defense because of paragraph two not one further that even if you adopt the district court's view that the ip exclusion bars coverage for any suit that detains one of its allegations for violation in that context is different than the use of the term violation in the policy because violation doesn't mean a violation of ip law in other words what basis in addition to infringement that's the underlying complaint so i don't know what it alleges is violations of the licensing agreement paragraph one hundred and ninety three says defendants have repeatedly used displays and otherwise exploited  using the trademark improper use is not a violation as that term must be understood in the language of the exclusion as this latter case references at two thousand and eleven alexis one  not a violation no not if you look at the case law discussing the use of the term violation that is referenced now reply greet that knowledge him those terms what violation means in two to avoid redundancy and one is misappropriation of trade secrets that's the only term of art in ip law where you can recover liability claims based on conduct that does not constitute an infringement the use the term violation should not be given a lay person meeting it should be given a meeting that is instructed informed by intellectual property law because it's a term of art is used in that context redefined otherwise you would have party who is not the insured who can be barred under the terms such as a codefendant that's not in one that gives you a right of action against that other entity that expands the scope of the exclusion and doesn't render on if you say that violation means any conduct that wrongful then you have no meaning or purpose for one that is necessary for its creation and you can't find the two is so broad that it re limitation it can be more broadly defined to include fact allegations of evidence infringement of violations but the evidence of infringement or violation has to create an actionable cause a claim for relie ultimately doesn't have to be a claim as stated specifically the other problem with that exclusion is it doesn't explain there's some ambiguity in it because it doesn't explain that there's a diminishing and coverage affected if that construction is adopted because it would mean that there is no possible way that you can get a defense of the entire lawsuit even though the defense of some claims and there's by courts nationwide the question here is really a specific one as to whether the underlying complaint alleges intellectual property violations and i want to lead off with judge bianca what you pointed to a moment ago which is th cause of action in the joint atlantics of page seven hundred and ninety two this is a common law trademark claim of course common law trademark is part of the broader law unfair competition and if you look at the very st paragraph of this other than the we religion and incorporate everything one hundred and ninety two and all brand holdings is the holder of all right title and interest in and to the purchased ip including the licensed marks that's what this is all about the licensed marks it's about the trademarks and it just keeps going on from there really every paragraph defendants have repeatedly used displayed and otherwise exploited the purchased ip and in particular the nanette lepore trademarks owned by an old brand holdings without authorization from an l brown holdings next paragraph it's outside of the scope of use permitted next paragraph alleges bad faith fraud next paragraph one hundred and ninety six sounds just like a lot of fact claim defense have caused confusion with or have been mistaken for the plaintiffs activities in the minds of the public didn't want to create a federal question jurisdiction state state court so it's a state law trademark claim and that's really the end of it but even if it weren't a state law trademark claim as your honor noted the question under new york law according to the new york  not what's the name of our cause of action it's one of the factual affirms what if we let just and what's alleged the substance that matters not the labels which alleged here are trademark violations the complaint is suffused with them it's rife with it as the district court noted and it's really frankly hard to find a page in the complaint that doesn't involve claims of trademark violation or infringement of intellectual property violations under the nd paragraph the perception that there was an infringement claim is is completely inaccurate and the fact allegation focus of the court's question shows that that's not an appropriate inquiry the bottom line is they didn't seek rescission of this agreement because they wanted to hold on to their ip rights if they wanted to sue for infringement are violations assuming violation means some kind of ip can cause a back sion they could have but they didn't because that was inconsistent with the license rights they sought to maintain and to construe violation that probably would mean again to render once a purple s and to find that the fact allegations that carefully avoided to serving any ip causes of action is not meaningful in this particular context the affiliated hospital products case from the nd circuit evidences what the kind of relationship is and the limits of what was at issue here that governs why this court should not  bear in mind that the pocus in offense based coverage is not injury or damages but it's whether the elements of the offense were implicated those offense elements here are the disparagement and defamation claims and they have nothing to do with any of the asserted acts and violations that are alleged here because they provide coverage of a character that has nothing to