of time for rebuttal your honour's in this case a police officer who possessed only reasonable suspicion of a license plate violation chose to investigate that crime by approaching my client's parked car opening the door to that car and sticking his head inside the passenger compartment all without my client's consent the question here is whether the for the moment allows such conduct and the supreme court's decisions in terry and michigan versus long provide the there's no the terry line of cases governs on the street investigative encounters based on reasonable suspicion what they wanted issue here and because the officer in this case conducted a warrantless search of mr vehicle by opening the passenger door and by sticking his head inside the passenger compartment those searches were only lawful under terry and walling if the officer possessed reasonable suspicion that one my client was dangerous  that there was a weapon in the car there is no such cause here and there is no other exception to the th amendment warrant requirement that justifies the officer's actions in this case you can cancel before you get further into the legality of the search but one thing that puzzles me about this case is d assuming that the opening of the door and intrusions the car was a search it doesn't seem like it really had anything to do with the discovery of the evidence that you're occurred because the car was towed because of a totality based on my client suspended license i disagree your honor respectfully that the information about my client suspended license wasn't discovered the of the search the questioning that the officer asked of my client regarding his license followed immediately immediately from the search immediately from intruding media only from and in fact occurred while the officer was still intruding inside the car and  so the question is the fruit of the statements the statements are would give rise to the to the ability d to tow the car those statements were elicited while the officer was actually intruded and i know that the government the government doesn't dispute and it's brief that these statements were the product of this search the government's position it doesn't even invoke any exception to that warrant requirement the government's entire argument with respect to the exclusionary rule is  free form balancing between deterrence and with the suggestion that the officers conduct was in flagrant i like to emphasize for the court flagrant she is not a requirement for application of the exclusionary  the government quotes flagrant repeatedly in its brief and i know for the court that that is a subject element of the attenuation exception which the government has not invoked in this case but that the flagrant c of the officers conduct is not a prerequisite and i know document doctrine suppression is favored here most notably because the government doesn't address the st two elements of that exception which are the temporal proximity and statements at issue here the only statement giving rise to the to which is the discovery of the weapon that flowed immediately from the questioning and even more importantly the nd component of the attenuation exception is the presence of intervening circumstances the government has an identified any intervening circumstances here and there are no chain so i submit that suppression is a correct around woody and there is no adequate showing that the officer would have come about this information in some other lawful way so that going back to the question of whether it is what the court is focusing on mims is the intrusive miss on this on the liberty of the individual it's not focusing on the privacy interests and and so the court in mims held that the created bright line rule out an officer to order someone out of a car finding that was a de minimus intrusion it d was only an incremental intrusion but only because the driver has already been seized the th amendment event the seizure has already occurred there and so the language about a minimal intrusion is informed by the fact that there's already a seizure there's not already a search here and two if i may expand on that the question about whether or not there's a distinction between opening a door and ordering someone out of the vehicle i think there's a significant distinction for at least two reasons the st is any the cases and i think it's the paleo decision and the cotton decision that suggests that there's not a difference between these two d are really based on a fundamental assumption that is and correct regarding the nature  which individuals are ordered out of their cars in the in the day to day interactions between police and drivers i recognize that my experience is not a part of the public record but i can represent to the court and over fifteen years of federal criminal practice these types of orders about accessing a vehicle come in all different varieties the officer may be in his car ordering over a loudspeaker the officer may be right outside of his car and be midway between his car and the driver's car the reason this  significant from the privacy perspective is that in any of those circumstances the amount of the passenger compartment that will be available to you by the officer is going to vary and the assumption that opening a door is the same as an order to exit is based on the in my opinion the faulty premise that an officer always orders someone out of a car while he's standing within one foot of the driver's side and i think the nd reason that they're different is that mims does not address what i think is a very significant issue in this case which is the supreme court's opinion in john jones is the court is aware is of an opinion in which justice scalia writing for the court reinvigorated property rights as a fundamental fundamental component of th amendment protection and so the difference between ordering someone out of a car and mims and an officer actually physically occupying in effect an individual's effect and opening that door that is all the difference in joe jones reiterated that property rights under the th amendment are sacred that is the that's the language of justice scalia property rights are sacred its own officers act of grabbing the door opening the door and sticking his head inside is a physical intrusion and a th amendment search even under the most basic framing of the historical imus's of the th member mr kennedy or can i ask you just to clarify your position on this issue do you agree that it was lawful for the officer to ask your client for his license and registration at least up until the point where he may have seen the temporary permit in the windshield no it wasn't a lawful because it was being done your job show it was being accomplished while he was engaged in a work a search my i'm sorry could have asked for a through the closed window on the passenger side he could have walked around in an asteroid through the closed window of the driver's could have asked your client to open either of those windows spoken through those windows all that would have been permissible  plane and ask your client for his registration and he can if you can not your honor because even opening the door d under jones and the property based theory of search that is a search it is a physical occupation of an effect and jones makes plain that vehicle is in effect within the original meaning of the concept if i might your honor i see that i'm i'm already near the end of my time i'd like to reserve the remainder and any additional for you know the row give you ten minutes if you very much from the government down morning your honour's mayor please the court my name is briggs matheson and i represent the united states in this appeal the district court did not air because there was nothing unreasonable about officer wilma's efforts simply to communicate with mr and them as a in initiating it conceivably lawful investigative detention of his vehicle the parties agree that at the inception of the suppress and that's because as the district court found mr i think him as a did not put forth any specific non speculative factual allegations that actually conflicted with the officer's testimony  his own sworn declaration that he did not notice the bill of sale on the windshield at the time he initiated that encounter and i think it's important and sorry to interrupt you again seems to me i mean i understand the we don't have  standard to require the district court to hold an evidentiary hearing is much higher it requires that a defendant put forth sufficiently non speculative facts that if treated as true would have required the district court to grant the relief that he sought and the relief that he sought in this case is suppression of the evidence and mr and gomez a's allegations fall short not only of that standard but of even creating a d material conflict with what the officer said there are that the officer even had an opportunity to view the bill of sale on the windshield prior to asking that question nor is there any information provided by mr endgame as a about what the officer would have become aware of had he made split nd i contact with that bill of sale during the approximately seventeen seconds of this purely verbal exchange with mr ingram as a and so even if the officer had made eye contact with that bill of sale on the windshield there's nothing in the record that indicates what information would have thereby been transmitted to the officer and reasonable suspicion would not have instantaneously vanished because the question in terms of reasonable suspicion in a case like this involving a vehicle that lacks license is whether the ambiguity surrounding the vehicles registration status has been resolved that is what would have been required for reasonable the district court accepted as true mr new met these allegations for purposes of resolving the motion and so that was not a contested issue but the question is not whether the vehicle was in fact in compliance with california law the question is whether under reasonable suspicion the officer had sufficiently particularize facts giving rise to a reasonable suspicion that something was amiss in terms of the vehicles registrations that the parties agree that he did based on the lack of license plates and so then the question is whether reasonable suspicion was result whether d the ambiguity was resolved that's how the california court of appeals but the question in the people versus datsun face which is discussed in both parties briefs whether the ambiguity  resolved and the particularized facts giving rise to reasonable suspicion either are confirmed there dispelled and merely glancing at a rectangle in the windshield during this brief interaction initiate an investigative detention of a vehicle and that is always true d under the th amendment and importantly it is not contested here the issue in hernandez of whether the officer there was no issue i should say in hernandez of whether the officer was aware of a temporary permit in the window in fact it was undisputed in that case that the officer even before initiating the traffic stop was aware of the temporary permit on the vehicle and when he initiated the traffic stop in that case was based on a hunch that sometimes temporary permits are not valid and so the officer never had reasonable suspicion to initiate the encounter at all but i think what people versus datsun makes clear  came after people versus hernandez is that the uninvestigated chance that a temporary permit might exist does not constitute a dispelling event that vitiates reasonable suspicion instantaneously and in that case in dotson the officer testified that he could not recall whether or not he had seen a temporary permit and that it was not sufficient to dispel reasonable suspicion but again i want to emphasize that even if the officer had seen the bill of sale there's no allegation about what he would have seen that any text was facing in order and that he would have instantaneously resolved the ambiguity and then precluded from even asking mr ingram as a for his driver's license and registration nor is there any can i ask you before your time or the can i just switch to another matter i just want to clarify what you're eating for purposes of you know what you're not are you conceding for purposes of the appeal that a search did take place of the defendant putting aside the question of whether was a lawful search you can see that there was a search yes your honor with a cabby out and this goes to judge miller's question as well about just what we're talking about when we say a search has tak place because following united states versus jones and the trespasser your intrusion theory of liability under d the th amendment even calling what took place here a search is a bit of a misnomer and the jones court itself recognized in footnote eight of the opinion that not every trespass onto a vehicle is that's a fairly a search in the constitutional nd and so while i think it's appropriate to d analyze the constitutionality of the officers conduct in this case as a th amendment event that triggers the reasonableness requirement of the th amendment i think that merely serves to highlight just why it is so important to apply that reasonable analysis and to take consideration of the totality of the circumstances and the interest involved and the minimal degree of the intrusion and that's how this after a couple of things so you can see the search takes place as i think you have to under class obviously the search was warrantless correct there was no warrant to open the door during the traffic stop the search i take it you're not arguing any of the traditional exceptions to the warrant requirement such as inevitable discovery that's correct yes with with the caveat that i do think and the government has made this argument brief that the challenge the evidence at issue the firearm would have inevitably been discovered notwithstanding the presence of the temporary permit setting that that issue aside what about the issue of fruits if the search was illegal i know you say it's not but if the search was illegal was the gun the fruits of an illegal was a fruit of that illegal search i want to address each of your questions your honor i do see i'm over my time but i'll try to address both of those briefly with respect to whether it is the fruits of the search i  think that even if this court were to find that the officer unreasonably opened the passenger d door simply to talk to mr and him as a that the extraordinary remedy of suppression would not be appropriate because suppressing question to be and you have as your friend pointed out the government has the burden of showing that the th year was that there was too much attenuation this evidence wasn't really causally related to the violation  and i did not understand you have made such an argument in your briefs did you the government has argued that the suppression remedy is not appropriate even if there is a th amendment violation and that is in  part three of the argument section of the government's brief right but that that's different from i mean that was i understood you to be making more of a freestanding exclusionary rule exception argument the argument there wasn't the requisite causal relationship between the evidence that was discovered and the constitutional violation well i do think that the question of deterrence is bound up in the question of causation because   th amendment exclusionary rule only applies where it would result in sufficient deterrence and that in turn depends on whether the discovery of the evidence  was in some way approximately caused by the constitutional violation that suppression would deter and the other is i know the answer to your question about fruit so if something is not the fruit of an illegal search we don't even have to reach the exclusionary question because it's not the fruit of an illegal search if the search was illegal once lived on the fruits of that illegal search putting aside the issue whether it should be suppressed i think this court can affirm the judgment of the district court on any basis and could find on this record that the firearm was not the fruit of the opening of the passenger door and that would be supported by the record in terms of simply the timeline of events the quake and whether opening the door led to the discovery of the firearm because this goes back to the question of whether there was a search in the constitutional sense when the officer opened the door there was no inspection of the vehicle search for weapons or visual inspection of mr and gomez at that point in time and that is not when the firearm was found to be there by colleagues of further questions thank you thank your hono would find peace officer walking up to their car and without consent opening the door to their car and sticking their head inside to be this are all and startling occurrence that just a terrible conduct it's appropriate here so it shows to your question about the whether or not this is the fruit of the gun is the fruit of the search it is undoubtedly because there's no dispute that the only reason the vehicle was towed for a license plate violation which was originally investigated it is because my client lacked a license and the government has not t saul there is a specific allegation and that is supported by sufficiently clear facts from my client's declaration the that the document was the media was in plain view on the windshield it was within d two feet of the officers head w inserted into the car that it was and the district court even recognized this that this was in his line of sight that is a clear inference that the officer saw this document and you're correct dr to what you are asking this question under hernandez once the officer sees this document there is no reasonable suspicion and so while my colleague says that internet does the driver pointed to the document on the windshield that's true but the court that's not the reason the court found there was no reasonable suspicion the court in hernandez found there was reasonable suspicion from the inception of the start because the officer saw the document that is on the issue and one last point if i might there is no dispute that the document that is on the windshield was the proper documentation for united states against