sales and services versus the united states that issue today in two thousand and seventeen and that's precisely why compel is raising the issue of an ambiguity in the statute but the issue for the court today is whether compel is race a plausible legal theory specifically one thousand u s c fifteen sixteen and see i will explain why the term entry some in those provisions is ambiguous the statute does not define whether all or a subset of all entries prior to section fifteen sixteen a see why i don't really understand your your comment that that if it's not necessary that the congress didn't say whether it's all entries are or not i mean congress separated entries in section fifteen sixteen eat a eat one he refers to all entries after the publication the timken notice shall be liquidated in courting with in accordance with the court's decision however prior entries after the timken notice so congress clearly knew how to use the word all and they also discussed the usual case vs extraordinary circumstances so in the usual case only entries of merchandise of the character etc that would make it very clear that that covers the waterfront of entries and like i guess you want us to add the word typically like entries of merchandise covered by the determination typically shall be liquidated in accordance with the determination and and the word typically isn't in the statute you want us to read it the word typically from that usage of that adverb in the legislative history but the legislative history doesn't give us any suggestion of why we should deviate from what i think looks like the plain language of the statute wh you're on i would disagree with that the legislative history actually refers to that typical case meaning in the usual case so since what could we're supposed to take legislative history and then assume that that we should use that to put words into the statute that aren't there well the court may rely on the legislative history for guidance in it in reviewing the statutory language so it's not just enough to review stature and one which in a vacuum the court has to review in the context of the request for an injunction that comes in before the term can notice the next is those that are enjoined and then the third is those that come in after the temple notice that you have it you don't dispute that you're only in that first category correct but we we structure is ambiguous in that congress did not address these circumstances at the time it promulgated statue in one thousand nine hundred nine as we explained in our brief nine hundred seventy nine the highest c b d rates were about forty percent now we're exercise them and so it it starts to look a lot like the classic waiver issue where the party waived its opportunities to resolve the issue or contest the issue and and so if if i read the plain language and that's in this very plain way that it says there's different categories of when these entries are made and then if you don't look if you don't have your entries for your merchandise enjoined from liquidation for you don't come in or those entries are made after the time to notice your kind of step with whatever the determination order was when you are at it the court doesn't have to agree with compelling arguments about the statute or why why there's ambiguity only has to find there's a trade court to address as long as compose made that possible legal argument that clears the hurdle of the twenty six motion and it should be heard on the merits at the court and as far as one of which is you're just stuck with whatever the whatever commerce decided unless and until this court or that c i t says that what they decided was wrong and i got the yes this is what conflict congress says there is no ambiguity dalton's the languages play the commerce can find a all of his rate of ten thousand percent twenty thousand percent and we're talking about a c v t all his rate that applies to all and producers that do not participate in the that are not selected as mandatory respondents in an investigation this is not behavior by a respondent where they fail to cooperate fail to answer question errors many of them they don't even know that such an investigation has gone off but that was true with the time that congress passed the statute that's right but that was for rates with a forty percent so essentially what we know if they mean how would how do we know that back then seventeen year i'm methodology of calculating and all others rate that was repudiated by this court but that wasn't that's not directly what's at issue here the issue here is seven percent from three hundred seventy four percent they set the rate back ten days they set all entries and afterwards you know after the state which is ten days prior to their publication date those entries will be subject to new rate joint entries but there may be others pursuant to the legislative history the senate report generally or spurs to subsets with reference to one specific subset only and only refers to all entries for entries after the two can notice converses interpretation correct correct but that's irrelevant to this particular question your honor because what they're saying is that the rate should not apply to them but the rate itself was calculated by commerce in the normal course and you know according to a you know according to anna procedures and under the administrator review a process that automatically quotation instructions are issued and there liquidated in accordance with the cash has a rate which is the three hundred and i understand your argument as yet as to how the statu works but in terms of what the reality is we're talking about a punitive rapes that ends up getting applied to somebody who was not well your honor is also somebody who didn't participate at all at least so that one one ambiguity you're correct and it's and you're right to also note that the word unless in the statute in fifteen sixteen atheist has unless your entries are enjoying the cards out an exception right there it's like and noticed that the the extraordinary circumstance is embedded there and it is it is called out as in joint entries and we see that in fifteen sixteen eighty two do you agree that commerce has discretion to make it new rate retroactive it does not have discretion to make a straight retroactive to the point where compel us saying all the way back to the start of the order no your honor because in fact if you if you look at the way the system is the excuse me what's your authority for the proposition that doesn't have what we have it isn't in the statute itself fifteen sixteen a fifty and and because it only says in joint entries it doesn't say that you can you know at the end it tells you before anything that happen before the timken notice is subject to the determination of commerce that are not enjoying commerce made it made this retroactive to ten days before the temple not as well as say except for if you look at the statute also again looking at the same two provision if we're supposed to con supposed to give notice within ten days of the court's decision and it it made it retroactive to make sure that it's ten days right ten days right after the court's opinion in both cases in the mcclane file cases so that's what the  even if even if there was some ambiguity congress is actually reasonable in the way that interpreted it it's if you have a decision that occurs years later after entries come in it's like it's it should not be applied there's a brief suggestion that maybe circumstances like the pell has what's best to happen is typically or usually they get the pretend good notice rate but maybe not always and maybe not for its merchandise it did not declare them properly as subject to your c d s it did not do that and so it's only if claims that it's broker you know somehow made a mistake or that customs you know finally told you know what the proper federal register notices absolutely your honor and in terms of actual notice they received actual notice from pub stems prior to the second a ministry of review but they still do not participate so in fact is what will compel us arguing is an exception only for itself they and they understand what the rules are and they have not challenged anything court so that that could be a possibility as well your honor i really ask again here i don't exactly know every single possibility it's like but  correct that you know you have to you have to have more than a mere possibility when you allege these are all conclusionary and allegation we have to remember here that there are no facts in dispute everybody knows that there was no participation everybody knows that the raid is everybody knows  just wanted to point that out as well so that was something that we there's also this is not a question also of unjust enrichment this is that has nothing to do with any end this is only it was the proper rate at the time of capello's entries and that they failed to do anything to either try and get a different rate or trying precipitate it's like that cannot be something that is redress of all here especially given the clarity of the statutes so congress acted properly and reasonably in assessing capellas entry the countervailing duties at the cash deposit rate of the time of entry and if if your honour's have any references to entries but that the legislative history for fifteen sixteen eight easy refers to all entries after the timken notice and the statute uses all  after the publication the tempi notice shall be subject to the new rate but commerce in its discretion apply the rate to ten days two entries that enter ten days prior so commerce d enact some kind of protection to allow parties or even non parties as well as arguing here to not be subject to such a high rate in this case these are unique circumstances because this is a c b d investigation it's involved it right that's been judicially invalidated the two year period to raise a claim is almost up under fifteen eighty one i we understand that expires