section in the article twenty four gun crimes that statute actions section twenty four dash two is entitled exemptions that's statute lists a number of exemptions to each of the by the defendant and is not an element that needs to be negated by the state or pled in the indictment was an issue brought before the appellate court you're correct the public court doesn't engage in that section at all was that raised by the state yes it was raised by the state in fact that was the state's entire argument and instead of reading the plain language of section twenty four dash two which analysis of that loss loud sure has no place in this case for a number of independent reasons first reason of course is lautrec dealt with a different clause that was not contain section twenty four dash to the exemption statute so the legislature when it added the clause edition we're not sure the on your own land or a vote lost it never simultaneously defined it as an exemption and we know this even though the analysis and options on the paragraphs we know this to be true because the on your own land or a boat was has been part of the u w offenses in illinois for rights no we're not justice freiman because he doesn't have a second amendment right to have a gun on someone else's private property there's been no pace that has ever held that a defendant second amendment right stands to other people's private property in fact that's why the legislature no doubt created this invitee clause not only as an exemption but with the permission component of it to in fact defendants kind of constitutional impediments to a plain language construction of the statute none of them actually have merit the second amendment doesn't in any way state who should carry the burden it simply states that there is protected conduct and that conduct is not protected on someone else's private property if we do plain reading of it we're going to hear about how the invitee clauses in the definitions portion right from old in council right and then in then saying that them therefore it's an element of the first of the offense based on our case law and then you point out the exemption which fast rule that every time there's language in the statutes definition in must be an element actually that rule is quite the contrary that rules says that sometimes it is an element if it is so to the body of the offense that the offense can't be described without it now the invite t clause wasn't added until two thousand and nine so the offense of u w can most certainly be defined without it the other thing justice thomas with respect to that position that the defendant takes is that he ignores the second corollary to the statutory construction principle in love and that  that just because it is in the body or excuse me the definition of an offense a particular exemption or exception clause is not an element if it merely withdraws certain ac persons from the operation of statute so we go all the way back go back a hundred years and we take a look at the statutory construction principle there is a handful of cases that have actually said that language in a definitional statute actually said that language in a statute is not an element if we read this if we read that section without that mind which is a you know does it describe illegal conduct ye it most certainly does and in fact we have to recognize that because this language wasn't added until two thousand and nine and clearly before two thousand and nine we have a fully active imperfectly defined i have a two part answer to that the first answer is where the language is plain obviously the rule of lenity doesn't apply that's right said a number of times but also even more language is ambiguous that doesn't necessarily require the rule of law maybe to create a construction inconsistent with the plain legislative language in fact this court has stated that it's only where a statute is grievously ambiguous that the rule of lenity itself should control and in this case where the language of the two related statutes is so clear and so plain on its face and it expresses the legislative intent without the rule of would operate to actually countermand the plain language and that's certainly not what the rule of lenity is ever meant to do and in fact no statutory construction principle is ever legislative intent here there is no need to engage in statutory construction aides construction or statutory construction principles involved sure or the rule of lenity because the language inquiry really hand and with the plain language as it should define it makes one additional point that i think there's mention and that is that he tries to make something of the fact that the invitee clause is found in proximity to the only under abode was as i've already stated the only under a boat clause has a different character than the invitee cos it's always been part of our u w offenses unlike the invitee laws which is just a recent addition but it also is significant that this court has sat for again about a century that position in the act is of no consequence proximity alone doesn't establish whether it's an element or not not taking the position that twenty four term member numbers twenty four to the exemption provision is somehow more specific than the identical language and that is if we were to engage if we were to need to go beyond even the plain language sure that would that would certainly be a statutory construction principle that we can use i'm not certainly not abandoning that but i don't even think we need to go there and i also don't think we even need to take a look at the way the legislature passed section twenty four test to the exemption statutes inclusion of the invited clause but that's another sort of heaping on of clear legislative intent here because when the legislature created this invitee clause in two thousand and nine in the same exact public as it did one more thing it did two things it added the invitee clause to the aggravated you w n u w statutes then in those very sections it added a reference in the exemption costs specifically listing the statutory places where but that invites the language a new w an aggravated and specifically adding clause that it was to be considered an exemption and as we know the exemption statute has always been considered exemptions not elements and plainly states so any suggestion that it can be an element and an exemption is simply absurd and it's also contrary to this court's decision and people versus a decision that came at least a decade before allowed sure where this court and it's our position is that these exemptions if they're certainly not permitted and says they most definitely cannot be considered element you're honest plain language controls in this case and for these reasons and those expressed in our brief we would ask that this court reversed the appellate court judgment thank you thank you that the legislature was just being cautious what about the age the talks not about burden of proof but about the pleading requirement information or indictment need not negate any exceptions exemptions has me contained in the article it does have to be well you know there's there is a thing here where they did it in two different places but the second thing where they put an exemption list that mean nothing it says and i quote your brain to need not negative and exemptions contained in this are minds in the normal way and negative in this requirement and then afterwards or i'm sorry and then the state or the defense can also request a similar instruction by phrasing  you know make it an element and also make it an affirmative defense i believe that's what they i believe that that's exactly what they did i believe they went into this intending to form a dollar they said they want to broaden the definition so they wanted to broaden his vote by at some point they decided they also wanted to add someone to consider whether or not that's exists but there is a test we're giving to this this is the reason this court recently stated it close and i think it's what we really do have to determine if you're trying to figure out that fact is if a person can commit every element of the very briefly your honors we take a look at the fund its argument the paradigm that he creates actually turns statutory construction principles on their head and makes the plain language of statutes subordinate to an interpretation based on outside conditions occurring in the process of legislation his argument starts from the premise that because the legislature intended to create this invitee exception and put it in the body of the fence that we can stop there and look at the legislative intent as far as that's concerned and it's set in stone it must be an element then he moves on only reluctant ly to section twenty four dash two and instead of reading the plain language of that statute to mean what it sounds he makes that plain language subordinate to the construction that he's already created based on the manner in which he sees this legislation being put to the floor of the general assembly that's not how this court has ever interpreted the legislature's language it has never used an implicit inference to be greater than the explicit language of a statue clearly defendant is ignoring the language of section twenty four dash two yet section twenty four dash two that exemption statute has been part of the article twenty four crimes or again like i said well over half a century simply absurd and be a attempt to instruct the jury is just a representative example of how that would be observed the burden is on the defendant the legislature said it's on the on the legislature said that the state need not  egate it this means it's not an element and whether the legislature started out with the belief that it wanted to create an element that's not what it did it added in the exemption statute so what that means is the legislature either changed its mind or put it in the definitional statute simply to give everyone notice that we're adding this but it has to be defined as something with that is the defendant's burden to prove and that makes perfect sense because it's just like all of the other exemptions in so far is the information about defendant's invitee status just like the information about whether he's a security guard or he's at a parade get round with relics license that's within his knowledge it's not within the state's knowledge it's not it's not what the state would know necessarily about the commission of a crime here defendant's ability to get permission from a landowner is something that he can prove easily and to the extent that defendant complains about having to wait a year and prove this at trial that's not necessarily pace you know many times charges aren't brought because the defendants have somebody there mediately to say i have permission to have th even if you did have to prove it trial that doesn't make it unconstitutional or any way improper plenty of defenses including all of the exemptions have to prove trial that's not constitutionally infirm or improper at all defendant suggests that it's ambiguous but again that's based on his improper reading of the statute section twenty four dash to his that in fact for a long time it has always been read in concert with the other article twenty four gun crimes it's part and parcel of the definition of those crimes that's how the legislature defines exemptions how they define these  it's not a quasi a primitive defense it's an exemption plain and simple permission i can see him being knowledgeable enough at that time and at that moment to say he had my commission because this guy just says well what happens to the real world even in the real world there is the absolute expectation that everybody knows the law so the other thing justice reman is that's not necessarily how the situation would play out in every single case and i would suggest that there's nothing again constitutionally infirm or improper about somebody raising a defense at trial self defense is a defense to murder people have murder trials and help to raise self funds again it is a affirmative defense but it's no different than any defense that accused individual raise trial and the delay again doesn't make it improper as to defend its position that briscoe got it wrong in our public court got it wrong so that must somehow mean that reasonable minds can get it wrong and that somehow means that there's not sufficient notice here that doesn't follow errors can be made that doesn't mean that the language of the statute isn't plain here there was in the state made by the appellate court when it refused to read