will move now to case number two it was ok i will start with you on the merits everything that's been presented to it the presumption applies even where the state court opinion makes no reference at all to the claim at issue in this case however that state appellate court on post conviction that would overcome the presumption but that evidence just triggers the presumption in your hearing janet johnson and it's illogical to find that that same old mission by the state court that triggers the presumption also constitutes clear evidence that would overcome that presumption i'm not i'm not so sure and i'm not so sure on this point i know what else the defendant the defendant maybe is petitioner could have done and that the reason i say that is because what what he points to if i understand is he points to the first district's appellate decision crimes which you're referring to and that's that's a lengthy reasoned opinion it's not a summary order correct and that at the end of that there are there is one or two line reference to ineffective assistance or jani appellate counsel correct but it's not the issue that the petitioner wishes to you know advance in federal and that's how it just seems it seems to me that why isn't he on sufficient ground of say that's exactly what johnson versus williams had in mind as kind of an exception to the presumption it doesn't mean you don't you may you may ultimately prevail but on this particular point it just struck me that he has the upper hand on that and i would agree that there was no express mention of this aspect of the claim i would point the court to this court's opinion in the verses which makes clear t the opinion should be read also in the context of that briefing so i would refer the court to his briefing on direct appeal or i'm sorry on the post conviction appeal regarding the color counsel's ineffectiveness and the brief itself  focused on that aspect that was expressed ajuda kid he argued that primarily trial counsel is ineffective for feeling of color alibi witnesses in another section he mentioned the public counsel he said appellate counsel was their friend effective for failing to raise trial counsel's effectiveness and there was an additional sense where he also said and appellate counsel failed to raise obvious issues including but not limited to sufficiency so he in his brief had failed to emphasize that as a key component of the claim and the so the court should read it to the state court's opinion in that light that this was i would say almost an afterthought or just an additional context contextual point about appellate counsel but really the focus of his brief shows that someone without identifying that person attempted to murder the victim garrett in this case and as we've noted it's proven completely outside of the confession that garrett was shot twice by someone who immediately got out of the band being the gun at him and began shooting if the district court's interpretation of the corpus delicti rule is accurate that there has to be some corroboration that mr winfield is the one who did it in addition to provocation that the act itself occurred can you still prevail here yes and is that based on the fact that you think there is crap or ration or plain place well exactly so there is corroboration  petitioner confessed that he was the one who did the shooting the victim garrett also identified petitioner as the one that shot him twice and given the trial court's credibility to terminations with respect to garrett how much weight can we put on corroborated by the confession so it had two pieces of evidence that petitioner was the one that did the shooting and petitioner was the one that did the shooting and here it so are you saying that we can implicitly determine what aspects testimony in the light most favorable to the people and it doesn't typically focus on the determinations of the actual fact finder juries out of d c don't feel right but here i have a specific credibility to terminations which i think takes it outside of that realm where you're about to say juries we don't know what they write they credit but here we do know what the trier of fact credited i do think it's it's an overstatement to say that the court made a credibility determination that here it could not be trusted  light most favorable to the people under the jackson standard to the extent it read it considers the fact finders determinations it should not construe goes beyond what the district what the t rial judge said specifically so it is fair i think for the court to say curry's testimony was plainly discredited in its entirety the record is not so clear with respect to garrett i think the court did express reservations about his credibility because he didn't identify petitioner immediately at the hospital even though he knew his name or nickname he didn't identify him so the court did express that there were concerns about his test but if we don't consider carrots testimony is there sufficient evidence in the record for corroboration under the district court's view of corpus to elect if the court construed purpose to lic as going beyond the actual facts correct that if we construe it the way the district court it here that it requires not just corroboration of the act itself but that mr winfield is the one who committed that act can we find that corroboration without carrots testimony so illinois law would refer i or you can rely on the confession as part of your yes but if you're going to do that the concussion has to be corroborated correct and that's my question let's put it aside garrets testimony if i can't rely on carrot and we can't rely on curry given credibility to terminations then is there sufficient evidence in the record that would corroborate mr winter yet what is that the hartman's testimony corroborated the details of petitioners confession about the type of vehicle that he arrived in where he did the shooting mostly how the shooting itself transpired that he exited and immediately begins shooting at garrett under illinois law not every single detail of the confession have to be corroborated before the court can rely on that as proof of corpus delict day and that would have if the court were to construe that is also in compassing the identity on our law would be satisfied by the fact that all of those details would rob rated and then what petitioner himself admitted consistent with those details that he was that person that did and the district court found that there were inconsistency is with mr hartman's and mr winfield's with mr hartman's testimony with mr winfield's confession what impact should that have i mean i don't know we're getting into sort of interesting hypotheticals i mean i would disagree i don't think that's part of the medical care if we get to that aspect if we i don't think that's a hypothetical so diverges and how many shooters there were and i think it's clear that petitioner in his confession was trying to limit his culpability i think it was known at that time that garrett had survived in europe could identify petitioner as a person who shot  van and as he was shooting at the area he heard gunshots additional gunshots coming from somewhere else so that it's all the story part of his statement conflicts with hartman's testimony that there was a single shooter that was the state's theory was certainly that there was a single shooter and that trial court ultimately did not decide to definitively decide how many shooters there were the court said the only evidence of that comes from the petitioner i am not comfortable beyond a reasonable doubt resting on that alone a finding that he was also responsible for killing stovall and there was also some advantage that there were two different types of bullet at issue and the court said that there's a gap here where the state has not proven that doubtful it could have come from the same gun that shot garrett so the court said i find reasonable doubt but it didn't say i reject articulated it today i would lera sets it out pretty clearly that that case does make clear that purpose to let die and the identity of the perpetrator are two separate elements which is one key point here  we've cited i think a number of cases that stand for the principle that purposed elect i if it's proven outside of a confession that suffices by itself and the courtney not take the additional step of seeing what there was for the confession that particular that persists point that you just made right there is that your view of illinois law in other words there is absolutely no question here that the corpus the kind of strict corpus to what i aspect of this is satisfied one we have somebody that's dead into we have another person that is shot and there is no question that the crime itself occurred correct and so is your view of illinois law that at that point the inquiry can stop with the fashion there is absolutely no need under illinois law to look for any form of corroboration and if that's your view of what case or cases you think best support that we cited a number that were admittedly murder cases and they focused on the existence of the body as being sufficient proof by itself of the murder but we're sort of extending that to the attempted murder contact don't worry about the crime here that it can be proven without the confession alone and that if the confession needs to be considered it was adequately corroborated and even if the corpus elect i extended to identity it was adequately corroborated to the i don't believe that it is it's not an extension of federal cases the state doctrine and that's the constitutional issue is the sufficiency so the constitution requires that if you have an element that needs to be proven in state law sort of defines what needs to be proof offered in support of that the constitution requires that there be enough for a rational fact finder to find that requirement met that haven't appellate counsel and you know i don't want to avoid that discussion but i do want to talk about trial counsel so let me just say a few things about appellate counsel and hopefully we can get some time for for tr one thing and i think the court must have this clear by by now when i get to with the be sure what we're talking about this is not a case where winfield is saying my conviction had insufficient evidence set it aside under the due process clause he say i had a viable claim on appeal and my appellate lawyer didn't adequately pursue that and that's an important distinction because the state once again this morning h waved around jackson versus virginia in front of this court illinois courts although they refer to jackson versus virginia and although they often make statements that seem to be very consistent with jackson versus virginia they we disagree with that if we think that the elena a court does not take a more strict view of jackson can you still prevail on the appellate counsel portion of your argument mean that's hard to say because we've never really fought that out but if if we talk about jackson versus virginia where we've got a defendant essentially saying i get it it seems like that that would would pass thought i'm sorry i just want all of you still have to look at jackson to determine it at least as a starting point to determine how viable or strong the sufficiency of the evidence argument would have been for purposes of pure strickland well certainly it it it comes in in the sense that if i as counsel on direct he'll say oh my gosh you know this is never going to fly under jackson versus virginia and then i have to start looking more closely at the illinois case which ties into these questions that the court has had a sort of suggest to you that o e illinois corpus to elect a law is very much like federal law and in fact it's it's not because you agree with the district court's interpretation of corpus to like the law you don't seem to go as far in your brief says to say you agree with that i thought i had agreed with that so you do agree with the district court's interpretation of what corpus to elect a lo i think in this case they're this they're the same people because when feel the saying i shot him and i was one of two shooters ok and the only credible witness eyewitness said there was only one shooter and it wasn't winfield and as a result the trial court at the end of the trial said i don't know whether there was one shooter or two shoes i really don't know and i ski night let me let me just run a couple of things by you and let you  ok the as i read mr winfield's main point and it's beside me i can't figure out why he did not file a motion to suppress his confession is involuntary but that ship has long sailed i think maybe he did but it has sailed right that's not exactly long on what he's arguing is not hey look that that confession was forged fabricated concocted it's counterfeit that's not my signature it's nothing like that he's arguing quite articulately it's cold worst ok we basically had a suppression hearing occur within the trial because it was a bench trial and he made the argument he wasn't saying judge i want to advance a motion to suppress he was just doing it in the context of challenging the can the confession is evidence and the trial judge in phatic lee rejected that contention and found that he was not kicked it cetera right that again i mentioned was voluntary then ok corpus dellec die doctrine seems to exist in no small part to kind of counter that concern that a confession may have been coerced it may have been fabricated etc and i'm not making that up i mean that comes right out a letter a writing lera says the primary purpose of the corpus to elect i rule is to ensure the confession is not rendered unreliable due to either improper coercion of the defendant or the presence of some psychological factor so given that that's that that concern is what underpins the doctrine corpus to locked eyes seems like a misfit here and the reason i say that is because there is no question the shooting happened that was current no doubt whatsoever to the shootings plural so then the only question is who should be held responsible for the shooting right yes and given the finding that occurred at the trial level that i that that every ject the contention that it's an involuntary statement i just have a hard time seeing how corpus talked i applied as well i think that involuntary may be covers more ground then physical abuse it legal promises it also covers a situation which is pretty common you know i think is what happened here is the police haven't been the station for a long long time he's denying any involvement they call him a state's attorney she doesn't write down the things where he says denying that he's involved and  they plant in his mind the idea well just admit you shot at one of them now that the state wants to spin this is he so clever that he thinks he can minimize things by admitting to one and not the other i would submit and it's all speculation but it's just as much speculation of state speculation the police were so clever that they thought we've got this mope in here we're going to supply him with this story we're going to get him to admit that he showed it one but not the other and presto we're told the problem is that all the other evidence or the evidence from the only credible eyewitness says  only one shooter and the didn't he effectively explain all the circumstances surrounding the shooting to the trial judge and the trial judge heard both accounts and unfortunately for mr winfield credited the state account over his and that was all about did he make the statement well the trial judge credit has his account in the sense that he credited winfield's admission to shooting at one but not the the other but but in so he said nd shooter in the in the part i just said that he was kicked rejected that he wasn't read the statement that if that's that's true i can't deny that but but the the facts of the event you know the attempted murder right are utterly inconsistent with the way winfield described it one shooter versus two that's that's the key fact and the judge counsel of course and that one of the district court ruled it against us and said that number one there was no deficient performance in it she really come in and say he was it home asleep he wasn't there we live in that neighborhood but he was asleep but at the time and so when the illinois appellate court says there was no way for the trial counsel to know about a potential alibi witness that is clearly reasonable facts how is that how is that unreasonable in light of the trial court's credibility determinations with respect to the mother and testimony versus the testimony of lee was saying that given the fact that his client told him and he did remember this that he was at j c penney and he tried to follow up on that alibi and it fell through well b anything directly that mr winfield has ever said he told us lawyer that he was at home i know we have the aunt and the mob's testimony but i didn't see anything in terms of post conviction testimony affidavits where he said i told mr bloom i was at home and he didn't follow up no the only place appears at the trial which is remarkable but he doesn't say at the trial i told mr bloom i was at home he testifies i probably say i was at home that's that's right and it which is different for purposes of the end effect of assistance of counsel from saying what he told see what he testified to it at trial it's kind of hard to understand what that means in terms of what he told the trial lawyer but i would suggest to you it's not just what he told the trial it's what the other witnesses told the truth but if we're looking at it from an unreasonable factual finding my question for you is the trial court or the court making this determination found that mr bloom was not told this and that the aunt and mother hadn't told him at the time and that his client mr winfield had only told him about the j c penn say that there's nothing from mr winfield himself even though he had the opportunity to put this through an appetite or come in at the post conviction hearing and testify i told mr bloom specifically i was at home how can we find the trial court's finding and reasonable that he wasn't that big because the trial lawyer never contradicted those two witnesses those witnesses were never in each and so it's your position that he told me he was at j c penney but the receipt was three hours off from the time of the shooting that alone wouldn't implicitly contradict that that's that's correct i mean because in defending a criminal case you talk to the client you come back to the client again you talk to other witnesses who have sought you out maybe you sought them out you know it's it's not that there's some old i'm a truth that comes out at the very beginning and it never changes it's a it's a process i certainly understand that but here it's a plot a process plus because he had the opportunity through the post conviction hearings to put something in saying i told my client that i was at home and there's nothing in the record like that so we only have the aunt and the mother's testimony that they told him even though the aunt and the mother never told anybody else about this including the investigators in till the time of the post conviction when you say the investigation in the police gets well you know i i think that's almost kind of unrealistic defense witnesses don't go and seek out the police and even if they do the police go with some tool that there isn't any evidence that they told anybody else about the alibi police or otherwise i'll accept your statement on on the police here but there isn't any evidence that they told anybody else about this including in a desta kater who went to talk to that that they they did tell the lawyer and strangely enough you know the lawyer could have easily said no it didn't happen what he said i don't remember and we all know what that  i say my my time is up i would just point out that as far as the performances is concerned the district court entered of a finding that the illinois appellate court really didn't decide prejudice had failed to establish either part of the strickland test that state court specifically said that and the nd part of that strickland test is prejudice so i don't know how we can see it stick well and then and then brings us back then to the question of whether or not there really was overwhelming evidence of guilt in fashion corroborated because if you say that there was no prejudice it's only because you're saying that the evidence is either thank you i just want to really briefly just address the trial counsel ineffectiveness claim there are two key pieces of evidence that contradict an inference that petitioner told trial counsel that he was sleeping at home on the st is trial counsel testimony at the connection hearing he didn't say i don't remember any conversations at all about an alibi he said i recall very clearly petitioner said that he was at j c penney i asked him to corroborate that they produced a wreath and that was in terms of the alibi time that was actually contradictory to an alibi that he was actually at home the entire day and never left and the point of trial counsel remembering further discussions was bolstered by the fact that he said if there had been any suggestion at all of a different alibi i would have run that down that's my practice i'm an experienced criminal attorney get this point he has you know decades of experience with murder trials so i would cite that as good evidence that there were no houses were no discussions about this other alibi sleeping at home and then also petitioner's testimony at trial shows that counsel didn't think he was presenting a firm alibi because his testimony was a quizzical as to where he was you know counsel said to him where were you at the time and he said well i think i was probably at home that shows that he had not given counsel of firm alibi and he was not from even in this testimony that he was sleeping at