forty five people versus larry fifth well the assault against the sea the state charge occurred sometime in april of twenty fifty yet the state in our indian impermissibly joined these two offenses together into one charging document resulting in one tri the jointer statute under the criminal procedure code at one eleven for for the offenses to be joint they have to be part of the same criminal transaction and again the most important fact which separates these two offenses which proves that they were not part of the same criminal jointer presuming it was permissible under the joint or statute prejudiced mr defendant because it permitted the state to join these two relatively unrelated offenses into one trial and committed one jury to hear all of the evidence of both of these arguably permitted the victim of the un charged assault to testify and be charged and pending case hypothetically if at the trial for a season solved t m would have been permitted to come in and testify however there was a wealth of other one  years say evidence that came in that bolster both girls stories that one fifteen and ten evidence one that my hypothetical and that one fifteen evidence one hundred ten evidence that pertains to t m would have been inadmissible yes that is my position and i think that's born out by the entirety of the code if you look at seven point three you still limits the admissibility of the evidence to the rules of evidence are seven point three operates as a and instead of the normal is i make the argument in my opening brief only applies when reading the stat bill reading the language of the statute one fifteen ten the hearsay only applies to the crime that is charged the crime that is pending in that case so my position is that one fifteen the medical personnel talking about the one the seven point three victim yes on a limited medical exception here say i think it would be but the more we drift down that hole the more we run the risk of the need of the mini trial aspect of other crimes concerning the case involving suzy pursuant to one fifteen there are seven point three is it your position that the statement suzy made that would be admissible or if she were the victim three twenty six illinois decision six thirty one court's decision to allow all the other crimes evidence pursuant to one fifty five or seven point three even in each of the two separate trials we conclude the friend suffer no prejudice because all this evidence was properly bro zone right and in that case i refer back to the statute itself by saying the language of the statute says the victim and that means the victim in this particular case when we're talking about the victim of a case and if there is no other referencing that one hundred ten evidence is admissible through the one thousand seven point three propensity have in store evidence door one fifteen ten evidence the outcry statements the additional repetitive allegations yes these are specific allegations of specific conduct because suzy froze up so the jury's not going to hear anything at all about what the different detour as a matter of policy what policy would you what policy can you think of that would explain why the legislature  mean it's the longstanding suspicion against copious propensity evidence once of seven point three permits limited propensity evidence in these specific scenarios subject to the factual pattern of a case the legislature by not extending the one hundred ten pierce a van may respect that listen we are still skeptical of propensity evidence we're going to permit it if the victim comes in and testifies to it but by allowing the state to get all of this other evidence past the hearsay bar policy in terms of the logic of restricting the application of one fifteen ten only those statements of the victim in the charge crime but not allowed for the them of another round i think i mean you misunderstand your question so if i'm answering the wrong question please let me know about it again i think you have to look back at the asking us to interpret the statute i'm talking about the disparate treatment you're asking us to apply here where in applying one fifteen ten of the statements would come in as to the  statements of effect them but they would not come in if they were the statements of a victim a victim of another on charge crime or the a victim of a charge crime and another prosecution what's the logic there you know that goes back to the idea that there is still an air distrust and excessive propensity evidence if you call the victim the propensity under seven point three the legislature has expressed we are comfortable with that we are comfortable with that that exclusion to the usual bar and see it's the legislature has expressed anything beyond that narrow what seven point resort says so the logic behind permitting the victim to testify in as a seven point three victim but not committing that that seven point three victims hearsay testimony and i think it's logically flows from that natural distrust based on the common law of propensity bob we're not going to extend that exception indefinitely as if it was the charge crime itself just because of that distrust and city and additionally perhaps because in one seven point three seven point three victim is not under the constitution necessary testimony it is a discretionary testimony it allows the state and avenue to prove a particular fact the propensity of the defendant that they were not allowed to prove for one fifte evans has been treated previously particularly when we're talking about hearsay propensity evidence is now we have hearsay and propensity evidence so we've got additional concerns one ten takes  i believe so i did a pretty comprehensive review attempting to answer this question and i do not believe it's been answered sell in em and it's essentially comes down to the victim not a victim first steps if this was an active fifteen years after the fact they were sure to soon or inferred that the legislature i got changing the statute didn't want susie's testimony to apply i think that's an appropriate reading and that's what i meant know the state was not going to waste much time based on the right scotian i'm in the state doesn't it and it's brief you know fully briefed this issue so we do not have much to say basically our position is that seventy three and in addition as were promising that the jointer was proper at all that one fifteen ten testimony that was admitted was also properly admitted and there was no abuse of discretion say would adopt the court's discussion regarding the enter play between the off one fifteen seven three and one fifteen ten although i do admit that we did not fully brief that issue out with that being said the state really does not have that much more to offer regardless of argument marks your honor serving russians so the gist of the defendant's argument here is when you read one fifteen ten references made to the victim not a that why shouldn't we read one fifteen ten literally and exclude or preclude consideration of statements out of court for children to freeze up during testimony this statute allows that testimony and when otherwise it would never have awa opened the door to the sorts of many trials these trials with in trials where in in a charged case you know going back to your hypothetical and the undef susie was the seven point three  victim and she came in and froze up and testified that there would be all this other evidence starting come in would that then distract from the purpose of all of seven point three and the purpose of the charge of the trial against the charge victim in that case the little girl who was not and so just briefly in rebuttal i'll say that that may be another policy interpretation as to why a legislator chose to use the phrase the victim's specifying the particular victim in a charge case as opposed to saying a victim statutes it seems to me that this is an awful lot every way play and this we read of the article chose a victim or the victim at a time when no one could have intended i think you have to look at the way that they act the way that that they the way that they spoke through the statutes so it says the victim and i talked about that a lot but also when they passed seven point three after the fact they could have made a reference  opposed to a very big but by referring to the rules of evidence they were thus for incorporating the victim inside of that and knowing that they had limited that in such a fashion again i i i hesitate to speculate on what the legislature intended for particularly when we're talking fifteen in the gaffa different legislatures without having any legislative history in front of me but i don't think it's an unreasonable assumption to mean that or to read that the victim means the victim in that charge case and not anything else particularly when we