our fifth case for today is nude central illinois regional council of carpenters against kind of tech carpentry mr cabot morning from an afternoon your honor think there has to be a little bit of background information for the court this case involved a contractor who was operating under an international agreement with the carpenters international union for to get decades or more this international agreement was always interpreted to mean that when a contractor was working out of his home jurisdiction and in this case mid central district council he could send his pension and health or health and welfare appearance on behalf of your client yes ma'am and then on january ninth you file a couple of things a third party complaint the magistrate judge however for more than a month prior to the ninth of january had had the default answered under rule fifty five a and it is mystifying to me that you did not include in the january ninth filing a fifty five c motion to set aside the default which is one of the things that gets us here because once and default has been entered we're in a whole different procedural realm in it and i just can't figure out it's throwing that into the mix wouldn't have it well that was a mistake but can't we also argue affectively that the motions that were made were in fact a dip and different name for a mo i can't argue that because in fact the magistrate judge had entered the default and that's a step along the road to a default judgment it's not the full trip but you've got to set aside the default before you can then move on to your other arguments in your case a motion to stay compel arbitration whatever other things you wanted to say and this came up against a backdrop of your having known about this case for a long time and not filing an appearance not really making a pete and i think the district court was concerned that that you had just left it entirely out of the loop basically that you that it was that it's they just weren't paying any attention that it was an error on my part there's no question  mistake or misunderstanding as a district court hell is not sufficient to uphold a default judgment to be sure see here's the problem you got beyond the difficult stage the district court rightly or wrongly  i'm happy to entertain either way but it grants the motion for a default judgment on the thirteenth of january and so then you're in rule sixty b te sixty one you're arguing excusable neglect but the standard of review rule sixty b decisions is extremely deferential to the district court and one has to look long and hard to find appellate court cases that say that the district court abused that discretion well you know if it had been at the fifty five c level that would have been a whole different analysis and most of the cases you cited are actually i'm sorry arguing to us that the magistrate judge lacked authority to enter a default as opposed to recommending to the district judge that a default be entered this could affect whether it was fifty five  six it's there's no discussion at six thirty said so the question is under the circumstances you know whether it's a sixty be or whether it's but if it's a sixty be whether or not it is a sixty yes it is and whether or not hundred these circumstances there is there is there it is an abuse of discretion number one to allow additional time to plead number two when a motion has been made to compel arbitration whether or not that takes the jurisdiction away from the court but what he had said and if there's an analogy here to people who want to amend their complaints before a final judgment a rule fifty eight final judgments been entered will fifteen governs that leave to him and shall be freely granted cetera but if the final judgments been answered and somebody then come entered somebody then comes and says oh you know what in the complaint you've actually got to go through the machinery of saying no well now we meet the standards of rule fifty nine to open law that you cite comes into play because otherwise you have not i mean the proceedings are not orderly otherwise but they are not orderly and that was a mistake in terms of how i approached it i understand that but there are compelling reasons under an abuse of discretion i believe to to allow you know i understand was not to set aside the real kick to find we have any case in which we've said the district court abused his discretion by refusing to set aside a default judgment entered against a party that had actual knowledge that the litigation was filed and just decided for its own reasons not to file an answer but there i'm asking whether you have cases that hold that it is an abuse of discretion not to give the party really generally what discretion means is the ability to decide either way and the affirm so hugh show do i have to i cite that do i cite a case as you just proposed no that's not in the brief however i think equity under the circumstances of the proposition is the same either way you know it is not for the reason i just gave discretion is the ability to decide either way and be over ok if you must decide only one way then the outcome is legally required not discretionary i've also raised the issue of where whether there is shuttle jurisdiction in this case to begin with because what but what the other side is raising in this case is to have a contractor pay benefits to a third party they disclaim that those you i don't think they do that your are they do they say you're the one who's saying that and it's actually to the extent you're making a third party standing complaint what the supreme court used to call prudential standing the court has now sa let's not be sloppy about the term standing there is certainly injury causation redress ability in this case and whether you own the claim or whether you're the real party in interest or whether you're trying to assert somebody else's rights is other side in fact shows that they're not seeking to have these funds sent to a third party they say i raised it in the original a brief of an appeal they were smart they don't not deny it in their response  three and then i raise it again in the reply brick so no where in their response brief response or brief do they deny the statement that their want us to send money but this this particular group is suing to have money sent to a third party and i don't think there's a traditional standing i wonder about lost and what that has to do with jurisdiction and if you can take questions walk this back let's assume that that's the agent but that concerns the merits rather than the jurisdiction of the tribunals to resolve or whether they are an agent i don't think they've made a claim that they were agents for any any third party they just brought this action in their own right and as such since are asking for relief for third parties i don't see how they have any standing in a court ok ok thank you thank you very much born by the time it's just missed out on a default judgment and you know the thing is filed in what late september of two thousand and fourteen and it's out the door by january thirteenth at a time when the appearance has been filed at a time the judge knows that the defendant while perhaps slothful you know for a while is coming to life what 's the rush you know why why shouldn't the judge have just said you know we'll postpone the the ruling on the motion for default judgment to see if there's any rule of motion to set aside the default the kinds of things he could have time but one factor in whether the judge has gone outside the boundaries of these just gresham is if he's just been so precipitous that you wouldn't sanction the here that's the magistrate judges act and the reason judges are broke is asking that question which might behoove counsel in all of our districts to least bear in mind is the supreme court's recent decision of wellness there the litigation obviously has not far over consent under six thirty six c i would agree with that so then you have to you know sort of pull it apart and in some different ways you of course finally have the court granting the motion for default judgment in fact rule fifty five allows in certain instances even the clerk to enter default judgments that those criteria are me unexplored area and after we're done with this case i think it will remain unexplored if i made one thing that i would like to respond to is the idea of jurisdiction on appeal you know that the claim was made that the funds in this case simply seek to have contributions paid to somebody else to the singles district council funds and what was not explored during the appellant's opening statement w contributions for employees work in each locality that in this case being the central district of illinois shall be made to such funds and in such announcers are identified in the political collective bargaining agreement for that locality provided that  it find a signatory to one of these national reciprocal agreements with the national reciprocal agreements allow it for exactly the position that these funds have taken as long as i've known it which is you can pay them to these funds directly and they will be reciprocated to the members home fund or you can pay them to the member's home fine as long as you provide proof to the funds where the work is being done that the correct contribution room is being paid to so this idea that we are seeking contributions on behalf of third party i think is is is a false assertion the case began with audit of the contract which participated in the breach without those of us to take place and when we do that we don't know at the time what choice this employer is going to made where they pay those contributions for frankly on whose behalf his contributions are pew because in many cases employees come from other areas hire local members contributions absolutely would properly be paid to the funds and for the central district of illinois now did you discuss this in your brief trying to remember you know we did not run it it's on the face of the the political agreement ok with me he could have let me know that there was a default by the magistrate whether that's his obligation or not is another issue now i thought i had entered an appearance you of course would have been on service list yes we were in active communication and furthermore he does notify me on the thirtieth so he could have easily done the same thing previously so what you have here is a situation yes it's the primary duty is mine because i did not enter my appearance but secondarily all this is going on in the background and there is no notice of the magistrate having entered just the default judgment thank you all right thank you very much thanks both counsel