this is a case about the speedy trial action in particular when ruling from the district judge excluding various periods of time in fact it really comes down to two periods of time that i'm going to talk about  as well as a motion to suppress that were filed on march thirty first two thousand and four and no action was taken on these motions and shell they were finally moved after that codefendant had pled guilty on september fourteenth two thousand and four the reasoning of the district judge was that thirty one sixty one h one  supreme court's henderson case required exclusion of all of that time it's an unusual situation though because nothing no action was taken at all not  hearing and what is interesting is where do we look to to decide whether it requires the hearing or not i would submit that we should look to the district courts own rules and in the western district of washington a motion time i trust i'm not going to use all the time anyway so i agree there's a distinction in your honor but it seems to me to be a distinction without a difference because you really don't get and it doesn't make any difference but you're saying because of the local rule it imposes an affirmative obligation on the district court seems to me there are certain certainly certain types of motions that almost inherently susceptible to hearing if it's something that is so obvious to just a question of law and may be decided on the papers there might be a different case but one of the motions here was in fact was that not a motion to suppress it certainly was your honor and the other one is important yeah he wasn't but my point being is if he if he had filed and joined in the motion for service then you might say i've really been you know i should have been joined in the first place and now i'm being by you know prejudiced by the fact that my motion didn't get hurt on a timely basis that's a i have to think about the logic of that what seems to me to have it seems to me that if if it became clear to the district court that they were going to have a trial then it would have helped you know certainly dealt with the suppression issue so what seems to have happened is that this is a continuance to it seems like in every other case the henderson case itself clymer the just record has taken some action even in the climate case the district court is like i'm continuing this till trial here this is just in space just exists and certainly the decision about whether you know this other defendant is wrongly joined certainly has implications for all of them for reasons of the speedy trial act and other and other cases and what i found in my survey of this court's cases is i couldn't find a case where a motion just sat out there for that long without some kind of action without it being continued over and over again or you know for instance in the henderson case there's a very long time after the hearing but but what i don't think the case is address is where just nothing happens so you are seeking in essence a new decision that would be a new and thirty one sixty one look at my number right h one f talks about the period of time from the motion being filed through that hearing and through decision here because there was no hearing i'm saying that the maximum that should be excluded here is the thirty days because it's like it becomes then when there's no action on it it becomes like a motion and the same thing more than that and therefore avoid the thirty day limit to full rule of your suggestion in other words enters the finding after all the time has gone by even though there was no hearing just  judge is even reminded by co defendants counsel at one place in early august you know with a codefendant reno it's the motion and still nothing is is taken it seems like if we continence a situation where cases can just you know you can bring motions and no action whatsoever is taken up on them you know for instance if this went by for six months and then the judge ordered it here and and then took another six months to decide the case i think because there was a hearing you would come in the operation of the  and thirty one sixty one h one f and notwithstanding the fact that that one motion took a year between time of filing and decision that that period of time would certainly be excluded here because the judge wrong here is an end of justice continuance that the district court granted on on the seventeenth of october excuse me the fourteenth of october which excluded eighty five days the problem with this continu this is a continuance where he read it it's a stipulation and it also comes with an order to subjoin order where essentially this entire thing is about we need more time to do pl it said that in order to get our plea negotiations don't work then we'll need to prepare does that answer your question your honor i mean that is i believe the way it styled in that case but the problem with this is there are some reasons floating around but there's no explicit finding none it's essentially the judge just saying it is so or whatever you say and the problem here is is the parties in their motion in order don't even stipulation in order pardon me don't even say you know we stipulate that the ends of justice and you know that the language from the statute itself and i'm not saying the judge has to get it perfect but there's nothing even suggesting that that is the standard or the finding being made at that place therefore i think that's a pure straight up question of law i think you all look at this posters and the second volume of excerpts of record one ninety three one ninety three three grounds and i'm just looking at my notes here that the government had provided the defense counsel audio recordings of conversations between the dean and the undercover police officer that they had received before that they wanted more time to conduct  the time of conflict and doesn't that fall into that the effective preparation prying for the ends of justice i certainly think it could if the finding was explicitly made your honor gave two reasons and the second got a case that's gone on that long at that time you know having saying you know getting discovery at that point there's no incentive if if we're just granting these things there's no incident there's no reasoning here about you know why this discovery wasn't there and it creates this kind of perverse incentive i mean if we're proving those things at that point then we're not affecting  justice alito said that a passing reference to the complexity of the case isn't enough it's got to be an on the record finding and indeed the statute itself talks about that this time is included  five added to the ninety one which you would get into a delay that would be of an out if i'm doing my math right about thirty five thirty six days more than one hundred thirty five  honor i'm i'm running out of time you can on the record by the time the district court rules on the motion to dismiss and that is exactly what chief judge last night did in his ten page written ruling regarding the defendant's motion to dismi dismissal was mandatory as well as finding that the indictment should be dismissed without prejudice was appropriate in this instance his ruling is complete and he actually as to separate the four hundred in today's question here into four separate categories and then he analyzes each of those categories for the days that should be included as well as the days that are exploited if you bringing motions to suppress quickly for a hearing but in fact the parties were busy this was a five defendant case there were defendants who were agreeing to cooperate the worst proffers going on there w how unreasonable or unnecessarily unnecessary the delay might be and quote that time is it scalable and we should not question that rule because it is well founded by supreme court and the ninth matters would have required the government to put on its witnesses as to whether miranda warnings were properly given to the defendants and there's no way that those two cases those two motions could have been resolved absent a hearing  doing anything on the motion to suppress because he understood there was a potential deal that would make those motions the only evidence that the judge may have considered in october which is that issue today the judge found that the with the attorneys on availability medina was charged with a with offices that provided for life in prison and at a minimum a ten year mandatory sentence there's no challenge that mr faced a serious matter that he objected to the continuances or that he wanted to proceed to trial his attorney was unavailable for trial due to either preparation for another matter for attending to that other matter through allegations were brought to his attention and his attorney's attention that required time for him to consider that problem and to consult with his attorney mr medina's decision to go on two separate occasions to enter into a february fifteenth two thousand and five or so i noticed the just last week was a bit upset that there weren't any stipulations and one of the reasons it was up so that he'd like to have comfort that the the defendant himself knew what was was not proceeding to trial in fact on that date he had a change of pleas hearing that's why the parties were in court and when he arrived at court he changed his mind we then proceeded to up to the  mr to judge last week's courtroom but there's simply nothing in the record that supports mr medina's contention in that in his appeal regarding his intent that he wanted to proceed to trial in that mr medina never communicated his speedy trial concerns until march ninth two thousand  resulted in some of these delays and he doesn't get to turn around now and use these delays as a strategy to terminate his prosecution thank i'm going to apologize to educate i do not have the government case with me i am going to go immediately read it and say it's appropriate we'll file something under twenty eight am very very sorry sorry we're familiar with the case ok thank you i just wanted to respond to one point that the government made and the government was talking about how ins that in our that is that in our kind of seems to extend the temporal period when one can do the required balance saying from the statute i agree with that that that's true it certainly seems to be what justice alito sank the problem now is the government then tells you analysis in this case under those terms maybe you could have been more precise and maybe you would like to see more ground soon but when weeks that order and gets the impression of a judge who's fairly carefully quite