is unconstitutional for three basic reasons the st being the composition of the interim board the nd being the composition of the permanent board and the rd being the mandate that the mud covered county school district be abolished and the interpretation that came from that mandate which was that d carey right the state superintendent of education education by later directed that all of the employees of the moderate county school district be terminated that same mandate was not require for why no as sometimes it helps with a limited amount of time to cut some issues out and you didn't file a reply brief so therefore there are several points that i'd like you to answer that the attorney general asserted there is no voting rights argument pending before us correct that is correct and this case doesn't implicate any desegregation order that's correct ok and you also both orally and in writing in district court disclaimed that the classification mississippi made was one based on race you disclaimed that i did do that yes ok two other quick questions just to clean up dust down to your argument in your brief you assert that the right to an education is a fundamental right triggering strict scrutiny you didn't give a case they point out that you didn't give a case do you have one now for us on that proposition ok and the last thing was when you made the argument about the non renewal of the teachers you cited signed them and sentiment i look at that as a due process case your argument forces an equal protection one do you have an equal protection case related to the non renewal of the teachers i do not ok go ahead with your argument thank you from the outstart i want to be clear that the private plaintiffs the prime ideas normal democratic school district when it did exist were opposed to consolidation it is the manner in which the consolidation was affected as a matter of fact i represented i'm actually a native of y no i graduated from what i mean a supposed epicycle district for some time wouldn't your argument be better defending someone like you with then why not in other words when i look at the equal protection issue here aren't the wynonna residence the one that lack any vote as distinct from the montgomery county residents that at least get to vote for two well that's a very good point and i think that in and of itself if you look at my argument triggers strict scrutiny st in if you look at d versus bloom's don i believe that the case that i cited at any point where we're on the permanent board now at any point where the right to vote is granted to sell off but not to others then that is the scenario where the courts are bound to look at it with strict scrutiny but they don't represent pardon me if i'm misunderstanding do you represent any residence i want on a no i do not know i do not only montgomery county outside of if there is a right to vote problem it's for those who don't have any right to vote at all your cards by contrast how the right to vote they have a right to vote but my argument is that that  three members who are appointed and i know that judge biggers was like i'm not looking at percentages i don't want to see any of that because this is basically an appointed school board however if you take that scenario the legislature can always manipulate the system by at any point takes your word manipulate the supreme court might have said they can always experiment at this level of locality he judge biggers didn't invent the phrase basically a point if he took that from the supreme court sure so so i guess isn't this doesn't this case reduce to whether or not sailors is a distinguish because the supreme court in sailor said you don't apply strict scrutiny to entities that are basically appointive and that's where we have to make that distinction because i mean it is a question do you know of any court anywhere that has ever applied strict scrutiny to a governmental unit that has appointed and elected officials do you have any case where they've done what you're asking is to have not i don't know of any case where the point that i'm trying to fifty seven percent of the population but they have the entire county and a direct voice on the board but the win over people get no direct way yes or and and with that fifty seven percent that leaves forty three percent over here only two people are are selected be election that leaves another forty three percent over here who obviously are having residents having their their workers in taishan appointed what if we have a board where the legislature says ok we're going to allow the county residents who only who comprise eighty percent of the population to select two people and the remaining people in the city limits you get to  thirty i think if you look at the scenario the generals answer we'll hear from her would be if it implicates race you may still get strict scrutiny if the state creates an entity that's majority elected then they are obligated to follow cramer and reynolds and lastly even when they don't so your situation they still have to come up with a rational basis to explain the geographic distinction so i thought probably confined by precedent you go would be telling us this was an irrational classification it absolutely is there is no question judge biggers did point to things he said number one the school that was allowed to have more w was a larger school one thousand three hundred students versus two one thousand three hundred dollars and it actually had been performing better and maybe mississippi didn't want to have a special election so he gave those sort of three or four reasons as ones that are at least rational there was no reason why and this goes to that and i want to just quote this because it's so relevant to the point as to what is the impetus for all of these why is this school district so different why do they have an interim board no the no districts have interim boards why do they have why are they the woods who have this quirky appointive system that they are trying out for the car sample questions does exactly and he answers that here if there's an article in it isn't a companion case that deals with the desegregation but my kid who was the facilitator that we dealt with on a day to day basis during the consolidation process is an employee of the mt admittedly department of education that six month period before a joint board is established will likely receive backlash this is what my kid says and he understands the frustrations of the muck every county school district typically new districts governing which means school districts governing is set up st with an election and everyone is put in place when the district is consolidated this one is different this one basically places power the consolidation in the hands of the one in the school district think even more in fact leave hadley makes clear if it's purely appointed that's fine there's no one man one vote doctrine because there's no theory representation there's no voting at all it's purely appointed so if you're saying your strongest states that appoint a school board systems are permissible we all know that under the constitution so long as the appointments are not in a manner that systematically exclude an element of the population from consideration  the supreme court the supreme court said that assuming that it's race neutral not race motivated as long as it's not that then you can set up in a point of structure and the state has no constitutional violation ok so i think you're running into  election and that choice does not itself offend the constitution namely racial issues the fact that each official does not represent the same number of people does not deny these people equal protection so you may be right but i think you have to go to supreme court to get really not my point exactly is that when you systematically exclude an element of the population and they're talking about race which you systematic this systematically has excluded every person who lives outside of the city limits power right they have authority power because you get three of the five seats what i'm telling you is hardly allows us it may be wrong but it's not something that we can do anything about until having to return sometimes i'm trying to stand how you reconcile hadley so we're going back and forth between the interim board and the permanent board because just a nd ago we're talking about wholly appointed boards and that's where i was discussing this is dramatic exclusion and that's the case that i believe this arson case i believe it it's directly on point in that interim board excluded everyone outside of the county and that it is it is you know i don't think and i say that for this reason the policies that were adopted the superintendent that was hired the the structure that was set up by that interim board is still in effect day to day and they are operating on the system that that interim board provided including closing the school both of the schools in the county those schools were closed that the school may have even been sold and it was up for auction at some point that the county schools but but my it's my position that harmful effects our own going and even if there is no remedy there has to be a statement saying this is on costa to record explain why judge brown didn't rule on your motions at the critical time when the interim board was making the hiring decisions and  there are why did she trust the record say she is the reason she transfer the kids the record just says do to oh i'm i'm sorry the judicial in qana me i believe that was and it was a one liner and after repeated requests even follow the motion or arguments we were never able to get any traction a new avenue up no other option at that point to judge biggers at that point the permanent board was already in place no permanent war was not in place that was last one person one vote claim by comparing three appointed musicians to two elected ones on a hybrid school board that was structured after two school districts in mississippi were consolidated the district court correctly answered that question in the negative and before i get to there is no claim before this court today that plaintiff's votes in the elections before him for the two elected positions on the school board had been weighed in equally or treated any differently and let's say hypothetically all that point as having had different districts for that but i'm glad i'm saying in this case instead of two elected in three appointed let's say it had been all five elected i bet i'm going to sue me you would if you would concede that that would be a one person one vote problem if i think i think your point is that it's not that this is appointed or it's blended yes but i wanted to make sure under your hypothetical that you were saying the three appointed or the three elected at that point would still be coming from the city as opposed to drawing on lines y of the upcoming him opinion coming in was a majority elected board but but it had appointed members and the point of coming to him is that that court did not apply one person one vote to the appointed members so that is what we embraced about cutting him in our brief but yes i agree with your honor that if we're talking about an entirely elected board we are at that point into hadley with a different districts for the junior college those are concerned then that this essentially road to government evading one person one vote no here's why if there's two arguments here one is that what cunningham indicates at least is that if you have a majority appointed board basically appointed system one by one person one vote doesn't decide whether or not a majority appointed board is basically an appointed system right because here's why because at most one person one vote applies to elected positions that is to vote and there is no claim before this court today  case is before the court on rule fifty four by john you were conceding earlier that if all the seats had been elected then you would have a one person one vote problem because you've got the city you know less than fifty percent population getting more than fifty percent of the seats that seems like a classic bigger be current of three somes problem yet so let me break that out a little bit here we have two elected in those two elected positions from the county that's where the franchise has been granted there is no claim before this court today that the plaintiff's votes in the election before them have been weighed on equally by those two seats there they're five thousand and fifty as to the to the rest of the county in the state like either but i'm still wrestling with my hypothetical which is if you're if you're stipulating as i think you are not subject to probably should that all five are elected then you've got a reynolds or sevens problem if you're stipulating that then why is this not a road map for the state to say oh great i can violate one hundred and eleven person one vote i just have a local entity that has some members that are elected it's still basically appointive and sailors controls what circuit is actually yet said that circuit court none of them certainly have to say that for you to prevail no but that is an alternative basis but you do not have to say that because if you look at the two elected positions on the board in one person one vote only applies to elected positions there's no claim before this court the plaintiffs vote the montgomery get a citizens  problem which is we would be writing a blueprint for states to say well after all we can grant the franchise selectively to residents based on where they live provided we make sure that the alderman get to a point a bare majority is that that's just a reality post sailors or i think you would say it more say more would sailors right because sailors entirely appointed you could say the exact same thing about sailors except no more so at the franchise can be you don't have to bring it up because there is no fundamental right to an elected school board let alone to a fully elected school board but and the critical premise behind that is that appointed officials aren't really it's apples and oranges as to  now is to say that a point of individuals are one and is are indistinguishable from elected once there can be no limit on how easily removed there are is it a fair concept to say that a point of people cannot be compared to elective people yes because you would have to give a voter a punitive fictional vote and it would be either the state legislature the governor or this court giving waiting for the alderman who  officials they're the ones that at least as alleged choose to fire all the teachers for the majority that's the allegation and hire just the wind on a teacher's and arguably allegedly neglect none renewed because the school district was abolished and that some of them had been hired with that the limiting principle being consolidation school district alone has a rational basis consolidation does but what's the rational basis for making subsequent re higher without regard to qualification and i say that because in your brief i didn't see any reference to the record that the rehiring are they continuing hiring of just the wind on a teacher's was based on disputes but again the statute we're here on a constitutional challenge to a statute doesn't classify teachers it classifies school districts and that's my rational basis but i also want to get back to another point of your honor's in questioning counsel opposite school district that is educating students outside of the city that are in the county and dozing instances which you can see from the language of the statute itself in every single one of those instances you have a hybrid court as a because of a history of consolidation i th the ratio the same three that that's where i'm going next actually if you look at that statute it's actually either majority appointed for one or depending on the county population it's majority point thirty two that is a structure mississippi has been familiar with and comfortable with for a long time the last point i wear may let me ask a question of this structure working and they did not want to change the structure of appointed an elected and when you consolidate school districts you consolidate boards and that's a that is a that's a complicated balance to do just that and if i may and by saying this that piano rational basis review opponents duty to negate every single rational basis of the law and recognize there's all say this too about voting plaintiffs have acquitted voting in this case to input on the board but your chickens and as you noted you cannot say from the three to structure the world of basically a well let me let me frame it this way if you have three members on the board that were elected in two network point i will concede that you could apply reynolds to the elected position representing the former miscible separates go district as the court correctly pointed out a moment ago neither the interim board nor the current one on a gun or a consolidated school district is before the court your honor and so is the district a consolidated board gone or more consistent with the statute passed by the state of mississippi the district is not undertaken any respect to defend the constitutionality of the statute that obviously has been very capably done by the office of the attorney general today we w however that some of the claims made by posing counsel that the district did not providentially think through some of the actions that it took is simply not correct for example with regard to extracurricular activities as we've indicated in our supplement to the brief the one own a gun or a consolidated school board and it superintendent tried ardently to enlist participation of the county superintendent and to get notice is out on radio and by other means to encourage participation in extracurricular activities and so on i'll point out also your honor in response to courts question the district court pointed out that the consolidation statute was passed by the mississippi legislature back in two thousand and sixteen and went into effect on july st two thousand and sixteen yet the plaintiffs did not file their also claiming the need for the emergency injunctive relief until approximately one year and four months later on november th two thousand seventeen so there was quite a lapse in time indicating to the district court correctly i think that there wasn't a sense of urgency or emergency claim by opposing counsel and her cons there's no further question john that will conclude my presentation  have the school district itself thank you abolishment of the mother emery county school district and what that means but this is actually in subsection forty eight dollars of the statute itself where it abolishes the armory county school district of course there is no corresponding paragraph that also abolishes the why known as district jim my kid the same facilitator that i talked to you about before who are quoting from the newspaper article he was the one who interpreted that quarter portion of the statute to mean that all of because this county school district was being abolished that all of its employees teachers bus drivers cafeteria workers everyone had to be not renewed or terminated that was his statement then we were seeking a letter from the state superintendent of education dr wright also telling us this has to be done by a certain date under the threat of immediate consolidation and that letter was dated march th letter you did provide to us i did it was in the record excerpts and it was also in the record as well so that this was no by happenstance this was a direct order that came down from the state superintendent of education get rid of all these people we were initially told i say we i mean the school board at a school board meeting by mr kit that every boy and all the teachers in both school districts would be darn renewed and that there would be a look at the crack tyria for educators test scores but of course that never occurred  in looking at the hybrid board and the statute that was cited by castle opposite that deal with added territories and things like that there is a totally different scenario than the consolidation is here those people agreed by agreement there was no agreement here this was a statute that was handed down by the legislature you consolidate so i think we're talking apples and oranges with that statute that she's talking about the she was just responding to our question ok but i didn't want to make that distinction that that that's that's apples and oranges future you refer to the six or eight and it's probably the case you both talked about your briefs the mix and decision do you do you are you comfortable with that ruling or would you like to try to distinguish the mixin decision i would have to look back and i can't think remember it off of the top of my head i apologize your honor i just want to close just by saying it's it's our position that this there are only going harms that are being suffered by the school district and this is just touching injunctive relief was filed that there was some delay there but there was not that the district wasn't sitting back you were going to the legislature you were doing going to the legislature we were out a letter to the errors and omissions committee because again my kit told us oh this is an er write a letter that they didn't they obviously didn't mean to write this because this never happens so that's what we did we wrote a letter we waited months to hear back and we were told no this was purposeful and so then we get out in the st to admit i'm not a constitutional lawyer this is this is not my place here in federal court and i start about trying to obtain co counsel that could fit within our budget and we could not so they were left with with me so i'm here today questing  that based on those three issues the interim board excluding all of the residents of the county impermissibly so i think based on the case law that i cited the the makeup of the permit board and it being just like judge homestead a roadmap to being able to sidestep the the one person one vote in all circumstances and i believe under those bases that the status should be found unconstitutional thank you thank you this case is presented