thank you your honor and may it please the court counsel my name is lee abend ex from the illinois attorney general's office on behalf of the people of the state of illinois this court should reverse the appellate court's opinion reversing the trial court order that directed b minor to register as a sex offender pursuant to section two a one d of the sex offender registration act or sora s p had found been found unfit to go through a juvenile judy cation proceedings and he was never rendered fit after fifteen months of fitness treatment he was found not guilty of aggravated criminal sexual abuse of a four year old victim m j at a discharge hearing but the court found he was not eligible for  commitment therefore his case affectively ended there except that the trial court then did order him to register as a sex offender as a threshold matter i'd like to take a step back and first request that this court find expressly that the code of procedure provisions that address fitness and discharge hearings should apply in juvenile cases and that is pursuant to section five dash one zero one three of the juvenile court act which provides that adult criminal procedural protections apply in juvenile cases except for situations in which provisions provide enhanced protections here these fitness procedures are the type of criminal procedural protections that were meant to be incorporated through this provision as can be seen especially through the speedy trial provision of the juvenile court act which in listing several events that told the speedy trial term missed three that involved fitness proceedings and in fact cite the code of criminal procedure so if there are no further questions though on that threshold matter i would like to focus my time on the statutory construction question regarding sora and the question here is whether an unfit not not guilty juvenile should register under the sex offender registration act which calls into question essentially two provisions of that act section two a one d which our first year as the unfit not not guilty provision requires quote any person who is charged with a qualifying sex offense and is found not not guilty at a discharge hearing to register the second provision at issue is essentially limiting the situations in which juveniles to register to that provision however as the appellate court dissenting justice in the trial court judge noted all three conditions present in the unfit not not provision are satisfied by s p d or a minor in his circumstance because a juvenile should be considered any person and he was charged with a qualifying sex offense and found not not guilty at a discharge hearing and notably there is no express limiting language that would support the appellate court majority's position it would be very easy for the legislature to have said something like juveniles must register only if adjudicated delinquent of a qualifying sex offense the legislature did not do so similarly it would be easy for the legislature to have modified the phrase for the other provisions in section two to instead of saying any person could say any adult person if meant not to apply to juveniles but it does not do so of its interpretation however there are reasonable reasons that the legislature could have made this distinction for example there is the analogy to adult criminal proceedings where an adults who is convicted and sentenced to a term of that adult can earn potentially good conduct credits and seek early termination of his sentence whereas an adult who is simply committed after a discharge hearing has no comparable mechanism so it's reasonable that the legislator legislature could have extended that analogy and determines that a juvenile who's adjudicated delinquent in some instances should be able to try to show a potential for early termination whereas a juvenile who's on fit need not have that opportunity and really the rationale that would be behind that would be behind that analogy is that the two it's two characteristics of that latter group being unfit but also having been found not guilty had a discharge hearing beyond a reasonable doubt the legislature could reasonably view that group as more likely to not understand the culpability of their actions and so that it is important for them to serve their entire or to register for their entire term after all juveniles in s p situation for example simply their cases and if they're never rendered fit and they are not civilly committed that is the end of their case and they're not otherwise on the radar of law enforcement and in fact that is the purpose of sora to make sure that law enforcement officials are aware of of certain sex offenders to help them address cases of sexual abuse and other sex offenses so certainly this group because they're not otherwise on the radar of law enforcement perhaps it's more important that they have to register for their entire term spend well it's hard to think of a reason for that specifically but there it but to the extent that it is it only comes up into context here it only translates to two situations the early termination provision that i just discussed and the dissemination of information under the community the community notification law it is true there that adult information is disseminated more broadly than juveniles situations but but looking at that provision there are seven instances that the term juvenile sex offender is used in only one time that adjudicated delinquent is used so it's much more likely that in that instance there was a legislative oversight that could be quickly or easily corrected so that perhaps the legislature did not intend for unfit juveniles to be treated as adults in the context of dissemination of information but since the only other instance where these unfit juveniles are treated as adults which is that the context of your question is in this petition for early termination as i just explained there are reasonable reasons for the unfit juvenile to have to register for their entire term that are not applicable to the adjudicated delinquent juvenile so since there's really only these two instances there is a reason for one and it seems perhaps that the other one is just an oversight because there's only one use of that term adjudicated delinquent juvenile and that's found in section one twenty one of the community community notification law now i speak raises two potential constitutional challenges to the state's interpretation but neither of them are successful some of the same arguments that i just made regarding section three dash five are relevant to the equal protection analysis there are actually two steps to an equal protection now says as this court is aware the threshold question is whether the two groups being compared are similarly situated and the two groups here are adjudicated delinquent juveniles and unfit not not guilty juveniles in the case of  connects this court was considering whether it's constitutional for juveniles to register under the sex offender registration act and face in the face of an equal protection challenge this court found not similarly situated adults and juveniles by looking at the differences in the consequences of of their status and doing that same analysis here these two groups should not be similarly situated because as already explained juveniles like s t d who are found unfit and not not guilty if not consequences such as a juvenile detention possibly or probation with several conditions attached and given this distinction in the consequences given their status they are not similarly situated but even if this court disagrees with that the next step in the equal protection challenge is to apply scrutiny to the difference that the legislature has made for these two groups and s p does not disagree that rational basis scrutiny applies here the lowest level of scrutiny because of the fact that there is no suspect class or fundamental right involved in applying the rational basis for reasons already discussed there is a reasonable justification for the way that the legislature has treated these two groups differently because again extending that analogy if adults who  earned good conduct credits where as civilly committed adults cannot that same rationale is easily relatable to this present situation looking at an adjudicated juvenile delinquent versus an unfit not not guilty juvenile accordingly there is a reasonable basis for this and the equal protection challenge fails the second constitutional challenge that he raises is a procedural to procedural due process challenge there is this is a two part inquiry where the first question is whether there is a due process rights implicated by the regulation involved and the second question is whether an adequate level of procedural protection has been provided to justify any infringement on that right now  has not provided any argument much less shown that there is a due process right implicated here presumably if any it would potentially be a liberty interest notably in that cannot speak case this court went past that first question and essentially left open whether there even is a liberty interest implicated by having to register are under so araa but it is notable that appellate courts that have directly addressed the issue have found that there is no liberty interest involved but even assuming there is a liberty interest involved the challenge also fails at the second step now connects the up how old the level of procedural protections provided to juveniles who are required to register when compared to adults in light of the fact that there  only one procedural protection absent in juvenile proceedings compared to adults that being that juveniles do not have the right to a jury trial now in our case in context the only difference between a juvenile proceeding and a discharge hearing in terms of procedural rights is that there is under the statute certain secondary hearsay is admissible so there is a lesser confrontation right in discharge hearings but this one difference that should not change the conclusion that this court reached in  adequate procedural protections in light of this court's decision and people versus wade which i called the constitutionality of the discharge hearing provision in light of an adult who faced civil commitment because surely civil commitment is a greater infringement on the liberty interest than any implicated by registration under sora so if discharge hearings provide adequate procedures in the face of civil commitment that leads to the inescapable conclusion that it's adequate procedures to justify registration so accordingly the due process challenge fails as well so getting back to the heart of the case looking at the plain language of the provision it is undisputed that s p satisfies the three conditions of the unfit not guilty provision by being a person who is charged pursuant to illinois law with a qualifying sex offense he was found not guilty of a discharge hearing and given the absence of the easily added limiting language in the provision that would  sex offender how the definition of a juvenile sex offender eyes to it and how south b in his case actually fits into or doesn't fit into this section and so or the difference juveniles it doesn't mention any other way that a juvenile can actually get into sora so adjudicated juveniles are mentioned they are specifically then in section two where it's defining a sex offender in general section two is incorporated by section three dash five defining or defining a juvenile who is a sex offender section two then list ways for any person to be a sex offender under any person one thing that's listed in section five of that is a person who's adjudicated juvenile we all agree that he isn't following that part so the only other portion of the statute that it has become fall into is under section one subsection one which does say any person which is the person but charged with a statute under illinois law here he wasn't charged with anything charges refer to adult proceedings they refer to a charge is a criminal complaint and information indictment a juvenile petition is not encompassed in that definition of a charge so he automatically falls out of the statute because he wasn't charged with a sex offense but dropping down the second qualification subsection one that you can find under d is that the person be found but be found anything but acquitted a discharge hearing under one now for cash to five so in an aston's that would be something like this where some is found not guilty but again it doesn't apply to a juvenile there subsection d refers to a one zero four to five just charge hearing here what looks like a discharge hearing was held but it couldn't possibly have been under one o four to five because there's no provision for that there's no provision for a speedy even come into this there's no provision for the discharge variance to be applied to him in juvenile proceedings we have a lot of different areas of law where juveniles want the rights that are given to adults but the courts of have held routinely that they can't of that particular right such as jury trial admonishments post trial most adjudication motions certain procedur  a provision that incorporates those procedural aspects of the criminal code that are to benefit junes the arguments been made that when someone is found unfit it's sort of there's no minor that you know obviously is true of some fitness aspects are our present intent because a juvenile we do not want to have them go through this being unfit we want to ensure fairness we want to ensure that he can consult with counsel assist counsel know what's going on in this case but so therefore we do have the general need for fitness however if you put him into this definition if his situation goes into this then you're taking out statutory or procedural protections such as petitioning for early termination by putting him into this section then he is losing procedur and perhaps maybe innocent of any charges and i think he was acquitted of one of the charges i think that the point is that with a one zero four two five just charge hearing that specifically puts you into the sex offender stack the definition sex section two but juveniles since there's no way to put them into that unless the legislature rewrite something they can still have those haven't applied that to juveniles but juveniles still have those constitutional protections just in other ways and i think that here this is a good example of why or how would you and i can have those protections here all the parties in the case they went ahead and they did what they were familiar with in an adult proceeding they did what like could you just charge hearing but it just couldn't have been because it doesn't fall under that not if he doesn't fall under section five subsection five of an adjudicator juvenile then he cannot partition the core for early termination and that's one of the significant rights that distinguishes juvenile from adults  know when we look at a statute we look at the words of a plain language we don't pull in assumptions for it but saying that you know the legislature didn't have that still doesn't make sense because those general provisions are just his was talking about they apply criminal proceedings to juveniles except if there's a reason a rule or a law specifically pulling them out and giving them more protection and early termination unfit juvenile fit juvenile a juvenile is dealt with in a particular way in that they should be allowed early termination that's what the statute says that's why this court said it's ok for them to register as sex offenders it's a huge issue and it's more because they're juvenile versus a an adult then versus not fit a juvenile you know in this case he could set seth could petition the court after five years this summer coming up this is five years but he can't petition the court for it and it's a little bit different fair or unfair it's still different than an adult because five years for a juvenile is significant you know their life changes a lot and i would say a lot more than five years for an adult here he is he was finishing up school for not time of his life he is a being a job  working he's getting married you know his life has really changed and from the markers in his life it looks like he's progressed so since he's a juvenile we want to give him the right to go before the court and say this is hype change these are some new evaluation by me this is what i've done you know and present evidence if he's still found unfit don't don't grant him the early termination just deny it it's just it's not an automatic right to the termination i so so i think that that's the that's the crux of what we're looking at and we want to follow the statute the way it goes we want plain language will look  intent we don't want to read stuff into it we don't want to make assumptions the state's making trainer kind of write it in in two places they're trying to hold on to do to kid juveniles into the statute where they did not they they just aren't pulled in by the language we have to make that leap to put them in that we have to say well it's like an adjudicated juvenile so he can come in or it's like a not or adult so he can come in but he's not either one of those so to do it we're rewriting the statute and making assumptions that we shouldn't make when following the rules the statutory construction then of course the second way that we would have to alter it on our own and make assumptions is with the early termination we would i mean there's there's no doubt that there is no way that he can't apply that he is prohibited from petitioning for early termination but if you know if we follow the state side thinking well sure there's this line here but we can assume that it was a legislative oversight and in the public or relied on this this aspect of that right begin tonight to so if we make source section to apply to juveniles but allow them this important right then we're not going by the statute the full term of the full meaning of statute statute and you know i don't i don't argue with that but in the speedy trial statute there dress thing specific provisions of the code to be brought down and then a more general thought of fitness hearing fitness determination which in then as far as you know the the argument that good time credits apply and so you know there's a certain protection they're good time credits and for to and just general mental health commitment are just different situations there are different ways of getting there there are different treatment plans ones punitive ones more treatment and when you're on the track to of a mental health issue then you have periodic reviews and so forth it's it's very different from from the from a good time version so there are no further questions i would just ask the court to affirm the court and you i have four points in rebuttal first addressing my opponent's argument that it would be a stretch to look at section two a one d the unfit not not guilty provision and to insert juveniles into that situation i would point to this court's decision in re j w from two thousand and three because in that case this court was looking although at a prior version of sora at again at section two of sora although at subsection three or sees me to determine whether the term sexual predator should be applied to juveniles and in that case even though nowhere within the provisions defining sexual predator was there a reference to juveniles per se this court still looked at the phrase any person and said that you can also fall within that even though elsewhere in section two at that time in section two a dash five there was a definition for the term juvenile sex offender although that provision no longer remains but the fact that you've been those were addressed elsewhere but the term sexual predator did not mention the term juvenile court nonetheless help that you could qualify as sexual predators now that analysis can can completely apply in this situation because even though the unfit not not guilty provision does not use the word juvenile juveniles fall within the term any person and the fact that a later subsection subsection a five addressing educated delinquent juveniles addresses juveniles that in itself absent express limiting language does not exclude the fact that the term any person does include juveniles the second point i'd like to make concerns that that juvenile court act provision section five dash one zero one three and whether fitness adult fitness procedures from the code of criminal procedure do apply in juvenile cases now s p seems to be citing that section three dash five that allows for petitions for early termination is the sort of enhanced protection that somehow blocks discharge hearings from applying in juvenile cases it should be noted that section three dash five is not about witness procedures it is not about discharge hearings in other words because the juvenile court act is completely silent about any sort of fitness procedures or discharge hearings there is no prison provision that provides enhanced protections regarding how business should be addressed or how discharge hearings should be conducted so section three dash five is irrelevant to that specific question so instead as justice thomas pointed out if only the fitness evaluation in the fitness hearing were to apply but not the discharge proceeding that would be taking sort of step four and a four step process of fitness evaluations out of the mix without inserting anything into their place and would in effect leave juveniles in limbo i suppose that would mean under espy's interpretation that s b would have had to continue to undergo fitness treatment indefinitely until somehow he was eventually rendered fitter i mean it seems like there would be no end point and and that shows why it would make no sense to only apply some of adult but missed procedures to juvenile proceedings because as as acknowledged right here what the court did was what is familiar what is best to fight in the code of criminal procedure and because there is no enhanced protection type discharge provision in the juvenile court act that is the situation under section five one zero one three because of the silence where the adult provision should apply mr and dick i have problems trying to understand this if an adult is required to undergo to register remain on the sex offender list for adjudicated delinquent juvenile can potentially be ordered to have a natural life registration in that case it was a sexual predator who is required to register for natural life but looking at the sexual predator definition because it does use the term convicted it would seem that unfit not not guilty juveniles could never be subject to a life time term so it's actually true that adjudicated delinquents although potentially some in some individual cases they might be able to seek early termination th delinquent also are potentially subject to lifetime terms whereas the unfit juveniles will always be in the tenure category so actually they're sort of a middle ground and that reflects actually the applicability of that analogy to the adult situation that it that it makes sense that in the case of and adjudicated delinquent juvenile or convicted adults that it's appropriate case by case that sometimes maybe they can show factors in a in a one in one case why they should get early termination but it's also true that in the most serious offenses sometimes they don't get good conduct credits or sometimes they happen natural life term that none of that is true in the unfit situation there it seems the legislature wanted to set a floor that given unfitness that there was a greater likelihood that they would not understand the culpability of their conduct so that the minimum should be the ten year term but also provided that they would never be subject to the lifetime term so that shows that it's not that the one group was treated more seriously than the other but it was just that they were treated differently because of the mental health aspect of the latter group i mean that i mean yes even though argued with respect to that point that the legislature could have had them apply as well  alternative to the argument i've already provided on this point of section three dash five about early termination that if there is a problem if this court finds either an absurdity or a constitutional problem with that discrepancy that problem is in section three dash five it's not in section two so in other words that that should not mean that unfit juveniles do not have to register in the first instance that should mean that section three five should be adjusted to allow unfit juveniles to petition for early termination whether this court you know suggest to legislature that that would be an appropriate adjustment if not because after all if it does not rise to the level of a constitutional problem that is a legislative question that is left to the legislature and because there is a reason that the legislature could have made that discrepancy  if it's not a constitutional problem it should be left as is and that leads me actually to my final point that i'd like to make on rebuttal and that underlying the statutory construction questions is the question of policy and this court has affirmed that the policy behind sora is to try to reduce and protect child instances of child abuse and sex offense against children by ensuring that that sex offenders register now that policy is equally applicable to unfit not not guilty juveniles after all the harder policy questions have already been made and already been affirmed we already know that adjudicated delinquent juveniles shall register we already know that unfit not not guilty adults shall register so there is no policy reason to take a group of unfit not not guilty juveniles and have them not register so again given that term any person that is broad and the plain language which includes juveniles this court should affirm that s b should have to register and to the extent there's any problem with the section three dash five in the petition for early termination that is where the problem should be addressed not by having the unfit not not guilty juveniles not by excusing them from registering in the first instance and so if there are no further questions again i'd like to