for morning if we morning where my name is cornell i stand here and i represent first mercury sitting at the table with me as mr bear we have agreed to split the time i would like permits to aspect of coverage perhaps the clearest way to consider the issue of whether or not there was coverage for viability is to focus on the sheppard dynamic because sheppard was that the underlying complaints in the court nose are for under one complaint all speak from the aspect of negligence to the axonal missions of either shepherd or  as to privity your honor but there is an issue as to who coverage for liability and that issue tees up because of the language of the of the endorsement which says that such person that is a potential additional insured is an additional shirt only with respect to liability for bodily injury caused in whole arm park by fast tracked acts or omissions and we all know x omissions speaks to liability in  another c g l coverage for the additional insured its coverage that tracks the guy bill it is that are created by the entity who is the name insured so if that is not an issue that i don't think that's an issue that's not in question is whether or not there is coverage for the allegations against shepard in the underlying cases and that's the issues on the complaints there is no direct and judge haven connecticut in a similar case found exactly that that there is no coverage in a situation where the named insured is not in the situation a possible of a possible finding of why ability against the name insured than the additional insured coverage does not come into play when the allegations are strictly and soley against the omissions of shepherd's case sheppard or only with respect to liability for bodily injury property damage or personal navid advertising injury caused in whole or in part by your x or emissions the x or emissions of those acting on your behalf in the performance of your ongoing operations for the additional insured that's what we're focused on that's correct your honor absolutely correct and so there are there are two aspects to main aspects that one is the liability only with respect to the liability include in the context of a general contractor and so contractor general contractors sub contracting out work the the the sub contractors doing work on behalf of the contractor well the long cited indicated that the principal is not responsible for the independent acts of the agent but he's independent well because the allegations in the complaint and the underlying complaint performed on behalf of it it had it was a subcontractor right and so in essence they're working on it together but if what if we imposed the names into the language of the additional insured indorsement we would see that such person that is to say shawmut or chevron i'm going to stay with one of them as we make it easier so shepherd is an additional insured only with respect to bodily injury caused in whole or in part by fast track very definition speaks to why bill and and there are no allegations in the underlying points that speak to law the reading that the police are urging on the court is not consistent with the natural reading of the language and one that gives effect to each and every term in the policy provision second it's inconsistent with the established law and the only two states whose appellate courts have actually read it construed in address this specific policy language and third as a matter of policy it doesn't make sense to try to shoehorn shawmut into coverage under this policy in the circumstances of this case as to the first point your honor the vin natural lay person's reading of this language was which is what connecticut law requires when you look at the language it says you and such organization have agreed and you and such organization here refers to you the insured fast track and such organization the one that seeking additional insured coverage shawmut have agreed the illinois appellate courts of looked at that alone and said that requires  agreement between the two parties it doesn't say un any organization have agreed to add this entity it's un such organ ization the language goes on to say the agreement must be in writing and it must be in a contract or agreement there a way to read that language reasonably to give effect to all of its power all of its terms each and every term each and every word in that provision without rendering some of them duplicative and under connecticut law that's not a reasonable agreement with shepard that's either yes or no while they're not me let me explain it is not even incorporating terms of the shawmut sheppard contract doesn't create an agreement between sharma and fast track to it to name s actually says your honor is that fast track agrees to complete the work in accordance with the terms of the of the sub contract in the contract my point is that does not constitute a contract or agreement between shawmut and fastrack because   is agreed to nothing so it can't be a contract or agreement because there is no aggrieved showmance agreeing to nothing it is just a one sided you must follow these terms that alone would is not adequate to satisfy the requirement in the additional insur an agreement in writing in a contract or agreement because justin there had to be a single that's that's correct your honor as the courts of new york and illinois do not agree that there is at least some it i would not because the only way of reading it is require as not requiring a one agreement a single prima between the party the insured and the party seeking insured coverage is to disregard some language or make some language redundant in the term and not give it its natural reading under connecticut law and the law of most states that is not a reasonable interpretation or only only an interpretation that gives effect to every word  if there is if it had said only in writing then in writing with multiple parties might make sense but it says in writing in a contract or agreement if it satisfies doesn't  if you look at it technically doesn't that satisfy precisely that no i don't think it does your honor because it would have to satisfy both the requirement that it be in writing and in a contract or agreement and you also have to satisfy th langhart is missing there because your honor if there is to agreements if the if there are two agreements and not one then it doesn't satisfy the requirement that there be a a contract or agreement and secondly it doesn't satisfy the provision that says there that you and such organization have agreed in a writing or a contract you and such organization as the illinois accords courts have make clear refers to the insured and the party seeking seeking coverage so the idea that you could satisfy this language which clearly invision some sort of contractual arrangement between the two parties is satisfied when those two parties have no agreement at all and you to multiple part multiple agreements to try to satisfy it is not consistent with the princip interpretation under connecticut law i guess the last point i would add is you know shawmut had multiple ways to ensure that it got this coverage there are other kinds of additional insurance for be sure provisions that don't require any written contract or agreement and in fact that is specifically what shawmut required of shepard if you look at the joint appendix page one zero seven the policy of the contract requires that they provide a specific named additional insured provision c g twenty ten and that requires shawmut to be listed in a separate schedule so it doesn't require any agreement that's not what they required here and it's not the policy that fast track particular thank you an additional in charge on fast tracks policy and that's exactly what occurred here both fast track and chalmette have each agreed in writing in a contractor agreement that shamu to be added as an additional insured on fast tracks policy the policy issue did not require a direct single contract between fast track and schama for an order for sham it as an additional insured well the courts of an illinois and new york has found that requirement other courts have found as we've noted in our brief the courts and pro con and mehlis which are the southern district of texas and the district of maine have found that the plain language of the policy does not require direct agreement but rather that that would require you to read certain words yet i think the language of the policy is is clear here and it needs to be construed in favor of the insured rather than in favor of the insurance company the plain language i don't think requires a certification in the connecticut ambiguity in the policy and in that case the policy would have to be construed in favor of the insured and against the insurer under connecticut law is there some other indicia in the record of intent here immunize here gray brief that says that the intended to have it's folder in each of that there's two contract construction contracts at issue here there's a contract between shepherding shaam it which is seamus was the general contractor and shepherd was its direct subcontractor that contract required shepherd to obtain additional insured coverage for shah met and to require for schama to have an excuse me or for shepherd to have each subcontractor it hired to also be bound by that agreement to the same extent that shepard was so basically required that down the line each sub contractor hired by sheppard would also act as an additional insured and then in turn in the contract between shepherd and fast track fast track was required to expressly incorporates the contract between schama and sheppard in essence making it a part of that paul a contract all together so there is a single agreement conduct something though this was sent to the insur which are the construction agreements that is the court the fact that it was all incorporated in one me that i do not know your honor come i would also like to touch briefly on the second issue  yes the underlying they've all underlying lawsuits are still pending schama is currently being defended by liberty mutual which is the in the library a bill of the carrier for shepherd you fastrack for one simple reason which is that there is workers compensation unity in connecticut so the underlying thing just could not have sued their employer are barred from doing so by the worker's compensation statute or read a look at the four cor employer of two of the underlying plaintiffs in that they were injured in the course of their employment while working on the steel structure so the inference is there that fast tracks x or emissions came into play somehow  additional insured indorsements to vicarious liability i have provided the court in my brief with numerous attentions to connecticut cases where which hold that there can additional insured indorsements can and to loss that gave rise to this lawsuit not necessarily fault but whether the acts or missions of fast track contributed to that accident that leads to the client that's the way the district court in this case interpreted the language and you as my sister counsel for trauma has indicated a reading of the allegations permits that interpretation that is there is a nothing in the complaint that negates that  reading and if you if you read the complaint and if there is a fair interpretation that would implicate coverage then first mercury should be defended but beyond that and very importantly your honor it doesn't have to be alleged in the complaint  and i've put forward for you the cases under connecticut law to clear the harbor casually case and his progeny as recognized by this court previously that the four corners rule does not limit the duty to defend where there are facts known to an insurer that are consistent with the complaint that raise the possibility of cover and in this is situation and even  you're on there's nothing in the record that goes to the underwriting question of whether before any of the work was done first mercury knew of what first mercury knew about the contractual relations between the parties  or anything and i'm sorry fact in the motion for summary judgment that was filed by first mercury they attached the contracts because you have to look outside of the pleadings in order to apply the additional insured indorsement hundreds playing life but even beyond that under the hard for casually case and in connecticut where there are facts known to an insurer that are consistent with the allegations that would raise the possibility of coverage and ensure must you can't ignore those facts i mean in that as a as a matter of fact fast tracks extra missions contributed to this underline loss and i provided the factual documentation for you you know with every forfeited that i that that i things that are in the record and i provided citation for them in my brief but critical among them is the ocean report which was in the hands of for first mercury for four years and which laid out the circumstances of how this this incident occurred i would argue a fair reading of the ocean report indicates that this entire thing was was was do with the accident missions a fast track it was their employees doing the work it was their employees actively engaged in the activity that led to the dislodging of of these these these pieces which caused people to fall and which fell on the men and caused the death and injuries all of that work was being done by fast a as a factual matter that that's not in dispute what first mercury is arguing is that you can't look at that because it's not explicitly in the complaint i would argue number one it is sufficiently implicit but more importantly you can look at it even if it isn't in the complaint under the hard for casually casing thank you your honor first of all with regard to the harford casually case i would like the court to keep in mind that there is a finding in that court that there must be at least one allegation in the complaint that falls osha report your honor i will i would submit that no court either judge or jury is is going to deliberate with regard to whether or not that poses any liability on fast track opposes any liability on either or shepherd that is not going to be part of the alegate encompassed within the allegations that are framed against shawmut or shepherd in the existing can point your argument is that we can only look at the complaint no that's not true you're i won't i don't mean to be that narrow but what i say is that you must first look at the allegations and then if the allegations take you beyond to some factual inquiry you may then look at the factual under here specter we disagree and i encourage the court which probably already has but i respectfully disagree when you read the allegations in the underlying complaint she will read directly that they are directly framed and  ship shepard in shawmut i'd also like to call the court's attention to this work compas you as this circuit has already said in i b m vs liberty at three o three fed third for two quick points here on earth one the question of intent was raised in your grade yes so it's the question is not whether what the parties intended to produce a policy to provide an additional insured coverage the question is whether  do that they could have sent a one line agreement that said we agree to it chairman should be named they didn't do that they could have insisted on the type of additional insurance policy they required of shepherd which your argument i mean half the argument would be those could could have been that there was no intent and here you're giving up that i mean you're saying if you align the technical language of the policy then you put it i think the answer is your honor you must look at what the policy was they produced not the policy they intended to produce they just didn't produce a policy that affects the way to that intent the other point i'd like to make briefly is that there are only two states that have addressed this language have their appellate courts have uniformly concluded