mr cook or the amity snow that both contends with all of that language as a whole and puts forth a plausible explanation of how that language could yield the result that the court reached here the statutory language refers to only two precede in time the other activity deciding any appeal so long as the board observes that require chronology it meets the playing language requirement of the statute why there is no long standing precise practice on this particular question because the board had no reason to think that the statute although their minor goal i mean we've found cases there are reason to think that the statute required a hearing as a matter of right upon the reaming and of any case from the veterans court to the board therefore there was no reason for the board to issue a policy or a regulation stating that the statute does not require a so after hearing as a matter of right frankly the problem here is that the veterans court miss top silence in the sense that the statute simply doesn't address this particular issue for ambiguity there is no ambiguity in what the statute requires in fact the various court recognized that the plain language interpretation of the statute is simply that the board must afford at least one opportunity before deciding  nine to ten the what the problem is that the veterans court suit that this statutes should answer the question that the veterans court had but it simply there is something nothing in the language or the history of it to indicate that it was intended consider the circumstances the request for a hearing and any reason provided for the request for a hearing and has to use what generally what will probably be a good cause standard which is the standard used by the board to decide a number of motions that are considered to be within the board discretion such as whether to grant an additional hearing after an appellant has missed the first one and determine whether in those circumstances a new hearing should be granted if the app appeals that determination to the veterans court the veterans court is entitled to review that determination to decide whether the explanation justifies the result reached within an adequate level of deference that similar to the same approach that for example appellate courts take to reviewing the decisions of district courts when they decide for example discovery disputes which are necessarily very fact the civic and there aren't usually specific bright morning rules determining what result should be reached but nevertheless the courts of appeals have no trouble deciding you know when the court has abused its discretion or when and the result is within the court's discretion so we're in no way suggesting that the board would have unfettered discretion to do whatever i wanted that's certainly not the case in fact and we don't believe that this would be necessary but we do think that the statute could in narrow circumstances require an additional hearing if there were for some reason development in an appeal that somehow nullified the prior hearing or rendered it inadequate so for example if something's changed so fundamentally in the applicable legal standards between the beginning of the appeal and some later point such that  couldn't have known what would be relevant couldn't have known what testimony is present and then probably there would be a strong argument that the statute itself would require a new hearing but we don't i think that it would be necessary for the veterans court to reach that kind of result when reviewing a decision  asked for supplemental briefings specifically to address the question of whether or not the statute in this case did or did not address the issue that prince court correctly determined that the statute did address the issue  bigger part of the facts assume what they may or may not be because as in this case additional facts were developed on henri man and it was those additional facts that mr cook sought to have an opportunity to comment was saying when there's a rematch and it's because there's a new wish you in that well not necessarily want to create an opportunity for here either i'm not saying that categorically but i am saying that specifically in this case and i am saying that the rule that was adopted by the veterans court gives the flexibility for the veteran to seek a hearing after he or she has already been afforded a hearing when the case comes back  court and that it is vitally important for the veteran to have the opportunity afforded to him or her by congress to have a hearing congress said that there would be a hearing before the decision was made on the appeal this is a new appeal in the sense that the appeal that was originally brought was denied that denial was vacated that denial allowed the appellant another opportunity to have another appeal proceeding before the war and in that appeal proceeding mr cook had developed additional evidence and water that opportunity to a late or to expound upon that evidence and he would do that in a hearing the same way he would do that on the hearing on the way up and there simply is no reasonable basis for the government's position that that statute should be interpreted in another way in fact the government has at least as i read their brief and have heard their argument articulated no legal error that was committed by the veterans court in arriving at its decision want this court to take a new look at the interpretation but without affording this court with any assertion of clear error in the interpretation arrived at by the veterans  absolutely are either and that the only way that a force an effect of the previous decision that was vacated is gong is gone now there are circumstances in which part of a decision can be a firm and part of the decision can ended and so it would be limited to that portion that was vacated and remained but as a general proposition i believe you stated exactly correctly and therefore under the statute we're going back to as it were the beginning of the appeal in order to have the appeal adjudicated and the read adjudication of an appeal following a re man from the veterans court is no different than purposes of statutory me fortunate because the statute we're dealing with emanate it is a regulation many many years ago and in the congress said well you should know better and should be entitled to more than regulation actually the regulation but by they're determining that this is the way in which things will be done including not having a opportunity for a second irritant rather than taking their responsibility as administrators to pro to and i believe that that that very point your honor goes to the essence of that statutory interpretation in this case does a better and have a right when the case is returned from the veterans court to have a second and the veterans certainly has a right under the statute to have that second hearing and more importantly he or she has that right as a matter of due process it is simply not due process to deny as the board did in start with gardner and not start with chevron that the correct way is to look at this under the can and construction for veteran statutes and regulations and that every veteran statute and regulation should be interpreted by this court and by the court below in the light most favorable to the better and in that context the light most favorable to the veteran is to be afforded a hearing upon remain unless there's further questions i'll cede my real meaning thirty seconds  seventy one a seven b does not define those terms and there is no dispute that when congress does not statute statutorily defined a term that it intends for the terms common in ordinary meaning to control and so i'm going to step through it very quickly the common and ordinary meanings of the side any an appeal in how they fit in the seventy one a seven b the common ordinary meaning of the side is to determine after consideration of the facts in the law the secretary now concedes this the common ordinary reversal and there is a case of the traverses to win ski when that app's three ninety four which is from a veterans court case but it does provide persuasive authority affirming that and the reason is that no over his brief the common ordinary meaning of is simply every and the secretary does not really dispute that either but attempts to evade its consequences through what is a straw man argument the secretary cherry picks one of what is several dictionary definitions of every and says that that which is definition one b creates logical tension in section seventy one zero seven b but with the secretary does not mention is that in the same dictionary definition one i have every is each individual or part of a class or group either definite indefinite number without exception and that makes perfect sense in seventy one of seven b which again provides that the board shoved aside or that is determined after consideration of the facts in the law any or that is every each individual without  circumstances they would suffice to trigger the opportunity for a new court hearing whether or not it's necessary it would suffice and so would seventy one of seven be does as unambiguous they require an opportunity for were hearing on every or each individual without exception submission of a regional offices decision to the board for review when possible reversal whether that submission is on initial consideration of the substance of appeal or after a remand back down to the regional office and return to the board it really focuses on what the secretary would like for seventy one to seventy to do and not is not linked to what seventy one or seventy actually says and getting from the to b is a real problem for the secretary because it requires essentially amending the statute from saying disagreement there is no such notice of disagreement submitted just upon a remain from the veterans court therefore there is no basis for finding the new appeal has been submitted if the award appeal were to be redefined in such a fashion is a very common used word throughout veteran statutes and regulations it would have wide ranging and very negative repercussions for the way the system works including how our docket it and therefore the order in which they're hurt second it doesn't matter whether or the board is called upon after a reunion to sign the case a new the statute only requires that a hearing or opportunity for hearing have been provided before that point which it has been at the outset of the appeal and the same appeal the they cater of the decision doesn't vacate the prior hearing lastly the court has suggested that the secretary could simply pro said that it was the vining the will or the intent of congress and we're not sure how we could problem gay a valid regulation if the intent of congress as interpreted by the court was that there must be an additional opportunity for a hearing on request after