subcommittee on management organization in particular moment of the committee on oversight and government we farm will now come to order and i'd like to introduce our newest member and its representative management and acquisition oversight practices for made your information technology programs at the department of homeland security and the hearing will also serve as an opportunity for d h s leadership to explain their plans for strengthening agency oversight mechanisms governing both current investments and future acquisitions without objection the chair and ranking member will have five minutes to make opening statements followed by opening statements not to exceed three minutes by any other member who seeks recognition without objection members and witnesses may have five legislative days to submit a written statement are extraneous materials for the record i'd like to wish a good morning to all of our witnesses staff and all those out in the audience and as i mentioned this subcommittee hearing on investment management stewardship and acquisition strategies for major information technology our programs at the department of homeland security will be examined i welcome our distinguished panelists and look forward to hearing their testimony now today's hearing for a subcommittee is the first look into the oversight mechanisms in some of the particulars associate it with a number of high risk i t investments in development that are critical for achieving many of their missions in fact roughly six point six billion dollars will be spent this year by d h h s on technology specific programs deemed necessary for both administer and programatic functions according to the g a o the d h s s investment review process is inadequate and has resulted in a number of poorly performing our failed investments in fact nearly all the programs achieved o most recent work were proceeding without adequate oversight from stakeholder leaders our detailed budget just justification for their funding these factors contribute to excessive cost it extended project delays and projects that are simply ill conceived from the outset the inspector general of the h s offered simular observation and findings in his previous work as well it goes without saying that funding dedicated to d h s investments will require stout internal controls and planning processes in order to be successful we know that previous high profile investments such as the emerge financial management systems program failed due to significant deficiencies in the agency's investment planning and contract oversight practices i think it's imperative today that the d h s provide us some specifics about the lessons learned from previous failed programs and how we can be assured that such costly failures will be avoided in the near future as part of the prior administration i hope mr duke can explain how exactly we got to this point and whether current circumstances merit moving forward with programs that are extensively flawed to be fair i know this is a tall order for her and other d h s s leaders to undertake alone and i implore the administration to become more engaged on these issues by finally appointing someone to head the office procurement policy at o m b and today i'm hoping that our witnesses will provide us an updated snapshot of where d h s s is by providing specifics about some of those programs deemed most at risk are in a poorly performing state hopefully this will provide us in such as a way forward for remedying those issues as a septimus he continues in its oversight of v h s in this congress and with that i want to thank our panels for joining us today been in existence i remember the scramble to restructure our system after nine eleven we just passed eight years and i think it's a great time to reflect on our successes and our failures the concerns that we have obviously are always tending to focus on the negative especially in this committee because that's our responsibility we tend to be the be counters for the congress and a lot of ways that mostly not deciding who gets the beans but where the beans went and right now there's a lot of this that does not look very effective i tell you the  emergency response and the capabilities of the federal government to respond to certain threats are obviously one of the highest priorities constitutionally with there we do a lot of things and talk about a lot of things that are not constitutionally mandated but when it comes to securing our borders securing our neighborhoods protecting our community at large for the common good that's definitely one of the major focuses of our constitution  you may not know i was born and raised on the border with mexico down in the san diego region my district is very close to the largest port of entry in the world land port of entry and a lot of people forget that and we've seen a lot of mistakes on here i think that one of the frustrations is the they have to implement haitian of the visit system i think it's got some great potentials i love to be able to talk about the great potentials of getting the biometrics of everyone who comes into this country legally and being able to use that but also the frustration of not being not being able to implement and what twelve years how long how many years as a band the exit program of the visit system so we don't know who's left and i think at the same time we talk about that we see the failure of the border security system and frankly i'm very interested in seeing it how much of that was wishful thinking or a snake oil salesman showing up and saying i've got technology that will limit the need for building a fence we've got to agents that are being killed down the border by people who are able to cross over drive trucks and then drive over agents we can detect them but we can't stop them and a lot of that  though was that some kind of response the political pressure against building structures that don't worry we don't have to build a fence and do a structure that somebody may take offense to we can do it all with technology lot of that kind of question comes out to how much political pressure drove people into and sumption that technology could solve the problem when in fact it was grossly deficient the the fact that we're going to address this in many different ways i think is should be open and frank about it but i think that we have some successes we can look at but we also have some great failures and i just wonder how many of those are people sent over selling technology or are those going to technology to avoid political heat for other tactics that opening statement ok we're now going to proceed on to our first panel it's a policy of the committee on oversight and government reform to swear in all witnesses to say before they testify and i'd like to ask all of you to please stand and raise here right hand to tell the truth the whole truth and nothing but the truth thank you you may be seated let the record reflect that the witnesses answered in the affirmative i will now a deuce  panelist and first i'd like to start with sob misaligned see duke and she's the undersecretary for management at the department of homeland security she oversees the management of the departments finance human capital and contracting programs including the design and implementation of all major investments and acquisitions prior to her point meant as undersecretary for management she served as a deputy undersecretary for management and as the department's chief acumen officer mr james t taylor is a deputy inspector general at the department of homeland security where he has participated in multiple audits and examinations of v h s investment management policies and acquisition programs prior to joining the h s mr taylor served in senior financial management roles at both the department of commerce and the federal emergency management agency mr taylor has been the recipient of numerous awards for outstanding  accomplishments including the presidential rank award for distinguished executive and the down o t scout a very memorial award for excellence in financial management welcome mr randolph hype is the director of information technology architecture and systems issues at the government accounting office doing his career he has directed reviews of major federal investments in information technology and major business systems modernization efforts mr hype is a principled author of several information said each one of the witnesses now give a brief summary of their testimony and to keep this summary under five minutes in duration and your complete written statement will be included in the hearing record good morning chairwoman watson ranking member bilbray and members of the subcommittee i really appreciate the opportunity to come before you today and talk about this very important topic not only to the department of homeland security to our but also to our country and we do indeed men chairwoman have lessons learned and i'd like to look forward to talking to you about how d h s s strengthening its oversight of all its acquisition programs including its information technology programs in talking with you this morning i'd like to talk about where we were where we are and where we're going in the aftermath of september eleventh congress created d h h s to provide a central point of command for securing our country and citizens in march of two thousand and three we opened our doors and combined the efforts of one hundred eighty thousand people from twenty two agencies and several newly established offices in the d h s s headquarters in march of two thousand and three the i t infrastructure for d included multiple wide area networks with overlapping and redundant systems circuitry each with its own network operation center and security operations centers the every structure had twenty four different data centers and multiple independently operated e mail systems with multiple address lists and helpdesk services there were multiple finance systems and policy and no secure data transmission capability this non unified networking made communication and information exchange across department enterprise arduous and costly and inhibited our mission success in timeline we are focused on this operational area and unifying and consolidating and modernizing however we  understand that this is more than connecting servers and running cables it's also accomplished through good program management and acquisition oversight to strengthen the institutional approach to acquisition and i t investment management d h s established the acquisition program management division this office is responsible for the overall coordination of acquisition oversight and policy within the department with a d h s chief information officer providing the leadership in the oversight of the information technology programs we have dramatically increased the formal acquisition review boards we hold in the department in fiscal year two thousand and eight we held eight formal board meetings in fiscal year two thousand and nine to date we have already held twenty eight including eight specifically focused on american recovery and american reinvestment and recovery act spending we will also ensure our t v programs are developed in accordance with the align with the homeland security mission additionally our c i a o reviews all acquisitions purchase requests for any i t m vestment over two and a half million dollars we have made major strides in cost estimating analysis one of the root causes of the weakness and many of our i t programs we have established a cost estimate in division which is part of each addition review and have also provided cost estimate ing systems to over a dozen programs we have assessed the risk of all seventy nine of our major i t programs and opposed to the results on the o m b information technology data dashboard this year we have conducted seven portfolio reviews encompassing sixty one programs that is one of the recommendations of g a o that we've recently addressed and in july two thousand and nine we have issued reissued the information technology management governance process catalog providing clear guidance to the department and how we're overseeing our i t programs additionally we have provided updates to many of our existing guidance created in the initial startup of the  department also we have updated existing guidance in terms of our acquisition review and have issued the management directive one zero two dash one that governs acquisition oversight and policy for the entire department and we have revise how we're tracking action items coming out of our reviews in formal acquisition decision memorandum that have specific do outs and tracking system the h s will continue consolidation and oversight of these programs towards the secretary's goal of one d h s one enterprise a shared vision and integrated results based operations our future efforts in the i to your area include completing the homeland security data network primary migration and also fully realizing our one that vision finalizing our data center consolidation and creating a more effective efficient and effective i t environment and greater level of information type technology security to address our cyber threat it's important to note that the h s developed and implemented all initiative i've outlined above while simultaneously meh an engine an existing information technology program that has grown to nearly seven billion dollars within the six years a department where we have strengthened many aspects of our acquisition program we will continue to seek improvements in our processes and provide our professionals the tools they need to meet both our mission and  objectives and achieve oversight i'm happy to note that the department has brought on the new administration's full time chief information officer richard spiers mr spiers and i have discussed his goals and he leading the department in the right direction his focus is on a sound approach to conducting systematic review of major investments and he recognizes the importance of his leadership as the department thank you madam chairwoman and has made over the past several years as well as the challenges department and its components going forward specifically i'll discuss our work related to the establishment of institutional and investment management capabilities for delivering major information technology systems  as required by the reports consolidation act of two thousand each year the updates our assessment of the major management challenges facing the department given the past concerns we have and the fact that contracting for goods and services consumes nearly forty percent of the department's annual budget and is critical to achieving its mission acquisition management has consistently remained at the top of that list spends over six billion dollars a year for the systems and infrastructure to support its mission departments components rely extensively on information technology to perform mission operations including immigration benefits processing border security the execution of response recovery operations and many others given the size and significance of s s i t investments effective management of department wide eyed expenditures is absolutely critical in the past we identified the need for the department's chief information officer to have greater authority to become a more effective steward of i t funds the department has responded by strengthening the c e o s role for centralized management of i t providing the cia or the authority to guide i t investments and ensure a unified strategy across t h s components additionally the cia has gained greater authority over component level i t budgets and oversight of i acquisitions this is a result from establishment of new policies and i t investment governance functions and a defined i t acquisition review process however in two thousand and seven only fifty seven percent of the estimated five point six billion dollar i t budget was evaluated through this process department officials stated that there had been a lack of sufficient d h s s component c e o staff to effectively execute the i tore process in two thousand and four around seventy five percent of the federal positions within the i s office were filled by two thousand and seven that never had dropped only sixty four percent unable to obtain and keep full time federal employees the cia has depended heavily on contractor support during that same timeframe from two thousand and four two thousand and seven the number of contractors increased one hundred twenty one to five hundred fifty a combination of factors that contributed to the low staffing numbers including a complex and lengthy hiring process includes background checks that you've heard as a familiar refrain what e o positions are filled so many employees have become burned out from working long hours and end up leaving for positions in the private sector to address the staffing issues we recommended idiot improve the c i a staffing plan to include specific actions and milestones recruiting retaining full time employees the department has since developed a revised staffing plan to increase pedal positions and augment overall staff by two hundred thirty six by two thousand and eleven this increase is necessary to address the complex i t challenges facing s an example of a major i t challenge is one that an initiative aimed at consolidating existing i t infrastructures into a wide area network d h s began work on one that in two thousand and five in visions will provide the components with secure data voice and video communications specifically d h s experiencing delays and meeting schedule completion dates some components are reluctant reluctant to migrate to one that have insisted instead on maintaining their own internet gateways as a result s may not be able to reach its ultimate goal of consolidating modernizing its existing infrastructure and achieve cost savings originally estimated at nearly nine hundred million dollars component c i a o is also facing african challenges in their efforts to improve i management in budgeting planning and investment because programs are often funded through direct appropriations or other sources investment decisions may reside outside the component c i s purview in these cases offices and divisions maintain separate budgets they're independent of the c a insufficient staff and effective i t budget controls and fragmented i t management have a long standing as having a long standing issues for civil d s s components for example in november two thousand and six report the results of a follow up audit of u transformation program we noted that although c i s a taken steps to address recommendations in our report the opponent had yet to finalize a transformational floatation approach subsequently we found in two thousand and nine that the large scale c i s transformation in addition we reported that the continuation of decentralized fragmented i t program efforts has led to a growing number of local systems that are beyond c i s c i s current budget or staffing level to manage practically all of the total number of locally funded i t systems  i s field office of reported thousands of applications that were created in house to summarize mr chairman our work with the department showed that there is a recognition of the weaknesses in i t acquisition and governance processes in the department and there has been progress in addressing these weaknesses however there remain structural and resource constraints that limit the department's ability to properly plan acquire and oversee critical information technology projects thank you for this opportunity and i welcome any questions from thank you on behalf of mr hutton and myself let me begin by saying that it was about three and a half years ago that i sat before the subcommittee and i testified on where d h s stood in managing large scale i t system acquisitions noting that while it had made progress since it was formed in establishing this range of institutional management controls needed to successfully deliver these systems it was not where it needed to be today three years later further progress has been made most notably in the last year however more needs to be done on a number of fronts to define and implement the range of controls needed so the department can successfully deliver these systems on a repeatable basis and what are these institutional management controls that i'm talking about one is having and using an enterprise architecture which can be viewed as an institutional blueprint to guide and constrain the structure in the content of what the systems are another is having acquisition investment management structures policies procedures that decision making bodies continues to make informed decisions not only about programs but portfolios of programs selection decisions around their selection and the control so they are managed in a way to maximize benefits minimize costs and mitigate risks a third is having a defined system lifecycle methodology that that is used to govern how systems are defined design developed tested integrated deployed operate and maintained all through their life cycle and a fourth is having the people that you need in order to execute all these things how does the department stack up today against these management controls the answer is mixed for example has recently strengthened its acquisition investment management approach and has in the last year possibly conducted as many formal oversight reviews of major system acquisition programs as it did in the prior five years combined however its new approach is still missing key aspects such as criteria for prioritizing and selecting among competing investment options and procedures governing oversight reviews also while the departments recently creat lifecycle methodology the scope of this mess a methodology does not yes not yet address important topics such as key practices associated with acquiring cots or commercial off the shelf solutions further while it has taken undertaken a number of initiatives to expand its acquisition workforce particularly contract specialists it has made very little progress in adopting and implementing a strategic and proactive approach to managing its i t workforce we last three and a half years d h d h has a similarly made mix and we had similarly mixed success when it comes to implementing these controls on large scale i t programs specifically our work has shown that programs have been allowed to begin and proceed sometimes for several years without sufficient management discipline and rigor and as a result they've fallen short of cost kegel performance expectations assuming in some cases that expectations were even set for these programs that's the bad news the good news is that when we have reported on these weaknesses that the partment has acted to correct them and bring the program back on track this means th programs like secure flight for example which is prescreening of passion jurors on commercial flights matching their names against watch list is now being managed effectively but to get to that point these programs had to overcome several years of poor program management and oversight to give you a flavor for the kind of program specific management control weaknesses that we have seen repeat themselves on these key programs and they've been addressed to varying degrees across the programs cite a few examples they include poor requirements development in management inadequate testing unreliable cost and schedule estimates insufficient program office staffing inadequate risk management limited information security management and poor performance measurement so say so having said all this what needs to be done what needs to change the bottom line is that the h s must effectively manage and oversee its newly  like task task is the follow on program to the emerge two that's chairwoman mentioned in her opening remarks that was a failed acquisition and you need to start managing these acquisitions properly right out of the gate and for those programs that are ongoing but have not yet turned the corner like f b i the f b i net virtual fence it needs to bring them in line quickly in my view the recommendations that we have made to the department provide a conference a framework for doing this and to d h s s credit it has agreed with these recommendations and we're committed to working with the department constructively to ensure that they are implemented this concludes my statement i'll be happy answer any questions you have to start with you for your testimony and we're now going to move to a question period and we will proceed under the five minute rule and i'm going to first start mr and some of the points you brought out in your opening testimony but i want you to consolidate them and be more specific d h h s has been operating for more than six years doing which you have played a key leadership role in shaping how it requires in acquires and manages large scale programs it would certainly seem that six years is a sufficient amount of time for the department to become a mature and capable acquirer and manager of i t how would you characterize where the department stands and its capacity to acquire and manage major instruments and please describe how mature in developing better capabilities for managing its investment procedures and then we're we're doing the oversight both the g a o and the i g have talked about resource constraints we are hoping this month to breach one hundred people in the c i s office so i think when we think about all three roles  doing the i t operations building reading the policies putting the procedures in place and then actually performing the oversight i think that that puts in perspective how much we really accomplished in six years so what have we  done that specifically i think is going to make a difference now in going forward in the iterations of policies we've done one is we have strengthen the role of the cia so mr spiers is the chief information officer for the department it has all the authorities of cohen plus he has authority not only over i t investments but over ip portions of non i t investments and we've integrated the idea oversight into our major acquisition program so that there's a consolidated look at acquisition for our senior leadership our new deputy secretary jane hall lute chairs our acquisition review board and she is personally looking at the i t and i t investments and that's one of the reasons we've had such an increase in our number of board reviews the other thing that we're doing that that may sound simple but is really making a difference is each one of these review meetings we used to document having their reports and give recommendations what we've switched to is we have precise action items that are tracked and so for each one of these meetings we say what the program needs to do for its next stage of sion and we're tracking on those and that is reported to me by weekly and the final thing i'll say is we have a new online system for our leadership called and p r s that gives the state of affairs for each program in terms of cost schedule and performance and that is going to give visibility continually not only as we have these board meetings but in between those in terms of the performance of each of the acquisition least once a year for all major development milestones and i think that's what you're describing is that yes ma'am ok what does the new leadership have to say so how does it differ from the prior administration i think the new secretary secretary in a politician a she came in with not only a knowledge of the mission and from her leading the state of arizona border state a lot of v h s type activity but i think from being a governor and being in the role of managing a bureaucracy she also came in with a very very strong understanding of how how we're doing not only meeting the mission but effectively and efficiently meeting the mission including i t so i think that that her work as governor came in with a presumption that we would do everything not just to meet mission but with good business sense and that really has put management i think on the front burner for each of our mission decision and it's really both stirred our visibility in the  number of legacy operations and sites into one campus and what assurances can you offer us that a multi billion dollar investment like this with so many major program and infrastructure components as part of its nerve center has been designed with effective capabilities and requirements for meeting the mission and in the us for decades into the future and do you have specific program matic lifecycle cost estimates and benchmarks for delivering that you can share with our committee today yes there's actually three pieces of our headquarters consolidation there's a saying elizabeth campus which has gotten the most visibility and that is going to be the where the secretary and the senior leadership are additionally we will keep about four of our existing facilities  including the secret service building and a few others and additionally we will be consolidating the remaining forty or so leases from the national capital region in till about one point two million square feet who will actually end up with about five to eight facilities the way we're managing that project is through management the chief administrative officer we were given a twenty positions to manage that project and a h s from the state we got them in fiscal year zero nine which is really a recognition of  appropriators that you do need the staff to manage that appropriately additionally with leasing because this is a g s a site we are using g s a as our execution agent so we are using our twenty assets to determine their requirements to make sure we have a stable program that meets d h s s headquarters needs all the work is being executed through g s a they are warning the contracts and they are managing the contracts and they have the expertise and the bandwidth to actually do those programs so i think that the fact that we have a program office fully dedicated to this in addition to his expertise in facilities will help ensure where was the department coming from and i know it predated the department to some degree and got into it but this whole issue of the virtual fence the technology could replace structures and then have boeing walk in and say boeing to be a security force for the national front how did that evolve into such a bet on technology that ended up going you know basically going b well i think that our approach the southwest border started with looking at what mix of solutions do we need to appropriately secure the border we call it alternatives analysis systematic look i think that the deviations in the program from taking a really bottoms up look and it up by the urgency were driven by the urgency of protecting the southwest border  so i believe that if there's one fault that i can point to to to be kind of a root cause it would be instead of completing the announces of alternatives and looking at what what are the operational requirements of the border patrol to secure the border and building up to what we buy because of the urgency there was a predisposition to jump to solutions to jump to technology whether it be tactical infrastructure or technology but not really take the the time looking for a silver bullet looking for a solar bullet or jumping to two fixes rather than looking at the anybody take the time to go down and look at the train to look at the operation i mean the fact is i'm not against the  application there but anybody who's ever been there realizes that jersey walls across the canyons were going to do a lot more a lot quicker than putting up towers with sensors and whatever but there was i hate to say this i'm a history major it reminds me so much of what happened after world war two when the air force came in and said we don't need the army we don't need the navy you know with atomic age all you need is airplanes that can drop bombs and all we other services should be abandoned so bad on us and korea and we're actually moving towards that korea taught us real quick what a failed concept that was based on that that seem like this element but to be fair to be fair with you and with the agency i just question how much politics was into a two people not lighting the concept or the the message sent by putting barriers up at the border and how much of that influence it and then how did boeing end up with this thing i  determining what mixture of technologies and infrastructure go at the border national an app the capability to perform i think in terms of the tactical infrastructure that was our first focus the fence in terms of technology we are moving forward very carefully and we are doing capabilities demonstration to see what benefit technology can bring but i think in going to mr taylor's comment that we should move carefully and mr height on new programs we are not wholesale just deploying technology across the board we are doing two small test projects in tucson and ah and seeing does this technology help the border patrol ok and let me say i have seen technology work great we were actually back in the seventy's using ground sensors had been developed during vietnam and the border patrol were using them back then there was all kinds of technologies there and they're still using those you know drive a road in the border region without our guys knowing that cars pass what about the business and one of the great successes is the fact that we now have the database and biometrics on everybody who comes in this country legally and a lot of people forget that forty percent of the people who are illegally in this country are overstays and would fall in that category that's not a great success but what's happened over a decade waiting for the exit program and i know my time has expired but that's a very important how can we move that agenda and it appears that no matter who's the administration this issue is being avoided and that's the exit part of the visit program so we know who is left which makes it a lot easier no who's left in i think it's the policy decision an exit has not been perspective is we're not just out there kind of doing things while a policy decision is made so i think that the approach that that this administration is taking is to decide what exit is ok i appreciate that and let me just close by saying this i thought the policy decision was made by congress and we passed a law that says this program be plugged now i appreciate you get the political pressure that people that say it is more important for people to freely cross back and forth across that tier one across in every day that  congress mean able to come into our ports is more important than securing and making sure that only good things get across that the implementation of the law secondary to political pressure by business and political groups so i think that a lot of these problems are seriously in addition to the oversight provided by congress most of the issue is very rarely that we non concur with any of the findings we might non con specific facts and i think that when you look at the  reports generally they're saying we're moving in the right right direction and we just have gaps still in the effectiveness of what we're doing so what i look at number one you know there are any indications that we're going in the wrong direction our practices not  within sixty days after the report they have to report formally to the congress on what they intend to do to address those recommendations every year we follow up on the status of our over recommendations and work with the department to find out where those things stand if it deals with major action on some of these things sometimes some misunderstanding in the communication when sometimes we write a recommendation we think it's abundantly clear to anybody exactly what we meant but sometimes it does require some clarification down the road network to do that something executed a little bit further the line towards fruition has said that they have taken several steps that get right at the specifics of our recommendation but we really believe and i think mr quinn mentioned earlier the importance of looking back we feel that the work that we've done where we looked at the execution of the best review from over four through march two thousand and ten or two thousand and eight it just was not being executed and we came we identified several reasons why so we think it's important you look back find out why it hasn't worked in the past but to me execution follow through to the end is what's important here before we're going to consider the recommendation fully and that report now that  enough board meetings they looked at how many acquisition review board meetings we were having the documentation of the follow up and those type of things i think we've corrected that at this point the recommendations are still open because they want to they want us to demonstrate sustained performance and actually keeping the system going but yes a lot of it was counting the number of review board meetings we had in the documentation  with programs or active when they came to the department they were not in place so we're going back and we're fixing the programs that came into the department those programs we only have a few new start programs since the department stood up as c i s transformation most of those programs existed in legacy agencies and we're trying to build a structure around them without stopping them and then balancing building the controls while they're still performing so yes it is going back exercise so i'd like to continue the discussion a little bit on the question about what steps have been taken and mentioned one of our points was about the meeting but i want to have some context  that what we're talking about is that we looked at forty eight major investments over four year period and there was already a process in place at the time it was applied with discipline and for example the programs had a mission need statements that were approved if they had operational requirement documents that were approved if they had acquisition program baselines that were approved and was actually involved in holding a meeting of though i think it's more than just the meeting department level approval of that investment as it moves forward that's the key but some of our other recommendations were that two of the components didn't have their own process that they're supposed to have that's consistent with departmental process that's just another example so we had several recommendations i think get at the core of some of the problems that we saw and i think that while they have taken some steps and i would agree with mister i didn't want to leave the impression that it was just   was it the policy of the bush administration that the exit part of the there's a system was not going to be implemented at that time mr gove i honestly don't have firsthand knowledge of that because i wasn't involved in in the policy decisions my role was more to have an actual requirement to execute so i honestly can't answer that question i'm trying to remember but you know i was i remember pretty closely when the visit system was being pushed by lamar smith and and chairman sensenbrenner and as far as i know that was not a voluntary authorization it was  a mandatory implementation and i still have a problem with why it hasn't been implemented and less they're just using the excuse that the technology doesn't exist to monitor those who are leaving the country or if the executive branch claims the authority to veto the legislative intent with the fact that we feel that it's inappropriate this time to implement the legislative mandate and you you have no recollection where the justification was it was outside of your realm i had never heard of discussions that the issue is technology it's more what the exit solution would look like the specifics and if if you'd like i could get back to you for the record on where we currently stand with the exit solution implementation but it is not a technology issue it was just more and it wasn't even an issue of are we going to do  it or not it was going to be what precisely is exit going to look like i'm going to understand see what decade we come to that conclusion what it's going to look like because it is one of those situations that after nine eleven there was a lot of talk about how terrible it was that the bureaucracy wasn't doing the common sense things and implementing and overlooking and avoiding things and that state and federal bureaucracy but now after all this time to go back and say we're still trying to figure out what we want this to look like at a time and let me just say this at a time that our neighbors to the south are stopping for african going through traffic as it comes out we're worried about somebody may have to slow down for a for a monitor to pick it up and how many of us drive drive through toll booths that electronically pick up our data and it seems like if it's to raise money if it's it seems like to generate revenue the technology is there an implementation is ok but if it is to to regulate the federal constitutional mandate of of immigration and border security that the federal government h we just don't know how to implement it and maybe what we ought to be talking about is just going to the state agencies that that are handling toll roads and say you know maybe we want to contract with you guys to do it because they seem to do a pretty well i mean i avoid the toll road the dulles toll road like the plague but i drive next to it every day that every week that i head south and south southwest and they sure seem to be able to get that technology working there so i want to leave an open invitation that please if there's political barriers to the implementation of the law we need to know about it and frankly i think that's one of those things are we need to address the other issue that the gentleman from texas brought up i want to open imitation of we're going how we can do it better where you see the system needing to be improved because we're going to be following up on why are we reinventing the wheel when we've got sensors and technology that's been used by our military and an r klein destine services for decades why aren't those technologies being looked at first rather than what appears to be left and a lot of this is politics look i've been in the game since i was twenty five years old i know how much influence of the politics this and politics have a good or bad let's thank god that somebody was willing to stand u bureaucracy that we can't do all observations from outer space we're going to try this little remote control airplane called the predator which has been one of the greatest success of military application with in decades but the politics of the lobbyist he pushing us to go and use technology on proven the silver bullet that looks so great when someone selling here in washington i think those are things we're going to address and i leave you an open invitation as much as you can within the law and protocol to work with us so that we're not just digging through your record your able to participate with us so we address and the issue and serve the community we're sworn to serve and that's the american people thank you very much i appreciate yes or a just a couple thoughts concerning u s visit exit and i can't comment to the extent to which is a policy or political decision i'm not aware of that the real challenge in dealing with u s visit exit is because is that the physical infrastructure was never there to screen people as they were leaving this country it has always been there to screen people as they come in and there are extraordinary physical space limitations for land based borders as well as in airports and seaports too so the real issue the real challenge it's trying to be dealt with now with respect u s visit is not technology it's operationally how we're going to implement this how we're going to implement the technology who's going to do what is t s a going to do it at the checkpoint the c b d c b p going to  do it at the gate for land borders how we are going to expand the build physical lanes in a very constricted environment in some of these urban ports of entry so that's the nature of the challenges being dealt with now and let me just say that the largest land port of entry in the world is being rebuilt today my question to you is as we're rebuilding the whole structure put in diagonal lane to increase double  up on there are we engineer in a designing into that retro that new system the exit system is that being engineered in there and that you know that's that i can tell you that but that isn't an excellent question and that's what should be dealt with when you look at a portfolio of investments and say we invest in physical infrastructure here how does that relate to what we want to accomplish through technology through the u s visit program so let's make sure they work in lockstep and let me tell you as somebody who's worked on border issues since the seventy's the political pressure is to get people into this country and back and forth as quickly as possible and security is way down the list of the trouble is we don't have that kind of lobbying and political pressure on on the bureaucracy to implement the law as we do is to make sure that commerce is is never obstructed any degree and frankly as you said the infrastructure if it was if we were charging at the border you darn well say that infrastructure  be there like that but when it comes to securing and implementing the man requirements of the representatives of the people of the united states it's been put off for a decade so i guess that's one of those things that we need to make a priority and my staff will be checking with the millions that are going into redesigning and rebuilding the border border crossing if you want to let's see if the exit part of it's being executed let's see if the administration is following the law or or responding to the political press mr bilbray we intend to hold a series of these hearings and make recommendations since we have a new administration it's just mind blowing when we put the department of homeland security together we brought over seven hundred fifty thousand people from various agencies and departments who had their own budgets and we have to see that this department functions  intended purposes and we might quote a number of years but still we have the kinks to work out and so i have faith that when we gather all the information we will make the kind of recommendations so our homeland security will indeed secure our homeland i'd like to go on now to mr taylor and your testimony cites the explosive growth of contractor support in the s office at the h s since two thousand and seven and what are the causes of the staffing shortages and is it a cultural are due to ineffective management i know we threw all it together that's why i made that comment and we just want to know has the h s made the significant alterations to its staffing plans since your recommendations were made to all and in the federal government have had a heck of a time hiring qualified people so it's tough to start with because we have trouble competing with the private sector and there are barriers still in the hiring process to make it frustrating for someone to try to come from the private sector and get into the government if they have an experience with a process background checks sometimes it takes months to get someone to get frustrated they have another offer they move on with the job loss in the situation the lower excuse me the higher grades so people coming out of industry with pay parity kind of the fourteen fifteen and above levels are our biggest challenge and recruiting is at the journeyman level the high working level the g s twelve and thirteen and we're not saying too much of an increase in the but we are starting to see additionally we're working on mr barry who's now running office of personnel management and getting some flexibility with hiring just about two hundred through contractor conversions of essential functions our goal is now to be at about three hundred twenty five federal employees file level and we think we can do that with existing budgets by making core functions federal employees a very generous letter like that overall i would say the success has been poor and doing that what we've seen is a pattern of progress i mentioned in my or remarks a pattern of programs getting started allowing to proceed for many years where they are rudderless basically and then when these problems come to the attention certain principles then they get acted on and through many years of efforts the programs begin to be brought back on track that to me is not an indication of a successful program to measure success and success can be anywhere on a continuum from achieving everything we possibly hoped to achieving nothing you need to establish what it is you're trying to deliver and you need to do make that commitment and you need to measure yourself against it time and time again on some of these programs i've seen where they get started they're allowed to proceed in the absence of any commitments without defining what's going to be done by when to deliver what kind of capabilities to produce what kind of value if you don't have those commitments it's hard to judge success yes you can proceed for a while deliver some capability and declare success so a day and what's going to cost us and they and then you need to measure yourself against that in nineteen ninety six congress attempted to strengthen the i t investment management oversight process through new requirements for capital planning and investment reviews agencies both agency procurement and information officers were charged with overseeing the following activities would it be fair to say that ineffective review processes are the cause of wasted investment like the e major emerge program and is the investment review process as broken is so how much of it is due to inadequate attention from agency leaders and we'll start with you mr i think that we have ways to go to deliver the robust acquisition review program that the country deserves but i don't think it's because of a lack of attention and i really think that right or wrong when the department of form it didn't exist so the programs existed the six billion dollars worth of i t investments existed and the things that g a o and the i g are saying we should have didn't and so programs came into the department and they didn't have cost schedule and performance metrics so what we've had to do in setting up the program is go back and put those in place and then start measuring against them so the result is is that you know things have taken time we can't measure performance until we actually put performance metrics into place so in a lot of the first years the department we've been in the remedial math we've been putting things into place and now as we put them in place we can measure against them and track performance but but we t i understand that senator carper has introduced legislation that would make significant alterations to the investment management process including increased requirements for budget justifications and transparency doing the development life cycle and should we be using firm financial benchmarks for determining when to pull the plug on programs with cost overruns are deficiencies but yond certain threshold and are there statuary changes that could be made to strengthen the oversight process is in place a my position on that is you should have to legislate good management that's true and in fact legislating good management can sometimes be a dangerous thing to do can have unintended consequences  but i believe is that there are the mechanisms are in place there understood the the issue comes in execution and implementation and the absence of implementation doesn't matter how great  process or a review board set up that you have you have to execute it so i would go back to something i've said many times that for a program of of the of this kind of magnitude to be successful there are literally one hundred stars that need to and any one of those stars can have a major impact on that program so there's a lot of things that have to be done right and you know oversight is one of those variables but there's a whole lot of others in the equation that need to be done right and and the reason that some of these programs have fallen on hard times over the years is is through a combination of these things and to miss duke's point about the fact that they inherited these agencies component agencies and inherited the programs and hence the department didn't have its own institutional ways of overseeing that is true the components should have had their own and the component should have been paying attention to in the component should have been doing these programs correctly and that wasn't a lack of form measurable requirements that what is it we're trying to accomplish with this technology application what is it we're trying to achieve and we start with those kinds of problems that and the constant pressure to respond respond terms of disasters respond in terms of the price of the border we need to do something quickly so we don't have time to really work through all of our requirements and so the requirements change and whenever that happens you have serious problems with oversight you also have a problem where it's not so much that the apartment doesn't have the infrastructure identified as being able to staff it as we talked about but also being able to follow up and manage component level so we need to focus  too i agree with what both the g a o and the i g i guess in terms of what the g a o said about what it should be i agree totally and fortunately as the execution person i have to deal with reality and what is not what should be and trying to get to should be i think that we do visibility into the budget by the cia is very important and we have instituted that through our performance review process and i think that we have to put the performance measures in place hold the program managers accountable and the components and i think also we have to have the discipline to be nimble and quick because our enemy is normal and quick but have the discipline to not just do things fast one of the early cultur the cultural pressures on v h s and do it fast and that seems to be the measure and we're trying to right now hold the line and doing it fast enough to meet our threat but do it well enough and that is a tradeoff between cost performance and that's one of the biggest cultural changes we're in the midst of right   but at the same time understanding there are huge amounts of waste of resources effort critical resources that can be used in other locations so we have been successful we don't know if that success is th accomplishment or dumb luck but we'll take whatever but let's move on on a not depend on down let's make sure in the future that dumb luck is not what we're depending on we have a responsibility to straighten us out and try to get into and make it as affective as possible information i would like to hear something about a detailed assessment on the lessons learned from the failed the merge program and how we can be assured that its offspring the transformation and systems consolidation referred to as fast program will not become another abandoned project that waste over fifty million dollars so where is the h s in developing the necessary requirements for task has the task program been reviewed by the appropriate investment review boards and developed the appropriate justifications for funding and mission needs and how did and why did we wait so long before terminating the original emerge program and what information was missing to determine that it would not be effective and what are your lifecycle cost estimates for this program and estimated date of completion so any of you can jump in but i'd like to start with mister regarding emerge that the two biggest lessons learned from the original program that was done within the first year of the department is one it was a noble objective we have severe weaknesses and financial systems in many of our components to the point where we cannot get to a clean financial a lot with the current systems that has to be corrected second we learned from industry that  single or a shared financial system is accent chilton effective merger and so we need some type of communication between our financial systems to be the mature department that that this committee in the country wants us to be what we did in the initial emerge was to elsley two lessons learned one is what we took what we called the nuclear approach we said we're almost starting over and give us a brand new system that you topix system one system deployed quickly within months of the department complicated to do effectively in that type of wholesale just quick hit approach the second thing we learned from it is that we were relying too much on industry for the solution so it's good to require and rely on industry to deliver the solution and work out the specific ways of delivering but we hadn't come up with our requirements well enough and so then you're get the mercy of industry to deliver whatever solution and so are regrouping in our time it's mostly been focused on the requirements of the current program task that is being overseen by leadership in significant detail they are of  is in the street there will be another acquisition review board this calendar year to look at the next stage i'll have to get back to you on lifecycle cost estimate but it's a multibillion dollar program if executed throughout the department but it does allow for a more staggered approach so that we really balance risk so it is really a total revision of the approach to financial system management and just a quick thought on  that we have ongoing work looking at the task program for house homeland security committee and for the house appropriations committee i believe it's scheduled to be issued so it's it's it's coming to a conclusion and what it's doing is looking at the six recommendations that we have made relative to moving forward on the son of a merge two and so you will be able to speak to what the department's doing relative to defining a strategy for the program developing a concept of operations putting in place the means by which the processes by which they're going to manage it or i'm just going to throw out some of the other programs too and you can cross the board to comment on them the automated commercial environment program and it did not meet its cost schedule our commitment and the costs went up and then another on specific programs at their convenience so they can get and i just want you to know we're holding these hearings so we can fix right what went wrong and how do you know we're putting together this among us yes we want to get it right so what we want to find out is how we and i don't think we have to mention do it through legislation we just hope that the leadership in the various  agencies and departments will be able to automate improve i'm sorry an automated commercial environment ace we just held an acquisition a view of that probably the fundamental or baseline problem of ace has been evolving it's a major system and we keep finding new ways to work with the shippers in the commerce and so that's ok it's ok for a program to evolve over time what we're trying to do now is be more disk plan about making the cost schedule tradeoffs rather than just adding requirements and so right now we're in a period where we're having a serious us its requirements its cost estimate and its program metrics before proceeding forth with any of the planned enhanced moments in rescue twenty one way we moved forward thrust to twenty one was to develop a unique developmental control system and so one of the things we've learned on rescue twenty one to get that back on track is we've gone away from that developmental system similar to the approach we talked about on asp beyond that and that that change in strategy which i think is good for the program in the long run to have a commercial system did cause some cost increases and  locations it was constantly shifting what it was going to be was shrinking without becoming more specific when it was going to be delivered was moving further out to the right on the time line and the cost were a veritable u nknown at that time in addition to that there were issues surrounding the ambiguity the requirements if you haven't clear requirements it's a recipe for failure because what you'll learn over time is it's it's very difficult to design and develop a system to a requirement that's not and then if you learn about those kind of things downstream after you in fact have developed software or integrated commercial products  and you're trying to test them to see whether they meet the requirements it's a whole lot more expensive to fix and then than it would have at the beginning there were issues associated with the testing at that time  component test work hering on individual parts of s d i net or i'm sorry had not occurred yet test work hering on the integration of components which is kind of out of order so that there was a range of program management weaknesses associated with it at the time and it had it on a tractor just flat out not being successful we raise these risks to the department we that's part of our recommendations we wanted the then  investor you board now the acquisition review board to get involved and conduct oversight of it i'm happy to say that that has occurred to a concern considerable extent the air be as looked at the i r b as issued directives  decision directives to the program of what it needs to do in order to bring itself back there's been a wholesale change in that program in terms of the leadership on it there the new program director for that is an exceptionally qualified individual so i think we're moving in the right direction there we have ongoing work looking at the extent to which the very specific program weaknesses that we had data file in terms of being able to put together a good estimate of what's going to cost a good schedule what's going to get done when and to do good requirements management good testing we have work going on now for the house homeland security on all of those fronts we're probably about three or four months away from reporting on that and because of our protocols with the congress i can't disclose what the results of that work it is right now we will be exit ing with the apartment and sharing the results of that work in the next probably thirty to sixty beyond it's an excellent question the problem we run into a some of these programs and you've seen it a d h s and other places i'm sure but we've had a problem because we don't know what the definition of what we're asking for in the first place we know we have an operation requirement we need to support we haven't defined what it is we're trying to use that application for what we're trying to achieve so we keep evolving the requirement and things change that we're going along and the costs add up over time you saw it was with some of the other projects you it's you have to require a real definition of requirements you have to have those requirements in place so that you know what you're getting so you can measure those costs against it and that's the biggest weakness right now is there a question statement you'd like to make this by and welcome and i think my assessment of the progress varies from day to day and i think when you look at the limited resources we've had the challenges we faced i am very proud and amazed at the progress they make let me just say this you know this new administration has been accused of growing government and i really don't know what that means because he is a prime example of why we want to grow government for homeland security this makes sense to me i come from los angeles and you really need to get there two hours in advance because you've got to go through security and i look back at the line i was in just to get up to the sensors there must have been three hundred people in three lines side by side and we were there very early we get seven forty slight out and so i'm saying you should upload you know the first team at each one of the security gates so that you can process these people for their flights they had to come through and say is the only one leaving on the seven o five a m flight you know and i'm saying and we stood there long enough for the crew to change then it went faster and i said you know if you got all these people in line then we ought to put the security force really double it on the early morning flights and these are the things that have to work down through the system we're talking about investments for the most part but there are a lot of pains that need to be done to make this a true working department that secures our homeland so we're not trying to throw all of this and get questions for you made at one time where the we need to go and you know that might have been mine or my experience is that we do it every single week and i'm saying by now you know we should have figured this out so i understand it takes time it takes money and when we talk about growing government we have to be sure that we use taxpayers dollars wisely so we want you to tell us how to use both dollars wisely one of the things we're working on is about as right sizing our workforce and the balance between federal and contractor in place our senate homeland security committee that was a was a bipartisan issue since the last congress and we have identified positions in d h h s that would be more properly done by federal employees that's going to be huge in delivering the mission effectively and it's it's not big government it's doing the right thing and having our core capabilities done by federal employees i think that the thing we have to do an acquisition a management is sustain the discipline and the t through that we learn as children decisions have consequences and we have to be good and disciplined after we put the fundamentals in place about making the cost schedule and performance tradeoffs so that we have disciplined approach and if it means slowing down a program that's the right decision and that we have the ability and the data to stand up and say we're purposefully slowing it down or whatever we're doing it to make the right decision and i think that we have the building blocks in place and i think we have a great federal workforce and i was a career fed for twenty six years before my appointment and we have some of the finest people and i think we have the people to do  it we have the leadership in place that will support them and i think that we do have the oversight of our committees that that help because it helps us keep the focus on a my personal opinion after being in the department as the building blocks are in place but every time i've traveled i've been impressed with sort of an uneven this about the training of handling the problem by security personnel  you know it's just as easy maybe even easier to get compliance with hard pressed travelers waiting in long lines understanding that security is an issue when there's a please a fixed to the request i have been stunned at how many airports i go through where t s a folks act in ways that are profoundly disrespectful the public where they're barking orders and making commands and it's frankly just lack of training and the public is not the adversary the public is in fact just as as much concerned about security as is t s a and wants to be cooperative but it makes it a little harder  the public full cooperation support and sympathy for the mission then treat them with the respect they deserve and i would plead with you to start to try to have that that apple  imbued in the training programs and in the mentality of some of the folks who serve the public some a great and and try to use good humor and treat people with respect but also many do not and you know this is the united states of america the public's in charge and i might have to follow up on that too because that what i was referring to the t s a has to do a better job in selecting the people that work at first contact you know you go you get your ticket and then you get in that line so they really are the first contact as far as i'm concerned they yell continuously at people rather than saying you know take your shoes off and place them on the belt that's what we have to do in l a here you can put them in the bin and you know it changes every airport you go in but and i can understand that and but you really need to treat the public a  little and we get treated we travel twice a week five hours and fifteen minutes for me and i i said to them yesterday you know i'm going to see what we can do about making the pr process more useful and smoother and not as antagonistic as who appears to be i mean that really irks me someone who flies all the time so anyway i mean that's minor but it means a lot to the passengers and one of the things that annoys me is the personal conversation among the employees when there could be someone there who really needs to be checked out and i don't need to hear about what you did last night and your personal problems and who is saying what and that's the conversation  you have to stand and listen to so we need more focus we need more shall we say accuracy and we need more detection you know and not everyone is an intended  terrorist but that's why we treated but however that rather minor but it is an important issue to start thinking about i want to say to the panel that we appreciate your input and this is a hearing to gather information to make this particular service to the people d h s s the best ever because you've heard th complaints out there in the streets and it's like we are the biggest i shall i say interfering big brother into people's business who are growing government and we're in danger in people's futures of their children their grandchildren the great grandchildren we're destroying our nation that is not our intent our intent is to build the department of homeland security to be the best in the world and to protect our country and that's the reason why we're holding these hearings i appreciate your input and just know we're here to get the information that you need and if we have to do it through policy will do it that way but i think these hearings will help us to give the information out to you and that you handle it the best way and i know we're driving this crazy but in any way we appreciate your feedback to us so we can match the public's dollars better and have better results and with that if