a security number we have been able to locate and the government has not pointed to any privacy act decision upholding broad public disclosure of those numbers and that's for good reason these identifiers are and we ask that this court reverse the records dismissal of his complaint as to the routine use exception which the government relies so heavily on this cannot fall within that exception for two friends but it carries has not resolved the meaning of compatible and it need not do so here under either definition of that term whether it's doctrine or misuse it has to meaningfully converge with the purpose for which the information was collected or whether it's judge williams this year that there can be simply no conflicts between the collection and the disclosure the appellant would prevail under the meaningfully converge standard he would prevail because individuals do not the general public does concede that the defendants could disclose mr chalker his social security number to financial and governmental institutions my understanding and it's not in the record in this is exactly why we would like to remain under factual development as that  agency is within the treasury department are routinely sends information securely to banks and other financial institutions on a bi weekly basis and if this court were to adopt judge william says view that there simply can be no conflict between the disk the purpose for which the information was collected and the disclosure we submit that there is a conflict between the purpose of collection the purpose of disclosure here because once a conflict  yes because although the agency has collected the information in order to effectuate the sanctions regime and it has reported that it has released that information to effectuate the sanctions regime public availability of such a scared number actually undermines identification of individuals on that list because it allows people to impersonate them and to trade and it increases the likelihood that people will conduct transactions in their name which is exactly what mr  second guess the the judgment of the agency but just as a commonsense principle you know it individuals delegates ask for social security numbers routinely and engaging in small transactions in which financial institutions when otherwise be involved so if i go down to a corner store and i want to buy soda from someone although i have an obligation not to transact with people on the on the sdn list i'm not going to ask him his social security number and if he gave it to me probably wouldn't give me his real one so having social security numbers publicly available simply doesn't further the objective for which information is collected and again it actually undermines the individuals have the same name again things are going to be aired financial institutions are going to be involved in those transactions and they will have individual social security numbers so they can assure that you know accounts are not opened in our name or that large scale transactions are not occurring and in terms of the sort of smaller you know cash based transactions that banks are not involved in people do not mean every user requires social security there's no reason why the general public needs that met when i applied for the bar i just a matter of routine credit check or had to submit or credit or or and your credit report reflects whether or not you are on the s t m lists there's a publication that we say in our brief that specifically makes that dollars to identity thieves also with the statute of limitations does not provide an alternative basis for four months because it is not clear from the record that mr t checkley has not felt any such of limitations and this court has for the government i'd like to begin with the question of the role of social security information in the implementation of overacting and the assertion that it undermines the efficacy of the program that is not supported by the facts on the ground but in this case and in other social security information is used not only to write down to five those individuals who are properly subject to sanctions but also importantly to distinguish individuals who are not as you mentioned a drug and there are a number of individuals who ha similar names individuals who have many aliases especially the individuals who are subject to this list have been often have many aliases or many known birth dates and that information is not always enough to be able to identify both the proper individual subject to the sanction and also to distinguish individuals who are not and it is part of overtaxed consideration and very reasonably so that this program be targeted in such a way that it is limited only to those individuals properly subject to the sanction it is a very significant and burdensome sanction is a probation on engaging in any commercial transactions in the united states and as a result the agency has a significant interest in ensuring that it is only applied to those people to whom it is properly to whom were properly subject to the prohibition what was the first system of records notice that soon that public disclosure been systems of record notice in place long before that since long before mr to talkies information was published and overact has always considered the publication and dissemination of this information as part of the implementation of sanctions to be security it does reference personal information information that would be relevant to the holding of assets and i think given the use of social security information that is pervasive in the weigh in with promulgated that regulation and so that you know that that issue can be debated in the air and in the agency can take into consideration people's privacy and other concerns and though this has been going on for a long time and certainly is covered by the system of records notice that was at issue in two thousand and ten and we haven't seen a direction or debate about it under that system of records notice either the your considers these both to be implementations and also ongoing investigations they continue to collect information from financial institutions and other kinds of entities about instances in which individuals who are subject to sanction attempt to engage in transactions in the united states they also continue to collect information about individuals subject to sanctions that might speak to the propriety of continuing those sanctions so the fact that they're disseminat information to entities that might be transacting or and where individuals might be attempting to transact business with those is part of ongoing investigation by the agency and certainly falls within the system of records notice that was published at that time and if i may speak just just briefly to the assertion that somebody who is buying something at the corner store doesn't need this kind of information i would say in response that the information is disseminated much more widely than just financial institutions and government institutions it goes to car dealerships to real estate agents to employers to landlords and and those are the kinds of institutions that are also obligated not to transact with individuals subject to this list and ofac gets compliance calls from car dealerships all the time so it is certainly the case that this information is being used by entities more broadly than just financial institutions in order to implement these kinds of sanctions and for their purpose of buying something at the corner store overact issues what are called living licenses which allow people to barring publicising a list of names you know when the internet and then if somebody sees the name and they don't know whether it's the right person they could do run a credit check or contact ofac and ofac could look up in their database and confirm whether it's the same person right it's certainly true that other systems might be workable but the question before this court is whether this permissible this is a permissible routine use under the privacy act and in order to answer that question we look both to whether it's compatible with the purpose for which the information is collected which certainly is in this instance and secondly whether it's consistent with the purposes of the privacy act and the purpose of the privacy act is not to restrict the disclosure of information to the least intrusive means possible the purposes of the privacy act are to routinized the collection meaning and dissemination of personal information by the government and there are a number of exceptions within the judgement docs dissent in national association of letter characters in which she discusses the routine uses and disclosure of information are are permissible under the privacy act when they're justified by a substantial public interest and that the point is not to prohibit disclosure it's to ensure that when the government does disclose information it has made a consideration of the substantial public interest and a consideration of the privacy interests at stake as well and certainly in this case there is a substantial public interest in the disclosure of information and there is consideration of the fact that this kind of information will well for the purposes of the ofac sanctions program by ensuring that individuals who are properly subject to sanction are identified and also individuals who are not properly subject to sanction are distinguished because as i say this is a very burn in some obligation not to be able to engage in any transact commercial transactions in the united states so the age under i would think that what you would be considering is whether the agency has made a reasonable determination that the interests at stake here is compatible as you knew that the dissemination of information is compatible with disclosure and considering that substantial public interest at stake and whether the agency appropriately consider the public interest on one side and privacy for something i see my time has expired ofac to for example distribute flyers or put up posters or with someone social security number or included for example their d n a profile or their fingerprint and that simply cannot be what in a meaningful way rather than preventing individuals on this specially does appear nationals list from gauging in transactions actually increases the likelihood that transactions in their name will take place with their  what about the idea that part of the policy here is to prevent innocent people from being in ensnared who are of the same name yes but on the other hand i mean that is a valid government interest on the other hand you know opec gets calls all the time and it's not clear that so sure that the public availability of social security numbers as opposed to the availability to government institutions and financial institutions who would be running these identity checks well what about the