good morning may have pleased the court paul hughes for defendants talents in adopting the active issue the general assembly authorized the attorney general and the state's attorneys to bring a claim and authorized interested persons to bring a claim although much of this law was modeled on the state false claims out the use of the term interested person is a clear departure from it the f c a allows for actions by persons but this act is limited to only those persons who are quote unquote interested the fundamental statutory interpretation question presented here is whether the term interested has meaning in the statute that is whether it narrows the range of individuals who may bring a lawsuit the plaintiff fundamental point in saying that interested is quote descriptive not restrictive is to assert that the word interested should not do any limiting work in the statute that contention is incorrect and we think there are at least four key reasons why interested serves to narrow the range of persons who may sue first one of the most fundamental principles of statutory construction is all of the words of the general assembly uses should have meaning words should not be disregarded especially when there departures from what the general assembly has done in other statutes second again the point is this the contrasts from the f c a is distinct if the legislature had wanted to model the scope and breadth of the f c a it had that language available to it the rd interested is such an important term that it appears in both the title of the relevant section as well as in this dr torrey tax to be clear we're not suggesting that the court should limit the scope of the statute based on the title but that this was not  accidental use of language but was so important it's replicated in both the statutory language and the text and th the term interested is a well established one statute often used interested to restrict the range of individuals who may bring a claim and at the time that the general assembly adopted the act in two thousand and one this court in several cases and cross range of issues had identified that interested suppl a limiting function wanted it modifies who is able to bring a claim in court once the court reaches the conclusion that the term interested has meaning then defendant should prevail plaintiff just can't  construe the statute in a way that supplies independent meaning to interested and in fact we really don't think they attempted to give separate meaning to that term by contrast with the anchor the meaning of the term in this court's longstanding construction of the statutory language and that's one standing interpretation construction of the general assembly would have been well aware of in two thousand and one when it adopted the language that is used here now this is this approach is also appropriate because it accords with the statute stated purpose of being remedial in nature and it also avoids what we think are very serious constitutional concerns if this statute were given much broader and more expansive scope now construed as plan of surge i think this would be a rather unusual statute it would allow an injured person to bring a claim against one private company intending it to fraud it another private company but in that context there is no loss to the public fest unlike in the f c a context here so this is not a situation as in the f c a context where there is a peculiar injury that's being claimed by the state rather the state's sole interest is  of a sovereign interest and we think that when the interest is that of the sovereign and not the states became your interest is when it's especially important for there to be the the role of the attorney general and the state's attorneys in identifying the claims in the range of claims that should be brought in the management of those claims so to further turn to our statutory argument interested is of course the critical word in the statute that y and we think that this word must be given fundamental meaning so that the st step we think in the statutory analysis is does interested the word interested supply independent meaning to the statute or can we sort of somehow look over this term and looks just persons so we think interest it has to have meaning that comes from the canon again surplusage that we need to give intent to the words that the legislature use and not disregard those fundamental terms the distinction from the f form of retaliation but the breath of section forty he is quite poor hot it protects against a range of activities investigation initiation testimony and assistance notably none of those are going and filing a lawsuit none of those indicate on the face that an employee will be interested person but one can easily imagine a range of situations in which an employee whistleblower aids in the investigation or the initiation provides testimony or offers assistance to the party who is in fact an interested person who brings that claim and so the the section forty of the inside retaliation provision has very extensive a fact and would preclude a company that is the target of one of these lawsuits from retaliating against any employee who shares information either with the state attorneys or the attorney general an individual employee could certainly as a whistleblower approach the state's attorney or the attorney general with information that could lead to the initiation of a lawsuit or assistance or provide testimony or additionally an employee could approach a company or an individual who is in fact injured in the context of one of these claims and section forty would provide protection to that whole range of circumstances the appellate court was of the view that we our interpretation would essentially shrink section forty to have no in fact and we just simply think that's not true would have very substantial effect even as we interpret the statute now that that takes to another point that the plaintiffs emphasize in their brief asserting that we limit the range of individuals who could suit only insurance companies and we want to be clear that that is by no stretch our position we explained in the reply brief that there are a whole host of other individuals in addition to insurance companies who will qualify as interested persons this includes not just self insured entities that are specifically protected under some of the predi to mention but also a range of individuals so for example one of the statutes way identify precludes fraud against medical providers individual doctors who may be a defect into providing services based on false representations about insurance coverage or things like that would have a range of claims to bring and that's just one example there are many more individual policyholders if there is fraud on them would have a claims throughout all of these underlying predicate statutes that they could bring there's a wide range of individuals who will in fact be injured so we agree with our colleagues representing the plaintiffs that this is not limited to insurance companies but it is limited to those who have an interest at the outset that is that they have a preexisting injury so we think that is a pretty critical piece for understand the statute but the fact that the statute does give only one example of what an interested party is an insurance company that that is a prototypical injured party that is only further confirmatory evidence that interested person is identifying a range of individuals who do in fact have direct injury and are not someone who is effectively a volunteer who may have some information and want to bring a claim but doesn't have a personal stake at the outset of the case now i think the plaintiffs also suggest the argument that if they  individual meets the other requirements of the act that that renders them interested but that really does would negate all meaning of interested because then the statute would be the exact same if the range of individuals who could sue are persons regardless of interested persons the word interested under that interpretation would do absolutely no work in the context of the statute and we think that's where there's a fundamental problem and interested is not just a sort of random word that the general assembly chose interested is a longstanding word that's been used throughout statutes to identify a subset of individuals who in fact you have injury we pointed the court we think it's very important line of cases this is the underground contractors and then several cases that this court has subsequently decided citing back to underground contractors to understand what interested me in the scope of the declaratory judgment act but that's that's far from all the probate laws the dead man's acts we  list those in the brief and it's a consistent term fuselage now one point that some of the unique he made is they pointed to other statutes the employee classification act for example in the employment of illinois workers on public works act trying to  that interested could be used more broadly but what's notable about those acts is st when they define interested it just to sell french referential turns back to saying somebody who's interested so it doesn't suggest that there's a broader interpretation but there's very clear decisive evidence in those acts that the cause of action in both of those acts are limited to those individuals quote whose rights have been violated under this act so those acts are consistent with all of the range of civil causes of action that the general assembly provides that are limited for example the state rico offense as well as the only consumer fraud and deceptive business practices act all of the civil claims civil causes of action under these acts are tightly limited to those individuals who have their own injury they have a basis independent of a sovereign injury to assert a claim for standing we think that again what's funneling this is fundamentally missing here and the  basis of what the general assembly did was clear in the language that he used my colleagues also point to the floor statements identifying the individuals sue and i just want be clear we don't deny that individuals can sue because there are a range of individuals that can in fact be interested much has also been made about this act having been modeled on california legislation we don't think that truly moves the needle here because none of the legislative materials california really shed any light on this interpretive question but more than that none of this material was put before the general assembly and what we know what was before the general assembly was the text of this particular legislation and how this court had understood the use of the same terms in other analogous settings we think that's the best evidence of what the legislature intended again that colleagues have had focus pretty substantially on an intermediate california court case  again that was not a case that the that subsequently post stated that the general assembly is an accident of this legislation so it certainly kind of born on the legislative intent that's at issue here but most critically the argument that we're advancing to the role of the statutory term interested simply was neither argued nor briefed in that case and so given the court didn't have the argument that we're presenting to this court about the limitation interested places very substantial role in in the context of this statute as we interpret it now if we were incorrect about that statutory argument and the word interested doesn't impose any restriction or restraint on the range of individual who can sue we think that would then lead to a substantial constitutional concern under article five  section fifteen of the state constitution that limits the role of representing the state to the attorney general now we appreciate that our colleagues rest heavily on this court's decisions keady looking to the state false claims act we think the critical distinction here is that that case in the f c a addressed a peculiar interest injury to the state where the state is acting in a capacity that is equivalent to civil parties and where civil parties can assign a claim for they're picking damages from one to another and insurance company for example that's interested could certainly assign out claims that it has for damages against  parties to another who may want to vindicate those rights so the can the nature of the controls that are appropriate and accord with section fifteen of the constitution ensuring that the attorney general has the appropriate common law duties that accord in that context the f c a context carry injury we think are markedly different from the range of controls that are necessary when what the state is asserting or that the claim is asserting is that of a sovereign interest that is protecting the public at large and not protecting the public fisker this the state is acting in a capacity that's equivalent to that of a private party and the this court's decision in alliance i think i especially instructive on this point in lyons the court explained that quote the attorney general as an elected representative the citizens of the state is responsible for evaluating the evidence and other pertinent factors determine what actions if the any could  properly be taken and what penalty should be sought why thinks important about this passage in lyons is it acquaints the importance of the attorney general to the tourney general speaking on behalf of the people as an elected representative the citizens the need for can tight control by the attorney general is enhanced when the action is representing just sovereign interests in the sauber an injury to the state as opposed to when the state is acting in more of a private party capacity as i described with peculiarly interest so we think that is a very fundamental reason why section fifteen would not permit the transfer of the state's sovereign injury from the state to an uninsured private relator and again that's what  makes this case quite different than what this court held in this key decision but turning back again we think the court need not reach these difficult questions under article five section fifteen by just a straightforward understanding text of the the legislature use in adopting this act giving interested it's plain ordinary meaning that meaning that has been given throughout statutes that the general assembly has adopted will resolve this good morning your honor centrally why song for the whistleblower relator in this case suing on behalf of the state of illinois we are here to address two questions regarding the auto insurance claims five prevention act in the st question is the issue of statutory interpretation and that is when the legislature chose to include a key tam provision in this act who did they intend to authorize to bring suit and the answer is anyone with information can bring suit to help the state fight fraud defendants try to read into the statute a limitation that requires a personal injury by the relator and that is not what the legislature going to they did not write a private right of action an injured party that's not what this statute is is a key tam statute that by definition involves the interest of the state asserting the rights of the public and in harnessing the power of a whistleblower later to do that its interpretation would turn the words interested person into a loophole and would effectively limit these claims to insurers it writes the key town provision out of the statute and has the constitutional issue there's no doubt that the legislature has the authority to pass this statute the general assembly can pass any law not barred by the constitution and no constitutional provision prohibits this statute it is constitutional under the direct application of this court's case sketchy vs u b s that upholds the key town mechanism under illinois law and so to address the statutory issue st there is no doubt but this statute authorizes individuals with information to sue if the key provision interested person is limited to insurers then section fifteen interested person including an insurer is redundant then section forty about related would make no sense the section twenty five ouy that excludes relator who planned the frog would never apply read as a whole there is no other way to read the statute is unambiguous that individuals can sue and the dispute here is that defendants want to add a requirement that the violator was personally injured that personal injury requirement is wrong it makes no sense and cannot be reconciled with the language of the law it is antithetical to a key tam statute a phrase notably opposing counsel didn't mention once in his argument because he's hiding from the obvious words on the page that this is a classic  private right of action for insurers they have plenty of remedies already they can supercharge will damage is already under section ten dollars that was written for insurers who were harmed they didn't write a law here for insurers are armed they write it like they wrote  heats ham law because what the government needs what the insurers need is the information relayed as possess and that's the problem the legislature is trying to solve here now defendants insist in their reasoning here today that they too will let individuals who they have to because the law is unambiguous but if you look at the examples they cite it reveals the absurdity of their position right they point in the reply brief to a self insured entity so proprietor suing because they were defrauded but that's just an insurer suing as an insurer it doesn't reconcile section fifteen's redundancy doesn't deal with the employee relations or retaliation provisions action then they point to the policyholder they mention it again here today citing the mets case who was subject to a false or fraudulent appraisal but your honors that doesn't violate the only fraud prevention act it's based on the mets case in california as part of the california penal dollars that we don't have here there so grasping at straws they point to a mistake that could never even be brought under this law and then they point to the patient perhaps a patient where the doctor was paid a kickback and say well if the patient paid a co pay then they can sue right that's the personal financial harm but if there's no co pay then the patient can't sue how does that make any sense the co pay of the patient doesn't change the state's interest it doesn't change the state's harm to the fraud it doesn't explain how the patient is going to have any useful information about a kickback and more to the point very rule your honor would say that the real whistleblower in that situation the person who worked for the doctor and saw all the kickbacks the insider with the information maybe even documentation that person can't sue that is the problem they cannot avoid with their argument they should not matter whether lawyers can and magine a handful of hypothetical individuals who meet their definition because the question is who the legislature intended and who they wrote a statute to authorize problem with defendants with the opposing sounds argument as they said today here and there fatally wrong the legislature they claim was writing in contrast to the false claims act when referring to the public code or some other idea they're grasping for some meaning of the word interested that serve purposes but we know that's not true we know what the words came from it's undisputed in this case these words came from california they were copied word for word from section eight hundred and seventy one point seven the california surance code defendants admitted it below in the court they put it in their papers the legislative history is clear the floor statements are clear the task force that wrote the report and that report was before the legislator is clear you can put the law side by side it's not a deviation from the false claims act it's a copy of the california statute and we know that california there courts don't require personal injury either the head case set it this is a key tam statute by definition relator does not need its own personal injury the california courts are unanimous on that point they say all have was a more recent case but there interpret in the same language in the same law here and the california supreme court denied review in that case strassmann case says the same thing no other california cases ever said to work with and under the control of the attorney general to assert the state's interest because that's what this is about this is not about an insurer getting an additional remedy this is about the public arm of insurance fraud that everybody pays consumers pay billions of dollars have a fraud bureau right because the legislature wouldn't create one what they did instead they because they didn't want to pay for the state agency or additional funds they created this statute because it's a more efficient and effective way to harness the power of individual to help the state fight fraud you can look just to the statute you don't read a word in isolation you read the statute as a whole in light of its context and purpose and there is no sensible reading of this statute that person can't sue you have written the key time statute where they have written a gate and provision out of this statute it cannot be what was written by the legislature and so the language is right there in section fifteen the relator is the person with the court material and evidence information fraud that is who can sue and that is what this statute authorizes and the question then becomes under the constitution can they do it and there is no doubt the legislature can pass any law not prohibited by a provision of the constitution we presume statutes are constitutional and the defendants do not and have not identified a provision of the constitution the bars this law until now today they stood up and said this is about article five section fifteen that wasn't the challenge they dropped below that wasn't the basis in the trial court right did they braised a good idea about the assignment of standing and for good reason because the article five challenge it is a nonstarter it's foreclosed by sketchy the court this court already considered bad very challenge to a key tam statute and those procedures under the false claims act are in distinguishable from this case the relator sues under seal the attorney general controls the litigation the attorney general can intervene or not intervene the attorney general controls the case either way they can exclude the relator from discovery the attorney general control settlement the current turn in general can dismiss the case the court has looked at this issue and they've looked at other setups they said you know there are different procedures sketchley says you know article twenty that wasn't good enough but this this set of procedures about is sufficient to meet the illinois constitution's requirement because every case is litigated under the effect of katrina control of the attorney general and so there is no worry about runaway road criminal prosecutors as they like t suggest because this isn't a criminal case right there is no one going to jail there will be no criminal record there is no criminal procedure by definition a key chance that it is an action a civil action for a penalty that's what this court said in statute here for ninety four dollars and by definition of crimes of the constitution these claims will always be brought under the control of the attorney general and only then when authorized by the general assembly right we know from statu there is no common law he town action you must have the authorization of the legislature they try to distinguish statute or your honors on this idea that the state's interest is different right oh they're suing under their sovereign interest instead of their fiscal interest or a harm to the fiscus i believe they said it but that's not relevant to the holding of sketchy sketches he says these are actions for civil penalties not actions for damages relator by definition has no standing that's what it means to be a key tam statute and yet they can still sue doesn't turn on a damages claim or harm to the government just either the courts that have looked at from out agency recognize that there are in fact two basis bases for government standing the sovereign injury and the proprietary injury they're federal circuit looked at these very arguments in the brooks brothers case about another ki chan statute that had no impact on the government test and they said that's ok there's no limitation they couldn't find any limitation on the state's right to use a relator whistleblower in this way and in fact the premise that sketchy and false claims act claims rely on damages to the government is wrong in the st place right this isn't about a government loss the false claims act provides an action for penalt that doesn't involve government damages we know in the bunk case and others we say that that's constitutional the premise that these cases are somehow limited to damages claims it's something they have invented out of thin air the legacy  statutes is long and this court should not be the st court to invent some kind of limitation on the authority of the legislature to use a key time statute so long as there's a statute in the general assembly signs off so long as the attorney general controls the action of the only constitution requires this is a valid law and in the end you're on a defendant's attempts is this quite clear they're trying to write this law out of existence their narrow statutory interpretation makes no sense and cannot be reconciled with the language of the law it's a key town statute that only functions if those with information can bring claims and this court should not invent a new limitation on such claims that are constitutional under the constitution and under strachan sketchy legislature had the power to write this and passed this law thank you just a few brief points to start with the statutory argument i think the fundamental issue is that plaintiffs cannot address the the problem that under their construction interested persons means the exact same thing as persons and the word interested does no work at all in that construction and it can't simply be a reference to the other limitations or the kind of range of information that one would have to bring a claim because again then the statute would be the exact same if the word was persons and not interested persons to give meaning to this legislature's purposeful use of the term interested there must be a limiting function that that term provides and if there is a limiting function i think defendants prevail because plaintiffs don't even attempt to suggest that the word has a limiting function in the context in the purpose of the statute so again basic statutory principles interested must have meaning and if it does have meaning if it serves as a limitation to the category of persons plaintiffs are outside the statutory limitation and are simply not who the statute was was written for the private cause of action now nd a plaintiff's assert again it's central to their argument that individuals can sue and we agree with we've said that quite clearly in our brief that we agree that individuals can be injured quite often by insurance fraud my friends claim that our reliance or citation to a california case is misplaced i think just overlooks that section ten point five a one is quite broad in this that would then injure the policyholder would be injured under the broad insurance fraud claim of ten dollars a one and so individuals would have a range of claims that they would be able to assert as we fully understand the act to consistent to understand why there's enhanced damages and ten dollars be consistent with the act because this with the act does is it allows those injured persons not only to bring their own claim but also to harness the power of the state and to provide information to the state litigate side by side with the state to get both their their private claim as well as the injury that they themselves have suffered litigated that though is by no stretch an indication that the act has no limitations and that term interested should be disregarded in its context again the pointing to the california cases is just not especially helpful for the plaintiffs because none of those cases not one actually has the statutory question that we've put to the court which is what does the term interested persons mean in the statutory context so again what my friends point to is various dicta in those cases that don't actually have a direct holding on what interested person means in context now moving to the constitutional limitations or briefs have been clear throughout that the reason that there is a lack of standing is because there can't be an assignment of the state's interest from the state to an injured private persons the reasons that we've always identified and these are the reasons that exist in the in the cases that we've been citing consistently from priceline to lions to rifkin to skip k t is section five article fifteen as article five section fifteen of the state constitution that's clearly been the basis from the start of our argument that there's a lack of standing here because the sovereign injury is not one that can be assigned from the state to an injured private individuals and again plaintiffs i don't think have a strong answer to the question or the point of that there's an enormous distinction when the state is acting in its peculiar capacity as a kin to any private party in the nature of assignments that are allow and understood at common law as opposed to the nature of the sovereign injury that occurs when the state is acting in its capacity as law enforcement that is to benefit the public at large and not tie the direct  claim to any specific finding of harm it's important to recognize that the claims of harm here it's never been alleged or anywhere in the complaint nor is there any suggestion that the claims of harm here have anything to do with a measure of injury to the public at large or the public fisc rather these claims are necessarily because they are completely divorced from any sort of real world injury have to be the kind of criminal penalty or punishment here that the state is trying to inflict and that's where used in this way this acts completely steps away from the remedial nature of it that is directly written into the statute and becomes a mechanism for punishment he used in that way that's where the section fifteen argument is an incredibly important because is this cory's said in lyons and elsewhere when the attorney general is exercising the sovereign authority of the people that's when it's critically important that the attorney general has the direct control over the action to be able to make the determination as to what is in the people's best interest that is lost when a uninterested volunteer is able to step into the shoes and take on this critical one foresman responsibilities now finally my colleague points the federal circuit's decision style for the brooks brothers case of addressing the falls marking statute i think there is are you a strain for a few reasons st of course it said nothing at all about the state of illinois constitutional argument that is essential to our constitutional standing point so it just doesn't have much to say there but more importantly on that and  meek in that case had raised to take care argument which would be effectively the federal equivalent to this is the kind of argument that we're making from section fifteen the federal circuit expressly declines to address the constitutionality of that argument because it wasn't briefed by the parties so not only does that not salford not address the illinois constitutional argument that's the basis of our nd claim here but it's expressly declines to assess the constitutionality of the action at issue there because it wasn't indeed raised that's the argument that we're putting to the court here that it is just simply not controlled by stealth for and certainly not controlled by scott katie because of the stench of the nature of the action again this is not a claim for kerry damages  assembly use the term interested for that to have a limiting function we've supplied the sole limitation and looking to underground contractors is where this court i think should begin and analysis in this case that establishes the general assembly knew that it was incorporating an injury requirement into the range of individuals who could sue that would make this accord with effectively every private cause of action the legislature has adopted we think that it's the express intent of the legislature in using the