at the first place on the call this morning gender number one is ok number one two three three one hundred people versus durn johnson if you're ready you may proce thank you your honor and may please the court i'm assistant attorney general eleven on behalf of the people of the state of illinois more than fifty years ago in people versus weaver this court interpreted the burglary statutes unauthorized entry pronk as incorporating what's come to be known as the limited authority doctrine under that doctrine as articulated in weaver a person has no with the warranty to enter a building even if that building is otherwise open to the public at the time if the person enters with the intent to commit a theft and that doctrine rests on the commonsense notion that even when a business opens its doors to the public it is not invited in those who would enter with an intent to steal weaver controls this case and it's i think it's important to note at the outset that the defendant has not asked the court to overrule weaver and even if he had he would face an uphill battle in doing so as weaver being a case of statutory construction would be entitled to a heightened degree of starry decisis considerations so the question here than is right there or not the court should recognize an exception to the limited authority doctrine simply for retail stores as opposed to any other type of open business and the answer to that question is no there's no support in this court's precedent for such an exception particularly in people versus bradford which the court decided a few years nor did the general assembly indicate any legislative intent to create such an exception by enacting a retail statute several years after lever and i'd like to briefly go through both of those points but i'm happy to take questions at any time on on any issue first bradford bradford it is true involved a defendant who had shoplifted merchandise from an open retail store but the question there was limited to whether or not the court should extend weaver's limited authority doctrine from the unauthorized entry type of burglary that was at issue here and in weaver to the distinct unauthorized remaining charge that was at issue there and the court declined to do so for a number of reasons but each of those reasons related uniquely to the type of burglary charge at issue there in particular the unauthorized remaining charge and really have no those factors have no bearing on the type of unauthorized entry charge at issue here so for instance the court in bradford noted that it would simply be unworkable to extend the limited authority unauthorized remaining burglary because there's just really no way to know rather a person who entered the store with intent with no intent to commit a thousand and so with authority there's no way to really know an unauthorized entry charge but here the only question is whether or not the defendant entered the store with the prohibited intact and entry is clearly a discrete event in time and courts are well equipped to commits a spur of the moment that would not be guilty of unauthorized entry burglary and under bradford would not be guilty of unauthorized remaining burglary but the question here is whether somebody who enters with that prohibited intent is guilty of unauthorized entry burglary and if someone if these individuals went into the store with you and then decided not to do it or they still guilty of burglary they would be and now would it might be difficult we might never see that case in court because we might never have discovered that the person had committed burglary but that the idea that somebody commits burglary assoon as they enter the building with the prohibited intent is true across off the arms of unauthorized and tree burglary even in what you might consider to be the more traditional types of burglary that don't depend on the limited authority doctrine so  imagine somebody who enters a building after hours with the intent to steal that person has committed burglary as soon as they've entered with that intent yes that would be unauthorized entry which would not depend on the limited authority doctrine but what we are said was that even if the building is open to the public if the person enters with the intent to steal they have no authority to enter because the building  not opened its doors to that person to enter the you know when the retail store opens its doors and invites the public to enter its doing so it's giving them the license to enter for purposes consistent with the reason the building is open in the first place so you're saying a lack of authority comes from the mind of the defendant right actions right just right so it's a little bit of both i mean implicit in the invitation to enter is the notion that that invitation is only being extended to those who would enter for legitimate purposes so it does depend on the notion that the proprietor has not extended an invitation to somebody who would enter with the intent to commit dou on the other hand or relatedly the fact that a person enters the store with that prohibited intense demonstrates that they've entered without authority under the limited authority docket and i think it's important to note here that again the defendant has not asked the court to overrule we've right his brief was very clear on that point and even if he had weaver was a case of statutory construction if the general  time in the fifty years since we've ever had thought that this court interpreted the burglary statute in correctly in weaver it's been free to amend the statute and it has not done so and as this court's cases recognize that that is traditionally the offense of burglary is traditionally completed upon the unauthorized and tree whether or not the person later commits so burglary is always so you can be convicted of a crime without committing an act i thought you needed the men don't steal it true and because rather not you steal something that's the separate offense of either general fact or retail theft so burglary is always by definition entering a building with intent to commit some other fact or other felony and whether or not if the person then does commit that crime they've they've then committed both burglary and the other crime but they've committed the burglary itself merely by entering the building with that intense and that's what people versus miller said in miller the person entered an open retail store with the intent to commit a fast and then did commit and he was convicted of both burglary for the entry and of retail theft for the theft act and this court held that there was no one act one crime problem there with convicting the person of both of those offenses because each one was enacted by the general assembly to address a distinct harm so the retail felt statute addresses the harms caused by the stealing itself and so that's why of course the statute takes into consideration the value of the get stolen and other proportionality factors like that the burglary statute on the other hand addresses the harm caused by the prohibited entry and so as the second district recognized in people versus more you of course have increased culpability when a person enters with that prohibited intent so you have a premeditation aspect that you don't in the bradford scenario where it's more of a spur of the moment after an innocent entry and you also have you also have in in the in the burglary sense you have the inherent potential that there'll be a confrontation between the person who's entered with that prohibited intent and a store employee or in this case we actually had a customer who was sort of her suspicions were aroused by the defendant's activities and so when the person has entered knowing that they have this intent to steal so they're not there to shop they're there to steal that person is likely to be on guard for any type of real or perceive suspicion that they might encounter from others and there's the possibility than that when confronted when they think they might be confronted the act in a way that could cause alarm or chaos in the store they might  you're correct in your interpretation of the brewery stance you legislatures dot the retail stench we're in so many cases as you described the state could be charging burger in almost every single re i well i don't think that's true that was that was certainly true in bradford and that's what the court recognized there is that if you were to apply the limited authority doctrine to unauthorized remaining burglary so that anybody who was in a store whether or not they'd entered with the intent to steal or not and then committed it would automatically be guilty of unauthorized remaining burglary because obviously at some point while they were in the store they they form that intends that's not the case for unauthorized entry burglary and so it's not true that all or even a substantial majority of retail thout will be prosecutable as unauthorized entry burglar and this is what the second district prove that a person had that intended you need and i think it was the third district that recognize this and people versus smith of the state when the independent evidence of bad intent so the thocht at south will not suffice and so is the second district set in more in the vast majority of cases we would expect that only retell thuck would be able to be charged it's only in the cases and i submit that this is one of them where are the people do you have that independent evidence circumstantial no doubt but still strong evidence demonstrating that the person entered with that intent and not did not simply and took innocently and then on the spur of the moment sort of crime of opportunity commit a retail theft so we don't have the retail statute the retail theft stack you can do the work that the defendant is asking it to do because by the same token the general theft statute that existed at the time of lever would do the same thing so you might say well if the general assembly bypassing the retail statute intended to exempt the entry of a retail store with the intent to commit a thousand from the burglary statute then by the same token the mere fact that the general assembly not to the general thought statute would suggest that they didn't intend for the entry into a laundromat and open laundromat with the intent to commit a conventional theft to satisfy the burglar statute court to overrule weaver and abandon the limited authority doctrine entirely which he's insisted that he's not asking the court to do and in fact he you know we made a number of arguments in our brief for why the heightened starry decisis considerations that would be a political to weaver would counsel against overruling it and the defendant simply didn't respond to any of those arguments so i think this would be a particularly bad case for the court to take up the issue of revisiting weaver i think instead the court should accept weaver as of the law of course as i said the general assembly has been free for the past fifty years i to amend the burglary statute if it if it thought that the court had made a mistake in weaver and it hasn't done so and so i think the court here should accept weaver as given as the settled law of the state and the only issue is whether or not that whether or not a different rule should apply to retail stores so as opposed to laundromats or if there are no further questions i guess i will save any further points for my rebuttal and i would ask the court to reverse the appellate court's judgment and reinstate the defendant's burglary conviction and rematch back or to consider the other issues that he raised on appeal that the cannot be charged with burglary and all the remaining burglary where the defendant comic was limited to the elements of the retail theft if you this court by necessity left open the question of whether that same reasoning applies to the other form of burglary on open retail establishment never entered an authorised area of the store and left while the store was open also in bradford not only was mr johnson charged with retail theft but he was charged with burglary the state charged the seventy six dollar of the mill shoplifting case as unlawful entry burglary after bradford that conviction can no longer stand this primary because seven years after beaver is just court recognized in bradford the legislature created the offense of retail theft a multi layered new one statute which governs the conduct issue here shoplifting and the reason that bradford apply seamlessly here is because this court central holding in bradford focus on not on the specific elements of unlawful meaning burglary but on the physical authority of a person to be inside a retail establishment this court's holding that where defendant interest ordering regular hours never entered areas of the store the rough limits and left while the store was open bars a prosecution from lawful remaining burglary that same holding a conduct the custard aggravated kidnapping as iron filings i believe and that's that specific conduct after the aggravated kidnapping statute was no longer prosecutable under christie under the more general offensive of armed and again the other the other point is that the legislature can create can x can act in one area by by amending or creating a different statute that's also reminiscent of  the blair of the more recent blair case and twenty thirteen where this court found a constitutional problem with the armed robbery statute and in conjunction with gun violence statute and you know the constitutional problem was with the armed robbery statute but the legislature fix that problem by amending the other statute so legislature can act to solve problems or create exceptions working under different statutes and again under bradford there's no question that the legislature section that punishes specifically possession of thefts devices that assist person a person in committing shoplifting eliminated bags and things like that shoplifting retail theft would be covered and that the burglary station either i'm off one tree or i mean yes that's the argument and it's it's it's important to be careful here what when which when the context is specifically limited to shoplifting that is entering an open retail establishment not after hours never injury unauthorized area of the store no employees only area no cash register no locked coin machines like conduct involved if the state can show that the person intended to enter it did enter or intended to enter an unauthorized area then that person could still be guilty of burglary of the miller case  offered to give examples of how a defendant may be guilty of other crimes beyond the retail theft because he had the knife on him i believe the facts of the case where he pulled a knife in order to try to escape i'm depending on the size of that and i would just conclude by pointing to another facet of the bradford reasoning that applies here and that is just the preface discussion of absurdity of the state does not deny that someone in our hypothetical an eighteen year old with no priors who standing outside a convenience store looking at a candy bar through a window if he tells his buddy i'm going to go steal the candy bar the state does not deny that that person is guilty of a class two  walks through the door the convenience store and that's true even if he doesn't steal the candy bar and that's true even if he pays for it the state does not deny that that's possible under its reasoning here now illegally that's an absurd hypothetical but it's a logical result of this reading of the statutes that allows that encompassed that the groups all the defendants together people commit  sledgehammer and they want to group all these defenders in the same class to felon category all the way from the miller defendant to mr johnson to the kid outside the convenience store who doesn't steal the candy bar but just intends to the state's reason i'm not sure you were talking about bradford but is it your position that if a person she creates themself in a place where he's not entitled to be that remaining within is subject to the burglary statute i believe it would be if the stated evidence that the person in felony or that in the store that's true for the price provided it was aware of the person's intent to steal i believe it would be within their rights to to bar the person and of course if the person remains interesting remains after being barred from the store that could still a burglary but but the the physical authority read preference holding focuses on physical authority open retail establishment a person has physical authority to be inside an open retail because the retail theft statute that happened after was an acted after weaver so the legislature in its retail fest actually manifested its intent that this specific form of contact would be governed and punished under that statute but weaver may or may or may not and that would be a different case before the court but we think that we were doctrine limited authority doctrine may apply to other you'd be talking about public a public buildings that are open to the public not only nine retail establishment like the laundromat and weaver for example i'm overruling weaver would not say that the weaver defendant didn't commit burglary it would just mean that the burglary happened when he broke into the change machine it wasn't walking through the door of the open laundromat that's what i think in fact if if the limited authority doctrine no longer applied to open buildings buildings  so for all those reasons your honor bradford on record applies seamlessly to unlawful entry burglary there's no logical or legal reason not to make to make such a huge disparity based on when the intent to steal was for me and for those reasons just or refined thank your i'm right just a few brief points i'd like to make first the first point is the defendant is still insist that he's not asking the court to overrule weaver but if i understand correctly he's now asking the court to completely rewrite it weaver did not depend on the notion that the defendant there committed burglary by entering a vending machine a burglary is entering a building or certain other state certain other structures such as cars and boats and such but not mentioned i'm not aware of any precedent that a person who enters a vending machine without authority is guilty of burglary weaver was clear that the defendant there was guilty of burglary because he entered the laundromat without authority and he entered the laundromat without authority because he entered with the intent to commit a theft and nothing in weaver depended on the nature of the theft that he intended to commit or the manner in which he intended to commit it it was the mere fact that he had the intent to com rather than do a lot do his laundry that negated his intent to be in at the building i would like to address your question just as burke about the effects of  overruling weaver and this is why i think this is a particularly bad case to do it since the issue has not been briefed by both sides but i do think there is the real concern that overruling weaver would call into question the limited authority doctrines application to other statute such the home invasion statute or the residential burglary statute and in particular in people versus bush we cite that case in our brief i wear this court held that the limited authority doctrine applies to the home invasion statute the court cited with approval a an appellate court decision which had reached a similar result on the ground that the without authority language in similar statute should be interpreted similarly and so you have essentially that same language in all three of these statutes the burglary the home invasion statute and the residential burglary statute and so there's a real concern that if you even let me make a limited authority doctrine from one of those statutes it might affect the other ones and so i think that's something the court should be concerned about if it's thinking about over to not just this vending machine but apparently a number of them and a great deal of money and coins in his pocket also argues that the retail that statute includes language about  the possession of the booster packs are going to recall and the retail plopped tools kind of idea yes the legislature included entry with those kind of tools to still be retail i but i'd like to actually push back on that a little bit because that provision of the retail theft statute does not require entry the person is guilty of retail theft under that provision merely by possessing one of those bags so the possession of the bag i think the statute exact language is use or possession of a theft detection shielding device with the intent to commit retail theft my reading of that provision would make somebody guilty of that provision of the retail merely by being found in possession of one of those back in the parking lot there's no and more importantly there's no element so might be true that usually the person will be caught with one of those bags in the store but the state will def not have to prove the element of intense and certainly not in out the element of intent or entry she's merely back up there the state will not have to prove the element of entry let alone entry with intent to commit a thought to convict somebody of the the people still would not have to prove that they entered the store with the intent to use the back to commit retail theft and so my copy a likely scenario that a person just carrying around one of those bags but what matters is are the elements of the offense and this gets back to people versus no or where the court recognized that where two statutes and people versus christine noted this is well where two statutes each were each statute has an element that the other doesn't the general assembly presumably enacted both with the intention that a person who commits both offenses in the same course of conduct can be found guilty of both offenses and that's because each offense is designed to target a distinct harm and the legislature and as the court s intended to ensure that defendants are held accountable for the full measure of the harm they cause and so no there's a good example of this so in miller the defendant was convicted of burglary retail theft and i believe some form of  t because he had the knife and he threaten the person on the way out now these were all actions that occurred in the same course of conduct but there's no there's no suggestion there that the legislature didn't intend for the person to be found guilty of each of those offenses if the person committed each of those offenses and that's because each offense created a distinct harm the entry with the intent to commit a committed to harm is generally associated with burglary which are which is the inherent potential for confrontation  the act of stealing created the harm generally associated with retail faffed which is the value of the good stolen and the the pulling of the knife on the security guard obviously brought about its own distinct harms and so the person was convicted of would definitely be in there in an appropriate case that would be evidence of the person's intent but it wouldn't be an element of the retail theft offense it would still be it would be evidence to be used in  the elements of the burglary offense and so this gets back to the point in bradford where the court said it was strained logic to extend the limited authority doctrine to an authorised remaining burglary because doing so there would turn every retail theft into unauthorized remaining burglary but that's simply not the case here at most we have a a small subset of retail fasts that will be also unauthorized entry burglary and it's only those of those that subset of offenses where the state can prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the person entered with that intent and didn't simply enter innocently as and bradford and then commit a spur of the moment retail theft u no i believe these are backpacks they brought with them well we think that this is a case with strong circumstantial evidence that the defendant did enter the store with the intent to commit that not of course he separate sufficiency claim in the first instance we do think we do we don't have the evidence to establish that yana reasonable doubt but the defendant of course is entitled to appellate review on that question the final point i would it i'd like to respond to justice thomas point which i think was an important one and you mentioned the a particular example where the general assembly did carve an exception into the burglary statute and i think that does show implicitly indicated an intent to narrow the scope of the burglar statute that's the standard backwards as the court noted in people versus jones which is cited in our brief the general presumption is that when the legislature passes a new statu it does so with knowledge of the existing law and with knowledge of this court's decisions construing the existing law and the a new statute won't be held to overturn that settled law i'm just the implication that the intent was there it's clear and so most what we have here if i'm understanding that and its argument correctly is an implication that the general simply intended to narrow the scope of the burglary statute by enacting the retail theft statute of that simply not enough we need to see some sort of clear indication of that intent and i think the what would be have been much more likely if the general assembly had intended to limit the burglary statute would have been for that same general assembly when an act in the retail theft statute to also add in an exception to the burglary statute to narrow it in a way similar to the way it did with the motor vehicle exceptions mr love of the sea or times are good you have one nothing would prevent the state from charging burglary in every case retail it's just a question of whether the group at the end farm before the under the store well obviously the state is constrained in what they can charge by what they have a good faith basis to believe the evidence will stablish and so i don't think the state would simply charge all retail pfaff's as are now thrice entry burglary regardless of their view of the i didn't concerning the entry element and the intent element but in a case like this where the people have strong evidence establishing the unauthorized or the prohibited intent supporting the unauthorized entry charge in those cases the charge will be appropriate and then the second district recognizing the vast majority of cases the people likely won't be able to prove that on this it was a difficult burden to establish that intent but we do think we have it here thank you number one two three three one eight people versus johnson will be taken under advisement as agenda number one mr levin mr lenz we thank you for your arguments this morning and you are excuse