plenary question here where those four depp's actually served in your brief one page nine you see you say assuming service was proper so isn't that a plenary question did the bankruptcy court determine that service had been properly made as far as i know the basic was not yet to to made a determination this wasn't at the end of the case so any case controversy then if there they haven't been served then liens were in fact created yeah and mike my honest answer is i'm not aware that that particular issue to the earlier one assuming service was proper yes nine that's to the second one that's the one to mrs ms not no that's the first one the second one you say you say it as to front streaming service was proper i don't i don't see a finding by any corps to you're suggesting that there there is a proof of service but you're also saying twice assuming service was proper you suggesting that there's a question as to whether or not service proper did you raise this in your brief i mean i mentioned it did you raise it as an issue so the issue of service is not on appeal look at this did you read did you raise that to the bankruptcy court looked at the question of service and but i'm not sure that we've we've sort of got a straight answer yet if the second lien which may or may not be relevant to the to the question of whether we have jurisdiction of a over the appeal but if the if a second lien there's a challenge to service service ordinarily can be waived does that mean under california law that if there's a if there if you haven't raised to challenge the service of a lien is good even though wasn't properly served because in order another context a defendant can always waive appropriate appropriate service and don't raise that it's waived is there anything different about california's lien lawyer or wrap that would suggest that that even if you failed to make a proper objection to preserve a proper objection to service that that the lien is is still not  not entirely sure if that was also included in their motion ok but it may be anyway we decided not you decided not to pursue it for whatever reason yet it's not being received today of service because it's just the very fact of service that creates or doesn't create the league yeah that's i mean so it is a little bit different from normal but then why did you say in your brief assuming service was proper on page nine if it isn't being ra i believe that it and in what way was in service for proper because i mean it was not served by somebody was over the age of eighteen or over the age of twenty one or whatever california requires or it wasn't serving duplicate or what what would be the what's what's the defect in my recollection is that was there a question on whether this service occurred before or after the bankruptcy was filed i don't think that's a question i think it was there before flea i mean if the ruling in morton would if accepted would render through sixty to eighty to be a nobody and do you have a way of distinguishing morton or do you simply disagree with it i do so i mean in terms of well morton in morton the court talks about basically two issues they talked about whether the automatic stay somehow automatically tolls i get a chance or price and i said i think i disagree with it is on the other hand little deals with judgment renewal which is again a separate issue from that specifically judgment enforcement tools because jeremy renewal is literally a continuation of the civil action without renewing the judgment you can't you would lose all stretch the language of want to see to encompass these liens because the debtor could take advantage of the process by filing for bankruptcy during that period when that runs and then basically delaying proceedings in the bankruptcy until the period runs but that's not i don't believe that's the case because first of all there's a chapter seven case still like it's going to be the money is going to be split between the creditors before and they'll all be paid in full before the debtor receives anything back so no matter what there's not going to be any sort of like mr swan tech doesn't gain anything by filing for bankruptcy during that period and moreover like mesquite it was free to you know either again renew the lien under state law or if she felt that she was saved from doing so under three sixty two two m move the bankruptcy court for relief from state and i think that would be a much more if the ninth circuit could provide that sort of guidance to sit in the state on this issue first impression i think that would be provide much greater control over the bankruptcy proceedings for thank the courts to be able to sort of know what's going on and be able to determine this issue all right thank you counsel anyone has public public policy issues with all wrapped means generally that that's something for the legislature to solve it's not for anyone else to solve but when you read the transcript of the bankruptcy court hearing before judge albert he makes clear that doesn't like means and he says quote is there anything within the spirit or letter of section one a way that ought to preserve it bearing in mind that i don't like them to begin with and i don't think it's commencement of an action and he also says quote and so the question really becomes what do i think is the better rule with respect to dealing with liens and i think the better rule is the one of articulated and the reason i say that is because i think liens are problematic anyway he doesn't like  one is a stays was to go into effect so that creditors are not able to take any action so the trustee can do his or her work and the debtor can get a breathing spell on the other hand want to wait see is designed to essentially maintain the pre bankruptcy status quo and leave creditors no worse off because of the fact that they've been stayed in the appellant's brief he goes to great lengths and it's a very well written brief but he goes a great lengths to talk about three sixty two a worn verses three sixty two eight two and the fact that a one reference is the continuation or commencement of an action whereas a two reference is the unfortunate judgment but three sixty two a contain subsections one through eight and they're not mutually exclusive of the purpose of three sixty two a in my mind is to be as broad as possible into a pole impose a very wide broad automatic stay and so something can be stated pursuant to more than just one of those subsections which is the case here and when the spirituals case was decided by the ninth circuit the three sixty two existent in the exact same form that exists today and that was no part of the court's analysis and the other logical flaw i think that the appellant has inclined to hang his hat on this three sixty two a one verse two distinction is that the trustee seems to want to create two separate artificial category that shouldn't be created on the one hand the commencement or continuation of civil actions on the other hand anything period that keeps the duration open under section one zero eight see the logic that this bit that the spirit toes court used was that because the creditor was prevented from taking action by the automatic state or in the bankruptcy case there work logically if there wasn't if the situation if the decision was to be other than what the pope in a ruled it would create a very strange situation in which openings are not told during bankruptcy so the debtor and the trustee can kind of control when to file to have the cause liens to expire then it would cause every judgment creditor and all rapley and to first file a motion for relief from the max stay asking the benefit judge for permission to go back to state court then the is this concept that because of the fact that jordan foresman steps such as this one are taken after the entry of the judgement that it can't be or is not the continuation of a civil action and therefore not include with them want to because a judgment was existing in civil court every time she went to court she went to the same judge that entered the judgment it's a supplemental proceeding i don't think there can be any reasonable dispute with respect to that and i think that a mordant to remain meaning that a creditor is allowed to renew the renewal period as told and i want to wait see the appellant trezeguet some artificial distinction between it's not so bad if a creditor loses her lien but it would be really bad if the creditor lost her judgment as a whole there's no reason to make such a distinction in either case the creditor is losing all interest in property losing a right a valuable right merely because of the fact that the debtor filed bankruptcy an automatic stay t distinguish very tennison hunters friend so hunters run was a mechanic's lien which is very different from these particular erap lien because the mechanic's lien involves a basically two third parties  authority that have nothing to do with the debtor filing in the mechanic's lien against the property of the debtor and then the mechanic's lien statute literally fixes a period for commencing a civil action particularly in a specifically foreclosure action under washington law so applies is because that involves a renewal of the judgment itself whereas which is literally continuing the civil action by renewing the judgment whereas this is like a temporary orap at the temporary judgment enforcement procedure which is not you know which is not which is under state law  after one years so what happens