the attorney general can come forward and we'll be back in  where the somebody was prosecuted under that statute for a false indorsement meaning that you know that they had authority to sign the document but they used for for an unauthorized they used the ballot document for an unauthorized purpose does that make the georgia forgery statute overbroad in the in the categorical analysis absolutely or a no absolutely the  that point in time considering what the law was in the sack you but if we determined that it was a a claims processing rule why wouldn't we just send it back and have b a determine in the st instance whether whether there was a problem here as far as claims processing goes or whether you know he had reason you know i'm saying yes sir no i  has been extensively discussed in the previous argument as has been consulted if you've got wisdom to offer we'd love to have it i would just like to clarify one thing regarding the last comment counsel on the other case where he said that somehow the government had conceded unambiguous and ambiguous and ambiguity excuse me what we stated that the statute was unambiguous for was that we have been through the spin i mean the supreme court has told us that in order to this jurisdiction a statute doesn't say this statute just jurisdiction if you know the you look to mean it doesn't require doesn't have to have it expressly referenced jurisdiction in your answer is but the statute doesn't express fully referenced jurisdiction that's not getting out of the question i was asking well i believe that all of the other circuits that have looked at this issue of course except for the th circuit have explicit they found that subsequent you you can't find jurisdiction in that statue if it doesn't mention so what that statute mentions as my strat as my colleague mentioned was notice the rd circuit in a como actually sort of mentioned the point of judge rosenbaum and i think yourself as well which was congress i'm sorry i ask a question about that because that's what's troubling me i don't see how we get to the regulations because the glue that is discussed in pereira it seems to me appears on the face of the statutes and so specifically meant them to limit the i j a subject matter jurisdiction so that and the nd part of this is that they but i'm not asking about i'm not asking i think that's a question we get to afterwards we have to figure out what it all means afterwards i'm asking you sort of a what was was the subject matter of pereira it would refer to in a potential proceedings which is also in that particular section so it refers to i mean the statute itsel references in that statue to that may refer back to one thousand two hundred and twenty nine a it doesn't expand beyond that to the court's jurisdiction right different question so you would agree with very limited application to the reference in the statue so it could it while it does refer to the stop time rule there and it does refer it might also refer to other framework to determine what your stiction is and for purposes of the notice to appear why wouldn't we look to that to see whether it might be a claims processing rule and look more generally did the statutory framework as a whole for jurisdiction your honor that question has a lot of different i'm sorry but i'll try to answer the best way i can and so again the statutory limitations are says that written notice in the section for two is a notice to appear so as my colleague argued in her brief we then say where does jurisdiction come in and jurisdiction comes in under section eleven of three g one that gives the to as it is determined necessary to carry out this action at that point you turn to the regulations and the regulations here specifically govern the immigration court's jurisdiction at that point you turn to date of the national removal proceedings where practicable right at that point but i'm sorry it seems it bottomed the argument you're making is that because because the statutory framework does not say specifically jurisdiction attaches at this particular point in the proceedings that the agency gets to determine when jurisdiction attaches is that the argument you're making yes that  me and well let me tell you why so maybe you can i'm sorry if that's ok it seems problematic because it seems like congress determines when jurisdiction attaches you're saying the agency determines it and  to be clear i don't know that you ever get to the regulation right what i'm saying is if jurisdiction is discernable from the statutory framework and we construe it from the statutory framework is whether notice the notice to appear requirement that is in the statute is jurisdictional or claims processing so so that's where i'm coming from to me the disconnect is how does the how does the agency get to determine when jurisdiction vast because it seems to me like congress has to do that well you know my making sense to you what i'm trying to ask believe so and i think this goes almost to to the question the agency's position if the statutory language is clear well your honor again and i think this is perhaps where we where your honor and and our position differ is that we simply state that the jurisdiction ok so just to be clear i'm not different i'm trying to figure out what the answer is here and what i what would help me really a lot is to figure out how the agency can dictate jurisdiction let me ask you this way do you have any case law that stands for the proposition that an agency can determine its own jurisdiction i believe your honour's getting into the claims process to enroll again into the question of jurisdiction and regarding that regarding that question your honor stated via lists i'm sorry let me just make sure i have a let's just assume for purposes of this question that we don't get to the regulation make your best argument for why the notice to appear definition in one thousand two hundred and twenty nine parang a is it claims processing role as opposed to does as well regarding you know i think as the claims process and the regulations are considered they set out certain requirements for the nose to statute is silent and characteristics of the review scheme here the after getting over the initial immigration judges taking over jurisdiction of the court the other requirements are simply procedures that them court has for filing that would probably be the best argument for for a nose to be a p r or being a claims processing role which i believe that the th circuit the four circuit and the th circuit addressed in much more detail than i did very briefly your hon statue however there are two points i want to make related to volumes and which i think will address the false indorsement question that you're talking about is it overbroad that's my question because people are prosecuted under that no just not for two reasons as we extensively argued in our brief related to forgery has been defined extraordinarily broadly so related to forgery as this court acknowledged in martina's gonzales expands to agency endorsement is that something that is excuse me i'm going to do is we've got a genuine document that you use for an unauthorized purpose but when you've got a genuine document but it's not well williams actually specifically addressed that in williams it's specifically said that there they used the difference between logical connection causal connection but they said a logical connection here is that it's no that supposed additional essential element of the generic definition because it still inherently encompass is what people traditionally consider to be forgery a genuine document the difference the other difference that i pointed out and under versus the current case is that the statute was changed in williams they were talking about a check that had been at that had been falsely because the because at the time the statue included the ability to write a track a genuine document however the statute changed afterwards so that it said any writing other than a check and to my knowledge and i did do is check my statute and that was the statute that he was convicted under any writing other than a check so the difference between williams and this case is that to my knowledge and i did my own check but i question of establishing its own jurisdiction this year is one way to usually when we say that it's like the scope of the jurisdiction and in part it seems to me that that here it's a question about a timing of jurisdiction in that usually we're concerned that the government is trying to claim jurisdiction too early and am i right in effect that now by waiting until the nd notice that has all the information the government saying ok we may have messed up  jurisdiction the st time but now we legitimately have jurisdiction at this later point is that a fair way of looking at it well your honor i press the thing about they don't do anything is that if you take if you took a strong view that you got jurisdiction with the st notice then you could go ahead and convict him or send him away and he would never have notice and so that's why i'm looking at it as a timing and the question notice would come up with an idea of an end absentia proceeding and where spel could bring up arguments like a due process issue or other other defenses that m address your honor's concerns however here we're simply talking about them gratian court's jurisdiction and in that process to a notice for hearing is essential curative of that because  that we the strong statement the agency can't determine its own jurisdiction that is the immigration court can't decide to issue divorces just because it has a help you but it seems to me that that the counter argument the one that says do justice though the heavens fall says that the agency is trying to to reach out and take too much jurisdiction by giving this defective notice and i'm saying isn't it the case that it's not how much jurisdiction they're trying to take it's really w when we're going to the idea of the two step process the idea is that it does actually meet the statutory notice requirement because it doesn't say that you can't get the type of notice that you're on or talks about in a two step process that you can nor shown remorse and or rehabilitation in this regard in that it appears to me that they just didn't see or didn't consider his express statement of contrition where he talked about his conviction and says i really made a mistake i've learned a lot from are asking for forgiveness so don't you have a reason consideration problem with that  section the actual motion to reopen mentions the convictions but there's not there's not really an expression of remorse there the section that mr opaque is placed in his brief where he says that the petitioner has expressed  everything like that was it exhibit that respect specifically just addressed a waiver application that he planned to meet if the i one hundred and thirty was granted it didn't actually refer back to the actual motion to reopen that was where the board because your argument that they didn't have to consider that statement is that you're not that they didn't have to consider it but that it was an ancillary consideration to the motion to reopen itself well how can they consider to they say it didn't exist i wouldn't read the board's decision like i don't think that the board's decision it says he didn't address the convictions well he didn't address it in his motion to reopen or in this error in his affidavit regarding except to mention that he'd been convicted it didn't in the affidavit supporting the motion to reopen these this later this lead or exhibit containing this affidavit excuse me i think i miss just a motion to reopen this later affidavit regarding the his idea of his comments on remorse was simply an exhibit about a possible waiver in