devastating consequences of unfettered equity receiver's we are now at the end of a process that has seen an equity receiver accomplish with the new york state department a financial services could not the seizure and liquidation of a defendant prior to any judgment merits and while this court cannot resurrect on door and it's already ruled that it cannot unwind the transactions the liquidated cond or it can grant the relief requested in this appeal and restore modicum of justice to the defendant were specifically asking for five relief surrenders one is that this court vacate the district court's order approving the receivers seven million dollars in fees and his council's three million dollars in fees we're asking that the court vacate the district court's order releasing an absolving the receiver and various third parties from a liability or asking that those decisions be remanded to a different district judge we're asking that this court find that the receiver improperly wound down and liquidated cond or and we're asking this court renew its previous warnings against using equity receivers to liquidate companies particularly solvent companies unless a member of the panel has a question regarding the facts underlying the matter under the matter or the procedure below i will skip ahead to our legal arguments the ultimate effect of the district court's errors below was to impose impermissible penalties on defendants in conducting the case the district court made a number of reversible errors as detailed in the brief the ultimate effect of these errors was to impose impermissible penalties on the defendants we start from the principle that equitable relief such as a receiver must be limited to remedial it must not be a penalty assessment here the penalties for the alleged violations are set forth in section ten fifty five eight of the dodd frank act and sections three zero nine and four zero eight of the new york financial services they provide for monetary fines and they provide for certain specific equitable relief but notably nowhere in these sections does it authorize the terminations wind down or liquidation of a defendant even as ultimate relief much less as an interim sanction to be imposed by a receiver but here the hurried sale of condors assets and terminations of the company impose massive additional penalties on the defendants those came in the form of lost revenues lost future profits millions of dollars in one necessary fees for the receiver in his counsel the transfer of tens of millions of dollars in value to third parties and of course the ultimate destruction of the company and the loss of over one hundred jobs in connection relationship to the gravity of the of the offense here a fine of three million dollars was ultimately imposed upon condo or at the same time hundreds of millions of dollars in value was lost or destroyed under any consideration of proportionality that is not a proportional penalty the district court made a number of specific errors if it applied the wrong standard and granting  improperly permitted wells fargo to intervene in an enforcement action and it provided insufficient due process at a number of different points throughout the proceedings the most egregious violation of due process came in connection with did not consent to this little something you agreed to know what he consented to your honor was the entry of a three million dollars fine and the future liquidation of condo or after it had already been destroyed all of the prime assets had already been sold off the company had functionally gone out of business it hadn't issued a new loan in eight months its workforce was devastated all the prime assets were gone what he was being asked to do was salvage what he could out of what had saying is that his company had already been destroyed by the time the consent judgment was entered he has a factory he has a house whatever metaphor you want to come up with it has already had its foundation ripped away the workers have been dispersed the court he then a lot he with them was allowed to preserve what value remained in the company after it had already been functionally destroyed and that's the real issue here now he didn't consent to that earlier destruction wh because you can't you know you can't because you've got to consent judgment and you know you can't so it's disingenuous for you to stand there and say something is basically wrong and it's not supporting your honor it borders on frivolous if you ask me your honor the reason are exposed when they operate the company not when they wind it down that's correct your honor now this receiver received seven million dollars in fees for operating the company be done because one of complaints says is that the receiver was never jet never got the lonely sheen working again that stephen never ran the company and all this receiver liquidated your iran or there the the receiver can have it both ways he can either claim that this was a very difficult situation for which he was entitled to earn seven million dollars and that all he did was liquidate the company if all he did was liquidate the company he could have handed that over to an investment banker and said give me the broad best price he didn't need to charge eighty thousand dollars a week to liquidate the company he didn't need to charge forty thousand dollars a week for events occurring after every asset of the company had been sold he was operating the company and we have a perfect example of how that now comes to rest last week we received an indemnification notice from one of the parties who purchased honduras portfolio saying  responsible to indemnify it for acts that allegedly occurred during the receivership now if the receiver was running the company and he certainly was operating the company notices were going out refunds were going out because money was coming in bills were going out and he is liable i'm sorry condors liable to indemnify these folks then clearly there seaver has some potential liability there if this happened on his watch he should be responsible on that score which is why we believe that that particular part please the court judith hill for the superintendent of financial services baron and commodore entered into a consent judgment with the superintendent in which they admitted to stealing funds from vulnerable low consumers lying to the consumers and regulators about the theft and then also failing to protect consumers personal information even though conned or had misled only stating that it would protect that information and also charging illegal interest rates in that consent judgment baron and agreed that the receiver would sell all of contours remaining loans and end the company with the profits of that sale going to mr baron and they also agreed to cooperate and effectuating that sale and not to interfere with the receiver despite parents every effort to undermine the sale that he had agreed to complete the receiver close the sale in february twenty fourth relinquish condors loans up sorry relinquish the licenses to operate condor and wound down the business baron ultimately received a little more than eighty million dollars from that sale seen in this context the current appeal is precluded by the consent judgment largely moot and entirely meritless this is and attempted end run around the settlement withdrew his appeal his prior appeal which tried to raise many of these issues it's seen in that context the release language is really a reaffirm and spin this case of the consent judgment and the permanent injunctive relief that has been issued against against baron and baron and contra don't have any rights to raise some potential third parties claim against the receiver i mean the nine fifty nine language that he tries to invoke here is meant to provide some third party maybe a lone consumer of condor with the potential to claim not barren and everything even if the court were to look at this i mean everything is moot at this point except for the fees issue and even if the court was to look at the merits here i mean the story that baron and conned are telling us is false the first sale was done pursuant to the preliminary injunction it did not liquidate the company it paid off a massive two hundred fifty million dollar loan that taken out and that they admitted needed to be paid and it left the company with more than two hundred million dollar portfolio with which to try to resurrect the business and restart loan origination if the company could put in some basic compliance procedures in order to protect consumers and find new financing and then while that process was going on while the receiver was trying to rehabilitate the company baron condor agreed to sell the entire company and this litigation and there's really nothing more to the part of its sale order it already said the parent can't suit up and the sale that he agreed to effectuate and all of these claims trying to go back in time are still just doing just that he's still trying to  sale that he agreed to effectuate and the court reasonably decided that baron doesn't have any right to do that and that protecting the receiver for the actions that he made he did in not operating the company in the normal course but in already in our brief as to lange and ten v caption in two thousand and sixteen decision which says specifically that you must preserve and consent judgment issues there's nothing in that consent judgment from two thousand and fourteen that preserved the issues that he's raising that which all predate the the mist in the house raises them in life one being a judgment man improperly allowed the receiver in the fall of two thousand and four to wind down and liquidate even though the record shows that at that point tonto were no employees a condo or mr b exceeded ours and they were in there for a year we were in that case three years due to concluded the tench contentiousness in the digits in this of mr barron throughout the course of this i also will note that the priests who injunction and release now i'm sorry short up so at its core this appeal i think you hit it right on the head judge is all about after mr barron now has eighty million dollars to sue people he's looking for an opportunity by receiver as to that yes mr o'connell would put in from time to time on etsy periodically monthly or every few months reports that identified his fees how they were calculated and they were put in when he had paid  us the amount of our fees once in a while they'll be letter by mr niehaus or his other counsel that predated him objected to them as excessive the court analyzed it and said we found to be reasonable we could find we had some trouble finding  during that particular so that's of it's a really good question because before we really got involved take a hostile or i believe the practice by mr o'connor was to submit the letters directly to the court of view of the facts and they weren't necessarily filed when we got involved with the case at least the early ones were we only see them right and then in the first right and then we'll be got involved and we asked to be brought in by mr o'connor because it started getting very issue let me address the issue about the obviously the district court judge appoints or equity receiver on the barton rule has the right to say no you can't sue them unless you come back to us which is effectively what we have here the exception that has been raised by mr it's in the final judgment by the court distance charging the receiver and so that's where it is there's an injunction in there so if you do anything further to try and sue the receiver he would have to go back before judge rick back and get permission which really is the right way to deal with it without here because she is in the best position to understand that all these issues have been dealt with before the reason this of what occurred here the one of the i missed if i meant one thing that mr that was on when right before the judge we had a full day here in among other things a full day here before just to judge mcmahon in december of two thousand and fifteen we were both there for that purpose and after that full day all the issues time and as a result of that the judgment men ruled it was reasonable and i think this was a fair you know as to best job that you can get under the circumstances just like you complained about the fact the only got fifteen million of the sixty million because there was a different cutoff date all those issues were addressed during a full hearing where everyone had a full and fair opportunity to have live witnesses and oral argument i think i just i don't know if i have any more time here and i think i'm over but whatever you'd like me very briefly this is the fourth time heard from this court and at no point have any of the appeals been ruled on on the merits mr baron has been told that his appeals were moot but the court had no power to do anything and that regardless of what had occurred before and was with withdrawn by your client one was withdrawn that's and that's sort of the it's true honor that is that is true but for example the deal that that was just referred to by my colleague here the circuits told mr barron we can't tell you whether the deal was good or not all we can tell you is since we can't offer you any relief your appeal is being denied what we're asking for today is simply that this court provide mr bear and the little pieces of justice that are left to him nine fifty nine a cannot be unilaterally overruled or ignored by a district court judge nine fifty nine a specifically provides that where receivers being sued in connection with carrying on the business and this indemnification thing that i referred to is exactly that carrying on the business a group of consumers is claiming that notices that were sent out to them during the operation upon door by the receiver are improper that is exactly what nine fifty nine is designed to address and chief judgment man can't simply overrule that i want to briefly address also the notion that he wasn't carrying the business five million dollars was paid out to employees during this period mr barron hadn't fired all the employees the salespeople had to be terminated because there was no loan origination but the other sixty people were there sending out notices collecting checks work in the loan portfolio that is an operation of the business and finally we had a we had a discussion about the of fees that were paid to the various attorneys number one there is no evidence whatsoever in the record and there was any evidence submitted of the attorneys fees those were submitted as expenses by the receiver we don't have anything on that score the fees that were submitted by the receiver wore these two and three page summaries that showed weekly expenses which we believe are improper under these standards and to the extent that mr baron ran up some legal fees that were approximately equal to those of the receiver mr baron was the defendant that's kind of his right his right is to defend himself against the charges that are being made against him it's not necessarily appropriate for a receiver who is supposed to receive quote moderate compensation only thank you reserve decision