through the th cases morning crosby versus thank you may please the court the st questions of piolo is whether the settlement agreement in an earlier excessive force lawsuit bars the subsequent lawsuit about a wrongful conviction on the nd question about costs i'll begin with the st question  that part of the case raises two questions of illinois law that both parties agree are governed i'm sorry raises two questions of statutory interpretation two questions of contractual interpretation that both parties agree are covered by illinois state law the st question is whether the language in the settlement agreement is sufficiently clear to waive future claims whether it constitutes the clear expression of inten required under illinois law the nd question is whether the language in the settlement agreement that the claims being waived arise out of the incident which was the basis of this litigation toppers the allegations in the nd place the district court relied on this court's ruling in can vs urge to find that the nd case was barred by the settlement agreement i want to explain why the settlement agreement in this case was different plaintiff's claims that plaintiffs had has or may have and this logical possibility of including within current and past claims things that may arise in the future is that i was going to address that it was not a foreseeable but the language had has for me in the future on its own is certainly implied we would not be objecting to and it was language almost identical to correlate on canon the problem is that claims had has or may have are sought to be included within claims that he had or has so the claims that he may have in the future are not claims that he had or has and there's a concession by the defendants in their brief that this language goes both ways and where this language is ambiguous where the language goes both ways it is not the clear expression of intent that you quired under illinois law to  basis of this little village occasion was the same in both cases mr sought damages that arose out of his torture by the defendant officers in this case the the st lawsuit filed by mr crosbie was about excessive force and wrongful illegal entry in the nd case which didn't accrue until after the st case was filed the nd case was about a wrongful conviction caused by a fabrication and under illinois law for a claim to a rise out of another claim there has to be a causal connection and in this case the fabrication of evidence committed by the officers after  the reason why the allegation in the complaint is not the causal connection required by oh no it is that the act of fabricating evidence to cover up the wrongful conduct of officers is not a forseeable  refer to claims may have ever had or can shower may have claims made in the future developed and they also refer explicitly to the type of interaction instead of limiting the release to the allocation if we don't have that clear language in this case to include future claims or to include claims covered by the allegation or by the incident which is  the nd question which i'll just very briefly is about costs after the motion to dismiss was granted the defendants sought repayment for transcription the criminal case the discovery was never opened in this case the morning your honour's may please the court and let's begin by explaining that the release bars crosby's claims addressing st the plain language of the release and then addressing this court's precedent in canon the burj to begin in two thousand and fifteen crosby signed a release barring all claims he had has or may have in the future against the city of chicago and its officers agents and employees arising either directly or in directly out of a two thousand and ten incident in which officer allegedly and turned crosby's apartment unlawfully and used excessive force against crosby despite signing this release in two thousand and eighteen crosbie filed the present complaint alleging that in an attempt to cover up  certain solaces misconduct the defendant officers concocted a false story that point that crosby had a gun and that that false story led to crosby's eventual conviction so plainly by crosby's own words the his current claims arise if not directly at very least in directly out of that two thousand and ten incident and this conclusion is supported by this court's decision in canada the urge there the plaintiffs can and signed a nearly identical release barring all claims arising out of his torture he later brought similar claims of wrongful conviction and the list of malicious prosecution similar to the claims in this case a wrongful conviction and a list malicious prosecution based on a false confession that he alleges obtained during that torture and that was used to secure his conviction and this court held there that because the torture led to the false confession which led to canons conviction the claims clearly a rose out of that underlying incident and were barred by the police and here to ringback the office to the alleged improper entry and excessive force led to the fabricated evidence in that the here is ambiguous and i would like to address that point st by clarifying that we did not in our brief concede that the provisions here pointed in two different directions our position is that as your honor pointed out these provisions are not ambiguous they clearly state that the it that the release covers claims he had has including claims he may have in the future we did acknowledge that though that if one were to read these provisions as pointing in two different directions they could easily be reconciled using ordinary principles of contract interpretation rather than resorting to construing the release in crosby's favor and we can rely on two ways to reconcile those provisions  being that illinois court precedent has explained that when a contract or similar document contains a provision that appears to be narrower and then one later provision that attempts to appears to broaden the scope of that document that it's necessary to give to give effect to the broader provision rather than render that provision to perth loise and also illinois courts have been very consistent on holding that when interpret ng  would interpret an ambiguous provision in a contract such as release it's necessary in ascertaining the intent of the parties to look at the document as a whole rather than the particular provision in isolation and here if we look at the release as a whole there is plenty of additional language that indicates the intent of the parties to release future claims numerous times the document references the city of chicago's future officers agents and employees there's language that other language that indicates future events such as referring to expenses or other claims that may be incurred and importantly the the release in paragraph three of the release the parties  say that the the point of the settlement in the release is to avoid the uncertainty of further litigation and illinois courts have held that when such a provision appears in a release like this then it connotes some an attempt to or the intent of the parties to release future claims in a book to avoid that that further litigation and even the arising out of language itself cannot some sort of future the intent of the parties to release future claims that language itself would be  superfluous if the release were read to include only the claims that crosby had brought in his initial complaint and i would also like to just address crosby's argument regarding the causal connection illinois courts upheld in the context of a medical malpractise statute that the that the phrase arising out of requires proximate cause and to the extent that those cases even apply in this case at all they do not change the outcome here because as crosby has alleged in his own complaint there is a proximate cause between the underlying incident and his current claims and that that causal connection is that that alleged cover up but even so more importantly  release does quire claims also that arise in directly out of the underlying incident and in crosby's opening brief and in his reply brief he does not address this particular language of the release or explain how that would affect this causal connection and in the very cases that crosby cites in his reply brief specifically brecker reamer cola the illinois supreme court said that when there's additional language alongside that term arising out of language that connote some more in direct causal connection then but for causation is all that's necessary necessary and crosby does not make any argument or dispute that at the very least in this case but for causation exists and finally just on the issue of foreseeability are our position is that foreseeability is not specifically in the element of that that the illinois courts do not use foreseeability and interpret in the scope of a time he'd already been convicted of a crime that he alleges he did not commit based on that fabricated evidence and even going back to the underlying incident the fabricated evidence and malicious prosecution claims were foreseeable at that time as well because crosbie alleges that he did not have a gun that his girlfriend told the officers that he did not have a gun and yet they pursued him anyways arrested him and falsified a police report saying that he had a gun at that time clearly even even at that time these claims were foreseeable and finally if this court has no further questions on the issue of the release we were just like to rest on our briefs regarding the