if their dealers which is the issue in the case if they'd say have a dealership under chapter one thirty five then the law has been violated they're entitled to remedies but the issue before the court bills that our legislature is addicted to has been for a long time and which the governor in our state has a right to veto in part and so the issue presented for the court today is what was left and under that statute that was left are the defendants do they have a dealership and i'm just to be perfectly clear we're just talking about the per who resolved the issue by saying no he didn't decide that there was no claim under one thirty five zero to stop three day at all and first of all i'm not going to reconsider w perfectly good definition of the kind of dealership that's involved here with this minus in line idea and well tillich beverage regulation is not one of the more rational parts of american well i mean if they've done it that way in wisconsin i don't know why they can't well it's interesting you say that around obviously the twenty first amendment gives states lots of leeway to do lots of things and japery one twenty five not one thirty five jeopardy one all sixty six and i see something called definition intoxicating liquor as meaning given away or owed to sunbathe minus one that's really all that i see in that statute so why isn't that a definition for purposes of dealership i mean you know the problem with your approach that i have is that it's very convoluted and it doesn't seem to me well first of all that it actually drains over sixty six of wine and i guess beer is never been in there you know right so so beers off on the side it just seems quite strange to me it's pretty easy to read the statute to say well you know one thirty five point zero six six is where the definition is line isn't going to be in the per se category there are reasons why somebody might want to do that i'm certainly not going to tell you what governor thompson was thinking about but that's what he did write two things your honor first it doesn't leave one thirty five zero sixty six meaningless it applies to hard liquor dealerships he was unwilling to veto that part of one thirty five that's  or sixty six five know that the question that the judge would had was also mine what is sixty six to a apply to it applies to sixty six it applies to sixty six o which is a which still applies to the dealership's created in three b for hard liquor dealerships which were previously perceived dealerships without any question nobody questions that that part the governor was willing to veto i start first of all and i findings it doesn't doesn't have any bite well it can if you don't want you don't want to read subject to as being a definition for the purpose of legislative finding that would make this completely cuckoo land well it's close but i don't get it it is appealing and they are findings that would be applicable if there were a dispute about the terminations of a hard liquor dealership well ok i mean the legislature put them in there couldn't could i ask you a different question you know in the eighteen years since this curious use of the single word veto have there been any state either administrative or judicial about what this did in fact there is no administrative structure in which there could be and there have been none that we've been able to find out courts or anywhere else this chat this this issue hasn't been raised apparently no i wonder whether it makes sense for the federal court to wade into this which seems to have a lot to do with the peculiarities of the veto process in wisconsin the alternative would be to ask the supreme court of wisconsin with that make sense your honor i thought you were one of the other judges might ask that question course occurred to us to raise it at the time when we were on appeal and filing our appellate brief and frankly the principal reason we didn't do it is we were already two years into this litigation which is expensive and if we go to wisconsin supreme court will spend another year or so before we find the answer it was might well think so i'll just be an ob i'll answer that as squarely as i can from an institutional point of view i think that makes a lot of sense from a party's point of view and obviously from the other side just didn't ask for it understood filed in federal court to of wisconsin authority because people file in diversity and the federal courts are constantly there right where we probably are not most useful grand jurors have a tendency to be somewhere else to terminate because they don't have these laws in their state or they're not well advised or whatever the fact may be and they find themselves in a court when they terminate and they find out about the law when they get serve a temporary restraining order preventing the termination of the dealership  so that's where we were headed when they decided to bring a declaratory judgment action and in federal court so you are in federal court even if it's a one way ticket right one day one way i guess i'll go back to the approach the magistrate judge took which was that first of all he noted the problem the judge easterbrook has alluded to and that's worried me that having a definition that applies soley the legislative findings and then on the assumption that they're somehow some fight  and later litigation is is is an awfully weak thing on the other hand it seems to me in wisconsin both the legislature and the governor have a role in the ultimate legislation that gets passed the governor was aware of that did what he did and so this is what we're left with not the neatest of statutes but it seems to me the most straightforward thing is to say the zero six six definition applies to dealership why met the definition  two that is also a definition it specifically incorporates by reference a wholesaler defined in one twenty five zero to twenty one as who a dealer is a mad definition takes you ablative conclusion that a wine wholesaler like my clients is a dealer that definition is as good as o c sixty six it's not a specific for one thing you know and it requires reading oh sixty six out of the statu well it doesn't require reading it out you know again why is this zero sixty six definition was there for the reasons that were vetoed so that even if there isn't a dealership lawsuit there would be certain consequences to transfer of than the legislative find it but he didn't veto because he couldn't do it i'm sure he would have loved to find a way to work his way into old two three b and get the wind dealers out of there too but he couldn't do it he and he approved he approved what dealer is it is a wholesaler as defined in one twenty five zero two one that's in the law who's granted a right to distribute intoxicating liquor if you go on a one twenty five zero to twenty one you see a definition that tells you what someone who sells at wholesale to retailers alcohol beverage use but there's a cross reference isn't there to point zero six six only on the it doesn't apply have please the court once the sausage is made that's what's on the menu and what's on the menu is what counts here put another way legislative history dictionary definitions don't create and you're trying your wasn't to his great credit talking about too much of the legislative history other than the fact that it's very plain that this came about because of the governor's line item veto but the what do you do especially if you're a federal court when there are two arguably contradictory definitions of the same critical term in a statute what you do is what the district court in just a magistrate jones did as you look at the definition of what we're here about and that is an intoxicating liquor and what better place to find a definition of intoxicating liquor in the statute than under the very definition in point six six which says it means minus wine ye t it doesn't say for what purpose right you would have an absolutely compelling argument if it said for the purpose of this chapter chapter one thirty five it means intoxicating liquor much more but it doesn't say that's the critical ambiguity is it for the purpose of the whole chapter or is it for the purpose of some sixty six well it doesn't tell us it in their way are and so what we have is the familiar  same term and this is a defined term there's no question about that it's it's the same term has the same meaning in the same statute you less there is some real evidence that it contrails who don't want to say same sta because we are dealing with three different statutes connected at three different two of the three are in the same chapter right but what you want is a rule that whatever definition there is in sixty six applies to the whole chapter correct and it doesn't say that and you can't get there by saying words in the same stature the neck at the same time must have the same meaning agree is is sort of the the hard liquor plus wine definition grace glee you know keeps beer out there i will say for interest odd reasons not actually because they don't care as intoxicating  but then one thirty five point zero six six says intoxicating liquor it has a meaning and one twenty five zero two eight minus why and so you don't know reading those which is going to apply to which aspect of the regulation well if we if we go back to the the definition of dealership in zero zero two that that defines a dealership and it uses the term intoxicating liquor and at the end when that was when the governor got out his his his pen that originally he had the reference to one twenty five he struck there so when you look at that in tandem with what the governor did you know sixty six so so your argument has to be ok for dealerships at least i don't know for what else you know but for dealerships his act this does require by the way a little bit of legislative history so you can play that game but the deletion of one twenty five zero two eight and the residual one thirty five zero two zero six six two  right leaves you with the narrow definition in wisconsin by the way grocery stores distribute you know can they sell wine can they sell beer can they sell hard liquors are seven eleven serve it is an element resident i have to plead ignorance on that so i mean sometimes well you know and states do it all sorts of ways that i'm just wondering i don't know whether there's some why didn't we do know what he did and that is he struck the reference to one twenty five you know old you know two there's no question about that so that not the definition of the toxic eating liquor is is is there  without any kind of limitation or restriction in the only definition in the chapter is what you find in all sixty six and that's an ambiguous minus wife and so wh we think about legislative history here what counts really is what the governor has a cold a co equal or what the wisconsin supreme court has described as a  legislative or did in one nine hundred ninety nine is not what the you know the original statute was but it's what the the governor eventual idiot that's going to look at any kind of legislative history that's what we should look at in there it's a mistake bill he created a new definition minus wind in zero six two six and he struck the the reference you know two to one twenty five so we can talk all about one twenty five and how it had its own definition that's not that's not what the governor did here and under the wisconsin constitution he had every right to do that is the wisconsin supreme court is described in pieces such as thompson wisconsin senate versus thompson which we we cite in our brief they do say so oh sixty six in general is the one that's untitled intoxicating litter liquor dealerships right so it addresses the dealership the do you know to refers to there's a list of definitions dealerships there it has the term intoxicating liquor now but the title of one thirty five point zero sixty six is what the it says definitions under sub two and that it says intoxicating liquors means a pop up minus not the title of the whole sign it is intoxicating liquor dealerships interact sicking liquor dealerships and that's the problem is that the governor vetoed it centrally everything having to do with intoxicating liquor dealerships leaving the legislative findings in sub one and the definition definition in sub two and a statement of non applicability in shop five the governor the governor is the wisconsin supreme court has said he has the constitutional power and when the wisconsin supreme court is described that is broader maybe it's the broadest of any governor in this in that there is so broad and there was once a lawsuit filed contending that as a result of that our wisconsin does not have a republican form of government we held that that was not just issue and and in in this in this case we have we have the wisconsin supreme court reinforcing the idea that what the governor can do is in the words of the wisconsin supreme court disassemble what the legislature has assembled and that's what the governor did he took a deaf way to understand that the question is what do you believe on the floor i mean you know he took he took a lot of part we can see that but if you left enough for this court to make a decision about whether wind dealerships are in the stay category under the fair deal or act and that's  common is if we can say there are not you know the only way you can prove the line dealership is a dealership for the statute is community of interest that would be another outcome or maybe you'd like to say a word about the possibility of our certifying which had certainly crossed my mind as well well let me address the first question your honor the what remains i mean we all when we look at all sixty six he took a very broad sweep with that the language he left in one thirty five point zero six six two applies to and just sit reach back into the rest of the statute now you've made the words mean the same thing everywhere argument and you want to start with those sixty six too and maybe there are reasons one would do that but you know we need to hear them and we need to and here's and just to come back to the idea that not only should we look at what he did in all sixty six we should we have to look at what  know to wind was in him in the bill that the legislature passed and it's important to remember that when it came to o'toole he struck the reference to one twenty five meaning that wind came out when the governor was done with his pencil on oath to that's that's how this all fits together and why intoxicating liquor that has any meaning has to have the meaning that the governor gave it when he when he did those two things and i also want to address your honor's question about certification that's obviously come to our mind as well if this was an issue about the governor's authority under the wisconsin constitution that might be something but the distributors have said from the beginning this is a matter of statutory interpretation we'll take them at their word on that  interpret state laws all the time we do but not authoritatively and the wisconsin supreme court certainly has i would think within its power the ability to take these conflicting arguments decide which method of statutory interpretation it prefers to use and how it comes out you can mean there can't be a question that that was constant supreme court could result of course i'm sure all now but you know in terms of where we are today i think you know both sides have been at this for two years i think we both like the final judicial determination of this and i would just come back to the the the principle that federal courts decide state law issues even state all the issues that are on settled and and i would just also reinforce that this is not an that there's never been a challenge to the governor's constitutional authority under the wisconsin constitution which would be a more compelling reason to certify it as opposed to simply  how should we interpret this is a matter of statutory interpretation and so let's the court has any further questions apparently not so we would ask that the district court's judgment and grocery stores and seven eleven's and wisconsin ok these are important issues i remember in law school in bloomington indiana drive to illinois to get beer on sunday because you couldn't do that in indiana so these are issues of at the time i think you three b he said he struck out the reference to chapter one twenty five he struck out one of the references to jeopardy one twenty five but he didn't strike out the meaningful one from my point of view which is who is a dealer well it's a wholesaler as defined in one twenty five zero to twenty one i didn't do that because he wanted hard liquor dealers to have the protection of the dealership statute and i don't know why but that's what he laughed and so that's my that's where i start with a definition that's in your right into chapter one twenty five to tell lines i think it does meet the criteria and that's probably certainly the last we're not challenging the governor's veto power we're just challenging what he did and everybody my friend in particular focuses on what the governor's intent was his intent is no more relevant than any legislators and ted he is not you know the third house of the legislature he's got something he can do and then he's done but he has to do it in a negative way he can't add language he would love to have you