in this case especially about two neighbors who became neighbors prior to nine hundred eighty six they were probably as close in proximity as two neighbors could having purchased his property from the plaintiffs they entered into an agreement governing essentially their relationship which was principally for the purpose of cross easements because there are parking lots but about to enforce this there were specific and limited restrictive covenants if you will and as we cited in our free and i don't think it's ever been contested restrictive covenants have their own standard of proof in that if there is a m b u because of the presumption in favor of the free alienation use of property if there's any ambiguity it's resolved  in favor of the for use of property by the code and same question well there are three such code so one talks about obstruction as far as moving back and forth between the two parking lots if you have two adjoining properties the second one talks in terms of the building of structures but that appears in a rather allah it is i believe clear and unambiguous in that notwithstanding those other provisions for to leave the sale of merchandise my client was granted a provision that intended to cover the entire project because the immediately preceded exception which ran in favor of the plaintiff allows him to display the shed but only in the southeast corner of his parcel  so the intent was to make it under strict as to paragraph beat now as to the sale of christmas trees and flowers plants and tree there was probably nothing better known in parking lot merchandising then christmas tree lots and the spring time appearance usually taking the best parking spaces and almost every grocery store big box retailer wal mart hardware stores all the temper of temporary area cordoned off section of the parking and the driving lanes of the little tail to protect the flowers that are were susceptible to the sun and of course a cash register for the exchange no it's been called the garden center but it's an area for selling plants and trees it would be cordoned off from traffic by those packing pallets and some bulgy colored railing he was about to put up a little protected area for the flowers and set up the cash register when this action was filed by the plaintiffs in joining that  for clue detail from any practical use of property in essence their position was you can't take up a single parking space you can't block a single lane you can't put up this temporary oriel lane cordoned off so yes you can sell flowers plants and trees you have no place to sell because as i think the court or yes a cour the orders submitted to the trial court and prepared by play this came from a language that already appeared in the agreement that is there was already a right to have sidewalk sales sensually all year round and to have ten sales for certain periods of time the expressed strong vision were trying my way those were geographically defined as to where they could do th one was on the sidewalk and one was just in the area it between the building and the first row the lights from the parking lot this provision that in order to effectively do this you need for more room than you can do on the side off of your building or even in that area because when you block the road and true in order to have any kind of volume you would have to essentially o'boy liberate the friend of your store as far as any visibility to the customers  because its purpose was one of these two particular types of sales for their specific period of time it would be to allow  use of his parking lot to conduct these in a volume that would allow him to turn a profit if you will essentially you could either pa battle now that you could pack significant enough merchandise to even make it worthwhile doing without losing more customers who can't get through the door under the suggestion of that provision or are you literally have people walking around like popcorn vendors at a ballgame selling these things i mean it's it's an effective possibility i think the current and probably anybody certainly lives in central illinois you know that these things or put up and there are a large to show a broad spectrum of merchandise from flowers to plants trees hanging baskets and all of those things these are restrictive covenants so the language you use to to eliminate them has to be free of any ambiguity now the interesting thing about this great is it prohibit the common area from being used for any purpose other than for ingress parking and the right now the socially every restrictive covenants specified is a subset of that purpose so i believe i at least brief as well as an independent restriction against the use of my client's property an independent covenant if you will length point zero nine is is interesting for a couple of reasons first it's not a restrictive covenant in fact it's an exception to the restrictive covenants what it says first is that the parties can improve their buildings if you will the non common area sions of their property it limits that ability by saying but you can make these improvements if they're going to interfere with sight lines or reduce the parking spaces then it imposes an exception to that restriction where it says but if and this is soley for the benefit of the plaintive if you decide to expand you were building of the plaintiff's building or my client's building for that matter if you would do that sort of expansion the only exception is that that one little nudge in grants that right to expand or build another building adjacent to the original ace hardware there's nothing else there's the reference it doesn't say that don't have an exception you have a situation where if we apply that to what happened is because the plaintiffs did in fact build a building a court may be familiar with the garden center it appears next to it it's a it's a fairly substantial love undertaking it's made of brick and permanent fences it has the same covering for the perishable plants that my client attempted to do they built that under the provision maintaining that was a building and so that they were authorized to do that however there was nothing in the contract that exempted the other provisions of the  o course because frankly one of the things this invoked one of the rules of construction is an absurd result of the giving with one hand and taking away with the other the logic is that you can build a building but you can't use it i mean that makes no sense and i think certainly crosses the line into absurdity so if they are granted a right to build a building they're bred of the right to use the building and a right that supersedes any other research that's exactly what we have here is a specific seasonal right to use his parking lot to put up temporary christmas trees or a sales of flowers in the winter and in the spring now the plaintiffs have used this they've built this building and they have used it because it's consistent with both logic and the meaning of the tent of disagreement in both instances the parties intended to create a right place to measure that they put up a garden center asserting they have a right to build a building and it over the rationale that well if we have a right to build a building it is logical and implicit otherwise that was their position that was their interpretation of this agreement that the grammy have a right exempted or superseded any other things that would be inconsistent with the exercise of that right it was only until my client attempted to exercise his right which coincidentally was in competition with the use he made of their garden center that they changed their one doesn't restrict it is limited to traffic between the two prop switch my place proposed guard mary was on the absolute opposite side of the border between the two tracks the second one is i think we're being kind to call it ambiguous because it's clearly intended that it not cover the entire parking lot but is so absolutely ill defined that you can't tell where it is in front of the building but along the street is it just the parking lot is it just a driveway and again applying the applicable rule of restrictive covenants that ambiguity bishop hard working up this is a fairly straightforward issue i think at its core justice turner i think to the heart of it which is a courtroom where to interpret a contract in a context each provision in the context of the entire grima give effects to each one to the extent possible within reason and i think that's exactly what the trial court to hear the courts are permitted to redrafting agreement to give parties a better bargain than they and we see that the parties expressly talk about what kind of structures or what kind of obstructions you you are specially permitted to construct on the on the counting area specifically tense references for small sheds tents during certain times of the year so the parties were perfectly capable of articulating the types of structures or obstructions in that time period for those things on the common area and it was a practical impossibility to exercise the right that is cited by the appellants then they should have provided for those things in the agreement when they're perfectly capable that in those provisions to the agreement that time because they did so and other instances and again the courts well where the well so principle that you know there's a presumption that parties intended for things to be a part of an agreement they would have put those provisions into the green which stands for the basic proposition that core should imply new terms  entire universe of things that you can do under an agreement but addresses a specific issue and enjoin specific kind of thing which you can't do so in this situation the trial court said you can't build the exercise at the same time within the count with the new constraints both temporal and geographic of the other provisions of the agreement too so to be more specific you know they could write tense under this agreement as long as it wasn't for more than ten days at a time and let's say that period happened to be between one of the november fifteenth of december thirty first cerebral first or june thirtieth they think those  rights of those could be exercised at the same time consistent with the express language of the agreement so i don't think it was the plainest burden at the trial court to articulate the universe of how they could permissibly says their rights under this agreement which would include what was direction here that that would comply with the bargain stanny structures obstructions you know fences that cetera there wasn't specifically provide for like a tent because because that's expressly provided for decision i don't think it's incumbent upon the plaintiff to show them exactly how they could exercise their rights or the green of the trial court said you can you certainly have the right to sell flowers plants and trees in accordance with with the agreement and it didn't say here's exactly how i can do it  clearly intended for there to be an ability to sell flowers plants and trees and i think the disagreement here is not whether they can do that it's the manner in which they can do that i don't think anyone would this is an extreme example but i don't think you know disagree that you could have flowers plants and trees and area in a parking lot that wasn't off our king space that you didn't have a structure surrounding it it didn't obstruct the view of the view of the building or be a killer traffic that notice that the prevalence of flour sales garden centers on on our side throughout central illinois there are a lot of them out there i don't think that's appropriate for the court a judicial notice of there's nothing in the record that would support that however there's nothing also nothing on the record that that suggest that all is or places have the same agreement that imposes the same restrictions on the party so perhaps those other places the parties enjoy use of those those properties didn't agree to the terms that are that are contained within this agreement i think the trial court's interpretation was fair and reasonable under the circumstances and although the interpretation of the agreement does substantially limit that express right it doesn't totally eliminate it and that's under the circumstances the balance of the trapper recent i think it was very similar circumstances  under or is it impossible to perform so there would be no reason to even put that in there or address it if it was limited to just the right that already exist term now obviously and that's why i point to the fact that we've observed countless of these implicit in outdoor sales of flowers or everything the pla do is structure was limits it is it could possibly be two rails but nobody can shop for anything in a parking lot if there are cars driving by because it's it's dangerous nobody's going to do that there has to be an area of safety so that they can actually look at the merchandise the places knew this was zero two b which does not appear in one on the way is the provision that subject to these express the purpose of this agreement should be fulfilled which of course is all restrictions they made it expressively subject to them every restrictive covenant in it that was clearly the intent of the agreement and i think the plaintiffs recognize that in the building of their own home center i think the only difference in our changing the plane to specific is the defendant's garden center would compete with their that's not a basis for changing the contract itself nor for the interpretation that everybody agreed on all these years that authorized the plaintiff to operate its own  building on his section of the common area so to avoid what the course is talking about they did it the way they did it ok you do yours in your parking lot you can build a building erect a building on your own property and do whatever you choose to do in fact it looking at the defendant got the worst of the deal because his