can't get any closer than this i apologize i don't have the video we've had our office the last two hours and it's just a wonderful time to be in kansas city my name is david baker and i do represent the appellant in this case ms edwards she is a police officer with the city of columbia assigned to work at a high schools there in columbia and what we're here about today is a question of whether or not taking the allegations of fact as truth contained within the amended complaint whether a statement that the officer summoned the plaintiff to the office and that's simply not true as we pointed out our reply brief we can take and you should take reasonable inferences from the complaint but you can add facts to the complaint and i just did i think that was more than just a reasonable inference the allegations against my office here are really pretty simple there are typically few and that is when g the plaintiff came to the school office officer edwards informed her that there were other police officers there to ask her questions and then she took escorted l g into the room where the other officers were located and she got to the door where the officer is an officer assigned to the in this case a clubby a police officer not in the port of the school district she is a columbia police officer assigned her primary task is during the school day there to that's not alleged and i'm trying to i'm just trying to think through hypothetically if that's going to change my position on this in my initial impression is that i don't know what my initial impression is it's  generally thinking of is when one ops are does one part of an investigation another officer does another part of the investigation and the rd officer then relies on those st two parts and putting together a probable cause statement or something of that nature and that's just not this  i mean this happened during the school day this happened during finals between classes and they were getting ready to discuss the potential sexual assault of another student and there's no allegation that there was any suspicion that plaintiff was a suspect in that and to at this all they simply believe that yesterday that at that residence that had the same st name of the plaintiff and so she closed the door which we've argued in our brief and that before the district court that was entirely reasonable to do when talking about a sensitive nature sensitive topic of this and that's been a long time since i was in high school but between classes it was a pretty busy time if you're going to be trying to talk in private mr banker mrs judge about that and that's the only allegation is that she was asked to come down and the teacher told the asper which i believe was the receptionist at the high school but the teacher that in the class that the pla told the plaintiff came to the office she told the plaintiff that there were officers there to ask her questions she then escorted essentially cook the plaintiff into the room with the other officers on the allegations are that it was only during the interrogation that plaintiff thought she was that she was not free to leave there's no obligation the fact that she had that belief at any time before my client left she placed the planets in the room with the other two officers she closed the door there's no allegation that she stood guard outside not a geisha and she walked away as i recall the many complaint is it is not decided to that to that question unaware of any case law from this circuit or any other that would address this if you want to put my lady on milt is that what she was doing was clearly contrary to established law when we don't have any circuit authority about this the case law instruction is that we have to look for a robust series of cases from elsewhere and i've certainly not see and they hadn't any of the briefing or any of the district court's opinion and so i think we've it was not and that is exactly the point i'm trying to make is that the allegations accept them as true not clearly established under similar facts which i think the qualified nd prong of the qualified immunity analysis requires it was not going to put her on notice that oh my gosh i should be doing this walking her down the hall telling her there were people there to talk to her and closing the door after she went in during the busy changing class there was nothing to tell her that this is a seizure and i should not be doing this under what the stablished existing press which ok thank you very much sir thank you jess's in gray areas not for transgressing bright lines in here the district court determined based on the allegations and reasonable inferences there from that officer edwards transgressed a bright line and the basis for that was elegies allegations that she was seized within the meaning of the th amendment but that caesar was per se under reasonable because there was no warrants probable cause but when l g arrived at the office officer edward said the police are here to question you and walked with her to a room and placed her in this room with police officers and closed the door the only other facts view into your view that the seizure took place when that announcement was made officer it which to me o g s to her purpose for being in the room and then placing her in the room and closing the door next that's your any reasonable sixteen year old in this situation than some of the office in a police officer says you're going to be questioned by the police and walks that student to a room no reasonable sixteen year old is going to feel like they are able to leave and in fact she alleged that she did not feel like she was able to leave and mr baker point that out that allegation is made in the context of being in the room that when she was being interrogated she's not feel like she was free to leave but i think it's a reasonable inference  that that that feeling of not being sealed to relieve and the seizure occurs from the moment that edwards tells her why she's there and that she's about to be questioned now i think  important point i want to make here is that edwards did not in the district court or now argue that there was in fact a warrant for or that there was reasonable suspicion probable cause circumstances anything like that  so really the issue is was there a seizure and if there was a seizure what a reasonable officer had known that that seizure violated clearly established the th amendment rights so as i mentioned before the supreme court itself in napa texas that the standard for seizure is when a taking into account all circumstances surrounding the matter the police conduct would have communicated to a reasonable person that they were not at liberty to ignore that request and again as i said this is a sixteen year old straight a student in the high school in the principal's office being told by an officer that she's going to be questioned by the police and being led on appeal edwards makes a few arguments to claim that this was not a seizure he says she says that there's no allegation that edwards told the plaintiffs that she had to meet with the officers well the fact that she didn't say you're being commanded to do this i think it's irrelevant what matters is that she's a uniformed police officer at the school and is telling the students that she's going to be question i think you know a contrary ruling here would suggest that students are free to ignore school resource officers and i can't imagine that that is the  that l g indicated to her that she did not want to speak with the police well again i don't think that that is a reasonable sixteen year old to think that was an option to tell this officer well i don't want from any adults who might have been in her corner or at least serving as a as a guardian in that instance it was also argues that she did not participate in the interrogation but as the district point just a core pointed out that inflates the seizure with the interrogation it doesn't matter whether she participated in the interrogation in fact i don't think it matters whether the police inside asked her any questions at all what matters is that edwards took her to this room and restrained her movement a sensually by show authority and that l g believe that she wasn't free all she's it was closed the door and the closing the door was reasonable in these circumstances well you know the pointed out i don't think she just closed the door she let somebody into the room where the officers there told them told her told l g that she was going to be questioned and dismissed the inquiry of the assistant principal who asked whether he was needed but you know even assuming that the issue was sort of limited to the door closure  se unreasonable absence a warrant or probable cause or one of the exceptions of the supreme court has relaxed that standard some was in the new jersey t l o case where the seizure itself or the search instigated by school officials and subsequently decisions have said well if the police are there at the behest of the school official and they're simply helping a school official then the standard is whether the search is reasonable without getting into whether there's probable cause but those aren't the allegations here the allegations here is that this is initiated entirely by the police the fact that it happened at school is rather incidental except of course we harston case said that there's essentially three ways you can show that something clearly established one is you can cite existing court precedent with similar facts that sort of squarely governed the situation so that the officer had notice about these particular facts to you that a robust consensus of persuasive cases lay out the contours of the right and the rd way is that a general constitutional rule applied with the obvious  is no debate that the right against unreasonable seizure is clearly established and has been clearly established for a long time does that change in the school settings somehow so that the right is not clearly established when you're directing the search of the seizure and in the i don't i don't know i could not find a case in which this court has expressly said that the t l o standard does not apply you know your honor you have to look at the general principle st the general principle is that if you're going to see somebody you have to either have a warrant or you have to have probable cause or some other exception the supreme court has come up with an exception to that that lowers the standard in a situation where the school is really doing it and that's that's because schools the court itself the schools need to have a little more give they need they need to have because of their you know in local parental status because they are essentially school officers rather than agents of the police they have to have a little more latitude  there's nothing in this case that suggests the school was in any way involved involved and so assuming that officer edwards had read caisson and was relying on case and i think it's unreasonable to say well that that applies here simply because  point specific to whether the if the if the officer is involved up to the point of questioning but doesn't ask questions i'm not aware of a case directly on points but what the case law does say is we look at when the seizure occurred the caesar doesn't occur when questions start the seizure occurs when the person sees what a reasonable person in their position would not believe they were free to leave and alleged in the petition and a reasonable inference there from l g did not believe that she was free to leave to ignore this request by a police officer when she got to the office that was told you know that she that she was going to be questioned and led to this r officers from having to worry whether they're going to be held liable for making mistakes but it is not intended to shield officers from know violating essentially plain prescriptions from the qualified immunity applies in this context simply because it is not clearly a stab so let's assume for a moment that it is a constitutional violation but it is not clearly established bassam exception follows the rule it will never  focal point of this discussion has been with regard to the nd prong of the qualified immunity analysis we put public officials we put police officers in positions where they  have a lot of interaction with the public we asked police officers to make decisions all the time that they don't have the luxury of going back and asking questions of their superiors getting a supervisor on the scene or  city attorney and asking hey i'm about to do this this is what's come up we have qualified immunity in place to provide those people we put out on the street with protection that unless what you're doing is clearly established neither the hi reply but my my opening grief is that specificity is especially important in the th amendment context where the court has recognized that it is sometimes difficult for an officer to determine how the rel the the second prong is somehow lowered as far as what the level of specificity is required the nd prong is the nd prong and i and i and i don't and i don't think we i'm not aware of any authority that would support the idea that just because it was an accident lifesaving emergency that the standard for the nd prong of some not diminished but if we're going to put our people out there to perform these public services the law is such that we are going to provide them with a qualified immunity as long as what they're doing does not violate clearly established law and i've heard nothing from the counsel for the opposition nor in his brief that would suggest that there was clearly established law either in this circuit or robust authority it among the other i'm sorry it was somebody asked a question which i was just informing you that you times each thank you for your courtesy participating in this morning and providing us argument in this case and thank you also mr baker sorry about the power situation up there in kansas city i hope that it's resolved today as temperatures in the rise