denial of benefits on a section one thousand be proceeding there's only one issue here before the court and that issue is did the commission err in finding that the petitioner failed to establish causal relationship between a work accident that fact have drawn from those facts and our position is that the commission drew the wrong inference because the commission applied the wrong legal standard to the unrebutted causation opinion of the treating physician dr philippe that would be the standard  the standard would be that the petitioner must show that accident was a causative factor in a substitution of l being and he can make that showing by testimony to a reasonable degree of medical certainty that the work accident could have or might have caused or aggravated the condition and that philippe are you sure about that yes in the record clearly indicate that he was after he considered the treatment records he changed his opinion regarding causation stated he did not know whether there was a cause and effect relationship between the claimants employment injury current condition of ill being he said actually that he was not as sure as he was before he could no longer say absolutely that it was caus presented to be even assuming all that but it was still the case to a reasonable degree of medical certainty that the accident could have or might have either caused the condition or if it was a preexisting condition aggravated that what he described couldn't possibly have caused the injury complaints of we get that all the time you're correct so the crew might get was only evidence of mechanism is not evidence of proximate cause now who said it was that it actually happened the way he s d that the that the fall actually occurred the arbitrator says that in the commission presumes that when it goes on then to rule upon the issue of causation without without establishing that there was sure that the claimants condition was causally connected to the december two thousand and eight accident and he could not say as previously expressed causation opinion was within a reasonable degree of medical certainty so what supports the causal connection is the doctor himself saying he's not sure about it anymore i believe the record indicates that he says he's not as sure as he was before but he's still able to say and he says this several times he's still able to say to a reasonable degree of medical certainty that it could have or it might have either cost a condition or if the condition already existed if the honey ition was already there it related it and made it become symptomatic where it was not previously where i was the commission didn't read it that way how do you respond to the argument you're simply asking us to reweigh the evidence or we're not asking to reweigh the evidence at all we're asking you to read the arbitrator's decision because the arbitrator use the proper standard and came to the proper conclusion we don't wa we they said that if he had seen what dr white house noted in his notes he would be suspicious but he never saw anything like that in his own examination he said but given that dr black shows raised all the suspicions he was now no longer able to say with absolute certainty as he was prepared to say before today responding also testified to the clean up symptoms were not consistent with the results of certain diagnostic yeah he said that some of the sentence did not seem to fit as well as he thought they had previously but they still could have or might have been caused that's not to say that on every on further investigation which is what we want to be one of the neurosurgical console it's not say that it would have turned out of the end of the day that they were in fact cause but there was a reasonable belief that they could have or might have been on that basis petitioner should've been awarded the treatment to which he was entitle as i say our position is that the commission has applied the wrong standard that they'd held the doctors dr philippe's opinion to a much higher standard than the president allows for and if they had applied the proper standard there's no should go back with the back to the beginning i guess this is only a nineteen b there's only interim benefits after all and we have no idea what this guy's permanent condition will be questioning you're absolutely right the first issue to be determined is if that fall actually occurred and there is a substantial amount of evidence to suggest that it did not so also along those same lines i know that there was some medical evidence as was described which is that dr philippe petitioner's own chosen doctor had some concerns about that his credibility and after looking at the medical records from the date of the injury and the great sadness subsequent to the injury he testified  of as well which would suggest not only over pathology i dr philip he noted that also the complaints that he had were and fingers that did not match the germantown flora what would be found on the m r i which is to say that if the finding on the believe that his opinion is what's on my opponent purports it to be i i believe that his opinion is after viewing the additional evidence i presented to him in his deposition he changed his mind and he testified that it wasn't the cause of the injury and if you recall he actually testified i you know in looking at the entire the totality of the evidence it appears as if he did have an injury from that work incident it resolved and that what he is complaining about by the time dr philippe saw him was something no so i don't believe that there's i guess technically it's a little better than that there is not another doctor saying one thing or the other but i don't believe that dr philippe is making that connection neck correct and if you know he at the end of his deposition he testified that if it happened then you know maybe i don't know which certainly is not the reasonable degree of medical certainty that is required by the court would just urge the court to look at all of the issues there are no more on here now while stranger to the issues of the standard of against the manifest weight of the evidence on the one hand there is of course the petitioner stating that he fell and that he fell on  that they did find an accident i think from day on you also have to go with the commission's finding that dr philippe's opinion was not enough to meet that standard of causation so even assuming that i still don't think it it's reasonable to say that something occurred in december twenty fourth and that got better by december the twenty nine correct so that even that even after december twenty ninth when he complains that he was having or any ongoing with regard to whether or not we pay testified to to the required to grieve certitude we had met the doctor philippe was a lot more certain at the beginning of the deposition that he was by the end of the deposition and that because he couldn't remember whether he had looked at all these records that had been sent to him he was kind of quite flat footed he tried to look at them on the fly he made some remarks that could be taken as as not really knowing what he was doing we have middle of that but at the end of the day you look at the transcript on redirect mr moss asks and this is that a one thirty three which is c three eighty seven in dr philippe tran deposition transcript ok this is a blind seventeen question ok knowing everything you know now having read everything you've read having been at this now for a couple hours or three answer i think it could have i don't have an m r i of the day before question within a reasonable degree of medical certainty yes based on especially on the e r report of the twenty fifth ok now let's assume that perhaps this honeyed a discrete existed this fall because as you say we don't have an m r i from the day before we don't know but let's assume there's a herniated disk before might this fall assuming the fall happened have aggravated answer it's possible possible ok that's within a reasonable degree of medical certainty yes our contention is that dr philippe testified to the degree that he was required to testify the sort of the commission applied the wrong standard hellen to a much higher standard than the case law will support and that on that basis the commission should be reversed the decision they found it was an accident that should not be disturbed by this court but they applied the wrong standard to the causation opinion and that's a question of law and that the court owes no deference to the commission on that and if there are no furthe