good afternoon your honors and may please the court spencer shar with my co counsel or probably decide on behalf of plaintiff appellant recode knox will endeavor to reserve five minutes of my time for a bottle i'd like to emphasize three points about plaintiff preemption claim first plaintiff is not asking this court to expand federal power but merely acknowledge the power that has been exclusively exercised by congress since seventeen eighty nine second plaintiff's preemption claim is narrow and a modest one plaintiff simply contends that states cannot expand or contract the permissible methods of private carriage fuss arizona's other ballot abuse laws would not be preempted third arizona cannot a veiled itself to the benefits of the unified national postal system and then disregard the long standing rules governing that system if arizona wants to opt out of the federal private carriage laws it could lobby congress for permission to do so it hasn't  address what is the evidence either in the text of the statute or otherwise that congress intended to create a space free for private this and said it was ok for the states to regulate ilia employment in that case because the congress hadn't specifically regulated it in arizona it was different because there were specific regulations alien employment so what specific regulations here other than just the exemption of compensating carriers can you can to for us to your honor in implementing the private express statutes the implementing regulations themselves clearly state it's not just simply an exception but it's also that individuals are permitted to carry by private hands or permitted to carry letters through special messengers those are all outlined in thirty nine c f r three ten point three where the implementing regulations which ninety six see where congress clearly in the statute itself the language of the federal statute says we will we are going to impose criminal sanctions on all private kerridge except for this type of private carriage and in sixty nine hundred sees both the private hands exception and the special messenger exception and i think if you were to look at arizona v united states i think it's a more powerful preemptive language than there was in that case because in that case the court needed to look to legislative history to determine whether or not the intended not to impose criminal sanctions here this court need not look to legislative history because it has the language of congress to look at which says we want to we're going to pose a general ban on private kerridge and we're not going to impose civil or criminal sanctions on this type of conduct and i think you know to use the colorful language so your honor if if so if for example if you were to take it that the a individuals don't have this right to carry letters then the state of arizona's position as to how they interpret the state statute wouldn't make sense what would give an end a caregiver or a family member a house member the right to deliver an individual's early ballot the right well i guess the including if one were to put a postage on a letter and then cancel out in ink the stamps not only could someone carry that without compensation but you could charge for that delivery in that instance because that's what congress intended as long as in that in that instance they were getting the the funds for the postage and as in that's that you as well so that's b one b two says that letters may be carried out of the mail when a letter weighs more than twelve ounces and be three states that a letter may be carried out of the mails when the private express statutes are suspended and so that the distinction between the exceptions versus suspensions is one is done through the implementing regulations that congress allowed and one of those suspensions is the suspension for urgent letters and that's found again  the in the suspensions and that's thirty nine c f r three twenty point six and i think the urgent letter x suspension is perhaps very important in this case because on the day that election day if one were to need to deliver your ballot the concept behind the urgent lettered exception is that needs to the value of the letter would diminish if it wasn't delivered within a certain time period and of course as this court well knows that if that ballot isn't delivered by seven pm on election day it will lose its value and so again that is an express not just exception but excellent examples of congressional intent here that congress intent and i think it's also if i can go back to arizona united states for quixotic the conduct that this court and the supreme court said that arizona couldn't to regulate had created a program to make it on lawful and to regulate it and the supreme court's that's what makes the difference between this case and her earlier decision the contests where there was not a theory evolve torrie program on that issue so it wasn't just out congress had immigration laws laws regulating immigration and said nothing about employment they had a they controlling or governing it so you're honor if you were to look begin at three the regulations governing the exceptions so for example thirty nine c f r three ten point four talks about the responsibilities of carriers now that's all private carriers whether it's u p s fed ex or miss knox who is a volunteer private carrier that's that's a clear example where it's congress through its implementing regulations is comprehensively regulating and in fact i would say they so comprehensively regulate private carriage they've done so to the outs in the hour or so it they've said if it needs to be delivered by ten if it if a mail is dropped off at ten pm it needs to be delivered within six hours they provided a very comprehensive regulation that governs all private carriers and it may seem that we normally think of private carriers as commercial private carriers but it would equally apply to anyone who like a c referred to carriage for hire or carriage and compensate both your honor both the regulations don't distinguish between what what the what a private carrier has the for example a thirty three ten point for the responsibilities of the carrier there's a volunteer would have to comply with all federal regulations just as much as a fed ex commercial carrier would have to comply government miscue question is it your position that the state of because you couldn't have a minimum wage no your honor it is not that our position is very narrow it's just that the state of arizona can't say this person can and this person cannot let me leave you know the situation nobody can be in the business of delivering mail a missive pass a background check whether arizona can impose a regulation that regulation wouldn't interfere with these this conference regulation because these these regulations don't speak to those though those those types of magazines they can regulate certain aspects that aren't interfering with what what the post the post the federal government has occupied the occupation is who who is allowed in or under what circumstances to deliver without criminal sanctions one thing that's also limiting the preemption else this is the post laws aren't triggered unless a post route is used so in that instance or in your being delivered within a hotel there's no post route that's being used and thus the postal laws aren't triggered the private express that you relates to delivery over a post route and post routes are defined by regulation statutes and i see that my i'd like to reserve as much time as again thank you your honors good afternoon and may please the court i am andrew pappas appearing on behalf of the defendant epperly arizona attorney general mark byrne of it at its core is my opponent make clear this is a preemption case he allegedly preempted statute is h b twenty twenty three a state ballot handling a law that this court knows well the allegedly preempting statute is eighteen u s c section sixteen ninety six c which reads impertinent part quote this chapter shall not prohibit the conveyance or transmission of letters or packets by private hands without compensation the statute cards out a narrow exception to the general criminal penalties that attach to the private carriage of mail but it does not confer on anyone a right to do anything and is nots cannot possibly show that when congress enacted the private hands exception more than one hundred seventy years ago congress clearly manifestly intended to preempt a state ballot collection law like h b two thousand and twenty three at least nine other states have limited who may collect a voter's early ballot but no court has that the private hands exception preempt any of those laws and as far as may ask a question about the reach of the arizona statute yes your honor each provides the and election official united states post office postal service worker or any other person who is allowed by law to transmit u s mail what's that last phrase mean any other person allowed by law to transmit u s mail i mean obviously you have the private hands exception which would  indicate that person is permitted by law to transmit but you don't seem to read it that way so no your honor i don't read that language as encompassing gratuitous private carriers like ms knox i think what the law what does it what does it mean if you're not a postal carrier sure what it refers to your honor is just a couple of examples one would be department of defense and department of transportation personnel who handle postal service duties that branch post offices on u s military installations that's thirty nine u section four zero six another example would be department of state personnel who are designated by the department to perform postal service to duties at branch post offices stablished at u s diplomatic posts that is thirty nine u s c section four thirteen be that the private hands exception constitutes an ability for or authorization for someone to transmit letters well no court so far as i'm aware has ever interpreted understand but this an arizona law that's why i'm asking you for your and i'm just trying to get the meaning of are you construe it because it's a felony obviously it is well certainly what the law intends to prohibit is third party ballot collection by persons other than those who are statutorily excepted from the statutes reach if the statute were to be read to allow any third party who carries mail or rather who carries ballots slee to to fall within the statutes exceptions then obviously the exceptions would would swallow the rule the other thing your honor is that the the language in subsection h which going to reference has to be read as a whole it's persons who are allowed to transmit us mail and are engaged in official duties as knox is not what does that mean it i think i mean she said she would say i guess probably argue she's  engaged in her official duties as a as a precinct worker and she would be mistaken as i know that's that's that's why i'm puzzling about the wording is i think the language by law has to be read through the statute i think the official duties in question have to be ones that are imposed by law as the district court pointed out the duties of a precinct committee person which are the duties that ms knox points to are defined by statute but those duties do not include carrying other people's ballots to the to the polls if there were i understand your point i just want to get through a couple more assurity because i know your time's limited certainly on just so i understand the reach of the statute let's stick let's stick to the reverse of judge bay as question let's say the bellhop takes a ballot down to be posted at the hotel i gather that would be within the statutory reach that's correct your honor i believe that would be a felony  thing with ice in the same thing would be true if if a voter asked a messenger service whether it's a bicycle messenger service or postal or whatever to deliver it that would also be prohibited under the statute as a right i think that's probably correct your honor i think the purpose of the statute was to prevent as a general matter third party ballot collection except for certain statutorily authorized persons that by the way follows the scope of what you believe the scope of the law is and its meaning what one other for example if a if ms knox said i'll i see you've got a stamped let me put it in the post office box again that would be a felony a stamped ballot yes yes i think that's correct because ms knox has no right under federal law or any other law to carry other people's mail whether gratuitously or otherwise ok i think i understand your and so go ahead and certainly you know and i think that really is at the heart of it the again no court has ever held that the private hands exception confers on anyone to an affirmative right to do anything no  ever held that the private spread statutes or there are exceptions preempt anything and for decades federal and state courts have made clear that postal preemption applies only if the state or local law interferes with the postal services ability to carry out its work h b twenty twenty three clearly doesn't do that first knox's conflict preemption theories i understand it is that h b two thousand and twenty three somehow obstructs or frustrates congress his purpose in enacting the private's press statutes and there are exceptions it plainly does not do that h b twenty twenty three it limits who may collect a voter's early ballot it doesn't necessarily implicate the federal postal laws at all because simply put an early ballot isn't mail simply because it could be mailed even if h b two thousand and twenty three did implicate the federal postal lost it would not obstruct their purposes in any way the best indicator of congress is purpose is the statutory language in acts but the private space statutes and exceptions reveal no purpose that h b twenty twenty three frustrates as i said earlier the private hands exception which is at the center of knox's preemption theory response to that i think the first response is that that simply isn't so that the regulatory structure isn't nearly as thick as the one that was that issue in arizona versus united states  implementing regulations do not confer firmat of rights that the statute itself does not confer the implementing wrote regulations used the word permissible in the sense that private carriage of mail for free is not subject to the general criminal penalties that attach to the private carriage of mail as for congress is purposes there is nothing in the statutory language that suggests congress intended to create a free standing preemptive right and in fact when the supreme court has construed the private hands exception of the private  d it's made clear that it is a narrow exception and acted at a time when congress was concerned with boosting the so postal services revenues by eliminating competition h b twenty twenty three doesn't frustrate those purposes in any way it limits who can collect voters early ballots but it allows postal workers if gaged an official to choose to do so what would frustrate h b twenty twenty three s c c what would frustrate congress purposes is to do what ms knox urges which is to transform the narrow private hands exception into an affirmative federal right to carry mail for free and then deploy it to preempt unrelated state laws as for the private statutes as a whole and the postal monopoly they the supreme court tells us that they have the same purposes as the private hands exception protecting postal revenues by preventing competition from private carriers again h b twenty twenty three doesn't frustrate this purposes in any way if anything position that would it be twenty twenty three also doesn't frustrate with knox calls the primary purpose of the federal postal laws quote to achieve national integration and to ensure that all areas of the nation or equally served by the postal service h b twenty twenty three doesn't stand in the way of that purpose at all as already noted it allows the postal service to collect early ballots just the same as it would without h b twenty twenty three so each week twenty twenty three doesn't conflict with a private express her complaint quote i understand that since h b two thousand and twenty three went into effect i am prevented from collecting and delivering another person's early ballot that's correct because ms knox doesn't qualify for any of h b twenty twenty three's limited exceptions as she knows that should be the end of the inquiry i don't think that that as somebody who understands the plain reach of h b twenty twenty three ms knox can possibly claim that it's fake and i think  if i have to say you're looking at twenty twenty three if you're allowed to carry mail which of course the private has exceptions allow you to carry mail that would seem to take you out of the first part so the only question is what official duties me no i don't i don't i don't think so your honor i don't think a lower price can you can our people allowed under federal statute to deliver mail by private hands on and on compensated matter federal law does not give anyone an affirmative right to do that  says this is allowed and it's not an affirmative right i think the best way to read that language is that someone must be authorized by federal law and engaged in official duties in order to fall within the statutes exemptions so all that language needs to be read together and i don't think it can be parsed out i don't think that the story that that wasn't my question i said the first part i think there's a reasonable debate about whether in fact there may be no debate at all she has authorize otherwise who transmit a letter by private hand as an ox if it weren't a ballot she could take anything from somebody and transmitted by private hands and uncompensated right under federal law right fred federal law would not prohibit her from doing so but i don't think it is true that federal law expressly or affirmatively authorizes her to do so but again the statute says allowed by law doesn't say authorized by law so then so then your fault of the second part vagueness we're not talking about interpretation and official duties it doesn't say by whom your honor i think again the statutory language needs to be read together so as allowed by law and engaged in official duties i think that language needs to be read together i mean frankly i think any statute if it were broken up into enough small pieces could be could be called vague if you looked at it in the right way that's not what the vagueness inquiry whole of the statute needs to be read together the question is if somebody engaged in official duties when she is purporting to do this the answer is knox's case is no and that is defined by statute  if there were any doubt about the scope of the statute i think it would be conclusively resolved by this court's decision just a few weeks ago in d n c where the court construed the statute definitively to  say i don't have the quotation right at my fingertips but that refers to for example mail carriers acting as such this court obviously understood what h b twenty twenty three means as well it means that you have to be authorized by law to do something and engaged in official duties while doing it it cannot be enough to to broadway construe official duties as miss knox has tried to do here and then say well that renders the statute  e that is just simply not that is not the proper way to conduct a vagueness analysis i'll say one last thing about preemption unless the court has of the questions on that and that is with respect to field preemption the courts have held for decades a preemption applies only when there's been a physical interference with the postal service is ability to do its work that obviously does not exist here my opponent has not even tried to distinguish those cases because he cannot do so with that i think the court for it's time try to squeeze in a bunch very quickly permit me the attorney general just came up here told me earlier that it's probably correct that a delivery service a messenger would be legal they've never explained to this court whether or not fedex would be allowed to carry a ballot or not and what official duties fedex would have more importantly we certainly know that they believe the attorney general believes elections officials are allowed to deliver mail but they have never pointed to anything in state statute were elections officials authorized to deliver mail if anything a precinct committee person who was statutorily allowed and required to help someone vote  more closely have an official duty to deliver mail moreover here we have a criminal sanctions that are harsh or in the criminal sanctions imposed by federal law for private kerridge so there is a heightened scrutiny as to interpret ing what is the scope of this what of the scope of the statute and it's very concerning that the attorney general can't answer these important questions about a law that imposes a year in prison and one hundred fifty thousand dollars in fines though those that type of vagueness in the heightened scrutiny necessary for state criminal statutes is is critical one last point i would like to make on the preemption analysis is what congress has always wanted to do it in relating to postal service lower case p lower case s because they regulate not just u s p s but postal services generally is to encourage americans to send letters and that's been a basic assumption about art the universal mail delivery system so they desired to design the postal system that balance both the need to have a financially viable u s p s that also had with the need for convenient alternatives so h p twenty twenty three upsets that balance by criminalizing a number of those convenient options and as this court recognized a few weeks ago that one of the findings in the district court was that there were and i understand that pontification was not with this court's lightning liking were at least some voters who quote slightly were slightly more difficult or inconvenient for a small yet quantified subset of voters to return their early ballots so this law this state law is doing exactly that it's frustrating at least in this small set of individuals what congress wanted to give them which was the option to deliver have the letters delivered by the postal service the united states postal service or through these other alternatives which take the clearly the statute and regulations expressly grant the ability to two individuals to deliver and that is a clear frustration of congress's purpose behind its entire postal scheme it's in to say that it doesn't impact the postal functions i think is just proven by the statute itself when you talk and your honor about thirty nine c six zero one and subsection be one where if as long as you put you know postage on your ballot it can be delivered if if you we're not allowing the united states postal system to have that postage or even to let someone go to take a letter and deliver it to a mailbox that's clearly frustrating a postal function it's depriving the postal system of those post funds because the way that ballot the way that the postage is paid on these early ballots is only once it's entered united states postal service do they get paid yes you're over your time if you have time for one last question how much of your argument depends on what regulation is anything that comes within the definition of letters that's thirty nine c f r three ten point one and it's not just that it could be mailable it's as i discussed in which the other important trigger is that you're using a post route to deliver it so if i were to hand my co counsel a note even if it was addressed to her and i had a message in writing it would not be implicating the postal laws because i'm not using a post route to deliver this letter address a card to my kids and take it home that would be fall within your definition yes your honor and in that case it's within another exception called the letters of the carrier exception and that's three ten point three b i believe which says that an individual is allowed to deliver their own letter so when an individual delivers their own early ballot which it doesn't seem the attorney general has any problem with them doing what they are still doing so at the express permission of congress because they're not paying postage on that delivery it's the delivery of their own letter ok thank you counsel just are you be submitted for decision thank both of you for your argument you