the next case on the calendar is pizarro town sports international retaliatory conduct the lower court your honors completely failed to consider our arguments for likelihood of for irreparable harm or for likelihood of success on the merits and all address each of those today and i'd like to first very briefly address the standard of review this court has repeatedly held that when reviewing the lower court's denial of the motion for pulmonary injunction we review the district court's legal holdings did novo and its ultimate decision for abuse of discretion and that's critical here your hono novo review must must be applied here the lower court again did not address any of our legal arguments for reparable harm or for likelihood of success on the merits but your honors even f this court were to apply an abuse of discretion multiple clay james underlying that this action there's the underlying consumer protection claim and then there's also the retaliation claim we thought a preliminary injunction on the retaliation claim and the retaliation claim was not addressed in any way shape or form by the initially was against the initial two name plaintiffs i can back up we initially filed in state court with two named plaintiffs there was retaliation against them and that action was discontinued we filed in the southern district with the retaliation claim for those original two named plaintiffs after the other seven new new plaintiffs had been added with an amended the federal complaint there's now a retaliation claim for all nine plaintiffs but there was an excuse me your honor or retaliation claim final paragraph says they claim their record lay injured by defendants germination of the agreement and barring them from the premises plaintiffs say this is unlawful retaliation and once and it's later deprivation of attendance at a few of the many existing facilities in the area is not irreparable harm that he may not have expressed and talked about showing but he's making a conclusion in connection with the retaliation that the conclusion that the lower court was making your honor was was based on a different type of irreparable harm which was attendance at a gym again as your honored knowledge was not our argument our argument was that there was a chilling effect on plaintiffs who might pursue claims against town sports international and on the public at large that chilling effect would come from i'm not going to pursue my legal claim because i'll be barred from the gym i'm not going to pursue my legal claim because i may be barred from the gym and for other consumers i'm a i'm not going to pursue my protect my consumer protection claim against a hospital against a bank against whoever because they may engage in retaliatory conduct towards me as well the concept of a chilling effect your honor that was not addressed by the lower court at all and this is not a new or novel concept this court has addressed the fact honor in that in the mode i guess i'm thinking of the factual predicate you would show to show irreparable injury they seem to be different context if you come into court and say i'm going to be terminated on my witnesses are going to be terminated that is an injury  immediately understand the chilling effect the chilling effect of being told your general membership will be terminated seems like it would be a substantially different factual circumstance well again the chilling effect is on the  ability of the law to carry out its intended purpose and your honor this is in the record at that one sixty five to one sixty eight this is not a theoretical or hypothetical harm there are those after after it became clear was retaliating against complainants ten people contacted our firm said they wanted to pursue their consumer protection claims against c s i as well but after learning that there was potential for retaliation or likelihood of any class action you need to show numerosity of course you need to show typicality and we would need other other witnesses to provide testimony provide and provide information and we've already been harmed in our ability to do that and your honor again it goes to the ability of the consumer protection laws to carry out their intended purposes not just in this specific case but in other cases if in fact there's going to be fewer people who are willing to come forward with these complaints the consumer protection laws will not be able to carry out there in ten to purpose or make sure i understand your cause of action you're suing under eight consumer protection laws of eight different states or do any of those states consumer protection laws have a retaliation provision in the statutes no you're on the to address that i see i'm running low on time but there have been the supreme court your honor has many times read into a statute an implied pro have been against retaliation and that can be  that did not include any reference to retaliation whatsoever in the statute and the supreme court determined you need to look at what is the intent of the statute and what is it intending to carry out and jack jackson which i just reference with the title nine case title nine does not have it and at every television provision and the court said in the reporting incidents of discrimination is integral to title nine of force mint and would be discouraged if retaliation against those who report went unpunished indeed if a television were not prohibited title nine enforcement scheme would unravel and your honor the same thing would hold true for the consumer protection laws for television were to be permitted if this court permits or affirms the lower court order businesses around new york and throughout the northeast frankly would be given carte blanche to retaliate against those who raise complaints music please the court jacob cohn for the app tell these town sports international and others judge stanton found that they this is a thin case poor is the likelihood of success on the merits it is supported by the record the terms of the contract these are just to be clear this there are one hundred fifty or so jumps in twenty seventeen years after these contracts were entered into seven of them for a new york three in boston were rebranded and renovated and set aside as higher and gyms for which there would not be access in the passport program so the court found that thin claim and having to go to another gym is not irreparable harm that should be the end of the analysis  here but what they wanted to do was use twelve ninety two and to float a trial balloon to this court one that is not well developed or well preserved in the record below essentially they want to import from civil rights statutes from fs l a serious serious employment situations right to own and possess properties and contract and  claim for retaliation in two nine their eight state you dep statutes and d c you that statute that our marketplace conduct regulating statutes between people at arm's length that buy and sell things and contract for services now the first thing one would expect to find in such an analysis would be a reference to erie there is no reference to erie here none of the nine statutes there is not a citation to a single case where any of the eight states or the district of columbia have imported such a cause of action to a u dep statute so to the extent that they want to argue that the district court failed to consider something and has erred in some way by not permitting these plaintiffs who clearly have no irreparable harm they have a clear a thin case if any case to import somebody else's claimed irreparable harm is a magnum leap that the court below was not obligated to undertake and certainly this court in reviewing that court's denial at the preliminary injunction phase on a thin record of a request for a preliminary injunction to prevent a company from electing to stop doing business with people who are suing it i suggest is unsupported and given the extremely deferential standard of review so what we're really assessing is whether the irreparable injury arising from from the termination from the clubs and then a likelihood of success on that claim which would which is a claim that would involve implying  cause of action and i said eight you say there are nine state or d c statutes right i'm fine if with the framing that way i'm fine because they have essentially framed it way for you by conceding that unless they could get there this way they have no reparable harm they have no basis to call upon this court to disturb the district court's rul i have if you have other questions i'm happy to answer them but that is the thrust of my argument we have you your honour's no court has ever addressed one way or the other at least as far as i've seen or there's been said in any brief whether there should be an implied right of action for retaliation under under any of the consumer protection laws so  it's never been addressed one way or the other this is the first court to consider it frankly judge stanton didn't even consider it and the consumer protection laws my adversary described them as marketplace conduct regulation statutes these are remedial statutes intended to cure a serious wrong that occurs in the public and there are many cases that say that the consumer protection laws are remedial in nature and talking specifically about general business law three forty nine in new york it's remedial in nature it should be very liberally construed to carry out its intended purpose so it's look at what is its intent let's look at the statute the statute is written very broadly it's titled the general business law is titled consumer protection consumer protection is built into the title of the law it's intended to protect consumers not leave consumers exposed to retaliate if they assert their rights your honour's jackson humphrey's the supreme court cases ask the court to look at whether the statute is broad or narrow and in both of those cases title nine and section one thousand nine hundred one the court found because they were broad statutes they should be read to be inclusive of retaliation g p l three forty nine is very broad all it says is deceptive or practices in the conduct of businesses in the conduct of business are hereby declare unlawful that is just as broad as section one thousand nine hundred one in declaring race discrimination in the formation of contracts to be unlawful and just as broad as  as title nine was in jackson and again neither the fair to say that the supreme court in recent years has taken a more skeptical view toward implying causes of action from the general purpose of a statute to the opposite your honor alexander v cent of all which was two thousand and one said the supreme court needs to look at what should be a proper remedy but what was the intent of the law and so there were two primary cases after asked after stand of all one was a jackson which again the court implied a right of action in title nine and that was a five four split that was a five four split and jackson was in i believe jackson in my brief but it's in the heart case which is cited new york sachi its chapter seven section three twenty one titled statutes subject to special construction because of nature or object says generally remedial statutes are liberally construed to carry out the reforms intended and to promote justice and chapter six section ninety five in the amount of time title construction and interpretation says the courts in construing the statute should consider the mischief sought to be remedied by the by the legislation and they should construe the act in question so as to suppress the evil and advance the remedy and your honors the remedy of the statutes to protect consumers can only be advanced if they're protected against retaliation thank you thank you beth will take it