the mass alayo decision people let's roll divine versus missile a zero where the same scenario occurred where there was a mandamus brought on appeal by the state's attorney's office while the defendant was seeking a direct appeal his conviction this court actually entered a conditional wri natural life sentence as required by statute even though the appellate courts in the supreme court have both held that such sentence is properly imposed upon an adult criminal defendants whose been found guilty under a theory of accountability in this case the re the honorable james lynn specifically refused to impose that mandatory natural life sentence even though the defendant was found guilty of the murders of sean russell and sean blanton in russell instead he imposed two separate sentences for murder one of thirty years one of thirty five years to be served consecutively for a total of sixty five years imprisonment petitioner now request this court's issuing a writ of mandamus or prohibition directing judge lane to one a one c two makes clear that whenever a defendant is found guilty of murdering two or more people in natural life sentence must be imposed as this court has repeatedly held in people x versus straight horn in people versus clarke the statute leaves absolutely no discretion to the trial judge to impose any other sentence similarly this court has expressly held in both people versus taylor and people versus no or that a mandatory sentence of natural life is constitutionally imposed under our state constitution upon all adult the fans even if they have been convicted under a theory of accountability in this case the defendant was nineteen years old at the time the crime was committed and was convicted under a theory of kind of realty found guilty by the jury clearly under the statutes and under the case law from this course there is no question that a natural life sentence was required you will be deemed unconstitutional as disproportionate under our state constitution if it is so cruel or degrading or so disproportionate as to shock the moral sense of the community in this case judge lynn made no such finding instead what he found was that in natural life sentence would result in quotes some bit of unfairness to the defendant clearly that is not a finding on constitutionality instead what the record demonstrates is that judge lane was personally trouble at the nature of imposing a sentence of natural life imprisonment so troubled in fact that he solicited new counsel for the defendant to come in in the post trial stage to try and address the question of the  make that finding but that he just did not impose the statute which the sense which is required by statute is further evidence as to why he did not find the statute unconstitutional it was his complete failure to satisfy any of the requirements under rule eighteen this court has made clear unconstitutional in miller in our reply brief we highlight the the distinction between judgments findings in miller and those in this case in miller he expressly stated that based upon the statute in the dispersion of penalty it understand your alternate position again getting into what you would judge when did hear that the least the ambiguity of his cameras you're also requesting this order we find that in any way this was a f that request as counsel suggests in his brief and as he suggested in his response to the original motion for leave to file the mandamus we the decision was made to view this as a mandamus action because the record is so unclear because the record i devoid of any precise finding of finding one constitutionally and as a result the state's attorney's office was this was had to make a decision should we take a an appeal from a finding which is not made on the record and thereby run the risk of having be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction because the court didn't make it or should we view it as a mandamus action because the record does demonstrate that judge lane was fully aware of all of the precedents all the precedent demonstrating that the statute was c less than natural law in fact it appears that judge lynn said it settled on a sentence of sixty five years in total in hopes that maybe it would not be challenged on appeal as he stated in his findings that to ensure this court that if it is ever reversed by this court or the he would certainly comply with it but until that point he was going to impose a sixty five year sentence and so for that reason the decision had to be made to treat this is a mandamus because it shows judge lane refusal to about by the case law after it was brought to his attention not the issue was not decided by prior precedent it demonstrated that the prior precedent miller was that the statute was constitutional as applied to adult defendants who were found under accountability in juvenile defendants were found guilty as principals but no court had ever decided this constitutional question of the legitimacy of the proportion of penalty for juvenile defendants found guilty soley on accountability theory and so because it was an open question and no our judge lane was permitted to reach the conclusion that he did in this case it's clear that it is not an open question there is no basis for it to to address that in fact in my opponent's brief they apparently recognize it's not open question because they assert to this court in this mandamus action that the  decisions which find the statute was constitutional are wrong well judge lynn doesn't have the authority to decide whether or not they were wrong this court clearly does not in this form with this court we clearly had an appeal but judge lane does not function is bound by diverge from them now it could also be stated i know my counsel makes the argument that all those cases are distinct that they are factually distinguish one is miller stated that the case must be decided upon its own unique facts while to accept that argument is true and i should point out that of course judge lane made no attempt to distinguish the cases on the facts in fact he made no attempt to even acknowledge them other than saying that he knows what the cases are there no attempt to distinguish them no attempt to explain why they didn't apply to this sense that seems compelling to just say it doesn't apply because the facts are unique would mean that every case is stands on its own and no president should ever apply whether from this court from the appellate court from the federal courts and for that reason that mandamus is appropriate in this natural life or to find it unconstitutional in complete compliance with the law as required and for that reason and for the reason stated in our brief the petition respectfully request that this court issue a writ of mandamus or prohibition against judgment good morning your honour's me it please the court my name is steven sanders i represent the criminal defendant in the case underlying this mandamus petition daniel lucas responding on behalf of judg preserving judge lind's decision your honour's exercising this court's extraordinary power to grant a writ of mandamus in this case would work a dramatic and precedent setting change in illinois law it would rewrite both the substance of law of mandamus as well as this court's own rules regarding appellate procedure by contrast dismissing the state's petition with prejudice and leaving in place the sixty five year sentence imposed on daniel lucas by judge lynn wood work no change in illinois law it would simply underscore the role that this court established in people v miller people v wooders people v huddleston the rule six zero three provides the proper rule appealing this the proper route for appealing this kind of sentencing determination it would avoid disturbing a half century of settled precedent that a writ of mandamus may not be used for direct review or for error correction and finally the sentence handed down by the circuit court in this case would have no precedential effect on the other courts of the state should another case which is this one to rise at some point in the future and should in that case the state follow proper appell justice fitzgerald and with that let me go ahead and move to the issues of whether there was a constitutional determination that is the critical issue here if there was the state's petition must be dismissed with prejudice because mandamus cannot be used for era correction the sixty five year sentence imposed by judge lynn was not the outlaw act of defiance that the state portrayed as judge lynn did not do this because on a whim he did not impose the sixty five year sentence because he was saying he wanted to make a statement of some sort or that he disagreed or thought the previous cases had been wrongly decided the entire context of daniel lucas's sentencing proceeding makes clear that the only issue behind the sixty five year sentence that judge lynn imposed was whether in natural life sentence would have been constitutionally disproportionate in this case i would point the court to five factors first judgment was obviously very familiar with people  more one thing straight strikes me that i think has to be addressed with respect to anything as as it applies to proportionality and constitutionality he says after after  the assistant state's attorney indicates that the defendant is knight was nineteen at the time of the crime he says i suggest that the miller case ought not to apply to him at all and that the chips have fallen where they have ball and then he goes him to a term of years today so he makes that determination i'm going to sentence him to a term of years and then after saying that he says the one argument that is left looking at the miller case in totality of all the circumstances in this doesn't even say how that somehow had anything to do with his judgment in sentencing to a term of years were it just uses the word unfairness so i guess my question is truthful the first is how is this in any way shape or form of determination of a constitutional unconstitutionality and second and it's tied into that and that's what i asked mr spellberg under it with this record with these statements  sure justice thomas thank you appreciate the opportunity first regarding the transcript and what judge lynn said if the question here is specifically did judge lynn's or a ruling comply with the technical requirements of rule eighteen i am not going to argue that it did if we look at rule eighteen however i would say it's important to it's critical to recognize that to say a ruling did not comply with rule eighteen that the judge did not fully articulate on the record the reasons for a finding  unconstitutionality is not the same thing as saying that there was not a constitutional determination and to that point i would point the court to the context first we have to assume the reason the judge lynn agreed to appoint a new sentencing counsel for lucas for his sentencing was that he saw some parallels between lucas's case and the defendant and miller lucas submitted a lengthy memorandum setting forth the governing standard for constitutional sentencing challenges and laying out in detail the constitutional arguments as to why a natural life sentence in this case would violate the proportion penalties cause i think we simply have to regard judge lind's or ruling is essentially incorporating that memorandum in those arguments by reference as you can clearly read earlier in the transcript most of the discussion at lucas is sentencing centered on the constitutional challenge and specifically the applica of the miller decision in fact the state's attorney at the sentencing opened the proceedings by saying quote the only question judge the defendant seems to be claiming that as applied to him a mandatory life sentence would be unconstitutional and so if we look at the context of what had just taken place before judge lynn the memorandum the judge lynn had received which by the way the state never bothered to respond to i think we have to conclude that even if the ruling did not comply with the technical requirements of rule eighteen there certainly was a constitutional determination there's no other plausible explanation for why judge lynn would have done what he did in this case i think his comments about unfairness  reflected his views he had been there he had seen three trials he heard all the testimony he was in the best position to evaluate the facts and the credibility and the specific level of personal culpability of daniel lucas to devalue rule eighteen and actually really came into play after miller the requirement that a judge specifically says stayed in the oral record his reasons for doing so i think that because for whatever reason judge lynn didn't do that  perhaps he thought that again the arguments in the deliberations that it taken place before him that day established and the written memorandum that lucas had submitted establish the reasons for the basis of the ruling all of the exchange with counsel that judge lynn had it i can only speculate that in his mind he thought it couldn't possibly be unclear you know what was going on here that this was about a disproportionate sentence under the proportionate and aunties cla between there were significant that's correct justice fitzgerald there were significant factual differences between the two cases however as we explained in our brief miller very much stands for the proposition that it is the specific facts of each case and each defendant's personal culpability that are the important factors by definition those are the factors that go into a finding of as applied unconstitutionality and so i think the way the state has briefed an argue that's case is if judge lynn had struck down a statute is facially up constitutional this is not a case like people versus taylor or people versus harry we are the issue that clearly could have they could have filed a notice of appeal taking into account everything that it taken place everything lucas had submitted the constitutional arguments he had submitted the arguments that took place the day before judge when they could have filed a notice of appeal and i'm aware of no reason why they could not in that notice of appeal had asked in the alternative for mandamus relief in other words there appears to be a constitutional issue that's going on in this case that's all that was discussed in all the filings that's really all that was discussed by counsel in front of the judge and so i see no reason why the state would have chosen to simply take a gamble and go for a writ of mandamus as opposed to asking for an appeal in the alternative if this court decided that there was not a constitutional determination here then to ask an alternative for a writ of mandamus that i would suggest would have been the reasonable in the safe in the responsible and thorough thing for the state to do in this case but instead i think that the the record simply the record of the proceeding simply belies the idea that there was no proportionality issue here essentially the if this by asking the court to consider its petition court would not have been ruling on a finding of unconstitutionality since rule six zero three provides for a direct appeal however nor would the appellate court have been ruling on a petition for writ of mandamus and so no matter which way you choose to characterize this case the appellate court would not have been involved and so you know i don't think for that reason we can read into that specific comment of judge lynn's you know his any determinative view of what he thought he was i would agree with that characterization because again that is if we were only looking if the only thing in the record of the only thing before this court were judge lynn's words when he pronounced sentence that might be an accurate characterization if though we look at the memorandum luke has provided which expressly made nothing other than a constitutional argument under the moral sense of the community if we look at the discussion at sentencing ever make a ruling on that issue ever if he did not make a ruling that would r i think we would have to find that simply implicit in his references in sentencing to proportionality and to miller i'm sorry pretty close that would be that would be and friends but i think if we were also troubled by that we would need to look what other grounds for the sentencing decision were ever discussed wherever submitted in writing river discussed at oral argument if we think it could have been some other reason other than a consonant constitutionality we would have to look for some evidence that that was in play as well and i don't think there is any substantial evidence in the record that would say that would support the idea the judge lynn was saying ok i've heard the constitutional arguments i'm not comfortable with those so instead i'm simply going to go on my instinct and and give something other than a term of natural life that that conclusion seems to be far more unreasonable than inferring that judge lynn was adopting by reference essentially all of the constitutional arguments that had been made to him at this point justice which i would like to address your point briefly if i could about the meaning of miller this court in miller very clearly before it talked about the specific criteria juvenile status personal culpability and so forth with this court said was we agree with defendant that a mandatory sentence of natural life in prison with no possibility of parole grossly distorts the factual realities of the case and does not accurately represent defendant's personal culpability such that it shocks the moral conscience that seems to be the overarching principle of miller and then specifically the court says it's particularly appropriate to apply that principle here and find the moral conscience of the community shocked in the case of a fifteen year old defendant with a low level of culpability but i believe and i realize i'm speaking to the author of miller but i believe one can search the opinion in vain for any language that says we specifically hold today that this only applies to juveniles the juvenile status is necessary but not sufficient if i can of i think all i can suggest on that point is to look at the entire record that's before the court the arguments that were presented the arguments orally the took place before judge len all of the arguments has comparing miller to the facts of this case were made in the memorandum that daniel lucas submitted and are again made in our brief of course we would submit that it would be inappropriate at this point really under any circumstances made to conclude  that it would be inappropriate under any circumstances to actually reach the merits of that decision and so for that reason we would ask that the court dismiss the state's petition with prejudice and rejected suggestion based on no good cause regarding a late notice of appeal and just one more sentence if i may if the court does remand for clarification to judge lynn on the rule eighteen issue we would respectfully suggest that's certainly appropriate if the court chooses to do that however that would that the court is not regarding this as a mandamus it is choosing to review the issue on the merits and the court would need to make clear the basis on which is choosing to do that thank you versus kleiner specifically pointing out that the state can only appeal in those cases which are specifically delineated in rule six zero four inherent in that decision is a recognition that there must be a clear ruling by the  absence of a clear ruling the state is not allowed to appeal that rule is consistent with the longstanding presumption that statutes are constitutional and the trial judges are presumed to not find them unconstitutional in the absence of a clear and mandatory unnecessary find g that's why this court issued rule eighteen because there would be a presumption against findings of unconstitutionality otherwise we would be faced with numerous cases where there are implicit or inferential constitutional challenges in regards to the claim that this court can look to the context of the proceeding and can take into account the defendant's sensing then memorandum sensibly claiming that the statute was unconstitutional as applied to the defendants the danger of such a claim is that that would allow this court or other court to declare that findings are made in the absence of an explicit finding by the court simply because a particular party a spouse for a particular ruling that's never been the doctrine of jurisprudence in this state or any other state that i know of because instead we don't allow the parties to define what the issues are we allow the courts to decide what the rulings are the my opponent here would ask this court to look solid at what the it is the defendant was asserting to  one also while it is true that the sistani did not respond in writing to the memorandum the record is absolutely clear that the state's attorney pointed out to judge lane explicitly the three cases from the illinois appellate court post miller explaining why the statute was constitutionally applied to adult defendants who are found guilty under an accountability theory and so while it is true is my counsel's as opposing counsel stated that miller itself never says that it is explicitly limited the rule t juveniles the miller opinion does talk about the base of the holding the unique convergence of the three statutes the appellate court has explicitly held that that the miller rule is defined based upon the juvenile status of the defendant judge lane couldn't avoid that he had to follow that rule of law he chose not to in this case and finally as to the question of whether or not we can ask for mandamus this case i just wish to point out to the court that counsel's argument would really put the state between a rock and a hard place so in this case we were faced with the decision to be made within thirty days we filed within thirty days on a motion for leave to file a writ of mandamus the same date that would have been due for a notice of appeal and looking at the record knowing the law as demonstrated by this court and rule eighteen there is no basis to believe that there was a fine even constitutionality and counsel has conceded that nothing in the record shows an explicit finding of unconstitutionality nothing in the record shows compliance with rule eighteen and the natural life sentence as required by statute thank you thank you