circuit did exactly what jackson says not to do in this county evidence before the trial court relied on an extra record declaration that was submitted only a b s and based on there you know there's this the attorney general suggest that we should ah well it's a new rule that convictions can you know are insufficient if they rely on illogical irrational and unconvincing evidence i don't think so this is not a ts situation  but you get to the end we look at all fifteen could you conclude that for each individual thing it's possible equally possible that it's innocent but we put all those things together the likelihood of each one being innocent is more than i what is what is the debt if you assume that that means something is my client was did that which he may not have been are you have to assume that he was angry enough about it that to want to do something you have to assume that something was to kill as opposed to maybe threaten the proof of that putting i think is if you look at our brief it pages thirty one thirty four our national brief we have three cases that we discuss pennsylvania supreme court insufficiency basis where the evidence is of least as convincing  as the evidence is here in particular you have the mcfadden case which is the site of a pennsylvania supreme court you have a man who drove the shooter in this court with the murder weapon in his car after the shooter had tried to kill the victim i don't want to speak to you to my phone and you know all the time you have to have the words but i would ask the court to ask you one set of facts we more likely than not even in combination what set of facts put together don't lead to multiple other just have a series of innocent acts with multiple innocent inferences and put that all together and say well you must have been guilty because he was out on the street the middle of the night up you know that and that's what happened you this is a real travesty this is fifteen years of this man's life sufficiency issues look to under state law but the end result has to rise to issue a federal constitutional law is clearly pronounced by the supreme court in this state application of that insofar it accomplishes a due process violation  in violation of jackson has to be an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law but the more that's an issue here is the law of specific intent to kill that would be quicker than what the law of what you have to prove to get a criminal conviction comes into it under the due process up or possibly just go out with him while he shakes him down to get the money that he believes he's owed how does this record get beyond a reasonable doubt the specific intent to kill that's that's the concern jackson the court said the constitution prohibits the criminal conviction of any person except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt so we have to go to the elements of where the crime are they get to see if they do nothing should this be really productive in terms of helping us get last look at whether or not there are innocent explanations or inference just that or that that are indicative of innocence rather than guilt here's the language from the majority opinion a federal he just we're faced with a record of historical facts majority is the majority opinion stated and now and i have to you know full disclosure that he still with degrees of you know not necessarily have stood innocence it dealt well what happened in that case the majority opinion thought compared the jones in the district court because dobson dobbs testimony the woman who gave these she used the word us not him ok was her testimony was throughout was about the morning in question and about the collective experience of the three of them her walker and the defendant we woke up in the same house we got up together we walked the kentucky fried chicken we stood there it's we it's the three of them she's so it's reasonable to in you know to the extent that the u s supreme court has stated that in the in the context of criminal statutory presumptions that that and the intent to kill again it's a case where the issue was complicated by hades morris but the issue was the trial council's ineffective assistance for not objecting to a jury verdict which totally muddled the vicarious liability and specific intent first  a was angry at the this evidence that this is who may be a buddies and the both angry at sea and a is clearly the killer and you're saying if evidence is there to suggest that be that walker wants to kill williams is that enough to say that walker the johnson intends to kill him and this is that's the gap in the seat all the time with juries and the problem is going to be the standard love inference that the people were laughing because they didn't take it seriously they didn't take him seriously wanted to kill the media take him seriously they were just laughing they were laughing you know you don't have to go that far they were laughing and for whatever reason this is soon that or any but you get in these situations where a fine line comes up between whether or not somebody really intended and then didn't use the phrase to turn some room and someone up or to really hurt these a v had the specific intent to kill it's a very narrow that with regard to the more likely than not specific specific intent to kill oh you've got to reset a very suspicious circumstances now the defendant is involved in a fatal killing but not the actual shooter and were not the involvement is so great jackson sufficiency question however my position is that when you apply the correct standards and what you're left with is speculation and surmise that a state court's failure to apply jackson and find speculation constructed possession this thing about the argument in a bar and i i think i may explode if i don't say this and i hope it's clear my brave nobody heard what was said for a whole we know mr johnson w