that's why illinois courts strictly construe releases against the parties seeking to benefit from them that's why illinois courts require the intension the parties their release to be stated with great particularities and that's why only sports insure the general words of release are constrained in effect by the specific recitals in the settlement agreement now had the district court properly applied those principles of going to the wall here it would have concluded the same thing that this court concluded in the court case of bank of commerce versus hoffman and that's that the settlement agreement in this unrelated defamation case  at the very least ambiguous as to whether the parties intended to release the judgment in this case and the court should have looked at strands of evidence to make that determination now from there with the brief obviously i've encouraged the court though to look for itself after the settlement agreement in that case and that was in the record of the court below the central district illinois for thirteen c v four zero seven five and it's talking through twenty three dash one and what the court will see is a settlement agreement that's set up almost exactly in structure as the settlement agreement in this as in this case you have specific recitals to talk about simply the transaction or matter that was in front of the parties at that moment hofmann it was a hundred fifty seven thousand dollars loan that was at issue there here the recitals talk about the claims and defenses in the defamation action and only the defamation action also in those two so many agreements you'll see a broad general boilerplate release that if taken in isolation would seem to release everything under the saw now the district court looking only at that broad boilerplate release concluded the parties on ambiguously intended to release the judgment in this case which was unrelated to this defamation action but at as hoffman teaches the district court couldn't just look at that broad boilerplate release in isolation it had to read the release in the context of the entire settlement agreement and specifically the recitals and the subsequent agreement which is the repository of the party's intent district court done so it would have concluded for the same reason this court didn't hofman that the settlement agreement was at best ambiguous as to what the parties intent was with reference to the judgement in this case and in the briefing my adversaries point out that they say will hofmann is different because there was language in the release there was conflicting language in the release again if you look at the actual so many remain hoffman that's not the case you have a release provision we've done kind of a side by side comparison in the briefs on page twenty two that it's structured nearly identical to the release  that apply this principle that limit general for the plate release language like we have here to the specific claims that are referenced in the settlement agreement and  that this judgement this case just wasn't on the table in the settlement of the defamation suit i'm not telling you as to what else she would have seen if she looked at the settlement agreement as a whole clear the parties and ted is to release those and to avoid further litigation on those and there's no mention of a global release there's no mention of the judgment in this case there's no mention of the other unrelated state court action and so that's the same conflict that was created in hoffman and that's the same conflict you'll see all want to be on those cases that we cited in our brief on pages twenty four twenty five want to call a couple of them  evidence and to say hate to do the parties really intend this incredibly broad release for or was it actually simply limited to what's what's being discussed there was silence which is really where the part it's illinois law puts the burden on the party that wants a specific unrelated claim to be released to be forthright about it and say this is what we want that wasn't done here and so the district court judge ellis reached the correct result in this case in support of that position i offer two arguments to you here today first i would like to address the ways in which the present case is legally  factually distinguishable from the hofmann case the one in which the appellant was just giving you an account of and second i would like to address a more practical explanation as to why under these particular circumstances it was commercially reasonable to opt for a general release rather than one that was more specific as the hampton v ford motor decision points out in illinois a general release typically covers all claims of which the signing party has actual knowledge here e a is trying to escape this bedrock principle fundamentally problematic to their position is that they admit to knowing about the judgment at the time that they drafted the release at the time that they proposed the release at the time that they were viewed the release and at the time that they executed the release and had it read into the record down at the district court were over the defamation complaint out of which this broad settlement agreement arose included allegations with respect to the judgment entered in this case this is fatal to their claims the general release here specifically states that e a here by releases defendants from any and all rights claims debts liabilities obligations damages costs attorneys fees expenses including but not limited to the claims and defenses set forth in this action to be certain language definitely encompasses the judgment here in spite of this routinely returns the court's whole returns this court to the its holding in the hofmann decision as being illustrated of it's argument over the h decision is distinguishable for a number of reasons first unlike hoffman where the main text of the settlement agreement contained a limited scope release under the heading one tender o release agreement it's the very first paragraph and if you look at the first paragraph there you will see under the heading tender and easily in lieu of foreclosure it limited scope released that relieves the quote unquote relieved parties from any further liability whatsoever arising out of or otherwise related to the loan documents or properties bus not only is it in the recital it's actually within the terms of the release agree this of course is followed by the second paragraph of that agreement which is titled release of release parties there you'll find the very broad general release that they found to be in conflict with the specific language set forth in both the recital and within the car in the confines of the release agreement itself in the hofmann decision here there is no corresponding specific rule or limited release provision there is just  general mutual release provision and well and while the mutual release acknowledges the action in which it arises it uses an expansive language to say that it includes but is not limited to too broad and rather than narrow its reach accordingly there is no similar conflict as the one that was found in the hofmann decision absent that conflict the court cannot hear determine that there is ambiguity and if there is no ambiguity created the court should not look outside the four corners of the release agreement i'm unaware of any illinois case that holds that an on contradicted general release does not release all claims to which the parties had actual knowledge of at the time that the executed were over unlike hofmann the general release here is a mutual release it states that the defendants also hereby release e a a from any and all rights and clings actions and or causes of action of every nature character and description whether known or unknown including but not limited to the claims in defense defenses set forth in the section at the time this release was executed defendants have not filed any counter claims this provides further support for the notion that the language in the agreement contemplates that it will extend beyond those claims expressly set forth in the pleadings because as i have said because there is no parole evidence of answer because there is no ambiguity the court may not look to parole evidence to analyze the intent of the parties and thus we are left simply with the broad release language and the broad at least language as judge ellis points out released the particular judgment here with respect my second argument i would like to give some context as well as to why it was commercially reasonable to opt for a general release rather than a specific release in this particular case as the illinois supreme court noted and as other intermediate courts have noted in miller there are times when including a list of every action in a broad release may detract from the broad and general scope of the release that's being agreed upon by the parties here the language was already broad enough the parties knew about the claims everybody because they were party to both access to all actions already knew that the other party knew about the claims by including a limiting provision may have resulted in what has resulted in many of the cases lighted by the plaintiffs here which is that it creates an ambiguity as to what the parties actually want to release when it's found to be in conflict between a specified and limited scope release and that of the general release and third and i think this might be the most coloring is that these parties have a long history sense my clients have left their employment in two thousand and eleven have subjected them to litigation for over six years they have been in dog at pursuit of their former employee and thirteen trademark action there is the two thousand and thirteen parallel state court action and will county there is the twenty fifteen bankruptcy adversary proceedings there is the twenty fifteen defamation case and now there's another recently filed twenty seventeen state court action and will county which appears to me are its prior claims as such under these circumstances a broad release with expansive language where the parties know what claims they already have pending would seem to be entirely prudent as a means of resolving all of the issues between the parties it limiting language could only assure another battle to come at the time where the release were there were all these other things out there your honor there was two other action there was the judgment that was out there in this particular case and there was the will county action that was still pending from the twenty thirteen case this case in which the default judgment was entered and then a monetary award of two hundred thousand dollars was later awarded to them one time it was to want to remember it was actually involved in a case where there was a huge amount of money road but there was a question of whether that person the judgment against any ability to pay well that's actually a good way in art why beat up because a relative came forward with a limited windfall which has been bandied about to some extent i'd like to push back on that and say you know although this judgment was in excess of seven hundred thousand dollars its actual value was substantially lower edward  both been driven into bankruptcy and while the judgement survived the bankruptcy they had almost no assets to speak of from which to pay that that judgment and after years of trying to collect  the what had happened leading up to this defamation case was after there isn't junction not to contact our customers after this default judgment had been entered which also included important injunctive relief for my client they sent an e mail to one of our main customer saying that our machines were liable to explode and cost serious injury to others so to the extent that there's a lot of litigation here it's of the apple lease making that also obviously have a better understanding of the history that we do is any of this in the record that the bankruptcy the condition of your client the the contacting your customer later is bankruptcy if you look at the supplemental appendix as say thirty four s a thirty six you'll see where my client went into the bankruptcy to make this judgment not just charged my client wasn't worried about collecting on the judgment but they wanted this judgment place have this judgment in place and one last point if i will just on the wall again illinois law is clear that when you have specific recitals in an agreement that are talking about a specific set of claims and