quorum being present a subcommittee on national security and foreign affairs the hearing entitled iran sanctions options opportunities and consequences will come to order i ask unanimous consent that only the chairman and ranking member of the subcommittee be allowed to make opening statements and without objection so watered ask unanimous consent that the hearing record be kept open for five business days so that all members of the subcommittee be allowed to submit a written statement for the record without objection it's so ordered so good morning it's basically to all of our witnesses are kind enough to come here and share their testimony with us today we're going to exhaust examine an important and timely national security issue in the options in effect of this is sanctions against the islamic republic of iran two thousand and nine is been a turbulent year us around relations last january we inaugurated a president ready to pursue diplomatic engagement this past april marked the thirtieth year of the islamic republic history in november we remember the thirtieth anniversary of the iran hostage crisis in the june twel present significant challenges to the united states and the international community nearly a year after president obama extended a hand to iran in his inaugural address we have yet to see iran unclench its fist instead iran continues to develop its nuclear program in the shadows claims that its nuclear program is designed for peaceful civilian purposes refuses to cooperate fully and transparently with the international atomic energy agency and its inspectors it raises significant concerns about the true nature intent of iran's nuclear ambitions last september the united states along with its allies disclose that iran had long been building a secret nuclear reactor and come home this revelation was followed the last month by an official u n resolution condemning iran's failure to disclose a site as required under the nuclear nonproliferation treaty the resolution was approved with strong international support by twenty five to three vote with both russia and china voting in favor of condemning iran there are many strong there are many strong options both within the united states and around the world on how best to manage the many challenges that iran presents i think that many of us support the president's strategy of engagement but that fails to bear fruit then a lot of us are contemplating what must be the next step and that's what brings us together here today we've assembled a distinguished panel of experts to share with us their thoughts on the vital national security question at hand you know i just on a personal side of this and stability of the middle east any program to which they may have a right as a party to the nuclear nonproliferation treaty must be peaceful civilian open transparent and subject to inspection by the international atomic energy agency  disclosure previously secret nuclear facilities as we have seen threatens to and the threat to him replicate that ten times over the general unwillingness to recently engage the international community obviously all of those behaviors by iran cause concern united states in the international community has made i think a considerable effort to negotiate and engage that is yet to be reciprocated that was a test for rand's leadership if it was serious about its claims that only a civilian nuclear program was being pursued and there was no reason it should not have it not agreed to export it to russia or elsewhere and allow the i a e a inspections so what options the government's intelligence agencies and other experts agree or disagree i should say on how close iran is to developing a bomb also many of them agree that any military strike on facilities would likely only to delay development by one of two years and cause other replications there's considerable disagreement a debate on the value affect nature would be in order if they were targeted and effective in that regard but now with respect to the iran refined petroleum sanctions act of two thousand and wish the house will be considering this week partially i have considerable concerns out of some nationalistic feeling or resentment for how devastating the effect might of sanctions might be on the civilian population it's notable that the two main opposition leaders have spoken against imposition of sanctions particular with regard to refined petroleum products the restriction on oil products refined all products could probably be assumed to affect the poor and the middle class in iran but it's unlikely that the elites in the gard particular would be deprived of the use of any gasoline or other refined products that would command in fact might control any market that existed in them so we have a large question here to do i think jeff and others may have a different opinion on that but i could only support the earth if i was assured that it's current language which i read to mandate the sanctions as opposed to provide the flexibility of the president to them would either be delayed before the final passes to a more appropriate time on the diplomatic pressure process that the administration is falling or if they were modified prior to passage to provide the president more flexibility we get those assurances that we may get it through the house so that it can go to the senate and be modified at a conference  necessary only would love flexibility in exercising sanction authority might the president secure greater cooperation from our partners in taking effect of action and ultimately facilitate a change in arabian policies now is a critical stage in the inten diplomacy seeking to impose significant international pressure on iran i think the legislative out of take care not to harm those prospects as they go forward so it's with interest that we listen to our experts on the panel here today we want to make sure that likely in the proper way in the most effective way and we welcome you and thank you for your testimony with that i defer to mr flake for his opening remarks i think the chairman i look forward to today's hearing myself  president's hands are tied there very severe limits on what the president can do in response to action on the part of the cubans or in any other direction so while this may not start out as an attempt to tie the president's hands state a letter to senator kerry on the chairman of the committee on foreign relations a united states senate on this issue basically the letter indicates it is following up with a conversation that james steinberg the deputy secretary had with john multilateral efforts to develop pressure track measures now it is in the spirit of the shed objectives that i write to express my concern about the timing and content of this legislation as i testified before the congress in october it is our hope that any legislative initiative would preserve the maximum and maximize the president's flexibility to secure greater cooperation with our partners in taking effect of action and ultimately facilitate a change in arabian policies however we are entering a critical period of intense diplomacy to impose significant international pressures on iran this requires that we keep the focus on iran at this juncture i concern of this legislation as its current form might weaken rather than strengthen international unity and support for our efforts in addition to the timing we have serious of state of concerns including the lack of flexibility and efficient monetary thresholds and penalty levels and blacklisting that could cause unintended foreign policy consequences i have asked the department staff to pay for discuss with their staff revisions that could address these concerns on timing and content and i hopeful that we can work together to achieve our common goals i hope that consideration the bill be delayed to the new year so as not to undermine the administration although see at this critical juncture i look forward to working together to achieve our common goals and i will stay in close contact with you as a diplomatic efforts george lopez currently serves as a senior fellow at the united states institute of peace where he focuses on international sanctions imposed sanctions economies he is also professor and chair at the crack international institute from international peace studies at the university robin wright also currently serves as a senior fellow at the united states institute of peace where she focuses on iran the middle east in the broader islamic world is right is reported from more than one hundred forty countries on six continents for a wide range of publications including most recently the washington post she is also a regular contributor to time magazine on the topic of iran this writer is the author of several books on iran of the middle east including most recently dreams and shadows the future of the middle east she holds a b a in an m a from the university of michigan embassador james dobbins is the director of international security and defense policy center at the rand corporation has held a number of positions in government including u s representative to the december two thousand and one bonn conference where he worked directly with iran and helping to reestablish the government in afghanistan after the fall of the taliban ambassador dobbins also formerly served as assistant secretary of state for europe and a special assistant to the president holds a b s from georgetown university thank you for all of our distinguished witnesses for making yourselves hand to tell the truth the whole truth and nothing but the truth thank you very much the record will please reflect at all the witness and answered in the affirmative and i tell you what i think you already know that all your written statements will be added on the record b consent we try to limit the testimony to about five minutes of possible so time for questions and answers after that and dr maloney if you'll be kind of the testimony thank you very much engage the iranians in a comprehensive diplomatic dialogue the discourse in washington and around the world has already shifted toward an embrace of punitive measures the search for alternative mechanisms for influencing iran is completely understandable given the current context both in terms of increasing crackdown within iran as well as iran's repeated rebuffs of the offers of the obama administration and the rest of the international community to engage in a serious dialogue at the same time i think it's  unfortunate that the track record for sanctioning iran is really not an auspicious one and the key prerequisites for a successful sanctions oriented approach protracted duration and brought it here answer almost certainly unattainable today with respect to iran there are some more promising indications of a more conducive context but that is no guarantee of success in my testimony else briefly about that track record but i will conclude by laying out a series of principles that should guide our consideration of any new  measures we've had thirty years of u s lateral sanctions on iran and there should be no illusions the likelihood of a more rigorous and more broadly implemented sanctions regime will produce a reversal of iran's nuclear calculus quickly  easily thirty years of sanctions have not accomplished their primary objective which is the moderation of iran's security and foreign policy this is largely been a function of the lack of international consensus moving forward today despite tough talk from various european leaders and the new cooperation between washington and moscow on iran the prospect for expanding the playing field on sanctions will still prove daunting largely because of our different divergent perspectives in washington we tend to see a direct relationship between economic pressure and eventual moderation of the target leadership many of our allies have exactly the opposite perspective they fear that once isolated from the international community to her on will be further radicalized and may retaliate either via direct action against governments that have supported sanctions or by accelerating their nuclear efforts or withdrawing from the n p t the irony is that neither the american nor the european perspective on sanctions is actually borne out by iranian history iran's response to the repeat d use of sanctions by washington has neither involved capitulation to demands or radicalisation instead the regime typically see seeks refuge in denial while expending a great deal of effort on trying to mitigate the impacts of sanctions through smuggling through promotion of substitute industries and through economic diplomacy specifically with respect to europe iran has been preparing for a possible embargo on imports of gasoline and other refined petroleum products for a variety of official schemes to minimize gasoline consumption and to establish stockpiles of gasoline more broadly or owns post revolutionary experience contradicts the underlying american argument in support of sanctions the islamic republic has experienced a number of of episodes a severe economic pressure but none of generated the kind of foreign policy moderation that the sponsors of europe or the other manifold unitive measures against iran tend to forecast instead in the past when iran has been under economic pressure this is illustrated the coalescence of the regime and the consolidation of public support economic constraints have enhanced cooperation among your own factions purse strings have in fact for some moderation of its economic policies but not of its foreign policy and i think that  particularly important to remember today as we move forward with new pressure obviously sanctions have to be a component of our overall integrated diplomatic strategy toward iran and one that has both a short term and a long term perspective it is one of the few tools that remains at our disposal and therefore has set forward the following principles that should be uppermost in our minds in assessing new sanctions the objectives need to be clear limited and achievable particularly sanctions that have a potential for influencing important constituencies that have some say in iran's nuclear policy at the economic interests of the revolutionary guard corps and other critical elements of iran's hardline power structure this is a particular uncertainty i think with respect i'm not sure what the scenario that the sponsors have in mind is that the iranian public under great economic constraints begins to go to the streets and voice and frustration with this regime and the regime somehow capitulates or moderate policy toward the international community is really a scenario that doesn't bear any resemblance to the likely behavior of the iranian leadership also suggest that we need to be careful about our rhetoric when we talk about crippling sanctions that will break the back of the regime again we need to be clear about the intended objective of our sanctions we are not trying to bring down the regime that is not within the capacity of the united states of america what we are trying to do is reverse their position on the nuclear issue and that means persuading them of their security is better served through another approach to the world secondly we need to integrate sanctions within the continuum of u s diplomacy i'm glad the obama administration has dropped the sort of talk about carrots and sticks but still the rhetoric of dual track seems to suggest that sanctions  to understand their security interests are better served by cooperation rather than confrontation third we need to have that kind of broad international consensus and implementation that has been lacking for the most of the past thirty years getting and keeping our allies on board with a sustained sanctions approach is important because so long as there are outliers so long as there hesitate or like russia and china historically that makes it easier for others to sit on the fence and to avoid full  implementation of the sanctions with this respect reset of the us russian relationship has been a necessary condition to improving the prospects for sanctions but it's not going to be sufficient to generate sufficient international support for sustaining meaningful economic pressure we're going to have to make a credible case to our allies that our measures can actually impact in a positive fashion the nuclear calculus fourth we need to focus on those measures that have the best prospects for direct any sort to say actions that hit prospective project pipeline projects that are many years from being away from being implemented are likely not to have much impact on iran's behavior largely because it's regime retains a certain degree of denial about it economic prospects finally we have to speak very carefully about the prospects of anything to influence iran emerging opposition movement there have been there in calls within that opposition certainly the political leadership of the opposition has suggested that sanctions would not help its position there are others who have suggested in fact that new economic pressure might galvanize iranians against the regime i think both of these arguments have a certain degree of elicit but we have to recognize that measures that target the burgeoning economic world of the regime press of capacity that are specifically identified with human rights abuses can serve a double purpose in pressing the regime both in moderating its nuclear course in improving its treatment of its people at home and here we should be supporting leveraging the interest in europe but we have to be careful to assume that somehow iranians if the price of gasoline goes up if they can't access home heating oil in the middle of a cold winter are likely to vent their anger against the regime rather than at the islamic republic the regime is quite skilled at deflecting the impact of sanctions and clearly it's rationing programs and access to smuggling networks will permit the regime to insulate its core constituencies from the impact of reduced supplies iranians would welcome american efforts to cut off supplies of heating oil and gasoline to me sounds like the same kind of logic that suggested that iraq would greet us as liberators after we violently removed their regime the reality is that the iranian domestic climate is complicated and uncertainty there are no simple solutions and frankly the cost of failure when it comes to applying sanctions is not real and significant if we move forward with the sanctions approach that does not work the alternatives specifically military options are far worse in terms of advancing u s diplomatic interests in the region and for that reason we need to use  you mr chairman i'm honored and grateful to have the opportunity to share with the committee this morning some of the findings that i think of emerge from over a decade of research that my colleagues and i have done submitted in much more detail and written testimony about the probability of success of sanctions under these conditions i think the congress and the committee face a kind of bitter irony the sanctions you have before you will no doubt if implemented take big economic bite out of iran the dilemma of course is they will not produce the political gain in concessions there are important for the interests the united states in fact i would suggest that there are four or five basic principles we've learned from the history of implementation of sanctions that lead us to be quite cautious about the legislation that lies before us first and foremost generally sanctions only have about a one third track record if you're a baseball player there's a good batting average if you're making economic policy or political policy at the foreign policy level you'd like a great deal higher percentage of the smart sanctions that we've developed over the last decade with that kind of success rate we've been able to use astutely under certain kinds of conditions particularly libya being one of the best examples on the other hand trade sanctions of which a major component of this package is really have a worse ratio over time and i see nothing in the sponsored legislation that increases the possible success rate as applied to iran under these conditions secondly if sanctions are to be imposed for the kind of multiple violations that we know iran is engaged in whether cure any enrichment human rights issues or support for terrorist groups those have been most successful under conditions of multilateral imposition particularly with regard to the u n framework so congressman flake's observations before i think are important to note we have a group of partners who've been very successful committed to what we'll do in terms of nuclear regulation over the last three years in zero six zero seven and zero eight strong regulations and resolutions out of the security council i'm not necessarily sure we should jeopardize that by you one unilateral action that's likely to have less and less success thirdly pure and simple we cannot punish the iranians into a nuclear deal no state even the united states ever been able to do that before i don't see the conditions of success here only an astute mix of continued engagement narrowly conceived sanctions applied at the appropriate time and versatile incentives will prompt the iranians hopefully to change their nuclear posture this is not the time for adding sanctions to the mix of that engagement diplomacy if impose now as suzanne has mentioned iran will react with particularly negative consequences for the prospects of future engagement with the i a e a or with the five critical partners in which they're engaged the ultimate leverage we have over time is the continued coalition of support that we've built at the united nations with the p five states and with states in europe who believe that continued diplomatic engagement at least for a while is the way to proceed forth in nations with the kind of internal disarray that we see currently in iran we've seen that rally around the flag effect that creates very very difficult conditions in fact at its worst would play into the ahmed in a judge government's insecurity and passion for repression of its own political groups why we would cast to them this kind of a preview is strange to me we need to build an sustain coalitions in iran that will see the united states as its friend and listen very adeptly to the kinds of reactions we've gotten from iranians about the sanctions remember we were able to sustain and have successful sanctions in south africa over time because the opposition groups were saying that this was the appropriate strategy and i think that's important for imposing sanctions now with a sanctions expert being so negative on the possibility of imposing sanctions through this legislation what do i offer you i think there are some ways forward in which the united states can continue the engagement with the iranians but state very clearly a number of particular postulates the first is that the american people and the iranian people can be brought together around the notion that no nation in the future should or could seek its security through nuclear weapons we should state to the iranians that they should see the relationship we're building with russia and the treaty we're about to submit to the senate sometime in the next year which leads to massive reduction in our nuclear arsenals and we're trying to lead the way through a particular kind of leadership by example and we encourage states that are thinking about the nuclear threshold to pay attention to this aggressive diplomacy of the first order in which we invite embarrass could joe and incentivize the iranians to think about the geneva deal that they've left on the table as being at least a model for the way forward is the way to astutely user leadership rather than sanctions in the future it seems to me that we can go to the security council in the near term with a package of tightly conceived smart and targeted sanctions which look at the entities and individuals that have violated prior security council resolutions and call upon our p five partners and the rest of the security council to add another resolution to the strong mix of the three we have and continue the multilateral framework that will penalize the iranians for i e e e a dismissal of regulations and unwillingness to come forth  transparently with the progress of their program are there incentives we can offer the iranians yes i think we should move forward with a picture of what life may be like in a post sanctions environment for them the first and most important might be a re characterization of the existing sanctions from zero six on which would guarantee a right of the iranians to enrich uranium up to a particular level and reaffirm their independence as a particularly strong state dependent on nuclear energy and medical technologies derived from nuclear technologies but not so in an environment that's not fully transparent and open to international inspection we should hold open to them the prospect for membership in trade and other organizations which current sanctions now prohibit the best incentive one can administration's approach engagement has to be understood as one year in a thirty year framework with the iranians in which the turnaround in correspondence we seek from them may not have gone far enough down the road and we have the strength versatility and energy as a diplomatic community to continue to put that pressure in a positive way and hold sanctions is keeping the powder dry for at least another six to nine months in case the dilemma continues to manifest that will need them thank you june has evolved in the most vibrant and imaginative civil disobedience campaign in the fifty seven nations of the islamic world and maybe the world generally for all the physical force used against the green movement it has so far remained nonviolent in response the green movement is a very broad coalition that includes former presidents and clerics as well as people who never voted at all and millions of students in one of the youngest populations in the world and women in one of the most politically active female populations in the islamic world both young and old but these diverse sectors of society also see the core issues through very different prism the new green movement has managed to mobilize iranians for public protests every few weeks six months ago it exploited anniversaries commemorations and holidays when the public is normally urged to demonstrate for government causes they communicate in messages like this one on the internet facebook and twitter or even in graffiti spray painted on public walls to turn government events into protests against the regime the public demonstrations are when we hear their messages at the november fourth commemoration of the u embassy takeover arrhenius normally are urged to shout death to america and death to israel this time many shouted death to no one more pointedly others shouted obama you are either with us or with them this is a message now heard often the demonstration last week on national students day was the largest since the summer it erupted on several campuses and additional protests are expected later this month to mark the religious holiday of assura and again during the first two months of next year on various anniversaries of the revolution the same period when the united states and its allies will be debating new international sanctions in policy debates on iran there's a lot of talk about clocks iran's clock on its suspected nuclear program the slow clock of diplomacy and u n sanctions and israel's impatient clock to that should be added a new one the opposition clock what the opposition does is more important than anything this august body will ever consider after six months the movement the green movement has proven that it has reached critical mass and has proven its durability since june the green movement has shifted its agenda from disputes over the election of president ahmadinejad to the role and powers of iran's supreme leader and the very definition of an islamic state death to the dictator is now a common chant with mounting anger over the militarization of the regime and the growing role of the revolutionary guards this cartoon recently made the rounds calling for the supreme leader to be booted from office yet the green movement does not speak with one voice it is united in opposition only it's many different factions take different positions and have very different goals dozens of factions under the green banner can be sorted into at least three general categories each represents a different side of a sometimes unlikely alliance the first layer is the public campaign of civil disobedience which extends well beyond the demonstrations iran's currency has become a medium for the message say stamp pictures and slogans on the reaal this one of the along with the slogan people's enemy most lash out angrily at the regime others reproduced pictures like this one with the famous picture of the female student who was shot at a street protest in june this pictures from the cell phone video that captured her dying the graffiti is usually in green some slogans merely appeal to others who might get that note to write slogans on other banknotes the bank notes even carry protests again against the regimes foreign policy this one against iran's ties with venezuela chavez and here against russia the regime reportedly tried to take the graffiti money out of circulation but found there was too much another civil disobedience campaign calls on the opposition to boycott all goods from food to cell phones advertised on state controlled television civil disobedience includes individual on coordinated acts mahmud by he is a math student who was invited to a meeting between iran's supreme leader and the academic elite he went to the microphone and instead of asking a question warned the supreme leader in a twenty minute tirade that he lived in a bubble and didn't understand what was happening in iran or a new on television which is broadcasting the program live turned it off but not before it was taped by the b b c and others and is now a very popular item on you to the growing signs of dissent show in many ways on public buses and on building walls public spaces used to give notice about protests when the regime closes down cell phones or slows the internet posters are often appeared over often appear overnight issuing new demands many call for the release of political prisoners who are now part of show trials reminiscent of the soviet show trials of the one nine hundred thirty s and the chinese cultural revolution of the one nine hundred sixty s the slogans are often in farsi and english because they want to get their message to the outside world even sports teams have become involved in iran's national team were green during a match abroad in june inside the country some opposition have dared to attend games wearing green which is reportedly led the government to broadcast the games in black and white the art movement the green movement has generated some lively new art this is the famous cellphone video of net assault on the young woman again shot in june that gruesome photo has become a popular poster in the technique used for the obama campaign the same midget image has been blended into the artwork iranian flag so her plate the face takes the place of the religious symbol in the middle the blood pattern has also been imposed on the supreme leader's face an implicit message that he is responsible for her death the reaction by the first category or layer is the most important sector when it comes to sanctions two key points many in the opposition support sanctions against the revolutionary guards or specific members of the regime but adamantly opposed sanctions that will hurt the people a time of serious economic problems and a time when many in the opposition already faced losing their jobs students facing losing their places in universities and as a result their future second persian nationalism is among the strongest forces in the world if you know a texan add five thousand years and you've got persian nationalism the revolution was in trouble in the  when saddam hussein invaded but millions of people who didn't like trust or support the revolution rallied to the regime in the name of persian nationalism public sentiment on sanctions is complicated by the nuclear issue and again persian nationalism plays a role reliable polls indicate that iranians almost universally support nuclear energy as the key to modern development shirin ebadi the iranian nobel laureate human rights lawyer said of the program aside from being economically justified it has become a cause of national pride for an old nation with a glorious history no rainy and government regardless of its ideology or democratic credentials would dare to stop the program the second layer is a traditional political elite which has struggled to develop a viable strategy there are as yet no mandela's havel's or violence is in iran the opposition has been a body looking for a head since the beginning the reform movement latched on to former president khatami in one thousand nine hundred seven because he talked about opening up the system but they also abandoned him when he failed to do so this time the opposition rallied around with not because they liked him the best but because they thought he was the only one who could stand up to the supreme leader as he had in the one nine hundred eighty s when they were in different jobs but mousavi is an accidental leader he occasionally issues statements and visits families of political detainees but he is baled to create a plan of action or even to appear much in public mehdi karoubi the former speaker of parliament and another presidential campaign in june is more of a maverick he first publicized claims of rape and torture of dissidents in jail and has tried often to join the protests the traditional political elites in the opposition would also like to see the regime punished under sanctions but again no sanctions that might further hurt the people and undermine the opposition was obvious complicated the situation for both the regime and the outside world by rejecting the recent tehran reactor deal it's widely believed that this is merely internal politics objecting to any initiative that might strengthen claim to legitimacy iran's nuclear program has basically become a political football at home with its own internal dynamics that could deeply complicate diplomacy the third layer very briefly is the debate among the clerics which is least visible but quite intriguing and very important to understand ayatollah montazeri is the most outspoken and credible opposition cleric but there are many many many others was a real was originally selected as ayatollah khomeini's error but was stripped of the title when he began to criticize the regime for its injustices since june he has been scathing about the government at one point warning iran security forces not to take actions that they would someday have to justify before god when toggery issued a fatwa in october against nuclear weapons on grounds that they are against god's will and will inevitably kill civilians as well as the military he urged muslims worldwide to take the lead in campaigning against nuclear arms among themselves the clerics are now intensely debating what constitutes good governance what an islamic state should do and be an even whether an islamic state is good to long term for islam the clergy i've spoken with over the years and i've been going to iran almost every year since  seventy three actually care about the nuclear energy issue but like the public they feel the regime has pushed the nuclear issue too far at great cost to the nation standing its future potential with millions of reigning iranians paying the price as a result of the debate iran's supreme leader is increasingly standing alone among many clerics have long been wary of theocratic rule for fear the human shortcomings of a modern islamic state long as they hear vast numbers of protesters challenging comment or see their messages on iran's national currency the debate among them has intensified thank you thank myself agree that further international sanctions will probably not compel a change in iran a nuclear policy nevertheless i think there are good reasons to pursue additional there are in fact at least five distinct rationales for further sanctions the obvious one is to influence iranian policy the second would be to promote positive change in the nature of the iranian regime the third objective is to degrade iranian military and power projection capability a fourth is to set a deterrent example for other aspirant proliferator and finally whatever may be the hope for effective sanctions such measures provide an irresistible alternative to the other two options which are even less desirable the options of either doing nothing to respond to a rainy a nuclear program or going to war to prevent historically sanctions have seldom seldom forced improved behavior on the part of targeted regimes sanctions did not compel the soviet union to withdraw from afghanistan pakistan to halt its nuclear weapons program saddam to evacuate kuwait the haitian military regime to step aside milosevic to halt ethnic cleansing in bosnia and kosovo while the taleban to expel osama bin laden step sanctions were applied in all of these cases but it took either a foreign military intervention or violent domestic resistance or both to bring about the desired changes now while none of the above name regimes alter their behavior in response to sanctions all but one of them eventually fell and sanctions may have contributed to their fall but more as a gesture of solidarity with those seeking to change the regime often by violent means that as the prime corps universally supported sanctions in support of human rights in iran might make a similar contribution as they did in south africa and haiti in serbia in iraq and in  however at the current moment there's not much prospect of getting universal universally supported sanctions against iran based on democratization as an objective  objective for additional sanctions on iran is rather under consideration in order to try to force iran to abandon its nuclear aspirations sanctions so directed are unlikely to encourage and could even diminish domestic resistance to the regime most are a man's as has been noted including the democratic supporters support iran efforts to master the nuclear fuel cycle and sanctions that are applied for this purpose could well  increase support for the regime rather than the reverse now sanctions can definitely degrade the economic performance of the targeted state and the by limited military and power projection potential that was certainly true in saddam's iraq it was also true with respect to haiti serbia and afghanistan in each case comprehensive and universally in for sanctions made in the made an eventual american military intervention even easier than it otherwise would be so sanctions as a pre to invasion and occupation have a lot to recommend them even unilateral american sanctions for instance against cuba and iran have had some impact on the targeted country's economy and capacity to project power unfortunately  these unilaterally applied sanctions also have tended to bolster the targeted regime and increase their domestic political support thus paradoxically unilateral american sanctions have both moderated and perpetuated the threat that such such regimes present the example you just tyrant effect of sanctions is hard to measure but is probably the best reason for going ahead with further sanctions against iran if the international community paled to respond to the ira program it would be giving a green light to another of a country including a number of countries in the region to go down the same path so that's certainly a reason to continue to sanction iran finally we have the political imperative to not just stand there but do something in situations where action isn't acceptable and preemptive military attack on appealing sanctions may provide the only alternative and this is certainly one of the reasons that free virtually every country that's ever been sanctioned eventually had a revolution changed their regime and became an american aid recipient and american aid to countries like iraq afghanistan the balkans and haiti has in large measure been directed to on doing the effect of sanctions and so in effect the american taxpayer does end up paying a certain proportion and are not further sanctions against iran are not likely to alter its nuclear policies they will out of they will weaken the state economically and even militarily actions against iran will serve to some degree at least as a deterrent to other proliferat sanctions are almost inevitable for the reasons i've suggested the next question therefore is what kind of sanctions makes sense we've heard from robin from others about the nature of the internal dynamic moving increasingly toward a police state but that's not necessarily an inherent stable condition and it could go in a number of different directions and including toward more democratization toward a greater police state or back towards it seems likely that sanctions that targeted iranian society as a whole would promote the least desirable result that is to say consolidation of a police state under the revolutionary guard such would be particularly the case if the sanctions were restrict the flow of consumer products of which gasoline is probably the commodity most widely consumed such a ban would hit hardest those who own automobiles that is to say the urban middle class precisely those whom tho pictures we've seen protesting against the regime and risking their lives to do so so internationally so an internationally opposed ban on the sale of gasoline would probably penalize the population particularly the most politically progressive element of the population and strengthen the most progressive elements in the regime unilateral american ban would be meaningless as the united states does not exporting any unilateral american band with ex extraterritorial application would seem to offer the worst combination of effect penalizing the population strengthening the regime embroiling the united states an endless disputes with its allies and disrupting the current international solidarity in opposition to  nuclear aspirations so what to do strengthen sanctions are needed to reduce passage to threaten its neighbors to deter other aspiring nations aspiring nuclear powers and to provide an alternative even less productive c action to achieve these results while minimizing negative consequences such sanctions should be international they should be targeted on the regime and on its nuclear potential such measures would include a comprehensive and bargo on arms sales and on transfer of nuclear technology financial sanctions focused on the military on power projection capabilities and on the internal on the internal security apparatus and an international travel ban on those associated with all of these institutions sanctions would single out the leadership and impose even symbolic penalties on them confer the dealer jitter mys that leadership in the on the eyes of the iranian people sanctions designed to impoverish the country as a whole probably would have a reverse effect finally any sanctions need to be rocket rapidly reversible admittedly there seems little immediate prospect that the iranian regime will alter its behavior in the near term nevertheless on two occasions over the last eight years the islamic republic has made far reaching over two hours of cooperation and accommodation with washington those offers were made in the immediate aftermath of the us intervention in afghanistan and then a year later its invasion of iraq in the mood of national brits which prevailed in this country back then washington chose to ignore both overtures we cannot predict if and when another such opportunity will arise but we should ensure that the president that our president is in a position to respond rapidly if and when it does this argues for including in any legislation broad authority for the president to waive or terminate sanctions in response to changing conditions thank you i think your testimony was very very responsible for nuclear negotiations and overall foreign policy coordination but it appears to be functioning in crisis mode because of the bitter differences among the principals so ambassador you had as much direct contact with the radios as anyone here  it at all a case of their failure to respond to the diplomatic overtures so far is because there's various conflicting groups that you all testified to are just frozen right now but politically inside of they are unable to agree on a way forward to even react to international overtures i think that's likely the case of the regime clearly is both weakened and distracted by the reaction the election i was actually quite surprised that they were able to engage as quickly as they did initially to agree to the proposals that the that the that the international community had put to them but that rapidly degenerated into a national debate in which the reformers among others began to criticize the regime for the possible accommodation with the international community and i think that does mean that that is long as the degree of uncertainty turmoil weakness and distraction continue it's going to be very difficult to constructively engage the regime the population responds certainly iranians can walk and chew gum at the same time they detest and also resent the international community for making their life more difficult and frankly that's always been the historical reaction to the american sanctions green movement in the aftermath of increased economic pressure but it will not in fact persuade the regime to be more accommodating internationally will see themselves under greater threat and they will certainly be more difficult to deal the main focus and that is what's wrong with the geneva accord that we seemed in early october to have a reasonable degree of consensus with the iranians on that we want to keep our focus on that as a template around which we negotiate and  ways in which the threat of sanctions over the next three to six months gives us much more leverage with the iranian leadership than the opposition because it doesn't permit the leadership to focus on new actions by the united states taken under conditions of new hostility that keeps our eye on the central focus of what's wrong with this existing nuclear deal that on paper looks fairly good to all concerned in early october you know we when i took out  can we effectively target sanctions say on the revolutionary guard or on some of the elites there in such a way that it doesn't adversely affect the general population as other things left to be done that do not already exist in the current sanctions regime that we have owned by the revolutionary guard and frankly just labeling those individuals and those organizations as pariahs and this has to be international to be a factor in international sanctions that have  rationing program that despite some early tremors of unrest was largely accepted by the population that's been exploited but in fact there is now a very systematized rationing program as well as quantities of and so they've thought additional additional sort of conservation measures and they have reportedly been trying to stockpile gasoline as well as some of the smuggling networks and craft deals  with allies including venezuela and possibly also china there are conflicting reports reports on this to expand their gasoline imports from those countries finally they've also been investing in a major program of expanding and upgrading their own refinery capacity so that they will i think what has to come along with that assertion is what then is going to be the cost and the logistics of implementing and importing that imagine a world in which u s tankers in the persian gulf  confronting venezuelan ships who see themselves in solidarity with the iranian people trying to deliver refined petroleum which crisis do you want to manage i think would want to manage a crisis with  our russian chinese and other allies at the security council of a defiant iranian regime that wants to throw out the because we're on the stronger ground there rather than shifting the terms of enforcement of an oil embargo which grounds on which to prosecute more of them for being spies for the united states or agents of the united states but they do want to have a sense that the world's most powerful spokesman for the free world i'd vote against these sanctions i think there are a lot of problems with these sanctions and they could backfire a proxy vote for military action here because i mean i understand it's going to need going to need approval by the u n security council but this is a first step in that direction so how would this work out in practice well if if if such a measure were to secure sic what get security council approval the security council could also authorize enforcement that iraq iraq food program came later as an effort to ameliorate the effect of the earlier sanction which was simply to ban iraq from exploiting its oil and that and there were unfortunate provisions that prevented iraq from exploiting its oil we were allowed to overfly the country were allowed to bomb iraq periodically we could stop ships and this was all authorized by u n security council so theoretically you could do that first of all you're not going to get a security council measure in support of an embargo on gasoline or refined oil products that's not going to happen secondly even if you did you probably wouldn't be able to get authorization for those kinds of enforcement measures but and so what we're talking about here is a unilateral u measure with some extra territorial application that is we will penalize foreign companies for engaging in this behavior by denying them access to our market i don't think that either the congress or the administration would intend to use military forces to enforce that so i don't think there's a danger that this would precipitate administration authorizing military action to enforce the enforcement mechanism if it was approved would be legal mechanisms designed to penalize farms from great britain or france or germany who shall products to iran from selling products in the united states and we get an endless legal hassles and diplomatic disputes myself with the opening remarks of my writing member i thought he made a good summary of what i wish was our position then and i also agree with mr lance that it's unfortunate that  overwhelming margin and and i think that's unfortunate because i think you've made the witnesses have made a pretty convincing case that this legislation is not a good thing to do protect it at least at this at this time i think that we need a more neutral foreign policy toward the middle east i think we need we need to try very hard to be friends with israel but we also need to try harder and do more to be friends with other countries in the middle east i read a year or so ago and then rest in book important to get the extra rider in this bill out of conference that gives the white house some degree of flexibility on this that the executive branch would judge when implementation and under what conditions would occur and i think we ought chairman and as the relatively new person on the block this is quite an education for me as well and i appreciate the remarks that my colleagues have made about the reservations that the panel seems to have about the effectiveness of sanctions but i can't help read the obvious in the news recently in times of london about the iranian nuclear weapons system being far along than we  in recent news much larger than we anticipated so i hear that either sanctions don't work and not just from this panel or they take a long time to work or they must be specifically targeted with a lot of coalition assistance they haven't worked yet with the exceptions in the limitations that the ambassador is talked about and they probably won't work in this set of circumstances but we don't have a lot of time and with the greatest respect i would suggest that it's not going to the iranian people who we want to be friends with a whole lot of good if they achieve a nuclear weapon or two and they certainly have enough material and that makes them more than anyone else a target for reprisal and for the decent stabilization of the entire region and threats not just israel but to our other allies and our troops so  i guess i'm saying mani hall isn't pointing to door number three is door number one or door number two we're in a short time frame tell us the options then if you would vote against  i'll take an opening crack at i don't think there are any good options and that's something that secretary gates has been saying for many years now it's something that most of us deal with every day there are no silver bullet to a regime that has been in power for  international community working in coordinated fashion for her perhaps the very first time since the iranian revolution to deal with the government giving the iranian democratic opposition some time to actually bring itself together find a strategy develop  leadership that can truly confront the regime but i am quite confident that in fact we can over a period of several years deal in a much more coordinated much more effective fashion with iran but that needs to involve both diplomacy and economic pressure and in particular very strong coordination with the international community when you acknowledge dr that the time frame that we thought we were working with has compressed already and you're talking about taking a pretty big risk  mean it's not going to contract again i'm making no assumptions whatsoever because i think obviously we don't know everything that there is to know about the iranian nuclear program and we were surprised in two thousand and two about the extent we have been surprised by the willingness  rather than simply trying to reap the highest economic price against iran because we know from past history that won't succeed mr chairman respond to this in that i think it really focuses us on what's a medium term goal and the highest order medium term goal it seems to me is to create an environment in which it becomes far too costly for the iranians to continue to reject guidelines and i a e a inspections let's remember that the neurons plan to still under guidelines the primary generator of enriched uranium is still under international inspection control one of the great advantages of the iraqi sanctions over time was that we had a nice linkage between the pressure of sanctions and the maintenance of inspections if you wanted the sanctions lifted you had to be continually forthcoming with inspections and i think to the extent to which this pressure  in the government to worry about a longer term time clock and sanctions is the answer you're limited to targeted sanctions against key component entities that supply high level components to the regime or elements of the revolutionary guard identifiable people who are in charge of the nuclear program to the extent to which they can be targeted sends the appropriate message a virgin but also doesn't risk the possibility of the iranians expelling the  or withdrawing from the n p t so we want to keep the synergy between those and there's a way in which the greatest dilemma the congress faces is that all the available tools seem to be a toy story that we can't we can mobilize but in fact you have to be very astute and selective about how to do that with the medium term goal being continued dialogue and inspection of the it may be that the end point two thousand and eleven twelve or thirteen puts us in a position in the same one we were in with libya i'd make the case that sanctions were very successful in turning around libyan commitment to terrorism and to its weapons of mass destruction program but we had to go past the eleventh hour and fortunately we didn't sacrifice a constructive engagement even when they went beyond the threshold that we hoped they would not they woke up one day and realize that a nuclear state is not all it's cracked up to be we may have to go through that entire threshold with the iranians i hope we are not but i think only a strategy of constructive engagement in a step by step approach to medium goals will get us to where we want to be  if you're looking for impact the kinds of sanctions that have had the biggest impact on the regime or the banking sanctions imposed by the treasury department this is something that has mobilized the international community because of laws passed after nine eleven that make every bank responsible for origin of the flow of money that they have in their banks as a result the five largest banks in iran have up a real price because it can find alternatives but at a much higher price thank you mr chairman i want to know as you say though that sanction worked and it did as you suggest hurt the iranian unprecedented of any case around the world in terms of how quickly it's made a regime sit up and notice how big a price literally and politically it is exacted  thank you mr chairman and i want to thank our witnesses as well for their being here in their testimony in today's post danielle pletka and i believe that name right has a piece in there pretty compelling piece and the writer talks about  this at least what they believe the administration is taking kind of resigned themselves to a nuclear armed iran and moving in a direction of a containment policy i would like to get your reaction to t premise of the piece and then also kind of moving into what miss wright pointed out in her opening statements the implicate if in fact that is the case that this containment policy is what's being pursued the that the administration at this stage has settled on containment i think that that really belies everything that has been done particularly the very creative and positive proposals that were put forward in a rush originally agreed to by the iranians to export the l e u and for the to her own research reactor deal so i just don't see that evidence i think that we need be planning for that eventuality simply because we can't predict the way these sorts of things play out as we learn from both india and pakistan there may be drivers that this regime to move forward more quickly that in fact produce a nuclear armed iran more quickly than we anticipated we should be prepared for containment if and when that comes that needs to be done quietly and discreetly but i would hope that planning is already underway i do not see that as in any way in contrast or undercutting the very strenuous diplomacy that we've had resetting the relationship with russia putting forward serious proposals toward the iranians and actually i think we're very quietly mobilizing at least some international support for the kinds of multilateral sanctions that would be effective because i think no one on this panel has said that sanctions should never be used but simply that they need to be used only where and how that they are most effective in terms of how that coordinates with their support for the iranian opposition i would say quite frankly that the iranian opposition is a force that we neither created nor anticipated and our support while important because we are moral leader because we have a certain responsibility given our history given our ideals to voice those sorts of ideas our support is not going to be what changes the future for the iranian opposition iran is a proud country that resents  interference of foreigners very deeply fifty years later they still deeply resent as one of the other representatives suggested the involvement with the mossad i am fifty three i don't i don't at this stage anything other than moral and it's a very very important question i detect through dealing with people on the national security council and elsewhere no resignation to the containment strategy and in fact i believe that the good example here is the way we're dealing with the north korea nuclear is a sion problem that is we're going to find every diplomatic and in the north korean case sanctions based way to roll this back so i detect a strategy that on the one hand counter to where i think we've been for the last decade rejects the notion that there's an immediacy to the ability to apply increased pressure and then and then somehow arm twist the iranians into changing their behavior the new detect in town now is that we know we're dealing with a very determined regime which has domestic cultural and other reasons to move only straight ahead with nuclear development now how do we show them that that's a choice that has consequences without immediately imposing penalties how do we hold before them a vision of be careful what you wish for when you get it as you deal in your neighborhood and if you deal in the rest of the global community how do we find a way for them to to match their own rhetoric with a responsible participation in the global community's concerns about nuclearization i think the contingencies will be there for dealing with this but i like the notion that this current approach sees a very very long road ahead and if the measures we don't take result in the desired turning back away from the program and export of uranium if the go nuclear we have models for which to deal with that as we've executed in libya and in north korea that is in a sense you're playing if you excuse the sports analogy we have a game plan as long as we're in regulation time and we have a game plan if we have to go to overtime i don't have much to add except that containment is the end of the process and we're still at the beginning which allows them to achieve a nuclear capability if if if barack obama or george w bush were elected president of iran they would be pursuing a nuclear capability and a leader and that geopolitical context would be the question is how can you first of all move toward a regime that's not threatening its neighbors ideologically or in others so that people are more relaxed about it and secondly create incentives and disincentives that persuade them that a nuclear capability is not in their interest we've already seen north korea cross a nuclear threshold and the current policies are to roll it back and there are fairly massive sanctions that are under in place and also some fairly substantial inducements that are being offered to try to roll that back so iran crossing the nuclear threshold is not necessarily the end of the world and it doesn't mean even if it happens that you're going to live with it indefinitely or try to live with it indefinitely one of the reasons for as i said for substantial and mounting sanctions against iran is to persuade other countries they don't want to do the same thing and so keeping iran in its pariah status even if it is nuclear weapons or nuclear capability would be  longer term unattractive for iran to either a nuclear capability we need to maintain international consensus which isolate iran and penalizes them in that regard and to the extent a facility we don't know about and can't because we don't know and we don't know where it is so if iran could develop a nuclear weapon at this point they would do it in a way that we would have absolutely no way of stopping unless we invade and clearly backfire and clearly galvanize the population around the regime however much they hated but because of the nature of conflict in our own deployment of troops in both neighboring iraq and afghanistan   that would disrupt international solidarity and make agreement more difficult are is the extraterritorial elements the effort to use u s law to impose sanctions on foreign companies for doing something that's perfectly legal in their own country and perfectly legal internationally and to the extent we've done that in the past and we've ended up backing away from it because of the very lightly i'm in agreement with you on that and i think i just two layers to this one is in terms of the multilateral vs unilateral dynamic it needs to be more widely understood in the congress how the russians and the chinese share very much our view that a nuclear iran is in no one's interest and if we believe we have to march down the road of leading with economic coercion so that we persuade the russians and the chinese we're  already on the on the same plane on this and i and i think that's what pushes us to think about more astute arrangements that are that are built into this legislation secondly i believe we have a new era of good feeling around the security council table that's been hard earned over the last two years and that concerns particularly in this town that the security council is either an apt or the environment is not right there for us in fact within this week i think the u s has shown remarkable leadership in the security council and the reformulation of the twelve sixty seven guidelines with russian and chinese partners i think we're at a unique moment in which the multilateral may need to lead the domestic and we'd be much better off in a technical sense saying the united states has in its holster if you will a set of punishing sanctions but because our highest order priority is changing iranian behavior in concert with region and in concert with the globe we're keeping that powder dry but it's very clear what we can do technically and economically but at this moment we choose not to because we believe this is a global concern of which we're pleased to play a part  i'm willing to respond i think this particular leadership in treasury has examined those in detail and i have great confidence in mr lay the levy for knowing where that is and there's been a number of discussions in the movement of monies to support the nuclear program i think both with the revelations that the congressman has noted earlier of the possibility of trigger devices the movement of scientists etc i think we have possibilities of looking into new areas where this kind of micro targeting would be very effective it has a combination of sending a very very strong message that our intelligence is is state of the art that there are ways in which we're trying to focus on the nature of the problem which is nuclear you women old and young you have taxi drivers as well as professionals this is something where everyone's been affected and i know we talk a lot about the revolutionary guards and kind of lump them together but one of the things you need to remember is that they go off and get a second job as many young men have to do to support their families in this bad economy and so we need to be very careful in looking at any sector of society in one basket   then i want to thank all of you very very much you're terrific witnesses you help us get a focus on this and we appreciate your time in your your information thank you very much