here the last issue of whether the this report abuse of discretion by denying the motion to amend i don't think we have many questions on that basically this comes down to the st issue that the district court properly applied their jerseys  doctor and necessaries and did they will credit opportunity act pre amps the doctor the necessaries of it does apply so once you begin with that st issue yes your honor your honor the issue is whether there's a conflict between the credit opportunity act and the necessary stock train that was created by the new jersey supreme court in one thousand nine hundred decision we can attend that it does the whole purpose of that traditional doctrine was to treat a husband and wife st of all no pies to people who are married nd it attempts it was based on the belief that the pardons to a marriage consider themselves a single financial unit the purpose of the equal credit opportunity act was was to dispel that notion to specifically provide that they would be treated individually so we have a situation where you have a judicial doctrine that is based on marital status and to directly conflicts with the purpose of equal credit opportunity act which was to segregate the people now the practical effect of this is pretty widespread is that there is an case law that supports the ip or and also the regulations and self's it suggests that this is incidental credit that would be covered there is there's no basis once you get to the credit level there's no basis there's nothing involved professionally or any sort of learned profession that's involved in the purposes of collecting a debt or establishing or administer in that so while the rationale for learn exception learned profession exceptions might exist in connection with whether you're disputing the amount of the debt or or you know whether the services should have been provided those plans in a professional questions the ministerial acts of billing and collecting on those debts has nothing to do with the professional services that's something that's done by every business every day there is nothing unique to professionals that would cause this to be treated any differently been any better political professionals cannot operate without that overhead type expenses or any other business that so is not not part of the expense it is part of the expense your honor but my point is that when you create a learned professional exception to something it's because you're recognizing that analyzing it might cause you to have to employ a professional to write a progression or in other words if i was disputing that the services provided were not necessary by an attorney that would get into an analysis of their professional qualifications the bill that they send has nothing no actually needs to it if i'm not contesting the amount of the bill or the necessity that led to the bill if i'm just addressing how they're approaching collection of that bill there's nothing you need to professionals that would call into question or require any sort of special analysis that's my baby or you can you're going to charge them obviously there is normally a presumption against preemption and so you're arguing expressed preemption applies to extensions of credit and it doesn't cover sharing of spousal liability after the debt is incur well and that's part of the issue here is it's a little bit different and a situation when we're dealing with a bank because this is judicially created doctrine so we don't have the normal situation of a bank might ask him to sign what's happened with the hospital's not extending credit i mean the question is something was a service was performed and we're talking about a guest roughly one thousand five hundred eighty dollars altogether and the question here is under new jersey law you have something called the doctor the necessaries that says that the spouse can be liable in that circumstance for something that's necessary and i don't see how the act expressively the federal act expressly overrides the new jersey doctrine your honor i would tend to agree i am relying on conflict preemption which is basically describing when a state law conflicts with federal law such a compliance with both state and federal regulations is and more of a conflict preemption it's the goal  the purpose of the credit opportunity act as to marital discrimination was to establish them as separate units and the problem you have here is you've got in essence a head in potential liability under this necessar dr i understand we're only here about one thousand five hundred and eighty dollars your honor what if the bill was fifty thousand dollars suddenly that spouse who did not incur vist at now has a liability created by judicial doctrine that not only effects her belly to obtain credit but could affect her creditors as well because the old but the only way to get around this new jersey doctrine is the federal law here the  provisions of state law because this is a conflict preemption and under that provision there's two provisions in particular under subsection one first is requires or permits a practice or act for it by the act we would  each spouse individual and voluntarily applies for such credit in this situation the only evidence is that mr clott when and and obtained services and the credit associated with those services th applicants and how it's not just clots and applicant well and the applicant that raises another issue is whether it's applicants and whether extends to guarantors or not how this is set up it appears to some degree that she's considered the guarantor of this debt and that's the debate hawkins case which was the th circuit case that rejected the idea that she would guarantee or should be considered an applicant went to the supreme court circuit who ruled against it but at the time there were only eight justices do so it was affirmed by afford a poor margin this court in silversmith previously had to dress and adopt it and that the regulation that was the subject of the hawkins case was reasonable and therefore they were you were going to nice that provision or that regulation that said that a guarantor should be treated the same way as an applican there's no question this is an unusual ration because this isn't a situation where parties are going in and asking for credit specifically you know one's being asked to sign documents and whether or not the spouse this is all comes back to  court case that says look we're going to send liability to you so in that framework the question becomes a job mishal doctrine that simply is base that applies to no one other than someone who is married whether or not and  applies to their financial condition and kinda have when initially when i asked you about who's the creditor and you said the hospital's a creditor because this debt is incidental credit doesn't that doesn't that fact that it's incidental point they usually with issues about whether someone's asked to sign a particular guarantee or not again we're not talking about a situation where there's a guarantee keep them out it's only iraq is a violation of  logs no there's no news no ability to reject this current stance what if a spouse didn't want to be liable under this judicial stock then they cannot exclude themselves that means whatever the spouse incur in debt will now become a debt that not only attacks you not treated spouses credit but again it will also affect their creditors again you know it recognizing that we're dealing with the small  there's no limits on this particular doctor or as it's read if he had a one million dollars bill she would be alive and so how's that affect her ability to get credit which was the purpose of of the meant to accomplish well your honor respectfully i don't think you can pay talking about the practical impact that if i get if i'm going to entitle to obtain my own credit then everything that affects my credit does impact the ability to go out and get my own credit if for instance if this person were not in that that that is so  also basically their argument would be that the was there an attempt to exhaust collection efforts against either obviously mr cloth suit now deceased or his estate that's correct  it was a service they got an indent january of eighteen correct that would be eight months not not eighteen i'm sorry yes you're correct eight months but even with that with that the state did have to file that should have been paid d under new jersey state law d so with that being said i think we provide it based upon a lack of fact that there's no assertion that there is actual addressing the signature rule and here's the point he said last we would have the right be consensus and no credit we would have the right to demand a signature from the b b spouse that may be true the problem we have here is there is the it also implies that the spouse could refuse that there is no opportunity here for a spouse refuse the signature it's just created a liability for that person with no action and no right to reject the credit on their part that's what the doctor unless a serious about both spouses are liable d for necessary expenses incurred by either spouse in the course of the marriage and medical expenses are explicitly covered by this doctor i agree your honor but in the context of the book credit opportunity act which attempts to segregate the marital unit into two separate people with a separate this provision does not allow for this and he spouse to reject credit that they don't want that would have an adverse effect on their stand their ability to paint credit in their own name either be terms of seeking credit and having a collection item appear on their credit report or even just report it as as wide deliberate so the problem that oftentimes what happens is you have this opaque law and then you have an agency by regulation attempting to in effect write new law into it and i don't see how that regulation necessarily covers what the text of the statute seems to say in terms of not not being involved not preempting the new jersey doctor well i i i understand your honor but my point is that there is a specific provision and put it simply the in regards to be issue of marital status was an attempt to split the credit between the parties to that marriage green birdsey stat the new jersey judicial doctrine says it's based on the belief that they should be treated as the single primarily human those that's the conflict whether you look at the c f r or not but there's there's a conflict here because you have a credit situation that affects the other spouse soley on the basis of marriage the other issue your honour's just briefly just two other issues one is whether or not i mean if the whole idea of the only thing that the case says is that you have to pursue the remedies against the st person the person who's live on the debt before you can p person what the details of batter not laid out the case what that means whether whether you can jump to the conclusion that it's this person's and that it missed without some showing or at least explanation to the spouse whether or not the statement that you're in getting this without any explanation or examination of that and then finally the issue relating to be amended complaint which was the issue of whether or not there was what dollar amount  we'll take the matter under advisement