that quote questions about the constitutional constitutionality of the language in the statute create their own ambiguity do you agree that aside from your constitutionality argument the length of the statute is plain and clear i do not agree that it's plain and clear there are parts of it that are plain and clear that are parts that are not let me explain what i mean by that what the secretary is saying about one thousand one hundred and fifteen dollars is they are saying that in order to do taht decide for this statute that gives additional compensation for veterans with children we're saying bring in the part of the deshon definition from child and one hundred and one for that is the dependency prong that's the interpretation that's consistent with what this court said in soup in soup it through s saying that the definition of child shouldn't apply and you know what you could not completely what we're saying is that there's a very specific reason that congress used the word and didn't in one thousand one hundred and fifteen and we can look to understand why t sukkah decision and in that decision this court looked at the word dependent parent and it said congress brought in the word dependent to limit the definition of parent in one thousand and fifteen same thing is happening here congress explicitly use the word dependent  and fifteen to give us some understanding of the word child and what i want for a man specifically to limit it that's consistent with what the court is saying in circuit because in souquet what the court was saying is that the adult th not a child under the statute any child who is not dependent on this that you know what we're saying is that any child that needs to lose that is not married that is under the age of eighteen incapable of support by the age of eighteen or between eighteen and twenty three that college is implicitly as this court found asuka dependent child and because that's implicit in the definition of child congress had to mean something when they add it explicitly into one thousand one hundred and fifteen if it's implicit in child they must have meant something by explicitly adding it either that or they're adding they don't understand what you're talking about and you look at are you saying when i went for it's not applicable or some help dependent alters the definition of what i want for no the veteran a legally adopted child or stepchild he's a member of the veterans household that's the three criteria right if this court uses that family relationship grouping to define child not that's in the definition of child  friend down the street as a child if not that not the veterans no relation a veteran but a child if their if on definition of dependent he meets if fred down the street is under the age of eighteen unmarried he would meet the definition of child in one on nature of children although i could see circumstances where it's not where there may be a divorce or the like and the child is in the custody of a different parent is not that better i mean in those cases you know they might be a child but word dependent but were not allowed in fifteen that has to mean something because it's implicit in the definition of child we know yes but they're using the word depend above in the general section that describes a whole bunch of categories and some of those people are not inherently dependant like spouses or parents and so it makes sense that they're using the word dependent to modify this entire class it may be that every child that meets the definition of want to one for different but that doesn't mean we should read out part of one o one for does it i mean look i am sympathetic to you i think that it makes no sense to have a policy that limits compensation in this matter too would give it to were adopted grandchildren and not dependent on adoptive grandchildren that makes no sense whatsoever particularly given the state of the country where grandchildren are caring for their grandkids all over the place but this is congress's problem isn't it i don't think it is and i would let me point out one thing your honor in terms of i mean it's just a bizarre way to do stuff satori construction to think that i mean isn't there and that basically says when you're reading statutes together you should presume that congress intended for them to to parents dependent on the veteran for support that suggests it's used congress's use that word twice so either they use that one time redundantly or spurs mostly or they meant something specific and both parent and child what they both have in common in this regard is both of them in their on grandchild and retreating time cousin and nephew number of people if they're dependent on upon the veteran for support yes we are and that would include friends down the street if he's dependent on the veteran for support he meets that definition problem with using the family relationship is wrong or to me a real argument which you haven't presented in this case isn't has implied equal protection challenge to this that i think we do raise that argument in our in our of waving the argument i didn't say you prosti even if we didn't press the arm and i think we did we asked the court to avoid it but even if we didn't address it in the court considers that to be some sort of waiver the actual equal protection violation appears in the veterans court's decision itself because what it does is it looks at that family relationship and it divides it down the middle and that's why it's been confusing or it is what is the rational this nation between here you know where there is no rational distinction between it because what you myself every person in this room has a fundamental right to define the makeup of our family and defining the fundamental makeup of our family says i can say i can raise my minor brother as my depend family relationships are good other family relationships are bad the congress draws a line they can draw a line through the fundamental rights if it's true it's true in all its systems where you have to meet certain criteria and even this one you know it seems like your argument could also go further than that and basically anybody that lives with these people and is supported by them keep that dependency compensation but why is it and this is  a i don't understand why you think this is some kind of strict scrutiny thing this is a rational basis to us and is that rochelle for congress to say even if as a policy matter i don't think it makes any sense is it rational for them say we're going to limit it to children and her and people who have a legal relationship in terms of an adoption rather than just anybody living in a household that ended up on them very if i have a fundamental right court has upheld numerous benefits programs welfare a broad term social security act the supreme court has upheld these programs over and over again that draw a line between different family classifications the amount of children divorced women and divorce women the supreme court is always up held always on a rational basis ground saying it's congress's position to draw lines in between different categories of needy people even if those lines do result in some inequality or not specifically being precise enough there's also different cases that are being cited here that are very factually distinct such as cases that struck the supreme court cases that struck down laws changing who can enter into these relationships in the st place for example on in some blocky red tailed out effect that was a statute that state law that prevented someone from getting married if they hadn't paid child support payments there's also one involving  pregnant women who are being forced to take leave and thus we're being penalized for having children so and another she's more it was preventing people from living together a woman was actually put in jail for living with her grandsons and there was a very large factual distinction there as your honour's noted the b men mr o'brien were not being prevented from being guardian and warning each other the v a has no interest in an illinois adoption law he has entered into and maintain that relations hip what is going on here is that he does not qualify for certain additional supplementary benefits because the way the definition of child has been created and that is not unconstitutional it is a rational basis there's certainly a rational to know your honor mr o'brien has the full choice under state law as to how best to care for the where this has come in is that the option that was chosen of guardianship does not meet this definition of child in title  would be unconstitutional we don't dispute that if it said only white adopted children get benefits but that would be a problem but obviously that's a different factual situation there's no fundamental right to obtain benefits regardless of the classification that congress exactly the same responsibilities towards the child that he would we're not the question is not whether in each specific factual circumstance for each person we could find a rational basis for that is whether the classification as a whole has any reason to any reasonable grounds to be found in the morning even if there has to be a rational basis for the classification but the supreme court has never required tundras to specifically explain in each other the rational basis is that to narrow the basis in order to preserve government resources the public face that certain trial that these immediate family relationships the parent child relationship are different than a relationship with a child who has other relations that are not directly but a lot biologically or legally a parent child relationship and state laws governing guardianship made differ in requirements from state law  certain objections based on cost of tuition at brown's but then was using them for a statutory interpretation purpose to argue that the veterans court should choose his interpretation of defendant the veterans court never ruled on the the secretary did below before the veterans start did address those arguments obviously not wanting to leave this issue on address but  under this court's jurisdictional statute i i don't believe that the court would have jurisdiction to insert new issues that were not the basis of the veterans tort decision if that's however there's no reason to discuss to rule on that that's the point purpose of a waiver of the waiver cases to avoid having to address these issues that aren't coming from the vet but aren't part of the decisions of the veterans  to conclude to address what mr bryant's counsel was indicating there is no dependency prawle and in such an one hundred and one it's all one definition and that there isn't any sort of distinction between the different elements of at appendix seventy three in the response brief of the court below the government said appellant presents a constitutional challenge and this is direct quote on section one hundred and fifteen on that as applied basis asserting he is excluded from receiving benefits that he is otherwise eligible for because he constitutional error in the veterans court decision is what this court can review and so we would ask the court to consider not applying the waiver doctrine to considering that argument i don't think that the court needs to get to it because even if this court finds that both prongs come in and even if this court apply is rational basis there's no rational basis for the government to say congress has given us a pool of money for additional dependents and we're going to conserve those resources by not giving it to a veteran that has additional dependents there is no rational basis in that whatsoever we ask that the co