your your letter to counsel instructed us to first discuss the pluck ability of maritime law i'd like to do that it's applicable and it doesn't matter whether we're in federal court or state court maritime machinery board vessels responsible for the placement of where parts it is reasonably foreseeable are those where parts contain asbestos and the asbestos cause harm so asbestos products that caused the harm in this case in the answer is in in each situation here with these defendants they supply dynamic machinery to the navy  and i use the term dynamic because it in it involves the function of machinery in each case the machinery could not work properly without the application of  you have to have insulation on the outside because you have to maintain the temperature inside the turban for the super heated steam the turbans have worked without it without asbestos insulation they have worked without thought this was not the sort of kept me up last night because this is a this is an important issue put or the limitations of liability as i thought about the machinery that the defendant supplied on them carrying steam why shouldn't they be responsible and it is because it's not dynamic it the pipes function perfectly well with or without insulation inside the room may be excessively hot but the but the pipes carry the steam in the case of dynamic machinery the pumps don't work without the s s they don't horsepower in front of me but let's assume for a moment that they were weighted at ten thousand horsepower with one they are probably insulated they might only generate a thousand horsepower but i didn't mean to say that they wouldn't machinery and so under your construct you would like us to consider having a test that says the manufacturer is responsible if  manufacturers of rewards compliments may be responsible for the compliments that are contained in their in their machinery so it's your view that the district court judge here in applying the strict you that you you would be encouraging manufacturers of machinery to walk away from their machinery and just leave it responsible to the company manufacturers and that certainly is not what professor prosser thought about and crafting strip products liability the idea was to have everybody responsible for that product in the same courtroom and then we can sort out those responsibilities but the manufacturer under this prize here the district court's judgment should be affirmed because defendants are only liable for products that cause harm to the plaintiff and that the defendant's place into the stream of commerce that is that they can be factored distribute or otherwise supply that rule is consistent with the overwhelming majority of state tort all with the principles underlying tort law and with the principles underlying maritime law with respect to the weight of authority the may decision on its face first of all a s that it's taking a minority view and second of all while the facts of nay did involve a navy sailor there is nothing in the may opinion that is a crying maritime those terms the term maritime law i don't believe even appears in the from the very beginning of that case through the end is primarily on state law and the state court opinions that would come into the court neal case from california the simon etta and broughton cases from washington those are the cases that represent the overwhelming majority view and those cases are also consistent with the principles underlying tort law to say that a duty attaches to a product but one of the reasons why duty attaches generally it is that it defended profits from the product and controls the product and as a result of controlling the product also has the ability and can be incentivized to make that product safer none of those rationales apply in a circumstance like what's at issue here where the defendants did not control and did not but it certainly is a recognition by that core and others that there could be a scenario where the manufacturer should be responsible beyond its own product required for its product to function at its best it's container dangerous component so o'neill did reserve that question i don't think it's dick i think it's simply an issue that they didn't decide and suggested that it would that it could be for another day as an initial matter those are not that's not the facts of this case the record in this  in terms of forecasting pennsylvania law with respect to strict liability only not negligence in terms of why that is not is sound rule of tort law first of all any safe product can conceivably be used with another unsafe product and that's especially true honest on a ship where as you say everything is interconnected to say the manufacturer of a safe product is liable for somebody else's unsafe product first of all it's unjust because the manufacturer the safe product didn't many fashion distributor profit from the unsafe products second of all it is potentially counterproductive because it actually reduces the incentive of the because from the perspective of the defendant the manufacturer of the safe product the incentive that should be creating for that defendant is to go out and test every conceivable product on the ship to potential reward about every unsafe products that could be used with a safe product  dangerous substance for it to function what is the implications of a rule that says mean if actually you are there for liable for injuries caused by this incorporated device so  is if you did have such a rule then the manufacturer of the unsafe product would have an incentive to make its product safer potentially to come up with some sort of an alternative no matter what the manufacturer of the safe products that even if talking about a much narrower thing but even if we say today even if manufacture access today my product cannot operate without assessed this there is always the possibility that happens in manufacturing all the time that tomorrow somebody is going to come up with a better alternative and it is the choice of the later supplier of the later equipment or owner to continue to supply a specialist or to use the stats this that is the cause of the plaintiff's harm the cause of the sense even in the choir and sort of situate in that you're positing the cause of the point if harm is the supplier manufacturer of the latest best it's not the decision up front to the player obviously is concerned with the protection of sailors war does not undermine the protection of say was this is simply about placing liability on the party most responsible for the harm can i could i wanted to take recovery exact same exposure how do you reconcile that first of all in most cases there would be a different result because the overwhelming majority state will is consistent with what we're suggesting and so in most cases there would be no disparity if there is a disparity i reconcile that by going to the other purposes the underlying maritime law first of all the protection of maritime commerce is a particular goal of maritime law the kind of potentially limitless liability that the because of the form selection possibilities wesley maritime wrought favor simplicity is a value we're advocating a bright line war that a defendant is only liable for a product the causes harm that it itself pla test of requirement as i suggested the requirement test would not actually be administrative ryan that could hold and so the main purpose is a maritime law promoting commerce uniformity simplicity point all in favor of our  result in strict liability and now i need a mental defense and not reach whether negligence would provide very know that i think that the proper reading of the district court's decision is that it was applying both it was or it was discussing both claims it didn't in that was used the only evidence that the plaintiff cites that any of these manufacturers supplied any is bestest in the navy has to do with other cases that don't mention the turner in some instances don't even that insulation was provided and installed by the ship builder with respect to foster we were this is at joint appendix have been for the seven and eleven fifty one fifty three there's simply no evidence that foster we were major supplied any of us best containing gaskets for the condensor that issue and lastly with respect to the manufacturers again this is a joint appendix fourteen sixty four sixty five sixty seven  fifteen zero three mr de vries and self admitted that he did you know where the navy got those replacement gaskets and the only evidence in the record that he relies on to show that many factures did supply such materials have nothing to do with the i would like to respond to the policy argument of simplicity and of that the plaintiff has a remedy against the suppliers of those products as you just heard from my learned opponent that remedy does not exist in this case nor does it exist in most cases because it is extremely difficult for a sailor on a ship to identify the products that are coming off and going on the ship so the question is it is a question of responsibility and it is generally so that manufacturer of a piece of machinery is responsible for the complements the exception here is that these companies are dangerous renewable they're replaceable they wear out all of which we agree with but the manufacturer knows it i think that that is a good working rule unless this court has further questions thank you very much thank you very much you have very interesting arguments