so there will be a change of panel between now and then but look for the roughly nine about nine thirty i think will be the time we start the case before us at the on both of our double jeopardy arguments and of course to answer the court's questions if the court will allow me i'll start with a short quotation from judge issue when you ruled on the defendants rule twenty nine motion and i'll go beyond what w is contained in the record beginning at page ninety two quote in this case there is no drug activity going on on the premises it's going to be a single transaction  responded but if there were other facts indicating something more than the single transaction involved here then i would have been inclined to deny it meaning the rule twenty nine motion but i have reviewed the cases as you said in reviewing all the cases both cited by the parties in your proposed jury instructions and the very few that are in the end its patients there really isn't any guidance on the specific issue that's here which is what ha to be shown to show distribution because i think they were conceded in those cases but there were multiple sales or manufacturing or some ongoing things so that wasn't even an issue i point the court to th purpose element could not be satisfied by the single proposed transaction that was that issue in the trial and it's also doesn't mean we should ignore what he wanted me to say  question and putting before the court is simply does the court make a finding in the first trial that in a second trial out of the quarter the jury would have to make a contrary finding about and this part of the collateral estoppel argument the purpose and even if the purpose belongs to two different parties the language of the purpose requirement is exactly the same what is your argument on whether this issue was actually litigat for the purpose of distributing that's the issue that was before the court trial the court decided that issue and it's not critical here that the court wasn't specifically thinking about it because that's not the query he didn't have to foresee what may or may not have been requi the court is after the fact going back and saying look i wasn't taking into consideration specifically eighteen with that time and my point to this court is that doesn't matter that's not the query for collateral stoppel purpose or to didn't have to foresee th but i don't want to stop there because that's only one part of the collateral estoppel argument the second part and i think the more well we send one or perhaps the stronger one is that really on behalf of the united states i'd like to address the argument counsel made with regards to the collateral estoppel of the fact of the district court's ruling i think we need to step back and look at t statutory language section eight hundred fifty six one prohibits opening or maintaining a place for the purpose of distributing manufacturing etc section eight true prohibits renting leasing making available it's very clear if you look at the excerpt of record that councils corrected just the court was concerned very much with that there was a single only a single transaction and council correctly cited the district court at excerpt of record ninety six with their attacks indicating something more than a single transaction involved so the court would have been inclined to deny the rules twenty nine motion the judge the district court were different the there was no evidence that the defendant opened these premises and immediately started drug transactions the operative for lack of a better way to phrase it was maintaining and the district court interpret the word maintaining to mean something more than a single transaction there was no evidence of more than one transaction even though there were multiple meanings in this government's position is that if on a single occasion a defendant rance least as most significantly perhaps makes available his property has violated the statute there's not the continuous the requirement of continuous activity the i don't focus your talk of what's the difference between me and i hope what i perceive to be the difference between maintaining an opening is opening is from the inception from the very beginning and the defendant he clearly has the property it owned the property to operate the property before any of the events about which evidence was introduced there was illegal a fancy legal occurrence as the defendant had owned it i don't recall exactly but for a significant period of time say here and this particular event happened over the course of i believe march nineteenth through twenty second two thousand and one going another reason i don't believe there's any collateral estoppel looks back on the over the decision rendered by  determined that's simply a legal determination this is the pack what's its operation is a matter of law turning to the remaining arguments before the court i think it's very clear that the elements are different it and knowing that somebody else intends to use it for illegal purposes to allow that to go on their words the intent for a true for the owner  source so to speak is to his knowledge and acquiescence that's all that's required is the knowledge that somebody else is going to do something illegal and permitting that to happen covering most of my remaining arguments the the difference in the elements is very clear it's who has the intent to distribute for lack of a better word to use a shorthand to distribute in a one it's held by the property owner himself in a can which held by the tenant and the property owner is evil intent is knowing that's going to  somebody opened the building with the intent of doing and do they single transaction let me retreat gracefully there that wasn't the factual scenario before the defense counsel's argument to touch on i believe it goes more to the deep block program now let's just to touch on that for a minute the under defense counsel's parsing of eighty eight fifty six day to somebody who absolutely know they're tainted he's going to do an illegal drug transaction there for example accept an enormous shipment of cocaine and store it there for a while was broken down and shipped out that person doesn't have any intent themselves to engage in the drug transaction their only intent is to make money from the tenant who's going to pay them a lot of money to use the warehouse under counsel's construction of a fifty six day too because the person is leasing that doesn't have the personal intent to distribute the drugs that person is not liable under age to intact something obviously the court's going to have to sort out i don't think it's particularly relevant to this particular case government believes that georgie she was mistaken in that ruling but that's we have to live with that there is here seems to be a dispute in different cases in different circuits as to whether you she's interpretation was correct or not the subsequent legislation seemed to address that but regardless to whether or not she actually she was correct obviously he dismissed the one charge and the government has to  that can i ask one more question and that deals with relationships between u s attorneys and the department of justice certain was the bringing of  really for the record the fourth indictment was simply a technical correction of the indictments have been returned a couple of weeks before i guess that's one way to look at it right the i think the next the bigger question is the third the third superseding which is there any requirement of main justice approval on that no none none is required none was sought here's my time's expired there's one quick point i'd like to make if the court very quick i'll try to speak very quickly i just want to cover a couple of brief points the government's position that the district court made its ruling on more than one transaction being required based on the work maintaining a fifty six train line is interesting but not supporting any the record the record reflects including the language that i read the court that what the court was focusing on was the purpose element the purpose for just distribution not the maintain portion of that cash and second in response quote the relevant the most relevant language i think from to mez is the court's statement in that case that quote eighty two was intended to prohibit an owner from providing a place for illegal conduct that's exactly what our argument is here these shows that the purpose requirement clearly goes to the action the statute the one who has the knowledge of what the government wants the court to do is read out of the statute in eighty two the words knowingly and intentionally thank you