represent growing russo and campus investors need in fact and the owner on this project i find myself here before you for the second time on this case previously court construed section one of them cancelling statute with section twenty eight and found that under this particular situation section twenty eight did not allow or statutory interest under that act it's sensually the court better found in my favor than ordered again the pro rata share based on your previous ruling plus court costs i believe directed me to prepare a written order before i could get the written order entered the next day the current trial court basically sent out a corrected order saying he felt that he had been incorrect or in error in refusing to  when that would apply and the court had not made any reference to a particular date from which interest within the crew we went back to the court because i filed a motion for a direction seeking clarification the court then found that interest under the interest act was due and owing from his initial judgment of december fourteenth two thousand and eleven and that is what brings us to you for the ordered pro rata share period you reversed specifically and directed that he enter in order for the program a share i do believe that that then becomes the law of court does not reconsider its ruling the really manage to provide not only for a determination of the program to share which you did but also interest on the pro rata share from end to end costs recoverable under to appeal to the illinois supreme court which was also denied and so i believe that for various reasons statutory interest and the mechanics nina act it has already been decided and decided in is that you only get one bite at the apple you can't keep coming back to the appellate court when it's plain court and saying i didn't get what i wanted and therefore give me another opportunity which is exactly what has happened in this case i think the argument was well the appellate court didn't render an opinion on that or they didn't address said or they must have been mistaken i take the position that words have meaning if that is the case then and i would also go on to say that if you look at section one of the mechanics means statute and when you look at that section what does what they have a lien on it says that you have a lien on the property or your labor and your services and interest and then it goes on to say this when it extends to an estate and so i think a proper interpretation of that statute is the lien that you have includes your right to interest under the act and if that is the case when you read section one then with section twenty eight which says the owner does not pay more than the contracted amount the lien has to be reduced pro rata that would include any interest and the act if if on the other hand if it were the case that the defendants take this stance it should read something like you get your lien for these things plus interest but that's not what it says you have only in for labor services materials and interest and so i think if you have a proper interpretation of section one and section twenty eight taken together says under this scenario beleaguer said well we really think that the mechanic's lien act which is a specific act trumps the interest act it's more specific and it's more recent and for those two reasons we don't think that interest and interest act applies we are putting all of our eggs in the basket and saying we should be paid the ten percent that that's really what they were saying and after hearing itself it to the tr said well i don't know if i would agree with that particular strategy here but you know so be it if that's what you're going to do in the first ruling the trial court found that they had waived their right on as well i think there are a couple of problems with the interest act argument first of all if interest under the interest act is due when does it start you reversed and remanded of course is was interesting under the interest act do we even have to pay it because we have this situation where either was tendered or tender was impossible  i know that basically under the interest act contender payment to stop interest unless it's excused either by a statute or by contract in this particular case i am until such time as you get your lien mavor you get your release of leaning in and all of those things you have your finger of course says they were kind of signaling back and forth that they were having some issues over over what was doing o emotion to stay payment i think that payment is now tender is now impossible the only thing i would say is they have always always insisted that if i am to tender payment it must include the ten percent the only time i got an offer of a release of lean was a conditional release which is i'll give you a release of lean if you will agree that we can still reserve this ten percent interest which i think had already been decided in my favor and so i think for various number of reasons and not the least of which is it's this huel year kind of fact pattern that we have we had  leaving and they're fighting among themselves about who gets what so i think for all of those reasons i don't think interest is is due an even the interest act at least in the alternative i think if you disagree with that then i think it's an open question and it should be remanded to the trial court for a hearing you know one at issue and so for those reasons we would the problem that we face there is no reference to any thing about interest in the can explain statute except the ten percent in section one and so then you're kind of stuck construing them can explain statute and what it is designed to do versus you know this kind of progress of payment situation don't you think of premier outlier i don't know how they arrived at that but it was not anywhere close to the we're back having that we have here later concrete company i do agree with counsel that words do matter in fact words of statutes that are on us that are a lot and that's where i think we have here i want to focus my comments on the fact that case there was no mention one way or the other of the interest on that korat award we were granted and they always granted and we understand that so we interpret that to be a statutory mandate from section one it was nondiscretionary torrie self executing mandate of the cancelling act under section one to look at such and twenty eight and say specifically twenty eight excludes interest when it's pro rata award that's contrary to the overall mechanic's lien act in general it's contrary specifically to the need and the intent of the interest on judgments and fact interest on a judgment award whether it be under the civil procedure or under built in specific awards under different acts it's it's designed to make the claimant whole for time value loss of money that's the purpose of it it's a preservation of economic value it's very different so if you bifurcate a mechanic's lien filing in this case you have the claim itself usually for goods and services and you have the interest so you have meant of something provided and you have a recruitment for something wast time value money there are two different elements and that's the exact interpretation that goes to section one of them camps lean that there are two separate issues that you to look at as the principle and the interest and that's goes to the  interest to separate elements that does not change when you look at section twenty eight in fact to dive into even deeper into a statutory interpretation issue at the end of section twenty eight it says i quote only to the extent his meaning owner is liable under his contract as by this act provided not as by the section provided but i guess the act provided and that act includes section one section one is the closest thing we get to in the cancelling act as it is clear as mud at times to be in a definition section of the act in general it defines what a contractor is and within that we kind of see of confusing section of what is where that one interests principle applies to the lien but again the the intent in the purpose and the clear need for recoupment of interest is for that time value of money and that should not change for the program at amount and i'll make that point using two examples one being the premier letter case that's exactly what happened in that case there were three counts two of them were a contract and bond claim but count one was a the cancelling claim and when that claim was reduced to a pro rata mount the court also the court examined applying interest of that and because inferred it was mandatory it was non discretion torrie and therefore self executing and in an intent from the sport handed down to the truck court and in the remain and to apply that interest rate as  the man's from the time it's due in other words in most cases from the time the original invoices of the product believe or whatever were due back when the world happened that's what's fair that's what makes sense that's the purpose of our cross appeal because we stand firm with my main point here that section one controls it is mandatory and it should have been self it skewed in the remained of the first you know th statute and this is so looking at the language in i would like to point out another section to canceling the act section twenty one interest and take this step further under their arguments in any circumstance when pro rata share is do they consider it until if the side they want to pay without the threat of that's certainly not the commonsense or the intent of the statute so if you look at section twenty one so should twenty one is the section that of that says that if you're subcontracted visions of section one els second deal is whether trial court's order is in or with a mandate i don't know how much clearer the other parties can be when they ask you please reconsider and please make sure that when you reconsider you give us interests under the act and you deny that and if you have denied that specific request have you not then denied the very relieved that they are now before you asking for i mean i guess you could have said oh i hate by the way we're reversing a remanding the us and you don't get interesting you don't get this and you don't get that but the truth is you addressed that issue when you answered their petition for leave for a rehearing by denying i when you deny it that should be their answer they don't get it and they have no right to be here before you again on the second time on the same issue so i think that's the law of the case the appellate courts are very clear on that point i would also say that i don't think that interest under section one is mandatory you don't see any language there are talks about shall or we die racked or any of that and i don't believe that in that particular section when you look at the use of the word and it means apply us between is clearly  or what you have done or supply and interest there's no talk about time use any of that kind of thing and while i understand that i don't believe that applies in this particular  situation i don't believe that your denial of their petition was inadvertent or that anything needs to be corrected and certainly the illinois supreme court didn't think so either when they denied the petition relief to appeal  if you look at all of the various sections and trying that the problem with the statute is it's nice if you can read one section to the exclusion of all the powders that's the problem with this particular i would say in those section one looks forward in terms of hey if you're going to be supplying materials or whatever here is what you get section twenty eight looks backwards in terms of now we have a situation where somebody has supplied something and we don't have sufficient find and then if you look at section three that talks about how you how you address all of these insufficient funds cases