well here the next case on the calendar pangea capital management court my name is caitlin bronner i'm counsel for pinching a capital management l l c the primary issue before this court on appeal is whether a divorce judgment awarding an interest in real property entered pursuant to section two thirty six of the d r l must be docketed pursuant to c p l r five two zero three a in order to have priority over a subsequent duly docketed judgment in this case the district court found that the answer to this question was no and that and the intervene or in this proceeding need not talk at her divorce judgment in order to have priority with respect to certain real property in suffolk county district court designers stand it at one point  that precisely resolves the question why isn't this a classic case for certification thank you your honor the standard for certification is that there must be except it is an exceptional procedure to which this court resorts only in appropriate circumstances appropriate circumstances are present where the statutes plain language does not indicate the answer to the question pending before the court and there is an absence of authoritative state court interpretation of the state statute in this three but you did not make this argument that you're making today about five to three c you know it sounds like one five to three years are correct the short answer your honor is no but respectfully we did not believe that there was any need to do so because is proceeding under c p l are five two or three a and there's no question that that we believe we submit that there is no question from the plain language of c p l are five two or three a the talking is required as confirmed by this court  as to the rights of third parties such as pangea here it's necessary as is claiming interest in john's property but if it's not john's property and they are not competing with andrea isn't that so becomes a decree it stuck it into new york county in this case your honor but the real property was located in suffolk county accordingly it was not talkative in suffolk county as it was required to be taken together not become her property  moment the divorce decree was entered and in new york county she was required to docket it because the real property was located in suffolk county your honor and again it's respectfully submitted that that it doesn't become  until there's a further documenting of the already filed the creed and the county where the property is located well that your honor is respectfully submit submitted that that that directly held that an interest in real property granted in an equitable distribution award under d r l two thirty six five a or a separation agreement under two thirty six b three must be documented in order for that interesting take priority over a lien by a judgment creditor i want to direct case on point no your honor it's plain we we submit from the face of the statute and its language so this is you know really appeals your honor again we believe that there are no appropriate circumstances because it is so apparent from the plain action no other objection so if i may proceed again c five two or three a ways out the steps of judgment creditor must take in order to establish rights in the debtor's real property which include to updating this court's decision and musso confirms the implicit billing of those steps up with respect to equitable distribution awards legislative history confirm that in point of fact there is no difference and that divorce judgments are not treated any differently than an ordinary money judgment affecting interest in real property so so respectfully i we we believe was one hundred percent as a matter of new york trust law in particular the trust issue here which owns the property the gems to realty trust was a soley self settled trust settled by john lee and it was trust and the property that was deeded to the trust was deeded by john lee king and who took title in his own name and conveyed it to the trust and under e p t six and eight and seven dash three point one the law in traditional legal concepts both causes the divorce and defines what property with marital values it and the them extend their rights to do so when they're filing wars on bad faith to begin with would be improper in this situation you are us  but there is another just another view and this seems to be the kind of thing that the new york court of appeals is in a better situation it's always more appropriate to have them answer that question than for us to answer  i think your honor that this is not be right case for certification in this because of three reasons one is that there are other issues including the trust issue this is not real property divorce judgment mrs lake ian was entitled to and it vested a greater interest apply to them on that basis fifty two zero three c says strictly it soley with respect to bankruptcy issues there was no bankruptcy so fifty two zero three c is not relevant for this case for that reason fifty through the oh three c again i come back to the fact that because of their filing which they told the court and they represented to the court pen she has attorneys represented to the court that they were going to file a judgement which would not impact the decision of the court with respect to the interests a right it's just like he and shia they were doing it soley for other judgment that this is not a case where that that issue could be answered because of the bad faith and that is the only reason they're here because they said the filing which they represented wouldn't be used in this case to allege any difference in their rights with that simply continue with the law that has been settled law often with docketing in the quote in the context of equitable distribution don't think that there had been any cases that have have cited that because none of them are two reasons one is that it doesn't relate asset is zero whether an asset is personal t or real property it certainly wouldn't and there are any circumstances limit to thirty six b face any financial  where she built what she thought was a very substantial estate she was a devoted wife and mother and grandmother she was a schoolteacher who had nothing but what she built and her marriage she found out to her incredible dismay and hurt that her husband had stolen most of her property along with the husband's param or that they had taken the matrimonial property virtually all of it the only thing that she had left and which she gave up all built where the money for the house that she built to come from other properties that she had built during the marriage during the ninety's during the eighty's and they sold a property in massachusetts for ten million dollars and she along with  architects helped build this property where she had her children her grandchildren her life this is all that's left is question were certified to new york corn pails and there might be one or two questions and they're all the issues that that that every case for forty years has said basically that when a case to a new creature is entered the distribution assets are just are believe they are i believe they are but i believe that there is no that this is not the proper case to do it because there is no reason and this case would necessarily make that determination under any circumstances because there argument is she did not need to duck it and therefore she prevails there and there has never why is there not a binary decision because there has never been there is never been a case there has never been  that she had to dock and that's not five two zero three eight because there is there there is no requirement for docketing and they are simply they are creating an issue which doesn't exist here's a simple question first are interests and real property allocated in an agreement pursuant to and why do you are l t to thirty six b three and later incorporated by reference into a judgment of divorce subject to the docketing requirement of new york c p l are five two zero three such that a spouse who is allocated such an interest must dock at the judgment of divorce in the county where the real property is located if that interest is to take priority over perfected leonids against the real property by judgment creditor's it's a simple it's not i'm saying that it's a simple analysis but the question is direct and then if the answer to that is yes then the question is where a nominee trustee which is designed merely to hold title to property for the beneficiaries as one individual as a settler and the trustee and a beneficiary revoke the trust is the trust property considered conveyed to the beneficiaries as with the passive trust or is the south learned deemed the absolute owner of the entire trust property relative to his creditors that's it is a basic question for them to answer but it but it's not a one of those hugely resource intensive cases involving lots of different  an extra day an extra month of extra you know number of months it is it is prejudice to mrs lake and who is in her seventies and and the edward distribution laws say that the  distribution decisions are final and cannot be modified by the way they cannot be about a fight that is that has been found by the courts the other thing is this was not an allocation as you say a real property so to revoke without terminating so i'm all of those issues that is my position thank you  let me ask you in fifty two or three c you're relying on that if you look at that it's it's appears that special appendix at thirty three the last three mine say solely for purposes of establishing the priority priorities and even fifty two zero three eight talks about the transfer of an interest in real property against which a money judgment may be five two or three see plainly refers to the priorities that are created and not to the docketing requirement so notwithstanding that c p l are five two zero three c addresses the bankruptcy the bankruptcy context the property well in this situation the property we respectfully believe is the debtors property bankruptcy action this is not a bankruptcy action your honor again just just to be clear you know if the court were to find that the docketing requirement outlined in both subsections a n c were to only in divorce actions apply where there's been an intervening bankruptcy that would create positive repugnancy between c p l r five two zero three a and two thirty six by requiring only a certain subspecies of divorce judgments to be docketed soley where there's been an intervening bankruptcy filing which is not there's nothing in c p l are five two or three a or c that suggests that there was any legislative intent to create such a such a distinction if i may also respond to several the other points advanced by a counsel for mrs lake and with her son were to disagree with you  to priority here is under c p l are five two zero three a we only refer to c p l are five two or three see to confirm that the bankruptcy excuse me that the darkening requirement extends to divorce judgments which is a position that has been disputed by mrs lake in with respect to with respect to mrs lichens argument that she was the fifty percent owner of the gems to trust at all relevant times under the theory that one and three which were expressly governed by massachusetts law is silent regarding governing one is thus governed by new york law as the local law of the scientists of the property and the state in which i apologize and may i have a moment to address the bad faith point ok thank you your honor with respect to the bad faith argument advanced by mrs by mrs lake and this is simply not a situation there was in any way shape or form bad faith on the as counsel specifically when pinching at counsel said that pangea would not interfere with what's going to happen with the property pending not only what we've talked about today but a determination of who is entitled to what from the proceeds of the sale  council was clearly referring to the specific negotiated sale of the property discussed at the outset of the october twenty eighth argument at pages twenty three to twenty seven of the record and to submitting to this to the district court's ongoing ancillary jurisdiction to determine the party's respective rights to the sale proceeds also discussed earlier in that conference at pages twenty three eight twenty five and a forty six to forty seven of the record the point at issue here is that all everybody knew that i was going to dock at this judge meant the district court specifically indicated that pangea would dock at this judgment and in fact counsel wrote to the district court in trying to prevent entry of the judgment specifically identifying the fact that pangea was going to dock at this judgment in suffolk county by doing