your argument next in case fifteen two three three the commonwealth of puerto rico versus franklin california tax free trust in the consolidated case of mr landau thank you mr chief justice i may please the court of this case present the question whether congress has stripped puerto rico of access to any legal mechanism to restructure the deaths of its public utilities which provide essential services to its citizens like electricity and water respondents contend that congress denied puerto rico access to chapter nine all together but left puerto rico subject to chapter nine preemption provision that anomalous result can't be squared with the statutes text and structure hundred four defined the word state in the bankruptcy code generally to include puerto rico except for the purposes of determining who may be a debtor under chapter nine but that's just another way of saying puerto rico's that amendment categorically precludes puerto rico from passing through the gateway into chapter nine which is located in chapter one in section one zero nine see to me through and out of that  the respondents here have certainly brought contract clause claims and if this court decides the preemption issue in our favor then they would certainly be allowed to litigate those contract claims issues on appeal to me remand the this court has never addressed the question whether the contract clause applies to puerto rico which as this court is aware is in a somewhat unique position in our federal structure that being said the first circuit has traditionally sumed that the without deciding that the contract law applies to puerto rico and again that is an issue for remained the question presently before this court is the antecedent question on which the courts below ruled against us which is to say that the congress's exclusion of puerto rico from chapter nine nonetheless left them subject to chapter nine supreme emption provision why would congress preclude puerto rico from chapter nine who is what what is the background of this provision sure you are it is a black box to answer your question directly there is no legislative history directly on point either way so either side here is going to be limited to speculation on that score the one thing that we do know for sure is that the mere exclusion of an entity from chapter nine is not typically deemed to be a representation of intent by congress to preclude a state law and to answer your question more directly again i'm admitting this is speculation just as their position is speculation one thing that congress could have been wanting to do is to put puerto rico and d c in the same boat for chapter nine purposes as guam and the virgin islands the other territories that are not even within the definition of state in the bankruptcy code in the first place in other words to somewhat unusual things happened in when this provision was added and again to go back to your question i think mr chief justice this came about after one thousand nine hundred ninety eight when the definition of state that had been in the bankruptcy code going all the way back to eight hundred ninety eight fell out of the code that definition broadly defined state to include territories and possessions in one nine hundred seventy eight there was an overhaul of the bankruptcy code and there was no definition of state i think congress recognized pretty quickly as early as one hundred seventy nine there were amendments to fix that omission of the bankruptcy code and the initial omission the initial fix that was proposed by senator de concini in one thousand seven hundred nine went back to the old definition is that all territories and states are included and had no territorial power to reorganize their tents there is not your honor so in other words precisely because guam let's say or the virgin islands by i think pretty basic principles of exclusion when congress which had long defined states to include all territories and possessions suddenly in this definition one thousand nine hundred four says state means puerto rico includes puerto rico and d c i think there's really no way to understand it other than to say that state doesn't include guam in the i know that won in the virgin islands have federal courts yes they have federal judges are they subject to constitutional provisions is it an open question of whether they're subject to the contract close as well to the contract provision limitation i should say i think it yes your honor it is in other words i think this court has never answered that question as to whether or not they fall more on the federal government like side of that where there is no contract was respect of the they pick up this case why would congress have done that and again i think one answer that's as plausible as any other that we've been able to come up with is that puerto rico and d c at least even though they're included in the definition of state at least for chapter nine purposes are in the same boat as the other territories which are don't which don't fall within the scope of chapter nine in the us don't have to go on subject to the chapter nine preemption provision mr lennox and i ask you to focus on the text here a little bit because this gateway theory of yours i'm not sure it matches up with the text very well i mean you could have a gateway provision which said something like puerto rico is a state for all purposes except chapter nine  except for any for vision in chapter nine or something like that but chapter nine but this provision one hundred fifty two is written much more specifically it says except for the purpose of defining who may be a debtor under chapter nine so it's not any provision in chapter nine it's just for the purpose of defining who may be a debtor that is an absolutely critical point your honor and that goes to an interesting point of the structure of the co the eligibility criteria for the various substantive provisions of the code be a chapter nine chapter eleven chapter seven are not located in those substantive chapters they're located up in chapter one so in other words if congress were to have said puerto rico is not a state for purposes of chapter nine that would actually not solve the problem at issue here because the authorization the gateway provision in the chapter nine is not in chapter nine it's in chapter one it's this somewhat unusual structure of the statute that i really think we can't emphasize strongly enough that that to to say that puerto rico is outside of chapter nine wouldn't have stopped puerto rico from authorizing its municipalities under chapter one to get into the chapter nine regime and then they're off to the races under chapter nine because then all they have to do all the chapter nine from is to lend out i'm not sure i understand that argument so you're going to have to back up and then ok i'm sorry because it really is an argue it's i think critical to your point which is justice kagan asked a direct question yet i couldn't congress have said much more directly under one o one the cerm state includes the district of columbia in puerto rico except for chapter nine because if puerto rico's not a state for chapter nine then it couldn't have authorized its municipality to file under one o nine but would have reached the same ends but more clearly saying that puerto rico is not a state that one o nine provision that your honor just referenced is not located in chapter nine it's located in chapter one so for congress to say except for chapter nine it actually would not have reached that one zero nine provision the way to close the gateway was to say puerto rico is not a state for purposes of off rising it's municipalities to be debtors under cha nine that closes the door which is not located in chapter nine once you close that door then you don't reach that chapter the provisions of chapter nine on which they rely on base their entire case don't come into play because their whole argument is based on subsection nine zero three one nine zero three one is a proviso to nine o three if you look at and these now are within chapter nine as opposed to one o nine  state earth had jurisdiction like puerto rico is categorically barred by congress from off arising it's to enter into chapter nine then that reservation of power makes no sense if it has no applicable conceivable applicability to puerto rico and so therefore the one only one nine zero three one proviso which refers back to such municipality in nine o three doesn't work either five two sends you to one zero nine c two which is in chapter one and then that's the gateway provision and that says that puerto rico we know is not a state for purposes of authoriz understand that that gateway is categorically closed to puerto rico unlike any of the states of the union then nine o three which is the next step in the decision tree makes no sense as a as a purportedly applied to puerto rico because what nine  three says is this chapter shall not limit or impair the power of a state to control its municipality but then it has two other clauses which are the key clauses that's correct that i have is what it says the same problem of justice kagan right i mean you have a statute that prohibits importing a vegetable that isn't a fish and we can't read that your bill is fish i mean it just isn't and i'm having is the problem of the language now but it's the whole bankruptcy code it's eleven so when i see the word state that includes puerto rico and then it says except for the purpose of defining who may be a debtor under chapter or not so i go back and look at it and it says one of the things it says well a state law prescribing a method of composition of in dead is not is not for the purpose of defining who is a debtor and do so under chapter n what am i supposed to do again your honor if you if you look at this as the decision tree you are already looking down here at the third at the third all the first part of the tree says his state nothing we say really stops you from controlling your look municipality except in one important respect right in the important respect is that you cannot have your own bankruptcy laws and logically that nine o three want the part that you were referring to you know doesn't make any sense when i read as a division what am i supposed to say ok so the decision tree starts as you as you recognize with one zero one five two the definitions as puerto rico is not a state for purposes of determining who may be a debtor under chapter nine that sends us to chapter one to one  c two says that an entity a must in order to get into chapter nine you must have that authorization from a state so we know that puerto rico is categorically precluded from authorizing its minutes of calories to enter no i'm ok so that part that's the second step in the tree it can't be a duck ok and so then we get to the third separate i think is exactly what your honor is asking the third step in that decision tree says this chapter i e chapter nine does not limit or impair the power of a state to control so the question right there i think you are is what you put your finger on which is to say does that make any sense at all to think invests provision when congress is talking about state this chapter doesn't limit per se the congress would have intended that to apply to a jew stiction that congress has not has categorically precluded from even authoriz debtor creditor stayed at play active roles in implementing the provisions of those checks correct so in all the other forty places the state is involved correct by inherent in the definition of a what a debtor and a creditor is the state has rights and responsibilities under those provisions yes your honor what you what i was understanding you to say is puerto rico's been kicked out of chapter nine all together doesn't even get into the gateway exactly right and i think and so to read it as being involved as a state the only other place it's used as here correct in nine o three you have to be part of it in some way that's exactly right it's nonsensical to think that congress having categorically shut the door on puerto rico that then it would mean for this to apply you are again the only thing a state does under this entire chapter nine regime which is not located exclusively in chapter nine but also in that eligibility provision up in chapter one in one o nine c two then you just the question that arises and just as right if this actually did something this would be a different case but all this says again is this chatter does not very different from what we did in last year and utility air regulatory group versus the e p a we had one general definition of a statutory term and then we looked at it and it's play within other sections and we said can't be given the same meaning because the definition applies to one generalized feature of the act one isolated provision in context and not understand me when i sleep or vision and not understand how that fits into the context again i think respondents are asking you to just pick up this case read nine zero three one and say here it and all i have to do is to get myself to do the following thing i could dress it up so people couldn't understand it but what i would be doing is saying the following it says a state law and it says the chapter does not limit or impair the power of a state a right i'll have to say is that word state right there does not include puerto rico because poor my only problem with writing those words is somebody is going to direct me to the provision a little bit later were it says the word sta in title eleven with which this is part means puerto rico well you're ok now that that's hard for me to do because of that language which are i would your honor has always been so sensitive to the contents you will approach to that maybe even i can't say that an airplane means a horse and i totally know but your honor if if somebody is saying that this doesn't apply to driving and then there this one is about a subsidy provision is about a right turn on red regulation you'd say no but driving has been taken completely out of the statute in other words you are in a position by the time you get to this is kind of a truism this is basically a federal nine o three when i think this is a important federalism limitation on chapter nine it's actually stated more descriptively than anything else it says this chapter does not limit or impair  power of a state if we know by definition the congress has shut the door there is no door for puerto rico and no key for puerto rico then disk to come along and say well it says stay here then i have to apply the power of say i think you can the definition of state but i think you have to understand that when congress has given a definition of state that clip that that categorically closes the door in the antecedent portion of the decision tree you don't even reach this sensibly so mr newdow i think i get what you're saying now which i didn't when i started with you're saying they couldn't just say it's a state except for purposes of chapter nine because in fact there's something that's outside of chapter nine that determines who gets into chapter nine so what they did was they said it's a state except for purposes of this gateway and then they assume that that meant that all of chapter nine wouldn't apply either that's your basic are precisely around or so but before in one thousand nine hundred four before this amendment this nine doesn't apply after one thousand nine hundred four because of of this definitional move that they made here in one o one fifty two what you have to admit is i'm not quite sure what the  word i mean it's a it's a it would be a mysterious way it would be extremely kind of cryptic odd way to make such a major change your honor but the major let me just i would say i mean it's almost like somebody doesn't want everybody to recognize what a major changes being made your honor and figured out the sway that is where nobody would understand that that was happening including the judges who would have to decide what this meant the major but you're the major words puerto rico your honor made the point that puerto rico was within the preemption provision of chapter nine but it also got the benefits of chapter nine so until one thousand nine hundred four there was always complete symmetry between those entities that congress gave access to chapter nine but then said but you can't have your state provisions so the preemption provision there was never any situation in which you couldn't do either you couldn't have any access to a legal mechanism frankly again both sides have elevated now seoul's provisions the other side has the elephant in the mousehole provision that your honor just said our elephant provision is basically the same to say it would be a huge elephant in a mouse hole if for the first time congress by simply taking puerto rico out of the access provision of chapter nine nonetheless wanted to preclude puerto rico to leave puerto rico in the preemption provision of chapter nine well that i mean that's your basic policy argument and i'm not sure it carries much weight why why would it be irrational for congress to say this is the system we're going to apply to all the states but when it comes to puerto rico if they want changes we want them to come to us arlie because congress has a different sort of relationship with puerto rico than has to all the to treat it not like the state and not like a territory absolutely and frankly it would be very anomalous mr chief justice in response to yours because that would put puerto rico in a worse position let's say think won in the virgin islands and that's a very you came up with a very good answer  mr land on my question but i wonder why it's absurd to treat the district of columbia in puerto rico different from guam in the and the virgin islands i mean why would you lump those two  those four together well again your article congress made this decision and one of the things that is somewhat unusual and i think this court is well aware of the some of these constitutional status issues regarding puerto rico from the pending s the one thing that everyone in that case agreed on is that congress through the puerto rico constitution has has recognized a status that gives puerto rico an incredible degree of autonomy the dispute in that case is not whether puerto rico has this you know merely state like status its does that come from the people of puerto rico or for congress but everyone agrees that puerto rico operates in that very unique situation which is really almost the opposite extreme of the spectrum from d where d c has to have its laws submitted to congress and they can and they can veto it so again we don't know why congress this goes back to the black box shows to lump these two jurisdictions which are kind of at opposite ends of congressional oversight certainly the other side came up with a theory that the first circuit embrace that congress was seeking to retain control over puerto rico's municipalities here which is a very strange theory given that congress has not had control over puerto rico's municipalities since well before the puerto rico the commonwealth was created in one thousand nine hundred fifty two that's just not the structure of the the the puerto rico government its political relationship with the united states have you given up the government development banks position and that of some of the a meek i that the provision of nine zero three one applies to states only when it that or is in a chapter nine proceeding because of that provisions use of creditor your honor we have not advanced that argument they make that argument our position is even more fundamental which is you don't even have to reach that argument which are you rejecting the argument we just didn't reach it because we don't need to get there but we don't reject thank you thank you counsel mr chief justice said may please the court everyone here agrees that in one thousand nine hundred four congress withdrew from puerto rico and the district of columbia the power to push their municipalities into chapter nine bankruptcy petitioners position is that by the same an act meant congress imply italy gave puerto rico and the district a much greater power that no state has possessed since one nine hundred forty six the rico and the district of columbia have free reign in whatever they wanted to do wouldn't they be subject in your judgment and sure you'd be arguing they're subject to the contract and they were that age i think contract  directly to puerto rico by dint of the jones act so from now you think that a congress intended to stop puerto rico in the district of columbia from passing emergency legislation that said don't shut off the lights tonight that cut that congress intended that that kind of temporary prove the asian could only be subject to congress who may be on recess who might be wherever it is that it could not do that yes just a sort of my own because in one thousand nine hundred six that was precisely the decision congress made when it decided to overrule this court's decision in fa well it decided to overrule it by keeping states the opportunity to go into bankruptcy and that would be the temporary stay to start with so the question is it's as i understand it justice sotomayor is what was congress doing in one nine hundred eighty four was it we all know that it removed from the district and from puerto rico the opportunity to put its municipalities into chad i mean every everyone agrees that and it never gave the territories that so the territories can pass a law that stops the lights from going out today until congress comes into effect this you can't to a permanent impairment of the contract justice sotomayor that's not correct i don't believe it's not presented here and nothing turns on it but let me explain why this argument which shows up for the first time in the yellow seventy eight all states territories and possessions of the united states were states after nine hundred seventy eight all states territories and position possessions continue to be treated as states and then in one thousand nine hundred four congress annex one o one fifty two which says state include the district and puerto rico except for this one purpose which is to defining who may be a debtor under chapter nine that the so the question is whether you know it doesn't say ohio which doesn't say state includes ohio but clearly it does because everyone acknowledges that the that the kids all definition of state has essentially carried through so i don't believe it's correct and no court i'm aware of as ever held that that the district the virgin islands or or the american samoa are not states for purposes of the bankruptcy code what we have here however is a clear textual provision that says puerto rico is  state and it is so is the district of columbia except for this one purpose which is defining who may be a debtor under chapter nine does another definitional section of the code tell you who qualifies as a tenner who qualifies it as creditor who can go into what chapter or not it tells you if you're this kind of pretty you go into that chapter if you're that kind of creditor you go i'm sorry if you're this kind of debt or you go to individual goes here business goes there this one goes here you have options isn't it what he describes as a gateway that tells you where you're a part or what you are a part of today that's true but it wasn't true in chapter nine was first and acted in one thousand thirty four thirty seven so it was the recount if occasion of the bankruptcy code in one thousand nine hundred eighty eight that moved all of the gateway requirements to section one hundred nine and no one has ever contended that that was intended to be a substantive change oh but it is because it tells you what kind of debtors could make use of what kind of privilege that was always true i mean if that isn't always that's what the purpose of a gateway is no no but it was true when it was part of chapter not all chapter acts in all chapter i  and it used to be that you know that one nine hundred thirty seven act provided a laundry list of certain types of municipalities that were eligible for chapter nine it wasn't every municipality under the sun it was a laundry list of you know six or seven hundred or if the if the definitional section defined state to include puerto rico and you say even though it's not a part of chapter nine by definition in one o nine  it's remains a state for purposes of this rez reservation of state powers why aren't we using creditor in nine o three as it's used in the bankruptcy code as going to be literal as to state why aren't you literal as to critter as the commonwealth i think here is acknowledged it is abandon that argument and it's not clear to me that even the g d b believes in it because if you look at page eight foot no two of their reply brief they acknowledge that puerto rico's own bankruptcy laws were preempted at least until one thousand nine hundred four which could be true only if you adopted our version of the plain meaning version of credit open but if you're going to take the literal meaning of state definition only why aren't you taking the literal meaning we are advising a principle that this court laid down in lawson and that it unanimously reaffirmed in northwest austin that when a statutory definition mechanically applied will  annihilate a major purpose of the statute then you don't apply it where when it leads to absurd results you don't go out and live it really into the statute it would annihilate the major purpose of the one nine hundred forty six act which was to which was to prevent states from in acting their own bankruptcy laws and that is you're well if you actually can't do that well meaning you can't do that according to our prior precedent inherent in state sovereignty that states have to have some method their own method of controlling their municipalities you can have uniform bankruptcy laws but if you don't make them available to a municipality because the state hasn't approved it can you rob a state and your state sovereignty of all power to regulate its municipality and to save it from from bankruptcy yes i mean that's always been true it was true in one thousand nine hundred so why do so many major commentators bankruptcy writers district and circuit courts the sixth circuit included i have said that that's impossible that you can't rob a state of the power to regulate its municipalities if you're offering it nothing in return in  it was of course he can subsequently re address at ashton and at least narrows ashton but the but the tenth amendment problem that was issue was raised in ashton was that state that the federal government was giving municipalities to too much rain to go into bankruptcy themselves without the supervision of their states the problem raised in the roco decision which is a forty year old district court decision for from the southern district of new york is a very different problem which is that the federal government is exercising too much power too much bankruptcy power over municipalities and i would submit that simply to the extent robocall was concerned about that and it's not a holding it's just a stray statement at argument is is straight on the text it's not about purpose because i don't know what congress says purpose here was it's not on policy it's just straight on the text but i now have a better understanding of mr  s understanding of the text and so i just want to engage you on that which is luck congress couldn't have just said except for purposes of chapter nine because of this flukey thing which is that the gateway provision is outside of chapter nine so if it just said except for purposes of chapter nine somebody could have said oh well look i am entitled to be a debtor under chapter nine whether or not i'm out of this estate and and so they did it the other way which said which attacks the gateway provision particularly and then in doing that they assumed that all of chapter nine would follow in its wake once you're not eligible for chapter nine none of the provisions of chapter nine apply to you that's basically mr landau's private argument so tell me why that's wrong it it it's stark i think the fundamental fallacy of the argument is that the gateway requirement you're somehow exclude you from the scope of chapter nine entirely and we and we know that's wrong because if prep or filed for chapter nine bankruptcy today it's section nine twenty one c of the code a part of chapter nine that would provide for the dismissal of that petition chapter nine applies to all persons you know all people under the compass of federal law so i think that's the fundamental fallacy chapter nine does apply the text to all or it it doesn't have to be just that he has some additional string to the bow that is what he wants us to do is to take the words a state this chapter does not limit or impair the power of a state which is in nine zero three now he wants us to read that as if there were then a parentheses a state that is a debtor under chapter nine you say and that a state what states the states that can be debtors under chapter nine now that's how he wants us to read it and that means that that provision does not apply to puerto rico or d c but it isn't just that no part of chapter nine could apply to them it is that if you look at the first sentence that what it says is that those states that are referred to in that first sentence maintain all the power to control by legislation or otherwise a municipality and he says what could that apply to the those entities that are not in chapter nine obviously have all the powers they normally had but the ones that are in chapter nine might not and so what this section nine zero three is address to are those states that are in chapter nine because there's no need to apply that first sentence to anyone else and therefore it doesn't apply to puerto rico that first sentence but since the key sentence is one and two are sub par it's of the first sentence they don't apply either i think that's the whole argument and it isn't requiring us to really play that much you don't play games with the words all you do is say this is one of those parts of chapter nine not all but one of those parts that even though it doesn't use the word getter under chapter nine applies only e textual response that you yourself just aspire evaporated that congress spoke with remarkable precision here in one zero one fifty two it says you're not a state for one purpose only which is defining who may be a  i guess is if we go through chapter nine and the parts that will do apply to death hers under chapter nine it states or municipalities state innocent if we go through chapter nine and look at those portions of chapter nine that do apply to municipalities who are there legitimately as debtors we will find some sentences that clearly apply only to those who are in there as debtors and clearly do not apply to anyone else in the world and he is saying this is one of those but so that inactive to say that congress is not also entering the field of municipal reorganization reorganization that could occur under chapter eleven this was a very important point in both  thirty four and the one nine hundred thirty seven debate that adjustment was something that was seen as within congress's purview reorganization of municipalities was seen as within the state's purview so section nine zero three says we are not entering the field of reorganization when you are entering the field of debt adjustment and then fade to misread section nine zero three one it was nine zero three rather at least in the judgment of the subsequent congress fetu to mis read section nine zero three two per minute conflicting you know support bankruptcy laws and so congress decision in faith and to make clear that only under a federal law should municipal holders of municipal bonds which are widely held be compelled to accept a recent restructure debt and the detail but let me suggest a few reasons why congress might have done what it did first congress has for a long time micromanage puerto rico's debt in the jones act it specifically limited the amount of debt puerto rico could take on that actually was kept and retained through the public last six hundred and it was only in one nine hundred sixty one that congress ended its own restriction of puerto rico's debt on the condition that the puerto rico puerto rico include that restriction in its own constitution so there's a long history of congress intervening on puerto rico debt issues second puerto rico debt is uniquely triple tax exempt congress has essentially told the nation that the encourage the nation all over to buy this debt so there is this is this dead even more so than the average municipal bond is widely dispersed throughout the nation i think the third reason is that by nine hundred eighty four puerto rico and d c are the two most indebted territories by a lot of puerto rico already had nine billion dollars of debt the district owed one point six billion and it was about to hit the general obligation bond market for the first time in its history so the question i ask is how would congress at that moment in time actually think that this was the right time to abandon a forty year old policy of uniformity and preemption in the field of municipal bankruptcy and for the first time since one thousand nine hundred six allow the district of columbia and puerto rico to write their own municipal bankruptcy laws that may or may not treat their nationwide creditors fairly that may or may not result in decrees that are enforceable nationwide there's no good reason or plausible reason to think that congress actually intended that result and under this court's cases in timbres of inwood and cohen versus dela cruz when the stet when there is no clear indication in the statutory text no indication in the legislative history we'll miss miss miss time ago if i could go back to justice briar's question because justice prior gave you a view of the way to read this text which is built on mr landau's view and said what's wrong with that and you go at the gateway provision and then even if not all of chapter nine follows in its wake at least all the provisions in chapter nine that refer to debtors follow in its wake and and justice price said what's wrong what's wrong with that as a way to read this text and then you answered him i think this is fair to say by giving a story about what congress meant to isn't justice prior's mr landau's view of the text just as good if not better than yours and i didn't come in here thinking that but now i kind of am thinking that so talk to me about the text why that's not just as good  say you aren't you are you're not a state when it comes to who may be a debtor under chapter nine and it's a pretty unnatural thing to say and that means that any provisions about being a debt are under chapter nine don't apply to let's be clear that states cannot be debtors right so it is under chapter nine so it's not that the state that the definition of state can't possibly track the definition of debtor it's the municipality that has to track the definition of debtor and twenty plus states categorically exclude their municipalities from seeking chapter nine relief so they  are in the same boat those municipalities as san juan there is no textual distinction to be drawn from those municipalities under one o nine c to d rico isn't given then a well that that is of course true it is an act of congress that does that but that there are numerous exclusions that are solely by dint of federal law in fact the rest of one  not used to it and the you go look at nine o three there are three separate sentences and you saying that the first sentence and second and third are really separate things that number two and three which are number one and two are have a  objective if i read the cases you cite i will say congress had intended something very clear they didn't want those states who weren't in chapter nine they didn't want those states who were not in chapter nine they didn't want them to make rules for bankruptcy of municipalities not binding rules anyway that was their purpose and there's just no reason to think that when they had the specific thing before they wanted somehow to let puerto rico and district of columbia it would do it the states couldn't do it wouldn't you say well there is a good reason they said good reason is the state's income in the nine and they can't and you say well that isn't a good enough reason is as that were if i got this it certainly would have been a momentous change in in the policy of preemption that had existed preemption provision and the senate are in rather than saying that can you give me one more thing give me your best either law review article treatise let's the history whatever it is little little show me that in your view look these are separate things this is the first sentence was not meant to be just a gateway into into one into that it was designed to do what you say what do i want to look at this court's cases in iraq versus haiti of ask a versus united and what weight ridge says is you look to the purpose of the proviso and make sure that york your construction is consistent with the purpose of the proviso iraq versus p t is a course in a unanimous decision of this court and  alaska versus the united states is is another not unanimous opinion of this court so i don't think it's i think it's entirely possible to read section nine zero three one as a general independent stand alone rule and that certainly is how congress enacted it when it was first enact it in one nine hundred forty six ifp have aberrated already i think nine zero three applies to every state in the sense that it demarcates where congress is not entering and where congress is that is the role that nine o three plays in this statutory scheme so that the states that don't permit their municipality to become debtors are limited in what they can do by nine o three in other words or their municipalities are not that are their sovereign powers have been cut off they could not read organize the debt exce nine then ben we're talking about a coercive provision were saying you can't do anything about the composition of your debt if ninety eight percent of the creditors want to reorganize their debt with you and those two percent vultures are saying no and a court would say it's not an impairment of a contract to redo this debt because of the need everything else that we've said in the past you're saying states can't do it if if at they can only do it under chapter nine you you have in your hypothetical just a some sort or i believe supposed that the that the composition does not violate the contract clause and the question then would be one of statutory construction whether the composition you have hypothesised fits within the term of  for that is chapter nine or nothing and the choice for puerto rico and the district is come to congress and what is going on right now in the minimum right of states to deal with their mini consistent with the constitution where does that leave you to make uniform bankruptcy laws but nothing about that primitive to do impair the rights of new of states so drastically well the contract clause i think stands a independent bar to any input to any impairment of the obligation of contracts it was recognized at the time of beacons that states were powerless to act in this area that was that's a comes right out of now what's going on today with respect to puerto rico and d c is congress is addressing right now across the street how to deal with puerto rico's in fiscal crisis that's that is what's going on  congress is considering a range of options for puerto rico including chapter nine just as congress considered a range of options for the district of columbia during its own financial crisis in the one nine hundred ninety s which resulted in a financial control board rather than chapter nine thank you counsel mr landau you have four minutes remaining thank you mr chief justice very quickly i'd like to make three basic points first i think we've seen an example of selective textualism on this morning  for their for response argument to make any sense in the spec to the various territories they have to say that these other territories such as the virgin islands and guam are in compassed with the definition of the word state they just can't say that and congress which had long defined state to include all the possessions and territories in one thousand nine hundred four in the very provision that we are considering said state includes puerto rico in d c that is probably the clearest express to you one can imagine  so for them to be saying that well even though it said probably going to see it meant to include everything and again guam for instance and the virgin islands have also triple a tax exempt bonds everything that is true for puerto rico would be true of the virgin islands and and guam i guess the more fundamental point though is when you are asking them about how this their argument is if you accept our position then any that is not authorized to file under chapter nine is also exempt from chapter nine they are trying to talk about municipalities but i think is justice ginsburg made the point no here we're talking about states massachusetts for instance always has the power to bankruptcy so the states they haven't get authorized just maybe haven't had a crisis that requires them to do that but they're trying to say you have to compare san juan for the boston our point is the relevant comparison since we're talking about the word state is you have to compare puerto rico to massachusetts or michigan unlike massachusetts or michigan which have the door this mean the key to the doorway to the gateway in one o nine c to puerto rico categorically does not thus when you arrive at nine o three and the word state appears only three times in all of chapter nine it appears twice in chapter in section nine zero three which is reaffirming saying this chapter chapter nine does not limit or impair the power of states to control their municipalities so that makes no sense as applied to jurisdictions like puerto rico that are caterpillar excluded from coming through the gateway of one o nine c two where is it does it make sense to apply that to the massachusetts's of the world regardless of whether to date they have authorized their municipalities finally the last point i'd like to make is we talked a lot about about legal principles as is appropriate today but there's this is also a flesh and blood situation in puerto rico puerto rico inactive this recovery act because it is facing a crisis in providing essential services to its citizens it is implausible at best to think that congress left port by taking puerto rico out of chapter nine mentor and i that's all we know it took puerto rico out of chapter nine to say that that precludes puerto rico from dealing in any way with the financial crisis for its public utilities which in this republic hillary's which provide basic services like electricity and water to its people that's the question whether people in a village in puerto rico will be able to get clean water that that this is something again it's fine to talk about the generalities is the law but when you're trying to think about congressional intent please don't lose sight of the fact of the fundamental implausibility and the anomaly of saying when congress took puerto rico out of chapter nine that it meant to leave that chapter nine preemption provision in place and thus leave puerto rico in the dire situation that led the commonwealth to use its police powers to enact this recovery act in the first place thank you thank you council case to submit