a new start physically stand more than one point five million dollars worth of bunker fuel that it owned into the vessels as directed by the vessels agents but was not pa district court held that bankrupt intermediaries that neither touched nor paid for any of the fuel and expected only a small markup relatively small markup for facilitating the transaction have maritime liens for the full value  shipments whereas neustar has no lien at all the district court in our view erred as a matter of law by its plain terms the maritime liens that you protect american suppliers like new start that physically provide necessaries that vessels have ordered regardless of whether there is a direct contractual relationship between the supplier and the vessel or its agent the statute simply does not contain the contractual privity requirement that the district court read into it kamla facilitates maritime commerce by allowing suppliers like new start to rely on the credit of the vessels that they physically serve without having to trace through the contractual terms of whatever intermediaries the vessels may choose to use to procure their supplies the statutory lien exists whenever a supplier provides necessaries to a vessel and does so on the order of the vessel or an authorised agent both of those requirements w satisfied here neustar provided i don't think there should be any reasonable dispute that new star provided the necessaries to the vessel by physically stemming more than one point five million dollars worth of fuel that won't into the vessels and contrary to the district court's holding neustar did so on the order of the vessel or an authorised agent because it is undisputed that either the vessel or authorized agents both ordered the bunkers that new star supplied and directed neustar as to how when and where to supply those bunkers there is no additional unwritten agents i'm referring to the agents the vessel itself and the agents penny in which case you're talking about the actually ordered about the bunkers in the first place and then i'm referring to the people on the scene including the chief engineer who signed the receipt  that we presented that also made clear we were asserting a lien latter did not actually place an order with anyone so they didn't place a written order but they certainly you know as the martin energy court noted that they directed us how to supply the fuel supply but they didn't actually order the fuel itself they they didn't they weren't the ones that placed the written order for the fuel but the statute says on the order of and i think that when you combine all of that together you have a situation where we are not unknown i mean to what i'm pretty sure that we are not unknown neustar is not unknown to the vessels they knew before the shipment that new start was going to be supplying it and they certainly knew during the supply that we were the ones that were pumping the fuel into their vessel they know that when the order was first placed they knew it right after within within days and before the ship before this the delivery occurred they placed an order then they were informed neustar would be the quote physical supplier they then sent it in the records their emails from the vessels or its agent saying that we have arranged for bunker supply as follows and then it says physical supplier new star and those emails are in both of the cases so they have a range they telling their port agents they're telling that the vessel we have arrange for supply as follows supplier neustar and i would say in our brief we've explained that if your if this court were to adopt the contractual privity requirement it would allow vessels to avoid the lien in all instances merely by using a bona fide affiliate to procure their supplies and making clear that the filioque is not their agent and just by way of an example in the meat on a case that's what happened they used a trading company a bona fide company that's their trading company they placed the vessel place the order with that company that then subsequently contracted with o w so by this means if the district court's privity requirements accepted only the only party could ever have the lien would be the affiliate that they contract with in the first instance and when congress amended the statute back in one nine hundred seventy they did so exactly to avoid or to eliminate the ability of that to avoid the lien through contractual terms that they make with their intermediaries the statute says if you provide necessaries to a vessel and you do so on the order of the vessel you have a lien there's no contractual priv anywhere in that statute and the other thing that congress sought to avoid when it amended the statute was imposing on the suppliers who often have to fuel these ships on a moment's notice the addition no requirement of having to go through and investigate all of the terms of all of the intermediary contracts that the vessels might use with their affiliates are there if you meet intermediaries and decide based on that whether they think they have a lien or not and in our case if the court accept the district court's pretty requirement neustar and all other suppliers will have to then go and investigate the chain of contracts to determine whether they think that the party ordering the the supplies is or is not an agent and that's a legal determination that's often hard to make and the other thing they'll have to do if they think that that's not an agent is will have to try to negotiate for some sort of alternative security arrangement either from the vessel or from its intermediaries your honour's the statu was and acted to avoid all of this the point at the very point of the statute his that physical suppliers can rely on the credit of the vessel before the a related issue was before the prior panel you're out  the physical supplier in that case argued that it had a lien based on terms in the o w a specific clause in the o w terms and conditions clause l for that that supplier that the counsel for those suppliers believed gave them a lien we are not making that argument in this case and i would actually think that our argument is kind of the opposite of the argument that the physical suppliers are making that case in that case there were lying on contractual terms to say they have a lien we're saying the opposite we don't need to show we have a lien through contractual terms i think it is frankly common ground among all of the parties to this case that maritime liens are creatures of statute not contract so we are not as the physical supplier in that case is relying on clause l for any other clause of the o w terms of conditions to say we have a lien the point we're making is that we have a lien because we satisfy the terms of the statute the terms of the statute don't have anything in there about contractual privity and if the court were to adopt that kind of a rule and i think it's important that this quirk partly due to its inner pleader decision in the earlier cases has pretty expansive over maritime commerce now particularly in this area and it will i think dramatically alter how maritime commerce is conducted not just in this in this district in this circuit but in around the world we believe in till the o w cases came out and i can be corrected but i am not aware of any case going back to the beginning of time as your honor said where a physical supplier was denied a lien when it wasn't paid the o w cases the line of cases starting with with the various decisions or the first decisions that i'm aware of where that's happened the throughout history and this goes back to when bunker fuel was actually because boats had bunkers that the coal went into that the physical supplier has always understood that when you put something into the vessel as directed by the agents of the vessel that it has a lien and of course the most the clearest analogue to our case was can lucky and circuit case very similar facts and we can talk about and i'm glad to talk about how that case came out but in our view the court adopted a simple rule if the if the order for bunkers originates with the vessel comes from the authorize age and is filled directly by the physical supplier who provides it to the vessel as we did there was a lien and the district court was concerned i think about certain other issues like there be a multiplicity of secret liens i think that's just not true nobody is arguing that everybody up the chain will have a lien certainly the physical supplier will have a clean but that won't be a secret lien the boat the vessel that's cr agents and in this case the record is clear knew knows who the physical supplier is and again in our case we have emails from the vessel saying directly we have a range for supply physical supplier neustar clearly not a secret lien and under the me adopted where that the immediate contracting party has a lien of course the vessel is going to know who that party is as well so there are going to be a multiplicity of secret liens there might be in some circumstances like this case that both parties can assert aleem but again that's not a problem either as the martin energy court did that the a adjust the values of the liens to match the expectancy of the party the vessels are here arguing hey we shouldn't have to pay weiss we agree we are not arguing that the vessels need to pay twice they just need to pay the physical supplier what it expected and then o w the various o w entities who are involved they can get what they expected which was in this case a relatively small percentage around four or four percent in each case and they could get that as a matter of contract or they could get that as a matter of a lien it doesn't matter justice is done equity is served commerce has been facilitated flipside imposing the contractual pretty requirement will be a dramatic departure from prior practice and i'd like to address if i might just the line of cases that judge prodi relied on the other side i would refer to those cases the general contractor cases if you have a general contractor where the vessel contracts for one thing you do is often repairs the general so they contract for repairs and then the general contractor on its authority not the vessels authority orders sub parts of that then often not always but often the sub contractors in the general contractor situation don't have liens but the reason is because the vessel or its agent never ordered the things that the sub contractors provided they may have known that they were going to be provided but they never ordered here that's not the case we have a single order for bunkers in each case that was passed through intermediaries but it's the same order that was issued by the vessel is the order that new star filled so it's clear that the order emanated from the vessel they knew what they were getting they knew that they were going to get they knew what they got and they knew who provided it to them  is required is not that it should be for this not in the sense i mean i read through those briefs obviously in preparing that the letter that we submitted to the court and if you look on virtually every page where the physical say that in in in their briefs and we put this in our letter as well they've actually conceded if they fall into the quote sub contractor line of cases they quote lose their case we did not make that concession and i adamantly do not make that concession today we believe that even if new star is viewed as not as a as a subcontractor in a sense not of a general contract but just of as o w we do win our case and we win it because there is no privity required i read their briefs in the other case is saying we when we had a physical spider when because these terms of o w's conditions somehow make us either an agent make o w an agent or make us an agent or make some sort of privy exists frankly i'm not really sure exactly what they're arguing i just know if you read their opening briefs it's not it's not the argument that we're making today and plus i do think that the issue is frankly an important one and i think the court before any of the panels of this court make a decision they ought to hear and consider all of the arguments that are presented from all of the parties the district court here aaron as a matter of law by holding that u s oil had no lien under similar despite us oil having delivered its marine fuel bunkers ordered by happy the owner the vessels to happy vessels on four different occasions in october or during october two thousand and fourteen at the port of tacoma in our case your honor there are a number of similarities in our case there are striking connections between the owner first of all i will say that in both cases the order originally emanated from the owner in our case the owner happy lloyd very carefully analyzed the bids of the fuel that was being offered through the o w germany intermediary but the record shows that that happened at a at a sheet showing the quality in detail being offered by us oil referred to by name and after analyzing the quality of that fuel the pricing of that fuel made a determination happy made the determination that the fuel offered by us oil was provided the lowest cost factor energy cost factor for them and they selected us oil the district court found that this analysis took place and that it that there was evidence the selection was made  and there's no doubt that the order was made by happening and that happened knew who us oil was and in fact could not have selected o w germany without selecting u s soil inextricable tandem selection at that point o w germany was only offering the quality of fuel at the time and place in tacoma that could be presented could be provided by u and and they were offering at other ports different entities and was was analyzing various o w these each of which was offering  from a different supplier they were analyzing the yes they were analyzing different suppliers i don't know if in any case o w itself was providing punkers but i believe in each case o w was providing fuel from someone else and in some cases it was chevron or phillips sixty six or to sorow but based on those analyses as as i said i have made the selection and lists on their form in each case for each of the vessels for different times us oil is the supplier they then issued purchase orders now when an owner issues a purchase order for a supply of fuel it sounds like it's on the order of the owner as the statute requires and happy i did so they issued a purchase order that specifically name also communicated extensively with us oil throughout this process the e mail exchanges in the record identified in our brief show for each vessel email exchanges between us oil and norton lily when we are the exchanges are to the effect you got the order or i got the order saying to happen and ha replying yes you did for the for example for the cspan hamburg wage there is an exchange of emails where norton lilly is asking can you deliver on such and such a date can you do it at such and such a time here's the ship's tight schedule and passes on looks but looks like you got the order on this one and passes on in the email chain the bunker order information from happening directly  at the direction actually of happy lloyd the testing they controlled the sampling they had appointed at from the beginning have had oil test the company to do the sampling and testing of the fuel and that was all coordinated with the agents and with us oil during the time of loading along with the captain and chief engineers of vessels who were participating in the loading and then who signed and confirmed on the bunker delivery receipts that they doesn't exist and as a result the district court expressly stated that it could disregard as not material quote not material the undisputed evidence that happened that specifically selected us oil to deliver that specific quality and quantity of fuel ordered by happen in so doing the district court also erred by failing to conclude that us oil delivered the fuel quote on the order of the owner w despite finding at page s p f seventy of the decision that happened originated in quotes originated the order and then have pegs agent normal lilly quote confirmed the than enough one would think but there is some suggestion in the admiralty treatises that the statute does not completely supersede the preexisting on codified general maritime law that's why we speak sometimes of the beginning of time would it be helpful for us in your view to request additional briefing on whether the sub contract is a lien can arise under the priest that you general maritime laws honor we would be we would be happy to to respond with that briefing if the court requested it of course you would have no but that that argument has not been raised in the papers and and i'm just one everything is turned on these the statutory language so far everything it before the district court everything was related to the statute that correct the statute and it in the broade in some sense on the preexisting on codified general maritime law but we can leave that for later on another question raised by yards as long a earlier regarding the the the previous case pending before another our court is it your view that the decision of that panel world directly affect the decision of this panel of it as  as mr franken was saying that the facts in that case very different from the facts in our cases for example none of the facts that i've described exist in in that earlier  case including the argument that the order originated with the owner as as i understand that case it's the arguments basically on this cause l for that's not an issue here because the o w terms through o w germany don't apply in our case the happy o w germany contract provides for german law and english arbitration and so there's no no leaning going to arising for o w germany in our case as there may be in the other cases so they're very different facts and in addition the decision by judge judge propriety in our case specifically pointed out that she was inserting a requirement for privity of contract no case and any circuit court that i'm aware of has other than maybe arising in some of these district courts on the  cases as ever impose such a requirement with the vessel owner close quote is not required by simple no apple e before this court argues that a contract is required under a similar this was an a rule that the district court created out of thin air and impose improperly requirement not in the statute and frankly at odds with the purpose of similar which is strongly to favor the us material men like us oil the statute does not state that the owner must order bunkers  by by the owner must be provided to and if you get a lien if you provide bunkers on the order of the owner if you have a contract with the owner or based on a contract congress certainly could have said that and chose not nor does the statute say that you get a mean if you provide necessaries or fuel oil to an owner where the owner directly places that order with you or you take that order directly from the owner no such requirement exists in the statutes nor should the comparison sheets that i mentioned can be found earlier from the happy analysis can be found for example for the c span hamburg case at a five sixty for the sophie express at five eighty three for the santa roberta  five of four and for the vienna express which is case nine twenty two at a six ninety now we also want to stress that the the district court found that specifically that in advance of each delivery happy exe agent norton really confirmed the orders with us soil there can be no doubt on this record that lloyd originated the u s or and that the bunkers were delivered on the order of the owner of the series of communications i described earlier norton really communicating on four separate occasions on behalf of  happy with us soil and by the way in those communications it's it's striking that the communications are only between north and really u s soil and happened there's no reference at all or even copy to any o w entity and those references can be found for the c span express set c span hamburg for example at eighty seven zero three through seven zero eight and also in there is the actual bunker we agree essentially with mr franklin's description the subcontractor cases have no application here that label really confuses the analysis it misses the point that especially here with the weird because in those cases all argument that there was some radical departure from existing law that was invented by judge propriety and importing are in grafting a pretty requirement on the owner what what the appellant's are really asking the court to do is is not strike down some new requirement but actually export the on the order of language from the statute what judges are probably did was collect case law just like judge forrest and judge in the other does in the other decisions which are in all involved the same issues and discussed and mention that in these situations a direct link and as she said a contractual requirement or an agency relationship is quite typically required but this is nothing new and the mischief that mr franklin says that is going to come out of this pando in the nature of a lien against a ship appear all to have been cases in which upon the facts it was possible possibly possible reasonably to hold that he was not a sub pratt contractor at all but had an agreement with the owner to which the contractor as the owner's agent and has been pointed out is not the case in that case so the notion that there needs to be a direct link under the statute between the party providing  and the owner or a person authorized by the owner has been around for a very long time and if you look at the cases collected but by judge to properly judge sheindlin and judge forrest as well as the fifth circuit in lake charles  stevedores and i would commend to your reading the recent decision of the eleventh circuit in bart cliff where it goes through the same analysis now that the parties in these cases of often indicated that if the eleventh circuit take be liberally construed and that as long as the order originated from the from the owner or person authorized by the owner you don't have to show agency up and down the chain or you don't have to show the direction or the selection by the owner through the contractor to to get to a maritime lien those concepts concepts were also rejected by the bark of court now and determine that case turned on a critical admission that the physical supplier in that case sold the bunkers directly to a sub charter a person with presumed authority under the statute  strain because in that case the court decided that the a pelleas admission satisfy the order of the owner requirement so in this case you have the statutory requirements the party that met the statutory requirements was in the in the new star matter o w switzerland the contract supplier the the one party in this case that took an order from the owner supply the necessaries as is clear from bart from a bar cliff and gale had in a number of other cases the physical supplier only supplier rarely gets a lien because it doesn't have a relationship with the with the owner of the vessel its agent the courts have identified the two lines of cases the middleman line of cases and the contractor sub contractor line of cases the other panel considered all the same cases they're saying the judge could probably did something more something bolder something different new star was and am a kiss in those cases yes there was an effort says on the l for  terms of the o w terms and conditions but that's not hasn't been raised by any party here but it's the same case the same issues did judge could probably do something bigger and go farther i don't think so i think she collected cases and says a contract or relationship is typically required i don't think she and grafted or or made some wholesale change in the law here i don't think that's what the decision is if she did  fact require something in the statute does not require that some reading of this case reveals well if that's the case that that's not the statutory language but she was construing cases that construe that very language what  on the order of mean and what does on the order of mean when you take an order as these physical suppliers did from a party that has no real and no relationship to the owner or somebody authorized have liens because they didn't take their own or order from the owner or somebody authorised by the on they took it from otoh you usa if that's the case they need to do that in the one nine hundred seventy one amendments did not eliminate the duty of inquiry for a party who was not dealing with somebody with presumed authority to bind the ship they weren't they were dealing with an energy company and so in that case they had better be sure that they're dealing with somebody w vessel or know that they've been selected directly or have some sort of relationship with the owner otherwise they're not going to get a lien the physical supplier it generally does not have liens good trolls is very clear that sub contractors generally don't have liens because they rely on the credit of the contractor not the owner the same same result should obtain here whether they're considered a subcontractor however you want to look at they weren't dealing with an owner or person authorised by the owner and they don't have liens and the the order below should be refer who then in turn contracted with third party supplier neustar to deliver bunkers to the vessels the sales order confirmation indicated that the supplier of fuel would be new star but clearly had no role in selecting the physical supplier of fuel following the delivery the masters of each vessel signed and stamped to the bunker delivery notes to confirm certain quality and quantity requirements of the fuel received and the note was then transmitted by new star to o w usa for the purposes of confirming that new star had met its contractual obligations following the bankruptcy of o w banker in trading in denmark as well as the bankruptcy of the us entities in november twenty fourth teen clear lake received competing demands for payment and threats of the order of the rest of its vessels in the us or elsewhere based on the us law carved out in the o w terms and conditions so clearly filed this  action among the first of many into pleaders to follow because if ace these competing claims and as a disinterested interplay or plaintiff clearly has always disclaimed to the invoice amount that it deposited into the registry and taken no position as to which if any party has a maritime lien however clearly has reserve the right to obtain a return of the excess amounts on deposit which were deposited for for interest but  set forth in our papers clearlake opposes the reversal of the question of new stars lien on the limited basis that the district court has already ruled that i n g as in the signing of switzerland has a maritime lien against inte funds so the reversal of this portion of the opinion would require a re man to the district court to reconsider its ruling as to to perform equitable arguments subrogation arguments potentially an unjust enrichment argument and this is because the purpose of into pleader is to avoid the imposition of double liability on the disinterested stakeholder and although codified by statute just a little bit so just this is a conditional argument that you're making correct yes the problem with having two liens and allowing the court to just reduce the amount to various liens is that in conducting business vessel owners will have no way to do this on their own  they won't know who to pay who has a lien for what value and it also ignores the contractual obligation that potentially but as a customer when there's a possibility the two parties have liens it's impossible to avoid double liability on the fly by just assuming that you can pay one party want to mount and one party another and if you if you do so you may be in breach of your conscience of your contract so it's really opening charters and another customer's up to litigation that they they really can't anticipate unless the court has any other question more in your honour's they please the court davis wrote on behalf of o w bunker usa your honour's to begin i would reiterate the comments that mr paulson has made and i will try not to duplicate them  i would like to address some of the points raised by mr franklin this morning the first is in his argument he says that the agents ordered the fuel  d as as runners have pointed out the question is who are those agents the agents that mr franklin relies on first is owed a usa neustar just assumes the usa was an agent that is not what the statute says it's not what came with says came over choir's that the party be determined if they are authorized that is the language of agency that is the analysis the judge could probably felt she had to conduct and was proper in conducting the the other point i would like to respond to briefly is mr franklin's concern that this creation which is not a creation of new law that this creation of contract privity would require new start to investigate each intermediary a long chain to determine if it would have a lien and i would submit to you your honour's that new star has made that decision already a new star sign line of credit usa it benefited from that by not having to make a determination up the chain as to whether any other intermediary has a lean or passed along it had contractual rights affected the new stark terms and conditions provided that a party could should provide either alternative security or a letter of credit neustar chose not to ask for that instead submitting thousand forty million dollars unsecured line of credit to the point your honour's that no other case has ever applied a a contract analysis to the supply of bankers the argument that ken lucky should be persuasive authority in the circuit every gun point your honour's and recommend the reading of the bar cliff decision where on identical facts a series of back to sub contractor analysis applied and that agency was important and the review of the contracts was important to determine who was an  agent your honor i guess with the with the on the last point the expectation point of what o w usa expects as with any business o w x a usa expected to be paid on its full contract that is wh it would have come in and if it is what would be used today to distribute equally programmed it to all of o w usas unsecured creditors pursuant to our plan of liquidation and in fact your honour's had a case like this or a similar case been brought before a bankruptcy court under a preference analysis or a fraudulent transfer analysis the full amount of money would be coming back into the st for consideration of the o w lien but i would also like to address a question that the court asked previously regarding the effect of the other panel and its decision in these cases although in my kill and has not taken a position in this case it's possible that if necessary to avoid double liability it may present some of these equitable arguments on remained and in the arrest actions considered by the other panel judge forrest had previously held that you and i n g are not entitled to a maritime lien because that they did not incur any out of pocket expenses because they did not pay the physical supplier and that the maritime lien act wasn't created to reward an actor who wasn't out of pocket or who did not experience this monetary risk so by him examining the legislative history judge forrest suggested that there may be a good faith requirement in the lien act and this also may refer to  considering questions of the un codified maritime law that similar incorporates or relies on judge pro knee expressly acknowledged judge force ruling in the tamara to the decision stating that the decisions are not in conflict with each other because the records in the cases are different so to the extent that the case is re mandated and judge kearney may consider additional evidence in a potentially subjugating one line or another we think that that might be relevant later on an decision issued by the panel as to a standard for considering whether you or i and he has a lien is going to be relevant for judge carney to consider on remand so it's possible that any evidence of bad faith or fraud which led to the collapse of the cities may become relevant in these cases bits so we have to step back of that first because who received those bids in the first place had bag had a pre approved sellers it circulated an invitation to bid to be germany amongst other parties i would point to the fact that us oil received purchase orders from o w usa the us affiliate stating explicitly that the fuel was being sold for the accounts of usa now at the time of these transactions us oil had extended the ten million dollar line of credit to the o w group which allowed to be usa to purchase the fuel for its own account was not supplying the fuel on order of the on order of the owner fuel from us soil the only party that remains liable to the vessel owner was over to you germany it would have had to gone back to market and find an alternative fuel to provide to the vessel or to be germany was the contract supplier and i that's that's basic contract law that's what we have here that's what the eleventh circuit the only circuit to have decided in appeal and case to date embark lefsetz and then we had similarly structured transactions we had invitations e mail communications with norton lily norton only being the port agent who logistically arranged the physical fuel delivery i would urge this court to look at the appendix an appeal seventeen nine three one it's at page eight hundred it's testimony from norton lily and in particular paragraph nine where norton lilly said look we never order bunker fuel on behalf of a vessel including have you given who should be going to the store it's eight hundred page one thousand eight hundred it's in appeal seventeen dash one three one said explicitly we do not order bunker fuel on behalf of vessels including have back void all were engaged in is the logistical facilitation of the delivery after the orders have occurred after the parties have agreed amongst themselves who is purchasing what who ordering the bunkers from whom all we are involved in is is making sure that port are not disrupted at the time the bunkers are delivered to the vessels i would also quickly point out that us oil did not rely on the credit of the vessels and in support of that argument they say well our bunker delivery receipts state that we're we were relying upon the crowd of the vessels well that's not sufficient and that's the fifth circuit in the komarr versus rater marine case where they said look if if your contract states you're relying upon the credit of the vessels it doesn't matter because if you are not really relying upon the credit of the vessels your contract is irrelevant the bunker delivery receipts in these cases they're not contracts to begin with so it doesn't matter what they say us oil was selling on credit to be usa a ten million dollars line of credit with thirty day payment terms so they were not supplying to that to the vessels i would also quickly point out that such use is fairly clear terms such as counsel of record for the vessel owners in those cases we can confirm to the court that the facts are similar in those cases you have an order from and on our time chart or are a series of sub contracts and a physical supply at the end he does rely a lot on clause four admittedly but his briefs also address the same order origination theory that's been advocated here his briefs also argued that can walkie gives him support his lean claims and he also argues that the bulk of delivery receipts create give him a lien so the the issues are similar it has not been phrase precisely as has been phrase here but the issues are similar your honor raise a question about preexisting general maritime law i believe the supreme court case in piedmont to fifty four us around page twelve that's a one nine hundred twenty case in it discusses the history of the act i believe your honor that the act was motivated because general maritime law allows borrowing from state law and you or you would have been lack of uniformity so congress created the lane act it has been well settled since nineteen ten your honour's that the lien act controls and that  supplier must satisfy those requirements to obtain a lien for necessaries there's been a lot of discussion about whether judge could probably you know interjected some new theory by requiring a direct connection to the vessel owner or its agents the we submit to you the district court did not do something new she examined all the cases her rationale and her approach is consistent with a series of cases that have been around add they are not limited to the idea that this rule against subcontract to lean is limited to repair cases those cases involve things such as stevedore services bonkers port services so it is not correct to say that the rule against contractors means generally only arises in repair context just just require component and not just something new the idea is that there has to be a direct connection with one of the entities identified in the act as having the authority to bind the vessel those entities are identified in forty six u s c section three one three four want what she did was appropriate i also want to address did they rely on the communications with norton lily about the delivery and the communications with the vessel owner about the livery the internal analysis is in the record in the in the nine thirty three case at record pages twenty one zero one and twenty one zero four happy purchase orders or are in the record at twenty one zero six twenty one seventeen those purchase orders were sent only only to germany all communications with us soil by norton lilly were in connection with coordinating the delivery norton lilly testified their declaration is in the record it is seven hundred ninety eight to eighty one that they did not fizzle supplier they wanted lied always with germany those conclusions are supported by the record they are factual findings they are entitled to deference in order to overturn them on us soil would have to demonstrate that those pleader issues and the breach of contract claims asserted by germany germany have not been addressed by the district court if this court reverses then the two these two cases should be remain ended so that those issues can be addressed the claim involving the on that issue on that particular vasso there are not but certainly the concern about having to pay twice we've already paid we paid germany us oil has not been paid but your honour's they'd choose to deal with  who ever they deal with they have to deal with an entity with the authority under the act assumed that my time is just about up unless the court has any additional questions i will rest thank you  judge curse is a curse question about the agents i have referred to the actual agents of the vessels are kona and white and wake a trading company those are the agents and then the port agents are the ones that we dealt with we are not arguing that o w is the agent the best counsel also mention that we had an agreement with o w that we extended them credit when he left out was that we did so because our agreement expressly said in it that we are relying on the credit of the vessel and you can see that it clear like panix page three fifty six and why k at two seventy six we also have testimony saying expressly that we extended that line of credit because we knew we had the lightly lien available to us that's what suppliers have and it would change maritime relationships if this court were to adopt the privity requirement what i did not hear from any of the council on the other side and there were a lot was any response to our contention that if the privy requirement is adopted any vessel could avoid it in the future just through their contractual terms all they would need to do is use an affiliate that's a bona fide company to procure their supplies and make clear that that affiliate is not an agent this is not unusual this is how a lot of big shipping companies including n y k do business right now and it is a departure from prior precedent  just browse i want to clarify one thing when i said beginning of time i was actually referring to the beginning of the statutory time i haven't gone back to the beginning of the common law what i do know and we have cited in our brief that the roanoke which the other side is ray as adopt as saying with the common law was and that's in the general contractor sub contract in even that case supports us because the supreme court said that a lien generally wouldn't exist in the in the in the general contractor sub contractor case in less the vessel had notice of the claim of the sub contract you are you you also are you also the view that the statute is more or less preemptive that as we look to the statute  proceed i think it was intended to be preemptive your honor the one other minor point i think somebody mentioned that the district court held that i n g had a lien in our cases the district court did not we have a separate question we claim that i n g was not validly assigned any o w liens were not the district or didn't resolve that question finally on the issue of double recovery that's not a problem in our cases in the inner pleader however if the vessels are concerned in the future the question is who is going to bear the risk when something like this happens is that the physical supplier that congress intended to protect who is going to be out having delivered all the fuel and not having been paid or is it the vessel which congress clearly said was in the better position to protect itself the easiest thing for them to do is to simply say to their contractor hey don't we won't pay unless the physical suppliers been paid first thank you  yes your honor there is one thing that the vessel owners could have done here to consistent with the the congressional policy and that is they could have taken the position of notice to the physical suppliers they could have notified through norton of lily or any other entity they wished the captain the chief engineer there's no lien on this vessel if you load your fuel your millions of dollars of fuel on our ship the notice would have effectively prevented these parties from from covering the point about the credit of the vessel our clients look to the credit of the vessel the testimony in the record is to that effect by us oil at a six twenty five paragraph sixteen in one thousand and the bunker delivery receipts all specifically pointed out that there was no waiver of lien these parties all use the lean as something in addition to whatever conch contract credit checks they run the can a lucky case reach the right result here because the court found that the order originated with the owner as it has in this case and enforce the maritime lien there the mark of court we respectfully submit misread can lucky and it was dicked in any event because the court went on to say that more fundamentally that ninth circuit president doesn't control them they were controlled by gale had and and and also in bar cliff the facts facts were distinguishable from here because there was no issue in the district court there about the constant significant ongoing involvement that the that the ship owner had with the suppliers as there is here court didn't address that because it wasn't raised in the district court  currently there is no circuits live on this issue but if we were in the way you want us to rule we would create it served its potential with eleven seconds potentially but we believe things that i'd like you to do not complicated but we might as well deal with it now i recommend that's up to you of course that you make arrangements to obtain a transcript of this very fine oral argument which might be of benefit to us and to you as we go forward those arrangements are made to the clerk's office in some manner of which i'm totally unaware secondly if the earlier court of appeals panel files its decision before this panel has done so as i expect will be the case there chronologically ahead within one week of the filing of that decision and that supplemental letter briefing need not be more than four it should not be more than four pages double spaced maximum sections nine dash three one two nine dash three three second edition one nine hundred seventy five minute and maybe others will have a similar view but  that's relevant to a request i would like to make for supplemental briefing on the question of whether the statute completely superceded on kind of five general maritime law on these great claiming that it did not mean to me no view on that i just i just think we were to be quite certain of where we stand on that this supplemental briefing would be ten pages double space maximum not all counsel need to respond to this request counsel whose interests are sufficiently similar may wish to choose one law firm to file in behalf of all similarly situated that supplemental briefing should be filed by may twelve twenty eighteen at twelve noon made twelve twenty eight hundred twelve noon electronic filing of courses that is more than adequate with copies to all counsel of record it is so ordered thank you very much we are