borrower to undermine that process and effectively get a restart in the case second district below rejected the first district's reasoning on the grounds that the conflict the way that it resolve the conflict was not supported by the language of the mortgage foreclosure act the second district also concluded that it was not inconsistent to allow a trial the barn's rationale in decision is the only way to square the plain and clear language of the statutes involved second the first hist rational decision is the only one that doesn't undermine the carefully worked out rules crip created by the illinois legislature when the enacted the mortgage foreclosure law specifically relating to the terminations of a b redemption rights third to follow the first district's lead on this issue preserves the integrity of the judicial sales process which is a public policy favor that by the state be that if your justice is referring to the provision of fifteen away be that allows a court to disallow a sale where justice was otherwise not done i agree that the language is similar but the differences in a third thirteen zero one need it is vacating the judgments in the foreclosure case and basically putting a restart in the litigation in an under fifty no way b if the court finds a justice with otherwise not done all it does is disallow the confirm the set and that would seem to suggest that then the statute itself is not triggered until a motion and notice in accordance with the court rules that has been file in your appendix you set out the timeline of what occurred here and you indicate that this the motion of vacate the judgment that we're looking at was fit file may twenty sixth after the sale but the motion asking for the order approving sale was not filed until august thirtieth and if that's true then the motion to vacate the judgment was filed after the sale but the section was triggered the my understanding of the record is that the motion to confirm the sale was filed first and in response to that motion the bar or filed the motion to vacate the default we know that the motion if any you lost all of their production they no longer have an interest in the real estate other than a possessory interest in whatever they're going rights they have theirs their sole remedy if there is a remedy is to basically have the sale reset if they're sale was the trigger event or the objection process but again my our position is that the borrower is right to vacate a default can't be brought after the hammer falls on the sale irrespective of when the motion thirteen zero one he very clearly states that it is especially to a court that says the court may in its discretion before final order judgment set aside any default and any  and thirty days after the final judgment and set aside if there is no or very limited discretion available to a court under section fifteen away the under that section the court the per the statute says that the court shall enter obligation to confirm the sale is mandatory so the court has the only discretion left to a trial court in a fifteen zero eight b hearing is whether one of those four specific and exceptions exist to disallow the sale not to vacate not included in those four sections of fifty two eight b is there the right of a trial court to set aside a default so it which is consistent with the idea that once the term and borrowers redemption have expired the bar would have no right to do that and there would be no reason for a court to allow bauer to come into a case where he has no rights he or she has no rights left to talk so one hand we have a we have a we have a statute that gives a cour why discretion to vacate people judgments the other hand we have a statute that severely limits of course discretion in approving say these two are the these are restricted because one deals with the sales process and one deals with the judgment process the first district got it right in determining that those two cannot be reconciled and in so doing it is it was obliged to find that the conflict had to be resolved in favor of the mortgage foreclosure act by virtue of the language eleven zero seven a which i quoted earlier one thing i know that the second district i think missed and it's something that i think is so important here and it's something we talked about a moment rights are still available up to that point and that point is when he loses his rights those rights are lost at the terminations of the redemption which precedes the sa district in barts the first second district also i think advanced an unwarranted concern that considering the mortgage foreclosure law to prohibit a motion of a kid the sale will not allow the trial court to see that the right decision is that but as we discussed a moment ago the court still retains that the discretion to disallow sales when justice is otherwise not done the adopting the first district's ruling  all rights of production are terminated to further says that once there terminated they can't be resurrected so to allow a borrower to come into a case after their rights have been terminated and vacate that would be in effect to resurrect those rights in my brief i discussed in detail the purpose behind this section of the mortgage foreclosure law the legislature was very clear that with that that beyond the sale that wreaked havoc with buyers coming in who weren't getting title to the property for some time and it discouraged their party betting so the other the other point i think should be made as to why this court should adopt the holding in the in the in the first district holding in barns is that this is consistent with the public policies of the state which favors the integrity of the judicial sales process again the mortgage foreclosure locks were laws were amended in eighty seven to encourage third party buyers to him to raise the value of bids at foreclosure sales and to allow these lingering rise to proceed after the sale would discourage that this court held in household bank versus lewis that that the law favors the suitability of a foreclosure sales and i quote unless that sub stance with the exception of no review at all the trial court record is clear that the court considered prior motion to vacate and the contents of that motion it considered the fact that the parties cut a deal  to extend the sale process while the borrower try to work out a loan resolution issue it heard arguments from counsel and it considered the the pose affirmative defenses or objections to the sale of the borrower had regarding standing in the sufficiency of the affidavit it cannot be said of the trial court failed to employ a conscientious judgment or that its decision exceeded the bounds of reason and ignored the principles  the trial court was thoughtful in its it because of the merits of the prior motion which was lengthy and contained a good grasp of the facts that said they were the report of proceedings page seven and it found in its order that justice was otherwise earlier agreement would bar the filing of this motion of a case i'm not suggesting and i think the second district was wrong to suggest that the trial court said that the second motion was barred i think it denied the motion because it felt that modification it didn't work out and i don't think it was it would be unfair to the mortgage or if in fact this were fraudulent deal if there were some genuine issue of justice not being done consider the motion at all but actually took into account what happened in the case the submissions of the earlier motion and that and the ultimate defenses that were the bar was advancing so i think the court was thoughtful and deliber this i don't think the trial court took the position that because they filed it once worked out to do this deal that they were forever barred from doing and i'd like to reserve my comments for any questions you have or  bring a thirteen one motion at any time after the sale has been conducted because to do so would essentially eviscerate the owner mortgage foreclosure on second district has departed from this decision saying that thirteen ones may be allowed and there it is within the sound discretion of a court to grant or deny such a motion if this court were to uphold barnes and agree with the first district that decision will centrally have the effect of causing judgments of foreclosure to go from being you know like a tory non final orders as they now into final and unassailable orders that cannot be attacked at any time after the initial sale our position is that thirteen want to fifteen away are in fact not in conflict with one with one another thirteen a way to deal specifically with vacating judgments fifteen away deals with a method of procedure in which a court confirms hold a hearing to confirm a judicial sale this conflict between the two code sections is a recent creation there's been no court before the arms court to ever find that thirteen zero one does not apply in mortgage foreclosure cases the banks had manufactured this conflict in order to intentionally remove the possibility of any want to tack in default judgments and mortgage foreclosure actions cite section eleven zero seven of the i'm with all for the notion that any inconsistent pursuit provisions within the codicil procedure shall not apply in word foreclosure auctions this concept is correct but the application is wrong and it is wrong in this it is wrong for thirteen no one motions section thirty no one allows a court in this discretion to set aside the false or final orders under terms which shall be reasonable within the court's discretion section fifteen away provides a manner in which a court state by that our legislature leaders have chosen to have the additional oversight in the foreclosure process their intent there is to have judges oversee that process from beginning to end in fact the third paragraph of the i must tell states that the court maintains authority for the entire pendency of a foreclosure action this is as this court has noted up until the final order which confirms the sale meaning that judgments of foreclosure are non final you know like the twenty orders which are subject to the review of the court at any cases the legislature clearly intended to have judges oversee this process the intruder default judgment is one of the most drastic actions that a court can take to punish somebody for disobedience to its commands due to the nature of the volume of foreclosure cases in this state many judgments are by default this in itself is not a problem however what would be a problem is that were if these default judgments were to morph into final and  just by the sheer fact that a sale has been conducted there by him many people from bringing budget image motions to review or vacate these orders shouldn't be any part of our analysis the fact that in this case the mortgage or was well aware of the proceedings and there was this proposed agreement as opposed to a situation where there's been no involvement till after the sale by the mortgage or is that factor into our  think for this case for in determining the conflict i don't think that does i think that that back to be something that can be reviewed at the circuit court level it can be one of the factors one of the overriding factors that you consider and determining whether or not honor i was present at that hearing and before i was allowed to argue the court stopped me and made the term nation that i cannot argue my motion because the defendant had already agreed to the seventy five day stay and despite the months after the judgment and those rights in order to the bank and they exist so that we do have stability and that is the intent however if there's a good reason why the underlying judgment is faulty that maybe there was a problem with the judgment amount into the wrong i don't think it changes and i as it stands right now sales are not final until they're reviewed by the court anyways you have to have that confirmation a sale and then there has to be thirty days after that before it's final bidders at sales they don't have any rights in the property until that process is done until there's a final order i disagree with counsel when he says that homeowners defendants do not have any property rights starting on the sale that i think they have rights in the property up until the final order by the factors including the diligence of the parties any meritorious defenses that may be presented the hardships on the parties and justice overall the point is we want our trial court judges to have that discretion and to exercise it if people are  buying frivolous thirteen or one motions they can be denied by upholding barnes and denying the ability of course to even hear such motions the only thing we're doing is taking away the discretion of the judges we're not taking away the rights of people to file motions to attack judgments in regards to fifteen no wait counsel mentioned fifteen away and how it can you can somehow modify judgments within fifteen away at actual application of fifteen away within the courts is so narrow that they don't review anything outside of the actual sale when they're conducting a fifteen away confirmation hearing there's a reason first district  be versatile cell bank where the justice describes how difficult it is to actually review actually find something that falls within that the four category of substantial justice not otherwise being done the courts only look at the terms of the in terms of those are the abuses question within this particular case as i mentioned i disagree that the trial court judge exercises freshen he found that there was some sort of an agreement between the parties to extend the sale he chose not to hear the motion my thirteen on the second motion on its merits and he chose instead to say you can file it motions tonight and he confirmed the stay on the same date finally trial course and trial court judges are best suited to handle their dockets and to manage their cases we should leave the discretion to make decisions and review judgments within the hands of the trial court judges essentially final and unassailable because of the virus holding if this court agrees with arms they're sending that message should judges they're also essentially writing in and you could lesion into the i am a fell which will support closure from what they have always been into these final orders what council's missing in his argument in analysis here is that this is the the bars decision in the in the decision we asked this court holiday does not completely take away a trial court's authority to manage its cases and to vacate judges and all that but it does put a time limit on when he can do that a borrower you know the mortgage foreclosure case up to the time as whatever takes place in the in the in the civil proceeding but once those issues are resolved and there's a ritter finding i'm in favor of the mortgagee and the writ the borrower has thirty days then to redeem the property for once that and then once that point that point common that that ninety days expires or the thirty days in a commercial basis that's the red line and that's what the illinois legislature has said we don't want the messiness associated with civil litigation cases to continue let that all happen before the sale after the sale we want to very limited way to review just the sale process because all those other issues have been resolved by this time that's not to say that a borrower is counsel little to loses his or her rights to appeal he doesn't he could preserve all of the objections and all of the rulings in the trial  court and bring those as an appeal once the order approving sales and that's the final order in the in the in the mortgage foreclosure so that the fact that no court before barmes  found a conflict of this is is no moment no court has looked for or address that far as i can tell it's only i think only become now it's only become an issue now because of the really i think the bottom foreclosures and the the fact that the trial courts are being inundated with borrowers coming in at the eleventh and sometimes the thirteenth hour moving to restart a foreclosure case after the sale after the motion to approve the salesman filed after the order confirmation filed bars are coming in and asking to restart the courts are going to first district anyway has gone back to what i think the legislature intended to put a stop to that say once the hammer seems to me the name seems actually does talk about how it's the in terms of the statute they do not become operative until they have been invoked by a motion requestion confirmation  one thing as it was apparently the time in the house i was looking at was not the sale it was the confirmation of the sale and because there was this interim between sale and then that didn't get to be a confirmation sale the court found that therefore there was a period where the judgment could be baking is natural no i think i think what the what the holding the household stands for is that any time before that before the confirmation orders entered its the plaintiff's case is the mortgagees case like any civil litigation the mortgagee is free or the plaintiff is free to dismiss it so all the household case bank stands i submit for the proposition that the mortgagee is entitled  to dismiss the case at any time before there is an order of confirmation so i don't think it has its germane to this case because in that case they weren't seeking to set aside a default the issue was trying to enforce the order confirming  terminated the mortgagee is free to cut a deal with the borrower after that time is free to dismiss the case is free to do it all but again the legislature i think is express that intent that if they want no more litigation