also i think the court can agree as the parties have that california law of judicial stoppel and i'm sorry judicial arrest you to cut and collateral estoppel is the law that mr johnson as i brief extensively in the papers and don't want to go over too much more but it is our position that residue to college does not apply to claims because she voluntarily with to her claims against jeopardy at the labor commissioner hearing the rule in california set forth a gag non and reiterated in many subsequent easy but it's a very interesting question that you raise and the case you just cited of course is a normal civil procedure case within the california system and this is  sure how you bridge the gap between those two between india which is normal california civil procedure code under a separate set of procedures and under an informal administrative  i go to hear the support for that's the norm when i was a worker's compensation case in which they up north versus workers compensation appeals board seventy you think that makes a difference absolutely not your honor because what you have is five eighty one see the code of civil procedure is an exception to the general rule ok in trials once the trial administrative mercy they have got a general analogy but now you're trying to draw a line between what would happen in superior court and what would happen and before the hearings officer because it's not a crime why do we make that distinction that if the law of claim preclusion issue preclusion in california applies generally to administrative proceedings why wouldn't the corollary provision with regard to dismissal during trial also apply because the law of the land is gag on and gag on says a voluntary dismissal without prejudice i'm sorry but not as a trial has started no it is not enough you just told us that after a trial has started that general rule doesn't apply if i want wouldn't that exception also apply to hearing because but you're not going to start applying the technical rules of civil procedure to it berman hearing because you have ninety eight point two which is the code section it says that its intention the legislature that the hearings be held pursuant to this section be conducted an informal setting preserving the rights of the parties there is no reason to apply the exacting standards of the code of civil procedure to informal proceedings such as the how is the provision that says with ra the trial started this exacting provision of the code of civil procedure it seems to be a pretty straightforward rule you can you can turn take another road until you start down the road once the trial has started once the hearing itself is started you're committed to that road you can say oh sorry never mind and that seems to be what happened here that the withdrawal that you're talking about is not somebody you said i've decided i don't want to proceed through a hearing i want to go to court herself which happens a lot nearly half the filings in our quarter prose that doesn't mean that the rules don't apply and not saying they don't apply but all you're saying is what i'm saying here is that you should not apply those rules to administrative proceeding this woman showed why not the because she was not represented by counsel she did not understand the law of throwing employers she was not aware of the extent of the control jeopardy had over her employment because she was i did not have discovery and she was not aware of that she was not going to be able to pursue claims otherwise if she dismissed her claims at the labor finish your hearing these informal proceeding it's not like a trial a trial you have separately but for your proposition that asking for carve out for administrative hearings there is no rule for it ministry of hearings there's nothing under the labor code there under the burman rulings that says when you start a labor commissioner hearing a dismissal is with prejudice the general rule of the carve out is five eighty one point c for civil trials that is what you i don't need to it's the other side that needs to prove that five eighty one so i don't do you know that's not offensive i'm asking you to give us when i  what is the legal foundation for saying that in an administrative hearing you don't treat that as something when you want it to be treated it is nothing they wanted to be treated as something the rule is i can withdraw my claim any time i want and it's not a dismissal with prejudice so then it becomes incumbent on them to prove that five eighty one point c applies to administrat there is no law out there on that there's also no law that what you're asking that specifically says well like i said it believe noland does apply on to say once there is a ministry or proceeding is still allowed to withdraw the claim if i may just on the collateral stoppel issue the whole issue of judicial exhaustion is doct judicial exhaustion is simply a corollary to the issue of collateral estoppel it should not apply to this ignacio's claims for the same reason that there was no final judgment on our position that the are i guess i'm losing track of which one is which the last thing you said about it is ignacio you're telling me the commissioner rule they were joint employer yes employee which is the exact issue you you're asking for it both ways and that can't be as if you want to apply this against gemini you're stuck with jeopardy being dismissed if jeopardy was dismissed they can't be bound because they're not a party to the  jeopardy at the hearing they received a money judgment for the full value of their claim against him backs yet they turned around and filed a new claim even against am ex space on the same  insolvent there's nothing in the record to support that as a matter of fact johnson at the labor commissioner hearing in two thousand and eight said that a match was on and solve so that's the only war there was no appeal for that award it became a judgment it was filed in the superior court under labor code ninety eight point two it becomes in forcible judgment ok so that circumstance chen in earlier some the judge of motion against the first named plaintiff in class representative in this case marshall field dealt with that exact issue and found that under the few trophy case a california court of appeal decision directly on point involving the same kind of cable service said that that is not the equivalent of an employer for purposes of the labor co and that that issue of course is not part of this appeal because they did not appeal read marshall field summary judgment the facts are the same no and i have every confidence that the result would be exactly the same were to ever go back to the district court so now let's take what happened it would happen after labor hearing the common law of war that it's a different situation where the firm of the i'm quoting from the case where page six fifty seven where it affirmatively appears the plaintiff intended to abandon the action in which case it is treated as a with tracts a common law and that's really what we have going on here and which kidneys and the same principles is a is repeated in the carville case which again judge chen relied on in the fisher case and are and i recall your basic superior court cases correct yes so his last argument was this is different because how could she know without counsel that ministry here well it would be part of that yes it is a board formal hearing but the end result is not informal it is by by definition in the statute ninety eight point two it's a put close of buying both made over one hundred thousand dollars a year they knew enough to bring a burman hearing claim they could have hired hell soul they are the dots and frankly they did a good enough job to prevail for the full value of their lost wages claim against a mess hall they had a handle on the facts that the the piece that may have been missing is the question as to whether jeopardy was similarly liable was a joint employer in some fashion and that's what he owes because civically acknowledges it was the basis for the for all the client but that's that's a legal proposition rather than a factual proposition and as a non lawyer she's more handicapped in trying to answer that question if she if she disagreed with the finding she was there to state the facts if she disagreed with the legal conclusion that commissioner brought from fact if she had a remedy and that was to appeal to the security record and by the way this is this is not like other appeals where there is a heavy deference to the commissioner's finding there's no deference in this field hundred ninety eight point two  for discovery but when you get the superior court you do it you get to open everything up there's a mechanism to bring this once they were going down that path they were obligated to finish that up and they didn't they just didn't appeal the sense that the current lawsuit is based on the premise the jeopardy is liable her understanding that the time of the jeopardy isn't liable was based arguably on her misunderstanding of  did if that was for her concern she certainly have the right to challenge that we will find him by the commissioner and there there is she she she clearly in the commission of found she there's nothing in the record to suggest otherwise here she submitted a declaration of support of the motion to to substitute the new class representatives there's nothing in her declaration here that suggests that she did not intend to abandon the claims that she intended to dismiss without prejudice there is no statement there that was an audio recording of the proceeding that was available to both parties that the the regulations for the labor code thirteen five zero two says that those those transcripts  listen to the evidence see health insurer going and then abandon that claim and we file again and that's just that it's unfair to the parties that showed up and made their case and it's just a waste of time to e there was an administrative hearing the court in that case at page six twenty refused to apply the provisions of by the eighty one  in open court here there was no knowing state that i just want to briefly touch on counsel said while the process is informal the decision is not it is binding ok that decision that was issue case it was the same situation in the johnson case st john's and against american mortgage and express there was nothing for them to appeal there was no judgment for them to appeal the appeal if they'd gone against it would have overturn you your thank you the case of the on versus american mortgages submitted