the next case are called the docket today is agenda number three case numbers one one zero six one five n one one zero seven zero two people versus jackson counsel for the  or assessments relating to a specific prosecution they seek to recoup for costs of that prosecution whereas a fine is an assessment that's not related to a prosecution and is instead imposed as a criminal penalty second principle is the rule of energy which guides courts to resolve ambiguous criminal statutes and criminal penalties in a defendant's favor this is because for criminal penalties to apply there needs to be clear and fair warning at the time of the offending conduct tonsil did either of the defendant isn't it forfeited well the imposition of a fine that was not authorized by statute would be void so i don't think it is forfeited and is are constantly raised on appeal in the public court i think the procedure in this sort of course is to check off a checklist of fines and fees the judge or the clerk checks that often the judge signs it and it may not even be seen but again the records not clear about that but the imposition of a monetary penalty that isn't authorized by statute is bored and can't be forfeited that the statute at issue today was amended effective august two thousand and eight which was after the date of the appellant's offenses but before the sentencing hearing the amended version are clear as are creates a clear fine that applies to all defendants regardless of the cost of the prosecution but the ex post facto clauses of the united states and only constitutions prohibit retroactive application of this criminal penalty is pretty amended version therefore controls in this version was filled with ambiguity and contradiction and in the face of this and due to this ambiguity and also due to the amendment itself this court should avoid considering it as i find that applies to all defendants but instead a fee that has to relate to specific medical costs of the specific case and because those costs weren't shown here it was improperly imposed ambiguity in the primitive version stems from several places there's the paragraph detailing the collection of the the assessment that calls it if fee that should be taxed as costs and yet exempt it from the credit a defendant gets for spending time in custody for the sentencing that only applies towards fines there's a against cleveland recognize that restriction the public court in a case relied on heavily by the state people against jones also recognize that restriction when money is used for medical costs there is another restriction in the statute that shows a contradiction and it shows that  poorly drafted and unclear the money could be used for medical costs relating to the arrestee on account of an injury that occurred during his or her arrest yet the very first paragraph says that jailers are counties are responsible for any medical care that arises for someone in their custody and they can they're entitled to reimbursement for that care so the first paragraph authorizes reimbursement for care that a later paragraph says the funds can't be used for that if that's correct  so you have collecting assessment a fair assessment but it can only be used for administrative costs to administer the fund when somebody else is injured and there are ten dollars can go towards their sentiments but the focus of the statute is on full reimbursement from a defendant who can afford it it says twice that defendant who can afford his own medical care has to pay for it or the defendant who has insurance his insurance covers it or has some sort of public aid medicare medicaid when the cross exceed five hundred dollars the county of the jail or the arresting authority said that the restricted use of the money necessarily restricts the collection of money it's only those cases where an arrestee incurs actual medical costs the court in jones recognize that restriction but said because money can be used for administr the statute and it's not just the courts that are confused the state's attorney's office has struggled to adopt a coherent view of the statute as well in people against jones the public court noted that the state's attorney the state agreed with the defendant that the theory was only proper where there were actual medical costs and conceded that it should be vacated because there were no cost court went on for various reasons to reject that agreement but that shows that courts can't settle an interpretation of this agreement is that you the state's attorney's office couldn't and with th it shouldn't be construed as a penal fine but does rather if he that has to relate to specific process of prosecution and those costs are absent here there's another reason to interpret it as if he related the specific cause and that's the amendment itself  the legislature effective august of two thousand and eight removed this restriction on the use of money for cost relating to the arrestee on account of injuries during his or her arrest and now the fund operates as your honor suggested it money can be collected from every defendant as a fine that can be used for any other case regardless of the cost of any specific case amendments or presumes to change the law and if the result is this broad fine that applies in all cases the previous version should be interpreted as a clarity and then to do it is clear again in the various competing interpretations of the appellate court in the state argues that instead of the pretty minute version applying it's that amended version the new version controls this case that was in effect at the time of their sentencing but their argument is that it applies simply because it didn't change the defense obligation to pay which necessarily relies on the application the applicability of the the under the first  and typically according to this first definition in the past if it's not related to a cross that would be a fine and a criminal penalty so in that sense it matters if it's a criminal penalty under the new version unrelated to the cost of a case it can't be  and the new version does operate that way the state claims that the new version is a fee that relates to the specific cost of this prosecution because the fee in the funds provided an insurance benefit to the defendant but this doesn't stand the statutory language r some sort of public aid and there's no indication that county or the arresting authorities are incurring further costs simply by taking someone into custody these costs of insurance benefits are merely theoretical and not actually realized there's no indication they're paying higher premiums by jailing one more person it's just that the state itself is the insurer of the county and they pay out only actual costs and this is even clear under the preeminent version where the new one we agree operates in this manner you collect money from every defendant who work together and when costs arrive medical costs rely arise in any other case that money can be used to offset those medical process but this assessment so that would be a fine that's similar to what happened here they had zero dollars of medical costs they could afford it and paid it and would still be subject to this time and so that shows it's completely untethered from the cost of their case and operates as a as a fine that can be operated applied retroactively against the defendants if there are no further questions for the reasons stated here that the previous version is a fee that has to relate across the did not morning chief justice honorable justices please the court i'm assistant state's attorney margaret smith and i represent people in the state of illinois the ten dollars arrestees medical cost and assessment was a fee under the original statute and remained a fee under the amended statute because all defendants have always been obligated to pay that fee the collection provision remain the same defendants are placed in custody once a criminal complaint is filed and the prosecution beg the sheriff at that point is obligated to provide medical coverage for those defendants in custody the defendant in custody benefits from this coverage whether or not he perceives medical treatment just like the beneficiary of any insurance money that's correct we it is our position that the amended statute should be applied to the defendant because it was in effect at the time of their sentencing and that the amendment was procedural was in effect the time of the facts but that that case they did not provide any support for there that conclusion i made no reference to the ex post facto law which is what the defendant is citing for so it's correct cheer the amended statute should be applied because it was  effect at the time of the sentencing of the defendant and the amendment was for see draw only the defendants always had the obligation to pay that fee because the collection provision remained the same and here because the defendant benefited from the coverage of the insurance policy they are under the statute obligated to pay the ten dollars fee into the front upon conviction so defendants argument that the assessment went from a fee in the original statute to fin punishment under the amended statute implicating the prohibition against ex post facto laws is simply wrong the purpose of the statute remained the same it was to make funds available to the county sheriff to cover the cost of providing medical services to those custody the purpose of the amendment was to expand those medical expenses for which the county sheriff could seek reimbursement and here also the defendants argument that under the original statute the excuse me the assessment could only be applied to injured defendants would lead to an absurd result it would make the fund unnecessary defendant would essentially is essentially arguing that you would take ten dollars from an injured defendant it would be placed in a front and that same ten dollars would be used only to pay the costs for treatment of that injured defendant if that were the case there would be no need for a font as was pointed out and if we were only talking about ten dollars ten dollars in for an injured defendant and that ten dollars being used to pay the cost of that medical care there would be absolutely no need for a fund it would run during the statutory language regarding the from the establishment of the fund the collection of the theon placing that in the front that would render that language meaningless so the character of the assessment has not changed the plain language of the collection provision obligating the defendants to pay that fee has not changed the policy of the statute has not changed it was always to make funds available to the county sheriff so that he could provide the cost of providing medical care to the fan i think custody the only thing that changed here was the purpose of the a t which was expanding those medical expenses for which the county sheriff could seek reimbursement thus the assessment was properly imposed for these reasons and the state in our brief the assessment was properly  resolve the ambiguity in the pre minute version if it was as clear as the state claims is that it wouldn't come up with one version that benefits the defendant and two competing versions explicitly rejecting each other that benefit the state and the state's attorney's office wouldn't have  the current version cannot be retroactive if i had unless it relate to specific costs of their prosecution otherwise it's a criminal penalty a new criminal penalty devised after the date of their offens and the ex post facto pass of the constitution of the united states in illinois prohibit that application and the state simply hasn't shown that there's any sort of cost with this prosecution i'll just refer one more time to the example someone who pays their entire medical costs they're still subject to this there's no cost remaining it clearly operates now as a fine that's applied to everybody regardless of what happened during a case or during a prosecution and that can't be you can't reach back and apply that to the offenses that predated him and the