in two thousand and one when this crime was committed if mr vance here had sat down and read california california law to try to figure out if his one thousand nine hundred five juveniles you cation was a strike  that basically the reference to two seven is seven b which is the list of all the crimes that are considered strikes that that that that changes after prop twenty one so after two thousand it changes and so that his his crime now he would have been on notice that that that second degree robbery was now considered a strike but in the juvenile context for himself lucky me before here in the in his case argued well that lock in provision applies to the second requirement but it doesn't apply to that final requirement that the juvenile had to have been adjudged a ward of the juvenile court because he committed an offense listed in seven o seven b and because that's written in the past tense he would have thought well i wasn't a judge to award of the court because i committed a seven zero seven offense in fact on that judgment i reason a person of average intelligence noticed that that that their crime was going to be a crime or that their punishment would be increased in that way then it's a violation of the due process clause so it's not technically an ex post facto claim  as wildly departed from bully well i need to show that eight that a reasonable person and average intelligence wouldn't have known that their conduct was prohibited and that by reading the statute in the way that correctly but it's certainly not not considering it in a way that would have given someone noticed that there that their one thousand nine hundred five juvenile adjudication was going to now be considered a strike and so construed that way well i believe that that the california court did that incorrectly i think that the way that they have they've now given future people notice that that's the way it's going to be construed  before the court had construed it that way if somebody came after my client for example would know this is how it's construed that they have noticed but somebody you know mr spear when the courts hadn't ruled on that didn't have any one it is a strike and he just didn't use the word due process clause but he didn't he didn't you know he said it was a violation of due process but he didn't argue beyond that and the court and the magistrate court and the district when they looked at it didn't interpret it in that way they just said look there's no federal question here well if you had said my question as to whether it was exhausted or not well i think i mean mr pitts you're raised it in the way that he could i think he  arguing in the state court look you should read this time section deal way i'm saying you should read it and so that was the only way he could have raised it at that point and then he came into federal district court and said this is a due process should go back to a court and do that i think that he raised it as as best he could in the state court and the state court by convinced by interpretating that subsection d the way they have eight you know i also think this court could find is our contention that this issue should not be certified for the reasons the my district court in adopting the magistrate's ruling this is not a federal question and it was not a federal question as raised by  in the state courts the claim that was raised in the state courts was purely a misapplication of california sentencing law it was not raised in the manner that was if that appellant is portrayed it before the federal courts and in fact if the certainly on notice when the court the court of appeals ruling in this case state court of appeal citing prior authority ruling on this claim and appellant never raised this claim in the federal manner that it was raised in the the claim was raised through the state court system and that is that the california court missed apply its sentencing law in this case and in fact the most recent case