prepared if you're ready good morning honors the ten dollar mental healthy and the five dollar you the version your court charges are or that were levied against graves are in fact these and that finds a pla reading of section five eleven zero one clearly reveals that the charges at issue are just that there are fees unlike the statute that was that issue and that was at issue in jones which clearly had or that which has some statutory ambiguity there is no such ambiguity anywhere in this particular provision there's nothing in any reference to fines or anything from which a reasonable interpretation can be gleaned to call these fines or anything other than fees the provision uses the word fee consistently throughout the throughout the entire provision of the primary of statutory construction and as a squad recognizing jones is to give effect to the intent of the legislature and the place to be good is the plain language of the statu and unlike the provision at issue in jones again here there was consistent use there's consistent reference to to the fact that these charges are fees once we have that you know the  don't stop there we continue to look for other hidden meanings or we look to see if there's a different way to interpret it but that's not the real estate atory construction that the role of this court isn't to substitute its view of how the statute should read or to rewrite the statute it's basically to get the intent to give effect to the intent of the legislature as it is written because so in this particular case unlike this actually of the jones we don't really need to go beyond we don't need to look to outside sources we don't need to l attributes we don't look to try to find hidden meanings that that simply aren't there ok so we're assuming then that that these are the charges are what they say they are i e fees and of course the next question is ok well then  what is a relief in this particular case the next question the question then is a constitutional question what standard do we apply and in terms of deciding whether or not this particular fee has a constitutional muster the proper test is whether it's rationally related to the intended publication just that that's addressed by each provision so the public interest intended to address of course the statute start out by saying it's intended to finance the courses ok and beyond that in particular with respect to the charge that issue here is basically twofold one is to fund of course you diversionary programs and the second being kind of a similar diversionary aspect or mental health mental health is simply just too attenuated from games and mental health diversionary services to find a rational relation between the two so this and the state actually tacitly concede this much it doesn't make any counterarguments  on this particular point at any time it basically takes the position and the assumption that these are in fact finds nothing else so therefore there is no rational basis scrutiny to consider  it's just misinterpreted or absolutely and jones absolutely i think what they did is they kind of took it backwards they basically looked at the relation and basically said well actually you can look at that because they basically look to see whether or not it actually compensated for that particular prosecution and then they basically said well it didn't so therefore it can't be anything but a fine and because of the fact that it's a fine there's no rational basis scrutiny to consider but our position is that can't be that has they can't be right because that basically says that that just makes it a naughty or just whimsical it basically says ok well in some instances if the fees are actually compensate for something where they actually relate to something put in that particular package and then ok they pass rational basis scrutiny they must be fees ok and in other cases such as this one where that doesn't happen or any number  basically says well the basically the label isn't the be all to end up ok well that may be the case where you have to add to get really going on where there's multiple ways and reasonable ways to interpret a statute but this is a case of apples and oranges we don't have that here we basically have a statute that consistently refers to the charge of fees ok so what what price that is basically say well john says for the pub this and that we don't necessarily stop there the rule is that the torah construction who says that even in cases nine ambiguity then we still got to look at his other attributes we still got to look to outside sources we have to look for hidden meanings it's ok for the court to rewrite the statute and i position that but that's not that can't be right i mean that's a violation of separation  mean that would basically make rational basis good enough to it still has it reversed i think the question is whether or not it seeks to and i think jones even uses that word seeks to intends to ok and the statute refers i mean it starts out by thing to finance ok so to compensate in fact the definition is as as agreed to in jones as well it's usually a charge for labor or services for expenses or services rendered ok so i'm looking think of plain reading of the statute real because ok well in the cause of prosecution other words the up the upkeep or i guess the finance of one aspect of the court system and our position as well but once you have that if then you know it's a good boys onto the whole definition of fees and fines you know the whole threshold nonconstitutional question ok then once you look to that oh it's compensatory in nature right that the definition in jones says refers to you know differentiates i guess the difference between a fine is being a finding  compensatory or seeking to recoup expenses for professional services rendered or labor ok so our position is that while these fees to finance youth programs these these fees to finance mental health court  certainly that's the first place to luck if they call it a fine and it's fine but then again you know of course that it's the design to penalize something that's punitive something that's part eight part of a sentence as opposed to something that's collateral ok what we have here we don't have any connection whatsoever to any type a youth program i mean this this guy was twenty two years old he was a in the adult he was in the da system he was charged and convicted of possession of a stolen motor vehicle ok that they had no relation whatsoever kind of and part of his family i mean and again just looking at the plain language of the statute it was designed to recoup it was designed and i think part of the problem with the state's position is again it basically kind of takes it backwards it looks to  well ok it isn't rationally related ok well it's not rationally related so it can't be anything other than a fine really the only question then is is is it excess of but again that makes the whole rational basis it would never  fine yes certainly it's a different question and in terms of excess in this you know it's a different argument and i you know i won't i don't have a challenge on that you know it's a five dollars on offer one in ten dollars or he other but to me the important question is again whether or not it's a fee i don't think there's much of a you know our position is that this is the correct test and that we do look you know it's not so much whether or not it's because i guess that there were no expenses incurred there was nothing to recoup for this particular prosecution is the very reason why it doesn't pass constitutional muster it's the reason why it's not rational related and it's just our position is that it's an arbitrary and unreasonable means to try to address what is otherwise a legitimate state interest if you're going to put the burden of financing these aspects and these types of programs on the backs of all adult defendants that are in court for you know position was the motor vehicle at the legislature indicated that this that it's not to be included in the fine so yeah i mean that to me that's a clear case of apples and oranges and that is the starting point and and whether or not reasonable people can agree in terms of you know looking beyond that what to me that's a separate charges in this case are find and they comport with due process jones controls this case jones tells us that he label that's attached to a charge is not necessarily definitive of how the charge should be characterized in jones the statute labeled the charges a fee but this court found that the charge did not possess any of the attributes of a fee instead the charge only possessed you have to be to a fine therefore this court found that the charge was clearly a fine the label notwithstanding a fine is a monetary punishment it's purpose is to punish a defendant for committing an offense in contrast a fee is a charge for labor or services it seeks to recoup expenses incurred by the state in prosecuting the defendant this court is held that a charge is a fee if and only if it is intended to reimburse the state for some cost incurred in the defendant's prosecution that is the central characteristic which separates a fee from a fine it's the most important fact to what what's the purpose of having in the statute references to the mental health court and to the youth court what is what if it's not simply a fee what is the purpose of that how does that relate to the fi the purpose of the statute is punishment and the proceeds of these two fines are used to finance certain parts of the court system however once it's with the purpose of the fine is to punish the defendant for committing a criminal offense it just so happens that the proceeds of these fines are earmarked for certain program however the purpose of the statute is punishment and we know that by looking at the plain language of the statute the statute uses the word fee however when the statute is read in its entirety as court must do it's readily apparent that the legislature intended these charges to apply to a broad swath of qualifying offenses for instance to mental health court fee i'm sorry charge will apply to a defendant who is not a youth thus clearly the legislature did not argument and in the end it's only it's only a fee if the and that's clearly not the case here and that's the definition that's in jones here plan they were job the statute indicates that these charges are not compensatory in nature and that's because the legislature intended them to apply to this wide variety of cases and defendants therefore because they are not compensatory they cannot possibly be characterize as fees they must be characterized as fines to construe the statute in the manner that the defendant suggests would lead to an absurd result because then you would have the state seeking reimbursement for costs that it never incurred during the state during the prosecution of the defendant's case that would make sense and it's presumed that legislature did not intend and observe result not necessarily because many defendants do not serve time in custody prior to their trial therefore yes some certainly fans if they did meet the requirement would get credit against their fines however there are numerous defendants where that wouldn't apply to you that's a separate matter and the legislature intended that to only apply to certain defendants who meet the requirements those who have spent time in pretrial custody once this court determines that these charges are fines then due process only requires that the punishment is rationally related to the offense and in the context of fines the in in this case the defendant did not have contact with the youth court or the mental health court so it would be more difficult to apply that standard however following jones we don't have to apply that standard because it's clear that the legislative intent wasn't to make these charges fees the appropriate standard to apply is the due process standard that applies to finds and that is whether the amount of the fine grossly disproportionate to the offense and defendant concedes that if these are finds due process would be satisfied here for all these reasons as well as those containing our brief the people respectfully request that this honorable court affirmed the judgment of the appellate court thank you rebuttal in reference to the question from the court about the whole free sentencing credit wow i would venture to say that most if not all defendants at least spend enough time in custody that would certainly offset thirteen dollars worth of quote unquote fines if that were the case and you know as far as what the control that jones has on this particular case you know o to talk about the spinal spinal chord he and issue in that particular case and out had referenced it was actually listed and one of the articles that was basically listed as a fine and again it made it even use the word penalty had various words and cross references where reasonable people can come to different conclusions as to what the statute what that what the legislature had intended there and that's nowhere near the circumstance we have here where we have just a complete absence of statutory ambiguity and that's what the state keeps ignoring it keep it basically their rule is basically even  cases where there's absolutely no ambiguity we don't quote unquote abruptly end well the basic rule when law accepted rules that a tory construction is that the legislature has a certain purpose it has a certain function right statute that says what into it what it intends to say it says what it means and it means what it says and it's not the role of another branch of government or a court to rewrite the statute which is basically what the court is asking this court to do what the state is asking this court to do so that that's an important distinction and i think that's where price and other the other cases that rely on price go wrong and what what the appellate court did in this particular case that just went in lockstep and just said well wa  it even under john's you know this is an entirely different situation this is a case where there is absolutely zero statutory ambiguity so there's there's no reference a panel is and i think the state makes reference claims that we could be characterized as such but there's no basis for finding there's no reasonable way to look at the statute and make that conclusion there just simply not so again that's our position and unless this court has any other questions  we have that the courts that the files be vacated thank you thank you both counts case number one zero six five four one people of the state of illinois versus willie gray's will be taken under