it please the court i'm allison thompson here on behalf of the city of la grange asking this court to reverse the district court's denial of the city's claim to action immunity from the federal antitrust claims that ruling was an error primarily for two reasons first the georgia legislature has articulated clearly and expressed affirmatively its intent that municipalities should enjoy antitrust immunity to the same degree in extent as enjoyed by the state itself when regulating water utilities and that means full and complete immunity from federal antitrust laws second the district court also erred in interpret ing and applying binding precedent specifically the supreme court's decision and how he and this court's decision in mccallum because the holdings of those cases support the studies the new unity claim conversely the tenth circuit's ruling in kalaloch trick is distinguishable from this case primarily because it involved a claim of immunity based on a general rule rather than a specific state authorization to regulate with respect to the regulation of water utility  involve time claims however the underlying statutes at issue and the authorizations through those statutes are very different in this case with respect to the regulation of water utility the conduct at issue enjoys full immunity from federal antitrust laws it is clear from every opinion addressing this issue that the availability and the scope of municipal parker immunity is determined by the state under the can you can do you think there is any and this is a mean you lose but is there any principled limit to your position in other words can east municipality tie water services any other industry in other words can a city say for example we'll give you water if you use our police department and pay us we will give you water if you jail all of your criminal defendants at our facility and pay us we will give you water if you buy sewage services for must we will give you water if you do and the list goes on in your view is there any principled stopping point or can i mean it's a polity tie the provision of water services to anything else in this case given that what the georgia legislature has authorization was the only limits are the first that the state of georgia through georgia code section thirty six sixty five to has not it sell place to any constraint on certain types of anti trust claims for which grange is exempt from and certain types which it is not a time claim generally is encompassed within the broad intent of the statute from the state legislature which is that the city enjoy immunity to the full extent that the state itself would there is also a limiting principle in that georgia statute itself is first to limited to apply only to count that particular code section would not authorize anti competitive conduct in such a broad way should the state appoint a state actor or through a commission authority or agency and finally the statute itself is also georgia has pacifically authorized municipalities to regulate to water utilities also to regulate in the natural gas arena so the circumstances in this case involve only  without limitation then a municipality can tie services in that area to anything else the limit in this case under comes under the parker doctrine itself and it is that the limit shall be dictated by the state ok then tell me about this language in f t c versus put in the health systems quote simple permission to play in a market does not foresee billion tail permission to roughhouse in that market on lawfully a reasonable legislators ability to anticipate an anti competitive possibility falls well short of clearly establish keylock trick was about the court trying to decipher from a delegating statute itself by inference what it was the state intended with respect to anti competitive  conduct that is distinguishable from this case the delegating statutes at issue and phoebe putney were different they were general authorisations giving hospital authorities general corporate powers and what the courts again citing favorably to cayle extract because it was a similar statutory structure at issue there unlike our case that general corporate powers do not themselves give you permission to act like competitively in exercising those powers what we have at issue in this case we have two sets of statutes both of which support the city's immunity claim first the state of georgia has has expressly said and did so only a year after the supreme court articulated the mit cal to use the words that the state of georgia articulate clearly and expresses affirmatively its intent that for power specifically granted by the state to a m articulation test where the state's intent has to be clearly articulated and expressed well that is what i read this is the state said you go anywhere you want in the county and sell water and sewage you can use eminent assuming i understand your question correctly i think that i agree and the point that we are making is that the supreme court's test is a clear articulation test the concepts of first the ability and the inherent logical and ordinary result that  articulated in cases following parker macallan to phoebe putney and forward common in the context where the court is trying to decipher from the daily delegating statute inferentially what the state intended and how far it intended to go in allowing its state actors to engage an anti competitive conduct we don't have to get into the foreseeability analysis because the statute itself thirty six sixty five to that let me tell you my interpretation to take in any if they are exercising water power they can do they can take any and it compared to keep the conduct that they want it seems to me another plausible interpretation especially all statutes are written against the background of the present law and the present law of course is that any trust law includes any trust law so the other plausible interpretation it seems to any other market what's wrong with that and whether you talk about foreseeability or where the you talk about clear articulation phoebe putney clearly says the law is you've got it least have clear articulation i don't see any clear articulation in thirty five thirty six sixty five to that the exercise of the power should be unlimited there is no it does not say that the exercise of powers is unlimited it says that there is a limit because the immunity is to the anti trust laws so what that statute is doing is the state legislature coming forward and saying we the state have complete immunity from all forms of anti trust claims including tying claims which are inherent conduct covered by the sherman act have the state wanted to exempt it tying claim from its full and complete grant of immunity it could have expressly done so but it did not a time claim inherently is that the state most of the firm in italy contemplated the displacement of competition such that challenge and they compared to the facts can be attributed to the state itself the hospital authority to acquire other health care and it is they hadn't hadn't appreciated that they might do so and it competitively klein a clear articulation test of the law before us we conclude that the respondents claim for state action immunity fails because there is no evidence the state affirmatively contemplated that hospital authorities would displace competition by consolidated consolidating hospital ownership it is the challenge restraint that must be affirmatively contemplated by the legislature under the language of phoebe putney it is  is it a free standing communit oh yes they the powers specifically granted by the by the law are are those two engaged in water and sewer and it just sort of boggles the mind to think that the legislature there was affirmative could go on go to if you if you want to buy our water you got to buy the these furnace is and then they could take a a share of the profits from the furnace manufacturer or they could they could say you have to buy a water fell there for that matter be at least a little closer so the the point is that yes this i think the legislature was concerned primarily th so but i think that was their main concern they wanted in a way to grant blanket immunity to cities just so they wouldn't be sued but they can't graham plank and amanda is the supreme court said in haley when there are places to suck the state may not validate them in municipalities and competitive conduct simply by declaring it to be illegal it's four seventy one u at thirty nine in other words what the what the what the state action doctrine is requiring is that the legislature actually look at what it's doing decide that this is a kind of an ink competitive restraint that it wants to control it may want to put in a whole regulatory structure that does away with competition altogether it may want to allow them to do something specific but what it can't do is just say well whatever a city wants to do it's a million and that's that's the way this this provision reads whatever city wants to do it's immune now the statute as your point as you pointed out really doesn't go that far all it really does is it says in exercising your power  maintain and operate water facilities you're immune doesn't say in anything else you want to do that relates to that that you might condition out that you might stretch out to get it that you presumed that for the fact that they could operate water and sewer in that and might be able to do so outside that well they must have presumed that they didn't really have to do that and that's probably true and therefore that must have presumed that they could place conditions on that well that that i guess is true they could place a condition that they pay a connection fee or some from that they mustn't presume that they could place an anti competitive the condition on that well maybe and from that they must have presumed that they put i an anti competitive condition that would affect and then tiredly unrelated market now we've really gone too far with the federal government did not affirmatively contemplate that i'm sorry the state legislature did not affirmatively contemplate that the city would put in the kind of timing arrangement it has here and that's that's the full extent of the of the issue the ordinance at issue here is an ordinance directed to regulating water and it is an ordinance related only to non residents of the city of le grange and the state of georgia has specifically granted the city authority to exercise discretion in deciding whether to offer such services to nonresidents and inherent in discretion is deciding what conditions you may place on deciding whether to provide such service well can you putting it putting this outside of the antitrust context can you place can a city be sued for placing any conditions on the provision of water service to nonresiden or is that an area that there is no liability for so the city of la grange says i'll give you a crazy example city of la grange says we'll give you what you are nonresident your outside of our city boundaries will provide water services for you if you provide a five hundred dollars yearly contribution to the blank party insert democratic republican libertarian whatever you want every year legal that under not under laws that are not the  exercise of the police power yeah i mean i know there are so they are limited my only point was you can start from the position that it because it deals with water everything is fair game that's not the case right it is not our position that they are immune from all claims it is our position that they are i mean from federal antitrust claims under the parker doctrine that is all the georgia code section thirty six sixty five two says it does not attempt to immunize the city from all challenges to the ordinance only from federal antitrust challenges which is where it ties in with the parker doctrine why isn't a good way of thinking about this to say given that the o as you indicated is on the state to provide what sort of antitrust immunity it wants for it to meet its apologies to only assume that that immunity goes only to areas where the state has given the municipalities complete authority operate so in this case you've got water but now you need the other type claim which is electricity or gas and if the city if the state is given i mean it's a pal of these complete authority to do whatever they want in those two areas and maybe you can infer that the grant of antitrust immunity flows to a tying of both of those markets but not otherwise because the grant of immunity here is up to the state and the question is the state has the ability to grant antitrust immunity to the full extent that it enjoys such immunity itself if it appoints regulatory powers to which it has done here then that mean as a palette he is entitle to immunity up to the full extent that the state is because the state has said i think it's important here to to recognize that georgia code section thirty five sixty five two acted in one nine hundred eighty one decades after the georgia supreme court decided the city of moore tree case that case was not an antitrust case but there was the constitutionality of importance similar to this one in that the city of multi there was providing water to nonresidents on the condition which charging more to residents who chose not to use the city's electrical services citizens challenge the constitutionality of that the supreme court of georgia upheld that ordinance as constitutional that activity meaning that the city was providing water and placing some condition or restraint that impacted another market was in existence in the georgia legislature was aware that the regulatory power was being exercised in that way when decades later it interacted the thirty thirty six sixty five to provision that itself is unlimited the sherman act includes tying claims and has always included tying claims which themselves involve claims where there is abuse of monopoliz it was not intended to reverse mortuary the point of my bringing moultrie up is that when the georgia legislature enacted the broad statute conferring immunity on municipalities in one nine hundred eighty one it was on notice at least because it mulcher a in the decision decades earlier where a city ordinance was put directly at issue and that ordinance involved a city's regulation of a water utility that had some bleed over a fax into the electricity market because the city of moultrie was charging more even if you're suggesting some connection there would not be a clear articulation on which  clear articulation in this case comes from thirty six sixty five two and it is that the only limitation that the state has placed it has decided to allow municipalities to take over the regulation of water utility and it has also elected not to constrain the grant of immunity that the state is entitle to in any way such that tying claims are exempt from immunity and other