the first three cases are indistinguishable from veera which this court decided ten months ago and which held that the judgment was void for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under the fs ira like the euro the first three cases involve three designation extra judicial killings or torture like vera there is no evidence that specifically links cuba's designation to any of those activities misjudgments granting false yes no help me with this i'm sure you will i will try i want to go through the basis of a bit of a timeline what's the state of play in this case of the district court let's just begin that well my position is that there is nothing further for the district judge to do yet he refused my application to enter a final judgment and should should we view as part of our appeal under twelve ninety one and the four gay conrad doctrine from the turnover order which is not a final order so you think we have a poacher's that is indeed under that doctrine but at that you have not requested to turnover and that's the account that was in fact turned over under the order on appeal here there are six others though are there yes but those don't qualify for turn over their so called phase two accounts so there's not going to be an adjudication with respect to those now you've been asked to transfer the funds from the count in question to the judge and all those we've been asked to transfer the funds first to the registry of the u s courts which which that where they sat for two years and then the most recent turnover order directs the registry to disperse the funds to the plaintiffs and that has occurred and has a good indeed how many in to argue t appeals as you file them in the course of the last three years regarding this particular count this is the second the first one was dismissed for lack of a collateral order i did not argue the four gave conrad doctrine because i had security and therefore had no irreparable injury now i lack security that having been stripped of me by judge ellison and therefore for the conrad applies tell me what you what do you want from us here what is the creed that you think this court or two and the court should enter a decree reversing and vacating to turn over order because to be judgments to pull the money back to the right to sell a second part of the order would be read would be a restitution the court should do should hold one of held in veera namely that the the judgments granting full faith and credit to this florida state court judgments are void the federal full faith and credit judgments are void for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under the f s a that's what vera held and that what i'm calling the first three cases here are indistinguishable from that so i want an order reversing in vacating the turnover order a judging that the judgments granting full faith and credit are void for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and an order of restitution why don't you wait for all of that until we have appeals from orders from final judgment about because that why you asking us to reach that it seems to me prematurely judge hellish dean has created an untenable situation by refusing to enter a final judgment even though he has nothing left to do no one on the plaintiff side has never articulated what else remains for the district judge to do neither has judge how it's doing yet he has refused to enter a final judge of it that's why i'm wondering i'm a little puzzled about what would be a final judgment here in this case and why you are and maybe it's that maybe it is technically correct but you're taking the position i take it that this is not up you are requesting the judge hosting enter a separate final judgment as to you or were you i at that's what you were asking for ok but and he did not he declined to do that  what would be a final judgment technically undisputable final judgment would be after all fifteen banks have had their claims addressed the other fifteen banks have had their claims adjudicated i see those bank fifteen banks have turned over everything that they eligible for turn over and then the plaintiffs in those fifteen banks entered a rule forty one stipulation of dismissal of all of the claims which judge allison so we're going you're not asking judge hellerstein or maybe you did but you might be able to esther not just to enter a separate final judgment as to you you're saying he should have entered a final judgment as to everybody because there's nothing left in the case especially that's why i don't de facto it is a final judgment that's what i asked for me appeal remember that i do and would isn't that what would happen here now because in that case i had security in this case i don't that makes to forget conrad doctrine applicable the injury the injury becomes or is treated as you reparable when the pay your has no security for restitution and would have to bring it on certain litigation to recoup that of the original turnover order directed to turn over to the court so that the money was still sitting there not in the possession of the plaintiffs until such time as further events took place so at that point you're saying there was no irreparable injury and no finality because the turnover had been to the court but things changed when the turnover was made to the plaintiff's i see it now of course hasn't irreparable injury already happened i mean they've got it they could long since squandered it  don't want to comes under the heading i'm doing the best i can understand i mean you know i'm trying to get reversal and if you get it now and get an order of restitution i guess your argument is assuming that these folks are operating in good faith and i have no reason to think they are and they're not busy squirreling away these assets somewhere to hide them from the court but over time any person is likely to spend money that they've been given by a court and so the longer we wait the more irreparable the injury becomes yes the delay of the risk the greater the risk of the delay exacerbates my risk and you know that's why i'm here so might my understanding for gay conrad though that its primary use has been for the delivery physical property and not  cash with an exception possibly in the s c c in kind of bank court case in which we directed there was an order directing distribution of cash in securities but in that case there was also a preliminary injunction that is an issue so there is an alternative based as for jurisdiction why why does four gay conrad reach here when cash is an issue there is language in the decisions in this court only that says cash turn overs don't qualify for for good conrad every other circuit is to the contrary you look at the cases i cited from seventh ninth and eleven circuits they don't have an exception for cash and i think that this court although it once said get conrad which is the irreparable injury that judge lynch was mentioning applies to cash turnovers just as much as it applies to turn over a real estate or tangible chattels or you know it the rationale there's no rationale for excluding cash and i don't quite know what the court is thinking in one nine hundred seventy three when it said that in this interim of maybe woods thinking was what the sixth circuit has said which is that the transfer of money is unlikely to create irreparable harm for money can in the seventh circuit the ninth circuit in the eleventh circuit apply it to cash and i just don't see a rationale it yes ok so money can be recouped in if in another litigation but the uncertainty of that other litigation is what makes the of a turn or execution proceeding there is a turnover order but there is no judgment yet entered and what that court said was that panel said was that there is no irreparable harm in the turnover of money it wasn't in that case weren't we still at the what is referred to as phase one where the turnover order was a turn over to the court it was a turnover to the court but i have a little different than actually releasing the money to the players but what else is left for the entry of a judgment usually you enter a judgment that says you pay him money right here the court said hey you know be paid him money pay the money into the court and then once it's in the court the court said ok now we're going to pay it so the other side and though the money is gone so usually the judgment proceeds the actual execution here the execution proceeded the judgment seems to still down in the district court veera three panel concluded that he had not made findings with respect to subject matter church stiction and remained it there is a remit to order which ironically addresses one of the issues that appealed on a walk a tory basis and that is whether or not that opinion is binding on the other judgment creditor's the  provides that it was only binding on veera and we submit also that the view or three opinion specifically says that as well so that issue that's fine but then doesn't that go to the question of what relief you might be and he might be entitled to if the issue is the district court needs to make proper findings has to revaluate subject matter jurisdiction rather than just assuming subject mad restriction exists based on what some other court had said right and why why wouldn't that be the appropriate order you're saying mr bruce was asking for two much to the extent on the merits that he asks us to invalidate these judgments correct but that still would leave open the agreement to tell the judge wait before you go to get the money back put it back in the court until you have evaluated subject matter drew stiction and then you might decide one thing you might decide another thing when he gets to that point there would be an appeal suppose that it could all be requested that hasn't been requested yet but i do know that there is a water and there are further proceedings but my problem is if there are further proceedings contemplated i get that that might make this not final in a certain sense but the money has already flown the coop the money is now in your possession right your clients are entitled to spend it do what they want with it that's right and i would submit that that makes it even less of any inappropriate interlochen tory appeal because as was stated before there's no in some foreign tourist diction beyond the reach of the court or doing anything nasty like that assuming that your client is operating in good faith and is just saying this is my money i can spend it if i want under the court's order isn't there still a question of whether that should be returned to the court i mean after all what you're saying is a judge could direct that money be paid by the defendant to a point if not enter a so there's still potentially liable to the person for whom there is a stakeholder and there are legitimately are they not entitled to defend their possessory interest in this money i think you've just articulated another reason why this you know he can make that application of the district court if that's what he wants to do as a result of your three minutes not to roll this court to do it i think virat who was very clear that under this fact pattern boy the this is still the turn over water that was at issue there yes there was a payment into the registry that was issue at the time but the holding of that panel is that a turn over water without respect to where the money goes is not the final  the premise is that and this is been the premises in every court that subject matter jurisdiction has been litigated against hausler in the southern district of florida in the district court in hausler in this court in hausler that the court has to sue a spot to establish an end to determine itself that it has subject matter jurisdiction this issue and by the way when it goes back to the district court which we believe it should this issue is really barred by race judicata with respect to hausler they have an adverse ruling in the southern district of florida that b b v a has no standing to challenge it because the southern district of florida judgment was registered in in the southern district of new york we also submitted you know from the briefing that the house floor decision also exercise subject matter jurisdiction and they are barred based on that ruling from raising it here so you know this is what we say there were four times that it happened again this is a raising of this issue on the second circuit as opposed to taking judge  commute order we do review orders those two orders were in fact appealable as the viewer to paddle point that out ironically those subject matter jurisdiction rulings could have been brought up on  holding someone else's money is challenging subject matter jurisdiction all of the united states of america to me is inexplicable which money is involved in this particular turnover it's about five hundred fifty thousand dollars and this five hundred fifty thousand dollars prize has been the subject of how many appeals or how many attempts to well there are five there have been four in auk a tory appeals here two of which we have not been party to one occurred on discovery before we ever intervened in this case and the third and the third one was on the fear of judgment we were not party to that appeal lead it either so therefore in this case therefore there and that offhand without making any statement on the merits of all of this it seems to me to be odd unusual and maybe you have a view on this who can display what's going on i think it saw an unusual there's a long history in the house where house slur had and frankly what the cuban terrorism judgments there's a long history the hausler litigation has been going on since two thousand and seven or eight in florida starting in state court it was removed to the southern district of florida those writs those routes were transferred by consent but under court order to the southern district of new york the state court judgment separately there was a full faith and credit determination by the southern district of florida federalizing the state court judgment that judgment weren't registered in new york and by the way that the haus decision lays this out very correctly those two proceedings the the state court transfer and the federal judgment registration were consolidated into into hausler so by the time of the turnover in that case that came up to the second circuit both judgments were consolidated in that single enforcement proceeding the arguments about lack of subject matter jurisdiction both wrists with respect to the state court judgment and the federal judgment were squarely present on that appeal your honour's may remember there were two of you on that panel that there was time set to argue subject matter jurisdiction there were sixty minutes that were given a counsel to address that very issue at the same time that that was happening there was a collateral attack that had taken place in the southern district of interest to state one reason why the designation of cuba as a terrorist state occurred we submitted in that in that case that was not the only reason and that that statement of interest was inconclusive that notwithstanding all that the southern district of florida judge ultimately concluded to keep his judgment intact because full faith in credit had already been given to that judgment in new york judge morale had confirmed to him that he had given full faith and credit to the state court judgment and therefore  it's in the record but i have it here september thirteenth september two thousand and thirteen eleven september twenty third teen five yes that's right it was five years ago the house or judgment by the way has been enforced ten times and there have been turn a warder's and monies paid over with respect to that judgement that was excused from from all other it's no different except this case has t hausler merits ruling that it has to address and so there were two phases set up in this case one was the f t's electronic funds transfer years that could still be turned over because the originator was or the bank was a cuban entity the others were phase two which is a result of the house the ruling could not be reached be to the court ruling that new york losses there's no property interest in electronic funds transfer in the hands of an intermediary so what you have is you have the southern district of florida that judgment full faith and credit judgment intact you have the house of the ruling exercising subject matter gers stiction to reach the merits ok and you have now this case which is again was a follow on to house floor we intervene there were other creditors that came into new york to try to collect and we i'm asking you to of course this crime impute motivation force to teach well i i'm i'm having a little difficulty getting my arms around the case which has gone on so long and  and manages to come up like a bad penny constantly right well i agree with the judge there should be an end to litigation obviously our view would be one that the judgment satisfied with our understanding is there's you know we've gone through the electronic funds transfer dispute and in the southern district to do york at least we understand there are too many other collectable assets outside of those electronic funds transfer which are not collectible as a result of hausler so you know it's all the case law says and the cases we've cited there's got to be some end to litigation and court i don't intend to take all five minutes because i believe a lot of the issues are already been addressed but i hated what your movie last question is an important question because i think there is an effort to preempt  discussion on jurisdiction i say because there was a an issue related to independent contempt citation proceeding which addressed subject matter jurisdiction we should suddenly now not  a final judgment only as to them rather than the entire proceeding and the judges i'm not doing that either now if the court does what i think it should do which is simply say is the pill is premature it goes down to j hellerstein the jurisdictional findings are there in the record if they still insist on bringing about the other comes up in a proper way for you to see it and dispose of it and it's probably going to be one of the shortest proceedings ever and is over jurisdiction put differently or simply a remained is unnecessary the factor in the record they present a pure question of law you have jurisdiction i believe and i ask you to decide those issues mr gross let me just ask an aide is tied question here we were  received this morning a notice a supplemental of surety regarding a final decision and if the florida case amended final judgment and i wonder if you could just comment on that i noticed that you were listed as receiving a copy and you counsel in that case i don't know why i'm on that list i've had enough that i have nothing to do with that case i've never appeared my client's not a party i believe that's mr hall trying to somehow put me on notice ok so please don't disregard that i've done not sure how judge made me an interloper there yeah let me comment on that because it's quite extraordinary that the night before the oral argument you come up with an amended judgment from the judge and i'm going to suggest to you that it was a perfectly obvious effort to  the record to try to meet this court's decision in veera for example you look at page nine the judge down there was very accommodating wasn't she she said that the these assets that were taken from the villa those were used to fund the fark and the l m which used terrorism as a policy instrument that's a quote from veera i mean this is an app this is an attempt to tell the record after the fact to your decision and i think that it shouldn't be tolerated i'm puzzled by that you said this is all a question of law and i've been puzzled throughout as to the status of the question did any of these events affecting these people enter into the determination to put cuba on the sponsor of terrorism list is that a legal question or a factual  question that is a legal question and this court made a holding that the record suggests the state department designated cuba as a state sponsor of terrorism generally because of its support for revolutionary violence civil of them that statement of interest he shows that cuba was not designated quote as a result of any of these killings there's an and and what conclusion do we draw and therefore the terrorism section does not apply and therefore there's no subject matter jurisdiction and therefore the judgment to rule void but that's it but but you see i say that the court did enter that holding but it did so as you read saying the record suggests in other words it's basing that determination on factual testimony about what actually happened yes and the record here is no different because there's absolutely no evidence in the record that links the designat these extrajudicial killing any more than to mr vera situation indistinguishable from indistinguishable and that's why i think it presents a question of law and if your honor is concerned about prolonging the litigation please decide the merits  rather than remand so that we can have lawyers come in with the known facts you know and you judgments from florida very accommodating so if you want to end this i think you clearly have the power and you have the viewer precedent on which which takes place after cuba is designated as a terrorist sponsor and the argument there is not that this didn't have anything to do with the designation because  doesn't matter the argument there is this was not torture or ok as i said is that not a question that distinguished from the other three thought was it should go back to the district court with instructions for the district court to make a determination with respect to whether these particular facts come an arguable assassination attempt the didn't happen well there's no customs no custody that will custody the people mrs midst of a lot of there wasn't even at home now how somebody can be tortured when he's not even at home is beyond me but even looking at the house they never entered the house they dispersed within minutes when volatiles wife ran out the front door with an a r fifteen rifle of all those son ran into the back yard with the second an ar fifteen rifle and the wife's was screaming i'll shoot anyone who tries to come closer now how can those people be in custody when they're brandishing a firearm ready to shoot the would be torturer and they're not simultaneously in the hands of or in the custody of those people as a matter of law judge lunch that can be decided in this court  judge lynch and judge carney sat on that panel the opinion was written by judge will i suppose it's a bit presumptuous for any lawyer to tell you what you decided and how you decided it but let me just make a few points as to why that's not collateral estoppel here lengths of saying even though we want everything we want we should file the circuit titian on the threshold jurisdictional question it's not realistic and you know collateral stoppel does have a certain amount of discretion and realism there second house decided deciding to use the c property and two days later my case was decided per curiam so i think it's a good example of hypothetical jurisdiction and finally vir as changed the legal landscape even if there would otherwise been a stop when the legal landscape changes and veera did change the legal landscape saying you have to make an independent determinate district judge has to make an independent determination the record then you can have a r question about the double liability issue s of if this were a case of a plaintive being given money from a defendant that would be one thing but how do you suffer irreparable injury your client as a stakeholder in a situation where the court has entered a protective order saying you are not going to be liable to cuba for whatever happens here he does how do you get your effort bill injury the discharge order is unforeseeable because the district court had no personal jurisdiction over the cuban originator it's the if we give this money over to these plaintiffs as we have those accounts are on blocked now by order of the your bomb administration that cuban originator can come to us and say we will we'd like our money now and we'd have to pay that over and then it might as a defense i put up the hellerstein discharge order and that cuban company says i'm not bound by that you know that says they're not bound by what how can they be they did nothing in the southern district of new york and nobody ever made them a party so you know i don't think there's any personal jurisdiction over the cuban originator that would come knocking on our door and therefore the discharge order doesn't protect you have this enormous concern concern which is triggered some much last of it let me go into this now what's going on here it is incorrect to describe the b v a as a mere stakeholder when this case started against my client back in two thousand and eleven the hauser plaintiffs were seeking to execute on certain electronic funds transfer is that were blocked my client owned those my client was just not a stakeholder in my client had a property interest in those accounts so we were getting our own property and judge maria roe refused to address these challenges which is a very case now says he should have done and sent us to the southern district of florida thereby creating another wave of litigation so of course we went down there  so this started and went on for years as a dispute in which b b v a was seeking to recover its own property we won that's the house where decision at seven seventy at third and those accounts were later on blocked and my client got that money so we were litigating over our property then you have what became the very case in this court which was a subpoena by the other plaintiff mr vierra for worldwide discovery now the other banks didn't really have much at stake there because banks in england and banks in switzerland they don't do a lot of business with cuba but my client's a spanish bank and we do a lot of business with cuba as a matter of fact it's public record we have a representative office and havana and we do a lot of business in south america and central america so we wanted to protect our records with respect to worldwide dealings that we had with cuban entities i believe that was an entirely legitimate exercise and we had a stak that that no other litigants in these cases had and that takes us right up until last year ten months ago so meanwhile we've been litigating these remaining issues because we have to maintain a consistent position in all of these cases is no subject matter jurisdiction we couldn't just cave in because we've been litigating all these other issues i tried to dismiss burke mr perkins mention that the southern district of florida refused to my challenge saying that we lack standing we appeal that to the eleventh circuit it's that case and stayed pending this case i tried to get that dismissed i said this is moved the challenge is moot because we already won our money we started that before the house where the twenty fourteen house where decision was entered and once we won all that money i had no further reason to litigate in the southern district of florida they refused they refused so you know what's going on here is circuit is if an appeal is dismissed the underlying judgment is vacated that's very important to us because we have a ruling from the southern district of florida again that his client does not have standing to collaterally attack our judgment because the southern district of florida judgement was registered in this court and because judge hellerstein in the house her case granted full faith and credit to the state court judgment is very important to us v the issue of hypothetical jurisdiction which is raised on reply there's no hypothetical jurisdiction here your honour's will remember that the calderon cardona case was decided under treated does not apply because north korea was not designated a terrorist state at the time the judgment was entered then it turned to six hundred ten g and said you cannot execute there's no property right under the statutes that allows you to execute on electronic funds transfer haussler was under the tree itself and so the court wrote this is a case of first impression under tria and the ruling there was that tree a has no property right within that statute and in the cuban acid control regulations that it were an issue in that case that would grant the property right to preempt state law and therefore state law applied no hypothetical jurisdiction to different cases and you very much will reserve decision we're joined thank you