the next case on the calendar is henri johns manville corporation standing argument the due process argument but i'd like to start with the due process argument because we believe that judge ray coughs decision below cast doubt on the scope of a future claims representatives duties and combination of lack of standing in the notice of appeal that's one in bankruptcy court orders and the reason for it is we think the due process argument is very substantial and we would encourage the court to reach it even if it concludes that there was no standing that the bogen law firm had no standing to bring the appeal there is this this is a this is an issue that due process question in the bankruptcy context particularly with respect to john manville has been litigated as you know up and down the courts to the supreme court and back and we think that this might be an opportunity to deal with it once and for all finally agreed with the standing  we would encourage you to to reach it judge rake off held that the the future claims representative did not adequately represent the future claimants because the future claims representative did not believe the bankruptcy court had jurisdiction we say that whether or not the future claims representative believed that the bankruptcy court had jurisdiction is irrelevant the supreme court in the belly case held that on its face the injunction covered in person and claims the future claims representative had obviously had the text of the injunction and he had an opportunity to object to it given his powers as a committee in the bankruptcy court but he did it he didn't object to it even though on its face covered in persona claims instead he actually supported the the whole confirmation order which included the injunction he supported at the bankruptcy court level and then even on direct appeal in kane against manville he supported it there even though they are objectors who said that the future claimants were not given did not have we did not court did not have jurisdiction over claims that they might assert in the clearly she judge morris being clearly erroneous in her findings but the findings that she did make we believe clearly show that the future claims representative did in itself was clear on its face so said the supreme court in bailey so in a sense this is an alternative argument for a cough dealt with we think in properly with due respect but you don't necessarily have to decide whether the bankruptcy court findings were clearly erroneous but they said a lot the finding said a lot judge lyft lind who handled the mandal bankruptcy for many years stated at the confirmation hearing that the future claims representative was quote active in the mantel reorganization for over two years and quote the catalyst for if not the architect of the plan  from the future claims representatives pleading and mouth he submitted a memorandum on legal issues in the bankruptcy court proceeding and said thus we consider it appropriate that the court that is the bankruptcy court find that it has in rem jurisdiction over the policies and that the injunction and channeling order requested is in rem he plainly was aware that there was an argument that the claims that that would be barred to the future claimants would be in persona and in fact he doubled down in the hearing frying to do the best job that he could for his clients i assume and said that the injunction was one of the subjects quote of most discussion and he repeated the argument that the proposed injunction only serves to enjoying claims against the race there were additional objections pointed to by judge judge morris in the bankruptcy court in her findings which showed that the issue of whether in persona claims were covered by the injunction when very much alive question so all of this is out there and in the face of what the future claims representative said and the other objectors said the bankruptcy court judge lift  did not modify the order the injunction to exclude in persona claims he understood his case he understood what the issues were that were before him and he made the decision not to modify the order therefore everybody knew that persona claims were included in the injunction whether or not anybody personally believed that the bankruptcy court did not have jurisdiction to do that certainly with respect to my client marsh it was actually a slightly different injunction that was entered in connection with the manville bankruptcy proceedings in the case of moore the injunction covered services performed by more marsh was an insurance broker it was not an insurance company all the claims were and all the claims were in persona and the and the the future claims representative that this was merely a captioning error that mr parra did not himself take an appeal did not file an appeal but they also concede in their briefs as they had to and also in the notice that was provided in the case of john's men vill was probably the greatest amount of notice that had ever been given certainly by that point in time to all of the potential asbestos claimants and the and the world i don't think that there's any fair argument that it wasn't as broad as it could possibly be the the the argument that the as i understand the  are making is that their client couldn't have gotten notice because the st future claims representative did not represent them with respect to the in persona claims and i've already explained why he did represent them in connection with the claims but in any event the duties and obligations as i indicated in the beginning which are so important to bankruptcy proceedings this and other other cases where there is a need for a future claims representative there isn't any question that this future claims representative and all of them had authority on behalf of their clients that's why they are there thank you  mentioned there are two issues and so i will deal with i will deal with the standing issue st the issue of standing comes down to whether or not it is objectively clear that mr parra was the one who filed the notice of appeal and that would be found under rule three of this court's rules question the only person as marcia admits in their brief over and over and over again is whether or not an aggrieved party and so not only did they say that in every brief but the court to district court opinions have said that and the bankruptcy court opinion has said that it doesn't seem to me that under the kimber case that this that's not what that's the situation is the engagement letter itself allows for the attorney to take appeals and it binds not only mr power but mr power successors and else excuse me so therefore  the taking of appeals it does not specifically say whether or not there should be consultation with clients or not not with consultations but judge recasts pacifically asked for affidavits during the hearings and the affidavit specifically said that she believed that that he was representing doing was stating the position of all the parties and so so it's not that he was saying i'm arguing the cough by evidence says he didn't he didn't assert any other positions he just simply said this is what all of the parties are thinking and not only did he do that in oral argument but he did that he did it in a joint letter and represented at that oral argument that there would be a joint joint letter forthcoming from all the parties and included included that the letter itself was meant to amend the agreement between the insurers and the various claimants so he relied on the following documents and following representations of this court after bailey my colleague referenced bailey which never really reached this due process argument and while they agreed that certain claims would not but did not state that if due process were challenge that that it was going to rule one way or the other it was actually sent down here it was chubb was the claimant and following the notice of settlement various parties objected to the overbroad language and that the language went beyond the court's jurisdiction the the  that this court the court and jurisdictions over the policies and the power to enter appropriate orders to protect that jurisdiction and that the channeling order only it was only intended to restrain claims against the race and this is part of that letter that was incorporated by reference and that so that all the march states and relies upon this kind of evidence that judge rick up relied upon it's relying on it for the idea that  these are arguments that were put forth in front of judge lefkow and and those arguments were either ignored or not or denied and that that's not the case this is a representation that there was actually a consensus  attempting to bring in mississippi or the they never were in anybody's minds for at least ten years after the orders were entered and so there is no evidence here that seems to say in persona claims and under taylor the minimum requirements are that the party the party is aligned or not on the interest of the non party and the non repeat not party representative are aligned and that the parthenon party represented represent or understood that this was part of the scope of the representation and that simply did not seem to be the case here one because number one those claims were even contemplated and nd of all because of this this letter of understanding that seemed to indicate that all of the parties agreed that it was restricted to the race and that it was your argument that the bankruptcy court was just clearly  and its factual findings yes ron and we wouldn't argue that that would be the same standard that this court would be evaluating generate off determinations to what seem to me the rem jurisdiction was not being used in the abstract sense of just whether a chord obtains jurisdiction in ram or persona in the issue was whether he was in ram with respect to the reason of the of the bankruptcy cords jurisdiction we agree or and the the suit could perfectly suit against marsh could perfectly well be and the jurisdiction could be obtained by in remi jurisdiction by seizing a bank account in new york or something like that  covered that were covered were beyond the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court but that it was too late to raise it that's right at the time it came before the supreme court that's right you are and i wasn't it was just simply wasn't part of the bankruptcy court proceeding that's part of coroner's committees and credit squeeze done a very to bind individual members of that committee they're allowed to go in and investigate their lot but it's all within the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court to extent that these types of actions which which are excuse me just briefly the fact that that people back in the what is it now the one thousand nine hundred and eighty s couldn't dream up particular claims can't possibly mean that the future against claims against against other people who were not the debtor for their own towards were not part of the bankruptcy courts jurisdictions not that they could be dreamed up of when i was a good imagination one can dream  it's the the the issues whether they were there were simply not part of jurisdiction you're absolutely right your honor that the reason i said what i did is because of my concern that to the extent that anybody dreams up a new claim twenty or thirty years later that was not specifically contemplated in the bankruptcy court proceeding then they would say they were denied due process because they didn't have adequate representation and that would mean that what the future claims representative is doing on behalf of his clients and to to get to a confirmation order would mean it's subject to opening up it's beyond the scope of the bankruptcy courts that's correct but the question is the question we have to decide on due process is whether the future claims representative represented his clients and the fact that he didn't if it's true even that he didn't know or he didn't imaginary didn't believe that the kinds of claims that mr bogden more from bringing  now would ever be brought in the future we don't know that one way or the other but we can't have a situation where we have a clear and on big unambiguous injunction against so says the supreme court and thirty years later somebody argues well you didn't think of that we didn't the future claims representative didn't think of that claim and therefore he couldn't have been representing me and therefore i was denied due process that's the argument and that simply can't be the rule we can't function in the bankruptcy court if this case falls within analyzed as we did in china if we don't draw a distinction we're essentially undoing the hol sorry the appellee tries to use the this court's analysis to to demonstrate that mr parra like was not represented properly in the bankruptcy court but that fails parra had a representative in the bankruptcy court did not mr barak had the benefit of a vast notice did not and mr parr's interests were certainly aligned with the future claims representative and showbiz interests were not aligned with the future claims representative in fact they were antagonistic so this case just does not fall within the due process analysis of this court following  one thousand in two applies in terms of the timing with which you have to bring a notice in the notice of appeal in the bankruptcy court they argue that they or they say they were unable to reach mr parr's wife i note that for five years i guess but i note that when judge ray cough asked them to get affidavits from her they got them within just a few days  in terms of the engagement letter if the engagement letter truly gave the bogen law for the right to appeal on behalf of the estate then they would just with respect that that is mr parra appealing particularly when we have an admission that nobody even spoke to mr parra about taking the appeal or the estate for that matter there are no further questions