well here the next case on the calendar will go back to the cramer  matter alleging malicious prosecution and first like to turn to the issue of favorable terminations because a lot was stated in the oral argument and then the ruling from the bench about favorable terminations in this matter  the court was simply incorrect on the matter and does acknowledge that in its ruling which appears on a fifty one of the appendix that the court has no case on point in finding that the circumstances under which the case terminated in mr cramer's favor was on favorable there is simply no case that states that and in fact the law is very clear and plain on this matter draws from the underlying state law and the federal law interpret late since that for questions of a cruel and for other matters but the met the standard it is crystal and it's that whether the defendant in the criminal action does something to purchase the knowledge and that is either stipulating well it's green to any kind of program stipulating to probable cause doing anything to obtain that knowledge or as the case recently set forth by this honorable court spac which is well record the record is clear that the government here entered the knowledge because there were more serious charges pending in georgia that's absolutely correct that is the reason that the prosecutor stated in that the crime was not likely to ever return to connecticut how is that be termination that's a very good question judge shin and the spac case which i was about to turn our attention to details exactly what favorable terminations means and this was a twenty seven thousand case from this honorable indicative of defendants innocence now the district court took that as a broad proposition saying there has to be some kind of disha of innocence but spac says that's not the correct reading of the specific term indicative of the defendant's innocence and i quote however this qualifier is defined narrow alley it generally only includes knowledge that are caused by the defendant either by his fleeing the jurisdiction to make himself unavailable for trial or delaying the trial by means of fraud it also includes any knowledge entered in exchange for consideration offered by the defendant now that's exactly what i'm saying that the state law  cause yes a heavily fact bound question in this case and at every turn judge underhill with all due respect to him judge facts did fail to  recognize disputes as material fact and then dismissed certain facts that were offered by the i have certain i understand your are going to have certain problems which i hope you can clear up for me i will do my best you say that your client was innocent of the charges in georgia i'm quoting that's not true at the time that the naleo was entered in connecticut there were pending charges and mr cramer bore but he was not innocent  charges that's an incorrect statement he bore a presumption of innocence which i would say is innocent he has to be viewed as innocent subsequent to this matter there was a disposition in georgia and what happened and he did in fact enter an alford plea where he disputed the facts there was a finding of guilt pled guilty that was after this occurred that that's the first thing that i find problematic if i might say so respectfully that's that's perfectly fine just but at the time that the that the prosecutor said look he's got other issues elsewhere i'm going to naleo this mr kramer was presumed innocent that's an absolute constitutional back to is presumed innocent you say that you say that the defendants made and i quote no effort whatsoever to determine the reliability credibility or believability of crystal philips one of the witnesses against your client but you're not contesting are you that the defendant took a voluntary sworn statement from philips they took a sworn statement from crystal phillips but in the context of other information that existed including the presence of another milford's attacked of j cortez who was on the scene who viewed mr kramer who viewed what the interaction was that was going on there were genuine disputes of material fact as to whether or not probable cause existed this nick valis who was one of the other witnesses who later came forward was a pending order against him prohibiting any contact with children under six mr kramer stated under oath and that was presented to the court that that was not the case your honor he believed that there was not a pending order made up for him but in fact the computer records showed that there was a pending order but is at least the arresting officers believe there was a pending order isn't that a genuine disputed material fact when mr cramer states that he had in his possession and attempted to give to the arresting officers more recent document that stated that that was no longer a condition of his release and the way this whole prosecution was in a criminal case in georgia had been closed as a matter of law closed as a matter of law is that correct mr kramer had asserted through his prior interactions with this court in connecticut and his litigation in georgia that based upon georgia law and i confess to not be an expert on georgia law that based upon the expiration of two judicial terms failing to have brought his case t trial that he was to sacto the case was the fact that dismissed it's a reasonable police officers supposed to accept his word and i'm innocent of the order is no longer any good well there's an interesting thing about a reasonable police officer after they arrested mr mr cramer people came forward clued in the miner and the mother of the miner and gave strong countervailing information in the action of the officers themselves were to make a telephone call to the georgia prosecutor porter and say what shall we do now i think that's both indicative of a lack of probable cause on the part of the mill for police department to actually engage in this arrest and in dish of malice they did something because this out of state district attorney asked them to do it they acted without following through and they ignore exculpatory evidence that was brought forward to them prior to and subsequent to the arrest and even after the year asked knowing that there was no allegation of child porn in the pending but not determined georgia case they sought a warrant to seize and examine all of the  material that all the computers and electronic material that mr cramer had there was nothing on there the mother of the child in the child both the child was grilled fourteen year old was grilled for six hours without the presence of the mom the mom flew back from california and the child stayed in custody for four more hours throughout that entire time as presented to the district court the child in no time since anything wrong happened in all the time that he spent with mr cramer there are so many disputes of material fact that the judge may please the court my name is james tall berg and i represent the defendant at pelleas antonio v t and stephen starr roski both of whom are sued in their capacity as detectives in the milford connecticut police force the district court's summary judgment ruling should be affirmed for four reasons principly the you've addressed the not only didn't satisfy a favorable terminations required for malicious prosecution second there was an abundance of probable cause for the risk of injury charge under connecticut general statutes fifty three dash twenty one we haven't really gotten to the third element that was missing of plaintiff's claim an inability to show malice these officers were simply trying to apprehend and bring an offender to justice there was no evidence in the record to suggest that they had malice and then finally qualified immunity the court hasn't addressed that yet but their conduct at all times was objectively reasonable and did not violate clearly established law on the but i would look more recently to suspect last year's two thousand and seventeen decision and i would say if you want to talk about the the effect of a nalini i think what really started to rather if you draw the language out of spac from last year where a knowledge doesn't constitute a favorable terminations when it's entered for reasons that are not indicative of a defendant's innocence that's really what you have here where the defendant mr cramer was absent couldn't be in court on the day he was supposed to be in court in connecticut because he had been extradited to georgia and this goes to judge chin's point about the georgia order i think the most important thing i would impress upon this court is contained in our supplemental appendix our rule fifty six statement of undisputed facts we had submitted thirty six statements of undisputed fact the plaintiff agreed and admitted twenty six of those including at special appendix sixteen that this modified bond order from georgia indicated that the defendant mr cramer shall have no unsupervised contact with anyone under the age of sixteen now he was in plain violation of that were when the police got a report on the date of this incident that mr kramer was in a hotel room with a fourteen year old boy at a low along alone and we have two witness statements from crystal phillips and nic valis as you've noted there in the record a special appendix fifty two to fifty four and mr valis at special appendix fifty six to fifty eight mr valis swore under oath to the police that when he went to the hotel room the fourteen year old boy was in nothing but a towe having just got out of the shower so when you couple these facts you have a person who is not supposed to even be in the state of connecticut the modified bond order indicated that he could travel to new york or new jersey for the medical needs of his mother or himself as needed didn't say anything about connecticut so you have the two witness statements you have the violation of the order and based on those undisputed facts the police had every legitimate reason to find probable cause for the risk of injury charge now this so this specific aspect of the statute fifty three dash twenty one that you think up tains is what yes just as that is there's so many when you read that statute there are a lot of wars separating the clauses well i think the district court properly focused on the health of such child likely to be injured or the morals likely to be impaired under these facts as you know context does matter a fourteen year old boy in a room with a fifty year old man who's not supposed to have unsupervised contact with a minor because he's facing multiple sex offense charges in another jurisdiction ok when you say that just to be clear and you touched on this  in your briefs you say that at least designer stand at that connecticut's prosecution of kramer for risk of injury terminated and i quote because it only because cramer was in georgia are facing a felony prosecution likely to preclude his return to connecticut in the near future if ever the criminal defendants face charges in multiple jurisdictions all the time don't they yes so  is it your point that the prosecutors here were trying to save resources or something of that kind and so terminated their the prosecution of kramer or is there some legal reason why kramer's proceedings in georgia prevented connecticut from prosecuting him for risk of injury no it's the former you are just as the district court noted and the disposition transcript is contained in the special appendix special  seventy five through seventy seven it's apparent that it would have been a waste of judicial resources when mr kramer is facing more serious charges as noted by his own lawyer his own lawyer said quote he's got serious charges there excuse me that that was the prosecutor but mr cramer's own lawyer says mr kramer does not stand in front of your honor he is currently held on bond in the state of georgia he was extra tied extradited back to that state to stand trial roughly a month ago on information and belief that is pretty solid that's the that's the order the bond order that he had violated so arced connecticut  superior court would have no reason to prosecute what the federal judge in the district court concluded was a lesser offense and i think that's where judge underhill struggled in that he looked at the language of  and his his struggle was that a criminal defendant should not be allowed to sue the police simply because a prosecutor decides to enter a nalini because the defendant is facing more serious charges elsewhere so as a matter of judicial economy it made sense for the knowledge to enter it didn't in any way indicate innocence but what this court has the opportunity to do is you have the four primary reasons why summary judgment is proper lack of a favorable disposition probable cause lack of malice qualified immunity but you can go farther and you can apply and broad or at least clarify this language from  year so that those in the connecticut law enforcement community criminal justice system can know what to do with these knowledge there has been great confusion going back to one nine hundred ninety two with a ro as this court noted last year in spac in a footnote that there are some district judges who have gone to the other stream to say that you need a you know a conclusive disposition and we will we could my interest as i understand  back at the history of this issue starting in one thousand nine hundred two with roche the older rola there has been a lack of clarity and a lack of uniformity in how knowledge is have been treated and for example roberts v backwards  cited that was a case out of our office where summary judgment was reversed because there wasn't sufficient evidence in the record about well what were the terms of the plea the fact that the naleo entered on the same day that there was a lesser offense admitted to that wasn't enough this court can just clarify that language from spec last year and that is what we respectfully request that this court do in affirming judge underhill summary judgment ruling and it could be a risky strategy or  i'm not sure about that it would at least provide clarity your honor and so unless there are any other questions for all the foregoing reasons we respectfully request that the district court's grant of summary judgment be affirmed thank you in other members of this court i do agree with my esteemed colleague that the reason that this knowledge was entered by the prosecutor was the prosecutor's interest in judicial economy and not for any of the bases bas forth and roberts which is the controlling case it was not something that the that the criminal defendant at that time did in any way give consideration for so i think that that absolutely redounds to our favor now as far as probable cause malice qualified immunity why was this not if there was a bond and this was a violation of conditions of release why was this not an arrest for violation of bond conditions that doesn't negate probable cause in and of itself but it also does give rise to and support the genuine disputes of material fact as to what the bond conditions were now we know that porter reached out to the defendants to the defendants as police officers and allegedly told them there was a bond and he wasn't the one of the conditions where that mr cramer was not supposed to be in the presence of someone under the age of sixteen years old why was not in iraq for a violation of that condition rather this nebulous statute of risk of injury as judge katzman points out which has many ors and connectors in it which covers a broad range of conduct an ill defined and broad range of conduct but none which occurred in this particular case we also know that the mother of the child came forth as did mr cramer and said that mr cramer is the guardian of this child and had filed proper guardianship papers with the folks who were making this film we also know that the child said expressly that nothing untoward happened nothing had ever happened in the time that he lived with mr cramer for many months prior and had been visited by mr cramer there are these were all disregarded out of hand by the court the court simply said oh i never saw you literally said i never saw the guardianship paper so i don't believe it where are they in the record that is in the arguments where are the guardianship papers in the record judge chris there are no guardianship papers that are in the record but there is the assertion by the mother of the child and by mr kramer that he was appointed guardian and those papers were filed why and how can a district court on summary judgment decide the credibility of mr kramer and decide against mr kramer on a credibility issue in summary judgment simply can't and as far as qualified immunity goes the same facts that underscore malice and probable cause disputes of material fact are facts that should have been submitted to a jury to determine whether maybe probable cause would be qualified immunity might apply after those facts were determined by a fact finder are laws clear that when there are genuine disputes of material fact that buttress qualified immunity or probable cause or malice they're submitted to a jury they're not for the court to determine on summary judgment