held that century had no duty to defend or indemnify p p i i think you'll find three mistakes that the court made over and over again that taint every one of its rulings first off the court misread of petition the court read in allegations that were not there in the court read out allegations that were there the court misconstrued the policy most notably the court itself by treating exclusions for an for intentional injury as if is if it was an exclusion for intentional act and those are obviously two different things intent to injure is very different from an intent to act exclusion was knowing violation of rights of another which required knowledge of injury right now i think that argument how does that translate to these facts  gentlemen one of whom was the owner of the property but he was off duty that they had been drinking all afternoon they she was eighteen years old they were with him for a view of the manager in the employee of the establishment p p i they over served her with alcohol that's number one number two they allowed her to remain on the premises in the presence of these two guys who are themselves becoming drunk number three and this is very significant a very s act they allowed her to leave with these two drunken gentleman rather than calling her a cab or notifying somebody for a condition that's important because the argument you're making now it doesn't help because there are four categories of vice principals in texas owner is not one of them and there's no allegation that he fit within these four categories more importantly i think by judge gabi assume that everything and anything vice principal doesn't cuticle to the corporation that is not texas law texas laws to the contrary that is if a vice pretty even soumik somebody is vice principal if they're acting in a personal capacity and we test a little bit that the intentional aspect of this if there there's been a car accident we talk about different category cases they let her go off she was intoxicated with too intoxicated me and if that's what if they had taken her six blocks away and beaten her turn i'm i'm not sure that would make a difference judge on what the significant thing here is what happened on the p p i premises and looking at the spectator and so you're responsible any time you left the intoxicated patron position well if you're talking about the under underlying allegations that's the negligence is there multiple acts negligence here but one is allowing her to leave the premises with two drug adults irrespective of what then may have happened  but for that act the sexual assault would not have occurred in the point is when we're talking about these coverage issues and exclusion issues that act alone is cover because it's bodily injury that arose from an occurrence at the same time the exclusion doesn't apply because there's no allegation here no proof here that the p p i or its managers or employees who lettering leave expected or intended injury that's that's the key to this exclusion it's not an intentional acts exclusion it's expected or intended injury and there's no allegation or proof that they expected or intended injury and indeed for that matter and this is interesting there's no allegation of proof that even dearie himself expected or intended injury that ultimately happened while he was on the premises now to be sure off the premises at the hotel where he sexually assaulted very clearly did expect or intent or intent the injury but we go back to negligence cause of action that coverage b then you start talking about these exclusions to liquor liability exclusion actually it's a little i belittle endorsement and it's it's hardly begins with an exclusion but then that clearly the allegations here implicate the pekoe provision because beer was served and the allegation is that the bodily injury arose from p p r as distribution of beer and it occurred after don't what tell me the difference but of course in analyzing coverage we don't necessarily look at the merits of the underlying cause of action but but that something is foreseeable and i do think that letting her leave the premises with two drug adults without calling a cab or calling him somebody responsible for her can lead to negligence on going negligence but the point is just because it may be foreseeable for it for proximate cause purposes he got he got beer importantly that they used to outsell a couple of dressing up as containers for the liquor which again triggers the pekoe exception so at this point i'd need to deal with judge owen i think you answered or asked an important question but you might not know half the answer which is that mrs dole was passed out drunk at the hotel where she woke up where dismay and free time survey's was on top of her she would not have been passed  drunk but for having been served alcohol but having been over certain alcohol so yes if a bar get someone drunk and up person walks outside in a comic it's them of course the bar is not liable but if that person causes  intoxicated but even so we go on ours it doesn't matter we have after a feed a trial final judgment of the state court discord has said time and again and so it must be for judges to be respected that went up  determines a fact that has happened and that that controls indemnification that that controls coverage here we have a state court judgment issued by a respected state court district judge upon a trial on the merits with this poor woman i was there being cross examined in detail about the most intimate and horrible things that happened to her and dad judge said what happened and dad judge said what happened is because she was served alcohol in which case she would have never been in that position because there was a manager on duty that allowed this to happen to her because that manager on duty ignored negligently his duty to an invitee to safeguard her once he got her drunk or allowed her to become drunk and i don't mean just drunk i'm mean blind drunk to her she had to basically bankruptcy lawyers so we're not coverage lawyers we don't we don't look at this from coverage perspectives and we're not appellate lawyers we're just people don't know that when the bar purchases liability insurance and pays extra for liquor liability coverage and a bar over serve someone and dead bar dan gets liable for that that is why you purchase liquor liability insurance in other words we're not trying to fit a square peg round hole w trying to reinvent the world here this is why people that sell intel it's a conspiracist liquor live below the insurance so sell to us yes we understand it comes down to certain technical details but to us  exactly why people purchase insurance from century people to serve alcohol and a duty to defend as mr levin joe was pointing out it is a different standard in other words for domestication we have to apply the facts as found by the judge we cannot do what judge g nowhere in her petition so right going there this court has proof that judge god went outside the please moreover upon trial and state court it was determined that she had not been given the gift so again we is not per se a vice principal is because there are many owners that you will daily management overall management to directors and officers there are companies little to pull on right now like hearing i mean he was he there on duty so many days a week in all the many days of the record your honor that's the actual trial now you're asking me the this was his day off he repeatedly had days off he had another gentleman whose name we have a hard time pronouncing who into any one of the poor categories by hans well it's true that in the g t case there i believe it was the court listed four categories but they were four categories of people who are who are allowed by the master control servants who are allowed by the master control known g t a obviously g t a doesn't have it all but here i think the facts as alleged in the complaint and the fact that he's an owner show that he fits into a category of someone who controls the business they've alleged that he walked into the restaurant he went in got he you know he did it you know they want to pretend that he's just some person who came in and set down and ordered food ordered drinks no they deal allegations in the complaint are he went into the into the restaurant walked into the refrigerator and just grabbed some beers out he brought his own liquor into the boat into the restaurant he went and got i'd also like to make one other point that i think is really important in the trustees brief they sort of suck took a bit of attack on us for not include not looking at any of the allegations in the original petition but the original petition alleged not only that he was the owner but that he was the president at that he was the alter ego and that he was a director and those all clearly do fit within just causing intoxication of the young woman and of serving under age person the only real question here is whether what mr having to call the peak of the products completed operation hazard removes the  crown royal liquor which mr geary bought from as as allege in the complaint bought from a liquor store and the third was really hit in the hall which is an illegal drug there was some debate whether where do you go you go and you look at what the little lot with what the liquor liability exclusion says and says it applies it does not apply to claims within the the products completed operation ha directly from the language of the with the liability exclusion which says that century has no duty to defend or indemnify and there is no coverage if any proximate cause of an occurrence arises out of the liquor liability so it's little liability unless it's in the p c away but if any if there's any liability that arises out of that proximately caused by liberal liability in this case exclusions has no duty to defend or indemnify it's absolutely both your honor that's that that's a plain language and what the what the opponents argue is that as long as long as one product the products completed operations hazard then the entire suit has to be cover and that's exactly backwards that's that's just turns the language of the policy on its head and i understand why they want to do that interpretation of the policy and it's mandated by the policies plain language they also make several other arguments your honor they argue that the little liability to exclusion doesn't brought the liquor from the outside and was not insured and this is one of the reply brief supply aged ten i don't really understand this argument they exclusion applies to claims were plaintiffs seeking to hold the insured liable for contributing to intoxication  serving a minor and that's exactly what the complaint alleges here and then finally they argued about the salad cuts that somehow the salad cups transform this product that was purchased from outside  who's the owner of the restaurant walking out and getting a couple of salad just grabbing a couple of salad cups transforms alcohol that p p i did not have a license to sell into p p i product and i think  made a great point is that's ultimately a self defeating argument for the palin's because once that happens you have what if you if you make a finding that all of a sudden you're right in the criminal acts excuse i mean that you know they've been providing unlicensed alcohol to a minor that's clearly a criminal act that would preclude coverage under a separate exception we've talked a little about the intentional acts exclusion as i vice principal based on the fact that he was the owner and the inclusion of the term vice principal in the allegations as well as the i you know there were the previous allegations that made the city i'm sorry art is gone and  the sufficient control to be a vice principal and you know i think this comes straight from the complaint they also argue that he was acting outside the scope of his authority  and obviously not everything a vice principal does would be imputed to the restaurant and if if he was on a vacation and did something somewhere else you wouldn't in puta conduct a restaurant but the very conduct there alleging here relates to the restaurant complaint alleges that theory went into his restaurant got beers from his restaurant serve those beers in his restaurant and got salad cut from his restaurant and serve liquor in his restaurant  policy and judge gobbets for finding that the exclusion applies to injury intended or expected from the standpoint of any insured and if theory is an insurer which he is because he is act respect to his business and the exclusion applies because he's an insured and and this is what he was doing when he was serving the beers in the liquor they try to get around this by point a separation of insure exclusions that use the term and insured but not any insured and that's all the difference and that makes key in totally irrelevant here and point the court to two cases is four thirty eight s w third six ninety eight both of those cases say that if the exclusion clause uses the term learned that ensured application of the separation of insurance clause requires that the term be interpreted as only be referring to the insured against whom a claim is made of the policy if however the exclusion clause is the term any ensure that application of the separation of insurance clause has no effect on the exclusion clause a claim the central problem of their argument is they nor texas law on duty to defend it which says that if any allegation if any allegation is potentially covered then they have a duty to defend the entire suit and they say that p p i it acted intentionally that's just absolutely fal the damages were that were subject to the duty to down the father have to be some assessment of that but we didn't get to that point either the other key case that they don't cite it all didn't cite their brief and insight today is the texas supreme court's most recent importantly bennett vs reynolds says that just because somebody is a vice principal doesn't mean that anything and everything that person did is automatically imputed to the corporation to the contrary then it versus reynolds says that when the vice principal acts in his personal capacity unrelated to his authority the corporation is not bound and all the allegations here and all the proof here was that barry acted in a personal capacity at all times both on and off the premises he was drinking all afternoon he was entertaining his friends and he was plying go with alcohol and he was acting personally for his own purposes to be sure when he was off the premises sexually assaulting her he and he expected her intended that injury but he was not insured and that's the other problem in the court's opinion he didn't meet the definition of insured at that time exclusions all reasonable inferences must be drawn against the insurance company any potential ambiguity in the language must be drawn against the insurance come because we're dealing with an exclusion and a hyper strict standard of traditional review applies so again even if opinion and king and we're dealing with the separation of insureds and i would search just submit to you that if if you agree with judge god then you are agreeing that on owner anytime he's on premises perhaps not even the only owner but the owner anytime he's on premises he is per se the corporation and dad would basically be against a hundred years of texas prince precedent that separates a corporation from its owners you would basically be altering going every single case any single time that an owner happens to be on premises and that is the only way to judge god b s opinion counts because otherwise anything that he put in there is from outside the pleadings again he found the bill had played the dearie had the power to hire and court's precedent that a plaintiff complete in the alternative it doesn't change the end result and we know as mr eleven's are said that so long as one cause of action is potentially within coverage the whole must be defended and that that not happen here and we haven't even