battery exclusion and spend thirty or forty seconds about what the parties agreed the parties agree below that the assault battery exclusion was purely a question of law for the court to decide in fact this is also agreed on appeal the parties agree below that the assault battery exclusion was not ambiguous unambiguous but the fact that there is disagreement might suggest otherwise well let me make the final point of agreement the parties agreed that the ninth circuit decision was right on point the ninth circuit applied arizona law dissent and the majority said we're following the plain meaning rule so the only disagreement is really on the merits that is what does the plain meaning rule mean with respect to the assault and battery exclusion and we have frankly some other we have the just record judge below also applying the play meeting rule so here you have several judges and i that's a strong reason why the question should be certified to the connecticut supreme court because how basically if it's ambiguous you lose i concede that and that's another point we agree on your honor if the contract is ambiguous w insured does not mean any insured well that's the question much such refers to that which has just been identified or narrow door or described above that that is the argument your honor and that's the question is and the question is is that if you if you are right then why don't you just exclude assault battery sayin insurance doesn't cover that would get you there that all these other words are going on here and then they must mean something well that's you know that that's true your honor and frankly there is a there's been some difficulty language because we have different judges looking at the same language applying the same rules in reaching different different conclusions i can't improve on the reasoning of the majority opinion rather in the ninth circuit and i would just ask you to be persuaded by that and i i know my time is very limited i just like to say something about the courage clause if i could again we have a lot of agreement a lot of  agreement we have some agreement i want to spend twenty or thirty seconds this time on the agreement we agree that in and central elements of collateral estoppel is that the issue in the current case is a tonic or with the issue raised in the prior adjudication cases what we're talking about of course we also agree that in jacob though the factual issue was whether the archdiocese conduct was reckless or finally we agree that there is no evidence that the archdiocese intended sexual abuse we disagree as to whether an object of standard ship should apply and if so whether the finding of reckless conduct in jacob means that under an object of test the archdiocese expected future abuse we also have a disagreement as to whether other conduct of the archdiocese which is set forth in some detail of pages four and five of our ply brief  expected or intended don't we have a fact determination here we are five day trial i don't think there is a factor terminations in the trial was actually a  should they just record over this court fall of a lie master test that says in exceptional circumstances that is where there is reckless conduct in our objective test should apply and we believe the republic policy reason  two of the issues that are involved in this case i rely on my brief for the rest and those two issues are first does the assault and battery exclusion clearly and unambiguously and to a high degree of certainty exclude the archdiocese claims from den and the second issue is should this court accept interstates invitation to disregard the subjective standard for determining whether there has been occurrence that has been adopted by the connecticut supreme court and up a lot apply an objective standard with respect to the first question again the exclusion that we're dealing with is a relatively short exclusion and it reads the policy excludes coverage for liability of any assured for assault and battery committed at the direction of such assurance now the connecticut rules of construction with respect to exclusions which that's what this is requires that there has to be a high degree of certaint language clearly and unambiguously excludes the claim and that's set forth in the posse act case which is set forth in our brief on page eighteen unlike other rules of construction that are typical in the insurance context and then sure who seeks to exclude a claim under an exclusion must satisfy this heightened standard exclusion does not apply in this case your honor for several reasons first and one that's not really been addressed by my by the opposition in this case is the terms of the policy identify the archdiocese as the insured employees such as the priests are also identified as insurance but only when acting within the scope of their employment no claim is ever been made in this case that the priests were acting within the scope of their employment nor could such a claim be made quite the contrary in their reservation of rights letters in this case identical now in this case the only sure of who is is in this case is the archdiocese and there is no question that the archdiocese itself did not commit nor did it direct any a commit an assault and battery playing a plain reading of this of this exclusion it clearly creates a subgroup of potential assured those who commit or direct assault and battery and then it says that the claims for liability that subgroup have no coverage or using the terminology that the courts have used which i find a little bit difficult than in convoluted is that when they uses the term such that word refers to the quality just specified and in this case that's the subgroup of potential assured who committed or directed the assault and battery it does not refer to the other potential assure its who did not commit what direct assault and battery interstates position basically is that such means any and that and they therefore just completely ignore the qualifying language that creates the subgroup potential sure it's either committed or directed an assault and battery their construction simply does not give effect to every word in the exclusion and ignores the problem  archdiocese is the only assured in this case now they rely heavily on the ninth circuit decision and the daya diocese of phoenix it was a two to one decision with the strongest that we believe it's just simply wrongly decided they apply the same rationale here the dissent takes issue with the plain reading of the statute and we simply have a situ situation where we have several judges who have read it our way clearly should be read in favor of the assured one thing to point out with specter the ninth circuit is they are applying arizona law and as far as i can tell arizona does not have that heightened standard of construction for exclusions and insurance policies was a history of sexual abuse they knew that the that they knew that and he had then went there had some and so was it really a surprise that it would happen again but they relied on the professionals to they just put him in there and they didn't know there was a fine we're not disputing that there was a finding in jacob doe that there was that that there was negligence and or recklessness with respect to the way they handled it the question the occurrence is whether or not what's the standard you apply and i think that's one area where i agree with your coverage for reckless acts absolutely i mean the that issue has been addressed under under where you have a subjective standard the only thing that's not covered frankly is intentional conduct or and i saw probably in the situation we had a willful blindness type situation that probably also was not covered as well the suggestion however in this case is that iran is should adopt i think that's the the actual wording of the the our argument in the brief is is that this  should adopt an objective test in determining whether or not there's an occurrence i respectfully submit that's not the role for this court to adopt for the state of connecticut a rule which is contrary to what they've actually announced is the ruling your adversary's really are you and we want to adopt if you ask the supreme court of connecticut to tell us but that's not withstanding the fact that the supreme court has already announced what the rule is and i and in that put a note the court went at length perhaps it was in dicta but dicta certainly is an indication of how the court would rule saying in connecticut we apply a subjective not an objective test and in fact they go so far as say that to apply an objective test would in many circumstances effectively take away the whole purpose of insurance which is an insurance we have insurance because people made mistakes and and even  negligence they should have acted differently but if you're going to apply an object at us you know objective test and say they should have acted differently therefore there's no coverage you affectively taken away insurance and so to say that under the circumstances well we would like to certify it to the connecticut supreme court because we would like them frankly to change the law that's not what this that's not what the purpose of certification is it's not to give the court an opportune connecticut court not to change the law the question is has court articulated what the law is and if they have then this court is in a perfectly suitable position to deal with it this suggestion that the court should follow a line master is i think indicative of exactly what the problem is and that's why master is a twenty five year old superior court case which is never as far as i know been referenced cited or approved by the appellate courts so why in the world is this court going to now declare that for public policy reasons we think the state of connecticut should adopt the line master test that's not the court's role now and further in terms of certification the one thing that i think is really important to emphasize and that is is that they can and they did not seek to do so and they just they felt and took the position that there was no that the district court was fully armed with the information that they needed based on what the law was to decide the case than they lost at the district court and now they are announcing that in fact the law is simply not they need some guidance from the state of connecticut the supreme exhibits thousands of pages of trial transcript one hundred fifty pages of the all of the solutions by the by the judge so it took a while for me to read this frankly to get a handle on what was what and you have repeated statements by the trial judge that there is no controlling a connecticut law on this question on that question i love a question and she's right on the currents question she's right the question is and we don't have it we don't have a controlling question controlling case on connecticut law we you have reckless conduct for most of what's involved and we say we argue that is a matter of public policy it's not in the interest  do nothing about it that's reckless conduct you do if you do nothing about if you do nothing about it and here we are what was done about it was frankly inadequate they never told anybody that the