overtime were they were subject to unhealthy working conditions and are allegation is that it's not only the direct employers of the workers who are responsible but it's also complicated than it seems there are basically two issues first this court doesn't even need to reach the merits because it is clear that the district court should not have actual size jurisdiction over the exclusively state  understand exactly what's at issue here the company fashion twenty as i understand it is a retailer of women's clothing is that correct forever fashion twenty one has a factory at which it makes clothes is that correct well that that is correct that they do not have in fact the ok to stand your theory that fashion twenty one and turn these people who did the slowing and therefore is liable for whatever claims the slower is have against their immediate employer the throwing contract that is one set of theor to be trotted whatever the nz if any do you have showing that fashion twenty one was somehow involved in the terms and rule eleven you've investigated this before you fall and my question to you is do you have any evidence showing that it's fact fashion twenty one played a controlling or significant impact look we've got to keep the prices low we don't want you to pay these people who are showing more than four dollars an hour do you have anything like that well at this point in the case when there's been no deaths discovery conducted we do not have that particular fact but you do have any then back to the question jurisdiction though this is a threshold issue and the us supreme court and this court has repeatedly said that that requirement is inflexible and without exception if the district c important provision of twenty us but all of the remaining factors as well the second question is really walking predominate the only remaining claims in the case this is different from when the case was originally filed before the appellant filed their rule forty one notice of dismissal that will forty one notice a dismissal was therefore ineffective the answer had been filed now it is true that when the case was pending before judge matsch the parties stipulated to an extension of to answer judge mathis did not permit it he did not sign off on that stipulation and it is true then that the answer filed by primarily and called was late under the order by judge matsch this case was then transferred as you know to judge real nevertheless there is nothing in rule forty one that says that qualifies the requirement that the appellant either get a stipulation from the party by the parties or an order from the court to dismiss the case once the question your honor if the appellant believes that the answer was should not have been filed it was incumbent upon them to seek relief from judge real on the other hand judge real could have on his own motion stricken that answer neither of those things happened there is nothing in rule forty one jurisdiction that is precisely my point and therefore it was appropriate and not an abuse of discretion for judge real to hear the motions as well be fixed because the jurisdiction over the claims against crimea lento carries with it jurisdiction over the claims against the fashion twenty one defendants settle the record reflects in fact they asked if i was represented the judge real i don't know that they have been or not i do know is that they have not been prosecuted i do know that they have not been prosecuted i believe the record reflects that the case was j c i sense that if this thing goes back all you're going to have a state law claims remaining is that right assuming the appellant's do not prosecute whatever claims they may have hanging out there against crime you let it go that is the case however that being the case and assuming there is then an analysis on whether or not it's appropriate for a judge real to retain your stiction let me address that first of all i differ with mr about whether or not this case truly involves complex there's nothing either unsettled or complex about the questions raised by their negligence claims the negligence per se claims or the claims under business and professions code section seven thousand two hundred and i think there's nothing magical about their claims under the labor code just for you amended in two thousand by way of assembly built assembly bill six thirty three that there is no appellate decision that you clarified exactly you made the point precisely that i was going to make an ad is the complaint is unambiguous about the relationships between these parties fashion twenty one is a retailer it purchases finished goods from manufactures some of those manufacturers contract with some companies to perform certain selling operations and the complaint is unambiguous that the appellants were employed by disowning companies the question here is not one of fact the question is one simply of law what are the legal consequences under the plaintext of the labor code of those relationships in order for the facts when there is some confusion regarding the definition of been kind of undermine your argument that it's clear whether or not you can be liable i think it does not and here's why i will grant you that i think that there is some confusion although the confusion may be been created by the parties in this case there's some confusion about the definition of government manufacturing and labor because section twenty six seventy one however and i think our briefs fairly exhaustively cover our positions on that even under the code it makes no difference because in order for fashion twenty one to be deemed the employer of the appellant's in this case two other things must occur under rule under section twenty six seventy seven a joint liability provision under which they suit two other things are required number one fashion twenty one must have contracted with an unregistered garment manufacture and number two that unregistered garment manufacture must have employed the plaintiffs you know or you turned generally doesn't agree with your interpretation whom and who employed whom fashion twenty one is two steps removed from the employers of these appellants section twenty six seventy seven any joint liability provision is absolutely clear contractual critique is required in order for joint liability to attach there is no contractual privity between fashion twenty one and the employers of the appellant's who allegedly deny them overtime and minimum wage compensation the far given that i think making  companies the joint employer of the appellant's and jointly liable for any wages that they were denied what the appellants are asking this court to do is to rewrite twenty six seventy seven essay and to eliminate the contractual pretty requirement that is i think that's left out the word when you read it these parties that is that forth in this very well crafted sixty five fifty page complaint fashion twenty one cannot be liable for the unpaid wages of these appellants that's why i think this case was dismissed that doesn't have anything to do with what you are confusing the state laws to what these statutes mean that's correct the only confusion if there is any is about the definition of government manufacturing and that question is simply whether or not back in twenty one it is invasion garment manufacturing to begin with because the predicate for liability the first predicate for liability under twenty six seventy seven any joint employer provision is fashioned by one must first be engaged in government manufacturing to begin with if it is not especially doesn't apply so we suggesting any person is contracting to have those operations performed brings fashion twenty one within the definition because they contract to have operations performed as the california attorney general agree with your interpretation of government factor or with the  doesn't make any difference because i'm willing for the purposes of this this argument to grant that fashion twenty one falls within that definition there's still two other requirements for liability to attach and the complaint is clear that those elements are not satisfied in this case  they are first question twenty one must contact with an unregistered government manufacture which is not alleged and number two even if it did in the contract with an unregistered gun of manufacture the appellant seeking relief must be the employee twenty six seventy seven a any person engaged in the business of our manufacturing who contracts with any other person similarly engaged who has not registered with the commissioner etc shall be deemed an employer and shall be jointly liable with such other person how do i how do i know what california courts are going to do when they get deal with this tactic the stack it's obviously represents some sort of a compromise between the conflicting and first and might i still come back to the conferees alleged well the california attorney general starts right out i like to read the arguments as the california labor code establishes that a person who contracts with another person for selling or otherwise making garments for sale or resale may be jointly liable for the wages of the government workers employed by the second person yes i believe that supports that supports my point your honor that is the second person here we have in there is actually about the definition which accepts i for a moment but nevertheless i believe his brief supports my argument that the first person who contracts with the second person may be jointly liable for which in our violations committed by the second person and may be liable to the second person's have been jointly liable for the wage now of violations of the unregistered some facilities with which they contracted what they are asking you to do is to extend life really to retailers i mean the california attorney general saying your view of twenty six seventy seven is wrong and we don't take any position at all on the factual issues of whether they can prove their case with respect i believe the attorney general is saying that our position on the definitional question is wrong right the definitional question whether or not we attorney general has said is a wrong interpretation of state law if i heard the other side correctly the state attorney general is dealing with point one well the definition of definition was properly understood by the district court yet the site says yes but there are three get briefs and therefore it should be deemed waived but but the spot well what if we go and we look at that to see whether the other side is right is that right it's wrong you have trouble on points two and three as they call them any other person similarly engaged was not registered with the commissioner is not an exclusive way that liability can attach there are other ways to absolutely that's absolutely correct that's absolutely correct and that's where you get into the construction of these  the last case on our calendar for oral arguments today brody versus united states district court having been removed is clements versus alameda and we'll wait for a second while the high school students stretch their