the panels that were not properly installed started off there was a ripple effect for those that were attached to those panels however net and other section  where the panels were properly installed this last resort to because the panels at the southeast corner of the roof were not properly installed head but it's in the southeast corner been properly installed that would have survived the storm  you actually look at the transcript and i glanced at it i thought you don't give a reason really it's largely transcript for fifty two for fifty three you really give a reason are not  quite a bit of discussion about conservation standards the supreme court in both cases at the end of the day said we're not going to invoke those standards and they didn't go to a jury these were those two cases or summary judgment happen and if you don't put if you don't install it correctly the pals aren't going to stay and that's what happened in the corner of the rough settlement but he may reserve actually we'll hear from you and i want to start just briefly with the facts george but noted this case went to trial but i just want to point out that it wasn't there were ten panels that were head missing screws there were a total of fifteen dollars to twenty s and so he was even recognizing that there had to be some other cause but so this idea that the only panels that were affected by the wind were the ones with the missing church groups just blatantly contrary to the facts which again went to a jury but the only two panels with missing screws were the st two panels you know one quarter of a seventy thousand square foot rope off i don't know how many panels that was but it was much more than two it was much more than ten so that's just from a factual standpoint i think that judge bolton you can have pointed to what really is the issue in this case and as it appears to this court on appeal first of all we're trying to determine what the iowa supreme court would do under iowa law and as judge bennett pointed out this provision does not have an anti concurrent cause provision related to this particular exclusion which means that the parties did not use that as a contractual way to contract out of application of the small proximate cause doctrine so that puts us within the small proximate cause doctrine regardless of what the language is and within the because that's not the only thing that was at that was a cause so the amish connection does cause me but for cause and not that's a very good question was means but for the following our school had regardless of venue if anything else contributed in any way everything is exclude it period but the faulty construction explosion is contained within subsection three of the exclusions and it does not have that same language so it leaves open the possibility that there can be more than one cause and so while the exclusion says if the construction is a cause then it's excluded that still leaves open the possibility of more exception to the exclusion and in this case at the district court the nd sentence has anything to do with concurrent cause independent cause or any other kind of cause it has to do with resulting two losses which is different than concurrent causes and have a thing to do und together and so bad as where the district court the resulting he the district court refused to consider the land as a resulting cause of loss because he thought it swallowed the rule ex had in the last it resulted in fire and then it would cover fire and i was supreme court said they originally relied on that but then decided that there were no damages from fire so they moved away from that but the supreme court didn't stop there that's when they looked at the structure of the exclusions there were thirty three explosions in that case like there are here one had an anti concurrent cause provision but the are going  what if there's one line in amish connection i want to ask you about ok in that regard it says toward the end of their discussion after they talked about cullen corrigan they say there would have been no water damage here but for the rainfall damage caused by this rain is not covered that's right before they say and even if we resolve the coverage claims based on the end of the us contract going toward causation principles but i could think you could apply but for in almost any situation where there are two causes and then it's a matter of but for what i think is a question that again seems to be bringing if we want to talk about bringing tort principles and that's what you're doing is trying to bring tort is the parties choosing to contract out of the concurrent cause or sole proximate cause doctrine that otherwise would apply and so and west liberty picked up on that as well that and so they looked at the poll structure of the policy and they said again three part three different types of exclusions where one type has an anti concurrent cause clause but another one doesn't and the one that does not is subject to concurrent cause clause would have applied and the court specifically walked through those very same three subsets and said where it was in one but not in the other then that means that the sole proximate cause  language applies to the doctor and applies i think it goes back to the general contract interpretation when you have one provision that expressly says something and another provision that expressly does not the inclusion and the exclamation has to be given meaning  well i think i suppose you can use contract whichever contractor that you want to use but i'm not sure that belt and suspenders necessarily override superfluous but i think the court there would be no reason for amish connection the supreme court again we're trying to decide what the i was supreme court would do here and there would have been no reason for amish connection the court in amish connection and in west liberty to even go into this discussion of whether or not there's independent causes if the but for was the actual rule that applied welshman's context maybe being unfair to them by saying they're confusing but they do go through all that but then in the end say it doesn't matter we go use toward causation principles so well and i maybe it was all  y but i don't think they would have to i mean the i was supreme court is a court of discretion they don't have to take cases this case the amish connection case started out in the court of appeals and then they had to ask for further review i believe the amish connection did i know west liberty respect to the jury instructions i mean during that conference travelers tried really really hard they wanted to keep that set in motion language in that instruction they were fine that it was so proximate cause but they really wanted this set in motion because that worked better for them than the instruction from grinnell that we were arguing for to so it's to the extent that there's any confusion by the jury instructions that was all travelers one won the battle on the jury instructions but then they lost the war when the jury found against him with respect to that but i what i but i think that there is a way to make sense of what it means to be and append it and the distinction is if the if the causes  themselves are dependent on each other so in the west liberty the squirrel case what the court said was that they are not looking at the damage that was caused but the ark it stuff could not have existed but for the squirrels looking at both of the cars and the same thing and corrigan which is the case with what the negligent supervision of them resulting in the criminal act at the daycare there would have been no negligent supervision had there been no criminal act it's looking at the causes are those are connection are the causes dependent on each other i think so then if you look at then club like judge calls i think you pointed out using a rope and tying it to a pick up to then pull the tree down are two different independent acts that work together to cause the damage that occurred in that case so it's looking at whether or not  the causes are independent and in this case the wind was very much independent of the faulty construction when did not cause the when the construction defects and the missing screw certainly did not cause the when it's only that are we back one of the perils and the parking was the other peril and in that case the court was very clear to state that our king could have had to have a cause so the court was looking at the cause of the peril and said that the cause was the other  dissent he said that they can correct cause if she was not argued below and so that should not have been an issue and then so i think his dissent actually is probably the best kind of explanation of how these things seem to work together but i think in the end if  we're we're plying iowa law and trying to decide what i was supreme court would do with this case i think it's clear that i have a court st of all much connection makes clear that the sole proximate cause analysis needs to apply then the issue is just whether or not the wind  d faulty or this missing screws are considered independent and by definition they have to be concurrent causes are i was going to work together that's the whole point of it and so you go which i reference t florida case the whole point of concurrent causes is when two causes that cannot independently cause the same what damage occurred but they work together that's when you have concurrent cause analysis and that's when you go through this whole proximate cause and i am a courts have made clear that in that situation the default is that coverage is provided unless the excluded cause is the sole proximate cause that issue went to the jury and that jury decision should be affirmed thank you very well thank you exclusion we all agree on that it also was not profit tory language in the west liberty policy to the arcane exclusion it existed elsewhere in the policy in the west liberty policy just as it exists elsewhere in our policy but it was not prefatory a causation analysis but there's two components to independent cause one is whether the causes are in the parallels are independent of each other but also whether they independently cause damage yes the wind is independent they have to independently be able to cause damage and we know that the wind did not cause damage that day to the panels that were properly is a different model because it's it's not the if it's the way it's using twitter principles when there's human activity it's sort of a tort proximate cause standard that has worked its way into liability insurance policies court did bring into connection which was a property loss and i think that has led to some confusion but even if you apply the small proximate cause again the only thing that caused the damage  are they in proper construction sort of for want of a nail the roof was lost and it is it's very simple whether it's so proximate we can disregard all of the conflicting testimony about winds up yes is that the key to your case well it's it's one it's one of the missing kids because it's one of the missing bolts that didn't put the panel in place i say that amount of time loss or any further questions very well for your argument the case