rights particularly in this case the tested rights of a public official after having been appointed public office in trying to pursue an appropriate remedy in the case of the planet filed a motion for pulmonary injunction after having been first appointed by the corpus compensation commission to in new term of office that would begin on july one thousand and twelve having faced a decision and a motion adopted by that commission later to attempt to rescind its earlier action and then the implications of a new public acted became effective late in the month of june two thousand and twelve  was providing that the governor would make future point months and read appointments for workers compensation arbitrator's in this case we believe that the circuit court was in error of failing to grant him an early injunction and looking at the fundamental purpose of a pulmonary injunction particularly a political in this case where the purpose of the injunctive relief abstain just to preserve the status quo at a point in time last and the last point in time that we believe the court should have to preserve the status quo was that out of may two thousand and twelve after the commission reagan pointed mr aikman arbitrator in a way that's uncontested in this argument that was in full compliance with tory authority given that time and the commission did so we end the only step needed was for the commission to make a motion to make the and approve it something that again is not contested in this record the commission in fact done alternatively if not the pulmonary injunction ask that the court prohibit the governor since the new legislation had by that point taken effect from making any appointment thereby leaving the position they get intel there could be a determination as to who had the awful of already to make the appointment and so the appointee could be considered out of this this is argued in more extensive portions of both of our briefs at the end when we talk about the balance of harms and the public interest because both the defendants a that may not be morally appointed and that raises questions of possible collateral challenge the state's brief raises exactly the same point making the claim that if mr apeman were not properly appointed in the preliminary injunction might interfered if that injunction order is reinstatement in any event these were questions that didn't have to be decided by the supreme court could have simply prohibited any filling of that vacancy until this legal question is resolved  and that's what should have been done in a case like this that presents largely a legal question is not a fact intensive question out and not only is the record uncontested in terms of the sequence of events because of the procedure that it came up to a pulmonary injunction hearing with no pleading on filed the nine the allegations but more importantly because really all of the action that exists in public records and there can't be any serious dispute about the sequence of events and i don't think the state's position is that there's a factual issue to be resolved here so the question here is whether or not the circuit court properly denied the motion for women or injunction or abused its discretion failing to do so and we believe the court did because the court found that three of the four factors necessary for a planetary injunction were in fact met based upon the truthfulness assumed in the allegations of the complaint in the motion and the fact that as a matter overall in the case law that we have cited to the court it's it's logically impossible for the court to conclude that there is irreparable that public officials have more in their copyright than simply a salary and in fact obviously moore's at stake here in terms of other things that are non monetary that a company being appointed to a public office like arbitrary of the workers compensation the east st louis federation of teachers case recognized the importance and protection under the law of a public official to be able to carry out the duties of office to which that person is either elected or appointed and those that well that's correct but the court failed to properly analyze the issues and in fact should have preserved the best opportunity for remedy which might have been to order that nobody could be appointed to the position pending the determination of the legal question by the court something that of course also could have been handled expeditiously in the public interest determine who is the waffle appointee someone appointed by the commission is be ar or someone to be governor might be a blue point in the future so that is the focus of the question here and in defending against it the briefs of the parties but we spent a short period of time on claiming that the public deck in a gives no rights and therefore there's no likelihood of success on the merits and at this stage it gives all of the process that might be due if this case is reviewed simply as a due process claim which it's well the reason that excited that is because the principle deciding factor here the question of the court in light on whether there is or isn't an adequate remedy of law really raises a legal question that derives from the questions they are presenting are questions of law and i think that is the overriding question at the circuit court will ultimately have to get back to addressing yet change the courts  agency in depriving the laboratory future contracts with the state in fact raised a legal question and that the legal standard of review here is a noble review of that legal question office for three years the state she tory steam provides that removal may be only done for causing provides a specific procedure just like you would have with other employees in the civil service commission type of review the courts have always recognised those as property interests are protected by due process guarantees which comes into quite in when interpret ing the effect of the new public act the argument is made that the new public act in essence negated the wire wall action of the workers compensation commission in truth that cannot be the case and that both a part of the rights that are implicated here the reason that the public act really does not have that effect as already by the defendants is this the public act relates to or changes the process for appointments that would happen after the effective act a couple of important points here the act did not say it will apply to appointments during calendar year two thousand and twelve it did not purport to say that it would deal with terms of office that are currently existing and knowing how to do that as the general assembly has shown it did not do so in this case and it clearly then established it followed the the process that was in existence the brief of the defendants keeps referring to the public act affecting a replace two terms of office and that's not the language in the statute it's not had anything to do with any particular term of office it purports to authorize the governor to make appointments it doesn't actually refer to the terms to which the statutory scheme applies and this begs the question then what appointments with the governor be making if there are no vacancies this is a case of of simple and direct statutory interpretation the worker's compensation commission have the authority and exercise the authority to make a reappointment if attempted to take that reappointment away in subsequent action there is no sta support for its authority to do that and there was never even a defense argument made that it has that power and so did some question that peter apeman was appointed the question is whether this court will allow the that the commission in fact made the case and there is no basis for that when the quarterfinals that there was irreparable harm then in accordance with adequate that yet well because by definition and their record all injuries irreparable and i think that's where the legal analysis from the supreme court broke down and that's where there's a legal error on the part of the circuit court  having made the finding and the finding is quite well supported by the record of course there is no question as to what the judge ruled in the case he specified three actors that were found and the one factor that was  found and then decided that he would decide no one of the questions that remain and the reason there is no that harm is irreparable it is for the very reason i say there's only be one person in this appointed position there are only twelve arbitrator's in this cycle of appointments and there isn't a comparable at what other kind of position that could be held  is already allowed ok there there there is a distinction because there are arguments made that no one has a right to do business with the state or nobody has a presumption of being able to i compile a case of them the he may decision for example dealt with the expectation that a candidate had to do would be in fact elected and that's not protected but cases like biomedical laboratories and the o'keefe case both  recognize that there is a right even if you have no right to have a contract or employment with the state you still have a right to have a statutory process followed so fair bidding processes are appropriate and the court has power to issue an injunction to stop an award when the bidding process is not followed even when someone might not have the right be awarded the contract new law took effect and enjoying the governor from appoint somebody else to occupy that position for that term and i do so work three reasons first and there i submit that the circuit court heard in concluding that the statute provides any basis whatsoever to conclude that the legislature intended to grandfather and create a special exception for appointments for identified any type of injury that is based on a right that would entitle the plaintiff to any recovery other than monetary damages if at the end of the day the plaintiff wins in this case then how  replacement i don't know and i know that there are cases i sort of scratch my head on that one too there are cases that say there's of stink in between irreparable injury and a lack of an adequate remedy in well i've heard that there are examples of the time sometimes shining light between the two but they don't come to mind right now and i don't honestly know how walkin the two can really be treated is other than being two sides of the same  an abuse of discretion review is one where the institutional theory to make the decision lies with the circuit court so it's normally not sufficient for an appellate court to say oh we could have found a different facts or we could have found different ordered throwing the persons affected by the those words into a chaotic situation of trying to undo actions that they may have taken in the lives of those orders would be all the against public interest and i think also this public and in not having  and there was a basis to conclude that he had no legal authority to do so as opposed to surmise about a substitute point by somebody else well so i suppose the reason he asked the question is a good is it seems to me that record doesn't show that and so we have the situation which the balance tips in favor of requiring somebody just serve in office because we can depend upon the restraint the good sense of the governor not to fill the spot that's all i can say is that the it's like the rule of evidence or the newton's law of things and rest tend to stay abreast of the rule lebanon says that you have evidence of the condition of some fact that a given day you can fairly you know draw the inference that it was the same condition the next day twenty years later maybe not so right doesn't show ever happened that the governor might appoint somebody else to to to that position knowing where you would be the same sermon no question about all this let's assume there's three hopefully prevails a traditional waratah which is intended to resolve this and it might be that any new appointee would have brought into this case a necessary party to resolve the who gets to sit in the in the position prop and subject to examine  further a possibly submitting additional or again this question my initial reaction here to standing it only him is only one person can occupy that position and if in fact the plaintiff were to prevail on the merits ultimately on their claim that the he  would have the rights to occupy that position and nobody else that it would necessarily follow if medication than any other point was not valid to fill that term you can only have one person wearing the crown if you will at a given time so i hope that resolves you know that concern about they represent injury issues very clear and i did want to devote some attention specifically to the merits here because and then issue it is a question a lot the likelihood of merits in a case isn't always  question of law sometimes you have competing testimony and evidence and you can't figure out what the contract means and who breached first all that so this is one way or the plaintiff's position is that there was an implied grandfathering provision in the new statute such that appointments that have been made under the old procedures for terms of office that had not yet commenced would be protected against the change procedures that subsequently took effect before that term and then modify the person responsible for making those appointments there's nothing in the statute to suggest that there was any such grandfathering of expectancies based upon terms and i think of the court looks at the statute the plain meaning of it indicates that there is no basis to conclude that it does create this implied grandfathering of in co it appointments for future terms and the counsel what about  draper is reference in his brief to the statute which i believe was the year before then it's pacifically address that issue in this one doesn't it the addressed a different issue in that case the statute said people who are serving terms as arbitrators those terms shall come to an end on this date this status you didn't cut off any terms it dealt with terms that were going to expire in the future after  i'm sorry it dealt with terms that were going to be given after the law took effect there's a huge difference a material difference and it's one thing to say that if the legislature is going to cut off some of these term in office before it's scheduled to expire they need to say so we don't dispute that there's a procedural process property interest in your position but the best type of probably interests that the legislature can take away at the stroke of a path it's not protected against legislative changes to protect against  absolutely and if and if the law had not changed his client would have had the right under that statute to take depositions starting on july first of two thousand and twelve but the law changed before two thousand and twelve he didn't have a job  he had an appointment pursuant to a procedure to start a job later down the road but the law governing the procedures for that new term change before he's stepped into that job as a successive appointment and the statute i think makes it an ambiguously clear that the governor had to make all points for all positions starting as of the date that he wanted to fulfill a renewal term the as a vested right there is no vested right in an appointed position in government there's no conflict in that position elected positions are fundamentally different because there's voter rights implicated in other things in the telling case addresses that but this is merely an it would have taken course as the prior law provided but it wasn't effective against subsequent legislative modification of the appointment procedures and that's what the legislature did it had a series of terms that works fire recall the case before july i want to get this deal yes it did and then i think also helps address the question about why is this different from the earlier the early recto terms that were in course and cut them off the new act and cut off any somehow silently intended that appointments made under the prior procedures that they replace the head get taken effect and weren't going to take effect if at all until after the new act became effective would act wasn't even necessary it wasn't necessary that's exactly right i think that the commission realized after the new act is still in the form of a bill that passed both houses of the general assembly they probably got scuttlebutt that the governor said he was going to sign it or something like that and they didn't want to straight men the think that his appointment to a new term which had not yet begun was somehow going to give him some type of vested right to that position so they revoked it but our position is that the validity or invalidity of that  you let me pick up right where the questioning left off supplemental record attached to the defendant's brief has a legislative history the senate amendment never replace language in the bill and added this was added after the commission had already appointed peter eight in the record before this court the general assembly therefore least in quietly had knowledge of the fact that the appointment happened and when we read the the act as it was amended nothing in the access it applies to any particular term instead it says appointments not times appointments after the effective date of the get a sense the legislative history we've got shows bill was submitted to the governor at the very end of june and the governor has sixty days in which to act never mind of scientists in august you cannot refer the general simply intended any particular term to be directly affected because they didn't choose to put in it this will apply to the terms that expire on july one two thousand and twelve they did that a year earlier when that was their intent but they want to get really to the governor to decide what the intent of the legislation is by determining we would sign it if they had meant for it to undo the action of the commission then does amendment in the legislative history should have expressed we've done that so this court would know what was intended and while it may be true that that that no one has a right to expect the general simply won't do things like eliminate positions after having been forty three year term of you can't interpret say as just imply it only eliminating doubt when the general simply didn't change the offset didn't say we will no longer have arbitrators didn't say we're going to change the position of arbitrator to some kind of a special hearing officer with different duties or different out qualifications instead there desoto grandfathering that's being a sort of here really isn't there instead there is an argument from the defendants that there's an implied rejection of the action that the commission took and we read statutes either plain words if we can you know i think that the supreme court has repeatedly cautioned us to do that and it says on in the after the effective date of this a minatory act nothing precludes the governor from carrying out what this allows which is to make appointments there first has to be a vacancy this is really a case of simple statutory interpretation and the defendant's argument that you should read this statute does somehow imply that the general simply intended to undo appointments that were is just not feasible especially not with the words of the stage all it says is the governor will make the future appointments and re appointments and he may do so and has done so since this was taken effect but the first has point and this is right going back to the public interest question the irreparable harm especially when we deal with public office intertwined with the public interest  no decision from the supreme court clearly announcing that that interplay is there but i think it's implied in all of those decisions that deal with elected officials right to office and the public interest and the voters interest for example there are decisions and we did cite them i'm sorry service to the court but healing with the same with the point of office where the senate has to confirm appointees that it disrupts the balance of powers to not respect the fact that whole process should be respected and so the idea that there perhaps isn't adequate remedy especially in light of the public interest in the the argument that we should go back to court and file a separate call or onco action against the office holder for either makes the holy of a rational and adequate remedy virtually impossible when the purpose of the poison or any injunction to preserve the status quo