which we argued that at the time that mr bright was arrested and charged with committing his third violation of the dui statute the controlling public act was ninety four dash six o nine which may be offense charged a class three felony eight and not the class two fel thousand and six so at the heart of this case is confusion as to which public act was actually in effect at the time of mr price offense now the state now the state alleges that its public act ninety four dash one sixteen which did in fact amend the dui statute to make a fair violation a class two felony but one sixteen never took effect because it was superseded by six o nine which was passed for days later and which did not quote we believe that had the legislature consciously intended to repeal what it had passed four days earlier it probably would have done so explicitly and further that quote censure in the frames is more plausible than the legislature had a sudden change of heart but chose to express it by passive indirection so could another way the court presume the legislature had been negligent and that had simply overlooked one sixteen the courts w extraordinary circumstances but otherwise resulting imprisonment so times in which the court held that all of the amendments had a similar purpose of the adding a tax exception to that statute here controlling act now finally to the extent that any ambiguity remains the rule of lenity should have been applied under which any ambiguity should be resolved in a manner that favors the accused here the ambiguity is pretty which is that it has this bizarre result that you end up having all these authentic defendants who could not possibly know what it was they were specifically being charged with this kind of left up to the when of whichever particular court they were at you from particular attorney confusing is that there are so many different versions out there it's very hard to say which was look at it a different time and you do have a problem with no desk and there were defendants who should have been able to look at  just a third violation of any u i statute but as the actual negro argumenta pertains we have an opportunity now so i'm drawing the time to go argument but we do retain the idea that he was actually charged with his spare violation of dui statute and has the additional element of while his license was suspended or revoked which was never part of his in it was a class two felony however that did not go into effect until june one two thousand and eight which was well over a year after mr bates alleged offense and so to apply that change to mr bright would be in violation of the ex post facto cause as applied to i believe that section the intent clearly was to charge him with and that the analogous action that they would have charged him with under six o nine would have been a violation of the dui statute which would have it class four felony nowhere in the indictment does it say anything other than just the third whether the defendant was on notice of what he's been charged with but the real problem here with his six different mandatory acts that were all passed at the same time with conflicting provisions intent on taking effect the very same day the problem was also had an o friday which i still maintain was wrongly decided when you look at those pieces you get the result that courts really could have just picked which one and there's a mandatory x they want to follow and then move forward accordingly new record is rejected