carlin believe in this case the question presented today involves the illinois constitution specifically section ten essay of article seven and the right of a not a whole rule unit of local government to contract and otherwise associate with the not another not whole no unit of local government as well as a private corporation in any manner not prohibited by law in this case the purpose of the association was to construct a regional water treatment and facility to provide safe drinking water to its members in a mutual or cooperate basis this is really just a partnership to provide water at the lowest possible cost its members not to spend a whole lot of time on the facts of the reef well but by council and myself case on behalf spike e j water cooperate details the decision here will impact the right of non home really units of look government across the state of illinois and in effect their ability to engage in these types of public private  partnerships many of these other entities did exactly what carl and bill did in taking advantage of u s d a grant money to finance the construction of water facilities carlinville obtain the same kind of u s d a grant u s d a grant as e  for example is much more cost effective to build one dollar regional treatment facility for multiple small rural communities instead of having each small rural community build and maintain its own treatment plant for distribution systems it's not this with another non home rule unit of government dorchester and a private corporation jersey erm schemes in a private not for profit water whopper in jersey roll water at an open meeting the city council voted to give  alderman city campbell authority to represent harlem bill for that purpose through alderman campbell harlem the joint with dorchester and jersey where water executed articles were gratian and entered into by laws to form a movie now has the individual authority to construct wells to build water treatment facilities to build a distribution center to secure public water supply in addition to that authority we have section ten a of article seven which we will argue a llows arlindo to exercise that authority by associating with dorchester in jersey or a water too formal so far purposes here today we're specifically looking at the nd sentence of section ten and it sets units of local government and school districts may contract and otherwise associate with individuals associations of corporations in any manner not prohibited by law or by ordinance it's our position the carlinville has and because there is no statute authorizing them specifically to form a little bill they can't do it in other words they can always associate and cooperate by using one of the statutes the play of said argue apply for example would have to form some kind of water co to be clear there is no statute prohibiting the formation of a not for profit corporation admittedly there's no statute that says we can do what there is though is section ten a which allows carlon them to exercise the broad brand of authority that henri possesses over the public water supply in cooperation with another home rule not a home or unit for chester and a private nonprofit corporation jersey or a water now plaintiff's overall been asking the courts to rewrite the nd sentence of section ten it they want you construe the nd sentence like the circuit court did to require both a contract and an association we've already talked about a little bit how the articles of incorporation  contracts and that's in illinois but the for sake of addressing this argument were ten for a few minutes that it's not a contract looking at the specific language of the nd sense of tannic in the phrase may contract or otherwise associate  st right off the bat we see meg and we all know that mamie means discretion the term otherwise is also used in that phrase otherwise modifies the word associate otherwise means in a different way read together the phrase means you can contract and also associate in a different way other than by contract section antenna can't be reasonably interpreted where both a contract and i'm associated because well every contract is already in them some station in doing that would read the word otherwise to be completely meaningless which we look at inter being statutes and in this case the constitution were not to be string things to be meetings it's in there for a reason the word any is also used in the phrase in any manner not prohibited by law any means anything without restriction any modifies word manner here this phrase means then that you have discretion to choose any way to associate with a private corporation as long as it's not prohibited by law now place of argument times is just doesn't make sense or it can't be it can't just be mis powis can do whatever they want the context in section ten x and we would argue that exact concern was expressed in addressed in the const the constitutional convention debates the content of a tz if you look at the cali case from site to in our brief on page thirty five that section discusses debates and says certain delegates expressed a fear that section ten would in effect give local governments a blank check that is open and miss a section ten would result in unfettered and unbridled discretion on the part of these units of government the sponsors of the section assure the constitutional convention that this would not be the case it was pointed out time and time again that the state legislature could regulate the activity of vision it's of government via legislation but argue that this isn't so much a legal question for plaintiffs it's a legislative one and maybe it's better taken up across the street with the general assembly there isn't a law outlawing prohibiting what carlinville did and if they're saying there should be well that's not necessary to be before the sport it should be in front of them assembled it's a lobbying issue not a legal issue mathias explain the amendment by saying the proposal is we strike the words when authorized by law and then we add at the end of the sense the words in any manner not prohibited by law or it's this is the same  to have with respect to enter governmental cooperation as it is now they have to get prior legislative authority before they may do it the amendment would permit them to go ahead on the cooperation of the private sector unless the past and were governed by laws and not by the intentions of legislators and i agree with that the constitution like statute should be interpreted based on the written language and i think the written language that's here is sufficient but at the same time to confound abates without taking the consideration the context of where it's being used and what it's being intended to remedy i think perhaps there was a misunderstanding on the use there is where it is very correct that you made the same arguments a truck or  of using legislative language i don't think this court has to rely on the content abates at all to resolve this case i think the plain language is enough but i don't think the dates the debates can be completely ignored given what they provide us  to the stand that plaza argue that there does have to be both a contract and an association and that somehow that this requiring both with regard to  should have the same authority with corporations as they have with respect to enter government the cooperation now this all is not to say the carlin bills without authority over the public water supply we've cited to multiple sections the missile code page twenty r you don't contract the contract and even if you did section ten it doesn't impose this before parliament sleeve plaintiff's wanting to read prohibited by law as provided by law and read the word before in w authorize specifically by the very statutes the plaintiff cites is not authorized by law but again going back to what we just discussed section ten a does not say authorized by law it sets prohibited by law so again plants argument regarded as requiring the court to rewrite the section and disregard the unless prohibited by law phrase councils use example before you know a child can have some carrots in the fridge doesn't mean they can take a cookie from the counter but reality section twenty is more like when i tell my little girl she get any snack in the kitchen now includes cookies on the counter and fruit the fridge and less money the general  has already said you can't have anything from the kitchen counter that's what the express language of tennessee gives you can do it unless the general assembly says you can't even if you accept all of claims arguments or public body to perform a ministerial duty where they exercise zero discretion mandamus isn't designed for figure out what right to petition might ave what the public officials duty is supposed to  and just want to address it briefly there is no allman and there's no foyer violation or the trial court is much found that because the facts did not support that state's i expect there may be some discussion here a bit the problem is that transparency violation it just doesn't make sense it distracts from really what the issues are spaces that leaves us with plaintiffs claim in the complaint that it's a well settled principle of illinois law that members of the public have a protectable interest in ensuring that public officials fall the requirements public statutes and seems pretty general to me it doesn't seem at all like a situation where a specific right doesn't already have to be figured out where the public officials do you have to sort it out i'm not sure what statutes we're talking about as we talk about a brief extensive none of the statutes lied about it by plaintiff require defendant to work in ice its water supply any given away and none of them require defendant used in fact the idea that there are so many options out there really cuts against the idea of judgement as to which one to use if the exercise of that discretion and the exercise of that judgment shows us mandamus was the incorrect remedy looking further at the specific report issued the rich s doesn't get this rig doesn't get the job done because the job is not fit for mandamus really  i did want to address one issue regarding the standard of review we did bring out in our in our happily brief that it is the no go for most of the claims made but not with regard to the lashes argument i think the court would be required to add here or to review that under an abuse of discretion standard just that specific one and we did cite case law  to it i want to spend a little bit of time talking about some questions that were raised at the last argument we had essentially in this case and that is judge stagnant asked me the question if we find that your interpretation of section ten a is wrong do you lose the case and i quickly responded i think so yes well i thought about it more and i think that was an overly simplistic explanation judge stagnant because i think it frames the i think it frames the issue in correctly at least from the standpoint of the plaintiffs in this case hi look at article ten a section seven of the constitution as a framework it is a general grant nobody we're not trying to make the argument here that to try to reverse the effect of  re reverse it or take us back to an old reading of the constitution what our argument has been all along the plaintiff's argument in this case is that the is that there are many statutor y authorized ways for carl and bill to go about doing what it did and it elected to ignore d all of them so you must read article ten a in the context of the other  ordinance it says unless perhaps it had by other laws and ordinances so i think what i'm getting at judge seidlin is i want to change my answer there are other laws and ordinances that would preclude c from doing what it did in this case and we've argued these things there in our pleadings it's not a surprise or anything like that but i want to give a i want to give an example you asked me about associations  what's what's an association in addition to a contract well i think you have to look at the statutes to see what that is and i'm going to give a more concrete example because i think it illustrates at least what my interpretation of section ten a is and you guys can take that for what it's worth but i want to look at the context of the municipal joint action water agency that's five miles yes to twenty three point one and i so want to talk about what it requires it doesn't require specific content of what this joint action water agency will look like it simply says that if you were at one you need to have approval each body including it needs to approve an ordinance and it's limited specifically to municipalities public water districts townships state universities and counties and instead of boring everyone with going through all the other statutes we cited they are i will i will say this about them they all contain similar requirements they either limit who can enter into them in their different limitations or they require the approval by ordinance of the contract or something of that nature something to happen before the law can take effect so while i agree the word before is not in section ten a that's because it's in the municipal code in the in the intergovernmental cooperation act it's in the requirements for publication of any says that no contract should be made by a corporate authorities or by committee or member of their oil and no expense shall be incurred by any of the officers or departments of the municipality whether or not the object of the expenditures has been ordered by the corporate authorities or the question of is there a before and ten a i agree there is not because the before is in the municipal code this is not a we're not asking the court to make new wall we're simply asking the court to look at section ten a in the context of all the other laws that the legislature has made to circumscribe the activities of non home room provision article seven regarding intergovernmental cooperation it doesn't it doesn't it says that notwithstanding any provision of this code to the contrary the corporate enter into any multi year contract or otherwise associate for any term under this provisions of section ten of article seven of the illinois constitution or the inner governmental cooperation act so it references back to it the legislature has made attempts to circumscribe what what government entities can do regarding contracts it's right here in the municipal code and it's no and i think it's not any secret to people that practice municipal law and another example section eight dash nine dash one of the municipal code contains very specific public work and improve met bidding requirements for any public work where they expense exceeds twenty five thousand dollars so there are laws regarding wrong we're not asking the court to infer things from the constitution we're simply arguing that in this case carl and bill did not follow the rules required of it under the municipal code under the enter governmental cooperation act under the statutes and they are using their actions to appropriate municipal bonds was this what the trial court that they're limited and two very specific ways that the st one being she said they're limited to the statutorily prescribed methods that are contained in the in the compiled statutes so i think in that instance yes she did make that ruling tilt and she also did say and she also did rely on her argument regarding that and or and i think that  it it still makes sense to me her argument about that and an oar in that context and the fact that you know we talked about intergovernmental cooperation mr  lee case and i don't really have much of the argument against what he said i will just point out one thing about the conley case it concerns t municipalities and cooperative action and the court found simply this that there wasn't a joint venture with regard to the sale of gravel so they weren't even looking for a time track they were looking for a joint venture and in that in the conley case i think we have to remember here we don't have a municipality we've got a private company in this circumstance and and i think that they would acquire on tract would also be required in this instance and it would have to go through their requirements that any municipality has to approve a contract and that didn't happen here the bylaws were not approved by the city of car window to my knowledge and that's not been pled in the case now there was a water service contract mr kabbalah mentioned in his reply brief that happened later but that's the time track that's been in front of them in front of the municipality and we have to remember this concerns appropriations of potentially millions of dollars of grant money awarded to carbondale through the through the the loan the federal loan program so there are this they have to adhere to the provisions of the you know civil code when it comes to appropriating the money and things like that  reiterate reiterate again i agree with mr ball in the court there is no procedure specify in section ten day of article seven of the constitution it's a framework and on top of that framework you have to impose the statutes the statutes that have that the legislature has passed to fill in that framework and they there have just couldn't do it this way they have we're looking at ten day to say oh this gives you some extra extra method for doing what you want right it's a catchall if you will and i don't think that applies here that's why we we talked about that maxim of statutory construction i have the same problem mr ball has with latin so i'll call it the cookie cannon if that's ok the cookie can and says you can't do it if that if somebody gives you ten ways to do it you can't pick an th way to do it because it's implied that there are no other ways to do it we can look at the and i agree with what he said his reply it's generally a canon that is applied to a you know a specific provision in a in what you know a list on a on a statue but it has been applied across tattoos and we didn't talk about that in our brief and i will say this it's also just common sense if the what we what  bill is essentially asking the court to do is just is to say exactly what what mr paul said is argument you can have whatever you want in the kitchen and i don't think that applies here you know he said mommy has said you can have whatever you want in the kitchen but i think mani i said no in this case mommy gave multiple ways for you to get what you want and you chose a way that wasn't authorized by law and our instead trying to use this very broad statutory grant that regardless of whether the court draws a negative imprints or a positive in france for the unless six unless prevented by otherwise prohibited by law or ordinance action says you've got to stick to what the legislature has given you it's not some carte blanche grant of power like they're saying especially in circumstances where the legislature has given you multiple ways to fix your problem we're not trying to argue that they can't do what they damned or that all of these organizations should be overturned we're simply saying you've got to follow the rules that the legislature has laid out when when it for solving these water problems is to small hard can you can you explain to me your understanding what the goal or the purpose of such intent a is generally well i think mr pollard did accurately and explain it very well i think the purpose of section eighteen is to give a much broader grant of power to regarding intergovernmental cooperation now when what i'm trying and all i'm trying to say is it is a much broader grant it does reverse  france regarding an inner government governmental cooperation i'm not trying to argue that all i'm trying to say is this you still have to have here to the minimum statutory frame or that the legislature legislature is the purpose of to contract an associate oh the royal and what will be the purpose of the two things well i think that they i think that they require and were asking me to you again speculate a little bit i think that it requires a contract in addition to the association with a with a private entity b for the very reason why the plaintiffs in this case are set private and it prevents private entities from enter from creating contracts that nobody ever gets to see i think we lose sight in this i think we've kind of lost sight in this case of the what really of the facts which i agree we don't really dispute contract which wasn't so by laws and articles of organization were created for a company that was never xplained to the public and it was done after the fact and i think that i think that the if if i were to hazard a guess the reason why that nd sentence is in there in our section ten a for private entities is said that there has to be a contract and the governmental entity has to talk about it before they approve it especially if they're going to do things like appropriate money that's why those provisions of the municipal code i cited to you talk about the possibility of getting rid of appropriations of it if they're not of a certain size or if it's with another governmental entity because government because as you can see in paragraph one in the connelly case is a good example yet they have a pretty broad power when it comes to relating to each other they i mean the calmly case basically just says a joint venture it doesn't require a written contract but the municipal code does require written contracts and transparency with regards to public projects with private companies that are going to that are going to require the expenditure of municipal funds so there i mean that's why i think it's a transparency issue and i understand yeah all you get with if they just got a water contract with a private company that it wouldn't have the same level of continued reporting that that you know the defendants are saying that there is and this case because the member comes back to the meeting and can give a brief summary of what happens at e j water i'm sorry at  meetings but i will say this a water contract is very specific and there are there's breach there is duty it's it's public the public can go see it they can know exactly what their rights are they can tell if they're getting a good rate or not and none of those things happen in a transparent way with the loop deal and that brings me i've only got two minutes left but that does bring me to the last point i wanted to address we are we we are not arguing that that the oh in may was violated or that there was some transparency violation  a request to and the court has in its file a live eels letter indicating that they won't they won't abide you know they won't provide any information and they won't let people attend their meetings that's the of issue that i think this very broad language in section ten day was intended to prevent with private companies because it point again it points back to the statutes there are affirmative requirements for municipalities with regards to contracting if they want to open a joint action water agency or water district that they are creatures of statute the process is the winning aided it's been laid briefly on the constitution is not a catch all i think we can all agree with that section ten a provides what it provides it doesn't point to all these other laws the council just talked about it meg now i agree once you decide to avail yourself of these individual statutes there are specific requirements that then you must follow once built up but in no way can order i'm arguing you are largely yes this point because the statute the constitution doesn't talk about authorized by law doesn't talk about following a statute it talks about statutes  restructure yet i don't see that requirement in section telnet is no reference to authorized by law and looking back at the compound debates we don't have i mean the idea of authorized by law that language is hold in place of have the constitution you can ignore section ten and you certainly can tag along to the end of the section today that you know it's referencing you can contract otherwise associate in any way that's busy not prohibited by law or by ordinance  as long as it's also in following these ten other things that are in statute it just it's not what's there it's not the plain language is not the written language  it doesn't say we have to follow some kind of sad story framework it doesn't have a process doesn't have a framework in there and we're looking at the language of the constitution it doesn't talk about appropriations it doesn't talk about the types of things counsel has addressed in argument i think that again each one of the statutes now for many of these statues just statements said shout we have a different story they don't each one of these seven or so or eight or so i think it is that counsel points out to each one of them starts with may you may do these things if you had to if if yeah i guess all of them can say shall visit up the wall but i suppose what if you know it was if that was a different story i think then you are automatically obligated then to avail yourself of the fireman structures underneath you know eighty seven section eighty seven thank you for your arguments the case is submitted in the court stands in recess thank you