good morning your honor richard gardner for the claim and mr brown does it forfeit your case and there are quite a few issues and given the limited time probably not going to get to all of them but let me start with what i think is the most significant issue from a legal perspective and that is the question of whether the district court could defer to the government's interpretation of the statute in this case that the district court in its opinion stated that applied that is a arbitrary  capricious standard and gave some suitable weight to the government's interpretation and for a number of reasons that is the wrong standard to apply first of all this is a criminal statutes attack statute in  essentially set the standard for how you construe that particular provision of the code and the court said that you first of all ply ordinary rules of statutory construction and then if there is ambiguity  hooty than the rule of lenity kicks in and the lower court believed that the that chevron was the applicable standard here and it is not because for a sole because this is a criminal court and it further clarified that was any doubt left as to what chevron deference applies to first of all course it deals with civil statutes this is not a civil statute so right from the get go chevron deference doesn't and the government in this case has not made any at assertion that the statute is in any way ambiguous so even if chevron deference were relevant which it's not because this is a criminal statute it wouldn't apply here because there's no allegation there's no assertion of ambiguity and edition to that to make it even clearer that chevron difference doesn't apply here the court in gonzales went on to quote from its prior  indicated that you can only talk about deference when you're talking about a regulation which interprets a statute where there has been authority by statute promulgated regulation and again in this case we're not talking about a regulation we're talking about a construction of the words of the statute itself this is really equivalent to the letter opinion in the case that the supreme court talked about in the christians in case where the court said that if the courts do not defer mean there's no two ways about it in our view if you look at that we got the briefs in the case and it's clear that the that actually at the in the trial court the government witness had testified to th well it's not so much this particular piece but there are hundreds and hundreds and hundreds of them out there and there are forfeiture cases pending all all around the united states there is one pending in the sixth circuit at the moment what that concern i asked which again i don't think it has any bearing on what the legal issues are but it's a good but significant in the broader sense of whether the government has this kind of authority under the statute to say what it believes is a machine gun and  register if it's a machine gun yes but the government has to prove in a failure to register case that the individual knew that it was a machine gun and in this case there was no evidence of this individual knew that i think that's why this didn't result in a  of the property is not if it's in however it's interpreted here would that have downstream consequences in criminal cases it's certainly absolutely so it has it has that that in question with regard and i'm sorry forgot with the first part of the question wasn't skidmore again this skidmore is is in the line of chevron deference cases it's an earlier chevron deference case and i don't believe as i said that that whole line of cases applies here in because this is not interpretation of the civil statute and in shape and in skidmore there was a regulation promulgated pursuant to congressional authority to promulgated regulations which construed and end with an ambiguous statutory provision and again we don't have any of those elements in that case is a criminal statute albeit in a civil setting and there's no no assertion of ambiguity by the government and we're not talking about a regulation construing a statutory provision and i see my time as i think you supreme court made it absolutely clear and then when you talking about the deference to an agency's decision it's not an all or nothing proposition and it's not for example either chevron deference o article where i think what i'm saying is that by welding the two parts of the receiver together the receiver as a whole and design obviously in this case always dealing it's whether this piece of equipment meets the definition of a machine gun and again because of the fact that the expert the government could restart so quickly because of the design of the weapon it meets not true that there were no facts in dispute about designed or or readily restored the the mr brown's evidence with regard to design was that the first design feature that the government relied on the select application of the word design also there was a dispute about whether the other two features in fact that anything to do with the fully automatic capabilities of the firearm there was also a factual dispute as to the length of the firearm and whether that had any impact on as to the readily restored part of the me the case really comes down to the meaning of the word read and that's why i think the smith case was so wrongly decided because eight hours in a well equipped machine shop by an expert craftsman