i would like to address first the chicago's shared housing ordinance and a fatal defect in the core definitions used in this law this is an issue that i raised in my brief the city hasn't answered it and i believe the district court is over looked  nasa do it the definition of a shared house and unit under that this law and whites defected one of the first men free freedom of speech clause second if the first amendment freedom of speech was applies i what i would like to discuss why strict scrutiny should apply in this case because this is content based discrimination as well as a classic prior restraint and third i would like to address any questions that this court might have about the non speech arguments that we've raised including freedom of association equal protection as well as the so i'd like to begin by getting to the fatal defect i discussed previously in the definition of shared housing in the definition of the term shared housing unit which is the target of the share chicago shared housing is defined in section four that one single room occupancy buildings two hotels three corporate housing for bed and breakfast stablish once got suites or six vacation rentals and i would submit that the definition of occasional is substantially simil now both definitions of vacation rental and shared housing units exclude guests suites which are defined in section ford f sixteen s three hundred eight as a dwelling unit that is available for rent for hire for transit occupancy solely by invitees for family members of residents of the building which contains the dwelling unit and it's not offered advertised were made available for rent for hire to members of the general public the fatal defect at issue here is that when you combine those two definitions what the city is regulating is not like to address if once the first minute scrutiny applies then the district court's analysis does not apply or is erroneous i believe this court overlooked this the city believes that this law simply says that nobody may grant a shared housing it without first registering with the city however if the definition of fair housing unit incorporates speech as a necessary part of that definition then the first one which really does apply to sit that this report did not apply any sort of scrutiny whether it's medical plaint what section four dash fourteen dot zero two zero s states is that no unit that is listed on the shared short term residential rental intermediary site which i believe that euphemism for air b and b so no unit that is listed on air b n b may be rented without a registration which is a particularly honest process and comes with on us restrictions this amounts to essentially channel discrimination because this is not something that applies to sites like that that hotels use on the internet to book or arrange for short term rentals this only applies to a particular or type of site air b n b which is used by particular kind of speaker which is an individual hopes not a big corporate and so because of that that the subject matter of i mean most people are traveling to should you know and they want an accommodation that being said we do allege that there are different factors about being on air b and b that there's a it's a different kind of community there's different type of interaction that occurs many are being the hosts are actually we're letting out a second bedroom you know guest room as it were and they stay and sleep under the same roof with their guests and thereby get to know them that's a very popular way of doing it and so it is different you don't have your hotel proprietor sleeping there in the same room as you when you state a hotel and of course you're staying with it regardless of whether it's a hole probably rental or partial rental you're staying in somebody is whole and they've designed it they've  they have amenities they they know they can give you advice as to where to go in the neighborhood what they like to do a case not just the interior decor but it's a different type of experience and also i think the more practical reasons most people like to have  organization kind of in an organization formed or out the cause yeah i think it would be more of the latter because we don't charge a membership fee we are there are other members yes there are in fact we have a board of directors we have members with events we actually the summer hosted a number of street fair festivals in chicago so we are ever a question raised about the organization standing is a plaintiff under the associational standing officially on our border and have not any any question as to the standing of the named plaintiffs and i guess the amended complaint you know there's been a lot of time that has passed since you know it's been eighteen months or so we've been in court so some of these pla if i might continue the ones first amendment scrutiny applies this is also should be looked at as what it is this law is a classic heard a magic prior restraint because it requires individuals to apply for permission to the city of chicago before they may post content to the internet about their shared housing unit on a site like area and the city of the power to deny this request to suspend revoke or registration and thereby order people to take down content on the internet these registrations have to be renewed annually if it's denied a revote the burden falls on the host to follow a notice of appeal within ten calendar days and if they fail to do that banished from using that site for up even if their situation changes there's no mechanism for the original the city's made several claims this is commercial speech should be you governor of the intermediate scrutiny standard and i think that and that it is therefore a legal but i think it's important to recognize that in a prior restraint scheme don't think i remember ship in the bar violates the first amendment no walk well again just because a pirate is what is legal advice but speech it of course it is speech of course and so therefore on your rationale the requirement that for strict would that violates the first amendment even if the principal thing being regulated is conduct like renting a space in which to live that is not i don't think that that i don't think that that's my position that anything on that regular strict speech is unconstitutional i believe what you were just saying on your feet but it's a classic prior restraint even though the regulation is regulation of conduct so i thought i would give you some regulations that are regulations are nothing but speech all the security for all the laws affecting who can be in the bar and what they can say they regulate speech or not conduct why isn't it from your argument off or shiori that all the securit don't you know in there is no regulation of what the lawyers say to clients what is can't say anything at all to their clients to give legal advice without being a member of the bar indeed you can't be a lawyer  bar it's not remotely like freedom and where for to kill or movies were submitted to a board i think you've got a lot of trouble reconciling your position with the same problem the securities law only to speech about securities laws about illegal practice of law apply only to speech regulated dealing with the practice of law and on your view that's all content discrimination and all unconstitutional you really need to give an explanation for why this kind of regulation is different from kinds of regulation that your i think quite sensibly unwilling to attack this but i think that the problem you go in law grocery store you see that on the side of every item there are statements about what's in it right it's compelled speech right under the author of content discrimination because it spe about this situation or you are effectively saying all regulations that have incidental effects on speech violate the first amendment and that seems to be the burden of your argument i'm just trying to figure out whether you are willing to face up to its consequences i believe the difference here is that this defines it goes to the fatal defect in the definition of what a shared housing  is not only conduct but it's conduct that is advertised the non speech element is not what triggers a regulation is the speech element that triggers the regulation the fact that you advertise it you can otherwise without listing on those sites it is the speech element the triggers regulation of membership in the bar anybody can study law think about all right but if you want to speak about law to clients you have to be a member of the bar it right it's the speech element that regulates food and drug laws if you just want to do research about what good food chemistry is go right ahead and so on yeah i mean you know membership in the hollow i am trying to pursue how this is different well ok so one of the reasons why this is different has to do with the new packing him case which has to do with the fact that this is regulation of the internet  social media and that's considered down by the supreme court a unanimous decision to be a public forum and so a different type of analysis must apply today's public park is the internet social media in particular i just don't don't get it right if you cannot legally offer legal advice to clients you cannot legally say on the internet but i am a lawyer and allowed to practice law right it will land you in prison exactly because the underlying conduct which again isn't speech is that conduct you are a practicing law at the underlying conduct is illegal so to advertise that conduct would also be prohibited will hear the underlying conduct is  fined in terms of speech instruction i ask you a question on a different front you have remaining open in the district court if they've not been dealt with in some time a point you have to size in your brief  first amendment associational claims in an equal protection court is there not a risk as the city points out of piecemeal appeals here it should raise a concern about our jurisdiction well i believe that there's a risk of piecemeal appeals simply because of how the district court has decided to parcel out decisions on our amended motion clearing judges she's only ruled on one of one and a half or more claims second bite at the apple saying well and then we got a new reason well i thinks why can't the district judge say no you've had your request for a preliminary injunction will now move to your request for a permanent injunction to make all your arguments but your request for preliminary relief has been decided right anything wrong with that well it is wrong in this case for the judge this record out about this case or is there is there anything wrong with in general that with the district judge saying for a preliminary injunction not to my knowledge and not to mine either so here's another area where you are asking for well i think the word on pressure that it is the right word again if i might point out that if you wanted to do number of other claims for injunctive relief in this appeal but this court lacks jurisdiction to review them because the district court has not denied an injunction based on those claims but i'd like to begin with the first many claims for which the district court an injunction as the court correctly decided the shared housing ordinance targets business activity and not speech so for example the registration requirement which is what plaintiffs principally complain about regulates activity by prohibiting the rental of i registered units other provisions of the ordinance also regulate activity by imposing certain operational requirements on shared housing units such as providing clean linens intolerance so because the ordinance does not target speech but rather targets activity it does not implicate the first amendment in the event this court determines that the ordinance does regulate speech the ordinance is nevertheless valid as a regulation of commercial speech to begin speech in shared housing list listings is commercial because it advertises the rental of a specific unit and hosts have an economic motive for listing moreover under central hudson commercial speech that promotes or proposes an unlawful transaction is not protected under the first amendment here plaintiffs want to be able to list on registered units but it's unlawful to rent an underage and unregistered unit so in other words plaintiffs are asking for the right to propose and on and on off a transaction that speech is not constitutionally protected tell how far do you want to go in that suppose somebody says we should overthrow the united states government right that's that's an all lawful transaction but of course this country was founded on the basis of that kind of speech having overthrown the previous government and i do believe the supreme court said in brandenburg against ohio that kind of speech was constitutionally protect certainly i'm sure you want to you want to you like your colleague on the other side of the r l need to be careful in what you're arguing you can't say any speech proposing an illegal transaction use outside the first met we would point to the the supreme court's pittsburgh press case where they think it overruled brandenberg against ohio you know i don't you know you know i i think  pittsburgh press an ordinance out made it illegal to discriminate on the basis of sex in employment and the same enactment made it illegal to advertise jobs in a way that encouraged sex discrimination and that regulation of advertising this valid in light of the nachman span on sex discrimination in place we have a similar situation here where our shared housing ordinance says made it illegal to rent not quite what has happened in this case because as they just record explained when the second most additional george wasn't quite clear enough about what was happening well i respectfully i think the court laid out its plan pretty clearly which was that in the second motion the plaintiffs raised new claims that could have ensured been brought in the first motion the city desire to to and there's actually only one claim here there were multiple arguments but there's only one claim that's true my so is the new arguments could have been raised at the outset the city preferred to move forward by filing a motion to dismiss the method completing its entirety rather than having to respond to this excessive motion and indeed the so why aren't you arguing to us that this should just be affirmed on the ground that we've been discussing that it's just time to stop to allow the city to file a motion to dismiss and then depending on how that motion is decided and depending on the outcome of this it peel the court expressed a willingness to revisit the question of preliminary belief we were ok with that plan as well but if miss morton would rather resolve all the police here you she's at this stage that would be fine as well so that creates a situation where the appeal could it could pop right back up again right so suppose that we in the primary appeal agree with you on the merits of it it goes back down and the motion to dismiss and the preliminary injunction on the amended complaint or the claims that are open in the amended complaint you so she claims we have a second appeal right from the ob a different aspect a different constitutional issue to be sure but same same party same underlying regulation second appeal probably and i suppose in that situation you would be an could right yes certainly that that's a risk in this case in light of the multiple preliminary injunction motions that have been filed there could be likewise piecemeal appeals  so that certainly a concern a valid concern here finally just briefly with respect to plaintiffs argument that the parties agree to stay that we entered into in the district court that that should be the basis for an injunction  rejection would issue finally you know with respect to you i will also rest on my briefs with respect to the issue resign meant with this with respect to what remedy this court would have again the issue we're concerned with is if this case gets