i can see it from here if you can't ok thank your honor may please the court there are three main reasons that the district court's order denying plaintiff supplemental motion for fees and costs should should recover all of their reasonable attorney's fees their full lodestar but that's not what happened here here the district court denied all fees based on its april twenty two twenty sixteen deadline and that was the deadline that the district court had set for the rule twenty three h notice to the class the problem was what made that erroneous was that there was compensable work to be done after that date that could not be claimed on the april twenty two deadline counsel didn't use pacifically represent to the district court that there was going to be one motion i'm looking at pitt paragraph thirty two of your declaration the parties agreed that all attorneys fees costs and expenses incurred by plaintiffs in all four actions would be submitted to this court or resolution by way of the pending motion which a cat with a capital m which refers to the one the court decided in august did you tell the court one motion this is it what that were for to your honor was the district court's line of questions to me about whether there would be fee applications and i was reading from your declaration counsel i also have the transcript but i'm looking at paragraph thirty two of your declaration ok and i'm confident your honor that what that declaration referred to was the fact that we were not going to be pursuing fee applications in the related state law cases of which there were four and which we had done significant work but they were going to raise our lodestar in federal court and at that time we had filed the initial motion by april twenty two as we were directed and we had done significant compensable work there after leading up to the august fairness hearing and so i'm confident without having it in front of me your honor that what that was referring to was there was one big motion in federal court at that time there weren't going to be any more motions in state court and we had updated the district court in july with declarations quote plaintiff's counsel also represented to the court that they would not file additional fee motions in this case or the related state court action citing your dac and the transcript and pleadings or was this w finding clearly an error to the extent that the district court was trying to make a determination in the footnote for that we would be barred by judicial stop the judicial stop all that would bar us from recovering our fees you'd also need to show a successful effort to mislead the court and unfair advantage you are prejudiced against the defendant and the district court didn't do any analysis of those two factors and the supreme court in new hampshire versus maine said you have to analyze all three factors and this court described that as being reversible error in said lasky versus michael stores six seventy two bendix seven twenty nine seven thirty seven thirty one so the fact that the district court believed at that time that there was a seemingly inconsistent position from plaintiffs is insufficient to give rise to dish will stop all of the court also relied on the language in rule twenty three and you did not get court permission to file the second motion or a date for that correct your honor we were not aware of any language rule twenty three that requires us to seek leave of court to file a female ocean if what you honors driving out was that there had not been a second further notice to the class no i'm talking about the language in the motion the court didn't give you that and then nine months later you filed this motion right we did indeed meet the able to twenty two deadline and that your honor is hit the nail on the head there was a lot of compensable work that  organizations in july and say we've done this additional work to try and get the solomon approved and that was all work that had to be done after the april twenty two deadline but you you sought the first time the maximum you could get under the settlement agreement right you that is correct and you sought the maximum the court didn't give you the maximum and then nine months later you filed the supplemental memorandum if the court supplemental motion of the corded decided to give you the maximum you wouldn't have been able to file any supplemental motion that's true but that's because the settlement caps fees recoveries of fifteen million when we file the supplemental motion we were also trying to recover the time and expenses that we'd incurred in the second stage of the settlement approval here which was you know making sure that the carter family selman agreement was approved in state court because the will it solomon agreement  was not going to be final or effective unless the parallel carter afine state court solomon became file effective in superior court and so we had some additional time and effort involved in doing that because when her honor signed the august twenty five an initial fiord her and then the judgment on the twenty sixth the carter family so many agreement and not yet been signed and the motion for the approval of carter femia had not taken place that all happened in twenty seventeen carter feeney was not approved by the superior court until twenty seventeen and so we had additional time during those months that we spent on this case albeit not great amounts but edition of time that was compensable and none of that could be sought by the april twenty two twenty sixteen deadline and so that's the whole problem with the schedule that the district court set up there was no mechanism your honor for us to recover that work that we did after that point in time now to the extent the district court had the rationale that well there needs to be a further notice to the class and there wasn't one theoretically still pending as far as we know your honor three years later we have never see if word from the clerk of the court so off erotically you could bring a mandamus action that we will reserve thank you thank you however the facts and the law confirm this so something else these motions inappropriate in this case there's a couple issues that need to be looked at first is the effect of the final judgment and whether or not the if it's not found by lower court turning to the history of the judgment in this matter in order to fully understand the process and significance a brief history is necessary this war was a long litigation the district court address the initial motion of moving papers not referencing me opposition reply supplemental reply to briefing so it does not ever talk about and there's no reference we've found where and this shal refers to authoriz multiple proceedings now going back to this matter your honor through do you agree that initialises at least in big us yes your honor i do however the court order was not the court's order now those don't include some of the supplemental fees but the significance of that is that the actual fees awarded exceeded what appears on that paper so the judge must have the court must have considered supplemental application and that's it and then it's over yes or no that's absolutely true and i would point to the fact that both standing in front of the court and in the sworn declaration counsel statement was this is it this is the only fees motion in well it's and then he lists the other cases so the notion that they're reserving the right to seek additional fees in willits is belied by the evidence in the record here we have counsel standing in front of the judge sworn declaration but even if they had reserved that judgment is final once it's in or by the court there's no appeals thirty days there after the final judgment was entered in was finalized on august twenty fifth two thousand and sixteen counsel in your jurisdiction issue though whether the second motion was meritorious or not meritorious don't we have jurisdiction over the appeal because this was a collateral order because there's actually case law on that and in particular the case and i believe it's human if i'm not mistaken your own tilman actually this co appeal of the matter is decided in a in the final judgment i mean is not basically what the collateral order doctrine as it is says there are certain things that are appealable irrespective of whether the case is going fashion waive that right and i don't understand how it can waive the right but i mean they file under the rules or request for cos the district court or the clerk or both are supposed to act on it  how can they waive their right to cost simply because they haven't filed a mandamus application if the court if the district court heirs marty has the right to challenge that through either man to miss action an expert application asking for an appeal of sump or a motion for reconsideration any of those mechanisms will be able to bring it forward but they have to be filed within the time frame it's akin to a motion for reconsideration you what's the timeframe within the time frame would be within thirty days from the entry of judgment prior to following the rule for the rules or so in your view clerks have to decide all cost motions no later as your honor stated there's at least two references and there's actually many many more where plaintiff has stood in court and stated explicitly when it's counsel scuse me that there would be only one motion you can find those references not only in the courts or the nine second fee motion but also at the entrance of records thirteen sixty one thirteen sixty two thirty sixty six now the agreement itself was the parties negotiated expressly precludes the second fees motion if you look at your eleven zero one it contains the specific language an agreement to the parties on how the fees motion should proceed and in significant part section twenty one point three provide defines final as the date that the trial judge issues the judgement or thirty days after if no peels are filed and not specifically to find out believe it sixty or twenty three of the record twenty sixteen yes your honor we did in this second motion was filed some months after that it was after they'd gotten their thirteen or whatever million dollars yes your honor that's correct we had paid them the final check shortly after the judgment was  before carter fein was approved we had proceeded with the settlement the city was desirous of getting this program underway although i've been making disability access improvements for several years and they wanted to kick this program into high gear they move forward and significance of that is the so my agreement has a provision that says that if the district court modifies and turns the parts in go back and discuss it maybe we should set it aside city never exercised that the city elected to accept it this was not a contingent settlement this was a final settlement part of the settlement agreement was you agreed for some reason that you wouldn't oppose the fee motion correctly our city had a priority in moving forward to repairs sometimes there's issues that had to be conceded in order to get that moving we wanted to make sure that los angeles was accessible but you're on the record absolutely she confirms and furthermore to the extent to significant  after the judgment is issued there is nothing else to do on this case this case is done and notice had been issued we had gone out with post it we had to put it in newspapers throughout all of los angeles we have put it on the internet we had gone out of our way and the process of making sure the community knew about this was very very significant and onerous and there was nothing to do for plaintiff counsel between take the judgment was entered and the second motion but yet we have a request for almost another million dollars for for what there is no benefit to the class there's no benefit to the city there's no benefit to anyone other than the private counsel you're most begs the question what it is but also significant if you look at the settlement agreement experts of the record page ten ninety seven and ten ninety eight the city built in a provision for monitoring teams and we agreed to pay plaintiffs counsel sense for the thirty year duration of the settlement to make sure that they were speeding and moving this program forward making sure that any improvements to the public right of way were done in a fashion that was one hundred percent appropriate and that everybody was at t together and relevant part we agreed to play plaintiffs counsel two hundred fifty thousand dollars a year for the first five years and then in the men's thereafter to make sure that this program was full so that any other work was done or was necessary it was should have been submitted under those provisions which were built into the settlement agreement that further confirms not only that the second motion was untimely but that the parties intended that there would be only one motion with respect to the contention that there was an additional sum over in beyond our march thirty first two thousand and sixteen submission that was awarded in judge marshall's argus twenty five  there was a thirty dollar discrepancy the august twenty five order makes no reference to or does no lodestar analysis whatsoever of any of the work or time that we incurred after april twenty two twenty sixteen leading up to the august fairness hearing with respect to counsel's contention that the settlement was final in august twenty sixth scene that is simply contrary to the language of the settlement if this you will see that if carter fe me does not become final then the will its solomon agreement and the will its judgment will not be final and that's in section six point one and those e sites are ten sixty nine to ten seventy and ten seventy five to ten seventy six so there's no doubt that the judgment in the few order that there was no willits in august of two thousand and twenty sixteen in fact carter fame he was not finally approved until may of twenty seventeen and then six months after that the appellate deadline for fimian ran and so will its became final and effective on october thirty first twenty seventeen there is almost an eighteen month gap between the april twenty two twenty sixteen deadline that the court cite this case in our papers san francisco in double a c p versus san francisco unified school district two eighty four afterward eleven sixty seven various fee motions are permissible at various stages of a lengthy civil rights class action proceeding including the award of post judgment fees that are for a work that that if it had the class making sure that the will it settlement agreement was approved in august in the district court and then making sure that carter feeney was approved by the following year so that both settlements could be final in a fact of was vital to the interests of the class and so i assume though there was no good in the declaration in those cases like yours here the parties agree that all attorneys costs and expenses incurred by plaintiffs in all four actions would be submitted to this court for resolution by way of the pending motion otherwise plaintiffs would have sought recovery of their fees incurred in connection with carter feeney griffith and neda in separate motions and this a period court that's your language and then choir as to the date of that your honor that was your august declaration that came to august twenty sixth that's what i thought and so at that time that statement was absolutely true before the district court in august twenty seventh teen was the initial female ocean which had all our time up through march thirty first two thousand and sixteen and then the updating declarations in july that updated our time up through just before the fairness hearing we put all of that in front of her honor and she denied or did not award that provided no explanation of why any time after april twenty two  and certainly your honor i hope that we would all agree that as of the data my declaration we can't reasonably expect that i was waiving all future fees after that time all the work that went into making sure that the city went through with the carter family solvent in the back got approved because that truly was as you will see from reviewing the settlement a precondition to the will it solomon agreement becoming fin fact of and therefore absolutely work with was work that should be compensated under the case law and so we would respectfully says requests that the order be reversed and this be sent back so that the district court can do an actual lodestar analysis of the time that we expended on representing the class after april twenty two twenty sixteen and up through october twenty seventh teen we believe that's w