would help so let's suppose that my costs are canarsie of and i look for an expected from the actual sale of my electricity i receive five dollars from the energy market later on when i have five dollars of cost that i haven't been able to sort of into city to really recover from the because the clearing places below the bill that you put in the government said not true you have an option you could have actually agreed to sell capacity at ten sure we understand you put in a retirement of one hundred let's say and the proxy comes in and says no no the appropriate beard would be fifty and the market clears somewhere in between do you do you have or not have the option at that point of saying ok i know we did a hundred but on but not the monitor but that's the whole point of the series which is who gets the the if one is or costs are just and reasonable are whole should be given precedence and reflected in the supply stack of bits that go into the auction that's that's the point of the case best theory was this scenario that these rules could under some circumstances force you to retire a plant that you think he's profitable proxy offer is key so it moves us from being sort of the market correct price of the market current resource the resource at the margin it's now being inside the supply curve and the market now here's a ten dollars instead of the fifteen dollars there was a buyer willing to thirteen dollars for capacity but now the market there is a ten dollars and because now we could accept that ten dollars price but except in a ten dollar grayson's that we're out under our understanding of our cost five dollars we're going to lose money why would we ly one plant that song the very front end of a fifty year anticipated life cycle right the injury of you might be for you know you might be soon making retirement beads which might be skewed by this system and might cause an imminent injury is a lot seems a lot less likely than the opposite extreme where all or most bits a particulars of your client situation either stand that if you were like me to supplement with affidavits after argument i'm happy to do obvious and it wasn't contested by for were we would have put in more information regarding those details but it of being having a performance penalty is assessed on you if you happen to be out during a cold snap or a very happy marriage and also how you value risk which is very important and first recognizes how you value risk the risk of things being not as you great demanded under section two o five not the end result the rate that is the end result of an auction or negotiation but as as it were an opening b suppose we're in mobile sierra territory and you just have two parties negotiate buyer and seller negotiating a rate and there's sophisticated parties right in the seller thinks the high end of the just unreasonable rate is one hundred and that's where i want to end up so i'm going to make an opening bid to my opponent i'll say i'll sell it to you for one twenty and that's as part of a negotiation strategy to end up at one hundred and let's assume one hundred would be the top of the just and reasonable rate requirement does anyone think that that opening bid of one twenty might be the rate that settled on at the end of the negotiating process rather than something at the beginning just another way of expressing first and put the or i i don't i don't think so again because position and response in such fashions would be a lot stronger if your brief was correct rather than false with respect to whether or not you could continue to  enjoy the clearing price if it was below your open position in other words the way you wrote a brief would have been you would have had a better answer the judge conscious than the fact  truth because as it is your bid which is your opening position is not your final position even as demand because you could yes the second rate which is about reasonable disagreement about how to value risk and what future the future will hold in terms of prices that informs our bid and that's our understanding of what our costs are and if the market clears all of that we don't we don't want to accept will retire that's that's the auctions the i s o actually asks suppliers i can't tell if this happens all at once or if it a rigid flee over time but the i s o asks a series of questions to the effect of how much capacity are you willing to sell at price number one price number two price number three  etc and when you bid on this you say well i'll sell you one hundred units at one hundred ninety units at ninety eighty units and eighty and so on right is that a fair summary of how things work advance of the ok but if the normal real time thing if the bidding works in that way under your theory why wouldn't all of those bids when all of those numbers bids offered rates demanded just means any any number that the seller tenders in the course of doing they saw auction before the market clearing remanded would be different layer by layer i meant the latter where the cost of production be different whereby where is that hypothetical that one one plant one plant a better come see and with a retirement being below that threshold there is no risk of i'm a market monitor snooping around and saying no no no i think  that some of the subsequent retirement there's even under the dynamic delist threshold maybe subject to review i'm not sure about that it hasn't been contested here but certainly your first time you make a retirement bid if you're under this dynamic delist threshold nobody it is done as a single option and to go to your unit question my understanding is you build in a resource like a power plant you don't get to say i'll sell all of it at this praise and have that i believe you billion each of your resources and every once in a market and as it drops down so above the dynamic the us threshold to have a bit at that level you have the market manager reviewed the most common one is static searched for retirement well those two but the more common one is the static deal is i don't have numbers on that for you but a shot of the listeners want that is i want i want to drop out of the capacity market for this year only or you can accept the bid that the market never thinks is right or you can unconditionally retire and just get out of the market so you actually have can you accept the gloom pros now know and that's why we think it's in their retirement options you do have to make your election in advance the proxy data is what the market monitor is going to put into the auction to prevent the suppliers bid from it influencing the potentially influencing the  because they all were able to develop their own ways the internal market monitor makes the determination the system operator makes the filing and you're right it is a two off i finally but to mitigate it to to do mitigated the market monitor has to show that not only the ten percent materiality threshold but has to show that a specific cost in place see this isn't just a number you come up with their specific was laid out in the tariff that you're allowed to put into your bit and the market monitor has to show the failure by the supplier to substantiate some specific cost item it's not just this number doesn't look right we don't like to deal with market accurate because the question is in addition to materiality threshold did the supplier fail to support with adequate quantitative analysis and accurate adequate documentation  know so what is the difference there is that frowns if you're saying no complaint that these buyers are getting exactly what they would normally get well they're getting exactly what they always got with the information families in the static deal this process for example numbers were just and reasonable if we're saying they're both in a zone of reasonableness that's not enough was not enough that is not enough for the monitors to prevail the monitor has to show  monitor cannot substitute its own particular cost item for the particular cost item that it's so placing it in the in the mitigated bid without showing that the supplier did not and there's a supplier has a rate that's been filed with ferk and someone is a challenger a customer whoever wants to come in and say that that rate which only has to be somewhere within the zone is unjust and unreasonable and the challenger comes in and says my argument for unjustness is filling a blank and blank is what you just said which is there some specific component of the rate that's not adequately supported with that be enough to establish that that rate is trying trying to get that aspect of the process that you're conveying to us and and you seem to be thing wrong is just as good a supplier as the regular old assessment of whether it's lose on line you seem to be making a separate argument that the process the bidder gets before ferk in this context is no different from the process of fail where the supplier has clearly to support the reasonableness of particular cost and the only way we get to the hypothetical that you just posed we're reasonable minds can differ and getting one could be right is if in fact they didn't fail to support the reasonableness failed to show that its rate is just and reasonable it's all you have conspicuously don't say that because the commission has held previously  but you've explained that your process of analyzing that is exactly the same as if it as if the bid were a ok now where is the difference between the two of you that do you suggest t my understanding of how the process would work is it would go back to the ones that work i mean we would go back to the suppliers cost savings that were supported and put those back in  park we're trying to for maybe it may be because the commission really with this was looking at market rules that were setting up a new kind of priest retirement that's not can they always had to decide in advance with unconditional retirements now they have priced retirement as well they always had to decide in advance as static delisted they have to decide in advance you don't get to decide what about what about the retirement good retirement that they put their bed in the market monger tells them we don't think you supported this conversation we're changing your number to x you have a period of time to choose three options you can unconditionally retire just say i don't care i'm done you can conditionally retire no i did ten dollars you say that it should be eight i'm standing on my ten dollars and i disconnect about when things are happening in time so the way it works years yes you did not make that clear you have to read your sheep preserve your position by pointing out that after the often takes place you cannot we we have to repeal or we will retire no no under the rules yet no under the rules under the rules we if we if we stick with our own original bid and the auction is then held the difference between the two of you was a time that impression do you understand there's really a big difference between the situation there are now pursuing on what they were pursuing before and you made it in your brief turn on the burden of proof line who has the burden be the the supplier have the burden of showing that its rates are just reasonable that's right so if you look at correct one hundred year in order that's exactly what's going on here and just not include the burden to show adequate justification of the particular cost him votes i think it's ultimately but about the ultimate rate your honor and so the sort of cost inputs with bear on the reason this is the ultimate rate you can imagine a situation where seven it's accepted with just the region right right now we have a market one who disagrees with the mot market monitor disagrees more than ten percent so it puts in a nother proxy or whatever whatever we want to call it and now the question is assuming that's possible the and we really do see two equally possible that both are just unreasonable the proponent of a range the supplier will bear the burden of proof to show that its bid is just and reasonable period full stop it right but it can only be ready conjunction with paragraph eighteen and other parts of that order in the previous order that say the market monic monitors bid is only compliant with tear it only is permissible under the tariff if two things are true would we do you have zain would you have any objection to our ruling in your favor based on your representation to judge williams that this the words he read to you should be interpreted or rewritten to mean what he said it's not it's  holding that that kids are rates that could create all sorts of consequences both home and it's that if you're really concerned about the consequences and the consequences are indistinguishable here why should we worry about but what is the well how here again by characterizing this number that gets assessed on the normal two zero five standard as a great since it's being according to you evaluate  do think that we're not i think we're all in cream and about how the supplier that should be treated if it is you know if it is compliant with the tariff and supported the documentation  assume house to be that everything we're talking about now in the words of two zero five involve rules and regulations affecting or pertaining to such rates