have please the court your honors also my name is matthew franklin and i'm the attorney representing mr andrew cochrane the issue to be decided by the court today is whether the illinois trial court properly refused to register an indiana custody order in today's oral argument i would like to focus on the issues of service of process the related issue of jurisdiction and the requirement of communication between the illinois and indiana courts under the uniform child custody group jurisdiction and foresman act whenever there's a dispute in the jurisdiction on a child custody case these are the same issues these are the same grounds that the trial court here in illinois found in favor of my client these are the same issues in the same grounds on which to justice miers cough based her dissent in the  pellate court in this case and ian alexis met at the job corps camp in indiana subsequently she became pregnant with sophia they continued to live in indiana and then sometime about the third month of her pregnancy sometime after the third month of pregnancy she and she and andy moved back to illinois where they remained until her pregnant told just about the time the baby was due she returned to indiana on her own and she gave birth to sophia in indiana she spent the next ten days living with her mother and then she moved in with her father and with her stepmother with father and stepmother and spent the next six months a little more than the next six months with them then on march thirtieth two thousand and six alexis decided to return to illinois with sophia and moved in with andy cochran  or by her father by her father by her father he did try to keep the child because there's evidence that alexis had to go get police help to get the child at that point and then she left for illinois ok they claim the right to custody as they factor custodians classification for which there is no exact parallel in illinois five days later on april ninth john wyndham and the father came to illinois and served state he was the child was there for just barely past six months which is the definition of a home state was all of those six months spent at the same location i think you said about ten days with some of the location although the complaint alleged that andy cochrane was the putative father and sophia was his daughter and that he and andy that alexis and andy and sophia were all living in illinois  one served my client and he cochran as a result two days later there was a hearing in indiana there was a hearing in indiana and the trial court in indiana awarded custody of the child to the lind argument here is that under the indiana uniform child custody in jurisdiction act it requires that all parties must receive notice of the custody hearing now who are these parties under indiana law as laid out in the statu first persons and title the notice under indiana law as in any custody proceeding between residents of indiana second a parent whose parental rights have not been terminated and third any person having physical custody of the child i'd like to turn to that third one first any person having physical custody of the child the verified complaint is filed in indiana said that alexis and my client and andrew cochrane and sophia we're all living as a nuclear family in illinois now so if i may yes  are any other evidence really matters we might look at floor to determine whether the the father had custody the child other than the fact that they lived in the same home support care whatever it might be and i we do not dispute that mr cochran was unemployed at the time and did not support the child up until that point he did have visitation with the child on at least two q two occasions and on one of them your honor although the council in its briefs called it a brief visitation it was a very brief five day visit patient with a child came with him question is this during that period other than the fact that the child in yander lived in the same home as you're going to any other allegations of support for the child or custody of the child whatever that just that he had custody i'm really talking about wiley while the child was living in illinois oh i'm sorry your honor i missed some other holiday every mother's of the fact that they lived in the same home was there any other allegation as to why this father should have been treated as a child and maybe i maybe even put the question another way is is the fact that they live in the same home alone sufficient to prove the point i believe that it is when they hold themselves out to be a nucular family that he's the father sophia is the child and the mother has come to live with him and they move in obviously by virtue of living in the same house together she don't want had any job than he did puts the paternity was a the hearing and order in indiana which is the basis of the registration was completed in the apparently in the morning of april eleven the child of the paternity declaration was made sometime after that we don't know what times it was but we acknowledge that they that in the illinois court already had information from the indiana court as to what was happening over there at the time but you're saying that he was still entitle to notice even though the paternity was an established until after the time of the filing of the actual that's correct your honor on what basis that he was the person that had physical custody of the child together with the mother while they are living in illinois well that the that the mother's or the father the father's parents were the people that i like i may have a ruptured you're just the wrong time now that i think about it to give you a chance to get back on track in the determination of whether or not the flag of the father was entitled to notice on the date question one argument of course is that the child was in his custody in illinois but i think the other one the was that is it is long is the parties were aware of the fact that he was apparently the natural father or the presume natural father would they actual i'm not entirely sure but i don't think that factor alone if he was not living and did not have custody of that child and did not have a relationship at the time that the petition was file then i think that there might not be a basis to name him a party but in this case the evidence is overwhelming that they knew exactly what was going on in illinois who was in that household there's a great deal of testimony and it's in the verified complaint your honor i would also note that a parent whose parental rights have not been previously terminated is also entitled to notice of oh that gets into the very thing that we've been talking about what is the putative what's the situation they're claiming that they had primary custody of this child and that they provided the financial support we don't argue anything about the financial support however both both of the newman's work and during the day  alexis by the testimony from the april eleventh hearing was taking care of that child she also exercised custody by getting the police involved to get her child back from it's the lindemann xbase their claim that on the fact that they did more of the work after they got home from work ok and that alexis was not a capable parent the problem with that argument is she may not if she was such an incapable parent why were they leaving her leaving the baby with the mother every day that they were at and that's the merits and i understand your position imagine there's a contrary position at the other table but we're is this court left with deciding that or is this court left with the religious tradition argument only i would hope that in this way your honor there's an issue about we don't dispute that the home state was indiana ok but at the time irrespective of where they were living and what the living conditions were at the time that that petition was filed mother father and baby were in illinois if they were not defacto if in fact as a matter of law they are not they facto  over in indiana because the primary custodian was a lexus then there is no party left in indiana for indiana to give to assert one is what you said that the union of court didn't have jurisdiction and that's all you would argue that right that's correct and i don't think there's any the facts don't present itself in custody yes your honor we're all those things raised in the complaint arguments were held that the very first thing out of the trial attorneys mouth who was representing mr cochran was that there was no jurisdiction in this case and later he talks about how much later he talks in the argument he talks about the service problem very briefly just mentioned he mentions it but i think it's enough to raise the issue and furthermore i would point out that it was also just go over a few things that were raised in th standing in indiana that was not was the argument that we just made your honor about the defacto guardian if there's if indiana is the home state you have to have a party in the home state so that goes into the women's claim of the effect of historians ship was based on false allegations right or not i mean this registration would there be a hearing then and whether there was how what would this look like in the in the trial court what happened in the trial court covered in volume two was that there was a the oral arguments made your honor  hope i'm i don't want to get too far off of this but the appellate court said that alexis never objected to the registration she was present and i believe it's on page twelve or it's page sixteen of the chose to not arguing therefore i'm most thankful because it gives us the opportunity to for the oral argument here but that's the process that they went us i think that there's a factual issue on that and whether or not there were defective parents throughout the entire proceeding in illinois that is a factual issue which was raised by trial counsel terence yes your honor ok how do we review that issue is there a standard of review that we have to apply and in reviewing that factual finding i believe that it would require that isn't that the evidence and be  i just want to say the the reason and i think the reason for justice fitzgerald's questions and well we're interested in the facts the reason the three o five d limits when an illinois court is not forced to register in august a judgment in this case in vienna is there's very narrow in fact there's three reasons right we really can't go into the facts and the reason is because of where we register between states regarding jurisdiction of cases involving child custody disputes the purpose of both acts was to provide a uniform a quote and recognition of the jurisdictional basis to be able to enter a custodial order in this case i represent the maternal grandparents of the child that is at the center of this dispute sophia grace lindemann alexis lindemann is the mother of sophia and has been at best a passive participant in this litigation alexis has had legal representation for the majority of th litigation however she has not filed any motions and she has made no arguments except to acquiesce to the arguments of andrea's attorney and who is father of sophia and he has been represented throughout this litigation by norber application of the u c c j a and the p k p a are the issues that are pending before this court the ruling of the trial court in this case is a complete and total disregard of u c c jay as it is clearly written the three most important elements of this case and the elements that i intend to address this morning are section three o five of the u c c j which outlines the procedure for registering a child custody determination and the elements that must be established by the feel they were the parents of sophia in their judgment was done in their absence so it's not the typical registration well it is not the typical rez registration and i don't think it's a fair statement to say that it was done in the absence of lexus the original hearing on april eleventh of two thousand and six alexis was not present for although she had notice and i don't think there's any question that she had notice of that proceeding as an attorney called on her behalf to the indiana court and attempted to taint a continuance of that hearing judge love out of indiana was concerned about the fact that she was about to enter a custody ruling without the participation of alexis and so she entered an emergency temporary order and set it for an additional hearing on april eighteenth and demanded that were ordered that alexis be present at that hearing alexis was present and testified at that hearing alexis also had a meeting with the guardian ad litem who was appointed by the indiana court either just i believe just prior to that hearing it was based on that evidence that day that judge love made the determination that indeed the lindemann is were the defacto custodians of sophia and that she felt that the situation was such that the temporary custodial arrangement should stay in place also it's important to note on that date eleventh two thousand and six hearing alexis testified at that hearing under oath that andrew was indeed father of the child and that an order had been entered here in illinois to that effect from that point forward judge love has made it she made an order on april eighteenth of two thousand and six that andrew is to be notified of all proceedings that follow that proceeding so once he was determined to be the father to the satisfaction of the indiana statute since that point in time to this point in time he's always been notified of every perceiving that it's been going on in this case not only in illinois but of course in indiana at section three zero five of the u clearly states that a court shall confirm the order in question unless the person contesting registration is able to establish that the issuing court did not have jurisdiction under article two that the child custody determination sought to be registered has been vacated which  mr franklin is already addressed is not an issue in this case and that person contests or that person contesting registration was entitled to notice but notice was not given in accord with the standards of section one hundred eight in proceedings before the court that issued the order for situation was sought now before analyzing those factors i believe it's important to note as it was noted by d l annoyed pellet court that first and foremost the burden of proof in going forward on a contest registration is on the person challenging the registration in this case andrew alexa's mr linton or mr franklin has stated that alexis is been an active participant in the contest of the registration but if you review the file alexis has never once filed a pleading in this case even though she has been represented by counsel for the majority of the proceedings so what if that if that qualifies alexis to be an active participant in this case i find it hard to believe that that could be accurate she has at no time challenge to in illinois any of the things on her own any of the things that were going on in the illinois case now they did originally alexis did originally at the april eighteenth hearing have an attorney in indiana who challenge jurisdiction and service of process in indiana that argument was made by her attorney over there believe judge love asked that the argument be briefed or that the positions be briefed they were briefed and after being briefed judge love determined that she did not believe that notice of prior service of process was insufficient and she believed that she had jurisdiction over alexis to love recognized vander as the father and insisted that he have noticed so toxic with her what has what had gone by before that happened what had gone by higher to that is in indiana there had been the verified emergency petition for custody to establish and her as a father and a determination later that day that he was indeed father of the child and then the at the next the next percy truly the next thing that i believe happened was the april eighteenth hearing over in indiana where judge love determined him to be father was a period of about seven docs seven days right my question to you is even assuming and for purposes of this question only that amber was entitled to earlier notice begin my question with that understanding i didn't expect you to admit that right so i'm just my question is even if if we decide no he was entitle to notice at that earlier date would you still win because the fact of the matter is he did was in the position to read the received notice seven days after that oh i think definitely and i don't think that our that answer can even argue that he did not have an actual notice of what was going on in this case you know sophia was was that the evidence repeated at some later date no they only in the ultimate decisions that were made in this case were based at least in part on that evidence they were bait they race in part on that evidence and in part on the testimony of alexis at the april eighteenth two thousand and six hearing but but the fact of the matter is that for whatever reason andrew was not given notice for that particular hearing that which this testimony was taken andrew was not given notice but i think the facts stab alexis did not have transportation to the state of indiana for the april eighteenth two thousand and six hearing so transportation was provided by andrew's family so for andrew to state that he did not have notice of what was going on in these proceedings is disingenuous he had notice from the very date that alexis i think that's pretty much what amber is going to say on the other side of the argument that the clintons knew from the very first moment that amber was connected to th well but but this is the problem as i see it with fat with that issue is for anyone who practices family law there is an understanding that just because a mother in this case alexis is saying that someone in particular is a father to a child and biologically connected to that child is not necessarily the truth at all times that's why there is a procedure both in indiana and in illinois for stablish in yourself as the father of a child you know up until that time you know anyone could come in and claim that they're the father of the child and if we were required to give notice to everyone who we believe to may have been of the father of the child of this child in the indiana we could be giving notice to multiple parties including multiple parties into this case and i don't know if that's the if there are the facts are as i understand your argument is that he wasn't entitle to notice at that period he was only entitle to notice after a quick enough to the court finding that's correct that's correct so he didn't get any notice of the hearing the only notice that he received to be a preteen terri would have been the alexis by by the nature of the fact that alexis was living with him and therefore you know he had noticed because they were living in the same residence and his family brought her to indiana so he had notice that there was a perceiving going on affecting sophia ok the counsel sorry to interrupt you again  but opposing counsel indicated that you plead digit indiana were verified pleadings and it contained an allegation that he is or was at the time of the pleading of the putative father if that is correct i'd like you to answer tell me if it is or not stated was that indeed he was the i don't think i made an allegation about him being the alleged father but it did make an allegation something to the effect that alexis had left the state of indiana to live with the alleged father so yes they do that he is the father but i think the problem with that is i still don't think that he is entitled to any notice is specifically under the indiana code because the indiana code states there are only two ways to establish your paternity as a father and one is by signing one of their paternity affidavits and the other one is by filing an actual legal proceeding and have an interim anation by an indiana court that you are indeed father of this child up until that is done i don't believe in indiana he's limited the issues that they address in their opinion to these three basis is for contesting registration and the position of  was andrew was not able to establish since it was his burden of proof it was his obligation to establish any of those bases for contesting the registration specifically andrew never argued that indiana did not have a home state jurisdiction i don't think there's ever been a dispute in any of the proceedings that indiana is not the home state of this child judge day the original judge that heard the petition to establish paternity acknowledged that there was a proceeding pending in indiana and indiana appeared to be the home state of the child judge bell has since then indicated that yes indeed indiana is the home state of the child and it would require a dec appellate court was that he failed to establish that he was ever entitle to any notice paternity had not been established as i suggested and as i stated and run alexis were never married they are not living together at the time of sophia's birth and was not present at the birth the testimony is that andrew only visited sophie on two occasions in the first six plus months of her life and andrew never signed a paternity affidavit andrew cannot establish i do not believe that he did not have notice of these proceedings alexis was living with him when he was served with notice of the hearing a person from andrew's attorney's office called judge love's office requesting a continuance on behalf of the lexus of that april eleventh two thousand and six hearing and a full hearing with alexis's participation was held seven days after the entry of the emergency order at that hearing as i said before alexis challenge jurisdiction and sufficiency of process and those challenges were denied now andrew i don't believe the anger ever establishes that or ever states that he has not received notice of all of the proceedings that have gone on in this case since the point in time that he was determined to be the father of this case and i think even even more telling about this issue of notice is andrew has never attempted to adjudicate his rights enter an appearance or challenge any of the rulin that have been injured by an indiana chord instead he has chosen to make his exclusive for him the state of illinois and challenge all of the proceedings that have gone on in the state of illinois he's never challenged jurisdiction over himself over his child or whether the case even belongs in indiana in indiana instead he has repeatedly asked this court the trial court the appellate court and now the supreme court to stand in judgment of the orders that were entered in indiana enter also as you say the challenge is in his briefs on behalf of alexis stating that no notice has been was no sufficient notice was provided to her and i think the appellate court was correct when it stated that the only person that has the right to challenge that is a lexus and a lexus is never challenge that lexus is never a challenge whether notice to her was sufficient or insufficient except for her challenge in in illinois as well but what i'm saying is it appears to me that the more appropriate form to challenge all of these proceedings would have been in indiana by virtue of the appellate process that is availed was available is available to him in the state of indiana and my understanding is this is still a temporary custody order they're still not been a final determination of anybody's rights in this case in the state of indiana because the indiana court has been waiting to see how this works its way through the court system here and i want to why at the same time the seedings were going on in indiana there were proceedings in illinois and there was an order entered giving the mother new custody the same child that is correct communications portion of the statute reads is that the judges may they communicate with each other it does not say that judge love had to communicate and judge love obviously clearly felt like she had jurisdiction over this case and there was no need for her to communicate in your regardless of whether that although the statute does say show immediately right now i agree with bad but i don't believe that the lender mens should be held accountable for the failure of judge love in this case to communicate with the elena court i can only assume judge love felt like there was nothing that needed to be discussed and nothing that she needed to nothing that she could hear from a judge in illinois that would convince her that indiana did not have jurisdiction over this case or the activision is the possibility of two states that have jurisdiction over the case in the absolute necessity of the courts communicating so they can decide which of the two will voluntarily relinquish relinquish it and that's the whole purpose of the communication is not oh i believe that it is in the end once in one state and i were not making a finding here but one state can just style me that by not returning or not answering the phone now i'm not suggesting that that was appropriate and i'm not suggesting that was the way the act in vision that this should proceed but what i am suggesting is i don't think the lindemann should be held accountable for the failure of judge love to do that and as i said i can only assume that judge love felt like because she had six months in l annoyed had five days she didn't have any issue for her as far as she was going to have jurisdiction over this case and see that my time has expired we would it do you anticipate there would still be a fight over jurisdiction of the contact with the child since the day that she left to come to illinois franklin if i may be sure that one of your really important arguments is notice and it's clear now that there was notice sometime during the proceedings can you explain to me why the failure to have notice at the early part of the proceedings prejudiced your client there is no evidence in the record that he was served with the notice at any time prior to the registration in your honor that the registration occurred in illinois the bridge when the registration occurred was never received notice for any indiana court proceeding as counsel kept saying he had actual notice i'm not really so we understand we're not talking about actual notice we're talking about notice through the service of process is nothing in the record that shows that service of process was ever made on the client there's a reference in the billing to it for june of two thousand  if there is no registration in illinois if registration is not allowed in illinois then i think that there can be they either have to start over in indiana or they have to come to illinois do you agree with ms blackburn vet if we agree with her position of the appellate court majority's position that registration is proper that the parties will still have a a time to argue their case the parents will have a chance to urge you because the only thing that's been honored is a temporary custody order it's my understanding having read the record many times your honor ok and indeed the coast the temporary custody right now is there still a temporary custody order in effect in illinois granting alexis and andrew custody that was actually vacated your honor prior to the once the court and this is where you raise the issue your honor really and second half my argument that i never got to and it was about the communications with the judges in the short time that i have i would like to point your honour's to the case of in rate l c from kansas that said that communication is mandatory and it even rises to the level of jurisdiction and that's in re l c in a factual pattern that's very very similar to this case mom though the court had warship  a of the child and mom had physical the child had been returned to mom but the court still kept custody of the child and she slipped out went back to in pennsylvania in a juvenile case and even there the kansas court said despite the fact it's your it despite the fact that there is a warship proceeding that you've already declared that this is a ward of the court and so on you have to contact the pennsylvania case and the failure to contact pennsylvania because it's mandatory the failure to contact the pennsylvania case in that in that case or that the judge in pennsylvania gives rise to it in the last two paragraphs it says this is a jurisdiction question because the jurisdictional question was decided in five because there was no jurisdiction because that contact was not made all orders in this court subsequent to that were not all of these that's how strongly they felt i would also point to your honor here in illinois a case which was cited in our p l way and i there was a major typo but the cases in rape joseph v d and we gave that it's a second circuit case which also said that it is mandatory for this for an illinois court to contact the other courts any time there's a jurisdictional dispute we called it in rape i think j o u p we do anything in our order concerning the present custody of the  student judgment becomes registered in illinois judgement becomes registered then you would have the opportunity would you not to i mean there would have to be an evidentiary hearing because you know there are ten it's a temporary custody order right in indiana if it doesn't either indiana has to start over the liniments can come over here what do order what order are we working off of that has sophia in the custody of the parents right now if the illinois court vacated the temporary custody order there's no cut there's no there is no custody order giving alexis custody there is a joint is a joint custody order that well that order would have been vacated too so this is just how they got my father holding the baby because they are the parents of the baby but the but there's an order in indiana  which is under attack here in illinois we have challenged the right to register that order but that's true and the appellate court disagreed how how long how long has this been going on two years your honor almost out of its way to attempt to contact the he went out of its way to attempt to contact the india indiana court calling eight times writing four letters being told that the judge would respond in from indiana and then no response from the judge in indiana in light of l c and right in light of in re joseph v d i believe that that is