say that for a very long time the supreme court has over and over said that there was a liberty interest in a person who's facing deportation in fact i found a case after i'd submitted my  talk about the banishment is the punishment that is attendant on this deprive all of liberty and of course there are other cases too that i cited in my i think was my letter that constantly over and over said that deportation implicates a person's liberty interest they're for that answers the question about whether is this a due process case and certainly it is and can charge it wasn't till twenty thousand and thirteen years later that the california supreme court clarified the mental the mental state that was required to be guilty of that offense however this court kept citing karr favorably and didn't we also say and surround that car was directly contrary to controlling panel decision and it lacked the authority to overrule that decision well that may be true i mean i don't i don't doubt that and i'm not saying that the court did not say that because of or did say that that would put somebody certainly on notice that the law is on settles to i'm sorry  on the fact that you get a decision car that's inconsistent with another decision that pre dates car and it's inconsistent with it would put someone on notice that the law is on settled in this area well it doesn't appear to have put the court on notice of that because the court kept citing car versus saying that's clear up till two thousand and thirteen so i don't see how he would be on notice that a case of forty years before reviewed the issue and determined that it needed to go back under chevron to the board of immigration appeals and i'm not arguing about wu i'm not arguing about whether the board of immigration appeals made  correct decision that's not even part of what we're doing here this is about retroactivity whether this was as you can see that if we rule against you on the money come reward issue that matter of his entitle to chevron deference and that would be dispositive  we can't argue against that discussed but the argument and the montgomery ward analysis is virtually identical unless well i'm just going to say it's virtually  identical certainly this was an abrupt departure from car versus zionists no question about that and my client relied on that decision which had come two years before his criminal criminal  conviction no question that he relied on it puts a grievous burden on him in fact and may i say that reliance and that saddam's reliance is presumed if the court former favorable rule was in place at the time the petitioner pleaded guilty and certainly was and as far as burden that's not us the court also said the board patient alone is a substantial burden there ways against retroactive application of an agency duty and this case that further burden and the prejudice to him was he was and able to present his claim for cancellation removal he didn't have a hearing on it but he had a hearing on was whether he was precluded from even even presenting his evidence and his equities for cancellation rule he didn't have a chance to do that and cancellation w his only possible relief from removeable therefore he was completely out of court because of this now i'm not going to say that there wasn't a statutory interest  the court said that it only leans in favor of the government isn't a point that is on their side in the monk emory ward analysis so i'd say that under but santos and these other cases my client should not suffer the retroactive application because it definitely is a we're interactive application no cornball the same subsection of this statute that your client was convicted on while my client in my client's case it's an inconclusive record so we don't know whether it was a firearm a deadly weapon or force likely to produce them if i might your honor that issue was raised when silva trevino was applied to this case it was an inconclusive record and the judge held a that it's under a one as opposed to a to the firearm a one is is not a firearm at a at the time of his conviction they were all in one paragraph they were that was an a one was moved yes but you're saying that at the time of his conviction a one covered firearms as well as a polish list so i'm not looking at right this minute but that's my recollect i mean because card dealt with eight to firearms and the answer to that so i can't answer your question i don't know what was the year he was convicted that's one thousand nine hundred and ninety six and did a one cover firearms at that time i'm sorry is there another question that i haven't answered no but i'd like to if i can reserve the rest of my time thank you very much content of what was not in dispute rather this case rises or falls solely on whether or not the the agency could retroactively applied that of when because the for the four factors laid on the grammy award favor retroactive time the book and position his conviction that undermined the rationale under barberin g r and so when the a just so the void created here occurred in two thousand and fourteen in two thousand and seventeen when the agency issued matter of  result and matter was still the same as the result under bar and instead it was the rationale that had changed so why do you why do you seemingly assume then in your brief that there is a retroactivity analysis to be conducted at all you want to be addressed retroactively analysis because of sisters due process claim was framed as an improper retroactive application that implicates the montgomery ward analysis factors and so you know the st half of our factor i'm sorry on a mcgovern award favor roger active application and that's because there's there's simply no abrupt change in the law and add best what petitioner can point to and i think i think the court heard this when referenced the car at most disher can only show that he relied upon an argument that as this court in flushed in two thousand and fourteen but which existed in one thousand nine hundred and eight what he cannot do is point to the confluence of those which was what this court found couldn't show reliance on a change of law that unlike this case in that case there there was a chain of law in terms of the board's analytic precedent addressing  petitioner in order for him to prevail in the case here and in and because he cannot show an abrupt change in the law because certain makes plain that at all that in one thousand nine hundred and eighty controlling law was barbour and the controlling were controlling precedent also the characterization of this court then when we look at petitioners case and ask what was the law in one thousand nine hundred and eight the controlling precedence also commanded that his conviction was a crime of moral turpitude so he had no simply had no assurance that his conviction would have produced would have somehow not made him statutor any play here it is only to form an argument and not the requisite change of law that montgomery ward retroactively analysis is sensitized to and designed to tease out as a matter of equity factors favor retroactive application a matter of woo there's no broad change at all there's been no reliance on change that didn't occur and while there has been a change in the rationale at all times the positive arc of the law at all times has been that the to the agency's brand x decision and also that deportation alone is a substantial burden that weighs against retroactive application of an agency education but the same time i'm not i'm not agreeing with the counsel that card does not apply in this case i believe that of the court's obviously the whole case as to the court's discretion and decision thank you very much for hearing me today