reporting act or ficker as in spokeo and this court's decision in bassett when there is a procedural violation of ficta there is often a serious question as to whether or not the plaintiff's injury is sufficiently concrete for article three  that is particularly true as bassett illustrates when there is no dissemination of information to third parties and as to over seventy five percent of the class here the only person who saw the class members credit report during the class period was the class member it was never disseminated to a potential lender or any other third party so what was sent to those people the majority of the class as to noise from ation was sent to the third party what information was given to them what was given to them was their credit report and it came into mailings one that gave them sort of the body of that sort of general sort of thought the financial credit report a normal going to report and then a separate letter contemporaneously sometimes a day later sometimes the same day would come and say we also are going to tell you that you have a potential match your name potentially matches a name on the  then so that's what they got if you had gotten that second letter what would your reaction have been you personally well you know i would have probably been a little bit surprised but distressed i don't think i would have taken any measures to say wait a minute what's going on would have said you know i don't think i'm properly matched to somebody on this list i'm not a terrorist i'm not a you know all the bad things that people on this list would do you just said oh i don't care i can't tell you you know we're way into the realm of hypotheticals when i get to where we are we're not meaning i'm trying to figure out if the receipt of a letter that says there's a match between your name and somebody on this list of bad people adverse impact upon the person receiving the letter and that's really what i'm after yeah and i what i would say is i don't think there is an article three injury from getting that information and i think that's actually particularly true in the context of the statute because this is not a statute that's protecting an interest that sort of sounds in infliction of emotional distress i think the theory of the statute for these kind of disclosures but wait a minute you're not talking statutory protection but i thought you were talking about article three which is injury in fact well i'm talking about identifying an article three injury in fact yes that is sufficiently concrete to satisfy the constitution of a dog barks outside your window into sort of the common law but i but i think the mit i'm asking a factual question you lost sleep when you injured in fact i may or may not have been injured in fact for article three purposes and i don't mean to hedge but i mean i think that the lesson of the court's cases is just because there's some kind of injury that doesn't necessarily make it an injury in fact for article three purposes i think the lesson of spokeo and bassett is that you have to have an injury that's concrete i think for purposes of that you have to losing sleep sounds pretty concrete to me it may or may not be sufficiently concrete and i think you're supposed to look at what congress was on about  the common law says so let me let me come back to the statute if i might short because there's three different claims here that's right that we're looking at standing in right now we're focusing i guess on what i would fact the fact that somebody would could be on such a list would of course typically cause someone to try to take action but that you can't figure out from those letters what can you do to  yourself off the list would that be sufficient injury i don't think it would be but i would very much like to take issue with the premise of the question all right because the second letter among the things  told you is specifically gave you a contact person at trans union that would help you get off of trans union sort of triggering list and i think for these purposes it's important recognize there's the ofac list and then there is sort of what trans union and its third party provider we're doing to identify matches and i think it's important to recognize because if you have a first name and a surname that is a potential match and this is on your credit report anybody who asks we're going to tell them you know i understand that but what i'm what i'm suggesting is i think it's worth thinking about the two separately for a second because when you find out the information that you are a potential match there's a sense in which that's useful information in the same way that when you get information from the credit report and it says there's something on there that's a past undue credit bill credit card bill that you never ever had that credit card i mean you may not like hearing that news but in the context of the statute that's exactly what's supposed to happen and ultimately i think that's why it was true in responding to judge fletcher i do think that the court's cases instruct you to look at the common law claim a common law history and the statute and see if there's an overlap and the reason i don't think it works to create an injury here that sounds in sort of the a fright that you get from learning that you have a name that potentially matches somebody on the ofac list is congress is trying to get you that information in this disclosure part of the statute the motivating idea of congress is information is power if you know what's in your credit file and you know that some of it may be in accurate or insufficiently accurate because in this case you did have a name match it's just that if you drill down to sort of birth dates and things like that you could eventually show that i'm not that person the idea of the statute is that's supposed to happen and i don't think you can convert that into an article three injury statutes as a real risk a risk of real harm that's what we're trying to determine whether or not that occurred here in each of the scenarios of the three classes based on the three claims are the three groups we have mr ramirez we have the one thousand plus that the credit report was sent to third parties and then we have the six thousand three hundred that their name was on the list and then we have you know whether or not the procedures were violated the disclosure and the rights correct i mean i think the disclosure of information and the rights so we have to determine whether or not i think it seems like a real risk a risk a real harm under spokeo and here just trying to figure this out we're talking about identifying people as terrorists on their credit reports i know the supreme court has has looked at this and spokeo and and has given us  this is the technical or procedural violations that are contemplated in the supreme court discussion sip code so why don't you i want you to have the opportunity to respond and to speak to that if you could assure your honor i don't think the grab a minute this is i'm not here to tell you that this is sort of that this information is the same as the zip code i mean i do what i emphasize though that what's being told both to the party and to the potential predator is that there's a potential match i do think the difference between potential match and match is important and i want to get to typicality before i sit down but you are being told you're a potential match which at some level this true i mean again if you go right now today to the ofac website and type in sergio ramirez it will bring a hint that there is a potential match and so you know with respect to the disclosure claims you're trying to get that figured out with respect to the material risk that i think you're looking for in the statute i think what it's a material risk is about is that incorrect information will be district disseminated to a third party and so the reason i think  this is in some respects an easier case and spokeo is spoke you know when it's talking about the zip code example is talking about a situation where there would not be actual injury even though the information is disseminated to a third party and here the letters only said you know here's a number to call they didn't say how to dispute this and i know you're making the best case for your client but i'm just trying to figure  more significant here even a potential terrorist i think has in effect been said your potential terror has a has an effect that's more significant well you get what you're being told it's not that you're a potential terrorist but you're being told is that your name your first name and your last name is a potential match to a name that is in fact on the ofac list and that information is actually accurate there you don't get is but if that information is disseminated to a third party say i don't know i don't will be a sales company new song that you're a potential match i think it's a fairly likely response of the company in trying to decide whether to do business with you that that potential match may scare them off because the penalties for doing business with someone who's actually on the list are so high and i think that does create that risk is that i'm i wrong about that well i think two things your honor one is i do think that there is a better case for there being a material risk with respect to the roughly sixteen hundred people that actually had the report disseminated no i'm asking you something if it is disseminated so those are the people i'm talking about is there a risk that the person receiving the business receiving the information that says listen there's a potential match this guy may be on the bad guy list and that their response will be you know what i don't want to make a loan which is the information is just sitting in the box so to speak right at which every credit agency one quarter of those people actually had it disseminated ok so would you agree that for those for whom it was actually disseminated would have standing because there is a reasonable risk of harm there that when somebody finds out you're a potential terrorist it could impact your financial transactions and they only disclose it when people are in a financial transaction asking for the information i would agree that there's a much stronger case for standing there i wouldn't concede that they're standing there and part of it is and i don't know that the case law directly tells you what to do with this but i can't ignore the fact that with respect to everybody but mr ramirez there's no evidence that they were actually denied credit inconvenienced or the like and i do think you know i think that's true but then then you get to the other test which is was was there if there's standing at the outset to take it to trial because of a potential  risk is the potential risk itself that once in the hands of a creditor you might say it's likely that there's going to be a negative impact is that sufficient or is it your view that they needed to put on some kind of class related evidence as to the likely impact i think they would have needed to put on some class related evidence or they would have had to show that there was in the main some material impact on sort of information that hurt the reputation or certainly i mean i'm not i don't want to say that you have to show the credit was denied because i don't think that's what the law is but i do think that when you have a situation where by all accounts i mean only one person actually had credit denied and i believe that in the vast majority of these situations you know maybe because the potential match the kicked on had a radically different birth date and the the lender whoever it was did what they're supposed to do contractually and actually looked at this that people got their credit same day it wasn't it was an inconvenience in the least if i were  to is agree with you in part in saying that only only that order had the standing and that they retained it at the end because of this material risk then with their need to be a reversal of the verdict because that is just one claim of three claims and the whole claim doesn't survive i think you would have to decertify the class at that and i think you know there and look at we just to be clear about sort of the the waterfront if you will i mean i'm not here to say that mr ramirez doesn't have stand he suffered article three injury you know if anything i'm here to tell you that he suffered significant injuries in the context of this particular statutory violation that makes him a very atypical class representative which i think is a separate and independent problem so i don't have any issue with his claim with respect to the six hundred i'm not going to concede that there's standing but i will i will tell you i understand why you would treat them differently and may think they have a better claim i think by the end of the trial given the evidence that came on the motion to decertify should have been granted i think even they don't have standing but i think with respect to the vast majority of the people who are in this class more than seventy five percent i do not think that they suffered article three standing at all so i think they have to be the class has to be certified and i think that independent of the article three problem i mean there's a massive rule twenty three problem here because i don't think somebody who is denied credit in the dealership testifies credibly that he was embarrassed in front of his family that he canceled his vacation that person is not position then that a class can never be certified if there's a possibility that someone within the class lacks standing just trying to figure out if that's what you're arguing here no i don't think i'm arguing that i think that would be inconsistent with this court's decision in torres which at least at the pleading stage i don't think you need to make that showing but i do think at the end of the day when an article three court is cutting damages chats to individual lit in order to satisfy rule twenty three the due process clause in the rules in a building act you have you can only have damages words in a class action that go to somebody with article three injury just as would be the case with an intervener just as would be the case with an individual point i mean they could be in which we tried to get the class d certified at that point the reason it doesn't sort of happen the way that maybe i don't want to do it i don't know exactly what's motive in your question but obviously the case with actual damages you know that's that's not a problem because if you're wording actual damages you have article three injury it's the statutory damages here that creates the problem because and just maybe i'll finish with this but you know as to these individual class members who are these absent class members who only got this notification in their own home they're going to get roughly eight thousand dollars in about it you know about nine hundred dollars in compensatory damages and then something like you know five thousand or six thousand dollars in  word makes perfect sense in the context of mr ramirez it makes no sense with respect to those absent class members who don't have any article three injury and the last thing i'll say about that is in addition to the other problems with this verdict i mean i do think there's a serious state farm problem here because if you're supposed to do a ratio of punitive damages to actual damages you can't count statutory damages which aren't actual damages and there's virtually no proof of actual damages in this case so the state farm ratio approaches infinity where we give you some time for a battle but i just want to go back to proceed real issue because it makes sense about improperly certified classes with respect to the outset with effect a summary judgment respected going to trial but the case went to trial so my question then is it really a question of standing and decertifying the glass or is it a question of lack of substantial evidence to support or is that it stinks and with that a difference i tend to think that it's the former and not the latter and you know this is kind of a theoretical question about what you think is a you know about a class action but i sort of think i look at this case and i don't think that there's a substantial evidence problem if mr ramirez really is a typical representative of his class because the proof of him is supposed to take care of it for the class i think what the case shows the way the case was presented is that kind of what my clients were saying all along turned out to be true that there's an article three problem here because these are procedural figure violations and there's a typicality problem and then when you look at the way the case was actually tried i mean you know mr ramirez didn't focus  and i don't blame him for this i mean he's got a right to litigate his case but he didn't litigate this case as somebody who only received two letters in the privacy of his home he told the jury about his very unpleasant experience at the dealership and he used as a reason why specifically his lawyer did why they should get statutory damages the top of the range and punitive damages at on top of that all of which makes perfect sense in his case but all of that just exacerbates the typicality problem that we were talking about from the very beginning of this case and i think you think good morning your honour's may please the court jim francis for the apple e surgery nero's and the class the district court's ruling granting class certification in this case was not an abuse of discretion and its ruling on transients post trial motion contained no errors and its decisions should be affirmed in their entirety starting with article three standing contrary to what trans union argues and what is not injunction case correct it was an injunction kill it seemed to me i mean it's what with all respect to our colleagues that that's a bit a bit of a loose language about what bates actually said and then importing it yes your honor i would just point out i don't think we need to the court needs to to look at that issue with bates because as i'm about to outline i think there was standing for all class members that was demonstrated but i just want to point out that it wasn't just in ray's appose the alley or case mentions it as well and it doesn't limit the bates doctrine to injunctive relief but putting that issue aside i think what the courts really questioning was questioning mr clement about was this a class wide article three standing and there was article three standing proven for each class member in this class first with regard to the accuracy class each class member had a consumer report prepared about them that was communicated to them as judge fletcher was asking mr comment about that associated them as a terrorist or a government criminal as a result of trans unions name match only procedure every one of those class members has standing because that concrete interest as this court in spokeo three and actually as a supreme court said in spokeo to the f c c or a under section sixty one created a concrete interest to be free from credit reports which contain inaccurate derogatory or defamatory information every single class member was subject to that increased risk of harm that they would be defamed and as the supreme court mentioned that for those for whom it never left the credit agency it seems to me there's a distinction to be made what kind of threatened or impending injury that there was i don't think did you have any testimony for example on the frequency with which these are disseminated and you know sort of what i would c information about that yes your honor we did and in fact that's again for i don't think for article three purposes i think every class member is in but in terms of let me answer your honor's question there was evidence that was agreed to it was a stipulation that about twenty five percent of the class just in a six month period of time had the information disseminated to a third party creditor over the two year statute of limitations time period that would be about one hundred percent of the class would have had all their credit reports published to a third party the jury received that information in that evidence and it was the jury was free to make inferences from that evidence that they all were likely facing a publication of this information to a third party that was the jury's province and it had that evidence to do so and so let me ask you this why it is risky standing alone sufficient to create article three standing for purposes of recovering damages i'll give an example just totally outside credit reporting someone drives past you at one hundred miles an hour subjecting you to enormous risk  but you're not hurt you get damages because of the risk to which you were subjected well and the fair under the fair credit reporting act if you prove a willful violation not asking about that i'm asking about have i suffered damages in the article three sense because somebody drove past me at one hundred supreme court has spoken to and this court and spoke you three discussed it's a risk of material harm every class member had that increased risk of material harm here by having the information in that  but it resulted in no harm to me i don't see how i have been harmed if i didn't even know about it well your honor i think to answer your own question earlier mr clemente they all did know because they received the letter he said that's a different question i'm asking whether risk standing alone is enough to give article three damages for purposes for that we stand in for purposes of damages for the accuracy claimed it is because as trans union admitted in its reply brief creditors are routinely looking at people's credit reports in fact i would i would i'm sure that the panels i'm sure you've looked at your credit report if you look at the bottom under inquiries your credit reports being accessed all of the time so the evidence here was that was a very real and imminent risk just like clapper that's what the  concerned about is this the risk that's real or is it or is it something that's attenuated these this was a very real risk that every single person and again twenty five percent over six months extrapolated to two years that's one hundred percent of the class had the information's published but let me just fact i don't want to be too statistical with you but no repeat it is going to give you a pretty high percentage but it's not going to give you one hundred i think you're right your honor and i would agree with that the one thing that i would also advise the court is that the f series makes very clear that in order to recover for the accuracy claim you don't need publication to a third party the statutory language under section sixty nine hundred twenty b only concerns the preparation of  consumer report and a consumer report is any information that is communicated there is no reference at all to communication to a third party this court has had occasion to look at this very issue and geim and and oates yano and has consistently found that for section sixty one e b the accuracy claim in this case there is no need to prove publication to a third party so you don't need that to recover damages under the fair credit reporting act but again for the article three issue that's just a threshold question in terms of whether or not there was a risk of harm or a harm to a concrete interest as i said before congress elevated the common law defamation into that section sixty  made the preparation of the report a violation and because that risk is so great and here your honor is what i would point out as a as a judgment where you are asking about earlier what makes this case different in terms of standing from all of the other cases the trans union has cited and facets not even of an accuracy case is that is the nature of the information we're not talking about a zip code we're not talking about even a thirty day late on a credit card we're talking about the worst and most a family tory type of thing that a credit reporting agency can say about somebody you are a terrorist let me ask you assume just for the moment only one thousand eight hundred  of the class members had article three standing for purposes of the procedures claim and none of the class members had standing on the disclosure claims is it your position that each class member nonetheless can recover a seven thousand money judgment in their name just because mr ramirez had standing would that conflict with the rules unable to act prohibition on enlarging the substantive rights because it would give someone who could never have bought a claim on their own the right to recover honor as i think it's probably clear from my presentation that we disagree with the underlying premise that only the sixteen hundred are in this in this class so yes if you were to accept the premise that only sixteen hundred people here had a claim or had standing then yes obviously there are if that they could assert the claims in court then yes i think i would agree with with your honor's question again we have three claims here any one of which would have satisfied the damages award based upon transients agreement so if any of the claims that issue here survive and their standing for any of the claims are based upon what the party stipulated so in this case it the statutory damages verdict and the punitive damages verdict if it we have evidence on the record as to how much money trans union made from this part of their business i understand we've got evidence as to what their overall are we do have evidence that tells us how much money they made from doing this during the class period or growing a more extended period there is evidence in the record i think that they introduced regarding just the ofac product and what they are and i don't have that information try i don't want to do the right into the heart of trying to figure out what they were charging her inquiry and i couldn't quite tell look like it might have been fifty cents per but i couldn't quite tell and i looked at the number inquiries during class period was a little over two million but i couldn't quite figure out how much of my i wasn't sure that what i was understanding of the record privately i think your honor is correct i think the at the amount per transaction was was probably somewhere in that realm i am actually forgetting right now exactly what that was but what is the members the information that ofac was in their file and denying them the instructions on how to inspect that and disputed what they did was they harmed each class members that the evidence of the harm is that it's an informational injury i understand what you what we've been having a lot of informational injuries floating around lately because of various statutes so that doesn't tell me really what we have any analogy to another itself was injury for to create standing and here what happened here to anyone other than mr what happened here is none of them were told that ofac was part of their file and instead they get some others letter which which references ofac but specifically doesn't tell them they can dispute it doesn't give them any instructions doesn't provide them with the statement of rights in clear violation of section sixty one g c which said other words because there were two notice paper in this case yes and there was one notices right there was one notice of rights correct and is that a violation in and of itself it wasn't a violation of rights for the first piece of paper if it disclosed the ofac information and told them how to dispute it but it didn't it wasn't part of that in fact what the second piece of paper did was say you've already got your file that's over there here's something else and there's no right to dispute there's no way to dispute it you don't know that so it's not a diminished claim here we're talking about the ability of a concrete or excuse me congress elevated the interest of discovering inaccuracies in your credit report to a concrete interest and as this court outlined spokeo to the question is was there any harm to that interest in the answer is yes this company in the prior litigation was told by the third circuit you must include ofac information in the file and you must let people dispute it and correct this information they had that this same very company had the third circuit find in two thousand and ten that the name match only procedure here was reprehensible that is unusual to have a corporate defendant whether or not the claims or defenses of the class representative are typical of the claims and defenses of the class not the specific facts surrounding the class representative as this court held in hand and it simply were his claims typical of their claims and the answer is unquestionably yes judge corley did not abuse her discretion and find mr ramirez typical he received the same  papers or he received the same notifications from trans union as every single class member he was associated as a terrorist or government ofac criminal just like every other class member  the weakest and that's the majority of the class members of those who had the information revealed to them in these two separate pieces of paper but as far as the record shows we don't know that they got that it was revealed to a third party understand your but we don't have any firm evidence that that happened there that there's not the weakest claim now does mr ramirez share all of the characteristics of those people with the weakest claim and i think the answer is yes does that but because he has a lot more does that defeat the typicality it does not your honor as this court again outlined in hand then the specific facts i think i'm getting the language correct but the specific facts surrounding the claims are not relevant to the reason to proceed claim but the remaining class members perhaps lack standing what does that mean for for the verdict here do we have to remain for a new trial i don't i don't think so your honor because as i said before if if if the jury returned a verdict on any of the claims then every class member recovers the end does the same degree that's the way the the the verdict form was created and trans union agreed to that so as long as there's one claim that's remained standing for that that that remains after the panel's decision that would support the jury verdict in this case for all class members so if i just may printed damages there's a there's an argument here that this is excessive in violation of go on a whole bunch of cases yes yes your honor we do not believe that the punitive damages verdict here is excessive for the reason that this case presents unique reprehensible ety that is at the highest and reprehensible it he for a fair credit reporting act case again as i said before they were on notice that this name actually procedure was creating harm for consumers for years they faced a jury trial and a verdict and a ninety one page decision from the court of appeals for the third circuit which said it was reprehensible in addition there was evidence in this case that that they had other alternative methods where they could have gotten it right and not mix these people up because there was a there was technology through their vendor that could have screen based upon date of birth in addition they there was a warning from the department of treasury two thousand and seven two thousand and eight two thousand and ten warning at that they're concerned about trans union's false positive rate ok i get all of that but there's an argument as you say it's a six point five to one ratio when you compare the statutory damages to the punitive damages and i get that but the argument is well but the true ratio if you're looking at gore and succeeding cases coming out of the supreme court is to actual damages and therefore the ratio  understand that but in fact they're not particularly combat strong that's why we call them statutory but your honor if you look at the language section sixteen eighty one and it provides that for a violation you can recover either actuals or statutory as in the cases that have looked at it seven circuit murray versus singular while wireless all the circuits that have looked at it have found that the statutory damages are designed to allow actual a surrogate for actual damages when damages are hard to prove where you don't you can have the proof for it or when their store is so small or they're difficult to quantify but there's no question that the statutory damages here was an actual damages was in place of actual damages for these people was contends it was compensatory case were tried by itself and the jury came back with one hundred eighty four dollars and six sixty three hundred in punitive damages nobody would be challenging but here i'm so i realize we're taking you over but what about the additional argument that when we're talking about class action damages  there's some notion that they shouldn't be so high in the sense of multiplying as to each of the members of the class because then you get anonymous punitive damages award which is more than merely punish and deter honor so the response to that is there is no appellate case or guidance which provides that in a class action the ratio analysis should be different under state farm and we would argue as we did and  judge corley also pointed out that that would undermine rule twenty three if the analysis for damage if you can only recover less when you're in a class then it would undermine the purposes of for rule twenty three so we do not think that there is a basis to reduce the ratio because this is a class action thank you thank you well we've given him more time we took up your time so would you please put three minutes back on the clock  thank you are just a few points rebuttal first of all in response to your specific question judge fletcher there is evidence in the record about how the punitive damages award here compares to the revenues from the ofac project and the particular it's an e r one thirty two and it shows that the punitive damages award here is thirty times the revenue for the product for the entire year and since the class period of six months and the revenues year that's basically sixty times the revenue for the product but  punitive damages are designed to punish and deter if what i'm led to terms of continuing conduct i think we've got to look beyond the class period i'm not sure that you do but in all events i think these numbers are so enormous i'm not sure much turns on that yet and if there is an argument yet this is the second point i would say is just and this is responsible to willful but also for the lack of injury for the people that received this letter when they got the second letter about ofac i mean you know it is not the platonic form of what we'd like to do with the reason the class period ends where it does it's because we eventually got this in to a single mailing but there's an assumption here in a couple of the questions and certainly my friends argument that there is no information here that allows you to correct the information the problem and that's actually just not true and it's not borne out in the record so the letter that mr maritz got is that for sixty seven the last thing it does is provide a phone number if you have additional questions or concerns for somebody at trans union that person at trans union was actually somebody who had heard about ofac and was actually specialized in sort of fixing these problems and this was their effort to be directly responsive to the cortez decision where what was happening is somebody would call sort of the general number a trans union and they'd get somebody who really never heard of ofac they'd look at the credit file they would see anything about this and they'd say everything's fine so this at least got you to a person who knew what the problem was and could help you fix it which is why the record in this case shows that both the contact rate was higher actually during the class period with the separate letter than it was afterwards where they got all the information into two letters and the result the letter they just had the number  this is how you does this i clicked and that's why start with the idea this is not the platonic form of the letter but it does provide information if you have further questions which i assume if you had a dispute you would and again the two mailings is platonic form of this but the reason that they had two letters instead of one is because that was the way that they could most quickly try to take action in response to the cortez decision one thing about the seventy five percent number and the  six month class curd my friend keeps like to wants to expand it to two years but this is only six months and it's six months for a reason it starts with the cortez decision so they have a better willfulness argument and then it ends with the merging of the letter and some other back to see what this makes as a practical difference because as he stated the stipulation if any of the claim survives then the damages leaving aside the punitive damages but the damages amount remains is that correct that's not our position our position is that they that that if even one of the claims falls then the whole the word falls and we have does that compare with what he claims is the trial stipulation he bases this on the verdict form and what he ignores and what we point out in a reply brief so you can look at this and see what you're persuaded by but we tried as part of that verdict form to have an additional question that said i don't have enough information for the entire class and we were not allowed to put that on and it seems to me that because we tried to do that that perves our ability to say look you now have sort of what amounts to kind of a generalized verdict and if one of these claims falls you've got to have a new trial so that's our view of that if i if i can beg your indulgence for fifteen seconds to just say the following which is the district court here at the beginning of this case when they confronted the california state claims recognize that if you had to prove actual injury which you do under the state statute you couldn't have a class action here that same logic really applies to this class action you cannot have you do have to prove actual injury to comply with article three you can have a class action and that is off where she or he true for the seventy five percent who never had their information disseminated thank you thank you i would like to thank both of you for the very helpful arguments and also the extensive briefing here the case just argue the mirror is versus trans union is