not tell you how you interpret or apply that language of the residual clause and that language is the same language that the supreme court in johnson described as judge her away said earlier is suffering from hopeless  indeterminancy guesswork intuition and judicial morass a black hole frustrated any effort to impart some sense of order and direction yield anything but even handed predictable or consistent results and it's nearly impossible to by consistently  says that you ignore the supreme court decision that on not only describes the language in that way but also over rules james insights which set out the analysis that this court and most other rejecting those tests they're simply showing that those tests one applied don't provide clarity it was the test don't provide the device which that they surely ambiguous big argument language can be have already added to it doesn't seem to me that they reject the tests if they're saying that the tests cannot be used to clarify the language then i would suggest that they are rejecting using those tests to define because well it is not addressing the question just as the supreme court has not addressed many questions arising from its initial case law i think that you look at the requirements from fall and other cases that the district court has to begin all of its sentencing proceedings  correctly calculating the god one range and you say that the residual clause language is this hopeless morass that cannot be  accurately determined or consistently determined you have no ability to use the residual clause to calculate the guideline range and that would be the kind of procedural error that interpretation here because we are looking at language that the supreme court repeatedly described in johnson as being hopelessly in pink us we've already heard that argument and  this was a case on remand you know the the the guideline range for the similar amount of drugs for the count of conviction was forty six to fifty seven there were enhancements that were added on for the offenses that had been vacated and the non career offender with all of those enhanced minutes was one sixty eight to ten so there is a difference in the dotted line range and this court has said in the movie and rita and taylor that where you have a an error in calculating the guidelines even though you recognize the sentence may well be the same that it's assuming i guidelines her assuming guidelines here and i like to also address the argument that it would be appropriate to remain and in light of the guidelines and then seven ninety eight that was not in effect at the time of sentencing was not retroactive but could affect the district court's determination of appropriate sentence this court has done that in golden an errant how it's a long time satins in march of two thousand and fifteen and then in seven ninety eight was first proposed in august of two thousand and fifteen it was promulgated in january of two thousand and sixteen and effective in august of two thousand and sixteen iran approach i won't belabor the dylan case but i do think dillon calls those decisions into question because the supreme court  we've presented several issues and i agree you don't need to reach out to me and the issue you raise j k out is exactly right in fact i think to some extent my friend's argument on the first point is that war with the second because her argument on the first point is that follow notwithstanding battles because of johnson to this courthouse to basically consider all of these crimes afresh under the guidelines and all of its prior decisions no longer have effect and yet on the remand for the sentencing under amendment seven ninety eight if that were in fact the case then it would has not done so since and that is far removed from the situation which confronts the court now very number of defendants who have challenge guidelines sentences whether career offender amendment that has been deemed not retroactive but nonetheless is has been made at the time of the direct appeal this court should adopt that approach i would suggest that that would impose a huge burden on the district court and will result itself in disparity because some district courts undoubtedly will say the sentencing commission has made its mind on retroactivity i'm not going to change the sentence other judges might be free might feel free to to calculated advisory guideline range in this case by contrast the guidelines range was two hundred ten to two sixty two months it was kept by the statutory maximum so in fact was to tended to forty months but the district very down to one hundred sixty eight months the bottom of the guideline range as my friend acknowledges if he he had not been deemed a career ender i'm sorry i think that's an additional reason why idina rent aren't appropriate in this case were in other cases in which a defendant has challenge their guideline sense on johnson grounds on the first issue in our view this court's precedents of holding the defendant's various convictions as proper crimes of violence under the guidelines remained controlling the supreme court in johnson to did identifying ordinary case analysis as one part of its conclusion as to why the residual clause of the a c c a was unconstitutionally vague it was only one part of its analysis and the court alternately said did the other clause was unconstitutionally vague because it failed to both yet fair notice to defendants am led to arbitrary and foresman by judges in battles we now know that the court has said that at least the former the fair noticed to defendants is not at issue about where the case and this court hasn't decided is johnson applies either to section sixty eight or nine twenty four c but if that were the case it would mean that people ordinary case analysis would have been overruled for those statutes as well even though those statutes do not have the graded primes in their respective residual clauses and again i'm unaware no court that has has s