plaintiff's contention that it was charged she was charged three thousand and twenty five dollars in attorney fees which were equally split between the law firm and chase's outsource are known as fidelity national for closure  and there are four independent grounds for reversing the decision below which dismiss a case specifically that plaintiffs had the court found century acknowledged that the plaintiffs had not paid any of the attorney fees of these four independent grounds each of these grants are sufficient for finding article three standing here first on the issue of payment this is no longer in dispute chase now concedes on appeal that it's a matter of connecticut for closure law chases for closure and claims his property constituted payment of the attorney fees because the attorney fees are expressly referenced in the judgment the retainer agreement with the law firm is not between chase and the law firm it's between fidelity and a law firm and in their agreement they had a prearranged split there wasn't any question that they were both going to be paid because when you for closing a property of usually monies are going to come from sell that property one way or the other and they're split was that fidelity would get one hundred forty dollars of pardon for all and that hundred forty dollars had to be paid regardless of lee's brief and that one ground for article three standing at the plaintiff's second ground for showing that it has a stake in this case is based on her claim for brea pending we believe the court then committed reversible error when it looked at the facts and adjudicated on the merits and found that there wasn't a breach of contract and that goes against the holding of this court in quarter versus health for tech rule which came down in two thousand and sixteen which said that regardless of whether the breach of contract can be proven that's not an article three issue as long as there is a valid breach  contract claim the court has the power to hear the case the plaintive has a personal stake in the dispute regardless of whether or not a jury finds that there are any damages under connecticut contract law damages happen to be assumed so even if she was unable to prove any actual damage that's not essential under connecticut contract law for a valid b g contract and therefore she would have standing under that gra a third ground for finding standing is the fact that she was charged the attorney fees that we claim were illegal the court noted in its earlier decision motion to sufficient for standing at that stage of the proceedings here finally the fourth ground the most obvious ground is that there was a judgment entered again and the plaintiff appellant in this case and last year second circuit decision in chevron vs danziger held that now adverse judgment which at the time was only impending provides article three power for the court to hear the case because there's an injury here  even by the nature of mean that there has to be some causal relationship between the splitting in the foreclosure judgement and isn't that where the district court found a problem with that theory well it the the court below looked at the invoices between the law firm and the bank that's the only documents which don't have warning signs that there is an illegal fee splitting here in the agreement between you're going to be liable if the court had looked at the retainer agreement between fidelity and the law firm we also have that red flag because the law firm after it entered into a retainer  never too are collected by way of a deficiency judgment after the foreclosure it did not and because of that under connecticut foreclosure law they everything the judgment is deemed satisfied had they obtained it and we pointed this out to the court down below the argument down below which is now i guess moot because they can see payment was that we never paid the attorney fees we did some internal bookkeeping after we took the property back and we applied all the money to outstanding principal that argument was contrary to connecticut for closure law thank you  please the court james bernard on behalf of the defendant j p morgan chase i'm going to take up the four points the counsel raise and address them each in turn first with regard to the concession on appeal that  paid the judgment i respectfully disagree pages thirty five to thirty six of our memo of law addresses two instances in which we agree that the plaintiff was correct about elements of foreclosure law under connecticut law and then it says but even if even if the three thousand and twenty five dollars in attorney's fees were deemed paid strike you still would not have paid the cost because the three thousand dollars and twenty the three thousand and twenty five dollars did not include the administrative charge this was not a concession that there was payment this was an argument about what would happen if the court were to find that there was pain and our point was judge as you noted that the disputed administrative charge was not included in those fees so there has been no concession of payment number two counsel argues that there was a breach of contract the district court judge addressed this alternative ground as well in his opinion and specifically found that there was not a breach of contract precisely because the fees v b challenged administrative charge was not included in the attorney's fees and there's no reason to disturb that finding on appeal there simply was no breach because the fees that are disputed were included in the in the attorney's fees counsel cites this court's opinion in corridor which addresses the question of whether or not when you have a jurisdiction issue that is intertwined with an ultimate merits issue how should the court resolve that how should the district court handle that situation and what this court said is that in instances where the jurisdictional issue is intertwined with an underlying facts issue of facts merits issue in the plaintiff has a right to a jury trial on that ultimate issue the court has to defer but the critical point here is there was no disputed issue of fact that's what summary judgment does it requires a plaint flush out are there any issues of fact and of course just reports grant summary judgments all some each of motions all the time and ultimate marriage issues there's no violation of the principle and carter here the district court properly found that there was no disputed issue of fact on appeal excuse me in the reply and here at oral argument again today counsel makes the argument that there was actually standing because the plaintiff was charged attorneys fees that was the argument that we heard the plaintiff was charged attorneys fees i submit that that argument was really articulated for the first time in reply on appeal so i want to address a couple of aspects of it actually three aspects of first is i don't think that below the plaintiffs fairly raise that argument it's certainly not how the district court viewed the record the district court focused on this issue of the administrative charge not the attorney's fees so i think it's been waived but putting aside waiver it's wrong on the merits for two reasons number one what the point of seems to be arguing is that the mere fact assuming that there was a referral fee payment or a split fee payment the mere fact that that hundred forty dollars was was paid to fidelity that the entire three thousand and twenty five dollars that was ultimately included in the judgment is somehow tainted and i think that's wrong for a couple of reasons number one the plaintiff doesn't present any any argument any law any authority for why that should be the case the critically the sights of the green affidavit the affidavit of professor bruce greene paragraph twenty three i urge the court to go back and take a look at it i won't read it into the record now it's really not what the green affidavit says the green affidavit addresses another issue in finking about this issue in preparation for the argument though we found two cases which are not cited in our opposition brief that i'd like to bring to the court's attention that i think do address the issue one is this court's opinion in a case called miller it's a three twenty one f thirty two ninety two it's an opinion by then judge sotomayor and in miller this is the basic facts the plaintiff in miller brought an action under the fair debt collection protection and said that the law firm and the defendant law firm was trying to unlawfully collect attorney's fees that law firm had entered into the referral agreement with an attorney referral network much like the fidelity network here and as the court's opinion recites the law firm was required by contract to pay three percent of any fees that it ultimately collected attorney's fees that it collected through the referral network and the plaintiffs argued on appeal well that's prohibited by a plausible law the f t c p a specifically says a lawyer can't collect attorneys fees if they're prohibited by law just like what we have here this court rejected that argument what judge there's nothing about collecting a facially reasonable amount of attorney's fees that makes it prohibited just because the the law firm then intends to do something with those fees that are violation of attorney ethics rules or otherwise there's another decision in the eastern district of new york all state insurance company vs ten nella t a and e l l n a it's a two thousand and twelve west law seven one eight eight six eight five and in that case all state brought a rico claim against the law firm who had been collecting attorneys fees for no fault insurance claims that they had been pursuing and allstate said you know this law firm it's splitting fees with a non lawyer because some of the members of the law firm are actually not warriors and therefore this law firm is engaging in an ethical violation and we shouldn't have had to have paid those attorneys fees to them we want them back that's a violation and the district court rejected it and specifically what the district court said at star page four there has never been a law or regulation exempting clients or adversaries from paying attorneys fees if attorneys fees if attorneys fail to meet their obligations under the disciplinary rules what the court went on to say is a disciplinary violation is a separate issue so the authority that does exist does not support the theory and last i want to address a another reason why the theory doesn't make any sense in judge politique it's a question that you asked earlier it's important to recall as we recite in our brief that the strict foreclosure proceeding is in in rem proceed the caption of the case may have been j p morgan chase versus strikers but it's an interim proceeding ultimately in particular here because we have to remember the plaintiff was got a discharge in bankruptcy j p morgan could not have proceeded against her individually for the debt it was limited to collecting the collateral and then applying the collateral so ultimately what happens is as your honor was asking judge was that the judgment is obtained it has the three thousand and twenty five dollars but that's a judgment against them property not against her individually and then as your honor asked when we get to law day thirty days later and actually that the facts here are that what happened was j p morgan had moved for summary judgment and the plaintiff said you know what rather than opposing summary judgment i'll withdraw my answer i'll agree to settle this case as long as you don't go against me in the in the law day proceeding where your allowed to get a deficiency judgment and j p morgan agreed it really had no choice because she didn't seem to discharge and under those circumstances for all those reasons the fact that the three thousand twenty five dollars was included in the judgment against the property does not give the plaintiff standing when she never was going to incur any personal liability for that in this lawsuit against j p i see that i've got about a minute left but unless the channel has any questions those are really i think the main reasons why the four arguments what the creator language would be for us and what is it that you would have us instruct the district court to do that the arguments raids are one for the merits for the trier of fact that the court had article three power to hear this case that the plaintiffs clearly had personal standing regardless of whether or not it was personal or in ram liability the is clear that as long as you're the owner of the property you have standing in that regard that that is what i would ask then and then you proceed to a trial and we proceed to trial and what what are you would be seeking damages that the connecticut for closure law confirms that she paid as a matter of law the three thousand and twenty five dollars what would you chiva if you were vindicated if you  succeed for the truck for a minimum under connecticut contract law there would be nominal damages to beach a contract the issue of damages whether it's one hundred forty dollars versus the three thousand twenty expectations your dream my dream is that a jury would find that there was a breach or contract that the bank shifted its cost onto the plate there because he didn't have to discouragement of the entire three thousand twenty five professor green cites to a new york state case in which the court found that the entire entirety of the legal fees in an action  inconsistent theories and that theory was only in the situation where the court found that the plaintiffs could not assert a breach of contract claim thank you your decision