thousand and fourteen u s physical suppliers of bunker fuel to foreign vessels were rely on the federal maritime lien act as security when they extended credit to these foreign vessels coming person providing necessaries to a vessel on the order of the owner or person authorized by the owner has a maritime lien on the vessel it is simplicity isn't that the issue  was exchanged between those two parties and in that confirmation order it list or excuse me it states that the actual physical supplier is going to be rachleff economy marine  contracts so that there wouldn't be this direct relationship between you know the person providing the fuel and the owner of the fuel and certainly your client could have insisted upon some sort of direct kind of line drawn from them and the owner of the company and that was just a risk that was part of doing business in that fashion whatever several things there i don't know if it's intentional where was set up that they had this sort of you know that breaking the chain of agency that's what has happened but this is the way apparently this is been done for a long time when you have these foreign vessels using foreign brokers or resellers or ok the redgrave says you didn't mention this argument at any time that you know that you argued ratification throughout throughout the case and  that you did not make this argument before the district court and you're making it for the first time on appeal well i somewhat disagree with their characterization of that word alone ok i've consistently argued the same facts that are used in those cases that can cancel out i've read the amended brief in support of summary judgment and you argue ratification you don't mention no discussion of significant and i'm going involvement then i've looked at the revised pretrial order and i read the whole thing there is there is nothing in in this regarding disputed facts you claims there's nothing in there regarding this argument that you're you're making now and it sounded like me setting up the facts to make when you started your your argument and that is significant and i'm going involvement which is the term  those same elements are out of occasion and the same arguments made by gail that there has been an ongoing systematic relationship but putting forward the facts in support of another theory prove preserve a different theory that's the thing i mean you can you can raise new arguments in support of eight theory that you argued to the district court the justification for us reaching that is well the theory was there if somebody overlooked a decision or somebody over looked up another syllogism in support of that theory at least the district court has shot at it but where you don't say even if you don't buy a theory here's theory b that's kind of different in our understand you didn't correct me if i'm wrong to say i put the facts out there that would have supported this theory even though i didn't and then a fat has a different theory it's accurate act that's correct ok but i also know to the core that this is extremely important case not just from a there's sixty fifty other  cases similar to this painting around the united states and i think the issues here are important enough that you know this this oversight of mine like i said is on may can be excused under the standards set by the score council if there is no directly with the spot supplier making agency really irrelevant no that's i don't think that's correct your honor i think the owner the owner of the whale the vessel was chartered out from what happened there is you don't have this issue of agency that no no there was no agency between gray bunkering and marine fuel where you would agree if the vessel contracted directly to the supplier in fleet be a different case radcliff providing necessary fuel to a vessel the deep blue on the order of the owner technica we clearly meet that is when you start to try to pull these in a marys into the mix and burden to prove agency under the statute there is no requirement of agency under the statute it's crystal clear that you don't have to have pretty you have to read contract there's had to be a writing between these parties it simply person providing the service to a vessel on the order of the owner that's what happened here and the kin can lucky case tracks that and and despite these intermediaries being involved and if i can quote for just real quick ken lucky that the court says it's clear that you're a stem as managing managing agent for belt ferd's to order the fuel and it's also clear that marine fuel deliver the fuel to the vessel section nine seventy one states that any person furnishing supplies or other necessaries to a bessel upon the order of a person authorized to buy the vessel shall be entitled tolling that's the exact scenario that we have and this transaction is fuelling between  bunkering and marine feel that the wrongs of the latter test which is which is what is not a test or something that's was created by the discourse below that doesn't exist but it failed and can lucky but the court below the hill that we need to jump through each of these wrongs the latter improve agency that's just simply not thank you very much and good morning bruce paulson for i n g bank with apologies i have a bit of a of a cold if it's going around it was to find out talked about  brokerage agency it was admitted that there was no agency relationship here it was stipulated in the pretrial order that this was a subcontractor situation where  was a subcontractor down the chain and never took an order from an order from an owner technician or anybody authorized by the owner the fact that there was a confirmation sales order confirmation  purchase confirmation all the way down the chain these are contracts of purchase and sale down the chain mr fein are described it as an exchange of papers but in fact it's sale was made within twenty days of the of the bankruptcy filing in connecticut and radcliffe instead of making a claim or even an administrative claim and that bankruptcy for twenty day goods instead is relying on a maritime lien claim where they say they were entitled to rely on the credit of the vessel but the law says the statute is clear on this court in crimson yachts made it clear that we rely on the literal language of the statute on the order of the honor a person authorized by the honor that simply didn't happen here there is a list in the statute under section three one three four one listing those presumed to have authority in a situation such as this one radcliffe took an order from a buyer of fuel it is not anybody listed in that statute as having authority to purchase fuel for the vessel so what courts have done and lake charles ste statements in marine coatings it's still can't meet those tests those are different cases those are repair cases where there was a significant and ongoing months long relationship between the  subcontractor in that case agencies the government the united states they're both involved public vassals this is a case where there are seller owed every usa a bankrupt counterparty and it's too bad that parties go bankrupt and there are consequences but that's what happened here what what radcliffe did here was deliver a product it's perhaps a more complicated delivery than amazon dot com dropping a box on your doorstep but it is you know  that's getting more complicated but that's never going to have your keys but but in any event it is it is factually extremely distinguishable from stevens and marine coatings where the government had i guess whether or not you are adding distinguishing can lucky or stain that that is a different standard that that should not be adopted by this court can't what is right in line with the rest of the cases if you read it correctly if you really can't lucky is taking the is define a quote from ken lucky and i'll do the same one thing that's a little confusing is that these physical suppliers name is a marine fuels so the parties agree that the order originated from bulk for its bulk for its was a sub charter a person with authority under the statute thus we need not reach the question of whether the district court's conclusion that broke intermediary was not bald for its agent is erroneous that cause and this is the most important wor case because a pallies have already admitted that the fuel and bunkers were sold to bulk for it's the quote went on to say we conclude that marine fuels need not establish agency between brook and ball for it's to fall within the scope of one timely under the act and they didn't have to prove it because it was admitted there were direct relationship between marine fuels the seller and bug for it's a person with authority was established therefore agency need not be proved the court was not saying that the agency requirement was thrown out the window so you can't read the case the way mr know suggests judge magistrate judge cassidy below correctly  found the admission to be the quote linchpin of the case so can lucky is in line with the rest of the cases around the country that have construed the situation where you have a chain of suppliers say in ga had here we have a chain of suppliers of bankers that delivery cases the repair cases are distinguishable gail had is the case that we need to look to here and that shows that i and she as the of o w k is the party that holds the lien in this case gail had involved three different chains of brokers two didn't have a lien that's where there was no relationship with the owner and the third the lien or polygon who had signed it lien to gail had did have a lien because it was it in relationship with the with the with the owner and so even though lake charles is a fifth circuit case and not applicable here it collects cases and discusses you know the situation where a provider of necessaries as here sell to someone other than the owner to not a person that's presumed to have authority under the act can lucky is distinguishable gale had is the case that matters here and under that case every u k has a lien and und think it's important to start with the proper statutory construction for the lean act expression the provisions that we're looking at here with respect to the third requirement whether it was fuel that was provided on the order of the owner or party authorized by the enter and the enforced without even any record nation of perfection with respect to filing anything other than the simple the rest and to allow a liberal view or broader view as espoused by mr clinton would be a problem for international commerce not what the cases say and that's what's been followed recently in the eleventh circuit cases sweepy marine and the container applications international cases they also cite there and when you use that framework and you look at what the district court did here it is techniques position as the owner of the deep blue that absolutely the district court applied the correct standard the evidence is primarily under spewed it with respect to what happened at the district court case and i think it's important to highlight to the point of the panel of it there were agreed facts in the pretrial order that were submitted by the parties and i think that makes it a little bit easier now specifically on page four of the revised pretrial order which was  relationship there's a separate purchase and sale of the fuel and that is critical for purposes of defeating radcliffe's lien because simply they didn't take the order on the order of the owner or party authorized to bind k also an english company and they set it up that way so that they could strip the chief engineer on the vessel with the authority to go make these purchases because the procurement for fuel was housed in a central office tech names operations worldwide it was done intentionally and segregated the way that it was so as to avoid the precise problem that we're dealing with here i think it's important to note also that even though they're from other circuits every other district court to decide the issues before this panel granted the district court level have all found except for one that there is no maritime wing for a physics supplier like radcliffe i think that's telling and i think that if you look at what the district court judge did here he relied on the roark opinion with respect to the proper test and it was absolutely correct mr paulson went through the difference between the agency line of cases the middleman case and the versus the general conch contractor sub contractor and unfortunately for radcliffe their own able to establish that they fall in the agency line and they can show they meet the general subcontractor a lot of cases which rarely grants a lean in in events and so unfortunately they're off without a remedy if you look at least as it relates to the vessel what they do have is they have a remedy that they did not seek to recover on which is against their contractual counterparty usa they haven't made that claim in bankruptcy i think it's important to know just generally speaking if the panel were to to adopt or look into the totality of circumstances argument the result would be that you could have multiple teams for a single debt a single fuel system which is unsupported by any legal precedent and contrary to the policy of maritime liens which are granted solely for the purpose of securing a claim under the limited auspices of the of the statute not so that whenever a physical suppl they want to call posts logistics sales but it's way more involved that we can't feel the special about their involvement this this feeling was delayed three times we had to take our fuel vessel to their facility lay out about a quarter mile of containment criteria i could get out of that i can ask for remand to have the judge determine whether we meet that but we clearly meet those standards i would like lastly point out the strict juror that doesn't apply to what they that it applies to what you consider to a new class or new service here it doesn't control the mechanics of how this lane occurs which is what has happened mechanics who are saying well we're not going to extend it on the order