know why you'd be going first because we actually set this script hearing i'm only the state's titian three here so i think that should be the order of business actually i think  addressed which we didn't address before so i think you should address in addition to what you want to say the argument that the equal protection argument should be revisited or should be examined for the first time all the difference between richardson in this case is how and where the comparison group was placed in richardson with the fed it was a seventeen year one side of an amendment and he was comparing yourself to seventeen year treated how they are treated differently under the same act but the playing of richardson and its comparisons of this case is how this defendant i goes about trying to find that there and the change to eighteen year olds were they were subject to the juvenile court except for certain that these exceptions that changed  a seventeen year old that wasn't subject to the act it your position basically is that it really has no application at all for ok now in this case if you rely on there's a statement about the general rule and the exception but there's no citation to any authority offer you where there yes so what does that mean that you cite any authority for the rule and the exception you know i decided to  that and then in your brief you don't really cite any authority not that there isn't authority i'm just saying that the opinion doesn't refer to it and then your brief doesn't refer to this concept about when we have the general rule he's after twenty sixteen any seventeen year old that committed armed robbery would no longer be subject to the except the general rule applies now to any one of the seventeen if they commit an armed robbery they will not go to adult court is that right i've always thought i'm just i just had some pressures not this idea about an exception because the exception doesn't apply right now at all to this particular individual and i think we would agree on make sure if you're honest about it could also address the arguments in five best one third shift out there suggesting that the language that's used in this particular statute this isn't really clear in terms of indicating what you say is the legislative intent or prospect of a nation only if you have a statement from the legislature indicating a retroactive or perspective intent you don't get to section four of the statute on statute so the procedural versus substantive part of it simply doesn't come into play i do any cases to cure where where there's the idea that in sentencing or anything if there's a strong public policy that has been has come about that at the if the case is still on brought up i believe it's a case cannot remember the name of but i believe it's from the one nine hundred seventy s and it was a similar case and they did find a major public policy shift and they did apply it to retro right which cases pending on a over three years ago over three years ago they changed the age for individual subject to the juvenile morning from seventeen to eighteen now that's we're going three years entering with a firearm they changed it from it was fifteen before and now they've said if you're sixteen you can automatically go but anyone under sixteen now is not going to go to adult  sentencing statute that says that if you're eighteen when you commit a crime at the time of sentencing the court shall consider the following and then in addition the court has the power not to impose a mandatory add on to someone who is under eighteen i'm known as the caters of a strong public policy shift it's been going on for three years now it might indicate that the legislature has this enormous policy shift that should apply to cases that are pending on a certain way and you know obviously council will bring up the roper versus that you know what sometimes it is unfair that some people never of the court says it's a new leader to changes those softening changes of the law but some people end up on one side some people wind up on the other but it's not a violation of rational basis or equal protection and it's not right for the legislature to do this there is a rational basis and a reason for doing it that way because there's other considerations other than  it has nothing in it to say to prove or under what circumstances the discretion of thought so first circuit court judge applying subsection b you have been mandatory that permits the big i don't know the number it's that was drew the armed robbery is a mandatory transfer your i q that that stand should was retroactive did you not correct you would have to grab relief on both issues in order for for our client to get a discretionary transfer hearing well if we if we agree with your equal protection argument that there be any reason to consider your other would mean that he's potentially subject to automatic transfer on the basis of the nature of the offense which then changed well i thought it was a separate argument it's if there's if there is no equal protection argument that's viable it was my understanding from reading your i'm putting brain not beat response here to this petition for a hearing that the statute was retroactive because it had me removed i'm dropping the automatic transfers and did that since a case was pending on appeal that the the act itself would apply retroactive related are well that that it is i'm just looking for an explanation why don't you then tell us why the equal protection argument is something that you think is viable here right olds more harshly than younger children aisles we didn't say that in the order it did we didn't say no based on violation of any equal protection argument did we no no i'm suggesting that there's another problem a constitutional dependency equal protection equal protection rights but the purpose of the sales clause is to provide practical guidance as to who subject to the amendment to do so in a manner that avoids confusion and preserves judicial resources so in that context illinois supreme court said sure the statutes have to begin somewhere and that was a practical way to do it but the same practical considerations have no bearing on the distinction at issue in this case is what is well the legislature made a value judgment bed seventeen year olds chaifetz felony and should be treated as adults no matter what bad bad judgment can no longer be considered rational in light of the scientific and sociological discretion when the kind that doesn't conform to the law so we're through that line at eighteen maybe it should be even higher but certainly seventeen year olds are all of those pieces addressed the young defendant certain protection said couldn't it be argued that when the legislation prior to twenty sixty held the line under seventeen there was a  a basis for that at the time it was generally thought of as the age beyond which other individuals shouldn't be treated as adults no i mean yes i think there's a longstanding history in illinois and is the thinking then between the legislatures ability to determine that even now if a person under eighteen commits a murder when a debate criminal sexual assault or an aggravated battery with a firearm where the person personally discharges the fire what is the rational basis were a legislature deciding that certain offenses are bodies in illinois not all of which really require bringing down the weight of the law on a teenager so that's that's the problem here is it doesn't even distinguish from one severe thing to another  five past one thirty that was in your argument and she really relying on things that really aren't in the record in terms of saying that studies have now shown that individuals under a certain age don't have the at sentencing the court shall consider how how do you how do you contend that that's not an indication of attempt world reach that it's going forward it's in the present te legislature made a conscious choice to make the firearm for patients have a brother reach the bed discretionary act do you have any he says no that it ever would really take in this interpretation that you are years and see how they are done differently and more explicitly and i think like for example the you know the raise the age statute in five deaths one twenty was much queerness spies not being retroactive come upon the procedural basis substantive distinction and i think there's really no good argument to be made here that this man is anything other than procedural under the new provision judges have the discretion now  language at all so and as you noted they are pending before the on ice supreme court but i don't know of any case that would not meet these sections together i just i'm not sure that there's a you would normally read the provisions together yeah but i think you did it depends on the statute right i mean there's a lot of criminal provisions sentencing provisions where the subsections operate comes lately independently whether or not they're efficient on the way an offense could be committed or conditions that support sentencing in certain manner i think the legislature could have made this more clear but the fact is subsection b says nothing about the reach of that provision and we do have a body of law i don't know if it fills that void so until the legislature decides to change it that's that's what i think this court needs to work with and howard is really instructive on that point as far as you know barring any constitutional prohibitions feasibility is the guiding principle when it comes to deciding to reach a procedural amendments and that comes from section four itself which says that the seedings there to shell