you may proceed when you're ready good morning your honor may have pleased the court this is an insurance coverage case in which the district court failed to enforce the unambiguous language of the insurance policy of american families homeowners policy in this case stated and i'm quoting here we will not pay to repair or replace undamaged property due to mismatch between undamaged material and new material that's what the policy said but the district court ordered american family to pay to replace undamaged property due to a mismatch that was an error this court should reverse it and remain and with directions to enter judgment for american family the facts are undisputed here both parties cross moved for summary judgment in two thousand and fifteen the pla house was damaged by a storm with a large house with a large rough there are twenty six separate slopes on the rough conveniently one for every letter of the alphabet as the appraisal report shows shingles on four of those slopes were damaged the other two had no damage at all this is all at our fifty five through fifty seven american families position was it should replace the shingles on the four damaged faces but not the twenty two undamage it should replace the whole thing all twenty six faces of this was a legal dispute american families undisputed has paid for all of the damaged parts and has not paid for the damaged parts the district court ordered it to pay for the undamaged parts the legal principles here just like the facts are also undisputed the case most closely on point is that the bin ski case the judge sheppard you honored your authored for the panel and coming to the opposite conclusion that eric made is that help there is ambiguity introduced by whether this an ambiguous language that i've read actually modified the prop the policy that the argument was that american family clearly was trying to say it's not going to pay for a mismatch but it didn't get the job done because and this is what i expect the argument to be is that what it needed to do is to say this new language which was added in the minnesota endorsement  two thousand and thirteen the argument was that it had to say that it modified the gold star indorsement not the gold star policy that that was the argument and that argument is baseless but let me let me play it out so we understand wh at it is there are three steps to this policy first there's the base form which is the gold star form that was interviews to ninety four and there's a gold star endorsement that was added in ninety nine and then there's the minnesota endorsement that was added in two thousand and thirteen and that has this we won't pay for matching language the gold star endorsement changed the last value provision lost value determination provision in one thousand nine the other side's argument is that the mismatched thing was a further revision of the last value determination provision and therefore it was supposed to say it applied to that that's wrong the reason is wrong as the last value determination provision is condition number eleven yeah it it's possible that somebody could write a policy where they overlap this one certainly wasn't written that way and we think concept of what i meant was that something called lost value determination could in fact without contradiction include a mismatch exclusion but in this case that's not the case and i agree you could write it that way but they didn't write it this way now and conceptually i think it's a different loss of value determination talks about how you value the part that was damaged  interpretive argument which we think it's an ambiguous and in just one district court just got that one wrong key consul now the the provision that that the argument is over is this provision that  under your argument was that also an amendment to the original policy yet that was added to the polish and to the it's in addition to the original policy language that's right your honor if there are twenty conditions in the originals this doesn't give the numbers but this would be twenty one and twenty two if they were added so if it if it just just a thought if it had twenty and twenty one there that might have helped explained what was going on you could you could do more things on that your honor i don't think that there's any ambiguity in here because it says the following is added if you look you know page three on our reply brief you know marks us up and makes it really clear above is a provision that does a man the last value determination provision and that says the following is added the last value determination so you know that they did a good job saying where this was going and there's no ambiguity here let me briefly address the other argument the alternative argument the district court didn't reach but the other side did make so they're entitled to make it there is a statutory argument and that is that even if american family didn't agree to pay this had to minnesota law on the fire insurance statute said they had to that's the argument there are a couple of problems with that this isn't a fire case so the fire statute doesn't have any application that that's really the beginning and end of that and we quoted this in our reply brief at page seven the fire statute expressly says what happens when you have a multiplayer all insurance policy like this would cover both fire and other things it says in there and you know i'm i'm reading here that it says that the minimum requirements apply only to quote with respect to the peril of fire so again it's really clear in the statute that whatever minimum apply with respect to fire coverage when that's applied to multipart all policy those minimums apply only when it's a fire and this wasn't a fire it was rain and hail that's not that's not the peril it's not the peril and so there isn't any basis for saying that minnesota statute would override what they actually agreed to make them do something else you know a case of hanging against firemen fund minnesota case i'm not familiar with that you're on a three eighty three flag this issue a few years ago but didn't decide it that was the front your own case you know we said that so it had been decided but i think it has what i might be wrong ok yeah and we just found other unpublished things that we didn't think were appropriate to cite thought that support our view but we think the answer is pretty clear i'm happy to answer any other questions your honour's have on opening otherwise all address any points on our view of the plain text of this matter is that the matching indorsement that section it speaks to matching and does not specifically reference the goldstar amendment unlike other sections of the policy time to time and in our brief we put in blue highlights instances where the minnesota endorsement doesn't ds specifically referenced the goldstar amendment and therefore applies but in this matter we have a very specific reference in the about when the minnesota or excuse me the matching clause up where it applies it does not apply to the goldstar amendment by its very terms and that's in the yellow highlights that we put in our brief because it does not apply to the goldstar memet it is a nullity to this case and that is the essence of our argument the district court got that right the district court also said that ambiguous and i would also agree that any ambiguity in this regard is a result in our favor but when we look at the text of the matching clause it needs to say that it applies to the goldstar amendment in the gold star form in its entirety and indeed it does so the goldstar form insofar as that paragraph eleven the last determination is analogy it's only the gold star moment so that had to have been specifically amended or revoked or added to in the minnesota doris mut and it does not with respect to the statutory argument i ask the case to ask the court to refer to sixty five a or one subdivision one that states when the duty to conform the policy language to statute is triggered so there is sixty five a day or one subdivision three that's important it's form language but under sixty five a or one subdivision one that's when the duty to create a policy with these minimum protections is triggered and it is triggered when an insurance company issues a policy that encompasses or includes fire under one premium and that is the case here noonan's are paying one premium for an all peril policy as we say in the insurance world it's in all peril policy it includes fire so when that policy was issued there was a statutory obligation to make sure that these minimum provisions in subdivision three are met now sixty five a zero one subdivision one also says you don't need the exact language but it has to conform to these minimum requirements and the matching clause that american family is trying to enforce would not meet those niman requirements found in subdivision three of the statu because in subdivision three of the statute it says the way you value a loss or damage the way you value loss or damage is very clear and you do both not just damage you value different if that section was specifically except applied to just fire or didn't but the point is it does apply to all perils including fire and so it's got to look like what the statute requires and if not the court where net arises out of the wind lost and that is where the court the minnesota supreme court specifically applied sixty five a zero one two that all peril policy because i think for the reason that it is encompasses fire so the issue is not what the loss was the issue is whether the policy encompasses fire and if it does that's when the statutory obligation is triggered and it was indeed triggered in this case so to address a point earlier from the court i would say that in terms of application of sixty five a or one so division three and one has it ever applied outside a fire loss i would point the court to quite the security which arises out of windstorm where there was an application of it because the policy encompassed fire and that also were for the court to sixty five eight zero one subdivision one so we have to have coverage of both a loss or and damage because the law would never assume that the legislature wrote a redundant statute those have to have different meanings and by the way when we have an undefined words common usage applies under minnesota law and a loss is different from damage it can be the demolition in value of something whereas damages physical damage i would add to that by the way we have the cedar bluff case in minnesota where american family took the issue to appellate court the appellate court said damage also includes demolition and value but in any event i'm here today to appeal to this court that there is loss and damage the legislature intentionally wrote both there has to be a valuation of both and on that point when we look at the minnesota indorsement is that a is an exclusion or is it a valuation clause of course if it's either my position would be there are strictly construed against an insurance company a certainly exclusions are strictly construed but when we look at that valuation clause the closet self of the matching endorsement the very last sentence specifically talks about how we're going to value the loss the word value is in there it is a valuation clause because that's what it says it does not say this is an exclusion and all council has said this would be you know perhaps exclusions twenty or twenty one but that's defeated by the text of it which refers to a value that refers to a valuation and so this the state legislature has said that when you've got a policy that covers fire this is how it is to be valued an american family does not have the profit of to negate that but that is what it is purporting to do because sixty five a a one subdivision three clearly has a valuation provision in it and no insurance company may negate it but that is what exactly what they are trying to do i asked the court to reject that  with respect to another issue in the briefing keep the short i was not argued by counsel this morning but we are entitled to full r c b coverage just as the district court said because for this reason we have an appraisal clause which is a believe it appendix twenty three and then in the next page as we see a last payment clause and then we see the last value determination clause there on successive pages and the appraisal clause says we will decide the in the appraisal panel will decide the amount of loss with finality which is what the center requires then and there is the last payment provision which says payments to be issued in five days the district court correctly held that when you read that that says when you have an appraisal ward that triggers an obligation to pay with in five days pay everything within five days the district court was right to say the duty was triggered to pay within five days after that appraisal or so i asked the court to affirm the discord in that regard and to a please have full payment for the r c b damaged lease characterizes undamaged as it as it appears in the appraisal ward because clearly the appraisal award refers to this is a matching case that some slopes were not specifically damaged but they held that if you're going to have a slate tile roof it's got to be there will be a loss if there isn't full payment for all the slopes and we ask the court to enforce that unless there are any other questions of the court i will yield my time and fake you for your consideration right the statutory language says that the mandatory minimums for fire apply in a multiple multipurpose policy only with respect to the peril of fire which seems clear the quaid decision from the minnesota supreme court  not hold otherwise it never holds that the mandatory minimums apply to something else at issue in quaid was the appraisal process that was a storm case but as quaid pointed out the statute specifically governing storm damage requires an appraisal that sixty five a twenty six that's what we've pointed out actually applies here that doesn't have the minimum speed it did have an appraisal so quaid does not stand for the proposition that proposition said and then the cedar bluff case interpreted a different american family policy that did not have the matching exclusion and so it provides no help at all in the interpretive issue nothing else to offer unless your honour's of questions