hallways and they rooms and out they were what they actually paid for his cage rosenblatt i'm i'm not i'm term sure after reading your brief that i understand your client's claim substantial sections of the brief seem to say that as long as if a hospital is overcrowded it's fraudulent to bill for any patient after all even one in a regular room receiving full under the u b s zero four form or the cost report and they say the patient is given a patient room and the patient is not ok your your only claim concerns those patients who you say the hospital represented to be in regular rooms who were not that's correct let me explain further on you look of our stepdaughter that they felt to disclose the regulatory violations which was made in fact misleading then explain for materiality purposes anybody looking at those claims for medicaid medicaid recipients it hearkens hospital would rightly assume that that patient is given a patient room in a bed and that would be assuming that patient was sleeping in a hallway or a day room and a runaway bed for a hargrove because i thought you just said you were not making an argument that every claim was just right well it just takes something simple hospital has one hundred beds and admits one hundred one people and one of the people  on a cop someplace in a gym and not getting proper treatment i ask you if there's any problem with the claim submitted on behalf of a hundred and you said no and you're now making it sounded to me like the argument you would make if the answer were yes so is the answer yes or no the answer would be no for a express boss client the answer be no for the implied false or occasion the answer that every claim submitted for all hundred one patients was fraudulent in my sample and i don't know if that's where your stress was in the district court i completely understand why the district judge thr medicaid program paying for those patients as though they are in patient rooms and a hospital bed is this an up coding problem is there a different rate that should be reimbursed of people are being provided care but not in as nice a circumstance no you are it's a straight for false claim case where they are saying that the patients inpatient and they're not they're not being given a patient we so you're saying they're not entitled to collect any money for the service provider for those lesser until they're put into a patient room with a bed so it could be a day or two for all for a few patients on those those specific express false cl don't under the expressed false claim theri which is the most basic and direct claim hargrove is to many claims for patients and not providing the services they promise to provide the state of illinois the medicaid program on the cost of pork which the form that submitted yearly to reconcile the payments to harken second thing as they fell to disclosed those regulatory violations that they're over census and the fact they're over census is important because by telling medicaid that they're over census it's time medicaid is potential for these medicaid recipients to be sleeping in hallways and they were and not in patient rooms the third element is materiel and what would a reasonable person think to conclude in a reasonable person looking at these claims being submitted by universal health services park of hospital would assume that these patients were patient rooms or back with beds i believe this court  payments over those years i believe the law is is that when he based on the answer that question based on where the liability is found i think we can look at the so you would shift back to the narrower claim of theory for damages well obviously that's a rule issue we get to probably several years from now but i believe we will get about fairness and i think we all i think we have to a position that sleeping hallways and they rooms were not getting what they paid for moreover in addition to relying on the deficiencies identified by the district court this court can also were firm the dismissal it's complete because his claims are foreclosed by the public disclosure bar and because he failed to plausibly allege materiality i'd like to begin with the public disclosure bar because at least with respect to plaintiff's claims before march of two thousand and ten that for it is your restriction the public disclosure bar for him it's private plaintiffs from bringing claims that suits on behalf of the government where the allegations are already in the public domain and where the plaintiff is not an original source of those allegations the district court correctly concluded  plaintiff's claims of also claims act violations before may of two thousand and nine those claims were publicly disclosed by two audit reports that documented over capacity admissions at heart  hospital there was ordered reports for issued in march of two thousand and nine and in may of two thousand and nine the district court heard however in concluding that with respect to allegations of violations after may of two thousand and nine that those allegations were not in the public domain the district court reached that conclusion because it did not have the benefit of this court's subsequent decision in cause of action  s cargo transit authority in that two thousand and sixteen case this court made clear that alleging the continuation of violations that have already been publicly disclosed is transit authority between one nine hundred ninety nine and two thousand and four the plaintiffs in cause of action part suit in two thousand and twelve and alleged those violations had continued during the intervening period this court held admissions that were documented in the march and may two thousand and nine and it reports continued through the time that he filed his amended complaint in twenty fifteen all of those allegations  substantially similar to the allegations disclosed in the two audit reports and are therefore barred by the public disclosure provision the district court concluded that with respect even to the allegations before may of two thousand and nine that plaintiff was not barred by the public disclosure provision because he was an original source that conclusion was error because once again the court did not have the benefit of this court's later precedent in both kena verses and medline a decision issued after the district court opinion in this case this court made clear that the two thousand and ten and men minutes to the definition of original source apply retroactively without regard to the date of the underlying allegations the district court applied the pre two thousand whether the plaintiff has knowledge that is independent and materially adds to the allegations that are already in the public domain nothing in plaintiff's complaint which here really adds to the substance of the audit reports that disclosed the overcapacity admissions at heart and again this court's decision in cause of action controls the outcome of this case because in cause of action this court held that alleging the continuation of violations that had been publicly disclosed does not materially add to the substance of those allegations and does not render a plaint and original source for those reasons this court should affirm based on the public disclosure or if however this court concludes that it has jurisdiction it should nevertheless affirm the district court's decision because that court correctly concluded that the plaintiff failed to state a claim under any of his theories with respect to the narrowest of those theories the factual falsity theory plaintiff is alleging that when heart group submitted claims for inpatient services it was making it factually false representation because according to plaintiffs and in patient is a patient who receives a private patient rooms for the plaintiff does not point to anything in illinois law in federal law or in the relevant medicaid patients agreement that equates in patient services with a private patient for that  plaintiffs implied false certification theory also fails in the matter of law because the plaintiff is unable to meet the two elements of that claim establish by the u s supreme court in escobar and this court in sanford brown to plead and applied for certification claim the plaintiff must allege first that it offended made specific representations about the services that it was providing to the government and second the plaintiffs must allege that those specific misrepresentations were rendered misleading by the defendant's failure to disclose its violation of statutory regulatory or contractual requirements the plaintiffs fail to plead either of those elements in this case he fails to allege anything about the substance of the claims that part of submitted inpatient services in this case we don't know anything about alleged specific representations that were made by part of growth in submitting claims for payment in any event plaintiff's claim fails under the second over capacity admissions there is no allegation for example that the quality of care that hargrove rendered to patients when it was operating over capacity was anyway compromised by these overcapacity admissions so there is nothing about the alleged contractual or licensing violations here or that renders misleading the substance of any representations that hard to prove made in its claims for payments to the government belleview was not employed at i understand that so he has no firsthand knowledge doesn't have to have firsthand knowledge does he he doesn't have to have firsthand all in order here on earth but so does have to allege with and employee b who allegedly told him that during the period before march of two thousand and seven that there were over capacity admissions at heart through him but we don't know who those employees are this is a twelve which means which means that he needs to provide sufficient detail for this court to assess the plausibility of these very serious allegations that are being rendered and with respect to these two employees we don't know who our you know who what when where requirements cease to be that specified here the practice has been described time location who's doing it namely the management of the hospital plausibility of the fraud allegations and the possibility depends on whether these unnamed employees or it ministry gers or high level staff or on their other hand were part time members of the janitorial staff that positions that they had at the hospital affect the plausibility of their allegations that hard proof was violence and peace people had fairly low levels of organizations often know a lot about what's going on in them and what sounds it sounds to me like what you're describing is a credibility evaluation that would be very difficult on twelve b six your honor if these employees work five i was weak at heart of hospital in a low level filing position  it's not plausible that they would know about part of this admissions practices during the relevant time period so the fundamental flaw is that we don't know enough about these two employees don't know what the plan is evidences we don't know about the basis for his allegation that part prove did not have the intent to adhere to its licensing obligations in march of two thousand and seven let me also add that let's let's suppose there are high level administrator and who have since left him no longer owe any particular duty of loyalty to the hospital and who would come forward and say in essence our business model was to stay about ten percent above cens then with that level of particularity and plausibility it may be sufficient but we don't have that here because the allegations on which plaintiff is relying do not speak at all to what transpired after march two thousand and seven he offers his conclusory allegation that between two thousand and five and two thousand and fifteen there were over the past the admissions but with respect to the period after march two thousand and seven when heart broke entered into its participation agreement and december of two thousand and eight when the audit report first began to examine hargreaves practices there are no allegations about overcapacity admissions that are offered with the the plaintiff needs to allege that when heart signed its bit to suppress an agreement it had no intent to add here to the requirements and if hargrove intended good faith to it here in march of two thousand and seven and only six months or a year later reverted back to overcapacity admissions and that does not suggest that there was in fact an intent to defraud in any event there is an overarching flaw in all of plaintiff's claims here which is his inability to plead materiality that is an essential element of all of plaintiff's planes and he does not allege in his complaint that if the government had known about these overcapacity admissions that the government's decision with respect to payment parrots the plain language of false claims act and in paragraph sixty four when he offers another unadorned reference to materiality thank you your hon provided materially adds to any public disclosure if this court this this determines there is some public disclosure caused by those two letters from public health and  did get a price some arguments and nauseum at the lower level in terms of describing what a patient room is in terms of construction of things like that but the regulation calls for a patient room at which is to finds a