the district court below aired in two respects first it misinterpreted the electronic communications privacy act in finding the good faith exceptional case and number two the court went well beyond the scope of the twelve b six  analysis went beyond the police and determined the state law claims the merit in order to properly evaluate the electronic communications privacy act or e c p a or as how it's been dubbed in the  briefs one has to look to the over underlying an overall purpose of the statute the statute is not necessarily to encourage participation with law enforcement officers in their investigation it's the exact opposite the purpose of the statute is actually to prevent and protect information similar to the fourth amendment and the subscriber or end users personal information or communications via electronic  or otherwise looking at i think it's important to look at the two statutes and figure out whether or not you can harmonize the two sections sections twenty seven o three provides no cause of action shall lie for providing information assistance in accordance with the terms of a court order subpoena paraphrasing there and other section at issue here is twenty seven zero seven which provides that a good faith reliance on a warrant subpoena a court order will provide a complete defense to any action the district or the real question for us here is expanded expanded good faith and rode out the reliance portion of it i guess to answer your question i would say that the good faith exception that we're talking about is a good faith reliance similar to leon no we haven't achieved anything in this case if we just say the district court erred in whatever way because if we don't get to this issue i mean the primary the heart of the error you call and the district court sort of reside it is our car a test in then didn't apply that test if we don't clarify what the test is then we have not accomplished i would agree with your your honor i were free to look at the available we come and i agree with that and i think when you preface or buttress that against where we are procedurally in this case and it will be six i think the court let beyond where it could have i think in order to determine a subject of good faith belief on the part of time warner cable in this in this case you have to at least know who the actor was i mean who knows maybe it was a rogue actor who was doing this intentionally and got fired because of it but without discovery we cannot reach that actual subjective intent whether or not it was objective reasonably maybe from the pleadings you can determine that but my senses without that you need to you know look and conduct some discovery and reach beyond the pleadings in order to determine the good faith the in order to harmonize the sections and i  realize that the test is the important thing but this court i think also has to determine the interaction between these two separate sections were upon first reading they appear very similar you have no cause of action will live  good faith reliance defense i think in order to properly look at it you have to look at the no cause of action will lie defense in the science that it is a subpoena a court order with absent any defect any type of problem there's no reason to question the underlying court order warrant or anything like that and in that regard you have a good faith or you have a reliance on that you're going to be immune from liability under the statute and there's no cause of action the second section require it i think is kind of supplements that next in the sense that you have a a valid warrant on its face  subpoena and at the end of the day it turns out there's a defect much like your good faith exception to the exclusionary rule where you have to look at whether or not that was a good faith reliance whether there was some objective o when you give the information over or whatever it is and you are acting pursuant to a subpoena you violating the statute but there's just no cause of action that seems like a strange way to rearden a life i think doesn't sound like a violation of the statue of the statute itself says this and i think you're back to violation though is what i'm asking at all if it's not a violation then here's my questions my main question i have it's a little bit different from judge givens question that the section provides that a person aggrieved by a violation of the chapter in which the conduct constituting the violation is engaged in with a knowing and intentional state of mind so what does that intent relate to i mean you would think it would relate to the conduct constituting a violation and if a violation is constituted of disclosing the information not covered by a valid subpoena then if a person doesn't know or intend to disclose to right so you got to know in ten conduct constituting a violation why isn't the absence of a ballots or presence of a valid supply absence of a valid subpoena part of what constitutes a violation i guess that's my question and so same question i asked a minute ago i did but now it's in context yet i think when you look at the statute and it's the way i read it maybe it's not the correct way but the way i interpret it is a tough statute is and i think the problem we have is it was last and then eighty six and you basically have you know everything that's wrong but that just answer your question really briefly i believe that the way it's written that  may please the court jeff jones on behalf of the pelly time warner cable we believe the district court properly dismissed the action below on two grounds one is the good faith community or the common law immunity would be another grounds as well or number it just fails to state a claim for relief under the various elements of the various causes you to do you disagree about the test as being the one articulate the preferred this being the one articulated by the district court the way we would present your honour's we think the objective test by itself would be sufficient the mccready case adopted that in other words was it objectively reasonable but we also think that the district courts test is a perfectly well in that case where in the district court's order if we go and look through it where would we find the analysis there are lights to the reasonableness of what time warner d it well there's no evidence in this case we don't know whether time warner employed efforts to make sure these were responded to with reasonable diligence we don't we don't know if this was the nearest nobody's resolved whether a mere mistake  enough to give you the the immunity or not we we don't know if it was a reckless we don't know and i mean i don't see any place the district court the district court articulated a yes and then it sort of i don't i don't see the application of that test fully so i'm looking at the district court order and maybe you can show me where i am wrong about that well your honor i think the court did win it  after providing the test it says the intent of the statute was to provide a defense will provide a response to a subpoena with a good faith belief that it was acting pursuant to that subpoena although a mistake was made in responding to fiat it why it has had a a know that i mean well obviously it wasn't the right number but how does the court know it was a mere misstep well your honor i think there is no plausible scenario under which the undisputed facts could be someone was acting knowingly or it's not a likely perhaps but i don't know that that's ok i mean we can stare at these two numbers and we i mean i have difficulty sometimes finding the difference between them i mean it is one digit not that some much that the district court didn't the plot sound test that is that it was a mere mistake because any other scenario would have been time warner would have acted with something other than negligence it's inconceivable that the subpoena response effort could have been set up in such a way as to easily permit this to occur i mean maybe it doesn't matter but i mean why is that the only plausible i mean a big corporations capable of making mistakes and not engaging in intentional or reckless behavior well i mean your honor again it goes to use our common sense and common sense says these two numbers are virtually identical it's almost impossible to see the difference even when you stare at them it's perfectly understandable that it was a typographical mistake and they allege it was quote a mistake in their complaint and in fact in their brief to this court they say it is hard to imagine a circumstance in which time warner cable was not behaving in good  so we're to take the word mister from the comply and from the and from the numbers themselves and your honor it's very similar to sam's in the nine others the numbers are similar but one would thin number that you would think that any reasonable employer might well check and double check both the person who originally supplied it and the person who typed it if those are two different this court they specifically said quote it is difficult to imagine a circumstance where an eye is peace such as t w c is not disclosing information with a good faith belief they say that in their brief and so that they might know they have  being anything that holy your honor it's very similar to sam's i submit where the court said look there was discussion about whether the employee knew that the subpoena was somehow invalid and the court simply reached the conclusion there is no plausible scenario under which you could allege bad faith in this situation the undisputed facts scream out and our common sense says that's what it is now there's tens of thousands of subpoenas that time warner cable gets i mean if someone had to us and that we don't know there's no record of well and i only say that as a lead in to i mean if someone is in a loft in a robbery and they give a license plate and it's one digit off we don't sue the witness or in this day and age it's see something say something we encourage citizens to cooperate with law enforcement and in the jacobsen case they cite the and they cite the legislative intent now admittedly it's twenty five twenty but they use the same good faith defense and the legislative intent of the senators was we do not want to punish people that cooperate with law enforcement and so it screams out your honor and to the knowingly and reckless point knowingly is defined in the legislative history as aware of the circumstances that you're actually engaging in this is the quintessential inadvertent disclosure it was one digit off of of an otherwise valid subpoena and inadvertent disclosures are not a they're not a basis for a liability under the statute because they're not knowingly or intentional and they are also subject to the good faith defense i submit your honor that a good faith defen includes inadvertent good faith mistakes and there is no plausible as a reasonable as long as their objective lee reasonable and this court can look reasonable as a matter of law well your honor i  the legal standard no but they do discuss plausibility and i did but i mean that's not the question we're dealing with i mean invoking plumpy twamley it ball in response to this kind of question is not really responsive but your honor this contents is intended to make clear that reckless or negligent conduct is not sufficient to constitute a violation it's not sufficient that the reason we use knowingly or intentional and the reason we have the good faith reliance defense is precisely to avoid someone coming in and saying well you were a witness to a crime but you were somehow negligent or reckless in providing information we the senate legislative history specifically says to your question judge guy which is negligence is not a basis for liability against an innocent provider trying to cooperate with law enforcement that legislative history in your brain yes it's cited in our brief it's a under the i could find the page but it's a reference to the senate report and the house report says the same thing which is that not reckless or now wouldn't conduct is not a basis for a violation under the statute and you're honor if i could if you look at the other three exceptions to the good faith defense section there's three subsections there one talks about grand jury and legislative authorization the next one talks about emergencies it refers to twenty five refers to let law enforcement merge and seize in the first forty eight hours were law enforcement thinks there is something going going on and the third one talks about exigent circumstances where law enforcement gets and of some approval of g but the point of that your honor is when you look at the other exceptions under the good faith reliance section those sections are talking about exigent circumstances where a law enforcement is asking people to cooperate very quickly and there's going to be mistakes there's going to be mistakes but we don't hold witnesses or or or companies or other entities liable for making mistakes  reese with respect to a good faith reliance on a law enforcement request that otherwise complies with the statute and that's all time warner cable did here your honor at it with respect to the sorry and but if you look at the the the same scase was a twelve b six case where the ninth circuit found that where the ninth circuit found that it should be dismissed on the good faith plausible scenario under which you can allege anything other than a good faith effort to comply with a subpoena or a quart of water and i respectfully submit that that same basic reasoning is what the district court did as well they just put it in the court applied it bowling twamley to the question of whether or not there's any other plausible explanation or your honor whether any other plausible facts if they had pled something like time warner cable you know had a vendetta against this plaintiff or they pled other facts that would somehow get out from under the law that applies to this particular statute that may be a different scenario but there's no such facts pled in this if the legislative history is such that neither reckless nor negligent conduct is a basis for a violation because of the knowingly or rock or intentional language that we can fairly use that legislative history in also looking at the good faith reliance and that the intention of the of the legislature and of congress i'm sorry of congress was not to impose liability on an inadvertent mistake the your honor even if you look at their case the friedman case the freedmen case catalogs a number of courts that have repeatedly said quote inadvertent disclosures are not a basis for here it's an inadvertent disclosure that screams out to i think everyone that looks at the subpoena at the numbers and the ip addresses it's just simply an inadvertent disclosure and there's not an offense what if it's negligent what if there's enough is they pleading negligence they don't plead any let me they don't plead any facts to support negligence they do have a state count a state law claim that says negligent disclosure but there's no negligen disclosure cause of action under that's what marilee negligence and reasonableness are pretty you can't be negligent if you act reasonably you can be negligent if you don't act raise them with we're on a i think negligence is definitely not the standard congress imposed because that's why they started with knowingly or intentional stated well but you can't tell that from the language the statute knowingly is far different knowingly means you think your honor if i may i just want to address whether or not plaintiff pled that it was a mistake that is not the case if you look at the complaint which is attached to the notice of removal basically the information we had agent warner said it was a mistake and that time warner ran the wrong number we don't know that and i can stand here as a plaintiff and say i'd love to throw a lot more facts or plaintiff's attorney i would love to played a lot more facts but at the stage you get these cases and at the development of the case we can't possibly under our rule eleven provide all the information we'd love to put in there how under your theory of liability under the first count it would a non negligent disclosure be i'm not even negligent these people acted with any jury would find under my question that they acted reasonably it just came up with the wrong number maybe the committee some deep blue computer mistake cost who knows in that case you would still under your theory finally ability is that correct so how that strict liability i mean you can say that you can say i don't want to use that word but that strict liability then right you're strictly liable under your theory for coming up with the wrong number regardless of negligence is what i'm  hearing you can do all the tests all the tests on it see how they would apply any differently you you can have all the good faith in the world but you come up with the wrong number and non negligently and you're still li because you intentionally disclosed the wrong number intentionally disclosed point sees the wrong number but the intent you say relies relates only to the disclosure of the knowledge of what might happen from a disclosure and all of that doesn't relate to the content of the number that's it might be a good rule i mean might make those companies be super careful that's the theory of strict liability is that it's a good rule that makes car companies very careful when they fine i mean this wasn't you find a violation when they say this is the wrong number here you go that's intent you know that it's the wrong number in the as you play at knowing intentional willful wanton malicious and fraudulent you might do any of and it seems to me we have you know one arguing that you have to know in the other argument that you don't even have to be negligent and looks like it's possible along the lines of what judge given spend suggesting that it was negligent you know maybe they were careless or not as careful as they should have been given the consequences that's what's going to inform you when all it is was the burden and all that but if you put if you take negligence out of  and you're only two choices are intent or strict liability which seems to be your stance reply i believe they're saying intent it seems like the language of the statue is closer to in town i mean if we get somewhere in between you're still going to relieved under the good faith reliance exception however that is not what happened in this case and i would submit that it's distinguishable and respectfully request this honorable court to reverse the district court's opinion remanded allow furthe