afternoon your honor to make this the court this matter presents important questions regarding subject matter jurisdiction and review under the administrative procedure act the answer to those questions are of significance to hundreds of thousands of temporary protected status recipients who might otherwise be eligible to become lawful permanent residents but for the arbitrary and capricious actions of the department of homeland security the government contends that because a cullen's have all previously been ordered removed the jurisdiction stripping provisions of the immigration nationality part of the united states they executed their removal orders therefore there were no proceedings were terminated under the law and they removed order ceased to exist even if somehow this court were to find that a palace from what words were not executed the challenge brought in the district court below was not a direct or indirect challenge to any potential existing order and although dismissal below was predicated on jurisdiction the government alternatively sought dismissal of the district court proceedings arguing that appellant's failed to say the claim upon which relief could be granted but it is clear that the government had a duty to act by adjudicating appellants applications for adjustment of status and they failed to carry out that duty moreover their actions were contrary to establish law and policy as evidenced by the fact that during the very course of this litigation the government issued a policy alert changing their policy on whether it c p s beneficiaries and arriving alien or not that was issued in december of twenty one thousand and as i said it was during the pendency of these cases states and return with an advance parole document upon return they sought adjustment of status before us citizenship and immigration services and their applications were honestly closed they sought review of this legal question in the district court but their complaints were dismissed for removed who has left the united states shall be considered to have been deported or removed in pursuance of the law the statute does not draw a distinction between persons who depart with a grain of events parole and any other alien it says if they has departed the united states while an order of deportation removal is outstanding shall be considered to have been deported the words of the statue in the regulation once again contemplate only departure the government has argued repeatedly that somehow these removal orders were not executed because appellant's departed with a permit that would allow them to return yet they do not have authority for that proposition they cited to the miscellaneous and technical amendments to the immigration nationality act which we were for to us matina arguing that because  is admitted in the same status that they had when they left that that somehow prevents them from executing their removal order but matina does not speak to the execution of a removal order and while it is true that a temporary protected status recipient cannot be removed by the government there is no statute or regulation that says they cannot execute their own removal order the mere fact of having advanced permission to return to the united states does not undo the departure and once again  says departure if you left you have departed yourself in this instance the government has made a mistake in conflating the status that a t p s recipient returns to with their manner a method of  which is specifically what this court warned against and gomez v lynch and gomez we allege the court said that admission is an occurrence defined in a wholly factual and procedural terms where a status describes the type of permission a person has to can return to their t p s status while also having eschewed the removal order when they left and simultaneously be in arriving alien because arriving alien is not a status under the act arriving alien is a designation it concerns somebodies manner a method of entry and t p s beneficiaries can be arriving aliens in the same way that a returning lawful permanent resident can be an arriving alien if they meet certain exceptions under the statute once again these removal orders were executed and the m possible moreover because all of the appellant's are properly designated as arriving aliens even in a reopened proceeding they would not be eligible to apply for adjustment of status because u s c i s has exclusive jurisdiction over an application for adjustment of status filed by arriving alien even if appellants are considered to not have executed their order which is not something that a palace have conceded or will concede in these proceedings their claims are still permissible because they are not directly or indirectly due to be nine is intended to work as a zipper clause and sweep up additional claims that may be less directly related it does not sweep within its scope claims with only a remote or attenuated connection to the rule of an alien as this court said in toronto johnson it also does not preclude claims that cannot be raised efficaciously within the administrative proceedings that are already available the claims of the appellant's are just that type of claim they cannot seek adjustment of status in a reopen removal proceeding or in any type of removal proceeding because by virtue of their parole into the united states they are arriving aliens they cannot efficaciously raise their claims in the court and their claims have only a remote or pretend or attenuated connection to anything to do with their removal order difficult to discern what was the basis of the dismissal below presumably because the government filed a motion to dismiss we know that it was on jurisdiction but to further distinguishes is impossible based on that order however based on court should be i believe that this court should find that the district court erred the district court's erred in failing to address the argument that a palace had executed their removal orders none of the decisions below make any type of finding as to how these are move orders were not executed they merely proceed to say that these are an executed orders and that jurisdiction strip and provide is provided by the statute but that's a clear error because we put forth that argument in every single one of these proceedings executed their orders when they departed and i believe that is the dispositive issue in this case your honor because if these orders were executed then played a palates cannot be currently subject to these are already executed orders  mobile they would still have to seek redress of the order again there's no automatic cancellation of this order under the law that simply does not exist and there is nothing that would prevent the department of homeland security from executing that order if the palace did not have t or if a province even after they were granted an adjustment the department would still have a valid rule order once again assuming that the court does not find that they were executed as a final matter the government had moved below to dismiss these proceedings on the basis for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted appellants recognize that this court is free to affirm the district court on any basis supported by the record and accordingly we will address the failure to state a claim allegation under the a p a we believe that  regulation and common practice taken exclusive jurisdiction over applications firing aliens there is no excuse for them to have somehow accepted the appellants and found that they were uniquely not eligible based on once again an interpretation of statute and policy that was officially announced in december of two thousand and nineteen well after this litigation began the board of immigration appeals has also found in matter of yari that u s c i s has exclusive jurisdiction over an application for adjust case law says that anyone who enters with advance parole isn't arriving alien nothing about having temporary protected status makes you not an arriving alien in the same way that a returning lawful permanent resident can have their resident status because th permission to be in the united states and also be designated as an arriving alien because they meet the exceptions under eleven a one that's just the reality of immigration law some things are status other things are your designated manner method of entry and their status is t p s there is no question but their status cannot be t p s beneficiary within an executed order of removal because within an executed order of removal is not a status arriving alien is not a status and yet aliens notwithstanding the fact that they do have t p s so i believe your honor in response to your question that i know there isn't another manner for them to obtain relief because they are arriving aliens and there's only one way for them to do this thank you my time is up i was serving five minutes for my coll plaintiffs to not become a writing aliens nor did they execute their removal orders by virtue of their t p s related travel i'd like to clarify it really what this case is about this case is not about whether plaintiffs can alternately become legal permanent residence contrary to what plaintiffs have argued each of these plaintiffs do have a path to legal permanent residency in the united states whether that is through a motion to reopen with the immigration court which one of these plaintiffs has had their motion to reopen granted or whether that's with consular processing abroad so this case isn't about whether plaintiffs will ultimately become legal permanent residents of the united states it's about honor they would like their claims their adjustment applications to be to take a did in this case is about who has jurisdiction to do that the government's position which happens to be the immigration courts position as well not just the position in this briefing is that the immigration court has jurisdiction over that just map cation so contrary to plaintiff's statement plaintiffs do have a path to have that adjustment application adjudicated that's in the immigration court and that's proven by one of these plaintiffs before this court today plaintiff a sala who has had his motion to reopen granted and he can now seek adjustment of status in front of the immigration court as he differ from her case her case is procedurally different from the district court below but they are similarly situated they have the same facts so the district  why this court can address both the jurisdictional argument the government puts forth and the merits underlying merits of this case and as your honour's may have already seen from plaintiffs argument the merits of this case in the jurisdictional argument to intertwine a little bit because plaintiffs are right if they executed their removal order by virtue of leaving the united states u s the i r s does have jurisdiction over their applications but the reason why that's not true and the reason why plaintiffs argument is wrong is because the specific portion of the immigration and nationality act not the general advance parole provisions that plaintiff's cite and this situation is indistinguishable from the situation that was present in this court's case and cardoso because if this court were to compel u s a s to adjudicate the applications it would also be compelling there's only two options there and one of those options is for u s c i s to have to grant that application and if u s c i s were to grant that adjustment applications they would be that just an application it would be in addressed by the courts below but those equally applied because petitioners the per a because plaintiffs the purpose of their action is to shift jurisdiction from the tribunals who has ordered the plaintiffs removed to us c i s in order to make their removal order and effective that means that their challenge is a challenge to their final order of removal and as the nd circuit has directly held merely just creative labeling and creative pleading because the practical fact is when you order us here as to adjudicate this case you are c i s unless you can find some other reason to deny the application is going to have to grant that application and then once it grants the application for adjustment of status that individuals a legal permanent resident in t h s is stripped of its jurisdiction of its discretion to execute that removal order plaintiffs are absolutely incorrect that based on the fact that they had an outstanding final order for movable because by telling us yes they don't have an execute they've already executed their final order of removal u s a s would have to throw that reason out the window  but plaintiffs are incorrect that you can be a legal permanent resident and somehow also have an outstanding final order for move all that contention is precluded by this court's decision in cardozo where this court already held that granting an adjustment  status application making someone a legal permanent resident gets rid of that old outstanding order of removal now that person could absolutely be put in removal proceedings again for some other reason but that  so more a better case to more on point case to look at although outside of the circuit with regard to differences between whether there is any distinction between the and ministry of closure about the scope of jurisdiction with regard to a c i s in the immigration court in this case the parties agree that in order for you are serious to have jurisdiction over an adjustment application that the alien st may not have an executed final order removal or the alien must be in a writing alien the parties also agree that before plaintiffs left the united states on their on this t specific travel they were not either arriving aliens and they had final orders of removal so before the alien before the aliens left the united states the parties would agree u s c i s absolutely did not have jurisdiction over any adjustment application plaintiffs argued that by virtue of this travel this t p s travel they have found a loophole in immigration law that suddenly makes them and arriving alien and suddenly execute their order for move all in ordinarily and any other situation in immigration law where you have a paroled alien or where you have an alien who leaves the united states plaintiffs would be right however they're not right here because there is a specific statute that applies to the travel of the aliens in this case all the cases that plaintiffs have to do with either an alien who left without left and executed their remov order without any permission or an alien who left a specific left pursuant to some other type of parole but that's not what we're talking about here we're focusing on what the matina says in the note to eight m says that they're emitted in the same immigration status that they were before yes your honor same status now plaintiffs bring up and that the word status doesn't mean the word in mission and that there are different definitions to that to those terms however we have to look at what the word status means in for purposes of them a teen or not for purposes of other portions of the for purposes of the tina it's clear that the word status means the person's entire legal condition everything they left with and the reason why is that the matina obviously provides a benefit to t p s individuals and allows t p s individuals to travel outside the united states where they otherwise would be unable to so we have to assume that congress when they enacted the matina intended to provide a benefit not a benefit and also in a detriment under plaintiff's argument they would interpret congress to have intended to give a benefit the benefit of travel but also an extreme detriment to the alien that detriment being the execution of a removal order which has which carries with it bars to becoming a legal permanent resident which includes specific statute controls in fact the plaintiffs when they're given their travel document it states on there that it's pursuant to the specific provision of the matina and they get around it by six seconds saying that the word status doesn't include the fact that they are arriving aliens and had an executed final orders of removal but that's wrong because we have to look at what the word status means in connection to the matina not what the word status means in other areas of immigration law we're trying to interpret this specific statute and in this specific statute congress intended to provide a benefit to the alien by allowing them to travel but if under plaintiff's interpretation it would it would mean that congress was intending to provide both a benefit and at detriment to the alien it would mean that upon returning from the from this t p s travel they will have triggered in this a bill to at least to an invisibility bars due to their final executed order removal which carries a ten year bar and a inadmissibility bar for occurring unlawful status which also carries a ten year bar to being in miscible to the united states and that simply can't be what congress intended to do here congress intended to provide a benefit to t p s individuals and we know certainly that congress did not intend for these individuals to become arriving aliens we know that because back in one thousand nine hundred and ninety when the matina was passed it was an absolute detriment for individuals to be arriving aliens because the word for arriving one this court to interpret the bettina a different way because it benefits them in two thousand and twenty but that's not what congress intended congress to not intend plaintiffs to become arriving aliens when they came back because in one thousand nine hundred and ninety that would have been an absolute detriment to the alien and it would be an absurd result for this court to interpret the mid tina in the way that plaintiffs want because then you would have a statue that's essentially that's making an alien choose between a benefit and a detriment and that can't be the result that congress to have from the statue that was intended to be a benefit so just because it's a benefit to put to t p s beneficiaries today to be arriving aliens that doesn't mean that that's what congress intended in one thousand nine hundred it's also not consistent with this court precedent in defining the word status the word in this court define the word status as the person as a person's legal condition the court to find it that way pursuant to black's legal dictionary because the i in a doesn't to define the word steps a person's legal condition means more than the fact that they have t p s it means they're legal condition with regard to immigration law their legal condition with regard to immigration law when plaintiffs left the united states was that they had a final and executed order of removal that they had t p s and that they were not arriving aliens we know that part of their legal condition because we're here today arguing about what arriving it what effect being an arriving alien has on an adjustment of status application so we know that not being an arriving alien and having an executed final order removal must be part of someone's legal condition which is how status should be defined in this case pursuant to a rubio the lynch so if we define if we look at the purpose of the matina which is to provide a vent benefit for aliens and we look at what would have been the impact of being in a riding a and ninety knowing that that full well would have been a detriment we have to interpret the statute as being as consistently providing a benefit because any other result would be absurd and then if we look at this court's precedent with regard to the term status and with it being defined in the i a e a but being defined by this court as a person's legal condition we have to find that that legal condition includes the fact that they're not in a writing so when we put this all together in the matina you find an individual you find three point four plaintiffs who left the united states on a t p r specific travel document s specific travel document is governed by the matina in the matina says you have to when you leave you come back in the same exact status that means the same exact legal fiction condition that means without any detriment to the alien so should affirm the district court's decision dismissing plaintiff's claims under stiction grounds and then also affirm the decision of the district court granting summary judgment in favor of defendants because summary judgment was appropriate on the merits of this case involving the matina at this point yes they cannot be deported because they have temporary protected status but that does not prevent them under eleven a one g from self deport and so the got while t p s stops the government from deporting them they are free to deport themselves when they leave and that's what happened here and if the jurisdiction shipping provisions don't apply that firmly resolves the case in favor of the appellant's even assuming however that the orders were not executed we are not order of removal and that is because they would still have to go to the immigration court file a motion to reopen and ask the judge to terminate proceedings and the judge can always decline to do so in his or her disc the government argues that the status is defined broadly as this court has noted into the rubio while that is true to the rubio is a very limited decision and gomez should be the case that applies  cancellation of removal it's a very limited decision gomez's more on point and it states that there are no subcategories of on local status such as being present without admission therefore the government cannot contend that a t p s holder with a final or a movable is a status within the meaning of the essentially they cannot append t p s status which is the person's status with final order of removal and make that a status because that would be entirely too broad and that's not  that congress intended i also want to briefly address the issue of is soulless case being granted now while it is true that the motion to reopen was granted for it's all in this case that does not mean that and the only body to adjudicate their applications is the united states citizenship and immigration services but even assuming that even though it's those cases reopen it the immigration judge has made no sort of determination in the order itself or any sort of decision afterwards that he retains jurisdiction and if he says no he does not retain jurisdiction then we would have to then we would have to seek alternative forms of really st so it matters not whether that and therefore the jurisdiction stripping provisions of one thousand two hundred and fifty two dollars do not apply even if they were to apply appellants are not directly or indirectly challenging the orders of removal because even a grant of adjustment of status does not in any way alter the removal borders and last within the meaning of the l