obtain rights to enforce them and it has absolutely no right to influence these litigations in any way the dismissal of the edges was there for an improper result that district court erred as letters does a m d did they reserve the right to practice the pound and the received after transfer ownership of the patents to lonestar loan are in turn granted a non exclusive license back to a m d and under that not exclusive contractual assignment of these patents and this is a fundamental difference between the way the district court looked at that patent transfer agreement and the proper way to look at it it's absolutely clear intersections two point one two point two that this was an they do have the right to practice the patents but only in all the distributors resellers customers direct and indirect they also are protected from any infringement claim they are because because yes the answer and there is a limited list of identified companies that you've been given the right to sue is that right well i wouldn't or maybe a different way to put it is i don't agree with your  blocked from suing anybody unless they're on that list is that fair to say well i would say it's more face the your honor that having obtained outright ownership of all of the proprietary rights in the past which not on the list then it would not be able to sue intel without being in breach of the covenant that it gave back to and be the consequence of that breach would be that a m d would then every right to sub license intel not the right and this is critically important because at the end of the day this court affirmed in every way emphasized in its abbott decision that the right of ownership of the patent includes the right to indulge infringement conferred through this agreement through this transfer agreement and we disagree with that because we have to look at the agreement for what it was it was a two step agreement in step one great ownership was transferred  was limited to just one company what if it was just micron here's a list of companies you can sue we're given you this patent and here's the list it's my car would you say that you would have been conferred all substantial rights to the patent well i'd have to know the remaining rights that were transferred but if i understand i think you're asking about this p t a if we change the list to only include one yeah company micra and i would say that would make this case to that a limit of companies that are and cannot sue that's another indication of unfortunately that is that what i that list and infringement is an unfortunate right is a substantial right and lower start exercising their right as the patent owner it covenanted that we won't go after companies prior to being put on the list in the significance of being put on the list it by being put on the list and b was warranting that that's a company that it has never previously granted license rates to and that is what about the limitation on recovery rights is that it is that does that reflect in your fortune right problem the plaintiff must have only had constitutional standing at the time of filing a complaint we clearly have pled that most are owns all right title and interest on fourth and rights are recovered rights and that infringement point of rolling scene is going to allow you to amend your pleading to bring the party in i think it's the wrong analysis of the right result to say because we didn't character as yourselves or the exclusive licensee that we don't have the right what's the court disagreed with us to fix that under rule nineteen and that in a pretentious standing dr now the reason is that the district court gave in our view we're not just a reason it's the as opposed to these are just the cats texas where this litigation's yet and that's just incorrect we filed these lawsuits before to see how it went under the law at that time a m d could have been it would have been joined in the eastern this theory that the defendants were prejudiced in not having the ability to bring counter claims for infringement against a m d and get the same timing damages clock for those cases we submit to the one the defendants it was just kind of a throw in argument they never identify any potential penetrant claims they had against the m b and second they were always free to sue empty for that infringement we did not prevent them from doing that and it's not indulging in their by covenanting not to sue people who have not been approved by andy but the fact that i am come later come in and say well we'll add someone to a less means that in fact it's am that is indulging the alternatively a m d could essentially reach a side agreement with intel and say you know what pay us and we'll agree to never put you on that lets so a m d affectively has the right to license rights that are actually granted explicitly in the agreement and the agreement never talks about them practicing and i think what's instructive here is if you look at a case like  which says you look at what the intent of the parties was and clearly there was never any intent between a m d and lonestar that lone star would be practicing these patterns known stars and non practicing entity and so there's no indication that the the parties intended lonestar to do that and so similar to probe at where the agreement is silent on it this court concluded that therefore no they don't have they weren't given a right rights and their right to sue but only with respect to one infringer and that's a case where the supreme court said no you can't divide it up that way you cannot create these with the scores of hunting licenses with respect to assertions of infringement and in additional indication that lone star didn't receive a substantial rights which your honor said now the rest is the fact that there are restrictions on their ability to assign whatever rights they do have a disagreement and that's something that the court has said in several cases it is highly important that they can in whatever rights they do have they can assign only happen and so that's an indication once again that a m d is keeping control of the patents of the litigation and therefore did not did not in fact convey all substantial right to the patents so we get to the rule nineteen jointer question because that's the one that concerns me the most and you know rule nineteen is pretty strong language when it comes to ordering lonestar as lacking all substantial rights please you know let's join a m d at the two two points on that your honor first is that that is similar to the situation that occurred in the that and remanded and said well it's unclear from the record whether or not this particular party actually is the patent owner but the district court and remained should either dismiss without prejudice if it believes that the standing issue can be corrected or with prejudice if it turns out that this party is not the is not and the ins of the standing issue cannot be corrected but it was clear there that under either metrics i can remember that's where we had to remain on the question on rule nineteen and if and if the rule nineteen applied because the party was unnecessary party and it was advocates that your honor cites is a good example because if you look at the discussion there it makes clear that standing is actually a separate question from the rule nine hundred s or the party issue and so first off in denying standing never pleaded that they were an exclusive licensee below and of course even assuming that by joining the ante you could correct standing it was not simply a question of rule ninety but it was also a question of rule twenty one which is the addition of parties and rule fifteen which is the amendment of the pleadings because no one star and that had never pleaded that it was an exclusive licensee and so under both of those standards the court does have some discretion and i would respectfully why would it need to plead that it's alternatively an exclusive licensee i guess the point is that they took the position that under this transfer agreement they had all substantial right that was their view and then they said ok if the district court disagrees and think too caught up in labels you know is this person a pattern owners that term is used in section two eighty one is this person an exclusive licensee it's more about who has the substantial rights and where are they located and if the district court deems that the substantial rights are split within two companies then why isn't it reasonable for the plaintiff here to request the second party to be joined under those circumstances  the issue there your honor is the fact that the each of the parties still has to have standing and so it's not simply question of getting all the rights together in one room it's a question of each of the parties having standing and for the lonestar to have standing if it doesn't have all substantial right it needs to be an explicit licensee it needs to have some exclusionary ray that has been violated so that it has constitutional article three standing and they argued all along that they do have constitutional standing and i don't recall the district court pushing back on that argument because after all they do have the exclusive lone star's rights are being violated in that instance which is redress of or through a pattern infringement action so they none of that was ever pushed back on by the district court the district court appeared to find that there was no standing because of this potential reason of of needing a m d to be in in the case i agree your honor that the district court decided on prevention of standing  the party with the right to sue did not have constitutional standing and so therefore simply joining the own the party that had had ownership of the pens did not solve the standing problem and protest is similar where you had a party that had the right to sue and so it that except in your honour's premise that lone star has the right to sue the parties on the waitlist that's not addressed that question it it did it dismissed this case for lack of standing or or said there is no jurisdiction because of it not of an exclusive licensee and to be an explicit licenses there are certain requirements including that you have a certain portion of it in the as i said i wonder if it's that rigid the do you have to be either you know technically the there were two parties that shared that combined had all the substantial rights and then we indicated in that case well the plaintiff diamond coating never sought to have the other party saniel joined and so therefore it was proper to dismiss the case because it i think i think the case law is if not perhaps rigid is clear that it does have to be an explicit place in c and so again t i believe the district court didn't think didn't specify that i don't believe that would probably be the appropriate right understanding and is that appropriate to do that under this more potential statutory standing kind of theory i  infielder if it was because the plate of didn't have the right to enforce in microsoft it was because the plaintiff didn't have the right to license and that's why it couldn't be fixed by jointer counsel referred to the mentor case a couple of  times in that case the federal circuit actually invited the plaintiff to amend the complaint during the appeal to fix a pretentious standing problem so that certainly the case certainly doesn't stand for the proposition that  would have been the appropriate time in coding is another one of them toting was only dismissed after the plaintiff was given an opportunity to join at the absent party saniel and for whatever reason decided not to try to join saniel so democratic is another case of actually supports this year a back to the standing issue if i might actually before you go back to staying with you you  filed a subsequent litigation you know where i think you among all the defendants you included a m d as a defendant did file one that yes your honor we have we have filed a case that still  live it is it is in that case against microsoft we filed that case and he refused to join voluntarily so under the universe where the standard we named him he is a defendant and we're planning and asking the court to  their course was to appeal we believe we have the right to proceed without envy and we believe we should have been given the right to join a m d in the alternative so that we could take advantage of the litigation that did happen there was a significant amount of litigation that transpired that we should have to start all over and we shouldn't lose a year's worth of damages if i might just briefly and i don't have much time but on this issue of standing this was in no way a hunting license here's why we got ownership of the to decide what to do and what not to do with its patents lodestar absolutely have the right to practice and i'm surprised that still even an issue because the poets have conceded this point in there is learned there are what we call a non practicing entity yes they don't practice these patents and for that matter there's no evidence that a m d does either but to me that's completely irrelevant under the supreme court's ground zero decision the owner of an invention as the natural common law right to practice the invention the great closers here specifically include all right into the inventions not just the patents as the owner of the inventions lonestar had a com that my client is a licensing entity this agreement was an absolutely proper transfer of of rights and the mechanism that limited my client's rights to sue certain companies was simply a mechanism to make sure that lodestar didn't sue companies that already had rights under these patents that was a very pragmatic and laudable way of structuring the agreement and it's no different than any other circumstance where a patent owner decides not to pursue certain companies for whatever reason it chooses that is the fundamental right of ownership that have ever conferred the right to indulge infringement and of course any party that already has license rights through reversed on that basis but in the alternative we should at least have the opportunity to join a and b and out of the reasons that have been argued for why we were denied the jointer are those are valid reasons thank you