the computation of the cost of living it to determine the fee which is charged is merely an independent calculus to determine what the ultimate hourly rate will be quickly charged under the statu utilized the courts have generally accepted that c p i is the correct methodology to use it within c p i there are several variables the deal with the location of the claimant the location of the claimant attorney the location of the court in the veterans court the veterans court has adopted the location of the veterans attorney as the criteria for that calculus the fact is is that the plain language of the statute mentions nothing about the method the language of the statute merely says unless the court determines that an increase of cost of living up exist it does not say three choices which one do you want to adopt i want you to adopt a rule that says that based upon the ambiguity of the statute and that this statute is being applied in the context  do and in so doing we believe that they have misinterpreted the statute by selecting a specific rule that as in this case causes harm to what happens if we agree with their interpretation picked the right location whether they should have looked at all three locations of the offices or just looked at wine and that's we would look at that right that would be an application a lot of factor now honestly i'm not sure in this case  because we are in this case different than most cases that come before this court and better and found that having to deal with chevron deference we're dealing with a statute that is completely separate there is no regulation we're only looking at what this statute says this statute speaks in ambiguous terms about cost of living that determination seems to me to be a determination that should be resolved in the veterans favor and that no burden should be imposed by a rule of the veterans court that says that as in this case you get no cost of living increase or that you get a cost of living increase that is dictated by only one standard that the standard should be the standard that is most advantageous to the applicant this is a remedial statute created by congress in order to compensate the claimant for having to bring the action that they brought up but it's the same statute that applies to parties other than veterans cracked but that's correct and your vet is that they be interpret that other federal employees for your interpretation of each  except your honor that the aegis statute was deemed by congress to be a political to the disposition of that print court cases now clearly in my view this court could limit any decision  to just those parameters i appreciate what you're saying that certainly the implication could be that if you say it your opinion that that friends get that additional benefit it could be a pleasurable in other circumstances an hour before your in i think that within this court's jurisdiction this court must decide whether or not the what i would call sanction imposed by the veterans court in disallowing any inquiries was consistent with that interpretation because the veteran when she submitted her application showed what that cost of living would have been for the local location that and count that they did so in three different circumstances because in this particular law firm there were three different locations that participate and therefore i think this court does have jurisdiction to address what amounts to a sanction because the court read into the statute that it was the burden of the appellant of the applicant for ija to demonstrate which of those a plot that's not what the statute said and what the court did was to retaliate against mrs arrott and deny any cost of living increases and all the award of the one twenty five back and said now it's dallas fort worth little rock and san francisco because of the location of the offices for between those two the position urged by the government and what the court does do we have jurisdiction to decide which of those was the correct approach i believe you do because of the ambiguity of the language of the statute and that's why in that article of local approaches i mean there's local in one instance one locality in the other instance three localities because the attorney happens to have three offices so it's we're not are we really in an application of lot of fact i don't so you are because it deals with what is the rule i believe as judge used correctly pointed out this is all about what the rules were it ended up but the problem for you there isn't it i mean you found some of the better argument because the court then this court must resolve that ambiguity i've urged you resolve it under the canon preventer and but you can also revolve resolve it under the can and the deals with remedial statute but i introduce question to you thank you very much about statute and that it it isn't they are entitled to a broad instruction based upon the fact that it that the that the statute benefits that in some way if the court disagree with that conclude i calculation which is not the transpacific in that case if that's actually applies to every plaintiff as the government is already brief than that particular one for i mean the legal the burden is on each applicant to provide sufficient information to show that an increase in the cost of this in living justifies an increase in a fee ward and in in the in the court below what happened was there maintained her stance that what she did was appropriate and she should be entitled to the fee increase based on the methodology she chose so it was certainly in some sense after peril given that the long history for seventeen years of of how each application fee should be calculated she had multiple let me ask you this question are you saying i mean what happened here is the government came in with the dallas forward feature the court said no we're going to three locations and then it said however since no information was provided with respect to the three locations you're stuck with the one twenty five are you saying that in this case we don't have to decide the issue of whether the national procida form approach is correct two possible local approaches but then didn't really use either he just went with the one twenty five i mean i think that the worst do we given the way the case ended up do we still have to decide in your view the work of the attorney was actually perform saw was it necessary for us to look at whether the veterans court correctly went with the local c p r i don't i don't think it's a yes or for the for the court to do so the court could could simply conclude that the veterans court to review what the lower court did what the lower court did clearly relied upon an interpretation of the statute now this statute in this parent's view does not dictate does not mandate does not direct or even suggest how the computation should be made and in fact the court has adopted a rule that there is a one rule that fits all situations that rule is inconsistent with the plain language of disagree that there is the differential i'm asking this court to focus on what the statute says if the statute gives no direction is it reasonable for the court which interests not that there is no direction from the words adopted the c p i in the next as the proper methodology the problem is there again is there are different methodologies within that that are based upon a calculus that is determined upon where you start and do you start is one of the where you start is once not dictated by the statute and in this context we're talking about a veteran or a veteran survivor who has been forced to go to court to correct a mistake a mistake that was not only wrong but was not substantially justified now we're talking about quite literally what amounts to less than ten dollars an hour worth of differential and so it just seems to me ironic that if there was ever a circumstance that a remedial statute was going to be interpreted in favor of the applicant whether you adopt that this is special to the veteran or not it should be adopted in favor of the person