so in this case we do not dispute that the monitoring of a tracking device with anwar consists home constituted a th amendment violation however not every th amendment violation requires suppression of evidence in fact our case was very clear that the suppression of evidence has always been our last resort not our st impulse the core rationale of the exclusionary rule is to deter police misconduct and when that mission would not be served courts recognize that the evidence should not be suppressed because of the high social cost of allowing an obviously guilty person to go on punished which is precisely what would happen here there are three well established exceptions to the exclusionary rule two of those exceptions apply here inevitable discovery and atten let's take inevitable discovery st when evidence inevitably would have been discovered the public interest in having juries receive all probative evidence of a crime outweighs the deterrent effect of suppressing the evidence if there is a reasonable probability that the evidence in question would have been discovered by lawful means then suppression is not warranted here agents had already identified watkins as the main suspect based on her role as a supervisor in the post office and turks dreamily nervous reaction when she encountered postal inspectors on the day she took the packages because of their suspicions agents looked up her background information which included her home address all three agents who testified at the suppression hearing explained that their most likely next step  find the packages was to go to watch consult to talk to her under those circumstances it is inevitable that the evidence would have been discovered the district court concluded that inevitable the question that you're asking of course is a question that involves analyzing whether or not this strictly falls under in a motion to suppress is this considered a question of law or a question of fact if i understand your honor correctly  this is to be the question of what that next step is would be a question of fact but it is well supported by the record that the the next step itself all of the agents testified that that is what their next step would have been what the district court determined i think is  that that the aspect that he said was speculative was what her reaction would have been not instead what the agents intended to do it if you if you understand that  can go into that more if we understand the distinction but the district court didn't give any reason or explanation for why that is why would have reacted differently the doctrine of inevitable discovery applies where there is every wherever there's a reasonable probability that the ordinary investigation of leads already in the possession of agents would have resulted in the discovery of evidence and that standard is certainly met here the agents already possessed the home address for their main suspect on the record reflects the agent's wanted to interview her quickly there was testimony from agent that he would have gone to that they would have gone to walk and home that very same night because quote it would have been exponentially harder to locate the package if they did not act quickly and if agents had knocked on her her door that same night it is reasonably probable that she would have responded in the same way by immediately knowledge ing her responsibility for the boxes mis gallery what i'm what i was referring to earlier this is robert  reconsideration order the district court right it is purely speculative to conclude that the law enforcement officers inevitably would have gone to defendants rather than to conduct a knock and when they completed their search on success think that that would be a finding of fact that would need to be found to be clearly erroneous but i as a judge carnes pointed out it's not very well supported with facts from the record witnesses as they testify did he not yes he did and he very found he found the free agents testimony to be credible and found as a fact that they would have gone anyway and then made by the magistrate judge and substituted his own finding without hearing the witnesses lied would that not be an error of law  understood it read it to you just district judge said in substance that it was purely speculative that the agent i would have gone to the defendants how to question this walking even if the before had not gone off is that the right standard i thought that the standard was not quote whether it was purely using the purely speculative standard rather than a standard of reasonable probability do i have that correct you do you s argument that inevitable discovery would justify not suppressing the evidence in this case was a recognition of the fact that it's not actually the knock and talk which led to which would have  which would have arguably led to the discovery of the evidence in this case but it's actually the knock and talk and the series of events that followed because the knock and talk did not actually reveal the presence of the boxes miss watkins home  or allow for the the full recorded statement that occurred in her home instead as the government asserted in its motion for reconsideration on page one that it was it had to be the knock and talk followed by the exact same unfolding of events this chain of events that the government was arguing to the court would have occurred in the same way was both appearing for knock and talk then when soon as miss watkins was clear from the threshold of her door law enforcement immediate entry into her home that is what agent had docked entry sixty nine on pages seventy and seventy one discussed as soon as miss watkins was clear from the threshold of her own law enforcement immediately entered her home and was present inside the home for two to five minutes it was also it also required law enforcement to approach their manner of questioning in a similar way where they immediately focused on wanting to see the boxes because they knew that the boxes were present in the home it also required the boxes to still be present in ms watkins home something that the the agents recognized in this investigation you can see in attachment a the government's reply brief on pages thirty six and forty one that these boxes were not actually intending to stay were to be transferred to another individual during the the recorded interview that occurred inside ms watkins home which the government has attached attachment to their reply brief the conversation at page thirty six and forty one that is where the agents are discussing with mr watkins that mr james who ultimately became the codefendant in this case was actually supposed to have collected the boxes and so this is static this isn't a static situation you know when you look at the navigable discovery cases by this court where you have at one end dealing with an inevitable discovery and in the search of a contents of a car you have the johnson case where law enforcement already had the car keys and was inevitably going to do an inventory search of the vehicle and so the contents of the car at that time are static however at the other end of the spectrum you have a case like this case and that would be the verdant case where the boxes were not statically going to remain in the home of miss watkins but law enforcement descended upon her home while the boxes were still there and that influenced both law enforcement questioning as well as miss watkins reaction and that's and that's the issue with why the court had to look at how the facts would have unfolded because it was not just a knock and talk that resulted in the discovery of this evidence it was the knock and talk plus the series of interactions that followed and the district court's finding that the government's argument below that the exact same thing would have occurred was a rejection of that not based on the credibility of the witnesses that testified before the magistrate court because the witnesses did not testify that that they would have done a knock and talk that night what they testified is that they each individually believed that would have happen so the government i mean excuse me the district court did not have to reject the magistrate judge's credibility finding about those individual  officers beliefs about what would have happened what he relied on instead the uncontested fact that the that the government witnesses supplied it was not only miss watkins whose identity and address had been looked up but also as agent rivera revealed the carrier for room eight this is the individual who actually scanned at least one of the packages as delivered that individual had been identified by law enforcement and their home address had also been looked up the district court was also i believe recognizing the fact that agent rivera told us that when the trackers began working at eight thirty in the evening the search would have had to continue for approximately two more hours so turned up empty handed at eleven at one thousand and thirty at night the idea that they would have gone then at eleven o'clock at night to miss walk ins home to conduct a knock and talk was a speculative belief that the government was asserting it specially since they had not even decided that that is in fact what they would do but this is robert look does not have to reject the exact finding that we were just talking about that their individual testimony that they would have gone that night because of the urgency of making sure they tracked down that package i just don't understand how you can say what you just said and not that not be a rejection of exactly what the magistrate well i think it was a rejection of what the magistr judge found but i don't think that it turned on the credibility of witnesses i think that it turned on the district court looking at the facts all the facts that were presented to the magistrate judge relying on his credibility findings but placing different weight on the facts as they were presented district court couldn't be cept in his credibility finding that the agents were credible when they said they would have gone to the house that night anyway and then said it was purely speculative where they that didn't sound like one but it is your honor but i believe that the distinction that i'm drawing is that the that the witness testified each individually they believed that what happened not that that would happen i mean witnesses statement that that was going to happen would just be a speculation unless there was in fact a plan for that to have already occurred and so although each of the witnesses testified that they believed that would be their next step that was just their own speculation and their own subjective belief that that's what they think would would come forward and so that's why the district court focused on the fact that to take that speculation and determine that they would have done it is is an actual speculation by the magistrate in his r and r and it's not according to the district court use the word speculation everything speculation you don't know if they had all gotten together and said let's go to her house it's only speculation but they wouldn't change their mind on the what agents were in the best position to determine what also involves a reasonable probability standard that in that case it was a reasonable probability prejudiced standard of ineffective assistance and the supreme court said that merely because you can say a reasonable probability determination is speculative and involved speculation doesn't mean that you can't make it and that you're not required to make it one way or the you can't dismiss everything as speculation and we've said that certain date is an illusion in human affairs when we make a determination about what would have happened had something been different you can't dismiss it as mere speculation mark i just believe that that the court was was recognizing the fact that the witnesses speculative prediction of what would occur is is not the sort of demonstrated historical fact that allows courts to determine what likely would have occurred and again i think that the the issue with how the government is framing the inevitable discovery doctrine is that they are they are focusing on just whether or not law enforcement would have conducted a knock and talk that miss watkins residence and and what they are ignoring is the fact that this was not a legal knock and talk in this case what agent dia testified to was after  watkins opened the door that as soon as she was no longer in the threshold of her home he and another officer immediately entered her home in order to go through the entire residence this is that pages seventy there we don't have to credit that were erroneous we found by the district judge as i say erroneous if they were inconsistent with credibility found sundin's made that hearing and we didn't have court rejected the credibility findings with respect to agent to dia and in actuality the magistrate judge credited this testimony by agent to dia you know below before the order on the motion to you do construe the light most favorable to the district court but the the same way that the district court relied on the testimony that was credited by the magistrate's court i believe that this court would do that as well and the magistrate judge and his  specifically found agent pythias testimony to be credible that testimony again said that as soon as miss watkins was clear from the threshold he and another officer entered so you can't divorce that fact which the magi strate judge which is magistrate judge credited now ultimately perhaps the magistrate judge and the district court judge found that that did not well actually the district court judge found that the consent that  miss watkins gave according to the district court was not sufficiently attenuated and so when you look at the facts and the circumstances to support the district court's finding one of the facts that you can look at is the credible testimony of agent dia that the consent that she allegedly gave only followed officers and the shalit entering her home as soon as she was clear from the threshold of the door having firearms drawn during that entry ordering the other occupants out of the home and when ms watkins attempted to walk back into her home she was specifically told she could not enter her home by definition that could have been voluntary well i believe that the court should reverse the district court's finding that this was voluntary doctrine as well as a failure to present evidence so that the court would actually be able to rely on historical facts rather than speculation about what would have occurred because of the fact that this was a dynamic situation mccrae i want to go back to a question that was earlier and that is whether or not the district court made a mistake of law in so far absent the illegality the only standard to the extent it's a standard at all that the district court seems to have employed was quote the purely speculative standard that may be a finding of fact it may be a statement of law i'm not quite sure but as i read the district court opinion and then arm the motion to reconsider never employed what seems to me that had been the appropriate legal standard reasonable probability the evidence would have been discovered absent the illegality did he employ standard and if he didn't wasn't that legal error i believe that because both parties properly briefed the court on that standard that we have no reason to believe the court did not apply that standard and his statements regarding the speculative nature of the government's argument were findings of fact they were in response to the fact that these issues had not been fully developed in the factual record about whether or not enforcement truly would have gone that evening and if they had gone at some point in time why it is that the course of events not just their arrival on the door but the course of events that got them inside must walk home  why that would be why there would be a reasonable probability that that would have actually led to the discovery of these boxes at that time just one final question about the law the district court ever construed the active and i believe before the district court and that again what the district court i think was recognising was that it was it was not just knock and talk that would have had to be pursued even though we we do not have evidence that that's ultimately what law enforcement would have done in relation to the leads that they had in their possession at that time officers were looking for it's it's very clear from the record that there was to find these boxes wherever they were she suggested that it was the presence of the box that influence the defendant's very quick admission that of her responsibility for them and i would invite your honour's to consider that the record supports that there is evidence in the record to believe that she would have had that same reaction anyway and that comes from the interaction that she had with postal inspectors earlier that very same day when they bumped into her and she reacted with such extreme nervousness that the agents described it as if she were going to faint i do think that that is an indication in the record that the court can look to to support that her speedy acceptance of responsibility for the boxes was unrelated to the presence of the boxes being so close to her because her reaction when when she had that encounter with the officers earlier in the day she was not holding the boxes at that time i also would note for the court that the plan that  appellee has spent a lot of time saying that the plan was not definitive which is the the finding that the district court made but again this court's precedents make very clear that the plan does not need to be and express stated plans instead it just needs to be reasonably likely that the officers would have been able to their ordinary investigation to end up realizing and finding that evidence ultimately was was found we would rely in all other respects unless your honour's have any questions on our brief as far as the atten n argument as well district court was making its the determination that the district court made were based on the record that it had there would not be a reason at this point to read manned and have a new hearing in the district court when it did not determine that that was necessary at the time in conclusion the supreme court has made very clear in next that suppression is quote an admittedly drastic and socially costly course here suppression would not serve to deter police misconduct which remains the core goal of the exclusionary rule accordingly suppression is an unnecessary measure here and we ask this court to rule the evidence admissible because what consist consent was sufficiently attenuated from the illegal tracking and the agents inevitably would have gone to her home for a knock and talk regard less of the tracker having alerted its location at her home thank you