony is fatally flawed because he didn't look at data but they tried to exclude his testimony on that basis before he testified and dr osborne explained well i used a qualitative method and that's an appropriate method for people in my field that doesn't rely on doses of bench trial and admission doesn't necessarily mean it has to be credited right that's true but there was nothing in the record to suggest the doctor was born wasn't it didn't apply the methods from his field that what he was testifying to didn't reflect what the academic literature said and what he had learned in his experience nothing at trial undermined that basis for his testimony and given that it's not clear what basis for an a for rejecting his testimony there could be other than the district court simply not thinking it's the case that what he is conclusions could be correct on the question of whether legislative leaders can be replaced that's true but it's not as simple as it might be in an ordinary party committee because the leader has a lot of power over the members of his or her caucus and if somebody tries to challenge the leader m o do a lot of state chairs well in this state in particular perhaps but it's not as inherent as in the legislative caucus committee we're a leader is always going to have institutional power over the members of the committee where if they unsuccessfully challenge the leader they could be thrown off committees they could be denied good positions they can have their legislation not called and they can have their primary source of funding cut off and another key characteristic here is candidates can only take money from one legislative caucus committee so if the leader gives you money you can then turn to another and another caucus committee later you're bound to that particular leader and that's something that other political parties don't have and it seems to be inexplicable unless the purpose of these legislative caucus committees is to get candidates to be more committed to the leader to be more bound to do the leader's bidding lest they risk losing one of their most important source or they're committed to the leader or to the party but to the leader because the leader controls this committee as long as he or she goes majority of the caucus but again they have institutional mechanisms of keeping themselves in power that are not present in other types of committees my my time is up all right thank you i think