and trade we certainly welcome our witnesses this morning and also welcome members of the public for joining us at this important hearing and  on the subcommittee on terrorism nonproliferation and trade four months north korea has taken a series of actions that are as provocative as any we have seen in decades how we respond to those actions is the subject of today's hearing as we meet this morning republic of korea alliance remain just strong and vital as ever stability and prosperity in northeast asia and beyond the president's visit also reconfirm our two countries longstanding commitment to working as closely as possible with one another along with our other allies and partners in dealing with pyongyang increasing actions that is definitely causing a lot of tension in the korean peninsula when viewed in the context of the past twenty years these recent north korean actions have come into unusually rapid succession just before our last hearing on january th career suspended another fight all major winter korean agreements including the armistice which is maintained peace between north and south korea since one nine hundred fifty three on march nineteenth pyong arrested two american journalists laura ling and euna lee were working near the border between china and north korea the un young then sentence them to twelve years in prison labor camps for what they referred to as grave crimes on april fifth defying appeals by the international community and issues of un resolutions north can korea launch a long range missile the united nations security council responded by issuing a presidential statement of condemnation citing that statement beyond promptly announced its withdrawal from the six party talks a day later north korea expelled inspectors from the young nuclear facility and by the end of april north korea declared that it would once again produce plutonium and weaponize all of its fissile material a month later north korea raised the stakes even higher by conducting second nuclear test by the next day on the ng fired three short range missiles last friday the security council responded to north activities and to widen the man on the country's arms exports and imports in addition the resolution called on the united nations member states to inspect and destroy all cargo to and from north korea tough regime hopefully with teeth that will bite over the weekend north korea countered by stating that it would regard an attempted blockade of any kind by the united states and its followers as an act of war and met with a decisive military response the threats posed by north korea are clear the onions actions have raised tensions in northeast asia and cause countries in the region to reconsider their current military strategic interests in that area of the world japan for example is contemplating in the increase in his defense spending and for the first time taking a serious look at developing an attack capability such capability and other steps that may be comp contemplated could well lead to an arms race in northeast asia there is even discussion in some circles of japan to also have nuclear capabilities which can easily be achieved with his current technological advancements in addition north korea's advances missile and nuclear weapons technology and in the production of fish on materials also increases the potential for  other states in the region while the threats posed by north korea's actions are clear the reasons underlying them are less apparent you have something of a consensus among close observers of north korea as for regarding to the likely motivations first north korea appears to be seeking advances in its nuclear weapons capability and delivery systems capable to demonstrate their effectiveness by its missile program the country appears to be in the midst of a political transition making john eales health problem that apparently led him to designate these twenty six year old son kim jong un as successor given a need to maintain support among the armed forces during this transition president kim jong il may be trying to satisfy the military's desire to test and improve its weapons system the threats posed by north korea are gr and we must address them how we do it is the focus of today's hearing another question raised here is whether there is still relevance of the six party talks that was initiated by the bush administration and another question that comes to mind is how important is china's role in all this and what options does the united states have now in the current crisis fortunately our bilateral relationship is a strong as ever social cultural economic security and diplomatically with south korea are two great countries share values and interests and millions of our citizens share family and personal ties recently the us strengthen these bonds by including south korea and its free so waiver program our trade relationship is just as strong currently our trade with south korea ranks seventh in the world on the security front the bonds we forge in blood during the korean war will never be forgotten especially when some thirty three thousand of our soldiers died during the korean war fighting for the freedom of our brothers and sisters in south korea south korea to a nato plus three member state within the us foreign military sales program i believe reflects our growing security cooperation and now with president visit to washington our two countries have once again reaffirm our unconditional and commitment to the bilateral alliance as we face the challenge of north korea we know that we can count on our friends and souls and they know that they can count on us it is  together we can bring beyond the end back to the negotiating table and that we can make real progress in reducing the security threats it poses in the korean peninsula i remain optimistic that the unified position of the security council in passing resolution one eighty seven four offers us a chance of that occurring and it is my hope that today's hearing shed some light on how we can address seemingly intractable problems posed by north korea and the important problem ever still being debated live is the issue of nonproliferation and the very reason why we have this joint committee with my good friend chairman of the subcommittee on terrorism and nonproliferation and trade gentleman from california mr brad sherman and i will now turn the time for him for his opening statement six they also have conducted a barrage of missile tests in the first half of this year now conflict on the korean peninsula is a distinct possibility and the fact that north korea might have nuclear does have nuclear weapons makes that more dangerous possibility but we should also focus on the fact that this is a regime with a criminal lost for funds they have counterfeit currency they've dealt drugs and my concern among others is that north korea will keep the first fifteen  nuclear weapons for itself and put the sixteenth on e bay north korea breton's the heart of the nonproliferation regime because like iran north korea is a signatory to the nonproliferation agreement if north korea is allowed to become and remain a nuclear state what will japan and south korea do and what implications does the general increase of nuclear states have for the nonproliferation regime worldwide today subcommittee hearing seek to examine the policy options for the united states reflect on how we got here six party talks began in temporary success in february two thousand and seven agreed north korea agreed to disable its key nuclear facilities in exchange for food energy and other benefits in july two thousand and seven the north shut down the  reactor and made a big television event of its destruction in the midst of this progress came an inconvenient fact through late two thousand seven early two thousand and eight we'd been told by the bush administration the u s government would remove the designation of north korea as a state sponsor of terrorism in return for what then assistant secretary chris hill promised would be a complete and correct declaration of north korea's nuclear activities he told the congress in february two thousand and eight this declaration must include all nuclear weapons programs materials facilities including clarification of any proliferation activities  the democratic people's republic of korea north korea must also address concerns related to any uranium enrichment programs and activities the declaration was received last june more than six months late it was extremely  incomplete it said nothing about north korea's proliferation in spite of what we've seen in syria it said nothing about uranium enrichment and probably understated the amount of found specks of highly enriched uranium on the papers virtual proof that north korea not only has the plutonium program at yongbyon but also a clandestine program to enrich uranium needless to say this was not a good time or a time that justified removing north korea from the terrorism list so in response to the bush administration notification i introduced  r sixty four twenty with six bipartisan co sponsors to block removing north korea from the terrorism list i was assured by then secretary rice that we would get an equal in to information through the verification regime that we had been promised as part of the declaration well it's clear we did not get that and it is clear that the removal of north korea from the terrorism list was somewhere between mistaken and premature but we can continue to dance around with north korea the fact is they well understand the situation that situation is they can do what they're doing and get away with it not only in the area of nuclear activities but  they can probably resume the counterfeiting as well the reason for this is simple they are getting subsidies from china not because china loves their regime but because china finds that the most convenient thing for china to do and given the overwhelming political power of the importers in this country we can't do the obvious which is to hint to china that their continued access to u s market requires a change in their north korea policy so china will basically continue its policy yes we have something past the un watered down as it is it poses no threat to the north korean he has to change its policy toward north korea or risk access to the us market or at least some interruption of that access or less china believes that its policy toward north korea is going to lead to a nuclear south korea nuclear japan or a nuclear taiwan unless china has that game changing information they're simply not going to change their policies and when we look at our trade policy toward china we not only have a disaster for the american manufacturing industry we also have a disaster for our foreign policy and given the enormous profits that are to be made by continuing the status certainly look forward to the testimony from our panel i wish the administration had agreed to testify today this is a very important issue that we're struggling with this is the second hearing that this committee  last north korean policy which has always been pretty aggressive has gone into overdrive we've had a long range missile test a nuclear test uranium enrichment we've we're going to continue to see china subsidize north korea this week in comments by south korean president lee move by to the wall street journal are worth noti president lee who we met with yesterday said that the six party talks are working and need to be changed defense secretary gates has said he is tired of never compromise u n resolution aside the u s should deploy our own measures to undercut north korea's economy and target its proliferation activities i can think of no more effective us but if we recall what happened then when treasury was able to convince the administration to deploy that strategy banks across asia refused to do business with kim jong il and as a result he was unable to pay his generals and he got very very antsy about that the only time i've really seen his attitude change from one of constant aggression and frankly we're at a standstill for north korea and that's until sanctions were dropped in the naive belief that north korea would bargain away its nuclear program if we're serious about a nuclear free korean peninsula the effort should replicated that we deployed then successfully a former u s official who spearheaded this sanctions effort called the b d a the bank the tip of the iceberg with respect to north korea's illicit activities indeed news reports indicate that south korea has given the united states information between ten and twenty north korean bank accounts in china one of these are in switzerland and that north korean counterfeiting has been ramped up in recent months we needed to act on these accounts yesterday north korean proliferation to the middle east certainly heightened concern cooperation with states such as iran and syria is very very well documented last august india responded to a u s request and block  last line missile defense the last line that ability to intercept and that has been slashed by the obama administration well pentagon officials testified before the senate yesterday that north korea's missiles could hit the u s in three years house democrats rejected efforts to restore missile defense cuts in the armed services committee north korea in the midst of a leadership struggle has dropped the pretense of being willing to negotiate away nucular program to enter we recognize this and focus in with a renewed effort to box out north korea from the international financial system which frankly is very effective because their money is worthless they need hard currency i've talked to defectors who shared with me that they were able to continue the missile programs at times when the hard currency  crunch was put on north korea why because they couldn't buy those clandestine gyroscopes that were made in japan that they were trying to buy in the black market in order to continue their missile line so you shut everything down when you shut down the hard currency box out north korea from the international financial system along with these other measures the sooner we do that the better because that's going to give us a chance not only to slow down their program but playing a game in which the hard currency that we put into the country or even the food aid which exchange on the boat exchange where it's sold for hard currency for the regime have the countries a no go area where the food is not delivered and the food that is delivered the monitors some of that goes to the army really time to timely hearing there certainly is no more pressing issue for the security of our nation and indeed the world than north korea's reckless pursuit and what me most about this very serious situation is that i feel we may have very well lost whatever momentum we had in dealing with this crisis the six party talks have stalled certainly bilateral negotiations have proven equally we're dealing with a relatively  person in leadership who has recently had a stroke we do not know what his physical and mental capacities are if something happens to him there will be a collective leadership in place which we have very little information about there are question marks about him a nd whether his are at this point ready so what mechanisms do we have left for dealing with this  there is no limit to what a government will do when it ceases to care about its people that's what is happening in north korea and certainly  regime has no regard for the health and well being of its people so clearly what we guard does we have for you in good faith on this issue sort of reminds me very much of an old peanuts comic strip lucy would ply the affable yet gullible charlie brown and a running  had to kick a football and then wouldn't yank the football out from under him at the last minute leaving him flying through the air to land with a heavy and of course we are the charlie brown in this scenario so i wonder how many times do we have to fall on our rear end before we stop running to kick this football how long until we began to explore options outside of the six party talks are we already doing that and are they working it would seem and can we ever trust north korea to say what it means and do what it says i doubt it very seriously as long as and here is my major point to this dilemma with north korea does not lie with either the obama administration or congress it lies with china and russia they must become more forceful with north korea in order to convince them to give up their pursuit of nuclear weapons it is china that whatever its china china is their benefactor not china and russia see north korea as a threat where we begin will begin to unravel the situation they hold the key they hold the trump cards in this drama to be able to stop north korea and i'm certainly pleased that we were finally able to have china and russia join us in approving more strict u n sanctions that is a good sign that the road i think that we have to travel and it seems that russia and china are finally starting to realize that indeed north korea poses a threat to them as well as us and the rest of the western world the question is this when north korea tests our will to enforce these increased sanctions as they most assuredly will are china and russia in a position to give north korea the toughness maybe we should say the tough love that it really needs or will they cave to pressure and so we need to find out what that pressure is undoubtedly this is a complex issue and solving this crisis of a car a great deal of creative thinking on every one's part but try we must the safety of the world and this planet rests with what we do concerning north korea  the gentleman from georgia for his statement and i would like to turn the time over to the ranking member of our subcommittee on the gentleman from illinois for its opening statement thank you mr chairman for calling this very important here and i want to commend that in the work of investor in trying to juggle all these balls at one time a third tier i want to have you come sit here as well as you know press the talk button you can come there's about twelve seats right in the third tier you can come in and sit there specially if you're inclined to come and sit in them so you won't have to well this morning i certainly would like to offer my personal welcome to our distinguished guests members of the panels that we've invited to testify in our hearing this morning and  would like to just share with the members of both subcommittees the distinguished records of scholarship and and their experience that they've given and i think their sense of expertise fits right into the picture in terms of what we're trying to deliberate on this morning the first gentleman that i want to introduce is mr selig harrison a senior scholar of the woodrow wilson international center for scholars and currently the director of the is your program or the center for international policy yes specialize solved asian east asia for some fifty eight years as a journalist and scholar and is the author of five books and probably several hundred articles and periodicals  india and pakistan and predicted right according to to what was that what happened in that area of the world he also predicted that russia would invade afghanistan and that's exactly what happened  and predicted also that russia would not be able to take control of afghanistan and that also happened but i am very very happy and pleased that mr harrison has been able to give us the benefit of his time to  join us at this hearing this morning mr ambassador thomasz hubbard i'm sorry is a senior director of the mclarty associates in washington where he specializes in asian affairs former as a former peninsula dr richard bush currently a visiting professor at cornell university on china in the asian pacific studies program was previously also director of the center for northeast asia policy good friend former congressman steve solarz from from new york i hope i haven't forgotten anybody here did i miss anybody gentlemen i do want to thank you for taking the time from your busy schedule and coming and sharing with us some of the issues that i've been raising with the opening comments statements again the question is north korea's nuclear missile test and the six party talks where do we go from when jimmy carter went to pyongyang with the grudging consent of the clinton administration carter negotiated an agreement with kim il sung that headed off to war and pave the way for the suspension of the north korean nuclear weapons program for the next eight years now we urgently need another high level unofficial emissary but the obama administration is not even prepared to give grudging consent process pave the way for a reduction of tensions as members of this committee may know al gore met hillary clinton on eleven eleven asked for the cooperation of the administration in facilitating a mission to pyongyang and empowering him to succeed in such a mission by exploring with him ways in which the present stalemate in relations between north korea and the united states can be broke matter must be kept separate from the political and security issues between the two countries in a news hour interview with u n ambassador susan rice in june tenth margaret warner asked how the latest u quote cannot be allowed to complicate our efforts to hold north korea accountable for its nuclear and missile tests i believe this is a very unrealistic position it shows a callous disregard for the welfare of laura ling and euna lee it ignores the danger of a war resulting from the administration's attempt to pressure north korea into abandonment of its nuclear and missile programs past experience with north korea has repeatedly shown that pressure invariably provokes torrie response that makes matters worse the administration should instead actively pursue the release of the two women through intervention in their behalf by a high level unofficial emissary empowered to signal u s readiness for trade offs leading to the reduction of tensions such as the provision of the two hundred thousand tonnes of that had been promised to north korea but had not been provided when the six party talks broke off last fall one third of the energy promised in return for the united states should be kept the north korean nuclear arsenal at its existing level and to move toward normalized relations as the necessary precondition for progress toward eventual denuclearization now gentleman from california i believe said that capping as a nonstarter that may be but it's the only way the only way we're going to get anywhere and it's very important to keep the option of capping as our major diplomatic prospects for capping the arsenal at its present level of improved as a result of thirteenth announcement inspection safeguards limiting enrichment to the levels necessary for civilian until now north korea's denial of an r and d program has kept the uranium issue of require us steps to assure north korea that it will not be the victim of a nuclear attack in article three section one of the agreed framework option of using nuclear weapons against north korea it will be no to live with a nuclear north korea while maintaining adequate u s forces in the new direction in u s relations with the muslim world in cairo knowledge the legacy of colonialism in the middle east knowledge of the impact of the israeli occupation on the palestinians and the u s role in overthrowing the elected  by promoting the collapse of the north korean regime above all he should express empathy with the painful memories of japanese colonialism shared by all korea state hillary because younger generals with no experience of the outside world are now strong position in the north korean leadership following kim jong il  thousand and two and they have a lot of others in the regime and realistic assessment of north korea's capabilities in the event of a conflict with  international atomic energy agency inspections in one thousand nine hundred three sixteen years later we know that they have substantially more they have conducted two underground nuclear explosions and have tested a range of ballistic missiles that deterrent and maintain that they are willing to return to the negotiating table only if their status as a nuclear weapons state is recognized in the wake of north korea second nuclear test nations in the world but we must assume that regime survival is kim jong il's most fundamental objective and the united states and its alliance with south korea as a primary threat negotiations in which we would offer security assurances and financial aid in exchange for north korean promises to give up its nuclear program that was probably a correct assessment until recently and remains one of the important aims at the outset of the new administration however i believe we have entered into a new situation in which the leadership is motivated as much by domestic factors as by an interest in manipulating the united states leadership transition is one factor having suffered a debilitating stroke at the age of sixty see his nuclear missile programs less as a bargaining chip than as his best security option a legacy of his leadership that will ensure the survival of the successor regime and give the continuing voice and world  suffering of people by failing to avail itself of the benefits are offered in the six party talks the bush administration and then by rejecting the hand that was extended by the obama administration the d p r k leadership has gone out efforts to change would be deeply alarming to some of our close allies and could well lead to a regional war recognizing that quick success is unlikely we need to vigorously pursue a proactive policy condemning north korea's behavior in no uncertain terms and calling for concrete steps to address if the north koreans continue to deny the international community pressure is our only option and it is crucial that the measures called for in the security council resolution carefully implemented at the same time we should leave open a path to dialogue as president obama has done since the parties in that process to live up to their international commitments in terms of implementation of the u n security council resolution provides an umbrella under which concerned parties may conduct initiative however there is a concern that if the north koreans decide that they have no way out that they might lash out and for this reason i believe it is important for the administration to continuously  talked about that and i'd like to get your your thoughts on the level of the right now how how can that be used what is that korea having said of course keeping its nuclear weapons several security challenges for china number one it doesn't rule out the possibility that those missiles or nuclear weapons could be pointed to china  areas that i think will be built up our missile defense and that's a problem for china because one of its major ways of projecting power are ballistic missiles  korea i think that there is the opportunity incrementally to bring them along more robust sanctions more seriously implemented conclusion how did you come to that conclusion i did not refer to an aggressive act toward japan what i said was that if as a result of the attempts to implement the un sanctions and force north korean ships into port using our influence to get countries to let us board the ships we end up in a cycle of escalation that i think north korea's retaliation in this situation would be to attack japan or u s bases in japan not south korea i think the danger of a war on the peninsula is small  these days in north korea or more manifest in north korea than in south korea under its present leadership and the national nationalistic younger generals who have come to the fore during recent into detail about that when kim jong il apologized to prime minister koizumi in two thousand and two this was a very sensitive matter inside north korea was not this was regarded as  very unfortunate by many of the nationalistic younger generals and other generals and others and north korea's kim jong il found himself criticized in internal meetings in north korea  japan is the hot button issue japanese failure to support to provide two hundred thousand tons of oil that they were supposed to provide in the last phases of the six party talks is what let one of the things that led to the hardening of the north korean position and the strengthening empowerment if you will of the hardliners in the leadership so this is history japanese colonialism  maybe it was just that because treasury don't you know they don't take kindly to counterfeiting of hundred dollar bills but but there's something about their enthusiasm there with which they went at shutting down the hard currency sanctioning the bank cutting off the access to the regime not shared i think by a lot of people who look at the situation in north korea and so at least by our witnesses here so my question is why not follow the route the treasury is always trying to get the state department to deploy why not go with with what they felt worked why not cut off access to that i've been in macau and i've i've seen the hundred dollar bills that come in from north korea and i've seen the indication the you know in terms of the effort they went to in terms of purchasing the and the rest of it and secondarily the that when we acted on it we did get immediate results and that the thing that interests me most i mean we talk about getting kim jong il back to the six party talks the only thing i ever saw that got him to the top was when we had his attention because he didn't have access to the hard currency and all the sudden it was look get the state department to lift this and i'll be i'll be back at the t so i can think of one thing that actually worked during all and i you know i went along with the ninety four framework agreement and i know your role in all of that i appreciate all of the good attempts to try to get north korea to the bargaining table but every single time that i thought that things were going swimmingly that i've thought things were going well i come to find afterwards that thereby building a reactor in syria and  tapping the north korean nuclear arsenal at its present level which i believe they are prepared to negotiate is much better than letting them go on and large in it and it seems of dominance is what i think would be a strengthened position with the many more moderate elements in the leadership that are now on the defensive internally given the past activity what makes you think the program could be kept and i'd ask you this and ambassador hubbard too in terms of capping how given that that would be dependent upon some kind of inspection regime and given the fact that north korea resists any inspection regime wouldn't the thought that we were capping be a delusion and wouldn't we run the risk that that the proliferation would still continue to the middle east or where wherever else north korea decides to proliferate we've got a record of their engagement you know from pakistan to to iran you know to to syria inspections then but maybe in north korea but but what it what about the reactor that was being built in the middle of the six party talks in syria or do we do we question whether that was happening or not because it seems to  all of us on the panel we believe that that happened the hard evidence we've seen indicates that that's exactly what they were doing congressman royce i think the record of north korean behavior over the last six months indicates that they're not interested in the negotiated solution whatever incentives we offer i said in my statement that i believe the obama administration implemented sanctions in a robust way those include financial sanctions so i think your friends the treasury will have a lot to do our subcommittee on terrorism this very crucial vital and hopefully productive hearing i would like to  start by pleading and demanding for the release of two political prisoners misleading mislaying these are not the words of her family members who have been gracious respectful of this process and have been great americans but i think it is time now for those of us who have attempted to walk on eggs to call the abuse of process the ludicrous this of the indictment or the offense is what they are ridiculous outrageous and clearly not a part of the community of world nations north korea should be called what it is shameful is laying and miss le have no argument no conflict with north korea or her people if there was a violation in small measure of a boundary line we apologize our family has apologized my understanding is that ms lee i miss laying are not trained in the technology a borderline they happen not to be experts on the fine points of a line drawn without presence and visibility so if any of the people of north korea listening then take mercy on individuals who are innocent and release them now  hesitant conversation is of no value and i believe that this is not an issue of war but it is an issue of strong persistent demand that these two individuals these women and family members need to be released i believe that we should separate the two and i want to pose my questions along the line i saw mr harrison that you had  well conversations that i had in june of one thousand nine hundred four led a week later to president jimmy carter negotiating what he balled into the so called agreed framework of october d didn't like that agreement felt that it was too soft on north korea that was involved giving things to north korea in return for a suspension of its nuclear program that we had a vice president gore encouraged to go to north korea by russian and that they cooperate with him and facilitating the visit and empowering him to carry on so meaningful discussions while his while h person prisoner was equivalent to a hostage situation and that was incompatible with a close relationship with i think that argument worked then because as i said in my testimony the north koreans wanted a close was not too long ago where i very high level of food person from the u n was there and i made the statement that the north koreans were about ten inches shorter than they should be because of malnutrition  i was with another individual that's very familiar in north korea that said that currently in some areas that they actually practice countless that that is you know you have problems burying your loved ones for really does seem very very difficult and i think some of the solutions that i've heard in the past and hearing again you know it's not like we're dealing with rational people mr harrison you critique of the fact that we're in the situation that we're here you know with with our present problems based on the bush administration i really think you simplistic it best i think there's a tremendous amount of factors going on and again to blow it off that white like i say is simplistic can you all comment in that regard you know this far is the fact that we've got a situation where we've got a leadership that is willing to put their people through this and then again to try and negotiate with a regime like this how do you do that how do you how do you doing good sites and really know at all how they're thinking how they're going to react to whatever i know it's a very broad question  simplistic to say that there are other factors that contribute to the immediate situation we face right now certainly the altered internal balance of forces in north korea in which the hardline generals have become much more powerful since the illness of kim jong il certainly in my view the main reason for the immediate tactics that north korea has been pursuing but i don't think it's simplistic to say that the abrogation of the agreed framework which had suspended nuclear weapons production for eight years is what set in motion the train of events that has taken us to where we are  the north koreans willingness to share their nuclear secrets or whatever it is not just happened over the last eight years i just don't believe that  very rapidly right now although my hope and prayer and my efforts are that we need to we need to work together to get this done again and i don't mean to be picking on you but but i just don't see that those kind of comments washington visit to north korea personally eleven times kind of gives me a little basis of asking for your sense of of understanding an oily the nature of how north korean officials as well as the people  react to that given situation that we're faced with now i think your comments are very well taken it seems to me that what's hard for americans to accept since we think we're the good guys and other people are often the bad guys is that north korea is afraid of us and i don't know that i am and i think that within north korea there are different elements in the leadership some of which are more rational in assessing whether we really are a threat to them or not but as a as a collectivity the north korean leadership and the people believe that they are threatened by the american nuclear weapons that's around them in the pacific and the fact that we took out our tactical nuclear weapons from south korea has ended that perception so what do you get i think when you go there can't get it don't go there a lot is the fact that this is real this is not a contrived posture and therefore they have moved steadily as the nationalistic younger generals i' emphasized have moved into more positions internally into the belief that they have to have a nuclear weapons capability and therefore i think you're right that as a fact now and that same time they haven't agreements in which they phase out their nuclear weapons if we are prepared to give up the right of nuclear first which we won't give up if we are prepared to carry out an article three section one of the great framework in conjunction with the nuclearization i don't think it's an impossible dream but you're right we face the fact right now we've got to live with that and that's why i think capping is real a real security objective of the united states the commitment or the allegations that was made by the bush administration was that north korea cheated and i want to ask the members of did they really because i seem to get achievement what it didn't adequately cover did not give us verify whether they were working on other nuclear programs somewhere else and that's where the suspicion tell congress they are doing a great job like to just get down to the economic realities of north korea and i don't know which of you will have the answers to this but can any of you tell me what is the total value of north korean exports in two thousand and eight two thousand and seven two thousand six exports one point five billion one point five billion but for some reason the rest of the world just didn't trade more than one point five billion is that because people loan money to north korea i thought the sub prime thing was a well what is a total of one way in which china subsidizes north korea's to run a trade deficit and to lend money to north korea what is the value of the subsidies free we oil that china gives each year world so do the math for me the problem is that i don't know what the overall figure as because it's classified but what is the best us estimate from the four primitive experts here as to what the number would be  that people who focus on these issues would ask the question to what degree is north korea dependent upon the large us of china do any of you have a numerical answer to china has for years had a concern that if they do that i'm aware that they could threaten to do it they could hint to do it or instead of bringing north korea down they could make  a little more difficult for the north korean put them in a position where they didn't have quite cements resources in two thousand and nine as two thousand and eight but it wasn't quite regime threatening in the current circumstance  biggest being north korea and so the chinese when they sent the money in two thousand and eight they knew what they were getting in north korea in two thousand and nine is there anything north korea's done that's a real shock to china or is or is there anything about japanese or south korean reaction or american reaction that is there anything that's happened on this issue that would have been a shock if somebody put it forward at a think tank in beijing twelve months ago i think if you'd said twelve months ago tested a nuclear weapon they had already tested missiles so now they've got a bigger nuclear test and the big or bigger missile it's just in my testimony this has led  the chinese government and scholars and security experts to come very recently to a different definition of the situation that i'm reporting what i hear ok yeah i mean and i think what you're reporting is that they would like america to just let the status quo continue and so in order to do that they'll make a few noises that will make us think that they're kind of mov g while we've been playing this game for for a decade i realize we have several people who are experts in china for many decades it's been the united states has prevented taiwan from developing a nuclear weapon while china has carried out for ration policies in many parts of the world to china just take it for granted that we will continue to prevent taiwan from developing a nuclear weapon i think taxpayers putting a huge lead out there which may be true this may not be true the decades to follow taiwan taiwan's idea of assuring its independence the american military do it for them at our expense i'm not sure that that continues to work what about japan china genuinely concerned the japan will develop nuclear weapons as a direct result of north korea's unhappy at the degree of dependence that they have reluctantly had to incur on china letting them take out their mineral resources and by the truckload that's why the more moderate elements there have wanted to have a real relationship with the united states and to normalize with the united states to offset dependence on china i think we are very naive in thinking that china is going to help us in putting the squeeze on north korea china wants to subsidize north well let me just they want to make sure we don't have a unified korea but one day one final question my time's about to expire has expired and that is the last administration refused to offer a not a gracious aggression pact to north korea how important is it to the north koreans that they get an official conventional old style non aggression pact from the united states they want nuclear assurances not non aggression pact what is honestly say that we will not use nuclear weapons in a way that is binding upon us nonproliferation treaty already commits us to that you'd think we'd put it in writing a second time evan already put in writing a first time  i'm shocked that non deliberate no they don't they don't think that's it i'm happy to send them a copy with a new signature but then again they don't want my signature  suggest that north korea wants and written affirmation from the united states that they will we will never use nuclear weapons against them and one of the our news is that this is the same effort on the part of president lee of a written affirmation from us that we would use nuclear weapons as a deterrent or as an umbrella to protect south korea's interests so we got a little contradiction here in terms of what we're trying to and how much of a threat we see that as and what we know what america and the rest of its allies should be  doing it's a very serious issue and clearly there needs to be as much attention as possible in the intelligence community directed to trying to discover those possible ties certainly have been it seems to me that to a material is detected in the chinese are supposed to be inspecting that cargo at this stage so this is going to be one of the areas where i think china is really going to be put in terms of their seriousness much involved with proliferation in that particular site could you expound i mean how serious of a threat is this how how wide or how active has a proliferation been and how much of a clear indications although again i was out of government from this happened i think there were no signs of actual transfer of while material the material needed to make those plants operate but they built platt i think the evidence of  cooperation with iran on nuclear is somewhat less clear it seems there may have been some some collaboration in both directions at different times on different kinds of programs  but suffice to say that this administration that that threat of proliferation is the single most dangerous part of this very dangerous problem and therefore much of the u n resolution calling for d with the situation do you think any relevance of the sunshine policy given the tensions in our exist in the korean peninsula is that a dead issue it certainly isn't  dead issue i think one of the very important reasons why the hardliners in north korea have become empowered in recent months is the fact that the policy of the agreements  the president and in the perception perceptions of the perception of north korea is that the elements in south korea favoring unification through a collapse of the north korean regime are now dominant in the south and they greatly strengthened the hardliners in north korea and the combination of that factor and the pressure tactics of the new a threat that north korea poses to the world through its nuclear program and for that matter the threat that iran poses the world is quite a different  north korea and i'm just curious how how was it that the bush administration came out and establishing party talks as a means to negotiate with north korea matter one of the added problems too is the fact that when you talk about abductions and kidnapping the japanese kidnapped and abducted over two hundred thousand asian women mostly koreans forced them into prostitution and they were raped and institutionalized by the highest echelons of the of the imperial army of japan during world war two so i'm i'm i'm i'm getting a little confused here in terms  us we're going to continue to get your attention and i would hope that we would not fall to thinking that we have to move aggressively i would hope i'm leading the sometime towards the end of the i'm trying to put it off as far as i can because i want to see the fallout from all of this and what the u n is willing to do i don't want us to north korea has had a basic change of policy it's going to continue whatever happens to kim jong il's health it's a consensus new consensus in a leadership in which the balance of forces has shifted to hardliners being stronger than they were before and that changes up until one thousand nine hundred four until january of this year north korea was committed to the policy that it would negotiate for denuclearization leading to normal relations with the u s which is their basic goal that's what they want they've changed their policy we've got to face that fact now their policy is they will not do nuclear until after they have normalized relations with the united states so we're just talking into the air losing sight of our real security objectives if we talk about complete do nuclearization of north korea as the immediate goal immediate goal has to be to cap their nuclear arsenal so that it doesn't become larger and larger with better and better warheads and then work for better relations with north korea simultaneously at which time we hope that that new atmosphere will lead to saner leadership which is prepared to pursue again party talks as scott snyder said have been very valuable because we need the participation of some of the regional powers the problem with that is japan has been trying to torpedo them because japan is led by right wing elements who don't share who really very happy to have north korea something that can justify sort of their own attempts to build to militarize and to prepare for nuclear weapons don't forget that we talk about the consequences of all this leading to japan going nuclear that's all very true that's why we've all worked for a denuclearized north korea but don't forget that think that japan's role in the search party talks hasn't been helpful and that's the problem with the six party talks but certainly the multilateral negotiations in which south korea and china and russia are involved and eventually hopefully japan should be our ultimate goal that's got to start with bilateral negotiations couldn't agree with you more and i'm thinking of the old adage in the community if you call yourself a leader and no one is following you you're just a man out taking a walk so i would hope that we would never again without provocation go out there on our own that's why i mention the six party the other  parties we can do this unilaterally and you just said that we've got to we're not in the neighborhood but we can probably be reached over the water eventually so what we want to do is let those in the neighborhood know that that is their problem even if we are the focus and i don't want them to lower it into an action unilaterally that's my deep concern whatever we can do  california we're talking about recommendations and i was thinking of madeleine albright as another potential person that could be an envoy some good time there was a time when she was received by kim jong and she would have a little understanding of what happened there for the second round and gentlemen i really really appreciate your patience my good friend the gentle lady  having meetings in and out of this room is to get a sort of a comprehensive perspective of the gentlemen who are before us and so i want to first of all just a moment of personal privilege i want to acknowledge  well let me pose these questions to mr snyder and bush were associated with the former chairman of this committee of whom i had the privilege as what i would call a baby member of congress to be tutored by chairman lee hamilton and of course being on homeland security worked extensively with him on the nine eleven commission the first the first question is how much fear how much accuracy is there in the fear and apprehension of the present position of north korea in terms of the nuclear capacity where are we know we're not on armed services is not the intelligence committee but give your best judgment as to where you believe they are that that's sort of set the tone for how we proceed then my second question is to make it very clear that that i am also not advocating for war in advocating for negotiation i'm on foreign affairs and engagement but comment on the concept of six parties should we be open to modifying should we call for a  regional meeting of north korea japan and china with south korea as an advisor you know that there are tensions are very high there should be be open to modification and i have a subset so the chairman will be accurate in my two questions give me your sense of how we divide the freeing of mislaying and mislead to where we are today i believe that we should have an envoy i believe that the administration is committed and engaged we're living in the real world we're not living in a think tank world these issues are connected they are pawns in a power game the only way to deal with the problem of their release  present tensions and to move toward bilateral negotiations which we've been talking about for the administration to power who ever goes to sound them out on a number of possible ways of easing present tensions and i do feel that the policy of strict strict separation of these two issues is completely unrealistic and and is very callous in my view i feel very deeply about the situation these two women face and i think we have to recognize that this can't be separated from the larger problems that we face  have been enormously gracious we have gotten very important instruction from these witnesses and this hearing has a broad sweep it's important timely and i just want to conclude my remarks by saying i'm going to put on my thinking cap and i'd like to work with you mr chairman i think this committee can play an important role of being an asset or an addition to the deliberation on these from and i hope that we'll have the opportunity to pursue this collaboratively and be an asset to the administration on moving this forward and i thank the gentleman for yielding and i thank the journalist you for her questions of the responses that the north korea i think they don't deserve this term of imprisonment for twelve years just for stepping over the line i think there's just something to that now we need to consider if the nuclear issue of the six party talks are more important than the lives of these two ladies and i appreciate mr harrison's comment on that i think you cannot separate the two but that's my opinion i can understand mr bush's concerns that will never let me come to north korea but gentlemen you've been so kind with so patient with your time and allowing the members of both of our subcommittees to raise questions or concerns about the issues that we're not helpful to and and making this record as complete as possible without objections i also have the statement of mister connelly from virginia there's opening statement that will also be made part of the record gentleman