judges we believe the trial court erred in finding that special use authorization was several from the base owning designation contained in the ordinance relevant to this case the district court found it's a general provision contained in a san antonio city code section one point one seven would in fact authorize severance in this case as we've argued in the brief we believe that the a put ability section of the san antonio city code at section one point three severability provision found at section one point one seven of the san antonio city code pelleas have argued that that interpretation is incorrect for various reasons in essence what they argue is that the reference to dealing with zoning at a eleven of section one point three only deals with previously adopted zoning but let me ask of that's their response is this a new issue raised on appeal or did you discuss who is to district judge whether severability cause even applies to zoning we argue generally your honor that this that that it would be inappropriate to seven to sever the special use to be done to novell on the issue and that ultimately this court has the authority to determine whether or not that particular section of the of the code doesn't factor of hiv if you put ability of section one point one seven neither one of you mention the severability clause that actually appears in chapter five i'm not myself trying to raise a new issue on appeal but if there's some reason that you think it's irrelevant and that's why you didn't mention it but chapter thirty five itself says five dash one ten yes or not i think that our our response that the reason that it wasn't raised by office is we don't believe that it's it's a political to this particular ordinance and the reason for that is  this this section referring to is entitled severability of chapter your honor the ordinance does the ordinance that's at issue here that we're challenging is not actually a part of the chapter of the uniform uniform development code it a man's chapter thirty as it relates to the city code when we look at a pelleas arguments as to why it only applies to preexisting ordinances part of what they've said is we need to direct you to another section of one point three want you to look at a sixteen and what a sixteen does is it says all warrants as an in effect upon the effective date of this code not inconsistent and so here we can see the city council was clearly able to distinguish between preexisting warnin says and other ordinances if if we are to if we are preexisting zoning and so we we believe for the court to determine that a eleven only deals with preexisting is zoning would violate one of the cardinal rules and basic rules of statutory construction because it would be rendered meaningless  it talks about dealing with zoning it doesn't talk about whether that be preexisting our perspective but another section of the very code speaks about preexisting zoning and so if we're to adopt the city's argument that this only applied to to  preexisting zoning then then that would render a eleven simply superfluous and meaningless and we believe that that would be an improper result even assuming in this particular case is very similar to what the common texas state common law standard is to determine whether severability is appropriate in a suit in a particular situation and i think the important part of the texas government code here is whether or not if other see if other provisions can be given effect without the invalid provision and in this case it could not and not only could it not be given a fact it would have been a legal and possibility at the time and the reason for that is that the the way that the use matrix was set up for zoning in the city of san antonio was that in order to even be considered for a special use offer is ation for a transitional home or correctional facility like they want to hear you first had to demonstrate to the city that you had the requisite based zoning and that base stoning at the time was c three ok so the city council could not have even considered the issue of the grant  special use authorization without first determining that the property that the subject property had the requisite bases owning which was which again was c three in this case and so even if the court from from the base designation this court would in essence be determining that result would the court would ultimately have to determine that the legislature special use authorization request would in essence be inelegant because we don't have the requisite base owning to even grant that authorization and we believe that that when we talk about legislative intent which is always of paramount importance in determining whether or not several severability provision should be upheld or whether certain provisions should be severed from those that have found including unconstitutional impermissible when we talk about in town we're talking about a tenth of the legislature at the time that the legislation was promulgated not at some indefinite period in the future appeal he's going to get up here and say well look they intended to do this particular piece of property and now they could have done that but that's not the inquiry for this court in determining what the legislature's intent now doesn't get the opportunity to determine whether or not it would be appropriate to grant a special aesop or ization knowing that the property couldn't be properly designated c three you are on track and i do that's something that's ok or are that's ok i think at the heart of the argument your honor is the city here's the question could the city have intended by virtue of the inclusion of a severability provision to allow an application of that severability provision that would have accomplished that which was not legally capable of accomplishment at the time thank   the crux of intervention under rule twenty four is timeliness does not really cross point the party effected here if the zoning goes away and they can't operate this facility they've been operating for five years i mean i don't understand how you could have this case without them in it so it is obvious and yeah it should happen sooner well arguably but i'm just struggling with how how this case really has any meaning if crosspoint isn't bound by it and it would seem like you would be the one arguing for cross going to be in it well your honor i respectfully disagree the city of san antonio is the only entity that has any authority to balance the property owning classified can i know that but it kind of doesn't or how it comes out it matters to cross point they're the ones that are operating this facility and have been for five years that would suddenly go away if you all were right absolutely and so how can you how can you or any decision in this have any meaning if they're not in the case you are i don't really think we get that for the issue but the primary issue in the crux is always timeliness united states supreme court says you don't even get to the other part of you know it says without looking at tying up what i'm saying this  a wrong that was in the case was proceeding on without a necessary very necessary and perhaps indispensable party and so maybe it took a while to get there but we righted the wrong why would we now and right the wrong of the wrong is reinstate the wrong  temporary injunction hearing that the plaintiffs were not successful and in maintaining the t r o subsequent to that they left they knew at that time that the plaintiff appellant was seeking to find th ordinance was on unlawful and to stop the operation of the facility they did it they left the litigation the day before it was removed to federal court they were represented by counsel they knew of the exact situation which was going on that this group was unhappy with the operation of the facility and the base doning and that they sought to attack it just because an interlocutory order granting temporary relief pending trial was not granted does not not is not a final judgment does not mean that further claims will be amended and that is the matter they knew or should have known for over twenty months i still i mean to me this should have been allowed to be monsoon and they should have been brought back in sooner i guess i'm just not understanding why the solution here is to exclude a party that clearly should be here well the problem is that it's it's clearly a tactical issue for them they had the group when the base only was applied for they had the sisters of the holy spirit apply for the zoning it wasn't the correctional facility and they let the city of san antonio litigate this case until there is a summary judgement and then they decide to get back in and spend resources and not stop letting other people fight their battles for that any harm that they would suffer is self harm and it is very clear through the jurisprudence that self harm is viewed very differently than harm that that that is innocent they among the rules seems to be in situations in which intervention is of right in those situations and the would be intervene or maybe seriously harmed if intervention is denied courts should be reluctant to dismiss even when on time when i mean we position that you're taking that the delay by cross point here should cause us to set aside the intervention the courts have viewed self harm differently than innocence and him leaving a pending lawsuit while represented by counsel and knowing of the possibility that their interests would be harmed it was a calculated decision made by the interviewer let me give you an extra minute you were a little late getting to your argument so you have sixty seconds to say whatever we didn't let you say earlier and if you set it up not ask you know i think that you know it's a four port of part  you really have to be a letting a party and after it's already been adjudicated and they've let another party fight for them for twenty months it's like coming back and having oklahoma play a game against villanova again after they just won the final four it's not not saying that there was a final judgment at that point but significant time and resources have been spent especially when a plaintiff group is comprised of individuals of ordinary means the essence is that allowing crosspoint to intervene would set precedents to allow intervenors to jump in and out of litigation and basically allow attrition against pla understood counsel thank you had not closed so crosspoint was considering purchasing this property the zoning the purchase was contingent on what happened with this zoning case crosspoint intervened in the suit to argue for what needed to be done to make the millions of dollars in investments and to go into business as a transitional home at this property at that point price point was satisfied that would leave a case that could come back to bite you you know there are a lot of reasons why you wouldn't want to be involved in the case if you were if you were satisfied that you were already up and running the i think the courts point is a good one that a party should if their interest might be at stake some degree of diligence to ensure that that their interests are protected but the case was very different when crosspoint non student them when left for the city and the unincorporated people to argue about what did you think they were going to argue about that didn't impact crosspoint by the what the request at the time of the non the case is in federal court they then amend the petition and they asked for a declaration that he not only that the law that the that the zoning ordinance be invalidated but that it be declared spot zoning and that everything revert back to how it was donna let me ask you this at that point then did your client become an indispensable party in my opinion it did become you know it's explained why because it was its interests that were at stake it was its operations that were at stake and it was ever to bring you back to your yes at the time they mended the complaint they should have brought  and in a way perhaps in a new direction were you participating in that time how was this presented to the district judge with these arguments presented at that time where the judge appreciated or at least w factors of intervention is is that concerned it has a lot of other ingredients to it that you may have argued to the district judge but the time in this is that you know something of a hurdle under under intervention this case had gotten so close to resolution when you got back into it resolution perhaps a direction you didn't like which is why you got back into it i agreed on a good deal and i would say just two things very quickly at the time of the non s that this spot zoning issue that you cared about existed which it didn't when you got out the first time that's right but the point is position would be that the initiation of a lawsuit was is the beginning of the time and timely notice my response to that would be at that point  it wasn't the same lawsuit in which we intervened months months later after the plaintiff amended the complaint and failed at that time to join cross point as an indispensable part of what you gives what else you have so the lawsuit you know ana is not let's be very clear the citizens aren't complaining about the zoning structure that the city of san antonio has implemented they're complaining about a halfway house being in their neighborhood  and so all of this the that the issues in the case can be resolved by considering whether or not the statute is several and whether or not it these issues are all mo t the statute is definitely several the city of san antonio and the citizens of the city of san antonio had an opportunity to debate not whether or not this the zoning the base owning should be c three or some other zoning category but whether or not there should be a a halfway house a transitional home in that neighborhood that was specifically considered by city council it was specifically considered by the parties and it was the council does it make any difference whether what we rule on the intervention or you can't really the bell of what's happened in terms of the judge now has heard your arguments and made rulings and all of than so if those rulings are quranic does it matter whether you may be hear or city san antonio made the argument and i don't i really don't see how it can i'm at and i'm a i struggle with the belief that the that the plaintiffs are entitled to hear even if the correct that the intervention was in pop the it's done there was no attempt to and i'm not sure that the that the that the plaintiffs had an appellate limited but there was no attempt to undo that it was granting of of the intervention when and when it occurred and so we want the cross point was a party presented its arguments and if the court is right in the fact of the intervention is now totally moot in and in addition to the fact that if the statute is several and we have the specific authorization to run exactly the operation that is there in that  event the whether or not this c three zoning the move to see screen was improper or is irrelevant because we got lot of the specific and if it's not severable and we should send it back for a new trial as they argue then shouldn't you be there for the next forty five seconds or so the intervention was after magistrate primeau made his recommendations it was after the present issue in play for a while i don't know when the motions were five when i do been considerable it seems to me prior to the magistrate announcing what was going to happen yes your honor at the time that the case was removed to federal court what we had was due process an equal protection and when i say we i was not in the case at that time because like crosspoint i didn't come to the dance until after the recommendations came down from the from the met having pop the sing had any legs until the  protection all of those we won on clearly even the magistrate recommended that we win on those issues except for how substantive due process segues into spot zoning so let's not spend much time on your honor this there's no question that this property is historic it's unique in one nine hundred twenty two when the sisters started this operation there was no zoning in san it goes back really i find a lot of joy in this profession if to the extent we have to wait and looking back and if you look back at the what started this all what started is down this almost  hundred year odyssey of dealing with land use questions and property rights and how they intersect and how you decide then you go back to amber city of euclid versus ambler one nine hundred twenty six and that was a six three decision even then but who is in who is on the majority we have brandeis we have homes we have justice other than that wrote the opinion so that set the stage and really in that case they said you cannot be a super legislature you cannot undertake to undo the democratic process and what we had here i don't know i'm sure your lockhart's have listened to it and watched it the d very animated public participation in this hearing for over three hours it was a nine two city council vote democracy at its at its best so that now getting to their in the district court we pointed out on appeal that they've made some new arguments i did not cite the section that you cited believe me chapter thirty five is not like this anymore but we believe that the section that we did cite which is one seventeen provides ample support for several bills this finding of a special use authorization can stand on its own and if so what would be the point of dealing with this owning issue at this point we do not believe spot zoning even exists under texas law anymore but that's not for this court to decide i'm out of time be happy answer any questions we have you prefer thank you counsel thank you  make lease police a court just briefly wanted to talk a little bit about the intervention plus points indicated that they didn't know that there are that the their interest in essence were at jeopardy until such time as we brought a spot zoning claim that said however the temporary restraining order that precipitated the temporary injunction in this case of which cross points was was at the hearing and was represented at that hearing the injunct the temporary restraining order itself states petitioner the unincorporated nonprofit association of concerned eastside citizens and property owners and its members are affected by city ordinance two thousand and nine zero nine seventeen zero seven five because i'm struggling to figure out what difference the intervention ruling makes if you lose on severability or you win on severability because you can't go back and say well we're going to make the district court decide this case but not look at any of the law disagree with that but the question is whether it was time and again this is self inflicted what i'm saying is what difference does it make if we rule against you on severability and then we throw crosspoint out they still get to go operate their the house or if we rule for you on summer ability and you go back for a trial then you're going to have to join crosspoint because you want them brown to match so i guess i don't even understand what difference it makes i suppose maybe  who argued that is that the grant of an intervention was improper and what the particular remedy would or should be at that point but again to get me to get back to the difference between or the claim in the relief the relief we requested at the time was known by cross points and they were in the very last and so for them to come here and say well no it wasn't until that you actually brought your spot zoning claim that we knew that our operations  crosspoint ought to be part of that case we argued against your intervention at the trial court your honor and i mean i would i would make those same arguments again so i would my answer would be no so if you went to trial and the court found the spot zoning unconstitutional map is crosspoint down to that if we throw him out absolutely i crosspoint us when we throw him out if they're going to be valid they have no will they have no right to the zoning your honor i mean zoning zoning is is a function solely of the city crosspoint has no right to its current zoning the city could come in and change the zoning tomorrow and they would have they would have no or you know well i mean they might have argument your honor but the question would be what you know do they have some right to the and they don't and they simply have no right to that zoning classification that zoning designation order particular use of the piece of their piece of property nor does anybody else it's ultimately the city who determines that not cross points so would would they be not be and reasonable result was intended and again in this particular case you couldn't have the special use authorization without the bases zoning it's not just more reasonable it's impossible ok not only that piece it also makes clear that the city council also acted with knowledge of the law and so in essence to buy the city's argument or to buy across points argument the court has to determine that the city intended to impermissi zone the property c three and c and again such a result is is in conflict with those basic tenants that the city council or legislative body acts with knowledge of the law and a just and reasonable result inten