i'm explicitly admitting to these facts and i think these facts are consistent with a statute that is about fraud seems to me like it's all but  you read backs they actually they were in the er and they complain they definitely all of the facts if you accept it all of them they're definitely lots of broad there and then he goes on to say that those facts are within the phrasing of his that it is about i think that just to make sure i understand your position is the parties can agree that there was fraud what they can submit to the judge would include that agreement that there was fraud along with other things but if but if what they submitted to the judge and the judge finds doesn't itself include the findings of fraud in your position would be i mean that the judge that the judge may have decided you may have been willing your he may be willing to sign this based on agreement with that not every fact that he may have admitted to would be a fact that would support fraud but certainly some of the facts that he admitted to would support fraud and he goes further and says i admit that that these  signed having had an explicit sort of finding a fraud and that's not good and that's what you have to have i think both oh i see how much time is up you please the court mark edwards appearing for apparently fund management international initially i think i would be remiss if i didn't went out to the court that this matters twice i'd like to address perhaps i think the central issue which is on appeal here which is the sufficiency of the stipulation of facts and i think that based on the discussion have you with my colleague in his opening remarks that that and the comments of this court has appeared to be the central issue and really what it boils down to was whether or not a stipulation of all facts that support all the claims in a complaint should be deemed sufficient and another way of putting that is does the fact that the parties voluntarily stipulated to all facts supporting all claims in the state court complaint is that any less effective then if the parties had decided to call them through a mob multi page complying that has i think in excess of one hundred and eighty aircraft and hundreds of factual allegations and had it gone to the trouble of actually determining or attempting to determine what it was that the parties did or didn't want to stipulate to now suffice to say if if the of palance did not want to stipulate to certain facts in the state or why they certainly didn't didn't have to  they could have elected to negotiate the settlement and the stipulation for entry of judgment such that only those facts which they were willing to stipulate to were included in those documents and  then that way if they truly intended not to stipulate to facts that would support a basis for a for fraud and for not just charge ability under five hundred and twenty three they they several years before deciding to settle the case you know what they intended and so i would submit and as i think judge gould and judge lee pointed out the fact that there is a stipulation to all  facts supporting all the claims in the state court complaint doesn't make the stipulation advanced effective and doesn't negate the fact that a moment the facts stipulated to are clearly and i don't think there's any  and those facts are clearly identified in the bankruptcy courts findings of fact and conclusions of law so there is no misunderstanding here is the what facts were being relied upon by the by the bankruptcy court when it went back and reviewed the stipulated facts i would also point out and i and i believe one of the justice if i mentioned this earlier that it wasn't just that the yangs stipulated to all the facts supporting the claims in the state court complaint but that but paragraph twelve of the settlement agreement goes further it says that they're doing so and they're admitting that the facts create liability and are within the meaning of section five hundred and twenty three dollars and so if there is any dispute over what they intended and that there was a stipulation to facts that would support fraud claims then the documents so that makes it clear that that that in fact that's what they did that there was a stipulation of facts and among those facts there was a stipulation that there was liability under section five hundred and twenty three dollars and with respect to the issue raised as to whether or not the judge made itself briefs indicate that that it is possible to have the application of collateral stoffel in connection with a stipulated judgment and they stipulated judgment is entered based upon a stipulation of the parks and in this case there was a stipulation for entry of judgment which provided for judgment to be enter based upon all the facts  it did so based upon the stipulation for entry of judgment and so as a result the judgment is based upon the stipulation of judgment which in turn is based upon the stipulated facts that are contained in both and why is that is that because we're assuming that those are usually met because of us have made it just seemed odd to me that they never discussed those elements in the well  large part because the case is going on as long as it has that we actually ended up with with two two banks the court judges in connection with this matter but i believe the judge russell in part i believe deal and had done so in the context of the application collateral stuff whether or not it it's or should be a fly and that it had indicated whether whether that's what he understands the mandate is and then he believes that this court because artie reviewed the record and determined that there is one issue of collateral style that needs to be that needs to be addressed and so he limits russell had in mind now i would add your honor that appellant raised this issue in front of judge russell and took the position and i should be clear that that my colleague i think misstated the fact appellee didn't take the position that the hearing and that it necessarily need to be limited it certainly wasn't for us to make that determination that was the bankruptcy courts decision yes russell made it imminently clear from the minute we returned to his court that he believed that this court's mandate limited limited when it is that he was to consider the evidence true here or however he did allow he did allow  and if you want to raise other issues raised and i would i would point out to this court that appellant did not raise those elements in the trial for it did not contest the issues of actually litigator necessarily decided  with respect to the application of collateral stoppel it only raised the issue of whether or not the the findings were specific enough in other words that that issue that i think we spend most of our time on today which is whether or not the stipulation of all  st paragraph the settlement agreement includes mrs yes and so one would argue that the use of yang in the settlement even includes this is yet also paragraph three of the settlement agreement contains a series of essentially restrictive covenants that that mrs yang was bound by in other words there were provisions to ensure that the yangs did not set up new companies and and not use of funds derived from those new companies to satisfy the settlement  appeal but it clearly indicates mrs yang had had those obligations what what what what really is is the only real issue here is the fact that mrs yang and there is no dispute that  maybe party to the stipulation for entry of judgment but that's one thing and to say that this is young wasn't part of the settlement is another and i think that's the whole point of the perfidy argument your honor is that she's they intended to exclude her from the judgment that's the testimony not that they intended to exclude her she was being that he indicated mr walker indicated that mrs yang that they had agreed after my agreed actually does that make a difference to your legal argument that you know your legal argument that she found because of pretty i that's what your legal argument or that your legal argument of her being found of her being subject to collateral stoffel turn on the fact of whether or father regardless of whether she got any of these other things well i think it's an independent argument i do believe the bad along with some with supporters but i think separate from the pretty argument the fact did she did she was also a debtor in the bankin you're you're pretty arguing need no way you could actually somebody even if you wanted to and i think i think you're you're that's true i think you're going to argue that means there's no way she could have been excluded she could have done whatever she wanted and she still would have got roped