two thousand and ten general election as the court is aware this case involves a question of first impression involving the interpretation of section dashed seven to sixty one of the election code as it was amended on january one two thousand and ten pursuant to a public act ninety six that eight or nine specifically the question of the issue in this case where the main issue in this case is whether an established political party is required to file a resolution in order for its designated candidate to fill a general primary bacon see under section seven dash sixty one and for brevity sake i referred to the primary vacancies that are set forth in paragraph nine of section seven dash sixty one as a general primary vacancy in a consolidated primary vacancy as the candidate didn't and her brief the second issue which was an alternative argument is if a resolution and sections ten dash eight through ten dash ten point one of the election code ordinarily in statutory interpretation analysis we start with the plain language of the statute which is obviously the best evidence of the intent of the legislature in this case i think it's important to just briefly touch on a couple past the minutes of seven dash sixty one which highlight and show the significance of the when of when a candidate was nominated and then either died or declined the nomination primary vacancies general primary and consolidated put primary vacancies were not contemplated in the statute at that time in one nine hundred eighty the legislature did provide for primary vacancies to be filled they added a paragraph which is developed in the paragraph nine in the current statute that allows for that allowed for status quo parties to fill vacancies that occurred when nobody was nominated at the primary and then instead of putting specific filing requirements in the primary provision at that time the legislature mandated that these primary be filled in accordance with the requirements of the section effectively linking the primary provision to the already existing mechanisms for filling vacancies which was the resolution and at that time the resolution was the only mechanism for filling vacancies in one thousand nine hundred five the legislature amended paragraph nine and divided the primary provision into two separate provisions one specifically related to consolidate primaries and one specifically related to a general primary vacancies without the language that required  mandated that these primary bacon seize be filled in accordance with the requirements of the section there would have been no way or no no link between paragraph three and no mechanism for which to fill the primary vacancies the statute as i stated before did not contemplate primary vacancies originally it was tacked on by the legislature in one thousand a d in january one on january one two thousand and ten the legislature struck the language in accordance with the requirements of the section from the general primary provision and replace that language with specific filing requirements for the candidate not the established political party excuse me  the the basis for this according to the legislative reports was that the legislature wanted to put these candidates on the same footing as the candidates that had to go through the process of getting circulated nominee titian's filing those nominat titian's and running in the primary so after they struck the language in accordance with the requirements of the section centrally severing all ties from paragraph nine to paragraph three they put in the following language to be read to be complied the designate candidate candidate it states that a general primary vacancy shall be filled only by a person designated by the appropriate committee of the of the political party and only if that designated person not a the only interested participant who can fill the bay can see the resolution is no longer the mechanism for filling the vacancy at this point the case at the elect court level should have been done the the plain language of the statute is evident it's clear it's concise and it's direct unfortunately that that did not happen in both electoral board and the a resolution was required to be filed but in addition to the plainly which is statute there are numerous other reasons why the electoral board in the public court should be reversed first and foremost the state board of elections right before the appellate court heard this case heard two cases that in which they reviewed this specific issue and both of those cases the state board of elections the hearing officer and  for the state board found that a resolution did not need to be filed or should not have been filed and that paragraph three could not applied paragraph nine in addition the state board also finally the state board of elections recognized as a candidate had at on judicial review that it resolution is required to be filed that resolution is required to be accompanied by a statement of candidacy and a statement of economic interest those documents have to be filed with the resolution by the party if it is to be filed then months later paragraph nine requires that those same documents be filed together with the state with the candidates not me petitions so here you have duplicate filings of the same document if we were to believe th it's it's it's just it's unbelievable that the legislature would miss something so blatant so if the a poll court is correct then there is no doubt you will have duplicate filings of these documents which begs the question what happens then i maintain that litigation is going to be significantly increased or could be significantly increased as a result of this for example you would have to objection period one for the initial finally of the statements and one for the second filing of the statements or you'd have one objection period at the end of the when the candidate files or nomination papers if that's the case you'll have a situation as it happened in this and this this case where the candidate went out circulated nominating petitions did everything that was required of her under paragraph nine filed those documents only to find out she never had the authority to do that because the resolution that designated her as the candidate was it was defective it was it was filed late that was the issue that was raised at the electoral board is that if you have to file a resolution and this happened in the fifth district the fifth district and i was born said that a resolution needs to be filed within three days after the date what that the committee takes action to fill the vacancy well we maintain that the resolution doesn't need to be filed at all it's these the specific language of of the resolution filing requirement is the resolution filling the vacancy and it no longer fills the vacancy the legislature made clear that it did not want it to fill the vacancy it wanted to take that power away from the established parties so we maintain that it shouldn't be filed in the first place but if it is filed then then you would run into the problem and it also raises an issue of whether if the first statement of candidacy or statement of economic interest is defective can the candidate remedy the problem and then file that with her nominating petitions one way or another this this these issues will be litigated if the appellate court is not  reversed and i'm sure they will pop up it sometime also there's no no purpose to filing resolution any longer the resolution is as its terms provide a resolution filling vacanc was nowhere in the plain language of the statute does it say that the resolution is now a notice provision it says it's a resolution filling the vacancy and the legislature is obviously aware of the fact that notice does have to be provided to the election authority that this person has the blessing of the elect the established political party to fill the vacancy and they provided for that in paragraph nine they now require or the the statute polk party to provide a notice of appointment to the candidate and the candidate is required to file that document together with the nominating titian's statement of candidacy and statement of economic interest so by following the resolution all you're doing is requiring a meaningless and superfluous document that can create additional litigation and a document that's got to be accepted reviewed and maintained by the election authorities frost state the electoral board found that the resolution was required to be filed only because the language resolution filling the vacancy was still in the statute to them blankly there was not much analysis put into it in the decision doesn't provide recognized that the operative language in the statute is the words in accordance with the requirements of the section or at least it was before january two thousand and ten and the full court recognized that that was specifically removed pursu  to public act nice sixty s eight or nine but the poll court found that it is since it's still in statute in sentence one of paragraph nine that it has to apply to general primary vacancies it's it's hard to understand exactly how they could misunderstand sentence one of paragraph nine as it states that is specifically addressing consolidated primary bacon sees there was a sentence the first sentence paragraph nine said if consolidate primary big c occurs you can fill in accordance with requirements the section sentence to was the general primary which mirrored that that first sentence th legislature remove that language from the second sentence and left it in the second and first sentence which is the consolidated primary if they can see the reason for this is because the resolution is still the mechanism for filling consolidated primary and once again that's hard to understand because it's not meaningless it applies to consolidated primary vacancies surely when the legislature says something applies to the consolidated election cycle it doesn't apply to the general election cycle i don't think i understand your question i'm sorry  that's what the appellate court found they said that all of the requirements of section seven that sixty one no matter where they're found or how they're limited by explicit language they apply to all the vacancies and nomination and according to the public court election cycle they would say that it applies only this election cycle well that's exactly what they the legislature did here and so the fifth district i think got away from its the decision of not born had it applied the analysing analysis i think they would have arrived at a different conclusion the other point is that the fifth district didn't work through what effect this would have on different vacancies so the poll court said well the consolidated primary requirement applies to the general primary requirement ok that's fair enough that works in this case but the converse must be true as well and that is that the general primary now applies to consolidate primary so in order to fill a consolidated primary vacancy under the apoel court's interpretation of statute you candidate the designated candidate would have to file nominating titian's within seventy five days of the general primary but it doesn't make in addition to the resolution finally a requirement this appeal as i stated earlier also involves when an appeal or when a objection should be filed court found that objection should be filed five days after five business days after the last day for filing nomination papers that's not what the statute says the statute adopts the rules of political the nomination papers and instead of applying the rules to the resignation resolution that apply to nomination papers the pellet court applied the rule to a number to the nomination papers filed under the under section seven that sixty one and then use that date so instead of applying it directly to the date of the resolution they applied it to the nomination papers and then use that date for  resolutions but the statute plainly states that if you're going to object to a resolution or any document under section some nationality one you need to file that objection within five business days after the date that last date that document could then file and that is it related to an axiom of statutory construction and that's that this court must construe the statute as a whole with what's been commonly referred to in the appellate court's order and in this argument the third on the as the third are numbered paragraph of section seven deaths sixty one in sept third a number paragraph that contains the resolution filing requirement it states that the resolution must be filed by the party that section seven there sixty one paragraph four states that in them of any resolution quotes will include upon its face and goes on to say the name of the original nominee and then paragraph three states that the failure to properly file a nominating resolution again quote still authorize the certifying officer in the board to certify the original candidate who is the original candidate mysteries well in this case there was a vacancy because there had not  a candidate and i don't think that there is a dispute either with the three appellate decisions that were cited by the appellate court or in in the petition or appellants own brief that that resolution of failure to file that does been construed previously by the appellate court and has been conceded in being both briefs in this case that doesn't fact apply to circumstances where there wasn't a general primary candidate and there by the by   the first and second sentence of paragraph three that says any bay can see a nomination and the second sentence please at the same way and that is the provision that is operative here because that is the paragraph that contains the resolution filing requirement now it is true that it was subsequently amended to include general primary they can seize it and consolidated primary vacancies but that language was left in by the appellate court both in the in the really in all the present at all the amendments that have been discussed already today both going from the eighty's all the way to the two thousand and ten amendment and of course the case law from this court indicates that the that the legislature is presumed to know what's in there and know how case law has interpreted it and they could change it if they see fit and they did not do so in this case again paragraph three which is the filing requirement refers to any vacancy a nomination which means all vacancies and nominations it doesn't mean certain vacancies a nomination so it's the responded to pelleas position that based upon that plain language and reading the statute as a whole filing requirement would apply to anything you can see we're going to say whether or not it's a vacancy caused by death or somebody declining the nomination or they're simply not being a nomination at to help me it's piers that even though this one statute and we all know that's not numbered the first section seems to be dealing with the kinds of vacancies where the candidate who was listed is no longer going to be candidate but from n nine itself is talking about when there's been no candidate with god why is that not a fair reading because a paragraph eight your honor it does end with provided the nominations may become vacant for other reasons and i think that what the legislature did later in the in amending this was it recognized two specific reasons but it did apply the resolution requirements on the political party by using the words in accordance with the section no it was removed because that what they did was they put specific requirements on the candidate in addition to what is already required in a number paragraph three he what they did here in the b i think the the  correctly noted that the amendment did not change the requirements for the political party it only changed the qualification of the candidate in a what it's what it's again that remains that political party requirement filing the resolution remains what i call the initial requirement it's an initial requirement showing the general primary vacancy what they did was they added a second part to that process and of course to the extent that this is deemed a big u s language there's an explanation in the legislative debate for that but it provides what is an additional requirement on the candidate to ensure that the candidate satisfy certain requirements similar to what a somebody who had run in the primary would have satisfied just to clarify using something you said earlier about our case law isn't there there's been none that you're aware of since january one of two thousand  is that correct that's correct your honor and on the second question following up on justice tice she was citing from what's in the number paragraph nine very solid here primary but really we're here on a general primary bal specifically directed ad general primary election when no name appeared on the ballot at any time and look at that's as opposed to the other sections your honor it's responding to  police position that you must construe the section as a whole this isn't a circumstance where you're referring back to another section within the within the election code try our statute of limitations circumstance where you're playing two separate sections this is the same section and reading it as a whole going back to the filing requirement again it says any vacancy not certain vacancies that doesn't identify some vacancies for the following requirement it makes reference specifically to any which which i would provision and the reason is what the it was as was indicated in legislative debates what the legislature was trying to implement was a circumstance where somebody would not only have to be appointed by the political party but they would also have to satisfy the same signature requirements as they themselves or any other candidate who went through the normal primary process prior to a vacancy as they had done and what that does is it provides notice because you need public notice to know who is the appointed person to properly circulate the nominating petitions because as a voter a registered voter were allowed to sign one primary petition if we sign more than one we invalidate our signatures so i think in fairness to the general public that's going to be signing these the registered voters in the general public is go be signing these petitions they have a right to know who is the appointed individual and of course who is not because otherwise what would happen is if the decision isn't made in advance you could conceivably have multiple candidates vying for a vacancy circulate the petitions and then go to the park go to the political party and then they would have a choice to make and again if you if i would refer you to the portions of the legislative debate cited what representative fortner said which is which is very telling is that the only change this bill would make is to say that if they wish to so fill it that person still must get signatures like the party would have would have had to get to qualify the candidate before the primary that's the only change or two of the filing requirements then filing within three days and then filing the notice again within seventy five days along with the  signatures yes there's a there's a references to different documents or on a reference as a a resolution that is filed within three days which did not happen in this case it was filed late and that's that's conceded and then there was a noticeable point to file and that's that is what is filed after the end of the seventy five days that completes the process for filling this general primary vacancy and again to the extent that this language is deemed  ambiguous by this court i would point out that i thought i believe the most compelling extrinsic evidence even more so than the legislative debate on this section is the fact that in this case the petitioner appell filed a resolution the petitioner appellant attempted to comply with a number of paragraph three however she did so late she did so after five days instead of three days and again warranted removal from the ballot section seven dash sixty one initially requires the county central committee political party to file its resolution with the election authority within three days the appointment of a nominee and then at that point the candidate is then required to go out and get the signatures and file a statement of candidacy along with a nominee petitions a noticeable climate in the statement of economic interest within seventy five days of the general primary so the completion of that process is what gets me to the second issue in this case and that's the issue regarding the timeliness of the objection sexual seven to sixty nine specifically adopts the objection procedures and section eight and section ten dash template one relating to the objections to nomination papers and again under that process it's the filing of the resolution then the later filing of the petitions along with the other nomination papers in this case the general primary was held on february second two thousand and ten under section seven to sixty  business days or until monday april twenty sixth to file her objection seven days after the last filing for the nomination papers since again the fifth the six days fell on saturday and sunday in this case that is the exact day within five business days of the of the last day to look for the candidate to complete her process one other issue i wanted to touch on was the initial issue i raised related to the  reserve that issue because there has not been a change in the in the section seven s sixty run as was indicated but if there is i would like to reserve that opportunity to raise that with the scored understanding this horse determination evidence exception and the sickest matter if there is no further questions i would like to say that i thank you for your time today and i would respectfully request on behalf of the  i'd like to respond to the argument with regard to section ten dash eight and when objections need to be filed through the resolutions as recognized by the objector  court found that you calculate the days the objection period for resolutions by county off five business days from the date that nomination papers were filed and that's the deadline according to tell court my question would be before january one two thousand and ten how were objections filed when no no no nomination to nominee petitions were filed under section seven dash to sixty one does that mean no objection deadlines could be set certainly not it's a mystery interpretation of the statute and that's and that's evidence of that fact with regard to justice burke i must misunderstood your question is far as i agreed the statute must be read as a whole but that doesn't mean that explicit language is limited in explicit explicitly limiting provisions is  out the window it doesn't mean that legislature can't limit provisions to specific situations such as consolidate primaries or general primaries the cases relied on by the  court none of them presented the issue which is presented by this appeal and that is because the statute was amended giving rise to this appeal the issue here is whether a resolution needs to be file in all the cases cited by the appellate court and referenced by the objector is how is that resolution supposed to be filed within what time period with what with with what requirements but it's not whether the resolution needs to be voters in a particular jurisdiction because they were unaware that that someone did not have the authority to seek their signature on their nomination petitions a resolution is not going to stop that resolution has no power to do any of that they it's impossible to believe that a resident or a voter is going to go to the election authority to check for a resolution before determining whether to section seven nashik see one as the court can see the two first sentences say nothing about the resolution filling the vacancy or when the resolution filling the vacancy should or should not be filed that those two state sentences that begin with the word any that the objector is relying on speak only to those situations where a candidate is nominated and then either dies or declines the nomination and the provision at the end of that  paragraph that states that they provided they could become bacon for other reasons just states that there might be illness there might be another reason why this person is is or is not running but that language is in this in the statute prior to the addition of the primaries vacancy so there's no need if that is addressing primaries that that provided statute so if we were you with your position we're literally left with their what resolution well that was what what would what would happen would be that in the general primary vacancy there would be no resolution file and the candidate would be the designated candidate that was designated by the status quo party and given an nos appointment would be the only person that would be able to fill the  we're asking for a future in this case there is there is no relief that this candidate could get she ran she was removed from the ballot her name was not restored and it's long since passed but we believe strongly opposition and we believe that the court is not only bad law on this particular issue but it's going to cause a plethora of problems with the administration of section seven actually fifty one so given the plain language and the practical facts of the amendment of section seven that sixty one we believe that requiring the resolution is just another impediment to ballot access and another way voters can be disenfranchised and subjected to contested elections therefore we request that the this court reversed the appellate court and the electoral one thank you thank you counsel case number one eleven to fifty