proceedings remain unresolved and today we are back before you on review of judge labarga decisions made on remand from roberts prior two thousand and fifteen appeal robert had successfully challenged several rulings that said nearly six years to the liver despite this being a relatively straightforward divorce action absent any child related issues the trial court's delay of more than half a decade was expressly found by your peers to be and excusable however after this case returned to the trial roberts three which set forth in detail three main issues with several subparts our limited time frame it's only a brief summary of a few key points turning to robert's st claim judge from bardot abused his discretion and hoping that did not include a review of the duration of the maintenance award there is no dispute between the parties that paragraph thirty eight and thirty nine of your prior order provide specific directions on remand to remedy to errors made in the divorce judgment with respect to robert's income by instructing the trial court to read visit these calculations that in paragraph fifty three the court's livered what it labelled it as its ruling on all arguments raised by robert to the maintenance award your honor specifically numbered five claims of error four of which are related to the duration of maintenance and that were separate and apart from the errors in the calculation of robert's income that were previously just posed of him paragraph three thousand eight hundred and thirty nine the key here is that these four numbered claims are in the other and the addressed nor resolved by this court in any other part of the prior order and indeed they remain unresolved up to today your honor stated that because you had already found a reason and was necessary to revisit robert's salary and we calculate the amount of maintenance you did not need to review the overall war at that time duration of night as paragraphs thirty eight dollars thirty nine cents were focused on the income recalculation and the fact that paragraph fifty three dollars listed but did not resolve the duration claims could not be viewed as a simple oversight nor as an implied affirmation after judge raptured was transferred to a different assignment judge lombardo took over this case he adopted the completely opposite view that your honors had remained at this matter soley for a mathematical correction regarding robert's income as stated in paragraph thirty eight and thirty nine s a paragraph fifty three after st stating that it created confusion he then concluded that any consideration of the duration duration of maintenance was outside what this court had intended common sense dictates that this court would not list roberts claims regarding the awards duration only to then have the remaining court refused to address them and leave all these claims resolved clear roberts had not forfeit this claim st and foremost kendall violates rule three hundred and forty one dollars h seven and thereby forfeits her own forfeiture arguments as she nowhere includes any citations for the record on appeal to support her claims not moreover her claim wholly lacks merit as she distorts the record and omits key background context details and details and robert's reply brief so he repeatedly asserted the duration agreement before both judge rochford and that both judges ruled on his claims it was after judge labarga help the scope of remand was limited only to a review of the amount of maintenance that he then ordered the parties to prepare proposed judgments resolving what he saw as the open issues robert maintained a standing objection to judge lombardo's ruling and included that objection and his proposed order that the final order did not include the slanguage in no way leads to the unreasonable conclusion that he somehow forfeited his arguments he certainly to not returning now to the rebound had judge lombardo not erred by limiting the scope of re manned a review of the maintenance award would have revealed that indefinite maintenance was an abuse of discretion based upon factual findings that were against the matter of this way to the evidence time does not permit a discussion of each of the numerous factors showing this error which are explained in detail and roberts agree however we highlight that kendall herself requested only five years of rehabilitative reviewable maintenance at the time of the divorce and that this alone makes the courts sue us ponto a permanent maintenance award irreversible the beautiful scratch and because as your honor is held in cantrell a party cannot be granted relief in the absence of a corresponding pleading notably kendall has offered only silence in response to this argument moreover the divorce course based its permanent maintenance award on its view that this was merely a twenty year marriage however nearly six of those years occurred while the divorce case pending before it a delay this court itself found to be inexcusable and for which equity dictates robert should not depend allies to finally although judgment auto correct at the calculation errors and reduce the amount of robert's income he abused his discretion the wrote against the manifest weight of the evidence and failing to also reduce the amount of maintenance and the same percentage it was in applicable to penalize roberts by requiring that he continue to pay the higher amount or that amount had been based permanent maintenance and at most grant kendall five years of rehabilitative reviewable maintenance as she requested reduce the monthly maintenance amount as stated in our brief retroactive to july st two thousand and fourteen an order that robert be reimbursed for the amount of his total overpayment as explained in our brief and as calculated the pog resolution of this appeal divorce proceedings judge when bartels rejection of this claim results in an equitable punishment to robert for the nearly six years it took to dissolve the marriage turning to robert's final set of claims relating to the sale of the former marital residen as detailed in our brief judge lombardo committed errors of law and abuse of discretion in granting reimbursement to kendall for the program to grill state taxes and by granting her reimbursement ancram request for sales related costs that was  and also by equitably distributing the escrow account as a final note kendall has filed across appeals solely focused on the issue of dissipate but has been barred by your auditors from filing across reply brief as we explain in our brief candle has forfeited her cross appeal on two grounds st by not including even one citation to the record in the entire six pages of her claim and merit thank you hear honor's we welcome questions on these points or any other issues presented in our brief that we were unable to address in the summary that very much mister justice brennan a reviewable rehabilitative reviewable maintenance award and because you're absolutely right that it would need to be that remain and it we do ask with respect to that specific claim that it would be remanded to dismiss judge lombardo at st agreed with robert that kendall had violated the october st two thousand and seventeen order by filing her reimbursement request five hundred and fifty two days too late and despite finding that she had violated that order nevertheless granted her some relief in re recovering some of the costs the prejudice the prejudicial effect occurs where time passes causing memories to fade and records to become remote thereby impairing roberts ability to verify kendall's claims the records show it that some of the claims that she made with respect to reimbursement were nearly three years old by the time that she presented them to the court and again the order that was entered on october st two thousand and seventeen had required her to present those reimbursement requests by november th two thousand and seventeen and it's reasonable to conclude that the court put that deadline in there for exactly the reason that that we state in the brief that to have a freshness of every man that was entered on april th two thousand and nineteen and just for clarification for the record there were two orders that were entered on that date there's one that was the order that was solved the remaining contested issues and then there is also a  order on that same date that is a stipulated order on remand that was all the the remaining issues it was a clean up order it was all the remaining issues that were still open i will remain and that the parties had agreed to so yes both parties had agreed at that time that the this a patient issue had been resolved but your honor only kendall is is appealing that this a patient robert is not appealing any portion of the any just the patient findings that's only kendall so because kendall is challenging just the dissipation ruling that was made by judge rochford earlier in the proceedings she forfeits it by there after answering into a stipulation that clearly resolves all aspects of that dissipate an issue matters which have been stipulated to by the parties cannot thereafter be disputed on appeal or it thank you very much i have no  thank you your honor you have any questions from the nd i do thank you tom so if i understand your argument regarding the in your brief the post separation bit it's essentially that the traffic court failed to comply with the scope of the remain and that fully litigating this matter but didn't the trial court explicitly find that the total didn't amount was supported by can those testimony and the lack of any evidence to the contrary your honor i do not believe that there was any kind of evidentiary hearing that was that was conducted with respect to that i believe that the record will show that judge labarga looked at what this court stated in the  and that stated that kendall had testified to only fifty six thousand one hundred and eighty dollars and that and therefore had taken what this court had stated in in height one and used that as the basis and our our quarrel with justice and by this treatment of that issue was that it appeared from what the court had stated in heist one was that there was a general re man that was intended by this court to look to the overall award of that because in the underlying brief that roberts had presented to this court and heis one he had raised the issue that there was no evidentiary basis in the trial record for this award to have been made by judge you can a at the dissolution proceedings so it appears that what judge labarga did was take what your honour's had said in high swan and use that as the basis for his ruling and and said that although he did state i quote although your honour's could have been more specific and quote in your dream and i'm sorry and i swan in your instructions of hungry man he then rematch as a specific greenland's rather than as a general re man and that is where we believe that he abused his discretion did robert continue his challenge to the duration of the maintenance in both ice one and apparently man or was this forfeited your honor absolutely robert continued  maintain that the duration issue was was at issue and was on the table kendall the argument in her brief that there is a forfeiture is exhibit a for the need her this court to two separate orders which were entered on april th two thousand and nineteen an order that resolved the remaining contested issues after judge lombardo had erred in narrowing the scope of remain and to exclude the dollars that reflects the parties agreement on certain uncontested issues including the just a patient now if seventeen of her brief candle includes a blot quote absent any citation from the from the appear that they are talking about the same thing but they are not these are two separate orders there were stipulations that were only made by both parties in that nd order robert is no way   he asked for proposed judgment to be submitted based upon what he saw as as the remaining contested issue which was the amount of maintenance and in robert's proposed order robert said this was over the court here in arriving at that conclusion your honor i believe that are we are our position in our brief is that guidance for the way that this can be treated can be found in the current statute  admittedly the statute did not exist it was not on the books at the time but again guidance can be found and in five bills for the eleven dollars and that allows the court to credit the party for temporary maintenance pager in the pendency of the divorce case now where there was no formal temporary maintenance order that was entered by judge you can a judge you can a did find that the monies that robert paid during the six years where he supported both households were implicit and quote were implicit if not expressly paid in lieu of temporary maintenance and quote robert then did argue that he should have received a fifty percent credit for this payment because it was a maintenance if you were to look if if you were to agree your honour's that kendall should have only been awarded what she requested which was five years of reviewable rehabilitative review maintenance robert has already paid if if we look at this these payments as being in lieu of temporary maintenance or are really a can put temporary maintenance in her brief to this court in high swan kendall actually took the position in her briefs in that st appeal that this was the temporary maintenance order well if we look at this as being temporary maintenance robert has in effect paid ten years of maintenance ready and our point was that if you were to accept that count the would only be afforded the five years and robert has already overpaid by five years because he has to pay ten years of maintenance and by also having him pay all of this during the very extended six year period of those trial court one there were specific directives that were issued and incumbent upon the drug lord to undertake and remain in fact there were nine of them and all of them were extremely specific  in conjunction with giving this directive the court until this court unequivocally affirmed judge you can on the trial court in its determination that using the years two thousand and five through two thousand revisit robert's r c a related say our rate and to recalculate menas that was the specific directive that was given to judge lamar on the trial court when he judy keating these remand issues all three credit card income and misc coronets income so very limited issues were presented to the trial court on remand by the directives of justice burke in his decision in heist one as a related to what was to be related to a transaction between our kind an entity controlled by mister heist and r c a is business then by was to determine what does a patient was undertaken by way of half of two thousand and fourteen to determine what transactions were personal in nature and make a factual finding as to dissipate in lieu of the alternative determination made by judge you going to as a related to extrapolate ing those years of dissipation based upon prior years and dissipate then six very specific get a current value for the st republic bank account seven get a specific value sprite for the range rover automobile and eight review the calculations undertaken by judge you cannot to determine what the debt was that was to be divisible between the parties that was taken by my clients during the three degree course of the case because the total determination was fifty six thousand one hundred dollars and judge you're going to have described the total value of sixty thousand dollars which was actually in conflict and then number  was the discretionary remand which allowed the trial court in its discretion to determine whether or not there should be any type of credit given to mister heist for payments made all nine of those specific directives were undertaken by judge lombardo in a meticulous fashion some of those as it related to the valuation of basic counts in the valuation of the range rover were resolved by stipulation of the court's request the mathematical calculations were undertaken in short order by judge one borrow and judge them bardot properly determined that the issue as it related of marriage had not been returned to the trial court upon remand there there is no reason to deduce that judge burke in any way intended for justice progression say in any way intended  issue of the overall award of meet and to be reviewed on remand that by no means is a directive on remand and there is not even a reference to justice by justice to the drug court that it was in the drug courts discretion determination as a related to credit cards was resolved by judge rochford on a summary basis judge roger in the face of this court's directive to specifically determine what r c a credit to terminations that she would not allow the two to cation of it she would not allow discovery to be conducted in relation to it and she would not address the issue and the common law record is very clear of that as a related to the stipulations from april t against my client as some type of acknowledgement by her that she was stipulating that that was not an issue that was subject to appeal in this matter and she timely filed a notice of appeal of judge rights for its order doing that once judge radford ruled there was litigation with regard to the argument that misess coronet has somehow constructively acknowledged that she was only entitle to five years a reviewable maintenance i use this court to appreciate that this was in the form of a written prosing argument proposed judgment for dissolution of marriage it was not a pleading and in fact what it was was part of a global proposal in which there was a wealth of property that was requested th be awarded to be found to be held as dissipation against mister ice that was rejected there were claims for attorney's fees that were rejected so i believe that it's not proper for them to extrapolate out this one a legit mission of what she was entitled to the trial court made a global determination based upon the arguments and the award of permanent maintenance is supported by a well so findings that are made and upheld by justice  within heist one which established that we my client it is a historical income of twenty six thousand dollars a year and that in order for her to live the lifestyle the parties were accustomed to during the course of their marriage shoe acquired one hundred thousand dollars a year the court with the trial court within its rulings under the judgment in the order on the motion to reconsider meet no findings that my client he had the ability to rehabilitate or that rehabilitation should be considered in this appellate court within its ruling in heists one makes no findings at all as it relates to arguments made by mister heist that the court irritant its finding as to the duration of the marriage i  remand or any directives to the court to redetermine the overall award is used and thus judge will bar to fulfill his specific directives and as it relates to the other issues which are raised by this it's clear by way of the kerman ball record and justices bert's decision that this court's only issue taken with the award of debt or the assignment of debt related to the mathematical errors that were conducted by judge you going to i e his rounding it up to sixty thousand dollars in fact in justice worst opinion he specifically finds that the court may want to re examine the specific allocation and specific remand to judge one bardot relating related to that mathematical determination and that really correcting of the record that it was fifty six thousand one hundred dollars and that sixty thousand dollars  as it relates to judgment bardos determination that the nafta magical difference is an averaging of mister heise income did not render it to be consequential in the trial court's award of six thousand dollars per month i think that's substantiated by the record and finally as a relates to the arguments that are raised relative to judgment bardot reimbursing my client for valid bought a flight and documented expenses that were incurred in putting the home in a conditions suitable for sale that it interests assigned to be an issue by the strike that they had been determined by judge you going to in a portion of his judgment that that would who was reimbursed for certain expenses that she had incurred to put the home any conditions suitable for sale and as a result of that they were able to affection wait the terms of their judgment sell the property and divide essentially saying that roberts remains challenges to the overall maintenance ward will never be reviewed in saying that are we is the is the conclusion that the heist one implicitly affirmed all these rulings by the trial court down below even though it said it wasn't going to reach these issues i think i think that is the determination that needs to be made justice i think that if you read throughout heist one that the section of the analysis that is dedicated to the maintenance award this court in a large part of its thirty page to page decision went into a comprehensive analysis of all the factors that were used in the determination maintenance it and i think that this court gave specific directives to the court that were raised relating to calculation there was no directive made in any fashion to judge lombardo that he should all examine or revisit the issue of duration in the question it's now before this panel is did just one bardot error on remains and there's you can't find that he was directed to review the issue of duration and he didn't do it has a different question is there anywhere in the record where kendall asks for indefinite may sh pleadings set for that because that would be incorporated into the initial petition for dissolution of marriage and as well as the any counter petition for dissolution marriage which i believe i would tell you that the counter petition for for she does not ask for indefinite maintenance correct and as part of her global proposal you are you are correct and i trust you appreciate in reviewing that there was a wealth of relief hundreds of thousands of dollars i do appreciate that so in the the last question here for you relates to the to the cross appeal and the lack of record citation and our rules can you address why that cross appeal in the arguments would be forfeited given the lack of any record citation that i believe it's clear and defined and from this perspective there's no question that the common law record reflects that at the very beginning of the this man are coming back before the trial court and remand there was a petition filed by us with that's part of the record to adjudicate these issues in addition there were motions made relative to discovery and then there's an order that's entered by judge rochford that specifically provides for and those were flat out to me and not the court wouldn't even adjudicate or it wouldn't entertain and the court wouldn't do anything so the record on appeal and that is very very limited there's pleadings and then there's an order and there's a transcript also of the argument that was made so none of which is cited to in the brief correct we fight for the orders and we say to the dates  amount of sixty two dollars fifty cents per month for a period of sixty months was that met her request in the closing argument that was your just as ugly you are correct that part of it but the court appreciate in all of those claims were part of the global position that was taken by ms for net so i think it would be unfair to say all that was her position in a vacuum without looking at situation than how do you respond to the argument that the court of yours is discretion because the court providing an award of indefinite maintenance that was not asked for i understand you're saying this is raised in different parts of the record perhaps but when somebody proposes reviewable eight and then and specifies an amount you will ma when we say well that that didn't really count in this case it's in the record elsewhere closing argument she asks in the proposed dissolution judgement itself he explicitly requests an award a reviewable rehabilitative maintenance and specifies the amount and specify as it will be reviewed in sixteen months  she made it was in a pleading in which she said i am not seeking permanent me as she clearly said and she had articulated throughout and advanced her position that she was entitled to maintenance the court have the discretion to determine what type of m appropriate in consideration of all of the factors under five all four including the property that was awarded to or and including a variety of other things so i understand that yes in that argument we asked words but  don't think it would be equitable to say hate no matter what you're bound by that position when you're not getting so much of the other really you would sought in conjunction there with so there is no question she had always advanced her position that she was entitled to meet once and the court made a determination as to the amount and duration in light of all of the factors under fifty three dollars fifty cents so so i think you have to look at that and say well the judge obviously need his determinations relative to meet in conjunction with his determination that they related to property division property allocation at this point i understand this but i believe that on remand the question is was the trial court directed to review the issue as to duration it and that's the properly framed issue before the  present your rebuttal i have a question one of the question is of the flood and i have one question on this matter i pretty much covered everything else that i had but i have one oh yeah console you agreed that a nice one robert the apple and challenge of maintenance challenge the maintenance award it was based on the duration of the maintenance the amount of at the lead income and the marital share of the estate so shouldn't this court really ma'am regarding maintenance then have been considered a general re man to allow for a view of the entire maintenance award i find no basis in justice works decision to know that justice burke as it relates to the issue of giving mister poe tensional credit for the payments he made three degrees specifically to the amount not the counsel repeatedly stated in his arguments that the common law record showed certain things in support of his position and yet it's notable that he did not cite to that common law record in most of the brief we know that most of what was argued by counsel in his brief was not supported by record citations and therefore we repeat our position that those points that are not supported by record citations are forfeited pursuant to rule three hundred and forty one h seven now counsel basically admitted to your honor's that the and higher cross appeal that he submitted is unsupported by any record citation and as i noted in my opening there is that was a record citation in the six pages of cross appeal indeed the rules are not advisory the rules of the supreme court regarding preparation of appellate briefs they are rules to be followed and rules to be enforced roberts is the party who is prejudiced as well as this court by lack of record citations  is well settled throughout the case law that an appellate court is not a depository and which a party may quote dump the burden of argument and research and quote near honors said that in in re marriage of patrick is the one who was prejudiced as well as just court by the lack of citations and indeed just as this court found in paragraph six hundred and twenty one that kendall had forfeited arguments regarding her dissipation claim documented pattern that has that has taken place throughout these proceedings with respect to the scope of rain and it is well settled that questions that have been actually decided on appeal are for closed from further consideration upon remain and binding contrasts those issues that are not actually decided by the reviewing court may be considered following support of those positions people versus abraham philip hetero here there was no vision on the four for up to five numbered claims that are set forth by your honour's and paragraph fifty three of heist one counsel repeatedly focused in his argument and also in his brief on paragraph thirty eight and thirty nine again as i stated in the opening there is no dispute between the parties that there was a specific rematch on the issues of the income of both robert and kendall but what about paragraph fifty three where does that leave that leaves us with issues that are under resolved and judge rochford again got it absolutely right she noted that your honour's did not address these issues and that could not be interpreted as an oversight or as an applied affirmation counsel offers no case law to support that claim that the failure of this court to address issues that were presented squarely on appeal somehow constitute fermat's that back in that the the case counsel speaks to other issues that were resolved by stipulation between the parties and gave you a laundry list of many things that were remanded those are not used to in these appeal in this appeal your honor and that's just allowing the question at hand as to what do we do with paragraph fifty three and those issues that remain unresolved again it is our position that those issues were met for the trial court to resolve and bardot abuse of discretion in this reading the  would show that permanent or indefinite maintenance is appropriate where the recipient spouse devoted significant time to raising a family ileo of pursuing a career and if not justified where the recipient has been employed throughout the marriage and seemingly has the potential to become self sufficient as those kendall he or she herself requested only five years or rehabilitated reviewable maintenance and in her closing argument she herself said and i quote from page absolute right of every party to a marriage factors are looked at and here the factors include at the parties had no children which would have impaired kendall's ability to earn income and kendall was continuously self employed in fact she's an entrepreneur who started her own business one year after marriage after three years of college is stated in her brief to states and her brief that she's a high school graduate but her test money shows the truth she had three years of college at the university of kentucky and that's that are for sixty three she's a business owner she's an opera entrepreneur she herself testified that she had a gift in her field of interior decorating but then became insulted when asked if  should find other employment when she was only generating one thousand dollars per month which was less than one rd of her monthly living expenses she replied this is my gift kendall has the ability to earn her own support and to help in contributing to her own support she is not a candidate for permanent maintenance on the trial court erred insua find a affording her that permanent maintenance award  and forty two that was entered on april th two thousand and nineteen this is a knowing involuntary waiver of any further rights that she had and bringing back that dissipates in claim before the court and this is in direct contrast to kendall erroneous lee alleges was a stipulation by robert as to the duration argument there was again i underscore there was no stipulation by robert that he was in any way forfeiting or because it's already been resolved and if your honour's decide that it is not that you wish to reach reach the merits judge roberts heard properly construed the rematch in high swann by refusing one is that the court intended that the circuit court examine the evidence already of record and disallow any of this patient claims for the period subsequent to january st two thousand and eleven for which no evidence existed trial and judge roger heard noted that kendall had filed a motion to reopen proofs in the trial court yet in that motion to reopen proof which was filed prior to the court entering its judgment on dissolution she made no reference to any evidence related to her just a patient claim against robert mintz actually failed to call that motion to reopen proofed for hearing so kendall's attempt to and has roger correctly found that handle that the candles motion to reopen prove did not make reference to or just a patient claim and therefore the reopening prove on that issue remain and was improper there was no basis for her argument and in any of my erasures this entire argument is rendered moot yes your audience doesn't tire argument is rendered moo has instructed that there must be an end to litigation and we ask that your honour's consider granting robert the release that he requests at the end of each section of his brief pursu and eighty five and finally bring an end to these proceedings thank you very much we appreciate your attention for this matter this is bridges do many questions i have no further questions thank you thank you there's no question that there was a motion to reopen troops that was filed prior to the entry of judgment that has no bearing to the issues that were brought back and remained there was a directive within this july st of two thousand and fourteen i think that there is no question that was a specific remained on that specific issue and the only way that that issue could have been resolved would have been by way of the introduction of evidence relative to the credit card charges because this court in hyest one made the specific determination that that speculating as to that and projecting doubt based upon the earlier years was an appropriate basis to determine additional imputed income but was not an appropriate basis to determine dissipation during the course of the marriage and the directive was to examine the dissipation claims for that time by judge radford refusing to do that she specifically refused to fulfill the directives of remand to address those issues and would let those issues be adjudicated with regards to the remaining issues that are before the court as it relates to the duration of the maintenance i trust this court appreciates this and  decision and has relied upon the decision in heists one as a rule leads to the award of permanent maintenance and didn't definite maintenance and b because of that it missed cornet is accepted the property division terms accepted the rejection of the claim for attorney fees and is accepted the award of permanent ends and has not rehabilitated herself has not done anything it and his advanced in age quite a bit so that she has relied on that and i don't believe that there's anything in the record that could be by her to leap to the conclusion that she would need to rehabilitate herself and that she could rely on the trial court's order of permanent maintenance that wasn't specifically reversed and wasn't specifically remanded in heist one and those closing arguments were submitted as this court knows almost nine years ago and and that since that time my client has received it and has relied on that permit mean it's in a wealth of life decisions she's m it didn't ask to revisit the credit cards and the scope of the credit card the hershey income because we had knowledge as to the hershey income mister heist had not complied with the supreme court ruled two hundred and thirteen i during the pendency of the gate before the entry of judgment so i don't look at the two is having any correlation because while we were waiting for the judgment we brought a motion to reopen proof because we knew additional income was being urged mister heise that was near the property wanted that additional information