claim in the in the bankruptcy case the issue that we're presenting is one of first impression which is whether the landlord limitation under five ought to be six if i can use a shorthand term applies or protects the estate or obviously we're here to is to argue that there is no such claim limitation in the case of a fraudulent transfer in that the court just correctly rejected the arguments that mrs wigley raised before i go into that so i want to there are three side points that may interest the court first of all our claim references a minnesota state court judgment that is still under appeal briefing is pending in that case what the effect of the reversal or modification may have is remains to be seen is that the judgment on the lease termination is non dischargeable as to mrs wakely that's correct the court term and she was an actual culpable participant in that transfer so are you asking that the cap be applied i mean is are they asking for the cap to be applied that's the five twenty three the second issue is what her estate needs to play to pay as a part of her confirm plan so hypothetically speaking she could pay three hundred eight thousand she's already paid deduct the bankruptcy case so well not just i don't want to keep you off track from getting to the meat of your argument yet but i'm curious about this the other nine discharge ability was the amount of the claim determined then that or was it just that whatever the amount of the claim is the parties would assume that that's the full amount of the state court judgment with accruing interest and if he puts the amount on it mrs wigley is going to appeal from that judgment as well because we'll have the same issue regarding the allow there may be a weekly six we don't know at this point but perhaps at this point it will it a lot of reframe the settlement from a legal standpoint can we consider this issue of the non discharge ability judgment in making in reaching a decision on this particular case well that's why i brought a tear tension my view is that no you would not he would simply decide this issue as it's been presented to you because it makes a difference if you give us the higher claim we're going to get paid pursuant to a plan or we're not going to have to chase this defendant through the state court collection process except for perhaps a much smaller amount so it makes a practical dollar difference to us well that is the discharge ability issue is significant to times suffice it to say this there was originally the least the two point three million dollars judgment that you refuse can jump ahead discharged and paid in part in the michael weekly case mrs whately was held liable for a fraudulent transfer that's what this is all about in the in the original amount of seven hundred eighty eight thousand dollars which by the time she filed a case said mounted to over a million dollars with interest  the issue is i think of the judges in judge fisher's language the issue it can be gleaned from that language he uses the phrase ultimately resulted from the statute can put it right for the court matter first impression i can't give you any binding authority on it is this a situation where where remote derivation invokes fibro to be sex or does it have to or do we have to talk about proximate cause i've searched and presented the court with authority on that point virtually every time a federal court to my knowledge has been confronted with a phrase resulting from it has translated that to mean proximate ca in this case the least terminations as this court noted been leery of in no weekly one the least germination happened in july two thousand and ten at that point mrs weasley had absolutely no liability or any prospect of liability that you could only ten months later or excuse me seven and nine months later she receives fraudulent transfers determined to be actually fraudulent lariat a cruise acclaimed ultimately wins litigation and gets the a million dollars i would eight principle plus interest million dollars inch in round numbers that we're talking about today the judge fisher you know presented the first time struggled with the question of is this does a landlord limitation apply in this circumstance aren't there two issues under five of to be six issue one does the move to judgment from the state court relate back to the least terminations and two should resulting from the termination of a lease so what does the real key phrase the one to focus in on is resulting from now granted with respect to mrs wigley we are neither a less or she's not a lessee there's been no privity of contract i think the causation the problem the resulting from causation which is a narrow much narrower than arising from or derived from or ultimately resulting from has to be looked at temporarily yeah i was go ok it's generally accepted i believe that a guarantor yes is going to have is going to be subject to the can absolutely no no question so the guarantors obligation arises from a guarantee or act ok so why is that any less tenuous the statute doesn't say guarantor it doesn't say lessee it just says resulting from the determination of a lease so if i'm understanding your argument correctly it shouldn't apply to guarantors either because their obligations arise from the guarantee me not from the lease let me let me  who's liable longer than the question i really have is whether or not this move to judgment is really an enforcement or collection mechanism not liability under the least well i would  t allow the claim of a less or for damages resulting from the terminations of a lease correct and well and the question is damages or some other form of compensation or as you just  an inforce meant collection well it's one of the mechanisms that a creditor has to do to prevent a debtor from from evading now whether we call it damages or simply give it back  whately give it back in his case no he was allowed the full benefit of the landlord limitation whatever liability he had for that first of all he did he doesn't have to go back he gave it away in the first place he would have to take it back rather than give it back he's the transfer or but also but it was ok whatever whatever his liability would have been under the two point three million the f t of the fr transfer liability would have been overlapping so basically i was treated as one complete and as this court wrote in the in weekly one it basically has to mr wakely it's the same debt overlapping rationales for the debt but the her cross appeal other than to say that it appears that that she is shifted her position she's quoting a memo line on a check that doesn't exist and for the first time this paid in full thing in the check misquoted is the whole basis for her appeal i think the judge correctly allocated or didn't allocate michael with lease payment as some kind of credit against against mrs weekly's liability i have a minute twenty left  little bit differently was the accord and satisfaction argument raised before the bankruptcy court i believe it was there's a couple different summary or there's a summary judgment motion in i believe we raised that had co coun l on that so i i i almost certainly believe it was you know is the according satisfaction argument different than the claims already been paid in full this thanks and that i'm not sure there's a difference but a cordon satisfaction has different elements and i read the brief to just say we think the claims been paid in full right and i agree with you your honor i believe it makes no material distinction in argument we feel the claim has already been paid can you explain  rule that there's a zero claim he feels that there should be some amount owed and why does he feel that way i don't know your honor these are just comments made in summary judgment well here's my concern are reviewed the opinion i don't see the words according satisfaction anywhere in here so in his opinion at least it does not appear to me that he addressed the issue and i guess my question to you is was that an oversight on his part because you believe that you raised the issue of accordance satisfaction in front of him and he did not address it or was it not right or was it not raised i believe it was resign or and i believe there's an implicit billet he of the payment issue that was those amounts if the payment was credited against the person point yes you're right you know we stipulated the three different scenarios that could result from the claim objection and if i'm understanding is decision frankly what he said with respect to that argument was that the amount he was awarding was less than the amount that would be allowed if he did credit the payments so we he did not address the credit all right here he addressed that i was  speaking of the payment from microwave lease should that be applied to the joint several judgment in satisfy that completely meaning because michael legally made the full claim payment in the point and your argument is that the payment from the mr wigley bankruptcy estate should first be applied to that smaller circle i believe is a three point two million total there was about a two point two million dollar germination judgment and then the joint and several judgment from the fraudulence really doesn't add to the two point two million that's just a collection mechanism to reduce the two point two isn't that correct correct your honor the court this court held that those are one of the same so they only you know the i guess without express we were ruling that they considered both judgments to be the same same amount under the is the ninth circuit said a plain reading of the section which is five zero to be six underscores that if it is the claim of the last or which is larry had not the status of the last c or its agent or guarantee or guarantor that triggers the put ability of the cap the section has to predicate its claim of the last or in damages resulting from the terminations of a lease of real property so she didn't have any liability under the lease at the time the state court judgment was or correct correct and by that i mean the lease breach of two point three million so the move was an effort and to enforce transfers to be applied to that state court judgement so what's her liability under the lease that would that would then trigger the application of this fibro to be six there is no liability under the least however that doesn't matter because the reason we're here is because there was a default under a lease for which she is now being pursued moved to doesn't create a separate cause of action it relates to an underlying cause of action which is the least the fault that mr weekly was to go if let's take this out of the context of bankruptcy pretend mr wigley has never filed mrs wigley has never filed if mr wigley paid the two point three million what happens to the move to judgment in our opinion the move to judgment is satisfied in full because the underlying claim was paid in full moved is just a remedy to protect creditors and million dollars she's not liable for the two point three million she's liable only to the extent of the asset that was transferred to in i guess that dovetails into our  appeal in i'd like to discuss why we feel that there is no claim here that michael wade was payment under his chapter eleven plan extinguished any liability on the part of mr his argument that the claim was unforeseeable because the underlying obligation was extinguished by mike weekly's payments to the a president you know i want to stop you there because you made the comment that you think that the claim is  o then why did you stipulate that if the cap applies to her it would be three hundred and eight thousand i mean i guess you entered into these stipulated numbers whatever they might be the amounts are unimportant but you know there is no option for it to be zero so is that an argument we've been should look at this point since the party seemed to agree as to the amounts that are owed well we we made the argument to claim a zero in the against that argument and then it moved on to if the cap applies what are the three different scenarios so it never got to the issue that you propose here which is five zero to be six doesn't apply and therefore since he paid the claim or liability is now zero that's that's our cross that's our cross peel that's not quite the argument though is it the argument is if i mean the move to action or the lease action the lease action so you're admitting then that the move to action is derivative from the lease well i'm saying that the claim against the purported claim against mrs wigley in this case is not a separate claim it's arising from or stemming from the underlying lease germination judgment in state court so i don't know if derivatives the right word but it's not a underlying action well i think it's nails that if it was in a venn diagram it would be the smaller i call it the subs where they call derivative subs a smaller number we think we understand ok  so the argument in the distinction here is we're not arguing that mr whipple is discharge got mrs whately off the hook we're not arguing that we understand that the discharge has no effect to a non bankruptcy party what we are joint several judgment in which is wife was liable so that payment in his bankruptcy fully satisfied the claim in since she was joint and several she received the benefit of that payment so upon his confirmed plan and  subsequent payment that claim in the underlying claim of move which is part of that claim was paid in full that's the argument why we feel there is no claim here by later you are you saying that you never get the six because would be one no i'm saying the distinction is a joint and several liability under the fraudulent transfer judgment if there was a guarantor cousin weekly and there was no joint and several liability with cars waiting for him to show up in the case by the way something else going to happen i'm sure you know or thirty five year in tours you know if only one of the five had a fraudulent transfer or move to judgment larry could pursue the other and get four separate landlord caps against the other four guarantors so the distinction here is that joint and several move to judgment that that makes lariats claim zero in the case in under the five zero to be six we cited a case where it garnishee a corporation that failed to garnish the judgment debtors wages was liable under a  garnishment statute and that corporation filed and was availed of the fable to be six cap that case is the main case so isn't is an analogous fact pattern the corporation that failed to garnish was liable under a separate state garnishment statute had nothing to do with the underlying judgment it just failed to follow the collection statute so it was thus deemed to be liable under the judgement so in that corporation minute warning i'm going to take a party of time right right off the bat so we can save some time for you maybe i want you to answer judge show dean's hypothetical that she put the opposing counsel if we were outside of the bankruptcy context and we have a two point two million dollars judgment for the least germination and we have the million dollar judgment for the move to transfers right if mr wiggily had paid the entire two point two million dollar judgment wouldn't that eliminate the move to judgment correct because its effect would in fact pay the debt of a code debtor as well because it's all it's all cool it's a collection of vice it's not it's not an independent liability it's a collection device and therefore i mean i understand it's a liability but it's a collection device and therefore if you collect your two point two you can also collect the million well that's right the fraudulent transfer gives arise to a code or liability not under a guarantee or a lease but simply under fraudulent transfer laws and  if you pay the whole liability you're taking care of your code it or as well i don't think that determines the issue here because we still have this question does the lab does the liability of mrs whately result from well but we don't get there if the underlying claim has been paid in full i guess the question is is a payment pursuant to a chapter eleven plan of something less than the original amount owed because a five zero to be six is camp is that payment in full well it's how i understand your position and you can tell you can take that two point three million and imagine it as a bar graph and slice off a little segments as it gets paid but ultimately it hasn't been fully paid there's still plenty that lariat has to walk away from here  wanted to make a couple points in in by way of quick rebuttal number one is of course through the miracle of electronics your court documents are in p d f format you can search mrs weekly's trial memos and ours for that matter before judge can tell this accordance at his faction is an entirely new brainstorm on appeal second thing there's a the the analogy between a garnishee and a fraudulent transfer it doesn't work an uncompleted garnishment the money that's being held  or should be held by a garnishee immediately becomes a property estate under section five forty one on a filing of a bankruptcy case it can be recovered by a trustee under a turn over action whereas a fraudulent transfer does not immediately shorter had already been avoided by the state court action so actually that would mean a state succeed to the interest of your client in that transferred property well that's a very interesting question that i think and we don't have time for a little bit of extra time but  thank you your honors my final point is mrs wigley is a transferee was found liable under the provisions of moved therefore the fraudulent transfer judgment entitles lariat to recover judgment for the value of the astra transferred is adjusted under paragraph c or the amount necessary to satisfy the creditors claim whichever is less so the question becomes the claim that's being satisfied the one against mr hundreds stand that but can you explain to me which you believe applies the bankruptcy court determine the allowed claim after much up and down litigation so down to the amount of allowed under five about to be six so his bankruptcy altered the state court judgment and determined that his claim was the five hundred forty five or forty six thousand plus interest so you know the better part of six hundred thousand dollars was paid and that was in satisfaction of lariats claim as adjusted under the chapter eleven bankruptcy that michael legally filed so under moved where it's been paid the claim here should be zero thank you thank you you thank