and i don't know if i noted i reserve five minutes for you thank you if the fees at issue here had been incurred in the two thousand and eight post judgement proceeding against political trust we wouldn't be here and if the fees had been awarded as part of an interim order in the ongoing two thousand and fifteen action against mr winter it individually we wouldn't be here because there's no final judgement there in so this court wouldn't have jurisdiction but that wasn't the case we're here because the fees awarded were granted to chase through an order in the two thousand  despite having been incurred in the ongoing two thousand and fifteen that's the problem the two thousand and fifteen action you're saying that they were incurred in the fifteen case but we wouldn't be here because we wouldn't have jurisdiction so you're saying we don't have jurisdiction well that's that's sort of the curiosity here is that when the judge consolidated the two thousand and eight and the two thousand and fifteen case he declared that all orders going forward would be entered only in the two thousand and eight case so chase submitted its request for fees in the ongoing two thousand and fifteen case in the two thousand and eight case and the judge entered the order granting the fees in the two thousand and fifteen case as an order in the two thousand and eight case so that's why we're here because this order that we're appealing was entered in the two thousand a case despite the fact that it involves fees incurred in ongoing action a different action a separate action but but the consolidation goes on remove the sub word character of the action it does not  where it would still be in order in the two thousand case wouldn't it i mean we couldn't take that we couldn't accept that at face value because that's not what the district court said the district court said it was entering the order in the two thousand and eight case so by saying that it forced our hands to bring this appeal we had to judge cone told us said that this is an order that he described the two thousand and fifteen case as simply a post judgment proceeding in the two thousand and eight case and he ascribed the finality of that two thousand and eight case to the two thousand and fifteen case in order to justify this award of fees that's why we brought this appeal why do we have jurisdiction even if it was in the two thousand and eight case it's a post judgment proceeding the two thousand and eight is imposed judgment and so an interim award of fees in that case would be immediately appealable so orders entered in the two thousand a case are immediately appeal because it's imposed judgement is always the case and imposed situation it's not always the case but it is the case here in india i think chase has pointed to several cases that real point in this case presumably at some point this judgement is going to be satisfied or deemed to be satisfied or you're going to stop fighting about i was the facts of the judgement and this case will be over  think that's true your honor and i and i do agree with you that that all of those cases that chases cited to involve the same case and ongoing ongoing action in the same case that isn't what we have here but from our perspective because the district court indicated that this was an order entered in the two thousand and eight case that's why we brought this appeal we had to if we didn't we would be potentially foreclosed from ever arguing that chase wasn't entitle to its fees in the two thousand and fifteen action even if we were completely successful in finding that action legally futile ultimately that's why our hand was forced and that's why we're here today there is the court is aware there is no final judgment in the two thousand and fifteen action there is no finding that chase has suffered any harm and despite the consolidation the finality in the two thousand and eight case simply can't be assigned to the two thousand and fifteen action but that's what happened here and that's what has brought us before the court as i said then the judge  described the two thousand and fifteen action as quote a post judgment proceeding in the two thousand and eight case and thus he found that the finality from the two thousand a case justified the award of it's premature to make should make the decision whether or not these fees are collectable under section seventeen of the guarantee the resolution of two thought of the two thousand and fifteen action will we'll make that determination you can our point is that it can't be determined whether or not chase is entitle to these fees until we have resolution in the ongoing two thousand and fifteen action so even though the two thousand and eight and the two thousand and fifteen action military ok i can clarify if you'd like i think i know what your take it right my point and our point is that the whether or not the award of fees is justified in the two thousand fifteen action must await finality in that case without finality in the two thousand and eight case without some finding of harmony chase is not entitled to an award of fees and that fees as an aspect of the two thousand and eight case so we don't number one we don't believe the chase is entitle to recover these fees in the two thousand fifteen action as part of the two thousand and eight  number one and number two we believe the chase is entitle me to the fees at all in the two thousand and fifteen action must await finality in that case thank you or there's not question the issue is whether or not chase is entitled to post judgment collection costs and expenses pursuant to a final not appealable judgment that was entered by the district court and that final not appealable judgment was entered in two thousand in connection with the two thousand and eight case and the question of whether or not the costs and expenses that were incurred fall within that judgment i think starts with a consideration of the plain language of that order and that order is extremely broad it says the chase is entitle to all costs and expenses paid or incurred by chase in ende ring to collect any or all of the guaranteed obligations or in prosecuting this or any related or future actions against the guarantor of connection with this and so  mr winch it makes the point that this is a separate case a two thousand and fifteen action but that's irrelevant because the language of the two thousand and eight order broadly covers efforts to endeavor and by the way endeavor is a broad term it means to attempt in prosecuting and again that's a broad term but why do we have why do we have jurisdiction right now you have jurisdiction right now because the order was entered in the two thousand and eight case pursuant to that final judgment why does it matter what case it was entered into it jurors were post judgment  situation well be because your honor the language of the final judgment here is endeavoring to collect ok and what mr winter has trying to do is he's trying to rewrite that to suggest that there needs to be a successful collection ok and that's not what the parties agreed to and it's not what the district court entered and there is a line of cases which we cited in our supplemental prefer to talk about situations where there is a final judgment and then there is an ongoing proceeding to attempt to effectuate that judgement that's exactly what's going on here i mean not those are all the monitoring cases that's what you're talking about right yes your honor but but in some sense again the fact is we have been undertaking tremendous efforts to try to collect and what happened here by the way just to make the point about these two different cases you know the only reason there is a separate case your honor just to back up for a second is that once we got a final judgment final not appealable judgment against winch and the trust mr windsor to announce that he'd actually revoke the trust the trust didn't exist anymore he had retired all the assets that were in the trust and he put them into his own name and then he filed the declaratory judgment action year you're out of the cases suggest that there should be some reasonable period of time by which we go in and seek awards and we have endeavored to do that on some sort of periodic basis the award here covers a space of over a year's worth of you know collection efforts but the fact of the matter is there is no success of there already been in this case isn't there one there's another one being brief now yes you're going to appear with three times already  need some point has to end of that i couldn't agree more your honor and we're making every effort to try to satisfy the judgment the problem is we have a situation where again assets are being moved around we're seeking then to get relief they'll be some and to that and then there can be they can appeal from every field war that they want to appeal my only point your honor is that that's not required by the terms of the judgment and that's not what the parties bargained for with the parties bargained for was that we would be for jurisdiction on a court by bargaining with the other party and the district court can't really do it either i mean they can in some limited situations well he issued a final judgment and it contains the language that i just indicated about endeavoring to collect and the judge has to review these feet petitions for a reasonable basis and so  you know to your concern about should we go in every month i could easily imagine the district court saying i don't want to hear you every month i want to do this on some sort of fixed and more extended you know time period but the fact of the matter is we bargained for you know expenses cost and expenses to be paid in connection with endeavoring to collect and you know just to make the point a little bit more concrete your honor what's happened in this case is we have a judgment against the trust once that gets reduced to a final not appealable judgment we're told that all those assets got moved you know to mr winship personally we then proceed with our fraudulent conveyance action you know but what happened is after the district court entered this fee order we were told that all of those assets had now been removed title back in the trust and so therefore the question about the finality of the two thousand and fifteen action  is i think going to be you know a question of you know is there damage now from the fraudulent conveyance claim by virtue of the fact that now all these assets have been put back into the trust factor the matter is that's precisely why chase money was placed into an escrow account pending a resolution of the appeal in lieu of a bond so that's that's the situation right now the fact of the matter is we bargained for this very broad provision the parties could have bargained for something different and in fact if you look at some of the cases that are cited in the in the papers you'll see that they involve contractual provisions that are different and that are more consistent with what mr windsor it seems to be arguing so for example if you look at the pransky decision which is cited in the appellant's brief it page twelve that was a case where the contractual provision provided that the party had to be a prevailing party in a collection action ok that's not what this language is this this language says we have to endeavor to collect and believe me we are endeavoring to collect  million dollars has been placed in escrow has this been sort of a practice of the trust to go ahead and you know where there's a dispute to put the money in escrow and if that is the practice  you know contorted question but you understand what i mean i'm going back to what you're not going to talk about earlier how often you come up and what's the rationale for constantly coming if in fact the money is being placed in escrow for your honor that would be true in any case in which there would be a bond which we would insist upon in can you know this is a condition review on the actually put in the dollar actually putting that out that's from our perspective that's even better but the fact of the matter is we have spent the better part of many years  chasing around mr winship to try to collect and we bargain for the ability to be made whole as we go along and we are not seeking to burden either the district court or this court with monthly fee petitions in appeals we're trying to do this in a way that makes sense which is why we picked a period that was more than a year and identified sort of a discrete period aren't you aren't you able to be made whole if the money thing that's going to be able to be made whole by appropriate interest calculation post judgment at the time that the whole thing is resolved we're having a way of making making whole perhaps honor but i would just point out we been at this now for over a decade and you know the fact of the matter is you know we loaned a considerable amount of money to mr winch it on the condition that he execute the guarantee with the terms that provided for costs and expenses that we incur endeavoring to collect on that and so your honour's actually right we could wait until this is finally done i couldn't tell you with any kind of confidence when that's going to happen  and so you know again we're not trying to burden this court in any sense but we're simply trying to enforce the contractual bargain that we entered into with mr winch it again these are going to be reviewed by the district court you know for reasonable  it vance the ultimate resolution of this case any ruling that we make now if that going to in any way curtail the future trips up to the court how does  warded pursuant to the expressed terms of the final judgment and the guarantee i don't see what basis there would be to take an appeal on a subsequent you know feet board and so i certainly would hope that you know this panel would issue an opinion that would make that issue clear and this could become then something you don't have to deal with that i can assure you that that would be true and certainly you know we've spent a lot of time both in the discordant part of this court in connection with this case all we're asking for your honor is is to you know to be given the benefit of what the what the district court awarded us in connection with the final judgment what we bargained for when we entered into the guarantee you know many years ago and you know for all the reasons that the district court set forth in his opinion we believe that the award here was appropriate so unless there are any other you your very quickly to point number one i don't think we should lose sight of the fact that this was an award of fees incurred in us in a different action from the two thousand and eight case which is what the counsel for chase talked about largely different case unresolved still pending and the question before the court in that action is whether or not chase was harmed by the revocation of mr winters trust and whether or not the the that mr winter through that revocation wrists received any of the guaranteed obligations now when mr duke a speaks to the point that the judgment and section seventeen of the guarantee say endeavoring to collect he doesn't finish that sentence which is endeavoring to collect to the guaranteed obligations and that's the that's the two million dollar question if there are no guaranteed obligations out there to collect then section seventeen isn't triggered that's the question that has to be resolved before chase's entitle to recover fees in the two thousand and fifteen action unless there are further questions thank you we thank you for your submission and your argument