through being for like the court the district court has a special obligation to be particularly careful and particularly searching particularly explicit in its justification of the imposition of the terms argument here your hono expect that the district court here did not make adequate findings justifying a term that lasts forever that support never said why something less than three ever might not work there isn't any authority that i know of your honor that's any anything like directly on point i would argue from a position of fundamental fairness in basic due process that went to court has when a court imposes a term that never ends it has to be particularly careful because the consequences of its actions are particularly profound so basic fundamental fairness to due process through generalized concerns there your hon here it seems that the district court's justification for the infinite term was the cause of the prior offense that mr cope had sustained twenty five years earlier congress counsel i mean th probably like supervised release for fifteen to twenty years conceivably your honor but it's also conceivable that he could live a great deal longer than that it's true that he has the back problems but it's not so clear that he has any sort of systemic problems he will be sixty eight when he gets out but in today's society it's certainly not unknown for people to reach the age of one hundred or more and i would certainly not argue that a sixty eight year old man even one with back problems is an old man i would hope not particularly today yes but i sort of are when you talk about a lifetime term for a twenty year old that has a different meaning from somebody who for somebody who's older and so for example you might have the same practical result if the judge had imposed a twenty year term and it's going to strike the judge appeared to be at one point the records not clear and perhaps it's a transcription problem but the judge appeared at one point to be flirting with the idea of imposing a ten to fifteen year term although if the court never said why change your term wouldn't be enough worth fifteen year term or how to distinguish between those two things but then ultimately it in its final some nation about the sentence that it hoped that mr coke would live a great deal longer than the ten or fifteen years that it apparently had been thinking about but not really talking about very much during the s specific lines with regard to the medication provision what are you looking for with respect to the clarification if any with regard to the proviso i find my understanding the court's question right now yes well it would be the same sort of findings your honor that could be that the court that the district court would have to make with respect to the peano plus is a graph condition my condition that it was narrowly tailored to bit broader and not so medications specific or particular medication specific that there be advance notice to defense counsel before any sort of medication condition be propose say you're not helping me we've got a good craftsman you just asked us to give guidance to the district court and we do have our own case law that says if there's psychotropic drugs there has to be there's a whole regime that has to be followed are you asking for that for all all kinds of medication or just psychotropic or don't know your honor there's there's not really any indication in the record that psychotropic drugs precisely are involved here but that's one of the problems that there's no indication as to what sort of medication well i think the district court first first of all we're we're except we're invasion ing on reading them and i see a situation in which the probation office would have to come to the district court and say for these treatment related reason we would like mr coke to have to take this particularly medication which would accomplish this particular school related to this particular treatment condition and therefore we're imagining a system that's really different with the burdens are very differently placed than they are at the moment what is the order what is the supervised release order are going to say that that well he comes out of prison at that point in want to supervise what do you want this order to say now that's what i'm trying to that's going to be in prison he's going to be treated presumably in some kind of fashion and at that time correct i believe so your honor is this prepare yes what is the regime you're asking for a current listing of anticipated drugs with the showing to day there's no other necessary you know your honor i don't believe that that would be realistic forecasting so far into the  future i believe that the more realistic approach would be that if the probation officer in conjunction with treatment provider believes that a second trophic medication is necessary that there should be advanced advance notice to defense know i know this is part of the form order or orders that we've been seeing but the requirement you take all prescribed medications is pretty broad it doesn't say by who doesn't say when and this case we have a life time of supervise as newman was discussing it may not be realistic at this point in time for the district court to know ten years from now what medications a sex offender will need as part of his treatment so i think the condition i example the hypothetical given what if he misses and i'm biotech he doesn't take that and the answer is it's arguable that that's a violation of his release conditions now you would say that doesn't make sense but it's awfully broad language doesn't say who prescribe officer and any treatment providers to do what is necessary to rehabilitate this defendant i think that they would have had psychotherapy drug well i think that as this court has said in williams and seem to them well it ten obviously be read that broadly although i do think that if there was a situation where a treatment provider elected to prescribe chemical castration as a form of treatment the defendant could certainly make a mother you put the burden on the phone and hoping he would be smart enough to know that he could do that challenge it instead of putting the burden on the government to justify have the psychiatry's come in and tell the court why this extreme step is necessary well unfortunately at that point in time it would be difficult for the burden to be on the government at the time it is imposed because the government i assume the burden to be on  any mind altering so does the government really was just the notion that there be a process you know a supervised release order like those who make it clear that before the a radical step of something like chemical castration would have to be upon application to the court with the proper showing its necessity the government is not opposed to that i think the difficulty is is way or to draw the line as far as does the district court ha medications and so forth so why shouldn't we extend ways to cover all medications what's wrong with that well i think that both the weber decision involving p g testing and williams which didn't really involve supervised release in the same way this case does but both of those cases i think are an exception to the general rule set forth and rewritten and it depends upon how well how broad this court wants that exception to be have think the carve up should be based upon the language in re terms of these treatments because typically they would be it could be psychotropic could be chemical castration what other medications are we talking on in terms of sex offender treatment well i think that realistically could be anything it could be high blood pressure medication i mean you could have  mean given its does all prescribe medication a treatment provider who's trying to help this person may want him or her to take whatever medications they should be taking for their health and wellbeing so that this would not getting back to our started because basically you say now we're not talking about and i biopics we're not talking about the routine stuff we're talking about stuff well drugs that are imposed as part of a critical sex offender rehabilitation treat well for instance like say a medication to particular to treat depression which could mind altering drug to the same extent as the drs that word is you and williams well you're having trouble deciding what's in or out so that's what's troubling i think i says we don't want to we understand riordan we understand that there has to be professional judgment brought to bear and we don't want to impose a regime i assume that has doctors having to run into federal court every time they want to change with those who done a prescription on the other hand as williams makes clear there's a category of of drugs which are more powerful and have lots of side effect implications chemical castration certainly seems to be within the realm of what williams was concerned about so as judge thomas is probing what does the government have to offer in terms of helping to draw the line other than to put it all into a general terminology and then put the burden on the two problems one is what are we talking about and i thought we started off by saying you saying it had to have an access to this treatment and i think you perhaps it's all brought in that into what about all these hands of anyone but if we're struggling this much and if you're struggling this much defense counsel is what's a probation officer supposed to do and what's a district court supposed to do so it's a difficult area reasonably necessary but i think right but that takes care of my first problem is that are we talking about prescriptions that he is getting from his own doctor or part of the treatment i mean that it's not stated on it's not clear in the least yet and the government would have no objection to that type of limiting language or explanitory language turning to the supervised release condition both congress and the sentencing commission have stated their intent to impose lifetime supervision on sex offenders it is specifically recommended in the guidelines and she or the district court properly considered the thirty five fifty three a factors and concluded that three years which was the lowest possible recommendation in the guidelines was not sufficient and that based on the nature of the offense the types of materials and the need to protect society specifically children that lifetime supervision was warranted here but we do with the fact that the district court got his criminal history wrong and making that assessment was that in maryland make any difference in terms of the analysis in one sense i mean if you read what the district court was saying i have the sense that well he may have gotten the kernel history as i've gotten a criminal history wrong but probably was going to oppose it anyway on the other hand we don't know that and it does give one pause when you're posing a life time of supervised release there at the district court didn't have the end of scenes right well first i think that you are correct that i don't think his criminal history was the main factually incorrect in the p s r defendant didn't fact state that he had been convicted of molesting his stepdaughter so i think the district court just mischaracterized the daughter for stepdaughter and the p are also states that he was convicted in one nine hundred eighty first on two girls both names are weston so that's what the district court was referring to so i think that the district court actually had a fairly accurate assessment of defendant's criminal history which i think ultimately did not impact his the prior sex offense clearly impacted the district court view here because the government argues its importance but that is not the basis for the district court imposing lifetime linked back to the particular circumstances of this defendant's this man's life life history and circumstances and if you get those wrong then you may be getting the entire justification wrong the basis is wrong and the conclusion may be wrong as well particularly as the court points out when there's a need to be careful because of the lifetime nature but more turning back to the issue on the treatment condition judge gould i believe suggested of a modification or a proposal in which the treat if i'm understanding it correctly in which the condition would stand unchanged except that the  question would say medications that are reasonably necessary for treatment and my response to that proposal would be that that's precisely the the sort of  modification that would require the process necessary to protect mr cope's liberty interests to make sure that really is reasonably necessary and so forth all of the  protections that reagan's outlines would be particularly necessary in a case like ground zero on that on that point i was a so i'm just trying to find out whether the government would object to that like i personally feel that there would have to be a process and some findings back on your or your life supervision  i must say i i don't find persuasive the argument that you're that your clive gets some mileage because he refused to step child rather than a biological only that the government it instinctually equated the two things and i wanted to point out that i think there's a level of moral condemnation that's slightly greater when it's your own biological child than when it's your stepchild but neither of them is a commendable act  broader point is that prior conviction that's twenty five years old loses some of its predictive force when you're considering whether to put somebody on supervised relief release pro life or