you your honor may please the court this case presents two primary questions the st is whether or not this court has the subject matter jurisdiction to consider the petitioners derivative citizenship claim in light of the irregularly a regular procedural way by which that claim arrived before this court the nd question is whether there are any genuine issues of material fact as to whether mr lane is in fact entitled to derivative citizenship pool verses and so the jurisdiction question we believe it does  u believe it does your honor i believe that that question that case reaffirms the proposition that that and procedural irregularities in a non frivolous claim for nationality in the context of a removal proceeding will not bar this court's subject matter because citizenship is not a casual thing certainly not and beyond that the the line of cases from in from the whole and from the supreme court stand for the proposition that citizenship cannot be relinquished inadvertently or in voluntarily which would include by making a procedural error navigating the immigration laws for instance especially in this context in the cause of the person navigating those laws motion to reopen several years after the final order of removal then then there was a petition to review that denial of the motion to reopen the court which ordinarily the court does not have jurisdiction to review as it's a discretionary decision by the b s a and yet the the court exercised jurisdiction over that claim anyway so while the while the petitioner in that case did file a timely petition to review thirty days after the  reopen thirteen years after the order be can't was a final order of removal so under the under that the statute calls for again and which what the government evokes is a thirty day requirement to file the petition for review thirty days after the final order of removal so we believe those cases that stand for the proposition as well that the that the time that the thirty day requirement of this court's jurisdiction heard speak to the material fact there are many issues that we need to know before we petitioner immigrated here with his mother they both were permanent residence they both were i'm sorry pardon me they were both permanent residents there's no dispute that the mother and  biological father never married and there is no dispute that the mother was naturalized when the petitioner was fourteen those are the principal issues of material fact the issues to the extent there is any dispute and the government has not contested or not raised any  any concrete contesting of the of the salvadoran law to the extent there is any dispute here it's with respect to salvadoran law and under a rule four hundred and forty one conclusions of foreign law are to be treated as conclusions of law and that the jena made it el salvadoran law would looking at the district northern district of california that decision's analysis of of salvadoran law would confirm that during the relevant period of  time the petitioner was in the status of was an illegitimate child under salvadoran law even though someone's name was on his birth certificate yes so under article under article two hundred and seventy nine of the civil c family code in effect in el salvador in one thousand nine hundred and eight and i'll quote it children translated version which is in the record children born out of lead wedlock will be able to be recognized voluntarily by their father or declared recognised by him and will have the legal capacity of illegitimate children so in the st place the father's name appears on the birth certificate under salvadoran law at the time the recognition component of this would require him to have signed that certificate and entered salvadoran code it's simple it's not relevant because the law continued to legit to discriminate because between legitimate and illegitimate children the ultimate the the basic conclusion under salvadoran law and the florist or his court summary of it which is lainer summarized again in a helpful way by anderson behold in the th circuit is that the only way to legitimate a child under salvadoran law is to is through marriage and there is no again no material dispute no issue of dispute here that that the petitioner's father and mother were never married thank you thank you so to conclude again that the with respect to the issues of if you could go back to dr stiction for a minute is the rule that you are asking for here the st claim of the derivative citizenship marries the limitations of  time simply don't apply i don't believe that that's a there may be certain circumstances under which a petitioners the way by which a claim arrives is so defective that it implicates that it creates some sort of conflict your honor i do believe that that the general our position is that that the under the under the supreme court precedent and under under the general there in other words we don't believe that this court has to decide that broadly of an issue here in this case the petitioner to timely appeal here is the district court's denial to bring it before this court in the st place there may be such a circumstance everything and everything out but but one thing i believe that the government is arguing the court does not have subject matter jurisdiction here because this is not a timely filed petition for a view on the general principle would be that that if is if the united states citizen is in removal proceedings at some point there should be there needs to be some procedural mechanism for that for that for that citizen to have their claim heard before in article three point article t this would only apply in the event that the court determines that the claim is non frivolous correct so there is there is some sort of there is a screening at the front end of whether or not the the claim of nationality is non frivolous in the st place we do note here that the government has not can not claim that mr lane as his citizenship claim is not a full of non frivolous at most in requesting for every man it's in fact acknowledging that it is a non frivolous claim of citizenship so in the context of a assuming argue endo that that  a court from exercising jurisdiction over that claim at any point so again the recession's case was thirteen years later after that after the final order of removal the sole procedural distinction is that there was a motion to reopen to reopen interposed after those thirteen years so as far as disregarding any time bar what the government's position would seem to suggest is that so long as you then lodge a a motion to review which you can do at any time essentially a motion to reconsider at any point you you reactivate your claim and then you can appeal thirty days you can bring the petition to review thirty days after that decision is presumably denied  here that option would be available but we don't believe it's necessary and for one for one and for one thing that we would still be inconsistent with the with the plain terms of the statute which calls again for the petition for review to be filed thirty days after the citizenship is resolved the propriety of the entire proceeding is in doubt so to require again assuming arguendo that a petitioner is a u s citizen that petition has no place in the be in the st place so so for that reason we don't believe it's necessary would the morning in may please the court christopher coddling on behalf of the government there is a proper procedural path for mr lane as to have his derivative citizenship claim heard in this court mr lane is referring to and in his reply brief we've discussed it briefly here he can move to reopen his removal proceedings in the immigration court at that point he can either have those proceedings heard administratively in the normal course if that motion to reopen is denied he can appeal that to the b i a if the b i a of firms the denial of the motion to reopen he can file a petition for review and he's in much the same situation as the petitioner was in this court's hand in case there are good reasons for requiring someone in mr lynn his position to follow that procedure st of all the the immigration courts should have the st crack at determining whether or not mr lane as a citizen that's particularly noteworthy here whereas we know in our in the government's brief there's been an intervening be a precedent decision matter of cross that arguably bears on the question of whether or not mr lynn is dr citizenship a matter of cross was just decided in two thousand and fifteen long after the immigration court heard his his removal proceedings more broadly and this speaks to some of the concerns judge winter  raised it channels continues to channel these types of claims through the claim channeling process that congress established in the real i d act there's an important distinction between the provisions that the government is arguing administrative exhaustion requirement talks about what you can argue once you're here if d one applied to mr poole and to others like him like mr lane is then he'd be out of luck then he would not be able to get judicial review of his citizenship claim but if a five in b want to apply he can still get here he can still argue his citizenship claim properly he just has to go back to the immigration court and go through obviously we're dealing with a question of citizenship here and you have an individual who's who's seeking to reopen my understanding is that in tandem in tandem with seeking the su sponte reopening with the immigration court mr owen is would also ask the immigration could i suppose at this point as a as a technical matter he could be i mean he has an order of removal that's currently final and and i mean the government would argue the united we stand here today that's true because there is not a proper petition for review that's pending before this court but again he's been released from custody as he proceedings were terminated he would be moving the immigration court and seeking a stay of his removal presumably abolished the distinction between children born in and out of wedlock and so that as of the effective date of those amendments which was in december one thousand nine hundred and three that distinction was was abolished and under that interpretation of the constitution  amendments that abolished that distinction between children born in and out of wedlock there were provisions in the salvadoran legal code that continued to talk about legitimation in legitimate and illegitimate children so the question is if those statutes continue to be on the books until nine hundred and ninety four did the constitution actually abolish that distinction or not and there's a b i a decision another precedent decision matter of cross in two thousand and fifteen that says that when you continue to have this it's not dealing with el salvador it's dealing with a jamaica and so it's different it's looking at different facts but but as a matter of principle what it said in terms of patern paternity legitimation under three hundred and twenty one a was when you have a country that continues to have those legal distinctions notwithstanding you know purported elimination of them that you would still you don't have to sorry you do have to apply with comply with those additional requirements in order to be legitimated so under that interpretation if that interpretation applies to what was going on in el salvador then then mr lane is would not have been legitimated and then he would be eligible for derivative citizenship it's a complicated question it's not as simple as just reading the plain black and white language of the constitution and frankly some some expert some expert testimony on that some people who really understand not only how salvadoran law works but but how if at all these legitimation issues were actually being decided in el salvador at the time as applied to whatever the relevant facts would be in mr lane is this case so yes again the governor argues there is no jurisdiction here there is a path for mr lynas to get back here without question he sessions and it's a summary order but but am in the sessions as well in all those cases that that that interposed motion to reopen is still not that again is not thirty days after the final what we're asking for in this case and i guess the flipside of that question is the petitioner could start over again as an arm and suggests and you just think that's a waste of time is that your reason for it certainly not a fission from it from a from a judicial resources perspective to interpose a requirement but we also believe that there is a that that under the under the the doctrine announced by this or the principle announced by the supreme court in from home the white the  the claim of citizenship is it is a denial of an essential jurisdictional fact for the executive branch to place that the petitioner in deportation removal proceedings in the st place so in some sense there is a there is an impropriety there in the st place but for nothing more than the proposition that if a government abolishes all distinction between legitimate and illegitimate children it amounts to a automatic legitimation of any given petitioner but again th california courts very carefully briefed on if you if you look at the docket through it through a full panel of experts on salvadoran law reached the conclusion that in fact despite the the  aspirational language of the constitution to announce that it would abolish all distinctions between legitimate and illegitimate children it left it up to the legislature to in fact do that with the legislature did not do for the intervening ten years and which are which is the key point