so the core erred and nine him qualified immunity also the district court improperly held that the law was clearly established under the facts in the case and therefore the district were also erred in denying him quality qualified immunity in that regard regarding the st instance specifically the district court found that there are no reasonable jury could determine that the sheriff did not honor st because close temporal proximity alone is not enough also because the district court noted other factors such as the understeer of allegedly harassing mr tice regarding the campaign and your honor i'm just saying they're not into and specifically because the core also found that there was sufficient evidence supporting the sheriff's terminations of mr ice it's simply noted it was not enough because she disputed that certain misconduct that she and is alleged to have done that she didn't do our position here your honor is that whether or not she did the conduct and whether or not it's to be disputed that she did minute retaliation plains where the defendant can produce evidence showing that he would have fired and miss ties regardless of any motivation related to her political association in that regard the district court found that there was that evidence and it was deficient however that some of those instances that evidence was disputed my position here is whether or not it was disputed to have occurred is not sorry your honor for her no we're not saying that it is it so it sounds like you're not contesting the district court's factual finding but that you maybe are wanting to add some facts to it that for statement think maybe the district court left some facts out i was i would say that's one way to view it i don't want to say that different occasions recommended her determination individuals from other law enforcement agencies including the v a s office and there were other instances that the district court specifically noted in the order that she all of those those alone would have been sufficient evidence to fire her but the ones that the district court said were also disputed whether or not they occurred it is not disputed that the sheriff was informed that he believed it he believed it was causing issues in the office you solve that it was affecting morale among the staff you saw that it was and this is not in the order affecting mrs tice's ability to do her job according to stover was dispute here is the district court said there was not sufficient evidence to say or i'm sorry that a reasonable jury cannot say that he would have fired her regardless and were saying it improperly relied on a about conduct occurring when that dispute of the conduct occurring we're not saying whether or not it did we're saying it doesn't matter that he was told that and that's not dispute it and we're also feeling based on the planet earth nearly established in determining whether it's really just don't i'll have to go with what everybody agrees on or what the district court found i would say for clearly the clearly established one going with just those fact established that he would have had a notice or duty that firing her would have violated her constitutional rights my position is also that with those facts as well as the ones mentioned the chance in cases distinguishable here and that's the case again of the district court relied on because janssen involved a sheriff who ran for offer a sheriff's deputy who ran for office and he was fired because of that but is also that supported that campaign in that case it was determined that their positions do not require political loyalty and that terminating their forward and support in the campaign was indeed a violation of their constitutional rights because the sheriff specifically in meetings said that that their positions required political loyalty and anyone who did not support his campaign and was not loyal to him would no longer be was not terminated per se as a result of a lack of political loyalty but for but that their column doubts surrounding their ratings caused them to not be able to work with people with difficulty noted that they were and the office is running smoothly and effectively performing their jobs which of course is not the case here if there are no further questions i'd like to reserve my remaining terminating plaintiff although ironically nothing was apparently said to plaintiff during the eighteen month period nor was she subjected to any discipline for her alleged behavior is that defense evidence is no in disputed certain of the evidence may be hearsay and the jury is the proper body for assessing the credibility of the witness on consider upon consideration of the evidence presented in the light most favorable to the pla or cannot say that any reasonable jury would finally the defendant would have taken the adverse action even in the absence of players or of her spouse in the election counsel's argument if i understood problem with that is there's no record that he he was told those things there's no record that he quote believed those things these allegations were were made memorandums no discussions with sabrina ties that they had disciplinary issues with her and so i think i think that the court used the term ironic i would use the term principle that you you janssen i think he demanded it openly right and the argument i've made on appeal in my response brief is i judgement you cannot require political loyalty at last it's a job that requires loyalty and that that involves controlling budgetary issues on so that was not raised in this case offices and and all add i think respectfully what the defendant is doing in this case is they're trying to say the chance another case law doesn't apply but in making that argument they're change they're not accepting the facts as sort of by the plaintiff and asserted by the district court st down by the district court they're switching the facts to take it out of the chance around and say well we thought it was ok to terminate somebody be understandable particularly when that when the law requires that we use the facts and always will inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving pari i think it should be pretty clear why judge  decisions that have to do with the context of the th amendment where they can indeed issue language to the appellate court saying don't define  arena in st amendment association and mason frankly dickason jansons like it's i think that's all i have i think this issue is actually not that complicated and in response to the council's claim that we're simply arguing facts and trying not to we are accepting as true all the facts found by the district court in the underlying violation is that it appeared to rely on the fact that mr tice claims that some of the alleged misconduct was and didn't occur and it was simply undisputed that the sheriff was told about that and it was what he believed occurred that he relied on as well as the instances that the district court defined occurred regarding the clearly established law janson is again distinguishable because there was a sheriff's office that was running smoothly they were doing their jobs he told them that he was going to fire people for and campaigning against him the other cases are also distinguishable and specifically going to look at france  again had similar issues in regards to the sheriff saying why he would fire and then also had and it involved a political party and dickason with somewhere here we don't have any law that says when there is misconduct specifically the misconduct identified by the district court and it's order occurring that a sheriff who knows that's the case and is would have noticed that he would violate ms tice's rights by f her for those reasons in other words there's no case that's particular lies and to the facts that the district court found here and those reasonable facts that apply to plain and that clearly establishes the law in that regard