abuse that had been dismissed about six years prior to that in the plea was pursuant to an agreement with the state whereby the state wasn't going to no longer pursue the sexually dangerous persons petition that he was being detained on and where they had agreed that he would get credit time served on the criminal case so essentially the agreement was that mr hughes would be released both civil and criminally pursuant to the plea so he pleads guilty without being told of the possibility that a section of violent persons petition could be filed based on that plea the state in fact files a section violent persons petition and the very next day mr hughes moves do they argument on appeal is essentially that mr hughes's conviction should be reversed for two reasons first as it turns out he pled guilty to not exist in the fence and second that his plea was not regarding the nonexistent charge what happened was your honour's there were originals or ten count indictment five of the charges were used as a basis for the s d p of the section dangerous persons petition am not sure about i just know one of the such a dangerous person statute you cannot prosecute criminally after you find such dangerous i'm assuming what the court had in mind was that there was nothing longer to pursue mine so it's its own term of art yeah i guess i don't but really as an irrelevance but um the point being that when they came into court for the guilty plea they moved to vacate that administrative this missile order and not  orally move to reinstate it you'd have to go through the formal process of filing a new charge and have the defendant waive a preliminary hearing so the appellate court was with us up until this point in the  actively participate in proceedings that are inconsistent with the merits well in its own brief the state argues that that a now process order isn't in a lack a tory and it's not a final judgement so by the own own the state's discretion it's not a judgment on the merits so if you look at all the at least everything that i found and i've seen nothing to the contrary all the cases that involve investment are all existing cases with final judgments and typically what they are when a defense attorney files an untimely motion for a new trial or motion of vacate the plea may be a few days late there is a theory that jurisdiction sure are you making a claim that the defense due process rights were violated when he pled guilty to a charge that had been knowledge process and not reason stated in the sense that there is no  but there's a couple things about that first that i believe the laws changed since then because now i think it was clear that a now process a formal dismissal that requires the filing of a new charge as opposed to the well procedure that apparently he's filed in cook county where it's it's not final and they can just move to reinstate in the differences for now past the speedy trial claque no longer runs where is a speedy trial claque continues to that the court has this ability to reinstate a charge within the term and we no longer go by terms but they put a limit on it and he said had this occurred outside the term there would have been a lack of jurisdiction will thirty days long you know the years in this situation yeah i mean for revenge you'd have to have something before the court at a minimum that's our position and like i argued earlier that you'd need a final judgment you need a judgment to ruling and beyond the fact that the judge accepted a plea to a nonexistent charge that argument is that my client's due process rights were violated because of pleas and voluntary and when you look at what happened here it's it's frankly kind of offensive that he was allowed this plea but the evidence is that mr hughes was acting with the soul with belief that he would be getting released both civilly and criminally pursuant to the plea and instead what happens is the state took the very police were he was expecting to be released and that was the benefit of his bargain and use that as a basis to civilly commit him and he had every reasonable right to believe this because at the time the police they had a psychiatric report saying that he was no longer a section dangerous person is that a violation is due reason the only reason he'd be pleading guilty to a drug charge at that point was because he was being released on the the s d p petition and it was just to simply wrap up all the matters and get released from custody and he actually testified that he was is that it's just not a voluntary plea because he didn't get what he bargained for so it's something that happens afterwards can render the plea and voluntary yeah i mean i think because what happened was that he was exists well that excuse me that's that's my question if there was no discussion whatsoever does that help or hurt you well i think it helps because when the defendant pled guilty he was under the impression he was going to be released civilly and criminally and in fact that's the unrebutted evidence the state put on the evidence of the i'm hearing on the motion of vacate the police so the fact that he wasn't told about it if he had been told that possibility then i don't think we'd be here if they had this plea in place and said oh by the way the state could in theory file a c p petition you're going to you're going to be evaluated before you're released that's i would assume that there was some type of evaluation done which conflicted with the prior valuation was found to be not sexually dangerous and presumably he was there after evaluating found to be sexually dangerous and they don't know that in the record when that evaluation was completed for that plane sequence of what happened when well i know that i believe it would if i recall correctly in my notes are correct i think  so then when you look at the cases such as in the foreign case of balun the that there's started emphasize that you know you just don't look at whether things are collateral consequences and when you look particularly here the collateral consequences work into the police and i think that's crucial to understand in a kind of didn't example of say a defendant pled guilty to driving under the influence in the state promised him that you will not lose your driver's license is ok what's important to me he pleads guilty goes to secretary of state and they refuse to give his driver's license well that's a crucial element that induced him to plead guilty even though that would be a collateral matter traditionally when you work it into the police it becomes critical to the voluntariness the police and that's exactly what you have here attorney general aaron o'connell on behalf of the people would like to address and turn defendants to arguments the first being that his judgment of conviction is voided the second that his plea was involuntary on the issue of jurisdiction and i'd like to make clear that the state did not actually forfeit the argument that it's making here that the trial court had a continuing jurisdiction as a result of the charges that were not dismissed in the appellate court we did not raise that argument however we also did not concede that jurisdiction had been lost so it's not the case that we are now taking to contrary contradictory positions we're simply adding another argument and an apple e mail and any grounds in the record charge you for a firm and now that can we've made that continuing jurisdiction argument because under people versus watson a trial court that has jurisdiction otherwise over a criminal case has the authority to reinstate a charge that has been nollie process presuming that both parties agree to that so that you explain to us what the law was back in the day in the two hundred forty six we'll be talking about term they're all sorts of words in the opinion that i don't understand your honor i'm not entirely sure either i i do know that there was a set period over which a court would retain jurisdiction and the term was i think as as defense counsel was argued was i think three month period however the principle that it announces are nevertheless applicable even though we don't rely on that sort of term structure here but the discussions about jurisdiction within the term and since we no longer use the expression term how is this case helpful to us today under our current constitution was stands for the principle that as long as a trial court already has jurisdiction and watson it was because it was so well we've heard the word knowledge what is administrative dismissal mean and why does it mean they're still currently pending that is as your honor notes a term of art that was used by the trial court and it actually stems pending the trial court didn't want to keep this on the call so the court entered this order administratively dismissing even though there's no provision that allows for that type of a dismissal it seems to just be the result that the court was viewing these as inter related and that the criminal charges as not really being before it while the state was proceeding on that stupid titian but after the jury entered its finding that the defendant was p or it could come back into the criminal case and it could proceed to trial on the charges that have been administrators we just missed but because they were back before the court were no longer dismissed in that fashion  believe was that s t p finding and so the dismissal was affective while that was in place however that the state and the defendant agreed that they would proceed in the criminal matter and stead of the s t p matter under the different case number and so simply by appearing everybody agreed that this was this a ministry of just missile would be vacated and that the state would proceed in th as i mentioned it's not provided for the basis for the questionnaire stiction was the indictment here and the indictment was as a matter of from the state perspective still pending in that it could be discharge of that the state could not have come back into the criminal matter and proceeded so it was a dismissal that was at that point contingent on this other proceeding and it's really unfortunate i believe that these were not all in the same case because if it had been properly filed then it would have been clear that the jurisdiction was continuing over both the criminal charges and that as you know yours well the jurisdiction it's clear that there was and then proceed to the original church are you arguing by and then what you this would happen here because that the state didn't exactly do any of it i think that was implicit in the trial court's order that it was necessarily great deal of uncertainty in the appellate court as to the current status of the reinvestment doctrine after the case of people versus flowers can you give us some ideas about what you think  i was not i was not aware of that being subject to question i mean this court has certainly not held that their investment doctrine does not apply in those circumstances but flowers people respond so it's not exactly the court if you was over thirty days and the parties participated in the emotion and this court said that there was no jurisdiction even though both parties for to speed has the time of thirty days with the court no longer had jurisdiction that   justice thomas raise a great point which is that if this is a jurisdictional issue and the judgement is void then either party could come in and say we're not satisfied with the plea deal but we're going to rely on this technicality to avoid it so it just happens to be the case here that it's defendant that wants to get out from under the plea agreement but it could in the next case if this court were to find that it's voided and the next case it could be the prosecutor that on further reflection changes his mind as to what was an appropriate sentence and then could determine that this was you know this was void as a result of this the whatever the theory is here that that it's void because there was no press written order in stating the charges i believe the theory as it alternately comes out then the prosecutor as as has been noted there's no it's not an equitable argument the defendant couldn't argue well that's unfair i entered this agreement and you know i want the benefit of my bargain it would be void and the trial  would have jurisdiction to act in either party could come in and seek to have it make  reinstate now it's been repeatedly criticized by appellate courts outside of the first district this procedure as being not provided for by rule nevertheless county apparently continues to use this procedure and the case law has developed that recognizes that this is somewhat distinct from annoyed specifically the court has held that if a prosecutor chooses to utilize this procedure and leave to reinstate the speedy trial act will continue to run because the defendant remains patently at risk of being recharged at the prosecutor comes back in now i have seen no evidence that this is ever been used outside of put dismissal that under almost all circumstances the state will be able to come back in if it decides to recharge the defendant and to be clear the argument here is not that the state can just whenever the state wants to come in and over a defendant's objection reinstate any charge that has been ole prost in the past the narrow ground that the people are arguing here is that this is proper when the defendant agrees to this procedure in effect the defendant is agreeing to waive his right to have a preliminary hearing on a new charge or a new grand jury indictment when the defendant comes in and expressly asks the court to reinstate a previously dismissed charge it's defendant's agreement here that is critical to finding that the trial court acted properly both in it in reinstating the charge as a result of its continuing jurisdiction or alternatively as a result of the read best and doctrine because there are two it was the defendant's own participation in the proceedings and his own affirmative act in asking the court to i'd like to move on if the quiz no further questions about the voidness argument to address his argument that his plea was not voluntary now his argument with respect to his plea has been fairly confusing throughout the not reach the issue of ineffective assistance of counsel because it's not very explicit the way he phrases his claim the people gave him the benefit of the doubt and address this is a possible ineffective assistance argument but it's fair to note that this was not an issue that he really pressed before the appellate court and that that court actually decided and furthermore it the defendant tries to join all of these issues together there is a separate doctrine that says that a defendant is entitled to the benefit of his bargain that's one basis for finding a plea to be invalid that's not relevant to the second portion of the analysis which is whether the plea was involuntary defendant is raising all these claims he's incorrect that he did not receive the benefit of the bargain to begin with because it's clear from the record at the change of plea hearing that nobody was guaranteeing to this defendant that he would be released immediately upon being taken into custody by ideas see the case lies clear this the benefit of the bargain theories based on contract principles and as a result the courts have reason that it's an objective view of what the parties reasonably expected it's not a subjective view of the defendant that's not relevant to this sort of contract based argument and he cannot show that there he had any expectation that the state would not file an s p p petition because as his own counsel testified that was never an issue discussed at all with the prosecutor in this case the parties were focused on the cases that were pending at the time of which there were two there was the criminal charges and the s t p petition therefore the that portion of his argument should be rejected he receives a benefit of his bargain now on a volunteer in this issue although defendant tries to frame this as well somebody needed to tell me about the s p p petition the court in deciding this case should absolutely make clear whether that obligation was something borne by the trial court or something borne by defense counsel the trial court admonishments issue the appellate court properly held that this is a collateral consequence and a trial court does not have an obligation to advise regarding a collateral consequence that's long been this court analysis in terms of the voluntariness based on court of mohnish meant so the court should reject that it was somehow rendered involuntary by some action or omission of the trial court the better analysis if anybody had the obligation to advise a collateral consequence it would have been defense counsel however for a defendant to prevail on this theory it's the typical strickland analysis the court must consider both whether he's demonstrated deficient performance and whether he's demonstrated prejudice the prejudice argument here i think is fairly straightforward the defendant's only support for his prejudice argument is his statement at the change of pleas hearing that he would have rejected the plea deal now this is a statement that any defendant at a change of plea hearing will make and perdiem makes clear that the court does not is not obligated to simply accept this at face value the whether this is actually credible and in doing so it needs to look at the circumstances that were confronting defendant at the time and determine whether it would have been rational under those circumstances for the defendant to have rejected the deal it although this court although it preceded the dia which contain this statement the court has previously done that in its own consideration in people versus manning a two thousand eight case where in that case also the defendant testified that had counsel advised him differently regarding the possibility of a b m i plea then he would have rejected the plea that was offered him and proceeded that way the court didn't just say oh well he said so so he proves prejudice the court considered whether that was actually credible in light of what benefits he would have received had he been advised as he claims he should have been the court in that case found that there was no prejudice and rejected it on that ground here the court needs to consider what was in front of the defendant at the time he was offered this extremely generous deal the defendant on the one hand faced the possibility of the s t p petition which is like the s p p but is actually different in certain significant ways for defendants in that the s p p act requires ongoing evaluations and continuous reconsideration whereas s t p act does not provide for these periodic revaluations and solely places the burden on the defendant to come into court and try to obtain a discharge so he was confronted with the possibility of this s t p finding and no evaluations or he was facing five charges that we all admit nobody had ever dismissed these were charges that the state could easily have proceeded to trial on the court had already ruled that the victim's hearsay testimony would be admissible and defense counsel even testified at the change of police hearing that that was a factor that he considered in advising his client to accept the plea that the state's case was strengthened by the fact that the hearsay testimony would come in he was if you add it all up in a worst case scenario he was facing over one hundred years possible in prison he was offered a deal where he would only be convicted of one charge you get fourteen years and he would get day for day credit and based on the way that this was set up was such that he was unlikely to spend really any significant time in g o c custody at all i mean that he did he went in to do you know see and then within two weeks his his release date had been set and then under the s p p act as a result of that the evaluation occurred but it's clear that his if the state had not proceeded on the ask b p petition he would have he would have been released very quickly so the court must consider whether it would have been rational for him to pass up this deal to prove either proceed to trial with all the risk that that entailed with the possible convictions lengthy sentences and then alternately even after that s v p petition make this deal let us out of it that's or has can for it's not a generous deal it could have been a generous deal if they had done what they promised which was to let the defendant out the custody he was no longer sexually dangerous  person so they couldn't of proceeded on the sexy dangerous persons petition was their argument is that they could have him found continue to be detained as a sexy dangerous person when he's no longer sexually dangerous they came into criminal prosecution in a sexually violent person the petition is you need the criminal conviction when it's sensually it continued before you release him back into society you want to make sure that he's not mentally ill and dangerous  he raped it would have been fair if they would have told him yeah you know if you you're going to take this in your expecting to get out but be warned that the state could you're going to be required to be evaluated before the department of corrections release s you and if they find that they come to a country finding in the state could file a civil petition on the such a ballot person's act and you could be right back in the same position that you're looking to get out of and you could never leave and he duty that would that be the case that it should have but yeah that would be an expansion of pity i think that's the easiest way to do this and i know that i'm sure the courts hasn't to keep expanding doctrines but when you look at civil commitment that has potentially no end in some ways is worse than the actual punishment itself so i don't think there's any risk if you find there is an obligation that courts should be admonishing defendants saying when you plead guilty there's a possibility you're never going to get out you could be pleading guilty for a year or whatever on there's a possible you may never see the light of day i think that's a pretty important fact it should be pointed out in the appellate court i was asked well what about the loss of a defendant's driver's license isn't that important right well yeah i mean there's a spectrum but the point is i don't think you have to reach that because i think that the holding could essentially be limited to put the a should be expanded bet quickly to some of the revestive meant and i believe there's a question about flowers and how all that ties and now i'm somewhat clearly of the flowers case and i don't think that they actually decided whether we best and should even apply to guilty pleas so you got that and then yet this where the doctrine itself even if you read the wording of it does not apply to a now process or because now prosor is not a final