exempting compliance from the nd procedural item i want to raise here is that the united states arguments on appeal in part three of its response for these are arguments that address the two thousand and eight richfield trigger you do this until x and then when x happens then it changes it can be read as an automatic trigger when the word is followed by something like a date certain or a specific time frame that until the right the word the static the regulation constructed that way the closure would lift automatically but here until points to the discretionary actions decision to lift a closure they are provided for in the tax to the regulation the district court really makes two errors an ins reading this reopen or provision the st was measures implemented to prevent recurrence that it ends but it doesn't it doesn't specifically place every burden on the element least textually doesn't mean you might be able to read it that way but it's think this is really only issue that comes up because the regulation to reopen information is written in passive voice it sort of invites that question of who is to take action here but b l m as the land management  or just that the authorized office or doesn't have to just make this determination that it opens baca that's right there's more than sort of this passive evaluative it's action here me let me walk up even further south in order to close the area all that's required there though under your reading is the authorized officer to say hey we need to close this and so the authorized officer can then close it but the authorized officer then doesn't have the have the authority himself to just open it back a determination that the statutory or the regulatory conditions been satisfied right now i think that really comes from a reading of this court's case in carpenter where that case involved before and question of when  here on the lifting of the closure really in isolation is that fair though to say it's an isolation i mean you have the resource management plan that's the backdrop it seems to me of this case and to achieve that as we all painfully know there has to be a lot of procedures particularly on environmental studies go on to say what will or will not happen in this particular area and at that point when the plan was promulgated it was determined that this area would be open so don't we rely and fall back to that that's basically the bedrock that we and that's really the touchstone but you did again to answer my question don't we have as a backdrop in this case the resource management plan and that and that told us the area has been studied environmentally can can challenge the opening order under the mistreated procedure and that's that's that's not a nepa claim you're just saying they had their deeds to be review of this decision to open the road and that's fine and i think you could do that under the a p a maybe i'm missing something i'm asking what the environmental impact study would say that goes essentially goes beyond that that wouldn't be duplicat the rule of reason that inquiry needs to happen but what would we be looking at that increase to happen after production of the rack the fundamentally argument that the yellow hand at the united states isn't here but the two thousand and eight to us for her own house style chases the record is produced and there is a we would have the chance at the very least amend our complaint on a review of the record to challenge the merits of the decision we we have this case was dismissed on this issue on meet the claims alone without the chance to and that this is really the the st crack here and you see a distinction between the reading with the question of when to judge discretion i think st and foremost a central question for this case is when do we judge discretion for the purpose of meta and in a place you propose federal action so we're looking at discretion it settles on completes the discretionary component of this decision making process the district court here and i think the question of your honor's question really hinges on a and they could have done that and frankly perhaps they still can in what would happen then is the question would be whether the decision by the agency to lift the closure was contrary the regulation wasn't supported by substantial evidence the the a challenge the substance of it having determined that the adverse effects have been eliminated in measures put in place to prevent recurrence whether lifting up a temporary closure at that point was mandatory and the language of the regulation we think it's clear that it to a point in time that certain but i just i don't think that's how and so works if i say bring example that i'm going to stay at a job in till i finish until i finish a brief everyone understand that it's meaning i'm going to leave the job when the group is complete even if i don't about fragile areas such as this and also plants and animals in this area well but in the there there there there is a there is a lapse that there is a lapse in time your honor and of course there is an option order as contrary to the regulation they just haven't brought that challenge here and the one thing i want the one thing i also want to add judge carson i think you were asking about the standard for imposing a closure order i think it's that was perfectly proper and in plaintiff's agree with us for that matter but what they're asking this court to accept and what the district court properly rejected is this idea that the regulation functions that was if the is that the regulation functions right your honor well i guess the price a couple things about that st of all i mean we think the way the regulation is drafted that the the agencies decision to lift a closure is just is not is not discretionary once it makes the determination just like imposing one but criticizes the district court for dismissing this case on the pleadings rather than requiring the production of administrative records but i mean if you look at the complaint in this case it only mentions the regulation once in the legal background section of the complaint it's very clear that this is purely a procedural challenge to claiming that review was required and that's that's a legal claim that we think is just wrong under this regulation under at they've brought a substantive challenge claiming that this was arbitrary and capricious because because the agency made an incorrect germination under the regulation we assumed that the administrative record would be have been produced in the case would have been would have been litigated that way and again or perhaps they can still bring that but that's not the claim they chose to bring abbie to address any questions the court might have on any particular issue i was just curious how important if you look at it think page eighty two of the appendix has the relevance as the relative relevant language although it's reproduced elsewhere it keeps the temporary closure in place but it makes clear that the that the temporary close only until the regulatory criteria are satisfied so i don't think they aren't he really b t r m p only underscores what the text of the regulation itself make clear which is that the temporary closure with which is intended now i also want to just quickly address the point if this is the fashion matter here we're not talking about one specific road we're talking about five thousand acres of