in this case as even judge firestone found the parties never foresaw the use of this property for anything other than a railroad they didn't forsee it particularly for taco trucks and dance scene and public recreation that was not case if you read the case is a short opinion that involved an easement to access long island sound that and the question there was whether an easement granted for the forces in vehicles could also be used by pedestrians because they build the sidewalk as i understand your law and laws generally as it starts with language and if there's something about the context that strongly suggests that the language should not be read as broadly  as it would appear on the face of it that's something worth considering but you start with the language and frequently i would suppose start with the line so that brings us back to judge humans question isn't this very broad language indicative of an understand what your position is with respect to whether this kind of conveyance could even if quite clearly intended to grant the right for whatsoever whether railroad purpose of otherwise that the successors in the sides whoever they may be might wish or is it your position that that that clause would be unenforceable in new york law you look at the text of the instrument and if it makes that conveyance and that conveyance is the intent of the parties wouldn't that conveyance be respected whether you call it an easement or a fee or fee with it referred her or whatever wouldn't that be this document to determine the intent of the party leadership government and we've agreed on track but i'm looking for something some support which i didn't really find in your brain for the proposition that no matter how clear even assuming away that such starting point for drawing to decide whether we're the inquiry into what the language actually means is we're gauging and i mean if if you can't have anything any kind of conveyance like this no matter how clear the language with well i would say no court i would agree exactly with that premise that no court in new york and particularly new york's highest court has never found ever that any easement granted the right to use property for any purpose essentially converting what is an the new york court of appeals both of those say when we're confronted with a situation such as this we have this document which in this case it's not just six words we're dealing with a ten page three thousand word single spaced typewritten document that the parties took great pains to specifically a done a fight all their rights and responsibilities and to conclude that that text somehow said oh forget everything in this document we're giving you the right to use this property for anything you want to use even things that as judge firestone found they never contemplated it is contrary to as a you know the court of appeals in new york has said timeless first principle that we're going to look at the parties and ted will put the language in the text of the document most of them particular pages six through eight where we quote the relevant provisions of this repeatedly throughout this document they define this as being for railroad purposes and for the successor railroad which in the screen words east alabama decision  a successor railroad as a successor railroad with the franchise so that would not include new york city using this property for something having no relation whatsoever to the operation of a railroad why would they have written ten tarted i represent the united states may please the court we all agree that this case involves the interpretation of usenet language under new york law the  language but when we look to how many areas should be used and this is clear and unambiguous language that it can be used for any such purposes that the road company its successors and assign central railroad and we have the new york realty and terminal company at the realty and terminal company was actually a division of the central railroad these are civics sophisticated corporations and they certainly anticipated that this property would be used for purposes we see that in the language but they also anticipated that the new york central railroad might want to use the language for other purposes and we know that because it's also in these that language and when you have law says is that once  the court looked at the language it allowed for horses vehicles and all other lawful purposes and what the court sat is this is unusually broad its general in terms and the only limitation on the use of this property is  be used for lawful purposes they went on if i recall the opinion to say that it's really related to access well the water i think is water for the change but they didn't do that your honor i'm assuming that it was only limited to a right of way because users would also be included but i am not aware of any new york case that says you know this is too broad and mr horan says that this is a fee but it's not in fact of the it's an easement because with the users of the easement holder but they had that right so they did preserve certain rights to themselves and if as you know the court is aware that the greater gives all of its rights to let me ask you a question that doesn't pertain to and the reason it wasn't is that on the day this issue was issued the appellant created a new corporation and transferred the property a couple months later to a new entity and then york got this new interview to sign the coveted  not to sue but the taking a legit taking occurs and date of the sea to do so although the entity that was you know wholly owned by this other entity and by the same family i signed a covenant not to sue this particular entity negotiated it and they use this language that the grant negotiated for this right and paid part and went to new york courts also say which i think is not necessary here but if the language is in the us or if it's not the are new reports i construe easements most strongly against the grant war and that's also in the missionary society case from the new york court of appeals and in this case that would require a broad the easement not narrow appellants suggest we talked a little bit about the relationship between the parties and i want to also talk about the east alabama case that my colleague mr that's the language no new york case says that the parties have to sit down and sort of imagine every specific use no the parties can contract they can say you know we don't know how this might be used we don't know what's going to happen in the future but we can contract it was not that shown by the granting files which we've discussed and that have been a pos which is found on page twenty seven and we are also discussed that as well moreover that evidence in the record shows that the railroad has been actively involved thank you thank you horses for carriages could also be used for pedestrians you're exactly right to say which is wow the court in a wise missionary society saying that's ok you can also build a sidewalk for the pedestrians and lay a water pipe that's a far cry from the situation we're confronted with here which is a situation where unquestionably what even vege fire from families what was intended to be an elevated railroad viaduct easement somehow now is used by a non railroad for taco trucks van seen stargazing public recreation things that have nothing to do with the railroad it is impossible to read that document the ten page typewritten document and come away with the conclusion that these people intended to  grant new york city and non railroad the right to use that property in the manner it's now being used that is the simple question of new york law no case that we've ever found in new york has embraced a situation like this  rotation of an easement to allow uses that were not contemplated by the parties again i've mentioned earlier the timeless first principle the new york court of appeals continues to be used to guidance interpretation of is the parties intention now when we look at the language as you noted judge newman and i quote the language right now the operative language upon which judge firestone premised her conclusion were the words for railroad purposes and for such qualifies other purposes it refers back to what appears before that we cite justice roberts decision in king the burwell where he noted the words it's not any the word such is qualified by the fellow judges and such other persons as i may choose to dinner the such there does not mean and they have to be among my fellow judges it means exactly the opposite needs such other different paragraph and particularly within the whole document you find again painstaking discussion of the specifics of the railroads uses so you find reference to cables to two tracks to the other railroad purposes that are necessary to the operation of a river that's clearly what i believe they had contemplated when they set such other purposes so for example employee lockers or hand cars or some signals or electric signals or telegraph lines that are related to operation of the railroad those would be other railroad purposes when you see this document it is it's impossible i think to conclude that when they wrote that that they contemplated and even tried first and didn't find oh we can mean a non railroad using it for contemplate the use for it to elop park as long as the language is clear enough that it's clear that they contemplated that they could be any other purposes this is an emergency that that's terribly helpful well trailer park means that it was not within their contemplation at the time of this document this easement was a stab not for those kinds of specific purposes but that's quite different from saying they couldn't contemplate that it could possibly be as free other than any do anything they wanted with the property you suddenly transform provide an easement into a fee of state because what would be the limits to this the only limit the judge firestone suggested was the physical dimensions of the product well that's not really a limit on