good morning your honor my name is jeffrey sklar's and they please the court there are two issues presented in this appeal st whether the district court abused its discretion by entering a post judgment payment an average of connecticut law and nd whether the district court improperly allowed post judgment discovery not concerning assets of the judgment debtor turning to the issue of the payment order the the relevant facts are as follows this is a diversity case of connecticut law applies the plaintiff obtained a twenty one million dollars judgment against the defendants and that judgment has been appealed and is pending before another panel of this court in connection with the post judgment activities plaintiff requested a weekly payment order in connection with connecticut law at the time of the entry of judgment the individual debtor mr greer had two sources of income wages from his employment and rental income property in rhode island by the time of the hearing on the weekly payment order the there was no longer any rental income the lease it terminated therefore the only asset mr grier had subject to a weekly payment order would have been the wage income as the property since been rented it is not to the best of my knowledge that it was renewed throughout two thousand and there's essentially two dollars balance there's two elements that have to be looked at by according to terminating the weekly payment order st after a hearing in consideration of the judgment debtors financial circumstances so that's the initial analysis the courtenay there's no requirement but it may order an installment payment reasonably calculated to facilitate payment of the judgment thus the prompt the primary be the primary thing the court has to do is ascertain what assets the defendant has to pay a judge pay a judgment in this situation the only asset available was the wage income now under and full financial disclosure was made  the amount of funds subject to a wage levy or a wage execution is limited to twenty five percent of disposable income so at the time of the entry of the judgement the weekly payment order here the only asset available for collection would have been the twenty five percent net income from the defendant now given that the remedy for noncompliance of a weekly payment author is resort to wage levy to read the statutes can grow and lay it would you can't have a situation where the only asset is wages yet you issue a collect a collection payment or weekly payment order of more than twenty five percent specific to twenty five percent though only applies to earning it doesn't apply to rent rental under the definition of earnings right it's not retro so you're simply are unique to us that even if someone where a judge said you can receive this bonus when i include that even though it's obviously not certain what a person's bonus is going to be you're saying that's completely off limits to a judge to make those kinds of assessments there's nothing on the connecticut law that would prohibit that it's very fact it very fact specific inquiry and in the bell fund a case which your honor references there what happened there it was a family owned company and basically the defendant's parents could decide whether or not to pay him or not pay him that's not the circumstances you no testimony taken taken at that at that time the the circumstances underlying the judgment i think certainly the had or had reasons why the property would would have difficulty being rented given who the landlord would be there was no specific facts stated either why or why not the property would not would not be rented but i think the the inquiry should be at the time of the weekly payment order what are what are the actual facts and the fact was that there was no rental income coming it in the bell font a case there it was it was a situation where the defendants the judgment debtors parents had literally had actual control over how much money they don't doubt and could withhold those funds and therefore that's if the judge is in a apprised of any reason to think you can't rent the property it had granted in the previous years for sit stand still portions or all of those years it's hard to see how the judge abused its discretion or erred and in including rental property painting the property would be rented but i don't believe there i don't believe there was there is no evidence that the property would it would be read would be rented it was simply it was that the lease expired and in that interim period no one had rented the property and given the circumstances and underlying the judgment against that if the defendant certainly that's a major change in circumstances given the nature of the the landlord that now has the judgment against him for what are the facts on the ground at the time of the entry of judge of the weekly payment order and if the circumstances change the plaintiff certainly can come back and ask that the payment order be increased in connection with increase income it shouldn't it shouldn't be there is no income now we're going to make him pay we're going to make the defendant pay more because that would be out of that would essentially be saying we're going to increase a wage garnishment in excess of twenty five percent happen in the new action i think you're right i think you're right your honor i as we said in our reply brief i think it is moot on account of the new action they would and they would be entitled to discovery there however we believe it is wrong  cited in in our brief in the motion for pay payment the nd circuit has previously held that you shouldn't have to go get a contempt citation against you simply to to appeal an appeal in order and i think this is where pendant jurisdiction or pool or collateral the collateral or rule would apply to allow the court to proceed against mr greer in the amount of two hundred and ninety six dollars pursuant to connecticut law when it took into account the prior rental of a piece of property in newport rhode island based upon the facts at the time of that hearing that had shown that the property had a history of being rented and certainly under connecticut general statute fifty two th concerns weekly payment orders there's really an equitable balancing and the court is not limited to just considering we just consider one type of income or another the court has to look at the financial circumstances of the judgment debtor overall and then also look at what is a payment reasonably calculated to pay for the judgment and judgment in this case which was  briefing of the plaintive i think it's pretty clear from the limited case law in connecticut that there's no and the statute itself that there's no strict formula for deciding  what weekly payment order should be the court's given some equitable discretion to fashion an order that balances the needs of the judgment creditor with the circumstances of the judgment debt jurisdiction over that denial of the motion for a protective order because st it's not a final judgment according to statute but secondly it doesn't meet the collateral order doctrine that would be an exception to that and for the same reason that most discovery orders don't satisfy the collateral order doctrine which is really the rd part of it is that the orders effectively on reviewable on appeal  panel of this court has said before is that the object of that particular discovery who has a motion for protective order denied can then resist compliance and then in which case there would be a contempt order and then that would be something that would be appealable to this court but as it as it stands the defendants didn't go that extra step and file before they had resisted compliance and there was a contempt order against a party in the situation well i believe it is it in less there was no if there is jurisdiction the court has the district court has wide discretion as to issues that the concerned discovery and this court won't reverse unless there's an and to engage in an investigation of the assets of the judgment debtors wherever those assets are located and also the judgment creditor to try to find concealed or hidden ass assets and to that and lower courts in this circuit and have found that with respect to question discovery directed toward parties and their financial affairs there has to be somewhat of a heightened showing that there's a reasonable need to ask those questions of of those non parties and there are really two types of situations one would be where there are fraudulent transfers and the other would be were there some type of alter ego liability and in this matter before the district court was evidence from the deposition transcript of mr greer which was   new haven and the various related entities that are referred to in the briefing are not run like most normal corporations with that type of separateness that mr greer is is on all the boards of directors he's had check signing authority with his wife and the district court lists a number of facts in coming to his decision and those are were cited by plaintiff by the plaintiff when he che cked in to the defendants motion for a protective order so based on that i submit that the district court did not abuse its discretion in allowing discovery of the of the gone party entities and less the court has any questions i don't have anything further thank you debtor i think is set forth well in the integrated control case which is a connecticut case written book by judge dorsey and specific specifically what what what what he says in this is cited in our brief is discovery related to the assets of non debtors is permissible when there has been a reasonable belief that they have received assets transferred from the judgment debtor or a rd party is believed to be the alter ego of the judgment  these companies there's no evidence of money flowing from the debtors or mr greer to these entities in fact the extensive post documents were turned over the only money flowed from that the rd party that there was some evidence certainly some evidence to support the idea independent of his confession that this was in fact cocaine right you just don't think was enough yes judge it is price in price we said a defendant bryce sets a standard that this circuit has followed for the past twenty years and by looking at the facts of this case and if accepting that what i believe boils down to just a description of white powdery substance it would erode the standard and this is in this is why i believe that the only description of the substance was white powder that was the only description given during the trial of mr croy first off no foundation was laid to describe what cocaine even looks like there was no testimony from an expert or law enforcement to describe cocaine in general or even or even being a white powder that mr you know x anyone who's watched television can fill and then there's there's also a dozen other white powdery substance is that it could have been and so i believe that when you look at bryce there needs to be some more even though bryce doesn't lay out  formular checklist it does give a standard to look at as a species for a gun that was worth three hundred dollars it was in a parking lot in a car in a parking lot and every indication of this transaction indicates that  illicit substance right the gun the gun itself i would argue doesn't have any value to mr crow act he made clear in his testimony that he needed to get rid of it in addition he didn't treat the substance that he received with any value and didn't even treat it like cocaine he said that he gave away half of it and then could last the rest of it he never used that these people exchanges and white powdery substance that they were believe was credited that it was a white powdery substance in a plastic bag that is the way you would package cocaine i think he said this was the packaging for cocaine in his own experience right he referred to it as standard package packaging for buying saying that he had bought cocaine numerous times in the past let me give you this scenario j f k airport case where someone is told bring this white powdery substance into the united states when put in a mortgage it to people in a sign that task one person yes that defendant and i had this white powdery substance we're told to deliberate for x number of dollars you're saying that's not that's not enough on the price it's not not under bryson a bracelet is not a standard again if you if you look at the facts of this case compared to the standards set forth and brace then there was no care high high cash paid for for the substance