this matter the question presented by mr green's appeal is whether a patrol officer employed by a private security company should be subject to the th amendment probation facts surrounding mr green stop in this case are essential and in that the district court in this case found that the facts surrounding the step that there was no reasonable except the fact is the district court found he disregards mr hudson's testimony but we need to look at the relationship between the chicago housing authority on the one side and this agency the investigative services on the other side what powers do the people who work for a g p have to what extent is it just a fillin for the police force and to what extent is a private security  force more along the lines of what we saw on the way case so that seems to me the relevant question yes yes your honor i agree and so the the fact of what officer hudson was actually doing at the time to stop i think go towards that question and then i'd be happy to talk some more about the contractural contractual scope of duties that the c ha demanded a d b to provide under the terms of the contract so as to the actual stop i think is on patrol proactively patrolling the property which is of course public property it's a c h eight building and he entered the laundry room of that building and he performed a terr stuff in other words he didn't see a clear violation of the law occurring he was not called to the scene to intervene he walked up to a person sitting at a table and ordered him to stand up  now that's actions in itself if if the court considers for example let's say a just john q public urging q public residents of the trumbull park holmes undertake those steps just walked into the laundry room walked up to somebody and ordered him to stand up and put his hands on the table that that wouldn't fly so in other words officer hudson has greater authority has greater power than a private actually but you mean it all you mean that if it's somebody sitting around in the laundry room talking to another person as mr green was and just a resident a person who  unequivocally not affiliated with the police comes up and taps that person on the shoulders and says i need you to stand up i mean it might be rude it might be you know other things but i tell you i don't understand why it couldn't happen seem to probably just happen maybe somebody is looking for something and they think he's sitting on it or you know any number of reasons someone might do that so i don't i don't see where you're going with that sure let me clarify your honor so so where i'm going with that is certainly anybody could say those words and anybody can frankly say whatever they want to somebody else but the words wouldn't have the same effect of say i went in there and stand up i think you magazine or stand up i don't like the look of you and fairly would you be saying that in the post you said stand up i don't like to look at you and instead of engaging with you what happens is the other individual as mr greene did tries to zip out of the room you know starts running away i mean you might think but it's a little strange but it certainly doesn't mean the th amendment is implicated at all by this encounters i get into this continuum of cases we have you know in wade we have the people who are in the lobby we have other cases where it's mall security guards we have other parishes where stores hire private  guards to address shoplifting risks there are huge number of cases that involve private individuals who are trying to provide security and most of them don't implicate the th amendment the ones that do even though i agree with you that an ordinance isn't necessarily magical but universities for example often have arrangements with the local police that says you know say the university of chicago police force has the powers of the chicago police on the campus of the university of chicago which happens to be the case and i believe northwestern is is the same but those are sort of self contained almost governance units and where do we see something like that here where do we see something more than just private security so so what we see judge we do not have an ordinance in this case as your honor pointed out as northwestern and apparently university of chicago do but what we includes identify an anti social behavior patterns an address protecting the residence and property maintaining high visibility and preventing intrusion vandalism abuse trespassing wearing a uniform et today than the desk attendant and wade where superficially that's a factually similar case but the garden weighed him his job was to sit at the desk and  check a list and make sure people signed then and he was prohibited by his contract from leaving the lobby area he was not under the terms of the contract required to go out and proactively police i did this one a very briefly save your honor and i'll reserve the rest of my time for rebuttal and he he testified that he enforced ordinance violations and that is a greater power than a private citizen joycean under the illinois code citizens  testimony about seeing the boat as a gun or seeing something that he thought was the bone of the gun sticking up the waistband and so as far as i was concerned with that credibility finding that fact was off the table but you referred to it a number of times in your brief indeed so often that makes me think that you think that that's an essential point that needs to be there in order to sustain this entire decision so i don't know why you didn't follow the district court's credibility finding my apologies your honor and you are correct that the district court did not credit mr hudson testimony as a relates to him seeing that gone due to the fact that  he invoked his th and then rights during the suppression hearing but as your honor noted it does not change the outcome of this case one way or the other because as the record in this case demonstrates the defendant was approached pursued and ultimately apprehended by security guards employed by the chicago housing authority and this security guard was a private party and not a state actor there was no ordinance or statute that transferred an exclusively public function to the security company the contract at issue did not delegate such a function and consistent with this court's precedents and actions and not implicate the th amendment so are you in fact this are you looking for a clear statement rules or is this contract which we have in the record between c ha and the security company a g p and it seems to delegate quite a bit of authority to the people who work for the for the agency respectfully or out of the contract is agreement for private security services it called upon a deviance employees including mr hudson to perform tasks customarily associated with price providing private security services and in fact that contract specifically reserve police powers for the chicago police department requiring a g b to alert the c p d if they were needed which of course happened in this case and more to your point we supposed to look at the substance and you can put a paragraph in a contract that says anything that you need to look at the substance of what was going on not just the fact that it's a contract and a lot of security companies use maybe a lot of security companies should be considered the police for force and then that's our question we're correct your honor and as you noted earlier this court has addressed that very issue on a number of occasions st this court addressed that issue in waiting and found that because that security guard in that case was not performing a exclusively state function that they were not a state actor and again that reasoning was confirmed again and she'd and then repeatedly again and miller versus buying these cattle company and and johnson versus her be the children's hospital and so the important question that needs to be addressed as whether or not the tasks that are assigned to are performed by the security company are exclusive stay functions and so in this case the at bottom the defense argument is that because a g b contracted with a government agency it transformed eighty b and by extension hudson into state actors but again that reasoning has been rejected by wade and miller and other cases in which the court has addressed that issue but you know wait and see what a different way it is these guys sitting in the lobby basically which makes you look like every single building in downtown chicago back when it was open  this i mean i think we want to look at the this list of things some of them seem not at all like the police maintain respect for residents that some of them ensure unauthorized people are not permitted on the property and they put it in the negative but they say avoid using force except when necessary to protect persons and properties so you can turn that around and say use force when necessary to protect where the private security guard in that case apprehended and the teens the suspect pending the arrival of the police and went back to your mention of the duties carried out by the security guards and weighed although the guards in wait were confined to the lobby area the th or this quarter noted that the security guards were able to carry firearms for for use in case they were confronted with situations where they had to protect themselves or others and they were also authorized to make arrests for trespassing pending the arrival of police officers and further your honor none of the tasks that were performed by a t v or assigned to them fell within the s jury selection and moreover the decision weighed declare that making an arrest tending the arrival of police is not a power exclusively reserved to the police and this reasoning again was affirmed later and she heeds and in miller and while the defendant trying to make a distinction between citizen's arrest and arrest for ordinance violations that distinction is not made in any of the cases that this court has confronted this issue klink she weighed  though i mean that would certainly be a very strong way of showing that there was a delegation is it your position that that's the only thing that will do that we're operating under some sort of clear statement rule no your honor but it is worth noting that the only time this court has ever found that a private security guard acted with full police power is when there was a statute ordinance delegating those powers to the police and based on the government's research that has happened on two occasions st with the united states versus hoffman and the nd time in pigment versus right presbyterian and here obviously defendant concedes that there was no statute ordinance conferring please authority and then the nd prong and look he wasn't really patrolling i think i meant to take issue with that earlier he was wandering around looking for a friend and goes into the laundry room and decides to take some initiative i suppose nice way of putting it yes you authority but as he testified that during the suppression hearing and as you noted earlier he was not directed to stop the spending drain there was no call from either c ha or from the chicago police department that there was a search underway f and just because they perform those tasks at a public facility does not make them state actors and i let this and for those reasons i ask this court affirmed the decision by the district court to deny the defense motion to suppress all right thank you mr mclaughlin you have a little more than a minute yes judge very briefly officer hudson's testimony was that he was on foot patrol and i guess i'll pick up where the government left off which is he was not responding to a specific call he was not told to go to the laundry room he was out proactively essentially walking a beat which i think again underscores the fact that this is not typical conduct a private citizen would undertake or even that a private security officer in a public facility like a c h a complex would undertake and so that from from the defense perspective from the perspective that simply underscores the fact that this is a particularly it's a state power that he's going in carrying out he's going out and interacting with public citizen in affecting carry stuff  that is not a power that a private citizen enjoys the situation in this case is far more expansive than wade and i think you have already touched on that it's a much different situation the case of sh some of the other criminal cases that this court has looked at frankly present actually distinguishable scenario so what we have here which is different than that line of cases that we have a private security company that contracting with the government and so instead it's a private security company that's contracting with the mall in some of the other criminal cases that this court is like that it's you know you sort of fed ex carrier that has no contractual obligation with the government