it please the court my name is leah bendix from the illinois attorney general's office on behalf of the people of the state of illinois this court should reverse the judgment of the court and hold that the circuit court correctly determined that the to potential sentencing range of six to sixty years for his class two felony conviction for a drug offense so that his motion to withdraw his guilty plea was properly denied to begin and i want to note that certain aspects of this case are quite simple because the records quite short and the parties in the appellate court have always agreed on the factual circumstances but what is more complicated about this case is that it involves the interplay of several statutes and and even just referring to them by their section numbers is is quite cumbersome so i have decided to use some statutory sort of shorthand nicknames i wanted to first point this court to the fact that pages two and three of the opponents brief provide the black quotes for all of these statutes and also note that pages one in two of the reply brief includes a summary of them and these nicknames that i will use but please let me know if it's unclear what i'm referring to in time so to begin the statutory question here focuses on one provision in particular that i have called the general extended term sentencing provision this is the provision that states that a judge shall not sentence an offender to an extended term sentence unless one of cited aggravating factors is present and it is true that everyone agrees here that there is no aggravating factor present but the parties also acknowledge that defendant has an extensive criminal history that qualifies him under two different recidivist related sentence and hence offense everyone acknowledges that he has higher class one and class two found any convictions for robbery and burglary that qualify him under what i have called the two prior felonies provision to have his class two sentencing range enhanced to the class x range that is the provision that states where an offender has a class one or class two conviction and has two or more previous class one or class two felony convictions that it is mandatory that his sentencing range be enhanced to the class x level the parties also acknowledge that he has a prior conviction under the controlled substances act and that act in particular has a recidivist related provision that states that where an offender has a previous conviction for an offense under the act then that person faces a sentence of potentially up to a double maximum that is otherwise operands that is what then doubles the maximum of the class x range of thirty to sixty to create the six to sixty range but the circuit court knowledge so then with that background looked at the statutory maximum doubling of the prior drug conviction provision and noted that having a prior drug conviction is not listed among the aggravating factors in the general extended term sentencing provision and held maximum doubling should not have been recognized by the circuit court this court should reverse on either of two independent grounds either number one that all of these provisions can be interpreted so that they can be reconciled without any conflict whatsoever or secondly in the alternative even if this court acknowledges a conflict the appellate court gave effect to the wrong question so turning first to the question of how to reconcile these provisions or whether there is a conflict at all again we begin with the general extended term sentencing provision the key here is that the f l it court construed that statute or that provision as providing an exclusive list of any factor that can ever justify a sentence above what is the case maximum for a particular class felony by simply disagreeing with that premise that construction all of these provisions can be reconciled if instead this court construes that that general extended term sentencing provision governs only sentence enhancements or i should say yes and enhanced means that are authorized by the code itself then there is no conflict to begin with so to explain let's look at the circumstances of this case as already explained defendant faced a potential sixty six year range it is noteworthy that the code in article four point five which provides the general sentencing ranges for all of the classes of felonies sets the class x range as six to thirty years and defines a class x extended term as thirty six years here the numbers don't add up six to sixty does not equal thirty to sixty that is an indication that when the code is referencing an extended term sentence it is only looking within the code authorized extended heightened sentences and it is not considering those that might be authorized elsewhere and indeed the sentence maximum doubling is from the controlled substances not from the code itself further support for this approach is found by taking a step away from the circumstances of the skates in preparing the reply brief i flipped through the criminal code and was able to five find twenty five additional instances where the legislature has set forth a class of a particular offense and then sets a heightened sense in range that notably does not match up with the extended term as defined for that class and also none of those twenty five examples are listed aggravating factors under the general sen i'm sensing that what this indicates or provides further support for is this notion that the code was only referring to extended terms that are authorized by the code itself that where the for a heightened term is found elsewhere in the compiled statutes that it need not be funneled through the general extended term sentencing provision and there need not be one of those listed aggravating factors present indeed perhaps the best support for this approach is by looking at a provision that the senate brought to this court's attention you filed a motion decided to tional authority after the reply brief was filed and as it was granted by this court and specifically citing page four of my reply before i set forth these twenty six conflicts he noted section five dash four point five dash five this provision is in essence the introductory provision to article four point five that sets forth all of these general sentencing ra that provision states quote except as specifically provided elsewhere this article governs sentencing for offenses that really encapsulates the approach that i'm advocating that if it's enhanced sentence provided for in the code then yes you have to comply with the aggravating factor requirement of the jacket senator and sentencing provision but if the authorization for a heightened sense is elsewhere such as the current world substances act or the criminal code then that is where the authority for the heightened sense comes from from those specific provisions themselves that way all of these provisions are allowed to co exist without conflict is retained there's an ambiguity that's created by reading these two  statements well i guess it is subject to multiple reasonable interpretations so yes of course even if this court recognizes an ambiguity i would look for legislative history on this topic through these statutes  there is none so certainly whether this court finds it ambiguous or not doesn't affect whether it can take this approach that i'm advocating and i would argue that yes these are two different reasonable approaches to reconciling  the statutes it is noteworthy that there is a statutory construction principle that instructs courts to where there are provisions multiple provisions that address the same topic that they should be tried to be construed together when reasonably possible to avoid a conflict and the state's approach that is being suggested now does that reconciles them without a conflict whereas the fence position in the appellate court's position recognizes a conflict and so where there are these different approaches the  construction or so indeed if this court agrees and concludes that there is no conflict whatsoever then there is nothing to stop the sentence maximum doubling up to sixty years that the circuit court recognize but in the alternative even if this court finds that there is a conflict here agreeing with the appellate court the court should still be reversed because it responded to the conflict in the wrong manner it is true that the general senator from sentencing provision was more recently enacted and it is true that there is a statutory construction principle instructing courts to give effect to the more recently enacted statutes but what the appellate court overlooked is the fact that the sentence maximum doubling of the prior drug conviction provision that is the more specific provision and there is a superseding statutory construction principle that directs courts to give effect to the more specific provision even if it is older and indeed defendant himself agrees that the prior drug conviction question is more specific because it applies only to drug related offenses while the general extended term sentencing provision applies both to drug offenses and non drug and indeed taking a step back the reason behind give in effect giving effect to the specific provision is because this court has expressed that repeals by implication are disfavored in other words where the legislature has enacted a specific provision and there is a later general provision that doesn't acknowledge the specific provision this court has expressed the policy to let the specific provision continue to operate because recognizing a repeal is such an extreme thing that this court hesitates to do it unless the legislature has been expressed and having that intent and it's important to remember the appellate court here while defendant is trying to couch his argument in terms of perhaps it's inappropriate to have more than one recidivist enhancement applied in the same sentence i teleports rationale is not so limited the appellate court held that the prior drug conviction provision which doubles the maximum should never be allowed to operate unless there is also an aggravating factor from the general extended term sentencing pr and what that rationale would do would completely render superfluid the prior drug conviction vision after all having an aggravating factor and justifying an extended term sentence there through that provision already doubles the maximum so the prior drug conviction provision would never have any effect in any case whether or not there are another recidivist enhancement involved and that is the approach that this court should reject and if you indeed defend acknowledges that is more specific the prior drug conviction vision but he does argument stead that what that should mean is that the maximum he faced was fourteen years rather than sixty and he arrives at this fourteen year number by doubling the class to maximum rather than the class x maximum this court should reject that argument for either of two reasons number one it's a forfeit argument he never has served it properly in the circuit court and he never presented it at all to the appellate court but even if this court considers it it has no statutory support because it seems to be based on a notion that somehow viewing the controlled substances act in isolation would prevent the operation of the two prior felonies provision that's the provision that enhances him from the class two to the class x level but there's no support for that after all the controlled substances act does not set forth sentence ranges it does have some heightened class  specific provisions but asked a class to use and particularly the one that the friend that was convicted of it merely says you are guilty of a class two felony and a sentencing judge turns to the code of corrections to learn how that person should be sentenced and that includes the two prior felonies provision which enhances him from the class to the class act it seems as though defendant is is relying on this notion that the legislature would never intend for more than one recidivist related enhancement to apply the same sentence but he really has no support for this idea the only thing he cites is the fact that the prior drug conviction provision which doubles the maximum enacted first so that at that time the legislature would not have envisioned that it might operate along with another recidivist enhancement in the same sentence that may be true but what it overlooks is later on fast forward to when the two prior felonies provision was enacted at that time the legislature would have been aware of its prior nachman and at that time it did not include any language or any amendments to indicate an intent to bar the application to the same defendant in the same case and it is indeed the lack of that language that shows that the opposite should be inferred that look the legislature had no problem with the idea that both of them might operate for the same offender and deed the only legislative intent we really have for this case is the expressed intent by the legislature to punish recidivists more severely we know that in this court has confirmed it previously and in defeat and indeed what defend essentially asking this court to do is to conclude that because he's the more serious recidivist because he has a diverse and extensive criminal history that qualifies him for two different recidivist enhancements that that should be the sole reason why one of them should not apply and indeed that would be contrary to the legislative intent to punish recidivists more severely and frankly i'd like to know another apparent mistaken premise of defendant's argument that seems to be that he has a misguided understanding of the the term double enhancement here he asserts that he is being subject to a double on his men under his facts but that is simply not true now it is true that this court's precedent notes same element the very same conviction is used more than once to enhance the same sentence that is not what happened in this case looking at defendant's prior convictions his prior burglaries and robbery  only ones through the two prior felonies provision to enhance him from the class two to the class x level and his prior drug conviction was only used once through the prior drug conviction provision to double him to sixty years there is no enhancement here and indeed there is no statement in illinois precedent or an illinois statute saying that there should not be two separate recidivist related enhancements on the same sentence where no conviction is being used more than once you thank you eighty dollars worth of cocaine to a confidential informant his conduct amounted to a class two felony for which the normal sentence is three to seven years in prison but the circuit court of law and the hanssen statute then a second and on lawful and destructive use of these substances section four away was designed to to punish repeat drug offenders was not designed to punish general criminal offenses therefore it should be it was designed only to punish drug offenses and a history of the controlled substances act was enacted in one nine hundred seventy one and in the state is correct at the time the legislative sessions weren't even transcribed at the time we don't act so it's not necessarily an ambiguity in looking at the two statutes whether the conflict or not the ambiguity is in the way in section four way themself itself when it says just simply otherwise authorized doesn't state otherwise authorized under the sac or that it was otherwise authorized under this act because only upon to that act it could only have applied to that act and in that in your honour's mr williams suggested that that precise phrase be read into the statute that otherwise authorized under this act the state argues that as it did here before this court that under this act would incorporate the entirety of the unified code of corrections simply and teen range shall be its to terminate sentence of not less than six years and not more than thirty years and that's section five eight two applies that's the extended term statute section five hundred two says and i i want to read the exact language here so what section five b two is it restricts that the sentence to a class sex offense the thirty years unless these exceptions apart it doesn't say only an extended term it doesn't define itself as an extended term it's  one of those exceptions under section five eighty two and it stands to reason that it should have been if if the legislature sought to allow section f two but only limited to these other exceptions the state argues that there's a number of criminal offenses that are not listed as exceptions under section five eight two and that's because there they have their specific their own sentencing provisions and it cites as those are already accepted from five eight two so it would not make any sense to list those under section five eight two as exceptions to this provision that a classic signs can be longer than thirty years what mr williams maintains is that all that section for other than the legislature intended punisher sort of has and there's more severely that's conceded but there is nothing that there isn't the state does not point to any legislative intent showing that an offense can be it argues that section four eight is a more specific provision because it only applies to drug offenses and that's correct that mr williams precise argument section four zero eight only applies to drug offenses and there's another problem with just point out one if mr williams if he had committed a class x felony for delivering ninety nine brams cocaine given his same criminal background he would still only be eligible for a i would like to cover three main points in my rebuttal opposing counsel has focused even a little more specifically on the precise language of these two key provisions and so i too want to respond to his point so turning first to be general extended term sentencing provision five eight to he point this is related to whether there is a conflict at all and whether this court should construe that provision to avoid a conflict he  he certainly is making an argument consistent with the appellate court's notion that this should be regarded as setting forth the entire all encompassing universe of what can ever justify it and sentence but he only quoted for you the first sentence and i would like to point out the an aspect of the second sentence of that very same provision it notes that so long as the proceedings were conducted in compliance with certain portions of the code of criminal procedure and this is the key part here the judge may sentence an offender quote to an extended term as provided in article four point five so that again is pointing to just extended term sentences a in the code that is further support for the notion that the general assembly saw that sometimes heightened sentences are justified within the code but there are other times that they are justified elsewhere in fact the friend it seems to agree that these other examples that i cite in the criminal code because they cite specific numerical ranges guesses the distinction he's making that those are ok and that those do not have to provide these aggravating this aggravating factors as required in the general extended term sentencing provision but it would make no sense to make this to draw the line there that just because it's a statute outside of the curve of the code of corrections that includes a numerical sentencing range rather than what we have here where it says it doubles the statutory maximum i mean that is addressing the numbers involved and so it indeed looking at this language at the end of the general senator i'm sensing vision provides further support at that to be an all encompassing compassing provision applicable to any heightened sentence and that would be the way for this court to avoid any place in the first place but even if this court does find a conflict in this then looking at how to interpret this prior drug conviction provision my opponent a my opponent is focusing on some of the length of this prior drug conviction vision but i think it's worth noting that in order to agree with his position he agrees he has to add language to the provisions because the plain language as it actually stands is that it is authorized f twice the maximum term quote otherwise author writes that gives no indication that the legislature meant that it to be for it to be something that is only authorized under under the controlled substances act and in  fact my opponent is arguing that this court should read in the phrase under the act but i would submit that even adding that language would be insufficient because remember defendant does have a prior offense under the act is maximum  conduct related to the controlled substances act indeed he would seem my opponent would seem to need to read in a whole sentence into this provision and say otherwise authorized by the act only related to conduct that violates act and that perhaps would read out application of the chill prior felonies provision that enhanced him from the class two to the class acts but certainly adding that much language to this provision would be a step too far and instead this court should apply the term this provision as it is an act that she say yes you are allowed to double the maximum otherwise occupied and indeed the sentencing court turns to the code of corrections to determine what is are the rights under for sentencing and that includes the two prior felonies provision to enhance it from a class two to a class act and so i guess just one last point i'd like to make is people versus oliva it wasn't mentioned my by act offense can never receive an extended term class act sentence but that is actually a misstatement of the holding of a leave oh and i wanted to emphasize there that while both defendant and the lever were convicted of class two felonies and they both were enhanced to a class x range shooting through the two prior felonies provision alito faced a potential extended term sentence there operation of a provision that i called the recent prior conviction provision that is the provision that states that where you're convicted of a certain class felony and you have a prior conviction for the same or similar or greater class felony within ten years that you can face an extended term and i'll leave this court interpreted that provision in particular that language and holding that you have to have a prior requires a conviction for a prior offense under the act it has no requirement about the level of class fanny either of the current conviction or the previous conviction and so leave zero does not defeat the state's proposed interpretation here so in s this court should either construe these relevant provisions to avoid a conflict in the first place and note that the code and particularly the general extended term sentencing provision applies only to those extended terms justified by the code itself and allow these other enhancements that the legislature enacted and dozens of occasions to exist to coexist along side without recognizing a conflict oh in the alternative recognize that if there is a conflict it's at its maximum doubling is appropriate and if there are no further questions thank you very much thank you it's number one one eight three seven five people of the state of illinois versus a dream williams will be taken under advisement his agenda number