that in those cases there is a reason why it can be upheld against a big news talent show accepting that those decisions were correctly decided you can make a very material distinction between those statutes and the one we have here with and that is because in those cases you those the conduct that is involved in those cases is necessarily indicative of bad faith which gives the defendant in those cases notice that they are subject to criminal consequences detention for filing an eight billion was it a one million it becomes people would never interacted with it is life somehow we're going to hold gigantic sums of money that was that's an objectively sensible reasonable thing to believe it's not your honor i would say that it could be describe delusional in fact but the reason that i'm making this point right now is that that is the point that if it is delusional and i think if you look at the lean itself it certainly looks delusional and that means that this particular defendant did not know that the conduct was what  filing was false he just did not understand it because i'm sure the jury could disagree with you right they certainly could but we don't know the jury could look at his testimony and say he's not delusional he's just a liar they certainly could your honor but you cannot presume that because we do to include subjective and objective so that the question this jury is given is based on what this person knew and there he testified in his own behalf could you say that what he believed was or what he testified to was objective lee reasonable that's what it how is that outside the realm of of ordinary criminal standards of the sort did this sappho case lays out multiple examples of reference there that this the having reason to know standard requires an inquiry into the defendant own a subjective component to it i would disagree with it with your honor what the reasonable person standard to have a reason the no reasonable person standard actually requires if not an inquiry into the state of mind of the defendant at the time the what it actually asked of the state of mind of a reasonable person who shares some not all perhaps of the characteristics of the defendant so it is not the dependents knowledge we are talking about oh it is isn't this just i mean going back to gore where the court looks a or reason to believe standard and says this requires the process q should the prosecuted to have acted in bad faith to sanction poison only when c enters a stamp there has to be a showing of subjective bad faith i think that gets to my point that i was making your honor and that the reasonable person standard does not require even allow an inquiry into the subjective intent of the individual and that's what united states versus williams and held in the th circuit but what goren holds is not that it requires acted in bad faith and it's a statement that that standard which is not materially different from this standard requires a showing of subjective bad faith i think that what the court is referring to there and if i may explain the espionage act in that case provides that a person commits a violation when they obtain tensioning a paid information that may be harmful to the interests national defense interests of the united states by a foreign adversary and the court goes on to say in that case somebody who perceives on that basis is necessarily that's their that's the conclusion there you go down the rabbit hole on the espionage act because that's not that's not the point that the court is focused on there it's not so much b s to hijack it's talking about that have reason to believe  no i do not i think that oh i think they are talking about that but i think what the court is doing is saying have reason to believe maybe begun its own application itself but look at the rest of this statute the conduct is prohibiting is going to necessarily involve that base because we have an individual at the upper echelon of government was intentionally obtaining information that could be used to her the united states and regardless of whether they have we like to say just as easily in that context well i didn't know that this was going to harm the united states had no idea this was going to harm the united states in fact couldn't you see that much more plausibly been i had no idea that a seven billion dollars against these judges was going to be something difficult or pragmatic i thought it was entirely justified i don't believe so at all your honor actually and i believe because the situation in that case as explain court was that these people are going to be at a higher level of government they'll have access to it so they would know at that point in time what somebody like mr hopper who is again you could almost make the conclusion that this was a delusional request and in that case you cannot say that it simply he knew  getting a little bit young what the actual statute is and again the statute we're only looking at somebody who does not have knowledge but had reason to know because that's the standard we're looking at and that particular standard can be satisfied whether or not the defendant has knowledge or not that's the basis of the standard about what i care what i'm saying is what the reason then this is actually if you look at williams and this is the explanation it goes its th circuit builds up chapeau and what it says is the reasonable person standard certainly does have a subjective component what that subjective component does fanciful subject of the compound exactly what williamson that's what information the person has that's not their state of mind the quite the ultimate question is what would that reasonable person believe and if you look after that paragraph that's when williamson concludes that a good faith instruction would be inconsistent with the specifically cited to warrant says this requires those prosecutors have acted in bad faith i think that is exactly getting to the distinction that i was making and that's what reconciles those cases goren found that the bad beat the verse because of the other conduct that was involved in the statute that's where the bad big came from sappho explained that yes we have a reasonable person standard and we we can find that sufficiently not big and williams went on as if a good big construction is inappropriate with respect to the have reason to know or have reason to believe standard itself because we might have bad faith involved in the drug distribution concept anyway well it's because it's i understood williamson to be saying you don't need a good faith instruction because you can't convict somebody unless there's a lack of good faith it's impossible for you to convict somebody under the standard unless there is scientific list there is bad faith as per goren as percent half zero which was binding on the williamson panel you don't need a good faith instruction because it's built into the system there's no liability unless there is bad faith like i said our group spectrally disagree your honor because i think the nature of the reasonable person standard necessarily is that you're sensing at the end of the day whether a reasonable person would had the thing as false and whatever characteristics that reasonable person had if they're all the characteristics some of the characteristics knowledge of the defendant the ultimate question is his or her state of mind and the good faith instruction goes to the state of mind of the defendant so it can't apply if you're asking what the defense in instructed the jury if you find good faith it's a total defense well based upon the like i said i would argue and it was argued but low that there should not be a good instruction could not be that requirement as a matter of the statutory interpretation and in that because the statute is invalid once we got to the jury instructions in this case the court had already ruled that a good bit instruction was appropriate and that we were new be admitted gotten out on that instruction right i'm sorry cover it could've won on that instruction if the jury found oh it was in good faith and i don't believe so your honor and the instruction actually appears at two hundred and forty eight of the appendix and what the district court instructed was not only that inconsistent with the reasonable person standard for the reasons i've discussed but also it said that the person does not act with good said and i honestly held reasonable belief that his acts were not unlawful would provide a complete defense yes that's exactly right but i guess that there was confusing elements to it and in any event even if the instruction was a good standard on the  subjective campoli to what information the defendant had doesn't say anything about science or i think what williams concluding at is if you take if you look at everything that the defendant knew and could a reasonable person in that in his position would they have reason to know that the was all that what they were filing was off and i think it recognizes kind of a core tenet of our law that you can't just put your head in the sand and ignore is not a rod because over breast deals with does this prescribe a substantial amount of protected speech well here there is no protected speech in the th circuit in the united states versus  retaliation for them in the performing their duties so this is a very narrow aperture through which this statute is is applied so it's very difficult to imagine a scenario where this would  impact protected speech and you know as the court recognized supreme court recognized and williams that you know this is strong medicine and i would put to you that this is medicine for a disease that this doesn't suffer from similarly not unconstitutional u k i think that deals more we can you even define what the statute is is prescribing here it's very clear the to the court of record book of records in lebanon county asking for his sentencing documents and stated in his letter i know i have five years and seven months remaining in my sentence so he knew he was l petition not one of the ways not one of many ways the soul went what is your if i can ask what is your position regarding the need for a good faith instruction i mean here one was given so and still convicted but what's your position as to whether williamson or judge chief judge connor were correct that one is actually necessary well as was argued in the district court level i don't believe a good faith instruction is necessary and i think yes that's exactly right that you cannot act in good faith you cannot if you had a reasonably belief then you can't have a reasonable person wouldn't have thought that this was  possessing a good requirement that is one that goes back to the as you were talking about just jordan to the sea enter of the actual defendant rather than purely to see and hear a reasonable person it can be helped competition because without that bad faith requirement or some other culpability requirement that the defendant himself or herself become possessed you cannot have fair notice of the crimes that they should know that the crime is going to be so if we if we thought this standard was reason to believe standard itself you may say you believe that point me to any language in the opinion that i can any language in the opinion all that says you know this i have reason to language we are interpreting this road and actually impugn imbue the reasonable person with his characteristics with his knowledge with his history mr hopper didn't have a high school diploma he had no legal training he prepared the end based on advice from a spiritual advisor will exactly why he did it he wanted attention he wanted to bring attention to the fact that he was still in prison and he didn't like being in prison i think that exactly is indicative of good faith actually in certain respects and that is because mr hopper submitted a letter to ask think that it was going to happen to him if he had thought it was going to happen he wouldn't have done it you know he they he thought that they were subject to performance bob which is you know wrong but in any event i have to thank you very much already thank you very much