warning please a court this case is here for a second time as i'm sure the court is aware it was here before and has one which was decided in february of two thousand and twelve this case in summ involves an employment agreement between myself and the law firm now skin associates and the two claims that were sent back to remain and it to the just record  that it wanted as extensive evidence as to the meaning of the words or phrase when fees are generated you know order to come to the ultimate conclusion as to whether or not the firm owed the employee bonuses based upon a number of cases that have been worked on by the employee for years prior to his terminations and unfortunately when the case record i thank you your honor with all respect when the employee performs could you answer my question yes you might later tell me perhaps why i shouldn't have asked the question yes sure but i asked what i asked and would be interested in the answer we go back on remand and you offer no such evidence that's true well it's not a problem well it's a problem of the defense created the defense if they wanted to sorry you're the play that played of couse the burden of persuasion but the the correct issue of when the fees were generated based upon extensive evidence was not raised by the defense in their motion for s that's why the plaintiffs in response to the summary judgment didn't bring up extensive gambits it should have been brought up at that time but any if any attorney that is trying to defend that motion for judgment is hesitant to bring up anything that's not a response to the opponent's summary judgment motion but having said that your honor the evidence that mean they considered it no it never came up if there were a word certain i guess that's what i'm saying yes that they didn't bring it up so it was it was not it was not brought up your honor so it couldn't be conceded it should have been addressed and then we would have the answer that this court has one wanted of what does generated mean under the contract and even more importantly under the only way to payment collection act and on the factual side there's no dispute that the employed it all the work on the one hundred seventy breast implant claims they were all submitted waiting for a check eight months before the terminations similarly not identical but there's evidence in the record that the employee performed years of work on the other five cases non breast implant cases all both sets resulted in significant funds revenue if you will to the law for the law firm then took the position after the firing you do you can't be paid the bonuses because of the current argument is section eight clear that once and the cases that are cited in our brief once the employee performs what is required to be entitled to the bonus those actions in this case it's one hundred percent of the work to generate t fee on the breast implant cases and it's a large majority of the work on the non breast implant cases but the way jack provides that once the employee and we've even cited we've cited to cases camillo golden bear  and also one of the regulations that all clearly indicate that an employee employer cannot try to avoid paying of a terminated employee compensation that's been earned to include a bonus with a provision that says if you no longer hear at the time the bonuses paid you don't you're not entitled to it that's section one fifteen five of the my wage payment collection act which  prohibits any illegal forfeiture the whole purpose and policy that there we cited the cases as to the public policy in the state of illinois and even this court in the herald opinion had ruled that the purpose of this is to make sure the purpose of the act is to make sure employees aren't stiffed by their employers and when an employee does that similar to what the act provides the the other camillo says when the employer does that work they are to be paid for work their crews in a recovery for the employer so what we have is the employee performing one hundred percent of the work act the statute has to be upheld and illegal forfeiture provision in the contract which is what section eight is eighty four that cannot stand because the law cannot enforce an illegal  provision which the law prohibits and the way jack prohibits that so on the one side as we've argued in our brief the employees entitle to one hundred percent of the bonus on the amount recovered in the breast implant cases and then as to the other five cases we argue as occurred in camillo and the cases cited in our brief the employee even though he's terminated early is entitled to a pro rata share of what had been agreed to as to a bonus on that revenue  american i go back when you started you indicated you're not in the same summary judgment issue that we sent back you're not in the same case it was a new summary no no no your honor where in the same case the case was sent back to counsel and then the employer filed a motion for summary judgment after a small amount of discovery and argued what is in their brief five essentially five arguments as to why th father came up on appeal the first time yes or time yes and that was the senate back whole case it was sustained as to all counts but these two cameras and then sent back for me right but then it was a second summary judgment yes so what we're reviewing is the second summary judgment or what we sent back well i think we should be reviewing what this court want reviewed which is the extrinsic evidence of what generated means the extrinsic evidence here is we've talked about is the employee's done one hundred percent of the work now the argument has been made by the defense that it was waived it was never raised before that's true but but from our perspective what's the important thing is to try to get back where this court make last time and again it's instructed what needed to be done on remand what happened with this summary judgment this time is the court and i and honestly i think the court was misled by the motion in the sense that you had the motion  here's the extensive evidence your your honor as to the meaning of when fees are generated that that that would have been appropriate and that could have been argued on both sides but it wasn't and it was  created a problem the others that the plaintiff was concerned raising an issue that's not raised in the motion but it certainly needed to be raised and had it been raised we would have had the district court's decision thanking our good morning may please court consider mr has his arguments the court this court did not say that the case was to go back only to decide the meaning of a singular word in a contract nor could it because that would be contrary to principles of contract interpretation contracts must be read as a whole with meaning in effect given to language in the entire agreement and the language has to be read consistently with one another and in harmony  possible and where there's a more specific provision in a contract and a general provision the more specific provision controls the issue here is whether mr hassett is entitled to receive a bonus in the form of a percentage of fees that were earned after he was terminated from the law for the district court held that he is not in the district court was correct for fo that to answer that question i would say did the current letter good use i will do that you are section eighteen d four of the contract specifically states that the employer acknowledges where the corporation retains clients upon employees terminations that employee has no proprietary interest in fees to be earned since the employees to be fully compensated through his salary and or bonus for all work don wanted ploy of the corporation that provision is specific that provision controls that provision establishes that in order to be entitled to a percentage of a fee as a bonus that that he has to be earned during employment it is undisputed in this case that all fees that are claimed mr house were not earned during his employment they came in months and even years after what earned means in the dictionary the other thing that we can look to here is the contingency fee contracts themselves under which mr hess worked those contingency fee contracts specifically stated that can ask in obtains a recovery for their client no recovery was obtained for any client in this particular matter which mr seeks until after mr hess was terminated and under the contract he is prohibited from recovering a share of that fee as a bonus tessa's argued to this court that the word generated should be construed in a vacuum he cannot be and the fact that section four of the contract in late later a letter agreement said that he's entitled to fees generated doesn't mean and this court didn't mean what remained of the case that you don't look to the contract as a whole and you don't interpret all the provisions together and you don't look at the most specific hacker dictionary definitions cannot be taken out of context and read in isolation to change the intent of the parties as expressed in the contract itself i would submit that it is exactly what mr  doing in this case by arguing to you that we're supposed to just look at the word generated and nothing else in the con terminations but we also did present extrinsic evidence in the event that the court would find the contract ambiguous and that evidence was undisputed mr can ask he testified at his deposition that in the context of the contr he believed that the word generated meant to receive to receive a fee let me go back and then and apparently i'm not understanding this very well the first people came up with for s what we sent back but the new most for summary judgment i respectfully disagree with that i think what is on appeal now is exactly what was sent there it's the question of the interpretation of the contract there was discovery taken there w was what does this contract as a whole mean that argument was never before this court the first time it was up on the motions really it was that's what the district court decided we decided in two thousand and twelve that this was potentially to be informed by experience  goes back to the district court for the consideration of expense of evidence and nobody yorkers ok so we come back on the same record as we had before with the same questions although why nobody offered any for was an interpretation of the contract and that's exactly what we briefed on summary judgment the second time and it's exactly what was argued to the port the second time and there was a strength again in its admitted and produced by my client simply not by mr  what a statement i believe x is not strings or get it it's in the loft contracts extrinsic evidence parole evidence reflects statements made by the parties to each other when they are negotiating the contract it might include normal terms of trade or so an expert on trade usage might be you but it is hardly irrelevant what any party subjectively believed and did not communicate to the other party it's this court did not prohibit the district court from rule i'm remit from concluding as it properly did that this contract is unambiguous when you can strew the agreement as a whole when you apply the rules of contract interpretation in fact in its prior opinion this court noted that in light in light of the fact that the parties have not briefed this question before our court we remain for the district court to interpret the contract and consider the merits counts one in four the court did not go back and say we conclude that this is an ambiguous contract that you have to take extreme to governance and that you have to then decide the issue he being intitled to a percentage i mean let me go back to what why was a new motion for summary judgment required because the court had to look at the contract as a whole and interpreted section eighty four w never raged and never argued in the first appeal it was not a basis for the motion for summary judgment the entire contract was not considered nor was an interpretation of the entire contract offered on them first a motion for summ judgment that was done after the case went back and it is that they have a point that we argued section eighty four is a more crispus if it provision it's specifically covers the situation where an employee is terminated client stays with the firm and what the right of the warrior is to a proprietary interest in a fee and what the clause says is that the employee has no proprietary interest in a fee that is to be earned at the time of his terminations and that was the basis for the district court's decision in granting the motion for summary judgment for can ask and associates well i guess  the district judge and it was good afternoon to governance would help the health i don't think the court needs to resort to extensive governance because i believe the contracts on it unambiguous when properly considered as a whole and when the specific provision is looked i believe it is not and i believe the district court correctly included that concluded that the contract is in fact an ambiguous and we also made an argument to the district court that was never made the first time this case was before this court th to adopt mr has his argument would be to violate public policy it would be to violate the professional rules of conduct and speech splitting between non winners so what we decided in the first  first case does not apply i think that if the court it concluded and remained of the contract was ambiguous it could have gone to extremes of evidence because there has didn't submit any so i don't know where it would have gone but the court didn't need to go there is the point the court didn't need to go there after looking at all the language in the contract and holding that there's a specific provision in that contract that was never argued the first time this case was on appeal the prevents mr house from recovering fee post terminations and for him to recover a fee incidentally post terminations would require iffy splitting between lawyers not in the same firm without consent of the client and we argued in the ambiguous the word generated has to be construed with the remainder of the contract it has to be construed in context dictionary definitions can't be taken in isolation the word generated is not invade us when construed with the remainder of the terms of the contract when read together in their entirety as a whole show that there is no entitlement to a fee post terminations i see that my time is up we would ask that the court firm unless there's any other questions thank you very much same as what happened in camillo and golden bear and so forth the employer can't hold out a bonus promise a bonus then provide a bonus for five or six years on all these cases there are cases out there that were resolved in the bonus was paid before the terminations but they can't let that it that employee perform what he's required to do to earn the bonus daily weekly monthly as the employee does with wages and other compensation by the employer and then pull the rug out from underneath the employee of the fore artificial date or in this case a real date of when the money is actually received from the defendant in these cases or the settlement facility has to the breast implant cases so his defense the defense argument that eighty four controls here it does not what controls here is in our way to payment and  compensation act counsel also made reference to it made as i heard his argument it was something to the effect that the court focused on just this provision of when fees are generated looking in the same paragraph in the opinion and has one the court specifically said the language of the contract is not clear because a contract is not defined when fees are generated it's logical to conclude that this court looked at the entire contract besides the other documents briefs and was aware of what section two three were provided eighty four from our perspective makes it clear that on the one hand the employee can't get the a share of the fees per the first part of that sentence but the employees to be paid for all work and be complied with and this provision in the contract that says otherwise according to the defense cannot stand strasser yes you one factual question of if i might payment was not made to the employee and i think that's a significant point if the court wants to look at feast splitting and i have a weather brief addresses it's not a fee splitting because the money first goes into the trust account and then the money goes into the firm's account becomes revenue it's now a bonus it's no longer a fee thank you thank you thank story has taken under advisement and the court will proceed to thirty days the united states