sir tell me help educate me i'm not familiar with the ocean carrier aspect of regulation and competition but there are certain elements of what would be considered traditional surface transportation board and the section fifteen and antitrust division six hundred as shipping act at the federal maritime commission were no longer applicable all the  regulation of ocean transportation services and therefore hungry small discrimination was no longer prohibited the board did this even though the national transportation policy commands the board to prevent destructive competition and discriminatory r evidence showing that the h x had damages of twelve million dollars for manson and seven point five million dollars from flies in life the board for the refused to entertain the rate claim continually contending that the board was established thing involve the establishment of race standards for individual commodity rates the board did not address several key issues raised by da jack specifically the discriminatory absorption of worthing charges and its subsequent revisions are generally considered preemptive of all other federal claims unless the act itself does not provide a remedy in this case the way the i c c terminations act is structured of the national transportation policy has been interpreted by the courts to apply to discriminatory rating under the great reason the statute standard you have the equivalent of a rule of reason analysis that you would bring to bear under section one or section two kline that's correct and so is your argument that that s t v basically has ruled out those kinds of and i trust equivalent claims by its interpretation of your statute that that's correct they have more or less taking the position that that sort of conduct is no longer prohibited under the transportation regulatory statutes and therefore it is it becomes permissible the act however  retains other provisions including the common carrier duties of the quality of treatment the nondiscrimination requirements under the fall great doctrine and the reasonable rate requirements which it which is fundamentally  such an excessive pricing situation the board never even addressed any of those statutes they simply took the position well it's no longer prohibited our hands are tied  are precluded under a number of federal regulatory statutes in this case the board did not even address this issue the way the carriers had something called memorandums of understanding or and all use which were actually loyalty contracts under traditional law transportation law they withheld the public information regarding the fact that these ammo use their boy thereby enabling them to deny that they were engaging in volume pricing the fact of the matter is the shippers that were afforded the ammo use ended up with  and june of two thousand and five and remained this matter to the board with the instruction for the calculation of damages under the comparative rate methodology in light of the fully developed record to remand to the board with the instruction of the we urged to the board not that they were in fact exchanging prices which the carriers admitted to the carriers further it mended to consulting each other on the interpretation of their t in competition which comes under the destructive competition standards in the national transportation policy due to the various activities which included the tariff watching the matching of the prices the identical ship relationships so in that context we presented to the board a very strong case that there was a serious adverse impact on competition not only as to the relationship between  from competing for full container load cargo and in that manner they they resulted in a total elimination of competition destruct a destructive competitive practice is a practice which final question as far as your clients are alleging price discrimination the supreme court recently absent been very interested  would he have a better rate than a freight forwarder because the freight forwarder would have to put his own operating costs on top of that he was only able to offer the container loads it institutionalizes an economic dislocation even among the the public little store big box when you assure yourself that the little store is not only going to pay a higher price but his service provider is going to be required to pay a higher price you have been sacked indirectly impacted  what do we do with those essentially what the board found is that all of them amounted to this thing point where did sources say that he said we don't have to get into every one of those little factual looks because they all come down to the same basic issue which is that someone else got a better rate than i got and therefore i'm entitled to relief and so the board like so works somewhere where does that address the word of the board  i think if you read the decision as i made that decision you can certainly say as i would say that the board said all of those facts to all issues come down to the same point that you can't make a person a allegation and survive a rule of reason type analysis and that's exactly what happened here d a checks throughout this case came in and said under one theory or another throughout the different aspects of the phase of the case ok somebody's got a better rate than i got therefore i have a person a claim under first the weight reasonable those provisions second the reasonable practice unreasonable disk and reasonably discriminatory and let me just make sure i understand the extent to which you have a well gobble lawyer at work here which control major form of trade between  the mainland and hawaii for the consumer there's a consumer interest clearly at stake the higher prices that they would have to pay for goods shipped under a monopoly but the board would still be able under the reasonable rate regime to address the competitive anti consumer impact of such an allegation correct the board would be able to do that under the ocean trafficking regime the board would not disclaim that authority and in fact the first decision the two thousand and one decision in which the board denied a motion to dismiss and found that the complaint was barking up the wrong tree and but that it wouldn't dismiss and it said it sounds like what you're trying to argue is that the board is too is that the carriers are trying to do just that and if that's the case you want to make you can come and try to make that kind of the case but  were the benefit of favorable rates from nasa and horizon when it made commercial sense for us to do so and i think that flows into my next point there is that the board found our conduct to be reasonable and important about that when they held that it was not an unreasonable practice to act in a manner designed to protect its meaning horizons profits from its market share from divergent to its competitors in fact i think they said that we actions on reasonable discrimination our price differential was rational i think we should have to be right and we didn't just say no to d h x and he said no to a lot we also say yes which leads me to my third and final point i'll be happy to address any questions you might have or we've worked out to my to my colleagues from the surface transportation board is that we need to ask what relief the appellant is seeking what we think they are  seeking is a reversion to a lockstep pricing that wasn't even in place in one nine hundred ninety four and whatever we feel about the changes brought on by the i c c terminations if nothing else we believe that it liberalize the market and that it allowed for greater price competition than existed before what they are looking for is lock step pricing in which we have to give every shipment not just inch x but every other understanding which incorporated the terms of our conversation we agree or matching what agreed to put in a rate of say two thousand dollars a container for a large ship and those rights may be predicated on conversations we had we live in a corporate environment when i first started out in the freight forwarding business thirty years ago i thought that's what i did for fifteen years before being demoted to the legal industry everything was done on a handshake basis now supply chains are complex and everything is driven by contracts everything everybody needs a lawyer you go to a target you go to home depot they say ok great you have a rate from that's now you have a rate for horizon where is the piece of paper that sets out the understanding and here it is here's a piece of paper standard and the judge question in response to your questions regarding an intent to destroy competition i would not for the record there's a manson memorandum dated june sixteenth nineteen ninety eight which is approximately eight pages long which goes into great deal great deal a great deal of detail and how they intend to destroy to destroy free for competition there started by crippling at and through on top and then the net effect is you have full price plus fifteen percent of an regarding the issues of the of the vessel sharing the i c c germination act nor any of the domestic commerce recognize that's all sharing the contracts themselves of which there are approximately four of one thousand nine hundred ninety seven to two thousand and one was the son of sirius and then that contract after two thousand and one described the relationship as a carrier shipper relationship for each of these companies with guarantees of the board's conclusion that they were a vessel sharing and permissible under