interpretation of agreements that delegate questions of arbitron billet he to the arbitrator and its decision on remand the court of appeals recognized that the arbitration agreements here contained a valid delegation but it held that because the agreements also contained a carve out provision they divided up responsibility for arbitron bill of the between the arbitrator and the court the court of appeals proceeded to decide the arbitron filippi question for itself thus effectively negating the delegation delegation is simply an antecedent agreement that is subject to the rules governing arbitration agreements more generally nd any doubts concerning the scope of arbitration agreements are resolved in favor of arbitration and under that presumption a carve out provision does not speak to who should decide questions of arbitrary billeted he cannot restrict the parties delegation of those questions to the arbitrator responded primarily focuses not on the question presented but on another question whether the incorporation of arbitration rules that authorize the arbitrator to resolve questions of arbitron billeted constitutes a valid delegation but the court correctly declined to add that question if the search for a stage because twelve circuits have held without conflict that the incorporation of arbitration rules is sufficient that holding is plainly correct and overturning those decisions without the benefit of full briefing on both sides would work and of also change in the law the court should stick to the question and agreed to decide and it should decide that question in petitioners favor the judgment of the court of appeal should be vacated i walk in the courts question thank you counsel when you look at the pertin clause issue here the one thing that's clear is that they did not want action seeking injunctive relief to be arbitrated they they say that expressly right at the outset as soon as they injunctive relief now if that's the case and it was important enough for space for them to spell it out right at the outset wouldn't the last thing you think they would want is for an arbitrator to decide which disputes qualify i mean that would seem to follow a force your right they don't want arbitrators deciding this why would they want an arbitrator's to decide who gets to decide it mr chief justice i agree with you that the carve out provision plainly carved out actions seeking injunctive relief from the scope of the arbitration agreement but the question we're talking about this morning is a different one it's whether they intended to carve out disputes about who decides whether something falls within the carve out on that was my precise question if they don't want arbitrators around injunctive actions why would they want arbitrators to decide who gets to decide that well i think that because it is highly unlikely that parties would ever want to divide up responsibility for our boat trip billeted after all the whole point of a delegation is to resolve that who decides question it's just remind the process by having the arbitrary trader decide the scope of the arbitration agreement and i think that the court of appeals opinion in this case well illustrates the problem here because the court of appeals having said that the plain language of the the question of who decides and where you have a dispute it would be very strange to say that the question of who decides is itself divided because somebody would have to resolve that doubly antecedent question and i would be content to argue that our reading is the better reading of the agreement as a matter of common sound but our submission here a simple it's that the presumption of arbitrary elevation apply and the court of appeals heard are the authority to arbitrarily as justice thomas we don't think it's all or nothing again we think it is highly unlikely that the parties would want to divide up responsibility but suppose that you had a provision much like the provision  page twenty seven of respondents brief that said something along the lines of except for an action seeking injunctive relief the arbitrator shall decide whether the parties dispute is subject to arbitration here  carve out clearly and unambiguously would operate on the question of arbitron filippi but we'd still be left with the problem that i was just discussing with the chief justice in that circumstance someone would still have to decide whether the action is in fact an action seeking injunctive relief someone would have to decide where there is a dispute over whether the arbitrator or the court should decide arbitrary ability and again the court of appeals decision well illustrates the problem because having held that the party is divided up responsibility the court of appeals proceeded to decide the question of who decides for itself and thus effectively negated the delegation altogether  our delegate would you walk me through sure and justice thomas this goes to the question the respondent is seeking to insert into the case but i'm happy to address the merits of it directly the question is whether the incorporation of arbitration rules that authorize the arbitrator to resolve questions barbara triviality constitutes a valid delegation here the incorporation is the reference to the arbitration rules of the american arbitration association that's quite common in agreements between sophisticated commercial parties like the parties here and among the relevant rules is rules seven a which cost arises the arbitrator to make that determination and this court has never required magic words on the face of the agreement instead all that the court has said is that you have to have clear and unmistakable evidence and under ordinary objective principles of contract formation the incorporation of a document suffices in order to render that document part of the contract thank you justice brier  arbitration case and that's where all the law comes from where one party the labor union says this is a section eight agreement arbitrary knows the employer it is a sectional can kind of situation grievance i i did justice pryor and the let me attempt to answer it very briefly and i'll make two points the st is that the st options rule with which i know you are well familiar does come from the labor context but i think it operates in the same way and i think easiest to understand this conceptually if you think about the delegation as a kind of miniature contract formation in other words was there a meeting of the min that the arbitrator should decide questions concerning the scope of the arbitration agreement and that's precisely why we think an incorporation is sufficient because under ordinary principles of contract formation that is enough and then once you have that clear evidence the presumption flips to the normal presumption because you treat the delegation like an arbitration agreement and you apply the presumption of  section two of the federal arbitration act but the federal arbitration section two we have also said requires equal treatment of arbitration contracts in other contracts so what is the basis for saying that there  this federal policy that produces the presumption that you rely on it's a good question justice alito and i'm not sure that the court has ever spoken to it so let me offer a potential explanation as you rightly point out this court has repeatedly said that section two of the arbitration act along with other sections establishes the principle that arbitration agreement should be enforced according to their terms but i think this court has also recognized the presumption in favor of arbitration as flowing from the policy underlying the arbitration act as a whole and that presumption in turn to pick up where justice prior left off seems to come from the labor context where of course under federal law you have the labor arbitration act and you have in that act in the a recognition that federal courts can recognize federal common law so i think if i were pressed i would say it's probably alternately a matter of federal common law but it also appears to flow from the terms  state and the structure of the statute themselves ok very very quickly i have basically the same question as the chief justice this case comes in a rather artificial posture so we're required to assume that the contract incorporates the contract provides for the arbitration of who decides question across the board and of course if that's true then  answer to the question that we're supposed to decide is for ordained but if we put that isn't that hard official when you have a carve out and the parties have taken pains to say this subject we don't want the arbitrator to have anything to do with the subject we want the judge to decide this because the judge this is something that needs to we decided in accordance with the law and we know that arbitrators have a lot more reweigh in interpretating  interpreting contracts isn't that relevant to the question of the scope of the of the delegation of the power to decide who decides that is the very question before the court and very briefly justice our interpretation makes complete sense because under our interpretation the carve out operates is only a carve out from the scope of the arbitration agreement it gives the court the power to enter preliminary injunctive relief pending an arbitration but the question of who decides is a discreet one and it wouldn't make any sense for the parties to carve out from that absent quick clear indication to that effect thank you justice sotomayor you know you make much of the fact that we didn't grant her on the cross petition but in your opposition to the cross petition and even in your reply on the merits you say we can reach the issue in fact you admitted in your cross petition that have grounds and that it was incorporated in you encouraged us not to granted so i don't understand how you can tell us that we have to assume there was a clear delegation of boom the exception is a whole other dispute to sort of educate me as to having said we could why you're saying we can't know just a semi or you of course could decide the incorporation question and i don't think we've ever disputed that our submission today as in our early or briefs is simply that the court should and very briefly to go back to what we said at the rd stage we said that a cross patrician was unnecessary but then we proceeded to devote i believe six pages of our opposition to the cross but tension in explaining why the court shouldn't add the incorporation have a clear television but i think what the court below said was what is unclear is whether the form of the delegation here in was except a particular one the issue is whether a particular one was delegated to the arbitrator in the following arbitration agreement seems pretty logical not a not an argument that the court below adopted doesn't seem to be irrational or even nonsensical arbitrary billet and that is where the court of appeals went wrong the court of appeals did think that the scope of the delegation was unclear but once you have a delegation this court's decisions make clear that you treat that like an arbitra the delegation i think you've made a subtle but important change because in this provision the relevant incorporation is introduced by in accordance with and in our view  really operates only on what is subject to arbitration now even if you disagree with me on bad i think i would be a blast with my point that it is unlikely and it did in my view absurd to think that the thing whether an arbitration agreement contains carve out and so suppose you had this very provision without a car about any dispute arising under this agreement should be resolved by arbitration in accordance with the aaa rules if you have a dispute about whether something is in fact arising under the agreement in our view that bad should go to the arbitrator by virtue of the incorporation law ones aside you pointed us to section two but section two seems to suggest we follow normal contract rules and trying to discern the party's intentions what am i missing i don't think you're missing anything j gorsuch because i really do think that the court has never spoken to this but i think quite frankly that the origins of what we refer to as the st options presumption but it really originates in the courts labor cases are  frankly somewhat more nebulous if you trace bad bad it really traces back to a footnote in one of the steelworkers cases that in turn relies on a law review article written by dean cox now there's no better person to have write a law review article than dean cox but ultimately i think that that presumption just rests on a an empirical presumption that parties often don't focus on arbit i think by contrast the presumption in favor of arbitration is a venerable one often reaffirmed and applied by this court and it's one that applies across the board and again it simply reflects the strong federal policy in favor of arbitration i know i'm still waiting for statutory argument so i get the venerable law review articles and lots of statements in our cases but is there indeed any statutory basis for any of these things well i think i can't do you really much better than section two and as i acknowledged earlier i think that there is you know some tension between the principle that applies according to its terms and the presumption in favor of arbitration my point hitch is simply that all that the court needs to do in this case is to apply the presumption in favor of arbitration to the delegation to rule in our favor and what the court shouldn't do is what respondents suggest which is to extend  the st options presumption beyond the context of whether or not there is a delegation to the scope of the delegation the latter is a question of contract interpretation and it should be governed by whatever the general rules are that govern the interpretation of arbitration agreement thank you justice kavanagh thank you chief justice good morning mr stanley jim so make sure i have the roadmap clear here with you the premise of the that's right or by incorporation to be sure you have by incorporation and you you say if we want to figure out whether the rules actually are an express tell a geisha and we should grant cert on that question at some point and decide that but for here we can assume express delegation correct or act ok and then your point is that the st circuit i think this is your argument confused the question of arbiter billeted namely what subjects are decided by an arbitrator  subjects are decided by court confuse that question with the question of who decides arbiter ability so yes also cracked ok and then in the real world i want to pick up on some of justice kagan's questions kind of real world how people draft these contracts what they expect my understanding was that the question of who decides arbiter ability the who decides question is almost never divided between a court and an apply as i understand it to every arbitration contract or virtually every arbitration contract because every arbitration contract specifies either limits or has carve outs and so if that alone except that it lacks the except for language and as i indicated you would have exactly the same question when you have a dispute about whether a claim is in fact arising under the contract or out of the contract it i think most courts of appeals have said that there would be under those circumstances justice breyer assertion again i really just have one question and it goes to the premises of your argument which is that there was a clear and unmistakable delegation of  to the the what the subject matter of the dispute let's say that we're not going to address the question on which we denied sir which is you know whether a reference to the aaa rules suffices to be which delegation of our which ability here as you point out this carve out you say that it would be nonsensical even though parties can do it because they can contract and agree to what they want to that it would be nonsense of nonsensical to carve up average ability questions if that's true why isn't that reason to interpret this closet as not being a clear and unmistakable delegation of all questions of ability i mean it's just the invocation of the aaa rules enough given the inclusion of what you say would be a pretty odd pretty odd language just to spare a i think the problem with that argument is and i want to make one further point about the relationship between these two questions because i think a number of the questions this morning have touched on that even respondent concedes that the incorporation question is discrete from the there is an agreement to arbitrate arbitron billeted at that point justice barrett everything else that we're talking about is a question of interpretation it's a question of the scope of the delegation and this court in rana center and its earlier decision in this case has said that at that point the rules output coupled to arbitration agreement and the interpretation of arbitration agreement supply the court of appeals legal error here was in failing to apply the presumption of arbitrary military thank you  to wrap up mr shanmugam thank you mr chief justice this is an unusual case because responded makes no real effort to defend the reasoning of the court of appeals in the decision instead respond it is really asking the court to decide this case based on a different question the incorporation question and that would be a bold strategy in any case but i would submit it to particularly bold strategy here because respondent asked the court to decide that question at the rd stage and the court seemingly consciously made the decision not to add it now that question in our view doesn't warrant the court's review and it doesn't warrant the court addressing it here in light of the overwhelming consensus of the lower courts on that question but if the court were to reach that question anyway and to reject the consensus view it would have dramatic consequences for innumerable commercial contracts that are worded much like the contract here all that the court need do in this case is to hold that the court of appeals actual reasoning is interpretive rule based on reasonable assumptions about the party's likely intent and presumed expectations if the arbitration clause here is silent on delegation it does not utter one syllable about it and one actually where this arcane issue would address t subject expressly on the face of the agreement and that is especially so against the backdrop of this court's heightened standard and how easy it is to address the question directly it is simply not plausible that anyone would recognize this issue and choose to resolve it  rules but those rules do not even apply unless the action false within the category of disputes subject to arbitration if an action falls within the carve out then it is not subject to arbitration and it is not subject to arbitration under the aaa rules it makes no difference what those rules say because the condition for activating them isn't met once a contract is read to mean what it so plainly says all the confusion disappears if arise for arbitration generally it exempts certain types of actions from arbitration and it requires that any arbitration be conducted under the aaa rules the only reason petitioner finds the simple language bizarre confusing or cert two are is because petitioners trying to smuggle in a delegation clause where it so plainly does not exist  counsel i think the most important question for you it's a challenge that your your friend on the other side has really laid down clearly and was the one that justice kavanagh was was talking about how do you distinguish a situation i would call the run of the mill situation where there is no express carve out is say that the agreement applies to all labor disputes it within in the factory and there's a storage facility right next door where they keep things that are used in the factory but they also keep other stuff and of the union says we want to arbitrate a dispute about that building and the factory owner comes in and says no no that's not within the arbitration agreement that's not part of the fact of the factory now why isn't that analyzed the same way you analyze your contract and say well that's a question of arbitron bill and that should be decided by a court what makes that situation different well i think that will make it different is that there is an express delegation permission and normally when parties include an express delegation provision it's  it's just i mean the argument on the other side is that the issue that you're trying to elevate outside the normal situation comes up all the time because arbitrators are always deciding whether something is within the scope of arbitration or not and that that issue has never been treated as a question of who decides but why is your case different i think that that typically is a question of of our big ability and the follow this that the court decides that issue the only time an arbitrator decides whether a dispute falls within the scope of the agreement is if there is in fact a delegation from asia if there is one and then the question becomes did the parties expressly carve out certain dispute from the delegation or from the scope of arbitration we absolutely conceded that if the exception is limited solely to the scope of arbitration and there is a separate unconditional delegation provision then the arbitrator gets to make that determination the problem here is that my my friends reading is profoundly a textual if in fact the delegation is in the  would you be able to make the same argument if there were an express delegation if it depends on what that express delegation and event that let's just take the aaa course we're not arguing about fact the arbitrator gets to decide it but if you have the exceptions that are listed here so it says any dispute except for action seeking injunctive relief are decided by arbitration under the aaa rules which means the arbitrator decides our ability  the clause for activating the delegation does not apply because the car about would apply to the scope of the delegation it's only when the carve out is limited to the scope of arbitration and that that really isn't so unusual unconditional delegation of the issue of armored ability to the arbitrator the problem here is that the exceptions to the dispute subject arbitration and subject to the supposed delegation are limited unless the court wishes to adopt a binary rule that says all delegations are all or nothing but the court has never said that parties are perfectly free under the federal arbitration act it delegate some issue just arbitration  if in fact there were a clause in the arbitration clause which says we delegate gateway matters to the arbitrator it would be the arbitrator who decided whether his nd warehouse spell is who should decide the gately matter of arbitron bill is it and we have in this contract it is a there is a it is a contract it contains an arbitration cla  i think i did understand it and i have two answers the st is that this is not a general delegation to the arbitrator because it's not unconditional it doesn't say that the tripling rules apply to all disputes if this is a dispute falling within the carve out then it is not subject to the aaa rules you don't even get there it does if you my friend like to say reproduce the language into the contract itself but that's not that's not a complete answer you would reproduce it with the introductory phrase that says the following paragraph shall not apply an action seeking injunctive relief so you don't even look to what that paragraph might say you don't even get to the aaa rules or any supposin delegation my nd point is i think my friend's attempt to flip the option standard on its head doesn't work it's not consistent with this court's decision and run to center run to center made clear that typically the court decides a gateway matter now it did say that a delegation of a delegation agreement is treated the same as any other agreement but it dropped the footnote that said and except when you're deciding what the if that agreement exists and what it is thank you console justice alito mr geyser i want to ask you for help cross petition i want you to assume that we are not going to decide the question that you want to decide and across the to show and if we make that assumption i really don't know how to answer the question that we grant a review on because it does seem to par degree of the delegation to the arbitrator  of power to decide whether the arbitrator can decide if if i'm required to assume that all of that was delegated to the arbitrator well as the answer is clear if required to assume only the part of it was delegated to the arbitrator maybe other st options the answer is also clear so if you just want to say look this is your problem not mine that's fine but if you can most abstract an artificial way without deciding whether in fact this is a delegation permission because your fact if we taking a single sentence your seeming a counterfactual for what half of it means my friend is now saying you should  delegation that would have to overrule this this case if you go against us so i do think it's very difficult you could dismiss the cases improvidently granted you could request additional briefing though i do think the question is fully briefed but with all that aside i still think that we can prevail in this case by simply following the absolute plain unambiguous language of what this contract says i think that my friends contention is that the case should come on the presumption that incorporating the tripoli it says on its face some disputes are subject to the crew are subject to the aaa rules but other disputes those falling in the parents medical are not and if they're not subject to the tripling rules they are not subject to any delegation and that is a plain tex perhaps it's because those who should you should give us a lot of alternative ways for you to win but i would like to break them to them to understand them better it seemed to me as i read your brief mere use of this text is insufficient now parties could establish to extremes of evidence for example that you have to arbitration scholars this is their th agreement they always use just language they always go blooey in what are you saying that this particular a language is insufficient we're saying that those are let me finish that this particular set of a language isn't sufficient for that you can never could get if that was part of if that was the awu for example are you saying that that itself would not be clear enough we are saying that this linguistic formulation is not sufficiently clear because the reason parties would predominantly include this language is for an independent obvious reason and it is that the ground rules for the arbitration do i don't think council please just answer my question i gave you a clear statement understand the argument i'm not sure it gets to where you want to be poor all the reasons that my colleagues have said that where someone clearly has forth that the scope of rules for the independent purpose of having and then knowing where to show up for the arbitration and who to pay there's no indication that the parties had an elephant in a mouse hole and intended the aaa rules themselves to supply the separate contract which is what it is to issue has to be decided by the court because every single offer transition agreement has limitations omo so agreements say any disputes related to this contract are subject to arbitration and almost inevitably a party will come in and say this dispute is not related to a contract and what would you have a express delegation provision that's unconditional so again the same set and chair there's a separate sentence it says the arbitrator shall decide arbonne ability and the arbitrator would make those determinations but where the delegation as here is limited the exceptions apply to the delegation then the court necessarily has to make that determination justice kagan mr gardner i'd like to ask you about the contention there is a view of the presumptions here as i understand it it goes like this st we have a presumption that is in a rd presumption the rd presumption is if we see evidence of any location then we should assume that the parties demand to delegate all arbitrement of the question so if there is any delegation of your response is to that argument sure your honor i don't think that that argument follows and i it's partly because the presumption in favor of the court deciding the gateway issue is designed to keep that most important issue before the court that's traditionally what parties expect that's what this court has said repeatedly is the likely intent of the parties it provides a critical judicial safeguard and it avoids a situation where the arbitrators deciding the scope of his or her own jurisdiction and there's every reason to assume that parties again the federal arbitration act in delegate certain issues but not others to the arbitrator and knowing that the strong default is in favor of courts making those determinations it does not make sense to say that once there is any inkling that the parties wanted something delegated that everything is delegated it makes more sense to say that unless parties clearly an unmistak that question to the court you force the court to decide what is our trouble before the before the court decides who gets to decide that your honor the only time that's true is w the parties have drafted the green men in that fashion but again the only reason that seems unusual here is because we're dealing with smuggling in a delegation where it doesn't actually belong to a party but in albany assuming as we assume that the aaa reference is candidate for not wanting to bifurcate because it doesn't you parties much good in terms of the goal of arbitration of the station c and expediency have to go to the arbitrator again in order for injunctive relief to go back to the court and seek to enforce that order through an elephant in the elephant hole when you look at the aaa rules rule seven aces the arbitrator shall have the power to rule on his or her own jurisdiction including the arbitron ability of any claim or counter claim that's very broad language which probably why it every court of appeals to addresses says that the aaa rules are an expressed allegation but again we don't have to decide that here that's just the promise but i wanted to just pause on the elephant in a mousehole point here's the here's the problem i think i have with your argument and you've made it very cleverly and persuasively but the problem is th youth are suggesting that the way parties divide up arbitration namely some subjects will be subject to arbitration and decided by an arbitrator and sub's subjects won't also applies to the i think that's what you're saying but that's just not how it works in the real world or could realistically work that way in the real world i don't think any contract says arbiter ability shall we just of certain subjects shall be decided by  court decides whether class arbitration is appropriate and parties are perfectly free to do that and here at the parties decide and i think on the basis of this agreement aside from just saying it's absurd so we're going to toss aside the plain language of what the party actually wrote in the context of the federal arbitration act which is trying to force the contract according to their terms well i think it's just interrupt i think we're trying to figure out does the car bound applied to what subjects go to arbitra your favor and i just want to be sure that i understand your argument and so the you should take as your premise that we're not addressing the question on which we denied certain across petition on whether incorporating the aaa rules by reference constitutes a delegation is it your argument that st of all there is no clear and unmistakable delegation here at all so you win or alternatively that even if there was a general clear and unmistakable delegation that the carve out provision ok so on the st point and you said to be candid that most of that argument does turn on the aaa rules the incorporation of them not constituting a delegation if we don't address that question and if we just decide this case assuming that it can be do you there is some form of delegation to the arbitrator but we don't lose in the sense that there are no limits on the scope of that delegation ok i didn't mean so you're referring to your nd wave nd route to victory right i'm i'm just asking on the st point do you lose on your argument that there was no clear and unmistakable delegation at all if we declining to get into the question that we deny sir on assume that incorporating  deal so it's not your position that it's possible to incorporate the aaa rules by reference but still through the context of the language in the provision not intend simply by reference  think that this one which is clear and unmistakable is precisely because it is in the us whether the parties included that language because they just wanted to set the procedures for the arbitration or whether they were actually trying to address and focus on the concept of delegation and that is you know part of a single rule out of fifty or so that happens have anything that remotely resembles delegation so i do think that you can say in theory seven a the again we disagree with this but it's a delegation provision despite not having exclusive language and precluding the court from addressing it and you can still say that just as parties adopt the same linguistic formulation when they want to delegate or not delegate or before rule seven a even existed presumption that the reason that you should not simply read the contract language on its face is to avoid a potentially circular result of the parties actually wanted an arbitrator to decide arbonne ability and so it doesn't exists and i think will be very difficult to construe this language in a sensible way without getting into the delegation but again if the court does wish to try that anyway we still do you think that that carve out is  some disputes are subject to the tripoli rules and if this is not one of those disputes then it is not subject to the aaa rules and it's not subject to any delegation and it's ultimately up to the court and it's traditional gatekeeping r that language and say what it means thank you counsel rebuttal mr shand madame thank you mr chief justice respondents entire argument this afternoon keeps coming back to the premise that there is not a clear and unmistakable delegation by virtue of the incorporation of the aaa rules but respondent has conceded that the court can decide this case on the premise that the incorporation is sufficient the court can and therefore should assume that the parties agreed to delegate at least some questions concerning whether a dispute is subject to arbitration to the arbitrator male respondent contends that a court should decide the scope of the delegation agreement and justice prior of course we agree with that our submission is simply that when court is making that determination the presumption of arbiter ability should apply and if it is ambiguous that a carve out applies to the delegation a court should hold that it does not especially given how unlikely it is that the parties would divide up responsibility in that fashion the purpose of delegation provisions is to assign clear responsibility where there is a dispute about the scope of an arbitration agreement now that dispute can be a dispute about an express carve out so is here whether the action at issue constitutes an action seeking injunctive relief or not so as in my hypothetical from earlier whether a dispute simply arises under the parties agreement it would effect defeat delegation to accept respondents view because someone would have to decide when there is a dispute about whether the arbitrator or the court should decide arbiter ability and it's one thing to say the parties may want to divide up responsibility for different types of questions of arbre triple of the such as who is subject to the arbitration agreement or whether a class action waiver is valid but as i pointed out in my earlier colloquy with justice kavanagh we are not aware of any actual agreement in the real world that divides up responsibility for a particular question of arbitrary bill of a and in particular the paramount question of the scope of the arbitration agreement justice kagan we are decidedly not asking the court to recognize a  rd presumption here instead our point is simply that once the st options presumption has been satisfied because there is clear and unmistakable evidence of a delegation it falls out of the equation and the ordinary presumption in favor of arbiter bil applies and that is because in the words of this court's decision and radisson are quote an agreement to arbitrate a gateway issue is simply an additional antecedent agreement and the f a a operates on that additional arbitration of and just as it does in any other in closing all we're asking the court to do today is what the court ordinarily does to resolve a circuit conflict on the question presented and to correct a legal error on the part of the court of appeals having held that there was a valid delegation the court of appeals failed to apply the presumption of arbiter ability to the delegation agreement this court's decisions make clear that the presumption applies and that is all that the court needs say in a brief and narrow opinion of applying settled law in order to vacate the court of appeals judgment thank you