maryland and the bar district of columbia is my task is bittersweet bitter because they're on the eve of abandoning me and it's leaving me wondering who these new people are in their offices to go and talk to but sweet because i get to remember just how much it meant to me over this year and how much help they've been scholars and had advisors and counsel and friends with great good humor through many intense interactions and for the formal part maybe i can i guess i will do them one at a time won't take long i move the admission of allison burke's and jury was a member of the bar and is in good standing with the highest courts of maryland and the district of columbia i have knowledge of her credentials and i am satisfied that you possess is the necessary qualification s also move the admission of thomas dervish who's a member of the bar and is in good standing with the highest court of new york i have knowledge of his credentials and i am satisfied that he possesses the necessary qualifications finally i move the admission of clarke over him who is a member of the bar and is in good standing with the highest court in texas for him to have knowledge of his credentials and i am satisfied that he is as as a necessary qualifications him please the court the district court heard and finding the claims of the nine sixty pending in the interim with respect to step one of the alice test is well established that a court must articulate what the claims are directed to especially the vicinity so that that step one analysis is meaningful the district court in this particular case failed to do that and the district court's abstraction was divorced from the actual language of the plains district court held that the abstract idea issue is a time adjustable lace that if financial instrument the claims are not directed to him adjustable license but the claims are directed to you is a specific application and implementation of how to adjust the license over time and response to specific conditions in other words they're not directed to you if i need to instrument itself rather specific applications implementation similar situation i would think and i guess i don't have them firmly in my mind but say starting with alice and i i guess i would have guess that many of our other  like clothes shadow account processes or whatever they're called and in else why isn't that what is going on here which is maybe just a small linguistic difference from what from the language the district court is so when you look at those cases like alice a number of the other cases that are a lot of the apple these the focal point is on the financial instrument and in those cases you have the edge of financial instrument or economic practice it's be claimed and then it just says implement this you know generic computer and so they're essentially two lines of cases where the target is the financial instrument itself implemented the generic computer in contrast to situations where you have  application clean with concrete steps to achieve a desired result or improvements in computer functionality or the fact that an improvement in computer functionality may relate to some financial instrument or some other financial concept does not render and that were the case if then every single economic practice would never be entitled to patent protection which is the report held in bilski is not true little preventing computer functionality is chill analysis and planning to take us to the considered and this goes on in sixteen and seventeen it gets into the actual clean language and talks about how those were meaningful elements limitations that are explicitly tied to machines it was on an eighteen in one thousand and twenty case is completely devoid of any factual issue whatsoever that does not matter what matters is whether or not the challenger in this case amazon the other at least comes with actual evidence to establish that the  there is no evidence whatsoever city by the district court to establish that any element of the claims that issue were well understood but well i guess i'm a little confused about they sort of procedural the district court didn't even consider the factual allegations instead with the district court it under step two is it looked at each element in isolation so first of all it disregarded and at no point did it if you're to the diamond versus deer standard that requires you look at the claims as a whole let's set that aside for now with the district court then to say ok each element if we take it in isolation it's said is that known or generic now first of all that is not the legal standard the legal standard and this was reiterated by this court in burke imo is whether or not under step two it limitation is well understood routine and i'm stressing the end conventional in this court were not to specifically  that just doesn't element maybe present any piece of prior art that's not enough that doesn't meet the threshold standard for under step to the district court never even apply the correct legal standard so what the dish recorded is it just said well be there based on defendant repl his argument or based upon it the district court i guess is coming into with its own body of knowledge is it limitation known or generic and if the district court answer that question in the affirmative that was computer i respectfully don't think that's the what the district court's holding looks the district court was but the number of the limitations found that they were just known in the are they didn't even generic wasn't part of it example would be the device honor is a little bit different my point is that the district court first of all just completely ignore what was in the complaint but setting that aside the district court then went and essentially filled all of the gaps in the apple leesburg where they b burden and this court has held specifically there must be evidence to support that the district court didn't require evidence and just said you know what there's all these gaps but that's ok i was going to fill it with my own knowledge well that's improper emantic debate over whether you're referring to a license to sell for two or just in the license over time it from the specification from the claim language all the way through it's clear that that is the idea central idea of this  approved before and then perhaps adjusting device on it from five to seven nothing occurs in the real world there's no technical improvements there's no solution to any technical problem it is a business problem that people buy more devices and they need to you know just the device them over time to reflect the fact that people are buying more devices that is not a technical problem you're using a generic computer to do what computers always beauty wire data and they manipulate i think if you were you could if you were solving it isn't this problem with a generic computer as you are here straight and just trying to figure out is that where our case law currently is no i think if you have step two i think this being court did hold that you don't rule out business ideas per se but you need to go beyond that to have an a half an eligible solution and we don't go beyond that here there's no new hardware here there's no new software here there's no new interface there's no new database it's basically just taking the idea of adjusting the terms of the license over time and applying that with software there's really nothing more than that it is not a technical solution and there's really no inventive step at step two we had some discussion about whether the complaint alleges that there are eight tracks and i'm happy to walk through paragraphs thirteen through twenty one  george bush was exactly right do you trust person is exactly right these are conclusory allegations and they primarily are a legal argument of the lawyers regarding whether this is going to a technical invention the closest they get is in paragraph seventeen which says that certain cla have is that combination applies the inventive concept of adjusting the terms of a license over time there's nothing substantially more than that well what about plain twenty one claim twenty one time is cryptographic  dependent claim all you're saying is take this known idea it doesn't proclaim it to be invented anywhere in the patent the only thing the patent claims as invented is adjusting the limits over time all this is doing is a way invention versus perhaps than actually being part of the real invention itself and that goes to what your opposing counsel was arguing that what failed to happen here was an evaluation of the claim as a whole or you consider all of the elements in combination with try to determine whether on that level and that larger context whether there's an inventive concept here as opposed to just studying each of the limitations and isolation you anytime you're going to be saying that this computer or this phone can use this software you're going to need to know whether it's this computer or this phone that's inherent in the idea of just licensing to a particular device the only thing this patent says is no or inventive is adjusting the device limit over time there's nothing unique that adjusting over time requires you to do in terms of device identification it's old fashioned device identification never treated as new in the specification never treated as new an opportunity to respond to but somehow it needs to be raised so that the issue is in front of of the court in that sense we filed a motion we identified a fact that it's defective under section one hundred one we explained why all these elements were well known in only talks about the inventive idea being adjusting the terms of the license over time anything else is just you need to identify the device and well here are a whole bunch of known ways of doing so if they wanted to declare that that was something invented they our brief do not call for additional claim construction they consider to be hearing that they didn't need quite construction they said if the motion is not premature to use their language so they had their opportunity we explain why even excluding their conception of what the patent was all about it was still directed to an abstract idea you're performing that abstract idea of adjusting the term over time on a generic computer there's no technical invention here is no inventive concept that of the method claim and concluded that the various steps of receiving and authorization request checking verifying license data the judge found that those did all the  but didn't really point to anything to justify why those steps might be why we should all deem them to be routine well what should we do about that i think actually he cited our brief which in turn particular device to a license and he talks about using the physical parameters and other unique ways of identifying devices that's in this patent it's bodily incorporated and if you look at the problem for them to see that in this court and supreme court limited but they said that the particular are and which we relied did not disclose adjusting to a second device limit in response to something not being on record it was a very very precise things and you didn't exactly disclose x in response for why not what was in claim or not wasn't claim one thousand or twenty one or claim twenty two or twenty twenty five but in claim nine this concept of adjusting a second time not just the first time but the second time also in response to it being and then i guess and the same decision i want to one ruling in which they endorsed the district court's analysis of the structure more than one issue but the idea of the idea of insider technique i don't know what the right word is to say but of moving to a second adjust the device on that once and then once you hit that limit not just move five to seven but after a month we're going to be able to move to seven all of them i don't think that's ever been alleged to be an inventor concept and i think the idea of adjusting twice is just adding an abstract idea to an abstract idea and we know from a good enough factual allegation that wasn't the basis of the argument and that wasn't the basis of the district court's decision so essentially that the panel is making some a new arguments for the up lease the argument that was raised by a police was just under the preamble of every independent claim sets were what the result is that we're trying to get adjusting a license over time i submit like infringement for example the result wasn't even clear the court had to go through and figure out what result they were trying to get here we lay it out here's the result and then we go through in detail fashion step by step here is a way to achieve that result and my posing counsel submitted this court that all these claims do as they say take the time adjustable license and implements non generic computer i respectfully disagree there are all whole lot of ways you could implement a time adjustable license whatever that concept that the just a quirk invented essentially that verbiage whatever that means there's a lot of ways you can adjust the license over time on a computer when what they claim is in the nine hundred sixty pence set forth is a very specific way of doing so and that's why in accordance with engine and core wireless and other decisions by this court i submit that under step one they are directed eligible subject matter it's the specificity to achieve a result that gets you there as opposed to simply saying either here's a result that we want to get at do it on a generic computer or here's an abstract idea to do it on a generic computer we don't do that so that you have i know you said a number of times that very specific but i just like you that just roll it up for me and tell me what is inventive concept what is the inventors contribution to the useful art generating a first downloadable security profile that identifies suspicious code and then linking by the inspector downloadable security profile and what was found to be inventive was generating a  end and claims we take it even further and there's more specificity that's provided and so i submit that it's the specificity in the actual organization in the steps that you go through to achieve the result  well i just like to leave the core with is if we're going to be endorsing the framework that the district court applied here essentially we're saying is that we can ignore what's in a complaint doesn't matter because we don't even need to consider it because the district court did not consider the action allegations in the complaint i understand th court believes them to be conclusory but the district court didn't even say they're conclusory it just ignore them completely ok that's not proper setting that aside though it's not appropriate for a district court to just summarily say that an element is either known or generic with respect to the richardson patent prior art this court has held very specifically just showing that something is in a piece of prior art that's not enough that doesn't meet the defendant's burden and so i respectfully submit that the district court applied an incorrect standard and as such its findings should be reversed