attorney general garson fisher for the people you honors at the time of the drafting of the second amendment the laws of the states and the laws of the english common law for hundreds of years before that that provided the foundation for those state  weapons in sensitive locations the united states supreme court recognized this in heller when it said that its decision there do not call into question man standing probation on carrying weapons and sense of places like schools and government buildings this court has held that the threshold question in a second amendment inquiry is whether the prohibited conduct is covered by the second amendment and on and here based on the fact that at the time of the drafting of the second amendment  five make it very difficult or even perhaps in some areas impossible to to bear arms the fact that in many parts of the state most parts of the say i'm is undoubtedly not the case that it is a constructive ban on the right to bear arms means as a facial challenge which is what we have before us today and that claim will fail so it's worth noting that defendant has waived the argument that this is a constructive ban on the right to carry arms they said that that is not the reason why subsection c one five violates the second amendment but rather that the regulation on the right to bear arms of prohibiting carriage and sense of locations is it thousand feet and perhaps the number one thousand makes it sound i'm bigger than it is for example in the city of chicago you're talking about a little bit over a block radius and it makes sense that you send the radius around other sense of locations be on their geographical boundaries the conditions that make a sense of occasion a sense of occasion don't stop the sooner you cross the geographical boundaries aren't simply more children in hearts but there are more children on the block leading up to a park making their way onto the park and indeed the federal gun free school zone act has an identical thousand foot radius around schools that's in compass by by its prohibition on the carriage of weapons  risks of gun violence in schools and there are in parks but certainly the reasoning that creates the substantial nexus under the intermediate scrutiny tast between important government interest in protecting children and removing guns from locations where children congregate would apply equally to the parks as well as as as well as schools absolutely your honor i think there's the only the only provision an application of subsection c one five that was that is before this court was before the lower court is carrying a weapon within a thousand feet of a school because that's the crime to which defendant  guilty and absolutely the court should have disagreed with the state and find that the provision regard with regards of parks is unconstitutional and should suffer that provision the status subsections you want five functions  equally well in its other applications without the language about parks and i think there's no question the general assembly would have passed a prohibition of carrying guns in or around schools in around  it disagree with the state can't sever the prohibition on carriage interim harv's i think there might be a standing issue here the defendant was under twenty one when he was charged not only this court but the most relevant in the discussion which which the sitting gaijin about why this case demonstrates why why this court's recent decision in china may have been wrongly decided the the states i drops charges that this court has and the supreme court have already held are unquestionably constitutional charges and should this should defendant prevail here the state would lose or the benefit of the bargain  into while the senate would receive a windfall of escaping any criminal liability but in this case right think your honor that in this case defendant only pled guilty to a carriage of a weapon within a thousand feet of a park and even something as objective as the defendant's age  a factor that would need to be proven to the jury in order to establish that distinct aggravated crime of unlawful use of a weapon so in the absence of him having been convicted  of of carrying a weapon while under the age of twenty one i don't know that would be appropriate to to hold that fact against him here now so i think the court can resolve the question of whether the so i'm first having it be illegal to carry a weapon in the sense of locations makes it easier to police against someone who arrives with a weapon with the intent to commit a crime because police can arrest the person detain the person as soon as they identify that they have a weapon without waiting for i will cause to believe any further criminal activity is under way and yes we are talking about weapons that are carrying concealed manner but experienced police officers often can identify that someone  carrying concealed weapon as for just recently decided holmes which had a fact pattern in which that very event occurred i'm so it helps with policing and it also helps to protect bystanders and law enforcement from the increased risk that is created when someone carries a weapon into a situation with no intent initially to engage in criminal activity someone who goes to a park with no intent to engage in criminal activity might choose to leave their gun home because it is prohibited from being carried in or around the park and then should a situation arise a conflict escalate an argument as to lay and there's no risk of that situation or escalating into  violence at which point the sensitive population that the hype number of children that would be present in a park wouldn't be placed at the increased risk that guns create under such circumstances of the general assembly has  has recognized in myriad ways that the mere presence of guns in a situation increases the risk of bystanders in law enforcement that's why crimes like armed violence in the fifteen year firearm enhanced and apply even when someone never takes out the gun that they carry into it a situation so so there remains a substantial nexus between this interest in protecting children and and prohibiting the presence of guns in places where they're going to be large concentrations of child  and under for either of these reasons either because at the threshold inquiry the court can say prohibitions on carrying weapon intensification are covered by the second amendment at all or should the court look at this as a general lesion on the right to bear arms and apply intermediate scrutiny because there's a substantial nexus between the government's interest in protecting children and the regulation at issue here the court should conclude that and see one point five goes on and says a person who violates on any public way within has is it your position that knowingly or is the i mean within the woods variable or i don't think so yeah i think the knowingly refers to carrying the weapon but just as i don't think that the thousand foot radius changes the analysis is that just as one can exercise one's right to bear arms by not entering steering clear of the thousand foot radius around that that sensitive location as mentioned the federal probation on carrying guns in schools extends a thousand feet beyond the perimeter of the school  that was the law when the court said that it wasn't calling into question the longstanding probation on carrying guns in places like schools on the court was aware of the details of that law they decided the case on the gun free school zone act just a term or so prior so so both because of logic and and the historical record i think it's it is clear that that this regulation lies outside of the parameters of the second amendment if the court does turn to this the second inquiry immediately i do think it is necessary to take a moment to discuss why intermediate scrutiny applies here this court has recognized there are two distinct defense of hearth and home that is the very core of the second amendment the right to bear arms in public at the time of the drafting of the second amendment for hundreds of years before that was regulated more than the right to keep arms and that's why federal courts  consistently applied intermediate scrutiny to regulations on the right to bear arms it recognizes there is a constitutional right to bear arms it's not rational basis but it's also not ships we need because we're not talking up the very core ranges in the city of chicago operated both practically and legally to infringe on the right to keep arms for defense of hearth and home made it difficult if not impossible to to to put in the training to acquire a license to own a weapon and as a practical matter it made it difficult if not impossible to prepare oneself to keep weapons for one's defense of hearth and home or a person who lives within  from the thousand foot radius and that which point they could carry the weapon conceal matter assuming of course they have the proper concealed carry permit from that point forward and your argument is incorrect the fact of proximity to the park is a fact that needs to be proven to the jury prior to a finding of guilty and as the us supreme court said in a way that makes it an element of a distinct aggravated offense on in contrast the sentencing enhanced mens in burns was a prior conviction prior convictions are an exception to the entire of line of cases it's something that didn't need to be introduced into after the senate had already been found guilty so burns is not controlled here in the court should employ its usual second amendment analysis and as discussed under that  the issue of severability again the only thing that is in front of the only provision in application of the session that is in front of the court right now is carriage under a four within a thousand feet of a school that provision assured the court disagree with the state it should only hold that that provision application is unconstitutional and separate from the remainder of the statute and finally you know the court's decision in shine on to the contrary is is quite recent but i think this case demonstrates why unfortunately onsen always was poorly reasoned and justice tases dissent there has the right of the issue before that this court has always consistently applied contract principles to negotiated plea agreements and under those principles the proper remedy should defender prevail here would be to return the parties to the position they were in prior to constitutionally regulated under the second amendment so for those reasons while i'm sorry to say this would ordinarily argue against that this court should revisit the decision shine on and take this opportunity both as a jurisprudential manner to avoid departing from its longstanding tradition of applying contract on as a practical matter to avoid disrupting the plea bargaining process to to decide that the state does have the right to good morning your honour's council may please the court my name is aaron johnson i'm with the office of the state of politics founder and i'm here representing the athlete mr who have now in this case the circuit court was correct in vacating mr his conviction under under section eighty four c one point five of the illinois on off lease weapons statute as it in two thousand and thirteen and that's because section eighty four of the  not talking statute has already been declared officially and constitutional and i want to stress that this is a facial challenge at the outset justice burke asked counsel for the state if there's a standing issue because the defendant is under twenty one and i would say unquestionably know there is no standing issue here because mr chavez was convicted based on his just being in public with a gun under this general provision and a four that says no one can have a gun in their vehicle or on their person while they're outside and then c one point five comes in and says if you're within a thousand feet of a park that's an additional  because he was not convicted based on his status as being under twenty one challenging the statute not as it applies to mr stress but by its plain language so i think that that to tional as a probation on the carriage of weapons in public and because a violation informs the foundation on which the c one point five enhanced it is built it cannot stand in this case where a four is facially unconstitutional and therefore avoid having a show and i do think contrary to counsel for the state's position that bruns does apply here in burns this court found that a sentencing provision which chanelle simply because supplied by sentencing provision to a category of persons who the legislature could've regulated in a separate statute have they chosen to and that's the same issue we have here in this case the sentencing provision increasing the penalty for a thousand feet of a park does not remedied the conservation from me of a four and so i think the results here should be the same in burns council state attempts to distinguish statute it's clear that when an unconstitutional approaches statutes occurred on constitutional what remains can only be enforced if it's complete within itself and capable of independent force mint and we look at c one point five here when you remove a four c one point five a person who violates a four and some other sections not relevant here in a thousand feet apart and some other locations that are not at issue here if we were moving for just prosperity for all it says is a person i think it's telling that in moseley was the state sites this court found certain provisions of the aggravated unlawfully struck and statute were constitutional because they were able to stand on their own but then looked at a sentencing provision that applied to persons over the age of eighteen more versus mad again which came after heller in looking at the second amendment right however heller talks about this right for self defense and then more clearly states you have a right to carry firearms in public for self defense that's at the core of your second amendment right and indeed more talks about the fact the need for some fans is greater in public than in the home so and i think when we look at loaded operational firearm would be unconstitutional and so i think that this is actually subject to a strict scrutiny analysis because it is at the core of the second amendment right now the state tries to distinguish this by saying well can't in sensitive locations is not a core sacrament right but here and this goes to i believe justice thomas question this is not a restriction in a sense of location this is not a argument and i would point out two issues i think that whenever we're going to have a regulation or it's not i think i'm sorry the law states that whenever we're going to have a regulation on a core second right it has to be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling government interest and when we look at these thousand foot zones they are not nearly tailored to serve a compelling government interest how the state points out this thousand foot zone in the federal statute you know how it doesn't actually talk about these thousand foot zones being presumptively constitutional it just talks about in schools and moreover the eighteen us c federal prison the state citing actually states that a person needs to be carrying a weapon within a thousand feet of a place that they know or have reason to believe is a school zone or they have language about knowing or has reason to believe there's a school zone so there's a knowledge element there in this statute there is nothing that would allow someone to be on notice that they're entering into the thousand foot zone and certainly whether or not schools i think that i think i agree with the state in the sense that if this court the chairman's that parks and constitutional it doesn't necessarily follow i don't think  all it's all or nothing it doesn't have to be that schools and high school have to be a hazard so we're just dealing with parks but i would say that the state's loss in the same burden of narrow tailoring and the issue with this red statute it restricts people from having guns in their vehicle on their person and there's no exception for a car that's in motion on a public way so you have a situation of someone who's driving within blocks of a park or school being invited running afoul of the law or just having a gun in their vehicle for self defense and moreover you have people being in jeopardy of having their right pop in and out of existence as they travel throughout illinois  correct but i would say that if you look at how there heller does use the language of self defense and how it does talk about the right to bear arms being the right to carry a firearm for self defense and i think the logic behind  supreme court of the united states hasn't come out and said you one question we have this right to have a gun on a public street the language in however that talks about self defense does indicate that that is part of your second  the right to carry a firearm for self defense so i think you know in order to you can't logically say that someone wouldn't have a need to defend themselves in their front yard or on the street in front of their home or people who are driving i mean this regulation people from having a gun that's operational their vehicle someone who's driving late at night and keeps a fire in their vehicle for protection would not be able to drive through out illinois without having the jeopardy of their right being in and out of existence as the re see in passing that it was possible that someone would have a situation where the zones got so big they won't be able to go outside at all and the state in their opening brief said well that's an overbite argument that's not illinois under this law is for headed for traveling with a gun in their car on their person without going into the zones unwittingly and have their right in and out of existence so it's not i mean to make it clear it's not a some areas of the state where there's someone could be in a thousand not in a thousand feet of pipe and i think you know the state says this in the brief they don't cite any authority for how big a thousand foot zone is than any location in illinois so we just have to take their word for it he even if we can imagine that there are parts of the state that are more world where someone could stand stationary in a field and not run afoul of this law that doesn't make this not a facial challenge that's a misstep with cation of the salerno principle that you know officially speech or your right to avoid unreasonable searches so it's a personal way travels with you wherever we're not saying that this is unconstitutional because mr chavez lives in a particular location we're saying it's unconstitutional everywhere because no one in though i would be able to travel throughout the state without entering the zones which are not nearly tailored to serve a compelling government interest and if you look at these out i mean these are not exactly on point with this case because it's dealing with a range ban but the corneas are said with a district judge said well someone to go outside of chicago and go to a range in the suburbs and that's fine the seventh circuit said no that's a misapplication of what salerno says you can't say that to the extent someone can exercise their right to a different jurisdiction their right is then that law doesn't kick in french on their right and i think that makes sense to say that because someone standing in the middle of the fields somewhere in a rural part of the state could have a gun on them that it doesn't matter that people in other parts of the state having their ability to carry a weapon in their vehicle on their person and friend makes the law right is i guess a real perversion of what he actually unconstitutional means this applies to everyone by its language and it prevents everyone from driving a car within a thousand feet of these parks without having the right hop in and out of existence and i think that also gets to i would also bring up as well because even if we  the right to carry a firearm for self defense a corollary of that right is being able to train yourself to properly use that firearm and because this is a corollary of second right we have to use intermediate scrutiny and  scrutiny as they didn't use out this law is not related to a substantial government right government interest that and it's not a close fit with that interest and i think the state keeps talking about children and  think although that's i think that's missed place because again here we're talking about regulation on parks which encompasses wide areas of different uses including forest preserves running trails all different things not necessarily were children might or might not be present and i think that under either interation strict scrutiny or intermediate scrutiny there is no narrow tailoring or close fit between an interest in protecting children which the state has put forth and preventing a law abiding citizen from having a gun in their glove box that they keep for self defense and driving within a thousand a block of apart maybe not even in view of that park there is no close to here and because i would reiterate that the right to carry a firearm for self defense is at the core of the second amendment this law is unquestionably on castors on that basis however again i would reiterate as i stated before that if we look at this course decisions and burns and mostly i don't believe that we even need to get to the issue of whether or not restricting gun within a thousand feet of a park the second amendment because comprehensive ban in saying that the practical effect was that a person could not leave their home at all with a a license weapon and in terms of whether that arguments been waived in applebee's in their athletes brief defendant said explicitly this is not why the statute is unconstitutional that constitutes a waiver of the argument that the thousand foot zones operate as a comprehensive ban on the right to bear arms believing aside the issue of waiver i response that the people made in our opening brief is that that argument fails on a facial challenge because there are unquestionably places in illinois and people in illinois to whom these regulations can be applied without it being a comprehensive ban on their right to bear arms in public the court of course can take judicial notice of basic geographic facts there's no question and it's not standing stationary in a cornfield that in much of this state one can walk around or drive around with a weapon with just a modicum of research into their surroundings without passing within a thousand feet of these  and that's true your honor but that is exactly the kind of regulation that we can tell from looking at the laws of the states at the time of the second amendment and the laws of the state at the time of incorporation via the fourteenth amendment and looking at the british common law that provides the foundation for those state laws we can tell the back end of regulation preventing everyone from entering into certain areas is exactly the kind of kind of that's not protected by the second amendment on the statute northhampton prohibit the carrying of weapons in fairs and market statutes at the time of that i think there are two ways to look at it right and one is is this is not a comprehensive ban on carrying a weapon and bearing a weapon in public for everyone in the state of illinois at m i posit that's probably not a ban on carrying a weapon in public for anyone in the state of illinois but but as a facial matter this is not this can be constant there's no question this week constitutionally apply to much of the state of illinois in terms of whether it's a comprehensive ban on carrying a weapon in public and in terms of whether someone can avoid going into the sensitive locations on courts of distress in discussing why these bans are constitutional the fact that one can exercise one's right to bear on simply by avoiding clearly fails and in terms of this being a regulation on everyone's right to carry weapons in certain locations as exactly what it is that that's the kind of conduct that's not protected by the second amendment  turning to the question of whether the right to bear arms is the core right of the second amendment we're not asking the court to overturn aguilar we're not saying that the right to bear arms is not a ri protected by the second amendment it's there in the plain language of the second amendment and you know this court followed moore's judgments that that the right to bear arms is protected by the second amendment any a supreme court has said the right to defend one's hearth and home is the core right of the said he guns for the defense of one's heart or arms for the defense of one's hearth and home is the curve right of the second amendment and not only has the ninth circuit recognized that the right to bear arms whil right under the second i mean is not the core right so the second third fourth and seventh circuit itself applied intermediate scrutiny through regulations on the right to bear arms it's not simply the case that because something is covered by the second amendment it's at the core of the second amendment and regulations on the right to bear arms in public lie outside of the core the core right of the second amendment which is why an argument  that perhaps some parts of parks don't have the attributes that make them sensitive locations and therefore on perhaps the general assembly could have tailored the statute somewhat differently to only apply to those portions of parse that do fit certain characteristics is on the feeling the state doesn't need to show no telling here they need to show substantial lation ship between the regulation the general simply didn't pick and the important interests that it was advancing  there's no question that that important nexus exists in this case and then finally to turn quickly back to the question of burns and whether it's controlling here i think there's no question after that this state legislature can't place an element of a crime outside of the elements of the crime and make it a sentencing factor simply by nature of the structure they have chosen to enact a statute the crime that defendant was commit convicted of was not carrying a weapon in public he was carrying a weapon in public within a thousand feet of a car on that's what was charged that's what pled guilty to that's what would have needed to have been proven to the finder of fact beyond a reasonable doubt it is a distinct aggravated crime from simply carrying a weapon in public and even if a for a s a facial matter can't function by itself constitutionally can't be enforced on its own constitutionally a four c one five so to speak can it's similar to the way in which the a w statute is constructed where either a one or a two needs to be proven in conjunction with some subsection of a three and this court found that a one an eight to a three a a four by itself may not be enforceable but a four c one five absolutely is on the lesser honors have any further questions yes just to follow up on the earlier question that she just occur merit for you understood your comments you said the homeowner i think is question was about the homeowner who lives within a thousand feet no problem you said when they go outside the home when they hit the public street or the public sidewalk for example it has to be cased as to be not operational right that's protected by the second amendment because it's carriage in a sensitive location i e it minutely as an as applied challenge i think that would be a closer case but but i still think the regulation of the right to carry in the sense of location is not protected by the second amendment as demonstrated by historical record mr fisher miss johnson we thank you for your arguments today your excuse