my name is esther safe and i'm here to represent the city if you oria nine hundred and ninety seven the general assembly passed the public safety employees benefit act which i will refer to as seed in that statute specifically provides that the firefighters a firefighter who suffers the catastrophic injury or is killed in the line of duty is entitled to employer paid health insurance premiums for themselves their spouse in their dependent children receive it is silent on what type of injury triggers the benefit except to say that the injury must occur while the firefighter was responding reasonable to reasonably perceived emergency an unlawful act or during the investigation of a crime critically however the sea police the rest a local government employers to figure out because  city's like a client which employs firefighters has historically administered and paid for those benefits it's also become cracked this that homo unit select and administer the health insurance plan the state really has very little involvement in the other than to require local governments to offer pay for and administer the benefits because to ceiba these crucial terms which trigger their four resorted to examining the legislative debate based on the statement that the handful of lawmakers crow ruled that a firefighter had suffered a catastrophic injury and therefore was entitle to  ve benefits when she had been awarded a line of duty disability pension such pensions are awarded by local pension boards compared to city officials and local firefighters crowe's context is crucial there the court had to rule in a playing slate because neither state local lawmakers had acted to define catastrophic injury in again that term is necessary to make benefit eligibility injury is for pacy the purpose crowe has been followed over the years but the city's legislative act in passing this ordinance supplanted crowe to be sure the city has the constitutional homeless already under article seven section six of the illinois constitution to legislate on matters were to pertain to its government in appears if the general assembly did not express we and specifically strip it of this power and i'm going to demonstrate today that we satisfy both of those requirements first to see the benefits really just health insurance benefits are firefighters pertain to local government affairs because there are basic terms of employment between the city and its firefighters now that relationship is an inherently local one firefighters are hired on the local level they recite locally often pursuant to residency requirements they serve in local fire districts their injuries which get right right to the see the benefits are sustained locally and the benefits are generally enjoyed locally because that's where the firefighters live in fact there isn't a uniform state right practice that governs the local hiring in employment of firefighters the firefighters are subject to the terms of local collective bargaining agreement the city also pays for it and it ministers to see the benefits the city council levies the taxes that are used to fund the benefits in each city chooses its own health insurance plan in that the see the benefits do pertain to local government affairs which brings us to the nd prong the general assembly does not expressly and specifically strip the city of the constitutional home already to unit exercise and perform concurrently with the state any power or function of a home will units to the extent that the general assembly by law does not specifically limit the concurrent exercise or specifically declare the states exercise to be exclusive now here nothing in the sea but declares the state exercised to be exclusive in that then brings to the question to what extent the general assembly by law limit the city's power to tax not to lawmaker commentary and not to case law here the only limitation that could see the supply is that bend it may not be provided in can in a manner that's inconsistent with  that is among the definitions that informs what a catastrophic injury is and that definition is necessary to render benefit eligibility determinations and that is a definition that like the other definitions in the ordinance does not is not repugnant and or does not take away from the more yes i absolutely agree it's just that what the general assembly has granted the general assembly didn't grant crowe's definition right the courts did because they had to resolve th a definitional gap no definition so the court had to tackle that problem and to supply a definition now that they're finished and gets replaced the moment a lawmaker hears the local government steps in and supply the definition  would be suggesting is that this essentially traditional preemption and there is a long history of case law in the supreme court that there should be no duty actual preemption meaning assuming that the general assembly has somehow adapted adopted something because the judiciary ruled in that definition stood unless there's i guess an exception to that and that's been the case of oppression it would tax that only that is what's required to quell home will already if this court rejected the city's definition of catastrophic injury because it somehow found that powers in the nd the can the and in section six m a bill in a constitution that home will powers have to be liberally construed we ask you to day that you apply the act in which the general assembly determined and the clarity that this act fulfills an important state interest directly in section five when you look at section twenty of this act of what you find is exactly what was not in the palm case which is what the apple lot is relying upon which is any and employer any employer that hires a full time and utilizes a full time firefighter in the state of illinois may not act any manner inconsistent with the requirements of this act of the procedure act so the state found that there is no concurrent interest by excuse me in in two thousand in three a question arose as to what does catastrophic injury mean that is the crow we case that we heard so much about and the illinois supreme court did exactly what in my humble opinion it is supposed to do which it looked at the language and said is it clear and unambiguous is it ambiguous what does catastrophic injury me and it did what it was supposed to do and it looked at the floor debate from both the illinois house and the illinois senate and it's and every single time those state senators and state reps said ca injury means line of duty disability crow we rejected every other assumption or every other proposal and it found that it is important to note that since two thousand and three every single case that has come before the illinois supreme court or appellate courts in state of illinois has held catastrophic injury as synonymous with a line of duty disability pension and in fact human went so far as to say it's now a matter of law it is it is it is set in stone that catastrophic injury means line of duty disability and to both justice o'brian and justice make da questions correct the state legislature in all of these cases looked at this there is no legislation that has changed this the state legislature and left this alone under the relevant case law this definition of catastrophic injury which is synonymous with line of duty has now become part of the statute and that is exactly what took place and it has been the law for seventeen years so with the section five and with section twenty this to state legislature said we are taking this out of your hands and because of that if you recall in the poun case there was this issue of section six i in this concurrent language and in section six i regarding the concurrent language what the pound court looked at was there was no limiting home therefore the state legislature stated you cannot i'm sorry what the state legislature said is you are able to act concurrent that is exactly the opposite of what we have here when you look at section five and section twenty so there is no concurrent jurisdiction this state city of peoria is not on equal footing with the state of illinois in passing legislation the state of illinois passed this under section ten and they passed it for an employer any employer that hires the full time firefighters and this is what they meant and it's what they meant through crow he and be dozens of cases if this court were to rule in favor of the apple want in this matter the city of peoria would in effect be overruling seventeen years of very clear bright  bloomington would have just simply passed an ordinance and that's what they could have done but that's not what happened here because those municipalities unlike the city of curia understood that there is a home rule exception that this is a state interest and a state issue so when you look then at the case law the next standard is which was alluded to which is the stubhub case which is six a of the home rule provisions and again it is the three part bright line test the nature and extent of the problem the unit of government with the most vital state interest and the role traditionally played by local and statewide authorities in dealing with this issue i would suggest of his court and what i would suggest to be the obvious which is in the nature extent of the problem is every firefighter in the state of illinois goes to structure fires in response to  accidents in shootings and hazardous material incidents and falls through rough god forbid etc every city in the state of illinois that employs full time firefighters has the exact same problem which is firefighters who injure themselves and are catastrophic we disable by the and found that way by the state wide article for a pension system that has its own set of laws standards of it that cetera every city has these injured firefighters it is not just a peoria problem purina cannot sit there and say well pure as injured firefighters but pekin does not that is not the case and and and interest if you were to rule in favor of the apple want in this matter quite honestly chaos would rain and that's why the limitation of whole rule is in here a pe chief any peoria battalion chief could respond on a box alarm to the exact same fire both of them are injured and the exact same fire the pekin battalion goes back and gets a line of duty and it actually goes further and the courts when they talk about hurrell understand about this important state interest and it actually goes further and january nd at the board meeting for peoria they can pass an ordinance that says x y and z and then at the next accounts a meeting or the next election they can amend that ordinance that says a b and c now it's a whole new standard and then the next month they can pass a rd ordinance that says a b and c the final issue which i wan done has have simply said you cannot make up a new definition of injury gainful work completely brand new you appear to want or trying to bypass what you cannot get politically by changing the state statu at the end of the day it's as simple as that catastrophic injury line of duty disability and a firefighter side were you responding to what's reasonably believed to be an emergency this is the vital state interests all of the cases and i can go into it but we have time constraints but all of the cases as we let set forth in our brief that have found that there is one real authority are completely inexplicable schedule bolingbrook evanston collage of most are talking about truly local issues local concerns in which the state of illinois legislature even found specifically during constitutional convention certain in the case of klaatu most that this is a local concern for  reasons why they found that way but in this particular case this is an important beigel state interest and it should be addressed that way and these cases have become part and parcel of what it means to be to suffer catastrophic injury what i would do now is i would turn it over again to my colleague mr du who will be talking about the state wide laws and state what statutes and how the interplay with one another and lester any questions by the justices i want to be this court that the payment of health insurance to firefighters is a purely local issue it's my job to disprove that statement as being accurate the fact is that the cboe is part of a statutory scheme that began over fifty years ago and the christian know and i'm going to end my oral argument discussing the human case but if you look at the benefits that the state of illinois has mandated for firefighters and police officers they begin with the pension code and i must say i can't find the year that the very st fire and police pension code was passed but i think the current version started and fifty one and the state prescribed a system of of of length of service benefits and disability benefits for police and fire in two separate  articles of the code under their stance shoot firefighters were provided with line of duty disability benefits if they suffered a an injury or illness that ended their career compensation system the firefighters became a part of is a state wide system provisions were made to coordinate the workers compensation benefits with the line of duty disability benefits in the pension code from the very beginning in one thousand nine hundred and seventy seven a offset provision was enacted again to more closely coordinate the payment of injury benefits on a state months under a statute called the public employee disability act which just for the interest of the court it has an identical preemption clause as the preemption clause found in perceive  the enhanced benefit also had a coordinating provision that prescribed the formulae by which firefighters and police officers would not receive double recovery so it brings us to nine ninety seven dollars the enactment of the public safety employee benefits act part this is all that's a separate statute beginning with croix but ending with hielan was was intimately integrated into the system that i'm describing so that croy began the holding that catastrophic injury means an injury that leads to the award of a land of duty disability benefit but i think what's most important is that they have eventually led to the decision of the illinois supreme court in the vernon village of  hill's case versus hielan and what the court held in that case i think is important because the legislature intended an injured public safety employee to be eligible for benefits under section ten a of the act act being perceived whenever he whenever his or her injuries were sufficient to qualify for a line of duty disability pension the pension board's award a stablish is as a matter of law not as a matter of collateral estoppel or some sort of rule of interpretation as a matter of law that the public safety employees suffered a catastrophic injury by virtue of the heel and decision statute has been intimate and it cannot be surgically removed from the system of benefits that have been prescribed for easily over fifty years this is not a local issue this is a state issue and what the what the he'll in court has emphasized is that the there is an intimate connection between the line of duty disability provisions in the pension code and the catastrophic injury provisions in the a pacy by statute therefore this is not a local issue and thank you for your time and attention this afternoon critically different fact is the reality that in neither of those cases the home will actually homegirl unit had actually passed an ordinance that defined catastrophic injury or injury this really is a case of st impression because peoria for the st time is a lawmaker at law making legislative by body that passed an ordinance that passed that law that defined those terms and those terms have to trump any prior traditional definitions on that same point because it is the fire fire who due to injuries hasn't forced to take a line or duty disability when the legislature says that this is the definition this is what they are intending to do then how is it that even with all of the home roll power that you have that you can limit what the intent of the general assembly was in the us what we have to look at is the general assembly's text  commentary that somehow supplies a definition that didn't make it into the plain language of the statute and therefore doesn't matter well only it only doesn't matter if the plain language is  as prerogative as a lawmaking body to do whenever they see it so you you feel that you have the authority to reduce the injuries were just rare this should be implemented in light of what you know is the general assembly's and no because the in order to ascertain the general assembly's intent we have to look into it and if it is to and local powers are concurrent and here they fit neatly into each other in the plain text of the statute and the plain text of the ordinance they complement each other it's a set symbiotic relationship i would agree with you that there are statements of an individual lawmakers that supply contrary definitions but those don't matter not for purposes of a home rule for taking for purposes of stripping the city of of powers one single lawmaker cannot strip the city of its homo powers those are constitutional powers and they're specifically set forth in section six and they can only be taken away under certain compliment supplement fill gaps of deceit and it does that it's really important to read that language in section twenty the preemption language limited  only thing it does is to say that whatever benefits we make ok that's your argument that it doesn't matter anymore that's right it has been replaced for purposes of peoria at the moment that peoria passed its ordinance and thereby exercised  catastrophic really injure is there not a danger of the residents in your community not having firefighters because they choose to go to a community where if they are injured but they are   a different definition but there is going to be put the community at risk when you can't get firefighters because some place else is better and different benefits no one because we could create great benefits too right we could give benefits a lower threshold hold or a higher threshold it's just that we're in charge we're in charge of creating the incentives for that employment relationship or maybe compared to other community distance issues are only for the state to decide they're not a local matter if they wanted to do that they could have done that but that is not the limiting language in section twenty thank you thank you