errors of law when it denied or dismissed my client's unbridled discretion and religious claims and refused to entertain their motion for cleaner injunction actually denied the motion is being moved why don't we deal with real looper first  you're not a religious organization how do you have any standing to bring a r extent of article three it doesn't say that only religious organizations have standing doesn't say that only religious assemblies have standing it doesn't limit it to any group whatsoever yuma one of our cases that quotes and says that in order to establish this claim there must be an imposition or implementation of a land use regulation to buy a government three on a religious assembly or institution now are you a religious assembly or client a religious assembly or institution no but we do believe that there has been a that or claim does check all these boxes though well whatever you want to call it do you do a survey for example of the people who are getting married to ask whether their religious are whether they profess any particular creed or whether they're licensed ministers not not for purposes of this claim but what we do argue and what we believe is that religious that weddings and this is what this case is about weddings are inherently religious assemblies since when since forever because argument that it's almost irrelevant in many situations i thought you were asking us to believe that because marriage sometimes involves a religious ceremony and that that gives you standing as a religious ceremonies but i would say that the concept of marriage and i think the concert and wedding wedding ceremonies do spring from religion do spring from religious i think religious moral you wouldn't marry an atheist would be terrible in that no but i'd look at the argument that we are presenting is that we believe that weddings themselves are dressed in religious symbolism dressed in religious traditions there  are pictures in the record of weddings that have taken place in their descriptions of weddings that have taken place at opponent state which do include religion i just don't question that some ceremonies are indeed religious no question about that but the question here is as the opponent and your client have standing under a federal law designed to protect religious institutions from discrimination in land use religious institutions and religious assemblies correct and my argument is that the that standing under real lupa is guided by article three to the full extent of article three of ok let's say that's true but you still have to meet the qualification of your religious institution or religious assembly and i'm saying i don't see it well how how does your l l c and your client become a religious institution or religious assembly we believe that the wedding ceremonies that we seek to hold on the property that to admit that your client and the l l c is not a religious institution or assembly but what you do is related to religious ceremonies well essentially yes i mean let's be clear i mean my client certainly holds religious beliefs and i don't care about that i'm just talking about this statu and impairing thehotel be at the neighborhood and all that and so i read in isolation i think that's potentially problematic but my question to you is as this report pointed out at the discretion this case is really guided by some fairly specific standards there are twenty eight or so factors that permitting officials must consider there are seven standards that they have to meet if it's tonight they have to make specific factual findings so what if this channel guidance to the permitting officials really need in this case so let me go right at the what you had indicated in terms of the district court judge's ruling account these factors but that's not that's that's simply not accurate as a matter of fact these actions have nothing whatsoever to do with the denial or the gran grants or the denial of a c u p is governed by a level one two point one one which your honor alluded to discuss is whether or not the use of noxious or whether or not the uses harmful or interest by contrast it one hundred nine point one and the other provision that was cited by the district court of deals with factors that may be considered when imposing conditions but it doesn't say doesn't speak to whether or not these c e p t should be issued in the first place it deals with conditions and of course it uses the word men it doesn't use the word must it doesn't use the word shall there's no s noise land air resources there's no guidance that's being provided by those factors even if that's what was governing the standard for approval or disapproval which they're not so let me let me turn then to your honor's point about the findings you know that's not so you know wait let me make sure i understand your argument you're saying that eight one one one that's one point two point one point one the permitting approval standards that's self contained provision there's no reference to other kinds or standards is that how you're reading it absolutely and that's that's what the n c c l provides and i think if you look at the how the the county view the application of my clients they never once mentioned eighty one zero nine zero point one or that there were some other factors that were looking out of the some guidance that we're looking at in terms of approval or that deals with types of conditions that may be imposed that's a very different provision that doesn't purport to restrict the discretion that's being exercised under the standards of approval eight eleven eighty one eleven etc well l eleven point one point two yeah right point one point one and those are whether or not the use is harmful whether or not the uses of noxious whether or not thank the it's detrimental to the public interest and you know these are the decent in thirty five seventy and in desert outdoor and all the other sea u p a cases where the courts have looked at these standards and said you know they're just too broad they're on tethered there's no objective criteria that's governing these standards isn't your best argument there's really no time limit on when a decision has to be made i think that that is a also a very important argument and i think that's also where the district court got it wrong  this this permit exchange is content neutral and therefore you don't even have to you don't even have to look at whether or not that there are reasonable that life that's not true because in the ninth circuit what the court has said in common who is that one of the elements of content neutrality is that you don't have this unbridled discretionary scheme so yes when you have a c u p requirement that is governing expressive conduct such as weddings and common who found that weddings are expressive conduct the house to be reasonable time limits imposed or else the length of time is effectively the denial of speech in this case it's almost exactly the same situation as in ray out there is your argument based on a first amendment claim i don't remember that if you did you assert a first amendment claim that is the basis of our argument that's probably ok all right let's that's the basis of our claim you want first amendment religious context but i'm talking about speech no no mike mike that the thrust of my argument has always been free speech we've played it since the beginning of this case we briefed it ok extensively in the trial court i only have a minute forty four i think you want to say that yes things and answers a hundred she line of precedent well your honor in my brief i take the position that we don't even get to an unbridled discretion analysis and that's because this is not even though it's styled as a first amendment case and a facial challenge based on unbridled discretion you don't see the the same traditional concerns that underline most of our first amendment jurisprudence in the ninth circuit there's no chilling effect here your hon we have here a private a purely private forum ok this is not something that's open to the public and anybody can walk on or off this is in a state with a gate that rents itself out for outdoor commercial events  a land use regulation that regulates the use of that private property the people seeking to engage in the expression probably don't even know there's owning ordinance exists so we don't ha what with respect to our common manu case takes care of your argument does it not i mean there's clearly standing the fact that it's a private setting does not change the fact that you can challenge a facial an ordinance on a facial basis right well i think there's a couple  and i know judgments has addressed this issue in her child evangelism fellowship case and you've talked about the lesser degrees of scrutiny that apply the less form the public is here we have a non public forum in the costume on a case here we have a purely private forum so the risk of censorship is even further reduced and i think that's important when you consider whether or not you're going to apply this very rigorous unbridled discretion analysis and the other distinction of  unbridled discretion that was at issue there number one it was a permit in scheme but applied to the speakers themselves it didn't apply to the vendors that apply to the people who wanted to engage in the speech and so there was a real risk of censorship and a chilling effect because those people could have a legitimate fear that they're not going to even apply because they don't want to fear having their license to night but but the discretion that was that and so that the licensing or marriages even though they're deals with the first amendment rights of an end the vidual you're saying that in this case because we have an individual here to his authorizing a marriage that's different it's not like a tattoo is not your argument right i'm saying in the taps you of cases and the reallocates we talked about the business the tattooing being the expressive activity since when has this circuit ever held that the business of running a commercial events venue that might hold weddings which might which might include the actual marriage ceremony county the discretion at issue or kamado was a single decision maker who could after reading the names on the permit decide this permit i don't have to tell you why you have no ability to reason that you're sort of maybe you're in times you why so if you if you has he we said this form was protected yes it is at the end of your case it's not to me the bigger point i was trying to make and i apologize for for an absolutely everyone here the bigger  i'm trying to make is that the unbridled discretion analysis should not apply that is an analysis that applies under the city of lakewood case it talks about the factors that plaintiffs have to meet to meet and make that challenge and they have to make this threshold showing that there is a risk of a chilling effect that there is really a threat to free speech and because of the forum and because of the discretion that's involved here because of those things we don't have that same chilling effect that's my point when you look at all those factors together combined with the fact that by the way we're talking about marriage ceremonies no one's not getting married in the county i've been tara let me tell you that there are thousands of places to get married anyone can get married at their home in their church as an accessory use there are public parks but it's council isn't that a red herring i mean in the real case there are a lot of tattoo parlors in the city of long beach and the county barred him from certain areas because they said it was not in accordance with public morals the people the like of there was competition from other people and they had an indefinite time to expand things you know this guy was the only tattoo artist in his place you know what they're going to business are not going to have business been looking at it for a long time i'm not sure i buy the argument that just because you can do it somewhere else that this plaintiff is not entitle to exercise his first amendment rights to conduct marriages i agree with that my point is really when you look at the totality of the circumstances do we have the same type of chilling effect do we have the same type of built in animus towards marriage ceremonies that we do toward tattoo parlors and the a consultant but the reality is these are pretty vague terms and there's no time limit on it i'm troubled by that i really am i mean i understand i did a lot of zoning work in my practice days i understand the need for the cat affiliates tests from this circuit we don't just look at the standards and the if there are basically look at three things three factors one are there are objective criteria to our findings required for denial and three is there adequate mechanism for judicial review those are the three factors under this ninth circuit test no one factor is determinative under that test now i will tell you i agree with respect to the standards they are discretionary there are there are fact but it's not a problem to be discretionary the problem is whether there's sufficient guidance they are that would prevent the permitting officials from having unbridled discretion i asked counsel this question i'll give you a chance to respond to this while the district court's analysis  really relied heavily on the fact that there are factors and standards that basically guy the permitting officials decisions and counsel said that those standards really don't apply because you're it's you're supposed to only focus wedge that in some cases we've expressed a concern is leading to unbridled this question so how how do you respond to that how do we know that you can then cross reference the standards and  uidelines and that permitting officials do so in every case when they deny a permit ok so so there is some case law and i didn't know this was an issue but i will i will see if i can recall what it was that says when you are challenge as zoning ordinance you read the whole thing in context you can't pick one piece of a zoning ordinance and say well you can only look at these four corners of this provision so i think the whole zoning ordinance is fair game and i disagree with mr unbridled discretion here you're saying that there is a case or cases that says we have to look at the totality of the ordinance to determine whether there's unbridled discretion if there is what's that case you know i don't have that case  i don't believe that there is it but my is there a cross reference within the regulation no your honor there's not but you have an entire ordinance and that is the scheme that the county follows these planning commissioners who make this decision and the board of supervisors are familiar with the entire organise and here's what i would say about mr he says point yes these factors that were identified by the district court judge are not required to be followed they are guidance for the people making the decisions making the land use decisions sure but we're going to know that they utilize the guidance and that's really my question well there are factors here it says the provision that the this report cited this article nine section eighty one o nine point one factor such as the following may be considered in establishing permit conditions doesn't talk about denial of permits you're right it is not your honor so two things this is opportunity for censorship would review the content of the sign and then decide if it could be posted based on whether it was compatible with the surrounding area but in that instance the sense that case so the supreme court has found as a sign and i think gilbert arizona didn't meet the standard because despite what you're talking situation was forgotten if you will and they've all ruled it isn't that an overlay on what we're talking about here well it is your honor but i think there's another component to this that we're missing and that is the county's historical practice in applying the ordinance which supreme court authority and that's outlined on page thirty one of my brief says we should consider in doing this and here we don't even have to have any extra evidence in the record because plaintiffs pled that information they told us two things number one they told us of all the people to pli for a permit to hold wedding events they're the only ones who have ever been denied and we know from the record that  all the people who sorry not of all the people but we know from the record that their neighbors thirty of their neighbors in fact in their entire homeowners association came out and protested and opposed this particular use and the reasons they cited were the reasons identified by judge she and her order which was concerns about traffic safety risk of vandalism risk of trespassing so we know how the county applies this ordinance in the history of mankind according to point it's never denied  except for plaintiffs and when you look at why the reasons make sense and they're perfectly consistent with those factors identified by judge g and that can't be overlooked it is important under supreme court jurisprudence to look at the county's historical practice in applying this one because it tells you how they interpret the standards and no standards are going to be perfectly defined and less they are called they're going to know your case by case basis are they not it's true yes so are you telling us that when this permit was denied that the planning commission and i guess later courts a county supervisor says and i'm not sure exactly but what it was that they went through and took each one of these criteria and and i analyzed it and 'm just saying that for purposes of in that official challenge which is what we're talking about here your honor it's kind of irrelevant that particular point what we're really talking about is you look at the face of this document and you see whether it meets the supreme court's and our standards about whether the discretion is unlimited and the timing is unlimited that's what we're really talking about and how that conflicts if at all with the constitutional restrictions on first amendment issues we honor i have one minute left so i don't think i'm going to move you any further on the discretionary standards but let me talk about the two other criteria because there are three and again not one is determinative the second one is we have to have the findings of factual findings for review we have that was we get to check that box and county gets full credit i know plaintiff wants to say well the findings are meaningless and it's really easy to make findings in california but that's not what ninth circuit authority says ninth circuit authority says if you have findings specific factual findings for denial you have to check the box and you get full credit so i ask that you give the county full credit for have amending its ordinance the third factor is whether or not there are appropriate mechanisms for judicial review here i think we have that in spades and i can address your timing argument we have a decision by a planning director with you to a five person planning commission with a de novo review to a five person board of supervisors these are public hearings with notice an opportunity to participate if you don't like the board of supervisors decision you have appellate review to the superior court so we've got that nailed down well it's about timing the question i  have is counsel and with respect it seems to me you're jumping between as applied and facially a facial challenge you're talking about the way this was applied we did this i'm saying if you look at the order on its face  and you consider what's there that's the facial challenge that's what we're dealing with here we're not talking about really what actually happened in this case we're really talking about the ordinance you know i'm talking about that we're talking about the same thing over and under seattle are now required in this case we didn't do it the same way we made them orally on the record now we do it differently because we've amended our ordinance but the facial ordinance itself we have these standards that someone could argue give too much just direction or they don't we have the requirement of factual findings that's on the face of the ordinance itself and then we have this third thing which is a mechanism for judicial review that's all facial and under seattle affiliates we consider each three of those factors and we can consider timing although  under southern oregon farther fair if the stat if the regulation is you point neutral we don't have a timing issue on the ninth circuit authority and even if you don't believe me on that judge pryor wrote a great opinion citizen's free speech versus county of alameda and he says we cannot basically circumvent the legislature hoost who puts down in the laws the statutes the requirements for when permits are going to be  right and judge pryor said that wonderful yes i had a trial in front of him many years ago just prior explained that if the california permits streamlining act applies to your project that's all we need to say on the issue of timing because that's legislated and the legislature has said this is the timing that we're going to apply to this permit you can see we're a permit in this case which has to satisfy california environmental quality act is going to take more requirement to hold one of the requirements is that they have to hold a public hearing there's no deadline in this ordinance by which that the hearing these days happened so it is limitless in what word this case shows fifteen months i think from application until final decision i don't think that that's constitutionally tolerable in terms of the findings you know council says well we amended our ordinance now we've changed the way we do business except that that's not true because what that what the county said and what county council said and told the board of supervisors when they were approaching this that amendment they said this doesn't change anything this is the way that we've done it always we've always included some findings and there were in fact certain written findings that set forth the basis they talk and they they say nothing about these noise and traffic concerns that supposedly animate this the decision to deny the c u so what the county has said is that the they're they don't they're not changing their practice they amended it to require finding explicitly but they're not changing their practice your time is up we appreciate your argument both of you a