testing one two one two three going to reverse the order of the witnesses because in all fairness i would like the federal witnesses to be able to respond to what i think is now the second handle so  of the drew company and aaron mccann a district resident if they would take the witness stand and after their testimony is daily brief  the agencies will have a sense of one of the reasons we have found it necessary to have this hearing to welcome all of you for today's hearing especially our distinguished panel i call this hearing as chair of this subcommittee and a member of the transportation and infrastructure committee however i also sit on the homeland security committee and i represent the high target nation's capital my committee work puts me in touch with the nation's security needs at the highest levels of this work and our experience since the oklahoma city bombing leave no doubt that the complexities of risk based security in an open society continue to elude us federal building security has little to do with risk based threats today the general accounting office was recently able to get bomb making equipment past security at several federal buildings in this national capital region where much of the new security has been focused because of nine eleven at the same time taxpaying citizens are unable to enter some buildings to use the restrooms facilities the security in federal buildings is not uniform where it should be and sadly not professional or even appropriately in the hands of the department of homeland security and the battle protective service non security personnel control much of the security for many agencies i introduced h r as i introduced h three five five five united states commission on an open society would security act on the eighth anniversary of nine eleven this month as an increasing variety of security measures have liberated throughout the country without any expert or uniform guidance on evaluating risks through security and without much thought about the effect on common freedoms and citizen access federal facilities where millions of federal employees work and citizens come to service have been the chosen target for major terrorist attacks on our country after the attacks on the pentagon and the a are oklahoma city federal building terrorists have left no doubt that federal facilities assembles of the united states government are their chosen targets consequently this documented pattern of terrors assaults on federal assets and consistent threats since nine eleven with arrests made even this very we have required continuing high levels of vigilance to protect both federal employees and the visitors who use that all facilities when the department of homeland security was formed in two thousand and two the federal protective service or f p s charged with protecting federal sites was transferred from the general services administration to the newly created department and placed within the immigration and customs enforcement or ice although the committee supported the transfer we insisted that f p s officers and guards be used exclusively by the f t s to continue the necessary protection of federal sites and those who work and use them however starting in february two thousand five a chairman and i've had a series have had to send a series of letters to d h s and this subcommittee is held hearings questioning the placement of f b i s with an ice inappropriate use of funds and make shift major shift from projection to inspection these concerns have strong bipartisan support with both chairman oberstar and miking member mi h expressing their own views about the gravity of the f p s situation now comes the g a o report to confirm that the f b i s nation's first federal police force established in seventeen nineteen and its contract guard force had been rocked by an adequate funding staffing and framing that cast doubt on its ability to carry out its core mission to protect facilities to complete  building security assessments in a timely and professional manner the manner and to monitor and oversee contract god g a o reports honestly that put proactive patrols have been eliminated and many g s facilities in spite of the fact that i'm here i'm quoting g a o multiple governmental entities acknowledge the importance of  proactive patrol in detecting and preventing criminal incidents and terrorist related activities and quote given the radical changes that f b i s at odds with it statutory mandate who can be surprised that today the g a o will testify concerning how g a o testers were able to get bomb making equipment past security at several federal agencies at the same time taxpayers are unable to enter some federal buildings without escorts or other obstacles to the access to which they are entitled surely we are smart enough to keep terrorists out without making it version impossible for us taxpaying citizens to get into federal buildings risk based security will be impossible as long as the requirements are set by a hodgepodge group who can choose their own security requirements without regard to evaluated risks and the big picture  concerns of each and every region what passes for security today lacks the needed consistency rationality and accountability outside the particular agency non security personnel are setting the agenda and calling the shots building by building we can do better but only if we recognize and then come to grips with the complexities associated with maintaining a society of free and open access in a world characterized by unprecedented all expected additional and increased security adequate to protect citizens against this frightening threat however the american people also  expect government their government to undertake this awesome new responsibility without depriving them of their personal liberty the place to began is with a high level presidential commission of experts with a broad spectrum from a broad spectrum of relevant disciplines not military and security experts alone who can help chart the new course that will be required to protect our people and our precious democratic institutions and traditions at the same time something we have never had to do before and something we do not yet know how to do when we have faced precedented and perplexing issues in the past we have had the good sense to investigate them deeply in order to resolve them exact examples include the national committee to mission on terror as attacks upon the united states also known as the nine eleven commission and the current a commission that investigated the uprising that swept american cities in the one nine hundred sixty s and seventy's the important difference in my bill is that the commission would seek to act before a crisis level erosion of basic freedoms takes hold and becomes infringed because global terrorism is likely to be long lasting we cannot afford to allow the proliferation of security that does not require and is not subject to  expert oversight or analysis of technological advances and other alternatives that can do the security job as well and without the severe r ations on freedom and on commerce following today's hearing i intend to move h r three five five five to help us find the necessary balance about establishing a presidential commission of experts from a broad spectrum of disciplines to investigate the threshold question of how to maintain democratic traditions of openness and access who are responding adequately to continuing substantial security threats posed by global terrorism the need for a high level commission is imperative to look at issues from makeshift security and make work from a makeshift security and make work security such as checkpoints that oppose in the streets even when there are no alerts to the use of on the shelf technology without regard to effects on privacy and openness we are open to all suggestions and recommendations conflict concerning what we also do not yet know and do not yet fully understand and that of course is the still developing work of keeping us safe and open we have confidence that our people and those in federal agencies can do both keep us open and keep us safe we have tackled and mastered strong contrasts before we will listen carefully to how the agency officials plan to balance city bombings and the nine eleven terrorist attacks demonstrated that the federal buildings clearly are huge targets for anybody who's out there trying to harm the united states and our interests and the recent arrests in that terror services from t s a to homeland security and the intention was to improve securing our nation's federal buildings and facilities however despite the importance of security the g a o has found that serious serious problems continue to persist in recent years the g a o has conducted a number of investigations and reviews of the security in our federal buildings unfortunately investigations revealed very significant vulnerabilities use risk management approaches to link threats and vulnerabilities to resource requirements raising obviously questions as to whether resources are used as efficiently and effectively as possible the potential w obviously result in these issues is critical to protecting the people that work in those facilities those of visit the facilities those terrorists whatever and that's obviously essential to ensuring security policies the building opened in one thousand nine hundred eight we are proud to work with g s a who is the owner of the building and some of you know after the pentagon we had a law just federal building three point one million square feet  in washington d c and the largest in the country no one knows better than you madam chairman that when the reagan building was created it was created with a unique congressional mandate that it was to function as an excuse building one of the main functions including that mandate is a trade promotion program that we are going to ice to create to create enhance opportunities for american trade and commerce its t c m is responsibility to support usa in the implementation of this mandate specifically our responsibility is limited to the international trade center fortune of the building which consists the public spaces both inside and outside of the want to reagan building so often we see international trip was of over five members a team operates the international trade center with a diverse workforce and passionate workforce of over five hundred fifty full and full and part time staff members we are proud to say that the reagan building is now washington's busiest conference and special event location we produc provide a wide range of services to over one thousand meetings and events each year and we welcome over one million visitors to our facilities meetings in advance diverse in range from the recent u s china economic recovery dialogue that president obama and secretary of state clinton and treasury secretary geithner organized this july to something that's taking place this weekend which is a wedding that's taking place this weekend which has been organized by us magazine and the wedding channel so it's a wide variety of activities that are taking place within the building in addition we operate d c s largest parking garage within the building and that accommodates nearly two thousand vehicles this includes hundreds of cars each day that are visiting the reagan building for conferences are attending meetings at federal agencies who are driven by people who are touring the city we also produce a number of activation projects that help the building fulfill its mission of connecting the central business district with the national mall in particular we host live on woodrow wilson plaza which is a free summertime concert series enjoyed this year by over seventy five thousand people it's worth mentioning that in order to fill the mission of the building into foster trade we also staff and we have a staff devoted to organizing in promoting upwards to one hundred fifty trade related events to take place within the building we have a diverse tenant mix within the building  public food court is has twenty vendors it serves as a cafeteria for our federal workforce in the building it also hosts hundreds of thousands of visitors each year many of these visitors are schoolchildren were on august who is washington the university of maryland has its business school located in d c in the building international affairs office as a multinational companies are within the building with foreign trade businesses within the building but not for profit organizations within the space  also international trade consultants occupying space now that you know more about the facility my testimony is happening focused on the building security and how it is created and sustained my remarks are limited to the security environment for the public spaces in the building the security is provided by the pop and homeland security through the federal protective service using federal police offices in a contract god force during normal business hours the reagan building has a pass perimeter security stations at seven different street entrances including an entrance at the federal triangle metro station the stations all have x ray and magnetometers and everyone in terrain the premises is required to present a picture id to a uniform guard some entrances are open around the clock in addition all vehicles entering the reagan building screened using technical means for detecting explosive devices in addition every trunk in congo space is inspected by guards we also get a large number of trucks delivering daily to the day they can daily deliveries to us into our food court restaurants catering kitchens and to support events at the conference center also many trucks come to service federal tenants one hundred percent of the larger vehicles now scanned it using a drive through x ray machine operated offsite a few blocks from the reagan building it's operated by f p twenty thousand trucks were inspected through the remote screening location in addition to the human and technical security barriers we also have canine officers present on site for random checks in response to any issue in a response to any issues that may arise as i said this is just the security apparatus for the public space the federal office towers have their own separate security stations and proceed just turning back to the public space international trade cent security was increased after nine eleven perimeter security was installed up until then all sixty one doors to the public space were open inaccessible with no perimeter security after nine eleven the message the measures i described above were implemented initially we feel that this comprehensive perimeter screening would prove to be an impediment to our conference at a gas tourist visitors as it's turned out everyone seems to have understood the need for heightened that th e risk of heightened of heightened risk and now i think believe that actually a perimeter security is applies or the aspect for the reagan building because this generally positive view of security in the building is made possible because a significant resources and coordination committed by g s a f p s in ourselves to make it happen we've developed a terrific working relationship at the at the at the building level in a mutual understanding the security comes first but the business of government in the ronald reagan building has to continue we all firmly believe that the building must be open to the public through this cooperation we have held over ten thousand secured events would literally millions of visitors have developed a strong institutional knowledge that allows everyone to work and function together as working partnership at the reagan building between homeland security g s a and with the support of iraq and sation literally continues to grow at all times and every day we have established protocols for the visits by the president united states working with the secret service we have also we're also ready for weekly visit his visits by foreign dignitaries to both the federal space and to the international trade center this is coordinated with the bureau of diplomatic security the reagan building also stands ready for bus loads of schoolchildren who come daily to the food court and see the birth alone berlin wall that we have on display within the building every visitor coordination communication and cooperation we have regular weekly and monthly meetings that take place between the federal tenants in the foot in the reagan building security staff that meet and talk about security issues in follow through on any updated procedures in other issues members of our own staff take place in a weekly number of our own staff participate in a weekly security meeting with the building security to describe all upcoming events we look twenty one days out into the future and we talk about every event that's coming in within the next those twenty one days each event is talked about it so i'm going to ised and then we coordinate each event in is for additional gods deliveries request mccain a canine after our screeners and we coordinate all the ip parking this is just to name a few of security related requests that we get daily that have to be addressed in this requires constant communication and coordination and conclusion i think it is worthwhile reiterating that all parties involved recognize that the safety of everyone who works so visits the reagan building demands and deserves ideally attention all parties involved seek practical solutions to maintain a level of security while ensuring that the safety of both the tenants and the guests pursuing the mission of the ronald reagan building to keep it open inaccessible chairwoman norton members of the subcommittee of the opportunity to speak to you today have a short statement and i'll be happy to answer your questions my name is erin mccann and i'm an amateur photographer i'm also an active member in a group of in a group called d c photo rights which exist to document and discuss incentives in which the tigers have been harassed by security officers or police in april i became aware of a series of incidents at the department of transportation headquarters in southeast d c during which security guards had stopped members of the public from taking pictures of the building referred written into a forum on the washington post website asking a columnist for help and word of the incident spread throughout the d c photography community others share their own similar incidents and many headed to the building to see for themselves what happened when they took their cameras out what we documented since then is a series of incidents going back at least until two thousand and seven during which security officers a stop to talk refers to doing nothing more sinister than holding a camera on d o t pa property i've attached the details of some of these incidents including my own it's important to note that this list is not exhaustive for every incident someone shared another photographer would chime in with agreement and say yes that happened to me there are too many of the officers a polite but they are firm in their belief that photography of the department of transportation or any other federal building is illegal others secure their names refuse to provide contact information for supervisors threaten confiscate cameras and issue contradictory orders when questioned my own experience started on may twentieth i phoned the d o t security office  referred my call to a supervisor when that supervisor failed to call me back by the end of the day i decided to go to the building to see for myself what would happen soon i was standing in the lobby waiting for a supervisor lieutenant butler who after taking on the details from my driver's license made the following points t seems especially zealous among federal departments and systematically training its guards to harass photographers with and about their said that made him proud he said he is doing it right and everybody else is doing it wrong lieutenant butler conceded that most of the people to photographs of his building are harmless the number he suggested was ninety percent if i lived in the version of washington were ten percent of the people carrying around cameras are terrorists i would never leave home with temperature set as employees are trained to intercept all photographers collect their contact information and forbid them from taking any more photographs of the building this rules an invasive attempt to collect personal data from law abiding citizens thankfully the security team often fails to collect such data from the people that it stops after this conversation i had to contact the american civil liberties union of the national capital area were sent a letter to the d o t general counsel's office on may twenty seventh asking for an explanation of attach that letter to my testimony it took three months for the apartment transportation to respond to apologize for my incident and they said the guard was in error they made no mention of the pattern of documented harassment and there was no indication that any guards would be retrained and their systematic harassment of anybody with a camera by way of defending their attitude toward photographers the d o t response included a two thousand and four homeland security bulletin regarding photography of federal buildings it is a flawed document claiming that quote a widely known or constant activity of criminal and terrorist organizations has been to gather photographic information about perspective targets in the age of google maps and freely available satellite images the idea that someone intending to harm a building needs first to conduct his own photographic work on a sense is laughable it's also an embarrassing waste of everybody's time the duty is not unique and regarding photographers with suspicion all around the city and the country courthouses train stations and federal office buildings have been deemed off limits to people with cameras they do so under the mistaken belief that taking pictures in public places is illegal or requires a permit or is an indication that the person holding the camera is somehow a threat in many cases people have been detained handcuffed and arrested for failing to move along when the guard tells them to is my belief that the time and energy spent questioning every camera toting tourist could and should be put to more constructive use thank you thank you mccain i'd like to question both of you i miss mccain i can only say to you that as a person who practice constitutional law i've seldom in the years i've been in congress heard testimony that if true it would amount to a violation of the constitution of the united states subject to a temporary restraining order if the federal government had been sued the notion that federal officers would restrain american citizen from exercising their right to express themselves and public including taking of photographs is on its face unconstitutional i say that without fear of contradiction and let me tell you it's seldom that a careful lawyer would say something as openly as that i say it also  who have had this to occur will try to get to the bottom of it i don't want to say particularly since you've been dealing with people wrongly hollowing orders what your testimony  illustrates is responsibility at a far higher level than that they are people who simply been told make sure that you help us protect this building it is the absence of high level guidance even cabinet officials that results in people doing whatever they curse to them they who have no truly expert terrorist security background whatever kirstin them bearing in mind that we are making it up as we go along eight years after nine eleven it's time to try to be more professional  that let me go to mr mr drew first mr mr dry listen indeed you've been invited here because we are also going to hear from those who control the other side of the ronald reagan building this time we're not dealing building to building contrasts as we see throughout the region where you do not know and where there is absolutely no consistency building to building here we have a real test case with in the same facility highly secured facility at that on the one hand with the federal agencies and then on the other hand i can tell you because as i  congress this was part of the first work i did was to say to the ronald reagan building a pay for yourself run it like a private enterprise get as many hours i was cheered to hear there be weddings there as many different kind of people who can pay the price in and by the way also to insist as we did that this had to be a trade facility and not an ordinary office building so you will get pretty highly placed foreign officials who were we are able to protect them would embarrass the united states of america very severely so because you have got a private facility as part of a large landmark public facility and at the time the largest since the pentagon  let me therefore ask you a set of questions i was particularly interested to hear you talk about the parking garage who may enter that what kinds of clientele into that private garage it's open to the public so that means federal workers on the one hand and people are coming for events on the other yes now if people are coming for an event there's a premium put on making sure they get there in time for the event to take place how are you able to accomplish that if you are while keeping the building secure for yes i'm sorry the way it's done in our case is that our people who are involved in sales and events make it known to anyone who's attending events are running events at the building that we're in a secure building and we describe the security and when they are contracting for the building exactly so it's part of it really is part of that is part of the communication that we have with someone who's going to be using the building and so they're aware of it before they ever  yes we hope they make the guest aware of it before would they ever come to the building the protocol that i described the f b i s put together about checking the vehicles and examining the trunks and looking at marysville all the vehicles has been established in put in place after nine eleven and it's followed for every vehicle that's coming into the building so people know that they will be that this will take place but it makes it it does mean that they leave extra time but we also explain that quite frankly that once you're in the building you're in you're also in a protected environment and that we turn into a as much a positive as possible in our case i think the secret is day to day and week to week working relationship where there is c  we've learned by literally working together since nine eleven how to in fact brief one another i think very thoroughly we also in those weekly meetings look at the past week's experience of the past ten days experience and we talk about events that have taken place and so if there's any learnings that we have from what we did last week we're sharing those learnings so it makes it makes i think for a very collaborative operation and in to give credit to the the team that we have we pay particular attention we as a staff pay particular attention the fact that we're part of the security operation to our people keep their eyes open keep their is open and if there's anything that they think is unusual they make it known to to the security team by subversive that we work with the security team on is trying to see in their policing in and security function how we can introduce some hospitality there so that people have moved quickly but but the work has been thoroughly and have people understand for example if we have a lot of people coming six and seven tonight we expect to have so many hundreds of people that might be coming in the entrances that they'll be using have you been able to describe how others came out as well did they come together with their cameras or were they testers also one at a time mostly time the deal with the d o t headquarters building is that it's right next to the national stadium and people cut through next to the building on their way to baseball games so there are certain nights where there are massive numbers of people walking by many of them carrying cameras happen so there's no consistency on when you can or not based on the time of day or any of the rest of it in my experience it depends on what cards are working and that's that's kind of the way it works that a lot of other federal buildings i had a friend who was sold in front of the justice building that he couldn't photograph in front of that building but that was a one time incident he went back the next night and a different guard was working and didn't stop him and that no one told you about a policy or or cited to you a policy cited your document or cited to a law that govern their discretion the guard that i spoke with lieutenant butler cited title eighteen of the us code which i believe is the entire u s criminal code i believe you are and that was the best that he could give me and again i stress that he's only doing the best he can and i also stress that i think the agency heads are only doing the best they can there  is no central authority that consistently advises agencies or guides them so that while you see some of this is laughable it all comes back to the federal government which is why this hearing is being held not because we think any food know what to do on contrary if you don't know what to do then make it up so that you project as much as you can i want to ask the ranking member if you have any question very secure and security and let me just say mr you that i'm looking at what you're doing because i think what you are doing is instructive for the very large private sector in this city and in the nation equally uninformed and without guidance are the far greater number of private facility owners and they've been out there doing catch catch can they can call upon the government they have to do whatever they can they'd like you have a bottom line which is we better be open to people or else we stop commerce in our building and in our jurisdiction but one of the reasons that i want a presidential commission or some high level commission frankly is not simply to guide federal officials but because i don't think there's a lot of difference and i think you show it between the private and public sectors most public agencies are pretty low level targets quiet as it's kept for terrorists and yet many of them i would say in their hubris but i think in the over there abundance of caution regard themselves as susceptible to morrow so my question becomes you've got one building conceivably you could have something happen in public or private side and then it's everybody has a that we have responsibilities for the garage now those responsibilities are in providing service in the garage so we manage we manage you when you come to the garage collect your money parked help you park your car all of those things get your car back in and we have you been given guidelines  program and i think a pretty thorough program established where every vehicle is inspected if you have if you're a tenant in a building if you have an i d you can show your id you can proceed into the garage if you're if you're a tourist service or a car building you in fact show your driver's license but then your car is inspected your trunk is opened cargo space is inspected in addition there's america put below your car so the see if the car is also say and then they have a way of checking the car for explosives which i can explain to you about a few but the but they have a technique set up there with a white car to make sure that there's no explosives around that car before they let you proceed into the any large truck cannot command to the garage or commence a loading dock unless it's gone through the offsite x ray system that interests me very much do you know whether or not there are other buildings federal buildings that if someone went out into that large beautiful courtyard by the ronald reagan building and decided to take lunch we have a concert going on for a concert going on there today there are many people out there were cameras and they're taking pictures of the concert as well as i was in the building have you had complaints from members of the public about how how tough it is to get into the building once in a while but again i think we defend we take those on directly and quite honestly we're not a for the security we really explain why the security is beneficial to them if they come into the building and beneficial to us backed up every you have found yourself with the cars backed out into pennsylvania avenue trying to get in once in a while but i'll give you opposite of that we've had some advance where there's been a lot of trucks bringing in exhibits for example that are going to be displayed within the building and the f b i says work with us to keep the used dogs and canines to on trucks that are coming in after hours as a way of expediting people coming in out of the building you know i must say it's a work and it's a it's a it's a work every day that's in progress and i think every you had a mandate to hold events there and was there a great deal of friction among you lost on this matter i must tell you that first of all because of the legislation because of the work that you did and others particular did in creating the reagan building we in particular g s a had they stood by us and then once we said no the building has to be kept open to the public it became a question of how to do it not and then i think the mines all got together in the corporation began and we had some stumbles i mean we we work together i think have helped each other out and we've learned as i said on a daily basis how to do it better and i don't know if we are doing it to anyone's complete satisfaction but the private mandate you did what what we can only expect federal agencies to do now there is no template for this we have to create the template may have been to be open and flexible enough to do it rather slam on the brakes and close up the society miss mccain you gave testimony before us concerning the use of cameras at another monumental site the union station where we heard some of the same things you said about the d o t building first i have to ask you whether or not to send you testified in march of two thousand and eight  what appears to be the same things you are now finding in d o t guards stopping people from taking pictures no text or guidance to point to no training have you seen any measurable change in the policy at union station i walk through there every single day and i'm always looking for people with their cameras and i walk through every couple of weeks with my own camera and walk up stairs and downstairs just just to check because i'm i'm genuinely surprised that it hasn't reared up again but it's it's been consistently open regarding photography since we had the hearing last year but i have to give you and your testimony credit possession of the united states of america to private property we all got that done and i see whether or not people can take pictures pictures of what we want to take pictures of extraordinary new rendering of the historic union station and i i think the union station new also required new training for guards we had everybody before us including amtrak those who use the station in any way and we have seen that oversight does produce and we didn't have to do any new law we didn't have to do any new regulation that oversight has been enough to get changes and one monumental side without a lot of oversight on this issue we have done oversight on ronald reagan building we see that the agencies using the statute have figured out how to do it i'd say that the federal agencies have lacked that oversight and even as i have been very critical the buck stops right here right in the congress and right with the agencies who have some oversight including department of homeland security  including our own transportation agency but we are cautioning agencies again that people sitting in congress are not always alert to difficulties until you bring it to our attention then the agency is in a much better position than to have people like ms mccain bring said mr mccann bring it to our attention and then we then have to say the agency how come you haven't done something about this  we sit here today to use your examples to help us who know least about this and to help the agencies across the united states and  find the balance and i alert you that in the region struck by nine eleven i can't afford to or against homeland security and i think you have chosen you have showed us that we need not choose to do that thank you very much will cause called a net the set of witnesses balart and members of the subcommittee on behalf of secretary ray la hood thank you for inviting us here to discuss the security practices and the policies for the department of transportation headquarters i'm pleased to say that the department transportation  enjoying its you headquarters building it's working out very well and we're excited to be part of the redevelopment that's occurring in the capital riverfront area of southeast washington there was a strong commitment by the department of transportation leadership at the time to provide a safe and secure environment for its employees and to comply with post nine eleven recommended security measures in the design and construction of the facility to mitigate risks the requirements for the d o t headquarters represented the government security consultant recommended industry practices and were reviewed adopted in collaboration with the federal protective service and the general services administration the d o t had border security requirements were developed consistent with the prevailing  inner agency security committee security design criteria the g s a policy guidance on fifty foot setbacks issued on april two thousand and two and a detailed risk assessment and analysis that was conducted specifically for the department that validated our requirements that the requirements were appropriate for cabinet agency with mission essential functions madam chair d o t learned well the lessons of oklahoma city and was directly affected by the loss of valued employees in that senseless act  violence prior to the oklahoma city by bombing in one thousand nine hundred five as you pointed out there were no government wide standards for security of federal facilities today in this this facility that is designed to the best available standards the department strives to not only provide a safe and secure environment for its employees but also to be a good neighbor our fifty nine hundred employees in the building support local businesses and i'm pleased to say the d o t has been recognized by the capitol riverfront business improvement district for our efforts to be a good neighbor we host a farmer's market open to all in the neighborhood every tuesday in season on wednesdays at lunchtime we host local musicians while vendors provide food and refreshments and the evening movies are shown behind  building for the benefit of neighborhood residents thursdays are open market days where local vendors can offer their wares and beyond those daily good neighbor activities we have also accommodated a plan special events like the district of columbia's presidential inaugural event which was held in the building in january the security practices and policies for the department transportation headquarters building conform to federal standards because of the new construction opportunity we've been able to integrate post nine eleven security measures that have greatly enhanced the security posture of the d o t headquarters building compared to many existing government facilities and we're grateful for that overall the security practices and policies for the department headquarters building our equivalent to other cabinet agency headquarters here in the district of columbia thank you for the opportunity to testify and i'll be happy to answer any questions federal protective services efforts to ensure the protection of over one million government employees as well as members of the public who are working visit the nation's nine thousand federal facilities there's not been a large scale attack on the domestic side a facility since the terrorist attacks of september eleventh hundred five bombing the murrah building in oklahoma city oklahoma nevertheless the recent shooting death of a guard at the u s holocaust memorial museum but not a federal facility demonstrates the continued vulnerability of public buildings domestic terrorist attack my testimony today discusses issues from completed g a o reports as well as ongoing work we are conducting to the subcommittee overall we have found that f p s faces a number of challenges that hamper the its ability to protect government employees and the public and federal facilities these challenges include developing a risk management framework developing a human capital plan and better oversight of its contract guard program a summary of our findings follows first as our july two thousand and eight at p s approach protecting federal facilities to not use a risk management approach that links threats and vulnerabilities to resource requirements while s p s has conducted risk risk without assessments such as building security assessments we've reported concerns with the quality and approach that f p s uses to conduct these assessments for is approach is not allowed to compare risks from building to building so that security improvements in buildings can be prioritized further complicating f p s is ability to protect that of facilities as the building security committee structure in some of the buildings and implement second not implemented because the building security committee members cannot agree on what countermeasures to implement or when we're unable to obtain funding from their agencies second as discussed in a recently released july two thousand and nine report the absence of a strategic human capital plan to guide its current and future workforce planning efforts is another significant challenge confronting f p s the agency has begun taking steps toward developing a workforce transition plans reflect its workforce reductions that had been required several years ago however in two thousand a f p s discontinued this plan because its objective was no longer relevant because of congressional mandate to increase its workforce at p s experience difficulties meeting this mandate in part because of challenges to shifting its priorities from downsizing the workforce to increasing it to comply with the mandate and delays in the candidate screening process additionally we found that f p s headquarters does not collect data and its workforce has knowledge skills and abilities consequently s p s cannot determine what its optimal staffing level should be or didn't a gaps in its workforce needs and or determine how to modify its workforce planning strategies to fill these caps third as we testified in july two thousand and nine congressional hearing f p s does not fully ensure that its contract guards have the training and certifications required to stand in addition f p s has limited assurance that its contractors and guards are complying with the terms of contract and post orders once they have deployed to a federal facility for example the components for an improvised explosive device concealed on their persons are investigators passed undetected through access as well as agencies such as the department of homeland security and the department of defense once our investigators pass the access control point this will be i e d from materials they were able to get past the guards we also noted that certs f p s is primary system for monitoring and verifying whether guards at the training and certification required to stand post at that level so it is as also enough to live reliable we were training and certification data for six hundred sixty three randomly selected guards in six of f p s eleven regions and found that sixty two percent of the guards were deployed to a pedophile so it had at least one expired firearm qualification background investigation domestic violence declaration or c p r first aid training certification without a domestic violence declaration place guards are not permitted to carry a firearm s requires almost all of its cards to carry such weapons finally while at the s s taken steps to improve its ability to better protect the saudis it is difficult to assess the impact of these actions because most of them occurred recently and have not been fully implement moreover there are a number of factors that will make implementing a sustaining these actions difficult first f c s is not about what controls to monitor and track whether it's regions or completing the new requirements second f p s is not modified any of it's one hundred twenty nine guard contracts to reflect these new requirements third f p s has not completed any work force analysis to determine if the current staff of one hundred thirty law enforcement security officers will be able to effectively complete the additional inspections and provide the x ray magnetometer training to fifteen thousand guards in addition to the current physical security and law enforcement responsibilities and while we are pleased that the new ramp system will modernize how f p s manages its mission we remain concerned about the accuracy and reliability the information will be entered into ramp including data from service where we have noted problems i'm sure this completes my statement that will answer any questions that you may have later thank you thank you mr goldstein robert pak commissioner of public building service here before thank you and for inviting us to have a statement questions i have a statement for the record i'm going to summarize it and invite you to ask questions we have no more important responsibility in g s a than safeguarding the one million federal tenants in our buildings and the people who come to visit it is a the most difficult responsibility to undertake because we have the responsibility both of safeguarding them and also of maintaining the freedoms that are the very reasons that our buildings in our government exists it's somewhat easier to secure a high security facility somewhere in the middle of nowhere put a huge fence around it say nobody can get in and authorize your guards to use deadly force to keep out intruders we are in the opposite position we want people to visit we want people to feel like these are their buildings it's a very tall order to say as an aside to ms mccann as a student in the one nine hundred set early one nine hundred seventy s working on a paper on government architecture i also tried to take a picture of a government facility in downtown washington and was thrown out by a guard so i had it's not just a new phenomenon and it's something that's been going on a long time i also thought it was totally illogical all their their national director when i came to g s a the last time it was eight months after the oklahoma city bombing and i spent a lot of time on security we were in the process of developing security standards and spending a lot of money on countermeasures  and we learned a lot over the five years after that that i was at g s a the events of september eleventh two thousand and one obviously increased the urgency of security measures in government and other facilities and there have been lots of changes since then i think mostly for the better the inner agency security committee which g s a scythes and i which we are the only agency with a primary real estate responsibility has in fact tightened its standards and attempted to make those standards more based on of the kind of agencies in the building the locations of buildings and the very structure of the things themselves i think there's still a lot of work to be done obviously since then the federal protective service has moved to homeland security and although we're no longer totally joined at the organizational help there is no less important a call on all of us for g s a and federal protective service to work together our job with the federal protective service and our customers the agencies who occupy our buildings is to balance the risk the resources we have available functioning in the buildings as government agencies and allowing in the public how are we doing with all of that i'd say as i said better than we have before i think there is a lot of work remaining to be done i will say that you've raised some important issues at the hearing today about whether there is consistency in the way we go about doing that among our agencies and so let me focus on that just for a brief moment it is very important that we have an overall framework in which we assess the vulnerability of our buildings and in which we assess the risks and balance those risks against the resources we have available it's also important to customize the security in our buildings because some agencies require more vulnerability some locations require more more vulnerability more or less more or less rather countermeasures against those vulnerabilities i have some questions about the way we've gone about it and i think they parallel yours i believe that in many cases the way in which the building security committees are organized and the authority the building security committees have now called facilities security committees have to assess their own countermeasures is perhaps misplaced i question will i one of the suggestions i would make is that at a higher level inside our government i believe we need to have a kind of a framework that will allow f p s and g s a to go to physic to go to the individual security committee and have an overlay in which we say we understand your concerns but we have experts who know how to do this kind of work and we are going to balance those kinds of concerns of us as tenants with the resources and the expertise that we have as security experts i'm i'll say again i'm brand new to the job it's my this is my first assessment of what's happening in our security business and i look forward to working with you to figure out a way to make those changes thank you mr peck jale director of physical planning division planning agency for the nation's capital and includes representatives from the department of interior department of defense general services administration the mayor of the district of columbia the council of the district of columbia united states house and senate committees with oversight responsibilities in the district and individuals appointed by the president of the united states and the mayor of the district of columbia i'm very pleased to have this opportunity to speak with you today about n c p sees role in trying to balance legitimate needs for physical security with the undesirable impacts to important public spaces in our nation's capital unlike other cities across the country as the seat of our federal government washington d c has a significant concentration of federal office buildings museums and national icons that warrant levels of protection the most typical invisible and visible form of physical security in the city is vehicle barriers located in our treasured public spaces these public spaces include sidewalks and building yards accommodate a vast range of uses and vied for mobility and enjoyment by the public however barriers sometimes detract from the sense of openness that is so important to our capital city in the national capital region and c p c is responsible for the oversight of all physical development proposals on federal land and as such has developed extensive first hand experience with the challenges  providing physical security in a city known around the world for its distinct public spaces our commission understands that access to our government as well as the important public spaces that define our nation's capital is worthy of our protection and c p c is concerned about continuing challenges a balancing security and accessibility over the past decade we have worked hard to minimize the impact that physical security measures have on the public spaces that define the city and represent our democratic values in response to the unsightly security features erected in washington d c after the tragic nine hundred ninety five bombing in oklahoma city and c p c prepared and adopted designing for security in the nation's capital released in two thousand and one this report identified an approach to designing future security features in washington that would reduce their impact on public spaces following nine eleven and c b c publish the national capital urban design and security plan in october of two thousand and two this plan provided physical guidance for the design of contextually sensitive physical security features appropriate for use in the monumental core of the city in our review capacity and c p c is regularly worked with applicant agencies over the past ten years to reduce the impact of proposed security improvements on the environment and public space for example and c p c was instrumental in guiding development of the landscape security solution on the washington monument grounds it is widely praised as successfully marrying landscape a man and improve security and most recently in two thousand and eight and c p c assembled a security task force to address the impacts that security projects were continuing to have both individually and cumulatively on the city's important public spaces the task force included members of our commission but also included participation from government agents from government security professionals including the department of homeland security and the united states secret service through this one year effort and c p c security task force reached several conclusions regarding the challenges of physical security but also developed alternatives to better balance the need for security with the value of providing and maintaining openness in the nation's capital the security taskforce found that one because the probability of any specific type of attack on a facility is so difficult to quantify the current determination of risk is based primarily on the vulnerability of the syllabi to the potential consequences of attack this approach to assessing risk often leads to proposals for extremely robust security solutions to that existing security standards may seem appropriate in cities with only a few facilities that need protection but these standards which are focused on increasing protection and physical standoff at individual facilities are more challenging in cities with many assets such as washington d c three because individual federal agencies are responsible for securing only their individual facilities area wide security improvements that could benefit the entire city or monumental corps are less likely to be identified and implemented and  for security proposals for individual buildings are often developed specifically to satisfy existing security standards not balancing improve security against other public or environmental impacts and c p c security task force determined that bringing together the views of planners designers security professionals federal land holding agencies and federal and local oversight agencies to guide the planning and development of future security improvements can help meet these challenges these groups need to work together to one prioritize security improvements at federal facilities to identify the most cost efficient way to address our most critical security  and three coordinate future security improvements to make sure that they address and respect the needs of federal local facilities in the city and finally for ensure that individual and cumulative impacts to public space public access and the environment are fully considered before implementing physical security projects in the future while it is important to make sure that we protect our nation's most valuable assets we must do so in a way that considers the impacts of our actions and which does not unduly harm the public spaces or the public access to our government thank you for inviting me to share and see p c s perspective on the challenging work to balance the need for improved physical security with the potential impacts that physical security projects have on public spaces and access to our government would be happy to answer any questions following the panel thank you mister next we'll hear from gary shank old director of federal protective service which is a part of the s immigration and customs enforcement mr chairman norton thank you for this opportunity to appear before you today to discuss at p s nation risk based security and federal buildings as well as describing the steps we have taken to address the concerns raised by the government accountability office as you know to serve customer agencies and federal facilities p s most effectively balance the need for security with the need for ready public access to government services this means that f p s in conjunction with the agencies that occupy the facilities must provide security solutions and ensure a safe and secure environment and do not deter people from conducting regular business  comprehensive physical security operations and security systems alarms x rays magnetometers and control systems monitors those systems twenty four hours a day seven days a week and provides uniform police response investigat follow up provision of contract security guard services crime prevention seminars tailored to individual agency employee needs to fill the security surveys integrated intelligence gathering and sharing and special operations capabilities are all part of the broader mission upon my arrival in two thousand and seven it was apparent f p s was experiencing some challenges the agency transferred from g s a to in two thousand and three with a full time equivalent workforce of over fourteen hundred spread across the country in eleven different regions and i saw that f p s needed to focus on becoming a single standardized organization this required a new operational construct and new business practices however f p s simultaneously face budget constraints due in part to poor financial and contract management as well as the collection requested in the president's f y two thousand aid budget that supported fewer personnel than we had on board and were and we were  that were on board and at the time when the budget was sent to congress to avoid having to reduce the numbers of federal employees at p s ought to realize savings in other areas consequently many programatic elements such as training and equipment purchases had contract security guards and managing over one hundred fifty contracts during this period carefully assessed as organization and made difficult decisions this refocusing effort culminated in the development of the strategic plan to shape future activities s p s now focus on critical issues within its protective mission and is developing a sound strategic path forward focused on facilities security and the safety of the occupants and of the visitors who visit those facilities with respect to the g a o report released in july we took many steps to improve the visitor and employees screening process at federal facilities including improved training of contract guards and oversight of those guards in addition i believe that more work is needed to improve the training of contract guards an additional study is required to determine whether contract guards are maintaining constant vigilance to that end f t s is taking steps to bolster training and performance increase oversight and supervision and create a more uniform protective system after reviewing the problems identified by the g a o i believe that the steps we have taken will redress these problems and the proposed future steps will ensure the improved protection of nearly nine thousand g s a o facilities protected by the f p s workforce and our contract guards i think it is important to note that f p s has limited authority with regard to the nine thousand or so facilities of projects although responsible for securing the facilities f p s cannot set standards or require a particular facility to have the best available security equipment instead building tenants make those decisions each building's facility security committee or fs he makes the final determination on the facilities security leadership role in the effort to strike the right balance between security and access to our federal buildings and look forward to working with you in this subcommittee on addressing those challenges i want to express to you my personal sense of urgency and commitment to the importan responsibility i share with the men and women of the federal protective service in keeping our nation safe i can tell you that as our secretary and apologia know innocence secretary morton are dedicated determined and committed to developing implementing and maintaining the highest level of physical security to ensure that the facilities they are charged with protecting are secure and their occupants are safe i thank you again chairwoman norton for holding this important oversight hearing i'll be pleased to answer any the regional director for the national capital region of the f t s mr moses chairwoman norton thank you for them to appear before you today occurring to serve as a regional director of the national capital region federal protective service i was appointed to this position in september two thousand and eight and i have served in the federal protective service for fourteen years as part of my responsibility as a director the region wide infrastructure as the ronald reagan building and international trade center and brasco ave complex directors has provided the subcommittee with a written statement on behalf of the federal protective service i will forgo making a formal statement at this time but would be happy to answer any questions thank you authority provided by the department of homeland security the federal protective service to the secretary of transportation is solely responsible without limitation for protecting the deal he should be delegated authority to agencies to set up security agencies like the department of transportation you don't have a smidgen of expertise on security of the kind we're talking about here should that be the practice i'm not asking you i know you were in there most of you at this table one day and that's why i'm looking less for apollodorus than i am for people who want to take on this unprecedented activity with me but i'm asking as a matter of of  expertise and security my short answer is no the you know for twenty years we have delegated the management of  major federal headquarters buildings mostly in washington to the agencies and i said and i know i can understand certain kinds of management notions being delegated so no i accept that we're not trying to you know and i just want to live everything we're talking i said on the homeland security committee and they've sent from the world and homeland security in order to protect us so accept what you're saying go ahead correct and i said what i was going to say is i just suspect that  since when that program first came in i think building security was considered an aspect of building management that's probably been the way delegations have happened whether we should what i'm telling you now is i think that we should reconsider whether that's a part of a delegation to an agency what what is important of course is that we consult with the agencies because all of the agencies can know how they actually use a building and what they need and what kind of visitors they have and what requirements they have on deliveries and loading and all those things but again as i suggested in my testimony and i think you'll hear from director shingles also that the balance of response to a decision making about security in buildings is probably something that we ought to move back to a little bit more to maybe even a lot more toward those who have the security expertise mr goldstein you who are an expert from the g a o where should the responsibility lie should be with the h h s should it be with the department of education should it be with the department of transportation or is there some authority that is specialized enough within the federal government to advise agencies in consultation with them about our security for millions of americans and federal employees were not looked at the question specifically but i would have to say in the work that we've done examining s p s and  homeland security and some other agencies as well it seems to us that some greater centralization as you say with consultation is probably useful at this point in time the whole building security committee apparatus the way in which risk management approach to as well does not provide an avenue for g s a and f p s to look at the entire portfolio of federal buildings and determine where the risks truly lie and how to protect them in a risk  and we think that if some have higher level security than others it's not because they are more important it's because terrorists and other prominent access to those buildings more often than others that's correct and one of the issues there is that the federal protective service historically has not had great access to threat information and also does not have terribly useful crime statistics coming out of its own mega centers to help determine where those greater risks need to get i'm sorry have not always understand you sure the two points i was making one is the federal protective service has not always had great access to threat information from the joint terrorism task force you mean they're part of the   and security that's correct overgaard not in the conduct of our audits over the last couple years we had many f p s officers and officials out in the regions tell us with their access to joint terrorism task force information do you need very to joint terrorism task force information to do what was done at the ronald reagan building by the private sector working with the f p s i can't answer that question and what i what i what i'm suggesting is a rhetorical question  they do lack significant information that they would need to develop a better risk based model and i question that mr goldstein i really question that because we gave very detailed questions to the witnesses that preceded you and they didn't any more have expertise and background than the f p s before for that matter oklahoma city nobody knew how to do this but they were given a mandate by statute and that was to make this building private to the greatest degree possible and have p s you better make sure that the public part of it  safe and secure as need be and i guess i should ask if anyone else at the table thinks that that there has been difficult to figure that out without access to the highest level information because next thing we're to hear mr goldstein is unless we know all the threat information that the secretary knows don't expect us to be able to guard these buildings in the way you want but i mean you all didn't have that at ronald reagan and yet you've got a million visitors common to ronald reagan and highest profile building outside of the capitol and the however is that the ron reagan building we assume is a very high risk target and we've had protocols develop with the secret service whether f p s has access to the information now or not that i don't know i know they did have trouble  have to if it's in consultation with people who do have access and they are acting reasonably that is correct that is correct and on the ronald reagan building since we assume it's very high risk we assume that we need a very high level and we've been able to assume that i think the issue becomes a little bit  more important what mr goldstein is talking about where we have buildings that are probably in a lower risk category and there we need to have the people that are tenants need to have the confidence that f p s knows what it's talking about when it sets a risk level because if we are you medicine want to you put your finger on something before that it's a physical so if a facility security committee run by people who aren't security experts don't know what the risk is don't know what the best practices are they're going to naturally go to the highest level of security that they have seen and some other building to be able to convince them that in some buildings we don't need things ratcheted up that high they need to have to security we've got something called the interagency the security committee i see now you are the only agency who has the mission mission of managing you of the of the p managing property so far as i know you need the chair you of the g s a or of the federal protective service either to share or even have a particular leadership position i don't even know the goals you know somebody knows whether your human being at the table matters who was in charge of this committee well i think the one of the is one of the problems although that's the and and everybody else is kind of at the table is that it most of it i think it's a group of twenty four members actual voting members everyone has would you get to us within thirty days the material online or offline and letter and tell us whether it is agency wide so that we may see what guidance the agencies haven't given you spent now everyone at the table should know that we're not here to say why haven't you done x y or z or why did you do x y or z we know the reason we do not believe despite whatever is online that the agencies consider that there is a of authority nor has missed the goals that even testified to any authority that agencies look to so i'm not saying how come you're doing this that or the other i believe agencies are doing the best within their discretion and i also understand that not everybody has been at the table the whole time some had to be at the table to make it up as they went along that's how that's what we're doing right now we're just trying to see if there's a better way to do it so i would caution everybody since i'm not holding those who put it in place without guidance or sufficient guidance responsible i don't think anybody one that table at all ought to take put that monkey on your back because then you are going to own it if you want to quite truthfully i decided to mr peck that you are doing what has been delegated to you but on page two of your testimony you also said that the d o t headquarter security was developed and you go on the and a detailed risk assessment and analysis conducted specifically for the department that validated our requirements were appropriate for a cabinet agency with mission essential functions now mind you what your i know fully what your mission is this this committee is part of the apartment of transportation and infrastructure and i'm on the homeland security committee so i'm not in doubt what your mission is and your mission is very important to the united states but let me tell you and i ask you whether you think this can be a improved you heard mr mccann testify about what i think could be called arbitrary treatment from guards let you take pictures some guards don't let you take pictures and she said she quoted eighteen thousand for mr shingle security bulletin regarding photography of federal  buildings and this is what she quoted from a two thousand and four homeland security bulletin and there's apparently published right here for the public to read it widely known reconnaissance activity of criminal and terrorist organization has organizations has been i'm sorry claiming the documents claimed that a widely known  today for the department of homeland security to keep a citizen from taking a picture or that you are in danger if somebody takes a picture of the front or the back or the size of the department of transportation headquarters that i'm sure let me first apologize to ms mccann i know that we did respond in writing that action was inappropriate we said so at the time i just want to reiterate that personally thank you for them and the november tenth two thousand and four federal protective service bulletin is what we have been following  would also add that we have since that incident given written guidance to the security personnel at the building that references that and that is very specific about how they should be and what you are presumed to be under oath and i may have to do this i'm you know every other committee they make people stand up i accept that a presumption in favor of the truthfulness of anybody who appears before me so be careful is no prohibition against photographing the d o t or f a a headquarters buildings second however because reconnaissance activity of criminal and terrorist organizations has been together for photographic information about prospective targets security personnel should follow the procedures but that warning is directly from the federal protective service to go out and for that's good so far so good one approach anyone within d o t or f a a boundaries taking photographs of the building and identify yourself and other words as a security officer to conduct a field interview to determine the purpose for taking photographs of the facility and devore to ascertain the identity of the individual that again is working directly from the f p s two thousand for guidance if the field interview does not yield a belief of criminal behavior or terrorist reconnaissance activity the photography should be permitted without further as you could see from mr mccann i know she's a lawyer not all i know she's typical of the people i represent smart so i'm going to have to ask you does that directive apply if you are taking pictures on the property or if you're taking pictures a few feet back from the property this applies  the o t by getting across the street and using one of the newfangled or for that matter old fashioned cameras and i think you could get something that would be virtually like a blowup of every part of it and yet list for cherry according to the guidance he has got people who could be looking for some people were trying to get into the buildings  going up to american citizens and questioning them about what they're doing there and i say  put on my all had as a constitutional lawyer who has argued before the supreme court of the united states i say that there is a serious  risk and we have already seen union station inside the union station they understood you better not do that there is a serious risk to go up to a law abiding see a person who  exercising her first amendment right to take a picture of the building she owns as a taxpayer and interrogate her to make sure who she is as if there is a r that can be demonstrated i have just tried to give you the kind of law school hypothetical i use as it still is a tenured professor lord georgetown university i say to you that not only have i found it difficult to see the risk but it is far from not only is there no overriding risk to unfriend or upon the first amendment right of the  citizen i believe a terrorist is better able to take pictures off the property and that no u s attorney would do anything if a suit was brought but give up that's just how how off the mark given the so called preferred rights first amendment rights are and i am to nominating the right to take a  follow i'm asking you as security expert whether or not you believe that a justification can be an actual distraction and help them out because they could find themselves in court is there a justification that could be made for keeping somebody on federal property where you have a right to be because it is that all property which itself is not off limits as secure property is there could you argue that it's justified to begin interrogation of a citizen taking pictures we've certainly not looked at the issue and any of it madam chair i would say though that many of the policies that f p s promulgated are not enforced in any kind of uniform standard and that's part of the problem that you do face even with those standards that ought to be  enforced no less those that may have some questions about whether they should be forced or not and so we're looking for to help the agencies get some kind of guidance to take seriously now obviously some don't take it seriously at all the testimony  do certainly you did we do we've had events as you indicated in your building but let me tell you what has not changed you work very closely with the business community in your area and this applies to them as well as to others when we first went to to use this beautiful facility which came through this committee on my da my staff staff of the united states congress which have this idea around them we're not allowed to who have a higher i would a security clearance than most in your building were not allowed to enter the building able with their i d and even after a magnetometer so somebody they were told from the building had to come down and that the man in the same way we are informed by people who actually work with you on a cooperative basis because the o t has done very good work in working on the m street corridor or with those agencies and private entities that  they people in the business community in the local did call the business isn't simply improvement district we're required to get an escort to get in to the building from when when we held an event there while there were people stationed at various doors we were told that if they happen to come from another area they could only enter from the other door until i personally intervened since the door they were supposed to enter into was the furthest from where the event was being held here people the guards were only doing what they were supposed to do but it was exasperating and frustrating experience and the d o t became the poster child in one stance for this hearing when we saw that that people who had pass the highest security even in the congress of the united states couldn't get in the building and take with him you were familiar couldn't get in a building with somebody came down and escorted them into the building and who knows that might be a different person each time but that person was pulled out of her work in order to come down to do with the mag nama her all the guards could do and this is what i mean by make work and i need to know whether you are prepared to look closely at the d o t building in particular and to make sure that it does what page three of your testimony says overall the security practices and policies of the department's headquarters building our equivalent other cabinet a no i can tell you that i know of no agency perhaps the cia where it is harder to get into than the department of transportation and while people may try to get to parts of your agency over which you have jurisdiction  and trains in airports we do not believe that you are headquarters are nearly as high profile a target and as many headquarters in washington which are identify a belief higher terrorist target so i'm not asking you to justify it you aren't here but you do say that you meet you do what all those who do i don't know anybody else who pulls people out of their work to come down in order to escort people in i don't know anybody elsewhere where you can't use the john and you have a kid and you say but this is a federal building i know very few federal buildings where you can get in to do a restaurant tell you one thing miss a porch ery you can get into reagan building longworth building and cannon building in order to use our facilities and in order to go to the restaurant you can get into the capital of the united states where across the street in order to use the facilities how are we able to allow the d o t to continue to have a stricter protocol then in the building where you are now sitting and all i'm asking you to do is not to justify god help you if you are going justified i'm asking you are you willing to look at it so that we do not have testimony that says you are equivalent to all the buildings when this member of congress has entered all the buildings that have staff members every bill all the buildings and hav is fundamentally it's an open office environment when you go through the security pass the magnetometers you can go anywhere unfettered access to the building it's a building that also has that's the case in every building  to know why that puts you in a different position that it puts me in this security procedure was set up at the time based on that office open office environment and some of the functions that are within it including the crisis management center which is opposite the cafeteria on the first floor of the building including the skiff facilities that are in the building go ahead i'm sorry and i know exactly how to build it took me ten years to get the darn building up frankly i don't like the building very much but i don't like the architecture in my home town very much and i'm a third generation washingtonian now to start a blow up the place give it to mr dowd and say let's start all over again but these buildings are built within the security constraints and particular within the budget constraints so i we are going to be building more buildings like that are testifying that the only way to do business in an open office environment is t pull people off their work every time somebody comes down i want to use the john in the building i'm testifying that that's why it was set up that way with one escort required because of the open office and it's still set up that way it is still set up that way  air you take it on i understand what happened in the past i'm trying to see if we can make things better now that madam chair about one hundred ten days ago when i was in a different role i had a very different perspective of this including what the security procedures mean for mixed use transit oriented development the need to mix both governmental functions and other functions like the reagan building does with the food court and the other public portions  of it i would again go back to the balanced part of it i am not going to tell you today that we have that balance perfect because i'm not sure that that's true and it certainly changes over talk it was supposed to and of course i'm not asking anybody that so i started this question off i think from for that matter working with f p s g s a and others were very happy to look at those procedures the point i was one of the points i was trying to make is that this none of this is static i don't think anyone believes that a process that you set up at a point in time would be the most valid one forever forever is a long time absolutely and you will find that this committee is only looking for what human beings can do in the short term that's why i ask for review and when i get impatient if people are not willing to go through the same head process i'm going through i don't know what you should do i have i also believe the building by building is very different i have given you examples i've given you examples of of practices that you have not attempted to justify and i think that's appropriate i'm only asking since you are in new york give me if you would be willing to look at things like whether or not a taxpayer finding herself with her kid on m street which is still being fleshed out could enter the building to use the facilities and whether or not it's whether or not you might think through a way to do that whether or not and one of the few eating places on the whole of saint if might be it might be possible to open that cafeteria to people who will not find restaurant you had on him street but will find a building that cost them billions of dollars to build and i am asking you if you are willing to do that and that all i need is a straight answer on that  you and others that your security people will tell you the example from mr mccann i need to know what training you intend to do to the guard so that they are consistent i need to know what the training is now that's already within some pla and i need to know how you intend to consult in order to revise if if if necessary current procedures and let me just warn people don't make i am outraged was eight years after nine eleven we're still using many of the procedures that we used on day one of nine eleven that is from whence cometh my frustration i recognize if you have sat where i sat and saw the streets closed up it took me months to get the streets opened up largely because people didn't know what to do and i don't know what to do if you live in a continental country surrounded by water on each side you had no reason to know what to do until you were here on your own soil so we don't have to be apologetic for that we have to do and here i go to mr dowd the n c p he has been very forward looking and thinking maybe because he didn't have to was really just on physical security so i respect there are many other aspects of security that each individual agency protects but as you know our commission purview is on the physical aspect but we did learn that there are other approaches to doing that and like i said in london they looked at a layered approach where they tried to manage security for the entire area and then for their most critical assets which they prioritized provide additional physical security at that site  we're hopeful that we can learn from some of those experiences as we introduce security here in the monumental corps domestically we have a similar approach in new york city the lower manhattan security initiative where they  have limited access points to lower manhattan and approaches like that work it'll be a little bit more of a struggle here but we can clearly learn from those lessons anywhere in downtown washington the whole city is limited  because we always have to tailor what we learn elsewhere but those places at least have experience of being far closer to places  realize that funds have been at the core of many of the yes problems that's one reason it would appear that they decided to get out of the protection business altogether and just inspect things don't do  don't do proactive patrols which if you want to prevent terrorism i thought was one of the standard ways to do it where i lay in all of this at your feet we we ourselves for example missed a shingle had enforced but here you needed the authorizing and the appropriations committee because the agency was being literally drained of personnel so again i stress i'm not laying this at the feet of the people at the table but unless we find out what the facts are we won't be able to be of any help now the fee for the fee for service based financing i take it does not take into account things like square footage like mr kerry has a very large facility now does it how does the forest service work  service but we are funded and it's been so what's the difference you get the same service that the formulation put together is actually based on some of the facilities services that we  been concerned about and we wrote in our last report to last july we've been very concerned about this approach because regardless of whether you're located in a level one facility or whether you're located in a level four facility whether you have  officers who visit you and are with you virtually all the time or whether you don't see them for six months what do you base it on any law that would be based on what whether they visit you often or not would be based on what whether they're whether they're anywhere near you in other words if you're a level one facility and your letter or your level four facility in manhattan you're still paying sixty six cents per square foot if you're in manhattan you're likely to see f p s officers were given to believe based on intelligence before me as a member of the homeland security committee i could be in some place role area which it be because it is in a rural area has a particularly large federal facility but that facility houses agencies that have never been considered a target for terrorists but because it is a large correct in our report last year two to you ma'am we recommended that f p s improve the use of the fee system by developing a method to accurately account for the cost of providing service curative services and to evaluate whether the current use of the system made sense or whether they should develop an alternative funding mechanism but that those recommendations along with other recommendations in that report have not been have not been closed yet they've not reported back yet what you say at page two of your mainly use the building security assessment process to determine what the risks are in their view on a building by building approach but as you know we've we've reported about problems about the building security assessment program itself over  the in our report what's your problem with the building assessment day looking at a building by building well there are specific problems with with how they're doing the assessments and then more broadly there are problems with doing on a building by building approach as opposed to assessing risk across the portfolio so if they assess risk across the board wouldn't they also have to do some building by building assessment you would certainly have to do some building by building assessment but the tools they have do not let them compare the risks across the buildings today would you consider the department of transportation a hiver facility for terrorists attack terrorists that's i think part of the issue that i'm trying to raise it's equally categorized in terms of risk but every level for building in the federal portfolio may not have the same level of risk associated with it was a building in fact characterized in terms of actual risk based on function not really it's mainly in terms of size of building the numbers of employees in those buildings generally speaking the kinds of agencies inhabiting those buildings it's not sounds like some events on resonator matrix are created in the first place to look at building so that agencies are the new security standards that are that are not that have been promulgated better not in effect yet go further than the should they be promulgated as they are right now they are still being worked out there are some questions i gather about whether we have within the administration about whether we have taken enough of a look at how much the criteria may cost in compared to how much more of a threat countermeasure they will provide but they are on the way i will say that i'm told i have to say i haven't read them i'm told that they are more risk based than what we had seen before but you know what mr goldstein getting to and this is sort of the big question here is how do you measure risk what are the risks by agency to make one point about the fee if i may the one of the problems separate little rent piece here and i think it probably wouldn't be a bad idea to take a look at whether that makes sense because some of the inequities that we're talking about here will result you get charged the same amount no matter how much  stuff for people we're putting in the building for security but the other thing that that does is it discourages us to the extent this is a building by building security fee based system it discourages us from taking a look at the kinds of suggestions mr dowd makes that you could create a security zone and not based on a building you provide some of the building security by saying we're going to screen people someplace else so we make two points about that you see that system here on capitol hill at the foot of capitol hill and elsewhere around you'll see capitol police officers making sure that buses and big trucks don't get into this complex at all that means that certain levels of security don't have to be borne by the building and the same thing happens at the ronald reagan building because we can screen truck somewhere else we don't have to worry quite as much about getting them into the loop that all of the federal buildings as well they use what you're doing at the right of the building for trucks or the bottom plate the trucks for the ronald reagan building are screened  probably we did this or at least the facility it was possible to do it when we created the building so all if there's no central facility then they're not going to be caught with trucks coming in  practices across our buildings in washington i think you're right i actually do if they don't do that i think well i don't you know i don't know enough to say i think they have been by think they've been looking at kind of high level security criteria and the more fine grained security practices that are really important are have some up and left to be customized agency and by agency and building by building the most of its history madam chair the c has been organization of really one part time person they have not really provided staff to that committee so it has not always moved as quickly as might be hoped you say you took steps immediately after the g a o report was issued in early july this has to do with the bomb making materials etc how do you tr implementation and progress of the steps you have taken   formed a tiger team and started doing a gap analysis and regards to what things had to be i mean with let's start with the magnetometer it looks like even the training at the magnetometer bases now for example liquids coming into federal buildings i don't know if my nominee can capture that or what you can do about that well we did do a blanket purchase agreement on a new x ray machines that will differentiate between water and then more viscous important retraining and yes ma'am i'm getting to that in addition that part of the tiger team in addition to the actual bullet and we also produced a training video that every one of the single guards had to go through in addition to that we have also retrained cod rays of inspectors that are in process right now of actually doing hands on training to all of our contract security guards also when we do conduct our operation shields or our guard post inspections if we find discrepanc we make remedial training an urgent mission right on the spot we don't wait for report it later on we take immediate action and retrain the guard as part of the tiger teams review we determine that yes we do need to be much more involved in more and believe me we went through trial and error i'm also on aviation subcommittee so i think i just seen it all in terms of dabbing it what is it we can stabbing at what we can do trying it out not often enough pulling it back saying wonderful cooperation on both sides of the aisle trying to keep the country open one thing that we security at airports before that it was much like what i hear the federal buildings are doing you know everybody try to do the best you can there's some overall guidance you can believe the airports have the overall guidance but a deterrent effect we think at least why can't f p s set up a model that similar to the t s a model which standardize certain elements of security even given the vast differences between a new york washington d c for that matter and i don't know nashville tennessee in a poll done call name out if we can do that across this vast nation why isn't there a standard model and then we work up from there or down from there that's been the effort  probably represents the optimal where we're all trying to get mr pac and i have already entered in discussions since just his recent arrival and prior to that his predecessors and his security office and f p s had been working on minimal security standards inconsistency is one of the most challenging things when it comes to security and consistency of working on matter mall security standards since when and when will they be out we we have no idea when they will be  because we don't know that we can act them currently there are not below that already you don't know have you have no idea when they'll be out because say that again i have no idea when they will be out because we don't have the authorities to actually so you're doing what you don't have the authority to do has the authority at some point he would have the authority to publish that but what we're trying to determine is a minimal standard that would be accountable because not i but you have the authority to look at the agency under your control i'm not asking you when you go and get it done i'm asking you i'm telling you this much if it's open ended it's going to get done whenever you get ready i am also telling you that this is a matter of security and therefore i need to know when you will when you intend to have a plan if you intend to have a plan within five years do you intend to have a plan within five months do you intend to have a plan within five weeks i not only know how to work in the system by goals and timetables thirty days that's all you i want to ask mr mosts a question you have within your jurisdiction the quintessential model you've just heard others say that they they would like to see that model looked at region would you favor a model that is more standardized based on what karen lee has been worked out at the ronald reagan building since you're the one that has been closest to the model you don't know whether mr shank will be able to use it or not but he's going look to you and say is this something you think has utility outside of this one building in in  the united states or not because the previous witness mentioned on your panel that requires close coordination and certainly within the national capital region but a protective service we're willing to work with the department  up is normally when we find models or the federal sector the outside of the federal sector we were delighted that the federal sector had free aided without any model of its own what appeared to those other values that are important what you said is very important i would phrase it this way i believe that everybody work on security is done with ease and is supposed to deal with security they've been given only one mission what you call a value i call a mission mr moses has two missions most of all i know how to keep everything secure just shut all you all out of it so cheeping buildings secure is not rocket science the great american  innovative spirit could come out in glorious ways if in fact agencies regarded their mission as two sided that security without openness is unacceptable openness without security is unacceptable here don't you don't see me quantifying the two if i don't know how to do that all i know is that initially in the capital this was a terrible place afterwards and even though sometimes there are long lines i don't complain a lot about the capital we are always looking at it we have complaints about the capitol visitor center based on experience kerry's point that you know it's not that it only correction to him is that it has been for the most part we haven't heard of those changes that have occurred we've heard of some regulations that may make changes or we didn't know when they were going to be issued it hasn't been a continuing move you because frankly it hadn't isn't anybody's business there's been this large group the i f c which means that all i'm responsible so nobody's response we're going to see to it that somebody is responsible and accountable and that the mission is is a two sided mission before i let you go the there's been a big concern about something that otherwise i regard as a a very important part of what security in every building should be after we get some kind of matrix about how to keep a building secure then go to the next step about how to keep this building in particular secure we would not begin to have put together what was needed until we had done the vital consultation with those who go to work every day in the building and in some sense knows that well here insist bin that they not only know it and this on the point of people going to work every day they do it these so called building security committees which have people from the agencies to sit on building security they may be from you know the department dealing with matters that have nothing to do security they may be from the they maybe somebody from the secretary's office who is a special assistant whose job really is to keep track of members of congress but nevertheless they sit together and we have been sounded at their influence what should be the role of the building security committee act as as i said before i think the the building security committees have been asked to perform a function that they should not have been asked to perform they have been the put in the position whether overtly or just through that way of making the decisions about security practices and a lot buildings and so i mean i had i've seen i saw it before and this may have changed but there were times when the federal protective service and g s a together would say there's really a best practice that would allow you to have all the security you need in your building by doing this set of practices and sometimes building security committee say well but we were in another building and we saw them do something else so we'd rather do that and sometimes the other building that they saw was a building with a different mission a different level of security different level of needs and so i believe that some of what you're  had no power to do anything about the only way billions telling telling you that they want to same thing they have across the street correct and to be frank the only way in which we've ever been able to say that we can't we can't or won't do that is to say we don't have the to do they want to straighten it out themselves as the best way to do it but when we believe that the agencies are spending money because they can after all it's within their budget they might spend it on something else but we will be working with the appropriation committee as well we'd rather see you spend it on your mission we believe that d o t does trucks because no central part of the federal government democrat believe in bottom up democracy but i also am a member of the homeland security committee and believe that at some point security trumps everything and after nine eleven security trumped everything as far as i was concerned until we figure out some way to make sure that we at least had a handle on not let me come right back at us you will not see me among the members of congress inviting the president that we are to get out of afghanistan right away you will not see me saying that i am sitting in the region that was struck i hope not of my mind my folks in new york to say and just walk away mr president you will see me telling you that there are some things to do besides start another iraq but you won't see me on mindful of this security concerns that each of you have raised it would be only an authoritarian regime that would say once you have looked at what the agency wants at it's rational level once you have looked at the template go to it that is not this country and that is not this federal government it seems to me that the import of federal employees is critical to the success of the homeland security mission federal employees will be just like those who find today that there are new security alerts and so they go out on the television is going out into the streets and saying well you know what do you think that now that is little more inconvenient and it's interesting almost is still slowing up the building security people who talk to employees will be able to say to you what you would otherwise never know that  they have in fact seen people in get through security with the guards talking to somebody instead of looking or they don't know how somebody who appeared to need help and to be homeless got in the same elevator with them how are you going to know unless the building security committee is is is alert and how are you going to know things about the building you can only know if you sit in that office and see ways that could be shored up without some of the ways that are being use now so i don't want to i don't want to be heard to say that we want to professionalize everything any more than i'm saying that what we have pointed out as as as as issues for us can be laid at the table of anybody except the congress of the united states it is our oversight responsibility to bring these out and then to work with you we bring them  out we are concerned and frustrated with them somehow but we do not stop with well we've shown the world that this doesn't work we use the hearing as a template to task staff to then go and help us help the agency find the way out that may have come forward from the hearing i'm going to take this opportunity to thank you for spending so much time with us understanding that you are educating us helping us figure out what all of us are still trying to understand and to thank you very much for your written testimony and from  your willingness to sit with us as we ask you questions and learn from you and the experiences you have had this hearing isn't