first issue has to do with whether or not the trial court erred when we made our fifty a motion and the court did not make a determination of whether the statute provided and then we made a fifty b motion in a fifty nine emotion and what i was saying was i saying to the court look if they win on the move to climb the unjust enrichment claims are all if they don't win on be giving the jury an opportunity to basically over rule themselves what they didn't know if and award the money under unjust enrichment a number of states you know this is a uniform law in a number of traditionally they're adopted pretty much without i think it's from minnesota the ban case yeah that that except your point of view every other jurisdiction to space the issue has come out of the other side except in idaho the law is very clear that if you have an when we certify a question we tell the state supreme court we don't know the answer of this our research suggests you haven't answered it yes and we will be bound by its determinants of the case you would agree with that that this one issue is  yes it would be yeah they came back and said you're right it's a different story and we always agree to be valen by what they say so why not do it i think i'm not sure because i'm not a procedural expert on rico norway really has very different rain grace and it doesn't have quite the same savings clause here which permits you to have what you might call duplicate remedies unless they're specifically you know  case the supreme court blew right past the same as cause and said look we're still going to say that because there is a statute like the u c c the provides an adequate legal remedy we're not going to let you pursue your equitable c that he didn't dispute that the problem we have with the court's reasoning and where we believe the court err is what he said wasn't he said demain not always be an adequate legal remedy for unjust enrichment therefore the equitable equitable claim could be considered by the jury but we weren't talking about whether the always had to be and an adequate legal remedy in every case we were talking about this case and so he misunderstood how the rule applied you don't have to apply it in every case just this one and given that gives remedies to that are very very well i guess that's the question is that the idaho supreme who would have to decide first of all are any common law remedies preserved and if so are they completely abrogated by the idaho legislatures and ackman of stature i don't think that's the issue it's not whether or not they're completely abrogated so that's what they've done is they've tried to change the issue the rule in idaho is if you have an adequate legal remedy with a legal claim you don't get to pursue an equitable claim it doesn't have to displace that's that's the issue that's undecided whether or not this is an adequate remedy that precludes equitable route and that's exactly the issue we're asking you to decide and usually do but they don't have to and then you're going to get a decision there and will probably follow it but there may be yet another round of briefing in arguments and this court you're going to be spending far more than fifty transfer you can do attachment you can appoint a receiver you can get injunctive relief and i love this one and he other relief the circumstances may require it is beyond comprehension to me that move to does not provide an adequate legal remedy what they're upset about is they didn't recover under oath and that is not and adequate legal remedy that's just you failed to prove your case under if them and so they clearly had an adequate legal remedy they could have gotten a judgment for fifty five conferred a direct benefit on mr back in fact when the jury found that mr yost was an initial transferee by virtue of the ninth circuit law that meant he was free to spend that money however he chose he was not of the direction of  that the benefit on mr back and not the ponzi scheme and that's and their argument actually goes against the finding of the jury on that issue i have to say i was my head was spinning at the conclusion or the special verdict form and i was  you know it was complicated and you take the position that when you get to the bottom of our mess that the earth care determination is legally irreconcilable with yes  he acted in good faith which means he had not even in forty noticed that this was somehow tainted money and he gave value they made those findings and so once you have a conclusion that mr baxter acted in good faith and gave value gave him some but not all of the interest and that is that is a great point because what that is exactly what they did what they all pretty much with to me like what they did what they did was they said here's what you what the part you don't know is they brought in several witnesses who get got up on the stand time how they've been wiped out of their savings this is their strategy let's make them feel sorry because mr beck got fifty five thousand for interest whereas there was mr hill one from shelly who lost everything he had millions so the juries look at this new go through the statute and they say well you know he's a subsequent transferee and they don't realize all the policy behind the rule then they say oh he acted in good faith and he gave value but you know we got this unjust and you're unjust enrichment jury instruction is so unfortunate that mr beck he got it's not equitable as mr back is not an investor and he was not an initial transferee had he been either one of those then it would be fair but they are comparing people who invested in try gone and had an opportunity to discover the fraud and do their own due diligence with a man who never even heard of trying and that is why it's not equitable and what they really did is exactly what you suggested as they came up with a compromise that's why i objected myself look at mr baucus held not liable under oath that he should have any enrichment no one has ever argued that that was not an accurate statement of idaho law it's the jury instructions six point zero seven two taken from the idaho jury instructions it's taken specifically from several i don't cases including aberdeen and the underfoot which we cited in our case in our brief the special verdict form that was provided to the jury it had a a uniform frys a transfer rack version section and also had a special special very form dealing simply with unjust that's not the case in idaho for the reasons i discussed right i mean if we if we agree that it doesn't abrogate it then the instruction is appropriate which i suspect is why there was no objections well there was an objection they're giving good they should if there n that's right roger that's right so the so then the special verdict form tracked the idaho jury instruction and the very first question that was asked was did the receiver prove by a preponderance of the evidence that try got try gone provided a benefit to mr back and i point that out because most of the arguments that are made here is that the jury didn't find that or that they found something different because they found under the uniform fraudulent transfer act provision a special verdict form that he was an initial transferee i don't know how you can say the jury didn't find that the receiver did not prove by i don't see how you can determine that the receiver did not prove my opponent's of the evidence they tried on provide a benefit to mr back when a jury specifically answered that question yes as well as the other two questions which were did you receive or prove by a preponderance of the evidence mr beck accepted the benefit and in the receiver proved by a proponents of evidence that under the circumstances it would be unjust for mr beck to retain the benefit without where our supreme court actually said in the code itself they had codified the rescission remedy in the code itself and therefore became the legal standard so you don't look to the common law in that richment that state but in idaho i think the key cases look here are many that we cite in our case and deal with the issue of a breach of contract case where the idaho supreme court has said if you have a valid contract claim then you're not also entitled to an alternative equitable remedy of unjust enrichment so the issues come up in a number of cases well if there is a contract claim in the case can you also alternatively plead an unjust enrichm is a contract and that it has been breached and there is an adequate remedy a law then you don't get the alternative equitable ready and then there's your answer your position here is there is no contract between back and try gar no there was never a an equitable remedy would be precluded if you had a valid legal claim that is a breach of contract cases they've said you can plead alternatively and you can go forward even if you're not successful in he had no knowledge and he was completely on involved in the ponzi scheme it was just an arrangement he had with yokes to loan them money and so the jury could still find under the un just enrichment claim that twelve percent interest was enough on that loan where they had all these other victims well that's absolutely right and what the jury did is heard a lot of evidence that would clear it clearly has supports the unjust enrichment claim i mean so in essence what beck is asking the court to do is to is to essentially eliminate a claim for unjust enrichment under idaho law in federal courts in the ninth circuit if there is any other similar potential claim that could potentially be alleged even if the other claim is not one that the plaintiff can prevail on and that's just not simply the law that's simply not the law and idaho and so on by those contract cases in a number of other cases that all cases in which the items records recognize that you can plead alternatively a breach of contract claim and unjust enrichment claim and it's only until you prove the breach of contract claim that the unjust enrichment thing goes he's a bona fide a purchaser of value because he made a loan of five hundred thousand dollars to yos and because idol law allows a twelve percent interest rate he should have been entirely receive the money as we pointed out in our brief those arguments were not made at the rule fifty eight that was traced as coming from the tried on accounts those payments were made because during palmer erroneous lee believed that beck had been an investor as a result beck was paid with the money of innocent investors in the  with regard to the statutory rape argument that's true i hope it has a twelve percent interest rate but i think is the court pointed out that receive one hundred forty five thousand dollars which is a twenty percent return and the so the question is is that a manifest injustice that he only received a ten percent return on his five hundred thousand dollars submission on its five hundred thousand dollars loan that he made i submit is not your honour's the only real injustice here is the back who made a five hundred thousand dollar loan twenty percent interest to ghost based on yost creditworthiness which beck never bothered to or beck never bothered to even conduct the reasonable investigation into that credit worthiness was repaid six hundred five thousand dollars five hundred fifty five thousand dollars of which was clearly shown to have come from try gone in another fifty thousand of which we came from another person who gave the money to for the specific purpose of putting it into try don it's the innocent best years that were once or harmed here there is no injustice to mr back on an unjust enrichment theory be happy answer any questions thank you very much thank you y all due respect to my good friend mr kurtz he never said why it does an adequate instead they're trying to reframe the issue and say oh you're trying to displace all of unjust enrichment law that is not what we're saying we're saying that this is an adequate legal remedy in this case there's no reason why you couldn't have gotten adequate legal remedy under these facts in this case health just this case not all cases across the board i would also like just point out that it's that it's what he weighs is this issue about the benefit on mr odds with what happened in for the declining and my last point simply is that what really did happen was that the jury heard this about these people who lost money they looked at mr back and they were analyzing it as they treated mr back as the same as everybody else who lost money or made money when in fact he's a subsequent transferee not an investor not an initial transferee and if we want commerce to work if we want people not to be afraid to take money and to do engage in commerce as a subsequent transferee we need to have a rule that does treat him differently than people who dealt directly with trying on and deron palmer and that's what moved to does over five hundred years it's developed this that takes these different situations into account the jury didn't do that with unjust enrichment and instead they and they entered a verdict that was inconsistent with their findings specifically with respect to conferring a direct benefit and