got a judgment based on iran was well so this goes beyond this goes to the government's argument of invited error and for two reasons i think at most what we can say here is that sentencing council acquiesced in the if now there is there are some cases as say well you know it wasn't really strategic and obviously it wasn't then it's just a mistake not invited there that you had only the mistake r that i quoted to say a reasonable probability is a reasonable likelihood i think that the same so we know the judge's view on dangerousness and if he goes through the the exercise  statute so they're not actually the same standard but in any event i've missed along would argue that there was a significant procedural error and so it's yes the district court clearly erred in finding dangerousness this report also applied the wrong standard certainly worth a read a very thorough and thoughtful opinion although i think the distinctions that the district court made with respect to mr long's case and omissions i think you're making that's i gather you're making a separate clearly erroneous argument about the determination of dangerousness and i understand your legal point that it was packaged wrong because it was following as if the guideline applied assuming that we get past the invited error obstacle and we're looking at at this tell us about your or your more record based clearly erroneous analysis of hinted that it had in part to do with that the district  remarkable from the underlying conditions to the underlying crimes to the truly severe criminal history even to the length of the sentence that they serve forty one percent in both cases with respect to the marcy murder you know the clean record  disciplinary record the pursuit of real rehabilitative programs and education the ties to a law abiding family in the community and a support network you know and these are all things that the district court simply ignored and it's order it ignored the fifty paraiso the discretionary judgment that you say should have applied here given the assumption of extraordinary circumstances was never made do you have a good case for the proposition that the failure to afford a defendant or here a person or an exercise of discretion required by law is always an option for a limited re man for the district court conducting alice in the st instance to the extent the court is concerned about that issue be availability to send it back to the district court is there and i don't think it would be an addition i don't think it would have undermined the interest in finality because again we're not even in the context of a of a response and saying plenary resentencing we're in the context of a sentence modification proceeding which the supreme court and dylan explained is an exception to the general rule of   error isn't just you know one sentence the standard section of a brief that usually means someone has advocated to the court argued to the court for adopting a proposition put aside to change it factor but there you see affirmative argument in an effort to persuade the court to adopt a position which the government did in this case as to the dangerousness but long as counsel did not there so that one background standard reference to the never mentions again gene what is your best case for the proposition that something like that well there's no argument in the district court is just laid out there's a background in this i think if you look at the government's brief it's all kind of ruled in together there but on day on the substantial rights prong up to me to review you know sixteen other circuits on the legal argument i mean what could even be the argument that it's not wrong well we've we've we've made the argument in our you know and you know i say it i think stronger for the government certainly here which is why i'm focusing on it but we don't we don't we don't agree that there was absolutely no legal error but we realized that those that did those are argument supports have not accepted so and i'm prepared to answer questions about that but from from the government's perspective the issue here is here is is it is it really plain error for a district court to look at a defendant like mr wrong who's committed to murders two attempted murders find  error and that ruling is i have no discretion i must address this and if i find this i have no discretion to balance anything else because that's what the old guideline provided and so you never got discretion omarion junctions so i'm going to deny it i think you would i clearly say that's more than a procedural error right and i apologize i'm not a civil lawyer so look at page three of the district court's opinion before it said while the court commenced long on these achievements big not outweigh the serious criminal conduct for which he was convicted and sentenced that basically a balancing of factors just on it under a different procedural sort of box and then to top it all off we had reginald douglas this case where is my my point is as noted you know there was a very thorough discussion of this you defended sent an explanation of why there was a different jury instruction because transactions have this character of you know getting a lot correct but also to some extent actually getting the parties satisfied and if a party proffers an instruction you know for maybe what partly atmospheric or strategic reasons and the district court things well if i were writing at a no i wouldn't write that but i'm going to accept that instruction because it's going to obviate a potential you know  issue that feels really different from this which feels to me more like citing a case that's been overruled or setting a wrong case where we really you know we don't see like like let's say the district th right it's just legal research in the supposed to you know everyone's to get it right and here nobody you know for some understandable reasons that there isn't a guideline that applies and so it does feel really different but i'm wondering really institutionally from your yes or abilene it was age twenty two i suppose age thirty eight around there thirty two to thirty four so yes later into adulthood but as we point out in our papers there are cases where district courts are held that you know even defendants who committed crimes well into adulthood it's a sense the equivalence of the danger to the community consideration the judge actually applied and among the things as i recall the judge said was that the long had  a factors and i think even if you assume that they are similar you know there are there are a wide range of factors that the court would have to consider and balance and then articulate reasons for why one outweighs another for example where you know gone now to comedy but to address the question there was you know i was hypotheticals assuming that this court would be apprehensive about you know the potential for harm is there a prejudice  i think what i was referring to is that in molina martinez and as well in chavez mesa the supreme court explained that you know when there's some concern about you know this harmless error counter factual an increase one option for the court is to  all right thank you mr to lie you were appointed by this court to represent mr long in this case and the court is grateful for your excellent assistance in the matter the case