you'll hear argument next in case fourteen thirteen seventy three utah versus strife mr greene mr chief justice and may it please the court court's typically apply the exclusionary rule to suppress unlawful analysis such evidence is admissible when as here the predicate stop was not flagrant but resulted from an object of lee reasonable miscalculation extending the exclusionary rule me what was subject to f  really know that there was juggling going on in the house he was trying to figure that out that's what was objective lee reasonable about stopping this man just the sort of my or we've been added that this was a miscalculation but it was a close call if the officer here had stopped the first person coming out of the house after receiving the tip that would have been objectively unreasonable under this court's case and decision in alabama vs white but this person wasn't the first person he saw come out of the house he'd received the anonymous tip and then had proceeded to corroborate it through three hours of surveillance and observation over the course of the ensuing week and all the traffic he saw during those three hours was the same short stay traffic that was reported in the tip based on his training and experience that activity was consistent with drugs really interesting and waited to see whether this was also a short stay they said harry i think you would have i don't see how this is any different than stopping the first person you see i think you're on a as as we've been minute i think if you had seen it and it were short stay i think we may well be to reasonable suspicion i think that's why the prosecutor here conceded that it wasn't but it was a close call based on everything he had seen to that point and the circumstances we think that's white where the predicate conduct was the result of misconduct would saing to stop police officers if we announce your rule and your rule seems to be once we have your name if there's a warrant out on you that's in attenuating circumstance under every circumstance what stops us from becoming a police state and just having the police stand on the corner down here and stop every person and ask them for identification no incentive for him to make that stop if there's no warrant on the stop is an awful if you have a town like ferguson where eighty percent of the residents have minor traffic warrants out there maybe and it's a very good incentive for just standing on the street corner in ferguson and asking every citizen give me your id let me see your name and let me hold because i have an eighty percent chance that you're going to have a warrant understander and that's above the second part of my is that officers can't count under our rule a warrant by itself is not sufficient they're still must be a separate inquiry into whether the predicate stop was flagrant and an officer can't count in any particular stop on a judge later concluding to stop it i assume  that there are a variety of circumstances in which police officers would really like to talk to somebody and really lead to search them but don't have reasonable suspicion and i think that the question that just a sort of my your is asking is if you are police in a community where there is some significant percentage of people who have arrest warrants out on them it really does increase your incentive to to make that stop on the chance that there will be a warrant that will allow you to search an unmet whatever evidence you gained in that search well justice kagan i don't think so i think again if the if the inquiry turns as it does on not only finding a warrant but then a determination of whether the stop was flagrant the officer has no guarantee before he makes the stop but the judge will later conclude that this is an officer who you say this is a close call so let's say that there are close calls but you don't think you have reasonable suspicion or you think you maybe do if you find a good judge out there but but you there's a reason why you want to talk so this is not a flagrant violation this is not a dragnet search or something like that but you know if if if i mean it does change your incentives quite dramatically it seems to make if you have police in a community where there is some significant percentage of people who have or arrest warrants but justice kagan i think with respect it doesn't officers know that the only sure fire way the incentive is always to comply with the fourth amendment that's the only way they can be sure that the evidence they're gathering is later used in a process th the only way they can be absolutely sure but but but here there's there's some chance that they're going to find the arrest warrant and then they're going to be able to admit the evidence that they're going to get whereas before there was none and some chances not like a once in a blue moon kind of chance in these very heavily policed areas it's i mean i was staggered by the number of arrest warrants that are out on people so it's you know a deterrence to say to a police officer in this situation you should have reasonable suspicion you know the first the fourth amendment requires it so before you do it intrusive acts are managing identification to do what you're permitted to do which is just to ask the person whether they'll talk to you but you think that that would improve the relationship between the public and the police wouldn't that be the appropriate encouragement we would if if we don't let police do these things in questionable situations where i think that's what the existing rule and the exclusionary rule itself does it encourages officers to comport with the for them and this applies edge in them now from doing that we're saying if you have questionable probable cause go ahead and do it as we're not going to make you take that sure step of just merely stopping someone and saying will you talk to me please no i don't think so you're on i think again because there are two predicate steps that must be that must happen before this exception one apply and the officer before the stop can count on either one that's why when that when we are talking about conduct here that is it that is admittedly a violation of the fourth amendment and that's where the additional marginal the turns that would come from suppression doesn't do its work and with respect to the particular type of intervening circumstance here this is a compelling intervening circumstance of the type that this court identified and its case and its holding and johnson versus louisiana insignias and you make the point that a person's name is not suppressed all evidence derives from just knowing the name if not the passable if that you're right about that then the police could stop anyway and say whether i have reasonable suspicion i'm not i want to know your name an intervening circumstance through the deterrence lens that makes a lot of sense we look at everything through a deterrence lens with respect to the exclusionary rule and that you know what we're supposed to say is this does this appreciably increase deterrence or guess so i guess then i'm back to my question in a world in which finding somebody with an outstanding arrest warrant was an extremely low probability you would be right in a world in which it was an extremely high probability you would be wrong then it seems that where is this on the spectrum what do we know about that it sure seems i mean again i will come back to this i was surprised beyond measure by how many people have arrest warrants outstanding and particularly in the kind of areas in which these stops typically tend to take place so that it seems to me you know is a pretty strong argument for why this will incur increased deterrence what you are again i think justice kagan the answer to that is the inquiry here in attenuation is not just is there an intervening circumstance under this court prior cases there still must be something else and we think that something else following from this court's teaching in brown is a flagrant inquiry what level of culpability does this conduct just what yours or do you think that something else includes a subjective component are cases on the on the other hand if the inquiry is one of flagrant then maybe that's necessary and it may be particularly necessary here because under the line of questioning that justice kagan just concluded with you it would seem odd for this court to say the higher crime the more the high crime area the less basis you have to stop that's very well i think your honor it would seem to me that the subjective purpose component might serve an important purpose here so that a police officer can just say i'm going to see if there's a warrant for this phone i'm that's the reason i'm going to stop and in those circumstances the factors in the facts that we think this court discussed in those cases go to show the objective unreasonable loss of those particular actions we think and it's different in the context of a terry stop where this court has repeatedly said courts can make the stop in order to investigate in order to confirm or dispel suspicion and that's particularly so you're unaware it with relation to that of the two part test that we think this that we think is appropriate here where there intervening circumstance is a preexisting warrant based on probable cause arising from facts completely unrelated to the stop that type of intervening circumstance matches up precisely with what this court found in johnson versus louisiana where the intervening circumstance there was a commitment this is a non se when you talk about an inch of beaming circumstances we look at it in a case law it's always been something different then the actual stop another police officer comes by and says oh i've been searching for that something outside of the stock of this location of evidence was a direct product of the stuff but it would never have happened except for the stuff you know we've read that there's but for cause or but with respect there was actually something else that happened  the probable cause to arrest but we don't let that cocaine come into evidence merely because it was a ground for the arrests we look at how the evidence was secured before deciding whether it's a precipice learn or not and i don't see how this is any different than not letting someone be arrested or suppressing d n a evidence fingerprint evidence that leads to other crimes we've suppressed those things because they've been the product of an illegal stop and just a sort of minor we agree with you that if the bag of cocaine if an officer had found a bag of cocaine during an unlawful stop that's the precise situation where the exclusionary rule would usually apply what's different here is that the search in which the which the drugs and the other evidence was found occurred while the suspect was unlawful custody responded has admitted that the arrest warrant was lawful and the arrest was there for a lawful under this court's decision  mr chief justice and may please the court i'm i'd like to start with the concern that just a sort of when you were in justice kagan or both raised about these communities where there are a lot of outstanding warrants as a preface there's a lot of communities where there's not a lot of outstanding warrants and the rule that respondent wants you to establish what you can't do is stop them illegally to effect an arrest so it's not as if they're going to get away from whatever the underlying crime was is an arrest warrant they're going to go back and serve their time on whatever  circumstance existed warranting batter raf's why are they getting away with anything what's being excluded is evidence of the crime that was i'm not the crime that the police would never have found but we do that well they might have found it during a separate ballot execution of separate execution of the word without a preceding terry stop but the evidence found on a person for example a firearm can be very serious crimes are also of significant danger to these communities sure of all evidence we suppress fourth amendment puts respect of course and the overarching inquiry always is weighing those very serious cost of excluding evidence of guilt against the deterrent value that you would get so what is marginal now now you don't need reasonable suspicion to stop someone know only need questionable reasonable suspicion to stop someone well and then we've now lessened the standard the cherry start stop standard which is fairly intrusive to stop someone i suspect and i don't know who's brief it was yours or your or petitioner's but someone said the public will stop this if they don't like police stopping you with no cause i think the public may end up stopping things going in a way that police are not going to like but just a sort of me or we're not talking about terri cases we're talking about a class of carrie terry cases were an intervening event of huge legal significance occurs it turns out that  s of the united states who have asked standing markets we don't know globally in the reply brief of the petition or in this case he cited a study submitted to the department of justice in two thousand and four that looked at two counties i don't pretend they're representative but it's a county in minnesota and maryland and it was an extremely low number of warrants per person and of course using that number would take the assumption that everyone just four different person which is probably not true and it would assume that the population reflects the total number of people who could be subject to words but of course people pass through people come in and out so it's probably extremely low i do take justice kagan's point though that there are some communities where the warrants are high i want to and what should we be concerned about there what what would prevent the problem and in communities like that import it's important to know that respondents rule does nothing to solve the problem that the department of justice in its march report march two thousand and fifteen report on ferguson identified what was going on in ferguson is that the municipal court in conjunction with the police were using arrest warrants as a revenue raising measure they were issuing warrants for very minor offenses and failure to appear and then police officers on the scene had the incentive to arrest people to bring them in to pay the fine respondents rule does nothing to solve it because everybody agrees the arrest is lawful the department of justice did not find even in a community with a significant number of arrest warrants as ferguson that officers had an incentive to search and that they were acting on an incentive to search people incident the incentive was to arrest and pay the fine or sent this the point mr bash but i guess i just don't understand of course this is a nationwide rule that we would be set in but most terry stops do not happen in most neighborhoods most terry stops happen in very high crime neighborhoods appropriately  but where people have lots of arrest warrants and and and and you might be right about the specific ferguson case but i still have my question which is why doesn't that dramatically change the incentives for police officers  deciding whether to search somebody if you know that there is a significant possibility that somebody you stop is going to have an arrest warrant that's another reason to stop them justice kagan i don't think the impure show that the numbers are so great that even in high crime neighborhoods at least outside of the ferguson circumstance where you have this odd revenue raising scheme that the chance of both finding a warrant and then finding contraband in the search and soon to rest is so high that it's incentivizing officers to conduct illegal stops solely for the purpose of finding a warrant that was my point about the importance or the likely importance of purpose in this analysis as actually just going to turn to that justice kennedy i think when this court has mentioned flagrante in cases not only those cases listing the brown factors but also cases like leon and hearing what it has been concerned about in part is the notion that once you establish an attenuation principle what i would say is a common sense principle here that generally an arrest warrant should be a superseding because of the discovery of the evidence you might have an officer exploiting that rule precisely in order to get evidence and searches incident to arrests so i think the way you could think about flagrant see is did this officer have the purpose and it could either be a purpose objective we understood from all of the facts or it could be a subjective purposed to exploit this attenuation exception precisely in order to search incident to arrest i don't think the facts here remotely get there i don't really think even respondent has argued that this was a legitimate investigation the officer may have made a mistake about the quantum of suspicion necessary but if you had a case where an officer truly either objected li or subjectively is going out just pulling random people over because he now knows about this  established in this case i think that's the sort of flagrant see consideration in cases like leon and hearing this court has left as a safety valve but does that mean that we're going to have elin every single case exploring a serious subject of motivations because that sounds tried to stay away from in the past justice kagan justice kennedy suggested subjective motivations and i think that has some support in the earlier attenuation cases like brown and dunaway and taylor were they did seem to be that the court was inquiring about purpose and it also has some support in doctrines like inevitable discovery which does ask you know what were you going to do in fact in more recent cases the court has moved towards an objective test so i think the way the court could formulate the flagrante safety valve in this case is to say does this st objective lee designed to exploit the ability to search incident to arrest on a warrant and it look at all the circumstances it could look at the fact that this wasn't incident to any legitimate investigation it could look to the fact that the officer pulled over several people and searching for warrants in the same incident i think you could have that safety valve which would have the effect of preserving cases like this one where an officer is acting in good faith and someone is found with very serious evidence on them of drug trafficking or a firearm and it would make no we don't until the point where we no longer have reasonable suspicion at all because you keep defending this stop and i keep going back to he has an anonymous call he does see a certain number of short state visits but he stops someone who he doesn't know has been a short state is it has not seen there before knows nothing about this person and is doing a complete intrusive stop not just a hey will you talk to me stop  formal investigatory stop and nothing else just a sort of my or respect i think this was i think this was a close case and all the others lay out why and maybe you'll disagree with that this is an officer with eighteen years of experience and several years or a couple years in drugs drug crimes an anonymous tip that this was a drug house observe it intermittently for three hours and so short term traffic that was consistent in his experience and expertise with drug activity and someone walked out of the house that person could have been one of two people he could have been a short term visitor in which case i think most people would agree that it there because to stop or he could be a long term resident of that house and there's not too many houses that are involved in a long ongoing drug trafficking or drug sales to be a long term resident of that house would know about i mean this wasn't a pizza delivery man yeah  superseding legal authority by a neutral magistrate is an intervening event of significance for the attenuation analysis and suppression would be appropriate only if the stop was flagrant either objective lee or subjectively understood thank you counsel what mr mr chief justice and may it please the court your toes proposed rule would open the door to the use it would create a powerful incentive for police officers officers to detain citizens without concern for the fourth amendment knowing that finding a warrant would wipe the slate clean and render the constitutional violation irrelevant it would cut the heart out of terri it would create a new form of investigation officers would be stopping citizens and hunting for warrants it's already the practice in many communities and if you toss rule is adopted it will become the norm it's unnecessary for this court to take such a sweeping and would that be true with let's say one half of one percent of the residents of south salt lake or salt lake city have outstanding warrants this statistics are important to our argument but not necessary because even without the statistics we know that officers make stops precisely for that reason to find the warrant that's why they're making the stuff they can target communities and so even if there's just a very minor amount of warrants they can still target communities that may have a greater incidence of warrants and if this were the rule there'd be no downside there's a downside with the officer makes an illegal stop the off circs poses him self or herself to all sorts of consequences but you're saying that what if the on the statistic that i gave you if there's a one in two hundred chance that there's going to be an outstanding warrant so the officer says well i had no reason to stop this person if i stopped two hundred people today illegally then i'm going to find one who has an outstanding warrant you would say that that that gives the officer the incentive to make those one hundred ninety nine stops well it's still precisely why the officer would be doing it he's writing the warrant check in this in this fa situation we're talking about about a very narrow set of facts where we have an officer that detain someone and as part of that detention there is a warrant check these these were not separate things it was inherent in this stop and so yes if it's officers were is detaining someone under those circumstances and runs a warrants check he's doing it precisely could you permissible to do a warrant check as part of  in our freedom we've referred to rodriguez and this court has certainly said that at least in the context of of automobile stops yes in this case the date and time are standard please correct me if i'm wrong has conceded and taylor and brown itself that that is unlawful conduct that is undertaken with the purpose or with the hope of finding something with the hope that something turns out up is  deliberate and it's flagrant and done away tells us that we don't need some overarching flagrante that that's enough and so the purpose is important it's viewed from an objective standpoint here we have an officer that us his purpose but objective leigh we do look at purpose we look at justification that's how we know the limits of the terry stop what's the number what percentage of people have to have warrants before you can imply that whenever an officer stops someone it is to you know illegally search them because they're very likely to have an arrest warrant well i think that the proper focus i mean i don't think breaking it down to numbers is the way to go i think the proper focus is on deterrence and we know deterrence is not suppose that's related i mean your brief had a lot of numbers in it and if only one out of hundred people have a arrest warrants then i think you really couldn't imply that that was the purpose of the stop if you had some of these numbers obvious you have in particular communities high numbers but some of them didn't strike me that i was surprised how low they were three hundred twenty three thousands a big number but that's the entire state of florida so so that officers run warrants because warrants checks because they're likely to turn up warrants with when they target certain why is that you mean every time a police officer pull somebody over and runs in a warrant check it's because he thinks it's likely there's a ward might it might it be to protect him when he walks up to the car he'd like to know that the person is wanted for murder right so running the warrants check tells him that that's when you run the warrants check is there but i guess i mean you do require us to determine whether or not he ran the warrant check to ensure his safety in this interaction or as an investigative matter i mean does it make a difference if he it makes a difference in the sense that when there is a stop that is is made that the warrants check is inherent in that stop so i guess my answer is no it doesn't make a difference because wh that legitimate ken can you have an investigative stop to chess for war it without reasonable suspicion or with without without you cannot you cannot the officer cannot detain someone without reasonable suspicion to run of warrants check as i understand your position you don't argue that the arrest was off is that right we don't we have never chosen the arrest was lawful and when the officer is making the arrest it's permissible for safety purposes for the officer to frisk the person who's being arrested do you agree with that yes so it's an it's a lawful search correct we've never challenge the search this you can you give me one other example of a situation in which this court has held that the fruit of a lawful search must be suppressed i don't have another case in this p circumstance our position throughout long and you circumstance so so this case has not come before the court we know that an arrest warrant is not always an intervening circumstance it wasn't one in taylor versus alabama and and  even even utah in the solicitor general don't take the position that just the the arrest and the search incident to arrest are enough because they've conceded that dragnets that any evidence that's found in dragnet is a fruit and and so that's just pointing it out that that's a curiosity isn't it to have a law to suppress the fruit of a lawful search and maybe you need strong circumstances to justify such an unusual and unprecedented result well our position is these are strong circumstances because part of deterrence the value of deterrence is found in the strength of the incentive to violate the constitution and of the law you could  say that the arrest for the warrant it has is a totally different crime doesn't permit you to search for evidence it only permits the officer to protect himself by putting down her weapons is that well our position is that anything that's found is the fruit of that of that illegal detention not of the arrest because the the  arrest and and ultimate and subsequent search are our fruit but but they're not suppressive all they're not something that we have fought against because again we have the warrant and authorization if the individual is going to be arrest of them put in jail isn't it standard procedure and lawful procedure for the authorities to search that person plural you they could have the person bring drugs into into the jail or things that the person might use to hurt himself or other people it would still be a fruit so it would be what does that mean it's but it's not it does that doesn't that's lawful conduct on their part right right ok but so you're asking for the suppression of the fruit of a lawful search what we're asking for is the suppression based on the unlawful detention that began the encounter so so this encounter begins with the stop the stop itself is it is unlawful the state has conceded that throughout so what's what's the problem with that stop this is a stop the kind of stop that lawyer i'm sorry that officers are faced with every day it's a basic kind of stop it what do we know about terry stops the officers have to have to have a reasonable articulable suspicion cortez tells us that it's really a two step assessment they have to number one look at the totality of the circumstances and number two they then have to look at whether there's an individual ised suspicion does this tie in with this defendant so in this case what does the officer know all he knows is that there's some short not terribly frequent short stay traffic at the house he sees my client emerge from the house knows nothing at else so even under the totality a reasonably well trained officer should have known that stop was not was bad you're arguing something that states conceded right well i think it's important because the state has taken the position that this was just a factor too shy of of what was needed and being a factor to the shy of terri leaves us with nothing terri is already a fairly low standard but if you still have to say that it's flagrant well my position is is twofold one that that flagrant see has two aspects one aspect is just the deliberate aspect and that in in this type of a stop where where it's made for the purpose of running the warrants check if the it warrants check is inherent in the stop that that's enough but secondly if we were going to going to include a different definition it would be that it was blatantly unconstitutional and so that's why i'm moving into the stop to talk about what was the problem with this stop what do we expect of our police officers what do we need from our police officer if you  the stop was made for the purpose of running for the arrest warrants i just don't know the basis for that other than your statistics that in certain areas there are a high number of arrest warrants many areas there aren't i mean is done in this case what is done in some other cases in this case we have an officer that makes a stop and he mediately runs that warrants check how did he immediately runs the arrest warrant check when he makes the stop because he wants to know who is dealing with it before it becomes i think bad police work to not run the warrant check until after you've had an interaction with the person with the danger that you could have found out about might have been when it's too late to act on it the way he finds out who is dealing with this if there's a warrant the point is he didn't have a reasonable suspicion to stop my client and so no i don't know what is your you're implying i i'm still trying to get at how you decide what the purpose was in your brief you say several times or the purpose is to who run the warrants check i just want to know why that's why that's the case because it was immediate it was inherent in what he did because he stated that his purpose in in stopping my client was to find out about my house find out about the house and that it was normal for him to run a warrant check and normal for him to know want to know who he's dealing with so we now think that the warrant check is something he does when he arrest people i don't doubt that but it doesn't prove that that was his purpose in the stop so the intended consequence of running of warrants check is to find a warrant number one and when an officer detains someone as part of a fishing expedition in the hope that something will turn up that is that is the purpose that is if there was no suspicion here he was your client wasn't f sorry wasn't for us you know there was no activity that the officer is alleged to have seen that would put the officer in fear of any kind of that this gentleman was violent or was going to china on him or do anything else wrecked so the purpose as i understand what you're trying to say is he is now routinely checking every single person that he stops whether with or without reasonable suspicion there can't be any other reason other than he wants to find the warrant or not but that so part of the stop may be to investigate but the other part of the stop is he's doing this routinely with no reasonable suspicion with no articulable fear of his for his own safety he's demanding people's names and he's running a warrant to do what you're saying to fire the guy in the war it exactly how often are the people stop driving and officer walks up to the car and they're shot does that happen a fair amount of time it does happen it does happen so is there no other reason for checking to see if there warrants out for that person before you walk up to the car or before you conduct an inquiry with the ticket so if the me not wanting to get shots a pretty good reason but this presents a completely different scenario this officer approached mr story if he knew very little about him as a matter of deterrence a reasonably well trained officer would have known should have known that there wasn't enough there because he didn't know anything about my client there was no individualized suspicion but we don't know very much about exactly what happened here which is u  he approached him and he said identified himself he said he thought there might be drug activity going on in the house and he asked him to tell he said i asked him to tell me what he was doing there now we don't even know what  he is someplace else on this record we don't even know what your client said but he could have said what am i doing there you know i live there or my mother lives there or my best friend lives there but whatever we don't know what he said but then at some later point he said i went in there because they're someone who's ill and i've been visiting for to you know twenty minutes or or this is where my friend lives that's why i was there and of inquiry and  the warrants check shouldn't of been run a reasonably well trained trained officer should know the important part of this case is that if we're only looking at we're not just looking at  deterring officer fact we're looking at deterring future conduct by officers and that terry limitation is something we want our officers to know it's fairly straightforward this is a fairly straightforward case that is going on every day in this country where officers are looking at houses watching houses that maybe might have drug trafficking going on they're trying to establish probable cause is relatively clear about what you need to get probable cause on a house it's also relatively clear about what you need to get individualized suspicion we know from cortez we need those two elements we also know from ybarra that just being in proximity to other people is not enough being around even when the officers have probable cause to search or probable cause to arrest someone if you're standing right there it's not enough so it should be clear to an officer that my client leaving a house that he doesn't even have probable cause on that he's trying to find something out about well all he did was go from the house to a convenience store not in a car walking right he walks to a convenience store he stopped in the parking garage but without a car and i go back to this is not coming up to a park bill and getting shot correct  would your rule apply in that situation well when it when an officer makes a stop of it would your rule apply in a situation where the officer approaches the car for a purpose that is later found to  dismissed but again in these cases if there is a warrant we haven't argued about the warrant itself what we've already our concern is the random stops and our concern is not just for my client it's for all of those innocent citizens that will that are walking around that are stopped that are warrants check is run and nothing comes up and then they're sent on their way there's no oversight the officer is encouraged to engage in in a catch and release type of approach with our citizenry and utah's rule would be something that that would create  needs to be independent and it needs to be a break in the causal chain and that when when a warrant is run and it needs to be something that is not directly related to the officers conduct and so because the warrants check is an inherent part of of the detention it's not an intervening circumstance and that's something that that the utah supreme court unanimously agreed with in the dissent in the utah court of appeals as well agreed that this is it's a natural and for seeable consequence it is the intended result it is not something that that is independent that that  comes as a surprise and that that's really consistent with this court's case in dealing with intervening circumstances spontaneous can confessions are something that are independent they break the chain  look at free will and that's independent and breaks the chain witness testimony but here there was no break it was a direct result of the officers conduct the the rule that we are really asking suppressed unless there is attenuation and of course if there hadn't been a warrant if if the officer just stopped my client and searched him i don't think anyone is contesting that that would just simply be suppressed without atten n and in this case there was there was no attenuation it as well because all three of the factors that this court has looked at work in favor of suppression the temporal proximity works with us obviously it was it was  contemporaneous it was immediate it was inherent it's not an intervening circumstance because it's not independent and it's not a break in the council chain and it was deliberate determination is based on a calculation of the determine a factor of the will i do i do i agree that the focus is on deterrence and i think that in this circumstance there's a powerful deterrence to to adopt our position and to not follow you transposition if if you transposition is part of deterrence is looking at the incentive to violate the constitution and looking forward to see see what would happen with the rule and under utah's were all we there would be nothing to stop police officers from from stopping people on the street articulating something terry doesn't take much most most officers can articulate some sort of justification looking for the warrant and then sending people on their way so so we believe that deterrence would be very well served by adopting our and your deterrence argument doesn't depend at all on st with even without the statistics our deterrence argument works because the point is a reasonably well trained officer would should know what the parameters of terry are this officer did not so if one in a thousand the it's going to self correct but for the most part i mean on the flip side is there's no reason not to run them if that's the rule but for the most part and in most communities the  there the other thing is with utah's rule it could create an incentive to have even more warrants for even more minor infractions this was a traffic matter many of these warrants in the cases down below are minor incentive of the kind you were arguing you were worried about before i'm sorry and warrants or the warrants are automatic you were suggesting that one thing will happen is they'll be issuing all these warrants if they know they can get evidence from illegal stops and because the warrants are automatic they're not going to be issued all these words are that they're on a matter certain circumstances and those circumstances would increase so there are a matic right now for no insurance or for speeding they would increase and they'd be automatic for infractions they and the other aspect is the databases and the incentive to keep those data bases accurate and up today it's our position that this absolutely  place into a deterrence and that utah's rule would have an overwhelming impact that would create a powerful incentive for police officers to walk up to people on the street and simply mr chief justice if i could just make three brief points in response first to the suggestion that officers make random stops in order to find a warrant to conduct searches of this type there's actually no evidence of them in this record but that's what happened here or that happens more broadly in fact i think the opposite is true if you look at page scene practice to warrant checks every stop legal or illegal he says it's he runs words on the street or in a car traffic stops that we've thought were legitimate speak because they had to do with highway safety now we're saying to police officers run warrants on any name you get because all you have to do is wave the flag of safety no that's not what we're saying we're saying that there's a safety rationale for the warrant check but beyond that there's also the important flagrante safety valve that we've talked about here and with respect to this particular warrant check on page one hundred one of the appendix to our petition there is actually a finding from the district court that the reason that this officer stopped this particular defendant was on suspicion of drug possession or distribution it wasn't for something else so that findings here and more broadly this rule as we've noted in our papers is in fact the majority rule among the courts that have addressed this issue throughout the country in the united states in the seventh circuit the case of united states versus green was decided in  ninety seven almost twenty years ago and that of course involves states with a large number of metropolitan areas chicago milwaukee and indianapolis and there's no evidence in this record or before this court that these sort of a random stops in order to check for warrants is happening in those so i think the actual practice in the way it bears out and has borne out in in areas where this has been adopted undermines that particular argument and second your honor with respect to the question of whether a subjective purpose should come in responding to justice kennedy's question to this inquiry i think if this court were to do that it would become an outlier of sorts and in that case in this court's fourth amendment jurisprudence and i think with respect if it remains an objective inquiry and consistent with the rest of this court's cases that objective  flagrant cases we've cited for cases from four different state courts in our reply brief and footnote one of our reply brief that's illinois missouri new jersey and oregon where the courts have applied this rule have undertaken the flagrante inquiry and have in fact suppressed evidence because defendant's own free will that we think that appropriate based on that concession that it would that this court should should reverse the judgment of the utah supreme court and leaves the question of course of what role to adopt instead and we think your honor this this intervening circumstance here this arrest on a preexisting morant that arises from probable cause based on facts completely unrelated to the circumstances and the facts of this stuff is exactly like what happened in johnson versus louisiana which is the case that this court pointed to in brown versus illinois where it where it adopted and said intervening circumstance is critical to the attenuation inquiry it's a straightforward application of that particular test there are no furthe