i understand that everyone's here will be arguing today and accordingly will dispense with the talking of the calendar we'll hear the first case atlas here versus international rather thank you decision from judge forest from the court below holding that denying our motion while actually granting summary judgment to the company and converting what had been our motion to dismiss as a motion for s confused as i believe it turned out to be i think that the court made several errors and all of which are reversible like to discuss with you today a couple of those given my rather short period of time with you the first one i'd like to discuss is the statute of limitations the problem there is you know at least that the contract allows for the filing of imagine a grievance there is a problem that us alone is not the company and the right to follow mention agreements is the company the company is defined specifically in the collective agreement as both atlas air and polar air cargo a collectively referred to as the company and that's effectively quoting from the very beginning of the section one of the collective agreement atlas alone is not the company but again with respect to the statute of limitations the company in this case apostol on file management grievance claiming that the union had to arbitrate whether or not section one f to the collective agreement required us in a contractual process to merge to stop for is contracts the question is whether there's an unequivocal refusal yeah actual question and legal question but i think it's a undisputed that i think should be undisputed i think that it's legal for the court to consider whether or not we've met the standard of an equivocal refusal i think that we give example there's some discussion about whether subsequent saying up but i'm trying to get a i feel for whether whether this is a legal question whether this is a factual question that requires discovery on whether their refusal was what are your thoughts on that my thoughts are this is a legal issue might be to where i read the case law again just starting alone just with harrington you know this court were to the trial court can determine what is he you know whether or not there was an unequivocal refusal we started on our letter softened saying that we will not arbitrate people twenty or employer argues that the language in the final paragraph of the latter we look forward to an amicable resolution of our does you suggest that it wasn't really unequivocal that there was a willingness to talk but the words i wanted my responses the court confused what the dispute was the union has never deviated from its refusal to arbitrate the management grievance the union has always and it's as if i believe it is its responsibility and amenable to trying to resolve disputes under the railway labor act and if you recall on the record the dispute here that we were referring to was the collective bargaining negotiations themselves not the question as to whether we'd be willing to negotiate to arbitrate we were not ever going to have a tree that's clear the company has recognized that as well the court confused what the dispute in front of  least formally since january the union says let's keep talking and doesn't say anything about arbitrating somehow the arbitrary clock continues to run well the problem with that hypothetical if your question is that we did tell them repeatedly we will not arbitrary we told them that not just in our april twentieth letter we told them in may tenth meeting we told them in subsequent letters and in july and in august and in september as that's reflected in the record those letters you said that you didn't think it was arbitrary we said we would not if you were the declaration of captain wells point set out that if you will we doubled down just in the main meeting alone we will not arbitrate that dispute we will be riveted into a chair ever before we would ever agree to interest arbitrate were to arbitrate those grievances or that grievance you will not do that and so i think it's very clear and it's very unequivocal the question as to whether or not somehow our discussions our negotiations to get back to the bargaining collective agreement if we agreed to a separate process not the contractual one but ones that we proposed to get back to the bargaining table it was markedly different than one have to the contract it was a completely separate proposed process that the again the issue as to whether or not just negotiations even even if it was on the merits that does not that's not the touchstone of what a clear and unequivocal refusal is it you know the touchstone is did we refuse and if we do so any quickly any answer to that is yes and again i think the richardson case here in this case within this circuit all points out that even if this was discussions and they were but even if they were discussions or negotiations on the merits of that grievance the they alone that merely does not toll or or stop or not even allow for the a cruel of the statue limitations and we were clear and we were an equivocal we were always willing to find alternatives to get back to the table and very quickly i'm i know i've reserved two minutes but there is one other issue and that is the southern grievance the southern agreements is not arbitrary at all as we discuss section to afford the our a way that's not a contract doesn't hold out for management grievances and therefore by that reason alone it's not arbitrarily that your owners are down to just a few seconds but i think i made a point past it so i would like to reserve my time if that's ok thank you thank you of events and what the parties were negotiating as is is directly clear from the documents that were admitted into the summary judgment proceedings and they are unequivocal this starts with a letter from the union on april forward to trying to resolve our dispute in a consensual manner now the district court judge four has found that the sequence of events which then occur and in judge force words it's clear that the union was actively negotiating the merits of the atlas group its i e the means of negotiating a j c b a and those negotiations lasted through january twenty sevent the facts are in the record from the documents that were exchanged these were not face to face negotiations they were exchange of proposals and in fact the union in its brief to judge forrest collective bargaining negotiations the documents that are in the record overwhelmingly support judge force finding here there was a series of exchanges they were attached to captain jeff carlson's declaration  noted paragraphs fifteen to twenty four in the summary judgment record but what happened was the first thing that happened was there was a single discussion on may tenth two thousand and sixteen the union told the company it might consider engaging in the interest arbitration process that the company felt was required but it was concerned about one issue they called it the scope provision and they didn't want that to be subject to interest arbitration so and the discussion was how would we might proceed with interest arbitration under section one f and section one b three of the collective bargain greenman and the and the concerned the union express was they didn't want to submit one particular issue scope they explained they thought they wouldn't do well in interest arbitration the company made a compromise proposal and offered then to exclude disco issue from the interest arbitration we were trying to c called compromise proposals and obviously if these discussions had succeeded there would have been no need to prosecute the program management grievance or have an arbitration on it because we were trying to come up with a alternative procedure on july fourteenth twenty sixteen the union responded they were not negotiating the collective bargain agreement they handed the company a document it was called proposed letter evergreen regarding j c negotiations process they were negotiating a compromise that if it was successful would have made the arbiter the management grievance arbitration unnecessary in doing so on on july fourteenth the union's proposal in writing said essentially let's hold off on processing the management grievance they said there should be a preservation of rights on that issue their words not ours and they said this preservation of rights should include the fact that both parties shell agreed to suspend told defer their dispute relating to the management greens there's no ambiguity about this we're not bargaining for the collective bargain in terms of we're seeing whether or not it would be necessary to pursue the management grievance the union didn't want us to do so they said let's toll it and let's have these discussions that's what happened and all of that record judge forest correctly relied on it to find that there was a process that was going on for a nine month period this included an exchange of compromise proposals afterwards august twelfth september second september thirtieth through the november through december finally on february seventeenth to the the company determined that the union compromise and the company compromise negotiations were not going to succeed and so informed the union and filed the complaint that afternoon that's what happened that's what judge force found that happened and it is indisputable written a record in the summary judgment process here and as the district court said it i'm going to quote judge for sisk right it would have been nonsensical for atlas in the midst of in the midst of those live negotiations to file an action of on to the next ok thank limitation on the section nineteen d in which dutch force relied on states that the adjustment board has jurisdiction quote over disputes growing out of the interpretation dispute over the meaning of section one b three of the southern c b s it's plain on its face if there were any doubt about it the section one thousand the statement of jurisdiction is derived from section to all four  d there's been no waiver there was absolutely no evidence of any waiver of that statutory right as we said in our brief to this court the supreme court has noted that if there is going to be any waiver of the statutory right it must be clear and explicit there is no allegation there is no possible argument that the company waived its argument for that for jurisdiction of the board it's it's it's an it's it's really pla and black and white judge force got that right as well i think that covers the points i'd like to make on that issue thank you your th north decision supreme court decision which is cited in the care flight case which we rely upon in our papers that wind which is synonymous with grievances language is that the board has jurisdiction over disputes growing out of talks about the that part this is or interpretation or despite of disputes that rule is synonymous with grievances the company here southern does not have a right to file a grievance under the collective agreement no limitation on southern no limitation as to who can bring the grievances you're you're saying that this is not specific enough and but the case law seems to say it's going to if you're going to use glutes somebody it's got to be explicit quite the contrary have decades we have what contracts where they have never seen the adjustment board has jurisdiction over disputes growing out of grievances grievances just limit coups grievances of man terence or lawyers or out of interpretation the way through and talks about employee and union being those the file the grievances and the company in this case other having the ability to be the decider that doesn't say that the company has a right to file a grievance it does not it concedes that because