limitations and it seems that the district court misconstrued some procedural rules i e those under federal rule of civil procedures for m and the fire or j for substantive absolute cause to get an extension of one hundred twenty day service rule and in this case we did argue at the district court level good cause but we were primarily relying upon the  time we filed for the motion because what happened was and i'm almost certain of that and i can verify that well and i'm sitting back but i believe i have today that we said we were going on the one hundred twenty days and they've got to remember the procedure here on the and so he showed cause he when he got an attorney and we discussed you know you mean one hundred twenty days we got to do something so we showed costs we asked the court to exercise its discretion under for him both upon good cause although we didn't push it very hard and primarily upon the discretionary extension and he did he said ok fine go and serve it you get thirty days and then american airlines comes in and says no you'd be on a stash limitations while that is situations where the course were not happy with the harsh result that occurred under four j so we've loosened it up a little bit as is they have in florida law if the advisory committee you know seems to say that it district court may grant an extension not required to that may or may grant an extension because the special limitations has run that seems to me to run squarely contrary to the district court's decision and other procedural issues we haven't even don't let that i anticipate will be reduced throughout the litigation and we like to get through and see if we can meet but in this situation we feel that he has met the burden and he had under the court rules to file this thing in a timely matter and it's forty seconds if you have left this case the one hundred twenty day expired on february twenty seventh two thousand and one on march twenty seventh which would have been the following month thirty days thereafter the court issued at the order to show cause to mr mann on april nineteenth two thousand and one mr mansour his counsel appeared and requested an additional period of time and indicated  part the moving of the papers in response to the order to show cause that service should not be a problem because american has an agent for service locally here and then it's on june fourth two thousand and one the services actually  him wasn't addressed in the police briefing at all and you know there may be a reason for that it may just have been oversight but i really i think you know i think i think rule for him is at the heart of the case however we decided and so we need position we don't think that rule in this dispositive this case we can see that the district court certainly has the discretion to extend its time for service of process to be affected after one hundred twenty days of dress and employment cases or perhaps going to be the only kinds of matters in which this intersection occurs and become visible to us in the courses of perhaps because of the relatively the time for service of process but courts also have consistently and other matters help that the mere expiration of the satchel in the patients is not a basis for expansion and that cases can in fact be precise issue here has been determined and i have since receiving the court's order looked at the cases that have cited the party as a decision since it came out and it would in fact appear that this confluence of facts is unique if i may just expand on that a little bit first of all i don't think in view of our position about rule for him that the ninety three amendment is particularly meaningful in this context and i would simply point out that heart disease was decided before the amendment so that doesn't appear on its face to be dispositive we don't know from part  whether this precise issue was even a problem in that case there is a reference in part is easy to the district court's thinking very beginning of the case in which the one which the heloc court states that the ninety day period remained before service was in fact effectuated on that on the defendant and that if we do know from the record that in that case the coleman hospital people were served within one week so it's got i guess prior to service yes yes so it again though we don't know what what effect if any this in this intersection of facts would have happened and it again just because i want to assist the court here  my research has revealed at least in the ninth circuit the case has only been cited twice by district courts but only for the proposition which was critical to the holding in part  that was the basis for the decision and and it's that proposition which is the only proposition which is one sided within the ninth circuit of course that to my knowledge of the ninth circuit itself is not cited partisan i've also looked outside of the ninth circuit to determine if any cases in employment have cited part is easy where there is also a discussion of the facts present in this case in an emmy and k z of where the the holdings in these decisions that we have relied on and that we presented to the district court it would appear that policy decisions underlying timely notice to the defendant can tell a situation to avoid we think that the grossly lengthy service period that occurred in this case and i think in each of the cases that we've cited to the court the feeling in the expiration in those decisions was that although service excuse me although filing is certainly necessary to satisfy forty two u s c section two thousand it is not in all cases sufficient if service is not a fracture waited and timely manner and then