about james beacons are to sentence respond to second statutorily required by by the unified code of corrections and the underlying case respondent pled guilty to dui and was sentenced to court supervision this court should issue the mandamus order because the plain language of the unified court of corrections precludes that disposition under seven thirty as c s five slash five six one d responding was ineligible for court supervision because he had previously pled guilty to reckless driving and that plea was the result of a plea agreement one of the reasons offered by the circuit court or respondent excuse the imposition of this disposition which is specifically barred by statute and therefore this court should issue the mandamus order turning to the language of the statute section five six one d addresses instances in which a defendant charged with driving under the influence is notable for court supervision when the defendant has previously pleaded guilty to a violation of section eleven five zero three of illinois vehicle code that's the reckless driving statute and the clear stipulation was the result of a plea agreement as the circuit court itself unambiguous it states that if there was a plea pursuant to a plea agreement previously it's reckless driving that subsequent to that and the defendant subsequently charged with driving under the influence he's ineligible for court supervision the result of quote a plea agreement it doesn't actually mean a cleveland rather it means a certain subset of riemann's specifically those plea agreements in which a driving under the influence charge was reduced to maximum sentence of twenty five years in prison now the court went on to explain that the plea of guilty was given in exchange for the promise of a twenty five year sentence so in that case there was consideration there is no dismissal of charges the consideration consideration and on the other hand on the other hand a blind plea in which no consideration was given the first case is people the economics at issue in eckart case was whether five six one d out three violated equal protection claim and in doing so it found that the statue was rationally related to a legitimate state interest and it took it up held the statute because it could find a set of facts which would sustain that  rational relationship which sustained that classification the fact that the court used as an illustration and as as its original set of as a set of facts a defendant who had been charged with  dui and then had that charge dismissed does not does not at all suggest that other considerations for instance a maximum sentence do not qualify under the statute and indeed position and that the analysis of this court there was that it had to find one set of facts to support the classification having done so its job was this court's job was done it did not need to go farther instance in which case the charges so long as the defendant complies with the terms of the court supervision vengefully discharged and so there there certainly could be a rationale which would state that treating that and that is not precluded by that statute generally court supervision is only given to defendants who the circuit court would determine is not a different it was not likely to commit for their crimes certainly the fact that there had been this conviction would suggest that the defendant would or might be likely to to commit for their crimes that is not the text of section five six one d three and moreover the fact that  all that there has to be again for this to survive rational basis for view is that there be one set of facts that suggests that there's just has to be one set of facts which shows that triggers section five six twenty three the other case that respondent offers and support is people versus whom but that case again just highlights that  there was no evidence that there was any plea that the defendant had received any consideration so there was that the burden had not been met of proving that there was a policeman's and that that is not the case here where there is no dispute that there the second was that that the statute somehow created an you're about a presumption but that or that contention fails for two reasons one there simply is no presumption in the statute there is no ultimate fact which can be presumed from a predicate fact there is only one fact whether the whether the plea was subject to be imminent there is nothing that that presume that it's not that simple finding is all that i necessary to trigger five six monday and moreover these sorts of presumptions are only a problem when they go to the underlying elements the elements of the criminal offense not to the length of the  county signed off whether signed off at least was of record agreed it was on behalf of the people that's correct and now the people trailers what they agreed to i'm sorry i don't understand but we'll the people signing off by the assistant state's attorney who then going back to work just as farmer talked about in terms of a scenario where there's a bench ruling or there's no agreement does the statute still apply that second section five six twenty three does not apply to that situation again there's a general court to provision generally under the statute should only be applied when a when a trip i want to defendant has shown  statute applies in this which is exactly or so in this particular case it wouldn't make any difference whether it's a blind trial and that in the two thousand and seven race no that once the charge for driving under the influence is made and there was the previous plea percentage of plea agreement and in two thousand and seven the respondent was precluded by this statute from receiving court supervision and i thought from reading your brief references  on page seven that the record is unclear about the prior dui proceedings but why did you i was dismissed in terms of i mean is it even clear in the record that there was an agreement you know and it's certainly clear that there was an motivation that the parties had people had in entering into the plea nor the motivation that the defendant had the respondent excuse me had an entering into the plea but again that the that fact the motivation of the of the parties is is not an issue and where and it would it would certainly it would be extremely difficult envision a situation in which that fact that the reason the motivations of the parties were put on the record i mean that would you know the that you plea bargaining process is complex and it's a there c two thousand true and the other from two thousand and seven the in my opinion the main fallacy with the state's argument and the state's petition for an order mandamus in th in interpretation or misinterpretation of five dash six that's one d c of the of the vehicle code what the state is saying to you is that any plea agreement regarding reckless driving results in a person who was subsequently charged with driving under the influence from being allowed court supervision doesn't make according to the state any difference what the nature of the plea agreement is it doesn't make any difference what the terms of the plea agreement were it's because it's if it's a plea agreement it affects a subsequent dui sentencing procedure that cannot be that was not the intention of this statute and this in your honour's this court has already ruled what the purpose of that particular section was now let me put it this way the most cases in my experience and i've been practicing for forty years are dealt with by plea bargain duis reckless driving and the like or are i can't give you a percentage but but and i think we all know that has to be done that way so the state says that any time there's a reckless driving charge and there's a plea agreement that affects a subsequent dui charge but so they mean by that let's suppose that a person is charged for reckless driving and they enter into a plea agreement whereby the person will gets probation where the person will get a certain fine or his plea of guilty or he will get a conditional discharge for his plea of guilty the state is saying if even if those are the terms of the plea agreement doesn't make a difference it's a plea agreement and therefore it makes a subset of person the person convicted of that or given  philosophy a preclusion of getting court supervision on this at a subsequent time i think that the rational basis is that charges that preet preceded the present dui must be related somehow to the alcohol and that was the purpose and the intention of the legislature in and acting as if you see one while i go way back and and there was a period of time and i don't think  anymore to the extent that it was that the wise were frequently disposed of by a reduction through a plea agreement to reckless driving when i was prosecutor that with that was we did that quite regularly and quite frequently and then when the statute was was adopted i which i think was in the mid ninety's a really ninety something like that the legislature had realized that fact and that a lot of people were getting a double break they were getting a break by having their initial dui charge reduced the reckless and then they were getting a second break when they got their second d and and being eligible for court supervision on the second dui and that's what the legislature was intending to to preclude and you said this yourselves in the in the  from that it seemed that he was saying that that literal reading of the statute would prohibit the subsequent supervision that's were contained within your article to you with your with your argument you agree to that i am i agree that a technical the interpretation of the statute without resorting to looking at the purpose of the statute would preclude my client from receiving court supervision  you know i do really understand that what you say when you say the purposes standard because it makes perfect sense for one thing but what what is there in statutory interpretation that permits us with this statute to go beyond the pla language of the statute and look and to something else because the to interpret the statute as the state would have you interpret leads to a result that is not only well in w may believe that it's one comes to what you're saying is that you're saying the statute is and big yes i am saying that these statutes is ambiguous yes it's ambiguous because let me first of all you look at court supervision for a dui one is when they've been convicted of a prior to you why are we seeing court supervision with regard to the son and the the second or the third one is when there has been a reduction done say that literally that means any player agreement i suppose even if the reckless driving was the plea agreement had to do with you're going to pay a two hundred dollars fine rather than a five hundred dollars fine even when the  the state recommends for a sentence which has got nothing to do with with the why and so it just wasn't the purpose of this statute to to be interpreted the way the state wants to and you've said that and was not intended by the legislature at the statute should be interpreted to mean that you're an older move for supervision only when the prior reckless driving conviction was a reduction from a it prohibits or supervision on the first he should see it so i do then how would you respond to the argument that could be made that if they can edit it they can and they can put any conditions it including no prior convictions for speeding or reckless driving or anything else i believe that they could probably do that and there would be a question in my mind as to the rational relationship between that type of provision and what they're attempting to do with the you eyes but my position is that was not the purpose or the intent of this particular church argument is focusing on the legislative and that's right and  your decision your honor in a car which which said that that the purpose the purpose of this section is to preclude supervision to those previously  of in this particular case that's a problem because it's two separate charges two separate charges and we argued that on our brief and i was going to get to that and i'll get to it right now because it would seem that  every time there was a plea agreement that would have to be articulated as we don't see or show on the record that it was a reduction but as you indicated and this was the judge's problem the the his record which he interpreted from the two thousand and two dui involved as has already been noted here two separate charges one was a dui and the other was reckless driving so there was no reduction from dui to reckless strike the defendant simply pled guilty to the reckless driving and that does not indicate that the plea was the result of a plea agreement to reckless driving it's him big you see i mean i'm not sitting here standing here and saying that i judges problem was was this plea of guilty to reckless driving a some type of benefit to the defendant because the dui was being  issue is the judge's interpretation of his own record and and he interpreted to the for his record to be void as to whether or not the  i and it wasn't i'm sorry the reckless driving supervision and the fine and actually got supervision on that reckless driving rather than a conviction whether it was the result or had anything to do with the charge we have to assume the police offer to surcharge my client both with the two i am with reckless driving that's unusual there must have been something there for both charges to exist so the case it it it's not there because of the fact that there were two separate charges so so my position with regard to that is that is a factual issue but it's only a factual issue if we do not accept the literal reading of the statute exactly yeah and that's why i started the argument with how you interpret statute and then we have to talk about this case and how it applies to the statute  chances as long as the negotiated leader offered some consideration it seems like that would be enough for the holding and once that conclusion was reached there was really really no reason to go and point out supervision to those who pursuant to a plea agreement have pled guilty to or stipulated to facts supporting a charge or a finding of guilty of a violation within the last five years as rationally related to the goal of high for highway safety and you made a ruling on that that it was rationally related to the goal of highway safety by pointing out what the focus of this section meant  and you reached the conclusion of the rational relationship because of the purpose or focus because they don't legislate or was attempting to prevent a person who was a previously charged with the y but was reduced  charges and valving alcohol from from receiving the benefit of the court supervision statute so i disagree with your honor that is i don't think it was the and i forget what the  know it would not want to interpret it so that every time somebody almost every time somebody has a reckless driving conviction that it can't get court supervision on a subsequent dui that is not what the purpose of this was plain reading of the statute that defendant was the respondent was ineligible for a court to provision the literal application of a statute precludes respondent from having received court supervision and that is the terminations of the case once that is agreed upon there is the courts should does not go beyond that to look at the legislative intent and does not seek to to look beyond the plain meaning when the meaning is plain no further the argument is here is that perhaps the legislature that there wasn't a specific intent to apply for the statute to apply to the situation here but this isn't really an argument that the that application would be absurd it's just an argument that this was not the main focus and it is it is possible that the legislature knew how difficult it would be to  o address the motivation in the facts and but that's an argument of that there's an imperfect fit between what the legislature intended and what the statute actually reads and that's an defendants and and again but the primary analysis is that it's a terrific argument but why make the distinction between line please findings and please that result from  that disagree with that at all but we're not faced with a constitutional issue here because it hasn't been raised if that's right your honor and but the question is whether it's an absurd result that that's what the respondent might be arguing because once once we look once the meaning is plain the intent of the legislature does not override even if that intents were somehow difference that does not override the plain meaning but but  is moreover the argument isn't that that response that the general assembly meant to exclude this group of reckless drivers but rather that wasn't the the specific focus  of the legislative of the general assembly but that's not the kind of absurdity that would allow this question of passed the plain meaning which as we now know everyone agrees would preclude defendant from receiving court supervision and that's again the the main focus here there is no factual dispute that there was a plea agreement in two thousand and two and that the defendant pled guilty to reckless driving  plain language of the statute when the defendant was then charged in two thousand and seven but driving under the influence he was precluded from receiving court supervision and because of that this question issue i mean damus order requiring think that case i think you're actually the problem with this application step in the current case the defendant at the circuit court level argued that his previous plea to reckless driving was pursuant to a plea agreement he brought the court file to the court room and said nothing in here suggests that it was a plea agreement when previously i pled guilty and then when the case was up before this court that original court file was not even was not even in evidence was not in the record and so this court had had no basis on which to find any plea agreements so there was a complete absence of evidence that the previous clea greatly inhibit the use of plea bargaining and indeed the court there might be different motivations multiple motivations of each party that might not and they might not agree as to what the motivations should be  entertain any argument or objections from the state because this is a void disposition that there's no evidence that that at that time there was a obviously when the motion for void sentence that included arguments on that