contrary to this court's precedent determined that directing individuals was sufficient for demonstrating controlled access under the enhancement today it's the government's burden to prove that a particular sentencing enhancement is warranted according to this fort in time in doing so this court should review the district's application of the sentencing guidelines under didn't know the standard of review for the maintaining of premises and handsome and the court looks at two different factors according to the commentary offer to the one point one first whether the defendant held the possessory interest in the property meaning that he owned or rented it and second whether the defendant controlled access to or activities at the predecessor in this instance the government has conceded that the first factor is not present therefore this court has looked at three different cases thus far on the enhancement and all three of those cases the first factor was present and those are the sanchez case as well as the florists a law case both from two thousand and thirteen included in our briefs and there's been a  present we look to cases outside of our circuit of that it's for the second factor and those both come from the first circuit in jones from two thousand and fifteen and the eighth circuit in renteria from two thousand and fourteen so let's talk about some of the facts in this case because william's apartment really played it never controlling me enterprise i mean evidence or instructed her to retrieve drugs from hiding places in the apartment  there was controlled access in the factors that the first and eighth circuit have looked at he said in those instances not only the defendant had a kia had access to the property there was also facts in those cases that suggested that the defendant financially contributed to the property that they paid rent payments paid utility payments and there was also evidence that they store personal items of the property or that they stayed there themselves and those facts we don't have present here so there is that also some yeah but there's certainly a lot of them about the engage in that kind of a here your honor first the district court held that mr evans had at the transcript of page eleven that mr evans only had indirect control over the property and indirect control has never been determined as a nafta meeting the controlled access factor subsequently that mr haven't they also determined that it was merely directing people and there needs to be more evidence than merely just directing people to the premises the four of the four controlled buys that were taken place of the buys actually took place at mr evans as cart so although there is some evidence of directing the directing should not be enough the government in this case would say that directing is sufficient when there is constructive possession that its presence however constructive possession has w to the to the idea of of the idea of of controlling another individual and they said that that the evidence for controlling another individual to satisfy this would have to show evidence of an abuse of her authoritarian relationship which the which the record does not reflect that evidence the government had and the brief of page four describes the relationship between mr evans as mr williams has a short term relationship it does not describe the abusive relationship in that case why they determined it as the control over the individual was because the defendant in that case controlled the control of his girlfriend's use of her cell phone what room she was allowed to access in the house he told her whether or not she was allowed to answer the door and it was in a abusive relationship that kind of was a more evidence of the controlled others to satisfy that factor which we don't have present here and there is no evidence to suggest that mr evans and miss williams and gage in an abusive relationship and merely the fact that he directed others to her property should not be enough to show that he controlled access especially given the fact that he didn't own a possessor to show that he could actually have controlled her but since the factors says that when there's not obsessed ranges we have to look to whether they controlled access controlled access to the property would suggest that mr evans had more of an interest in the property that he had a key to the property that he paid for the renter paid for some of the tailings or that he even store his personal items or stayed stayed at the property the jones case from the first circuit in that instance the defendant had a key to the property he paid the rent he even had duplicate keys that he gave out to a coconspirator showing that he not only had access himself can give access to other people and he also stored his clothes and stored on his tooth brush and slept there at times and we don't have that evidence here we're going to go and minutes with really  access can be enough but there needs to be more of a more of an evidence there and i think that the absence of these factors suggests that mr evans did not control access to the property that although he directed other people refer them to mr williams as a location where they could get the drugs it was not necessarily enough to demonstrate that he actually controlled the access to the property it could allow us to to reach out a slippery slope and the fact that drugs eventually have to be stored somewhere so if they're it started just merely that they're stored at a house should it be enough to to come under the maintaining of premises argument in fact that the this court in thomas describes kind the paradigm example of these cases as ascribing them to someone who has and had a supervisory or entrepreneurial i'm roland  enterprise and the district court judge said that mr evans is a moderately substantial drug dealer and that his house necessarily wasn't the largest of stash houses so in order for it to be to be present we need to see more evidence that the controlled access factor especially especially separate himself to some degree by using ms williams as more of a primary distributor in using her apartment but even even to the extent he attempted to separate himself he couldn't completely for instance if you look first at the five control for the controlled by as occurred with in the apartment itself you had mr evans telling ms williams to retrieve the drugs from the hiding place in the fist controlled by you had mr evans meeting the cooperator in a parking lot and sending the cooperate or up into the apartment of ms williams yet as judge williams pointed out there are at least fifty occasions where drugs are purchased from this apartment using the apartment as a district court found this apartment was used for storage it was used for distribution you could compare it almost to a walmart you warehouse it you sell it there it's a storefront mr evans was not on the lease that's true that's possibly the only mitigating factor here for mr  and his this court has found it would it would defy reason to rely on that fact alone when you have other facts showing that somebody is actually using a premises for drug distribution which mr ev doing in this case to a phenomenal degree just the under the totality of the circumstances just of course was absolutely correct to find that that mr williams was using the houses a as a drug premises as to point to in the brief the district court also was correct to find that there was there should be no reduction for acceptance of responsibility in this case we beg with the finding of the obstruction and hansen it was challenged at sentencing but is not challenge here on appeal so we operate from a presumption that the declaration of acceptance is proper now of course finding obstruction is not automatic it's a rebuttable presumption but it's remarkable only in the exceptional case the extraordinary case in the extraordinary cases is outlined in the case law recognized by judge peterson in this case the sort of a case where shortly after arrest there is a minimal act of obstruction followed very quickly by abandonment of the obstructive conduct and acceptance of responsibility by stark contrast in this case there were ten days after arrest where mr evans engaged in obstructive conduct he sent ms williams and he sent a smiley to mr ward and now it isn't just the message that the district court read the transcript was fairly convinced by the transcript of the jail recording this was an attempt an attempt to intimidate a witness he listened to the recording and found it even more compelling when he heard the tone and it isn't just the message it's a messenger mr warden is a person who went to collect a with went with mr evans a collector drug debt from mr johnson the witness that was attacked that they attempted obstructive but it places the because it happened prior to arrest but it places the relationship in context so it was definitely intimidation of a witness over protracted period of time not of the sort that is the extraordinary case of de minimus obstruction quickly abandoned it was extensive obstruction clearly the district court was correct not to find acceptance of responsibility under