does andrea barton versus the attorney general mr focus should be here for the petitioner mr hayes for the attorney general and mr fogel you made begin when you're ready construction of the statute but does not give meaning to every word implicates the will against surplusage what what these this talk time will admit what the issue in this particular case is that respondents in removal proceedings are treated differently people that are outside the united states coming into the united states  which again are the same i mean and have changed over the years but he's not and he's not removable for this but for this particular offense he's not charged as being  offense because it was committed after five years there's a difference and it does that but it it the language of the statute says what he's committed to see him to you i mean we've you would you accept see him to  tries to come back and he is not getting back again because of the status that judgments and as described so i mean he is he's in admissible in the ether and if he ever leaves and tries to come back then that ether like status will ripen materialise and it'll prevent from coming back and right because it's our president is our position you are that this is not a speculative this is not a speculative situation it's a real it's a real situation because if he did never he's not remov for this particular offense because it's a quite a moral turpitude outside the five years which is different from just being any any climate models turpitude whatsoever so let me ask you this and you can tell me that this analogy may not be right  if someone has a terminal illness doesn't the illness render that person untreatable even if that person is not currently seeking treatment tell me why that analogy doesn't work the reason then that analogy is a more jars because the immigration and nationality act treats differently treats people that are outside the united states applying for admission differently than people that are that are already in the united states but doesn't the statute eleven zero one eight thirteen see recognize that a lawful permanent resident can relinquish his or her very well if they leave the united states and actually it's it's only if they leave for more than a year or that they lose their permanent residence but if they leave from work if they leave for more than one hundred eighty days is a presumption that they've abandoned it that's correct but that's not really i mean that's not the the issue is here that if she was here if they would have won if they would have meant for for this to apply just to everybody anytime they committed a c i am and what would be able to leave at some point later in the future and come back they would have just said that they wouldn't say say inadmissible or movable this is a new issue in this circuit but other circuits have certainly considered this as disagreed with your position that this somehow allows him to have to apply well then i'll tell you the difference with any of these cases and i couldn't find any any case that the again when you have to look a where it's a crime at the port of remove ability it's also a crime of animus ability so the drug offense or heredia case a drug offense and plus the guy also left all of those cases and even with  all of those cases are they track and they trigger they treat the person exactly the same way a person is the only way that this statute makes sense is for is when they both crimes applying for an invisibility and there's a portable for being in a missile so i don't know i don't know even i don't have a note in my notes so to speak but i've got written down in my notes that render means to cause or to become so back to judgements and question why isn't that a status based definition one one can differ from is more one can only become in the miscible if they leave the united states it's interesting i actually think that one becomes an admissible as soon as one commits the crime the more turpitude and then the the application of that status materializes later but that you sort of carry around the scarlet letter so this bill why why would they they did that then they wouldn't be but if it's after the five years then they're not removable and if proceedings are never never there they're still here then that's so what happens if they were slightly differently what happens if the person leaves terribly as you said for a year and then coming back into the country what happens well if they leave voluntarily for a year the statu they've abandoned their permanent residence right at which point they need a new admissibility determination right correct but they're inadmissible because of this crime of moral turpitude well they would have i think they would have to apply for admission again through whatever way they could because they surplusage and where the there is two different treatments of somebody applying for admission and somebody in the united states is it is if the stop time walks when somebody leaves and they're applying for admission that's the only way it makes sense here thank you your honors may please the court timothy hayes on behalf of the attorney general under the stop time rule a person's period of continuous residence shall be deemed and when two requirements are met the first requirement is the applicant must  in a mist of under the crime of all the moral turpitude privet provision the statutes plainly which uses the word renders which as judge knew some was going to heredia and the merriam webster dictionary defines it as to cause to be or become it's a status the minute first prong is commit an offense so once he committed to prague one is matt kronk two requires him to be rendered in a miscible to be rendered in a mess of all you either have to have a conviction or you have to admit to the essential elements of the crime and until mr barton did that either in removal proceedings or he was convicted then that second prong is triggered in this case it was triggered right away because he was actually convicted of the crime are let me ask the next question what  if in fact he commits a crime of moral turpitude he's convicted of committing a crime of world target the government brings removal proceedings against him because he's been rendered and this is the those words out of the statute ok so we would say if you take those words are you have to do is commit a crime of moral turpitude no your honor why couldn't you take those words out of the statute because again it has to render the a under eleven hundred two but i thought the government's argument is that all you have to do is commit a crime of moral turpitude don't you have to either be convicted or admit to the essential elements of that crime in order for that second prod be triggered so marques if you commit a crime of moral turpitude and you're convicted period you can't you can't get you can stay right as long as the other elements this within the seven yes yes your honor that's all those there's no discretion on the part of the government to overlook that and cancel removal  there might be a little well understand the statute is this is for the purpose of terminating whether or not you are statutorily eligible for cancellation of removal right yes your honor i mean there is a distinction between whether one is subject to remove from the united states and whether they're eligible for relief from or move on their distinct like in the earlier in order for mr barton for example to be charged and subject removal yes to be deportable but in the relief stage it could be either there are lots of instances where no p r is also an admissible in that matters for the relief stage but to get more to your question there is a possibility where an individual could apply for what's called an eleven eighty two h waiver it doesn't apply in this case because he doesn't mean they'll go to requirements for it but it's possible that there could be some waiver that might apply to prong one in the garcia case and the board does that but generally speaking no if someone has committed the crime and they've been convicted of it and it's been within the seven years there is no discretion oh awful permanent resident may be considered an inimitable to the united states without seeking admission and i think we've touched on some of that one is at the border for example examples waffle permanent residents can apply for what's called cancellation or remove or non permanent residence which is under section twelve twenty nine a again the alien is a lawful permanent resident but he can apply for things that are more geared towards people that are just  was plain language the chevron argument is only to the extent that the board did use a dictionary definition a term of the word renders and they said it was to cause to be or become in word oh so that is the extent the court finds that provision ambiguous which i don't think it is but to the extent the court does they should take into account defer to the board that the board is interpret it that way so that's a reasonable way that's how that word should be read so there's no there's no dispute here the this is you know a non presidential single judge decision i was trying to figure out exactly how it is that that happens and how i verify it is that that's what happened i take it there's no dispute that that is what this is this is a one member of yes it's an unpublished one a member board decision but chevron also applies if the board is or why not a presidential decision and they did cite to or the use wardo in their definition of the term renders which is what we were getting at but does that require like rely on you know we as as a cork in an unpublished disposition sometimes will say we're lock solid since bound by prior panel precedent and smith versus jobs there is no way around this thing it's the same issue same procedural posture same everything why would we publish an opinion isn't that what this is talking about not like sort of in the same space but requires ambiguous provision in a published presidential decision it defers to under several of them i would argue that word zero did interpret this provision in a target of the word rendered so that would be enough but i understand the counter argument that there are without them explicitly saying so and relying on unpublished deference rather than understand your argument is that the plain language of the statute is clear right here and have at least one other circuit the fifth circuit that has come to the conclusion that no the language of the statute is ambiguous and therefore we go to chevron analysis that's right your honor but two circuits the third in the second and her ready have said it's plain language and the board as i read read the provision the way we do and so you'd argue plain which is sufficient but if not only it only makes sense if you remove all and admissible and inadmissible for the same offense because otherwise you're treating permanent residence differently so than to judge wilson's question and the backside of mine i guess why not defer if you say the statute doesn't make sense sort of we can't make heads or tails of it then why not for a look at this because because they're there when they're wrong i mean he'll have to look at it and and we can mr barton was not removable for this offense therefore it should not operate for to stop the time it just seems like there's a lot of headwind here because you're asking us to conclude without respect to the nature of the deference that we may give the b s decision or whether it's chevron or something less something like skidmore you're asking us to discount the agency's interpretation and the second circuit and the third circuit and the fifth circuit all of which for one reason or another have construed the statute differently than you do and  and why is it the other way around have to be logical though most folks who are there are a lot of statutes that aren't logical but that's what they say but that's that's true but that's why the courts have to interpret it and a