consent that only the chairman and ranking member the subcommittee be allowed to make opening statements without objections that so ordered ask unanimous consent of the gentleman from california representative george miller be allowed to participate in this hearing in accordance with the committee rules he will only be allowed to question the witnesses after all official members of the subcommittee of had their turn without objection so watered i ask unanimous consent that the hearing record be kept open for five business days so that all members of the subcommittee will be allowed to submit a written statement for the record and without objection that were just discussing this we're anxious to hear your testimony will try to keep our opening statements relatively brief on october fifteenth two thousand and nine president obama signed the enhanced partnership with pakistan act to formally known as as everyone here knows that carry little berman buil tripled the united states civilian economic and development assistance to pakistan to one point five billion dollars annually until two thousand and fourteen well kerry lugar berman was a largely bipartisan demonstration of u s commitment of long term assistance to pakistan serious concerns remain regarding the ability of usa id and the state department to effectively and efficiently manage and account for such a massive increase in assistance in november and i led a congressional delegation of pakistan in order to investigate among other things the status of us assistance programs and the state department us a d s capacity to manage and oversee carry little berman funding at the time a basket of holbrooke's team and usa id in pakistan were actively searching for a new delivery model for u s civilian assistance to pakistan i understand that this policy review is now almost complete and i look forward to the administration testifying before the subcommittee on their plans in early two thousand and ten during the congressional delegation we met with pakistan's civilian leadership and political opposition and a wide variety of civil society members n g o s and international contractors we also traveled to push our to deliver aid supplies directly to the principal hospital that have been receiving wounded from the many bombings there over the several months preceding know it'll be surprised to hear that everyone had a different perspective on how the united states could best deliver aid prime minister galani prefers more aid to be funneled through the central government and the provinces meanwhile we heard that war money should go straight to the provincial government local n g o s botia that they could cut out the high administrative fees for international contractors and build more domestic capacity but international n g o s and contractors claim that the local players did not have the capacity to do so so in short i meetings help us quickly identify all the problems with the various aid delivery models under consideration but we found no consensus regarding how to go forward clearly there's no silver bullet solution for delivering  pakistan more disconcerting than the lack of consensus regarding the best aid delivery model was the lack of capacity at usa id in pakistan for years usa ideas been marginalized and stripped of personnel while at the same time  foreign policy is increasingly emphasize a delivery and high risk conflict and post conflict countries like iraq afghanistan and pakistan it's no wonder that usa ideas become so dependent on international contractors to plan manage and even oversee the massive development projects this challenge is only made more difficult by the current security environment that makes it extremely difficult for the usa id personnel all western ex pats to see let alone actively manage oversee many projects particularly those in the federally administered tribal areas in north west frontier province of pakistan as a result both usa id and international contract is often entirely dependent on sending third party locals to verify and account for major development assistance projects although i understand the temporary security need for these oversight work arounds i have a serious concern about us the ideas ability to provide long term oversight and accountability of major projects without ever even seeing them in person i plan to continue to work with congress and administration opposed to us the i d s internal staffing and capability we have to reverse us the ideas decline of the last decade if it's to serve as a central tool of u s foreign policy in south asia or the middle east task that has been assigned but not given the tools to fulfill in the meantime however any new plan for us civilian assistance to pakistan must factor in us the ideas limited capacity both limited personnel to actually manage oversee contracts and for security reasons limited visibility on many of its projects but today's hearing we've brought together three experts with a great variety and depth of experience in both pakistan and u s assistance program i don't expect any of them to provide a silver bullet the witnesses i share the concerns of the chairman as expressed about the pace of this going and it seems to be more supply side driven rather demand side at this point i also share the concern and i understand the issues regards curity but the inability to actually see where some of this money is spent in the end is troublesome for a committee that provides oversight answers to the testimony and i look forward to the  entire panel and i will start with dr fair dr christine fair is an assistant professor with the center for peace and security studies at georgetown university's school of foreign service she previously served as a senior political scientist with the rand corporation a political offices to the united nations assistance mission to afghanistan in kabul and is a senior research associate at the center for conflict analysis and prevention at the united states institute for peace our current research focuses on political and military affairs in south asia she goes a d from the university of chicago dr andrew weil there is the research director for policy process at tufts university's feinstein center prior to joining the center we worked in afghanistan where he established and directed afghanistan's first independent policy research institute the afghanistan research and evaluation unit between one hundred eighty six and two thousand and one dr weil their work for several different international n g o s managing humanitarian and development programs in pakistan and afghanistan his research and publications she has testified from pakistan to here by video before as i understand dr while there was also done at least one occasion and maybe died a fair for all i know you having been on the video you will get you there but we appreciate the fact that you traveled government and the institute of regional studies for areas of expertise include south asian affairs democratic transitions and out there are terry and states and ethnic and religious conflict she holds a ph d from the australian national university and we appreciate that all of you are here today that you go to share your testimony as i said we read your written testimony with great effect i do know that if you were to deliver that each of you would be significantly over fifteen or twenty minutes or whatever we like to have some time for questions and answers so if you could verbalize in about five or so minutes we're not going to drop the hammer do exactly five but far shorter than i would for the entire presentation of the written testimony that written testimony will be put on the record by unanimous consent and i will have had that or those who have a chance to read it will read it so first let me swear in the witnesses practice to do that before the hearing please stand and raise your right hand the tests always tell the truth the whole truth and nothing but the record please reflect that all the witnesses of answered in the affirmative and dr fair if you be kind enough to begin collaborators of the relevant secondary literature of nine eleven has become very much a tool in the global war on terrorism yet in my interactions with pakistanis since nine eleven many persons have communicated a deep awareness of and quite frankly not allow effort to discern pakistani preferences with a critical which is critical to generally demand driven programming this results in supply driven programming that may not address the needs and aspirations of pakistanis and even engender frustration with a foreign driven agenda i provide lengthy examples of current efficiency in this regard in my written statement equally important usa does not collect data to inform their branding absolutely strange given the technical expertise to do this sort of market research and there is a shocking robust data about pakistanis generally the views they have on a wide range of domestic and foreign policies the source of information that pakistanis access and which inform their views and the legitimacy and trustworthiness of various sources of information for years development economists have debated the vices and virtues of community based development programming unfortunately there is no the way to resolve the debate between community based development and those provided through subnational or even national channels because really no robust study of the relative benefits of any of these mechanisms world bank analysts have conducted extensive review of community based development projects and they conclude that the success of these initiatives depend critically upon local cultural and social systems and quote it is therefore best done not with wholesale application of best practices applied from projects that were successful in other contexts but by careful learning by doing this requires a long term horizon and willingness to engage in a monitoring and evaluation process that is not only rigorous but is designed to allow for learning and program modification this description is ranging as a personal hobby of elite housewives to mechanisms to basically take money from the us tax dollars and put them into the pockets of those that run those n g o s so it's absolutely critical that usaid discern which n g o s are credible and most importantly which ones are seen as credible in my testimony i suggested it might be useful for us they decide up the kind of mechanism that we have here in the states that puts transparency into n g o s the way they use expenditure their service delivery and so forth those sorts of systems might be able to over time increase public confidence in n g o s because they concern more credibly which ones do their job and which ones are basically organizations but there are other henschel problems associated with using n g o s and i cite some studies of this in my testimony namely the civil society organizations sorry for the abbreviation civil society organizations that rely upon external funders oddly enough become less capable of mobiliz g social capital in strengthening their civil society because their constituencies become the funders not memberships so this is certainly a principle agent problem that usa will have to deal with if they pursue programming through n one of the methods that i have advocated with my world bank colleagues is actually using the market and generating demand for change one of the examples that i give pertains to education given the pervasive problems with some important ministries you may want actually done an experiment is they provide report cards for student teacher and school performance and what's interesting when there is a cost neutral way parents actually shift to private schools as a lot of misunderstanding what private schools a testimony private schools are the fastest growing segment in pakistan and they're actually when the most efficient ways of delivering a higher quality education for reasons i discussed at length another way forward that that work suggests to me is actually information based programming what usa does in many cases is it tries to supply a reform from some sort of government agency the example i give my testimony is corruption so efforts to clean up corruption be in the police or in a particular minister are likely to fail because pakistanis themselves are part of the the corruption system so any mechanism that engages in civic education is to sort of communicate the pakistanis they themselves are to support in the corruption problem corruption is not simply done to them might be a way of buttressing the supply driven aid so in other words trying to create demand to support the supply driven effort the final set of issues that i look at given that aid has been securitized especially since nine eleven but one could make his colleagues and he uses the case of iraq and i want to note that he has to use the commander emergency response program funds because usaid funds were so in cumbered with multiple layers of contracting that simply made doing the analysis impossible where actually much more direct in assessing its outcomes what they found with the surplus the survey funds that delivering community service actually resulted in a modicum or a modest decrease in violence but that the monitoring and the understanding requirements of achieving a modest result are really quite onerous in contrast in a similar study that he did with his colleagues on unemployment in iraq he actually found that unemployment was negatively correlate with violence so in other words the more unemployment there was the less violence there was so in conclusion a review of the literature coupled with my own experience in the country does suggest that there is no magic bullet and there is no substitute for experimentation and rigorous evaluation indeed there's a strong argument for experiments in with different forms development efforts in pakistan a feast and famine approach to development aid to pakistan famines i argue both of them have been harmful and they result from what i believe is in promoting security objectives in our main finding today is that while development can be very effective in promoting humanitarian and development objectives there's actually remarkably little evidence that  hearts and minds in promoting security objectives development program first and foremost to achieve security objectives rather than development often fails to achieve either and i argue point out later in some cases can actually which provides guidance on how to use money to quote win the hearts and minds of the indigenous population to facilitate defeating the insurgents this is some win hearts and minds widely held policymakers and practitioners alike and it's having a major impact on our policies as well as our counterinsurgency policies it's resulting in a sharp increase in aid to countries like pakistan and afghanistan and it's also resulting within those countries of disproportionate amount of aid program to the most insecure areas rather than secure areas so when i'm doing my research in afghanistan in the central or northern part of the country you often  widespread this assumption is and given its powerful impact on our aid and our counterinsurgency policies remarkably little evidence to actually show that an effective weapon system or is effective in winning hearts and minds in context like pakistan and afghanistan i think the pakistan earthquake response is a very good example of this i was personally involved in that i saw firsthand the tremendous response of pakistani citizens first of all the pakistan army and the international community led by the u s to what was a very effective humanitarian response to the earthquake the u s was the single largest donor to that response five hundred ten million dollars rapidly programmed as well however there is no doubt that the scale of the response in pakistan was affected by the desire to win hearts and minds and additional support in a war on terror ally the wall street journal and  editorial referred to this as one of america's most significant hearts and minds successes so far in the muslim world and there is a widespread perception that the response did win hearts and minds i'm arguing percent and today i think we're at around sixteen percent so again there may be a very short term benefit to that half a billion dollars an earthquake response but not long term and i think the point there is that that was an incredibly effective humanitarian response but with limited hearts and minds benefit my research from afghanistan show similar results we have found afghanistan in afghanistan development aid carefully program very effective pas and positive development outcomes but there's very little evidence that the billions now being spent on aid to afghanistan is actually translating into significant hearts and minds benefits or stabilization benefits losers in the zero sum society perceptions of winners and losers there's mounting evidence about how the political economy of security contracting can actually result in significant amounts of money ending up being paid the taleban by construction companies as protection money for their road building and other construction projects in these insecure areas but the most important way in which i think aid in afghanistan is its role fueling corruption and it's nearly inevitable in a highly insecure area with limited implementation and oversight capacity that large amounts of aid in those areas are going to fuel corruption corruption  turn has a very corrosive i think and destabilizing effect by reducing the legitimacy of the government and while donors are in the us and people are rightly criticizing the afghan government in terms of it's not cracking down on corruption i security over development object has been one of the main factors undermining the effectiveness of u s development aid to pakistan and with the passage of the seven and a half billion carried an amount that exceeds the total u s spending since the start of its program one nine hundred fifty one through two thousand and seven it is more important than ever before the question how u s aid to pakistan can be spent more effectively and groups and it's not driven by economics in any way it's not driven by educational background in any those variables behave very differently when you look at different militant groups so when i look at all of the policy is that it was never conditional upon encouraging the pakistani government to change the constitutional structure that governs fatah and one of the things that might be more effective is actually helping the pakistani unprofessional tribal levies and of course the frontier corps a paramilitary organization it's always struck me that a more effective way of trying to reach has actually been to incentivize the pakistan government to incorporate into the rest  october then on november first when secretary clinton was visiting there the los angeles times had this in one of their stories at a televised town hall meeting in islam about the capitol on friday a woman in a mostly female audience characterize u s drone missile strikes on suspected terrorist targets in northwestern pakistan is de facto acts of terrorism a day earlier in lahore a college student asked clinton why every student who visits the u viewed as a terrorist the opinions clinton heard were the strident voices of radical clerics are politicians with anti u s agendas some of the most biting criticisms came from well mannered university students and respected seasoned journalist insurgents in afghanistan salem skeptical airs wednesday and next hour bank stand a much larger nuclear arms state that obama said was at the core of the plan and had even more than afghanistan and what what i'm getting at is this this weekend i'm participating with fourteen members from the house and there are twenty six members from the various european parliament in new york city at what is called the transatlantic legislate dialogue the chairman of the european delegation actually one point criticized the u s and all these people are very nice people but you criticize the u s for not spending enough on foreign aid and for many years i've heard people say that well foreign aid is only a little over one percent of our entire budget yet they don't stop to think that about half of what the department of defense does now is just pure foreign aid we've almost turned the department of defense into the part department of foreign aid particularly in iraq and afghanistan we're spending money to do things in other countries through every department and agency of the federal government and it's that foreign aid that we that we don't get credit for we're actually spending hundreds of billions in other countries and our have spent hundreds of billions in really poor foreign aid over the last several years and i ask d for the latest from the congressional research service on how much aid we had given to pakistan over the last year since two thousand and three and this this wouldn't even take out all the money that's been given through all these other departments and but but people also don't realize that in addition to the traditional foreign aid program we come up with these other bills like the seven and a half billion one that we just passed and before that since two thousand and three we' got almost sixty trillion in unfunded future pension liabilities and then we come along and we spend all this money to get all this money to pakistan and then what do they do they criticize it seems to me that  takes an extreme amount of god for our country to set fifteen and a half billion in aid from us and now seven and a half billion coming on top of that in addition to all the other things and they come out with just one anti american statement after another it just really bothers me and i would say to the leadership in pakistan  if they don't like what we're doing please turn down this money the problem is all these countries and iraq afghanistan pakistan all of they all want our money and that's all this is about it's about money and power and it's not it's not doing us any good at all it's just seems to be increasing anti american feelings thank you mr chairman  redundant given what you talked about earlier in my cursory review of some of your your comic your written comments but it seems to me that the outcome here is that this is a big mess if i could summarize it dr that's correct and you've made the suggestion that the linkages between poverty minute mitigation and social services are not achieving the hearts and minds strategy there is not achieving security outcomes that you would hope to be an intended consequence of capacity building look i'm very much for cups of tea strategy where you relationship build a status communications establish trust partnerships that can lead them to mutual understanding and long term continuity and capacity building but given some of the complexities as to how this is targeted to how it is institutionalized it seems to me raising very critical points that we may have to read think some of this with the intended outcome of strengthening the partnership and alliance for the long term security situation of the region not to mention the social justice outcomes we want to see for more impoverished people around the world is a pretty correct summary of what i've glean believe that to be the case a really good example of that is the drone the reality is the drones are not killed that many civilians i have this from very well placed pakistani sources ministration knows that the drones are run from pakistani territory it's done with their permission we're not obviously running drone operations in a rogue way and in fact in pakistan the drone destroys this change during swat when four million people were being the place if you read some of the op ed they're saying why don't we have drones of drones don't displace millions of people but the civilian government rather than taking advantage of the manager of the us has continued anti american sentiment over drownded i assure you if we stop the drone attacks their security would be worse not better and in my opinion so i think they do try to create this way because then give them an out to do less when we're asking them to do more and i particularly see that on the security side of things they're constantly asking for more their cars we talked about their sacrifices which it which is reasonably fair but i think think would be helpful or hopefully helping all of us on that when we were doing the so called kerry lugar berman bill a number of us were adamant that there be conditions in that bill there was some sensitivity to try to give the civilian government more authority because we wanted them to extend their red throughout the entire country to nondiscriminatory way it sort of gained some ability to deal with the budget of the military and to take some control over that as most civil democracies would have so the conditions were put on the military money and basically one of the conditions that must be met is that they do extend their writ over the entire country we're going to continue to get the military assistance on that and dr but i like you to talk a little bit about the relationship between the military establishment and the civilian government on that because it's been my distinct you as you well know and others that the recalcitrant here we also it's of corruption issues of incompetence issues on the civilian side but we have a very serious issues on the military side about just how much they want to impact all the policy decisions as well as and implementing decisions on that and much control they have over it and the pushback that you get how they not wanted to at that time but there's great control of the military at least influence of military on the media and that would stir the media almost exclusively sang the song of the military on that bedrock public opinion considerably on that whole notion as well so that was economy and that and they do see foreign aid as something that one says they want to do and they understand implications of that but almost need to justify it and the easiest or most available way to just buy some ties is the security aspect of it so i learning or even whether they were showing up every day on that so you have a minute where we're right to take it further let me just ask you tell us a little about your remarks that you made in your written testimony about education and whether we ought not to think about pulling to be very clear full time utilization is actually quite rare in pakistan there have been a number of very interesting estimates that they aren't supported by by robust estimates using a variety of survey instruments and this  cause well in the much ases for example that are involved in terrorism i view them as a law enforcement and intelligence problem they are well known to pakistan's intelligence agency because they have been using them to create militants for quite some time so i have been in principle opposed to the united states trying to get into him under some reform it also undercuts those people who are important that are seeking to reform in their own are going to make them look like american lackeys on the public education sector which is a provincial subject you have because of the capacity issue trying to shove large sums of money down a small pipe that results in this outcome driven stuff you know how many teachers can we churn out knows no impact of did the was there any impact on the training i many teachers have we trained that's why i focus i find a more interesting approach is an information driven approach the world bank has done some really interesting stuff reporting teacher absenteeism reporting student performance school performance and when there are cost neutral ways parents actually shift as a result of this information i've also become a fan of doing what we do best and that is encouraging competition the world bank found that when there are private schools in the mix and when there is information about school performance it actually produces it compels the public sector to also improve so i think we should probably be looking at doing what we do best and that is improving through competition some of us now this does not mean that we should not be working with the ministries to improve their effectiveness and to deliver services but simply relying upon those given the pervasive problem and quite frankly they don't want  out to friends of the local administrators so dan this kind of goes back to we really have to try a variety of different mechanisms all of the available have a number of problems and i suspect each of those mechanisms have their own particular country in the world if you give vast amounts of money what little oversight you're going to end up feeling corruption and i think that's where i think we need to be committed for the long term in terms of our development programs to building in the afghanistan context is going to be the problem in pakistan and i am a firm believer we need a long term commitment in our aid program to pakistan but i think we will be fueling corruption if we try to get too much money too quickly that's not linked to discussed the point your comments were very germane dr ahmed in that this is a fledgling democracy we work off of certain operational assumptions premises that there is going to be capacity to absorb this type of aid quickly and whenever you're not dealing with well defined institutions institutions are not necessarily fully reflective of the principles of self determination and therefore are not going to be more transparent and have power consolidated in the hands of fewer institutions fewer people who may be in a situation to manipulate your outcomes are going to be messy and difficult i think that the benefit though of this hearing is actually look staring that in the face under the very real constraints of the geo political urgency in the area and the new evolving u s strategy security capacity and stability based upon a wedding of military operations as well as social outreach and institutional civil society building we've had other hearings and we just directly talked about whether or not the military itself as they had to learn quickly how to do in iraq is better position in some ways to deliver the types of social service inputs for capa building in a very insecure situation versus a civilian component which may not have the ability to deal with the security situation adequately so we're in a very constrained situation i think that's the point that the the institutions s lly developed we have a policy based upon the nature of our government where we have to do things quickly because of changing political dynamics as but the urgency of the security situation as well is compelling us to make this move as difficult as it is and i understand the intention that's what you're talking about to separate the outcome measures of how you might be implementing a health care clinic and what the outcome of that is vs did it did it stabilise of the it's difficult passages for again governance and security for the people over the long term we just don't have we don't have strategic long term thinking everybody recognizes that but it's very hard to have that with the nature of our political system with the nature of the again geo political movements in the arena and with nuclear weapons sitting over the horizon potentially falling into the hands of people w very twisted ideologies who want to do us grave harm that might be beyond the realm of what your expertise is given the the very good comments you had in terms of making our efforts more effective but that's a constraint that we're operating under and i guess your your recommendations short as i heard what you said separating the objectives of security and social capacity building and measuring those distinctly i think if we had time the investment in social justice outcomes does security give it i think it's a matter of the truncated allocation of time compresses this into an artificial period without the capacity to absorb it quickly without the experience to a level perhaps on our side as you were just suggesting the last thing we need is people holed up in an embassy we're spending a lot of money who can't get out and do good things or her doing good things empowering the wrong people that actually undermine the stability of the society over the long term so that's a long editorial comment on just how how i think complex this is and if you want to talk about any other recommendations given again the constraints of time and the nature of the political system there as well as ours that we improve the chances of meeting the dual goals of social justice but also security yes mostly my work calming down this photo timeline of urgency let me give you a really good example of what's going on in pakistan i don't like to call it counterinsurgency because what they're doing is not population center point it's actually low intensity conflict resulting in massive damage exactly the agency that should be doing holding i know that dr emmet has done a lot of work on police reform in pakistan we would like to bring dion corps in there and churn out police in large numbers over a week that's not how you make police so if you wanted clear hold and build you can't get to the build part if there is no security the pakistanis have not shared with us their operational plans after they conduct an operation they have the they don't for example in swat if you're going to think about building you need to have is a part of your planning the civilian component for example the relief to the id p s if they had coordinated with their operational plans we could have helped them put into place the civilian relief now the army is that they've cleared they're holding in there waiting for the inept civilians to come in that's their narrative is the civilians of course the civilians are not because they've been however ten years but if they had actually been genuine partners with us we could have helped them think through what would be the civilian requirement so another concern that i have other than this vague urgency and i say fake urgency because we impose upon ourselves when in fact i don't believe we can execute this program affected in the time constraints and the quantity with quality and given the security environment this is just seems an impossible task but we certainly can't do it without pakistani partners and when i look at different sectors another good they want a court houses to be redone but what they don't want is actual human capital development so i'll make the other argument that it's not only the limitations of use a number of their security environment but it's also  the political system in which our partners are embedded and this comes to a much larger issue which i think dr wilder knows a lot more about than i do in that civil service reform so you keep rolling back the things that have to happen before we can security if we were to slow down the distribution of aid in the northwest frontier province and in five until we had in place a system a mechanism for compiling the data that would tell us where best to allocate the resources to prioritizing them putting together an implementation plan putting together affective monitoring plan evaluation plan of  not be so anxious just put it out there somewhere but to get together a plan of how we're going to engage local people really get their cooperation important have them take some responsibility accountability for it and develop a plan from an implementation oversight which is good i don't hear on that basis there so my last question to each of you is can you give me examples of the types of incentives they could be used to facilitate the civilian government moving forward on reform and to the extent necessary because having the military not impact on the bases what types of incentives might be put in place to make that happen because i think one of the problems is the will is there a will example have been conditional upon the pakistan government having a plan for political integration a fata development plan which they marketed as integration had nothing to do with political integration something as simple as extending the political parties so that fatah has  be when we do that we had a visit of about thirty military people at one point in time came in with a hair on fire and an opportunity to speak up in cambridge massachusetts another occasion where when i finished speaking and in defense of the conditions because we had issue a directive for that to become law and they talk about our support are we talking about the need for the united states government through the secretary of state or the president make some public declaratory statement or to work out about it offense with the questions there's a lot going on here at the same time but i have been following the testimony in the ante room the question i had is the problems that we've seen on on both sides of the  border along the pakistan and afghanistan border at least what we've seen visiting the federally administered tribal areas in the  northwest province area frontier province similar to what we're seeing on the afghan side and that is very weak government institutions that don't get out into those areas model is the right model that we're using here because it doesn't seem to be the case and i worry about squandering the resources that that we're dedicating towards this effort and if we've got to come up with another model that allows us the accountability and transparency that we need to make sure the money is going to the people that we want to help and that is being used effectively then we've got to come up with the right idea before we pump more money into the system because otherwise it'll just be wasted and i wouldn't blame the american people one bit if they grew frustrated with just continually pumping money in here we've got to show some progress matter of months or even a couple of years capacity building but i'm more concerned that that framework the pairing of a military unit with the capacity to areas which is also fueling the insecurity but my concern with the model is the more we end up doing with the civil military teams the more we end up in a way setting up the afghan government to fail because build up government institutions and capacity but that's not going to happen in the timeframe that's in which even the five year ten year time frame we're talking about in terms of our troop presence and places like