via illinois without pointing to any ambiguities before the request or inherent in the request itself the state court use his statements subsequent to his invocation to determine that his request was ambiguous this is contrary to smith where the supreme court held that all questioning last cease if nothing about the request for counsel or the circumstances leading up to the request would render it and to us the state court also made unreasonable determination of the i think you're looking at that at that but two hours and two hours in two minutes right so so i want to talk to my lawyer then please then ole what do you mean why do i have to why why why why ok i'm already going to jail right i didn't say you know you've asked for an attorney i can't talk to you let me read your mind let's let me ask you a slightly different question that looks to me as if forty five seconds after that he's read his miranda rights and that nothing he said between i want to talk to my lawyer please and receiving his miranda rights he didn't really say anything except oh come on be straight with me i'm the sort of non substantive discussion you had with judge christian so what difference does that make another word to you basically he says i want to talk to my lawyer and the next substantive thing that happens is he's read his miranda rights which reinforce that he has the right to talk to a lawyer so from not really sure i understand where the issue is in that it's a little difficult having the same problem now that i had in your briefing there's this sequence of events that we look at right at what point if it's an interrogation for the entire almost four hours at some point it becomes accustomed to go you know you typically that's how i invision these and i think that's how the case law does but you seem to be jumping back earlier in time and kind of and i don't know of any case law that does that where you're sort of putting different sequences together as opposed to drawing a line in the sand and say this became custom build this custody so let's just even if we're going from the point where there is no dispute that he's in custody he's after that he says he's not going to talk anymore he asked for an attorney  same thing my colleagues who were that he didn't stop talking after he said so i want to talk to my lawyer please then and then he started asking questions of the police and in addition i have a problem because in one of the edwards line of cases you had that sort of request in the supreme court decided five four it was him to give us arguable decision nevertheless i don't see why ed deference doesn't kick in at this point and and requires to say that the state court decision was not an unreasonable application of edwards that you know why am i going to jail but tom's response is well you know and tom's keeps asking him additional what wait a minute he didn't stop talking then that's the thing but but putting putting that to one side for the moment why don't we have to apply ed to deference to the state court decision and conclude that it wasn't an unreasonable application of edwards line of authority  having an argument and one i'm says oh i'm going to kill you not really well if you took the first sentence and that was all the person said it would be an unambiguous threat but once they say not really it obviously is not an unambiguous threat and as long as the person is still talking when they say not really why don't you have to take the statements together so that it's least not on reasonable for a court to conclude that it sentence outside the continuous stream of conversation uttered by the suspect well i think that you're you look at the context before the actual invocation and you're allowed to look at everything before but he doesn't say anything don't i don't think that that that the sentence that comes immediately afterwards makes the prior sentence ambiguous he just says i'm in my going to jail and then tom's actually very sophisticated lee draws him back into conversation by saying well you know i think you're lying you know you said these things that other people said these other things and it's becomes a back and forth i think before he he i mean there's really no i mean there's no the morning may please the court charles raglan deputy attorney general for responding i'd like to go directly to the passage that the court has been focusing on i'll be referring to page thirteen of my pelleas brief where that segment is quoted as you notice right before he says so i want to talk to my lawyer please then that's when the dock detective tang's this is beginning to inform him of his miranda rights if you look at a quote couple statement up before that detective says and i have a lot of questions to ask you to clear that stuff up all right but because of the things that are happening here because you know a couple of things that you said i want to let you know what your rights are and that's when mr willis lee begins to say he wants to talk to my lawyer please but then he has sort of a reaction to the fact that detective thomas is now going to advise him of his rights and he says oh what do you mean why do i have to why why ok i'm already i'm going to jail right so he's asking detective thompson these questions immediately after he says i want to talk to my lawyer please now this directly distinguishes this case from smith versus illinois and smith versus illinois when you have the unambiguous statement i'd like to do that when  the suspect is told about his right to have an attorney you have a question in from the police before you have any statement that casts an ambiguity on the suspects initial statement here we don't have any intervening police questioning mr wilson says i want to talk to my lord please and without interruption he continues talking and then asks the detective the question i'm going to jail on the border arguably that's that's your opponent's argument that that when there's an unambiguous statement questioning has to stop period right that's the rule and the problem is that we've got here is that the defendant continues himself right  continues in self and even the state court said if this had been a stand alone statement it would have been an unambiguous right and i don't hear you to be disputing that it's just the second part of the paragraph is that the defendant continued and  seems to me to be important that he not only continue talking he ends in a question to the detective asking the check to continue yes when you look at smith versus illinois that's the closeness we have here in that case because there was intervening questioning right can i ask a different question or so little time in when i take a step back this is a case where you of course terribly terribly significant consequences and you have strong arguments i think for each of the many arguments raised here not not to mention there are procedural issues that we haven't talked about yet today and yet when i take a step back this is a late night interview that lasted almost four hours that the detective was quite relentless although not now not shouting not but but but very real and this certainly very skilled in experience through your question go home that were overlooked entirely it's troubling counsel well when you do take a step talking to mr willis lee and the supreme court has said in precedent that suspects have the right to control the interrogation what subjects are discussed how he has to go home three times and it and there is a flavor to this interview that the defendant gives up because his requests to go home are ignored and the conversation goes on with that response that is part of it i disagree with you that he's requesting to go home and those requests are ignored when you look at those requests to go home he's really saying he doesn't have time to take the polygraph and so i don't i strongly disagree with that so what is your response about the you know the thirty thousand level and i understand we parse these very closely but you don't find this to be interview a custody interrogation that's close to the line this carjacking carjacking excluded that part of the interview until he was right in the mirandized and that's fully consistent with the i so let's talk about siebert because that wasn't even raised in the trial court except by the district of the superior court judge who evidence very consistent with the sequence here is certainly consistent with intentionality no this that is quite a stretch to say that this is anywhere close to siebert in siebert you have custody from the beginning i know what  so tell me what your responses were here and you have a voluntary interview it begins voluntary and the corps has acknowledged that officers may not be as precise in determining when it becomes custodial when you're talking about  is the state's response to that finding out there is no evidence consistent with an intentional siebert violation first of all this case is much closer to else there than it is to see you have no testimony from the officer that he was at the time he said something that would cause a reasonable person to believe that they're not free to leave but that there's no evidence that this detective intentionally withheld miranda warnings there's no  two issues i want to just quickly put aside see here's what here's why it is consistent or at least i wouldn't i wouldn't put aside quickly this isn't and this is an experience detective it was late at night it was almost a four hour interrogation he had talked to several witnesses who had fingered this person in these very serious crimes he disregarded several requests to attempt to go home there's a lot that would look like there's a reason this was triggering a seeburg inquiry in the sapir a court judge and then interrogation technique he said well i've already told you everything why do i even have to repeat it which is exactly what we worry about you do worry about that in this case that statement is not that significant he has been saying that all night long remember he starts off by saying he wasn't even in the car the detective says i know you were in the car because i've talked to these other with witnesses so they keep continues to ask him to tell me the truth tell me more tell me what happened in the car and mr wesley keeps saying i've told you everything i told you everything i am telling you the truth i don't know why those people would say that so when we get to that point it's it's not as if mr wesley is saying wait i've already told you everything you just duped me into confessing without the warnings and now you're giving the warning that's not the situation we have here mr worsley his head consistently said he was telling the officer everything but then as as often these things go as the officer continued to ask questions he then began to relent and and the last thing i believe i have thirty seconds or the last thing is that judge kleinfeld brought up the standard every view here under at but is paramount where discussing these things the way the whether these requests were ignored whether there was any evidence of intentional conduct by the detective reasonable people can disagree as to those things therefore under the at the standard the state court's decision should be respected address the issues counsel did address it and am i correct in understanding this about the california rule if there's something in limon a probably a motion to suppress and the defendant loses the diff finn then still has to object during the trial when the evidence that the judge has already decided can come in is offered i'm sorry could you  you have a motion to suppress defendant loses go to trial at trial the evidence that was issue on the motion to suppress is offered by the prosecutor that the california rule that the defendant must then object again a trial no i don't believe because the the trial court has already ruled against the defendant so for the defendant to to lodge another objection where the trial court is argue world would be would be pointless and so i