mr levin may proceed when he's ready good morning again your honor my name is james levon for the record i represent the defendant george bailey your honor the police stop the car in this case because the occupants mr bailey who was a passenger in the car and the driver were not wearing seatbelts the police did not observe any other traffic infractions the question here or the first question here is whether the seat seat belt law permits the police to investigate the person seatbelt violation a warrant check in this case doesn't qualify as such a search warrant or inspection and is prohibited how do the courts interpret the meaning of the statute well mr bailey and state agree on the rules of statutory construction we need to look at the statutory language the court is not to read any exceptions and limitations in the statute that are not found in the statute if the word of a word in is not defined in the statute the court is to look at it dictionary for the popular really understood meaning of the word now in terms of applying these rules of statutory construction that's where the state mr bailey disagree stay argues that the seat belt law in effect codified her follows fourth amendment shore's prudence and i would argue that that's a loop in a rony is interpretation in the application the rules of statutory construction the stench doesn't contain any language i dotting the fourth amendment or adopting fourth amendment jurisprudence the state phrase is the issue is whether or not it's a warrant check is an unconstitutional search but there is no exception for unconstitutional searches within the language of the statute the statute per hit its searches and inspections not just those that are deemed to be unconstitutional under current fourth or more minute jurisprudence as i do ask this court to apply both terms search and inspection now what the state argues in this case is that we should apply the meaning of searches the u s supreme court has applied the term with respect to unconstitutional searches and what i'm asking simply is this court just apply dictionary definition of search the state sites in its brief the cardinal case and in the kind of cases u s supreme court case they cite a dictionary definition of the word and that's precisely what i'm asking this court to do i'm asking the court to apply this cherry definition of the word search oh i respectfully submit that the state has made a jump and it's reasoning by arguing that just because  define search within it in the case that that means that that that fourth amendment sure is prudence is have the will to the meaning of a state statute i'm arguing that it's simply based purely on the language of the statu as this court has an all or all courts have done in the past they've applied traditional and historical rules of statutory construction interpret the plain language of the statue with no exceptions read into the statutes  so i am applying what a dictionary definition of search or inspect and means of checking over of information and investigation and under those terms a warrant check does qualify as a search even know this court in harris two is construed it has construed a warrant check is not to be not to be an unconstitutional search of the stache is different because  the legislature did not use the word unconstitutional and did not mention the fourth amendment so we don't need to reach the issue of what is not unconstitutional search we just reached the first issue what is a search so  harris to understand that your argument if i understand it would suggest that the argument that that search does not implicate the fourth amendment would not apply here because this is the not the kind of search that we're talking about  word unconstitutional search they use the word unlawful search so on lawful search connect compas unconstitutional searches and it can also encompasses searches that are illegal on or under state statute unlawful is the key term and i believe if the state is reading into the statute unconstitutional i believe there would be a violation of this statutory intent the statute specifically uses the word unlawful and not unconstitutional  the historical rules of statutory construction that has applied in every single case and that is what do the words of the statute mean and how do they apply in the case at hand the question is not whether the federal constitution provides more protection the same protection or less protection the question solely what do the words mean and how do they apply and i discussed that at length in my briefs and i also cited people versus campbell where the courts interpret a states the actu and a state rule not any state constitutional provision and determined that it should be applied and it's were pretty independently of federal constitutional doctrine involved the four a one rights and the court held unanimously that this court should be interpret the state statute independently of federal constitutional doctrine so implying the meaning of the have an adverse effect of producing instability in the law because it's quite possible that and let's take a look sample that we could balance decision the supreme court decision that did put our law in the state of flux because instability in our own state law so what i'm suggesting here is that it seek this court interpret state law independently of federal law this court is a sovereign in its own sphere and cannot be overruled and have its decisions modif words you know i don't unless a court has any questions on that i'd like to go to the federal constitutional issue and in the federal constitution we have the the belton case what happened here is haftar the warrant check turned up  police can search the interior of the car as contemporary or contemporaneously with the arrest of a recent occupant of the motor vehicle but there is a dispute on the court as to whether there's a rod or nero version of belton to be apply lida and i i ask you a question yes i did read the brief and i thought that your description of the history was compelling in its way but my question before we we're arc upon the journey through that again is even assuming that there is a debate on the court on this issue and there clearly as you pointed out doesn't it isn't the law still remaining at the united states supreme court level where it constitutional law because we believe that the court itself will do it at some point in the future i don't think that would be a principled reason to rule on the case my reasoning is not that elton should be overruled because this court doesn't have the authority to do it at least as the federal preserved but he says it should only be applied in the type of situation that was handed belton that means that where there is reasonable cause leader something incriminating in the car some other words about bright line rule applies crib construes belton it's an issue that's undecided by the supreme court in fact and for no for the case or for a footnote to the case they say that we do not settle the issue today i've whether or not a person safety prevent the destruction of evidence and whether or not the defendant whether or not the object of the search is within the immediate presence of the defendant arrested and if we apply those principles set forth that want to wait once in a case and hand the answer must well that they will name picked officers they will they will call for a case by case determination that's exactly what i'm asking the court instead of applying a bright line rule because one a late one calls for a case by case analysis and that's what i'm asking for under the facts of the case the driver the car was also escorted outside the car was under the custody of an officer there are two officers involved and one officer custody and mr bailey other officer had leslie i trust the illinois constitutional issue and i know that we have the limited lockstep doctrine and there is the presumption that federal law will apply but this court can deviate from locks if the defendant shows that a very strong to tradition of our courts require such a deviation and we do have that in this case our tradition for ever in our tradition cases to apply case by case analysis instead of a bright line rule we had that tradition under the one nine hundred sixty four sketchup that's one thing the court should look at we have that tradition and walk ins louison and chanelle which were all seventy constitution was passed well let's look at it on a case by case basis to determine whether there was reasonable cause to believe that the person could grab a weapon or evidentiary item inside the car or whether there was reasonable cause to believe there's something incriminating in the car in this case we don't have anything incriminating the car that the defendant can reach and therefore the defense counsel trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel in failing to file a motion to quash arrest and suppress evidence and i would asses court to reverse mr bailey's conviction and remand for a new trial without the incriminating evidence thank you mr lemon thank you sanders when you're ready from the office the attorney general on behalf of the people at the outset it is important to bear in mind that defendants claim is grounded in the sixth amendment right to effective assistance of counsel this is not a fourth amendment case and so in order to prevail he has to show there's a reasonable probability that such a motion would be granted and that's in fact where his claim falls apart defendant can't meet this burden because the statutes here that he relies upon the seat belt statute in section  suppress on those grounds wouldn't have succeeded and therefore counsel cannot have been impacted in effect for failing to  statute has to be given is ordinary and popularly understood meaning which is the meaning it happens in the fourth amendment in article one section six of our state constitution and other words the statutory meaning of search is contiguous with the constitutional meaning of search and so defined it's clear that the warrant check here was not a search and defendant didn't have any reasonable expectation of privacy in the arrest more although he may have hoped to be had no right to conceal the existence statutory construction such as dictionary and general tenets of statutory construction do not yield a defendant meaning of inspected sure on the one hand to tenants of statutory construction suggest that the word inspect interpreted to mean any kind of police review or examination or evaluation and construction like that would prohibit not only morning checks expedition warrant checks but also common police practices like evaluating demeanor of a suspect or skin for objects in plain view or smelling drugs or alcohol on or about a defendant or passenger lists on leaves that brings the question to mind if in fact i think this the facts of this case is none because everyone i mean are you saying that the statute permits it warren checked for all those who didn't have a seat belt or those who did you know had a seat had to have a seat belt or all of them didn't find me and if the proof of one person had a seatbelt then you would run a check on that person which is on the person who was wearing the seat belt yes i believe it would be permissible yes certainly the officer could ask for the identification and if the person who was wearing say the passenger was wearing the seat belt if they in fact complied the officer could run them or in china because again a warrant check doesn't click disclose any kind of private information and has no reasonable expectation in the privacy and you not see any rap was based on under the statute not wearing a seatbelt but if one person was it doesn't insulate anyone else in the car from regular yes the the the basis of running the warrant check nobody is trying to justify that by reason of the fact that there was a c it's just routine police procedure that they're allowed to it doesn't implicate the fourth amendment as long as the seizure is not under reason in any way just disperse various hypotheticals isn't the right answer rule it really doesn't make any difference because if they've gotten the name they could have but they could have done a for seatbelt statute because that was explaining earlier used to have secondary enforcement of the seatbelt statute that meant the police could not stop you for seatbelt violation but they could cite you for it if in fact they had stopped you for it they really like your argument you made reference to other other other facts that could exist that would justify further action by the police you refer that there were other activities there were other actions or other things that could have existed demeanor of the driver that sort yeah that could have resulted in a proper search right and so we construed inspect to prohibit that sort of any kind of police review or examination it would lead to an absurd result if you look if you could live it the officer knew the  the driver was in there something about the criminal background is an example i don't know that that would put you out is your question is whether it was actually knew that that he had gone to court or without and whether that would be a search or inspection by virtue of the fact that had just prior knowledge no i don't see how that could fit within the definition of search or when the when the legislature to legislate debates on this sanction the senator the senator coalition was the bill sponsor he explained that he just wanted to reassure people that by moving from secondary to primary and forstmann he doesn't give law enforcement officers any that there was a stop for a violation of the seat belt law for the officer to reach second hearing foresman i'm sad to be some other fact in the case other than simply stopping the car because it was a seatbelt violation and moving for the search we all agree that that would be would be an improper threat so they have there has to be something that is described in the word soul would this be something beyond solely this they have to use that particular word you can't do any you can't do these things solely based upon your eyes for the yes this is going to be out there has to be some other factor in this case you would say yes but the other factor is that there was a proper warrant check revealed the war you have to reassure them that they couldn't be searched in addition to citation virtually the legislative history you can see that the legislature didn't intend to make any change to existing jurisprudence all they intend to do again it's reassure people that by moving from secondary to primary and forstmann of the seat belts that you police officers were not now going to be search establishing an exception to the fourth amendments warrant requirement for searches incident to arouse and that really confers no protection beyond the fourth amendment or the state constitution not the statutes reproduced in page two of the blue brief and you can see that the language is permissive it lists the purposes for which police may conduct warrantless searches but it doesn't place any limit on their conduct here the statute here has to be warrantless search incident to arrest belton and bailey to find the area within the person's immediate presence as the passenger compartment of the vehicle the birth of the statute permits searches for evidence related to an offense it doesn't sta law defender really provides no support for his argument that  regarding both the defendant statutory contentions as the court noted earlier there is no exclusionary rule apply couple the statutory violations and defend it really fair is no better under the statutory exclusionary argument under the code of criminal the c procedure because it applies to quote those aggrieved by an unlawful search and seizure and that tends to call it a mind again the constitutional exclusionary rule or excuse me the exclusionary rule of political the constitutional violation incident of the grass search the passenger compartment the vehicle and in so holding the court rejected the very proposition advanced by defendant here that one tees handcuffed and seated in the back of a cruiser that there is no longer any justification for the search was conducted thorton recently reaffirmed belton although my opponent argues that since it's there is no majority opinion there are now actually there were five justices in the majority justice o'connor concurred in that opinion as to all that footnote force that in fact there is a majority opinion thorton reaffirmed belton and unless and until the supreme court overturns justified under belton and this court's decision in bailey defense counsel really had no basis on which to file a motion to suppress and there's no reasonable probability that a motion to suppress it of succeeding and significantly here the court to note that by asking this court to mary in finally as to state constitutional issue the search area the vehicle search incident to arrest was also constitutional under a state constitution this court adopted belton and bailey reaffirmed that whole thing in stamen and if there were any question as to whether the state already adopted it we would adopt it under limited locks them the general rule and to limit lockstep being that state constitution means what the federal constitution means with exceptions of course for where the language of the state constitution is different or something about something that debate sort of a delicate indicates like a contrary intent or where there's a longstanding state tradition of preexisting state are the fourth amendment means and a country to defend its argument really belton does not conflict with preexisting jurisprudence belton is just an extension seized and destroy but that was difficult to apply in the context of the automobile search incident to arrest situations to what bell did is simply to craft a bright line rule to apply it's a belt and it's simply an application of the sheer number and does not in fact without merit and if there are no further questions we ask that the court affirmed the judgment the public have to satisfy two prongs one being that the motion would probably have been granted or we place ourselves in the position of the trial judge at the time the motion was presumed would have been presented in two a my argument is if if the court does apply fourth amendment jurisprudence to this case it's going solace because how does the legislature know what the law is going to be some future unknown time they plied the inquiry and in harris one the court held that the that the warrant check would impermissibly change the fundamental nature of the stop so that's why it's my position my first position is a score to apply the plain language statute independently of the fourth amendment in the alternative if the court does apply the fourth and then it should be consolidates because that's what the legislature intended to codified at the time it passed the civil law if says also thornton i believe is two thousand and five and the legislature passed in them in two thousand and three so my position is that you know that interpretation delton always existed  and if we look at the facts of belton we don't have the defendant who was placed in the back seat of a squad car arrested in handcuffs that wasn't the situation the facts of belton were one police officer and four occupants of a car arrested outside the car so we weren't faced with that issue in that case and the fact of the matter is the police in this case in the end belton did have reasonable cause to believe there were drugs in the car because they found drugs outside the car like to address your honor chief justice fitzgerald's question to state could the police officer reliant demeanor or could if we saw officer knew a rely on what he knew about his personal background let's say the police officer knew this person that he stopped and recognized him as you know perhaps being dangerous or something of that matter and i would argue that's outside of the statute i would agree that that's not a search i agree with the state because anything that's in plain view within the car anything that the police officer what officer walks over that a car and sees marijuana plants in a car let's say or see something criminal being in the car then that in itself would give him reasonable cause to go and search the car arizona hicks's provide supreme court provides a very good illustration of this what's in plain view is not a search so there's no search or inspection within the meaning of the seatbelt law by doing something that's in plain view plain view is not a search so up here and this raises another question there's got to be something other than a seatbelt law violation to justify the warrant check in the search and here we don't have anything we just have a seat belt law that the police cannot stop a car for seatbelt violation and the legislators were very concerned about the expansion of police powers what they wanted to do was make sure that people safety were safety was protected so they had an  illegal but under this new laws the state argues they have the right to stop and get an id run a warrant check in and search the car that constitutes a very large increase and expansion of police powers that was not  by the legislature so they wanted to reshoot reassure the people that the seatbelt laws would not expand police powers to do a search and that's exactly what the state is arguing in this state is the warrant check found war with they have a right to defend it with name if they did a warrant check and that one check was legally found his name within reasonable time yeah if they found a warrant check search to the car they won't be able expand the search the car based on the issues two three and four i race the court of criminal procedure belts and in the all my constitution plus the general gist of the legislative the tent underlying seat belt law i'm not limiting it to two three issues two three four under issue one there's a general idea there is a sudden senator cullerton state you don't want to see belt law to be used as a pretext for people the police to be going into people's cars and that's exactly what happened in this case i also like to address an issue that your honor just as thomas raised about the possibly applying the ballasts to the code of criminal procedure does the language does the state statute have to follow the interpretation of the fourth amendment and that the state argued something in their argument that the you have to show under a limited lockstep show that the language is difference in order to justify deviation well one of weight one is far different as far different language then the fourth amendments you know like constitution has very similar language but the fifth one a white one doesn't have any justifies it but deviation i don't think the limit of lockstep should apply at all because i just think that the historical tradition rules this court is applied in every case says that the courtship simply apply the plain language and to determine four five seven