call the committee meeting daughter welcome everyone here chairman skelton unfortunately is not able to be here but i'm pleased to have the opportunity to chair this important hearing in this place instead led by the sub and vice chairman and other members of the commission but in particular bill perry and jim sikes here the hearing today you all all of you deserve enormous credit for bringing this hearing this investigative process to the conclusion you have in the report you filed with the interim report your late release last summer i agree with your broad definition of strategic posture in the priority you placed on dealing with the most  threat what you termed in that report catastrophic terrorism you went on to write or say and i quote quote it terra group cannot make a nuclear bomb from scratch so the best defense against a threat is to prevent terror the opening remarks in the open market you might go to thank you mr chairman and good afternoon to everyone in this hearing will cover very important ground led by the subcommittee on strategic forces which i have the privilege of chairing the house armed services committee has long called for a vigorous and open debate on the future direction of the united states strategic posture and a fresh examination of our nucular weapons policy in the national defense authorization act for fiscal year two thousand and eight which the house  proved almost exactly two years ago we created a congressionally appointed bipartisan commission to analyze and make recommendations on united states strategic posture the commission was designed to foster in frame a debate on these critical issues it was also designed to help forge a consensus on the united states nuclear weapons policy that has been lacking for too long is with great pride in anticipation that just fourteen months ago this committee and the senate armed services committee announced the names of the twelve individuals who agreed to serve on the commission i see several of the commissioners here and i want to thank each and every one of you for your service i am most delighted to welcome the commission chairman and vice chairman dr william perry and dr james les injured to this hearing i also want to praise the united states institute of peace its president richard solomon and paul hughes the commission's executive director for their vision hard work and shepherding of the commission's final product and the publishing of the final report i'd also like to thank secretary gates and the strategic systems program of the navy where we were able to get the funding for this very very important commission as you know forming commissions is the part time of the congress finding the money is a very very difficult job of the congress and it without secretary gates and the navy coming forward we would not have the final product that we have today dr  you have brought a great wealth of experience and expertise and your service to the country of many decades and it could not be more timely or more important for this work to be done now as the commission noted in both final reports what the united states does with its nuclear weapons and how it does it is linked to our ability to dissuade other nations from pursuing nuclear weapons and to our efforts to stand the flipper ration of weapons of mass destruction and nucular weapons of course other nations will continue to make their own decisions about whether to pursue nuclear weapons for many reasons as the commission has noted as long as there are new nuclear weapons the united states must maintain a strong safe secure and reliable nucular deterrent but as you have also said how we maintain and manage our nucular arsenal directly impacts how credible we can be when pressing for nonproliferation we have committed under article work in good faith toward nucular disarmament both president obama and russian president medvedev have recently reaffirmed this pledge so the question we basically put before the strategic kasha commission was how do we craft a nuclear weapon strategy that balances these fundamental challenges how do we maintain an effective and credible deterrent while trying to reduce our nuclear arsenal and persuade other nations not to pursue nuclear weapons each of you has spoken eloquently about this need for balance in your testimony and the commission's final report reflects that challenge as well dr schlessinger i appreciate your emphasis on stabilizing the effective  from the extended deterrence we provide our allies and dr perry i am grateful for your forceful oper observations about the urgency of our efforts to stem the flow for ration of nuclear weapons let me recites a part of your testimony d and i quote all commission except that the united states must support programs that are both and hedge that is programs that move into parallel paths one path that protects our security by maintaining deterrence and the other which protects our security by reducing the danger of nuclear weapons that is at the heart of the matter i want to commend you for your leadership in steering the commission thank you again for your work and for being here today i noted on the commission are ten other extremely accomplished individuals and we are fortunate as both the committee and as a nation to have the service of these great people on what has certainly been a longstanding and repeatedly difficult and complex task it goes without saying the report before thoughtful and it is and i want to add my words  chairman to yours of appreciation to our strategic force chair and the ranking member gentleman from ohio mr turner for their great work they asked for recommendations as to the most appropriate strategic posture in the most effective nuclear weapons strategy for the united states and i think the great commission has really set the stage for delving into those answers i expected when this all began widely divergent views on such matters as nuclear of nuclear weapons and the policy associated there with say the least unusual and i would note highly refreshing to learn that this commission embodied as it is of twelve thoughtful individuals could achieve bipartisan consensus on these issues and i said to dr perry before the hearing perhaps they could give us here in this congress some lessons on how to calm and to work together and i am most of all hopeful that the administration working with congress on both sides of the aisle can now build upon this bipartisan momentum as it works to to find its nuclear policies and posture in the future the report highlights some basic tru in realities and first and foremost it reaffirms the need for the united states to maintain a nucular deterrent capability to deter potential adversaries and equally important to reassure our allies who depend upon our nucular  and as a result forsake developing their own nucular arsenals one month ago the president delivered a speech in prague calling for a world without nuclear weapons but as the commission rightfully noted in its interim report no less than a fundamental transformation of the world political order would be required to attain a goal of zero no president no president has wanted nuclear weapons all came to the stark realization that possessing them was necessary as long as others had sought or had them in their possession in a speech last fall secretary gates observed try as we might  hope is we will the power of nuclear weapons and their strategic impact of the genie that cannot be put back in the bottle at least for a very long time for the president's long term vision is laudable i fear its allure may be a distraction from the near term nucular security and proliferation challenges faced by our nation and the international community these challenges are multi faceted and start with how we bring an end to the uranium in north korea nuclear programs to efforts at least in my view pose a real and immediate threat months ago and perhaps coincidentally on the same day as president obama's speech in north korea launched its satellite atop a long range typo dong two ballistic missile ignoring all international warnings hording to recent reports some in the administration expect that nation to conduct yet another nuclear test in the meantime iran continues to of long range missiles and pursue key elements of the potential nuclear weapons capability despite u n security council efforts as a report before subserve unless these programs are halted and i quote there likely to be a proliferation cascade that would greatly increase the risk of nucular use in terrorism and quote we're also faced with the challenge of securing nuclear materials and facilities worldwide implementing safeguards into civilian nuclear programs to prevent breakout weapon capabilities and preventing terrorist groups from acquiring a nuclear bomb weapons design or facade material both russia and china are moderniz program and as this report points out ironically our edge in conventional capabilities and has induced the russians to increase their reliance on both tactical and strategic nuclear weapons a credible and reliable u nuclear deterrent will be required for the forseeable future however senior government officials and many outside experts have expressed concern about our stockpiles long term condition and the confidence that many have in that stockpile and it's supporting infrastructure the commander of u s strategic command testified this spring the most urgent concerns for today's nucular enterprise lie with our aging stockpile infrastructure and human capital to that end i believe we need a program to modernize our stockpile and in for structure i want to be clear i'm not calling for a new weapons capability however i believe there are prudent steps we can we must take to introduce greater reliably the ability safety and security features into our arsenal and thus create conditions for maintaining a highly reliably deterrent with fewer warheads furthermore we should insist on a conscious effort to strengthen the u s nucular infrastructure support investments and stockpile stewardship and sustain our exceptional scientific engineering and production workforce what i find worrisome  this evolving nucular policy is that they resolved almost entirely on treaties an arms control measures the previous administration wrongly in my view appeared to have an aversion to arms control i believe it's a valuable tool but it must be practical verifiable and enforceable furthermore actions taken to decrease our nuclear forces should be counterbalanced by other means to strengthen our security and that of our allies missile defenses advance conventional capabilities unconventional capabilities intelligence nonproliferation and other aspects of a comprehensive strategic posture strategy lastly secretary gates warned we cannot predict the future that on certainty cannot be underestimated as we way the nucular policy and posture decisions ahead of us the commission has given us much to consider i want to thank them again and i look forward to the testimony of that mr gentleman i but very difficult to execute nevertheless we have come surprisingly close to that as you will see and reading the report i'm going to use my time mr chairman by trying to relate some of the major findings in our report what i perceived to be the administration's emerging strategic policy and i base this judgment primarily on statements and speeches made by president obama first of all he has said that the world and the country indeed the world faces a new threat nuclear proliferation a nuclear terrorism but same time we need to hedge against a possible resurgence of the old threat the commission firmly agrees with that judgment secondly he said that the nuclear nonproliferation treaty the n p t is critical in dealing with this new threat the united states should work to strengthen  agree to put more resources into the arm of the n p t dealing with inspection and force and here the international atomic energy agency the commission agrees with that judgment as well and third he has said that we should in order to get success in preventing political oppression we need the effort of all nations and they get their full cooperation entails the united states and other nuclear powers make progress and disarmament i agree fully with that  judgment the commission members have different views on the extent to which our progress in disarmament and getting that full cooperation is really coupled together thomas think it's couple quite closely i'm of that view and others don't think the coupling is quite loose that the president made a very clear statement in a speech in prague that united states seeks a world without nuclear weapons and therefore we should be reducing the number and the salient of our nuclear weapons but he went on to say as long as nuclear weapons exist it will be important for the united states to maintain safe secure reliable and credible deterrent forces i strongly agree with that for statement some of our members do not agree that we should be seeking a world without nuclear weapons or that's even feasible to do that but even those members fully support that part of the statement dealing with maintaining a safe security allow a deterrent and they also support reduction in the numbers provided that reduction is done bilaterally fifth the president seeking new treaties start treaty official material cut off treaty and taking two out of five the comprehensive test ban treaty  our commissioners agree with the goal of moving for a new follow on start treaty and we offer some comments in a report about how that might be done we also agree that seeking a fissile material cut off treaty is desirable on the comprehensive test ban treaty about a vacation i strongly agree with that move indeed i believe that the us will not be able to assume leadership in the world if we do not actually make that ratification but i must say that the commission that is split on that issue about half of our members disagree with the goal of ratifying the comprehensive test ban treaty and indeed if the senate proceed to hold hearings on that i suspect some of our members may be testifying on one side of the issue and others testifying on the other side all of us however agreed to do certain steps and then say should take before they submit to treaty who had occasion most importantly to get a clarification among the p five as to exactly what is bad by the test ban treaty seems to be some ambiguity on that today the six issue which missile defense the president said he wants to move forward on the european missile wide variety of views on the value and importance of missile defense but on those two issues at least on missile defense we were able to reach an agreement seven on civilian nuclear programs the president argued we should get  finally the president said we should roll back north korean nuclear grammont prevent iran from getting nuclear the six party talks have failed to stop the north koreans from building and testing the nuclear bomb and the compliance with  nonproliferation treaty is in tatters president has argued there must be consequences under the n p t and we firmly agree with that we do not offer him or you advice on how to achieve those goals but quite clear those are very important goals now beyond commenting to you on these policy issues i want to make some point highlights some specific recommendations we made last how to sustain the nuclear force particular how  sustain this force in the face of the american policy the no testing no design of weapons a new capabilities and with the budget limitations that have been exist at those under those the limitations it's a challenge to sustain this nuclear deterrence the key to that i believe indeed all of my members believe is this ranks of the nuclear weapons laboratories they have we are blessed in that they have outstanding technical staff these laboratories and they have had remarkable success and what's called the stockpile stewardship program and the life extension program but as our weapons age is going to be harder and harder to to sustain that success inexplicably i believe our government has responded to that growing problem by cutting the staff at their weapons laboratories we believe that trend should be reversed and and beyond that that we should add responsibilities to the laboratories for other important national security programs for example programs in research technologies programs in supporting our nuclear intel dense assessments and even more broadly program programs and research that has the effect of making a research lab national research laboratory out about the weapons laboratories if this is done we believe in reporting to change the name to the laboratory and not just weapons laboratories but they are national security laboratories and they should be renamed and they should be funded accordingly we have a unique national asset in the in these weapons laboratories and we should be treating it accordingly if that is done they need to be congress some years ago on the view that they would be able to provide that direction but they have not had for success in doing that we believe that the n s a should have more autonomy of action than that has today and that should be restructured so that it reports to the president through the secretary of energy and to the president reporting arrangement i'd like to conclude my comment by looking briefly i had a future world out there is heading in the direction today in a very dangerous direction there's a danger