work and the owner of the copyright in the work and when conveyed in connection with copies of a work constitutes e m i and were fishers as mr fisher's last name and it was conveyed in connection with trying to set the dish on norms with respect to information that would be identifying so they're different because one has mental state requirements and it's trying to shape the norms that downstream users be they getting a public distribution of the work or seeing it online have a way to understand who owns or author the work because registration of a copyright is entirely permissive phrase that contained focus on the four phrases right and so the four phrases the only rationale that the district court provided there was that there was quote no c m i significance in the word fischer's so it made a legal conclusion regarding the name fischer's and that's what's being appealed here c m i is supposed to signal that that this is a copyright this is there is a copyright and who owns the copyright would you agree that that's the purpose of c m it's supposed to be i be identifying information if someone's trying to trace the copyright so there's no in here in the four phrases how how was the name fisher being used to signal the existence and ownership of a copy what it and yes your honor so it was being used to signal if someone is reading it for that purpose so if you compare and contrast the notice of coverage the statute says a notice of coverage in sections for one and four o two is supposed to signal the claim of but contrast such phrases right someone should be looking at this and they and they see the reference to fisher's be quick and they should be saying i understand that these four phrases are copyrighted and the copyright is on by fisher  that's isn't that i want to see and i should be doing no your honor it's a it's if they are looking for the copper and the way that you know this is twelve o two c eight it says a link an internet link to identify information counts to see a mine and so what that means is that there was a link that didn't use any of his any identifying information and the name of the link the u r l but it went to information that identified the author the copyright owner those links to quotes such information would also constitute see him on i respect phrases for phrases if you're focusing on  the word fischer's used just one is that right right that's correct so what your argument then is that one would understand with respect to all four phrases that the use of the term fischer s is for the four phrase that's correct because and it was removed and i would point out the rd circuit and murphy recognize that there is no context requirement it's an extremely broad definition and there's no limitation on the context in which the c m i has to be used because congress was looking to create with the d m c a protection of the integrity of my and that it would have ball with technologies or however its use of the nose as the intellectual property report by the blue ribbon commission said there is no standard as format the trying to get it so that anyone any lawyer or any person trying to trace copper ownership for unregistered work they do that through the do all mental state requirements and they do that through acquirement for an underlying copyright infringement with all the defenses to that as well as the connection between the removal of c i and the underlying infringement if i could if i we holding the lower court did not the order being appealed did not hold that the name here is just the name fisher standing alone is not c m i in fact they held the office of base and as you pointed out that it is capable of constitut sihamoni that's consistent with the court's earlier order where it stated that fisher's name although used to describe the product also serves to identify the author of the work and therefore qualifies as c of mine but it wasn't just fisher's that was removed and by the way i got to this this is a secondary point in a minute but it wasn't removed from any of the original works it was removed from an authorized copy and that's really the basis of the  fischer's be quick that is what was removed not just fisher's and there in the context in which you fishers be quick was used the court made that comparison to kellogg's cornflakes or something like that where people would understand that to mean well i think it's it's almost like a common sense interpretation you could take you know wrigley's chewing gum you could take any of these ads that you see on television or in print and  take them you know to the consumers commonplace understanding of what is being conveyed and i think that's the position that the court was taking that no consumer could understand fisher's beat where as it was used in the allegedly infringing ads to indicate the author or the owner of the copyright was just referring to the of the name fissures in the phrase fischer's be quick to be d c am i for the four phrases correct that's correct and then the other thing is that they didn't remove it from an original from the original work i mean the whole the whole case was based on the fact that and it's alleged in the complaint that the license whatever license there was was revoked on december th two thousand and they're after two thousand and eleven they removed it from their two thousand and ten authorized act they had done a number of years of authorized licensed ads and they removed it from those and then transferred it you know transposed it on to their ad for their own product and substance i think of people i think it's a substitute for smoking the bees i think i'm not an expects but in the industry mr fisher is and i understand he invented a product that some people found useful because it did not smell as bad as other products like he says be go and and other things so yes that's my understanding but again it was none of the allegedly infringing materials removed from the original work and i think that right there is enough of a basis to dismiss  claim i know that didn't raise any other issues but i just want to very briefly respond to a couple of things and the reply brief that i may have overlooked in my brief but just very quickly we would say that the clara tory judgment is certainly not wanted to hear because we don't see what the justice shabelle controversy would be you can't do the dis and i think you you know the declaratory judgment however they referred to it was also among the claims that were dismissed and i think you know the grounds are that there's just there's just no jurisdictional controversy you can't come in at the summary judgment stage after three or four years in the case and then change your you know your theory of the case and try to manufacture ambiguities and agreement on the record  yet not only that they they actually made an offer of judgement which isn't in the record but me and i realize that's outside their record but they made a rule sixty eight dollars offer of judgment which by the way included an injunction like a stipulated injunction not to use the phrases nonetheless even though mr fisher the other issue i want to just mention is that there was no wind that appellant says in the reply brief that we didn't contest the merits of his argument that the moral license was revoked in april two thousand and eleven as opposed to december t ten which is where you've been saying all along throughout the case this is that new theory where he on summary judgment repudiated record tenant of his complaint and change the entire theory of the case in order to avoid the holding that there was pre registration infringement in december in january two thousand and ten we didn't contest that i mean again in right in the complaint and throughout the action until summary judgment it was always i mean he says in his complaint this license or permission to use and here plaintiff's intellectual property and quote and that was referring to december th two thousand and ten and we cited this numerous times in our brief and on summary judgment so i just wanted to make the point that we certainly did contest that and we do judicial resources if we have to go back and now defend you know we defended the case on the on the theories that were put forth and the allegations in the complaint so to change him now is is just not fair so anyway the point about the contract is there is no the wind down period that he talks about is really irrelevant because there was never any contract he even testified mr fischer at his deposition and this was the st volume of the joint appendix of page one hundred and seventy nine that he didn't have any contract with any of the three individual findings and although we didn't testify that he didn't have a contract with the corporate defendant he didn't and the evidence shows i don't you know i don't know if i need to go into the other areas unless the court has any questions for me i'd be happy to answer them into it consumer standard the way that the statute protects consumers is true knowledge requirement they know that they're removing salmaan in addition requires and it a standard of mentoring with respect to the underlying anyone looking at us would if they're looking out for the purpose of copper it would help them to trace the origin so for example the district court meant the magistrate mentioned the issue of the kellogg's cereal example and kellogg's is in fact the author and the owner of the coverage materials so if you want to know who owns the coverage materials in the advertising you go to the cover off you would see that kellogg's owns it if you take that name out of the advertising materials it's going to be much harder to trace the copyright extra in fact extraordinarily difficult so it links it back the problem here with the standard that the district court applied is confusing that you don't have to look at it in the same way if you watch a movie you're not thinking about copyright but if you are thinking about copyright it will help you to trace the origin of the work to understand oh this is the person that i have to go speak to if you aren't watching it for that purpose then there'd be no very broad broad definition and that's intentionally so by congress to set norms so that individual consumers are subject to strict liability claims for cover infringement so you poor man's requirements for the c m i claim and in turn that helps to protect consumers downstream and in this case you see a prime example the defendant stripped the sea a mine and they sent it out to rd party websites those rd party websites put it up they are now liable for copyright infringement if mr fisher sued them but if they had retained mr fisher's name they would not be if they'd asked and said why is