supervision that was not imposed by the sentencing court it is undisputed that that term was not imposed by the sense in court and this court held in early two thousand and six that sentences that are not imposed by a or unconstitutional as a matter of law and subsequent decisions from this court upheld that the judicial and the administrative imposition or enforcement of such sentences are also unconstitutional and violate clearly established law for purposes of qualified two thousand and eighteen that's correct it seems that hassle at least from the res decision this past august has been interpreted as adding an adverse consequence requirement for due process claims are related to post release supervision if that is the case respect we submit that that decision should be reconsidered for several reasons and the st of which is that adding an adverse consequence or compensable injury element to due process claims cannot be reconciled with the supreme court's decision and carry and forward four decades of consistent precedent from this court that have consistently held that compensable injuries not an element of civil rights claims generally speaking that that applies to both procedural and substantive civil rights claims i believe there's precedent in this court applying that to fair housing act claims and the court this court has made clear that it is an error of law to dismiss a claim including on summary judgment on the grounds that the plant the civil rights plaintiff has been unable to stablish a compensable injury looking at at the magnitude of adding a compensable injury element to these types of claims must be viewed in that context and also in the context in which  judges administrative everybody virtually everyone believe the country at the state level that's correct but in this court's decision in vincent they held that the relevant time period for whether qualified immunity exist in these types of cases is in two thousand and six in the early decision decided that in forcing or imposing these these administrative p r s terms was unconstitutional and going forward what will the majority of the defendants in these types of no facts in the record suggests they had any involvement at all with regard to one it's if i understand it help me understand the record differently if i'm missing something but there's a single conversation in which the parole the parole officer says well you should take it up with court and you're saying it's clearly established that he should have known that even though the high level policy makers were in the process of and fixing the early situation and re sentencing and they had parole defendants here waited fifteen months to do anything in response to the decision now the lower court cases in scottie fisher and the hassel case itself have dismissed cases against low level pro officials on the grounds that there was no allegation at that time that they had any knowledge whatsoever that the plaintiff at issue had unconstitutional p r s this case is different from those those scenarios because the undisputed record is that defendants where oh was informed by our client that he had our client had proposed a release supervision that was not imposed by the sentencing judge and the undisputed response to that that complaint was to take it up with the courts and i think a logical extension of instant and hassle and how courts have been analyzing the qualified it this court has been analyzing the qualified immunity issue is to look at what was done in response and clearly doing nothing in response to this complaint is does not allow the defender to take advantage of qualified  immunity i want to circle back to to the hassle issue because i think it's important and the reason being is that the supreme court and this court have noted that there are certain absolute rights that need to be there does need to be redress in the courts of not their monetary monetary but the problem as an institutional matter is that we've got a decision on point i think you'd agree from a month and a half ago and now you're asking us is a panel to be visit we consider that decision we're not really in a position to do  issue and i understand that the position that i'm in what i'm asking the court to do and as judge paul noted if this truly was was inadvertent and looking at the hassle decision the case that was cited to support this  law in essence was a case of whether there is a claim in connection with a defendant who has been convicted of a crime it is not yet been sentenced and that is not the case here these are cases where it is clear that they there is a due process violation and one of the right have a matter of timing and they can do so the one thing that's very important to note and this is this is what judge pointed out in his dissenting opinion there is conflict within the house of the sit in itself before concluding that there was no adverse consequence and therefore apparently no due process claim the hassle court determined that the defendants were not entitle to qualified immunity looking at the elements of what you need to establish qualified immunity that necessarily entails that the court found that there was a due process violation and judge hall's main point to send was if the conflict within hassle and the consequences for adding an unprecedented and pretentiously insurmountable hurdle for civil rights plaintiffs who can't prove compensable damages should be considered if at all through the courts many on process if it were were inclined to do so court david frankel on behalf of the state defendants appellate in this case and there's two independent reasons to affirm the decision below the st is that there was no due process violation in the st instance case there has conceded this in his briefs there's unrebutted evidence in depositions that it was in fact administered the same and that there was no more onerous requirements because of the p r s did we go astra deprivation here and where the lawful sentence imposed here was was all that was certain where there were no additional requirements based on the p r s there is no deprivation in the st instance and that's an element of a due process claim it was process is able to show that the adverse action would have happened anyway but that doesn't mean that there wasn't a due process violation i mean you could say that's not invariably what is said but we've said things like that and kerry seems to say that well i would quote from the race decision where they say the more onerous requirement follows from the basic requirement that a point of claiming a violation of due process must show a deprivation of liberty or property and i think the distinction from kerry is that there was the deprivation the students were suspended without any predisposition process and here you have no deprivation above and beyond what was already mandated by the lawful sentence and there's no requirement that any pr majority to the extent this court has any authority to reconsider that very recent decision through many on bank or other process and my understanding is that the minium bank does require unanimity among the court so it seems unlikely this one member of the majority who sits with this court would be willing to reconsider a decision that was just issued but in any event there is the entirely independent grounds for a firm and here which is the qualified immunity here and even if there is some other reading of i think another way of putting this is that if parole officers were aware that there was a lawful sentence authorized to do everything that they did in this case and authorizing every restriction of community supervision the fact that there was also some other un pronounce sentence wouldn't have changed the way that they acted and there's certainly is no clearly established law to the contrary and individual and in addition these periods cases have largely turned on questions of whether high level policy makers were taking the appropriate steps of the reasonable promptness but here we have a case involving line level parole officers and there was no act or omission that these line level officers had based on one single statement to one of these officers that maybe the p r s sentence was unlawful to take any affirmative act or omission they had no policy making responsibilities they were not in charge of bringing the department into compliance with the requirements of early and we also know that the policy makers at this point were in fact well aware of the situation with p r s and well aware of the situation of garcia and others similarly situated and we're taking active steps to address that and whether or not those steps are sufficient is in some sense outside the bounds of this appeal because the individual defendant suit here had no responsibility to nd guess what those policy makers were doing in this case i'm happy to answer any other questions the court may have paul just very briefly on the call that immunity point i think this two important distinctions are that are that the law is clearly established for all officials there the defendants want to cast a very specific highly technical that wasn't clearly established for these types of plaintiffs who have overlapping potentially overlapping terms and that's not what the supreme court has ever required and the critical point here is that the low level wind parole officer was informed of the unconstitutional sentence and did correct there are cases in there is a risk that attorneys fees could come into play to drive these types of suits to points on that the supreme court in this court have made clear that the amount of attorneys fees is a matter of discretion to the district court and oftentimes with nominal damages  are are the only thing that is awarded zero dollars is the appropriate amount of attorney's fees there is another point related to that and that is in early itself judge walker noted that the decision would potentially open the doors to significant litigation plaintiffs such as our client who would bring suit in connection with these types of claims and recognize that that was going to be an afrikaans as a consequence of the decision and held nonetheless that these p r s terms were unconstitutional my last point is just that