protect the party in that case her former relationship you have the former person immigration court judge that night or at least be terminated her application cancellation removal saying that they have violated a section thirty seven eight to stretches what that bar in provision into thirty seven states to thirty seven specifically states that that per person a court must find that a person violated that portion of the order protection deals with threats of violence for peter harassment bodily injury in this specific case and even the case in stride and the court never found the court only found that they violate the stay away provision when this when the straighten issue came before accepting stright him but was never properly presented properly to get it in this form here what the court said in garcia hernandez was that the decision of categorical or modified approach doesn't apply  essence adopted truth conditions it was adopted in one circuit with says you look at what the court found what the violation was and let's assume that's the case if that's the case then we do not have a violation of those provisions of the a little broader it's if the court determines the person has an gaged in conduct that violates the portion of the protective order that involves protection against credible threats threats of violence why isn't  threatening acts of mystic violence in the in the wisconsin statute as it is routine domestic violence protective orders include stay away provisions precisely in order to protect people from violence right correct but then what would be the purpose of congress and waiting those specific words is two lines above that saying you the court must make a finding of such and such it be no purpose in writing that statutes writing basically says if you've got an order of protection inherently that is designed to protect against threats violence intimidation well that's not the case it's a stretch for straight i'm to say that even though protective orders might be given in that regard that's not the case in all cases in wisconsin is one of the most unique states that i've seen out there i've looked at all the statues that dealt with all of that with the strength type of decisions wisconsin is a state where you can get an order of protection by simply  destroying someone's property if you were at one point had a relationship with every other jurisdiction illinois kansas calif california oregon utah every decision that dealt with this right and type of case specifically says in order to get an order protection you must do in essence what the federal statute requires which is threats of harm or bodily harm and so forth wisconsin doesn't say that wisconsin adds an extra provision and that's where we come up with our coffee cup if  i had a relationship with someone before i destroyed their coffee cup presumably in order production can be issued in that case but aren't you asking us to go back and apply the categorical approach then by distinguishing the wisconsin statute because you're claiming that it can all it can be issued for different reasons some of which fall under the definition of the act and others that don't when this is not a condition the categorical approach as was decided by this court and garcia hernandez is not necessary and therefore we're available or we're able to look at the actual record in the case and we can determine which is clear in this case why the order of protection is issued whether or not it falls within the definition of the acts order or protective order definition and then whether or not the provision that a state court found was violated is designed to protect the defined purposes we don't have to go back to the category go or modified approach we have to look at what was done in this particular case in wisconsin right search the complaints in a very unique way which is basically a police report and some and at the end this is you guys figure it out we have she violated a provision deals wisconsin statute simply doesn't do that it's improper for the immigration court the board of immigration appeals to go back in and say that wisconsin order of protection of restraining order inherently involves that where the court did not make that finding we do not know what the what the court found we know that she violated those provisions in the way that drafted in the complaint to a very lengthy complaint with but we're not is nothing to say she violated those provisions and protection enough the petitions for the order protection the order protections can be obtained a person lets twenty thirty forty things in order protection that could be fraudulent and only one is where the court says i find this and we can't possibly do that we have to look at  court the ultimate make this decision say you have violated your protection and with that in these regards i think it's improper to say just get in the order of protection is enough to make it so you just simply can't jump to that point limited you have to have a core of protection that has to deal with these issues and you must violated in this fashion you simply cannot go to the next step of saying we're does assuming that you haven't or protections you're in violation of those three provisions of court jonathan robbins here on behalf of the attorney general good morning to all of you in this case it has been made relatively simple in light of this court's presidential decision and garcia hernandez against going to in that case this court determined that when we're looking at the conduct at issue here and comparing it to the federal statute of the courts employ a circumstance specific approach the board acknowledging this court's precedent in its decision in this case did exactly that employed the circumstances of the protests pointed out that ineligible for cancellation of removal i would take issue with this notion that it is still an open question as to whether this court has deferred to strike up this court and garcia hernandez specifically said that it agreed with the reasoning of stratham now i'll grant you that it didn't specifically go through a question as your honor of pointed out during your argument with my colleague petitioner is raising a lot of arguments that are essentially attempting to get this court to go back to the categorical approach away from the circumstance pacific approach he's talking about minimum conduct we don't compare the minimum conduct of it of it well we don't even have a need a conviction with respect to this particular statute but one recount comparing state statute convictions to federal offense that's and we're live and we're looking at whether minimum conduct is looked at with respect to the federal statute that's exactly the categorical approach and and that and possibly the modified categorical approach which the supreme court and you want said isn't appropriate for the circumstance pacific analysis so  that there is precedent from this course agreeing with dr m and employing the circumstance specific approach that really is where this case shouldn't what would be some circumstances in which there was an order of protection and there what would be an example of a pr if violated that would not trigger an election well that's actually been in eligibility the board of stratham actually mentioned this and that the ninth circuit mentioned this is well i think there are provisions in other types of orders were for example back in some way if that's the purpose for the order to be issued will there other orders for example that require the payment for supervision during up or during parenting time so they would have to pay their orders to actually pay money for the supervision so i don't think that would qualify under the under what under what you're referencing but again with the but with employing a circumstance specific approach here under this particular case i mean there's no dispute the petition as also provides a pretty a pretty detailed analysis of why chevron difference is appropriate to this particular interpretation of the statute your honor got a little bit into it regarding those this language regarding involves protection against another so that language seems to indicate that there is that you don't have to have actual threats you don't have to act have actual violence or bodily injury or harassment in order to qualify under the statute it just has to involve protection against the board has taken the approach and the t discussed it you could sort of have two different analyses with respect to what that language means and a narrow construction which refers which would sort of cover maybe just imminent threats or this broader construction which they've adopted the tenth circuit referred to this is the nip in the bridge but approach which tries to prevent violence from occurring by stopping the build up you know that for example the contract provisions which ultimately are designed to prevent the violence in the future when nipping in the mud but nipping in the bud means removing your mother a single mother with four u s citizen children's that's pretty strong as well your honor i mean i certainly understand what you're saying there but the consequences of violating these orders are severe it's written in statute and the congress has intention or was clearly too when you look at the i mean the federal statute itself doesn't even require conviction it's sort of designed in this way to cover  does not require that wisconsin can get it without it so i don't think that streit can be applied to wisconsin and only can be applied to wisconsin and also in this particular case  have we we have a complaint which we don't know what the court found there was a two page complaint is a narrative from the in essence a police report and at the end we say figure it out so we've you don't know what