notice issued by the clerk's office after the case was transferred in this case the bankruptcy case was originally filed in the eastern district of texas whereupon upon a motion to transfer subsequent to the initial three forty one meeting but upon it becoming final on june twentieth the case was transferred to the northern district at which time the district court i'm sorry the district clerk the rules rule four thousand for a contains a specific claim processing will you provide that a party must file shall file no later than the sixt those deadlines other then pursuant to the terms and conditions of those rules of four thousand four and four thousand and seven importantly that four been noticed without the notice take and what too late at that point to file something is at the reasoning of so was the reasoning that at the time that the clerk in the northern district issued a new deadline and it was there was still time based on the preexisting creditors meaning to file something timely yes the present tense the issuance of the second notice came before the expiration of the of the deadline cripps the court said you were entitled to while on the notice time the motion to extend the time was untimely filed as to the original deadline but it was arguably timely as to the secondary erroneous deadline issued b both cases the parties the creditors were not able to protect and preserve their rights to object because of the peculiar procedural posture of the case in costin there were two competing petitions filed against the same entity pursuant to rule one thousand and fourteen be the second petition had to be stay and it was staid the first petition was openly dismissed but yes yet the second court the second petition had already issued us three forty one notice but by the time that first case was dismissed in the stay was lifted the sixty day period of time had come and gone and this court said well because of the purpose of the rule and that the case was stayed and you couldn't follow a motion the creditor cannot f motion to extend the time during the stay then they allow you did as the extraordinary circumstance and allow the bankruptcy court to issue a new three forty one notice with a new deadline for  that case there was a case where the case the bankruptcy court inadvertently dismissed the case prior to a hearing and a with a pending motion to dismiss used that to extend the deadlines in the in the in the dumb luck case there's the two only two instances where the court this court has extended the rule now took in two thousand the supreme court found that four thousand four essay is a claim processing while an author of all history purposes one is to inform the creditor of the time they have within which to act to file their objections or complains the second one is to instruct the court of its limits the limitations of extending the time frames and third providing the debtor an affirmative defense for any late fall of claims those are the three purposes for rule four thousand four as set forth and contra on contra contra since then construct has been the supreme court has on various times in the ybor her case the manner a case the hammer case when in interpret in cl processing rules have established that these claims processing rules are under alterable inflexible if a party invokes them the duty of the court is to dismiss the case now granted the supreme court has never indicated whether at the equable exceptions apply to claim processing and i'm hopeful that the determination will come here next month or two put in the pending suit pending case before the court which court heard in november but with respect to the bankruptcy court decision here the court ultimately affirmative fence is raised can be raised now these rules can be this defense can be waived in forfeited by the debtor no doubt and that's what contra kill in this case we did not wa i submit your honor is that while a court has powers to correct mistakes in this particular instance to do so would be contrary to the rule now there are my opponent cites various other circuits that have ruled in their favor but those cases date back to the one nine hundred ninety s early two thousand and six well before they say well concha the court erred but you know who are we going to put there the risk of the debtor or the creditor no one's at fault in those cases the other circuits decided well we'll put on the placed the burden many times on the creditor to preserve and protect their rights he did it in compton they did it in nearly they did it in sam that those rules these rules impose a high burden heavy burden i believe it's the court said for the for the creditor to preserve and protect its rights and to do so they can file a complaint before the deadline they can file a motion to extend the deadline for cause that's a very low burden on this case that did not happen after the deadline expires would cost include a pending mention to transfer i don't to ten fourteen you compare that to real ten one thousand weary cases converted from a chapter eleven to a chapter seven that rules the simply provides for a new deadline for the and i represent the appleby's which include a group of judgment creditors and the chapter seven trustee and that issue here is whether the litigant should be allowed to rely on the affirmative representation of the court regarding  filing deadline even if that affirmative representation turns out to be erroneous i respectfully urges court to follow the line of cases from other circuits and numerous district court holding that litigants are entitled to rely upon the if the bankruptcy naturally read got to foreclosures are going to crash him well i know that each of those cases did acknowledge that the rules are strictly interpret it so i don't i can't tell you whether they specifically cited rule one thousand and six but i know that they certainly mentioned the fact that the rules are usually strictly interpreted but where the court has made an affirmative representation of a deadline to the party that they believe that the court had the equitable power and in some cases they actually referred to the responsibility to rip correct its own error several of these cases stated that it would be a an abuse of discretion by the bankruptcy court not to extend the deadline to the deadline stated in the second notice to correct it there so every every circuit court that has addressed this issue has considering similar facts to ours where the case was and the m wyler case was another case where the court discussed the abuse of discretion of the bankruptcy court if the bankruptcy court were to not correct its own error and the tenth circuit has addressed this issue in  and in that case it's with difficulty noted that the court not only has the power to correct its error it has the responsibility to do so the second circuit while it didn't address specifically are facts has stated that it unpublished opinion and that case cites in wilder and thingy and holds that section one of five a provides the court the power to exercise jurisdiction over complaint objecting to discharge where the objecting party relied on the court's scheduling order containing an incorrect stat line and a number of lower courts both in the circuit and throughout the country have ruled similarly  including both the northern district of texas and the southern district  the last notice yeah right she is four thousand four talks about sixty days after the first date set for the meeting it could have said frankly maybe it should have she had sixty sixty days after the meeting but that's not what it says it says sixty days after the first date set for the beating right and you would agree the first date was the original jurisdiction that's absolutely true and i would like to point out that that meeting never happens it wasn't it was continued until after the car but that's convert my four thousand for every four thousand more the saying is look i don't care when the meeting takes place or take space five years later the point is sixty days after the first date set for the meeting that's when your deadline elapses i take it the way this works is the creditors kno the nature of the debt that meeting may not take place three years keeps getting postponed but the rule says sixty days after the first date set for the meeting and sounds like you're not arguing that this was the first date i'm not arguing with a second date before the discharge is granted because there could be some time before the court actually gets around to granting the discharge if the objections based on facts but if learned after the discharge would provide a basis for the discharge on he a is pretty broad and in giving the court's equitable powers and it says the court me issue any order or process for judgment that is necessary or appropriate to carry out the provisions of this title and that's the suction that most of the says don't you dare change the deadlines except as the rules provide well potentially but i think in this particular circumstance where the court has made that affirmative representation section one basically why people might argue that section one thousand six prevails but as the court noted in in re rise up in the district of new hampshire and this is one of the first exercise their existing right now i wanted to come back to a question judge owen i asked and it was about whether the daughter gave notice to the court that the deadline is wrong the second notice is wrong because that's something that could have done and there have been a number of courts that have addressed this issue and said no because the the daughter and this comes from both  two innocent parties if one must bear a loss that should be the doubter because he had notice of the erroneous state and greater incentive to examine and correct the notice and judge houser in the bankruptcy court address this issue and that's on in the record so going back to another question you asked a little while ago was you know what was there ever a hearing on this and there was a long long before trial that had a hearing as counsel noted when we first filed the motion to extend the deadline and the debtor objected to the extension and so the transcript of that hearing is important for a number of matters before you and that's in the record at twenty twenty four thr twenty eighty three and at that hearing judge hauser specifically in a discussion with the counsel for the debtor said you didn't come here and say that's not the date that's wrong judge what the clerk did was wrong correct and send out a correct notice so that people could know what the real deadline is you want creditors who got what appeared to be an official document of the courts telling them what the deadline is you want them to scratch their head and say i don't know if this notice is really what they meant but you in fact knew that you thought it was wrong and you didn't do anything and so that's kind of the point here you know when creditors get this and it goes to all of the creditors some of them might be sophisticated litigants in the bankruptcy courts but most creditors probably aren't and so when they get this notice it doesn't say you know the deadline is sixty days from the first day of the meeting of creditors it's size the deadline is the stay and so they should be able to rely on the and if the debtor that says hey this notice is  court the opportunity to correct the problem before the deadline expires and so a number of cases have taken that into consideration i don't think there's any question at least in my mind that the problem here is really districts to begin with so this isn't a situation where you have two innocent parties he filed in a district that had no real relationship to the case now a conflict to see that later on at trial they had come up with a reason that he had a lawsuit she asks you know why did you file this in the eastern district to begin with the response was for the convenience of myself and mr ward and she asked me how was it properly filed in the eastern district and as attorney the knowledge i can't say that it was so if the debtor were allowed to prevail in this case and the court were to say well now the creditors can't rely on the notice from the court the court sends out a second notice that would send a signal to all the doubters out there to say hey  wrong district maybe you'll get lucky it will be sent to another district to get a new notice on the creditors will lose their opportunity to job not only what not but of course it would send the signal that you can't rely on orders and notices from the court regarding deadlines and that would create all kinds of confusion with people having to second guess that the courts intentions and the supreme court has indicated that in circumstances such as these it would warrant use of the court's equitable powers and there's a case cited by the doctor it's the carlisle case and in that case the supreme court good knowledge that there is a supreme court precedent that allowed a late filed notice of appeal but in that particular and in the carlisle case they said you know that precedent wasn't pertinence because that precedent expressly relied on unique circumstances we're not going to address whether equitable powers would allow the court to change the deadline because it wasn't looking at unique circumstances such as these in another case dietz which i believe is also cited by doubter the court actually stated that a reasonable court it started it would be reasonable for court to start it would be reasonable to allow the court to fix its mistake so again the supreme court how's spoken on this issue what is the best case you have for a situation where you have language like nine thousand six which seems pretty stark court may look mean large i'm looking through my notes to see if i noted which courts might have referred to nine thousand feet and i will concede to you that i probably did not but i think the end wyler decision is probably the most analogous to our case and there the court said that again the notice was required by law and appeared to be valid so the creditors could have reasonably believed second notice was operative and that the power granted by section one of five  would be meaningless if courts were unable to correct their own mistakes in the in the theme e decision that the court noted that although the burden of protecting one's ri ordinarily placed on the creditor when the court's act affirmatively misleads the creditors as to the deadline the court bears the responsibility for correcting its erik's so while i can't point you directly to a discussion of  thousand and six i think both of those cases are appropriate to consider the other thing i wanted just to point out before i run out of time the the debtor had argued that there was no evidence reliance that a reasonable reliance and so i wanted to correct that and it's again in the same hearing the transcript i've talked about already  twenty thirty five and twenty seventy two if you look at twenty thirty five there's a quote from judge hauser saying this is the situation where the clerk's office issued a notice that is wrong but they did and people have relied upon it and then time we filed something and reliance upon it so she certainly found reliance and in the discussion if you were to look at the entire transcript my co counsel actually testified he was cross examined by the doctors attorney about all the things he had done to pursue the claims and so that discussion showed reasonable reliance but at twenty seven co counsel stated i filed a motion for extension within the deadlines that i thought was a political based on the notice that the clerk's office issued so there is evidence of reliance on the record and judge hauser when she discussed this at the time of trial referred back to that hearing in that trial in the record at sixteen twenty four she says but they were relying upon the northern district date and my clerk's office sent out a notice that said you don't have to file until x so again she found reliance there's evidence of reliance and that shouldn't be an issue for the court  of the obligation to come before the court thinking you know stating that the deadline was inaccurate the debtor knows that that was inaccurate certainly other parties competent counsel she know that the deadline was inaccurate but getting standard for anything before the government excuse one o'clock create the after the deadline in case you missed the deadline and third you have deadlines that can not be extended regardless and that's b two b three is what we're talking about here and these rules took out these issues added excusable mikkel act and put them into the b three category saying get only extend them under the terms of four thousand if the the issue of a vector beamish ration but if you look at this as an equitable issue you're bringing four thousand one thousand sixty three back in i mean back up to being one why is the deadlines of four thousand form four thousand and seven