may two thousand and three that's when the complaint for the driving while license suspended offense was filed and will count the first day on which this position was obtained in this case was august twenty sixth two thousand and four and that's it they won't sing one tense in time this morning however because it is not that common for cases take well over seven years to reach this court on a direct appeal i think it would be helpful to to that package and pled guilty on that date in august two thousand and four the package therefore included the immediate imposition of the six year maximum sentence as well as a recognizance the of the state of the execution of the sentence was noted on the formal judgment order and another order was a separate freeform order was also answered and i was twenty four twenty six that stated that this began by weekly reporting to jobs providing a urine test is assessed by this year and using drugs each time and those bi weekly appearances interview till the end of october two thousand and four at that time ju seven months past the original sentence and say something packaged that offended head had been reporting monthly and at that point the judge indicated he would you know kind of loosen the strings and allowed to come on a three month basis now the court is aware from the brace that as it turned out that if any continue to report well past the thirty month self imposed deadline they the stay into two thousand and eight she reported in july of two thousand and seven in december of two thousand and seven and then finally june twelfth two thousand and eight all of those appearances were beyond the thirty mon which was the say was invalid and can be severed and the original six year term of imprisonment can remain intact whereas the defendant is urging the court to not separate those two aspects of the it was a maximum extended term son's class for driving a suspended license and it was imposed on a guilty plea by the defendant the only reason that the defendant agreed to a maximum possible sentence that the department of corrections was the built in process that she may never have to actually serve and that was obtained by the lengthy stay of the execution of it so i think we could for the cross of the central issue which is issue one and three that i file is whether the stay of execution part of the sentence that was imposed by just shows that it could be  multiple orders that were entered in two thousand and four each of these cases was features what i think could be called the centerpiece of the first issue in the three perhaps before this court in the opening brief the family relied on in complete surprise to her and would not be possible without providing her first an opportunity to  those thirty months other than the provision that most of them vacate could be presented to the court at that point it was unclear whether the court would consider the time that she had been reporting to be the more intensi an opportunity to validate the guilty plea or drop so that's an alternative request that we've made in the library but i think you end up with the same point if he did fine in this respect because she will have an opportunity but yet she's been on probation i mean you hear your historical fact that she's made dozens dozens of reports to the circuit court she's been on probation but legally that really didn't happen you know for the question what was the important part of the brain was of the fact that she was going to be allowed to be free for three months or just the fact that she was going to be about three is the three months that was a task that is that actually   four the only difference between roles in this case is the fact that  problem that i'm having procedurally it seems to me that whatever the trial judge did back in two thousand and four war continued because there were all the subsequent actions the state participated in those actions why has the thirty days of finality and we don't we have if nothing else a series of read vestments and doesn't this doesn't the trial court in a in actuality have the authority just under the facts of this particular case to with i think kind of ad somewhat to the mix here a little bit as far as any kind of an analysis of the overall scheme of things but i i don't think that we have just do one more question to go back to the request minute that applies here it's the state that's asserting a jurisdictional bar you're saying that nothing could happen after thirty days right you're saying that the two thousand and eight hearing was voided because the trial court couldn't do anything thirty days more than thirty days after the original participate with the original sentence if both parties didn't continually revise the court with jurisdiction to do whatever it was doing  i think that first wife and i think the defendant and i'm sure mr kraus a correct me if i'm wrong i think the defendant as well of the state of both argument that that june twelfth two thousand and eight order in order to really give you any kind of you know a legal opinion on my part but it does seem to me that that a lot of times with investment comes in a lot of times as is the fact that individual re raises an issue that the state rather than walking away from actually then becomes a participant in and i saw it but in this case because all of these orders were something that  of course necessarily had to come up because she had to stay clean because of the fact that in staying clean she could stay free during this so called three month period so i don't think that necessarily that would be part of the going to make issues that i would have that kind of research i don't think that that her automatic appearance in order to effectuate the conditions of her bond that kept her free necessarily as quote unquote raising an issue or trying to take and we've something that would be correct  as the fact that you know that you know you and all of my insight we can say yeah you know that was a big mistake ok that was a boo boo or that was you know that was just something that he could have done or by doing that he therefore legally did this when at the time the sentencing in a guilty plea we know that that's under oath six all four were not without such a motion being filed there are plenty of cases after trials that allow the trial judge t rules six zero four and the in monuments and to some extent under six or five is special and i know there have been cases that have rejected arguments that even the state's participation in a post guilty plea motion could have been stretched out and this would make it even crazier than it already is is it one hundred twenty nine hundred thirty eight days time they vacated the plea and did it all over again and restart in the new thirty days and you could have ratification of what happened even aside from the defendant being without counsel in two thousand and eight if i can i would like to just talk about the effect of the state concession that the time frame within which the defendant could come in to ask to vacate the sentence was the problem here because it went too long the state agrees that thirty days with the maximum and and plea was induced by giving her more than thirty days the problem is what is the a factor that and so the state it's kind of oh well too bad you had your freedom during those forty six months but under gregory the question is as mr going to have it pointed out whether that concession that wasn't permissible was an essential part now i believe i made the she's not rehabilitated so they would have been upset if the judge had done that it would have been consistent with the orders that were entered in august of two thousand and four but also be illegal because a judge would have been acting without jurisdiction to the it wasn't surprise that he ended up looking at me having served sixty days because it was a trial and he didn't have anything to resurrect as the defendant here does which is her plea of not guilty gregory is the case that