good morning your honors i represent leon lewis an appeal from his conviction for illegal re entry and she want to appeal is whether mr lewis should have been allowed to present his defense of acquired citizenship to the jury the district court precluded the defense as a matter of law on the ground that he could not qualify for citizenship through his u s born father because he was illegitimate and was not legitimated before he turned twenty one the court held that he was not legitimated by operation of law children born out of wedlock act which made all children legitimate because the law left in place a prior means of legitimation marriage of the parents now this decision is contrary to be a case law holding that such a law and this particular deserve to a gym a children born out of wedlock quote irrespective of whether the country has prescribed other means of legitimation that's a matter of cross the most recent b i a explanation of this issue across held that the same kind of law in jamaica legitimated a child for purposes of deriving citizenship from his naturalized father despite the continued existence of an older law requiring marriage to a digital made a child cross reinstated and reaffirmed matter of guru which held that this kiana law at issue here eliminated all distinctions between illegitimate and legitimate children and thereby legitimated all children  visa preference purposes it also held that it need not consider other methods of legitimation because that would be super super flu as the blank relevant distinction here between legitimation and having to turn to stablish answer to that is no that is what the government's argument turn hangs on is that somehow there's a a big distinction between those just between those two sections just because of the phrasing paternity established by legitimation in form of fourteen zero nine and legitimated under section eleven zero one that the word paternity changes everything but that was not the reasoning of cross cross interpreted the term legitimation it did not talk about paternity by that they may mean different things they may but your honor and in this case it makes no sense for them to mean different things given all of the holdings in this area what's the textual evidence or the legislative history you can cite for that well i don't have a legislative history but we do have the purpose of the step of the different statues as explained in cross that the purpose of the those the purpose of the statutes that make legitimation a prerequisite for a benefit is a is to further the child's rights under the naturalization of the immigration naturalization laws whereas the purpose of section three twenty one which all the case law has held this interpretation of the statute is limited to sec two cases under section former section three twenty one that that statute interpreted paternity established by legitimat very very very narrowly because in under that statute legitimation is a barrier to the child's right to or derive citizenship through his naturalized mother so across explain is that it won't it only makes sense and also interpreted for and why should why we defer to them but what they're actually interpreting is whether this foreign law can serve to legitimate under the under the ins statutes so that is within their wheel house to interpret the term legitimate and what that means but i'd like to point out that if that federal case law has also held the same and loudly kylie this court  here well it didn't analyze the statute here it analyzed a very well you're right and that's that's where we would disagree it analyzed a very different statute it analyzed section three twenty one in father explained it's holding in those terms explain that this statute does nothing except further that the parental interest was intended to purr to further the father's interest and at least and under those father's marriage the mother so it's the same analysis just arrives at a different place right it's well it's not this other words it's a conclusion which otherwise about the father he would not a bit able to get citizenship through his mother  opposed to all the other cases that deal with other sections that don't require an affirmative act by the father all of those cases are cases in which the claimant the claimant to citizenship did get citizenship through his naturalized mother and let me just also point out that  the application of the law in the general on legitimate which that which is that a blanket statutory legitimation can't does legitimated child the application of that general rule to three twenty one would make no sense at all because in such a case a child could never a step could never if he was born in a in a country that had such a statute he could never establish citizenship through his naturalized mother no matter if his father beat him through the window whatever the father did so it makes total sense to require in that situation an affirmative act by the father and that's the distinction the cross makes and coursera includes that is it's part of its rationale what do we want to we know about the the extent to which legitimacy act in going on a is enforced or not i don't know anything about that whether it's unforced i mean isn't this a different case if it turns out that there is the removal of discrimination act and yana but the legitimacy act is not enforced oh the the prior act yeah well it would contend that it doesn't matter and i would i would i would i would focus on law law involved the same the same almost identical i mean not the same the stain statute in china which said that children born out of wedlock show enjoy the same rights as children born in lawful wedlock no person shall be allowed to harm them or discriminate against them this court held it is clear to us that the first paragraph of this article makes all children born in china legitimate and we don't even have to look continued that we don't even have to look at what other provisions they have for legitimation because that would be superfluous that's what this court held and that's basically what cross held in analyzing the jamaican statute that it doesn't matter if there is this other thing on the books somebody who wants legitimate their child could still do it presumably but it wouldn't it wouldn't affect the child's rights maybe it would affect in this case th e act is not the legitimacy act is not enforced doesn't that affect your argument and this is a different you're saying it doesn't matter whether the act is on the books right right but if it's not on the books right then you have a different case i don't think it would be any different i know that's what that's what i'm not i don't think it would be a different case it might be even a stronger case if the act was not on the books but the case is whole that it doesn't matter whether it's on the books or not because the it was basically superseded by the blanket legitimizing statutes that's the general  legitimacy which is purely a legal concept concept and the other is biological paternity biological paternity still has to be established in laos the court said it still has to be established we hold that the chinese statute with inmates everyone but any individual still has to establish the biological paternity which in this case the defendant would have had to establish the defendant would have had to prove a trial that he actually was the biological son or at least show a reasonable possibility to to create a reasonable doubt that he was the son of this man mr he who you that mr he was in fact a u s citizen that he that all the other facts they were all the facts were disputed but the the court didn't allow this to get before the jury the court precluded as a matter of law based on an incorrect reading of the case law which i have to stress that coursera roe v hines the roe and hines have all been expressly overruled to the extent that they apply to anything other than section three twenty one which makes with generation a barrier to citizenship thank you you have a minutes  good morning your honour's may please the court my name is caitlin farrel i'm an assistant united states attorney for the eastern district of new york representing the united states in this matter at age fifty two facing his second criminal conviction for illegal re entry appellant leon ira lewis claimed for the first time that a dead u s citizen named leroy hug you was his biological father the core issue in this appeal is even assuming the truth of that claim whether he could have acquired united states citizenship through hug you as the district court correctly held the answer to that question is no the district court therefore correctly precluded the appellant from presenting any such evidence at trial because it would have been irrelevant and confuse the jury now in order to have acquired united states citizenship through his purported father leroy hug you the appellant's paternity must have been  by age twenty one by a legitimation that comes from section three zero nine of the one nine hundred fifty two immigration and nationality act now crucially whether the appellant's paternity in other words who his father is was established by the requisite time by the time he was age twenty one and means by legitimation is an entirely different inquiry from whether he is considered a legitimate child for the purposes of the definition section of the hundred fifty two act as interpreted by the bureau of immigration appeals now to be clear the government does not dispute that one nine hundred eighty three removal of discrimination act removed certain discriminatory provisions of the law that was against children born out of wedlock and the government also does not dispute that the b i a case law establishes that all children in guyana are considered to be it enforced do you mean the legitimacy act in guyana it is still it i'm not sure of to this day twenty one thousand song the books but as it pertains to that to the plane to the appellant in this case during the time frame that it would apply to him it was still on the books oh let's say for it let's say that kind of act is not is not on the books then all you have is the general legitimation statue and in that regent general legitimacy in your view would be sufficient so that exact scenario is what happened in andersen versus holder in the ninth circuit and also allow versus kiley and the important point that both of those cases make is in each of those cases the paternity was not in dispute and so in a circumstance where the paternity of the child is not in dispute and there is no legitimacy act on the books and legitimated an illegitimate or out of wedlock children and in what wedlock children are considered identical under the law then you have an entirely different scenario but usually is what is sufficient if there is no formal we did mention process becomes insufficient when there is such a process and i'm trying to understand the common sensical in why there should be so the law the law requires that if there is a legitimat holder respectively neither of those jurisdictions have the concept of legitimacy and so the fact that paternity is not disputed in that case is sufficient to satisfy section three zero nine of of the act or in  those cases they were actually talking about section three twenty one which deals with naturalization not birthright citizenship to your question your honor if there is a legitimacy statute on the books and it requires  affirmative act by either the parent or the child then that has to be done in order to satisfy the paternity by age twenty one by legitimation requirement of the immigration and nationality act  you're concerned about hypotheticals where there is not such an act you can look to andersen versus holder and loud versus kylie to see how courts have dealt with that situation and in both in both circumstances the court recognized that paternity was actually not in dispute neither of those cases anderson vs holder noted however that had the paternity of that child been in dispute it in fact would not have been sufficient for him to simply be legitimated by operation of law and that they would ha to turn to the paternity statutes on the books in arizona but that was not the case there it is however the case here clearly his paternity is in dispute because the defendant only for the first time claimed that this man was his his no functional difference between children of when and on with parents but still have these best provisions requiring the additional step to congress memorandum that analyzes the guyana statute and it compares it to the jamaica statute and notes that many of these commonwealth countries that were at some point territories of the united kingdom contain a similar statute to that of jamaica and that that memorandum also points out the distinction between jamaica and diana's laws specifically that to make the act in jamaica and also a similar ones across these commonwealth countries specifically states that you you cannot discriminate against children born out of wedlock whereas in guyana the removal discrimination act does not contain such a provision it amended the laws in order to remove words that weren't politically correct it substituted out of wedlock for illegitimate but it doesn't actually contain a an affirmative provision saying the government cannot discriminate against children born out of wedlock so at least theoretically diana could pass a law that discriminates against children who are born out of wedlock and that would not be in conflict with guyana is removal of discrimination act and that's different from jamaica and these other commonwealth countries one issue i'd like to address is in the federal defender's reply brief they point out that our position the government's position creates a situation where children attempting to get united states citizenship through parents who were born in the u s is more onerous than children attempting to get united states citizenship to a parent that is naturalized and that's simply not true and the court judge ammons opinion in footnote four addresses that that exact issue and specifically what she says and the position that we take is that if you're attempting to get citizenship through naturalization you have to prove both that you're in that parent's legal custody and also your you have to be legitimized by the time you're sixteen years old those provisions don't apply to people who are seeking to get united states citizenship from a parent who is a united states citizen what they have to show is that their paternity was established by legitimation at age twenty one and so it's simply not true that it's harder to get united states citizenship through a naturalized parent as opposed to a parent who has birthright citizenship going back to you anderson is it your view that anderson was correctly decid that's a good question i think in the u s in those circumstances because the arizona law contained no concept of legitimacy whatsoever versus the law here in guyana clearly contains a provision by which you can become legitimated and that's through your parents your parents marriage and importantly in addition to in anderson in addition to the fact that there was no dispute over the paternity of that  child judge m and also noted that the ninth circuit in a separate opinion from andersen observed that guyana unlike arizona does contain a legit its legitimacy statute that requires the affirmative marriage of the parents in order e formal legitimation process you know ever change anything well anderson is very clear that that's only the case if paternity is not disputed so in anderson everyone agreed that this particular person was his father and so because there was no concept of legitimacy under the arizona law just the statute itself saying that all children are on equal footing was sufficient to establish paternity by legitimation under the law of arizona but it's the ninth circuit very clearly notes that if there had been a dispute about who the father was then just the just that statute would not have been sufficient and that they would have had to turn to the paternity statutes in arizona to determine whether his paternity was in fact established by age twenty one thank you honor i like to first address the government's argument that the ghana statute doesn't eliminate discrimination and doesn't include any broad provision of discrimination against illegitimate children and i would i would i would just  just read it in determining this is an indeterminate relationships for the purposes of this section and this is the family relations section no regard shall be had to whether any person is born in wedlock or out of wedlock and a person born out of wedlock shall be entitled to the same rights under this section as a person born in wedlock and the title of the act is in parentheses is the anti discrimination act or  something to that effect the law against discrimination between unwed against on wed children it is basically the same provision as the chinese law that lao held accomplished statutory  now just to answer your honest inquiry as to why this old old legitimation method might still be on the books one one possibility is that the the under the anti discrimination  distinctions between a legitimate and legitimate children there is one exception provided which is that the father cannot inherit from a child that he has not somehow acknowledge there's more to more to to for the father to take the child's money now maybe that would be something that the child can only accomplish through the vestige of the otherwise vestige of legitimate provision that's that's one possibility but in terms of the child's rights which is what matters for purposes of the of the statute the child is not wood is there's no such thing as an illegitimate child the child as it is is legitimated the fact that paternity is not in dispute does not matter and lao the facts of paternity biological paternity were not established law went on after holding that the chinese statute which it made everybody that they still had to look to what facts supported the biological link the biological father son relationship that is a anderson held in our view the question of paternity is ultimately a simple one anderson's paternity is established by the very statute that establishes his legitimacy and that is consistent with guru which says that all children are deemed to be a legitimate offspring of their natural parents from the time that country's laws are changed so when the laws are changed for paternity by legitimation is a stablished in a general sense that child is the legitimate son of his natural biological father what needs to be established under the statute and that's under a different section which is whether he is the child born of or he was born to born of an american father under this under the fourteen  that is the is the fact of biological paternity which must be separately established but there was no ground in this case for the court to preclude the defense entirely preclude it on the basis of  case law that has been limited specifically to section three twenty one and doesn't apply to this this provision thank you thank you both your arguments the court will reserve decision