jurisdiction of the trial or arising out of a claim for attorney's fees in a compensation and the two issues on appeal are one compensation commission and second the second district's opinion articulated some reasoning that runs counter to  frustrate that so the first issue i'd like to address is the issue of subject matter jurisdiction and the expression in the contract as to the exclusive jurisdiction of commission as to disputes between attorneys for fees arising out of the act generally and it's not disputed that certain courts have general jurisdiction and that subject matter jurisdiction is generally presume however that presumption is not available under the compact and that's because the act is comprehensive sets toward the scheme that provides prior case law such as in order of education warren township it's it's clear that this court that they the legislature can limit the jurisdiction and the consequence of bringing an action that should have been brought an initially in front of the administrative body in the circuit court is that the circuit court must dismiss that explicit and in this case six section sixteen a j of the compact satisfies the explicit divestment requirement and it does so by saying and all disputes regarding attorneys fees including fees which disputes or it's involve whether or not one of morant attorneys entitle to these disputes or relative to a division of fees initially sought in front of an administrative body is to make a determination by considering the nature of the case and the real we saw in the complaint that set forth so it's not a factual determination it's a determination as a matter of law and the determination is made by looking at the allegations that way now in this case the complaint makes clear that this is a dispute between two parties two attorneys over the entitlement to fees arising out of a comp claim and the reason that it's clear is that the allegations of complain admit this and the complaint also attacked is to attorney representation agreements which explicitly state that the  the commission and and so that's enough in itself because it's plainly an unambiguous he stated by the legislature but even going beyond that other provisions of  demonstrate that the compact is concerned with regulating not just the behavior of attorneys appearing before the commission but also attorneys  sixteen b of the compact expressly regulates or touches upon the requirements of referring attorneys so in a comprehensive statutory scheme such a when the legislator has broad language reaching not just relationships between attorneys with appearances before the commission but also referring attorneys and the way that referring attorney did enough under the rules of professional conduct to justify fees are right in that situation that is the legislature's mandated that the the a referring attorney or the attorney seeking a division of fees has complied with the rule of professional conduct one way bought and so there are two ways to do that under one point five there's be proportional services approach where each attorney services are considered and if the terminations is nate as to which attorney earned a certain amount of fees based on the performance and then there's if the primary service and that's the language used by rule one point five if the primary service provided by the attorney is a referral then the agreement must show that reviewing that dispute to determine that compliance with will one point five has occurred that one of the issues flesh on the briefing is whether or not this case is similar to the prior cases of this court opinions of compensation question but it wasn't back action brought by an insurance company in a circuit court asking for a declaration that it not open of raids in illinois because it was a wisconsin insurance company for  an employee injury and illinois and in that case the employee argued that if he the insurance ing question however that case did not involve analysis of the situation here where we have sixteen a j which specifically talks about a dispute between attorneys for  another point i'd like to clarify between the parties positions is this issue of whether or not there can also be an application of the doctor in a primary jurisdiction which would lead to  the potential for a finding of concurrent jurisdiction on this question between the circuit court and the commission in this case the doctrine of primary jurisdiction is not available because there has been a explicit divestment by the legislature saying all attorney fees to speed shall be heard before the commission therefore that's a pronouncement that exclusive original jurisdiction resides in the commission and if you have callen and the only kind current jurisdiction case if i pronounce that correctly the i think i was the concurrent jurisdiction case that i was  ultimate no toward the claimant would receive from her under the workers compensation commission or yes it is you know on our analysis in any way it does in the sense that  o both attorneys it did have appearances on file the final word was fixed and the commission order one attorney who received the payment to pay a portion of that fee to the other attorney so the body of the award of fees was pared down and one in twenty was ordered to pay another but it didn't affect the overall that says that the plane must be resolved expeditiously to facilitate payments of point claim it's going to get the money to the commission and order the attorneys to divide defi among themselves before the commission is that is that three zero five sixteen which says that the commission has power the power to fix the fee for services rendered in securing a right on the act the dispute between the parties on that but when you look at rule one point five of the rules of professional conduct referral is referred to as a service and so when you have rule one point five mentioned in the contract and one point five defines referral as a service and at the top of the contact talks about the service provided i want to touch briefly on this idea that there's a constitutional issue with respect to the claimant being deprived or the attorney plaintiff attorney being deprived of a jury trial a route to contact and going to the circuit court does not give you standing to argue that you're being deprived of a jury trial you never would have gotten the feet were not for the statutory remedy that doesn't appear before the the commission and what i would argue is that the comparables are not an indicator of legislative intent the plain language of the statute is an indicator of life of more specifically we're talking here in this case of a referral so let me let me further offer toward the fact that referral fees were also known  there's not a lot of material out there about the historical sort of genesis for all these but if you examine where our common law came from in england would not so i'm going to get into my take on the statutory construction issue but with respect to the constitutional issue and by the way and all it does it actually criminalize it works compensation turn from giving gifts for referrals of workers compensation cases where the one point five rules of rational sponsibility comes into play when you read sixteen b is it says and last an attorney is giving a feed in a in compliance with rule one point by the rules rational sponsibility that is the only circumstance in which an attorney can give anything of value in receiving a referral of the matter before the commission so i would argue that i would turn the defendant's argument on its head and say that this gives us insight into the legislative time in a very important way by the by the legislature when they drafted sixteen a sixteen right next to their obviously saying that the circuit court shall not hear matters resolving attorney few disputes that's not what sixteen a size this court does not legislate from the bench and i'm sure will follow process to not add language which is not so sixteen v i think is very important because it shows that that the legislature is missing for all these and they chose to exclude it from the sixteen a caylee the sixteen a jailing language that i'm the boss all inclusive any and all fees is the centerpiece of the defendant's argument but it has to be read in conjunction with section sixteen and if the court does that it will make legislative intent crystal clear because sixteen a size in relation to claims brought under the act the following paragraphs  i think the court should also look into what is the purpose of the workers compensation mission michiru the agency is uses that specialized knowledge and primarily gathering facts not passing on matters of walk and that the commission is very useful in finding that attorney a who was fired should be entitled to these fees under ponomaryov it versus attorney be the that's what section sixteen a j should be limited to sorting out what the reasonable value of the attorneys fees were when one lawyer is destruction and the other attorney  lives in this case should be heard by the complaint which attaches an refers to the exhibits talking about their co representation of a comp matter but doesn't explicitly say that it's a breach of contract action to recover fees and a cop accent the exhibits control over the body the allegations in the complaint the idea that the the right to a jury trial will be violated if this case of place before the commission the background of that is that it was clear the time that the defendant plaintiff entered into the co representation agreement to get the workers compensation claims compensation that exclusive jurisdiction over disputes under that agreement would exist in the commission so that's imported in applied by law into the contract so it shouldn't come as a surprise to an attorney that the place to resolve that dispute is in front of the i also want to emphasize that the defendant doesn't concede that this is a conflict or a referral fee arrangement if you look at the division of responsibilities in the representation agreement attached to the complaint each party has duties delineated which include communicating with the client record preparation and those are part and parcel of an attorney client relationship so it's  there was there were some vents in that argument the inference from which from that mention was that only this use for compensation disputes in relation to claims for compensation under the act should be read as only disputes for compensation under the act these should be before the commission so sixteen a j is broader than requiring disputes for a claim for compensation under the act and the fees are growing out there out out of  that it says disputes in relation to claims for compensation that's that's expansive language so this idea that you have to have an appearance on filing for the commission for that dispute to be properly and for the commission  doesn't jive with the broad in relation to language under sixteen a j and that makes sense that other fees are fixed by the commission for people who don't have appearances in front of the  commission three o five sixteen is the commission the power to set fees for any service including for physicians physicians don't appear before the commission but their fees are subject to the commissions power granted by the finally there was discussion about the factual findings made by the trial court and the defendant appellants position if i haven't made it clear is that anything entered by the erroneous determination as to the presence of subject matter jurisdiction is void so factual findings by the trial court about whether this was a referral fee agreement the agreement for the division of responsibility in the representation it doesn't matter because the trial court has to look at that complaint make a determination as to the existence of subject matter jurisdiction and make that determination as a matter of law factual disputes not t factor into the determination of the existence of subject matter jurisdiction so that's not binding on this court at all and this court doesn't have to defer to the trial court's findings of fact in the judgment order at all because that judge and orders