case number three for argument today is united states against  ok i think it's quieted down mr t but your honors a man please the court the appeal that we have today arose from a six day jury trial as well as a two day suppression hearing there were at least two issues that were raised in our previous i'd like to focus today if it pleases the court on the one clean legal issue that is presented in the briefs and that being whether this court's holding in the united states versus williams which extended ran into the collective knowledge doctrine is good law and should continue to be followed it is norton's position here that williams and its incorporation of rent to say that the subject of intent of an officer an important for a probable cause determination should stay where it is in the record and that being the one officer making an arrest based upon probable cause that he himself has developed that should not be extended into the collective knowledge anything other then that as an objective matter if the police force has probably will cause doesn't it just doesn't matter what the officer making the arrest knew or thought or cared or what crime he it just doesn't matter to you sounds like you're asking us to disagree with the supreme court well if that's the case your honor that we have to disagree with the supreme court in hensley we have to then disagree with this court then napster and its other cases where we say or where this court has said that objective reliance on the part of the arresting officer is in fact the very first test that we are the  still relied upon a bible for governments and defendants in the circuit regularly they aren't there in fact relied upon by the district court in this case and so if it is the case here that the circuit is no longer going to adopt that test or no longer to apply that test that it needs to be very specifically stated because the courts of this circuit still apply to ask are they still apply the three prong test that it announces and it still applies this objective reliance test inconsistently in fact this court applied it as recently as two thousand and fifteen in the sands case so it's not a situation where this is an ever and least in this circuit has been expressly disapproved of or not followed in fact as i said within it at least the last two and a half years even this court has has applied that that test to a collective knowledge case and so again if that is to be the ruling then i guess i would ask for the purposes of the court for the purpose of the practitioner's below that we just simply say that the napster and three parties are no longer the law because as i said the district court here relied on it the government here allied upon it the mr norton relied on it it is the law that is relied upon by court's below simply a wholesale i suppose repudiation of the argument which the courts time the longer than necessary so if there are questions i'm happy to answer them if not i'm happy to reserve the rest of the time for  it sounds like there's no real dispute as to that at this point us or shells has his radar gun he clocks snorting going seventy two in a seventy mph zone that gives him probable cause to pull over norton that testimony wasn't contrary to the laws of nature it shouldn't leave this car with a firm and definite conviction that the district court erred once you get that seventy two in the seventy mile per hour zone that's probable cause stops valid everything that happens after that is permissible under the fourth amendment and there's no challenge beyond that in terms of i guess mr norton second argument on appeal as relates to the transcript given that that hasn't been raised in oral arguments and we think it's pretty clear the none of the confidential sources statements are being offered for the truth of the matter asserted mr no one has and pointed to a single statement that is being offered for the truth of the matter started we would rest on our brief and let you do two  i would have no clue what that meant right i could imagine an instruction that says something like what you've heard the statements from the informant you can't consider them for their truth but you can consider them because what other people are saying the meaning of what other people are saying may depend on what this is you know the conversation i'll meet you at five o'clock at the corner followed by honor what defense council the government and the court agreed upon was that the court would be told the confidential source the statements were not being offered for the truth of the matter asserted it did tell the jury that the coconspirator statements were being offered for the truth of the matter  but there was no instruction given along the lines your honor just said other than being told it wasn't being offered for the knowledge your honor we didn't rely on the case judge easterbrook brought up and so truthfully i'm not able to give any guidance to the court on that final shot almost nobody ever does it's one of the most ignored for the supreme court in the last twenty years and i apologize for that your honor but what i would say is even under the three part tests set forth in cases like williams this case fact pattern fall squarely within that right but as an experience practitioner i'm asking if there's confusion in the district courts about the meaning of the collective knowledge doctrine and how it applies to your has been my experience that it actually has been brought up all that much i understand that's not really answer to your honor's question in terms of whether there's confusion in terms of the case to clear it up and so we have another piece it's a seventy two and a seventy i  think it is this is not a case where the court has to reach that issue because of the seventy two and the seventy that's right your honor so unless this court has any further questions we would ask that you affirm for the reasons stated in our brief much just briefly to address the two points that were brought up by mr whalen first the seventy two in the seventy issue as we said in our briefs we don't believe that this court needs to give the district court determination the seventy two deference because ultimately what the district court did was not make a credibility determination she just simply ignored all of the evidence contrary as we the way the seventy two was developed is frankly a bit more complicated than what mr whalen would cite as we see from the the record there was another dea agent agent roberts and that played a technique that he refers to as pacing where he tries to drive approximately the same speed as the other vehicle and then look down at his butt ometer and make some sort of estimate as to the speed of course he testified at the suppression hearing that that method is not all that accurate so i give in the darkness that he was experiencing on that day this was in november it was very early in the morning but he determines the speed to be between seventy and seventy five of course seventy being within the speed limit that the district court has determined existed what age or or what officer schultz then says to the court is that i confirmed the prior reading of seventy two course the problem that is there is no prior reading of seventy two to confirm so his testimony essentially postulates a set of facts which did not exist so he then says well i then confirmed the seventy two which didn't exist with my radar equipment but i'm not going to provide any evidence of that radar equipment to the court it and indeed i'm not going to then issue a citation to mr norton for driving the seventy two in the seventy so what we would submit your honor says that the district court did not make what the disorder not say is that i find him to be credible what she essentially did was just simply ignore everything else and then simply accept the testimony despite all of the evidence to the contrary that's in the record so that's frankly how what was all the evidence to the contrary of this of the well it is the schultz is own testimony i mean when schultz tells the court that i confirmed the prior reading of seventy two is necessarily postulates that there was a prior reading of seventy two to confirm that reading doesn't exist agent robertson never testified that he had a rating of seventy two in fact he couldn't given the technique that he was using this pacing technique his testimony was on the low end he's driving the speed limit on the high end he's driving five over but there was never any testimony from age robertson who are talking about a dea agent and a state trooper who makes those kind of stops that's correct but again if the state troopers testimony is to be credited that he was confirming a prior reading the question i guess that from nortons standpoint is where is this prior reading why isn't that prior reading anywhere in the evidence in our submission is that there wasn't one that's what agent schultz actually did was to devise a speed which was my new fully above the speed limit and then go with that that is what we think the evidence shows and it certainly there's no evidence to the contrary as i said there is no radar reading that was provided to the court there was no citation that said seventy two and seventy that's that frankly we believe that the court should frankly credit robertson and then ultimately what was the test why and why he didn't want to provide that radar test or record you'd have to ask the government or are they simply didn't provide reading the transcript over is that we did ask him and he just simply did not have it within the court that day well it did mean it didn't exist well no but again this was a two day suppression trial i'd like to i like to point that out that there was an opportunity certainly between the conclusion of the first day in the beginning of the second day to go back into the records and find this reading and or find the citation for the seventy two neither of which are for the court but dead doesn't mean it doesn't exist and that doesn't mean the  lying i think it means for our purposes though in reviewing the record in front of us that indeed that it doesn't exist i mean it if it's not in the record for the purposes of appeal then frankly it is just as well as to not exist now whether in an  extendable sense that exists or not i suppose we could we could ask officer schultz but i think from a appellate procedure standpoint for the purposes of your honors and making the determination i think we have to accept the fact that it doesn't exist because it was never offered by the government and briefly with respect to the evidence with respect to the c h s the statements of the government has made this statement repeatedly that we've never identified a statement by the c h s that wasn't for the purpose of approving the matter sort of that's not true of the c h s in this case made a number of statements that the government would then incorporate into its argument specifically the statements about the quality of this particular batch of heroin this particular c h s was quite a fan of this batch of heroin as demonstrated by the fact that he was actually using it during the times of the recording and he made very complimentary statements about that here and this was ultimately then used by the government in its argument that that these are high level dealers that they are bringing in the best of the best for a mexican cartel so to say that all of these were just sort of you know chitter chatter i think would be correct and i think i mean just sort of the side when you really start using c h s rather than c i you again this is a question i think for the government this i think judge easter brooks question i think raises a good point which is that yes the instruction that was given to the jury was relied upon and agreed to by the defense and the government but the reason for that is ultimately because the statement of this court for all the problem of course is that there is no case at least in the seventh circuit which describes what context means if you can if you look you can start to sort of divine what it might mean from other cases but neither none of those are really the case that we have in front of us so you have a group of cases where you have a two party telephone conversation where they say well you need the testimony of the confidential informant to provide context because otherwise you have answers without questions and vice versa that's obviously not what we have here where we have a free wheeling discussion between up to a half a dozen different participants we don't need the c h s of statements to sort of explain why what is being said is being said the other the other way that it is described is simply to show that the that the discussion took place in the first place is essentially evidence that there was recall so neither of the explanations of context that are provided in in that we stood the federal circuit case watt seem to apply here and that's why we would say that this was in fact not s being used to provide context because there was no need to provide context to these statements these were in fact provided to show the things that the government wanted to show that being that mr norton was a drug if you look at the record in whole there is very little reference to mr gorton doing a whole lot of anything if you go throughout the six the six days of the of the trial we have the conversation the recorded conversation where he is appears to be an active participant in in these deals and then we have the four hundred thousand dollars that is taken from his vehicle that is essentially the entirety of the testimony that implicates mr norton and doing a whole heck of a lot of anything  flight he did go to mexico and i think there's a question as to herbs are not mexico to texas i suppose there's a question of whether that was that was flight but yes i think the testimony was actually it was actually you know i suppose but i think that if you take those out i think certainly the two strongest points that the government had i think in this case were the recording where obviously he is participating in a discussion of how you deal drugs how you make drugs those sorts of things and then finding four hundred thousand dollars of that with the proceeds in the back of his truck are certainly far more indicative of guilt perhaps than a pleasure trip to texas