the beginning with the c s and the definition of theft presented in v c s has been accepted in many places and in dicates that it takes applies to both permanent and temporary takings however it also says that it does not apply to de minimus interference with property rights and what is i think causing problems in many cases is that it then goes on of these yes then goes on to say that temporarily or permanently established fact and as far as i can tell that has not been either overworld by us or undermined in that regard by anything in the supreme court so i'm not sure what work that means for your argument because if if a temporary taking it still requires the without the consent of the owner and with the intent to deprive the owner of that property temporarily i don't see how that helps you your honor i supreme court which whose definition of this particular statute is binding both what stays very clearly that it clear includes both aft and non theft offenses and that would be my my argument your honor we can argue about whether or not  the he's charged is a principle and i kind of add myself to mr mcmillan saying that there's no requirement no case is said that that's a crucial distinction whether he's too they include that language about accessories after the fact and this case has no difference whatsoever between the the down and the idea in both cases mr deprive the owner of his right to their property during the time he's driving that's a requirement in the statute yes and the jury instructions say that that may include moving at any distance no matter how short or taking it for any period of time no matter how short and that's in page which was has an interesting background of providing relief with the intent to deprive the owner by driving their car right and if that distinction if the only distinction i know you don't accept the person's correct but if the only appropriate distinction is between principle and accessory after the fact his plea is clearly as principle and not excess reactor the fact is he said i drove with this intent i i really don't agree with that you don't think that's what the play says or you don't agree that the only distinction is with with accessory i think this is clearly could be construed  as to whether he is an accessory after the fact and he drove a car that somebody else took are that he was the actual person that took the car that's not what you read to m drives it which could be as five minutes or five days or five years night i think i'll reserve whatever time i have left you have i'm sorry that it's not reasonable to you or you have about six and a half minutes a little more than you're welcome to research yes thank you the morning it leaves the court robert tennyson for the government of very quickly this court in crown of sanchez found that the definition of that applies to temporary permanent takings of property with without the consent of the owner with a criminal intent to either permanently or temporarily deprive the owner of the property that's gonna sanchez the supreme court approvingly cited that definition in joint is alvarez so that rez relied on de camp which itself said you know that you have to have you know that that what you look at is that you look at different elements in the statute and this court in went out of its way in a footnote to say by the way this decision duane is alvarez is still good law and it's good law in part because a jury has to find can't find offensive simultaneously can't find the principle offense and the after the fact offense because the principle fence has to be over before you can be we can take that as someone what as an accessory after the fact so not only do you have  i mean not only do you have joined us alvarez relying on de camp which essentially set forth the principle winner in don't win this court set forth in rendon the particular sort of test that i would say was the  we need to move off of that because of because of math this going to the conviction records in this case i would agree with judge graber that language that you know that th tissues counsel cited specifically says that he was you know that he committed the offense by driving the car that indicates quite clearly and unambiguously that he is a principle here we don't need to go any further don't understand how we can reach a different result here