wiretap orders in this case did not contain a piece of information required by the wiretap statute that piece of information being the identity of the person authorizing the application so the only question before rationale the name isn't required well brendan's and he identity could be included if the person is identified sufficiently i agree that that's what branson says that i mean for a number reasons i don't think this court should consider ransom is controlling but i'll let you start everybody agrees and i thought mister agard sent a letter saying he agreed with bronson cell i just i want to start with everybody agrees with something this disputed go ahead ok well st of all i think everyone does agree that the name john smith or whoever it was is in there and that was really all i meant ok government had previously argued that it wasn't facially insufficient because the order said that the court had considered the application and the application in fact includ you can only may find out what it's supposed to have in it by looking at other documents so how many jobs are ition would it be insufficient if it said the attorney general it would not be insufficient according to scurry if it said the attorney general i'm not sure with that i agree that it would new current data but there is an important difference between brunson in this case that frankly i failed to mention in my response to the twenty eight day letter and i need to mention it now because i think it's really it's really central the orders in branson were different than the orders in friend because according to the brinson opinion and i will say i didn't go back and look at the orders but according to the branson opinion each order identifies as the authorizing official the assistant attorney general who signed off on the application leading to the issuance of the order it didn't give its name but it said this was authorized by the assistant attorney general who side the application the friend orders don't say that they just say pursuant to an application authorized by a deputy assistant attorney general who's been specially designated one of the statutory language they don't refer to a particular person and the problem there is that if you just read that then that could have her refer to any number of people and that was the problem in scurry and i don't think branson solves that and i certainly don't think dot it does so what we have here is an order for orders actually that say that some authorized person authorized this application but without but but don't you know even within the context of the order said that i mean that you can do this pursuant to an application authorized by a deputy assistant a g doesn't that mean that we're talking about the deputy who authorized the application well i think the problem is if you look at donna which says you should look at the four corners you shouldn't have to make inferences from the poor corners about which deputy attorney general the or the judge was referring to now the order the judge in brown in branson made a particular reference to the attorney general who signed the application the judge in friend invalid because one would have to go outside to four corners to see who is the attorney general as of the date of the order well the issue is that  and the brunson case still don't fix fran and even if you have a less restrictive if you because they both said it would be ok if you could tell from the order which particular person was being referred to and that doesn't happen in those friend or what they know my friend orders say is this application was authorized by somebody who can authorize applications or i mean specifically an assistant attorney general who can authorize applications but there are a number lawyers and judges who are supposed to read statutes so if you say they made this good faith mistake reading the statute four times so they should be excused i think it's hard but the other thing is that in leon what the court did was to say we are making a judicially created exception to the judicially created doctrine of the exclusionary rule here the court would be making a judicially created exception to a statute and well or not we have apply the good faith exception but the more case did not concern a defect in something that was specifically required under under the statute the issue in the more case was that the judge the order was on side and they said well that doesn't render that the order facially invalid under the statute anyway so this is a situation where we have an order this facially invalid under the statute positing that for a moment and what the court is being asked to say is well we the court can decide that even though the statute says that and come up with an exception that will allow that will allow this to go through and you know again leon at that point so that's why leon doesn't apply and i think i'd like to save my other fifty five seconds for rebuttal of that's all   st we don't believe that there is a good faith well the field agent of this case to know they assisted of the crappy process the next issue was a telecommunications official going down the chain with a dumb a telecommunications official have the right to know now  not the proper procedures are followed for the wiretaps that you or the telecommunications fissions do have that assurance because the judge himself or herself has reviewed the order as indicated the orders passed muster it back references the so i don't think scurries concerns that articulated about people other than the judge knowing are really sufficient here to require us to suppress the abbotts of this particular case i think the identity of the approving official was made clear the order itself the next is the next question is let's say for the sake of argument that mister carlisle is correct and that the name should have been placed with the the order well even under dogma datta makes it quite clear that all of the facts do not require suppression the issue is whether or not the order is sufficient sufficiency is the test now you know that it got rid of the court concerts and now replaces it with a sufficiency test or deficiency to just put it up which but the issue here is that the order keteyian what was required to ascertain for purposes of a fair reading of it the name of the person actually the identity of the person excuse me that approved the application or the name of the deputy attorney general in the application but it has the actual authorization letter attached to the application and those documents are of reference to the order clearly by the judge indicated he reviewed them and approve them everything that  g the wiretap and what i would also say further that it going back to the lot of cases before slippery and before datta all indicate that without really very very little exception that the name of the order is there is no reason for suppression it is sufficient now i would agree it was miss carlyle that putting the name in the document is the best practice and i think the office of the electronic operations has got that message but i don't and talk i talk about the great detail of the brief talking about how more extends the wiretap extends good faith and wiretap stature so there is also some indication with the wiretap language itself the historical history  has to follow in this case to suggest that the officers of the attorney of the people that oh you know somehow acted bad faith because they had case law that would support these type of applications it is really i think a little bit beyond  says is when the order doesn't comply with the statute you're done and that i think is what congress meant when they said quite specifically if the order is insufficient on its face it gets suppressed so i think that's the that's why you don't get to say well if we had been congress we might have written this differently that's what donna says and the and i guess the other the other i may just be