this appeal presents the question of whether the fair debt collection practices act applies to collection of monies to defendants collection of monies allegedly owed to an electronic highway toll payment service whose relationship with the alleged debtor i created and governed by a written account agreement for the following reasons the act applies plaintiff claim arises under fifteen u s c section sixteen ninety two laugh which prohibits any unfair unconscionable means to collect or attempt to collect any debt that he turned in that in the provision is that the act of fines that as any obligation or alleged obligation of the consumer to pay money arising out of a transaction in which the money property insurance or services which are the subject of the transaction or per merrily for for personal family or household purposes so basically three requirements do needs to be an obligation or alleged obligation it needs to arise from a transaction and it needs to be an obligation of a consumer all of those requirements are satisf as we understand it there are there are two key elements within your honor's questions where does the obligation come from and then is it wherever it comes from is an obligation of a consumer and the primary dispute is where does the obligation come from here now the court primarily in the police case rather rather than wrestle i think it looked at both sides of the line that the line was clear the obligation come from a transaction why is it why is that line so clear because you you have a tax and then i guess we can understand that and that's by operation case not not at all because he because that the same panel of the court looked at both of those things and said yes to the utility no to the tax and the reason the difference is the utility the there's an exchange the the the consumer the plaintiffs it's the state money the state gives the consumer the service utility service by contrast the property tax just a tax it's just there the state doesn't give anything to the taxpayer it simply commands the pain and that's the difference and so simply had a toll free use of the highway service that would be more like the utility in the police case precisely because it's an exchange the the the the state provides the opportunity to use the road and the consumer pays for it and so there is the state gives something the state gets something unlike property tax where property taxes paid for it for local schools whether the owner's kids are in school or not in the distinction  at least a distinction from toll payment we think it's more than that we think it's a difference although we believe that the toll payment by itself is like a utility it's an exchange it's something for something and so the toll payment by itself would be covered by violations that are exactly what are in defendant's collection letters and so that's why to collect the defendant's collection letter is clearly collecting charges pursuant to an agreement that that satisfies the x requirements as to is this an obligation arising from an agreement your honor second question is it is it a consumer consumer obligation the answer there is yes if we have in the if we have an obligation arising we now look at the consumer and why the consumer entered into the agreement and the consumer pleads that he used the rose for personal purposes and so that that's that's what satisfies the personal family or household merely for personal family or household right and the the this statute recognizes that you know maybe you know all commercial all personal are the easy cases and what happens when there is a mix but the access primarily and so the question becomes is it used primarily for personal family or household purposes the you know the plaintiff pleads as to in self that it is and the the the definition limits itself to natural persons rather than and some form of corporate person which where this nation cation may shake out to for the basis of the of the toll it is granted in law  corrected set by an authority i presume some entity regulates the tolls as a set fare the told by itself is a it's a charge that comes accepting the government service but not paying the charge and so it's the it's still in arises within the context of an exchange between the plaintiffs and the state this is a problem for  immaterial to the claim second v whether it's effect or not the fact that this is a contractual relationship what they're alleging in their collection letter is a breach of contract there are four places in the collection letter where it's clear that the obligation and that's what the f t c looks p a a looks for the obligation that the obligation defend in this trying to collect comes from the contract but were we to be blind to the fact that the underlying obligation to pay the toll is set by law you say it's a transaction of this it's a transaction nonetheless the this alleged obligation comes from the contract it does not come from the easy pass agreement and not the new jersey regulation the who that's collecting is new jersey passed party to the agreement not a party to the regulation the time of collection the new jersey regulation defendant sites provided for sixty days after the violation here the list of violations occurred on july eighth and tenth two thousand and thirteen the date of the collection letters june two thousand and fourteen eleven months later the regulation that they say creates the debt doesn't allow for collection the contract doesn't have that kind of time limit then finally the amount and the the total amount plus fifty dollars the regulations at the fifty dollars as with if there's an is the new jersey law says that the fifty dollars fee is waived proof of an unintentional violation the agreement does it and the collection letter doesn't the collection letter just listen out several of the amounts have fifty dollars there's no reference to an opportunity to waive the terms of the collection letter line up with the agreement they don't line up with the regulation for each of those reasons the that the amount is unconditional and that it's way out of time from the regulation whereas the new jersey statute for preacher contract is six years so it would be timely as a contract collection but not as a regulatory enforcement is a c m over my time we've found by  command of the state you will pay tax period nothing you don't you don't get anything you simply pay the tax whereas in on a highway toll removing the contract which we have made clear can't be removed but even apart i don't know that that needs then a kin to taxes for this purpose that the it's if whether it's looking at does this constitute an exchange or not it you know it may be that it's a command of the state and it may be that absent the agreement there are men dettori penalties that apply but the question here is did the plaintiffs get anything for the pain and the answer is yes and that's what makes an exchange under the f t c yet the way over my time conclusive and persuasive statement as to what new jersey means when it enacts tolls new jersey believes a new jersey court has said so that they are very right of it that they are taxes and that's in fact what they are and that in the police case it's clear that the source of the obligation is what dictates whether something is a debt we're not in this case the source of the obligation is new jersey state law the purposes of your fos you consume it you consume the services of flushing it in treating it tolls are not like that well i'm not sure that i'm not sure that the court really went that far as to talk about penalties but the underlying obligation was the purchase by a homeowner of a service or a good so you have one you use the turnpike in new jersey i all act you make a determination you don't have to drive and turn right right right and you don't have to own property in the property to well but if you own property you're going to have to pay property tax so so that's there's no wiggle room there's no discretion  or tolls that are due that are outside the sixty days statutory window and other words it in an but i dress in a couple different ways first your honor you look to the root source of the obligation which is tolls second and you look for the purposes of those of collecting tolls which is declared in new jersey satur polies case the court explained that the mechanism it is in that is in vote by the municipality or the taxing authority to collect the debt does not determine it it's the initial source of the obligation second i would also point out that the e z pass obligation is also covered by the new jersey sash and i've got it here  with a statute enables e z pass know there's a statute that says you have that it's a violation of the new jersey statute not to pay your e z pass charges twenty seven calling twenty three dash thirty four point three that says so even payment e z pass although there is a contract is pursuant to state law i'm not sure honestly that there's any payment that you make under that contract that isn't covered by new jersey state law except the one dollar transponder fee and that is not the subject of the collection the third way  i think what the court and what my opponent's argument is getting out a little bit and with courts questions are getting out is that tolls are a per use charge let me go back to judge wilson drops a footnote and says if there's a dollar membership  you know i don't know the answer to that i'm sorry your honor but even if there is it is still derivative of the obligation that is required to pay those charges we're talking about whether it's a debt not whether it was a mistake or whether it was not charged properly wh yes well the statute doesn't make it clear i think my opponent would have it the person who is supposedly the consumer and we don't think there is one here i'll get to that that the it is that that specifically but the language of six hundred ninety two a five doesn't indicate that it it allows for consideration of everybody's purposes and in a taxing situation it's we think the governing purpose here is the purpose of the new jersey statute the purpose expressed in the years the satchels of collecting tolls in a statute of allowing for an electronic toll collector and system like e z pass in a statute of requiring that those charges be paid in a statute and we think in this instance those are clearly intended to indicate that this is a tax and not a consumer try to fight it but it  that is really just the way they have decided to assess the tax so it falls a little bit more on turnpike you say rich but you but users pay a proportion tax as i understand the basis of a toll road to maintain the road to build a road road  miles until the next toll booth it does not reflect that you are leasing the lane that you're going to be driving and will sort out all the facts or is that that would be of service right but it but it does go to the to the maintenance and the construction of the road raise it not it goes generally to that and it can also in fact on the statute be used to a limited degree for other purposes but other transportation purposes but let me give you my parking example because the fact that it isn't per use charge can't be determinative and here's why in the franklin case t seventh circuit dealt with a parking lot that was owned by him in a surprise but it was run by a private parking company and they had a sign when you drive in that says if you park here you're going to pay this much for an hour this much for two hours and so on and if you don't pay they'll be this charge and so the so called parking dashers would park and dash and the the parking company would hire a debt collector and the seventh circuit held that those charges were deaths covered by the fair debt collect practices act for two reasons one is because there was a contractual relationship nothing signed but a consensual perhaps to cross use that were maybe it's better when a consensual relationship formed when you parked there with the charges right in front of you and you implicitly case that is secondary to the purpose of the debt but let me give you the rest of my example about parking because there's a second part to yes exactly that was that my second point the first point was that it was there was right exactly right right  right and this is why the fact that it's per use can't be termed it because let's say instead of parking in that parking lot you part of the street in front of the parking lot at a meter spot no court would hold that what you were supposed to put in the meter was a was a debt or that if you got a parking ticket for not putting money in the meter that that would be a that same act same curry used charge party or parking twenty feet away and it's different and that and the reason for that would be that the source of the obligation to put money in the meter and the source of the obligation to pay the parking ticket if you don't so it can't just be per use it's that you still have to look at the original source of the obligation in this case that source is new jersey statutes in new jersey administrative codes if there are no further questions all  i think the former your honor because that the legal entity in this case the state of new jersey that created the obligation did so for a purpose the statute doesn't indicate that it is the purchase the purpose of the consumer the water utility offers water for personal family or household purposes the it offers sewer treatment sewer treatment i guess for the same thing the state of new jersey offers the turnpike for general purposes and charges the toll for purposes of keeping that operating so we think it's that perspective it's the perspective of the party that creates the obligation what role should play in our we've talked a lot about oh yes well stal i think is the original status now is the original case that rejects the idea that you know because you simply because you use a government service that you're creating a contractual relationship with so i think salvias what to some argument that you cannot have a contract with a municipality and i think you know and i think that's right but you still look to the source of the debt you still look to the reason it was imposed thank you the tax looked at there was after the tax obligation of rose there was a payment plan and the court said that the post obligation plan the post obligation contract doesn't change the nature of the original obligation so looking at a situation where you had an obligation and then contract here we have the reverse the e z pass agreement predates any of the alleged obligations and for the reasons we've already argued it's the source of the obligations so we're not we're not using the agreement to transform the nature of the obligation the relationship between the party on whose behalf the action is being undertaken and the plaintiff was created by the and it's the obligate it creates the amounts that are in the collection letter which includes but isn't limited to the tolls it's also the non with the ball fifty dollar fees which only come from contract because the regulation qualifies them that's why w it seems to me contract or not it doesn't matter so it could be a collection contract after the fact or it could be an overland contract before the fact it's the source that's what i recall as you say the date is significant i'm is new jersey law we've we've lined up all of the ways in which the the party collecting the the time of collection and the amount the nature of the amount line up with the agreement and don't line up with the only law that they offer as an alternative has to the point about the consumer perspective the in some ways i think this ultimately light lines up with the other arguments but the plaintiff the alleged consumers purpose that that the act refers to a transaction primarily for personal family or household purposes so let's remove the e z pass remove the turnpike authority and put in a credit card company or a debt buyer the the the case like the courts rosenow case or even the courts pull this case didn't look at what the sewer authority was going to do with the money it was collecting it looked at why the plaintiffs entered into the transaction to get that thing and why the plaintiff agreed money agreed to give money to get that thing and that's why the act applied because the  consumers purpose was the driving factor that you know for for the defendants argument on purpose to to prevail that would mean that in a credit card case we would be looking at what the the creditors doing with the money rather than think that the answer to that question is that it's incorrect to look at what the plaintiffs consumer is getting because the question is is the point the consumer getting something for the money in that transaction and use the property property is separate and apart from that the governance obligations are requirements it's so it's the it's the fact that the consumer is getting something that makes it an exchange this money that's with where does the property tax money go what is it used for and it's not used for the it's not designated for the person paying it the people pay property taxes whether the kids go to the schools or not  there's not even a defined benefit that's what makes it not in exchange that the act in this court cases are looking for an exchange the the money is given and something comes back to the person who did it and  property tax there is no the there is not a that there's not any benefit to the consumer for the defined benefit for the consumer and if you know in a situation where the property taxes go entirely schools the benefit would be something amorphous like the benefit of an educated populace as opposed to the personal benefit of anybody paying getting an education and that's when it's a differen but the benefit that mr st pierre gets from paying the tolls is not is the use of the road the ability to keep going and get to his destination that's the the personalized benefit from the payment that lines up with  payment of the poll is for the portion of the year the road used it's not it's not a general obligation people who aren't using aren't paying that charge that's what makes it  with the act with sixty nine hundred eighty five asks us to look at is the purpose of the transaction and mr st pierre's purpose was not to make the roads good for everybody it was to get to his destination that's what makes there there's nothing in the agreement saying otherwise there's nothing in the collection letter from everything that's in the record yes because the agreement doesn't provide for the exception that  they collected as they sent the the collection letter the june two thousand and fourteen collection letter there is no indication of any ability to dispute the fifty dollars charge now can't the absence of that is consistent with agreement where it's also absent it's not consistent with the regulation that defendant says is the source of the obligation because that that that qualifier is in the regulation that's it whether whether this is a you know it's it does appear to make things worse for the seamers in in two ways it extends the time for collection and it charges more the but th the very least the question before the court is what is the source of the obligation that you're trying to collect on and what's in the collection letter on one page and page seventy the append