was prohibited in light of what retroactivity holding in morris as we know morse held that whitfield may not retroactively be applied in collateral cases where the sens are conviction became final before december twentieth of two thousand  the defendant pled guilty and was sentenced on july sixth two thousand and five her conviction became final thirty days later when the time for her to file a motion over six zero forty expired and at that point the trial court had lost jurisdiction to consider consider the motion challenging the plea or any anything excessive concerning concerning his sentence the defendant argues that morris doesn't apply to this case so the trial court was right they didn't have jurisdiction so the case is dismissed nothing about that appeal threaten the finale of her conviction didn't threaten the sense it couldn't attack the sense it was straight was a very limited question and whether or not the trial court had jurisdiction to consider it she won permission essentially for the appellate court to say can i go back to the trial court and begin the process of directly attacking my conviction and sentence and the court said conviction is final it is no less true today than it was during the initial process of things defendant's conviction became final thirty days after she pled guilty which is on august fifth of two thousand and five and you rely on that appeal concerning about the judgment conviction it was just it was a very limited question and you the court could not reach the any of the issues really any sensitive issues timely but there was material on the common law record that would have supported defendants claim that she actually mailed from to write prison a motion to vacate on july twenty sixth two thousand and five which would have been timely insufficient the court did have a right to make the decision but my point is there was a real serious issue here about whether there was a timely filing there was substantive issues addressed it's very unlike the two cases the states cited and some to me in terms of fundamental fairness we should we should include the day that the case became final as reflecting the appeal in the forty five days after the circumstances which are very different from coward five days after the a power of the session which was on september twentieth two thousand and seven so it would be sometime in october two thousand and seven which would be almost two years afterward feel i think burger still says when a plea rests in any significant degree on a promise or agreement of a prosecutor so but it can't be said to be part of the inducement or consideration such promise must be felt and how do we know for sixty six pennsylvania for fifty three back in one nine hundred seventy six and the minnesota supreme court in james versus state in two thousand and five and six ninety nine northwest section seven twenty three said the court should consider a seven the situation was there was that ever bonnie misunderstood they didn't think truth in sentencing apply the defendant was misinformed but that was the case it turned out it did apply the only supreme court said well we're going to fashion court said well you know it was about the longest m s r so there's no problem but here simply the problem is she did not know about the longer term that applied in her case it's simply unfair you  a great and because it's fair it's just unfair and it makes the courts look bad if something is told in court and the defendant can't rely on it when it's told by the judge it's just a matter of fundamental fairness as well stu process that the court could have considered was the jurisdiction of the trial or people before people be foster says that the court's job at that point is very limited the only question that they can consider is the jurisdiction of the trial court on the rule six zero four motion whether they