he's an aggravated felony for one basis under the law in that it was a drug trafficking crime but in order to show the cells were for leave we also have to show he's not an aggravated felony under the other illicit drug trafficking section we cited numerous i'm confused because i read your brief is conceding that the massachusetts traffic truck road traffic in violation equaled the federal drug trafficking under forty one a day but that it was something about massachusetts that at least with the exception of felony murder which isn't involved here aiding and abetting equals intentionally assisting the principal while sharing with the principle the mental state required for the crime but again the th circuit reached it's holding its eyes to the massachusetts laws and you know the statutes themselves are nearly identical in their language and massachusetts as the government can seize up by the natural probable but when we're seeking relief in the form of cancellation we have to prove these not aggravated felony under any purpose that's where that argument comes with it is a two pronged attack on the argument so the distribution element is different that's one reason why we think the categorical approach of why is there  cited those cases in our brief and then the aiding and abetting approach is for the other version for aggravated felony drug trafficking where we think there is a distinction as articulated by the th circuit it appears perhaps the th circuit's interpretation of the federal jurisdictional challenge in this case and nd the agency properly denied mr so to between a motion to terminate and its application for cancellation of removal because it's two thousand and eighteen conviction under section thirty two dollars a subsection a one that's where the we're trying to address the main issue in this case which is whether to compare the aiding and abetting at in massachusetts to federal counterpart arguments or three f need not do the comparison to begin with under its own precedent in last and percy ortiz mitchell and others as it is contradictory inconsistent with the traditional categorical approach should this court disagree and wish to engage in a comparison of the aiding and abetting elements we st argue that there is that section thirty two or rather aiding and abetting as applied to section thirty two  falls within the generic definition of aiding and abetting as interpreted by its supreme court and won as over us which is natural probable consequences should the court disagree on that front and wish to apply different route we suggest that it should compare to the federal definition for aiding and abetting which is found under eighteen u s c section two and which this court has interpreted and encarnacion and forward and others are st argument is that accomplice liability comparison is completely irrelevant in his opening brief mr teenie provides no justification for doing so to the extent he relies on by the via fluor neither does well to be florists the th circuit also did not provide a reason this court has rejected a compass liability arguments in the criminal context unless send this court provided three justifications for not engaging in such an analysis st it is inconsistent with the traditional categorical analysis under taylor and its progeny we compare the elements of the statute of conviction with those of the appropriate federal analog the underlying facts of the conviction i e the level of culpability of the person is completely irrelevant nd engaging in such an analysis is inconsistent with the nature of aiding and abetting as understood in the modern sense there is complete in all jurisdictions state and federal we've done away with the distinction between principle and enter in a better the end result is that we treat them the same we convict them of the same underlying crime and we provide them with the same punishment and penalty so we're not talking about a completely different offense we're talking about the same offense so for example in massachusetts sent provided was that engaging in this sort of analysis would be inconsistent with the intent of congress congress has not indicated that it does not wish to charge to have accomplices be removable under the i and a and indeed doing so would be inconsistent with the modern understanding of aiding and abetting where there is no distinction again that we're talking about the same offe should this court disagree with our accomplice liability relevancy argument our st argument would be that it should find and it should compare with the generic definition and california aiding and abetting encompass natural probable consequences doctrine the court reason in reaching its conclusion in rejecting that argument the court made two findings st that aiding and abetting is inherent in  federal statutes and nd generic aiding and abetting encompasses the natural probable consequences doctrine now the natural problem consequences doctrine is very broad it encompasses not only crimes that the defend intended to achieve but also any crimes that resulted as a result of that intention so for example a person who provides a principal with a gun for the purposes of a robbery may also be on the hook for a murder resulting from that gun being used by the principal section thirty two a subsection a when we apply aiding abetting to that state statute the conduct falls definitely within so we're way in the commission of the principle fence as well as the intent required to commit the underlying offense so applied to thirty two dollars thirty two a subsection a has and then mens rea of knowing or intentional that's the mens rea or that we are working with here and because natural probable consequences does not concern itself with any mental state  there is here thirty two dollars a the application would fall within natural public consequences finally should this court disagree  which is the federal aiding and abetting statute now encarnacion this court adopted the roseman definition for aiding and abetting which is an affirmative act and the attent facilitating the commission and rosem interpreted that nd element if the intent facilitating the commission as knowledge of the circumstances constituting the charge defense this court infer for it further clarified that we are looking really to the knowledge of the facts that make the that predated rosemond so when we apply a thirty to a subsection a in the car and they come in the context of aiding and abetting massachusetts courts seem to up at the school the person the accomplice was the person who made the phone call setting up the drug transaction and told the principal to meet this person out of school and the person was charged the caller was charged with aiding and abetting distribution in the schools one hundred and thirty two dollars there are a number of other course cases that seem to highlight the same knowledge of the underlying facts required i would direct the court to broad regas hornsby and martinez a final point that i'd like to make is that mr so to fifteen is not shown a realistic probability that the massachusetts by this court in determining whether that holding is of good force in this year's election because if that were the case in the massachusetts statute at issue here is not a categorical match because the aiding abetting would differ in that version of