me in the prior case it was the multiple suspicions of terrifying incident that i just alluded to that posed the jury issue about general awareness for aiding abetting here in contrast there's no december of two thousand and one after filing their nd suspicious activity report there's also no doubt really notice peut that they were aware of their role in money laundering because if a bank knows that its customers money laundering by transfers through its bank account then the bank knows that its role is the washing machine so the pretty nice argument boils down to claim that the credibly believe that money laundering has nothing to do with tara financing the dollars are completely distinct and they're incredible claims that they were only looking at the sources of c b s p's transfer is not the destinations and here's the evidence some of it i suggest indicates that reported concerns about their client tracked in actually in its annual report says that part it's part of a movement to fight not only terrorists mainly islamised but origins of their financing so it clearly doesn't distinguish between money forms have boxes that you can click off one of which is for money laundering they did not check that box instead they wrote in by hand terrorism as the reason for the specific activity report and then just a week destinations close quote so there's no wonder that the lower court said a jury could find the banks claim that it was only concerned with sources and not destinations of the transfers quote unquote incredible  finally after that blockage from the new york branch one month later they filed the nd declaration and then they decided to close the account they say now it was for money laundering that was their concern terrorism so obviously hiding the money trail and diverting money to terrorism are closely connected and that was another reason that the court below in strauss three roman numeral three said that concerns about possible international terrorism ties were the reasons for the closing or at least that there was a genuine dispute on that point if that's true then there must be a genuine dispute about whether the bank was generally simply can't claim that you know your client is money laundering when all of the regulatory authorities say that tariff lancing and money laundering work hand in hand and then say you had no awareness at all of your role in money laundering for a financing purposes moreover you can't claim and hide behind the notion that all the transfers for charitable purposes if you know your client your customer i should say is money during because ostensibly charitable money laundering is an oxymoron and it's an oxymoron that a jury has to puzzle out the district court didn't see it that way but it's impossible to reconcile the holding that gee all the money went to charitable purposes and therefore the transfers are not dangerous and therefore the bank was not aware of what was doing with the simultaneous finding of the dispute that it knew it client was engaged in money laundering and only a jury can try to reconcile those two i think it would be hard to ask for it but it's certainly a jury to ask finally a suspicion of money laundering also takes the bank services out of the realm of routine banking you heard mr blackman use that phrase multiple times in the last argument it read throughout both recent both cases they're trying to bring this within some sort of safe harbor that i actually think the linda case never created  said routine banking that violates two thousand three hundred and thirty nine b doesn't as a matter of law equal general awareness aiding and abetting not that it never could well it when the routine banking is  customer you know is money laundering then the banking can't be routine and again that creates a genuine dispute for a jury to resolve how you could conceivably engage in money laundering with a suspected this case because the facts are somewhat different here there were five transfers through new york not one hundred and seventy nine but the court's decision in ricci roman numeral three still stands in the way of the banks and president but for argument in the st place there the distinction between the two cases leaching this one is not simply in the number transfers and it's in the fact that the bank used its own branch in new york to make the transfers  and in fact that confirms a concern a congressional finding in the anti terrorism effective death penalty act the same act in which they made a finding about how all contributions to foreign terrorist organizations for their terrorist aims a separate finding them made was that foreign terrorist organizations use the united states as a conduit for funds raised elsewhere so they had precisely a concern here that the united states was being a conduit and that funds were being elsewhere results where foreign terrorist organizations also the five transfers were not the only contacts that kryten these had with new york  it received the blocking order that prompted a recent speech in its customer c b s p and lead within a month the closing of the decision to close the account it received that from its new york branch and it had intertwined with new york in any case the standard here is minimum contact not predominant contact it's whether there's even a single act that is related to the claim that would give the court jurisdiction to consider the entire case the court i mean i'm sorry the bank cites supreme court decision in bristol myers for the argument that the  transfers that occurred elsewhere are not within the jurisdiction of the court but there's a crucial difference between this case and bristol myers the court was looking at claims by california residents against drug seller drug manufacturer for defective drugs and it said that while they might give jurisdiction for the residents claims all of the conduct giving rise to the nonresidents claims occurred elsewhere  five transactions all augment the substantial assistance and therefore contributes to the causation of every attack that takes place after the five transfers they are built into proof of those  add that bristol myers does not in any place discuss a causation standard let alone a buck for causation standard it simply repeats the affirmation or reaffirms that what's required is an affiliation between the form an underlying controversy principly some activity or occurrence that takes place in the form state we have that here it happened early on and that activity contributed to the substantial assistance for all the subsequent  they're not innocent not only that all occurred after israel had outlawed the bank's customer as a criminal organization and for them occurred after the bank opened a file on c is so strongly expressed ingested so if congress made a finding that entities that knowingly or recklessly and directly or indirectly provide material support to foreign terrorist organization should reasonably anticipate being brought to the united states to answer and while we don't claim that the congressional finding can resolve the constitutional issue it certainly expresses a form interest in burger king the court said the stronger that kind of forum interest the lesser rehearse all of the arguments you made earlier blackman i'm sorry i was on mute for giving a start again i won't repeat the legal argument i think the court understands them the one point i would make is that what we satisfies the elements additional elements for civil liability under the eighty a including just as far as the specific factual points made  i'm a little puzzled why my adversaries thinks that it is a a bad general awareness of playing a role the bank playing a role in laundering which involves suspicion of where the money is coming from and not a suspicion of whether it's in fact being used for charitable purposes were again the record  clear that the internal records of the bank showed that a transfers being were going to charities and showed that in fact c b s was a legitimate must be closed there were some bureaucratic neck ups and so it wasn't but critically the last transfer from c b s account to any of the charities was entrepreneurial lesson two thousand and two well before  as i said over a year before a year and a half almost before the ofac designation in august two thousand and three there was this reference to israeli designations which go back in time there is not a shred of evidence in the record that c b s t v was aware of those designations i'm sorry that that credibly in a was aware of those designations critically and they did not have a branch or any other operations in israel i believe there's evidence in the record that shows that israel does not intend those designations to be extra territorial any more frankly than the ofac designations are but in any event there is no evidence a tiny tiny handful of transfers that actually involved dollars going through new york is worth commenting on in this case there are exactly five transfers through new york five this counsel said during the entire history of the count totaling two hundred thousand dollars i'll say again what i said before the plaintiff's expert says that hamas has yearly income  minimus it's hard to imagine what it is and that goes to the question of jurisdiction and it also goes to the question of causation because how can it seriously be said that those two hundred thousand dollars  burrage which is you know a leading supreme court that the phrase by reason of requires at least a showing up but for causation so you've got a huge causation issue and therefore a huge personal jurisdiction issue here which just leaps off the page at you otherwise the evidence was undisputed that when credibly and they was talking about these people was an increase in donations because there was an increase in need in the occupied territories but no suspicion whatever at those funds were being used  a terrorist purposes or terrorist financing much less that the bank was generally aware that it was playing a role in terrorist activities of any of the charities there was a reference made to  blocking that is with all respect another total red herring the branch of credit lyonnais in new york which unlike critically in a in france is of course waffle but on the ofac list i'm not that charity and by the way i should say at the relevant time this is true of both cases none of these cases none was ever designated was designated as a supporter of all kind so the bank's sculptor picked up the same name it turned out to be a false positive nonetheless when the head office in paris was notified that they made a report but it was a false positive it was not the al wafa in gaza to which the transfer was actually intended to be submitted the account was blocked the transfer rather was blocked as far as we now as far as the record shows it remains a block to this day so at the bank the fact that the bank got a transfer that turned out to be for someone else which blocked it hardly is evidence that the bank was generally where that it was gage engaging itself in a role in terrorist activities just the opposite and not to mention that the activity is utterly unrelated elements and i think it's revealing that counsel once again cited holder holder is a prelim the case and involves criminal liability no one is contesting that there is a tribal issue found by the district court of material support again there's never been a criminal prosecution by the united states when professor avery and to keep citing legislative history that was intended in the statutes including the material support statute which actually was passed after the civil liability provisions of the a t a s we point ou fundraisers for terrorists this bank credit lyonnais was never prosecuted under that statute neither was not rest as i said in the earlier case and the s government is hardly reticent about bringing prosecutions one of the things that is kind of interesting about this range of cases that the court has dealt with is that in a number of them  including in rothstein if i'm not mistaken the banks actually violated sanctions and ended up paying fines or entering into d p a a result of that nonetheless you know civil liability respond because there was a finding that as a matter of law there was no proximate cause well you're there's no allegation or could there be certainly no evidence  that the banks ever violated any criminal statute or were ever prosecuted so what we have is the plaintiffs taking unprosecuted violations alleged jury trial issue of a criminal violation and trying to bootstrap it into a civil liability claim by just essentially ignoring all of the elements and i won't go through them again  designated entity is what the united states says it is at the time it doesn't need to sort of least it's evidence of that and it's historical evidence that the destinations are based on past history they're not predictions and finally it also can be used to discredit the banks repeated claims that if we had only known we would have done something differently because after a designation they do know and if they give the money back after the designat then it undercuts their claims of you know a good faith prior to them secondly mr blackman mentioned the garage case i won't repeat what it says but the paralleling case which they also cited and the all three note that a background tort principle of causation is for multi cause to torts and it's the principle that where there are multiple causes that independently  positive without wafa had nothing to do you know with this case and the very detail he spent on it suggest a dispute in my experience but in fact this false positive within a month caused  speed to be monitored for not only high volume transactions but transactions to destinations in the middle east and truly there after to the closing of the account so it's impossible to say it has nothing to do with whether or not it was a false positive but in any case that's hotly disputed that's just the kind of thing that we ask a jury to resolve on the evidence and finally distinguishes holder as well as the congressional findings accompanying tw as simply constructions of the statute that are not relevant here that's not right and you have a minute left thank you the record expressly said that what it was commenting on and finding an answer to was the empirical question of whether foreign terrorist organizations can separate their terrorism from their non terrorist that's an empirical question and the answer to it is they cannot and that's an answer that is applicable here as it is in the twenty three  congress findings that entity's foreign terrorist organizations raise money through affiliates this is what they said in jest on the most recent finding for supporting terrorism and they raise it outside the united states or they're finding earlier time that foreign terrorist organizations all contributions to them for their terrorist events those are fact finding we're not saying that they're binding on the fact finder here but they're certainly sufficient to create a genuine dispute they're not limited some sort of construction of the twenty to thirty nine the statute honors i just want to note in closing that this case has now been through for summary judgment motions and it's time that the disputes that i have identified be submitted to the jury we asked that the court reverse and remand for that purpose thank you very much thank you