the propriety of the circuit court an appellate court's award of judgment interest under the civil practice the act in addition to the statutory interest that's available under the property tax code section twenty three twenty twenty three twenty is clear its terms provide for interest to be paid when a tax refund is ordered by the circuit court or the illinois property tax appeal board for the interest to accrue on the taxes that are refunded from the time the taxes were paid or due until such time as the taxes are refunded the language is clear this time period covers both the time prior to judgement and the time subsequent to judgment when the refund is actually paid illinois has a long history of cases indicating that in the absence of a statute in the property tax code authorizing a payment of interest on tax refunds interest is not available some procedural questions sure my understanding is that the sec heard when the treasurer moved for a stay pursuant to three wives from the court allowed the motion to stay and so a spontaneous i believe also indicated that judgment interest would be applied to that period so i question is really two parts first court my understanding is the treasurer made no objection to that order that the court entered and first raised it on appeal so why is it forfeited and then secondly that section of the court's order about the application of post judgment interest is that a final order and if it is how do we have jurisdiction or how do the full court have to the request first say the collector did not want the judgment interest awarded harbor there's no record of the proceedings where that happened in the evaluation of jackson's but from the get go that the collector intended to i believe that was addressed but it is to the extent argued there was no motion for reconsideration it will state that the court awarded the judgment interest and then feel the appeal had been filed in three of the cases however with regard to the tax rate objections this matter was argued prior to the judgment in those cases and those cases the taxpayer actually brought a motion seeking determination of the appropriate amount of interest and the judge did award didn't indicate th proceedings where that happened are not there's not a proceeding to it's a reflect back but there was an objection and that in the rate of tractions that's not what was sought by the treasure and in the valuation objections the issue interest correct at that time the court had decided respectfully the court had decided there was no further opportunity for argument absent motion to reconsider and under supreme court rules it's not necessary that we bring a motion to reconsider that's why there was that the but the judgment interest was part of the notice of appeal i thought it was not i thought it was never there was not any most appeal that was filed if the court and its order no was the nose of fuel that had been filed amended to reflect any objection to the trial or toward there were multiple cases that were consolidated on appeal ok there were four of approximately forty forty three perhaps tax rate objection cases which were combined with the the traditional tax valuation objections there were three valuation objections to which you refer where there was not a second notice of appeal filed because the original case was on appeal all that was sought was a stay then there was no second notice of appeal filed however met saying that confers jurisdiction but under the ybor case if something's a matter of form over substance it doesn't preclude the court from exercising jurisdiction and in fact the court had the forty to forty three cases and the right objection  issue appropriate the cases were consolidated and as justice murphy indicated in the g m decision that in fact it was appropriate for the court to hear that issue in the three valuation objections as well my concern is let's talk about the g m case and the g m case and those other objections there was no motion to stay in any of those cases correct only in the general motors case there's only in the general motors case there is no motion to stay presented so the little boys case there was no motion to stay correct and so the kind of order that i've been asking questions about with the court sue a sponsor a indicated that there would be this kind of judgement interest that was added to the court's order in terms of the granite state that was not part of the general motors cracked correct ok so when the trial when the appellate court says that general motors has waived the right to argue this that the court in that they have in fact a right to that kind of interest where was the court coming from in that sense how could the general motors have waived that argument when it had never been raised before the trial court well just as twice we as we indicated our in our brief in fact we there was not a motion for say filed in that case so while it was not raised on the other side by the taxpayer it was a different situation where that issue was actually not presented to the trial court so you know whether or not that was a correct finding by the appellate court i think more to the point from the collectors perspective is that the award of civil practice act judgment interest in addition to statutory interest under the property tax code has not occurred in previous cases that have been cited by any of the learned counsel for the tax payer in fact in cases where the property tax code addresses an issue such as interest then the civil back practice act does not apply moreover interest on tax refunds such as property tax refunds are in derogation of the common law it's only provided whereas the civic lee addressed by the statute here is section twenty three twenty in the madison to case of that this court previously decided there was an effort by various taxing districts to participate in property tax litigation under twenty three fifteen of the property tax code there the statute provides for the plaintiffs for perhaps jointer plaintiffs and names the collector as the defendant however the statute did not address whether taxing districts could in fact intervene in that case this court found that where the property tax code was silent on that particular issue the civil practiced act applied here we did not have that case we have the property tax code providing for the terms and the extent of interest that is payable on property tax refunds in section twenty three twenty that interested crews on the tax refund from the date the taxes were paid until the tax refund issues illinois law also does not favor a permit to compound interest under the a connal and lewis cases where the the person entitled to the judgment their continued a cruel of interest where interests would accrue on top of interest that had already accrued this is the court's found that that was in fact inappropriate that illinois law did not favor or allow to not permit compound interest to be paid similarly here what's at issue is a disputed amount of interest in the statute it issued twenty three twenty was amended effective january one of two thousand and six all of the cases before this court received judgment orders that were entered subsequent to the effective date of the amendments thus when the orders were submitted to the cook county collector for payment the collector paid those orders the property tax refunds with interest in accordance with the law in effect at the time this was done and appropriate interpretation of the law under the knowing case the rose vs no way case this there was a of application of the law there's been some argument made by the tax has for general motors that in fact they are seeking the payment of the old statutory interest of five percent for the duration of the time what both the circuit public court did was indicate that subsequent prior to the effective date of the amended act that the old interest percentage at five percent would apply from the date the taxes were paid and there after going forward from january one of i was six the rate based on the lesser of the five percent or c p i would apply in the no way case there you had a situation where the statute changed subsequent to a judgement where some of the judgment remained unpaid and there even when the statute changed app sure the court made its decision then going for it the only interest that was allowed to be paid was based on the law in effect at the time so from the date it was amended going be out until the fields were resolved there was no motion to stay as to g m correct however we are told the collector did not pay the judgment as to g until many years later if i may the collector paid the property tax refund with interest based on the c p i percent to enter potations and then subsequently the additional interest the difference between the five percent c p i was paid subsequently how many years afterwards it was paid in january of two thousand and ten two years later so there is a stay as to say not a stay as is to g m and yet they do they were not made whole until sometime in  it's finally paid when entirety and it's only a position we believe that the terms of section twenty three twenty govern this issue clearly the code provides that the interest is to accrue from the date those taxes were paid or due severs later up until those taxes are refunded so the taxes were refunded to general motors several years ago and a portion and what we now consider under the appellate decision a portion of the interest was paid at the time it was in a very good faith can construction of the law that the interest was appropriately paid so you have both the principal property taxes were refunded and the interest based on the c p i and the admitted statute under the terms of the statute the interest accrues on the property tax refund there's no provision for the role of interest on additional interest that remains to speeders and outstanding so this would allow a cruel of additional interest that is not authorized in the property tax code again we have to go back to the and i constitution in one nine hundred seventy which provides all authority with regard to revenue and tax matters in the illinois general assembly the general assembly act and enacted twenty three twenty in its current version with an effort to reflect a little bit more of the economic times and interest rates that are more typical of these days that amended the provision to indicate that the interest would be based on the lesser of the five percent or c p i so too for a court to award additional interest based on the civil practice act or to allow the continue to cruel adventure is only an interest that remains outstanding both lies outside the parameters of the specific terms of the property tax code it also is not in line with the strict construction of interest attitudes that is supported by a number of cases in this area such as clarendon associates the lakefront real to case the jones versus department of revenue where you know prior to any interest  none were paid on property tax refunds under the civil practice act or otherwise thus we think the legislature the law indicates the legislature chose the extent of interest payable so in this case what would make the taxpayers whole is paying that amount that specified in twenty three twenty up until the date the taxes river refund it when those tax refund it a summary sheet is provided by the cook county collector which indicates the amount of taxes by parcel number for each piece of property each objection and it indicates the interest that is paid such information details in fact was being paid at that time does it clearly indicated in this case and general motors as well as the  c newcastle and the rate of jackson's what was paid in principle to property tax refund in the interest that accrued on that refund once that refund was paid the property tax does not allow additional accrual of interest we also want to address the serious case which was decided by the illinois appellate court and you know one of the reasons that this is she was now before this court there was a conflict between the serious decision and the g m with regard to the application the judgment interest there we were talking about a refund on certificate of errors under the property tax code and twenty section twenty one seventy eight provides for the extent of interest payable there was a dispute about the time period which and there was mention of sixty days subsequent to the issuance of the certificate of mayor and sears and the dispute centered around whether the inch issuance occurred when the assessor initially recommended the certificate or when a court hated a right to a certificate of where there was a decision on that matter the court specified the time period and then the collector sought a say in that matter when the stay was issued the circuit court also permitted the application of judgment interest under the civil practice act and that was appealed on appeal the first district indicated that in fact the court initially lacked jurisdiction to warrant additional under the civil practice act secondly it did go on to address the propriety of civil judgment and interest in property tax refunds could you address the jurisdiction again sears it's very similar after the notice of appeal has been filed can you address them yes that's in fact what the court ordered they indicated that once the notice of appeal was filed then there was no authority for the court to grant additional relief whereas the stay motion to stay was granted i think they only had the authority to grant the stay i don't believe they did have the authority to grant the additional interest because it's a it's additional relief that's not been provided before in property tax cases it is additional revenue when you talk about six percent interest accruing in addition to say in the general motors case i mean the difference between the c p i and five percent for a set time period was almost two hundred thousand dollars so are you agreeing with sears  trial court did not have jurisdiction to do that order we are additionally we would indicate that the issues that were reached beyond the jurisdiction were appropriate and rightly addressed by the a regard to the authority of the court to property tax matters i grant you the additional interest attorney who has a case where there was no state and there was no award of judgment interest at the trial court level we have divided our argument or i will be discussing the issues concerning where a state was entered by the court and where judgment interest was entered by the trial court and mr davis will be dealing with the issues specific to his case who counts you just might need to keep track of your own time i will you adjust your questions just to see in regards to the matters were represented as you see in newcastle before the trial court what happened at the trial court level was the collector filed for a motion for stay and as you correctly pointed out during the course of the argument concerning the issuance of the stay we have addressed the court asked them for judgment interest or fear that at the end of this whole process if the stay was entered we would not be given any to that no your honor there was no objection there was no discussion at all before the trial court having to do with if the trial court had authority to grant judgments or not that issue was never raised in the trial court level there was no motion to reconsider in fact the order it was entered by the court in regards to this was drafted by the collectors office not by tax objecting counsel so there was no objection and then with a notice of to be in the notice of appeal that was filed there was no mention at all of judgment interest or any objection to judge me interest at that time also and as counsel correctly pointed out the first time that we hear of anything is in the dock and statement in regard to judgment just and i raised this issue as part of my case of the appellate court that there is an issue of waiver there's an issue of jurisdiction of the appellate court to rule on the matter because it was never brought up in the notice of appeal and i think in regards to that it raises issues here before this court i think those issues are appropriate in this matter because if we agree with the treasurer that the code controls and that's something that can be waive i think if the code controls that you probably can't waive what what is in the code if the code is something if you find that the code decided this is how this is the interest you're entitled to and you're entitled to nothing else because this is been specifically declared by the legislature you look at the procedure involved here the motion for stay was brought pursuant to illinois supreme court rule three zero five which gives the trial court specifically jurisdiction to enter a state that will also give the trial court discretion to either out of the state or not in the state and then also to condition that stay on any grounds to make the state just so clearly it is rule illinois supreme court rule three of which gives jurisdiction to the court in this ma final order was entered granting the motion to stay and the judgment was fired after thirty days you have to know some appeal also just as a side note to why the sears decision may be a little bit different another important factor that in regards to this issue of waiver or jurisdiction of the tele court i should mention is the first district's opinion kind of indicates yeah i think that the it kind of looks like the court saying they didn't really do it the right way but kind of no harm no foul and we're going to go ahead and we're going to we're going to let them argue even though they probably should've given you know recently or the problem with that is there is a potential for prejudice against my client and here's why because if the he did have authority to grant that he may have said i'm not going to issue your state i'm not going to issue judgment just pay them out in appeal which is clearly after he had now what happens by not raising this issue earlier as i say it's kind of the same situation in the pekin insurance case that i say to you in my brief where the treasurer can kind of sit back get the benefit of the stay and then wait to on appeal and then if you decide after reviewing his case and judgment it doesn't apply then court didn't really address when they're considering if there's any prejudice towards my claim wouldn't be any greater prejudice than if at the time of the granting of the stay there were an additional conditions on this today that throw a quarter just a turn i mean you'd be in the same position would you i to make a decision for the state in the first place and what happened the difference would be then if the court determined if they had time that they didn't feel that i should get such an interest and i wasn't to it at least they would have had the full opportunity to make an educated decision and not this brought up later without any kind of opportunity for them to address that issue that's the difference i see in that  i just turn to the issue then of is the property tax code silent on this matter i think what you need to do is you need to take a look at section twenty three twenty one section twenty three three twenty not only orders interest payment of insurance to taxpayers in this situation when there's a court order saying that we're entitled to it but it also says is it includes mandatory language and that mandatory language says the final order of the property tax appeal board or court results in a refund to the taxpayer refunds shall be made by the collector from funds or meeting in the protests fun it's not discretionary the collector shall make that payment to us it goes out to say interest from the date of payment regardless of whether the payment was made before the effective day of the minatory act or from the deed payments to whichever is later so the date of refund shall also be paid again mandatory language shall the legislature clearly  the treasurer be the collector refund the overpaid taxes with interest immediately to the property owner and that's what happens in ninety nine point nine percent of the cases appear in the courts yes specific objections and that's why there's no case on point in regards to this issue because you never have an issue where the treasurer says here's your money i'm not going to pay you any more if this time and that's what happened here what happened here is the treasurer of the collector by her actions of mapping the required amount to start with deviated from section twenty three twenty of the property tax co twenty three twenty this is silent as to the issue of what happens when a court then enters an order saying treasurer you didn't pay the right amount in this matter you need to pay an additional now and then the treasurer instead of paying says i'm going to feel less let's take payment of this again there's nothing in the tax code in this section of the test before specific objections which allows the treasurer to do that what the tax code does allow it allows appeals in section twenty three each fifteen the specific objection procedure in hearing section allows appeals of these matters so in regards to that we get into this realm of appeals and the rules of supreme court concerning appeals and the rules of civil practice concerning appeals and now we're outside the court which is similar to your decision in the madison associates two case which the collector doesn't really discuss from the fact that i think the madison two case actually supports the action of the appellate court in this matter because in medicine to you if you do that same type of analysis to say does the property code specifically deal with this issue in regards to where stays entered in the collector refuses to make payment even though they're directed by legislation to do that now it doesn't contest or doesn't do that so that issue that can be addressed through other avenues of the law in this case supreme court rule three zero five and also the rules of civil procedure and that's where the court has jurisdiction where the court is in compliance with the property tax code and with the normal rules and laws of the state and that's why in this instance it shows an interest should be applied of mr davis to just the others they made please the court counsel my name is mark davis i represent general motors in this case just to study sewer correct the no question of judgment interest was raised  general motors argued its case entirely under section twenty three twenty of the property tax code we have no idea where the question or where the appellate court was coming from in saying that an issue was waived which was never presented to it in the first place it's our position that interest under section twenty three twenty has to continue until the taxpayer is made whole the taxpayer is not made whole general motors as i stand here today has not been paid the full principle tax refund there is simply no authority in the illinois law or any law that we can find in any party has found that the treasurer can unilaterally stop the running of interest by pain less than the full amount of refund in interest though under the trial court's judgment and under the property tax code there is no law that defines a section twenty three twenty refund quote with interest to the date of refund as less than what that phrase plainly says neither the appellate court nor the treasurer can cite any authority to this court that says that that they can pay less than the amount that was owed as of july of two thousand and six which was when the short payment was made to general motors and thereby stop the running of interest in that at that point now another payment was made under the appellate court's decision in january of this year as counsel acknowledge but that payment addressed only interest that had accrued before january one two thousand and six there has never been a dime paid with respect the interest that accrued from the period of july two thousand and six through an including the present day at the rate which we maintain due process requires to be applied in this case namely the five percent korea amendment rate general motors is still owed about fifty three thousand dollars at the lower c p i rate general motors is still owed about nineteen thousand dollars yes in  the slightest justice because this is not a question involving a rate of tax it's not even a question involving a tax the lawfully collectible the circuit court by its judgment has determined that the money is to be returned to the tax payer this is money that was either illegally or a roni asli exacted from the taxpayer and it's coming back so there's no question of a tax rate at all and the commonwealth edison decision the s supreme court decision that has been cited or to the same effect although we've pointed out in the briefs that on due process grounds that stopping the taxpayer from receiving the pre amendment rate of interest would not even pass muster under the standards that are enunciated in those cases for lawful tax rates but that's not what's involved here returning briefly to the question of why interest is still running  this court has held since eight hundred fifty eight and the appellate court has held continuously that there is a general solid principle that governs the allocation of principle and interest when a partial payment is made doesn't matter whether it's a judgment debt or a contract debt or any kind of debt or there is no legal context in which case the question has and presented to the illinois reviewing courts in which this court court have not held that a partial payment is applied first to interest and only if the interest is entirely extinguished then it is applied to reduce the principle consequently if enough is paid as was the case in g m's matter that the interest is extinguished the remaining balance is principal tax the figures that i've mentioned which g m is still owed is unpaid principle tax under the rule that has universally been applied by this court for one hundred fifty years of illinois law in every legal context now the only thing the treasurer has offered against that is that well all of that string of cases are not property tax cases we've pointed out in return that one of them the thrall carcase than the appellate court was a case involving unemployment contributions which the court characterized as a tax it's also been applied in workers compensation judgments it has been applied in literally every scenario that has come before the courts and the courts have declared it to be a general principle of law in the nineteenth century it was known as the united states rule quote unquote emanating from the u s supreme court it is the fair rule there's no reason for it not to be applied it allows a precise calculation and as the courts have explained repeatedly it does not involve calculating interest on interest i see my time is short i'd like to briefly speak to the due process question we returned to the commonwealth edi decision of this court which mentioned that although it at dopped of the land graft test for statutory retroactivity due process concerns were still controlled by the same concerns enunciated in the old vested rights cases and the court commented in cases like henrik vs libertyville schools that a vested cause of action cannot be cut off by a subsequent act of the legislature interest under the property tax code is part of the compensation for to the taxpayer the u s supreme court said in land graph itself that the states have almost universally held that compensatory rights are substantive they may not be cut off retroactively by subsequent legislation that's consistent with this court's commonwealth edison it's have been a decision and all the decisions that the court has has made where this question has come up it's also consistent with the appellate court's decision on property tax interest payments that's the apos the lack of the novak case the treasurer has offered no authority to the contrary and there is none to the fact that in novak the court awarded interest to the taxpayer under a statute that had already been superseded and repeal the only authority that the novak court and we believe all parties have suggested to this court that the novak decision is correct we also suggest that it is indeed correct but we would ask the court to look at the essence of what the court held the essence of what the court held without using language such as vested rights or even due process is that the tax payers rights to interest attached when the tax was paid under protest the proper perspective application of the amendment in two thousand and six to section twenty three twenty is to confine its application to taxpayers who pay under protest after that effective date with that i think the court for its indulgence we would ask that the  court decision be reversed in so far as it cut off interest under section twenty three twenty and in so far as it did not reach the question the due process compels the application of the pre amendment raid thank you thank you so if you if we get past all of the waiver and when jurisdiction questions are are the issues as simple as this and if not please enlighten me what's the rate of interest that should have been pai for the refunds or were due prior to the effective date of twenty three twenty that is really one of the six and secondly is the issue if it was under paid when the refund was made by general motors regarding whether interest in fact it can continue to accrue when they indicate that a portion of their principle taxes were not paid as far as the first issue the appellate court decided that it was appropriate to apply the five percent under the old statute through december third thirty first excuse me of two thousand and five we did not raise that issue in this appeal what we raised was the application of civil practice act judgment interest in addition to the property tax code interest we also did see as the appellate court noted the application of the interest in the amended statute from its effective date through date of payment of the tax refund  the interest had been paid out based on the c p i rate pursuant to the new statute so the difference between a five percent and the c p i prior to december thirty first of two thousand and five that has subsequently been paid to all but the  injectors the rate of doctors present a unique situation because there are literally hundreds of thousands of personals involved a refund would involved then if this court were to decide in our favor as we seek not to apply judgement interest in addition to statutory interest then it would me be an almost impossible task for the collector to go to one hundred thousand approximately taxpayers to collect back judgment interest and that's the  principal was paid with what was you know believed to be the appropriate rate of interest at the time and then the additional interest that was paid his notion is that principle remains outstanding and thus it's still accruing interest based on either the five percent or the c i you know the cases cited by general motors really deal with very different types of debtor creditor relationships in this situation the county collector represents some fifteen hundred taxing district she does not stand to gain in any way she does not benefit by paying a lesser amount of interest this was done in her capacity as a few sherry for local taxing districts indeed revenues are the lifeblood of local government for local schools the public education system part districts villages in fact cook county benefits from this property taxes so when we're talking about taxes being refunded in a specific statute twenty three twenty authoriz payment adventurous then it was her good faith construction of that amended statute which was in effect when the payments for made that led to the payment of based on the c p i or whatever duration that the difference between the c p i and five percent was not paid again that money is paid out of current collections for the various taxing districts the system is set up by the legislature pursuant to their authority to do that and the collector does not in any way benefit from the money that was delayed in payment as far as the tax payer is being made whole the interest provided in two thousand and three twenty was intended to do that all of the tax payers will receive their interest and right now that stands as some combination of the five percent and the c p i interest but they are not entitled to judgment interested in the civil practice act and the cases cited by general motors again are distinguishable that seek the continued accrual adventurous based on their allege and nonpayment of a portion paid to property tax objectors was in fact interest that accrued on protested payments the taxes that were paid that were protested were held in a fund they actually crude interest thus those statutes and the case decided there reflected the actual terms of the statute the the terms are much different today the protest fund has been abolished twenty three twenty speaks in terms of refunds being paid with interest that accrues whatever that interest is not a know the illinois law at the law in effect at the time that the case is decided should govern and if anything this is the pros back to application of the c p i interest rate subsequent to the january first two collector not acting properly and paying interest as she chose that does not take the collector acted properly she in fact paid a principal tax refund with interest based on the amended statute and contrary to the allegations of s b c in newcastle that does not take property tax refunds or the interest that is allowed on those refunds outside of the property tax code the law is clear the legislature has spoken in the property tax section twenty three twenty governs that matter when the circuit court awarded judgment interest in addition to statutory interest it either acted without just jurisdiction or without authority under the clear law of  illinois finally there is no vested right to a certain right adventurous rather if one were denied the right to obtain a property tax refund or obtain any interest on merit that would be a different story the legislature has the authority to change the rate of interest at any time when that rate is applied to prospect of really going forward to judgments that are entered subsequent to the change in the law that is an appropriate application of current law and it's an appropriate exercise authority  the illinois general assembly and for all the reasons stated today as well as in our previous the cook county collector would ask that the court reversed that portion of the appellate court's decision which allowed judgment interest under the civil practice act interest that was outside the terms of the strict confines of the property tax code we'd also ask that the relief sought for the payment of five percent interest to date and that the judgment had not been paid of the princip tax refund that that re relief be denied thank you thank you he's number one zero eight eight thirty three general motors corporation have all