it was taken on bond but then the petitioner died so you don't have an opinion but you have that one vacated but the problem is it seems that it but the other cases still are precedence even though and so did they they rely on that case they're still president well iran  the with martinez the deal being vacated the the court that relied on it explicitly relied on it can no longer be bound by the there's another and there's no word there's no  that with i think i would say so far not but the other cases are not wiped out the two that i mentioned to you are still night circa precedence and so you your argument has to be that because you say the only reason they were decided was was included within the child abuse guess you're in some ways but yes the child there are two children both of his children on separate occasions he put in the car when he was drunk so yes a difficult time claiming that he doesn't know the nd time that it's wrong that being said i'm sure that you're aware that more people are killed by drunk drivers that are actually murders so it's yes he does have going for him that he didn't kill his children because he was drunk but it's your pent up question a rock up hill deference to the board's complete definition you know after the matter of sorum decision clarified its position of its existing otherwise the definition already  negligence means that a person under ordinary circumstances has not acted reasonably without regard for risk of harm criminal negligence high  is criminal negligence but also to be sure it's not just the definition of child abuse the statutory church is child abuse child neglect or child abandonment and that is congress's term in the statute and the forward and matter of zorra made clear that its definition as previously articulated covers also child neglect and child abandonment and in and in examination of that entire stash for each her arms where it clarified when you're presented with an endangered statute in that case that endangerment types of offenses can qualify just as long as statute is criminal negligence so it involves both criminal negligence for passive for passive acts or they call them indirect acts against children so will fall under the statute because the statute says willful and then it has a problem where it's actual acts so in valdez the supreme court explains that willful acts which are interact amount to criminal negligence rea for direct acts those are general intent to actually do the act so those california statute is certainly not broader than the board's definition because the minimum  criminal negligence for the california statute meets the minimum and for the board's definition as for justice not that i understand your argument that you know we also set the  the board's definition since two thousand and nine and for it goes though that precedent decision and and also to be sure the board's primary you know mostly fulsome definition is there's no element of requiring proof of actual injuries so they said we never said it before and we are now your clarify so everyone knows that we will not we find no reason to add that limitation of requiring proof of actual injuries so they just clarify that they never said it before and they're not saying now in store they also clarified that the definition they previously articulated that this court defers to is it encom child abuse but also neglect and abandonment that entire congressionally legislated term in the statute that it had to give meaning to and then finally it's said within the universe no treatment of a child can constitute impairment of the child's wellbeing as long as that risk is sufficiently high so with this backdrop in mind you know as i as i keep mentioning this court has been deferring to the board's primary definition and blood has herrera since two thousand and nine and just you know the board clarified that we don't have an additional element of requiring actual proof of harm or injury to a child just as long as there was no treatment or there was an impairment of wellbeing and nothing that now we have that which lead to but we have to distinguish between two hundred and seventy three a and to seventy three a day correct it's a twenty six team decision and it is in the next cases brief it's not before the court in the briefs here two thousand and sixteen board president stating explicitly what you just asked the board said  the misdemeanor version of endangering it agrees it is not in danger and the board said because it creates only a mere possibility of harm you know as signaled by the words may endanger and also under not qualify and yet here with the a provision which is the felony grounds we have a set of circumstances where explicitly in the statute the circumstances must be create a likelihood it must be likely that great bodily injury or death will occur and then the risk of harm is also presented so there the board has delineated it has limitations express those studio pointed out and also in the floor as a decision the judges pointed out there are there are very strong reasons for rejecting evora because it is in this court's colleagues terms flawed and they gave for a very strong reasons as to why that our decision is flawed and primarily a bar i took issue with the board's method of reaching its generic definition  please answer i guess i'd like to ask one question just to point of clarification let's assume that the issue that was before the court in my opinion studio is in fact still an open question and just take that as a given it depends it depends on the reasons you articulate for not deferring to the board like for example in a bar we have filed a case in the th circuit that even though injury i would say here if you say this court were to follow exactly what the a bar a court did i would say the statute still falls within the boards and within the board definition as primarily laid out in full as to its herrera because creating allowing for circumstances likely to cause death or great bodily injury to a child is necessarily  and their well being and whether it be criminally negligent mens rare or or the more stringent or the general intent which also falls within the statute that the impairment factor is so great the likelihood is so great that it's not just the mere possibilities like under b that a child could maybe tumble off of that or something and maybe possibly get hurt like what the court was concerts for and about in the free goes ok thank you thank you i mean just the question for my calling ok then we'll go back for anything else you know thank you very much well all right well thank you both for your argument i would even though you won't be able to jump up and say anything in the next two cases since we're asking other people i suggest that you just stay on so you'll have an idea of everything that the panel hearing on the particular issue thank you this matter will stand submitted