this court reversed the trial court's order granting a motion to suppress as obvious or the meal had a reasonable suspicion to support a traffic stop civically his observations of defend its cracked windshield travis stops are governed by taylor the question i have is what information in the record would allow this court to conclude that the evidence in this case would have been evidently discovered and the record self  agency can you explain what community caretaker function would be performed to him and tori a vehicle for a nuisance violation again i'm not sure exactly least in this particular solution what you're trying to ask i think i just got confused myself well well we indicated in our previous decision again people versus condo seal in that it's a community caretaker function when you're doing perform an inventory search and and my question to you is what would you say in this case a nuisance violation would satisfy the community caretaker function i know you're arguing for picture in your brief but could you explain that to us to protect the content of the vehicle itself to ensure that someone's place a vehicle that the person's property does no harm no additional harm will come to it so that's why it's community care taking and this is the vehicle was going to be impounded for apologises violation or in the same area with him and tori search i know court to question whether parking ticket violations can be the basis for an inventory search are you aware of any case jones and another case i can't think of the name right now but you say those cases in those cases provide that a cracked windshield automatically constitute what about you know in those cases where the trial court specifically found the police testimony was not credible credible it was saying that in this context that it did not believe the reason that i also gave for wanting to stop the vehicle because context of the court's order ok and do you agree that if this court agrees with the trial court that there was no rational basis to stop a defendant that there would be no need to conduct an imminent torrie search of the vehicle and the place indicated that discipline this is a violation which under orders would allow it to be impounded and also didn't receive permission to leave town to vehicle for that reason so even if this court were to find that the st was not justified the interest rates could still be a lot and so you believe the report ordinance would allow an officer to drive through a community run a license plate and then if it be showed a nuisance violation previous nuisance violation as you have the ordinance that vehicle then could be impounded and searched i'm re moving the arrest and stop because that seems to be our argument of your brief when you argue regarding the ordinance so that your position our position is that these two are two separate evidence basically the photos of the windshield and the fact that he never took the photos and went to the next day some want to lie that testimony do you think i know you disagree but my my question is you rely on carrie and perry is an objective standard to decide whether the facts available to the officer at the time would lead to a reasonable  the court felt that the officer was not credible and that he never odds are that crack would feel because it would be impossible to observe it he never observed it until he pulled for the l t how what is standard and how do we reverse that trial court judge who felt your resaw this or was operating on a under a subjective standard as opposed to an irrespective of what every observed the trial court decided that because of the pretext of this stop it was going to grant the motion to suppress and unfortunately for the trial court that is not correct describe severe to crack on and they only indicate a crack existed and and it seems as if for the trial court can't look at severely and indicate that says this would never be sufficient to convict is not sufficient to justify a stop which is not correct right now would be a beyond a reasonable doubt correct that's correct no need to be reasonable suspicion which is less than probable cause and which is somewhere in between not turn on a legal question it turns on finding the facts and it turns on witness credibility judge hauser did not believe that officer machall male pulled mr collins over due to an observed traffic violation and so in this case without a traffic violation there is no basis for the stop judge hauser's ruling is based on the application of the facts in this case to the law because of that his decision on the motion to suppress should be a despite what the state is arguing the state basically makes two arguments st that the judge improperly consider the pretextual nature of stop and nd that the judge applied an incorrect legal standard in assessing whether the stuff was legitimate based on a crack when shield and despite what the state's arguing we are not disputing that pretextual thought there permissible as long as they are based on an observer isolation of a traffic law in this case the court simply found officer medical mill did not observe a traffic violation of the law is clear there must be an observed traffic violation officer cannot pull someone over st fully pretextual reason and then justify it by finding a justify his action by pointing to the cracked windshield this court found that testimony to be incredible and so if you take a look at the reference to the pretextual nature within the context of the judge's findings when he mentions the pretextual nature he states quote the only reason machall meal initiated this counter the judge fully recognize the law regarding pretext and that pretext cannot be the only reason for the stop he says this again in his in his ruling officer miguel meal test actions in this case were based entirely on events occurring a week prior pretext cannot be the entire reason for the stop not only is it presume that the judge knows and applies the law correctly the very language in the judge's own ruling illustrates he knew the law he applied the law that pretext cannot be the sole reason for the stop the judge did not believe the officer michael mele pulled mr collins over for a cracked windshield and when the judge did not believe that medical mill pulled him over for a cracked windshield pretext became the only rationale for the stop and that is what is not permitted by the th amendment regardless of the nature severity of the violation and so the state continues to focus on how bad was the crack was the crack a violation cetera but in reality the severity of the crack really ceased to matter once the judge found the crack was not the basis for the stop and so believing machall mill regarding the justification for the stop was a necessary but not sufficient to condition to satisfy the th amendment requirements set out in terry vs ohio because in kerry vs ohio there also needed to have been specific and articulable facts supporting the reason for the stop and so although the judge didn't need to get into that he did he said hypothetically even if the court found that testimony attempting to justify the stuff credible that still would not provide a sufficient basis for his actions and the reason is that the crack did not provide specific articulable stops to support the stop the court found the very nature of the correct feel to support it the judge asked the question set out and people versus price quote what would the facts available to the officer at the moment of the seizure warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief the action was appropriate the judge's answer was no and so in his hypothetical even if he police medical mill pulled mr collins over due to the crack when chilled the facts available the specific articulable facts regarding the nature of the position the federal would not it warranted and the judge's findings on this matter in the matter of maximals credibility were well supported by the record there are photographic exhibits in this case and i do encourage your photograph furthermore you can note that the two side rear windows and the back window the two side rear windows are tinted and so if a crack do not visible even from the vantage point in the photograph it's absolutely reasonable that the chuch could conclude and ask how is it possible that this crack could have been visible through either the rear window or the tinted side windows as the officer follow the car in the car turned into the private driveway that the state argues in its reply that quote the trial court makes no explicit credibility determination in its written order that is just a disingenuous statement to the judge explicitly found the justification for the stop incredible he describes it as an attempt at a justification the judge notes even if this court were to find mike o'neill's testimony credible he clearly made  credibility finding and this hearing was about the facts and about witness credibility when the entire hearing turned on the justification for the stop for the state to say there was no credibility determined determination  shocking especially given the strong language the court used in its written ruling furthermore the state's recounting of the statement of fact in their opening brief they make no mention whatsoever of the statements by the court regarding the credibility of the stingel witness on the single fact that matter the most in determining the outcome of this cake didn't matter if he found him credibility credible as the fact he was a police officer or the background information what mattered was he did not find him the th district is directly on point to this case it deals with the same statute although a separate subsection of the statute but both have to do with material impairment of a driver's vision  explain that not every air freshener hanging from a rearview mirror is going to constitute a basis to pull over knowledge asli not every crack in a windshield is going to constitute a basis to pull someone over the state attempts to distinguish it on the basis of strong language just said over the legislature in the statute itself this is not the judge trying to apply some beyond a reasonable doubt standard as the state continues to reiterate even though that language also never appeared in the trial court's r the court never even suggested he needed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that it materially impaired the objective facts available to the officer at the moment he pulled mr collins over had to cause a man of reasonable caution t action was appropriate not every crack is going to meet that requirement the judge made a factual determination that in this case it did not for these reasons the court just firm the trial court ruling granting defense a motion to also briefly address the state inevitable discovery doctrine argument that argument was raised for the very st time on appeal it was not argued either at the hearing on the motion to suppress or in the state's motion to reconsider because the defense had no opportunity to counter that below the court had no opportunity to address that whatsoever as our position the status or for that that argument on  appeal however if this court doesn't choose to address this argument the state cannot and has not proven that the evidence seized what is the lawfully discovered or miscible under that doctrine and the state's burden to show this by a preponderance of the require an inventory search the ordinance goes through the specific things that are required under the under the ordinance but an inventory search is not one of them therefore the inventory search must necessarily have been base so my question is does the fact that the defendant attempted to flee the scene in any way supports the seizure of the vehicle so with regard to the attempt to  walk away from the car your honor st i would know that the state abandoned that argument on appeal but with regard to him attempting to flee he had parked his vehicle in a private driveway and the description was that he was walking away from the car and so the mechelle meal did follow him and did detain him potentially for this reason and he then detained him in the police vehicle however once mekel meal was already separated himself from the car once he'd been detained in the police vehicle there just was no reason then to search the car this is under the case arizona versus a can't that it's not a search subsequent to arrest anymore and so even if in some cases the officer may have had a reason to you know pat him down after you know it does not provide for an inventory search of an impound a vehicle so my question is that was never raised in the trial court why shouldn't this be considered forfeited doctrine now in our response i did raise the issue that potentially you know again a hypothetical because the court below never addressed this this could be a separate basis on which this court might affirm the trial court's ruling because this court may sustain a judgment on any grounds appearing on the record regardless of whether the trial court's rule reasoning was challenge to the inventory search is based entirely on the basis that the seizure the stop itself was improper the correct both that the impoundment was incorrect and the inventory search was incorrect and so in the context of the vehicle inventory both the seizure meaning the impoundment and the search meaning the inventory search have to themselves meet the requirements of the th amendment and so our position is that neither of those two are i believe that that argument was made by the defense but not explicitly adopted by the judge's decision the judges language is written decision repeat  his ruling is that the only reason that the counter was initiated apprehended was due to the observation that week prior and so although i'm sorry i don't want to interrupt although pretextual tops our permissible they cannot be the only reason and he uses that language twice he says it's the entire reason for the stop it's the only reason for the stop and phrasing it in that way and pointing it out in that roy really lends again a clear sense that the judge understood that it cannot be the only reason for the stop no separate incidents because even if he did see whatever the whatever you indicated he thought he was able to run the white separating apart in come up with the fact that the vehicle was section and so taking a look at section four hundred and sixty four dollars there has to be a specific notice given to the registered owner of the vehicle that any subsequent offense she'll be subject a motor vehicle to imp at trial he just that he just testified hey i got permission to tow the car pursuant to the ordinance can't recall what the nuisance violation was there was no specific details about it there was no details that there had been a subsequent offense or whether the criteria in the ordinance was actually satisfied there was no testimony that he even determined the mr collins was the registered owner of the vehicle there was no evidence presented that the owner had been notified that the other really big problem with the testimony is that the inventory again the inventory is not set out as justified by the by the ordinance the inventory had to have been based on then a police protocol explanation of the of the process of an inventory there is it doesn't have to be you know really it's a fairly low bar as to what needs to be described at a hearing as to the reason for the inventory search but there was not be he there needed to be an explanation of the policy and that he conducted that search relative to that policy and say that the state failed to present evidence to the trial court when and no for knowledge to do so doesn't make sense and finally the fed also points court you stated you cited several cases on the fly cracking in the windshield as you were asked by just given none of both cases talked about credibility really so how again how do the guy tried many doesn't put on a turning signal and the police officer pulls no in this case doesn't the trial court basically find that he pulled him over and then see the crack and chip impairment of the crack is only necessary with regards to actual conviction violation not sufficient to conduct the stop initially  stop so obviously it was just a pretext therefore i