resolves the interpretive question underlying this appeal the sentence of either nine months or on the other hand twenty six years could be said to be the maximum consistent with the recommendation of the sentencing guidelines if there ever a case called out for the application of the rule of lenity this would be that case the sentencing on revocation of a suit of a term a supervised release is governed by chapter seven of the guidelines these are policy statements recommendations after book or recommendations just like all the other portions of the sentencing guidelines chapter seven is silent on the question at issue in this appeal which is when there are multiple concurrent terms of supervised release that are revoked all at once should the sentencing to prison for the revocation of each one of those concurrent terms run consecutively or run concurrently be consecutive sentences of supervised release so you have the same thirty five mail fraud convictions i mean i'm not talking about revocation now i'm just struck me about the initial sense well my understanding is under eighteen u s c thirty six twenty four he sentences of of supervised release must run concurrently to each other so i believe if what if  that address a parallel question to the question in this appeal which is the statutory restraints on running census concurrent in the situation that statute is discussed in this court's two cases jackson and federal state or local term of probation or supervised release or parole for another offense to which the person is subject or become subject during the term of supervised release of that appears to be and i believe has been interpreted as the putting by this court a blanket requirement superbugs release terms run concurrently to each other counsel one is our standard of review the standard of review is the noble because this isn't a question of interpretation of the sentencing guidelines our argument is that the guidelines should be interpreted in light of the ambiguity brought about by the silence on this specific question as recommending against concur of consecutive sentences the any objection raised to the the policy statement the recommended range the correspondent this is actually within the policy statement it's just consecutive mr williams and respondent i mean concurrent within the three to nine months range and then again on the following page page thirty five mr williams we would ask the court to sense in somewhere within the three to nine month range and run those sentences concurrent but there was no indication that it was unlawful to sentence consecutively or an er misinterpreted the guidelines did you lose that objection raised that imposition of consecutive sentences would be a validation of the gag i believe it's implicit when mr williams says he means concurrence when the judge says it's within the guidelines and he says no i think it needs to be should be concurrent it's just asking for a concurrent sentence at the polls so consecutive sentence but do you think you fairly conveys to the judge the notion that sentencing consecutively would be outside the parameters of the god i think it does however i understand it could be clearer than it is and i understand this court may believe that he could have been more explicit about this specific argument i'm making now however i believe that his objection and his statement is sufficient to preserve the issue under federal rule of criminal procedure fifty one which states a party may preserve a claim of error by informing the court when the court ruling or order is made or sought of the action the party wishes the court to take or the part is objection to the court's action on the grounds for that objection so he stated what he wanted the court to do is said i want this to be run consecutive he also said that would you want to a conclusion i'm sorry i'm sorry  bill i want this court to run the census concurrent and under rule fifty one that appears to be perfectly adequate to preserve the issue and not have the situation replay in there would be applied and it would be simply a question of and the support is revocation so the question is whether this char which seems to carlie the sentence w violation in the criminal history category at least implies that it's per violation not per term that you're sentenced to this  well there's really no indication one way or another and the couple of courts that are discussed in the brief have said guideline simply don't address this one way or another cases from other circuits  made that observation i believe that's accurate there's nothing in the table to say these are run concurrently or consecutively there are however there is however in chapter seven another instance in which the guidelines specifically state under these circumstances a sense upon revocation should run concurrent consecutive start consecutive to another sentence and of course part of our argument is applying the negative pregnant rule of interpretation the absence of any such statement in terms of this situation should be read as recommending against that good morning your honour's may it please the court my name is kayla noel i'm an assistant u s attorney in phoenix and i'm here on behalf of the united states mr mr campbell's sole claim on appeal is that the district court miscalculated the guidelines by failing to acknowledge a preference for concurrent sentences upon revocation of multiple concurrent terms of supervised release of course the problem with this argument is that the guidelines express no such preference  as mr campbell concedes we start with the notion that first of all that i gather the original terms of supervision are concurrent by statute now i understand that the statute has been interpreted to allow these consecutive sentences on revocation but it's it would at least be an auditing if the flies with your little chart which seems to talk about per violation meant to allow as he's saying twenty six years of imprisonment for one violation that would be strange  the sentence that with their by p suggested would be ridiculous well i think the based on the chart in chapter seven i think the district court would still be starting with the three to nine month number that's in the chart and it would then just be exercising the significance of the chart is set up her revocation not per term i don't think that the  anything in in chapter seven addresses how to deal with this specific situation of multiple concurrent terms of supervised release i believe that  your whole premise of the guidelines with regard to revocation as i understand it is that the the sens should reflect this is the reason for the class a b and c the nature of the revocation not the the nature of the violation not the nature of the underlying sentence right or the underlying crime right so here we have whatever he gathered he didn't report it he absconded for a while and so on release conditions and nothing else and you only did that one thing you're correct of course that the he only did did one thing there was one violation found here but he was subject to multiple term so that was a violation of all thirty five of the terms of supervised release and again i mean if not more as i understand it a higher sense on the revocation then he got on the underlying imprisonment term that would have been the court would have been perfectly within its authority to impose consecutive sentences but again i think in light of the backdrop of the requirement that the in section thirty five eighty four that in choosing between concurrent and consecutive sentences the district court consider the political section thirty five fifty three a factors i think if if the court had decided to impose consecutive sentences consecutive nine month sentences for all thirty five of the counts there would have been an issue of substantive reasonable mous the district court's discretion is at as always informed by those sections via political section thirty five fifty three  factors and i think it's telling that in this case mr campbell is not raising the claim of substantive substantive unreasonable this and that's because given the conduct here and that includes absconding from supervision for over two years and failing to pay any of the over eight hundred fifty thousand dollars of restitution that was owed by the district court looked at the policy statement noted that it didn't take into account the extent of the violation here and concluded that based on that conduct it was appropriate to order a five month sentences which were within the policy statement range but to order honor i've only been in a usa for six months so in my personal experience it is a huge little bit unusual but i do think that the record here reflects that the district court considered the conduct that was that issue here and given the seriousness of the violation and just the complete refusal to comply with the conditions of supervised release here and particularly where the district court had very down downward in the initial imposition of sentences that that conduct warranted a term of imprisonment that in this case did happen to be one month longer than the original imprisonment that was imposed when i was a district court judge i remember we had to inform the defendants at sentencing that if there are supervised release was revoked it would be possible for them to serve more time than they were originally sentenced to so that's why i ask you that to see if that was still the kinsey's as i said i don't i'm i don't have enough experience to know whether this is unusual in itself i do know that after the admit deny hearing in this nd also noted that with respect to the policy statement a range of three to nine months that that range was to each count so i do think that in this particular case when he decided to admit to one violation of each of his thirty five terms of supervised release that he was on notice that he could potentially receive a sentence that was lengthy or than the initial term of imprisonment that had been impos yes i know your honor as if the court has no further questions for me the government asks that the court affirm th so it's possible your honor it is pretty rare i would i would point out though this question about the judge's ability to reasonably go outside of the guidelines range really shows why the court should not have any hesitation or concern about agreeing notes so not much of a cap in this instance but the fact that the government correctly points out the court can reasonably go outside the guidelines range really just shows why there isn't any concern here that if my interpretation is accepted there'd be any undue or inappropriate constraint on the court the court if in fact the range were understood to be no more than nine months under the guidelines the court could still reasonably say because of the nature of this violation i think something more than the guidelines is recommended the question is the court should be required to make that determination understanding that the maximum guidelines recommendation is nine months not twenty six years if she goes to what's appropriate thinking the guidelines max is twenty six years is very likely to go higher than if she does it knowing the guidelines max is nine months ok thank you very much thank you