calculate whether a large urban hospital is entitled to a special enhanced ment of its medicare reimbursement based upon its service to a disproportionate share indigent patients if the numerator of the fraction that is described in the statute exceeds at least thirty percent of the denominator a hospital qualifies for the special in just a minute this case presents a question of what components make up the denominator of the fraction and the answer to this medicaid or medicare have been excluded during the defined cost reporting period for indigent care from state and local government sources the denominator is described as the total of such net in patient care revenues during the period the government would construe the phrase total of such a net in patient care revenues to mean simply the hospital's total net in patient care revenues i e they interpret it to mean essentially what the statute would mean if the word such were removed entirely and they argue that under the chevron case the court must defer to their construction of the statute because there are multiple possible meanings of the word such and therefore this renders provision ambiguous but this view cannot be squared with application of one of the cardinal principles of statutory construction notably the canon that when possible a court is to construe a statute to give every what you end up is describing the denominator as thirty percent of it's i'm sorry thirty percent of such net in patient care revenues now that could create confusion and lead a reader to determine that the such no in patient care revenues is the same as the the is the entire that's of revenues that have been described in the numerator and you would end up with an absurdity what total of does is it clarifies it makes it clear that this absurd construction is not possible and it's in nobody's going to be confused it does have an effect on the statute and statute and in many cases in many respects at the same arguments being made i will say that the north broward court overlooked i think a number of things overlooked the argument that we've made that it's not just the word supreme court has has said that a number of times that congressional inaction is to be given little weight in the interpretive process i would i would tight for that alexander versus stand of all which is that five thirty two us two cite and i won't bother you the strings tight at this point but the inaction of congress is not something which it is to be considered in this kind of statutory construction i do think that it is important to look at the supreme court i'm not quite sure how to pronounce that but lammy lamie this one of the two but your i think that case is highly instructive here it does point out that the principle that we rely on here the canon that no word is to be construed the surplus is not an absolute and we don't claim that it's an absolute indeed it is generally expressed that we are possible if we were is to be given effect what lanny however sten is that there are times and it  the judicial preference that offset the the principle against construing the word attorney as ter plus that in that case was a judicial preference to interpret a statute to have a plain meaning and not to be ambiguous you had to canons the point in a different direction here your honor those very canons point in the same direction in this case by applying the canon in favor of giving each word a fact you avoid ambiguity it is by disregarding that canon that ambiguity is created that's exactly the point of the government to brief the government of the hospital's position and get this case because here you have both of those candidates going in the same direction and the direction it goes in is that the denominator such net in patient care revenues statute in lanny and have decided that the legislative history point to directly contrary to the interpretation of the supreme court and up deciding was the right interpretation and the basic rationale in the particular language and decided what that language meant that is exactly what we want the court to do here and i would say that that is what most recent guidance from the supreme court makes clear is the right thing to do  our our canon of statutory construction which we do believe is controlling here essentially instead of having another cannon that they can propose to offset it rather they're trying to use legislative history essentially the government's argument is that revenues excluding any medicare or medicaid revenues are provided by state and local government payments or indigent care it defines that denominator as net in patient care revenues excluding any medicare medicaid revenues that is the statement of the congress that passed this language now the north broward court and again i'm going back to why that is incorrect characterize this somehow and s law there says under one criterion that a hospital located in an urban area which has one hundred or more beds nearest to you such payments if you can demonstrate that more than thirty percent of the in patient care revenues excluding any medicare or medicaid revenues are provided by state and local government payments again this is not subsequent legislative history what this is is it is a congress that has a minute the statute saying this is the statute from which we believe we are making technical changes we are intending to and that language which makes no change which is something simply the same a this and therefore i think it is a total that characterization of the legislative history which is in the north broward opinion to regard this as something that legislative history but even if this were that does not change the fact that two pages later in describing what this language does it's a flat out statement it clarifies that this is the case that the denominator has the exclusion of medicare and medicaid managed to go on for te clear and we don't oppose that contention of law at all the point is that is chevron step to analysis chevron step one analysis is you look first at the language of the statute and if the language of the which it does because the word such revenues such construed according to the canons of construction specifically addresses the question here then you are not to look at the agency you're not to look at the legislative history you are to look at the language of the statute and that is precisely what the supreme court has emphasized again in miami so i don't think chevron is problematic at all your honor i think it is quite clear however the question is is the statute statute to quote make clear that the other observed construction is not right but it seems to me that given credibly important to this fraction what the phrase total of such net in patient care revenues means on the coin of what construction renders the word total superfluous if if the statute were to take out its total of such all of those words the statute would read that it is ok if the if the numerator does not exceed thirty percent of net in patient care revenues the interpretation that the government gives to the statute sense the sense that says these things as they have been particularized earlier before and that in patient care revenues have been particularized as excluding any of the revenues attributable to medicare and medicaid i would point out another canon of construction that points in the direction of our interpretation and again in that the government sought to rely on in this race is that there is a tenet that congress is assumed to use the scene word in the same way when it uses it more than once in  arising meaning our contention is that the second time it is used according to in the stablish ten of the statutory construction it is again used in its particular arising definition not its mere referential meaning by applying that tenet by applying the tenet that such and total love cannot be mere surplusage by as miami indicates very important striving if possible to construe a statute so that it is not ambiguous so that you do not have to get into the pitfalls of looking at legislative history that tenet also points in the direction of a clear interpretation that points to the denominator statute the way that the government says that it should be read the government's rationale is that they have come up with in their briefs and this is a point that was not addressed by the north broward court it may be that it was only brought up in oral argument and therefore it was not addressed but since medicare revenues are not from state and local government sources the only possible meaning of having medicare referred to in the exclusion is if the exclusion applies to the denominator as well as the numerator in the numerator since the numerator definitely only includes revenues that are for indigent care from state and local government sources medicare is by definition excluded the rationales that have been proposed by the government simply don't hold water the co insurance payments that yes the medicaid may pay co insurance premiums that are associated with medicare but these are still medicaid payments there may be situations of stake where the medicaid program by the state pays for something that should be paid for by medicare with the dual eligible but still that is a payment by medicaid and that is what is received by the hospital so those those rationales have not successfully explained why medicare is in there is a reference so we now have not only medicare as a reference we had its total we have such all of this the surplus mission if you accept the government's proposition of construction and if you apply the simple canons then it is a