address the the recent order that the panel submitted to the parties on march seventh recording the issue about the the similarity in language between section have have raised an issue of statutory interpretation and based on that order i when i did as was do some research and i think that the authority from the supreme court u s supreme court coherent regulatory scheme and the court also noted that and fit if possible all parts into a harmonious whole the next decision in two thousand seven justice souter author of environmental defense versus duke energy corp five forty nine us five sixty one there the supreme court stated that although we presume that the same term has the same meaning when it occurs here and there in a single statute the court of appeals mischaracterized that presumption as effectively irritable we also understand that most words have different shades of meaning and consequently may be variously construed not only when they occur in different statutes but when used more than once in the same statute or even in the same section then justice souter made i think the key holding which is to say thus the nor the natural presumption that identical words used in different parts of the same act or intended to have the same meaning is not rigid and readily yields whenever there is such variation in the connection in which the words are used as recently to warrant the conclusion that they were employed in different parts of the act with different and she said there were three cases and you just examples where the legislature referenced either specific paragraphs or the actual or an actual subdivision for example  if you look at paragraph one that references of subdivision d that references paragraph three of subdivision essay so that's yet another example where the legislature deliberately reference specific paragraph number in order to differentiate it from any other any other paragraph number within within the statute and then finally in sub in the same subdivision subdivision to your the reference to subdivision c so these are three examples in which the legislature specifically referenced either parent specific paragraph numbers or or specific subdivision or in reference to that's a huge or that's a very significant indication let me ask let ok let me ask you does your does your whole claim turner succeed or fail on the basis of seven hundred six zero three no no i mean it it no that would that what's that for injury then because i mean we're looking here we're at looking at whether there's an injury here and i thought your whole claim for injury was that you there was a procedural violation in the cancellation language and you were injured because due to the procedural violation the cancellation language you should get the continued service for free that was my understanding of your claim and it was all turning on seven hundred sixty three and so the interpretation of as is necessary to your case misunderstanding well here are our complaint also is not limited to seeking the relief under cancellation the description of the cancellation or how available that information was what we have to say is that there was a that procedural violation caused an injury i think the district court's concern was that there no allegation the complaint they had the charges or there were charges because of the you didn't see that there was a cancellation provision so that you weren't injured because of the procedural violation and as i read the complaint the response to that was well we don't have to show an injury because we were entitled to a free gift and we should get reimbursed not for the monies that were taken that the story of your complaint not your honor i disagree in the statute to ensure that that consumers don't you know it's one thing to have consumers make up make a purchase based on their faith based on their consent i mean if you go to a fast food restaurant and you make a purchase you're consenting to you're exchanging money guess my question is you know your complaint is consistent with with facts that said your client mr johnson intended to keep the service he liked the service he intended to keep it but he sees in this notice that there's a technical violation and he goes there's a technical violation that means the service i get after the technical violation is free under seven hundred sixty three so all of your claims that that that is that i disagree with that characterization of any of these violations that are set forth within seventeen six zero six zero two whether it's whether it's under subdivision a b or c if those but to keep the service is is there any anything other than a procedural violation so if your client intended to keep the service he liked the service he didn't intend to cancel the service is that anything other than a procedural violation it is  substantive violation and this goes to this goes to the line of case law that emanates from spokeo the recent spin court decision that lot of a lot of defendants have have been raising as as arguments to motions to dismiss the subscription picture payments that might like client made through to the defendant did he say he would have cancelled or he tried to cancel they couldn't find out that he didn't want the service and i thought it was what was messing with the district court said was missing from the complaint i didn't see it either they say he was injured because he didn't want the service he wanted to cancel it but they kept taking money out of his account without his knowledge well that the i mean the argument is that it's actually my complaint where is it in the complaint economic entry to other other injury is an intangible injury which is recognized under article three of the constitution based on case law that we've seen post pokey zero which is that in countable injury based on it's called directly on point though or there was the supreme court in spokeo laid out two specific elements requirements in terms of how to how to deal with in town to injuries and in terms of let the legislative history i mean in terms of the legislative it can't and what the purpose of the of passing the statute and clearly these these are substantive violations your honor the legislature decided in two thousand and ten that there was a clear gap in the law and  and so they they decided based on the supreme court's two factor test i would submit that that both of the elements of the spokeo test have been met here in terms of wide legislature passed this that subsection a one in their might might which which speaks to conspicuous terms that maybe that might have have some impact on whether there had been affirmative consent or not but that's the allegations here were under age three and seller that's the way we've understood it and other words from what i may understand could you have stated a cause of action simply based on six you know three we don't believe so you know there's been some district courts of that suggested that that could be the case in our pinion yeah it's designed for a situation and it goes back to the time warner situation and the statute was sort of designed to remedy where they were sending c d s out with a than to make a conclusion of an economic loss i mean there's a very low threshold well why would they be complaining here what is that they're trying to do here i understood the complaint to say that they wanted they they would have cancelled if they'd known how to cancel business and doesn't say that anywhere in the quote that's a fair reading of the complaint isn't it the judge the district court judge gave them the opportunity to add that simple statement in there if they could truthfully add to that and they declined to do so so i think that's since you have three of those not being in there you know intentionally not in there they asked for reimbursement but the reimbursement was for a bounce they paid which they say should have been a free gift because of this cancellation language or because of this this error but they they didn't say that they would have canceled it at the otherwise i mean that's why i was concerned the scene perfectly consistent with saying i intended to keep the service i had every intent to keep the service but there was this violation you know i think there needs to be a very low threshold of standing that you know under proposition sixty four that there's been an injury in fact a loss of property or money that you know i didn't mean the by this i wanted to cancel i couldn't figure it out there's nowhere on their website but if you meant about it you're enjoying it and you just say aha then you know that's not an political parties if you see information things like that yeah i did not aware of a case similar to this in that regard i would say even if there was a court like an informational damage alleged you'd have to show a loss of property or money and they failed to do that and i think that the recent district court cases and i think the statutes pretty clear that there's no standing to sue directly under the statute  so they have to meet u c l standing requirements that would have to show a loss of money or property and without something more than just a bare i didn't get the notice that i was supposed to get them that doesn't qualify arguably if they could allege seventeen six o three that my qualify but there are alleging the after the fact notice problem instead of a before the fact which gets them in the seventeen six o three so if you read the complaint i mean night here's what struck me if you go to paragraph nineteen of the complaint talks about more defendant failed to pry plaintiff and class members withing acknowledgment regarding how to cancel the subscription and allow plaintiff and class members to cancel before payment is and if they wouldn't have paid as i understand it they wouldn't have paid this is before payment and and then if you read that if you read the prayer for relief it says that the court  the district court's opinion or order i'm sorry specifically states that the court you know without well the court took exception the seventeen  specific words but to the effect that you know they need to say that next step they need to say i didn't know i wanted to cancel but for this lack of information i would have cancelled that sort of causation and then in paragraph twenty four when he's talking about the class money because i wanted to answer it i don't think it can be inferred and i that i would point out again the district court judge said i'm giving you leave to amend just to say the simple things and counsel didn't take the opportunity to do that and i think that needs to be understood as counsel couldn't truthfully say that so the law says i read the complaint was they should have gotten the services as a free gift and they didn't and so they should be and so is there a way i guess a way that they can rely on seventeen six o three even if they don't say i intended to cancel and i had i made payments even after i wanted to cancel  but the only two that they alleged were a three and b which are sort of the after fact information after you've been charged so i mean you know i think the legislature did that on purpose because they didn't think it would make sense if i agreed to buy something now i get it for free but they were saying you know their concern is an ongoing basis that after you've been charged with you've bought this thing that you get a notice saying hey we're going to you know charge again next month or s you thank your honor for what i want to point out that it's not just seven hundred six o three that's at issue the actual provision that allows civil remedies is in section seven hundred six zero four and if you look at something six afford that allows for all available civil remedies that apply to a violation of this article may be employed so that begs the question what is which article are we talking about we're talking about article nine article nine includes seventeen section seventeen five thirty five of the business and professions code that's still says or which may be necessary to restore it to any person interesting money or property acquired by practice so what was is this notion of a failure to disclose its informational injury because the disclosures were intended to be were supposed to be provided and supreme court and the lower courts floor federal courts have recognized the concept of informational injuries what five of the business and professions code and that's you know you're finished ok thank you thank you very much