case we believe do meet the twamley it bought standard it's alleging enough to be able to stablish the at a competitive one of the problems i have in this case if you want to talk somewhat about is whether we have jurisdiction appellant's right yes there were dismissals of complaints here where there was an opportunity to follow a new complaint within a certain by a certain deadline that wasn't  done and then a complaint was filed later that the district court treated as allowable under rule six and it seems to run straight into our precedent  was filed after the deadline but i recognized by the court as being accepted and then this well i think going to get that under rule six which the problem for as i understand it is we've said that that's for prejudgment decisions not post judgment decisions right why don't we take these one at a time so they're in the area cases i understand that was amended complaint was filed four hours late mississippi case they move for extension right in the in the court construct it took the amended complaint and basically said because now i've ruled on at the yes i mean i would think that you know especially the mississippi complaint is still law because you know even have acted permissibly but the letter briefs ask you about that in those terms and you affirmatively said don't pursue a rule sixty b theory pursue a rule sixty one theory is that right that's correct we did you so how can we make if we think and think this is otherwise a problem how can we invoke rule sixty to save the complaints when you from italy told us not to well seems like your theory has to rise or fall on what you told us which is that rule sixty one dollars is what saves you well we would argue that at the to me that there at the time that the amended complaints were filed or afterwards that there was ever a motion of any kind filed by your cots there was a brief brings a very close with scale of justice we're very close i mean the standard because we have and it's a dispute of this country perilous and what tips it tips the balance to a conspiracy to the buyer cartel i think josh wilson particular would describe the fact that this isn't your standard out of trust case where you have a seller's cartel you've got a bias cartel and they're buying products and services from our clients out of body dealers and then order to have a contract with and serve their insured and because they can control a buyer's cartel think control and keep those prices down at lessons in the number of repairs it weakens the number repairs the type the repairs are aren't as good and so the quality of insurance goes down there's a reason for them to keep this tab this agreement absent the agreement smaller perhaps than the big state farms the big ones would come in and say look we are going to we are going to pay the higher price we're not going to stick with this agreed cap we are going to pay for basic structure of this market which scorched land over in the end bank decisions so what is it about these complaints that makes your cases different or makes let's just talk about mississippi what in the mississippi complaint distinguishes stows allegations from the ones in the in bank complaint and it's got to be something a lot more specific than that exists is a market structure in which everyone just follow a state farm well you can price that you get that complaint there are very more specific allegations factual allegations to support the fact that there's an opera what you can what's your best two or three distinguishing allegations that you know for a price very specific about there's no market study there's no survey there's no there it's keeps this price that they s all agree without knowing what that is without without any market studies can never describe to our clients why they set that price why is the exact same as state farm there are no studies state farm it's just that arbitrary calculation with this little ritualistic formulation that we detail in the mississippi complaint as to how they come up with this amount but why would these insurance companies all the other stories companies go with this price absolute agreement and obviously we can't set the agreement but another fact that we do allege and point out is the fact that there is an opportunity through the associations and very specifically about how the representatives executives of all these companies participate just we had just on the pricing point i mean they tell every you're right they seek the protective orders and that's a little odd but they tell every body shop in a geographic market this is what will pay for such and such service doesn't sound like a secret like and i think it was cement institute where they're sealed bedding like steel bedding simultaneous and lo and behold the bits are the same to the penny a technical sense if if they're telling everybody shop in some area whatever it is here's what will pay for a certain kind of repair doesn't seem like that's the kind of thing that would quickly ask me for someone other good good example is the uniform refusing to follow industry standards to to repair the cars of the pre action conditions it's uniform what they will pay for what they will not pay for parts and not paying for new parts i was asking earlier about the failure to file the amended complaint with ended deadline pertains to i believe the indiana utah actions and judge martin brought up the mississippi action that wasn't that kind of situation the motions the jurisdictional questions in the mississippi cases i understand it are are issues about what was designated in the notice of appeal they're not they're not issues about following the amended complain issues for all of the cases but in particular the indiana and utah cases have jurisdictional issues for the failure to file a timely appeal pursuant to twenty eight u s c twenty one of seven and eight and you put your finger on the issue  and the court asked us all to address it the question is when was a final judgment entered below and that question is answered in this case by reference to the court's decision and hertz which makes it plain that if it date certain is provided for filing an amended complaint and that date certain is not met then the final judgment is entered on the date that the minute complaint was due and that's what happened in this case both in indiana and utah a judge martin you're correct in indiana it was one day later four hours late and in utah it was two days late the excuse given in indiana you're right was the purported e c f excuse which by the way is the same excuse the plaintiff's counsel offered as to why no reply brief has been filed in this court and that was never pressure tested below because as judge pryor stated there was never a motion filed below for post judgment relief under either rule fifty nine or rule sixty b to amend the order instead what happened was that row six motion filed a there was never a real six motion filed at all what happened your honour's was that the defendants moved to strike what at the point is what had filed there are many complaints in those cases late defendants moved to strike those a complaints was being tardy also moved to dismiss in response to the motion to strike and the motions to dismiss the plaintiffs filed a response and they as part of that they they noted that they had these e c f and other issues  judge pres now in ruling on the motion to strike and in the motions to dismiss treated the opposition as a rule six requests for an extension of time and granted a two day extension of time and a one day extension of time the problem is that in the words of this quote of this court in hertz at the time as of the time the final judgment was entered the to use the court's language of the trial court surrender jurisdiction to provide any kind of pre judgment relief which is what rule six is so the only option available would have been rule fifty nine dollars or rule sixty b well rule fifty nine dollars is out because you have to file a rule fifty nine dollars requests for relief within twenty eight dollars days of the judgment that did not happen even the opposition was not filed within twenty eight dollars days of the judge judgement so now we're down to rule sixty this court specifically asked the parties does rule sixty apply and on september th two thousand seventeen plaintiff's counsel said quote this court should not proceed under rules fifty nine or sixty b and quote specifically said that now maybe they said that because they understand that it would be a far reach to take their opposition to a motion to strike and to convert it into a motion asking for relief under rule sixty b for post judgment relief we do not disagree that this court has discretion and the trial court has discretion to do that you're not required to simply go with the formal labels of all of the document but there has to be some indication that the plate the party was seeking that relief and maybe just named it the wrong thing here there was no request for relief they just filed an amended complaint late and proceeded and they could have at any time filed before that deadline of request for an extension of time and a rule six it would have been on file and then we would they wouldn't have been in the situation or they then could have filed a motion under rule fifty nine  rule sixty be asking the court below post judgment relieve to to please excuse their tardiness they didn't do any of those things it's not just that they made one mistake and filed the complaint late they didn't seek relief prejudgment or post judgment in a motion asking for an extension of time or relief from that judgment and that's on them that's no one else's wrongdoing the mississippi case just to know your honor there is an issue with jurisdiction there because they failed to designate not granting dismissal of the federal antitrust claims in their notice of appeal and there was law from this court making clear that the notice of appeal designations are jurisdictional what they did instead is they designated the motion for reconsideration denial in their notice of appeal so before this court is the question of whether the district court abused its discretion in denying their motion for reconsideration but the federal and i trust claims are not properly before this court because they were not designated in the mississippi case in the notice of appeal and then and we said in our in in the in the nationwide brief that was submitted your honor there's case law cited that for example the grant the dade county case that where you designate of the ocean for reconsideration but not the original order so the order for reconsideration reconsideration but not the original order it's only the order on reconsideration that is probably before the can  ask to have the chronology right the basic chronology is stanek trust claims were dismissed then reconsideration of that was denied and then the state claims were dismissed right yes  correct your honor a so none of these orders became final until the state claims were dismissed and the notice of appeal includes the dismissal of the state claims as one of the orders appealed from right correct or so why doesn't why isn't everything before us in the mississippi case on the theory that if you appeal a final judgment that takes up all the interlock atory orders that happened on the way to final judgment i think you're unaware that where the order is involved different claims in different subjects that the law is that you have to designate that separate different order and i might understand that intuitively but what's the case from this court that holds that i mention grant vs miami dade certainly holds that your honor in addition i would refer the court to this is set forth in the brief submitted by a nationwide and safeco and if you look at page six of that brief we also cite the gonzales vs thaler case from the supreme court as well as the white versus state farm case in this court which holds quote when a notice of appeal names a specific order to be appealed we must infer that the appellant did not intend to appeal other unmentioned orders or judgments and so the white case from this court specifically contemplates a situation where there are multiple orders and only one has been named and one has not been name and that's exactly what happened here certain orders were named but the order that dismissed the federal and i trust claims was not identified in the nose it white light was remembering it correctly what that the reconsideration order was probably on appeal on an abuse of discretion standard but the original order was not on appeal and that's just a year year argument your argument has a lot of force to me except for this site via that you know if you check the box of appealing the final judgment you're generally in pretty good shape i think that's generally right your honor where you have one order that covers the entire set of claims but here we don't have allegations of steering whether they should have been dismissed or not and tortious interference claims and it seemed to me there was there was a customer who told progressive she was taking her vehicle auto workers collision for repairs progressive responded it would guarantee the repair work if she went to its preferred shop but not if she went to auto works the nd customer told progressive she planned to use  repairs progressive responded if she took her card to a preferred shop instead of walker's progressive would guarantee the repairs for life the complaints allege that the statement about guaranteeing the repair work were misleading for two reasons the insurers don't ever guarantee war rip repair work themselves that most they require their preferred shops to guarantee the word and in the preferred shops often do not live up to these hypothetical guarantees and nd to ensure statements mislead the body shops customers and potential customers into a singing that the plaintiff body shops don't guarantee their own work it seemed to me that these were sufficient to state a claim that they were  intentional steering of two customers away from body shops in a manner calculated to cause damage to the body shops with the on lawful purpose of causing damage and loss without right or justifiable cause and because the two body shops lost the business they suffered actual damage why didn't the district court or when it dismissed those two claims will the district court did not air when it dismissed those claims the mississippi case for a couple of reasons your honor st of all in mississippi tortious interference claims must include an allegation that the defendant engaged in some at with a malicious intent to interfere with the business of another mississippi court specifically recognize that it is proper to engage in competition for prospective gain as long as tortuous acts are not employed for that gain thus a claim for tortious interference requires bad acts exceeding the realm of legitimate competition that were committed without legal or social justification here the allegations were late to it if the allegation is that look progressive is going to pay the same amount for repairs no matter where the work is done why isn't that enough that with these allegations of steering away from the sea and misleading the customers about the guarantee well because that allegation is flatly contradicted by what the point is actually legend the complaint which is that progressive and other defendants are motivated b the desire to make profit which is a legitimate form of competition and this prison in particular the form of competition described in this complaint was recognized by this court on baucus being perfectly legitimate and as a result it doesn't qualify as a bad at under mississippi law and when the district court scrupulously can considered all of the allegations it concluded that there had not been any allegations of a bad act these were truthful statements the complaints themselves allege  that it was truthful that progressive would not be warranting any of that work and progressive was simply implementing its d r p plan telling the customers the truth and the customers then could decide in the end where they wanted go and let's not forget that even under this fear of these customers still could have chosen to use the body shop because progressive nor any other defendant precludes them from choosing the body shop of their choice aren't  there allegations that the defendants made false or misleading statements about the quality of the work the length of time it would take to do the repair and things of that nature there are  allegations that that defendants made statements about those issues and there is a conclusory assertion in one paragraph that those statements were false without tying them to any particular prior allegations we don't know whether in any particular case are the plaintiffs saying those allegations were true or false as to the specific examples that judge pryor is providing there's no claim that any of the statements that were made were false it was actually true that progressive would not warranty the work if it was done at that body shop the allegation is that they were misleading well there's no there's no and that isn't that right but that's what the they say that they say that magic word but they don't actually put provide any any evidence in the bank lends me a bill and they say the reason it was misleading is because that progressive doesn't guarantee work any way they knock a general obligation of the defendants don't guarantee work anyway without specific reference to any particular defendant and they and they say that it also suggested that the other body shops wouldn't be guaranteeing the ones that they preferred wouldn't be guaranteed which was accurate and at least a progressive wouldn't guarantee misleading for that reason your honor what they failed to provide of course and i should know that in some of these tortious interference cases a clue the ones you're discussing they are the are using unidentified false statements made to unidentified rd parties to deceive unidentified rd parties not to use the body shops these tortious interference claims those sounded fraud in fact what you're describing is a fraud type claim and so will ninety would apply to those kinds of allegations and they do not allege those claims with the specificity would would anticipate and require under rule nine b i see the clock has me your honor certainly it's our view that these claims are identical in every respect to the ones that the  court dismissed in quality auto the only exception as we put in our briefs is that we think the tortious interference claims fail for reasons beyond the group pleading we could ask the court just for just one question on that yes your honor if we assume we agree with that the conduct described by judge prior states certain discrete tortious interference claims it's question about the scope of the r man why wouldn't we would we remain and justice to the little pieces that we identify in the complaint or would we have to remain and for all tortious interference claims under the reasoning of the n bank court that this is not shotgun pleading we're not going to make individual we're not going to require ended identification of individual customers who are steered well the court only consider the group putting doctrine right here we have everything including a valuation of the merits of the claims upon the appeal and so i think the appropriate first i think of course none of the claims satisfy but if the court were to find that as to some of the allegations they appeared to satisfy the brain requirements of course interference i think that the remain would only be for those particular claims i don't think the the point is good why hasn't the group why doesn't the group leading holding at the end bank court cut against you on that point well because we put that to the siletz assume we lose the coop group leaving here the issue is that the tortious interference claims in this case were dismissed for other reasons as well the failure to allege malice the failure to allege that some of these activities actually were accomplished for example in all of these states you require to show damage an injury to support tortious interference claim if there was attempted steal steering but it didn't actually happen the customer actually went to the repair shop as alleged in the complaint there's no tortious interference plan parties they said essentially tell us what's different and these three complaints that we have to force that wasn't decided in the decision what they supplied you in a supplemental letter brief was a truncated version of their you talking plaint judge you asked with regard to mississippi will tell me what's new the answer is there is nothing new they talked about uniform pricing this court exhaustively dealt with uniform pricing in the decision so the answer to the question of what's the impact of the on bok decision on this case for the i trust cases at least and that is it's outcome determinative it's dispositive those cases all should be dismissed on the merits regardless of the jurisdictional issues i want to take i would suggest in this case that the on bach panel and two of you were honored of course you were very narrow in your decision you noticed you decided it as a notices you and you said in four the five  the issue of whether the defendants are in adequate notice is different and that could be a basis to distinguish the on block decision on tortious interference thank you thank you mr kenny mr jones under rule sixty b or anything that was done under rule sixty b in this case because there was in fact this judge bar you pointed out there was no motion filed there was eleven dollars minor factual development that occurred at least in the indiana case in which i was involved and that is that we know from the metadata in the nd minute complaint that the plaintiffs filed it was not even created until the a minute period had already expired that document itself did not exist until the  regardless of whatever the purported allegations in the e c f system were that document was late to begin with and the reason we don't have that you know fully addressed is because as you point out your honor the plaintiffs never even filed a motion at all  primarily in a trust cases and the burden on the actress playing at the no the access to the court issue so the issue here with with regard to what how much we can allege and the result is that the fact that the defendants have all the evidence with regard to steering we made we believe in that case sufficient allegation specific facts situation of a tortious interference the malice of it demonstrated as part of a practice that's consistent throughout this industry and that is making the misrepresentation that we want ensure when when they know they don't insure or guarantee scheme we don't guarantee any of the work done that is missed as it's like submitting to the court a search  i've got we've got the hertz decision i'm reading it and i'm trying to make sure i understand how it applies to the case in there and i'm bound by whether i agree with it or not right that night or stand completely out of hand and we're bound here today by what prior counsel did in that case and