we'll hear argument next this morning case seventeen eighty nine ninety five mont versus united states mr chief justice and may it please the court when congress uses plain ordinary words in a statute the word should be read accordingly the language just section thirty six twenty four tolling provision is both plain and unambiguous the use of the phrase isn't present in connection with  conviction for a crime has meaning derived from the language of the statute it's enabling legislation and others that you tory provisions in cases which make clear its meaning the manner in which section thirty six twenty four is interpreted by the sixth circuit alters the plain meaning of the statute by interchanging imprisonment with official detention the purpose and meaning of the provision which is beyond the inten that he is presently serving and the ohio he did he did get a benefit from that pretrial and official detention it was treated as if it were part of the  in ohio what happens when a defendant is sentenced is that the state judge is required to apportion pretrial or official detention towards the credit of the sentence it is not imprisonment it is a credit that goes towards the days that a person has to spin and imprisonment in this case mr mott received three hundred days for one of his cases and from the danger the friend the may pose correct that's correct and so i'm assuming your argument is that that period of safety is not a period for conviction the credit is just a credit it's not the purpose for the detention yes your honor that is exactly the point because when a person is been official detention they are being held because they are seen as either a flight risk or a risk to the danger of the community when a person is imprisoned on the other hand the purpose of imprisonment as it is embodied in section thirty three thirty five fifty three it's as the the for reasons for imprisonment is punishment retribution rehabilitation and incapacitation those i'm sorry no finish i'm sorry those are the reasons why imprisonment is markedly different than official detention but if we look at suppose somebody is sentenced to five years in prison and has been  in detention for one year and the judge says i'm son sing you to five years in prison but i'm giving you credit for the year in which you were detained prior to trial but isn't that person imprisoned during out that first year no your honor the person is officially detained during the first year they were giving credit towards the five year sentence so that now that they will only have to serve for five years but those four years will be the imprisonment term that they were actually served suppose the statute said that upon conviction of this offense a defendant shall be sentenced to five years imprison discretion for the judge but the person has been detention for your does that mean that the judge cannot read it about a person for the one year spent in official detention because that person wasn't imprisoned at that time no the person can be credited towards the imprisonment that that sentence announced by the district court judge would be the sentence that was mandatory sentence under your scenario it would be a five year sentence once the person reaches the custody of their jailer either the b o p or if it's a local or state what would you say the granting of that period was in connection with the grants the language of the statute i understand your is in prison argument but it's in connection with the conviction so he's given credit for that period in connection with the conviction right he is given credit for the period but the credit is to the term of imprisonment not to his official detention but it's the term of imprisonment in connection with the credit after a sentence is exactly that that is after a sentence is imposed pre trial or official detention does not punish pretrial in official detention it was never intended and  this court has stayed it and us versus salerno that pretrial detention is regulatory it is not pino so even if a person is granted official detention time and granted custody credits those custody credits are not the same if they're not the same as a term of imprisonment they are handled separately the person is in prison not at that and he is given credit for that time and again the sentence of conviction i really don't follow what you seem to be  say justice ginsburg when a person is sentenced to take mr chief justice argument and five year sentence if the person has spent one year in official detention prior to his custody prior to his sentencing then that year that they spent may be given credit towards the sentence it is not the same thing as the sentence the remainder of the remainder of the sentence that the defendant has to serve it was presumed for detention purposes safety not for his conviction that is correct so you're back to his imprisonment that's correct you and the my colleagues are saying there are two textual clues here one is the present tense of the statute which favors you because it is in prisons for what purpose it's not for the purpose of the conviction he is being held for safety safety concerns for flight concerns whatever not because of a conviction yet and on the other side is imprisonment in connection in connection with the conviction and the chief justice skins burger saying that which favors the other side's reading because once you're given the credit that credit shows a connection with the conviction that's the argument now the question for me is what breaks t tie why if they are so tied between those two textual clues i should elect you are reading and not their reading if separate imprisonment with conviction and connecting phrase in connection with is a is a broad phrase but the limiting terms are  imprisoned and it says isn't prison which is important because that connotes present tense that connote something that's happening right at the moment that you're looking to see if you take a snapshot of the time that you are determining whether or not supervised release is told then that snapshot is the imprisonment that is contemplated by the statue and that's true in mexico it raises a very interesting question why is that the point at which we look at this congress and the actual statute alright the statute is going to apply in the future it wants to describe something that it anticipates will occur in the future isn't  natural for it to use the present tense so let's say some an employer adopts a wall that says going forward if employees work on the weekend they will get an employee who works present tense on the weekend gets over talking what do we read into that it's how you describe something that is going to occur on a recurring basis in the future so it's natural to use present tense why does or why do we infer from that that you're going to examine this person's status in jail in real time and ask ok today what is he what you see doing is tomorrow what you see doing you see what i'm saying the reasons for granting credit and the reason for granting a credit for official detention in the scenario used by the sixth circuit was that i can look back to see where he was at that specific time but only if the district court or a state court judge has a portion that official detention as credit for the sentence so what the sixth circuit did was require a looking back they did not use the present tense of of the of the of the statute they looked back and said whether or not and they had to wait until the person was sentence interrupt there's a lot of uncertainty involved because in any given moment and this is why it's important to take that snapshot approach because if any given moment a person may indeed not be detained there is no guarantee that a person remains and an official detention state courts regularly release defendants arrest them and read imprison them and there's no way a district court looking to violate someone on supervised release can know whether or not that official detention at that snapshot at that point of time is going to be the fact that under the government's reading if someone is leader released or the charges are dismissed there is no tolling so that if the charges are dismissed at the end of this detention and no credit is given then there's no tolling and the judge who sat on his or her rights of issuing a warrant loses out correct that is correct that doesn't make much sense if the statute was intended to read the way that justice alito suggested as a look back statute that wouldn't make much sense well that is the point your honor well but you would still that's because there's no conviction that it can be in connection to right that is correct because a conviction you know that doesn't help you know but i guess actually it under our under our reading of the word conviction under thirty six twenty four eat it does help because the conviction has to include of a final judgment i mean it doesn't say judgment of conviction  often after the bruising or vendor issues a guilty plea he says i'm guilty and a jury may find him guilty and sentencing may not take place for months and when it finally does then the judgment will enter now why isn't is being in jail once he's pleaded guilty or once the jury has convicted him why is that not in connection with a conviction it is not a connection in connection with a conviction as the term is used in thirty six twenty four because thirty six twenty four deals with convictions that have final sentences the government the government says that we should look at the difference between the phrase in connection with and the word after which congress could have used and that we should draw some textual significance from that and that that fits in with the larger purpose that congress likely had in mind of not allowing double counting of time your spent physically in prison as justice ginsburg says as counting a supervised release so why should we draw some significance from the use what's not used which is the word after justice cavanagh the reason why you would not use the word after is because when you have a conviction and a conviction meaning a final judgment than if you use the word after you still have a person you still have a period where the person was held in official detention prior to the prior to the entry of the judgement and the statute has been interpreted and thirty six twenty four as requiring a conviction that also includes a judgment where is that it doesn't say that know it doesn't say it however using section thirty six twenty four and indeed most of the sections under chapter two twenty nine of of title of title eighteen that title is its place there to govern imprisonment it governs sentences it governs any action that takes place after a person has been adjudicated guilty and has been imposed a sentence there is no occasion and section thirty six twenty four where you could have a conviction that did not include a judgment because at that point you have to have an imprisonment because that's what this that portion of the statute is what it uses in its argument through this part of the argument this part of the argument was raised below but it was not addressed by the six the s in section forty two forty one define conviction specifically as for and in fact there are some statutes i believe i could be wrong that require mandatory detention after a guilty plea or a jury found so someone can be out and the jury there are some judges who do this routinely the minute that you're convicted they basically do a new bail here and hearing and put most people in with that under your theory of the case still not the imprisonment relating to the conviction your honor under thirty one forty three of the bill reform act that particular section deals with official detention after a plea or an or a judgment of conviction with respect to a jury verdict and it still you are still eligible for bond you are still eligible to be released and the concerns of pretrial detention or official detention are the same it's flight risk granted that the the standard of proof increases under thirty thirty one forty three you then have to prove by clear and convincing evidence that you were also occur after a judge conviction and or as you might be released on bond pending appeal that is true your honor but that is a much more difficult hurdle for a defendant to to overcome because you basically have to prove that your case will be overturned that's the standard although it's not i'm not articulat correctly that's what the practical standard is you have to prove that you're going to be you know you're going to be found innocent of of the c official detention and the practical problems with applying official detention as imprisonment are that when when a state court judge imprisoned somebody for an a detention the question becomes does the person who is not held in official detention still have the ability to be supervised by their probation officer the answer is yes but the answer is also yes that the person and detention can also be supervised by their probation officer there for the purposes of supervised release go on even if a person is held in official pretrial detention granted all of the pam a plea of benefits from being supervised release ie which probation provides cannot be met in prison but a defendant who is in official detention and who is also a supervised release person has to report their arrest they have to report their commitment they have to report any type of of contact they've had with law enforcement and many times that has to happen while they are in fishel detention and indeed many of the local courts and local jails have the ability to have programming counseling and other services that are available to people in official detention now the government would have you believe that there's no and in fact the the sixth circuit would have you believe that there is no supervision occurring while a person is an official detention and that's simply not the case and the majority of times the probation officer is in contact with the local authorities the local jail and they can contact their their supervised release see and determine and indeed they're required to report back to their court to let the court know what the person is doing while they are on supervised release well it is a little different i mean the supervision is a lot easier if the person is in jail right that's correct and so i mean i understand your point but it does it does seem to me that the imprisonment changes the obligations significantly u supervised release and and alters the degree of supervision there although it does alter i guess i guess mister i guess i would say i would think of the period that you're detained as being a lot more like the period you'd be imprisoned than the period when you're out free and being supervised as it has with respect to that being held in custody you are correct it is them all or to being i prisoned and in a prison facility after sentencing however the ability for that person to receive a bond alters the dynamic with  probation officer and indeed when a person is charged with an offense in state court and they are also on supervised release they are usually represented by counsel but what do you think is the purpose of supervise release a person can be who is in prison serving asylums can receive vocational training or any other sort of training but i thought that the purpose of a supervise release report role was to see how that person would do in the outside world i want to take up your rebuttal to yes if i can answer what the difference is though is that when a person is in and in prison serving the sentence they are eligible for a whole host of training and and review but that official detention period is not as significantly different as it is for the person who is out on bond who was also facing a supervisor least violation because they're represented by counsel and they are not allowed to talk about the events and the the reason why they are they are under indictment or have been charged with a crime so for that and i'd like to reserve the remainder of my time thank you thank you counsel conclusion follows from the plain text of section thirty six twenty four easy which broadly toles supervised release during periods of imprisonment in connection with a conviction whatever this is i don't think it's really clear i mean you have in connection with justice sotomayor says this in connection with it's a very broad phrase but i guess on the other hand how is it grammatically possible to say that a person is is meaning is suggesting currently is imprisoned in connection with the conviction of the conviction hasn't occurred yet the standard for legislative drafting is to phrase statutes in the present tense and congress reasonably that's the presumption congress can not do that yes go ahead and finish yes no that's correct but we know that congress has in at least one other statute that it passed at the same time in the sentencing reform act used the present tense to describe a period  tolling that where the tolling would be subject to a later determination and congress thought that present tense was inappropriate way to frame the statute there it took the same approach in the statute as well and that the phrase in connection with indicates that congress was not intending for the imprisonment to necessarily follow the conviction or result in the conviction i mean in connection with as i said i totally accept your point that it's very broad but the question is whether it can effectively change the tense of the statute just because it's so broad and and that seems a strange way to read language to me it's not changing the tense of the statute the question is really at what moment of time  have to occur when do you have to decide whether the imprisonment was in connection with a conviction and my friend on the other side takes the position that you have to know immediately but the statute doesn't require that the state doesn't it because  back a little bit in the statute it says that the term doesn't run when the person is imprisoned in connection with a conviction right so when doesn't the term run the term doesn't run when the person isn't present in connection with the conviction meaning that the conviction has to have occurred in the person has to have been imprisoned in connection with it no but i disagree your honor because the phrase do not run is used to describe the period that will be considered told no no don't tell me what it means read it so that the language embodies what you think what i mean the matter how i read it ok in which the person is imprisoned in connection with the conviction he wasn't he was imprisoned in connection with suspicion probable cause whatever the standard is that he has committed a crime that's not a conviction so what i want you to do is read it past present or future in a way that embodies what you think your honor i would read the statute to say that at the moment that it in crazy end to the tolling status of a period of and pr my now i've done it if it has justice kagan has just said to you there is ambiguity doesn't that ambiguity suggest that there is a clear way to write this if that's what congress intended there may have been other language that they could instead of imprisonment they could have said for any period of detention there they could have these i mean what they could have said i think closer to what justice briar was looking for any period in which the person is considered to have been imprisoned in connection with a conviction that's and i mean the the difficulty is that they're engaging in something of a legal fiction weeks because there's a conviction and the judge says well you're getting five years and we're going to start counting ten months ago i mean the process of imposing the sentence sort of changes the nature of how the period has been counted and i don't know which way that counts but there seems to be there is qualify and that makes sense in the context of the supervised release scheme because supervised release and time in prison and imprisoned there are also mentally incompatible states and it made sense that congress would want to limit the number of situations where a person would be while they were in custody letter from down the other side suggest that's not true suggest that when you're in detention that a lot of the features of supervised release can still continue my understanding is that that's not that's not correct that the probation office generally treats pretrial detention as triggering tolling that they are not capable of supervising defendants in clearing in jail and pretrial detention in the way that they can on the outside and there are a number of things that probation officers do when defendants  out in the community that are simply not possible in jail ordering drug testing for example asking the defendant to participate in certain types of community drug testing or you soon lead to drug testing in prison on a pretty regular basis jailing facility may well do that but case we had a defendant who is in state jail but he was also potentially under petitioners theory serving his term in federal supervised release at the same time so the question is is the federal probation officer really able to supervise the defendant in the way that he believes is necessary to execute the term of supervised release when in fact the defendant is under the jurisdiction of the state even under am i right about this that even under your view of the statute you will run into the problem in certain situations you'll run into it when the confinement is for fewer than thirty days and you'll run into it when the defendant and being acquitted isn't that right yes that's correct so why is this so different well this is the difference here is this is going to be much larger swath of defendants and the two exceptions that congress decided to put into the tolling provision makes some sense the first for short periods of detention reflect a recognition that if a defendant is imprisoned for a short period of time that may not disrupt his experience of supervised release he may be able to continue transitioning into the community it may not interfere with the probation officers ability to supervise him and then if the defendant is imprisoned but it is not in connection with a conviction congress determined perhaps as an exercise of legislative grace to give that defendant some credit for that time served in jail which the defendant would otherwise receive no so long as for the probation officers determination of the judge's determination inspired preponderance of the an acquittal really doesn't tell you whether or not  the successfully integrated into the community or not because the judge could always hold a hearing and by a preponderance of the evidence that he or she had and still keep them longer maybe until the earlier case is decided but the point is that it seems to me that i don't understand the legislative crease or how you get it out of the language of the statute it is true that a defendant who is acquitted or has charges dismissed may have also failed on supervised release but congress determined that it wasn't necessary to have automatic tolling in that circumstance perhaps congress was concerned that there was a possibility that defendant was jailed by mistake or perhaps congress wanted to see wasn't it and he was he would have been justice to why shouldn't the time under your but the difference for that defendant is that we know that defendant will get no credit against another sentence for his time in jail whereas the defendant who is ultimately convicted will almost invariably get credit for that pre for the sentencing judge has to determine at what point it becomes the defendant's noncompliance with supervised release rises to the level where it might warrant revocation proceedings in this case the judge determined  to defer that decision until after the state prosecution has concluded at least until the defendant was sentenced on those prosecutions which is not uncommon often judges federal judges when faced with a defendant who has been accused of a new crime wants to see how that unfolds in the other jurisdiction before rushing to judgment perhaps on what they did whether the defendant is or is not guilty of the offense it would certainly be appropriate for the judge the the person has done something putting him back in prison there are guidelines and i think when in a case like this one where the defendant has violated criminal laws on supervised release that's a serious violation that as a general matter should warrant revocation but the question is the timing of the revocation and whether the revocation has to come immediately or whether the district court can potentially defer that adjudication to allow the parallel  new criminal proceedings to unfold in this case under a legislative greece or human i think we have a choice between reading in connection with capriciously or reading it i think you would after the time that you spend prison then they wouldn't have created the they would have made all of that not count you understand yes certainly congress could have made that policy call  the number of defendants who are jailed on charges and ultimately not convicted is actually a fairly small sliver compared to the same purpose would still be served in that circumstance correct yes honor yes the supervised release would serve the same purpose but this is the this is the line that congress decided to draw and it's clear from the statute that they thought a conviction was necessary here and that they wanted to leave out the other types of imprisonment this was it was a reasonable policy call to make it is it does potentially mean that some defendants get a little bit of a benefit in terms of their supervised release outcome because they are spending less time out in the community under the supervision of the probation officer than their sentence dictated but congress determined that as a matter of policy they wanted to draw that line and why what do you think the reasonable policy call is can you explain why they would do it that it may be because i think the inference that i would draw is that congress may have believed that a defendant who was jailed but not ultimately convicted has not necessarily failed on supervised release in that circumstance supervised release scheme gives the federal judge tools to determine whether it is nevertheless appropriate to revoke the defendant for that conduct even though by definition the person would have been in jail for a longer was in fact indication that they were feeling on supervised release and that they needed to have their supervised release revoked in that context the federal judge would have the option of revoking supervised release supervised i can see why it seems just unfair on the big picture level but i guess not seeing the policy call the question is just what the default should be and congress determined that for defendants who are judge has additional tools that he or she can deploy to potentially add on additional supervised release if necessary as opposed to the defendant while you know while in pretrial clear whether the defendant was going to be in prison for more than thirty days in connection with a conviction then the defendant would not as a practical matter be on supervised release in pretrial detention because it's possible that the super if it becomes clear just so in this case the way you interpret what happened with mr mock had done that during the term of pretrial detention that would not be grounds for over cation that's correct because because at that point when it when it's when we have not yet determined whether the term of supervised release is running that the defendant is can't be subject to the terms of supervised release and then later it might turn out that the term of supervised release was running because he was not convicted in that jurisdiction would not be unclear because the district court as long as the supervisor lease term has not yet and would be able to adjudicate a violation that occurred before so let's assume the following hypothetical defend arrested for drunk charges he's leader acquitted but while inches he now commits a drug offense your claim would be the district court can't find a violation but because it was not clear at that point whether supervised release was running the defendant can't be deemed to have been required i think that's what renders the is in prison language little bit suspect in the statute because you're sort of looking backwards all the time there is a set of looking at present moment the suspension period starts thirty days after that sentient looking forward looking forward if you start counting it from they had the rule that we're advocating here which is that pretrial detention are over so they didn't have to reach yet and it wasn't to argue yes no we were as any other court argued that point or i'm sorry not argued address that issue and decided to the nine years at least to ninth circuit yes and one other circuits who are who are on petition or some have either of those two courts address this issue the ninth circuit in one of their opinions on this issue at least they determined that it was a very short period of imprisonment that followed that if the entry of the defendants guilty plea they determined that that was not in connection with a conviction in that case in that case but they didn't address the legal question  they they made a quick they had a quick discussion of it but alright so why should we be the first ones to address assuming we disagree with you on the main point and agree with your adversary why should under either understanding of what conviction could could mean and the statute the defendant's imprisonment here would qualify because certainly if that conviction means the entry of the guilty plea or the now i'm saying if we agree on the from security to true imprisonment your honor this is this is part of the question presented the question presented i asked the court to determine the tolling status of the entire period of petitioners state detention that position or needs all of that period to have supervised release running during the entire period in order to get relief here i guess i'm still struggling with that question is are good reasons why we would be the court  first view rather than a quarter of review on the question of you effect of a guilty plea why wouldn't we let that percolate you have yet to win a case below it's yet been decided by the this court of appeals in this case wouldn't our that's when this certainly the court could do that we you know again we believe that the line that this court should draw on the question presented is an earlier line that wouldn't come just the pretrial detention i got that once that once the court determines that that's not the appropriate line presumably it will be answering the question of where the line falls and to answer that question the court would have to determine whether the period between a guilty plea or verdict or we could remember it right the court is sort of can certainly do whatever the court wants to do and i was just i was just giving you an opportunity to tell me why we wouldn't do that but if you don't want to that's ok oh no i mean i would say that the court i would i would urge the court to decide the question because it is even if you lose that one too well maybe maybe either but i would also like to just address the fact that petitioners reading is in conflict with the text of the statute and with the statutory scheme that congress has set up here with respect to the text of the statute the phrase in connection with a conviction is inherently broad and it indicates that congress intended for a broad range of imprisonment to toll supervised release not just imprisonment after a conviction not just imprisonment as a result of a conviction congress has used that alternative language in other statutes it chose not to use it here and the decision has to be given meaning in addition because the defendant who is in jail will not be getting the full experience of supervised release it makes sense that congress would want to minimize the number of defendants who are in the condition of being deemed to be on supervised release while they were in custody we also know that congress in defendants should not be getting double credit for time they serve in pre sentencing confinement against another term of imprisonment giving that the interpretation of the tolling statute that petitioner is urging here would give defendants double credit it would mean that all defendants in pretrial detention were also deemed to be on supervised release which is a much larger interference with the supervised release scheme than the narrow exceptions suggest and does mean that it would interfere as well with the double crediting system we also have anomalous results that would occur if a suit a term of supervised release was told during only part of the defendant's sentence for another crime in that context you can imagine the timing of the defendant's guilty plea and have an effect on his supervised release so for example if you had two identical situated defendants who entered jail on the same day and ultimate they received the same criminals that and they would have different supervised release outcomes if one of them pleaded guilty after two months of detention and the other pleaded guilty after six months you could also imagine a situation where you have two identical defendants who go to jail and identical offenses in different jurisdictions one jurisdiction happens to process cases more quickly than the other the defendant who is in the in the fast moving jurisdiction will have a different supervised release outcome than a defendant who is in a jurisdiction where the on their sentence and to say that some but not all of that period is in connection with a conviction is very strange indeed and it seems an ominous for defendants to get potentially a supervised release benefit or when some sentencing judges m you get credit for the time detention and others would say you don't i mean people in different situations have different consequences i guess including for supervised release that doesn't seem particularly compelling the other things seem the ministry of cost of ordering the warrant and it being law is there something else that the judge would have to do or the system would have to do to affect that warr keep it active that would be a reason why a judge would just issue a warrant when someone's arrested in theory a judge could issue a warrant but it's a little bit of an odd answer to the problem presented by the defendant who goes to jail during supervised release and in fact it was thirty five eighty three i warrant procedure was not added to the statute until one thousand nine hundred four which is ten years after congress designed what would you want to say anything imagine you lose everything  what would you soon response the statutory language indicates that conviction me and the adjudication of guilt by plea or trial you can look to the first sentence of thirty six twenty four which is not the tolling provision but it is an earlier part of the same the same statutory provision where it refers to a statens and the fact that thirty six twenty forty elsewhere uses the word sentence but decided to shift to the word conviction in the context of the tolling provision indicates that congress intended to refer to a different moment a different event in the criminal adjudicate of proceedings we also know in the sentencing reform act that congress regularly used the word conviction or convicted t or to the state of being adjudicated guilty before the entry of a sentence and it used often the term judgment of conviction or entry of judgment to refer to the later moment at which the judgment of conviction was entered so the plain language of both thirty six twenty four itself and the larger statute of which it was a part indicate that conviction means the earlier moment in time but even if a conviction referred to the judgment of conviction that happens in connection with the sentencing a defendant is still imprisoned in connection with the conviction once he pleads guilty or is found guilty by a jury and as leader to and because that detention is at least in part to assure his appearance at sentencing and to ensure that he is there to receive the entry of the judgment of conviction that is largely certain at that point and also at that point his his imprisonment becomes punitive because he no longer is subject to the presumption of innocence so for all of those reasons even you know whatever meaning this court gives to conviction certainly in the period after his guilty plea would be told we believe that the entire period of his imprisonment what should be told because all of the time  served on his state sentence and is still serving on his state sentence is in connection with the state conviction that landed him in jail in the first place thank you i would the government's reading the statute has created such ambiguity that it is not workable the conditions under supervision supervised release persons are held continue while they are in official detention that is true for mr monti kase for in the northern district of ohio the chief probation officer has indicated that there supervision continues because the continuation of the probation officers duties do not stop the moment a person is arrested those duties continue and also the probation officers are instructed to allow the court's information of what happens while a person is being held in pretrial detention in state courts oftentimes probation officers have a relationship with the local courts they are there and they understand that they have a concurren case there they do here here that they have any contact with the defendant that they reach out to the stake or do we know whether they continue any of the functions of supervisors in this case your honor the probation officer initially had contact with the state court when he was first indicted for the marijuana  and he also had contact with the mahoning county jail when he was arrested in june one of somebody after that time i don't believe that there was any additional what if somebody is being held in a jail where the sheriff says this is my jail and i supervise the people here and i don't want any federal probation officers messing around in my jail is up to from that may be different but it does not disturb or affect the anticipation of the judge who is handling a supervisor lease case in knowing what's going on with their their release see the judge would still like to know and the probation officers would still inform him and whether and at that point the probation officer would inform the judge that i can't have any contact and often as i said previously contact is limited because  person is represented and they can't really participate in a lot of back and forth communications with somebody before they're adjudicated in addition justice leo you had a question about whether or not the grounds you could revoke somebody based upon the grounds that they violated supervised release while they were detained and indeed they can for the same reason if a person had drugs on them while they were in local jail that not only would be a new offense under state law but it would also be a violation of his supervised release just as it would be if he was out in the public because the probation officer still have the responsibility now my friend here decided that stated that when  to case is by the time the person is sentenced then they know whether or not the official detention has been a portion to their prison sentence but you can't know that unless you have the backward looking and now is this under the statute which just doesn't work and thank you thank you counsel the case is submitted