of over one hundred ninety thousand dollars against that then seventy six year old on a question are the widow of mitchell who's now after twenty four years of marriage we believe these rulings are not only erroneous on multiple grounds but also profoundly unfair  statutory provision which sets courts forth your requirements for substitution of a representative when a party to an action dies a million died in two thousand and six and the power of attorney that to must question or was acting under died with her  authority and you look closely at the terms it shows that it does not grant him standing as a fiduciary if you look at that specific terms of that order it only names tomas and his sister as equal heirs in a different court proceeding apparently no a state has after our first briefly attached to a reply brief that is the proper procedure for authenticating a document from a foreign country and third even if he had a document from another country which  firmly dispute it doesn't excuse the appellee from the plain mandate of illinois law why should somebody be excused from following illinois statutory procedures i'm simply because the deceased party is from a different country it just does not procedure should work and the year has been further compounded because now a judgment has been entered in the name of the deceased milia which is further evidence that there has never been and a state opened for her so did not create an estate for amelia and now we have this this oddity of having a judgment in the name of a deceased person and as the court knows the deceased person is a non entity so based on the lack of standing  thousand and nine as you know from reading the briefs here as a result of an earlier appeal in this case the appellant and i had been deemed to be the  distributions i'm from a pension fund governed by a receiver and in that case central state's pension fund versus gray which is attached to our initial brief as part of the appendix the  arista law because the pensions are governed by that he did not have the benefit of that federal court's two thousand and three reasoning but judge coleman's ruling in two thousand and nine came after the central state's case and courts and i quote shall apportion shall approach person property maintenance and support rights among the claimants as appropriate and in the interests of justice we've also cited to this court the illinois case of in re marriage of noise at page twenty of our brief which held it was reversible error for a court to fail to hold the evidence rehearing and make the findings required by the statute once a finding is made that a person is a d with other respect your honor if you look at the precise language of that order it specifically says it refers to the assets held in the craft thrift plan and then it proceeds simply to order the dispersement of this remaining lump sum of funds that anna had not yet received but it does not say anything about this other category of funds that were no longer held in the craft thrift plan because they had long ago been dispersed to ana and had been spent it's that there are to be two totally different sort of bodies of funds here your hon and your honor even if the court had made the ruling as you suggest it was clearly and in accurate ruling and should not have been  continued forward in light of the court's reasoning in the two thousand and three case so we would submit that either way either whether as we argue it did not address those separate category of funds in fact it's more like the nature of the damages claim trying to recover funds that have already been paid out and spent if if that had been the  the intent of that order then there never would have been a reason for a separate petition to be filed by the petitioner it was not a final order it was subject to certainly be argued r are charged against and of that should have been and the judgments did not follow the post judgment statute with regard to what the nine percent judgement interests can relate back to there been no liquidated some determined in two thousand and one it was error for the courts to reach back to two thousand and nine percent interest could not possibly have started till there was a liquidated sum in two thousand and nine  some in pension benefits the majority of which almost forty thousand dollars was spent on her husband's last expenses and bequests even before she had any idea that tomas would be filing a claim on behalf of his deceased mother which is about a year and a half after mitchell died and so what is happened in this case is that she is being not only denied any of the retirement benefits th that is what is wrong here your honor and not only has been denied every bit of retirement that she and her husband saved for for twenty four years but she's being asked here twice for his final payments at forty thousand dollars that she paid out before there was ever any it is simply so unfair your honor that's what the punitive spouse statute was designed to remedy that kind of all or nothing kind of result where late in life when someone dies all of a sudden strongly that this is one of them the most substantial miscarriages of justice that i have seen in my years of practice and i would implore you that as a legal matter the court was wrong to say the  clearly was not any liquidated some back in two thousand and one that the court could have reached back to the start nine percent interest it simply is contrary to the statute there was no look at it it's something there was discovery that went on by the appellee trying to determine what their damage claim would be we didn't know about back to us when there could not have been a liquidated from at that point nine percent interest is just wrong under the statute and similarly the protection some state you can't have an outright favorite dead pick i understand your honor and the wave that this case took place back in two thousand and one there was an order entered it basically stated precisely and there was  solution that we have to that is that in the in the country of poland there were perceiving and those were spread of record and authenticated by the consulate general and f us in poland and those were spread a record before the is based on the papers that were spread of record before the court that those proceeds that opposable to the surviving spouse and of his task acoustic are should be paid according to the polish law of the case to  what the trust or my problem is i'm had licensed to practice in the country of poland when she died in poland the documents that were provided from the polish the state is h remind me of a summary administration here probably because she died with very little assets if any besides the potential in hit and harris might not be the river potential ways that she has in this estate so m and that's you know i don't know is that this was similar to a summary administration where it says whatever she's entitled to is payable to these two people so this isn't to be the equivalent i would probate estate it's not this is similar situation to a personal injury cause of action or something like that worth five slash two ash one zero eight would apply instead so there are ways that people and we've paid in people paying per way to states to beneficiaries directly when presented with a small state after that happens all the time there's nothing different here that than paying it to someone who would present a similar affidavit  has a really rough rule for pete certainly applies to this case because it finally determined the right of someone in a state if you want to get into fairness argument there's a whole bunch of joint assets a house and other asset she got so the poor widow who got fact i would point that out in terms of the equity type arguments that have been brought back in two thousand and one when i when i was in this case because of this case it's been going on forever  there was we appeared before the judge and there were as with the quality hearing we stood up before the judge each side made their arguments and the judge made a ruling back in two thousand and one it's taken ten years to get to the point where we could actually get a judgment this matter and that's why you have three or four b to begin with if if somebody says legal rights are affected in terms of inheriting from an estate then you have a right to appeal it and need to appeal it right then and there so you don't proceed in the next ten years under a false assumption so i would posit to this court that there should be no the only issue and i put that i tried to put this many times to i couldn't my bro before the court is how much  that quarter was also appealed and that there was d w p there was a third appeal before this court based on a two fourteen zero one argument that i withheld some document that would have solved this whole case and that's been taken care of well so this is the fourth appeal i think the only issue in this particular appeal is what the gesture amounts should be because that's what was before the court in in ruling on the summary judgment so  t the judgment amount correct there was in the hearing to determine the amount of judgment the only evidence whereas by the craft with plan administrator who gave values as to what it was what it should too low or in correct they didn't present any of that's why the summary judgment is appropriate there was no genuine issue presented before the trial court of any fact any material fact that the judge in a while was was wrong and that's what we're before this this court it's the two thousand and nine order determining the judgment she was relying on the law the case that was established in the two thousand and two thousand and one court orders that have been highlighted in both sets of  in the state account that i know of and the two parties are trying to finish this part up so that we can wrap up this nine hundred ninety seven  thank you i heard with the comments about that you cannot have a judgment in favor of dead people there was some speculation going on here which is totally outside of the briefs here about what the procedures might have been in the courts in poland but it boils down to this we're not dealing with the smallest state here it's with the council made reference to the speculating about what happened in poland and if you look at the terms of the order there is clearly no appointment of a personal representative there has been no the information about the supposed court order was submitted apa time of the summer disposition hearing it was no two hundred two thirteen compliance  international treaty but going on to opposing counsel's argument that there was a final determination two thousand and one we're talking about the original august two thousand and one order and he argues that that's law of the case if that was so then how could he then file a petition to totally reopen that bring in evidence get an entirely new and different damages remedy against a new party not old ca but regarding a totally different set of funds he's arguing he wants the courts to treat it as not on file non final for his client the final for an a that's an impermissible double standard and it's simply not the case we've pointed out in our reply brief that in the motion for reconsideration on that two thousand and one order the court crossed out the sentence that says this is a final order it was not a final order by the judge by different party regarding a different class of damages which were the funds are paid out so they argued that somehow that was law the case it doesn't follow and plus this court is not bound by the legal court and so that argument simply doesn't fly so i would submit that we're here to do justice you know at  the fact that the judge in two thousand and one ared means that the fact that the judge in two thousand and nine also aired doesn't mean that we can't be arguing to this court that's two thousand and nine order