how that the definition of an aggravated felony crime of violence under eighteen u s c section sixteen b was void for vagueness because it combined two indeterminate inquiries first of all how judges and the president that supported that finding and examination of the record reveal was sent to my sixteen b case though innocent this is sixteen a case that's actually not clear based on the immigration judge in this sixteen be here that pretty clearly sixteen a well in terms of what the agency found or in terms of the in terms of what the statute better matches what happened well  sufficient a sufficient risk that physical force may be used against another in the commission of an offense to qualify as an aggravated felony crime of violence under sixteen be no us vs gray heda the legal authority cited by both the immigration judge and the board of immigration appeals in this case found itself bound by u s persons her own silliness to find that a violation of two forty five a one is in fact an aggravated felony crime of violence no of course conviction was a quote crime that unequivocally involves a substantial risk of physical force and committing the offense which is language that echoes sixteen b the board of immigration appeals simply agreed with the immigration judge that mr  indicate that this the aggravated felony remove ability finding in this case to not be divorced from the definition of an aggravated felony crime of violence  own selena  rejected the argument that surround vs holder overrules or hate finding that surround actually relied upon the same construction of the california mens rea at issue to determine whether fact both of them are any of those decided after jimenez are thought to well opens valencia was your honor and in what way does that change or change anything well since valencia emphasizes that an alternative element of a crime as opposed to an alternative means of committing the crime is something that a jury must find unanimously and beyond a reasonable doubt lopez valencia as well as rand joan an earlier day can require a court to look at what the jury was actually required to find before they convicted somebody of a california assault crime under two forty five they want in this case there actually is a definition of a man's right up assault in california criminal jury instructions that california criminal jury instructions states that quote the people are not required to prove that the defendant actually intended to use force against someone when he or she acted to convict someone of california assault the only authority forty five a one indicates perhaps that those courts construction of the mens rea or california felt was incorrect we have we have to dig pretty deep to get there wouldn't we well i mean it the california this court's cases do require that and aggravated felony crime of violence must incorporate as an element an intentional application of physical force against another person this  reference in a california criminal jury instruction indicates that that intent is not required and since the camp rendon and lopez here require a court to focus on what a jury was required to find minyanim a plan beyond a reasonable because he was convicted of a categorical crime of violence and he was sentenced to a year or more incarceration this court has repeatedly held and published precedent that to forty five they want has categorically a crime of violence under the federal definition found eighteen u s c section sixteen a and that's the decision that the board made to there is some confusion i admit in the immigration judge's decision about whether sixteen a or sixteen b was that issue and the immigration judge  which operative language from sixteen b if you look at the board's decision the only decision that the board cites is greater and i would disagree the great it could be construed as a sixteen b case in fact anger heda the court talked about how  sixteen b cases were not considered by the court because sixteen b was a very different kind of provision than sixteen a sixteen a's and elements matching provision or sixteen b as a residual clause but he did who did use law the supreme court and this court on bach do not undermine your heda the maya and johnson in particular do not undermine sixty in fact they are very clear in carving out sixteen a as something that they're not attacking  substantial risk analysis they contrasted that to this almost a simple helmets matching provision because the provisions in the i c c a are actually parallel to what we have in sixteen ac they have an he was sentenced to four years imprisonment with the yes your honor so that one year requirement is easily satisfied and now one year requirement under this court i just ask you this question so the people in the back room know what's going on you we'll give you a minute intentional application of physical force against another person her own selena looked at the california home with a firearm and on that the plain language of that statute matched both definitions of an aggravated felony crime of violence at sixteen and sixteen b and found that the stated mens rea for california salt and people versus williams quote closely track the language of sixteen b by naturally involving a person acting and just regard the argued previously we cannot divorce the aggravated felony definition of a crime of violence of sixteen b from sixteen a in the context of this particular case and in the context of grade which cited explicitly