page for argument today is great west casualty company against rob good morning i'm louis wooten for appellant may please the court the district court determined that quote it is clear that the clauses in the endorsement are meant to limit coverage and not grant coverage to those remote third parties contemplated by the clause with all due respect to the district court that a single sentence demonstrates multiple errors in the court's opinion the court was answering the question of whether great west intended to grant coverage to what the court deemed were remote third parties but that was not the relevant question before the court the question was does the endorsement clearly and unambiguous when viewed in this light it's apparent that hawker is not some remote third party for whom it would be unreasonable for coverage to extend rather hooker is a trucking company who had a specific contractual relationship with lake they entered into a trailer interchange agreement that trade or interchange agreement had multiple terms including insurance terms poker was clearly nowhere near as remote as a class of people who would fall within the definition of quote anyone who was using a vehicle with lakeville permission so again the question was not whether the endorsement grants coverage as a court opined on but whether it whether the only reasonable interpretation of the endorsement was one that excluded coverage for hoper and phillips and that is anything but clear in your view what is the endorsement do in my view the endorsement is a poorly crafted endorsement that was either intended to clarify that coverage should be provided for the end of a dual listed  there's a belt and suspenders approach being used something that ok look i understand the answer it doesn't do anything it's just redundant is there in your view anything it does the answer no it's perfectly respectable i don't agree with that and i would point to the ok so you think it does something so just tell me what you think it does i think it in our view adds to the definition of who can ensure the two classes listed now then it doesn't do anything the policies definition of who is in insured says pay you for any covered all the anyone else using with your permission a covered  right in your view i think the endorsement does nothing because the already covers in those two categories of people mentioned in the endorsement in most cases we would agree but the seven circuit case of great west casualty vs national cap national casualty demonstrates that that is not always the case there are many statutes including statutes in indiana which were at issue in the great west versus national casualty case that hold that someone who is leasing a vehicle is deemed to be the owner and therefore cannot be a permissive user b says anyone else you and anyone else categories you and anyone else covers the entire world i think that anyone else is finished by anyone else using with your vehicle with your permission whereas with your permission and then if you look at the endorsement both categories covered in the endorsement are people who are using the employer with permission that is great west position in this case it's perfectly straightforward great look i just don't understand why you're resisting the conclusion that it does nothing and as you say they're just trying to make clear that b really means what it says i could understand that argument i just don't understand the argument that it's doing something coming from you for the  guess the argument is that the question that it does nothing assumes that those individuals listed in the endorsement would always be permissive users in every state  in the great west versus national casualty company great west actually argued based upon a statute that those who own or lease a vehicle are not permissive users and multiple states have such have stat as such the indiana statute is nine dash thirteen dash to dash one twenty one and specifically says someone who's leasing is not a permissive user and the and one of the categories of individuals and the endorsement north dakota under your theory should in the court read the insurance laws of the states and to the policy to i think in this case it's proper to read wisconsin and because the trailer at issue here was  endorsement could and does say they will comply with all those state laws well and what if what if there was a conflict between the states i understand why you're saying it should be wisconsin one is we're in a situation where there's a conflict right i think that  you do have to to look at the whether the i believe the endorsement says that we will comply extent we fall within the statute and not those exact words but there still does have to be right other than the financial responsibility certification is there any other part of the policy that refers to or incorporates wisconsin law that incorporates wisconsin law no there are like bill does have multiple locations and wisconsin and there are notations and the policy of those covered locations and again the the licensing entitling of the vehicle which is what there's a requirement to submit the proof of insurance for was done in wisconsin let me ask you one other question in the series or certifying proof of financial and the court determined that accident occurring and texas that the section one hundred four point four one should still apply even though the accident did not occur in wisconsin almost wisconsin passed a law in order to drive a truck in our state you must comply with wisconsin law in all your operations in every state fury that would be the most clearly unconstitutional statute you could imagine would it not be the whole extraterritorial application the supreme court has said it's impossible in answer to george williams's question you defectively said that that's the statute wisconsin has enacted and which we should enforce that seems rather strange to see not well i think the it's it's when you one ninety four point four one discusses is is it that the reading  you're giving to this statute because you see it is it's blatantly unconstitutional i'm sorry could you give me the reading again it's your own reading in answer to george williams this question that wisconsin is saying in order to drive a rig in wisconsin at with wisconsin law in every state right that's by definition the demand for extraterritorial application of wisconsin law it's blatantly unconstitutional if that's your theory about why wisconsin law applies here it seems to me you've got trouble and i wonder whether that's really your theory no my my theory is that when you certify them today to wisconsin department of transportation that you will provide coverage for permissive users then you're obligated to do that and regard restatement of the proposition you can't drive a truck in wisconsin without promising to apply wisconsin law in every state and no state can do that that's why i'm asking if that can really be your theory here well i don't think that's my theory and i forgive me if that's if that's how it's coming out i'm not suggesting that wisconsin is saying you have to comply with wisconsin law everywhere what i'm saying is that if you want wisconsin has a statute that says if you want to operate within wisconsin you must file proof of insurance that you will cover permissive users and once you do that your policy is required to cover permissive users and it is not that fortunately that's just another verbal description of if you can't drive in wisconsin without promising to apply wisconsin law to everything that happens in texas or california or alaska and no state can make that a theory under which wisconsin law is applying without the state having made that the again this that the issue is that the wisconsin has determined under section one hundred four point zero two that they have an interest in regulating trucking business within their state and that we have a company here that was conducting trucking operations within the state and it simply says this is not a requirement where they're asking hoper or lakeville to comply with any laws what they're asking is that once you certify that you will cover permissive users to the state that you do that because you can't operate in wisconsin without certifying that and there's not a single case that's held that one ninety four point four one can't be it cannot be extended to talk briefly about section six thirty two point three two it's a separate statute other than one ninety four point four one in six thirty two point three two it applies only to policies issued or delivered within the state of wisconsin this court and in the decision of mole a member indicated asked to certify the question to the wisconsin supreme court of whether one ninety four point four one incorporates six thirty two point three two and the court didn't answer that question because they found one ninety four point four one clearly applied however the court did say that it is holding was quote in harmony with rule six thirty two point three t another reason why we believe the district court erred in finding six thirty two point three two does not apply is that this policy was issued or delivered in wisconsin the court prescribe a very narrow definition of what issues are delivered me an saying that only the principal address of the first named insured is where the policy is delivered in our brief we cited a case from minnesota indicating that simply delivering a certificate of insurance within a state to a less or is sufficient to find that a policy was delivered for purposes of statute in this case we had a i don't know every a policy not just to a lesser or but to the department of insurance a certificate of insurance was delivered to the wisconsin department of insurance and we believe that's sufficient to demonstrate that the policy was delivered in wisconsin and i can say the rest of the time for about half of the policy is issued one owner sends a copy of it to somebody else in arizona does that mean the policy is delivered in arizona but in official uniformed us government messenger i know i was nervous you know i believe it would need to be delivered by the insurance company and in this case it was delivered by the insurance company to the department i'd like to save the rest my time for about oh please if you have i think about fifteen seconds  may please the court your honor i'd like to address the first question that was asked about the endorsement do and the endorsement adds two additional categories of people who don't qualify be anyone else while using with your permission a covered auto you only hire or borrow accept and it lists a number of people who don't qualify as insured and the endorsement adds to that section a one b two additional categor so there can't be any doubt about what the endorsement does it adds to additional categories of people who don't qualify as insureds and that's what the district court i think found and as to the  question of application of wisconsin law outside of the state i mean that's that's really what what's happening here the only opposition to your response to the argument that that hope are in philip's don't qualify as unsure just that wisconsin law essential reads those provisions out of the policy in the that they are entitled to coverages permissive users despite what the policy says but the fact is the accident happened in in iana not in wisconsin chapter one ninety four of the wisconsin statutes which covers motor carriers says in numerous places that the statutes apply in wisconsin there's nothing in the statute to do that because one forty one one ninety four point forty one one says in it that it doesn't apply to a motor carrier registered in another state and rent is registered in minnesota in wisconsin and the reason that the led presumably to read the mind of the legislature presumably they've recognized that they can't apply the statute outside of the state and so have therefore accordingly limited it to wisconsin in no case and the application of the law but it doesn't discuss whether the statute should be applied outside of wisconsin and doesn't really stand for anything in that regard and even if the court had addressed it it wouldn't be controlling so it's really not not on point so one seventy one one scuse me when i nine hundred forty one is limited to wisconsin six thirty two thirty two the other omnibus statute is similarly limited to wisconsin effectively through the language of the of the statute that requires that says that it applies only to policies issued in wisconsin  minnesota the delivery of the policy well the plaintiff's argument delivery is used in six thirty two point three two means sept so the same policy could be imprinted on the liberty in all fifty states plus what some how do we know whether that's the meaning in six thirty two point three two well i think we know that that's not the meaning because that would be unreasonable to us interpret that why there are the regulations are there other statutes in wisconsin that help us figure out what wisconsin means by the word delivered no your honor there really isn't a definition of the cases that discuss it implicit knowledge without much discussion that you know that that  definition but you know sending the policy to list constant you know bureau of motor vehicles doesn't qualify as delivering a policy to the insured and there's no certainly no authority for that want to be very brief guaranteed delivery of a policy to the insured is not in the statute it does not say delivery to the insured as a policy delivered in wisconsin the only authority side in either brief or what delivering the ins is the case we cited from michigan which says well you know this is a word in a wisconsin statute is there any definition you say no in the statute any regulatory definition by the commissioner of insurance about what delivery means there are absolutely no no evidence there's no definition of what delivery is just simply multiple cases saying that this attitude is to be interpreted as broadly as possible for the purpose of giving