a categorical almost temp work lapsley van on the incarceration of status offenders either in detention centers or the department of juvenile justice under all but a very limited number of circumstances if the minor does status offenders to the most serious sentence that we have available under the terms of the juvenile court act commitments of the department of juvenile justice youth prisons and yet that's exactly what occurred in this case ok let me stop you there are you saying it would be lawful under the who committed juvenile detention for thirty days up to thirty days for this offense depending on the particular circumstances of the case if she were placed on probation for this under age drinking the court could not sentence her to detention after that initial probation sentencing because it now point that under age drinking she hasn't violated any order of the court and usually typically when the she could be sentenced to thirty days in detention but she could be sent to your jay jay she absolutely cannot be sentenced to go to a j because they have here are three statutory provisions that govern status offenders and only two of those contain an exception for a valid court order there is the general prohibition on committing kids to to any detention any secure confinement that's contained in article one if there is a status defense you can taken into secure custody the list of sentencing options that are available to trial court however of the provisions that govern when a child can be sent to the department of juvenile justice does not contain a valid court order exception about section of the juvenile court act says a minor may only be sent to the department of juvenile justice if a minor is at least thirteen years old and has not committed a status on that particular subdivision of the statute says that theory of the case a juvenile would not be subject to detention for a lawful consumption of alcohol it's an initial disposition yes if they violate their probation you think that is a waffle this is under some circumstances question that's being yes i think i'm hesitant to concede that that would be appropriate because that's not the issue that's before the court so we don't really brief stat issue vigorously i can imagine a case where if i had a child who was committed to detention i would be arguing that never to the department of juvenile justice and i think that that's or that the reason that that that the legislature in this statutory scheme where it didn't create include a valid order exception for d o j commitments makes some sense there is a qualitative difference between putting a child in a detention center and putting a child in the department of juvenile justice detention centers tend to be close to home so my inner circle can be can be visited by their family members whereas commitments apartment of juvenile justice you're moving a child far away from home there is a greater stigma attached to the department of juvenile justice commitment than there is to a detention center commitment there are thirty day limits to detention commitments where there are not time limitations other than the maximum sentence allowed for that for an adult who's committed a comparable offense and i think also then also the degree of commitment the trial courts are not free to commit any and others that he can't be controlled by by by what's but by his parents of that this is really almost essentially the disposition of last resort so department of juvenile justice commitments are qualit cost the county a dime when a child goes to the department of juvenile justice state except the tab for that child's commitment whereas if a child is committed to a detention center that the cost of that commitment has to be borne by the county and i think it's reasonable for the tryout for the legislature to say we want trial courts to think about costs that are associated with this if you really think it's important to incarcerate that kid we'll get we'll get that will allow you to find that child in contempt but we're going to make you county your locality pick up the tab for that commitment order thirteen years of age or over provided that the commitments of the department of juvenile justice shall be made only if the charm of incarceration is permitted by law for adults found guilty of the offense for which the minor was adjudicated to life but very long way of but he's not encompass with the provisions of the juvenile court act what the juvenile court access is we treat children who commit misdemeanors under eighteen to sixteen for felonies but if a child commits a misdemeanor and absolutely yeah yeah and it is only because the legislature has said we treat children differently and we've drawn the line for children age of eighteen earth isn't the worst place recently saying that eighteen nineteen and twenty year olds are going to be treated as adults whether or not they precisely meet the definition that absolutely doesn't that undermine your argument because eighteen and nineteen and twenty year old juvenile court act which is where shelby wackos like you did to support of their question here the juvenile court act that shelby was adjudicated delinquent under defines a minor as anyone under the age of twenty one so if a minor is under the age of twenty one minute dealt for purposes of the provisions of the juvenile court act an adult is twenty one or older so when you look at the definition of a minor it necessarily sad is that when we're operating under the terms of the juvenile court a an adult is twenty one and older and so therefore those eighteen nineteen or twenty year olds don't fit the definition of adult under the chip mccord act my second response is that's not an offense that all adults can be found guilty of and in prison it's a very very narrow classification of adults if you were there and also in criminal court they're not adults in juvenile court it depends on which door or which court room door you walk through whether that eighteen nineteen or twenty year old  are minor and then finally i think that it is that there is nothing that it makes perfect sense that that that the legislature chose to problem lie in their legislature has drawn the line at kids under the age of eighteen behavior that is a that is often in caged and by the majority of teenagers and so what we're going to do is we're not going to throw these kids in facilities where there are still beds in concrete walls and razor wires around the facilities we're going to treat them seem logical i think that you can i think you can make an argument that the legislature was behaving in a moment because the legislature has such broad discretion to define offenses and what offenses they find worthy of punishment what a fan says people should be treated like adults and i think that i think you can make a reasonable statement that it was reasonable for the legislature to say listen once you hit the age of eighteen you know better you ought to know the age of seventeen so for example if there are sexual contact between a sixteen year old and a fifteen year old because there's left less than a five year gap between those those those two kids that's that's a mistake here is what that is right so the commission the offense itself isn't illegal because the kid is only seventeen only the degree of punishment that applies is affected by the age of the minor we're as twenty five year old adult committed that same offense against the fifteen year old that would be a felony they're both guilty of a crime but also a twenty one year old male could commit sexual contact with  the breaking of the law and so it's illegal for anyone to engage in that sort of sexual behavior everyone is prohibited from doing it it's not be a show of the accused that crypt trigger scrim a liability it's offense because it's not illegal simply because of the age the age of the age of the accused is not what turns it into a criminal offense whereas with under age drinking especially because there are some pretty draconian financial consequences that come to the state when we hit over a certain term of children over when we incarcerate over a certain percentage of children when we are when we incarcerate over certain percentage of status defenders who are risk of losing federal funding and so i think that most of most counties are are not incarcerating status offenders and so the champagne county numbers are keeping the numbers love i think that from from this practice of sending trying to send children to the department of juvenile  it can reach a matter first time issues a first impression when you have a rogue county that's engaging in behavior that's an authorized by statute you're never going to have conflicting case law because everybody else is doing  attorney claims that all three apply except there's really no there showing of clarity consequences or civic reference to applying for military service and what the case is like alfred h h show there has to be some the purposes of the federal consequences exception their argument is that somehow juvenile prison is a difference and it doesn't seem to be any different because if the fact is that there was builtin from that the look down the of their prison time service time is not going to be the determining factor the judge can look at it while you've been to prison before having corrected your behavior this court cannot change history if that potential for liberation of advisory opinion and what the supreme court of the noise trying to tell us is really that the public interest exception is really it's clear that they are the ones who decide and resolve  the cases in which there is a conflict if the public process is that it's going to be the most common application of that rule and they do not want the public court deciding questions have never been decided before just for the sake of setting a precedent for future cases essentially between this public interest wrong and this public interest exception here the existence of conflict and therefore it is socially that's what it says a surrogate for the actual third factor of the public exception in a public interest exception t that no these type of first impression issues are not to be decided under the public interest exception to the minister and that that that is something the state would do if this if this court were to go down the road so we should the language that the state cites for me now it's about whether the supreme court looks whether there's a conflict or disagree in the law that is certainly one ground for determining whether in the court a determination is necessary under prong to a public policy exception but what the supreme court doesn't say is these are the only criteria from two was only satisfied here is a conflict or disarray and already and instead what the supreme court has done and this court has that bond is more than satisfied in champaign county we have two of the three players in the courtroom the state's attorney who has the authority to charge and ask for sentences and the twelve court that has the ability to impose sentences under the impression that they can commit kids to through department of juvenile justice for despite the language of the of the statute the fact that this is going to occur is going to occur again the state is still steadfastly at this point rather than saying whoops we were wrong we should have committed her to the department of juvenile justice continues to defend its right to send kids to the department of juvenile justice so there were two terminations is necessary to prevent when the supreme court refuses to reach the merits of those cases under no circumstances is there any threat of future harm to anyone in the case of the adoption of the greens and that was a case where the we had with the case was found moot the supreme court observed this is not going to be moot in future cases because these adoption cases drag on for ever by the time that it is reaches that the issue of the issue of adoption is still going to be pending method to adoption order is not going to be final in most cases in hernandez the court observed that the state  the terminations proceedings when she filed her notice of appeal she could have done that she could have stopped it so any future case like j p apparent and terminations case can always file a document asking that determination be sta in this case there's no way to avoid this future harm because of this because at the very very short duration of what's happening in these cases because a child is going to be sent to the department of juvenile justice and because it a misdemeanor charge that child in most cases is going to be out of the departments in three months may have his parole terminated even shorter than that so that when you look at the typical timeline for cases even if the cases were handled by us at even if we complot were able to fly with every single deadline for briefs and the filing of records you're still going to miss that deadline for these kids and in both robert f and charles k this court recognized when you have a vulnerable population in the case of robert and charles it was mentally ill people who were facing ninety day terms of commitment and the review of those could never be had at the appellate level before that ninety day commitment has run in the same way we have vulnerable children who in all likelihood are going to be released from the department of juvenile justice but only after they've been held for at least ninety days the issue is going to is going to completely if they review