appeals and it's been consolidated by your honour's for argument so i think i've got twenty five minutes now and then five minutes on the bottle of the first one is the cotton case which is an appeal from a district judge brown in reaching the conclusion in her case involves essentially the same central legal issue and that's whether the two lower courts adoption of a state law standard of a formal legal device such as a power of attorney for finding an agency relationship between the two plaintiffs and their elderly mothers under mississippi long for purposes of entering into arbitration agreements is preempted by the federal arbitration act as interpreted by the united states supreme court most recently in the concepcion and marmont health care decisions we also have an issue about the misinterpretation of mississippi law but i thought i would address the issue of f a a preemption first and i would also note that under both federal law and mississippi law there is a strong presumption in favor of arbitration under court went on to make a determination whether the evidence of actual or apparent authority would be sufficient under mississippi law absent the application of this preempted a legal standard of a formal legal advice device excuse me for arbitration agreements and some other important contracts like real estate sales transactions but given that to no standard of review and the special importance of quick resolution of motions to compel arbitration under the f a a recognized in europe the fifth circuit decision in american guarantee and liability insurance company vs and co insulations and that no seventeen in that case and also the moses concave moses age cone case from the united states supreme court this court can make that determination of actual or apparent authority under the correct interpretation of mississippi law now or when you authors decide the issue i don't think that there's a requirement that that you all go ahead and apply the correct mississippi a lot of what essentially are under undisputed facts but i think given the importance of trying to get quick resolutions of motions to compel arbitration it makes more sense to do that now rather than sending it back down and having the potential of the coming back up to your honor's once again so the threshold issue in this case is whether the district courts but i'm becoming the formal legal device standard for arbitration and other important contracts is preempted by the f a a and the answer to that that rhetorical question is very clear after concepcion and also the marmot health care case and also prior supreme court surest crudeness i would say to the agreements the same as any contracts and the same as all contracts the inclusion of some other important contracts like real estate transactions requiring a formal legal device doesn't appeal they admit that arbitration agreements i'm quoting now cannot be treated less favorably than other contracts and quote nor nor could they i'm just jumping in right and i think under that framework you put and that's that's helpful to hear it stated that way so am i correct if i simplified your argument down to mississippi doesn't actually have a legal device rule but if it did conception would have invalidated that absolutely correct ok so then that just leaves us with the gritty job of looking at these contracts what was the scope of authority given by each principle to each child and if so which case are we starting i would start  right so let me go ahead address that another thing i say i took a look at on the on the way out here was the discussion of the actual authority standard in the restatement third of agency and i know that that's a a little bit of a higher level of abstraction but it's it's pretty useful in looking at section two point zero one and zero reason to think mississippi doesn't embrace the rate is no reason at all in will there's every reason to think that mississippi that that's right and i've seen my basic take away from that the comments to that section and and the actual text of it is really very clear and i think it just means it's contemptuous and i'm going to read it it's very short quote an agent acts with actual authority when at the time of taking action that has legal consequences for the principle the agent reasonably believes in accordance with the princip manifestations to the agent that the principal wishes the agents to act and quote so we look either at concrete if you look at comment see they make the point that x the principles expressive content of conduct can be either contextual in the sense of their presence you know the way they act in they're going to have to any manifestation or it could be five words as well and that it goes to the point of the agent's reasonable understanding of the principles of manifestation and i'm reading from comments c at this point in time so if i could take but that's just jumping ahead in that theme provision it's correct that when we look at scope there are aspects of actions that a principal wouldn't authorize an agent like a tort like a crime time and specifically other acts that create legal consequences for a principle that are significant separate from the transaction directed by the prince and that's and that's a very fair point but i don't think that's a problem for us here because the transaction we're talking about we're not talking about somebody who's elderly mother is with them and they were like maybe she's out in the waiting room or she's still principal here in connection with gross said that he testified that his mother knew he was handling the paperwork for the nursing home and trusted him to do it without limitation so there's no qualification it's you and all the paperwork also there's evidence in that case that suggests that he felt that he had authority to handle her health related matters and this is certainly a help get him into nursing home is certainly health related if not at the outset sooner or later so but after answer me a question normally when we get these cases and we get nursing home cases admission to nursing home cases this isn't our first rodeo the usually the arbitration clauses wrapped up in the main contract and if they hadn't been done here then you'd say well she wanted me to get her admitted to the nursing home as a health related decision and a man in the end i when i hear the nursing home says we're going to break this into two separate agreements you made that decision you and your client made the decision to put it in two separate agreements and want to is not a condition to the other so why haven't you in effect created this problem on your own i think it's a fair question have your client i ask you the facts quite right and the reason i say that is that although the execution of the arbitration agreement and a number of other agreements in connection with the admission there's an agreement about a do not resuscitate order there's a agreement about whether you want to sign on for a beautician care there's a whole bunch there are six seven maybe ten separate documents that were signed by the agents ok and of course they're not orally in about their ability to enter into those agreements but in the deposition he's pro on each one and each one of those relates to doctor hospitals health care there's no question that you know or maybe only to be argued that it within its scope was to make decisions related to medical and health and and yet but the point is here you specifically said this isn't a condition of residency right but th this is an important qualification it was optional for them to sign that the arbitration agreement or not they could still become admitted to the nursing home but not quarrelling with that but there's a specific provision in the earth to trace an agreement that says if you sign the arbitrary it becomes part of the admission agreement that begs the question we're here to decide which is whether or not that agent had authority to sign something that was not in the right way to look at the problem is to understand whether that whole context for manifestations through conduct and words indicated that the agent reasonably believed that they ha the authority to enter into all of the paperwork was why should i write it in the deposition you went through every single specific subject matter that gross would have felt but you never asked him did you feel you had authority to sign the arbitration standalone document he's never asked that a lot i wasn't there but i know but but you know the record to every question is did you have authority sign documents but then the sentence finishes to have her health needs dealt with to get her admitted it's never did you have authority to sign documents that wave legal rights or your right to a jury or to a trial that may have  been an improper question asking this particular plaintiff whether he thought that he had a story to enter into the arbitration agreement he actually the provisions of the arbitration agreement provide that the person signing it says that they do have the authority to enter into the agreement and of course he's openly motivated to disagree with you you have in your head or you have it with you do you have because that was troubling for the gross case for me  mother is unable to consent because of physical disability or mental incompetence or is a minor they authorized represent of assigning complete the following but she she would no one's contending she was disabled or mentally incompetent or a minor correct i think that there's no evidence that she was mentally or any of those three i don't know why but so the appropriate section to sign would have been the one that's blank well they haven't really made this argument i'm making it because this is vital to find out what authority you're saying he had authority to do more than what i see he says he died in the deposition we don't have a notarized power of attorney at all unlike in cotton she wasn't even present and you were lying and you just moments ago said it's all in the document then you look at the document and he signs where it makes no sense to me what the document does provide that the arbitration agreement becomes part of the admission agreement there's no question about their ability to enter into the admission am i right just just read you know this part is the appropriate place that your client would say he should have signed the section that blank yes or no line on one of these admissions either on the admission agreement which it happens all the time that doesn't mean that there isn't an agreement necessarily if there's some sort of error in the place that they sign it he's never taken the position that he indicated that she had no mental ability or burden of proof to establish that he was off rise by his mother the principal to do all the steps you contend he did i think the one item we've got to suggest that is what you just pointed to me through the agreement and it didn't get signed in the right place that's troubling to me then i look at the deposition understand what he thought he was authorized to do and he clearly thought he was authorized to do health medical even residency every questions he's asked is that no one ever asks him did she authorize you to waive her right to ever get into court if there's a mishap you know if i could just turn back to the testimony where he says that his mother knew that he was handling the paperwork for the nursing home and that i would say that the paperwork isn't necessarily limited to health issues and there were a number of other items that he signed for her i mean if you paraphrase it correctly for the nursing home you've been emphatic that with sort of best practices you arbitration agreement is paperwork for the nursing home that would be my position your honor but it's not mandatory it's not a condition well he didn't say that she gave me the authority to do all that was absolutely required to get her in the nursing home he didn't say that he said that she authorized him to do to sign the paperwork for the nursing home and he did do that and the arbitration agreement was part of the court itself indicated that that it considered the incomplete execute a power of attorney to be in itself strong circumstantial proof of agency which it obviously is another example of people not getting everything right i mean that's a context in which there are many unsophisticated individuals in a stressful context and sometimes they make errors with factual question about acting that i had the maybe not in the right no but that's not the case of listening somebody is handwritten in the name of the residence and the two daughters that the same person and that it's the signature is by the notary of course there's evidence that in fact they were interacting about this and that the residence as ms robeson on the phone when she was on the phone with the notary she said she understood the effect of the power of attorney and orally indicated her intent to cotton have the general power of attorney and once again i mean going back i think you're on a supply satisfied with this issue but that the difference between being an actual agent and having a fully executed power of attorney i think is one that the district court was simply wrong concluding that there has to be a fully executed power of attorney either under mississippi law or as a matter of federal preemption under the f a a evidence that the parties believe that the power of attorney was fallin to the mother wanted the power of attorney for cotton to quote go handle things for her and quote the mother intended to give condon the power of attorney to quote handle her affairs no kind of limitation to any kind of medical issues so this the issue in the other to engross about whether it's medical in character or not that doesn't exist in the in the cotton case and she mother stated that she wanted  have authority to sign documents on her behalf and on and on and so i think the at the evidence of actual authority in the context of the common case is really quite overwhelming if the correct standard is is applied i want to make just one point your honor that in one of the cases that the gross case there's this issue about the national arbitration forum which the district judge didn't decide and we noted that point in a footnote in our opening preens indicating that we thought it wasn't appropriate for this court to deal with that issue because the court below hadn't hadn't dealt with that and there was no discussion in our opponents  brief wrong it's yet another obstacle it only applies to gross right that's right but you've got mississippi law dylan below you said dylan's been superseded by conception is that your position here that  dylan which would say that's an integrity part has been superseded by conception i don't understand that i think i think i do understand it and that's from plaited to the green versus cash advance case which is unpublished decision in ransey over b p we don't agree with easter brooks approach to it you come to a different outcome you don't consider either a judge easter books approach or the approaches of some of the other federal courts of appeals that would be that congress has a little case only circuit and it's a split opinion that has not even applied the integra part test is that correct i think that only the seventh circuit is has not apply  part test but there are i'm assuming there are you all are going to reach the end if issue but if that's not right there's also a third is if we did reach it the language here was mandatory it wasn't permissive exclusively the position that we have is that that not only do we have the seventh circuit opinion our side but the converses del case which applies the interval part test but comes out in our way  binding precedent but there are cases from other course but of course if you decide not to find that there's agency gross you don't need to reach that any official ok if if if you are have any other questions i'd be happy to address them  foundational point that gets glossed over in these cases in like judge king have put up with some of these over the years is that cases like these two are not f a a section two cases they are section four cases the primary issue is not whether the arbitration clause arbitration agreements will be inforced once it is determined for certain that there is a contract is whether there is a contract in section four deals with whether there is a contract concepcion marmet health care or both section two cases that is a principal difference in this case these two cases and where these briefs have gone and i'll be candid in say that that foundational point doesn't come out of anybody's briefing as strongly as a win right here you judge came a know that but that's i have not seen that are under i know it's not here now to these days it may be here but it's not nose at in the briefing you got thirty minutes and in my mind i'll just tell you where i am mentally but i'm looking for does most of the argument you presented to me and the destroyed asserted isn't very convincing if this this notion that there's a heightened so a legal device rule a playable to an arbitration agreement in nursing on context conception would sort of take a side and chop that out i think so and yet when i look at i can't pronounce them to new and modern cello yes they may not have been saying what the district court thought they were saying and what your brief i thought indorsed that you've got to have this legal device this heightened thing they're just saying there was no evidence of authorization at all right and therefore we put i put those cases aside i jump right as you heard me to let's look at the contract here and that's it as i went back through the briefing in pain and i think this is much clearer in the cotton brief than it is in the groom's breeze and i will tell you i had more of a hand going have any hand in the gross place but i'm not i'm not going to criticize you good and all that but the cottage we really unfortunately does put us in the predicament of relying on the legal rule because it embrace is the legal rule and gives very little factual discussion so in cotton where the facts are less compelling that the authority of the child was circumscribed we also have less from the district judge other than mississippi's got a heightened rule for arbitration agreement in nursing homes understand where you're coming from ok so conception and i will break the case down this way you know the number one i think you never have to reach this concepcion marmet health care preemption issue because in neither case in my reading the most liberal reading of what can give the forty two somebody to do something for someone else golden living did not meet that dangerous threshold in either case that's my primary point i think that's the primary point from both of the briefs that this evidence simply isn't strong enough and in the room we have a notarized power of attorney and we have her child you know forgive me for forgetting what her name is the word it was a woman right yes but her deposition giving no limit to what she said she had agency authority to do i don't agree that her deposition is that clear and i don't agree that the spin to put on the art of the power of attorney is that it is in dick indicative of their being in agreement here's why i say that with respect to the power of attorney to begin with  impression that they'd actually signed their names thinking it was the signature line but they didn't they printed it or something that each person killed and then i was worried that they signed the wrong blank myself and look specifically for that in the deposition and testimony that is part of the record on appeal and my reading is that they just wrote their names in it was not an impression that they were signing that was where it was supposed to be something caught yes and in other signed power of attorney a power of attorney that has never completed i would submit to you is just the opposite of evidence of  authority it is an incomplete act she stopped we don't know why and as a play this lawyer i don't often get to say this i don't have to know why of proof it's their burden of proving agency there must be some explanation why that was not completed in order for it to have any value that helps golden living at all and there is none may not be independently sufficient but your position is it has no evidentiary weight i see no i take an even stronger position i given it is a negative what it already for either negative inference or zero value the mississippi statute in any case i don't have any i do not have in the mississippi case all i have working in the back of my head cases from other states that i can identify right at this moment submitted to the a j letter of if they show up in my head but but you don't dispute the alternate position that oral grants of authority if there in specific terms can be sufficient i agree that none of the three cases the judge mills relied on and that judge brown seems to rely on as well specifically states that the mississippi law pretty clearly elsewhere says you can i agree that mississippi law says that oral grants of authority are effective now where we part company i suspect is that those oral grants i think have to be specific in fact i think any grant of authority need to be specific need to be very specific in order to allow someone to act for me i need to i need to make that that grant of authority specific to that  things if she wasn't available she made statements other were other places in her deposition where her mom granted her authority to do things if her mother wasn't available  if she needed something been asked to do candidly is it your understanding when your mother signed her name at the top talking about the pos a dishy believe she was completing the document to make it effective so you could use it i don't know how i can answer that and then the most candid point that we cite in our brief is whether she was asked whether she was authorized to sign whatever documents might be necessary and the answer was that her mother didn't authorize it we just did it because we thought she needed so i think that if we had if we were living in power of attorney world rather than oral grant of the forwarding world there's such a thing as a springing power of attorney where the ability to act doesn't arise until some condition occurs a lot of times these are our durable powers of attorney that spring into effect upon incapacity we make provisions so that our children can take care of us in the event we become incapacitated but until that happens thank you kids i'll take care of myself i'll decide where i go outside what rights i weigh i'll decide whether i go to the nursing home or whether i know somewhere else and you don't get the ability to do that until there's an i think that's what she said if the district judge was wrong in the legal rules apply is there analysis along the lines that you're suggesting to us now that in fact it was only on an availability that was the scope of it just whatever make that depositions was sufficient to create authority under anything other than a power of attorney type who i bring that needed district judge made that the time with the district read this again last night in the end the factual analysis is calling into question saying there are many witnesses in the testimony and that sort of thing and also pointing out that testimony is there it isn't and then i agree with that now and i think that's part of the reason i wanted to point out section four of the f a a because part of it says that if the making of the contract is an issue the courts will have a trial in fact a jury trial now presumably the way we get around that in a lot a lot of these cases and have this to know will review which is a candid with you never completely understood in the context of section four is that we have this deposition testimony and there's no testimony offered  and you get to determine are the truck we've got to determine what it meant our position is that neither child testified sufficiently enough to create the authority to enter into an arbitration clause with respect to the cotton case i was going to say roberson because we talked to him about them to we've named him based on the residence the cotton roberson case because of the things that i mention because we have an uncompleted an incomplete act with respect to the power of attorney in if she meant it to be she simply had to sign it which she never did it has no effect and in fact the inference to be drawn from it is the negative inference that she didn't go through when she didn't test the authority and second the qualifying statements made by ms cotton in her deposition regarding whether her mother was available to do something was when she won the one to give her daughters the ability to add where are you are you not defending it get to court rulings on now that there is a legal device rule and that somehow that survives conception are you agreeing that that crux or legal ruling inherent both is mistaken you know when i get there in a second my first point though is you don't have to get there that's what i'm saying primarily is that on this evidence there is no agency created but you're also saying the district court made no finding on that no am not the what's the relief you'd be asking the relief i would be asking for would be alternative alternative number one that you affirmed the district court on the grounded district courts on the ground that they did not reach which is this evidence is insufficient to create the agency relationship necessary to waive the right to jury trial and enter into an arbitration agreement alternatively if you don't want to go that far you can remain for a determination by the district court in the first instance on those on those questions in those cases i think you can do either i don't think it's necessary to remain and because i don't think this evidence is sufficient enough and in frankly judge you've done a as good a job or better than i could with respect to gross and explaining why that is so but point but the the point i'm sorry what are you independently defending the legal analysis below or not yes i will now defend the legal analysis below first of all i think it is a fair inference from the mississippi cases that mississippi requires some degree of specificity up to something like a power of attorney a guardianship of conservatorship in order to vest authority my from my reading of those opinions is that they did not necessarily limit themselves to a documents but a significant informal statement on the part of the resident to somebody else that yes this person has the ability to sign this kind of document for me and waive these rights that degree of specificity i think is appropriate to read into the mississippi cases i get there those are but those those cases are preconception so they may have been valid then when you say this kind you mean arbitration agreements well the authority to enter into an automobile loan contract for his parents if we were talking about an automobile lol contract we would have no question we would have no hesitation i think in saying that it better be awfully certain there better be some direct manifestation by the parent to the finance and loan officer at the car dealership or at the bank that mr gross over here has the authority to sign that automobile loan for me i think that's why judg i don't think that's preempted by concepcion for two reasons number one it is a simple matter of agency law all that for some reason has gotten distorted away in these nursing home cases because we're dealing with this delicate issue of people in failing health needing to get into the nursing home but if you put it in that simple context of selling the house fina it in all of those kinds of contractors people on the other and finance company whoever you're selling the house to the title company is going to require all that in writing that's not because looked at in the abstract under mississippi law you would need to have it in writing if because they're not in the business of transferring that much money without being absolutely clear that it got a document that's going to go into our file our our electronic file that makes it clear that this person has the authority i'm not being as clear as i need to be i agree  have their machinery their machinery will require a document right the law i think requires a specific manifestation of authority by the principle that be sufficient to walk up to the nursing home personnel and slip at the document and say yes you can sign that for me we wouldn't be here then your your rule would apply to doctor visits attention this direct manifestation not in writing rule your to kewl lady would extending any medical visit of any sort i think i think in order to waive a right for somebody  bind another person yes there needs to be a direct manifestation of that degree of authority i think that's what the cases in the law i think that's what the restatements is this generic son i  want you to handle things so i can get in a nursing home or son i want you to handle things so i can go see the doctor that's not a manifestation of authority to do anything in particular how is it it's not how  well my mom's not a good example of what i mean maybe because my mom is going to do what she wants to do but i am serious when i say that this whole world of elderly parents happens a lot over while mainly on or off there is the nation to sign whatever needs to be done take care my now get me into the nursing home and all functions are really that's just how it works and that's why it is that the nursing home didn't ask for more and they didn't they they made a stand alone and they made it voluntary they seem to be doing good things right i agree being standalone and being voluntary are good things yes being presented along with the rest of the admission agreement on a quibble with that let's have a specific conversation with people about what this means the person who's waving to the right about what it cases and i agree that there will be plopped down in the middle of the opinions the sentence the age of statistic money alone can describe scope of his story but in every one of those cases the person who is e age it was already an agent by his status for example in walters you can stonewall clinton i remember this as the company town of legal status guardianship power of attorney i'm sorry what you mean by status in walters in that case it was an employee and really the issue in that case was liability for a private employer and so it's it's an odd example but because he was an employee already and already had a status as an agent then his testimony could prove to be used as evidence of the extent and scope of his agents in the room what will case wicking rise against actually we're talking about a branch manager of the defendant someone who very clearly was by status by status an agent of the defendant and his testimony could be used to give evidence of the scope of his agents the eton against porter cases that's the car like case where the car was repaired is really an apparent authority case but there it was again an employee of the employee was the father of the owner of the company who had in my extra research before i came here that says someone who doesn't already have by status by by context of who they are in relation to the principal that says next of kin automatically creates an agency status but the point is that the way it works out as a practical matter and nursing home hospital admissions with elderly status of some of child or spouse or nephew or whatever does not create agency relationships  good in every one of these cases where the testimony of the agent was allowed to define the scope of his or her with already there was a status of agency by terms of who they  what you're saying and family members don't fit in those categories and i think maybe they do and i agree you probably know more about it and i do but i would think that with elderly parents that they fit into this case post conception it says this stat unique status are you talking about admission in the thing are you talking about sign that part betray should read up and i'm focusing on the arbitration but how would that suit you know state supreme courts are pushing back against conception just as they were before it but what what what case do you have post conception that has this status rule to sign an arbitration when you have any case i was i was made aware into scope of authority if the fact of findings were made the middle ground you have any case law on that not offered you not copy it ok third you say affirm because the facts in the existing us stand for not sufficient authority best case i'm sorry third option just affirmed straight up this factual finding not in the record but as a matter of law they didn't have scope of this correct what's your best authority find one of them that is something that is absent from the briefing on both sides and i just don't see these cases of agency i'm sorry where the restatement of agency  but i still think the pay attention to that i agree but i still believe that under the restatement rule these generalized statements of you know if i'm not available you can sign stuff to hit me in the nursing home do not include this separate arbitration agreement and a key point which we've kind of bounced all around isn't in you in particular and other mississippi cases that have some insight into everybody's briefs this is not a medical care decision because the arbitration agreement is a separate stand alone the grain that it is not a condition of admission not part of the medical i don't see how your position can be they do because they don't include arbitration that would seem to be arbitration specific problematic under conception you would have to be saying he was given authority to do medical and residency but nothing not banking not real estate not arbitration all equal the second you distinguish arbitration i think you've got a problem let me turn it this way the grant o momma wasn't available at your that's it nothing else is included in their authority not by car not cell house or not to enter into an arbitration agreement wasn't as clear as i needed to be earlier about that it's the scope of the scope of the authorities defined by the going and if an if for example a power of attorney said you can make all these decisions for me to do anything for me that i can do for myself except enter into other tradition clause because that person said you can't do it that's not preempted by concepcion that's because the agency the principal didn't write the agency a tough right now on tuesday and i didn't think i could officers that be very very fast the first point i would make is that my opponent keeps falling into treating arbitration agreements differently than other agreements for the agency issue and for other reasons as well and so did the two district courts and concepcion doesn't allow that and the argument that concepcion is only about forcing arbitrary arbitration agreements not that stand as an obstacle to the accomplishment of the f a a is objective so we're plainly right on the f a a issue and i recognize that the difficult position my opponent was in and having to defend that position i'll be at half heartedly what a point that the judge king made you know they have a restatement of agency urges us in issues of actual authority to be focused on the actual context and on manifestations in context and i would submit your honour's that we're not talking about somebody that these of older elderly women going into nursing homes pulled off the street that we're talking about their children and my mother's a good example the reality is is that these elderly women are counting on their children to make those decisions for them and we're not just talking about the arbitration agreement we're talking about all of the agreements that they entered into when they went into the nursing home that includes the resident fund management service the authorization to obtain nutrition services they have knowledge one of written notices and the medicare secondary pairs screening form the representative paid document the assignment of benefits form the pharmacy choice to resuscitate orders and on and on this case they were the ones who signed the arbitration agreement and they're trying to get out of the arbitration agreement based on their own signature of the arbitration agreement and i would i would submit that even if you don't agree with me  with respect to the existence of actual authority in the gross case that there's still a very good argument for stucco in the gross case because gross is the one who's trying to get more  money out of the nursing home because he thinks that he'll do better in court than he would in art trace but he was the one who signed the the arbitration agreement along with all of the other agreements that were in connection with is a legal change in position it's like the you know the consideration in connection with you know the sale of black acre a point whatever the example was from law school all you need is a legal change of position with and we've covered that in the  briefing in i'm not sure if it's in gross or cotton i've lost track of it by now but we have specifically addressed that issue but that's all that's necessary you don't have to lose money you just need to change the legal position which we we plainly have and and i think there was a human that even if it's notarized it's not signed that actually creates a negative inference and i i think that given the entire context that her hand written  name is totally sufficient to to if you look at the whole context it indicate that she intended to grant the general power of attorney and there's other evidence of that as well ordering that's what the net everything didn't they didn't do that great  job but they knew what they were trying to do and what they were trying to do was to give the general power of attorney to the daughter and what's the surprise and thank you jane's worth would say you did a great