to just generally talk about the statute in the new statute just to set a little framework as to what i believe the differences are between the term and why that's important th responding with those same age parameters so with that said i think i just want to point out that i think it's quite a difference between the truth and they need to be treated differently but it was a particular case the statute was is reversed we're going to hear that he didn't show any interest in the trial for a year and a half or two years that he was operating under the fact that he thought he may have waived his rights by signing that document in fairly received legal advice to the contrary for less just spent fourteen years just because that's an age where the child child's preference might be accepted by the court or it's listen to that court and the room for whatever reason the mother the father never marrying that they have a problem and statute such as that in fact i think the statute such as that are contrary to what we tried to do that way and unfortunately get appointed interim cases every now and then i notice how hard the courts work to place children back with natural record that the relationship between the parties actually commenced when my client's or williams was thirteen years of age the father mr right now that's correct she became pregnant at the age of sixteen and then she yes the my grief actually had a scrivener's urn to locations the minor child was actually born on june eighteenth two thousand and eight i actually put two thousand and four so that was my fault the in november two thousand and eight there was a petition filed through the department of health care and family services to commence child support payments and that is not  visitation on a regular basis and as i stated after a year you think that in this circumstance no i don't the reason why i say that is because for a substantial period of time after she in temptin to here i would disagree your honor is the reason why i say that is that this family is not a stranger to the court system as i indicated in november of two thousand and eight child supporting fact was commenced  under the law which i believe has the appellant's of i guess complaining he would have been able to file a visitation petition at any time to in fact institute visitation he declined to do so but that is true which was at the point of twenty thirteen of the section six point five of the act was in effect i believe that the effective date of the new provision that we're dealing with today it was effective january one of twenty well that's a very good question it was my understanding that despite the fact that you laurell change in effect at twenty fourteen the ruling was made off based off of the current statute and i think that's one understand there's a relation back doctrine obviously there were multiple actually petitions filed for visitation purposes i applied the statute that actually was in effect at the time of the hearing the gene for twenty fourteen my basis for that is actually part of your argument in the sense that there are new nimbys there is no impact to the rights that this gentleman would have had whether it be twenty thirteen or twenty fourteen my basis for saying it is as of illinois ruling that in family cases under the parentage act you are not guaranteed this patient that under the dissolution act it's assumed unless you are serious and danger meant that you will have visitation rights of some some statements so in my opinion he there is no impact on his rights i think that the a problem is walking in your assuming that this court is going to give this gentleman a visitation there is no i guess increase of opponents brief was this is an automatic thing under section six zero seven i just want to point out that i don't believe that's correct your right though that if you're in would be provided on that very basis for those  yes i believe that's true i don't believe that a parent would have a right to consen under the commonwealth case that i resigned in my brief i believe there is no actual retroactive impact and we've kind of touched on it now about there is no guarantee under the parent eject as compared to the dissolution act  act because i don't believe there's any guarantee or impact of rights because there is no guarantee of this station while a biological relationship creates certain obligations in these cases i don't believe compelling and other standards and i don't believe that that is correct i also believe that the opponent is not correct in the argument that the statutes purpose is to prevent th prepayments it's it's my understanding that the statutes purpose is in effect to deal with someone who has been raped or unable to consent to sexual intercourse which resulted in a pregnancy an speak on that i don't know i have to admit that this is a case that i've never handled before i my primary practice it is family law it it but i've never had a circumstance where there has been an acknowledgement by a man who basically is conceding an aggravated sexual criminal abuse to to a mother i was not involved though in the parentage action or the child support so i don't know all the facts particularly regarding those issues so i would believe it's probably minimal that a man is never my clients actually did go to the police my client's own mother of when she found out about the relationship when the child my client was thirteen didn't turn this over to the based on the peace laws i believe that frankly women's rights and children's rights are an important governmental interest additionally i think the real purpose of the statute here is not against prevent pregnancies as a teenager but basically to prevent someone who in effect committed rape for someone who cannot consent to have to be exposed to this person for their own life  child when they turn approximately fourteen has a little bit more i guess are considered competent tesla is only words i would also think that as the child grew older if the child would like to have a relationship with with this person than that could occur as well that it's only justice is i don't believe that this is has any type of retroactive impact because of the disparity of government between the marriage and dissolution marriage act in the car act i believe there is no impact whatsoever retroactively additionally i believe we're equal protection purposes biologically men and women are different as we all know which there is a plethora of is for women  act or parentage act would still allow all that of an age to still seek visitation in custody which again it's not stated in the statute not capacity over the best interest factors would allow for that to be kicked in in the sense that the case would then be presented that the i guess male victim would be able to seek custody and visitation on that basis i believe that there is a difference in this matter  but i believe that statistically proven despite fact or have been male victims i believe female victims or more i guess in numbers thank you  just a couple of things i want to mention the impact is the loss of the right to a hearing that is as is our position is the difference between the owner statute and new statute is that the you know you  neutral this one could have been gender neutral to the just a couple little tweaks so that's a reason six of seven was mentioned a couple other things i don't think the record actually reflects that mr coon  yelled that and so on and embarrassed and so it was very discouraging to him to to have any more contact with them i think that that is what i remember the record saying the other from this particular i mean the statute