we'll call our first case of the afternoon and central afternoon your honour's may please the court why does michael tear off the i represent the reorganized company american premier underwriters formally known as the penn central corporation and the debtor the penn central just like the reading company in that case was given a fresh start by a consummation order that protected it from consummation debts in liabilities number two the most significant feature of the consummation order was a sweeping hominid injunction again identical to the one in the reading company case indeed they were they were both virtually word for word the the reason i think it's similar is that in the reading case the court grappled with whether or not the claim was pretty consummation in this case there's no question that the claims involved are clearly totally  in that case there was a genuine dispute about the origin of the claims here there's not and that's the reason i know there isn't is there n p a claims early on judge fully recognized these are the types of seven and first of all it doesn't speak to whether the reorganized company could be held liable for these obligations these pre con summation obligations of the debtor there's nothing in section seventy seven and in particular the language is a very narrow language which says no judge shall change the wages or working editions there is nothing about the issue whether the reorganized company could be held liable that affects the wages or working conditions and in fact we've never asked the reorganization court we're not asking this court to change any wages or working conditions we are you're arguing why the story you're going to be that if we were of who were to decide not to a terminations your honor what what happened in this case is is very typical of what happens when there's an intersection of labor issues and bankruptcy and we cited case ellie covert brothers in that case like many other cases in this circuit around the country when there's an issue of a collective collective bargaining question oftentimes that question is decided by other traders and in fact this court said question's quote questions involving the interpretation of the bankruptcy act should be decided by the court while questions involving the interpretation of a collecting are getting agreement and now you come in and want you know an emergency you know as if all of a sudden you're realizing there might be some liability here jeffrey and i just don't don't get why you sat on your rights if you we didn't judge absolutely did not i well says more that it also says the simulation that is the simulation that the litigation of the labor claims can go forward in the northern district after judge smith case that fact would not operate as a waiver of any protection that would be extended to the you know the trustees or their successors i e the reorganized company by the bankruptcy court so judge rangel we would strenuously suggest that this court that the the fact that the district court ignored these stipulations is is an air which requires reversal or would you dispute that the argument you're making could not have been made here could straightforward assessment of the situation by the first the one person on this universe who probably knew more about that and central bankruptcy than anyone else judged that the reason he said that is that far from transcending the bankruptcy via section seventy seven and what judge for law clearly knew and what is set forth in his opinion a dock in the consummation order at separate beginning at page seventy five of the full judge from describes us in his order is that there had to be a mechanism for paying these labor claims and the reason that skidmore excerpt doesn't matter what just roll is really saying is hey whatever i decide here is not going to matter because under section two of each of the regional rail reorganization act and under section five zero four of that act those claims were being paid and again the claim is can see this in their brief already that's why the seventy seven an argument is unavailing because he's claims were being addressed and they were being paid judge full of knew that the claimants knew that they admitted in their brief and here's what's really important that this mechanism was part of the reorganization and section five zero for each of the acts as the following quote liability for employee claims in all claims by the employees arising under the collective bargaining agreements of the railroads and reorganization conrail shall soon responsibility for the processing of any such claims and payment of those which are sustained or settled on or subsequent to the data conveyance shall be entitled to the direct the moment of the fishing and there is no interest post bankruptcy consummation and it's clear from those decisions the district court cites one exception the case which we which is limited by both this court well you're i think seventy seven again what we respectfully request that you remand this case back to the district court five the reorganized companies not liable i think second section seventy seven and for the reasons i said don't doesn't apply because the the labor claims didn't transcend the bankruptcy what should happen though is a determination which never happened at the district court whether the claims can be asserted against the debtor and there isn't one nine hundred eighty especially what the district court did is stop reading that section with the language may continue specially geisha in the name of the reorganized company well and didn't consider the rest of that section which is or the continue such litigation in the name of the reorganized company or the respective reorganised secondary gutters our position is the reorganized company was compelled it was ordered by a district court to do good afternoon your my name is fred carrillo i have the pleasure of representing thirty two railroad employees in this case one there arbitration case  primary jurisdiction over that legal arbitration was always in the system or to be just and and never in the reorganization or doctrine of primary jurisdiction microphone a little bit closer i will belly up to the bar your honor the doctrine of primary jurisdiction has been a fundamental characteristic of railway labor laws since the inception of the act in the one nine hundred thirty s p c c was admitted leave the carrier and the employer it was also the movement who compel that arbitration which it could not have done if it were not a carrier under the railway labor act judge bartol below found by interpreting his own were the consummation worker in this case that p c c was a mere continuation of a labor protection provision case the final determination so is it not possible then for the reorganization court to say we absolutely disagree with what happened in the arbitration we're going to decide it is the other way i think it's very clear from pitney itself your honor if you read the dispositive language that says the supreme court says i mary jurisdiction is in the board and then the case returns to the reorganization court in the words of pitney to enforce any rights clearly revealed by the decision so yes the case had to return to the reorganization court because no one anticipated the case would go on for four years and the money was in the reorganization court let me ask you w that they approached the court without clean hands and consolidated all four arbitrations previously they were proceeding separately and ordered them to recommit its judge all over certainly had the discretion at that point to change the order of his own order the order of that court to compel arbitration he did not do so and the employees as a result of the arbitration motion that was brought i p c c which and i had the right to jury trial they lost important legal rights by going forward through the arbitration forty years later it is it had late to say all of this was a big mistake and that we were litigating a case that was dead since one nine hundred seventy eight with no doubt or no defendant and no money to pay any judgment all for fun z's for forty years that satisfy you your honor i mean it still this delay took thirty years there's no one sitting here thinking this has to move forward oh i think at all times the employees desire to move the case forward to a conclusion real really workers are not wealthy people they of course wanted more than anyone else to get immediate payment of their claims just like all of their fellows did in the  claims were eight hundred cents dollars that is correct and i want to but there is no n p a claims that were for instance made it as like a six hundred dollar claim and then paying under the plan for you know ten cents  or lesser amount there were no such claims indeed the claims are not classified or even mentioned in the plan and it is a matter of fact from the record in the arbitration and also from the appeal to the  transportation board that approximately eighty eight million dollars of such claims were paid in full during the course of the reorganization proceedings so you would think you'd be hard pressed to think that if the debtor could have somehow compromised those claims and section would have allowed the reorganization court to impair labor protective provisions or merger protection a clean it claims it was never passed by congress and i think the debtor is proceeding or arguing today as if it had gotten congress to enact that law it is also proceeding as if seventy seven n had never been passed i want to dispel the notion that if only judge fullam had kept jurisdiction of this case people would one as divest in him of jurisdiction and requiring that the crew consist litigation go to arbitration number two he cited burke versus morphy the case we cited or the proposition that he could not impair the claims he cited seventy seven said in his opinion that some employees who might yet vectored by that arbitration would have merger protection claims arise and that those claims ought to impinge he wrote that they shall have those protections in his wor albert hock turned out not to be an employee of the company but judge will rule that if you were an employee of the company his claim would be entitled to immediate payment with interest and would be preferred against other creditors in the code section the seventy seven and said i don't believe you can and judge will and said i agree with you words that indicated that judge alone was very well aware of his lack of our judicial power under seventy seven and to impair those claims and he ultimately told mr skidmore this proceeding can't affect your claims now that's not just a snippet that's a series of decisions and rulings by judge for him which shows he was well aware of the precedents upon which we we rely in this case does the court have any particular questions for the the cl and i want then in closing briefly to address a couple of things raised by mr sha'ath the he made the contention that seventy seven and doesn't speak to whether the reorganized and are in fact the liability of the organized company and that they ride through he also made mr truck excuse me for the familiarity mr chalfie also said that this is an interesting question about the intersection of labor policy and bankruptcy policy it is indeed and the plenary power for bankruptcy and were commerce resides not in the courts but in the congress however sister told us how they intersect in seventy seven at the words congress chose no judge acting under this title shall change the wages or working conditions of railroad employees except in the manner prescribed in the railway labor act that is a very clear policy choice by congress that it is the railway labor act that prevails over bankruptcy law in this one instance i don't know what words congress would use otherwise to express it the contention also raised by the palance that the labor claims were dressed head on by the reorganization court i think ignores the who insists litigation that i just we cited for the court where where in  admitted that he was constrained by seventy seven and in by the supreme court's decision it me and then in closing your honor i simply want to address the interesting question that was raised it is generally true that where an insolvent debtor cannot pay claims legally because they are state that the interest ceases to run on those claims it would be basically unsecured  for example but it is still the law today as as the court well knows that when claims are not dischargeable and survive the bankruptcy and there are many examples besides seventy seven that loans whatever reason some of these rights aren't determined for eight years later you're not going to dilute the fact that they would have been titled hundred thousand dollars that is correct and is one of the factors cited by judge bartol in his opinion judge bartol gave good sound reasons liquidated that was found by this court in the one nine hundred ninety one appeal both of which are cited in green he held that it was in part of the inherent power of the arbitration board to determine the value of the claims which included pre judgment interest a classic remedy for nicole remedy and later cases not only under arbitration but also under discrimination statutes and finally he held of course that it was the intent under seventy seven and not to preclude the running of interest on those claims i also want to mention in the last moments i have your honor that another ruling made by judge bartol that is covered by the abuse of discretion standard is his determination that the the palin's should be stopped from denying that they were the real carrier after having litigated under that pretense for more than a quarter century we found this to be on all fours with this court's decision  continental as a debtor attempted the same disavowal of its own earlier position and again no abuse of discretion has been shown here judge bartol thought case was on all fours we have heard nothing from the appellants that indicates that there is a significant difference between this case and continental other than that continental isn't out of line in this is a real thank you ron thank you very much first of all with respect to continental yachters that it's not applicable because that that case did not involve whether a reorganized company loses protection from a court's consummation order because of a judicial stoppel there's not one sided case either in the a kid playing this brief or by the district court or anywhere that we could find that says reorganize company that's protected by a sweeping broad consternation order can lose that protection through judicial stoppel as i said a little bit earlier and i think this really bears repeating there is no judicial stoppel here on the facts of the case and the trustees on their own behalf and for their successors i e the rig reorganized company preserved and protected the protections that they would get from the bankruptcy court there's an what more could they have done and the court ordered it through that stipulation and so there's never been an inconsistent position that the reorganized company is taken you were organized company always turned in the stipulation and said were protected in addition reorders company if you look closely at six point zero four was compelled mandated in its own name to go forward and defend litigation it's not purpose of the district court committed reversible error by not reading the whole section in its totality that section clearly mandated the rewards company to do what it did and it did it knowing that the stipulations exist how i strongly disagree they work for the plan and that's the key part of our argument because the plan in the class no no that's part of it they are like last year because that's where these claims arose but class b is administrative claims we clearly the administration claims but your honor what i'm saying is that the reorganization included the provisions of the rail act so we'll have an age in five zero four easy that provided for the payment of these claims so what we respectfully suggest you should do in this case is remanded it for a determination whether those claims could be pursued against the debtor in you go back and look at judge forms original or accepting jurisdiction back from the northern district he said that the real guys court would decide three things number one whether the reorganized company was liable number two whether interest could be awarded and number three whether the claims could be rot in collected from the dead or there's no evidence in the record that there are assets either remnants of the two of an age program and five go for easy or otherwise that could satisfy the