to this prosecution the specific issue here is whether this seventeen year old can be charged and prosecuted for delivery of alcohol to another minor or stated more broadly a bit more broadly since this is a statutory construction question of whether any minor being defined as any person under the age of twenty one may be prosecuted under section six sixteen of the liquor control act or delivery of alcohol to another minor another person under the age of twenty one this is an issue of first impression in the published case law of illinois so far as i've been able to determine and i don't think the my opponent has found any cases on this subject either the particular provision has been in effect since one nine hundred sixty three there doesn't seem to be any case discussing prosecution of a minor for delivery of alcohol to another minor now section six sixteen of the liquor control act is in title prohibited sales and possession but we submit that if you read that provision the focus is really on the sale the delivery the furnishing of alcohol to minors section six twenty another provision close by section sixteen in the liquor control act is really the one that focuses on possession there are two return to what i would call redundant provisions within section six sixteen which sort of duplicate what's in section sixty one now the specific charge here was brought under section six sixteen a the triple i guess i'll call it three small rise and that says no person after purchasing or otherwise obtaining alcoholic worker shall sell give or deliver such alcoholic liquor to another person under the age of twenty one years except in a performance of religious ceremony or service re provision would allow the prosecution of jenna christofferson in this case certainly she under the definition of any of it says no person she is a human being she obviously would fall under those terms so does the statute on i face does appear to forbid delivery by one minor one person under age twenty one shoe another so our position is not that bad individual sentence or provision is ambiguous on its face however the provision must be read in the context of the home of section six sixteen specifically with the rest of section six sixteen a not we don't think that sentence should be read in isolation section six sixteen is directed to the liveries by those who are authorized lawfully authorized to possess liquor and despite the literal language do require us to read this within the context of the entire provision and that's there's more than one principle of statutory construction that comes into play and another one that we have to use here is reading it in the context of the whole statute those under twenty one cannot possess consume or receive liquor except in a religious ceremony or in the privacy of our home with parental consent and that's in section six twenty and i would aside here section six twenty allows the for show by a parent to a minor of work or in a home that's not that limitation is not found in section six sixteen so there is a least one exception or limitation to what seems to be the pla of spots within the statute where the legislature specifically refers to persons over or under the age of twenty one yes your honor and while we're on the subject you know the legislature maybe a little bit different and here the harm is the same whether or not an adult or min we're not saying that the legislature didn't want to prevent the harm your honor right the heart the harder the harm is something yes they want to prevent it's but who are we going to make response ok we've got nine now let it go we got no disagreement as to pertains to licensees and their agents that employees the second run pertains to express carriers common carriers and their agents and employees those are both groups that are authorized lawfully authorized to deal in liquor to deliver liquor the third provision then we first annoy other person and we're saying it's in that context with two other things to other groups that are those lawfully authorized to possess that's why we're saying it is adults who are walk away authorized to possess under this particular provision it's adults who should should be considered to be barred from furnishing alcohol to minors under section six sixteen and that category would encompass the young man who was charged with in this particular case before the events of march seventeenth two thousand and christofferson there is a young man over the age of twenty one charged in this for delivery to the minors that was appropriately brought batts what the statute was meant to apply to section six sixteen is not meant for deliveries from one but section six twenty says it's a marker for minor to possess consume receive liquor so the minor gena christofferson can be prosecuted under section six twenty we've never consent contended otherwise that is a class a misdemeanor which is the same classification as the offense under six sixteen which with which she is charged here so we're not saying what the position we're taking does not mean jenna christofferson cannot be charged any time a minor is even if you want to call it a chain of delivery where someone over no because we're maintaining the intent of the legislature is for the minors you deal with it in terms of possession and consumption for delivery you deal with adults you deal with the off the wall it section six twenty is the extent to which the legislature has chosen to allow teenagers allowed minors to be prosecuted for their dealings with alcohol that is a class a misdemeanor as i said and it does cover besides possessing alcohol consuming alcohol all sorts of fake identification fraudulent identification matters any of those are also covered as pressing mr manners under the statute we would urge this court not to read the statute to make minors criminally liable for the delivery of alcohol to other minors class a misdemeanor possession provisions are sufficient sanction for the role of minors in this minors who are considered less competent or less mature to deal with alcohol we would ask this court to reverse the decision of the appellate court and affirm the circuit court the phrase no person here in compass is those of all ages nor is there any dispute that the same harm ensues as it did in this case when a minor versus an adult provides alcohol to another minor the circuit court in this case did find the phrase no person to be ambiguous and this was the threshold conclusion that court reached before proceeding to define what it perceived to be the legislative intent behind this provision and relying on that for its ruling in favor of the defendant on appeal and again before this court  has abandoned that can be and rightfully so the argument that the phrase no person is in any way ambiguous for clearly it's not instead defense relying on at least first and foremost on the overall structure of section sixteen and i have a couple of points to make in response to that first of all the structure as a whole quite clearly if anything favors the state's position in the plain reading of the phrase no person here excuse me as the questioning noted throughout section sixteen six sixteen a legislature was extremely careful to use restrictive phraseology went to finding age groups throughout the statute in six sixteen eight two two mediately perceives the provision at issue here there are no fewer than four references to adults of at least twenty one years of age or older precisely the qualifying language the defendant would contend with should be read into the phrase no person in the very next provision in the same statute likewise is the court is noted throughout section six sixteen as a whole and throughout section sixteen six sixteen a there are numerous references to minors under the age of twenty one again the legislature being extremely careful and cautious in defining the age groups that are at issue in the case i should also note that  section six twenty one which is very close on section six sixteen obviously there is an express reference to any person at least twenty one years of age who pays for a hotel or motel room or underage drinking occurs they are the offender itself being defined this specific terms that defended in this case claims ought to be read in section six six hundred eighty three into the phrase no person the claims being made the section six six that section six sixty eight as a whole deals with the distribution of alcohol to minors that the individual being criminalized by this provision are all meant to be adults but this is a description by the remainder of the language of section six sixteen a itself later in the same provision it appears on page fourteen of the appendix these are not separately enumerated subsection so it's simply paragraph by paragraph at this point in the statute but there's a reference to fake i d s and the fake i d s of course are limited expressly in the statute once again to minors under the age of twenty one who have the fake id likewise there's a public possession prohibit that appears on page a fifteen of the appendix also in section six sixteen am there to the legislature was careful to limit it to the class of would be offenders are those under the age of twenty one so the claim that section six sixteen a is designed holistically to criminalize conduct by adults viz aviv minors is simply untrue and that's not borne out by other provisions in section six sixteen a itself finally in the last point i'd like to make about the overall structure the term any person appears elsewhere in section six sixteen as well and if person were to be read merrily as defendant contends because there's a holistic effort here to criminal the conduct of adults throughout this section it would lead to absurd results elsewhere in section six sixteen to provide just two quick examples there are a prohibition on any person criminally just calmly liable for selling or furnishing fake i d s there is no contention that any person should somehow be limited as to the individual twenty one or older who creates or furnishes or sells fake i d s and again the claim that person must be limited in section six sixteen a because of your overall structure of the section  would create an absurd result there that clearly can't be consistent with the legislative intent of stamping out the use in pro and the provision of fake i d s likewise i'll make one more reference to structure and that is the phrase that the phrase any person used with regard to alcohol possession on school property here again there's no suggestion that the general assembly intended person in this context to be limited to those over the age of twenty one who have alcohol on school property indeed quite to the contrary the very exception that the general assembly creates for this particular offense requires the offender to show not only that the alcohol is in its original container and still still sealed but also that they are otherwise legally they are not otherwise we can be prohibited from possessing the alcohol the exception itself requires a showing that you're an adult proving that the word person in the offense itself or schoolyard possession can't possibly already contemplate that it's limited to adults the other strain of argument in the briefs here has to do with absurdity and redundancy and both of these arguments fail as well absurdity as we point out in our brief is an extremely limited doctrine this court's recent decision and howard this earlier this year is an example  five just how narrow that is where the court expressed openly misgivings about the practical effect of a plain language interpretation and yet it here is strictly to that interpretation and even the court's decision in people vs hannah from two thousand and three which is one of the showcase pieces in the briefs in this case where there was the exercise of the absurdity doctrine to override what seems to be the most plausible reading of a regulation there to that case is the exception that proves the rule extraordinarily absurd outcome in that case in which the court would have to have presumed that a state agency had imposed upon itself not only impossible but wholly frivolous requirements not surprisingly let the court to conclude that perhaps most plausible reading was not the proper reading and finally there simply is no absurd result here in any event regardless of how the doctrine is construed the legislature here made very clear at the outset in section two thirty five i'll say yes five one dash to the alcoholic liquors there can be no question here as as has been said already in this argument the same harm ensues there can be no question that that purpose would be undermined by the more restrictive a textual reading advanced by the defendant here and so far from being absurd indeed the plain language interpretation is perfectly consistent with the obvious intent of the general assembly in this case and finally there's no redundancy here the rule for one one point i would make it the outset is even if there were complete redundancy between this provision sixty six sixty eight three and six twenty the possession still that would not rise to the level of certainty the general assembly routinely and quite properly separately defines and criminalizes both distribution and possession they do so with regard to controlled substances restrictions on the possession distribution of firearms could be deemed redundant in the same sentence but more than that they're simply not redundant here in the not redundant for at least two reasons first under the parent supervision and with their approval consistent with this exception they of course would not be liable for the class a misdemeanor set out in section six twenty possession but if they were to turn around and provide that alcohol to an under age friend they would be liable under section six sixteen a free so there are a substantial number of cases one could write only imagine in which there would be absolutely no redundancy in section six sixteen a freeze probations would be essential to capture conduct left on captured by section six twenty and finally available in instances in which there's a knowing violation of the statute and that ensues this is not there's no analogue to dispel any enhancement when this far greater harm ensues under section sixty the court has no questions for these reasons and those  provisions that's all we've claim also both in the briefs and here to date the state has claimed that we are relying on the absurd results proposition nowhere in anything i have filed before this court have i claimed that there are absurd results in this case what we are relying on is the legislative intent for section six sixteen if i might track back a little bit to the legis his legislative history of six sixteen under the previous code it was in chapter forty three section one thirty one when the amendment creating this provision no person may deliver alcohol to a minor first took effect back in one thousand nine hundred sixty three the only thing that was in in the provision before that said th licensee shall not delivered to persons under age twenty one or intoxicated persons there were all these multiple references to persons under twenty one when this provision took effect in fact the only thing there was the wife says the provision at that point is totally and does that mean that you're it's read in the context of the rest of section sixty eight that there becomes a question in the end what the legislature intended comes into play and the principles of statutory construction do say you look at the statute as a whole so i'm trying to look at the whole of the provision in section six answer children because under your interpretation if i understand this correctly minor could obtain alcohol from an adult the adult would be charged but then the minor could distribute to any number of people here she wanted to and could not be charged charged under sixteen could be charged under six twenty yes that's our position here as so look at more charges under six twenty because that minor would be distributing to maybe a dozen other people knowing she or he or she could not be charged or the what could be a more serious offense would that not legally contravene the legislators and where an adult could have a committee of minors helping him or her distribute and knowing those children would be free from prosecution i would suggest eat even in your example you have an adult behind that chain of events the adult is who the legislature meets the way out under section six sixteen submit if you read the home for the provisions together section six twenty is where the legislature wants to go after the juveniles and that all of the miners are under sixteen but again we're talking about misdemeanors and me they're both class a misdemeanor wherever as the cisco group pointed out there are additional fines and there's a possibility of a felony charge under sixteen that there isn't available under sixty one that's true and we're saying that the legislature did keg party situation where an adult was sponsoring it that motivated the addition of that felony provision that was certainly directed at adults that added felony provision your how do you as to the absurdity from the vision it issue would not pertain to minors in your well i guess that's why i went back to the one nine hundred sixty three amendment your honor we didn't have all that other stuff all the other reference to any person or no person or persons under twenty one if you go back in the history this provision was added when there was only the licensee provision without all that other language and i believe the language of this provision is essentially unchanged since the one nine hundred sixty three amendment and if you read it just with where they added it with the licensee provision i think dating back even to then that was the intent without the consideration all those other things because like the other legislative history it comes afterwards it wasn't there when this took effect so many cases already come up with where  legislative history but but the other principles of statutory construction at least let you look at the whole provision and trying to construe the meaning even with that we have an individual sentence the that seems to say one thing literally but you can look at that in cont