hide or somehow further concealing the commission of a criminal offense by taking some affirmative act to cover up the crime i don't think i would agree with that entirely i believe under the expense to restack shoot it is broader than just concealing or hiding  a crime or a criminal could it could be helping the person to avoid capture by giving him food or shelter but the question i asked is isn't the the legal policy i mean both of those offenses notion felony and therefore harboring or accessory after the fact is a crime log in again because i think those cases had different statutes before them they were able to focus more on the concealment and if you look at the language that the court are different as well and i believe that the court in those cases improperly focused on what the underlying crime was that it was accessory to murder accessory to a crime that resulted in the death of an individual and we don't have that here california as i understand it includes within the scope of the statute someone who protects his child yes so your argument is that someone who protects his child after having gauged in some sort of malicious certainly violates this particular statute it is not morally reprehensible it is understandable in fact that a father or a mother would bring their son inside the home given food and if the cops were out looking for him for half not parade him right out there wreck i would argue that well nobody's been prosecuted for that in my in my experience was there anyone who helped somebody who was trying to avoid being there are limitations in the statute that's correct and would like to see that that's a crime involving moral turpitude there are issues again there of is that morally reprehensible is that more reprehensible than assault with a deadly weapon  in my opinion again what is punishable under this statute when you look at it under the categorical approach there are no elements here of fraud there are no elements that you can be proven of baseness or of depravity and so in my opinion is not as significant as whether or not again under the categorical approach here you look at the elements of accessory and see if there are elements that need to be proven or need to be then i think for example of this court's decision in goldstein where an individual was convicted of failing to comply with the reporting requirements for financial transactions again depriving the government of information which is similar to what's done kia impeding the administration of justice not allowing the government to see transactions that are more than ten thousand dollars and there's an interest in the government in seeing all of that doing that was not  ered to be a crime involving moral turpitude again even though it impeded the administration of justice it impeded the government from being able to do administer the laws and to be able to see for haps conspiracies or god trafficking or money laundering or things like  arrest trial or conviction which is what he pleaded to correct that's i mean that's the language of the statute again i don't believe that that makes this per se a base a vile or just praised crime  aiding someone again providing a meal to someone providing shelter to a spouse who you know is on the lam and knowing that that will allow them to continue on is not morally reprehensible in every case we you don't have to know that they've been indicted in fact i think you could be out with some friends and somebody gives them a fight that person commits an assault and you help them you know you put them in your car and you take them them off somewhere because you're not quite sure what just took pla know that your friend hit somebody and that's an assault most likely a felony and i believe that would qualify for the prosecution under the statute again without knowing that the authorities are actually going to be looking for that person or party looking for that person of that there's been an indictment or a complaint deceitful conduct you are essentially encouraging someone to to lie i believe the deceit element there probably takes that back into the first prong of more of a flawed type of of analysis rather than is that bas the and again going back to one other point i think it's important to note that that although there are board cases on this prison which are more recent which seem to rely again on the a tiny case and this court's decision in this case there section thirty two itself a felony i'm sorry it's a violation of section thirty two itself a felony if you're an accessory after the fact of a felony is that a felony my understanding is it can be a felony one misdemeanor ten or seventeen before handing o so much is at stake in being deported be given the benefit of the doubt in statutory construction but that's also not present before state our court we believe that that that cases distinction or not to really not have much much use here disciplinary proceedings the court there are much of the fact that this was an attorney who knew that his client had been indicted and i believe again it was a a monitor that he was aware had tak there's not a direct correlation i believe there are are differences in in the decisions that they've made and they rely heavily upon the miss prison cases and their analysis just isn't to be quite honest very deep they don't go into any real deep legal matters like those of the sort not correct to say that the supreme court's characterization of accessory after the fact is a crime involving more to moral turpitude was based on the fact that it was time to give an attorney expected to look at the pinion there are two separate parts of it you might  impede justice in the next paragraph of the opinion where the court is talking about whether or not to approve a disciplinary recommendation that's where the court starts the supreme court starts to go into the actual time the feel of the attorney violation of the statute is a crime involving moral turpitude taking that and putting it in the context of this kind of a case where we're not allowed to look at the motive or the underlying conduct i think that's that's a very helpful precedent there are other presidents from from definition that upon which the the board in this court again agree contains a great many descriptive phrase not just the crave when you see in this court case you never see the word you crave the alone you usually see it in conjunction with vile and base and i think that's very interesting when you look up those words in the definition in my in the dictionary in my case the american heritage dictionary you find that by all means you're pretty waved in noble post i'm discussing just those terms but the entire definition of the cia and cheat can i ask you the following question requires a bit of a narrative if you don't mind imagine a young woman she's with her boyfriend the boyfriend outside of a car hit somebody pretty hard looks like a criminal assault she says to the boyfriend let's get out of here as the sirens come in the background she takes him home and she says you better stay here tonight don't go outside you're going to get in of leveraging would you put me up for the night because i can drive back to cambridge massachusetts where the semester starts in a couple of days and therefore i think i can get away with us when the father says yes you may spend the night with me is that intent to impede justice yes it does yes part of the story yes it does he was sheltering is only daughter's life has died ten years before she she is entirely dependent upon him for the protection and they're going to charge her only as a way of leveraging her to be a witness against him at the underlying conduct you know why is she more morally culpable but he is because because she because her conduct reflects a specific intent to impeach justice no less than misprision a felony for harboring a fugitive taking ninety one i think i can say without fear of contradiction that yes they have and thank goodness that we don't in every respect view everything the same way that we did then especially when we're trying to discern what involves moral t e what's the moral turpitude here the moral turpitude here it's committing accessory after the fact which requires as and as a necessary element an affirmative act of concealment of a felony from the authorities obstruction of justice well i have to say that technically yes because because i had spent years of my life litigating ventura type issues and so under ventura and thomas the answer to your question for me has to be yes because they weren't thankfully my time has expired thank you very much made and that the elements of this crime of accessory are not in the know themselves per se categorically based by old craved they are not cruel or violent doesn't require any of those elements providing shelter to a friend