that's pretty clear i think both rules talk about the time period running from the entry of judgment and the entry of judgment as specified in rule fifty eight dollars and you have brief that but raise this particular question since this was never addressed and what was raised by the court and we realize that the court has a fair amount of discretion to consider and some circumstances an issue not an argument not raise previously why would we not consider the failure to raise the final judgment argument simply a waiver on your part you may be relaxed in a case in which there the issue involves questions of law in the proper resolution is beyond any reasonable reasonable doubt and again to the extent that this argument falls within the ultimate issue in this case which is highly which has been raised you know below and before this court this seems to be appropriate circumstance in which the court would either relax the waiver rules or otherwise exercise scratch and take up to eight that's being raised for the st time on appeal i'm so under either whether it's a waiver analysis or whether the court relies on it as gresham court has made clear as in your scenario to the extent there will fifty eight clearly dictate the resolution of this on the one hundred and fifty dollars day if there will be no entry of judgment for purposes of local rule or for purposes of federal fifty four until it destroys the finality of judgment this court held that our surrender to district court that its local rule when it uses the term entry of judgment refers only to the original will continue the last question to you from judge stacker basically it was the district court has construed its local rule to mean the entry of judgment to be only the actual judgment and not the extension of a judgment by post judgment motion and she asked why should we give deference to the district court for interpret its local rule that way yes thank you the reason is that this case in the at twenty seconds we lost council the court oh i didn't hear much of mr cowan's presentation but i think i have the gist of it from his briefs and feel free to frame the way you want me to address it's points by questions but i think i'll address the layers the st layer is that our phone it actually waves that we the right to rely on will fifty eight at all because under the hughes versus halifax county board keith mentioned in their most recent free district court intended its order to be a final judgment and i think that's pretty clear that that was the intention here the nd is that the order or judgment was entered on the docket and that happened in this case on june th that same day judge ti handed down its ruling the rd prong is that the parties exhibit that they viewed the order as a final judgment and in this case that clearly happened because neither party requested the court to enter a separate document which they had the right little bit of a difficulty with that analysis and as much as a waiver would indicate that the party didn't intend to present to argue the issue  implication and in this case it's pretty clear that they filed a post trial motion under rule fifty nine dollars which extends the time under the rule and then within the a motion is timely we have to decide whether it was filed within the requisite number of days of the entry of judgment and if we were did we're of necessity have to decide as a matter of statutory interpretation what what  entry of judgment means i hear what you're saying that there's an implicit waiver but the indicators don't suggest that they intended to waive or bypass it and in other words they didn't want to just get at it they they they seem to want to pursue the attorneys fees based on the language of the federal rule well your your point is well taken your honor  because i understand that the generic concept of waiver is the voluntary relinquishment of a no right and i think what you're suggesting is that here mr johnson and apparently didn't appreciate that he had to right under go the application of the law as opposed to and quite apart from rule fifty eight that's a hard conclusion to reach but well my only reaction to that is i think a lot of time lawyers when the case gets on an appeal they think of arguments that be which they've made in the district court and they didn't intend to waive the argument but but they did and the argument i'm talking about here right now in the pickwick leaving one hundred and fifty because either he waived the separate document requirement or he waived the right to rely on rule fifty eight by not reading it before the district court well how do we how do we as a court construe entry of judgment absent the rule and other words the entry of judgments a term of art which the court has to construe and while there were he didn't make the argument or didn't see the dollars for all intents and purposes it was the one and only judgment it was an adjudication on the merits it was a dismissal with prejudice and the court ordered the clerk to close the case simply didn't if you want separate kinds hypotheticals where the court issues the dismissal order in court or all in doesn't say anything further and nobody does anything and people send in letters and the idea is at some point we have to call an end to the business that's what i mean i think was designed to do i think so too and it's very practical actually and i think we we have to be candid to the court that if we're all fifty eight dollars we're not waived in this case then i think that it would dispose of the mining issue but our position is that it was waived for a variety of reasons so let me make sure that understand what you just said if if we determined that there was not a waiver here and that under rule fifty eight there is the necessity of a separate document then you're conceding that the june th order from the district court is not an entry of judgment for all fifty eight purposes i think it was a judgment that if the rule later so so if that's the case just to make sure our understanding as well if that's the case if we find that the rule fifty eight argument was not waived johnson did not wave through a pretty eight in to them i don't think that you need to get to the merits of the peel as originally grief that's right put up but again we strongly feel that for multiple reasons there is a waiver here can i ask you on the on the merits the there are three terms are are being sort of cross applied here we have the notion of an order of court we have the notion of a standing order of the court and we have the notion of a local rule it seems to me a local rule regardless if there is any difference but if of if a local rule is denominated the local wool then it seems to me it has to be consistent with the federal rule and doesn't fit in the exception to the federal rule does it well the district court held in this case that the local rules of the district of maryland anyway are considered standing orders of the district of maryland and i went on the court web site yesterday and i actually was able to find pretty easily the standing orders that adopted and implemented and effectuated the various iterations of the local rules over the years the last one judge bernard mind in november of twenty pm so you know the district of maryland considers its local who orders and will fifty four dollars allows for the modification of the fourteen day deadlines by provision of a court order and that the basis part of the basis for the ruling  judge gallagher and judge grant up with but then any local court could could bypass the requirements of the federal rule that there be some consistency throughout the country and i must say it goes back to my time when i was chairman of the rules committee we were very much we had a project in place and trying to get the local rules throughout the various districts across the country in conformity with the federal rules the idea is that people practicing throughout the country ought to be at practice under one set of rules and if a district court could simply call its local rule standing orders in order to get around the uniformity of requirement then rule  standing order is considered a court order so i understand what you're saying but you know based on the precedent in the reasoning and i also don't believe that there is an inconsistency between the local rule  words the federal rules extend to the entry of judgment to the disposition of the rule fifty nine dollars rule motion whereas the local rule doesn't include that aspect right i think that the rule will fifty it's not in real fifty four but but there's no question at the filing of an intervening roll fifty nine motion extend the fourteen day deadline for purposes of the rule fifty four i can't argue that i mean none of this means none of this whole dispute here doesn't mean that attorneys fees are going to be awarded or who's going to get them it seems to me that's going to be a complex issue and you may very well succeed in this type of thing but  you know by the other point i'd like to make your honor is that if rule one no signs point to a was intended to be construed exactly as rule fifty four then i don't see why there would be a rule one thousand and ninety two a there would be no need for it it's pretty clear that the drafters of the rule in the district court intended there not to be polling for purposes of the the physician as contrast can you can see the difference so one the rules of total rules refer to local rules then in conformity we would have to say this is not a local rule but a standing order i think that else nothing your honor except i would just i would just add that the waiver cases the waiver cases addressing the waiver of an argument that wasn't presented in the district court and this notion that the appellate court really shouldn't frame the is who is for the party if those principles apply there have to be exceptional circumstances for those for the court for courts to entertain arguments that w advanced earlier in the keaton and i don't think that this is a case of presenting exceptional circumstances that doesn't involve some constitutional rights in and one of the decisions that the hicks case the can i ask you this question if we were to conclude that mogul rule should be read consistently with the federal rule than the motion for attorney's fees in this case well what's the rule forced motions for sanctions want to start with the last point that opposing counsel made folks doggerel fifty four which read that the time requirement does not apply to quote claims for fees and expenses the sanction for violating these rules or is it is a motion for sanction certainly as well but why would not fit in the rules if you for e because it wasn't a motion for sanctions for a violation of the federal rule and that's what that's what the rules are referring to so while we certainly thought most certainly was a motion for sanctions debate these for sanctions was not a violation of federal rules it was it was otherwise and so on that basis quarry has no application here and the time your partner will fifty four dollars would apply but i would i would also just get back to the issue of waiver as the court discussed and as opposing counsel resolve the ultimate issue of time and there and again whether it's a waiver issue or whether the court relying on the inherent discretion opposing counsel acknowledged the proper resolution and he's being raised the st time not resolved the case four i would just make two other points the st relating to earlier the court asked about the fir in the district court interpretation of federal fifty four so there's no discussion in the district court interpretation of its own rule as to the interplay between four and the local rule and in fact in cross this court  of a rule fifty nine emotion did not stay the district  telephone which is not as dramatic but i think it's a fact and at this point we normally come down from the bench and great counsel and we would like to presume that's what we're