debt collection practices that act in maryland and consumer debt collection act and in maryland consumer protection act the district court dismissed the case the claims that we were certain was really that means that we're being used to collect debts against the land back what that means that we complained about or that there were orders to docket which is however a foreclosure is an issue with the order sudhakar were being presented to the state courts maryland state court with signatures reporting to be the signatures of the people identified when they were not in addition what we complained about was that the notaries that were being affixed to affidavits that stated that someone appeared before them and signed this document were also inaccurate and finally the third category was probably what we considered the worst means of collecting these debts was having other people fill in as the debt we're not hear about whether they owed the death what these acts attempt to do is basically inhibit what or limit how you go about collecting debts i think is ford's point is that this materiality there's nothing in the statute that says materiality and that we pointed out a recent case by this court in a criminal setting where they refused to read in materiality into a statute that didn't mention it recognized that congress knows when to add the word materiality but even you can see that there are some misrepresentations couldn't possibly amount to a violation of the statue so there's got to be some dividing line between those things that matter and those things that don't well there's there's two parts  first of all when we're talking about misrepresentations that the statute itself talks in terms of two parts it's not just whether you misrepresent or it often talks in terms of deceiving in connection with collection but it also talks about the means of collecting and the district court here described their actions as short cuts and if i can go further on materiality we're short because because the lawyers didn't sign the papers they just they had someone in the office  be subject to criminal offenses but that that's correct your honor but but again going back to metairie ality i think you have to take into account the purpose behind which is set forth in the bar associations can and do something with the lawyer if they're violating the rules of ethics right that is true but those are not mutually exclusive just because the facts might support some sort of bar action doesn't mean that it's a cloak or a shield against those same have the war in case not the way around that if i could mention that in that particular case actually didn't decide the issue in that particular case they found that the military ality issue was not before them because the particular violation was under sixteen ninety two eleven which is a requirement that basically what's referred to as many miranda warning be provided what they did in that case they didn't know that other courts have hell but i don't think if you read that case the issue wasn't actually squarely before and so if i can but the materiality and let me i'll go through because you laid out exactly a lot of my notes first i don't think materiality should be read into the statute and the reason for that is twofold one the words don't appear and we look at the text of the statute second this is a remedial statute it seems to wrap it should be broadly and liberally apply adding a limitation to remedia statute is inconsistent with the statutory construction so how do you deal with those misrepresentations which any reasonable observer would regard as trivial the seventh circuit provided an example of that of a debt collector representing to a debtor that he or she would receive a notice on ten paper and in fact the notice was received on blue paper under your reading of the statute that's a misrepresentation that's a violation of the act that subject that debt collector to damages  circumstances in which the in which materiality does matter well i think your honor what i'm pointing out is that the materiality might matter how you are proposing it but what i'm saying is the question comes back to looking at the statute what the statute prohibits is misrepresentations deception unfair or unconscionable debt collection or means of debt collection so i think in our case we're not just talking about whether the representation itself it's also is this appropriate means of collecting a debt using papers that are not what they purport to be is that an appropriate means we're not limited to the misrepresentations so and and here's the other thing i think if you do us playa materiality element here that part of the issue that you're going to have to look at is whether it applied correctly here i would submit how judge titus applied it in this particular instance was he said what he  well if that's the test for materiality then this collection practices act has no application if you have the debt and that's not how the statutes written the statute is not concerned with whether you know the debt the statute is concerned with whether how you go about collecting that debt and so if you're going to work backwards and just say well if you owe the debt you know the ends justify the means that doesn't make any sense so i don't i think in this particular case even if you who didn't sign it but what was attested that it did the the lawyer who signed it played both roles they were the trustee and the lawyer and under the maryland rules the document has to be signed by the person presenting it and it is not so going back to the materiality i mean and in this particular case when you say well how was this material i would suggest that it was material i mean for operates one is the materiality i mean within a week of this coming out our case being filed in maryland you to sherry commenced emergency rule section and within a week's time they passed new rules based on this and in that room making they noted that this was an attack on the integrity of the judicial system and obvious prejudice to the homeowner and so the maryland courts take an action against lawyers doing this kind of thing but and you've won that in a way it does your honor because of the fair debt collection practices act which says that if people use inappropriate means to collect dad's that you're allowed to obtain relief in addition your honor as to the actual damages there's also statutory damages under the fair debt collection practices that they're available and again we're not talking about the debt what we're talking about is how they went about to do it and that and the question is and for instance one case that we cite the only case that we sort of found out for to our district was district of maryland green versus baltimore city in napa take your case judge small often found that when a party presented affidavits that were signed by him on behalf of the even though he later come back and say these particular affiance meant the contents were to crack he dismissed the case with prejudice recognizing that testimony is the bedrock of our system and that's what we're talking about the things that are being presented to the courts how how it in my mind the issue is whether we agree with judge small ins conclusion that that's so basic to our system that we can allow honor actually the statute itself doesn't limit itself you're not talking about just the debt collector and the debtor this statute itself actually talks in terms of the purpose of it is is to make sure that someone who is using improper means doesn't contain up painted competitive advantage against the people who follow the rules and so when judge height is described this is a short cut and what we alleged in our complaint was that this was being done to give them a competitive advantage so when you're looking at materiality it's not simply just limit it in this statue it's not limited in scope tell only talking about the creditor and the debtor the statute itself talks in broader terms how does this affect other people or competing so you have to so when he applied materiality here there was no consideration of how this affected their competitors if we're right what we alleged in the complaint that a motion to dismiss which should be taken as true that this particular action gave them a competitive advantage when you're considering materiality under this statute a purpose under sixty ninety two subsection eat which sets forth the purpose you have to look did in connection with the underlying foreclosure matters the issue in the case is whether or not it constitutes a violation of the specific federal statute that's that issue here the fair debt collection practices act in order to determine whether it does or doesn't the question turns on the issue of whether or not the alleged violation was material materiality is not a question of whether something is being read into this statute materiality is fundamental to the and it's inherent to it is fundamental to the very purpose of the statute as was found by every circuit that has considered the issue of materiality the sixth circuit seventh circuit the ninth circuit the eleventh circuit most recently the second circuit in the gabrial case and i would maintain this circuit as well and so this is so so fundamental that congress couldn't be bothered to actually insert the word into this that congress did not insert the word into the statute that's that's question we don't want to not it's not a question we don't believe of fixing the statute it's a question of implementing it's a question of implementing the inherent purpose that cut that you can read into or that you can read that the statute has the statute has the statute has the basic the basic purpose of protecting and advancing a debtor's right to make full and informed decisions based upon full information and not have deceptive practices that will impact on a debtor's decision as to how he or she will act in connection with a debt collection process  another general purpose of the snatcher is to avoid placing those that collectors and comply of the statute at a competitive disadvantage and isn't it reasonable to argue that allowing a law firm to engage in the sort of practice that is robo signing of documents to more efficiently process an increasing number of foreclosure auctions places those who do not engage in this practice and take the proper steps to complete the foreclosure process at a competitive disadvantage it may place them in a competitive a competitive disadvantage although although again i we can move perhaps your honor into a into another discussion of how these signatures were actually done because the it's it's it's being somewhat misrepresented with respect to what actually happened here but but well i mean it if we assume we're not getting into the into the merits but assuming that what i just said is true in the allegations of the appellant's are correct wouldn't a reading that at least allow the claim to go forward be consistent with that other purpose that the of hollands what it would it be it would be it would be consistent it would be consistent but the fundamental purpose of the statute the fundamental purpose of the statute which also requires that there be some damage you have to have the if if the debtor if the debtor is no way impacted every court that has ever considered the issue of the fair debt collection practices act as far as i'm aware in any event every circuit that has considered has determined that the fundamental purpose the fundamental purpose of the act as was laid out  a brook in the hahn decision and and adopted by this court in the sessoms decision most recently was that debtors are supposed to have full information so that they can make their decisions this was not an act that was promulgated to level the playing field for dominance or primarily among debt collectors this was an act that was promulgated to protect debtors it may have a subsidiary or corollary effect of assisting in leveling the playing field if you will among debt collectors but the basic purpose of the act is to protect debtors i don't think anybody can dispute that issue but wo to which the supreme court has said we should not read the debt collection act due in the german case we should not read the declaration act to produce absurd results right and it was safe we put it not reading materiality materiality would you absurd if we didn't search that interval no i don't think so your honor with respect but i think could because i think you read the statute you read the statute in a way so that you will implement the clear intent of the statutory language the clear intent of where you get the intent from the statutory language in the statutory language doesn't include the word material it does not but that does not mean that it doesn't mean that if you do not include your reality as a provision the way every circuit has done that has considered it you will wind up with a situation where the interpretation of the statute does violence to does violence to the very words that the statute is intending to do every statute that every statute that that that that has as the estabrook as the hon decision has indicated every federal tort snatching every federal statute has a materiality component built into it and there is no reason that the f t c p a should be treated any differently whether the word is in there or not it is common place they always go to a court to show some other federal court oh th to the site all of the cases which you do hold that for every single sort of made the observation it made it made the observation to enter just free to back away from that observation should it should it determine that that is what it desires to do well these are sort of tautological statements at least in in my view if a statement relates to a non material fact it makes no difference the bottom line here is it makes no difference to a  who signs who actually physically ascribes a signature if every fact if every fact related to the debt is undisputed the amount of the debt the fact of the default the date of the foreclosure the amount of foreclosure how you go about redeeming the debt every single substantive fact is correct then how in fact the signature is a scribe to a document is absolutely fact have a different set of interests in this the maryland court system and the bar for instance have perhaps a different set of interests in this there are a different set of dentures at work here and a different set of regulatory system and a regulatory process and work with respect to how documents are presented in a court system and those processes and those regulations and that degree of supervision is well under way in the state of maryland whatever whatever interests are at work here and there may be many of them are at work so you would not choose it's not an f t c p a s you're not sponsoring the proposition that we should be endorsing this kind of conduct absolutely not absolutely i would nobody that 's why i said when i first showed up this is not a question of anybody pinning a medal on anybody but the point here is that whatever the issue is the one thing the issue is not is an f t c p a issue it can be many things it can be an issue for the bar it can be an issue for the maryland legislature can be an issue for an individual maryland state court it can be many things but one thing that it cannot be is an f t c p a issue unless you're going to twist the f t c p a into something that is appeal there are two sets of issues on the cross appeal there are the issues relating to the statute of limitations for the first set of alleged misrepresentations prior to the first foreclosure and that's where the that's where the tolling where the where the discovery rule is an issue and then there is the issue related to the alleged misrepresentations in the second foreclosure where they say that is within the one year period and we say that's barred because that is simply a continuation of the original claim and and continuing representations related to an original flame do not start a new statute of limitations so there are two separate issues relating to statute of limitations your question your honor goes to the first set of claims as to why that is why a discovery rule shouldn't apply to those and and why it should not apply to those is because discovery rules  or equitable tolling which is essential leave the same the same thing does not generally apply in a situation where a statute of limitation is key to a specific date it just it normally it normally doesn't it normally doesn't apply it also is a very specific and unusual application of a rule it has been made clear that that where unless there is unless there is a gross injustice that would result in harris vs hutchison this court said it's it's only in the rare instances where it would be unconscionable to enforce limitation periods and a gross injustice would result i ask the court what is the gross injustice that would result here in this case and we have to question whether we apply the rule because it's never been determined that the rule applies to the f t c so why would this be the case to decide that it applies where in this case we can't even find a material misrepresentation that goes to the merits of the merits with this procedural question of whether or not t limitation period should apply no i don't what what what yes except except for the fact that in this case the question of material misrepresentation can be decided at the motion to dismiss stage because that's an issue of law that is first decided by the court so in this case we know if i'm correct if i turn out to be correct we know that there was no material misrepresent misrepresentation here because the issue was an issue that's completely immaterial what but that's right and that's the yes it is it is or it is a remedial statute but you're you're applying to apply a discovery rule you're applying a rule that that again if it's if it's applied in the same context as as the rule  it's apply in in cases where a gross injustice is going to apply or happen and only in a rare in a rare instance where that is the case and i would suggest that this is not a case where the court ought to consider that this is the application for such a rule and with just the facts and do not merit it perhaps factual situation could arise where that might be the case but this is not the case where that want to be want to be considered with respect to the second set of alleged misrepresentations which which related to the second foreclosure which occurred clearly within a year of of when they filed their suit the argument is that those misrepresentations allege misrepresentations on the second attempted foreclosure were just a continuation were just a continuation of the same and michel foreclosure action courts in this circuit have been split on the question of whether or not continuing efforts to foreclose on the same debt trigger a new statute of limitations or are just a continuation of the old original statute of limitations the north carolina district court in martin versus sessoms and rogers said it was just a continuation of the old statute of limitations and fun tell vs hassett in maryland is a case which that is a continuation of the old statute of limitations and there are a number of other cases which reached the opposite result case out of maryland has reached the opposite result and said it represents a new stature of the material or you have a split even in the district even in the districts here i would suggest to the court the better reasoning in obviously from our point of view is that it is a continuation of the old statute of limitations where you have a case like this one where nothing has changed nothing has changed the the new notices the new action during the limitation period relates to the same death there is nothing new or different in the notice there's nothing new or different about what's contain it is simply a a continuation of the exact same procedure that was started based upon a voluntary dismissal and i agree commencement of the original action in the cases which find that it is a new action kone which was in the district of maryland a county versus american express you have two credit reports that are separated by five years and in the second credit report five years later there is new information arguably the second credit report told the debtor that his credit but his that is that his disputed credit had been charged off which the original credit report had never told them so the court said well listen you have some information in your second report that creates a new statute of limitations that creates a new statute of limitation that i can understand in this case in this case you have got simply a continuation of original action there simply is no reason why that what to trigger a brand new statute of limitations and at least a half a dozen courts around the country have came including some in this circuit have come to that same conclusion i would respectfully suggest that is the correct conclusion to come to under the facts of this case with respect to the statue of limitations regards the second set of misrepresentations about our time and there are no other questions i could reserve a minute for  when you ask them about the competitive issue we said well the primary purpose of the statute is the debtor protecting the debtor well let's assume he's right that that's a primary there's no question if you look at fifteen u s c sixteen nine two section b it states the purposes include so someone will be disadvantaged so whether it's primary secondary it's still a purpose of the statute it's still a valid concern and what we're talking about here they frame it in terms of just strictly misrepresentation so they can argument areality we're also arguing the means of collecting are you going to condone these means of collecting debts using documents where you have no reason sed making false statements where documents are purported to be signed by someone are not signed by that person are you going to allow people to use other notaries or other people to stand in  notary's and make false statements we're talking about the means of collecting the debt not whether debt is zero that's what we're here about judge titus described as short cuts maybe terribly but at the end of the day there is no question that they gained in advantage by creating a system now judge diaz mention the robo signing practices it's a little bit different than robo signing and we might have been guilty of using that in our pleadings at some point but this is different robo signing is where you having someone who really doesn't have knowledge signed off on documents but their signatures are for real they're actually signing those documents which are different here that the person who's purporting to sign isn't signing i mean could you allow someone would would the court be pleased or think it's in a proper means of collecting a debt that if i call because an affidavit is nothing more than testimony would we call in the clerk who signed this document to testify in court and you would accept their testimony that wouldn't happen the way they went about collecting these debts gave them a competitive advantage over their competitors who were doing it the right way and it also gave them and a means of collecting that that i would describe as either unfair unconscionable and here's the thing sixteen ninety two e the statute talks in terms of preventing a deck collector may not use any false deceptive or misleading representation means in connection with the collection of any debt so we're not limited to whether there's a misrepresentation here with this court has to decide is whether they're going to condone the means that these people used to go about collecting on these debt and it doesn't matter called due respect whether they owed the debt or not you say this is about robo signing what do you call it i call it basically forced signatures well here it is but is that a false signature if it's really authorize going to your right here here is why every time you sign a pleading for someone else where you have someone signed what do you do you make a notation and with permission report your initial so somebody else son of a lawyer's night rock and what you are and what you're saying is that term with respect to the debtor when they see the signature with the underlined sub script they think who i feel a lot better now that i know that the this is been sign this and this raised it what happened they dismissed the case so from their own actions they obviously thought it meant something they dismissed two cases when it was raised why would they dismiss two cases when it was  doctor ethics board up or maryland apparently and then the notary is going to get in trouble for or testing that there so i'm going to heaven that that might be but again going back to that issue your honor just because i mean if i steal money from my client it's an ethical violation it doesn't mean i can't prosecute for stealing money as well there's not going not mutually exclusive i mean this idea that we cloak that they're cloaking themselves saying well we committed ethical violations so you can't sue us for fair debt collection practices act i just find unpersuasive but you may you may find it persuasive but i don't see how it's mutually exclusive but somehow those facts can no longer be used what we're talking about  here and keep in mind when you say how did it hurt when they filed when they raise this issue they dismissed they had to hire an attorney to raise that issue and i frankly may if they had signed and put the initials maybe part of the pro se party has to sign right and then put it at undern saying the permit do it a bad direction or a power of attorney that's correct your honor and there's no power of attorney here and there's no real contention i mean the cases that they cite that said this was appropriate if you read the facts of those cases you find out that those cases involve someone who had physical limitations and they were allowed other people to sign but that that's not the case here and if they would have put the initials maybe this would have been found out sooner maybe the competitive advantage that they enjoyed for years by doing this would have been discovered sooner if people saw maybe we could have raised this issue and set rule one three eleven doesn't allow other people to sign this for you you have to s i'm not sure what interest the debtor would have been leveling the playing field among debt collectors there are concerns with this debt they're not going to your interpretation of a statute and this was the intent of congress to make sure and i think it ties into the mean straw you know one minute you want to use it i reserve that for the statute of limitations i have much to say on other things you argued about that stifling limitation really  on the on the statute of limitations issue i just want to make sure that the that that the court understands the position that that we that we took that there are two separate issues on the statute of limitations and with respect to the first one the question of whether or not the or there should be a tolling with respect to the first claims or so there is no indication that there should be any tolling on the first claim because there is no indication that there is in this case in this case there should be no application because there's no indication that there was anything concealed that would lead to the application of an extraordinary remedy with respect to the second issue which is whether or not there was anything new it would create a new statute of limitations when the new foreclosure was started there was not it was exactly the same in all of the cases that have applied a new statute of limitations and had a new issue or wrong in the second