nonsense of claim to but what about the somewhat more modest idea that what claim one requires is the ability to be self aware even if you don't have to be self aware all the time that is the ability to have information you're going to send to the smartphone that you did not acquire through a sensor i think the first answer your question is i don't view the district court's order that way and i don't think you can't you're that way when you look at what the district court said it was clear that it was interpreting it that it must not be censors because it noted a couple points that was the only way to think i will assume for the purpose of this question that the district court did not adopt this construction why would it be wrong to construe claim why in light of this back to say the the the operational as conditions are but important to answering your question is the paragraph that begins on line fifty two and that's where it goes through and talks about the controller that's being disclosed it talks about the controller can  information on our status conditions in multiple ways it can be self aware of them but it can also use extra sensors to develop them so if you were to interpret claim one is saying the controller must be self aware closed i don't think you can do it for those reasons in other words when you read a limitation a controller having a plurality of control operational status conditions you read that as meaning as describing a controller that at that that has this information but it doesn't the claim doesn't describe how the controller got that information and there's nothing that says how it obtains it nothing that talks about sensors the thing that talks about not using sensors it really has no support at all for the district court's conclusion on either of those points you know that it be self aware or that it can't use external sensors and again that's contrary what's in the specification the specification is clear is there's multiple ways to get information one is using sensors one is not using sensors so if we assume the district court got it wrong on this construction then i think you have to vacate the primary injunction order because that is the sole in only reason that the district court gave for denying our limitation there were discussions about other limitations i don't think they rose to the level of the discussion of the controller but the key for this court is if we look at what the court actually concluded it below is it was crystal clear that the only reason for d against us on a substantial question of invalidity was the control of the mitigation so obviously the district court did not rely on any other arguments orders not based on any other arguments so those are really not right for your honour's consideration here we have to deal with the district stands the findings announced there and again on the issue of the substantial question of invalidity the only distinction the only thing the court a lot upon was censorship i guess the point is we wouldn't be able to conclude here in this court that there is in fact a substantial question of validity if we agreed with you on this one particular client i mean isn't what the best we could do is simply vacate the grounds for the district court relied on or the one grounds for concluding that there substantial question i think you could go further because i think from reading the district court's order i believe it rejected any other arguments that would have distinguished the claims other than the construction of the controller as you just asked but if we concluded that it was the opinion just simply silent as to its other possible questions then that would be crowds for vacating i believe that's right but i think you can go further than that in  especially since chamberlain has i think i mean they've tried to say that these arguments were definitely raised if that's true in the court rejected them and relied only on the controller limitation and i think you could call a step further and say that there is a substantial question of when he'd been raised at this point that was raised between the claims and the curious how come we didn't get the full office action response and in the joint appendix i think we tried to go out of hair to go get that i saw the full arguments that were made and whether or not you know the district court judge was right and how it understood what it occurred i think we were trying to keep the joint appendix small for you and it was not an attempt to keep any information from your honour's it was just to focus on the key the key one is as you say so it is completely neutral as to where information comes from should we or should we and i think that that's fair your honor and i think it is probably never that was just a question i think you raise a good point is you know what's the most efficient way forward here i think that the the more guidance that you all can provide to the district court i think would be helpful i think we've seen the district court struggling with some concepts in terms of both irreparable harm and the merits here i mean we even noted you know with respect to the second pattern that's not subject to this order that there were some clear i think struggles with the discord understanding you know basic concepts of direction for enjoyment so i think it is proper trial now set for may it not yet so the last time we were before the court the judge was talking about possibly  june having a trial that sometime in june but we do not have a trial date set yet but the other issue that i think your honor should be aware of is there is sort of a spin off of the marine junction which is a contempt proceedings that is pending right now so the defendants in this case redesigned the product based upon that plimer injunction order and released a new redesigned product chamberlain hala motion for contempt and we had that hearing last week so the judge heard evidence it please the court i'd like to first address the rely language in the court's opinion when the court used the term rely in saying that so and i'm paid seven of the that the controller itself needs to be self aware it needs to be aware of its own states and not determine those states based on external sensors and the reason the court used that language is because through a three day hearing with six with extensive testimony by experts the court heard testimony from dr ryan that the first clause in claim one should be accorded its ordinary meaning and if you look at the language of that claim the language states a controller having which is possessed of a plurality of potential operating status conditions defined at least in part of operating states there was a shorthand used during the trial during the hearing that that language referred to self aware that shorthand comes from the specification itself in c specification starting at around line fifty two the applicant differentiated between information that is obtained by control of it somewhere where the controller is aware of its own conditions from actually obtaining that information from sensors and the reason the applicant did that is because in the background of the patent the applicant talked about that that the external sensors were known in the r and that caused was disclosing in the specification is that there's two ways of doing this you can either be self aware aware of your own states and that's a technical term pelican apply here because it's a technical term given with state diagrams and being aware of your own states or you can get information from a sensor that you're passing along and the applicant didn't preclude the idea that the controller would get that other information that's claimed in claims to in three people can you address this this problem of claim to being dependent on a claim one which under one twelve deal for whatever it's called means that all of the claim what claim one limitations ha to be met by claim to rob the world i don't see how under the district courts view it i think them to the view you're promoting that it's possible because if claim one is limited to discusses that the information that the controller is using in claim one is self aware information that doesn't mean the controller can't also use information from sensors but that sensor information can't satisfy that limitation of claim one so when the judge says rely the controller can't rely on x journal sensors to determine its own state but it can both determine its own state and the controller can pass through information from an external sensor and i think claim three is instructive on that point because claim to first not claim to does not have any antecedent bases its claim differentiation is inappropriate it's not modifying anything in claim is adding to it so claim to adds sensors claim three says that the transmitter which is a box in claim one can take information from those sensors and send that out so now you've got a transmit in the upper left hand column of the upper left hand side of figure one that can send information from the control or the self aware of formation and it can also send information from the transmitter so in my view the proper reading of plane to him three is that the applicant understood that you might not get completely away from sensors you might still have some but the tension was about the self aware controller that monitored its own state could send that out to you might know that it turned on a light and might turn on another light based on the fact that it knows its own state i think back to the district court's reasoning i'm looking at towards the bottom of the search concluded that the only reasonable the judge was was hearing three days worth of testimony the testimony was that you can't use that information to satisfy the limitations in claim one so when the judge is making these statements he's doing it on the backdrop of three days of testimony and extensive testimony from dr rhine who said that you can indeed have external controllers he called the minority approach it's it's the prior art approach you can have those you can add that into the invention but you can't use th satisfy the limitations of claim one so claim one precludes the ability to use that external sensory information to meet the limitation of being self aware because that's that's not and again i'm using the shorthand for self aware you know over and over again we reinforce to the judge and that is just shorthand it's really the first cause and claim one about the controller having potential status conditions external controllers are not sending potential status conditions defined by states they're sending their states so there's a there's a lot of testimony on this include difference she ation between a controller who can know the states it might be and versus a controller receiving an actual state of the garage doors closed from an external sensor you agree that the district court shouldn't have relied on the prosecution history as a way of understanding the limits to claim one i don't think the prosecution history has histories was really instructive here i don't think we need to get there because it's not that we're trying to import some limitation into the claim which in fact he has if you look at their claim construction that they're proposing to the district court now kind of in my head translate to being a self aware controller that's the terminology the pattern uses a column for is shorthand regular and so i guess the next question is how how would  aware controller accomplish all of these different functions or side and claim five like for example detecting a likely presence of an obstacle to movement of the  barrier to the garage door i mean i can understand a self aware controller in the sense that it already and knows that it open the garage door so it knows that you know the next action would be to close the garage door or the controller and he knows that it believes it turned on the light so it knows the next action it could take would be to turn that light off in that sense it's self aware but i don't get at all how the controller could detect the presence of an obstacle to movement of the garage door unless it was relying on external sensors so first i would say that ted i do believe comes into play on this because the interpretation of whether those could be performed by the controller or the or the sensors there was testimony on that and dr brian provided testimony on that as to whether the garage door can detect an object when there is an object the garage door which is starting to to close will reverse direction so the garage door knows i reverse direction and based on that it could have logic to know that if it reversed direction there's a likely presence of something in the way of the garage door four to six inches from the bottom of the door that do detect the presence but what's happening in that claim is that it's not relying on a state of states that from the external sensor that something is there in order to be self aware example where because it knows what it's motor did and yes the motor motor triggered based on that but the controller itself still has the state diagram and it still knows what it's door and the doors closing and then there's external sensors that recognize that there's some obstacle i e my dog blocking the bottom of the garage floor then they start all sensors will notify the controller you know you need to reverse course and then once the controller is reversing course you're telling me that that is information that now the controller possesses that it now itself is detected the likely presence of an obstacle to the movement of the garage door that's the theory it would that's correct as to if it self aware on that particular element that is how it would be self aware and certainly if somebody were to just take the information from the sensor and the controller just sent out right out that's not meeting the limitation of the claim a claim one it would have to actually be self aware is to whatever that item on the list was and again there was extensive testimony that claim five that there was items in that list you know that the controller could be self aware of them it could also be that that information comes from an extra controller in which case that would proximity to the garage without a sensor and he said i can think of one and then when he was asked about home link which is chamberlain technology that's in the garage door the buttons you have in your car that's all that's all originated from chamberlain when he was asked about that the nie recognize that yes you can have you can detect the presence based on the fact that your signal came from home wing that's not a sensor that's controlled data but that was an example that he gave of that that he could come up with and it wasn't this this particular claim clive was not and i may have overstated when i said extensive testimony there was testimony on this it was challenge at some point if you try to stop challenging the pressure to get more rebates by home depot when we had the hearing they were in that some negotiations with some people they have subsequently offered rebates since then it's not in the record because it wasn't part of the p i hearing but it's and the price has maintained at the same level up to forty four so now the two hundred sixty eight dollars model has been repressed in price this entire time you can go on the website and look it's still two forty four price below the right  and you also heard chamberlain suggests that over and in what you're saying now if you have not said anything that's a reason to reject the construction under which it has to have the ability to and i but i don't have any trouble at all using the term self aware as a complete shorthand for what's for the notion about where the information that's being sent to the to the self to the smartphone is coming from as long as it has that ability to have anything else you want so claim five would be consistently two would be consistent what is wrong with the claim construction that says it has to have this ability that's actually pretty key to our invention and that all the other bells and whistles but it's gotta have that to get the best thing i can point you to as i think that that would exclude the embodiment that uses sensors for the information if you say it has to be self aware then you could never have the scenario where it just relied upon external sensors and so i think you'd be eliminating one of the two  one respects the first scenario referring back to the column for the first scenario where the controller self aware and the two seventy five pounds claim to corresponds to the second scenario by reciting in relying upon