there the court said whether it is reasonable under chevron for commerce to construe the identical statutory provision one thousand u s c sixteen seventy seven thirty five to have opposite meanings in investigations and reviews where one nothing in the statutory language indicate the different interpretations were intended in to this court has rejected the claim that the meaning of sixteen seventy seven thirty five and on the stage of the dumping proceeding well don't don reasons that have been given in prior cases with the same reasons that they gave this court in j to act they gave the reasons of wealth the difference between a minister in a reviews and and investigations it was the w t a yes or a fact that they're us maybe they're right well that's one possibility on the other hand that would be czar reasons that have been rejected by this court and the thing that had we ever evaluated their reasons i why the statutory language supports is inconsistent right interpretation in your brain you interpret that as meaning i'm quoting from your brief the court you say that the court in held that congress must apply then appropriate patient consistently and less to convert wajda reasonable explanation for why as a matter of statutory rape is correct but but it's not just a question of statutory interpretation is it well then going to j tech said actually it is a matter of statutory interpretation is a matter of the interpretation of sixteen seventy seven thirty five well the question about statutory interpretation  pointing to sixteen seventy seven have someone well this court and essentially that's what this whole issue of implicit opposite not that's all you're talking about is sixteen seventy seven zero one now if you look at that section this court dealt with that issue on the on whether or not that is a sufficient reason for distinguishing sixteen seventy seven and thirty five in chorus they then in u steel looked at it again and said you know we understand what you are saying we understand that there are differences in investigations in reviews in how you calculate the dumping margin and the reality is we dealt with that in chorus it to the national or organization of veterans advocates which this courts that i cited and gone through which again stand for the proposition that if you have a singular prop a singular provision and that singular provision but that but that's a good point because this is a this is what issues are going to the fact that it's not a chevron case isn't relevant it is relevant because what clarke says is what is reasonable or what is not reasonable with respect to never been my problem that said ok let's get back to clark in the case of clark with clark stand for is that ok you have a single statutory provision you can interpret it to mean black you can interpret it to mean white but you cannot interpret it to mean both at the same time when the statute does not otherwise provide for that in you really unless you can tell us tell us why if you can and not only an alibi why they fail they fail because they gave you the same argument that they gave you in j tech but that's ok we hear the same arguments why aren't they persuasive because this decide that they made the argument that where you have the average against a one month tour review maybe your own makes sense yes they made that argument right on with what because that's the argument that was rejected by this court with respect to chorus because the average the one month average in the annual was specifically addressed in the in court in florida do you know we understand that but that does not make the difference between investigations and reviews and therefore we're not going to do a separate chevron and the argument that we have decided this issue and so we shouldn't even be talking about this no my argument is they have given you is i mean assuming we are going to argue the merits of their distinction tell us that it doesn't make sense the merits of their distinction don't make sense because all you get what you want talk about an implicit offset in the say in the fact that an implicit intent that is buried here in the reality is they have proven nothing what they have done is they went one level down and gave you an explanation of how margins are calculated winds in how margins are calculated  of voiding masking dumping and warning masking dumping is an interesting question your honor but again western every calculation mass dumping you have to make the civic bindings and there is a specific provision to deal with it so that really is a non issue your honor thank you and i will reserve the rest of my time i appreciate your patience and we will save it and the government is pretty high hasn't spoken to the questions during all in the statute congress could have said congress you must zero in all circumstances or commerce you can never zero or commerce you can do in some circumstances but not others but congress no such thing  is more specific it's focused on individual transactions that simply isn't true in the average average methodology also there's no inherent offsetting on the export price i had in the average transaction methodology because you aren't averaging anything in that methodology on the export price side of the equation commerces explanation is not as helpful suggested the same as provided in j text text the explanation was two paragraphs were calmer simply said there are differences between investigations interviews and we're zeroing in in in reviews but generally not investigations here over the course of some not just two paragraphs but twenty plus pages congress went but in any event congress did in fact tie its explanation to the statute and that is to six hundred seventy seven f one and the different comparison methodologies that are provided in that section now another mistake that union makes and they rely  say no commerce can't endure in some instances and not enough in others and nowhere in our priest to ever make that argument moreover of course precludes what congress did here what would have been the point of agreement in j tec in dongo moreover of course precludes during the one comparison methodology and not in others and this court said well look the set you doesn't say anything at all about zeroing and we think congress approach is reasonable it may well be that congress has been signaling to commerce the dickens era in some situations but not in others by providing for the different comparison methodologies and six hundred seventy seven of one finally if this court were to say here that commerce can't zero the commerce can't zero in this case we would have one case u s deal that tells commerce you can  in different circumstances you can zero in one methodology but not another and this court would be saying here no commerce you can't do that we respect we submit that that simply would not make sense this court should affirm average average methodology in investigations but realized that we concealed our getting done things where they do they provided for the average transaction methodology to be used in both investigations into misread reviews to address targeted dumping but in order to address targeted dumping it's not enough to use the average transaction methodology you also have to use your why is that well because without zeroing you would still have done sales being offset or matched by higher price non dance s so that without zeroing you would be negating the congressional intent to address target something in addition without your own you would get the same exact martin result whether you use the average a transaction methodology or the average the average methodology she would be rendering the every transaction provisions in the statute completely meaningless you would be not only getting congressional intent to address part of the dumping but you would reap the reading those provisions right out and statute and in fact this court recognize that in the u s deal decision this court rejected the argument that the part that the provisions of the statute we would be rendered meaningless without hearing by recognize mekong congress was going to continue to use eroding in the average of transaction contacts and therefore get a different result than it would in the average average contact and if found that that was not only permissible to use those dual methodologies under the different comparisons but it found that that was consistent with congressional intent so the us zeroing in administrative reviews not in investigations is justified by the fundamental statutory distinctions between the due to different comparison methodologies as used in the two different proceedings and we would ask you to morning your honour's in may please the court i'll just make two fundamental points that have already been brought up this morning first of all thomas did give reasons and second of all this was not just a question of statutory interpretation congress did give reasons i reasonable for commerce to have treated the same statutory language differently in investigations and reviews because the statute itself sets up two different approaches for investigations and reviews the two proceedings are different in several fundamental respects as mr crean already mentioned and therefore it's reasonable for commerce to adopt practices that reflect those differences even in terms of how to interpret a vague statutory term that covers  behavior which is why average the average comparisons are warranted reviews designed to calculate actual margins in to address much of the dumping is possible which is why average the transaction comparisons  in altering its practice in response to an adverse w t o determination may reasonably decline to take any action beyond what is necessary for the department to come into compliance and that includes applying a different approach to different types of proceedings where warranted as a lower court said congress has wide latitude in bringing its practices into the beauty of compliance and congress even foresaw this in the stat statement of administrative action that this type of thing might occur the national organization of veterans and that in that case is a chevron case and it followed the same precept of clarkie martina's on which this court said that actually it is not reasonable for the for the veterans administration to can screw regulations to construe substantially similar statutory provisions differently and the v zero ing average the average method in every transaction method will always produce exact same margin result you agree with that i do not agree with that i think it is true that it does in the case of investigations it does not in the case of reviews the key issue here is what the key issue i haven't heard much discussion is whether there is a fundamental fairness in the economics of applying zeroing in one case and not applying it in the other i've heard nobody talk about that well your honor to zero ing is a device to increase something margins i'm not sure the fundamental fairness gets into it i think that the issue is whether or not they can interpret it the determining whether commerce is acting in a arbitrary lerner they didn't think about it i agree with that in the sense they didn't think about it in what sense they didn't think about it in the sense that look we have a single provision and it applies reviews for twenty years because it was the same provision that but that was their policy and that was what was assumed it was assumed that it was unitary and that's really the problem the problem is that it's a single provision that applies to bo and that's why when this port of looked at it previously it that well ok i understand there's a difference between an investigation review but let me ask you a question does that go to the question of whether or not zero ing is appropriate in investigations and reviews and i