proceed when he is right case presents to matters of statutory construction and one issue of trial court discretion i would like to combine the maintenance statutory construction issue and flow into the maintenance discretion issue because i think they are somewhat dependent upon each other the maintenance statute section five zero four of the illinois marriage and just lucian of marriage act  three times talks about the duration and amount that the trial court has given discretion to set when awarding maintenance it says maintenance may be set for a temporary or  and clearly the word temporary is not the same as a temporary maintenance or dependent lete since that's covered under section five of one of the act but i will force as the court mail award maintenance in amounts and for periods the co deems just and five o four says that the court may ward maintenance for fixed or indefinite periods of time maintenance modification statute five ten ambiguities in the language of either statute and accordingly the appellate court's finding here that there is no statutory authority to limit a maintenance extension and review to a fixed period of time is simply wrong essentially states that the legislature did not limit the discretion of the trial courts in the manner in which it wanted to fashion manes i'm as the court will recall the trial court did a hybrid between maintenance and growth and periodic maintenance to make it to dr ball and this court said that the almost unbridled discretion five zero four a provides allowed the judge to do that trial judge to do that as to fixing the amount of maintenance for the duration that is set for by before a also gives the trial court unlimited discretion that this may be an act of legislation by the second district indeed three district all agree i disagree with that i do not think that either mayall or car paul or so under i don't think any of them stand for the proposition that the second district stated here which is the second just for state here that the trial court has no authority to set maintenance first pacific period of time mak end and make it non modifiable during that time and may all was a case in which they simply said that if maintenance is set for permanent on a permanent basis it's inherently  reviewable i don't think that's the same as saying a court doesn't have the authority to set a review period or or an initial period of maintenance and not provide for a review and support statute in five zero five the legislature said that child support has to be set in this particular percentage of somebodies income unless or except if a court makes the sipek findings that allow it to deviate from the guidelines five zero four contains no such language it doesn't but if the legislature it wanted to they could they could have written a statute that said the court must always provide for  review the maintenance awarded if awarded will always inherently be modifiable and it did and statutes are to be read as well as written as long as they are not and ambiguous and i do not see any ambiguity here it doesn't state you provide now that means can be modified or terminated only showing a substantial change circumstance that's change so that's correct and i do not see isn't thing conflict provision i don't think it's in conflict with five ten and i think five zero four and five ten both have to be looked at and i  i'll give a quick example in a direct five time directly let's say that a that there's a three year marriage and a court thinks that one of the spouses should get six months worth of maintenance  or does that mean that the court that if you were awarded six months worth of maintenance that anytime in that six months the recipient's files can come in and ask for modification of the end of the six months they can ask for review  i think part of what i'm going to talk about here in terms of everything is that you know i may be naive but i think that the that legislation is written for the people of the state of illinois and not for the attorneys and all of the what judge wilder did here in the trial court was he kept these people from coming back to court and i think five o three which justice thomas mention i think that the legislature meant to keep people under people's cases the end where they it indicated it can't it indicates that the wording of five ten indicates to me that and we wouldn't be dealing review or asked for a modification and says there's going to substantial change in circumstances i think the court has the authority depending on what the substantial change of circumstances are and they could see if there's a change of circumstances could occur favoring each party in contested litigation i don't think the court is forced to modify or extend maintenance simply i think the only significance it has is that the one time that the review was allowed for five years and one month nobody could have stopped it from occurring it doesn't mean that judy agreed never to have another one but it also doesn't mean that her ability to seek a review was open ended and and and i think that i give an example and one of the briefs that  another year of maintenance would be appropriate i think under this decision a judge would be reluctant to do that because when the years are you going to see these people again and i think that the court i'm can't be deprived of the authority to stop the litigation between the people if that's what the court deems appropriate and also you know it can i mean we are taking a chance on costing somebody maintenance they may need because of fear that the litigation is never going to end and plus we do have to remember as justice thomas just pointed out that this was a negotiated agreement and why would a pay or ever negotiate a fixed period with a review for which they theoretically gave something up i mean here doctor wanted reid to pay for all of the children's college with after tax dollars if it becomes essentially meaningless  of time that five years in one month becomes a some silly meaningless because your lawyer has to tell you well she'll come in for review and if the judge thinks she needs another year to remain and she's going to come back or view again and you know militates against the agreements agreements both inherently in a way i just said in the way that it basically i think of this rated doctor belongs agreement here i want to ruled that a short period of rehabilitation really grip holidayed of maintenance of four hundred dollars a month was inappropriate in a case like that and i would agree but salinger does not stand for the a statutory obligation in the first place to be make ever so become self sufficient she agreed in the agreement she had a responsibility to become self supporting during the initial maintenance period and she also agreed in the agreement that her standard of living after the dissolution would not be the eighteen thousand dollars per month that was apparently the standard of living during the marriage that the appellate court here seized upon but it would be turned out to be around eight thousand dollars a month with with the extra percentage of maintenance payments that were made and that was with two minors in her house all know the agreement said that the children's emancipation would not be a substantial change in circumstances but it didn't say that there no longer residing in the household would be one excess of a million dollars and that's what agreements are the giving up one thing and getting another and in my view in our view this concert gave up the right to expect to be dependent on dr braun for the rest of her life or even for more than five years if she did not meaningfully meaningfully strive toward self sufficiently and we also think she voluntarily agreed to give up the marital standard of living which the appellate court used it was not was not the province its conclusion as to the efficacy of those efforts and its impact on maintenance are not ones which no reasonable person would make she forced suck her career in law in her law degree to go into the jewelry business and for which she had absolutely no experience she kept no resume she could know what application she did not to use an employment counselor and she made less than twenty thousand dollars in employment income in the five years after the marriage  and that's if this is something that she agreed to in the court had a right to look at it and the court had a right to weigh the credibility of this cossar and of the two expert witnesses but under five ten the court has other aspects that can rely upon also such as the length of payments in terms of the length of the marriage and here with the additional three years the judge while the awarded i'm disgusted will have received eight years of maintenance after a seventeen essentially the appellate court said here that the trial court put too much weight and what essentially was miscast was broken promise to support herself and not it and not enough on the standard of living that she had voluntarily given up  five years before not only does the trial court have the discretion to look hard at the self support issue because it's a statutory and it was in the agreement it had no discretion to consider the marital lifestyle since that would have violated the agreement that the parties had made that what this cost of lifestyle would be immediately after the dissolution and it had numerous other factors as i pointed out to vindicate its conclusion i think the appellate court on the discretionary issue credibility judge waldeck i think i actually did miss castor the justice of giving her close to one half of her prior maintenance payments for an additional three years even though he found that her efforts of becoming self sufficient home had been woeful on the issue of attorneys these i don't have an inherent philosophical horse to ride here i do have a client represent and i think the side we have taken is the correct it but it did not it stated a time period by which contribution petitions needed to be fine it could have changed that for post to create litigation in five zero three and five zero eight or in five ten it did not do that and i don't that the property both people have should be examined and when you're modifying maintenance or support and there are nineteen other factors on that a court looks at a modification petition and there's really nothing that a court would look at to determine whether a few should be paid at the time an initial judgment is honored or at the time post for each party's properties they are going to consideration each party's income each party's health each party's ability to acquire as an income in the future they're all looked at in both of both occasions and i think it's a distinction without a difference petition to be filed after a motion to reconsider ration has been heard on the substance of opposed to the petition makes these things go on forever and i think that not allowing a judge to limit maintenance to a specific period of with the contribution issue first i think it's the easiest to dispose of it the second district had this rule in qatar that applied in a way that it made what was common and typical in preter cases that is contribution to attorney's fees and issue for property distribution a rule that also applied in post to create matters it didn't make sense and the second district has since reviewed it itself and changed its own rule and it is now in line with the first district case of car and it is in line with the third district case of macaluso there is no longer any  confusion is between the district system how the contribution rules should be applied and the interpretation of five a three day it may be that in dick in the first district our case was written by just as burke there is in its interpretation in the dissent there is an agreement with that interpretation now that the second district has three over ruled itself and reversed its holding in contrary i don't think the districts are any longer in conflict and they shouldn't be  the contribution action in a predicament case is obvious that it should it's obvious that it should be made prior to the disposition of property like any bill a gas bill electric bill a mortgage whatever the bill might be legal fees should be part of the disposition of either property or debt and it makes absolute sense in a pretty creek ace judy custer's case as it presents itself shows why it doesn't make scents and post court the second district recognizes it it says by its own decision meaning you don't know what to ask for by way of contribution until you have the very decision she didn't know if she was going to get the eighty six hundred dollars a month or if she did the thirty five hundred dollars a month in reduced maintenance should she have had to file that prophylactic motion for contribution after the close of proof some prior to judgment without knowing what that judgment would allow or it and again the second district talks to the practical effect of having to do it in overruling its own decision and why it is obvious from statutory construction why the contra rule as an earlier thought should apply to c weight factual issue and and i think it's important just without repeating too many facts to note that judy was thirty three years old at the time she marry she was fifty one years old at the time of the divorce eighteen year marriage she was fifty six years old at the time that maintenance was to be reviewed pursuant to the agreement now what's interesting is there is a distinction between the golden case gives us the distinction between modify villany and review ability he makes some very good points but i think that there is a distinction between modify ability and review and as we heard my colleague a moment ago say that we are dealing with issues  statutory construction but i think in case we deal with really just a five a five to ten that is an order from maintenance may be modified or terminated only upon a showing of substantial chang circumstances in all such proceedings as well as in proceedings in which maintenance is being reviewed meaning there's a distinction between modified delivery and excuse me between proceedings where there was sort modif ability and review and essentially that's a burden shift difference under modify bill or the you have to the doctor boom would have to have shown a substantial change in circumstances the golden case if  your honour's except that is showing the distinction between modify ability and review village a there is a distinction and again that distinction is a burden shift dr bloom would not have needed to show a substantial change in circumstances  the general factors of five zero four and five ten as five ten references the five or four factors but all would have been reviewed for the purposes of determining whether or not judy should continue on review to receive maintenance now so the five years pass and were now in review ability and under review ability maybe dr boom does not have the burden of substantial change in circumstances if you hold col to be accurate as to the distinction between review ability and modify ability but what factor is there to show that this new order of three years thirty five hundred and not a modifiable and ending at three finding here and that the trial court it really not applied factors accurately and that's really manifest when you look at what the experts themselves testified dr blum called an expert to the stand who said th did walk was reasonable in order to attempt to rehabilitate herself and if you don't get permanent magnets well all maintenance is reviewable so here we are on reveal there is a perceived need that is found a thousand dollars a month that's clear in the record and now it's being reduced to thirty five hundred dollars a month which means that judy who has undertaken all reasonable efforts to rehabilitate herself is now going to have to liquidate whatever heads if she's going to enjoy the lifestyle despite a stipulation from dr blum the stipulation in the record that he can reasonably afford to continue to pay the maintenance of the eight thousand dollars a month and keep in mind too that when judy at thirty three having two kids at thirty four and thirty five also took dr steven bloom's trial from a prior marriage and raised him and she didn't just forego the use of her law degree she as one of the factors suggests raise this family and now at fifty six is told at fifty nine you're not going to get what you need to live despite you made every reasonable effort the court having said this is where the second district  departed from the trial court the court having said the trial court even said that her inability to earn more income to self impose his own expert said to the contrary she had made reasonable efforts she's now being punished for century failing she had a law degree she attempted to develop an immigration practice what happened well two thousand and one nine one one happened and it was very hard for her and then she tried alternatively to develop a jewelry business that also failed so now she's traveled to california with dr bloom she's come back here she's raised a family she needs eight thousand dollars a month that's the standard of living he can afford to pay it she's made reasonable efforts now we say you can't have the benefit of say that on thirty five hundred dollars if we force her to live her life she'll do better she's now fifty nine years of age it's hard for a lawyer with a degree that you haven't used for eighteen years to to do better and  k said because the woman will never be able to earn enough so that the husband and it was a husband in that case it's gender neutral but the husband in that case will always earn two to three times as much as her we're going to make it permanent maintenance but short of making it permanent mate and certainly the couric shouldn't just cut it off without having some understanding of where she'll be at the time and all this court did the second this record did was say and the exercise of your power should be review e and in given the manifest weight finding that the findings were against manifest way you should have reduced it in this particular case and of course that's particular to this case based on i don't know if i answered your question but i hope so thank you  jewelry trying to go into the jewelry business was a mistake she said that this cost was highly employee of all that attorneys can work in many settings such as corporate in addition to having private practices which is the only thing that miss custer tried to do was set up her own practice and if we're going to talk about you know how all this cossar is now dr blunt to sixty two years at some point you've got to have the expectation that he can retire and even if he continues the work that he's no longer responsible for someone who made it entered into an agreement saying i will make appropriate efforts to become self sufficient and i think one thing that being ignored here is that  statutorily at any rate judge waller could have given her nothing he could have said i'm not extending your maintenance i'm sorry now she could have been appealed and claim that that was an abuse of discretion but and in terms of statutory construction why are we forced into court or what why are we thinking that the legislature forced the court and to and between making that judgment your mit i'm sorry you're getting nothing from now on or i'm going to stand up for a while then we're going to see if we're going to a standard again where the legislature preclude the middle ground of signing you're going to get this much more maintenance and that will be the end of it  the court does have the authority to do that and i don't know that mr leavitt addressed that before the scored some one juror does not stand for the proposition that a court cannot do that it simply does not now in terms of know whether her maintenance is being extended or not that's not the only factor that goes to contribution she could lose the case and still say i want any contribution because i have no assets because my income is limited his is a lot more than mine is and plus in a predicament setting you're required to file your contribution petition prior to knowing what your distribution is going to be and and prior to the final ruling in the case and i don't see the distinction there i think we have to read statutes as they are written this statute is written that contribution petitions have to be filed within thirty days of close of proofs or any time the court may extend with within that period of time and five seven nine by will be taken under advi