seizure disorder was based upon the board's failure to have considered the provisions of thirty eight u s c one of five a which is the presumption of service connection and thirty eight u s c a lot eleven which is the presumption of sou presumption the board also physically found that the twenty thirteen decision that in the twenty thirteen decision that the one of the five a presumption did not in fact create a presumption of service connection that finding is in direct conflict with this court's decision instead they found as the argument is made in chad that that provision pertain only to line of duty determinations and misconduct the board was not required to directly apply these statutory presumptions in its review of the one nine hundred eighty four board decision well in fact they did consider those they did review those provisions and the effect of that determination by the veterans court was to the niger dish will review to mr akerson of the decision that was made by the board of veterans appeals in two thousand and thirteen because the board in its two thousand and connection if it's established that he had a chronic condition or chronic disease and the board made a fact finding which is beyond the scope of my review that in light of the record there was no chronic disease demonstrating drug demonstrated during the service or for many years thereafter so i feel like everything else is a house of cards that you don't have an unstable platform not because it's wrong but because i don't have the authority to reveal the fact finding that was made at the base level everything else you this court does have the authority to review questions of law the question of law in this case is the apply could build the of section one o five a as well as eleven eleven section one five a pertains not just t specifically referenced his post service disability for the injury in the service from being hit in the head with a baseball back there is no dispute he was hit in the head with a baseball bat that was an injury the question then becomes did that injury that was sustained while on active duty result in a post service disability he is entitled to the statutory presumption that if under the court's holding  shedden there is a present post service disability with the new material evidence establish that there was not merely a progressive seizure disorder but also a psychiatric disability and on that there was in cur of any injury in service of being hit in the head by the baseball bat and then provided the causal relationship between that present disability and the injury in service so what was that last part i mean i know  said at page forty three of the appendix it is quite possible that he referring to mr akerson sustained a significant cerebral concussion from the blow from the baseball bat in one nine hundred fifty not which produced a post concussion syndrome and a gradual development of a seizure disorder that's the nexus that's all that require you connect the in service injury giving you connect the post the board in this one hundred eighty five decision expressly said that that presumption did give me the two thousand and thirteen decision expressly said that that presumption did not create a presumption of service connection that only dealt with line of duty or willful misconduct that is the specific argument that this court rejected in schenn and found that that statutory presumption permitted the  to rely upon the presumption that is provided for under one of five day of service connection and that if you have in the play which of shred the existence of the present disability correctly applied by the board in two thousand and thirty and the bor in the veterans court refused to allow for consideration of that because they made a legal determination which just didn't correct that the  c because that seemed to be one of the problems that the corps had in understanding what the error was below but in applying these presumptions that the chronic disease has its provide the nexus evidence but i don't i guess i still am back to what i was asking before which is i don't see this is a disease case i don't see this as a case in which you get the benefit of the three of three presumptions because there is no proof and even if there were i could review a fact finding to the contrary but there is no proof that there was a chronic disease that manifested during service or within a year of full service he is currently diagnosed the c's are seizure disorder if you want this to fall under the three of three presumption you have to establish the seizure disorder as a chronic disease was one during service of that one year so it's now your argument is i'm not arguing for the chronic disease presumption of the three or three i've been stead arguing for nex understand after that was presented to the court below in terms of the way in which a veteran is capable of the stabbing independent of actual evidence a regulatory presumption axis by showing a chronic disease i've argued below that the testimony from dr bertilsson described symptoms and manifestations of the same chronic condition that the doctor brutally and said i believe gradually developed to a seizure disorder that i appreciate the fact that that three zero three three argument may not prevail but the legal error here by the veterans court was to say that those statutory presumptions that don't have anything to do directly with three of three b were not required to be considered by the board i just don't understand all of your presumption of sound this argument seizure disorder which was first diagnosed many many many years later and the baseball bat injury that to me if we put aside all the chronic disease stuff which i don't understand at all the fear because i establishes on this record your failure to establish that required nexus between the baseball bat and the leader seizure disorder but i don't understand what you want me to do i don't see how the presumption of soundness has a lick of anything to do with  i talk about the presumption of soundness the reason that we are here is because of the error by the veterans court the veterans court senate that these presumptions were not required to be considered by the board that is an er the board was not required to directly apply these decisions in the review of the one nine hundred eighty five decision rather it was required to determine whether there was q in that decision it doesn't seem to me they're saying and look  clearly and unequivocally was the board was not required to consider that the board was required to consider the board actually did consider both of those presumptions i'm not asking this court to review the fact i was asking places because there's one place they clearly didn't screw up and that and your kids are all right to use all your time let's wait for restore some for about all let's hear the other side misinterpreting one on friday eleven eleven or eleven the statutory presumptions under eleven twelve when evaluating mr akerson claim for disability compensation additionally additionally although m attempts to frame his argument as one of the misinterpretation of the statutory presumption at the heart of his argument is the fact is his disagreement with the board's factual finding in the five medical evidence that was in the record at that time and again that goes also to the q analysis which so that there is not an on debatable error in the record that would manifestly change the outcome because the record was shared and where the court is referring to service connection in the more limited sense of the second element of the three part three of three eight test not in the broader sense of establishing nexus the third element this court held in shed and that that the line of duty presumption goes to the second element of the test that the veteran a still obligated to establish a current disability as well as the nexus and so presumption establishes nexus this argument's been rejected in fulton and di and it spends expressly held by this court that eleven eleven goes to the second element of the visibility test and the better and is still required to prove current disability and nexus and that's the problem with this case going back to the factual finding the board both in one thousand nine hundred five and two thousand and thirteen found the better and had not established nexus under three o three a with the evidence of record and did not trigger the presumption under eleven twelve again that the factual finding for which this court  presumptions to say that necklace nexus had been established the argument didn't seem to change to the request for reconsideration which you then was stating the left letter triggered the eleven twelve presumption argument did seem to change but it argument it comes down to his disagreement with the one nine hundred eighty four letter which again is factual finding that this court does not have jurisdiction to review and as the veterans court found one zero five a eleven eleven simply are not issue in the case so there is no mis application of the statutory presumptions the same applies for eleven twelve there's no question that the chronic disorder did not have its onset during his service hundred eighty three after that or decision he got this letter from dr person that was the new with material level when a case is real but with new material evidence that it is supposed to be considered under all political provisions of the law the assertion of where the first letter from the first colloquy with the government in one nine hundred ninety three mr akerson did submit another application and eventually that application was granted based upon even more clarifying evidence and now he establish the right to service connected disability this case ultimately is about whether or not the board in one nine hundred eighty five correctly did not i did service connection for seizure disorder that was the result of an injury and that