end of the day it's really about fundamental fairness this is a defendant who sought a bench trial had made certain concessions regarding the allegations against him and asked the court to decide one narrow issue as to whether or not the images that were on his computer traveled through interstate commerce after the trial of those that narrow issue there was a thirty month delay before the court issued a verdict clearly this preferred to delay on the court's part was that over the objection client your honor the defendant has absolutely no obligation under the law to seek a verdict after a trial in fact this court in u versus ray indicating the defendant has no obligation it is the obligation of the court and it is the obligation of the government to bring a defendant to trial and to brand offended to a verdict the defendant is when the government made a motion to your client by my client but he has no obligation and him understand your position i'm trying to determine whether in fact there was an objection the only objection was during the thousand and fourteen all the judge affirmed we don't rush well you can say don't rush or you can say don't rush so it's a matter of interpretation and his tone i was not there i'm peleg counsel but certainly a cold record and you have a cold record but in the motion or rush think under any ordinary reading of those words means don't rush don't you don't have to provide me with  review i don't think so because in the motion practice that that came about after the verdict counsel certainly clarified his tone and indicated that he sarcastically tongue in cheek indicated to the judge why you're rushing out and it wasn't as i understand it there's a court called record but clearly we have an indication from counsel as to what his tone was and what his do you make of that because i've acted because i think that the court's interpretation of barker this court's interpretation parker with respect to prose trial delay is different than pretrial delay and and here the defendant clearly by narrowing the issues was signaling to the court i want my case heard i want to i want fast track it i don't want to jury i want you to decide this very narrow issue and i need to know what to do with the right if i mean what you have thought of if in this case the defendant had said i affirmatively want you to delay rendering a verdict would that have been problematic for you that might constitute a waiver if there was  affirmative but you're told there is it it doesn't matter what the defendant says or does the obligation is on the court to ensure that a speedy verdict is is opportunity in the court system to waive certain rights and obligations but here there was no waiver he had his trial and he waited and he sat in his house with a bracelet and he went to therapy and he did w but he didn't make an affirmative waiver the facts are are such that he simply waited and waited and waited and the court itself admitted that the court was negligent in not rendering a verdict at the time that it should have rendered a verdict and clearly there was prejudice to the defendant he was in his house he couldn't move on with his life he didn't know when which direction what direction he was facing was he going to go free was he going to go to jail the stress on his family the stress of living with uncertainty i don't think any of us would want to live with that kind of uncertainty for thirty month on a case where you have yourself indicated to the court that you just want them to decide this narrow issue and wherever it falls it falls and he couldn't assert his right to appeal for a very lengthy period of time because there was a thirty month delay there were all sorts of things that that happened emotionally financially to this defendant through no fault of his cell and  clearly the fact that at the end of the day he got a sentence which the court gave some lip service but it was even over the minimum so he didn't even get the minimum sentence after he had waited thirty months to hear what the judge is going to do i don't think that there was any reasonable excuse that the court offered for what it did i think that the pressure on the defendant was great and i think that was clearly both the sixth amendment and due process and basic fundamental fairness requires the court to address this issue as requested in the brief i just ask about the interstate commerce aspect i haven't seen any decisions to support your view that the contract content approach does not satisfy the element of all statutes before wasn't there were amended do you know of any cases that support your view that there has to be a demonstration that the internet transmission for the defendant came from another state at least i know but i believe that in this circuit it was a matter of first impression i know there are cases in other circuits with respect to that issue i would only ask the court to consider that if somebody receives if any of us received an image on our computers for us to know that it came from well it's a matter of proof and it's not necessarily notes a lot of it's a presumptious well but but what's happening here is that the court is building into the law a presumption and i understand that there is case law that undercuts the position of the defendant in this case with respect to that issue and there's a way also of reading our own case law as suggesting that that and with respect to we we we did file a letter with the court and we'd like the court to consider that on november first there were changes to the guidelines and there were clarifications there weren't that it wants these conditions to be specific and the seventh circuit even before the commission made those changes has seen this is a matter of fairness and due process and we would ask that this court adopt that view and understand that not every defendant the comes before court is the same and the guidelines should be tailored there should just be standard guidelines given in conditions conditions ye that with respect to every standard condition the district court has got to specify why it is that the standard condition is appropriate i think that the court has an obligation to at least review the standard conditions and see whether the standard conditions as have obviously apply to the particular defendant this goes on in many courts across this country especially in new york with conditions of probation judge by the district court and this court should firm it first of all with regard to his speedy trial issue the question of whether this delay that occurred between the end of o responsibly there's no question that it exercised its discretion and so is there any limitation so this is thirty months but let's just say that the period of delay had been five years which i can't imagine that you never know and there had been no objection from the defendant at some point isn't it incumbent upon a district court to  notwithstanding the lack of jackson from the from either side frankly well i think judge you have to apply the barker factors and you apply the lengthy delay which is which is a threshold issue anyway you don't get that to the other three factors if you don't have a delay that sufficiently long and here thirty months was long enough that you agree that there could be a circumstance where there was no objection whatsoever judge looked at the reason for the delay and the reason for looking at that why the delay occurred is to make a determination as to whether the government gained any advantage from it and here it didn't the trial was over at least the proof part of the trial was over it's not like memories could fade the defendant could lose witnesses things like that that didn't happen so you apply those factors here proof was over and as a matter of fact as as appointment as my ever siri has indicated all along it was a legal issue that was being determined here the defense was purely a legal one so there's no possibility that memories fading or the factors are appropriate going on to the third factor the assertion of the right and here and now you you judge you have you have pointed out kind of a tension between the law stating what the defendant doesn't have a right or doesn't have an obligation to assert the right however when if he's saying if the defendant is saying well my speedy trial my constitutional speedy trial rights have been violated you look to see whether he's been asserting the right and here there is no indication whatsoever that this defendant was interested at any time during the delay with getting it over with was the government's effort to speed speed up th judge the government made a motion to the court asking the court to deliver a verdict citing the rights of the of the victims to have this case disposed of and as a matter of fact when when the parties appeared before the court on that motion mr scarlett's counsel said oh geez i told the government not the at that motion i didn't think it was a good idea for the for the government to pressure the court into into into delivering a it was quite up quite a ways through and just for those in yes it was it was quite a ways through i think it was in january and then the or it was if it was i don't have the exact date your honor but yes i can see that it was more than a formal motion had there been some some informal attempts to speed things up well there's there's nothing in the record indicating that there was i don't i can't point to anything in the record if i were to answer that if there was something about an instruction not to call chambers and something the government did call chambers and inquire i don't know exactly when that was how far along in the delay that was but the a usa as scientific case did call chambers to ask what the delay was or ask if if if the verdict might be forthcoming forthcoming i don't have an exact date on that your honor  but there was some effort in africa but here i mean we have a situation where the defendant and even when the parties appeared in november twenty fourth team for this to end his conference  that's when counsel said look i didn't think it was a good idea for the government to put pressure on to the court to issue a decision saying mr c barley's doing fine saying don't rush and i understand the argument about you know what the pens and what the inflection was was he being sarcastic but he followed that up with don't rush mr scarlett's doing fine which really there's there's no reading of that no possible reading of acknowledged that the that the district court did not articulate its reasons for imposing that and that doesn't fall into the standard conditions exception to orally pronouncing it in this case our argument is that there's there's there's no error was not plain because it doesn't affect mr schuyler substantial rights here we have a situation where there was no restitution imposed so this financial this this issue or this requirement that he provide financial information for the purpose of collecting restitution will never happen and you can't think of another reason or you didn't state another reason and your beliefs for imposing that special condition well no i can't i don't i don't know that there was any other reason there was big because that special condition was provide financial so we acknowledge that the court did not articulate a reason for opposing it but it's harmless or it's not plain error and it's harmless because there is no there there's no there was no restitution impose and that will never come into play for that very reason so for and i'll stand on my brief with regard to the interstate commerce argument and for those reasons that this court should issue an order affirming respect to the court's question as to when that motion was made i believe it was me twenty three months after verdict in addition i would as the court to look at pages twenty seven and twenty eight of my brief with respect to the invited error doctrine and the discussion that your honor had with me regarding whether or not there was any potential of you to some how the as and with respect to the guidelines issue i would indicate to the court that there's precedent indicating that it does not harmless error does not necessarily apply in these kinds of situations to supervised release and the special conditions and the fact that there's no harm no foul is not really true because we don't know what the future holds for any of us and there may be harm and they may be fel be relevant to that issue to the collection but the old standard indicated it was he could ask for anything he could ask for any financial disclosure that the probation officer wants and whether he will or not is is not for second part of it but the question is can he ask for anything he wants for this he wants to as opposed to what he does in terms of releasing it and that i think is what they that's what the sensing commission is looking at and that's the kind of stuff that the seventh circuit was concerned with not being specific enough so that the probation officer knows what his limitations are with respect to a defendant thank you very much you very much will reserve