morning good morning and may please the court and the system attorney general jennifer vandermeer and i represent the appellant in this case the board of regents and its university of wisconsin stout let's start out with  diction and yes your honor as a threshold matter i would like to say that this court has jurisdiction over this case the district court's order was a final order under bowler the blue hills bank because it pertains to a discrete dispute namely the determination of discharge ability and we know it's a discrete dispute because the order i'm just heard ability alters the status quo and fix the rights of the parties namely whether you w question merely the preliminary issue for determining whether to impose sanctions as essential eous up issue of the sanctions question we would say that there's no no need to put form over substance and there are lots of instances where discharge ability its own discrete disputes and prefrontal discharge your argument would have merit if there had not yet been a f discharge order and the only dispute in question was discharge ability this is post final discharge and the dispute in question is whether the university should be sanctioned for violating the don't have a remedial orders we don't know what consequences the university is going to be forced to pay for misjudging the discharge ability issue and that has yet to be determined and by the with respect to the dispute angst charge ability there the case law that discusses re mans for non ministerial functions is related to remains for issues and different disputes and there's nothing more to determine as to whether that that is just charge the court could decide this question now we understand that there are concerns we've briefed that if the court doesn't have any further questions about the state's position i would like to to move on to the merits supreme court's case discussing the standard for contempt and what sanctions whether there's an objection plea reasonable basis right that's all bound up with the merits of the discharge ability issue your honor so you take it still has to be litigated as to what the meaning of objective we reasonable basis is but i don't think that that's the same as a determination as whether as to whether that that was in fact is charged whether there's an objective we reasonable basis could be that there was a reasonable basis in the law to come to the conclusion that the court right that's my point it's all bound up in the same dispute would you agree that the appropriateness of sanction is a central issue  your honor all the parties it's really a yes or no not for the central question here is discharge ability which is what the parties have briefed and sanctions will be determined if the court were not to rule in favor of the state on the merits right but the dispute is about whether the university should be sanctioned for violating the injunction the discharge injunction  and that dispute has several components one is the discharge ability issue and two whether universities position was objective really reasonable under the law that's what taggart says and then three if you do owe sanctions or your client does of sanctions what their scope should be and the bank bankruptcy court has broad equitable discretion to fashion a remedial order that includes many different components and so to do this piecemeal just really strikes at the heart of the final judgment but rather a factor underline the sanction determination and in that context the law your honor you're correct that the just the state agrees that the discharge ability issue in this case is related to sanctions but the key is that the discharge ability issue is not earth to the dispute is not dependent on sanctions it's an independent determination that the court could make there is there is case law mainly in the top ninety one context but courts have also applied it in bankruptcy court and context where if there remains issues to be diction as i know that is foremost on your mind again i cannot be impressed enough with the similarities between this case and to the hypothetical that was illustrated in the enderson matter where left to be done on the matter and therefore it's taking a position i believe it is not a final order and therefore this matter is not properly before this but moving on to the issue of just charge ability similarities with this with the language that existed when this court decided chambers that and i think that the facts behind the two cases are very similar so in this present case i think that there's three reasons why the matter that the agreement that has it's unsigned is not an educational loan and cannot be held to be along the st is that there was no extension of the obligation in the matter was decided by the bank for it without taking any testimony without reviewing evidence i suppose we could either call it a motion to dismiss or motion for judgment on the and either case the the facts before the bankruptcy court before the district court before this court is is that in summer session of two thousand and fifteen classes began in june th and july  classes so that would be respectively june th excuse me june th and july th so under the agreement the tuition for summer session two thousand and fifteen is due before it would have been do without the dream and i think and therefore this is clearly not an agreement to extend the obligation there is no extension of time in which the debtors can pay then i believe that this c change in the agreements any way that they want to and then that change in the terms would fly retroactively to any debts and had already been incurred i help i didn't miss it but why why should the language  it's a subcategory of education such that if it meets the definition of a qualified education love it necessarily is an education it i think that that question is well founded and i don't know if i have a good answer for it but i can respond in another way in regard to subsection b itself expenses so there needs to be few separate incidences there are two separate actions to read that there could only be one of that might be possible for the one to get one occurrence use the incurred language twice and so under your interpretation the payment plan for the fall and spring semesters would constitute a qualified education loan if she had defaulted and if this suit was about that or if this case was about that perhaps i didn't not address that since there is no allegation that these debts relate to anything other than summer semester so i think that this matter can be decided much more narrowly so arguably apply that we don't have to decide that here yesterday because it's there's no question that subsection interpretation there is no superfluous here subsection a subsection one still refers to an educational loan which is either guaranteed or made directly by a governmental unit subsection b thank you for your consideration actually i'm just a few rip points on her but i'll briefly end this hazelton points to the andersen case as analogous to this case for establishing jurisdiction we don't think that that case is analogous the remainder was for the same dispute we've already discussed that we just we just don't think that that case is on all fours couple points on the merits the state disagrees that you need to have a common law definition of educational loan in subsection b because that's obstruction has its own definition of loan if you meet the i r c's definition of education qualified education loan then case but there there is a dispute about whether the the payment plan as it pertained to the summer to mission expenses which are the that's the only thing that's at issue here there is really an extension of credit all that and that goes to whether it would meet the requirements of a one well no it also goes to the requirements of of the i r s definition because it has to the indebtedness has to be incurred by the taxpayer solely to pay qualified higher education expenses if this if this wasn't a payment plan to extend credit for some or to sion expenses then it wasn't a debt incurred to pay those expenses it's just normal tuition yes well in pay expenses she just didn't pay these but the payment plan does show evidence of the deferred payment agreed for fall and spring not for summer for summer as well you know because the actual standard today for this later but payment plan actually accelerated disagree with that characterization of evidence and it was also not that in the bankruptcy courts findings which were based on the undisputed facts we would disagree that point but i see that my time is up thank you thank you both very much