all of the counsel the first case today is number one seven one three six seven united states versus jose decent and all  court this is a case involving the distinction between reasonable suspicion and probable cause there are many subsidiary issues but the principal issue i believe is this distinction between reasonable suspicion and probable cause mr centeno was arrested on what was barely reasonable suspicion and page thirty four the united states quotes the district court's is statement that quote centeno was unlawfully arrested on suspicion that he had committed a firearms related crime in the toyota that confusion that failure to draw a firm line between reasonable suspicion and probable cause resulted here in  later address the fact that the basis for that reasonable suspicion disappeared when it was learned that the telephone calls will live upon didn't happen and or did not contain any information about mr centeno struck the description of which was the reason for his being stopped and almost immediately what they see at the suppression hearing the officer testified that she received calls at the police station from people that described the truck that  she heard the detonations however it turns out that in fact there were no cones received at the station four and half an hour before or after that don't know exactly what happened i wasn't there but the testimony about the white toyota depends entirely on phone calls received honor i could be mistaken but i believe that testimony about they didn't see another car well it's to the period before they stopped not while the entire period they were in there but it doesn't matter your honor because on i do not believe is probable cause i do believe it's reasonable suspicion to stop the car but probable cause well quires reason to believe that this defendant was involved in that incident and the mere matching that description weaving on the road but there was just one road in the officers knew that there was only one that's why they were there i think well actually there were two they went two different directions there were several what were described as smaller streets in between there was a main highway to reach the next large town but there was well yes because they are in the toyota were fleeing from they seen of them on it would have a probably been able to get away faster  there were intermediate rows it could have taken not necessarily the main and obvious one and see that could have been other white toyota is on those other run so there was not just one ro officers to go from where they stopped him back to the scene there is conflicting testimony about the exact amount of time that it took the office how much time elapsed between the call  stop and how much time it took the officers to go from the scene of the stop back to the scene of the crime at some point it's ten minutes at some point some of them say to the four minutes but he was not in so quickly that he would have had to be speeding to get to where he was on this  of course we don't disagree on that and there are other circumstances had been pointed out by the united states the fact that it didn't stop immediately that this was a well traveled world this was not a high crime area laden night this was a well traveled road it was around seven o'clock seven who are of seven seven o'clock at night and he pulled over on average in front of a supermarket where i assume there is a parking lot or place to stop i just i think the interesting contrast is the case of ruhi dust in which this court said that it was close to the limits of reasonable  that was in response to a call that a specific address i had made and color of a car the police arrive so car parked catty corner judging l l legally went over to the car and also of course said well this is very very this tests the limits of reasonable suspicion well i don't submit that this case test the limits of reasonable suspicion and i think it crosses the line between reasonable suspicion and probable i think it fails to cross the line between reasonable suspicion and probable cause i want to address the dogs sniffed number one because i think this is a unique case obviously the arrest is a little the rest of the evidence falls i believe that's obvious i be happy to entertain any questions or doubts the court has harbors one by the time that dog sniffed the truck all this is knew that there was something seriously wrong with the information i had about the white truck they needed would we don't know your honor there's no evidence on the record and that's not necessarily the case he was not stopped in the middle of the highway he was not obstructing traffic it was not creating a problem and there was no evidence whatsoever about a policy about towing or inventory search and then inventory search it may well be that they would not have discovered this compartment so i don't think that the prosecution its burden to show and never will discover here i think that's just not present on this record so theoretically couldn't have happened maybe depending on the facts but they this is the prosecution assuming constitute probable cause for the arrest also constitute probable cause for snow because by that time they knew that there was the why toyota had not run over anybody there was no money for no hit and run doesn't the facts that are on the record except that by the time we get to the search warrant and some of the other testimony was being passed is not in on the object so it's not clear what someone if someone believe he did because he didn't have all of this information he didn't have the information that there were he didn't have the nine one close in front of him he didn't have the information that there were no phone calls to the to the station during the half hour right before or after the testimony was absolutely consistent about the time of stand this defendant never established that he was in legitimate possession of the vehicle that was detained on the date of his arrest  it is his burden to establish that he had standing it is not the government's burden to establish that standing is lacking and that a minimum we would submit that he had the burden of this stablish in that he was  of that vehicle and here here's what we don't know we don't know when he came into possession of that vehicle how he came into possession of that vehicle whether it was a guest whether he stole it whether he himself killed the drivers the the vehicles previous owner and the what the record reflects is that the owner of the vehicle was killed in january of two thousand and fifteen just four months prior  to the intervention with the friend that we don't know how often he used it what we do know is that the person who was the registered owner of that vehicle never knew him mr santana never met she never said it was stolen she testified about her brother she testified that she had purchased a vehicle for her brother and that her brother died was killed in january of two thousand and fifteen as you specifically asked whether she had ever seen a defendant and her answer was no she was asked whether she had ever authorized the defendant to use that vehicle her answer was no  the reason he decided not to go into it was because he the the district judge determined that it was unnecessary to go into it because the dress going into the merits of the suppression issue he could conclude that police officer received there because the re the calls were actually not received should be wa that and spite of their cross examination the magistrate judge determined that this officers testimony was credible and the defense never objected to that factual fine an effort to relive the gate that issue in the middle of trial before a jury and the government objected because from the government's perspective that was not an issue that would that was properly  would be properly presented to the jury because the jury the jury does not decide fourth amendment issues that is a matter for the court to decide and that that would have amounted to collateral to to impeachment on a collateral matter make any suggestion or proffer that this was a frame up it seems to me that if if their point is that there were no calls and yet the calls had some considerable detail and it actually resulted in police officers going to the scene and making a stop that logically flows from from the position that there were no calls that it was fine it was any of that the defense and that would be that would be material at trial that's not just a fourth amendment issue but it's not at all so was there any discussion about that about what why they wanted this stuff is that the lack of a phone call and when the judge pressed the defense as to why this was wrong in the fence his response was essentially that it's relevant because it's wrong because this is all made up and if my memory serves me right that's what the fen firearms from one vehicle to another correct your honor and that would have and that would have been that's right your honor and that should have been and that's an issue that could have and should have been are dressed at the suppression hearing not a trial in front of the journey and i would also point out that the that the government requested on multiple occasions the government requested reciprocal discovery from the fans defense we presume had these records for quite some time and never turned it over to us and that is an issue that we raise with the judge because these records they were strong with us in the middle of trial when we were talking about the telephone toll records to the to the the who actually show that at all did the france listen in that trial that the that the home this is the police department had two phone numbers that there were two phone numbers that went to the police department and with those and those records pertain only to one of those phone numbers so we don't know or at least the record doesn't reflect what the other one of those phone numbers would reflect but be that as it they would be collateral because they go to the reason for the stop they have nothing whatsoever to do with any issue of material fact that was before that jury and what was before the jury was whether the felon possessed with intense distribute crack cocaine whether he possessed a firearm after having been convicted of a felony and whether he possessed a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking cri will make i will answer your question in two parts your honor first of all i would say that the supreme court has also recognized that there is a diminished expectation of privacy in automobiles that's why we have  my second point is that in this particular case evidence that the that the vehicle had firearms would have been evidence  the particular items that are particular to firearms in your own little but not but not just not reliable in the detection of firearms all right thank you thank you