we'll hear argument first this morning in case fifteen fourteen thirty nine cyan vs beaver county employees retirement fund mr cox thank you mr chief justice and may please the court congress in one thousand nine hundred eight reacted to a new problem hundred five reform act which dealt with the crisis of abuse of federal claims in federal court plaintiffs had responded by shifting their litigation to state court the upshot was that the pre ninety five abuses were happening they were just happening in state for many thirty three act federal claims and state court respondents disagree with the third one but the text structure and purpose are all against them and the best way of understanding our argument is this if beaver county brought the exact same complaint that they did here alleging a federal thirty three act claim but did one thing differently they also brought a state law claim they'd be knocked out of state court that's of their own reading but they say because they didn't bring their state law getting there and you know this but body could have written a much better statute than our friends across the street or so on but i do think it's the best way of understanding the text explain why in a moment and as i was saying a moment before the anomaly on the other side is far worse this would then be in no other statute that they point to that i've ever heard of does bringing a state count force you out of state court but that's their reading and if congress is going to do something that's strange you would expect them purpose the main purpose of solution was just that to ensure that claims of this particular time were not covered under state law but covered under federal law if i accept that was the main purpose of congress's position what difference does it make who would you dictates the claim if both courts are going to be bound by federal law justice sotomayor we disagree with the premise and what i leads you to in your in your question to me in terms of your conclusion so we disagree that the main purpose was preclusion or state claims they pointed to nothing saying so and i'll walk you through the actual statutory findings in the text of the statute which i think rebel at that and then even if it were a main purpose to deal with the precluded claims there's certainly nothing to exclude and i think there's legislative history in the statute itself is pretty clear that congress also had in mind the abuse that was going on first clause is supposed to preclude or give exclusive jurisdiction to the district court's over all covered class actions which  did i don't think the contradictory i think that what our reading does this leave the thirty three and thirty four x in exactly the same position that is to say that both of them say if you're bringing a federal claim either thirty three or thirty four you can't bring it in state court you're outta there are sorry you're there reading of that first except clause is that it covers all covered class actions as federal or state law claims under your reading this reference to excess is definition f just as a to me you're right to say that under our reading the except the jurisdiction that is our state of the state court is greater than what is precluded by congress that was intentional what i'm trying to say is that's exactly what happened in the thirty four act and has done so for good reason because this court said  chad born when congress is precluding something that's very strong medicine that's them saying to the states you can't have this law all the substantive law but when we're talking about jurisdiction over federal claims congress is the master of that and can they can decide you know we're to bring a case and so on that you would ask about the legislative history and i want to get back to that because in the purpose because i do think it is very strong the purpose is found in our blueprint the statutory findings or in our blue brief it page twenty i wan the whole thing and we see what's there except that's provided and we don't look to an ancillary definitional provision that all it does is to find a term we look for a rule that might be in conflict that could be taken to be in conflict with the jurisdictional provision right so you know it just seems as though you were interpretation there is a very odd thing  y when you read except as provided in section seventy seven p to say let's look to a definition in that section so this is justice kagan you're reading from section twenty two a the except clause which is v which is also seventy seven v a it's found in our blue preferred page a day and you're absolutely right that the clause says except as provided in section sixteen and you say if that alone which is the part you read to me were enough you say well do you look to the definition it's unclear but it's more than that because then it says with respect to covered class actions so there are two halves to this except clause the first half is your right is to say point you in the direction of where to look but it's the second part with respect to cover class provides guidance about how you read statutes and i looked through that to see what we are supposed to do when congress writes jibberish and that's what we have here you said it's a tuesday that's flattering and we have very smart lawyers here who have come to come up with creative interpretations but this is jibberish it is just jibberish it says the provision that was read says that the state courts have jurisdiction over federal claims except as provided in section seventy seven p which says nothing whatsoever about jurisdiction of four states for federal claims so what are we supposed to do with this i think it's a three things about it first is justice ginsburg i don't think the statutes by any considerable evidence has been presented to congress that a number of securities class action lawsuits have shifted from federal to state courts and then this shift has prevented that act from fully achieving its objectives and then it is appropriate to enact national standards w preserving the appropriate enforcement powers of state securities regulators and not changing the current treatment of income sorry that says nothing about ousting the state courts it says providing national standards that control state enforcement agencies so whether it's state court or federal court it's still the same national standards well it's not the same national standards because congress cared very much about the procedures the whole  to did things like say you can't have professional plaintiffs or limits on attorneys fees all sorts what was already clear in the act is that there are certain sections that were clearly intended to be national certain things that were and were not covered and then there were you're right some procedural aspects but nowhere in those procedural aspects that congress say they have to be followed both in state and federal court in the reform act are absolutely right but i do think that is has a bunch of different subsections you're relying on the definition of one but each of the curtain and ones also talks about class action limitations removal of covered class actions by referencing p in its entirety what is either illogical conceptually wrong or improper about looking at all of the provisions of p that law with respect to covered class actions because b and c are certainly talking with respect to covered class action so i certainly agree with you justice sotomayor that when congress used the entire point to the entire clause you can point to any part of the clause you know in i think the definition does give you the best and disha of it but there's nothing that says that you should only look as my friend on the other side does says only look at the preclusion provisions after all these are about pork no he's not doing that he's saying you look at every provision that mentions or talks about the covered class section in the few did and then you look to the definition as well actions as defined in not as provided by as defined in seventy seven p f to not just seventy seven p so there are two ways in which you are reading really does seem at odds with the statutory t first by not saying this the text says provided in your saying defined by and second this the statute makes clear you looked seventy seven p as a whole not to some sub subsection within it so i question all the time in big cases like burwell in small cases like perry versus murchison's protection board last term you're dealing with the statute that maybe you if you look at it one way it's jibberish maybe some of you could have written it better but it still has to be given some were absolutely justice ginsburg and that's why to return to your first question why congress didn't say exclusive jurisdiction as they did in the thirty four act congress and may took care and this is finding five that i had read to just  earlier to say look we want to preserve the vast majority of concurrent jurisdiction and state courts that's individual lawsuits and class actions that aren't covered so that's derivative actions or actions not seeking money damages or actions for fewer than fifty but if you accept their reading what you're essentially doing is saying look congress in this statute they built this super safe house you know in salusa with a front door that was locks that had alarm systems to bar against federal court abuse of federal claims that's the reform act and then the side doors they locked because they were worried about state court abuse and federal court abuse of state law claims that's justice sotomayor is point but they didn't even build a back of the house they didn't  actions and for that congress did everything it wanted because exchange act actions are all in the federal courts there is exclusive jurisdiction there so essentially what was happening was that in exchange at actions it that exclusive jurisdiction was being compromised by the ability of people to bring state law actions and congress completely shut that down so congress did everything it wanted with respect to exchange act actions which are the lion's share of securities lawsuits justice kagan i don't know about lion's share or not but it is very clear manifestly clear that salusa dealt with both problems thirty three and thirty four there are two separate titles that deal with this and there's a  this is a huge problem on the ground you know the ali baba brief says that fifty percent now of these thirty three act claims involving i p o s which you know if it's an i p o it's usually thirty three a claim fifty percent of them have parallel federal and state covered suits in equity in actions that law does that phrase specifically refer to the thirty three acts it says the thirty three or so it says it's all actions that law in the next words and again i'm reading it blue br a reading twenty two a or seventy seven v a actions out law brought to enforce any liability or duty created by this subchapter created by this i will does this subchapter mean thirty four thirty three offenses and suits it is about federal go about this my question is the other side the on the on the purpose i assumed that you put the strongest legislative history argument you could find on page twenty of your brief and that's who president clinton when he signed it and so forth all that stuff you have there and it seems to me in reading through the legislative history i couldn't find anything that really makes clear that it's referring to the thirty three act that could be just referring to the thirty four act i think is there something you want to point me to that would absolutely make clear that this is referring to the thirty  report does in its very first lines and i think it is talking about both that was already three in thirty four act and there's no it's out of the clear oh it's very pretty clear and i do think it's clear i think that you know that i mean in congress again this returns to my point of just oregon at subsection b and you take that as referring to which is it's possible but it's tough not having the words based upon statutory or common law of any state you see because because if it picks that up well then then well we're talking about is those actions that have the state action within it are removable which explains the nominee that you started out with and it would just be an anomaly and you said well it isn't a not depend on you know rereading the removal provision the way it does all argument depends on it's a straightforward reading and it you know i understand just as this is a covered security as set forth in subsection b now the commas around the be around that phrase i just read i agree but the most natural thing is is there furring to those covered actions that are referred to in b and what it refers to in b are covered actions all  right but they're involving state law right so my only point to you is the first argument is really about the first half the jurisdiction clause in the gun restriction clause all you need to look at it says that there's concurrent jurisdiction that's what the thirty three act said except as provided in section sixteen with respect to cover class actions and so in order to decide does the state court have jurisdiction you look to section sixteen and you look to the definition of a covered class action argument is that is you know it's not the you know the usual way provided it is written justice kagan is right to say that but it's not such an unusual way there are other statutes that do exactly this you know the national guard statute in the scholarship statute vessels in the like our example about you know about parking that's in our reply brief it page five these are ways of doing this and again i think that you know if congress is going to do what my friend on the other side says which is to say that by bringing  assume somebody brings in one nine hundred thirty three act claim in state court it's hard to a non one nine hundred thirty three state law action under your theory what happens to that case you can't get removed because under c you can only remove those claims that are state law claims that are based on one nine hundred thirty three and this says you can't remove them so now what happens  they are exactly right that under our reading the preclusion is narrower then the oust of jurisdiction in salusa so that there is a category of cases non covered securities or claims that aren't about fraud in which there is no preclusion but we believe there is no state court jurisdiction over these federal claims so your theory is that those claims they just get out of court even though they have a non covered completely viable non thirty three state law or action exactly and that's exactly the so that's a fairly extreme result on a reading that blocks the presumption and one that exists when there's an ambiguity that says we presume in favor of concurrent jurisdiction so you're taking a very strong presumption churning it on its head and saying we're ousting state court just over jurisdiction security's actions that have nothing to do with federal law so it's a two things that's what you're claims as of thirty three out and the jurisdiction the way we read it is exactly the same that is that same category of cases non coverage securities non fraud cases there's no jurisdiction in state courts for them but they are but they are don't cases in what other situation where we do not have a federal law that pre amps a state law have we ever permitted the federal government to sell the that thirty three in the thirty four act do not preclude certain state law securities actions if they're not precluded how can we give a you can pass a federal law that says this federal law precludes these actions but if you don't have one that says that but i think how can you order the state court not to adjudicate jurisdiction we have to be billeted to paint with a broader brush without interfering with federalism principles here we're only talking about federal court cowan federal court causes of action and all congress is saying is that they are the master of that and you can't bring those that so you can see about to hear from the governor about their theory we do think it does solve a lot of the policy concerns that congress is getting at we think are textual reading is better because we actually give effect to the twelve words in the in the modification of federal court jurisdiction and so we think that's why you should adopt our reading over the saucer general so if i may preserve thank you counsel mr chief justice and may please the court petitioners are correct that congress enacted sluice up to reestablish federal courts as the preferred venue for large class actions involving nationally traded securities but it did  so by eliminating state court jurisdiction over suits involving federal claims but by permitting removal of such suits from state to federal court perhaps a good place to start justice prior would be with your question about the removal provision and how under the text of that provision removal of actions that only involved federal claims is permitted and i think it's easiest to understand if you're looking directly on it seventy seven piece subsection c on page one a of the read brief i think the question for the cord is whether the limiting clause as set forth in subsection b modifies the phrase immediately before it involving a covered security or instead modifies the phrase that comes at the beginning of the sentence and he covered class action if it modifies any covered class action justice fryer i think you would be correct that what congress would mean by that is the type of class action that specified at subsection b which would have all of the criteria including that it would be pleaded under state law but if we are correct that instead it modifies involving a covered security then i think you would look to subsection b to answer the question what type of connection to a covered security did congress have in mind referred to a the definition of covered class action i think what we're talking about is not just the definition of covered class action it's what congress meant by the phrase involving a covered security which is a phrase that doesn't have its own definition and to figure out what that means you look at b one and b two which talk about certain types of misconduct in connection with the purchase or sale of a covered security crew within and then involving a covered class action but it's not an outing a cover climate action it's involving a covered security involving and covered we think for a few reasons it makes most sense to read the limiting clause as applying something which told you what a coverage security is but b want to include don't do that they talk about you know the kind of conduct that's in the way you know the because it's not just modifying covered security it's modifying the phrase involving a covered security and you have to figure out what does it mean to involve the security in the relevant sense perhaps it would be useful to consider an example of a hypothetical statute in which congress impose liability for quote impeding interstate commerce as set forth in section one hundred in that case i think you would want to look to section one hundred ok and the type of impeding acts that are described there to tell you what it means to impede in the relevant sense your point your point is involving a coverage of security that's right so you have to both know what a covered security is and you also have to know is what kind of involvement that's right the first answer is very harbored security you could have just referred to three with a defined but you have to do a second thing which is how is it involved that's correct and one and two in b tell you how it is involved that's right we think that's the better reason versed based on the rule of the last antecedent under which the limiting cause is most naturally applied to the thing that comes immediately before it rather than to something that presented in the following sense both petitioners and respondents make structural arguments about the relationship between the except clause and the anti removal provision in the penultimate sentence of seventy seven v subsect and this is an explanation that responds to both of those arguments moreover petitioners make a very powerful policy based argument that congress could not have intended for federal claims to be stuck in state court where they wouldn't benefit from the protections of the reform act that was the whole point of salusa this is also a powerful response to that in addition we do think that it would be very useful to the lower you understand the the legislative history to just  about is relevant to the thirty three act not just the thirty four act that's one that's right congress can was concerned about both acts in addition to the rule of the last intercede and i would point to the fact that in between our two candidates for the limiting clause and we cover class action at the beginning of the sentence involving a covered security later on there's an intervening phrase brought in any state court and that phrase doesn't have any obvious analogue in subsection b which as the court is well aware applies regardless of whether you're in federal or state court and we think that strengthens the inference that the limiting cause should be applied to the thing adjacent to it could i just want to get the best version of your argument sure one and two involve covered security because what because they involve certain types of misconduct in connection with the purchase and sale of a covered security in other words what does it mean to involve a covered security in the sense that's relevant for the removal pr it has to have an omission with regard to that covered security a false statement with regard to that covered security and the like the types of his conduct specified in those two provisions counsel what do you do with our statement in kershaw and i know you try to distinguish it sure but there e explicitly says remove the interesting question to deal with removed cases is limited to those split concluded in the charms of subsection b that's right and that opinion every time it related to itself to one or two it would say something like like one and two or one and others w limited to just wanted to i think it was talking about the types of misconduct at issue and one in two and the reason i think that is because the specific argument that the court was considering encourage sure was the argument that the plaintiffs made that  the case did not belong in federal court because it didn't involve the purchase or sale of a covered security the defiant defendants responded even if true that's an argument about preclusion under subsection b not an argument about removal under subsection  you really think that whoever wrote this move will provision fought about all this stuff that you're telling us now i'm not sure that they thought about the rule of the last into seat in and the like but i do think they set out to do what you say this does and they decided this is the way we're going to do it if i think it is so far from reality that it really is strains credulity i think even if you think that our reading is a little bit of a stretch i think the contrary reading is also a little bit of a stretch i think all the readings of that everybody is given to all of these so you have provisions are stretch i'm series is there at a certain point at which we say this means nothing we can't figure out what it means and therefore it has no effect it means nothing can we not we have to say it means something i would caution the court against saying it means absolutely nothing i do think that if the court is concerned about the policy arguments that petitioners raise which we think are very important arguments and based on the findings of fact and sluice of these they are things that congress was concerned about we think that our removal argument gets to essentially the same place as a policy matter but with a much more things economically efficiently i mean that is efficiently with words one thing he has to do is get rid of these state actions that's one and a second for us to do is to remove the federal cases into federal court ok and that's where the mixed or not makes your so forth if he was given that task this is the language that does it but i would expect there would be a  report in this report there would be an explanation such as you gave me of the word involving and my guess is there is no such report that's correct that's moving in there and there is no such explanation but there's also no contrary explanation that well it's true and if i could add two more textual points that support our reading of the statute if what is meant is the contrary reading and he covered class action of the sort that specified in subsection b it's not clear what the words involving a covered security would be doing in that sentence at best it would be superfluous and at worst confusing and distracting thank you counsel case you know that the lawyers are scrambling to try and figure out what the statute means and with the way we think you would resolve that is to recognize that these words actually mean something they may target and also that they may not accomplish anything but this  cases like manning that if congress is going to change this kind of law significantly you don't find elephants in mouse holes you don't say that have to use language disrupts and it takes away from the state courts a longstanding form of jurisdiction and that's what the other side wants to happen here the securities act of one nine hundred thirty three unlike the thirty four act always has provided for state court jurisdiction that is the way it has always been and if congress wanted to disrupt that and get rid of  say so quite expressly i can see the importance of the study in the removal issue here because it's so untrue to the interpretation of the question the answer the question before on the other hand is court do x is always yes you you can write an opinion that says we agree for example with the government and the respondents that this language at the very least isn't clear enough to accomplish this result we reserve for another day removal question to be and that honestly is a matter of jurisprudence is probably the right thing to do you're talking about two things they didn't remove it and it's not in the question presented and if you want to signal to the lawyers how it is that we're supposed to litigate these cases that's probably not  the best signal to sand on the other hand it's true for example that if the court were to understand the cursor decision that we do in the structure between b and c and seventy seven p as having a parallel in v a one could effectively resolve the removal question but you could only essentially resolve it in the favor of non removable it would be very hard i think to write an opinion honestly that says what should happen here is these cases should be removed under seventy seven spe anything and also we render involving a covered security that language potentially superfluous and c ok so help me out with that and i know i know we generally we know nobody likes j but it is our job to try and give effect whenever possible to congress's language it's not for us to assume that congress is language means nothing as it was a waste of time it went through by camera lism imprisonment and normally respect for the legislative process dictates that we afford some meaning to these words fair enough i will say however just to be clear that you do have a background presumption that congress would do something like this clearly in these are conforming amendments to be sure if you decided that my reading just came up with nothing in his was perfectly sensible but when one of them doesn't yours and don't come up with nothing no it doesn't spec to that first except clause and also with respect to the provided involved with a number of securities so china would help me out with that ok so the manning decision so there are cases that involve either a state law claim that isn't expressed that relies on the securities act of the thirty three act for the substance standard or a case that combines a thirty three act case with stuck with that all right we're going to do the work with just let me let me work with me right you can't refer to see because we have another except clause that refers to see so it has to refer to be but there's no point referring to be courteous right and this is just  disagree and so if you were to ask it to justice briar's point if if you gave a draft or a mission what would they do if i if this is the mission and that is be under seventy seven p b what we're going to do is bar complaints call preclusion bar complains that combine a state law claim that involves a covered security and is a covered class action with some other claims so a thirty three at claim and if what you want to do is avoid confusion about what you do with the concurrent jurisdiction under   see involved in a covered security how does that not so person reading it is only an indication of where it is that you look weak in the in seventy seven p because there are a lot of provisions that are in seventy seven p so if you say look at seventy class covered class action brought in a state court involving a covered security as set forth and subsection b the government's position is that the words involving a covered security must be doing some work i  certain you're talking about in the oval provision of the no ok ok great ok still jesse right and he covered class action brought in a state court involving a covered security is set forth and b the government makes the on anybody's reading because fraud in any state court would also be arguably superfluous and the cover class action would be superfluous if all you're doing is saying pick up the cases and be what curch are says and i do think it does just a sort of mars right the no no because we're talking about removal here so you have to identify cases that are in state court in order to ok we don't any of our class action ok covered class action could be won in federal court so there's some sort of it would be support forces as well i don't see with incredible precision what kircher says is going on in sluices in b we're going to ban the set of cases in c we're concerned that we might have recalcitrant state courts the cases that are abandoned in b can be removed under c and i don't even think this an argument would help the other side very much for two reasons the first is the last andersen is covered security is not involving a covered security and the second is you have to ask justice kagan when they refer to involving uncovered security it's not just involving a covered security in the air it is an action involving a covered security and that action has to be one that's based on state law i add to that i mean as i stare out of a little bit more i wish i could ask mr kim and show be subject to subsection b because that suggests that it has to be dismissed and you wouldn't want to dismiss the kind of cases that mr cannon wants to remove his whole point is that you wouldn't dismiss them that would make ends shall be subject to subsection be superfluous and  sensually mean nothing so just to circle back around to the question justice alito you pointed out that maybe this thing does nothing at all and that may well be true we do think it picks up the mix cases the mix cases did exist previously but think that the statute this provision which isn't discussed anywhere in the legislative history at all is intended to accomplish very much although it's intending to do we think that it obviously didn't do it latest revision only the v a amendment of the jurisdictional provision yes i'm answering the road to nowhere we don't think that it is a road to nowhere because it does make clear that the courts without regard to whether or not the defendant invokes p b do not have jurisdiction and actually accomplishes that result but no matter of matching  phrase we do start just with the simple text that phrase except as provided in section x with respect to subject matter why everywhere in the u s code it's used refers to the person to a rule is the opposite of a notwithstanding clause it the usual rule justice ginsburg and remember we have a really good indication that's what congress intended because that's the p s l or a congress when it wrote the p s l array against the backdrop of state law say court security thirty three act class actions voted to say that the procedural protection apply in cases that are are subject to the federal rules of civil procedure what did decided to do is it matched the same compromise that's in the thirty three act itself which is it allow these cases to be decided in state court and as we explain st over to c and since they're talking about removal of a thirty three act case a case with a thirty three act claim with a thirty three act claim a case with a thirty three act claim we look to see and say see therefore must refer in part to cases with thirty three act claims and if that so since yours what i think happened or not is the answer yes so sluices a door closing statute no it looks back to the p s l array and says we've had a statute that's been evaded a bunch we just don't want it to happen again so we're going to ban a set of cases that have shifted from federal to state court those are thirty four i cases by and large we're going to ban those what made a clever plaintiff's lawyer do well what they might do a slap a thirty three at claim on here and say it's still within the concurrent jurisdiction of the state courts so we're just going to make clear that's not true that's all that ok now this is my choice that in the choice is reading v for thirty three act back to see and when they talk about c which refers to be the either mean all of the which is a case with the state law claim in it and also a thirty three act play that's your view or the government's view is that involving just refers to one in two in b and so it refers to thirty three act claims sitting there by themselves in state court to rats my choice right and i've got to see which of those two makes more sense in terms of the act which is so here's why you know that the thirty three act is the tail of the thirty four act of the dog the legislative history in the findings that my friend talks about referred to the shift of cases from federal state to state court these are not cases that shifted thirty four case shifted the thirty four act requires you to file in federal court what happened is people instead brought securities fraud cases under state law in state court to avoid the p s l or a fine but that's not what happened here our case was under the securities act the thirty three act it was fine in state court before the p s l or a congress didn't change that in the p s l or it's not an evasion of any existing standard all the rules that applied to the thirty three act continue to apply to it so what was concerned about is a body of cases moving out of federal court to state court these cases have been within the concurrent jurisdiction non removable of the state courts since the day the statue was an act that that was the compromise a plaintiff files a third files a claim in state court under a state law cause of action that mirrors the thirty three act in the in the respects that are set out in the statute the state court can't entertain that that is i reckon ok now given that why in the world would congress want the state court to be able to entertain the real thing and actual thirty three act because what congress is targeting is it just doesn't want this resolved under state law it wants it resolved under the thirty three act it does want rules of civil procedure and extend the p s l array to the state court or if it wanted to make all these cases removable or if it wanted to refer to a definition there are ten different easier ways in more clear ways rather than to pick up a phrase that is not used in this way in the us code anywhere at all i did want to just respond to an anomaly it's akin to the one that you just described as possible that my friend talks about he says this look under the respondents view if what you did was combine a thirty three claim with a state law claim then we admit that case would be litigated in federal court that is not correct under fourteen forty one this is what would happen is that the case would be removed to federal court and under fourteen forty one see would mandate severing out the prohibited state law came and the case would be remanded to state court and that would be litigated in state court as a matter of law and the whole mix case thing doesn't make the first bit of sense to me that you've got the federal you have the thirty three right yes but that's only because of salusa because what's looses doing is barring the state law claim that wouldn't be true if salusa didn't exist and i just think that you just have to look this is a narrow provision not discussed in the legislative history you can ask it to do the world which is undo the jurisdiction of the thirty three act that is existed a long time and that is it's an another anti evasion principle i do want to respond as well to my friend statement that when he says the exact opposite thing he says his position produces a direct parallel between the thirty three and thirty four act and then justice ginsburg says it treats the thirty three and thirty four act wildly differently it does treat them quite differently and that is he is pointing to statements in the legislative history that suggest that some members of congress believe that all securities cases would be litigated in federal court but he leaves behind all of the non class actions and he picks up cases that clearly was not intended to apply to and that is non covered securities sluice it is quite clear about this that it is intended to respond only with respect to the nationally traded securities that are defined as covered securities but this reading somehow picks up according to the petitioners all of the covered class actions even if it's not a nationally traded security at all and it would be incredibly weird to write a statute that says except as provided in seventy seven p with respect to covered securities and to do something radically different from what seventy seven p does with respect to covered securities what it does is it causes them to be dismissed not removed and it applies only with respect to those that involve nationally traded securities and their reading doesn't it is really really good to use it is an extraordinarily unusual way to accomplish this result which is a with nonetheless it is the case that we do give meaning to the phrase it wouldn't pick up any cases but their reading is not the words that congress used aren't nearly clear enough to accomplish that result if there are no further questions what do you understand yes all right if we read it the government's way what would we make what would be left of the second except close in in seventy seven  the removal except clause yes so i can accept so the second except cause just to walk us through says basically whatever we're doing in seventy seven p c controls right ok and i do think it's very useful that except as provided in should be read the same way in seventy seven vs so it does you know if you look at the way the government does it says you can't remove these cases in a right so you can't remove them but see says them so is there anything then that is not removable why write the second except cause at all well it is the case that it would be completely unnecessary because she controls i do think probably in the got a point in the government's favor that ultimately is in our favor is that there are parts of the that don't do anything ok in the removal provision is an example of that if you didn't have the amendment to the removal provision you would still know that you could remove under p c they're just closing really want to be a question for mr kerry that he's down but i don't want you to agree with me just for the sake of it ok but if i understand what he said it's these class actions with this last antecedent principle you're only referring to one in two so now you make those class actions removable but the way this provision works and you think kind of that makes sense right we would want those those actions to be remova be consistent with congress's other purposes you know but but i'm sorry i don't think that but i'm saying what i put that in his view ok right but then it says and shall be subject to subsection b and all that subsection b does the way they see provision works is it makes a category of cases removable only so that a court can dismiss them that's the point of subsection c it's like they were worried that state courts wouldn't just dismiss these actions so it made them removable to be dismissed but then you're getting those cases up there you say ok we'll get them removable because these cases really ought to be in federal court but under c now they have to be dismissed that's right i will say i'll give you the answer that i think he might have and that is what he would say is ok subjected to subsection b and some of them get dismissed in the rest of them aren't subject to it that's just not the structure of this statute and that's not what kurtzer says court has a duty to house to be because the mix case and up in part being in federal it does not because under fourteen forty one c it gets remanded the federal part of the case as a matter of law gets cleaved off and gets sent back to state court it does not p it gets removed and federal law fourteen forty one c says if you have a otherwise non removable provision combine claim combined with a removable claim that what you do is you break them in half and you send to remove the fed part to the feds and also to get rid of this right and so if you just is there any history not not see about the amendment of the there is no history and we don't think there's any history that suggested moving the cases to federal court thank you thank you counsel for minutes mr cox thank you for four points first congress took the affirmative step of modifying the preexisting concurrent jurisdiction provision and section twenty two were the only ones who give that some meaning to course it's this is not about surplusage candidates or is it this is obliteration they can't give you an explanation for what congress did when it added those twelve words and that's why my friend says oh there's some canon against doing thirty canada you have to do things the simple way there is no such canon and this of course jurisprudence the closest has just as opposed to my or said is a presumption about concurrent jurisdiction but that presumption has never been held to apply when a statute isn't silent those are only when the congress is silent this is one in which congress is affirmatively taken the step to remove twelve were a two to remove and some subset of what was preexisting jurisdiction in the state courts in addition as this court encouraged her said when you don't have a long history of state court adjudication in the area presumptions about preemption don't apply and did presumptions about preemption justice prior your opinion and geier says they don't apply when you have an expressed statute that deals with preemption and i think the same analogy is true here you have a specific statute that deals with that which deals with the amount of jurisdiction so i don't think this court could apply the presumption about concurrent jurisdiction second justice prior you asked about the legislative history and justice ali you asked who do you think did you think the person who wrote the statute set out to do what you think you're saying it did and we're the only ones who are telling you a story that is in the legislative history itself the first line of the conference report quote title one makes federal court the exclusive venue for most securities class action lawsuits the manager in the senate senator d'amato in the chair quote there should be a uniform standard and there should be a uniform procedure and that's where you move these nationally traded securities to a federal form president clinton signing statement quote since the uniform standards provided by this legislation state that class actions generally can only be brought in federal court will be governed by federal law clarity in the federal law to be applied is particularly important there is nothing in there so saying this is only about the thirty four act this is my friend on the other side's invention congress affirmatively took the step to modify the thirty three act jurisdictional provision not just the thirty four act justice kennedy this is my third point you asked about removal and whether or not if you didn't accept our view of twenty two way would that mean that you know we defectively be out of luck and i think you should reserve that question because of the reasons that my colleague from the solicitor general's office said and indeed it may take years for another case to come up precisely because there's a bar an interlocutory appeals from removal decisions as this court in kurtzer made clear and in addition the ninth circuit in a case called reya versus michael stores in two thousand and fourteen said when this court the supreme court makes removal available for the first time then we as litigants can go and seek that removal there's a lot of precedent which barred us from seeking removal before but obviously we would do that if this court were to accept the alternative reading and last and finally ultimately you are left with justice alito is question what sense does there statutory reading make why would bring a state court count oust a plaintiff out of state court when in mixed one would not and justice ginsburg asked why would congress when they're so concerned about procedure and things like abusive litigation and serial plaintiffs and massive attorneys fees and took all these steps to regulate that in the federal court cont why would they just leave the back door gaping in wide open that is not the way to read a statute i understand the statutes a hard one to read but we're the only ones giving it a reading that a makes sense and that is be consistent with the legislative history and see most importantly is textual we give effect to those twelve words they obliterate them thank you counsel cases submitted