violation it was discovered that she was driving on a suspended license while the officers rode out citations for these offenses they called in a canine unit to do a routine dog sniff around her impounded vehicle and during that dog sniff it was discovered that there was marijuana located in the suitcase in the trunk of her car she proceeded to bench trial and was convicted of possession of narcotics with the intent to deliver on appeal she argued that her trial attorney was ineffective for failing to move to suppress the evidence found in the trunk of her car under this court's decision and people versus cox in cox this court held that absent clear reasonable and articulable suspicion of criminal activity with respect to a vehicle it's impermissible under the fourth amendment to conduct a dog sniff around the vehicle held that trial counsel was in fact ineffective under cox given the absence of any articulable suspicion that anything was going to miss in the car after the court rendered its decision in that case the united states supreme court decided to illinois v in illinois versus cabal as the supreme court held that there need not be any articulable suspicion to conduct a dog sniff around an vehicle so long as that dog sniff doesn't and reasonably prolong the detention or the episode at issue people filed a petition for leave to appeal in this court and cited versus illinois support of reversal this court declined to issue the p l a but did enter a supervisory order instructing the it's instructing that the appellate court reconsider it vacated the otherwise lawful traffic stop so long as that dog sniff doesn't and reasonably prolong the detention that's exactly what happened here on the facts in the record let me just i'm going to try to find out where this case falls  citations and the defendant was in the backseat of the vehicle the canine sniff was going on so this is thinking about the time or they were placed in the car will never time the evidence only time given ten t fifteen five to ten minutes after they were placed we don't know how long they were in their car the record or at least into the police we don't know that your honor we do know that the relevant that remand to determine that would be important i don't think in this record your honor we have a record showing that the defendant was pulled over it was discovered within a few minutes that she was driving on a suspended license she was placed in the back seat of the car during the encounter in the car while the officers were  in effect but on different points he remand with these questions cleared up would you think that remand would be the thing to do in this case judge i respectfully disagree with respect to the cabal us analysis i think the record is more than adequate to show that the of the dog sniff occurred during the duration of an otherwise lawful traffic stop which allows to you know the time that the defendant was still remaining in his own car before being moved to the police officers all we know is that the defendant was in her vehicle and then was moved to the officer's car done so that there's no duration of time and it's in the record that you know it is important to establish that as well and in terms of the time duration i don't think so judge i think what we have here is a clear investigating the case further than a half hour certainly would be acceptable what is not acceptable is if the officers hold her there while doing nothing and then call in a canine unit that would be somewhat problematic under even under collets and under cox w overruled on the unreasonable prolonged question but i think we do have here a very clear record that during all instance during all the duration of the stop the police officers were doing business with respect to the stop on crossing the crosswalk and then doing the citations with respect to the suspended license of lacking and lack of insurance and the records clear that while they were processing these citations the canine unit one around her stopped vehicle and at that point the marijuana was discovered long because the officers went back to check her license and then they discovered that she was driving on a suspended license record there's nothing in the record that says it took me two or three minutes to go to her car then return to my car there is testimony that the duration of the stop was about five to ten or ten to fifteen minutes and during the entire night this is the important point here during that time they were processing the citations and while in the course of this police business and doing that trial council's failure to recognize the precedential value of cox at the time of trial hindered his ability to enter into meaningful plea negotiations and the defendant cites to this court's case in people versus curry for this proposition the defendant's reliance on curry however is misplaced in curry this court found that trial counsel was ineffective at trial for failure to grasp the nuances of the consecutive sentencing statute held that consecutive sentencing statute was somewhat unclear and the trial counsel cannot be and cannot have been ineffective where there were some ambiguity in the applicability of that consecutive sentencing statute this court held though that trial counsel was ineffective because there was no change in the law following her appeal in trial that would have i guess excused counsel's failure to grasp the applicability of that statute in that to grant the of the alleged deficiency or do we measure it on the likely and likely outcome at this point well judge this court has held that such questions must be analyzed in light of subsequent and should have applied it then to determine the prejudicial effect and under lockhart the question is whether the proceedings were fair and reliable nothing on this record indicates that they were unfair or unreliable the defendant only points to this police process which i mentioned earlier those comments are sandwiched between an affirmation by trial counsel that the case was going to be going to trial and that the defendant was going to be waiving her jury so there's really no substantial or meaningful evidence in this record of any  would have come to fruition and that is also unlike in curry where this court was able to gauge prejudice because the record showed that trial counsel was a unaware of the consecutive sentencing laws and b the defendant himself testified at a post trial hearing that he would have accepted a plea by the state and the other four with the defendant's plea argument is this during of his appeals the defendants consistently maintained that had counsel been aware of cox and the presidential value of that case at trial he would have been able to somehow force the state's hand and would have been able to engage in more meaningful pleading goshi ations but let me let me back up the defendants consistently argued that had the head counsel been aware cox he would have moved to suppress the evidence in the state would have been that would have been much more effective than having the charge dismissed so that that argument doesn't hold water if this court doesn't agree with the cabal as line of argument in our brief i've already mentioned that this evidence would have been admissible under the inventory search exception at least four or five times in this record different officers testified that in accordance with joliet police policy they were prepared to inventory and so the vehicle and  undoubtedly during that inventory the marijuana would have been turned up in the defendant's trunk the defendant says that there were no there was no testimony that the police would have opened containers in the trunk but this court is held in gibson and humbly that explicit testimony regarding opening containers found in a vehicle is not necessary to obtain evidence found in those containers the testimony unrebutted is of the policy of the  suspended license judge i don't your honor i don't know the answer the question i do know that the you know the dispositive condition what happened to the defendant after after the police were through was he taken to the police station correctly took the defendant to the police station after which she gave a confession to make to owning the drugs found in the trunk the on that he make bond and whatever he was charged with i don't know your honor we don't have any effect on judging what the duration of the stop it would and whether or not the defendant was arrested whether there was a to ration period measured by him by a fifteen minute standards once he's arrested for the misdemeanor does that fifteen minutes standard is that something we still shouldn't use to analyse your analysis of the duration i don't  i follow your advice and it's that it's that in most traffic stops the defendant is not going to be arrested right now to get a ticket he's going to be on his right in this traffic stop that was not the case right i goes in in a valuating t duration of a traffic stop doesn't make any difference if the defendant is actually arrested it doesn't your honor it does not is as long as the stop isn't unreasonable even if it's for mr minor she's going to be like oh it's long as during the duration of that stop  the canine is brought around and they're not holding her they're just to do the canine and this is a part of the i wonder if you're answering my question because is the director is the duration longer when somebody is arrested for a misdemeanor that is when they're arrested for a red light i don't know my question is did we get back from the appellate court and analysis instead of looking at the facts and circumstances this in this case in light of tobias we get back an analysis of the facts and circumstances of this case in light of the case is about a criminal defendant who's trial attorney failed to research this court's case law failed to recognize binding precedent specifically on point and beneficial to the defendant and the resulting a fact of counsel's incompetence on pretrial with regard to the duration of the stop i had had defense counsel raised a motion to suppress under cox this question as well as many other questions would have been answered on the record however he did not and he performed efficiently in failing to present that motion to suppress evidence here upon remain in this view is asking for the benefit accorded to her by the yes that the cause properly should be remanded for further proceedings defendant for a while alleged ineffective assistance of counsel for counsel's failure to recognize and object to what's considered double counting that's introduction of a factor in aggravation that is inherent in the offense during and double counting was no longer improper the supreme court held that giving front well relief would amount to a windfall the court was careful however to observe that deficient counsel's deficient performance is to be assessed at the time of the alleged indeed in that state in that case the state conceded that counsel performance was deficient however the court held that front well could not rely on on an improper interpretation of the law to establish prejudice windfall because he never should have been able to raise that objection but the court did distinguish between the performance prong and the prejudice prong of strickland in that analysis court noted that performance is to be assessed at the time of the alleged deficiency here miss b relies on cox to show the counsel performed efficiently by failing to present cox as a bargaining chip however her prejudice argument relies on this court's decision in her dispute is arguing that but for counsel's failure to present a bargaining chip pursuant to cox deficient performance there's a reasonable probability that the result of the proceeding would have been different because the state would have given her a more favorable offer and she would have accepted it i of success that the state would have offered a more favorable deal faced with that suppression of evidence that was critical to the case in face of the potential of obtaining no conviction at all isn't that pretty it would hit she would have won the case that that's correct your honor however the state's contention on this point ignores their second issue brief before this court whether the evidence would have been inevitably discovered although mr pugh maintains that the evidence would not have been inevitable he discovered that the state presents what would amount to as a contentious issue during a motion to suppress evidence case or defense counsel inform the court that he had received a phone call and as a result of this phone call there may be a plea in this case from the context of his statements it shows that the state had extended an offer prejudice to the defendant in the sense that counsel didn't get a better deal when he may have gotten an outright dismissal i mean that's and i know you're saying well it's not only on this issue it's also on the inevitable discovery issue but they could have in both issues but even on the first prong why wouldn't that be trial strategy is well worth the defense counsel makes a determination that i think we have a better chance of getting the whole thing dismissed and we do use the some type of independent suspicion of the presence of contraband in the vehicle before being justified in the sniff justified in conducting the sniff you know that was repudiated by could by so after to bias there was no independent justification for using a canine unit during a traffic stop is required as long as the canine sniff is performed during the time frame and that's what we're of the legitimate stuff so we're talking about the ration so i know only the  had counsel performed had counsel not performed deficient me and filed this cox decision we would have had a complete record with with regard to all these potential issues the duration of the stop adequacy of the hand or  of facts once the trunk was open she then gave permission to open the suitcase even though apparently she said it wasn't her suitcase that was after the dog had hit on the trunk right officers remove the suitcase placed it approximately fifteen feet away from the vehicle and had the dog sniff it the second time it's not clear during at what time during this entire process they requested miss use permission to open that suitcase they we don't know from the record if it was after the dog sniff the dog sniff the suitcase hit on it and then the police officers caught contact with the state's attorney's office and received permission to open the suitcase she precisely said she said that it was her cousin's suitcase but it was hers which is essential to what she said so it's not entirely clear if she she did not admitted it mit say yes this is my suitcase state argues that the miss of us forfeited this issue however the law regarding performance of a canine sniff has changed when the law changes to the defendant's detriment such as in the press present case the appropriate analysis is found prejudice analysis asked whether the defendant was deprived of any substantive or procedural right to which he was entitled thus the holding in lockhart anticipate invites presentation of alternative theories to demonstrate prejudice that may not have been originally raised for this issue is not an forfeit thank you your honour's just to clear up a factual point here that was brought up during my able punnets oral argument mr putin gave her consent to open the suitcase after officer walsh's she's the officer the state's attorney was contacted first and said that it was ok to open it then they went to this view and she said it was ok to open it as well just to reiterate a point here that's been raised by the court and by my opponent  his plea argument doesn't make any sense that this court were to review it again and i i mention this in my opening argument he's maintained consistently that cox would have resulted in the dismissal of the charge it would have made no sense for his attorney to use fact that the change in law that the state argued had occurred on appeal did not in this court's opinion in fact happen the sentencing laws remain the same counsel's performance at tr effective here by contrast we have significant shift in the law governing canine sniffs and to give the defendant the benefit of the preexisting law on this record would amount to a windfall undeserved under