constitutional system sort of an interesting intellectual exercise i'm sure we'll hear from the other side but there's a statute lower courts say it does provide this court course the cause of action the supreme and are they saying the supreme court rules are wrong to say this wasn't there or are they saying we accept that the supreme court says it wasn't there we're now putting it in well i think it's the latter judge hawkins  because congress can express dissatisfaction with the ruins of the supreme court but of course you can't reverse them so i think under our constitutional system for many many decades now the supreme court has the final word on what statute that all statutes passed under section sixteen fifty eight are going to be governed by that uniform four year statute of limitations are applying that statute to this case would also it vance the purpose of the section fi sixteen fifty eight because they would have a uniform statute of limitations that would be a political throughout this court now there are several steps of limitations applicable throughout the jurisdictions governed by the ninth circuit and starting with the statutory language of sixteen fifty eight states accepted otherwise provided by law a civil action arising under an act of congress and acted after the act of the statutory language of the civil rights act of one nine hundred ninety one itself which in which congress did not reenact nineteen eighty one congress simply revers created new rights and liabilities but that's not the same as a new cause of action in which the difference well you can not rely on the civil rights act of one nine hundred ninety one in order to  alone in order to bring an action under nine hundred eighty one because the civil rights act of nineteen ninety one simply says insert the letter as before existing language of the statute and subsection b which is the because you can't you must utilize the structure in any language in order to find the cause of action at all i suppose carol of it walked into your office the week after paterson was decided and that your firm didn't have a conflict form conduct the terminations alex yes the terrible comes back to you and says good news congressman after the civil rights act of my three ninety one and you remember that cause of action i was talking about before i want to bring it  can i bring that cause of action what would your response be it would be that you may bring that cause of action if we're still within the statute of limitations and the statue of limitations remains almost roberson there was no cause of actually comes to it cannot reasonably that be said that the cause of action arises under section b i learned section b is simply a definition the cause of the action resides in section eight of the statute cases in which courts have come to opposite conclusions and come up with issues that that sort of walk the line that your honor is talking about was the case viable before the declined to make that distinction because they recognize that under the legislative history of the civil rights act of one nine hundred ninety one and six hundred fifty eight you would be  would certainly result in practitioners not knowing what statute of limitations to apply and in some cases having to apply different statute of limitations under the same statute depending on whether the that it's also clear that that congress put a higher value on not upsetting established expectations and a higher value on uniformity within states than it put on national uniformity if and presumably congress did not thoroughly consider the inner play of these two statutes which creates the ambiguity and allows this court to look at legislative history of both of these statu and that's exactly what congress had in mind people shouldn't be guessing as to what state statute applies to a federal law what tolling period applies whether the arizona common law of tolling or the california common law of tolling applies that's the purpose of the statute it is not confusing and moreover i think that there was a long tradition in the united states supreme court and a long tradition in this court of liberally construing the civil rights law