it was only in this case and almost a decade after david join t r x that the state argued for the very first time that the two thousand seven act was actually special legislation but qualifying for that was dedicated to serving public school teachers it also required highly irreproachable your local is ironic election to doing your ass in that had to happen within six months of the effective date and for public school teachers that are in here as they only pay their employees a contribution in the local school district has the employer side or union employee members like my frugally to make those payments over the course of four years we have met that the optics aren't great but that's because the unit i like looking back now what happened even turned he had nothing to do with the bill's passage it was not an eye of his management he was not in charge of lobbying pension issues never like engine issues and in fact the record is clear that he did not know teacher certified prior to two thousand and seven that would require the legislate to differentiate against those that were certified if it's so that teachers that were already earning credit working for the union because they were teachers before they joined the union my client was somebody who wasn't previously teacher so this law put him on par with his coll already chiar as members and earning t r s credit for their union service this law allowed people who like my clients who were previously not teachers but serving teachers indirectly through the union to become have really two questions to ask you about that this issue of special legislation and whether anyone at different union i e a new ending about this existence of this legislation before became all that was raised in the trial court from what i understand these supplemental documents were not presented to the trial court nor were they referenced in the original brief in the response of your motion resolve questions of fact at this point it's not a question of fact they are simply facts that exist and that are on the public record and we would ask or t sense unique or unlikely reputation in the future cannot rationally and hence constitutionally be linda limited application by a date restriction the close of the class as a as of the statute effect more would be important would be an honest the extent that your honour's consider them similarly situated and we don't believe they are because they jointly are right these are people that came on board with the lakers and i think the mere fact that they were a leader makes them dif hey he was he was promoting  yes there was evidence  no it shouldn't because this is not the general assembly's job to decide the constitutionality was they want to have to get a law they want to decide that law is no longer good public policy they want to decide that you know under the first test of special legislation analysis the state can't make it need its burden of proof because it hasn't identified somebody who is similarly situated the who was it who did in other words two thousand seven and the reason for it or that is because the n h l contributions were really significant under the second prong of the special legislation analysis this statement show that the two thousand seven was that the two thousand and seven happy cents no cost to the system but that promise hinges on the fact that they had an idea at least in general terms the number of the that the two thousand and seven acts relevant provisions which permitted employees of a state wide teachers union to perform one day of substitute teaching thousand and seven legislation not special legislation the specialist's lation a jurist prudence by this or recognizes that there are situations in which the legislature legitimately addresses unique circumstance in the curious school board case pacifically identifies that principle and describes the schiller case in the crucial as cases examples of exactly that type of situation that same a notion appl pacifically to the two thousand and twelve there was a unique situation of people that had availed themselves of benefits under a law that was unconstitutional and to deal with that unique situation the legislature repealed and it's not uncommon for a law to repeal an earlier law what is unusual about this situation is that when the later law requires a state agency to take specific actions to undo things that were done under the earlier law and where if the earlier law was valid it couldn't constitutionally require those to be undone because those road tested constitutional right if it requires that those things beyond done and it can do so only if the earlier law is unconstitutional it has a unique situation that it can address in the special legislation was i would add that no argument has ever been made that the two thousand and twelve back by leaves the special legislation clause wasn't argued in the circuit court wasn't argued in the briefs before this court and it has no substance in light of the unique nature of the circumstance that the two thousand and twelve act was addressing so the controlling issue is whether the effective date eligibility cut off in the two thousand seven which excludes anybody who satisfied that x other eligibility criteria but did so only after that law took effect that renders it unconstitutional on special legislation and i think the circuit work got absolutely right under this works teaching in the furious school board case which follows the eastside levy case which is certainly been followed in the moline school district case that i would quote again the language that justice high school when there is a generic class with attributes that are in no sense unique or unlikely of repetition in the future to then create a discrimination between those who benefit from a law and those that don't through the device of a temporal cutoff is an inherently arbitrary discrimination that violates the specialist lation  this case is a perfect example of exactly that type of problem i think it's relevant that the curious school board pointed out that the legislature has used these types of temporal cutoffs repeatedly in the past in a way to grant special favors in the work has been vigilant especially after the one nine hundred seventy constitution made clear that although there is deference to legislative determinations about classifications the constitution unlike its predecessor says that whether a general walker would have been passed is a matter for if you dish will determination so that the court can't simply just you know ignore whether there is in fact a rational basis for treating similarly situated persons  before it was passed their memos were circulated among the i f t telling everybody here's your chance to to get retroactive service fred is now opposing counsel says that this law merely put i have t employees theoretically get retroactive service credit for prior employment historically the state wide teachers unions hired many of their people from teaching serves you work as a teacher or certified school administrator for a number of years maybe you're not quite vested and then there's an election and somebody asks you to work for the state white teachers union and you either have to give up the ability to vest in the t r s if you work with the union  you give up the opportunity to work for the and so it it seems like that is why there's a a legislative justification for allowing people to continue to accrue service credits as teachers if they then go to to work for a state like teachers union after having been historically it appears that nobody had ever figured out that you could do that if you were really union without having previously served as a teacher just by doing one day of substitute teaching service i think that's what that surprises people when shocks them so much about this law there was sort of a a laden attribute of the law that nobody had ever figured out and it wasn't enough just for people in the  you and the idea so this did not put i of the employees on a par with their colleagues and that the way the i call it the laden aspect of this bill is that nobody had ever used this opportunity to be a substitute teacher before to get service credits for you know one that was the notion that especially in the lack of any evidence that this was certainly did among i e employees the fact that nobody had ever used to substitute teaching as the predicate for getting later union service credits but why is the suspect with the conjecture by posing counsel that necessarily all the guy employees knew about it and they just decided not to take advantage of it because it would cost them too much even if that were true the law affects the discrimination between people who could satisfy the certification as a teacher before the walked with a factory and those who could not so on the substantive questions of the of the special legislation was there is a two prong analysis and the two prongs are interrelated the first prong is whether the parties for the groups or objects are similar situation and if they are then that's a necessary element of the special legislation that says it and if they are similarly situated then the question is is there a legitimate justification for discriminating between them or treating them differently now those two prongs of the analysis are opposite sides of the single point system if people are similar to situated it is quite difficult to say that we can treat them differently in a rational way as opposed to an arbitrary way and i think although the court has focused on both aspects of the analysis in the past i can't think of a single case in which the court explicitly how that these groups or persons or objects are similar situation but there is nonetheless a rational justification were written differently but let then there's nothing about the eligibility cutoff that promotes that purpose it doesn't both his son some aspect of meaningful differences between those groups that's related to the purpose of the law of rewarding people  or union serves the plaintiff argues that well the difference is that some people actually apply for those benefits and other people didn't apply that circular it's actually creates a catch twenty two and tries to ineligible and now the plaintiff is saying because they didn't apply they're not similarly situated that gets the analysis exactly back it turns the vice of the law into was a pose of virtue that justifies it with no relationship to the underlying moline school board case i think go a long way to articulating this sort of framework of analysis and i would submit that the legislature can use these types of criteria primarily legitimate ways in which those criteria can be used and happy one is when the purpose of the law directly relates to the criterion itself so if you have a population right gerri that relates to cities over a million people it's because there are differences in the actual circumstances between cities that have more than a million people and other cities that's a real world difference that the legislative or cheeriness focusing sometimes though the those criteria are used not because the direct directly relates to the purposes of the law itself in the means to implement those purposes but simply because there are a means to identify a person or situation that is unique and if that situation is unique it's not a permissible to use definitional criteria that pin down geography population or time and that is essentially what the furious is about the groups just situation which involve the emmel casinos the only one that was shut down it was on the mississippi river the port said this is uni it was permissible legislature to take the unique situation use definitional criteria that relate to it and deal with it separately from everything else the schiller case is exactly the same it was a unique situation that the legislature use these types of criteria to identify and then address but the third category of situations in which the legislature uses these types of criteria is when they are an arbitrary device to create an impermissible discrimination between similar situated persons or things and that is the belmont fire protection case  board case that is the mostly school districts cases where those criteria are used to define a unique situation or to implement a policy based upon those criteria themselves but is simply a time honored but unconstitutional means to try and ran special favors and that's what the special legislation was was intended so the plaintiff argues that there isn't back a valid reason for this discrimination in this case and that is that the that the people who got in before the top who got their substitute teaching certification before the law was even signed that the legislature legitimately wanted to treat them differently because it had physical concern to didn't want to spend a lot of the state's money for promoting his purpose that's isis me because there's not a shred of evidence to support it in the record and it's not even supported by rational speculation in fact the terms of the two thousand and seven themselves create a neutral fiscal position for the benefits that this created as the plaintiffs counsel pointed out the law required contributions for these so when on the floor of the legislature the sponsor of the bill said this will cost the state nothing it's because the bill was designed across the state and to say now that we're going to save the money by limiting the benefits to some small select group of people you can multiply nothing as many times as you want and it still comes up with nothing there was no for this school purpose of this law and there was no fiscal impact of this law and to say now after the fact when it creates this arbitrary distinction between people who are certified before and after it was signed into law the say that discrimination is justified by financial concerns it is i think  what we have is a exposed by later events a clear attempt by one group to get a special set of privileges for its members and to do so in a way that didn't draw a lot of attention to what was going on and there was not discussion on the floor of the house of the senate about oh you can do one day of substitute teaching service and now you can buy all these years of prior service credit for working for a union this came in at the end of the legislative term without much fanfare or with a description that said this was a technical correction or a prior you know bill for early retirement legislation that argument was made below that that's in fact what was going on it's been abandoned because there's no basis for even in the legislative history so we have a special favor we have a special favor bill that treats similar situated people differently people and therefore renders it unconstitutional under the two thousand under special legislation was and i'm not asking the court to hold that the legislature decided that the two thousand and seven there was  hard this year and i think you exactly that out and it says plaintiff do not claim that they were similarly situated instead they provide conclusory arguments like the status here that this case should have any any other property owner who meets any of the other conditions from  that's record that these owners sought to convert their finally into residential areas this is the year the village of frankfurt annex their property or additionally site each school district boundary change there's no evidence in this record of anyone similar situated to all housing or any other property owner who sought the boundary change and therefore there is no similar situation so it doesn't matter if somebody apply it doesn't matter if somebody try to see who pursued an interest but who was excluded from that interest and that's the case here and that's why the state can't meet its burden of proof under the first fro working for public sector union that has a mission of ensuring teachers interests are represented before the illinois general assembly if its hundred new shoes also in large part by national in nature and like t al teachers working for public school districts like i said he paid both sides of the contribution the employer in him police said so as corporate representative testified in this case and that's in the record union contributions were significant he didn't get a free ride he didn't get a cheaper rate he paid a hundred and ninety three thousand dollars of his own money for securing rights under the two thousand seven that law was valid the on the books but i invite no means of beating the standing argument i do not believe that here as a standing here as his job under the under it's their own state actually create their statute creating it says that it is the job to protect library is that ideas of standing or ideas of bringing a claim being played here this is a defensive action does it make a difference in terms of no it doesn't make a difference because here us doesn't even have