when we sought injunctive relief in the district court and as we stand here today adult uses in gage in speech protected by the first amendment are permitted nowhere in the village of broad view that unquestionable constitutional violation means the judgment of the district court should be should be prohibited from or a line on an unconstitutional zoning scheme which incorporates explicitly five thousand two hundred and eighty foot setback incorporates explicitly isn't that the real in a way it is the entry statute and by the way we did challenge the old and i statute below gave notice to the attorney general but my argument is the constitutional violation is patent it cannot be implied applied to protect the village  broadview from the claim that their zoning scheme is unconstitutional what is currently unconstitutional about it and i can hear what is currently unconstitutional about it yes as we at the time we took the injunction as i stand here today so please listen to my question i try today what is unconstitutional about the village laws other than their incorporation of the illinois statute you are not challenging we're not we're not asking you straight down the line i stretched statute you told me that earlier so please answer the question i just asked you the five thousand two hundred eighty foot setback which is based on the illinois law right incorporated it's it's explicit in the village of broadview two thousand and twelve or it's explicit so what if we issued such an injunction what good with it too that would permit us to engage in expresses the please stay close to the microphone that's how the argument is being recorded ok that would permit us to engage and others to engage in expressive speech it would be in violation of illinois law right it may be in illinois a violation of the illinois law but i'm saying that the village of broad view cannot rely on that to prohibit the speech because because it's unquestionably unconstitutional to rely on that for the village to rely on that i don't know if that if you want us to say the illinois statute  unconstitutional nobody can rely on it but you're not challenging it broad you can't rely on it and i'll tell you why when i challenge you were to ask me to strike down the illinois statute because it's a big state and there are lots of places where a mile sat back may or may not be perfectly permissible i refer the court to page eight of the supplemental appendix there is no such and that's judge  that they deprived us of our constitutional rights to expressive speech by denying us a special use permit based on ok is near as i can tell you haven't asked the district court for an injunction whately were here when was that you asked back in two thousand what each or so thousand and eight and then we asked specifically in connection with the briefing that led to his judgments or so why should twelve ninety to a one be interpreted to apply to this the seems like an open invitation for when did you ask us for an injunction eight nine years ago we can appeal at that time right we asked for an injunction in this year i should say last year in the cross motion for summary judgment and in our request explicitly in that cross motion we asked that an injunction issue did you move for a preliminary injunction no it was a motion for summary just so it looks i know you've got there some case law from the circuit been criticized rather heavily that might allow this but why should that be allowed if you are not in dire need of an injunction well your honor because that's what the statute says you know the statute is not that clear and we know that we the reason for allowing twelve ninety to a one appeals of denials of injunctions is because you might be the party who is denied an injunction maybe heard right irreparable and we have been hurt irreparably from the beginning to the end and when was the last time you asked for an injunction the last time we asked for an injunction is when we filed the motion for some cross motion for summary judgment and asked for injunctive relief permanent injunction right that's great ok so why shouldn't we just say why should we just wait until you all have resolved the damages claim and deal with us all together and once your honor it's unquestionably a constitutional violation and continuing and it's continued then you shouldn't move for a preliminary injunction we did you know nine years ago you did we please stay close to the microphone and six are we did and then we asked for a permanent injunction and why right yeah look he's your client you need to be able to tell us i'm about to ask you some more questions about this vested rights theory of yours as well but if you can't sort out the transactions for us it's going to be very hard to see how there's any vested right here who owns the property now there and to assert these rights then that's something that the failure to brief before to raise before will matter your honor and we will provide the court with the answer with respect to your vested rights theory what does the record show about money that has actually changed hands at least thirty thousand dollars that is that in the record believe it yes we were do we find it will provide the court dance now judge concho was under the impression that one hundred thousand dollars had changed hands is that right yes there was a one hundred thousand dollars money so was at thirty thousand was one hundred thousand i've also seen ten thousand they know it's in the record judge i know it wasn't raised in this round the defense the defense is saying this is all smoke and mirrors and that is in their appellate brief to our court and i was looking for some clear answer in your reply to what money changed hands to support this vested  right that apparently would have been illegal under law at the time so well the application was mary addressed the question in a different way i'll be happy to listen for a few minutes ok but i hope you get the the injunction after we answered the question with respect to an alternative form that team seeks a place in broadview to operate that is an unconstitutional violation is it your contention that every municipality has to have room for strip clubs it is my contention that broadview has to have an alternative reasonable form there was questions raised in the case law that in a very tiny municipality adjoining availability right is is sufficient that's not the case here how big is in broad anywhere if you think if you don't own the property well that's not the only thing that would give rise to standing ok because we've asked doing gauging business in broad view and k through the use of a property to engage in expressive speech ok let me try this again ok i'm looking at page twelve of the defense brief in this court middle of the page judge god shows vested rights finding in september eleventh two thousand and eight was based solely on an inference drawn from a letter reciting that appellant chicago jos had made a nonrefundable deposit of a hundred thousand dollars to appella conway as part of a contract to purchase the property and evidence obtained in discovery not only refuted this inference but also demonstrated that the appellant's had not actually made any significant expenditure to spend that you are which would grant vested rights and the only vested rights doctrine with respect to the expenditures owed to whom i can tell you that it's in it's in the discovery and in the record but i don't know for improvement dead for improvements to property yes no i don't mean to be flip about this i know ok you're asserting serious constitutional claims but this looks an awful it is as is this comes to us on the brief c's it looks like you are trying to hide the ball on whether there was a significant expenditure by whom for whose benefit because you're trying to claim a vested right you became concerned in preparing for the start term vested rights in the briefs creates more confusion than clarity so let me be clear again today our claim is not based on any doctrine of state law that given the unconstitutional right in our continuing attempt to do business in broadview it's not dispositive and the judge did not rule below and you should not rule paul based on the concept of the confusion created by state law vested rights so are you giving up a claim based on supposedly vested rights we believe states why we're not relying on state law i think that what happened was vested rights is used as an unfortunate short can in connection with the briefing and that unfortunate shorthand has led to this confusion we are relying on the undisputed constitutional court alluded to in some of its questions because a sixty five i o c s five eleven dish five dish one point five what i'll refer to the one mile rule that prevents adult uses from locating within one mile of permitted argument's sake say to chicago joes go ahead open we drop all our claims they still wouldn't be able to open because of the state law the second reason why it's moot is because the village infirmities that were pointed out by the district court in september eleventh two thousand and eight order we amended to remove the one thousand foot restriction and we've added negative secondary evidence of negative secondary effects  with regard to adult uses and alcohol to address some of the questions that were asked by the court of the court on dog meat the ownership issue i have to actually read neither chicago joe's nor purpose conway nor donahue have absolutely any interest in either of the beneficiaries or the trusts the fact the matter is the property was sold who are the beneficiaries the beneficiar a corporation one i believe is called green industries and the other one is fire protection l l c i believe as you learn who those benefits or through discovery your honor discover that it's not in the title you  the issue of whether or not there was a thirty thousand dollar or one hundred thousand dollars in this money deposit me it is a non issue it's a red herring because once the property was sold by plaintiff conway to trust number zero seven two ninety two they had a right to to get that back and effect the matter is we don't even know how much earnest money was ever placed the letter that the district court received said one hundred thousand the evidence in in depositions and discovery said maybe thirty thousand and then maybe it was made part of a ten thousand dollar note that was executed later but doesn't say thirty thousand doesn't say one hundred thousand it says he says ten thousand it's  a confusing tangle in the only reason i can see for such a tangle is tight who the actual owners of all of this is but the fact of matter is the chicago joes is not the owner purpose connelly's not the owner anymore and neither of them had any interest at all in the ownership of the property as it is today with regard to jurisdiction your honor brought up a good question and injunction but it's not acted upon for a number of years like this injunction that has been acted upon for for over ten years there's this other requirement of your parable harm to to prevent piecemeal  litigation and appeals and i think that that is ethical in this case the vested rights document that was touched upon a bit by the court it is also interesting because it appears the coun concedes that there is no federal vested rights doctrine and that's what the district court in its in its ruling alluded to was you know it's if there are no state claims there really isn't a federal vested rights doctrine it sounds like point it was no longer relying on that theory here exactly your honor and if we if we look at it for argument's sake under the illinois best the rights document are doct they can't satisfy the good faith element of the whole situation affect the matter is they filed an application for a special use with the village of ravi the explication asked for certain things the application is like a complaint complaint forms the court of what the issues are the epic ation informs the village of what you're asking for and they asked for alcohol alcohol was prohibited under ten dish for dish six and board of appeals for the village was authorized to to look at their requirements and if they looked at that requirement