you know i'm i did hear that forty one years of practice i don't believe i've seen a case that is as much on all fours with the issues we're addressing today and this one now we know of course this case is not presidential but you know for certain there's not even a fourth circuit bankruptcy case but i point to  it as a example of analysis and analysis of the facts and circumstances almost of do nickel to what we have here addressing the same statutes same amendments same corrections same concepts that have been addressed to earlier cases that are here the first some slight differences one is in the are so usual context the heel case was brought as a complaint by the lawyer who is seeking like we are is the fees for services rendered during chapter eleven in this case the issues of brought before you based on the trustee jim angels on its own motion in aid of distribution of the issues of the site based on judge doubs the bankruptcy court's decision is a footnote difficult for me to understand totally let me just summarize the overall picture here we are looking at a statutory sequence  the just kind of to summarize we've got three significant dates prior to two thousand and five i don't think there's any dispute that the our party the attorney seeking expenses under chapter eleven was entitled to subordinate tax like don't totally agree but let's assume for our human though here that it was the intent of congress to correct that previous law and give you chapter seven trustee a priority for expenses but not the chapter of a law that was some feeling in congress that this was not a correct correction sort of speak and i think most of the parties agree that the bab sipa version did not accomplish the job and consequently on in the center of two thousand and ten is when the b t c a version was passed what we are asking for is our services that were performed to the estate prior to the symbol of the t and two thousand and ten and our brief shows the amount is about one hundred five thousand dollars if you include work in progress up to that date it's about one hundred twenty three thousand dollars now i'm not going into the details but let me accepting the other party's argument that the babsy reversion that took place in two thirty two thousand and five intended to correct the problem but did not in essence what the problem was and i'm not going into detail but the commentators in the cases refer to it as the improper placement of a parent that it'll phrase and this is spelled out here's what we plainly intended to do all you know let's assume that for this argument for this case when you we all know how legislation is made you've got competing lobbying explanation and i think that was one of the keys of that analysis which it says is not absurd if that's the case which we have here if it had makes sense it's not absurd already converted to chapter seven what's the relationship between passage of the correction legislation in two thousand and ten and when the case converts and section seven twenty four becomes relevant for the first time let's take several dates the effective da of the let's say the final correcting statute the p t c right that was effective on of december twenty second two thousand and ten it is it does seem to me that congress had one thing in mind throughout all of these different iterations which was to give tax liens a priority over administrative expenses which were consuming chapter eleven as states or whatever but anyway this this this case was converted from a chapter eleven proceeding to a chapter seven percent yes and  as being the sequence of conversion versus correction let me ask you this question i've looked at it now and i've tried and you're you're backing up my question you know i thought your expenses were incurred in connection with a chapter eleven bankruptcy that's correct and they were and then i thought this this case was converted from a chapter eleven to a chapter case was was converted you know if that's true has said because as i understand the section seven twenty four simply doesn't apply  it applies to chapter seven but not the chapter of love the seven twenty four of pliers to own the confusion came in that parent that it will part that said will only look different search ins let me give you a bottom line here is a if you've got any statute that has confusion which is the babsy book version and i think let's agree with that i'm not sure  's agree with that for here and then you have a correcting statute which took effect on in two thousand and ten which was ahead of our conversion isn't doesn't that make our case are stronger if we are asking only for those fees which we are that incurred prior to the services that were formed were performed of before the effective date of the statute before the conversion so we really we're not asking for any payment for services after conversion we're having here which is coming back to judge here is your question here is the issue of retroactivity that's i majored in issue here and thank you your honor may it please the court paul a little less appearing on behalf of the united states of america and together arguing with me this morning is mr james angle the trustee who will address one particular issue of concern regarding the time that the case converted at the time that the trustee made his motion in aid of distribution at the time that the bankruptcy court made its judgment at the time that the district court made its judgment the p t c a version of the statute which is  corrected version of the statute is the version that was in effect at all times relevant in this case as your honor correctly pointed out chapter seven has no application during chapter seven proceedings section seven twenty four b two had no effect whatsoever while this case was pending in chapter eleven during the chapter eleven portion of this case so you say doesn't matter whether this was a screw loose there  section seven twenty four b two were merely to change the court need not address any of those questions so long as the court determines that the corrected version was the version that was in effect at that at the time i mean t ask if they get it right but what you're saying is that scribbles there is not a is not something we need concern ourselves the critical point here is that section seven twenty four doesn't apply to chapter love perceives and while the case was in the while the administrative expenses were being incurred we're all trying to decide whether or not it was a scrivener as there had been corrected prior to the conversion as i understand that's the essence of what you're trying to that's the essence of your argument is that yes your honor that is exactly correct and are going to try to just so make sense of a stew of but that does that's why i say your other point doesn't require us to get into that ma no it is not your honor and in fact that is why the conversion date is is a critical day here and as as the court has already correctly pointed out this case converted from chapter eleven to chapter seven eleven months after the correction had already been implemented and again it was only when that day in november of two thousand and eleven that the provisions of section seven twenty four be to have any impact whatsoever if the court were to reach that question and then to analyze whether the statute that back up version of the statute could be read in any sensible way the answer is actually no to that question because of the way that the parent thought or call was placed in the earlier version of the statute to interpret it in the way that the appellate process would actually require the court to read to ascribe no meaning whatsoever to the entire parent i understand already at this point i'm going to ask do you have anything further to add to your argument no your honor i want to ask my colleagues are very have any further questions no thank you we have no further questions thank you your hon  your honor i am a member of the chapter seven trustee panel for the eastern district of north carolina my name's jim or james b angel i'm also the chapter seven trustee in this case the policy matter i want to address his trustees as trustees we generally try to get court orders to approve whatever we do if we get a court order we act in accordance with the court or we have judicial immunity so we try to get them whenever we can which gave rise to this motion eight of distribution because there was some potential for conflict in closing cases and often times our general procedure is we give notice of a proposed distribution there's a period of time for people to object and then if nobody objects we make this tribute but we don't get trustees need clear guidelines as to which version of a statute they can rely on congress obviously has the power to implement effective date language in their stat in their statutes and say we're changing the statute as a  my colleague pointed out then it's generally effective upon act the exception is this imprimis simple retroactive effect and that's pervasive in bankruptcy because bankruptcy is at bottom the bottom line just a fight over a pile of money and one one creditor benefits from a change in legislation that another creditor has as a detriment as is the case in this case if the i r s wins they get more money if mr stubbs wins he gets more money so they're all always there's the argument that there are rights that ought to be ought to be that ought to attach as the when those attach those rights attach to for an impermissible retroactive effect is a gas because frankly it could be when the services are provided window orders are entered when he applicant when he order authorizing the attorney application is that all those could be possibility which means a trustee would have to go to great lengths in cases what i'm concerned about is  concerted instead of actually filed as chapter seven is on those states but as a trustee i need to be able to look at a statute and know that i can rely on the statute that's presently in effect when i'm doing the action taken under the statute i could have five more seconds all wrap it up but basically what i'd ask the court to do is while the conversion dates important i think it's trustees we need to be able to live on the statutes that are in effect on the day that we take an further and be guilty by referring to the conversion date is the key date but i think the key date is the date that the statutes invoked thank your hono noted first let me just address the issue only retroactivity i don't think really either parties or saying that the statute was wrecked through active acts that occurred that we s and it also gives the quality of treatment i think to different classes of creditors so it has what i'm saying is why are you saying that this has we're going to make a hash of bankruptcy administration i mean that's that's why i say this is there are different ways you can lose this case and this is another one isn't it the let me let me take those in order if you look at and retroactive if congress says in the statute itself we're going to make that retroactive that's that's a good enough to make it my true active if there is some sort of i think the phrase is manifest in justice let's not look it either of those here but i'll give you