the underlying premise of the f c c creditor debtor rule is set forth in the rule itself the rule says persons who knowingly release their phone numbers have in effect given their invitation or permission to be called at the number they have given the operative key word being knowingly knowingly release the issue insofar as it relates to the three  their cell phone numbers to a consultant anesthesiologist on whose behalf credit adjustments was collecting of course the answer depends upon what's written in those forms if i can  questions because and you may not be able to as a matter of your ethical responsibilities to your client to answer the question of so that time and that is why it wasn't this case brought under the fair debt collection practices act you got a bill collector that statute according to my understanding was intended to respond to congressional clonk response to the kinds of abuses i understand occurred here multiple robocall in an effort to collect the debt and i'm i'm truly baffled because it seems to me that's the statute that fits the scenario that you're trying to remedy the two statutes the t c p is a telephone consumer protection act and the debt collection practices act actually protect different interests although debt collectors a subject clearly to the t c p a and the f c c has so ruled in courts have are different interests being protected what's being protected with a t c p a is as a debt collectors and as to everyone else is that you cannot abuse telephone technology know whether it's technically preemption or not but as a general rule and policy when congress seeks to respond to one set of problems in a particular statute where another statute might you let the problem be addressed only in the statute intended to remedy the problem and if i'm wrong about that fine but at least as a matter of policy it makes a lot better sense to me that trying to stretch the c p a to fit your case to say no you should have gone into the federal fair debt collection practices act and particularly in light and i know it's a multi part speech rather than question but particularly in light of as i understand the dominant role that the f c c plays in doing what it did in regulating  application of the statute all i can say your honor is two things what i said before is that there are different interests being protected the t c p a deals with abuse of telephone technology by anyone including debt collectors and this is referenced in our brief that debt collectors are subject to the statute not only does the f c c repeatedly say that but the case law says that there are many cases not not in our brief but in general your honor many cases against elect debt collectors throughout the country in the federal courts where they've been found liable under the t c p but they don't involve the contention that's being made here that the the the the question as to whether their consent to use was no those other cases obviously would decide side of them if they do what is different about this case is that at the time it was first presented to the lower court there were no cases involving that we could find no one else found involving an indirect transfer of telephone numbers by way of a consent form signed for one creditor supposedly transferring to another kreiter there were no cases like that the f c c's debtor creditor rule had never been applied in that fashion it was always the direct providing of the numbers during the pendency of this case actually eighteen days after we had already filed our opposition brief the mice case was decided by the eleventh circuit recognizing for the first time that we could ever determine this theory f i say ok you can use that for your purposes what i mean is you can let somebody else tag along by passing my number to fall back on that's what i meant and that's the main problem we have with this scenario is that it's we're saying that these forms did not transfer did not permit mt carmel hospital to disclose cell phones to consultant that's what we're saying we're saying to avoid reversal they have to win in all the three points they have to convince this court that the word they use in this is in both forms there are two forms here but both forms say i understand mt carmel may use my health information and then it gives the various purposes use health information in their br to this court in the briefs below but if the defendant the apple leader here has never explained how use can mean disclose and they have never explained how health information can mean cell phone numbers they just haven't done it now in the mice case upon which the district court relied both of those  terms in that case were defined for the consumer to read right in the authorization that was signed it said that that hospital was a hospital in that case to that hospital  use or disclose or disclose is right in the form so that the consumer reading that could say if i sign this i'm knowingly aligned them to disclose that's not here with the word disclose is not there all we have is the word views and we contend that the word used does not mean disclose how the district court specifically said that it was found that our clients had granted permission to disclose we contend that's wrong the word is use it's a different word and if there's any doubt about this these are preprinted forms and they should have been construed against  the hospital these are and he says if forms we believe there is no doubt interestingly enough and in terms of health information the other term that we conten list it's also a laundry list of purposes and signing the the form it said the hospital mount carmel may use for billing it doesn't services at the hospital as part of your client's overall care at the hospital i mean this is part and parcel of the admission i think we there's no evidence of that on the record well is it not or not i mean it's not that you even go shopping for anesthesiologists to do it we have cited three cases in our brief showing that it's creditors specific including in the medical transactions the hospital bill and the hospital services with the anesthesiologist services that can't be conflated you cited cases saying that exact point and we as a matter as a matter of fact factual matter there's evidence of the record that they were separate transactions or separate consent forms separate bills etc it's in our brief or i think we understand your argument any further questions judge batchelder do you have any questions i please the court brian speace on behalf of ca i want to start off with the question that judge griffin had regarding whether or not this would have been part and parcel of the admission process the the forms that issue and in the record all medical and surgical care so to your point they were not shopping around for anesthesiologists that's very broad that you know you're not going to go through the admission process ten times once for the hospital once for the anesthesiologists once for some other type of doctor there's one admission that hospital admission form where i give them my cell phone number for all the things that are listed and then billing is in there somewhere hospital cannily i don't see how that express consent to a bill collector to use my number but as i understand the situation to for me to implement that i have to sort of override or jump past what the f c c has done interpret in this statute i assume is i mean tell me how that works what what's the interplay there between the statutory terms which i think are quite clear in this case the conduct violated reading only that but then we have the overlay of the f c c act well i think first you go back to the form itself and the fact that it talks about building a painting you're signing this i don't understand by mister express consent all the way down to the bill collector hospital fund hospital calls me pestered me about right but i don't think if you were to ask an ordinary person can they turn this over to bill collector to the hospital and i think an ordinary person say no you can't course not it's i sure they can call me but not some bill collector hassling me so that's why my understanding maybe is on the issue of ask your opponent but it's this f c c oversight in determining the scope and how the statutes implement and how does that work you may not have asked my pony but he addressed that he said that the controlling their control of those f c c those f c c points that come in every so many years clarifying things those are those are considered controlling controlling authority on how we interpret the i don't know  base we don't have to pay attention i just don't know me ask you because i don't know the law and those are controlling and into your to your point about how regular person or ordinary lay person would interpret this as a whether a debt collector the form is not going include every the name of every individual to understand it but really i'm trying to find out what the law is in terms of the deference well of appeals or any court has to give to the f c c declaration of what the law is i can tell you what this court did in august of one fifteen just just four months ago in the case of hill vs homered residential the sixth circuit said quote a debtor consents to calls about an existing debt when he gives this number in connection with that debt and quote so if you give your number in connection so that this court has said that that f c c and that's this intially were paraphrasing the f c c ruling from several years prior we had a third party bill the the issue that's critical here is they say persons who knowingly release their phone numbers have in effect given their invitation or permission to be called at the number they have given my opponent on in their briefs implies that somehow they haven't is for these robo calls these unwanted solicitations that come out of nowhere offering someone a beach vacation this is not what happened they had a medical debt and they corrected most numbers my understanding is going to have some of these cases both heard a collection practice act you would ever get the kind of express consent you're wanting going to walk through a name see ai as the specific debt collector if it can't it would be it would sort of undo the entire debt collection process too to require  something that would meet that express that that i think you're talking about maybe it may be you know you may not find that that that that that's your definition of express but if we don't consider that express how does a debt collector ever collect them hospita that's where the limit to and that's where the f t c p a a that joe that's the record that alluded to and for purposes of this argument we're not addressing we don't agree with the allegations of the number of calls but that's and we don't this court doesn't even need to address know that's my whole point and if i can pick up on that have already shown as i obviously read the brief notes reference object and didn't make that connection what about i mean is there anything that m is the plaintiff in that case the person went to teach went to turn off their mother in law's power ok it wasn't their bill it was their mother in law's house she had died she was deceased son in law comes in and tries to turn that off and gives his phone number that the court ruled that that was not in connection with but that's not what we're talking about here here you refer to it as a a tagalong i don't know that that i would use the term tagalong but but in this case you've got an anesthesiologist working with a hospital there's one admission process that's completely different from the the  case my pen and also references whether or not health information doesn't include phone numbers or the hospital's ability to use versus disclose you know again if you look at the forms themselves and it talks about billing and payment for all medical and surgical care i'm not sure how they were you were using the word use or disclose i'm not sure how you argue that they can't use that information when they provide it for purposes of l who are in the law congress has made a definition  congress knows how to do that whether the f c c did or not or the statute does i can only i don't think any of that really matters a whole lot and basin sissoko up also sort of framed this this morning as a question of whether they knowingly you know this is in the consent form that they signed the hospital so i think that that's without basis the argument that they did not knowingly consent to this information if if there are any further questions we believe that this is not the kind of case that the  would address because there is here we have a specific exemption if there's prior express consent and that by coming into the hospital giving a phone number signing a consent form as to billing and payment we believe that that prior consent is there and that's what the district court found emphasizes that prior express consent is deemed granted only if the wireless number was provided by the consumer to the creditor and that such a number was provided during the transaction that resulted in the debt owed we contend that all of those these referred to consultant to the f c c elegy bill not to the hospital and in our brief we did cite  three cases including the heinz case involving a hospital in a similar arrangement and also the moyes case where it's improper  unless they can factually prove that the transactions were cooked stance if which they have not done here they haven't this is to the contrary if they if the transactions as a factual matter are not coextensive they can't conflate them what is call anesthesia was part of the contemplated surgery all around all along so why isn't that quote coextensive you know it's not the mission into the hospital that you're there for it's to get the surgery what you need t factual matter they're separate creditors and a separate debts and we rely upon the heinz case and the boy's case cited in our brief to that it's very very similar along with leaver says the gulf coast these those three cases speak to this directly the other thing that i'd like unless i have not answered them all hospital hines case did in the moyes case involve a doctor and a lab where the lab didn't have consent even though the doctor did in the hinds case the hospital had consent but the provider did not that that was a smear there it's very similar to what we're talking about here the other comment i'd like to make to the court relates to the question of that was discussed originally by your honor and also again and it's just pieces comments about debt collection somehow the implication i understood his debt collection somehow not being subject to the act on page thirty one of our brief we cite the two thousand and three report an order of the f c c where it clearly says w affirm that on the t c p it is unlawful to make any call using an automatic telephone dialing system in any in the original is emphasized in their paces side on that page including the third circu