pursuant to the worker's compensation act and as a result of the verdict and settlement in this case just as brief background ronald there was a iron worker injured on a construction received the pain the verdict of sixty four million dollars post trial we settled with the partisan box after settling that matter we satisfied the workers compensation really in terms of what benefits had already been paid by the workers compensation and sure and we moved for attorney fees with respect to the future savings in terms of what the employer area medical expenses the trial court granted our motion awarded those fees on appeal as the court knows area rector does not challenge the attorney fees with respect to savings for future losses but challenges the fees with respect to medical expenses that's the issue before this court and this is an issue of of section b which is the a political statute here the first two paragraphs of section b are the ones that are in play here i think it's important that they be read together obviously a part  of the statutory scheme and there are two separate paragraphs in this section b but the same time they cover separate topics or ask that is of the section dealing the first reimbursed there the employer isn't totally reimbursement for what it has already paid to the employee and what it will have to be paid in the future and again because we're talking about payments to the employee in large part we're talking about a lost wages lost income council though if you try medicals were included in that settlement haven't the attorney fees already been paid on that there were attorney fees paid on that sub but it's our position that section b requires a mandatory contribution for that entire attorney fees for not asking for an years it becomes clear that there is a mandatory contribution to that and this case is a little one third tourney fee there's a mandatory contribution by the area rector's the employer so there's going to be sort of a protracted division between the plaintiff the injured party and the employer or the worker's compensation and sure and terms of how that fee is split up and that's really all we're asking so no no no no money just split up what's there in the in the settlement as it exists true and i'll give you a practical example example is what's going on with the lost wage pretty clear that section b does not represent a second were additional fee it represents a sharing obligation of the fee between the employer and the plaintiff it described that fee as a mandatory obligation a mandatory contribution to the fee and it also made clear that section five b and requiring that in part the end the intent or purpose is to avoid a windfall or an unjust enrichment by the employer in other words of being relieved of sick you know in this case of payment of significant medical expenses without taking on its share section b does bear that out and again i think you need to consider that you separate paragraphs as i said the first paragraph of section b lays out what the reimbursement talk what's paid to the employee what should be part what's to be paid to the employee in the future what's paid pursuant to section eight a day of the statute which is the payment of medical expenses now typically those are paid directly to the medical provider but that still reimbursement under that first paragraph so medical expenses paid and medical expenses to be paid that first paragraph captures the reimbursements for the employer bending move on to the second para and the second paragraph there is no limitation on the reprint first it's the twenty five percent fee provision and it sets out of any reimbursement received by the employer pursuant to this action there's a man goes on to say that there is going to be a sharing requirement and it also says that based on the languages and he remembers and for such and he reimbursement there is go be assessed at twenty five percent attorney fees and the language in that second paragraph is mandatory and there's no limitation on the reimbursement that refers to it as any reimbursed so you have to look at state your position on whether or not this would amount to a double recovery church judge again i do not believe there's there's any indication in the record that there's a double recovery here i mean again i go back before the trial court as well as when asked counsel we were going to receive our one third fee out of the settlement we specifically requested the trial court to make these payments of future attorney fees that were coming from the employer in the future were going to be used to assist in the payment of the one third fee that the plaintiff had to take our original and initial and as a it goes to you know relieve really the plaintiff in these cases of taking on more of his or her share than is necessary in other words for every benefit and reimbursement that is being paid or that is being received by the employer the navy have to pay their share and this sense you know paid their share of the expenses and costs associated with that as well as pay their twenty five percent fee and i think in terms of when you look at the appellate court decision you know the the problem that we had and in that decision is that court was making connections or times when the first paragraph of section b and the second paragraph of section basically their interpretation the employee but not for reimbursements that were paid to medical providers for medical expenses but if you read those two paragraphs there's no such language in there there's no such linking of that language i mean again the second paragraph the twenty five percent fee provision talks about any reimbursement so it has to refer to all of the reimbursements in that first paragraph which include lost wages and medical  think you know area argues impart that you know the issue really is one of what the legislature has done if you have an argument here it's really with legislation and to a certain extent i agree but that's areas are if they take the position that they're putting forth now is not what is stated in section b in the first paragraph in the second area now it would be different if the legislature wrote a statute that said in the second paragraph out of any reimbursement paid to the employee then there's going to be a twenty five percent fee provision but that's not what the legislature did and i think you have to look at sort of the plain language of that statute and and when you do that i think the fair and really only reading is the one that we're been put forth today by lana i think the other issue is that you need to consider even what this poor has sa discuss section five the purpose of section five and it specifically said action five he knows that there's going to be a benefit by the employer not only fact it is appropriate to impose attorney fees on the employer for both that offense i think the and and they go on to say that that really at least in part was the purpose and litigation fund or reimbursement fund that's going to benefit the employer in this case area because of that fund the court talked about there's a man the section five of mandatory contribution that's required to the attorney fees and i think as a practical matter you know again that's what i think section five b says in plain language but i think as a practical matter in terms of how section five b is implemented there's sort of a line of cases that this court has put for and i think if you consider the free case the super case and abuse case together it creates a practical model by which these three fees and you pay under those cases you have a settlement  workers compensation benefits will stop be suspended and there's going to be future savings to the employer by by this settlement or verdict in the third party case of being relieve the employer would be relieved of those payments and that those at that point in time the savings would occur as a result of the savings occurring that would be the point in time where these attorney fees would be assessed for example and zuber there was a two hundred twenty four dollars a week payment for lost wages moving forward that the employer was being relieved of on a weekly basis the employer had to pay its twenty five percent fee that's that's what's happening right now with the lost wages and under the the language of the statute section b as well as the case law here that's what needs to be done with respect to the safe medical expenses as well thank you but have one question in the of hoping part of the  regard to undisputed medical pain which others a factor in a little while i don't think it does factor in now again i think that was specific that was an argument that area insurer a to the employer as opposed to being paid to the medical provider as at as i've said nobody here in this courtroom none of the parties no paid medical expenses paid the past even though they were paid to the medical providers and that includes fences that have to be paid in the future again to the medical provider that first paragraph of section five that in compas is the world of that in reimbursement you go to the second paragraph it refers to any reimbursement and you reimbursement is going to be charged with twenty five percent attorney fees to the employer and so i think i don't think so because i think that second provision that you read is similar to or to their argument about sixteen a section sixteen where they're saying well there really should be no attorney feed charge because these medical expenses medical bill payments were undisputed but just like that provision in and section eight section sixty eight it's not talking about in the case some talking about that issue in the framework of a section five evening where there's been a recovery it's talking about a worker's compensation for turning in that initial worker's compensation petition cannot take a fee on undisputed medical expenses that's a completely different issue and what we have here and what we have here is where section five applies where you have a plaintiff at his counsel take on huge amounts of risks expenses well over one hundred thousand dollars to try a hotly contested case come up with a further that substantially benefits not only the planet but the employer and there's a mandatory twenty five percent attorney fee on that recovery on that contribution to the employer's th durkee's would we have to overrule these two to do keith no you would not because in turkey to try to get to attorney's fees but my position is here is fairly simple it's a fairly narrow issue we're dealing with here  expressly state that the twenty five percent attorneys fees apply to suspended matter and my position it does not this statute is in duration of the common law it the amended the act the state the twenty five percent attorneys fees but this court in hardwick vs muster men in one nine hundred fifty nine acknowledged the fact that the changing of the statute was a clear indication that without a specific statutory enactment no such liability would exist against the employer in actions by an employee against a third person so therefore it has to be in the act allows in census and there are a geisha of a common law the meaning of the stated this court stated that since the wrongful death act that not have medical recovery provisions in it that medical bills were not recoverable under wrongful death that because it's not explicitly stated and similarly in this and as a ploy or shall provide medical bills etc and all necessary bills thereafter incurred so section eight a seems to define and we've been paying undisputed medical all the way along this case from day one of the accident back in twenty a way to when you want to weigh what we're dealing with is the fact that there's no provision in the sack that gross amount of such reimbursement now you're saying reimbursement is distinct from compensation in regards to suspended medical because it's not reimbursing it it's already quite often in worker's comp when you suddenly case you'll say ok unpaid medical thirty days or sixty days will include in the settlement and if you do that it's paid or on pay as included in it they stress to all of the suspended t d but in this case here we had a settlement and i don't know if you look at settlement of court opinion they went into it last but it was rather convoluted on him and i admit that but that's what happens sometimes when you're dealing with litigation services and part of it was that we could not agree on the suspended medical and t d attorney fees so part of the release was that if all parties s that plaintiff would waive all attorney's fees and we couldn't agree to harwich and i couldn't agree on whether it was t t and medical or both and as part of a sudden when we agreed about the laws pretty clear on t will pay to t t t but we're not going to pay you he suspended medical if in fact but the case didn't settle it that went by the wayside it was a green we had but it didn't go through ition but we've redone the super part of it in regards to t d d and i might add he is easy for you to minister in the industrial commissioner of parties will agree it's a thousand dollars a week twenty five percent two hundred fifty dollars a week he said to do medical medical costs were there for an ongoing administration by some judge somewhere because you're going to have constant disputes in this case here we have bills being provided on a monthly basis for medical that attorney's fees with anybody was not an attorney nothing saying that he's allowed to give money back to his client or not give money back or reimbursed in fact in this case here i challenge in both the appellate brief and brief before this court to tell me what you've been doing with the t t d money supplement the record show the court that you've been paying back the twenty five percent to mr baer that challenge was ignored there's no evidence before this court as to what's going on with that mine the only now the court is a asking us the pay for suspended medical at the point of a guy from the jury it's not like he hasn't been paid it already at they can take the attorney's fee out of it they've already taken their attorneys and they're asking this court for an additional amount of money now i have gray hair i've been around a long time i've had a lot of cases over forty three years you might have why isn't this come before this court before isn't or had a lawyer really go that far after getting a sixteen million dollar attorney's fee client being fully compensated and the matter actually proceed on joe you make it as part of the settlement and i'm a you know i don't see me here i do an awful lot of settlements for an awful lot of years but this case here they want to double seven five i would have taken my three quarters minus the caret of costs but then in turn i would bend half to pay for twenty five percent attorney's fees for suspended medical that i recovered that provision of the act makes no sense at all if you're going to allow for suspended i think that he attorney's fees you know as i stated it's a double recovery in all these other cases cited the party had not yet received the money have it has to go to the attorney in this case here you know if but what if what if the money really doesn't go back to the point isn't a really dumb recovery absolutely in this case there's no question about it that it but there's nothing in there allowing you to have it you're go because the word including is in section five b which includes that amount received by the employer and also including the eight provisions of the act so with that i thank you for your time this year for the questions thank you contribution by the employer for these issues that we've talked about there's certainly nothing in the law at all that prevents those that contribution of trannies be either one going directly to it's mantids how you want to describe you know paying that money directly to the plaintiff we're taking that in as a contribution and taking and basically granting the plaintiff well you know area rector's did raise that in its briefs our position is that the record is what the record is i don't believe there's any burden or requirement that we put in the records indicate that we that were not complying with the herbs or were not complying with the truck world order i mean quite frankly i think we have enough ethical obligation to do so that's what we've done again there's no indication that anything else is going on here other than speculation in the briefs by the fenton area who's got a legitimate interest here in either you know retaining what this was an issue that was never a she's that any level not in the brief so it's it's a little difficult for me to speak to it but you know on a cost i can say that there is under section five b ther mandatory contribution requirement for the attorney fees i'd knowledge that there are there there may be a difference in how that is processed compared to temporary total payments but at least on the record here there's no indication that it in fact is going to require monitoring you know why in large part  have been able to work out a lot of these issues with counsel and if in fact there there are there is an issue that pops up with respect to administration then so be it you know there's there's no evidence in here that it's going to require frequent administration or we're going to be going back and forth from court or the or the commission and in fact that the worker's compensation case is still open so there's you know whatever whatever issue is raised in that respect i guess could be raised in the framework of the workers compensation case but there's there's certainly no evidence that this is going to be an issue to the extent to basically ignore the plain dictates of section five b and i think again if if down the road it becomes an issue that doesn't mean that we can rewrite what section five b has or what the legislature is already written in there if it becomes an issue down the road again i think that's something that needs to be addressed with the legislature and with respect to that that language in section five be large part area rector says well there's no specific language specifically say the words medical expenses suspended but i've already gone through it the first paragraph the fines again what the reimbursements are the second paragraph specifically says a twenty five percent fee on any reimbursement you consider those to gather and it becomes clear that medical expenses are included here and under that argument i mean there's no specific language in section five b that specifically about lost wages or disability payments whether paid in the past or to be paid in the future and under their argument basically there'd be no twenty five percent fee provision a political ad hoc because there's nothing in the statute that talks about specifically medical expenses or specifically disability payments or suspended disability payments or suspended now nickel bill payments that are it just doesn't make sense then section piece clear lays out what the reimbursement far and there defines what any reimbursement or that any reimbursement requires collecting zuber fees as a contribution to the one third fee for years and this never has been an issue i mean this is quite frankly the first time it's ever been contested by the fence council this is routinely done in all of our cases and all of our construction injury faces there's always a contribution for future lost wages that the employers being relieved and future medical expenses that the employers being really one of the most you know significant verdicts in illinois history comes down and this is when we see the champs that's  this morning you're excused this time