specifically whether the people's complaint satisfies illinois fact pleading standards the defendants lost on this issue in the trial court they could have and did not seek a certified question on the issue so accordingly we requested that the court limit this appeal to the two certified questions that were accepted now the first question asks whether as the trial court held the people must be made and through a misrepresentation with intent that others rely to state a claim under the consumer fraud act the trial court reached this holding i were lying on a single sentence from one thousand nine hundred ninety two decision of the illinois supreme court people verses in the halling this morning i will explain why why the trial court should not have followed that sentence it is obviously inconsistent with the plain language of the statute it was not necessary to the whole thing in the context in which it was made and it was subsequently superseded by the illinois supreme court's two thousand and two decision and robinson vs toyota motor corporation i will start with the plain language of the statute the new me harlem court purported to be construing section t respectfully request that the court make that clear in its opinion that bad statement is inconsistent with the statutory language and we would urge the illinois supreme court ask the court to urge the illinois supreme court to take the case because we do think this is a very important reading just part of your complaint using misrepresentations and other deceptive or unfair practices that diamond and the other defendants have a deuced consumers to enter into risky on affordable loans and countries other also court reached a very broad ruling here the trial court said that in all cases the attorney general has to plead a misrepresentation with intent that others rely there are many claims i mean some claims like omission claims concealment cla intent is required under the statute and we are more than happy to plead that but other types of claims simply don't lend themselves to intent allegations for example the consumer fraud act lists and number after section too many many her s violation is when a defendant failed fails to provide the requisite notice of cancellation to q file ations occur when a defendant fails to refund a consumer's money after the consumer has asked for a refund reading of exactly i mean the expressed language of the statute is that it prohibits a variety of misrepresentation false statement type claims and then it says or the concealment suppression own mission  any material fact within ten others rely on the concealment suppression or omission of such material fact is expressed that the intent requirement applies only to concealment suppression or omission claims and in our view is that the general assembly intended that for a reason and that's because if you're going to hold people responsible for what they don't say there's a real risk that you could sweep up a lot of inadvertent conduct but it's quite different when you're talking about holding people responsible for what they do say become so that your impression of what it says correct based on what in the legislative history or what caseload is the supports that we are relying solely on the plain language of the statute and that's what the court calling relied on it was interpreting section two it didn't have a case citation for this proposition and they clearly misread section two because section two limits the intent requirement to concealment suppression or omission planes and then it goes i'm to say that section she was to be construed consistently with the federal trade commission act although those six are different gervinho itzhak if one isn't a mirror of the other i know the language of the two acts are not the same but it was clearly the general assembly's intent that the type of conduct that one could be held responsible for under the illinois consumer fraud act would be the same as what you could be held responsible under the federal law surely but where the wording differs  will the wording differs i'm with respect it's actually more favorable to the people because it expressly says that the intent requirement applies only in concealment suppression and omission claims the federal law does not those cases are all involve private parties and i refer you to the if we were asked is that those cases don't reflect the statutory language but the court is not required to go there in this case because the only case that involves the attorney general claims that the illinois supreme court has has made this statement and is the e n e hauling case and i would like to walk the court through any hauling to explain why the statement was dicta in the context in which it was made so first i am at the outset of the opinion this is a page four hundred eighty eight the court in me any hauling correctly described the elements of a claim brought by the attorney general or a state's attorney and those elements come from section seven and section two and the three elements that the attorney general could reasonably conclude that the action is in the public interest that the defendants are engaged in a trade or commerce and that the defendants are engaged in an unfair or deceptive act of practice the court did not bear at the outset of the pinion identify a requirement that the attorney general need a misrepresentation with intent that others rely now the court made the statement on which to have relied in the context of dealing with section two but that wasn't the basis for the trial court i'm sorry it was dealing with count two but that wasn't the basis for the trial court's holding on count too bad how it was dismissed because the attorney general failed to plead that the misrepresentations at issue with material the missing element was materiality it wasn't a failure to plead a misrepresentation with intent that others rely and then this our understanding is confirmed by the way the court any any hauling dealt with count nine count nine was an omission claim and the court there said consistent with the statutory language that it was dismissing cow at nine for a failure to plead that others rely on it pointed out however that count nine was not a misrepresentation claim the implication being that if it were a misrepresentation claim the elements would be different as the statute provides and there would be no vironment now the closest that the court in any hauling came to the holding that the trial court identified here was on page five hundred and this is where the court out with counsel levon and thirteen it dismissed these counts in a very conclusory manner and among the reasons it gave is because the people did not own ledge that the defendant intended to induce reliance on the misrepresentations at issue respectfully the clerk should not way it resolves the first question presented is going to have to disregard some language in the hauling and the best route by far is to disregard that language that's inconsistent with the statute and further confirmation comes from the robinson case in two thousand and two after any following the court stated in robinson that recovering may be had for unfair as well as deceptive and ducked under the consumer fraud act thereby making clear that the talking about deception and it goes on to say there's another type of claim available under the consumers consumer fraud act and it's an unfairness claim and unfairness claims don't necessarily involve misrepresentations because  three factors for identifying a fairness claim are whether the practice offends public policy whether it is oppressive and whether it causes consumers substantial injury so the robinson court does go on to say we have two types of applies to both private parties and the attorney general but dispositive distinction and this goes actually to the second question presented here which i will get to between seven and ten is that ten eight requires private parties to show  to wait for consumers to be harmed but i guess to your question with regard to the first question i mean we do believe that private parties should not have to show misrepresentations with intent to induce reliance however know the only time that they go and i supreme court you know has made this statement you have to show misrepresentation with intent to induce reliance clearly in conflict with the statutory language in the context of an attorney general claim is  the halling case and in that case it was dick death for the reasons that i've explained the decision is internally inconsistent about what elements the attorney general needs to show and so therefore this court is going to have to disregard at least some of the around them i know they've said it for well if the court i do believe that the private party cases are distinguished or as i said if the court feels bound by i'd be on my supreme court statements we would respectfully i was at the court make that very clear i'm in the opinion because we do believe that the illinois supreme court if necessary should revisit this issue because as i think the panel agrees the clear language of the statute makes clear that a consumer product claims are not limited to misrepresentation claims and then one misrepresentation claims are plaid intent is not a necessary element of the claim that is clear not only from section two itself it's completely from the federal cases u pon which section two it was modeled is clear from the per se violations with which by their nature are not intent based claims and that's also clear from section seven b which describes the remedies  attorney general can see when he or she brings a claim and that section says that the attorney general can see enhanced penalties if he or she proves intent to defraud the implication being that the attorney general can see where to marry penalties in cases where she doesn't prove anything about the intent so i think i guess going back to one question perhaps section b is an important distinction seven b between private party claims and attorney general claims because it does draw that distinction between claims that where intent is pled and claims where intent is not pled i would like to briefly talk about two arguments that appear in the defendant's brief the first is that our approach would make every breach of contract a consumer fraud act claim that is interact and we recognize consistent with this court court's holdings that a breach of contract rises to the level of the consumer fraud act violation only if the defendant's actions sufficiently implicate consumer protection in current concerns and protective and content to this requirement by looking for things like a pattern of misconduct or deception or some other aggravating factor in this case we clearly played a pattern of misconduct we pledged that fifty complaints have been filed against these defendants with the attorney general's office and then the attorney and that these defendants or one of these defendants the primary defendant has settled similar claims resulting in consent decrees twice in the past so clearly this is not an ordinary breach of contract claim it involves the type of pattern of misconduct that sufficiently implicates consumer protection concerns if you will conclude other cases and i believe it could have been something that they would have cited that say there's been a lot of discussion back and forth about how the course of action state the cause of action but we'll see there's only one case dealing with this issue that deals with the the action or it isn't i don't think you get to pick and choose but unlike from the various cases the morning here is it really sure to be prologue there needs to be some form of intense b failure to give notice question that's not what was but it is actually a complaint in front of the trial court is that right well it was one of the numerous allegations but i just know that that's not what was people intended for the person who did not receive the necessary document intended them to rely upon the document that the fraudulent person do not give them it would be intense injury lawyer what they didn't get it would be if that that's not part of the question i gave you examples of the types of allegations where the court has ruled that the intent was required he didn't say that intent was required only failure the beast in him where as the states that are there per se x but if we look at the other allegations regarding supposedly deceptions misrepresentations were concealments that's the only case on the subject says yes intent is required otherwise this whole game trust me argument the state can make every reach of relied on the section in the trench held he must have that no matter what the allegation in their complaint which you can just a very short portions you put the pastry of your pre the age you refer to the actions of your journalese right and so and again i just can't understand how the supreme court is discussing rug is sufficient for allegations of eight it's a fraud complaint brought by the  language you know how can you hail a remedy if you don't have engine nothing has happened wrong everybody got exactly what they want but we're still pedal to penalties and damages you just i can sense there must have been a harm in order for them to remedy it if there is no harm there's nothing for them to remedy and as i said this is not a case about what may happen in the future they're alleging in this case and it could that's what we're here to talk about now that the broader picture about any case they may want to bring in the future we'll discuss what of any material fact with intent that others rely on the concealment suppression or omission of such facts just as calm as you asked what the legislative history shows i would seem that the legislative history is not necessary when the language is so clear expressly the intent requirement applies only to concealment suppression and omission claims justice when there were a number of questions about the per se violations that were played here these restrict the liability violations and they were dismissed by the trial court because the trial court believed that the attorney general needs to plead and prove a misrepresentation with intent that others rely and on that basis he dismissed strict liability violations there simply is no way to understand that ruling that's consistent with the statutory language matter opposing counsel suggested that the attorney general going forward under our theory is going to i guess essentially no longer have to clear the intent when pleading concealment suppression or omission claims that's clearly and correct there is a difference between a misrepresentation which requires a false statement of the consumer fraud act it modified some of the elements that were required under the common law and among those elements would be a requirement of a misrepresentation with intent to deceive the general assembly made a decision that more lenient proof requirements when necessary to better protect the public and ensure a fair marketplace and so there for it in section two it is not limited to misrepresentation claims expressly and it requires intent only for concealment suppression or omission claims it says it's to be construed consistently with the federal law which does not require a misrepresentation with intent to deceive it provides for per se violations which are strict liability it includes section seven b which i think having given it some thought is the best way to distinguish attorney general claims from pot private property claims because section seventy express lee states that the attorney general gets enhanced penalties if the attorney general can prove the defendant acted with intent to defraud the clear implication being that in the load mary case the attorney general can still proceed without a showing of  intense and then i would simply reiterate that if this court feels that it is balanced by ian he hollinger decisions involving private parties we respectfully request that the court made clear that those cases are inconsistent with the statutory language and ask the illinois supreme court to resolve this very serious problem turning to the second question present to the trial court that the people must plead improved damages and cause a shim it cited no with the o t for this proposition and there is court clearly confused private party actions with attorney general actions because of attorney general actions it was anticipate by the general assembly that the attorney general could take preemptive action to stop threaten to harm and that's exactly part of our meeting here we are seeking an injunction we're seeking to stop these defendants from engaging in the type of misconduct that they have engaged in and my closing counsel is simply incorrect with regard to the consumers at issue when he says that these people got exactly what they wanted a complaint includes allegations that these people did not get what they wanted they got home repairs that were incomplete that were shoddy that were unfinished and they got financing