one where i think where the rubber meets the road in this case and that is with you so you can launch your story i'm going to talk i think the rubber meets the road in this case in section two to ten and i'm going to direct that's one of the spend most of the time talking about there are other matters  referenced in the brief i will talk about them only briefly but i think this is the key issue there are three defendants you're flying to two and all three of the defense to the school district would prob would apply to the extent to some extent to the actions of the two individual defendants so i think they do apply to all three there are things that also apply to the school district separately but because of the facts of the pleadings which  think i get that separate but i think this is the central point is two to ten ok i guess on briefly mr goldberg was a bus driver he alleges that somebody was riding with him and said some things that weren't untrue i think the allegation is without cause or justification i've reported repeated it to someone else and they repeated that to someone else and that's why he's here defense files a section two six one nine motion so that makes our job a little easier if we have we take everything that's true that's in the complaint we don't have to argue about questions of fact we're here on the question of whether or not the affirmative matter that is asserted by the defen that's where we ended up by both judge plenty of i think there's not a whole lot of question that he properly the the two different lawyers in the case i'm the third one on the third one because the second lawyer  for personal reasons can couldn't do it he's been overwhelmed as things the facts are properly pleaded the question of whether or not the opportunity to amend should have been allowed is both a matter of law that's pretty well known but in addition to that goes to the question of whether or not because of action could have been sustained i think that gets us right to where we're talking about two to ten there are two affirmative matters that are have a a broad a get out of jail free card because there are two provisions the second one that says public employee is not liable for injury caused by the provision of information that one is very very broad you can provide any information in essence you get the right to life i don't think as a matter of statutory interpretation which is what we're here for that that is in fact a proper reading in the statute what's your  tell you what we're looking at here is there are two things that give that to you one is the actual lang were there to see the principles of statutory interpretation and there are two things about the statu principles of statutory interpretation are number one we all you have to i don't you have to interpret a statute so to give proof to give effect to all of its meanings if in here let we've got provision and provision be there divided by the word or year you it says just so that it's fresh in our mind the public employee acme scope of employment is not liable for injury caused by his negligen misrepresentation or the provision of information as described ok you can interpret a statute to say that one provision is ineffective and if the other provision covers everything they both have to be given to me the second principle is this is a statute interrogation of the common law that similar case this is sovereign immunity that was abolished so if you have a choice between two interpretations one of  caused by his negligent misrepresentation or the prohibition of information going to that first principle of statutory interpretation the provision of information either orally in writing by computer et is very broad i call that a get out of jail free card for a reason you can provide any kind of information reasonable proper misrepresentations intentional negligent not intentional not negligent all of that if you interpret that to mean that this is separate from negligent misrepresentation and not modified by negligent then you are saying provision big the provision of information is a big broad one that makes provision a irrelevant because provision a is one of the things that would be included in the provision of information second statutory interpreter couldn't imagine something worse would be a misrepresentation supplying information for a lot of right that's what's does it's just junk so it's two different alternatives and no that's under elementary school district one for the one percent shorter so you have either normal definitions or the normal understanding it's given to these which is what we use i'm not just talking as an advocate i'm talking as as david helpful the provision of information is broad i think yes you could imagine a situation but that's not what that's not what we that's what you do what you do is say what are the ordinary meanings and even if you could find one out there doesn't this in effects of soon the second the other thing that backs t up is if you're going to look at the history of the statue this statute section to tan originally was only the negligent misrepresentation part two additions were made in  eighty seven eighty six eighty seven i think public at eighty nine fourteen thirty one they added for the provision of information with everything except the computer and electronic stuff then nine years later they said hey we're in the twentieth century you know you can provide information by computers and  if the legislature was going to change to ten from negligent misrepresentation to any provision of information don't you think they would have done it differently don't you think they would have stricken negligent misrepresentation don't you think that there would have been some brouhaha what i down in springfield saying we want to give this broad protection to all public employees those are the two elements of statutory interpretation that are in front of us today now it would be if it's tempting for me to say i think it's a pay out rule to head out a get out of jail free card that gives you a  live that's not what we're here for we're here to say what is the statutory interpretation that applies to this and when you look at it from the perspective of number one are you making the negligent misrepresentation part a irrelevant by inter breeding it the way the defense does i think that answers the question beyond that when you see the progression of how the legislature did it it makes sense for any negligent provision of information that's the point i want to make and i think that's the thing that makes this case there and i think that's why it should be reversed well the most recent case from our supreme court  policy decision it's not a forest and furthermore i'm not prepared to sit here and say what the language was of one else too we're here today but the language of this when you look at the language of th good this is what we have to decide and maybe the language in one or two is different maybe the supreme court which is latest size your writing style in this opinion as well if you reverse that but i don't think what they say about  to necessarily applies because if that's their their instinct in springfield right now that's fine art direction is not the supreme court building our direction is to the general assembly building that's what the general assembl the number may be different but so what case his her case would hold interpret or for the provision of information either or we have cetera as not meaning this type of case i don't have a case and i think the defense what would i file personally or what with the plaintiff file what was what was filed there wasn't a first amended complaint filed with a motion for leave fortune to reconsideration that that motion  also pleads interference with a contract so there are two general types of causes of action in and the you know if you want to talk about whether or not those allegations were adequately pleaded i think that's a different question i think they were and i would cite generally the idea that you see in there the allegation that feet that the subject statements were made without cause or justification  the to me the classic illinois case a city of geneseo where the court changed the regulation of public utilities the reason was that there was an argument made previous to that in a case that was not made before the court city of geneseo i don't think in the seventh circuit they made the argument that i'm making to you today if they did it would be persuasive authority they're free to adopt it but i think more important don't think the lawyers in front of the seven circuit said what i said but look at this language of the statute look at this legislative history they were deciding the same thing you're presented with  it seems to me to be that but first i'd like to address a question by justice murphy the immunity provided in section two ten only applies to ms brooks and ms bradley the school district is protected by other mean a t s and that would be specifically the most specific one as to dash one of seven the school district is not liable for any acts of its employees that are defamatory so the immunity of two ten which was the basis of the plaintiffs argument is only applicable to the two individual defendants range of activity by governmental employees for which those employees are mute the interpretation of two ten in this case if we're going to talk about statutory construction which i think is what it boils down to is this word or supreme court in a case called to snatch which dealt with a different immunity however dealt with an immunity that contain the word or in separate instances dividing separate parts of the immunity and the only supreme court said and we cited this case n these this use of this word or separates the different communities and they each stand on their own so here in this case we have the immunity provided to the teacher and the principal about providing information there's no question that these two individuals were acting within the scope of their duty when they reported incidents with the bus driver there's no question that these two individuals were providing information about the bus driver and so for going to just use rules of statutory construction that the terms of the of section to ten are met and i think that's the end of the discussion i'm not sure why the legislature did not take out the phrase negligent misrepresentation i reviewed the legislative history i hate to say it is an enlightening there is very little mention made of the statute but i don't even think we have to go there because i think if that if the terms of the statute ar big us that's what we look at that's a court looks set and that the terms of two ten are met justice quinn mentioned the horwitz decision that is a case out of the sun circuit we cited that case however in a different part of our brief which discusses common law immunities that these defendants have immunities which are separate from section two tax so leaving section two ten aside there are still two separate common on unities are there actually there are three the under the common law defamation is a complete the facts so you're saying is absolute immunity we're saying it is absolute immunity absolute privilege i should say in the school district he's in that issue other than the horwitz case no and that's the i don't know if the court wants to talk about the anti slapp statute at all just judge flanagan did not rely on that in reaching her ruling however we believe it is it is a political i realized there were anti slavery cases coming down fast and short and i'll try to keep it that way there's no question her first point about the use of or is it disjunctive and i can think of several english teachers in my junior high it would be clear is that remember to yes there's no question in this it disjunctive but there's negligent modified you know misrepresentation and provision of information when she said i don't know why a legislature didn't take out negligent misrepresentation i think that's evidence to you and to me that that the fact that it wasn't taken out raises a question about whether or not the legislature intended to create this just think she's wrong about point of procedure this is a two six one nine everything that's in the complaint is taken it is true you're barred from presenting evidence to contradict the complaint in two six one  remember looking at it and you know i've i've cambridge the city of chicago first district three twenty four e l f thirty eight fifty six at eight fifty nine no that doesn't trump were here today on the basis of a complaint they chose to file a two six one i and rather than a motion for summary judgment everything in front that mr goldberg says is true or not here with any of this hey our affidavits trump that that's not the way two six one nine works and when you start from that premise you can't dismiss all of that stuff you can't dismiss this complaint on those bases it brings us right back in two thousand to two ten and where the rubber meets the road and right back to you what do taken under advisement and this