treat in quincy we believe the strip of covenant issue is on in force and the only way that it can be applied against dr hayden is to imply in the agreement which do not exist and to liberally construed the terms that do it's still in for their reason we're asking that this court remanded this case back to the trial judge with a finding this quoted greek's but the sentence fragment that i'm referring to reads quote it back to compete within twenty miles of the quincy i e c office or any i c office where the doctor's practice in excess of thirteen weeks per year for three years from the end of employment we see that sentence does not contain any specification of the activities which are prohibited under the terms of this agreement now in response to the same argument that we presented to the trial court i e c ask the court to refer back to the opening paragraph of the two thousand i try to read the contract as a whole as they are now first of all there is no provision in the now compete term which directs anyone back to that first paragraph for guidance on the scope of the of the non compete term for the duties are in the post employment period so again that is the basis for our contention that in order to get where we are in this case with a blanket prohibition that analysis is entirely contrary to illinois  what we have is in this case a not compete term that fits the definition of contract and b and that is that we have  term that is obscure in meaning because of indefiniteness of expression a term that is susceptible to multiple me it's the scope of the activities are entirely undefined and we've we've submitted some examples of just how this particular term does not give us any guy it's i mean does it apply or working as an independent contractor up thomas  because it applied to selling eyeglass frames nothing is expressed as it applied for me i exams doesn't say is it bar him from filling prescriptions related to the treatment of eye disease no guidance on that issue does it prohibit consulting with other of tom interests in quincy gun issues patient care nothing doesn't prevent him from owning an interest in a business which offers optimiser services again nothing these are all things that an optometrist would do and there is no indication in the contract to give anyone any basis to decide as the court did here because we don't have a cited in the briefs and we don't have to look very far to the to the stablish that proposition because we just look at the cases that been cited by i e c and they've been repeatedly throughout these proceedings power versus sawyer the doctor will madding gage in the practice of medicine surgery or radiology very wise center person butler dr shah not engage in any medical practice for lesson versus carbondale i centers there was an express prohibition on the practice of ophthalmology bascule or surgical associates the lawyer doctor show not engage in the practice of vascular surgery or offer any related service is the core pointed out in the case that we cited joliet medical sources and senior it's probably ok to have a blanket prohibition on a doctor or in this case an optometrist right to practice our commentary but unless that stated in the agreement the courts cannot read into the agreement what the parties did not express that's exactly what the joliet medical group case said that's exactly the rule should be applied here one of the quest rating things about this has bent the parties head to practice up commentary they took bad out it did not survive in and become incorporated into the two thousand and nine term sheet and so what we're faced with here is an attempt by i c to reach back to the  provision they clearly knew how to get the job done if that's what they want to do they chose not to and now we're stuck with the trial we're trying to make some sense of this and instead of applying the reasonable approach to trying to solve a problem but it's again it's it violates the principles that apply in case the other problem is there are there are two activity  one is it says that dr hayden will not solicit i e c patients and he will not interview or hire current i employees those are really the only two restrictions that by with any specificity those two meet the definition of cataract ambiguity because they are indefinite in expression and susceptible to multiple means and we've again stated in the briefs reasons why we think that is the case what is soliciting me does it mean telephone calls does it mean mass mailing does it mean advertising the newspaper  facebook page ever ties in on google there's no indication i think if you look back at the ninety nine agreement there's a clear prohibition on on on specific items that would fall within the category of solicitation and this comes out and again it's ambiguous as a matter of law the same thing with the hiring of current employees i see current as a when when the when the data turn she was signed the gate that d hayden left it's an it's it is it is a clear mess and the mess in this case the burden of that falls on i  this question of ok you have ambiguity in a contract is what i believe we can clearly say the question becomes what is the court to do with that i see is argue both a question of fact and the judge actually excepted he said well i don't think it's ambiguous as a matter of law that even if it is i think there's a question back here to be solved through trial ordinary patrick principles which suggests that that argument is correct if there's an ambiguity in the contract there's a question about the intent of the parties and that's a question of fact a trial but not in a case that involves the restrictive public because there are specific rules that apply can't and the ordinary ones would be you know cataract ambiguity construed against the drafter strong presumption against terms they could have been easily not but more importantly over the top of all that we have roles where  the courts are required to strictly construe restrictive covenants to protect an employee's fundamental right of employment and for that reason there's no the importer only gets one chance intended in the restrictive covenant it only made it only makes sense in let's let's face it the employer is in the best position to make a determination of what interests it is seeking to protect by having a restrictive cover it would be that easy for the employer to simply s practice of optometry that's not what i see did in this instance we are now bearing the burden of that problem and it should not be it should be i c's problem that's the way the law resolves this issue for these reasons we believe the motion to solve the problem area junction should have been granted we asked this court to reverse the trial court and remand this with instructions that motion for summary judgment holding that this provision is on in force of the grant contracts must be construed as a whole you take them in their entirety you don't look at one line you don't look at one paragraph but you look at the entire agreement and looking at the tired really the court had no and they wanted to restructure the bonus to be got a net office never basis rather than on a gross based cases based on the number of patient dollars attributed to him they changed the formula not necessarily less and not necessarily more it was a different formula and were here before the court a year ago the question then was whether or not the lower court was correct when it threw out the two thousand nine contract based on the preexisting duty this court filled rule but it was never that that was in fact did not car the two thousand and one contract that was what led to the two thousand and one contract which is in effect but before before the court made its preexisting duty on a motion by dr hayden the court had already made a determination that this contract was clear on its face within the four corners explicit no loopholes and all along that i wasn't necessary to try to restate that in the two thousand and ninety three as opposed to just referencing the not compete from the two thousand and one agreement the storm force that the chronology is a little different than and then that i think your question why the two thousand one contract was  without trying to throw in some terms and not all you know for simplicity sake you just put a reference to that not compete that you sign when you first order companies still remains in full force and effect well it had changed over time in two thousand because it was it really wasn't the same not compete it changed to two thousand and nine one thousand nine hundred ninety track was for a greater  it wasn't addressed in the in the two thousand and one contract it was not addressed specifically as to whether or not dr hayden for example could have an ownership interest high end and optometry shop within  twenty mile limit that was not specifically addressed that's not the issue before this court because we're not arguing that he should have it he should be disallowed in the ownership interest that's not here the only thing here is ploy full time he has to treat i t c patients that's what he does so consequently and this is interesting some point during the  brought up to look before the lower court in the lower court correctly the side of that's not going to issue advisory opinions of things that are not at issue in this case what the issue is whether or not he doctor he can practice but obviously it means you can't practice optometry within that you strip in some we also have before the court an argument that relates to the jurisdiction this court to hear it doesn't ordinarily when the parties below have filed a motion to to vacate i understand that but whether when the motion itself the essence of the motion w motion for summary judgment case this positive if granted that would have ended the case in favor of the the fed and there would not have been any vacation of the injunction it would have ceased to exist it really wasn't appropriate to call it or ask for a motion to dissolve the delivery injunction because it would have dissolved on its own account that's the points up the problem and what i think gives the court an opportunity to really step in and nip this in the bud so to speak and that is what counsel argue not to compete with to check a box and we will argue later about what that really needs all that all that does is encourage employers to draft intentionally they agreed it's so that they can get the same effect by a nice clean agreement like the one you know i mean the minute i tighten up the employee in years and years of litigation arguing about what that means this case presents an opportunity for the court to address that issue there are cases that talk about geographic destructions time restrictions but cases are few and far between addressing the issue of well then you're arguing that you should never have provisional admission in a restrictive covenant case because that would be inappropriate because it always has to be strictly feeds through and totally four corners because  disadvantages the party who wants to practice their profession and yet you're the one that sought provisional edition of reliable i did for the other reason that i state to show that i see about a job but but the point of not going to the next step and say you know we need to get into the fact that she's about parties tend that's not the result or the application of the issue case or the joliet medical group case where the more rockies