because the conclusion that petitioners engine cylinders present an unsafe condition is not supported by substantial evidence and is not the product of reasoned decision making the party issue is the cylinder used on reciprocating engines which are installed in small airplanes when this type of cylinder fails it causes a approximately twenty percent loss of engine power to the affected engine most of the cylinders it an issue in this case when stalin dual engine airplanes with the loss of a single cylinder would have an even less significant impact under the f a a own risk assessment policies for small airplanes a partial loss of engine power is not in and safe condition that would warrant an was references to the fatal crashes in the final rule and which you actually look at the route for it's the new hampshire crash route or heard does not assess causation the bahamas report does assess caus agency could not an issue its advisory despite the evidence it gathered because essentially what it would have to be able to find a one hundred percent risk you know you never they didn't that's why i asked you are you saying they could only issue the advisory if they could show a direct cause a part is installed on an airplane that has an accident doesn't mean that i mean all the flight parts that are on the plane are suddenly associated with the no question about it that's not there they are right the agencies but even if even if you were to assume or out so they did their own sort of risk assessment methodology wrong in terms of assessing likely well that's because you're reading that is a direct cause requirement and the agency isn't right able to land safely no one is injured right but it could lead to other things and who knows what the weather is one conditions of courage cetera and so this mosaic of evidence is enough to put out an advisory and furthermore the industry itself makes and she and since two thousand and nine there haven't been that doesn't mean that have to make hand improvements can be made right so i mean i drive a car with lines five detectors that doesn't mean that just because that safety technology that improvements available that all the other cars that don't have that should be that's what i'm trying to get at it that there needs to be a conclusion and that the heart at issue without regard to whether could've been subsequently improved or whether other people that made cars had a similar failure rate with it apart issue well if you it depends on whether you're going to use that small airplane risk assessment methodology that would require associated with the talent is there were no fatalities associated with those two fire events and if you use the rule is eighty forty point fo r safety risk management policy you use that matrix which be included on a reef where you calculate the likelihood of the fire occurring and then there's that i hazard rating based on whether it caused serious properly assessed likelihood because they looked at the likelihood of a cylinder failure rather than the likelihood that i wasn't and let me ask you just following up a little on judgment and tells a question i thought part of your argument here was that even though this was a long drawn out consideration by the agency and to supplemental notices were issued various documents were made available yes and these are my words not your words and some of the critical documents were not made available the most critical during the notice and comment period you pointed out that the government's statement in its brief at thirty five was wrong where the government said at thirty  now right there so those are sort of two procedural points i'm getting at right on it is that data record reports analysis on which the f was not made publicly available prior to the final rule and then second it's brief has acknowledged that it didn't follow the methodology it was going it wants to distance itself entirely from those eight hundred forty point four a methodology which is what the final rule itself said we're following so that is very much of a problem that one of the examples of why we don't have reasoned decision making here is  so they didn't provide the risk assessment but based on their summary of the risk assessment that they did they erred by ranking the cylinder failures as creating a house or just condition because they linked it t and they could find the methodology by assessing the likelihood it's unlikely that of the cylinder failures rather than based on likelihood of the house or just event which is what their policy requires and they were report and this is in the record as well reports from f a a safety inspectors reports from the n t s b recommending corrective action in response to the separation of these cylinders there were multiple service difficulty reports those are in the j as well there are a number of examples of them starting at age fifty one and more in the administrative docket as well and there are much mandatory service militants that are issued by the manufacturer itself detailing continuing problems caused by the separation of these cylinders and we're not talking just about a small diminishment of power we're talking about a violent occurrence where a piece of the engine comes apart  flight it causes at minimum twenty percent power loss but there are myriad other consequences that result including loss of engine pressure engine failure damage to other parts of the engine including the eggs in some instances fuel line separation which can cause fuel to leak into the engine which operates at temperatures above the auto ignition point for engine fuel and can cause fire as is documented in two instances referred to in the record there are instances of metal contamination in the engine increased vibration in airplane engines which can cause as is also noted damage additional damage to other parts including the same type of site and there certainly substantial evidence in the record before this court and before the agency that would confirm both of those conclusions as appropriate in this the agency did multiple risk analysis it included in the administrative record sufficient evidence of reports from field inspectors from pilots from the company itself detailing issues and problems that were continuing to occur with this particular part a significant mechanical malfunction in the new hampshire report it refers to the engine sputtering and backfiring in the bahamas report it refers to white smoke trailing from behind the engine and then goes on to conclude that conclusion that they have major mechanical failure was reciprocating event that accident and both of those were identified by number in the agency's role making prior to the issuance of the final rule they were publicly available at the time and the comments that the agency received reflect that commenters had considered the accidents and were suggesting to the agency that they understood what was going on at the time so i there's nothing to suggest there was procedural impropriety in the rule making an issue here one about the argument that's made about the risk and so certainly so i would also point the court to order eight zero four zero for analyses may also be used for example an evaluation against the likelihood of a fatal outcome which is the kind of risk analysis you see in the as they are a risk analysis at three fifty two and in the  eighteen nineteen so just so i'm clear that's what you meant on page thirty five your brief yes when you say that we you know you said but it's th risk matrix that you are not required to use it and you did not do so here correct and but the agency did explain that the room making the determination in the room also noted as i might point to at j thirty two that the agency had also relied on the sense of evidence in the record from service difficulty rick and for service bullets and various recommendations from f a a safety inspectors and the accidents is necessary no accidents are necessary in order to conclude that presenting a significant safety hazard that merits an airworthiness directive but in this instance the agency relied on two fatal no further questions i do have one question and yes it is the certification process is it done in a general level in other words do you ever revoke the certification that a party h been certified can continue to be manufactured by other manufacturers and it's only for the c i a in your motive to have manufactured it manufacturing process or that was changed along the way that contributed to the failure and so other parts comparable parts can continue to be manufactured without violating this everything is  fifty two so there is no the risk assessment methodology and the rocker there is no risk assessment methodology that's consistent with the rule eighty forty approach i think it's very irregular and not consistent with with including on the record the basis for the decisions you have not included us on the record and i think it's because they are not supportive and in terms of whether