for the trial court's decision here is one that is in direct conflict with another case of the court here today the pacific gas and electric decision the two cannot be reconciled and it is the visit the gas electric analysis of how to determine ponzi action in these cases that is the rational analysis that complies with this court's precedents with regard to causation analyses the trial for the particular case on indiana michigan quote altered the landscape and changed it into this essentially a review of mitigation whether the mitigation that the utility engaged in was reasonable or not  and for the reasons that we discussed in our brief that analysis misses the actual causation houses we jump over that the trial court here specifically found that regardless of the rate of acceptance which is one of the central factors towards any prosecution analysis in this case the government's delay was going to be at least twelve years would be a very lengthy delay and i as a result the court found that all costs that the utility claimed with very few exceptions were substantially caused by the government's delay this analysis fails to consider whether or not the utility lives for the cause in the first place simply labeling things mr lester if the if this court concludes that the best contribution it can make to this series of cases is to set the rate for compensation which the i guess for alternatives can we tie to the contract best well of the race that the government disguised as folks in this state in fact all well that's progress although i'm going back to ninety eighty three furious when the contracts were actually for there was no rate at that point the utilities requested during the interval making process that you would be putting certain minimum mandatory requirements you will under this time track prior to that time all doctors were simply planning documents that were subject to change subject modification given the long time frames that we're talking about this contract as well as the technical i know that  well that's a pretty low rate that's a late that's a rate that is anticipatory of breach if if nothing else it's farther from contract formation than the eighty seven rate why don't we go with the summary well utility as do we repeatedly stated throughout the process including the contract commission period of the rates which do we didn't know at the time of formation what it would be able to do the next ninety eight this is a novel project has never been done anywhere in the world it's time we very difficult so by ninety one everybody knows it's not going to happen right well you heard it's pretty clear it's not going to happen congress is on its way to the linkage problem which takes everything off the table why isn't the eighty seven the one where everybody really thought it was still a workable goal to have the government take at least an f m to use to prevent them having to build extra storage will i it's it's a so low that it could hardly be seen as fulfilling the contract obligation of getting everything well this is a contract out of this regardless of what race you live the concert going to be performed over the dozens of everybody knows all this is going to continue for dozens and dozens dozens of years but the eighty seven rates closer to the contract formation perhaps reflecting the intent better it's not as low as ninety one it's not as high as just reagan gave  to the other case the sacramento case however your honor as part of playing along the national by products case you know the ideas that were set forth in eighty express is defined by obligated self to satisfy its program plans now is certainly intended and why now there's a problem with the the the deal we not can committing itself and didn't have to commit itself i mean it was this is these are pretty unilateral contracts they take what you offer period because that's the only thing there is there is no alternative place to contract so why isn't still the eighty seven a better than the ninety one that we have in the contract in our basic job is to tie ourselves to the contract right that is right eighty seven or ninety one and eighty seven seems to be the more reasonable although there's nothing in the contract out of the the issue there is did fairly simple the statute and the contract spoke to find high level radioactive waste as one of the definitions is other highly radioactive material that the n r c consistent with existing law determined by the notice of the proposed rule or in the final rule was it fifty four five register at twenty two five seventy nine in those that are registered notices where the rule was promulgated yesterday actually explain what it intended by that rule i mean it said that if the commission in their right said the commission is not now determining that the ways even if highly radioactive do in fact require from the isolation it specifically referenced the interview p a s determined that based on  where the rape question comes a judge reader your question asked which of the four rates was most appropriate i think your right to feel when tired of the contract i'm not just looking for policy appropriate and that's what i want what can we kind of the contract yes and the answer first is that there are four rates in this record that the trial court exam and one of the you have observed was a total lie and that's the nine hundred the rate th forgotten bridge you have three grades in the record and judge marilyn looked at each of them and those rates were drawn from documents from eighty three eighty four and eighty eight the last of which was also the rate that the plaintiffs you look at the purposes of the contract and here we have substantial evidence in the record contemporaneous with the contract telling us what that purpose was that's judge marilyn milian pages twenty one twenty three twenty four of his opinion documents that you heard from the government in ninety three eighty four eighty five eighty six clear that the critical purpose of this contract the reason these utilities have paid that is the purpose of the contract and that is the starting point for any assessment of what constitutes a reasonable rate how do you distinguish the seven from the the one in terms of trying  of limiting liability and it was conditioned on two events that never came to pass one of the congressional legislation that never happened never has happened so again looking at the record in this case what  forty five before thoughts of reach started creeping in yes when you're defending now everything which is what judge merrill awarded you right well heard even in the not let even the one hundred eighty three plan recognize that that was optimistic and not meant to be binding it was aspirational you tends to show the parties agreement on what the contract man and what they were undertaking as the contract progressed but let me answer that and to suggest be reasonable medication right let me suggest this is not the part and the way that you supply that context best in these circumstances is by drawing all the way back to the signing of the contract with those contemporary stocking that's eighty three eighty four eighty five and discerning the did twenty one twenty two or twenty three decision and what he concluded is that the purpose of the contract was quite plain that government started itself to come congressional committees to the public when promulgat government to submit testing whether the amount of money that's coming into the nuclear waste is sufficient to carry out the project as the government vision and what you see in these reports for those three years is it the government in vision the reasonable rate that the plaintiffs were putting forward in this case that the utilities were probably were saying was the most reasonable way to produce for the spent nuclear fuel to be picked up so under any reasonable rate and again reasonable is given its meaning by the purpose of the parties to the contract to clear this spent nuclear fuel at a rate that with our late edition at reactor storage after january thirty specifically and what it says is other highly radioactive material that the n r c consistent with existing law determines by rule requires permanent isolation there is no dispute and hersey has issued a rul completely the n r c said g t c c ways require to permit and isolate and i know there's another school but everybody agrees that right now in the current state of affairs there is no other option for were very reasonable and very appropriate these are not the sorts of decisions that can be entered into lightly with reracking to begin the very next day as the judge found based court concluded that that particular utilities decision in nineteen eighteen to rewrap a decision that had been percolating since nineteen eighty seven according to the trial court w made in the ordinary course of business this trial court concluded that there was sufficient deep ample testimony and evidence from the witnesses affiliated with these utilities themselves showing that their decisions made in ninety three ninety four ninety five to engage in the lengthy and cumbersome the ratan process were made in anticipation of that breach that comports completely within the michigan and equally important to boards with the general notion of mitigation precedence that when you look at the parties mitigation you ask yourself whether it was reasonable whether the party at the time acted had reason to know of the impending  themselves all pointing to the conclusion that with these really rocky decisions were made they were made because of the government's bridge if there are no further questions and i think you're le won't discuss whether any further argument would have been awa