morning your honour's here please the court my name is jessica diane tam and on behalf of the office of the state appellate defender and i represent the appellant mr charles donalson your honour's illinois has a very strong policy against voigt sentences they can be attacked at any time in any court by either party directly or collaterally in line with the strong policy the illinois has against voice sentences this court recently ruled and no it is not this guilty plea is the same as and people vs why it was a fully negotiated guilty plea meaning that the parties negotiated for the specific fixed sentences in the arrangement that they did and in this case the parties negotiated specifically for fifty years on the murder thirty years on the home invasion and thirty years on the aggravated criminal sexual assault to run concurrently and those were the terms of the agreement and yes and that is what makes a fully negotiate a guilty plea distinct from all others it's unlike a guilty plea where the defendant pleads guilty for a cap your honor here in this case the defendant pled guilty for exactly the sentences  plea the parties could have just as easily negotiated four consecutive sentences in a different arrangement but it did not hear the state pursued maximum sentences on the two lesser offenses when it could there is no prejudice analysis with regard to a pointless claim boyd is void is void this court did not apply a prejudiced analysis for pierre white he did not have to show that hint that he would be prejudiced or anything like that this court is clear when i went to fully negotiate a guilty plea is entered on avoid sentence it boards the entire plea and that is what this court held in and why and we're asking the court to hold the same thing in this case and going with this plea and that is not what happened here mr donaldson did not plead guilty for cap and this the state can seize this at page twenty and their brief the state can see that it says the people agree that the defendant did enter into a fully negotiated plea and why it was clear as a person a rule that when a fully negotiated guilty plea is induced by a voice sentence that the voidness relates all the way back to the plea itself and not just the sentence who knows if mr donald thing would have accepted  court is not in a position to determine what was important to the parties at the time and at the time of the bargain i mean the state had its interest as well when it formed the offer that it gave to mr donaldson and in this particular case your honour's this is a case that involves multiple victims there's a fifty year sentence on the murder a thirty year sentence on the aggravated criminal sexual assault and we don't know if that was essential if those numbers were essential if the state state was in a position they could have offered mr donaldson legal sentences but the state offered him void censuses assuming the risk that they would that the sentences would not be challenged and in this case mr donaldson mr donaldson case is right in line with white and we're asking that this court not make any exceptions in the white court i mean to be fair the way court didn't have to discuss prejudice right i mean the sentence is just a taste where it was mandatory minimum right so there was a mandatory minimum the sentence didn't qualify for that so the defendant was going to get more years right that you don't really have to talk about prejudice in that circumstance so it seems to come down to again what justice twice a remedy mean the the remedy and why wasn't available to the defendant here but in this case as i pointed out earlier i think in this case not only is  prejudiced but potentially could have an advantage in having consecutive sentences that would fit with fifty years rather than concurrency so why wouldn't we indicate  remedy that would allow you know just the fifty years consecutive i understand your position your position is a void you don't have to look further than that i mean that's basically your position and i'd argue that that approach would be contrary to white and that approach would be contrary to the the one mistress prudence that we have in this state your honour's it's clear the parties the parties are clear that the sentence is void the public clear that the sentence is void and in white this court has already decided this question that when we have this situation where the sentence is clearly roy and the and the defendant has negotiated for specifically that sentence that the court cannot unilaterally modify the sentence later on as if the terms of the agreement meant nothing to the state and nothing to the defendant the court is not not in that position to go back and unravel a contract that has been just the sentence because this course stated in evidence that when you have a fully negotiated guilty plea meaning when the parties specifically negotiate for specific numbers specific fixed sentences that the guilty plea in the sentence go hand in hand that is what this court stated in evans that it goes hand in hand as material elements of the plea such that neither party should be able to unilaterally modify modify the agreement and that is what the a courts to do now with this decision is to go back and reconfigure the numbers go back and change these times that the parties have already agreed to to fit and that is that is contrary to white and it's contrary to the  is this court did not this court did not try to parcel out or preserving any aspect of mr white's guilty plea your honor is this court said that because there was a a fully negotiate a guilty plea based on a that he was subject to consecutive sentences and by the supreme court rule four to which the judge is required to do that if consecutive sentences are mandated a court is required to tell the defendant so our guy is not properly i'm honest either so we have the same exact situation and we're asking the court to give the same remedy and not to open the door to an exception the court opens the door to an exception to the bright line rule and why it would have to address many more exceptions that will come in different of the numbers and different things like that when the law is clear that void is void is void you're out of the state contends that remapping donaldson's cost a recent thing is the more equitable solution because of the ensure i can address that if you want me ok the state argues that the equitable solution is the appellate courts solution because the state will be prejudiced trying to reprosecute a case years later now argument your honor is that any risk of prejudice here would apply not just to the state but for mr donaldson too because once he vacate once he withdraws his guilty plea all of the original charges will be reinstated he be subject to consecutive sentencing and he  face up to a life sentence in prison whether he goes and gets convicted at trial or by another guilty plea and so the risk of prejudice is there equally for both parties your honor and also the state especially lading that  prosecution will be forced to retry this case when that is not the case the parties could resume plea negotiations as they did the first time around and so there's no way to tell at this point that the state is is is suffering prejudice because state is making i'd like to mention that the state assume the risk here when the state offered mr donaldson a legal sentences the law was clear for four years already that consecutive sentences were mandatory but the state assumed the wrist and offered been an a stop a limitation on a voidness claim a void judgment can be attacked at any time in any court by either party directly or collaterally there is no waiver there is no stopping limitation and took place in a stop a limitation on the voidness argument what really just encourage parties to answer and so please based on what sentences the state raised the same argument n p r white this court did not even address that your honor because it is contrary to illinois law the state's the stop all argument is also based on the erroneous assumption that mr donaldson is trying somehow to retain the benefit of his guilty plea wow making the state relinquish their benefits but that's totally wrong mr donaldson is trying to vacate his plea in its entirety meaning he is trying to give up every benefit that he got from this plea and to white allowing trial courts to unilaterally reconfigure the terms of a fully negotiated guilty plea after the parties have already agreed to those specific terms is contrary to white and it's contrary to tensed within a cap of fifty years but what i was referring to was the risk of prejudice that exists for mr donaldson by vacating his plea which is what he is asking what i'm saying is at that point all the charges  good morning mr chief justice annabelle justices of the supreme court counsel may it please the courts i am assistant state's attorney alan spellberg and i represent the people of the state of illinois at like to begin with justices question what is the remedy the remedy in the situation is clear it's clear under contract law it's clear under this court's precedent it's clear that the goal in a situation involving a guilty plea just as it is in contracts is to do the best to enforce the agreement of the parties to allow both parties to retain the benefit of the bargain and that's precisely what the appellate court did hear what the appellate court did was it determined that fourteen years after the crime ten years after the original guilty plea eight years after the subsequent renegotiation that when it was finally realized that the concurrent sentences were improper and they were void that the plea as answered in two between the parties could still be court clearly was questioning the defendant would suffer no prejudice in the scenario because the sentences would be impose would still equal the same amount of time to which he answered his guilty pleas respond to the defendant's argument that he pled guilty  contract law when there is a mutual stake of the parties as to the expression of the intent it is appropriate for the courts to reform those those terms of the agreement as best as possible here it minutely the parties entered into  for concurrent sentences that was improper we know that but it wasn't simply the state's fault it wasn't simply the state's mistake it was a mutual stake on both parts the state had no interest in entering into a legal contract in entering into improper it was a mistake in this court knows well for the last twenty years worth of precedent the determination of one consecutive sentences are mandatory can be confusing and that's what happened here this was a situation where the obviously the parties in the t sexual assault and the state offered him fifty five years and then later very soon later reduced that and allowed him to plead to fifty years to all of the sentence senses is there murder over a five dollar debt in all horrific humiliating actions then you have the final against the victims but what occurred here was in the middle of trial where the state was seeking the death penalty after the opening statement after the initial witnesses knowing intelligence and obviously the perception at the time was that this is a very strong case that the defendant will likely be sentenced to death or life and based upon the strength of this evidence and he was trying his best to avoid a trial at that time the where the fifty five years came and then where the fifty year sentence came two years later upon the renegotiation after the remaining from the appellate courts that's not a record my guess is that was a time frame that was acknowledge that i mean it's it's unfortunate but it's true and as i said it it's quite often including most recently with the with the sports mandamus case in the mirrors and decision that trial judges are still to the state having a difficult time understanding the scope of section five eight four and  it is mandatory when it's not i would only say that in this case based on the timing of the crime this was in one thousand nine hundred crime it was in one thousand nine hundred seven when the section five hundred four was altered to require the mandatory consecutive sentences in both the single course of conduct and single course conduct it wasn't till one thousand nine hundred nine after the whitney decision that murder became a triggering offense itself this is a ninety eight crime and original two thousand one sentencing my guess is that in with two different courses of conduct involved between the sexual assaults in the murder and the home invasion my guess is that everyone was confused naturists the state's attorney's natural trial judge but the defense the defense attorneys were also confused and that's why i stress this was a mutual mistake it was not in the state's interest at all to enter into a contract with improper sentences but unfortunately it happened and now fourteen fifteen years later we're faced with what to do with the voluntary and knowing intelligent guilty plea which has been rendered final by time with the inability to recreate the exact scenario of that we were at going to trial back in two thousand and one what is the proper remedy and that's why what the appellate court did here was fully appropriate fully consistent with contract law fully consistent with th court's rulings in criminal cases i would point to this court to its decisions in people actual ryan versus roe people versus williams people versus whitfield in people versus thompson in each of those cases this court was confronted with a negotiat plea recognizing there was a problem in the expression of the sentencing and in order to maintain the benefit of the bargain for the parties really formed the sentences in some way i'm going to point directly to people  is a direct example of what this court has done in the face of a claim of a void sentence in thompson it was a negotiated plea where one of the sentences involved for agri battery he received an extended term sentence but it was not the most serious offens available of which the defendant was being convicted of and so on or the statute as a matter of law it was prohibited to give him an extended term sentence on that aggravated battery charge this court recognize the void of that aggravated battery charge allowed the parties intent to be expressed in a lawful manner it was a guilty plea that was being affirmed in that case it was a guilty plea that was being recognized as being appropriate the case in this court recognizing the mistake of law the mutual mistake that occurred in that case managed to allow through an aqua little authority essentially allow the parties to maintain the judgment that they had voluntarily and knowingly in intelligently entered i and so as for that reason that what the appellate court did here is fully inappropriate inconsistent with contract law consistent with this court's precedent but in terms of the stoppel argument that justice freeman asked about which we include in our brief this is a collateral proceeding this is not a direct appeal and this court has always recognized the distinction between collateral proceedings and direct appeals because of the importance of recognizing the finale of judgment the people the society the entire state of illinois the entire community benefits from finale of judgment whether it's criminal or civil there is an appropriate how would that affect done well your honor i i actually did a lot of research into this and based upon our now which is the sort of the seminal case regarding voidness particularly when it comes to consecutive sentences there has been only one decision by this court that we could find involving a determination of a void sentence in a collateral proceeding and that was thompson absolutely only one involving that scenario where the where again  stated it was the excess extended term on the aggravated battery charge which violated the statute in this court simply vacated the extended term nature of the conviction so the voidness arguments very rarely it's made frequently in collateral proceedings but it very rarely results in any relief and i think the reason why that's important is going back to our not and even before ana in davis what this court had recognize is that void is a term which is utilized frequently but for to really be considered void it has to be something outside the courts of outside the trial course or section and avoid order which is one where the court doesn't have the authority to order at all and so in the towns and scenario it was clearly outside the court it wasn't simply a mistake as to what the meaning of the statue was it was you could not impose that extended term sentence in that scenario in arna there was it was clearly it was to attempt murder convictions were both victims were injured so clearly fell within the statute as required in this case as i said it was confusing we ultimately now know that it was properly improperly identified as concurrent sentences but it was confusing but in davis and in ana this court recognize that mistakes in the law mistakes in the application of the law doesn't render something boy it merely renders avoidable and so in terms of your question i'm sorry for the long winded answer in terms of your question how would it affect the voidness factor very little very little because collateral attacks are very we rarely successful in demonstrating avoid this in allowing a stop all to apply in a collateral proceeding recognizing the validity of the  help support the determination of fidelity of judgment that exists everywhere in our legal construct it exists in our civil proceedings it exists in our criminal proceedings and recognizes that litigants shouldn't have to go back ten fifteen twenty years later to relive  n a point that was most likely simply an error in application in the first place that's an important distinction which hasn't had the opportunity to be litigating it wasn't a bit really available to be litigated in in the pierre white decision in the reason why is because pirro white was a direct appeal involve the defendant who days after pleading guilty to murder in exchange for a twenty year sentence filed a motion with brother guilty plea saying my sentence is too low it doesn't com port with the mandatory statutory requirements and so that from that point forward the litigation continued whether or not it was a valid guilty plea but the question before the core ultimately was could that conviction be affirmed in any way and what the court said was no it could not because no first remoter conviction could be entered in that case for less than a thirty five year period because the statutes require that the state couldn't offer anything below that the defendant couldn't accept anything below that and the trial court couldn't enter judgment on anything below that and so white was a scenario where nothing could be done to recognize the validity of that conviction your honour's est mentions that remaining for recess and saying would be in line with contract law in the state mentioned a few cases and not like to mention that those cases are completely distinguishable the case mentions thompson but thompson was not a fully negotiated guilty plea the defendant did not plead guilty in exchange for a specific sentence pled guilty in exchange for the state to drop certain charges so that is not the same scenario that we have here the critical factor here is the factor that is present in white that he pled guilty for specific fixed sentences that was not the case and tom sam your honor also the state mentions which feel which field doesn't involve overweight sentence that was a benefit of the bargain claim the defendant was not trying to vacate his plea he's trying to get the benefit of his bargain in that case and so we don't even have the voidness doctrine being applied in that case because this twenty five year sentence for a cap which is totally different from a fully negotiated guilty plea and that goes back to what i was explaining earlier the appellate court's decision treats this case as if mr donaldson pled guilty for kept the court change the complete nature of the plea agreement here from a fairly negotiated plea to a plea for a cap and that is not what the parties bargained for that is not that was not terms of the agreement at the time and the yes because the because the when the court monist the defendant him i'm stunned that he's going to receive fifty years on the murder thirty years on the aggravated criminal sexual sot and thirty years on the home invasion and those sentences were fixed numbers and that was what mr donaldson was expecting to get and that was what the state was willing to give and again i want to mention that the state was unwilling to give anything less than the maximum on those two lesser offenses which shows that those two those two numbers were significant the state did not mistakenly enter i mean after mr donaldson concurrent sentences as as the state has offered there is absolutely no evidence on the record whatsoever to show that any body was operating under a mistake here there's no there's no evidence from which to conclude that in this case your honour's the state could could could state that it got maximum sentences on those two lessers and mr donaldson was able to avoid consecutive sentencing and that's what happened in this case and there's no reason to assume that that was a big mistake consecutive sentences have been mandatory for four years and the judge the both attorneys were or were  that the appellate court is not in any position to determine what was essential to the state at the time of the plea was essential to the defendant at the time of the plea and so back in two thousand and one we don't know we don't you know if you know i'm saying that the state would have offered anything less than the max we don't know if the victim's family would have been acceptable with that we don't know what was going on during that plea bargaining process not in the today case number one one three six zero three people versus donaldson is taken under advisement to turn number three