and the court would note that the court has you know review powers over the aisles of the motion the critical reason the court should have granted the motion is that the plainti in order to create the duty of reasonable care if the notice requirement went there the shipowner would become the ensure or the gas safety in order to satisfy the notice requirement there just for actual notice of that dangerous condition the plaintiff failed to produce evidence on either of those elements in therefore the motion for judgment as a matter of law or should have been the undisputed facts of the case i think are very important for consideration of this issue here on ars there was no testimony about who allegedly placed this pocket in the area the testimony of a daughter who testified at the trial and she was asked tell us what you witnessed as far as the bucket she was there apparently at the  time the the fall occurred and she said and when i walked in the dining room i noticed buckets sitting around the dining room along of wall and i thought to myself why are the bucket sitting on the dining room on the floor question did you ever see any crew members using them answer i saw crew members dipping their rags into the buckets and wiping the table and then she was asked what did you see at the found she was coming from somewhere in this direction of the bus and somewhere over there and she walked around the corner she was turning the corner a person sitting at the table and those chairs started to get up she saw me she continued walking she took about two steps i'm a corporate what yet on the block it and she said i don't know and that's the point at which he  d doesn't that hurt river at the point that you were making or at least could not the jury have credited that the purpose is not only actual notice but that the buckets were being used by the crew for the purposes of wiping the tables clean but i don't believe so your honor we we know that the buckets were used for the purpose of cleaning the tables the point i was making is that there is no evidence that any cast a crew member point this park at in this dangerous location the point is theory was that it was and what he's cause a around a blind corner and you're right the point out that there's no direct evidence that the caustic remember put it there i think it's certainly possible that as in a food court in a mall that a guest could have used a bucket to to clean their own table that's a possibility there was no testimony about that either way well why don't we put down a jury and far from the tar clue in some of these facts that the bucket was placed there by the crew where the daughter testifies unambiguously that while the bucket was in the walkway on the carpet too she saw crew members in their rags into the bucket and three she saw crew members could could make our issue is whether that inference was reasonable under these circumstances however we have to go beyond that because not only is there a requirement that there be that the crew member that cost and place it but that cost or knew that use of the buckets in the way they're using them was a gain constitute a dangerous condition in there was no evidence in the record at all about that in fact the evidence was completely to the contrary cost of experience was that there had been no complaints about the use of the bucket system or the way they were being handled and used in that in the buffet area there were no prior accidents there was no prior warnings about indeed there when she fell right yes you i said that's not what i said before a jury could they could infer that is whether that's a reasonable inference or not i don't think so but that your could infer that but that doesn't get the pla that the bucket's in that position was a and recently dangerous condition there's no evidence of that whatsoever so that nd element let me ask you the core question with respect to that if i can suppose daughter had testified i'm giving you really a hypothetical here that in fact she saw or a crew member placed a block it i'm a carpet and she saw before miss bell that the crew member get the rag into the bucket on multiple occasions and use the wet rag to wipe the ta but again your honor there's no there's no facts to support the notion that caster knew or should have known that was a dangerous condition that the bucket in that position constituted a dangerous condition that's a critical element of the notice requirement as well and there was no notice of that there was no prior accidents there was no prior warnings or no prior complaints about the way the buckets were used and in the area so yes your honor the jury i suppose could reach that inference that custer placed the bucket in that position and cast to using the bucket but there still are lacking the next critical step that that constituted a dangerous condition which constitute a known about of course that the court in this court in the where why was that we never know council why would that be so with a walkway plainly a walkway with several would be going from a challenge to a table that walkway was pretty narrow between the character on the one side and the tables on the other i saw the pictures it wasn't much room so if you put a bucket in the right in the middle of it why wouldn't that be an obvious and apparent as it to anybody who was there who start because that because there had never been a problem with the buckets before that that's the reason you are we checked for it that's the subject ship in a sister ship for a period of three years there was never a problem there was never cruise line has to have notice of it they have to be on notice of it actually being a problem where it should be could have existed for a period time such that an exercise a reasonable care they should have known about it that's the critical element which wasn't satisfied in this a new or should have known that it was dangerous to put a bucket in that location under those circumstances now before moving to my point i need to address some of the questions and issues raised in council for cost of time before the court judge marcus just asked counsel for cost why it would not be apparent under those circumstances that it was dangerous to place a bug at location and counsel for cause to argue that because there were no prior incidents so therefore we cannot notice that it's not true and we know that's not the standard because this court told us that last month in a published opinion carol versus carnival there the court said that we can look exclusively to the cruise line policies and corrective measures month it was just last month but the court the district court did have the same evidence that this court has before and that identical evidence that this court relied upon last month carol to reach that decision in that case the plaintiff tripped and fell over the leg of a lounge chair which was perturbing into a walkway and a court found that carnival's policies were clearly designed to prevent those lounge chairs from creating to pander to the passengers they had policies in keeping and tucked up against the wall in the upright position so that they would not retrieve it into the walkway we had identical evidence of that in this case cost us corporate representative miguel munir his testimony as an appendix volume four dollars page thirty five he was cost of food and beverage director in charge of both a operations and he testified that for buckets to be in a safe place that word safe is important he said for buckets to be in a safe place they must be visible to everyone guests and crew on page thirty six dollars the next page he says per bucket the bucket should be placed where they will not interfere with guests moving about the dining room that was his testimony as to what policy what constitutes policy square with respect to where to place these buckets from that testimony there's no other reasonable inference the jury could have drawn other than that that policy was specifically acknowledging that if these buckets were not kept in place visible to guess and if they were placed in walkways where interfere with again they were likely to post her past and based on this court's holding in carol last month that is sufficient evidence that would allow the jury to find that costin knew of the dangerous condition knew that the condition was dangerous now first the court was discussing and judge marcus asked counsel for a cost of some questions with respect to notice of the condition being where was notice of the bucket being where it was we satisfied that element  because as judge marcus was asking counsel past christina bartolo testified we had numerous eyewitnesses with christina bartolo testified that she was in the dining room numerous times prior to the day of the incident and her testimony is in supplemental index volume two page one hundred and eighty seven that she saw the bucket sitting around the wall she saw crew members using the bucket she only saw crew members using the blankets and never saw anyone other than a crew member touch the bucket  he'd been in the dining room prior to and on the internet the day of the incident question that he had only seen crew members handling these planes picking them up putting them down moving them around and placing on near the bus station and that he had never seen anyone other than a crew member so not only to judge marcus's question not only was that a reasonable inference that the jury could draw on that if a bucket indeed up where it was it was because a crew member placed it there but really that was the only inference that the jury could have drawn because costin never produced a shred of toxicity evidence on that issue they never cross examine the witness and said well isn't it possible that a passenger moved they never at their corporate presented it never testified to that  as counsel admitted there was no evidence that anyone other than a crew member ever moved to this argument that baby was placed by someone else is really being raised for the st time here on appeal but the only evidence on that issue at trial conclusively prove d or at least proved part of the evidence rather than that it's book it ended up where it was because a crew member placed it there which obviously satisfies the st wrong to prove that they actually knew the condition exist speaking we're only seeking to the court to review that to the extent the court finds that that issue is separate and distinct enough are distinct inseparable enough that the court could act on that issue without disturbing the remainder of the  certainly don't want the court to determine that it would then it would rule in our favor on the collateral source rule that it would have to disturb the entire verdict if that were the case then we would simply stand down on that issue and way that issue because we believe that that issue of damages in that itself is separate and distinct in where it could be ruled on without disturbing the remainder of the verdict and on that issue the courts one of the court's recent opinions in l health care services versus publi supermarket which was a two thousand and eighteen case the court stated that this reiterated the purpose and a possible one hundred collaterals source rule which supports our argument that the collateral source rule is states that the receipt of benefits  or mitigation of loss from sources other than the defendant will not operate to change the plaintiff's recovery of damages so really the question is in the private insurance context is the reduction of a concert contractual reduction of the reasonable and necessary medical charges which is only obtained because the plaintiff had private insurance that she paid for is that reduction of a benefit which she paid the premiums out of her teacher's retirement so those were her wages fairly earned wages which were which were deducted each month out of her teacher's retirement to pay the premiums for this private health insurance and i believe because to medicare supplement plan they pay medicare rates but we're just asking the court to look at the issue the narrow holding not with respect to medicare or medicaid and how this collateral source will get operated in those contexts but only with regard to the private insurance context where certainly it is because they had entered someone who did not have private health insurance or any health insurance there would be no contractual benefit but because they were fortunate enough to enter someone who had private health insurance those premiums out of their own pocket and it was at bargain for the benefit of a contractual discount now they're being given the benefit of that discount which they had no role in curing and which comes completely of collateral to the defendant and then we believe that's clearly contrary to the spirit of the collateral source rule and judge jordan issued an opinion in two thousand and six when he was with the southern district of florida in challenge versus carnival which sets out very appropriately why that reduction of a dent because it's important to remember in this case the testimony trower that her full medical expenses were reasonable and that's was problem that i see with the approach and maybe it's the best anyway but the problem that i see with it is the amount billed frequently doesn't even the remotest relationship to the reasonable value of medical expenses example one insurance company happens to be large enough and negotiates an appropriate arrangement with  hospital and another insurance company gets a completely different kind of bargain with the bill itself there's almost no relationship to whether the reasonable it's i'm sorry your question is if it's not if it doesn't bear a reasonable reasonable relationship then presumably that would be worked out as a fact question at trial and it was determined that actually they were unreasonable then certainly the plaintiff would with affidavits from the provider declarations which aren't miscible under the rules of evidence wherein the provider states that the services provided reason were necessary to treat the patient and that the amounts charged were reasonable under the circumstances given and i'm not the exact language if you gave me but it tracks the language of the rule and those reasonable and necessary affidavits were submitted without objection and were not controverted by carsten and i think that is where that issue w appropriately be worked out and as judge marks pointed out if there were any question as to whether or not the total amounts were reasonable that it would be on the sentence to controvert that trial and bring to this right the st approach counsel simply look at the amount billed isn't the appropriate way to charge that your a we say that with respect to determining the reasonable value approach you look at  damages incurred isn't that the way you're supposed to proceed here and the answer is yes is that not what the district court that is yes you are that as well as what the district court did the jury awarded the full amount and then the court subsequently reduced it but i think that is i think what you're saying is the actually the approach because the juries charge on damages since they're only permitted to whether that is in law and the better approach is the one taken by the trial judge here which says the touchstone is the reasonable value of these medical services and among other things you may look at the amount bill and the amount paid and maybe are the circumstances that counsel for the decide my present in determining the reasonable value to follow the thrust of my question yes you're not going to answer the st part of your question these district courts are applying different some of them are following a hybrid approach like judge sort of like what you can't do that are cases where you allow the jury to consider the full amount and then post verdict reduced and some  n subsequently unilaterally reduce it based on the court's view of the law we would be amenable to obviously the court's approach which judge marks which you're saying which is to allow the jury to consider in the context of private insurance they clearly are and it's not appropriate the collateral sort of rules asshole rule of evidence which would preclude evidence of those reductions and if there is any argument as to the fact that the gross bills are too high and at the own reasonable then that's a matter for the parties to put on country burning evidence and for the jury to look here's what plaintiff says her reasonable unnecessary bills are and this is what her providers say the defendant has put on contrary evidence with should not be blocking access exits and that they should be placed in a visible location and of course plaintiff says well this bucket was placed in around a blind corner but that ignores the fact that it was visible from the vast majority of the area where the guests were to prove notice under the undisputed facts of this case there is no evidence which a jury could reasonably infer notice a dangerous condition on the part of cost based upon the prior history in any controverted testimony where the court found that the inference notice cannot be based upon speculation and conjecture i would also point out to the court the judge cites decision in the braun vs royal caribbean whe said the plaintiffs most show that the defendant knew or should have known not could have known about the condition and that's exactly what the trial judge indicated in this case as the rationale for the motion he indicated that the shipowner could have known about this dangerous condition that's not the standard in that in the facts don't support that kind of inference your honour's i would like to move on if i could very briefly to the adverse inference in the bad faith findings by the court in the adverse jury instructor in which flow there from in this case is undisputed that under  correct ok thank you one hundred and three see that if i could comment then on the set off issue with my remaining time i think the we had no problem with the way the district court handled it the collateral source rule implicated in this case because there was no payment by collateral source as the st point to be made this was a contractual stand off is a contractual discount no money was ever paid to anybody for the written off amount no mishear igs will never happen be required to reimburse anyone for the written off amount in so for her to be able to recover the written off amount where she has no oblig on to repay it would be phantom damage and it would be a windfall to her and it's just it's just not tested with the general notion of damages in this country you're only entitle i quite honestly have never understood the plaintiff's argument about this medicare supplement my understanding was that this is higgs and the medicare recipient in that these money that the bills were paid under medicare  i don't understand the argument is the medicare supplement so i can't really argue whether it's it's a private insurance which ration or and medicare situation but i think the rationale is the same that there's no there's no recovery or written off amounts because there's no there's no right of subrogation by rd party into a war those damages would be phantom damage the johnson vs carnival cases were pointed out as a district