two sections in the municipal code i think it's called chapter sixty five five seven or seven five seven or eight applied i'm sure the courts are familiar with those the trial judge disagreed finding that you had that you had to qualify to use that you had to come under one of the provisions of the criminal  policeman in west city who was looking for somebody he went into a pension which was an adjoining municipalities use a guy that's obviously driving under the influence and arrests him the yeah i think was the fifth district upheld that  in two thousand and two they spawn the two sections that state relied on in this case and the high rune case if i'm pronouncing that correctly which was a police officer who was out doing and  got into with a burglar in an adjoining county and they were willing to give him a disability pension but not on line of duty pension which was more money but then the appellate court found that this section again appl now my opponent i think in a few minutes is going to get up and talk about speed traps if you look at the argument section of the defendant's brief the word speed trap your words speed trap appear on almost every page  just twice appears in the legislative debate but nobody defines it so i don't know what it is if the problem here is a spee fenders brief as well written but most of it relies on comments by legislators and i asked leave to cite and additional additional authority in the form of just eichmanns opinion talking about well that's that's not the that's not the best thing to rely on that the words themselves are the best thing to rely on the determine what the intent of the legislature was defended the second argument in saying you are outside your jurisdiction you have no authority only assistant state's attorney came in and said well look at these two statutes judge and then the defense went and said well you haven't established that it was in springfield a lot of these cases you'll find that seem to support the defense actually was in an unincorporated area not joining in its policies put us in the country and of course our argument is no good in the well combined with two and three of you you should decide this but that's all right with me if you if you want to if you want to decide whether or not these two municipalities are for joining or not that's fine with me but i think it better practice would be send it back to the trial judge for his determination and they say they want you to decide whether or not this reynolds refused and i response again is this is this is a factual matter  the ambiguity here comes from the fact that we have one statute that uses the term police district and doesn't use the term primary jurisdiction and we have another statute that uses the term primary jurisdiction and doesn't use the term police district and these statutes were enacted in the same public act and if they had meant to use identical words they could have they could have used the same word if they wanted these words to be synonyms they could have included definitions section in one of the other statute to say that these two words were two phrases mean the same thing and they didn't do that and the fact that illinois tropp court judges it struggled with the interpretation of these statutes is one indication of the ambiguity and the fact that the interpretation urged by the state would render other statutes in the criminal code absurd and create chaotic results is a further indication of their ambiguity and i want to touch on that for a moment because that was the one that really drove the point home for the trial court judge he asked the prosecutor a question he said so you're telling me that a southern view police officer can take it sudden view squad car and drive it out on jefferson street and right seat belt tickets in springfield and the state's attorney responded yes your honor five slash one zero seven dash for eighty three they're talking about anywhere in the state and so i don't really understand what you're saying conflict is there there are three there are three interpretations of of that statute and you know their position is that seven dash for dash eight applies here's the trial court had it a interpretation let me start with the states the state says these two words mean the same thing the trial court said no you need seven dash for dash seven to be interpreted along with one zero seven dash four so that when one of the factors of one of seven  then an officer can step across the adjoining jurisdiction then the second the middle interpretation which i referred to in the brief is the third interpretation gives meaning to that second sentence of seven dash for dash eight and that's because it says the police a famous story short for authority and power to go into any part of the district and then the city disasters yes i'm saying i don't really see the relevance of having to come up with the three different interpretations because i guess what i'm saying is doesn't five seven dash for dash eight and not apply when you're talking about connecting and then if i want to seven  h for a free talks about anywhere in the state so i'm making county police officer or to get a police officer in chicago because i'm he has become personally aware of a felony or  interpretation but i think it's fair to recognize the second sentence of seven dash for dash eight which says for these purposes the mayor and the chiefs of police there in shall use the police force is under their control so to give meaning to that second sentence the word and mayor and chiefs we assume that that should have meaning you know shall use we assume that that should have been in the cases you know we have to give meaning to that so that's a that recognizes that there is an additional interpretation to give meaning to that this it mean that they can go without the mayor has knowledge without their chiefs knowledge can they go across the district permission can he because what that means is when officer katter's could leave southern view and drive up to the airport and set up shop and start without anyone in springfield giving him permission without anyone springfield knowing without his own police force that his own mayor knowing that he can do that and the answer to that is that would be absurd that's not what this second sentence of that statute implies and you look at it what that does you occurs and we recognize that that would be an absurd result also and then when you recognize that absurdity and you say well what what we're let's look at the evolution of the statute and we look at where that statute started pre nine hundred ninety five because the state the state side of this case says please don't look at the comments from the legislature tours and don't look at the evolution of the statute because once we get to that point the state lose because the legislators comments were clear and the evolution of the statute lets us know that result which is that a southern view officer can drive up to the airport or that it chatham officer can drive over to you know anywhere in that he wants in the city that's not what was recognized what makes sense is that sometimes officers who for the most part officer stay within their own  sometimes under one of the seven dash for they could leave their municipality and go anywhere they want under those four circumstances right so as well anywhere they want within those four limitations sometimes there's going to be intergovernmental agreement formal agreement as you know the burden and padi for example may agree to share an officer and they're going to have a formal intergovernmental agreement under that statute and then sometimes under seven dash for dash eight when you have a joint municipalities you're going to have it informal agreement that involves the majors and chiefs of police where they say between us we don't have to have a formal intergovernmental agreement that's going to be voted on the way it has to be voted on is going to have those things that the statute requires for government metal agreements we're just going to have an informal discussion between mayors and chiefs that how we cooperate in this area on this day so your position is that in pain had brought in evidence that there was this informal agreement then you would lose well that would be i would lose under that second interpretation my point is is that any statute that has three possible interpretations is ambiguous and if it's an ambiguous statute a fair thing to do is to look at the evolution of the statute and look at the legislative history and out of the evolution of the statute the legislative history i win under that second interpretation under that second interpretation if the officer had said yeah the officers in springfield know i'm here my chief knows that i'm here this is you know this is what happened though is this officer claimed that he didn't know he was  for for that scenario to have been the true intent of the legislator is not the true intent well i mean i agree that we have to look at it in conjunction with each other but the thing about it is this section starts out the five slash seven dashboard dash it starts out talking about the police in the police district so i have full authority and power and peace officers in me going to any part of the district and so it seems to me that you're reading in things that are not there in terms of this statement that the chiefs of police and the mere shall use the police force is under their control anywhere in the district i don't see anywhere in that language that requires some type of agreement or something to document that it's ok for my police to go into your area i don't see that well the phrase that i used in my brief was advice of the advice you can set and i don't see that i said the words are not there however if we get any meaning at all to that second sentence then that has to have there as some to me given to the fact that we care about the mayor's the chief of police then turns to the legislative history and if the court does not find ambiguity then the court moves on to the second of my two issues and the second of the two issues is whether there was in fact evidence that the officer was within the municipality of springfield but then springfield proper and the state filed its motion to reconsider it here and i pointed out that there was an assumption that the officer was in springfield but there was no evidence that there that the officer was in springfield the state made no motion to reopen the evidence for introduce any additional evidence if there is there reason to hate a prince that he was in joining be there is it and the reason for that is when it was pointed out to the court that there are within the city of springfield oh incorporated pockets all over the city and the court said quote you are right you see the inside the house is always your family right it's possible he could have been in that incorporated portion of springfield because there are those areas my mother in law lives in one but i'm not going to decide it based on that so he did make a fighting because he said it's not required for me to make that finding i'm finding the jurisdictional issue resolved the case had he made that finding he's stuck with the record before him and on the record before him the question is ok now am going to try and get in some evidence to show the exception applies but they didn't do that they just decided to let it go so we're left with the record before us in the record before us is there isn't any now what they try to do is they say well we've got this map that shows a bank of springfield as though the bank of springfield somehow can only exist in springfield proper or her testimony that i go on the interstate head and scream bill to use the restroom as though that somehow implies that she knew she was heading to springfield municipal proper as opposed to wherever she was there wasn't evidence and that failure because it's the state bird that behavior is a problem for the state not for the defense or yes i'm still the defense even though i'm it's just not used to being that guy the final point i want to make is on the issue of the refusal normally the court doesn't make credibility in factual determination to this level and i recognize that however this is a situation where the record before the court is absolutely clear and i've laid out in my brief the testimony from miss reynolds about efforts to take this breath test you can you can see what was going on between miss reynolds and this officer the officer then testifies that when she attempted to blow in the machine the words insufficient came up on the breath test machine that he was borrowing and then he said well no it was insufficient it said good that it would sample and then he said following that it said boy and then he was impeached with the manual from the machine and it clearly says that when you are initially polling it will be a single plus sign and then if you blow a sufficient sample it goes through a double plus sign and then you get the  don't blow a sufficient sample it goes from a single plus sign to the words no it would never say insufficient sample so if the officer was using the breath test machine properly or if he was telling the truth it would have said no go so you have a clear situation this isn't worth trying to redefine language or to determine you know truth based on demeanor this is just a whole words on paper officer says if you do this it would have said x as it turns out if you do this it would have said why and we can look at that testimony alone and say they did not lay the foundation for refusal we don't need to send this back because we can make this determination based on the words and then add a recognized that would be making a determination based on some other grounds that were not i asked the trucker to make additional factual fightings unincorporated pockets then it's absolutely clear that the state loses phrase in there i think it's number two talks about a misdemeanor being committed in the officer's presence at the time a lot of these cases came about beating was a petty offense or no offense which reverted down to being a petty offens the other thing was he says that's where the officers feet are planted that that's not that's there's plenty of cases out there is the matter where the officer is as far as he sees the offense being committed or determines an offense has been committed in about that but he decided the officer was in springfield and the stop was in spring that is either the judge's finding or a reasonable inference of the judge's fine if you will if you all want to take judicial notice  of where these boundaries are it's fine with me i don't think this should be turned into a trial court but let there be a big improvement from what i've experienced so i'll agree to it if you want to decide whether or not she refused go ahead but i think again this is a matter that should be remanded back for a judge you heard the other the other question you know thank you