officer or civil rights removal statute by its plain terms the statute permits review of the entire order not particular issues the court of appeals contrary interpretation is invalid respondent offer is virtually no textual defens that interpretation relying instead on case law policy and an alternative interpretation but those arguments cannot trump the statutory text and in any event lack merit as to case law this court and the court appeals have consistently interpreted statutes permitting appellate review of an order to authorize plenary review and respondent to contrary examples involve unique considerations as to policy the plain text interpretation is consistent with congress's special solicitude for cases involving civil rights and federal officers that interpretation accords with the background principle of plenary review would lead at most a marginal additional delay and could actually expedite resolution of the appeal and ask for respondants alternative interpretation a defendant removes the case pursuant to the federal office or removal statute what it invokes the statute in its notice of removal regardless of the merits of that ground the sole remaining question is how best to dispose of this case the court should reverse the judgment below because respondents claims necessarily arise under federal law this court's precedents dictate the common sense conclusion that federal law governs claims alleging injury caused by worldwide greenhouse emissions the court of appeal should have reached that ground for removal and it should have held that the case was removable on that basis the court of appeals judgment should therefore be reversed i welcome the court's questions a counsel you just said that the your theory applies regardless of the merits of the federal officer and the federal civil rights basis for removal but what if the those bases are frivolous  zat everybody who wants to keep their case in federal court and put in as many grounds for removal as they can and they have to only have to do is tack on out one of these to federal officer federal civil rights grounds is that right in that circumstance banks and fiords would be available as they always are whenever a litigant bakes frivolous argument and a party could be subject to sanctions to dismissal mr chief justice i don't think there's any evidence and if there turns out they're wrong about the federal officer basis will do send it back and we don't have to consider all these other possible grounds well i don't think that a court can do that because the ad shoot obligate an appellate court to consider all of the grounds for removal and it contemplates a situation like this where a federal officer or civil rights ground may not have merit that is why the use of the word order is so significant and  to adopt respondants interpretation congress would have had to make clear that the question or issue of federal officer or civil rights removal with all that was available on appeal in congress obviously did not do that just order or the bases offered by the moving party is frivolous it would still have to be considered now i think in that circumstance the court of appeals would have the power to impose sanctions and those sanctions would include dismissal of the appeal i was trying to get i heard you say that to the chief justice but why would that even be aces for you i think that is what we're getting at as opposed to the sanctions so i think that an alternative option that would be available to the court would be to say on a ground much like that that the court adopted in palaver says good where the federal officer or civil rights ground is frivolous there is no appellate jurisdiction but i think our principal submission would be that sanctions and feel words are available where that crowd is frivolous my last point to the chief justice justice thomas was simply that where the ground is not frivolous and simply is found to have lacked merit as indeed the court of appeals did in this case the court of appeals nevertheless has to address the other grounds and that is once the order is peeled that the courts have no discretion to consider grounds that were not the basis for the remove for the appeal well the court would have the power to consider all of the grounds asserted in the notice for a move all and that is because what is before the court is the order it is the command re entering the case to state court and one benefit of our interpretation is that it gives the court of appeals flexibility in the other direction if the court of appeals concludes that there is an easier brown than federal office or removal on which to reverse it can do so thank you justice briar one concern would be that if you are uncertainty possible and who knows so they'll add on those grounds it will get over to the federal court the federal court will say this is not frivolous but is wrong and therefore they will appeal on everything and that fire i would say two things in response to that st in response to the specific concern about abuse i do think it's important to keep in mind that the federal officer and civil rights removal statutes are relatively dero it is certainly not going to be breyer i think that would take me to my nd point which is would it have been reasonable for congress to have made this policy determination and i would respectfully submit that it would have been and again we have no legislative history that even speaks to this issue our primary submission is that the text is clear but i think that congress could well have concluded that in light of the significant federal interests that are often in play in these cases that even in circumstances in which the civil rights or federal officer ground is ultimately found not to have been meritorious that congress balancing the risk of erroneous free man's against the risk of incremental delay could have struck the balance to permit plenary review consistent with the ordinary way appellate review operates justice sotomayor count so you're talking about what congress balance congress could have chosen but i go to the fact that when congress added  forty three to the statute every circuit court who had addressed this issue had already ruled that the only thing that was subject to review was a decision based on  forty two and had rejected your argument don't you think that if i'm trying to figure out what congress intended that i would look to what was before congress is understood under in front of congress in understanding number one number two that when it told to me that it didn't want appellate review of all issues and that it only wanted appellate review of fourteen and forty three issues that our review should be limited to what it wanted i don't but i do know that we have some of my colleagues who believe that exceptions should not be read narrowly i don't happen to be one of them but even if i read order in order the way you want i don't think i can read it in isolation and i think those two other factors make me believe ruling against you well i think most of the circuit decision that respondent invokes predated yamaha there were a few that post dated it but our submission is simply that yamaha ought to be taken into account and addition congress merely added t words it did not reenact the entire provision and it didn't make comprehensive amendments and it's hard to say with any confidence that congress failure to speak more clearly reflects approval of those preexisting circuit decisions just to scare you mr chairman jim when you were brief and if the court thinks that sanctions and feel words would be insufficient in this context knowing that that is what the court ordinarily relies on to deter improper conduct by litigants i think that the court could adopt a bell versus hood like rule and again if there were more evidence that this was a problem and respondent does not cite a single example of the sort of gamesmanship that it posit then perhaps the court should take that further step but again as this court recognize for instance in arthur andersen in the context of appeals in the arbitration context thanks and feel wards parodic magically it would apply in a situation like this where a party is advancing a frivolous argument and doing that for an improper purpose namely for the purpose of establishing appellate jurisdiction where there otherwise would not be any and whether that's a matter of statutory fee shifting or sanctions rule haven't sanctions or even the use of a court's inherent authority again the sanction of dismissal would be available dismissal of the appeal and i think that that would suffice to deal with those situation thank you very much justice gorsuch i'd like to press on the versus that argument a little bit from the other direction is a little bit on the police true stiction based on whether an argument is frivolous or not wouldn't that seem to be more of a point so i don't think you can press the point and then say well i don't know you cork never once i mean you surely have to take a position here well i submission is simply that the court may wish to consider that but it's a decision on whether or not to context and so for the court to do that it would have to st conclude that it is comfortable with the underpinnings of the rule and nd i think included that sanctioned and these would be insufficient in our front line submission to this course that is there is no reason to think that those would not be sufficient in this context  or are we to get around that here or if from from your perspective of trying to convince those to adopt your position i think justice cavanagh that this court can apply its existing precedent on the ratification doctrine and comfortably still rule in our favor and i made two points in response to justice sotomayor but st that the law was hardly settled and that at a minimum in considering what it was settled it was settled there were a lot of court of appeals no one gone the other way but i think that is only true if you take a very narrow view of the relevant question for ratification purposes and again i think in a minimum you have to take yamaha into account because that with this court's most recent pronouncement involving materially identical statutory which is so important made go ahead i was just to say and this court has made clear that where decisions have only well i think simply because we believe that the claims here arise under federal law and the easiest basis for that is the federal common law ground that the court of appeal did not reach because of its resolution of the question  reversed outright and that issue is fully briefed here and we believe that the answer is clear under this court's longstanding precedent and there's also a i think a very significant prudential reason for the court to reach that issue because as you are aware there are some twenty of these cases pending nationwide in courts around the country and indeed there are a number of sir petitions in follow on cases that are currently pending before this court and i think in light of all of those considerations it would be appropriate for the court to resolve that question and the answer to that question is clear because this court for more than a century has applied federal common law to claim seeking redress for interstate pollution a relevant factor and i think the government agrees that mr lucas can speak to that as well but ultimately of course that's the case that drives the analysis and when you have a unanimous clear decision from this court construing  y identical language and court of appeals decisions that really had very conclusory if any reasoning i think that the law was unclear and when you add on to that all that congress did here was merely to add two words and forty two or i don't think that you can conclude that there is ratification particularly when you go back to the original version of four hundred and forty seven d in the civil rights act where congress was plainly very concerned about the risk of local prejudice resolves the question permitted it presented and really does permit an appellate court to review the entirety every man to order where a ground for removal was the federal officer removal statute but we do also respectfully submit that the court should proceed to ensure that this case and the many others like it proceed in federal court there is something profoundly counterintuitive about the notion that these cases which seek relief are injuries caused by world wide greenhouse gas emissions should be litigated in state courts under the laws of different states this court has long made clear that as a matter of constitutional structure such claims necessarily arise under federal law the united states has agreed with that proposition and resolving that issue now will preserve the resources of the judiciary in the parties artificially limiting the scope of that appeal to a particular question respondent resists that straightforward reading but never denied that its approach would give the phrase in order reminding a gaze different meanings into back to back clause of the same thought it instead responded pivots to a congress has already authorized an appeal to remand order considering multiple issues it's unlikely to prolong litigation much further and may in fact expedite it alone in the courts question counsel i would like to get back to the question i asked your friend previously is the appellate court required to consider those additional grounds for removal or simply permitted to do so now with respect to whether the federal office ground is is frivolous by let's say they just look at that st and they determine it wasn't frivolous but it just happens to be wrong and therefore we don't have to look at the other bases i don't think in that context your honor whether this was not a frivolous or bad faith assertion of federal office or removal that an appellate court could simply close its eyes to questions that were presented in that a defendant had the right to appeal so no i don't think in that context they could but in cases where there is actually abuse i think as addition or explained one of the remedies available for such abuse of appellate process would be a dismissal of the entire appeal are there any grounds on which your position differs from that  order remapping a case to mean a portion of that order remaining a case out and what about on the remedy on the remedy if we haven't taken a position we think the court could address the issue in this case and we think that it's important that all common to we think the important question that the court will need to resolve at some point or another but we haven't taken a position on whether the court should use its discretion to decide here but whatever this court decides to do with that issue we do think that it should confirm that section four hundred and forty seven those there's a scene there's an odd candidate void in the sense that it seems as though we are smuggling in smuggling into a review appellate review other issues that are not necessarily the issues that are front and center like federal office or could use somehow help me to eliminate that sense of those early justice thomas pointed to the fact that this really isn't that unusual i think in other contexts the baseline is really what triggers appellate review doesn't necessarily define the scope of that review and i think yamaha's a good example so there this court declined to answer the wrong foundation and i think you can see this in other contexts such as with respect to the review of interlocutory orders concerning injunctions or even with this court's direct review over three judge district court injunction  know you said you're not going to take a position or if the government is not taking a position on whether or not we should get to the federal common law issues but do you have an opinion on whether where the whether or not federal in nature and although respondent why the plaintiffs in the th circuit over one case has tried to create around a court decision and maybe if they still depend on away injuries in the city of baltimore caused by emissions from all over the world and those emissions  complaint you know the focus of the surface ishan was on the federal officer question and whether other issues could be resolved but the subs the grounds for removal was four eleven in that period gap of full fifteen years right in miller had question the majority rule but suggested that if needed congress to change it because it read the limitation the way that respondents to so i'm not sure how you get around ratification and that has to have some meaning especially when we're talking  saying that they think the natural reading is what the circuits have made it to be you can certainly take them into it count there are but i do think that when we're looking at the weight of authority for ratification purposes it's important to decision they're really rooted in purpose i think a good example of the early decision that i'm aware of on this subject from the facts circuit in the appalachian volunteered case and on the other side of the ledger not only do you have a right miller meeting that extra argument you also have this court i'd like to give you a hypothetical suppose that there is a removal on multiple grounds including one thousand four hundred and forty two dollars and then there is a re manned and then the defendant decides that he wants to appeal but he decides that he doesn't really feel it's not a frivolous argument he just doesn't think that's a strong this other arguments there is and he abandoned set is there's still jurisdiction i think in that context you could still quiet revelli hood type situation i think it would be analogous to the stansell and then it had the entire case being i guess i don't understand your argument i mean i can understand your hesitation in answering the hypothetical the opposite way but once you answer me in that way it seems as though you're the meaning of the word order changes in that context simply that if this court is concerned about those hypothetical and you arrive remedies would be available and i would know so there is jurisdiction but the court has discretionary remedies available to get a power of you even though they have the same other or attempted federal question ground so that's one problem which makes it seem seem on doubtful that congress really  this there's also the gamesmanship problem and then there's the ratification which i want to zero in on with you what exactly would you say about the ratification doctrine because if you just read the black letter description of the test and the extent there is any reasoning at all rather than just citations the other circuit court case that is there really just about purpose and even if that isn't quite conclusory and on the other side i would know that you do have this court case terms of the sanction here that it's not susceptible to a bell before the type construction or to sanction available then i think the text of the statute would control but i do think that's going to be rarer when you get a context like that because i think in those cases it's quite likely that those can be fairly characterized as evidence of bad faith if a party seeks to gain appellate jurisdiction using want to be's grounds and then abandon that argument on appeal that would seem to me to be pretty good candidate for instance of a bell the hood type remedy or any number of sanctions available in the well i'm not sure about that because if it wasn't if it was a decent argument but they just decided not to press it on appeal i'm not sure that's quick points on gamesmanship want to underscore the respondent has neither identified any evidence of abuse in the circuits that review the entire emad order nor really offered any compelling reason to expect that situation to change and if problems ever do arise in the limited set of cases where a defendant can plausibly invoke section four hundred and forty seven to use exception at the end of the day they can always be addressed by congress in the meantime the theoretical possibility of undesirable consequences is no reason to carve out undeniably appealable remand orders unreviewable portion rather appellate court should be able to figure out whether remonde order resulted from a legal error even if that error doesn't involve federal officers or civil rights that's how this court has approached other types of orders and there's no good reason for treating pleased the court according to petitioners merely referring to section four hundred and forty two and a removal notice yaron tease the defendant and appeal as of right of every ground rejected by the district court even if the  meritless and even if the defendant drops it on appeal that is not a permissible reading of four hundred and forty seven dollars d that section a general prohibition subject to a narrow exception tethers appellate review to two designated grounds and forty two dollars forty three cents and to those grounds only this court has never held that review of an order necessarily encompasses every issue addressed in an order its interpretation of similarly worded statutes proves th moreover the exception clause limits review to removals pursuant to one thousand four hundred and forty two or forty three meaning where the removal was in compliance with or in accordance with those statutes the court of appeals must decide if federal office or jurisdiction exists not merely whether a defendant asserted it perhaps of the bootstrap to obtain review of grounds otherwise absolutely board in this case was not removed pursuant to four hundred and forty two because as the courts below held petitioners do not qualify for federal office or removal petitioners interpretation does runs counter to the language and structure of four hundred and forty seven d and even if the language were not clear there are few violates basic principles of statutory interpretation finally petitioners construction ignores that in two thousand and eleven congress ratified fifty years of unanimous circuit court of forty that limited review of remand orders to the exception clause enumerated grounds and only to those grounds and the courts in those cases held that the language was clear and that was what supported their jurisdictional analysis i welcome your questions counsel you just said that  your petition was reading a one thousand four hundred and forty seven day is contrary to the language of the statute i will give you an uninterrupted three minutes to explain to me how the language and order remanding a case shall be reviewable by appeal or otherwise should be read and read to say a portion of an order remanding the case shall be reviewable d by appeal or otherwise solely with respect to the text of that i know you have arguments outside the text but with respect to the actual text what's what's your best argument sure your honor the st thing we have to keep in mind is that you have to look at the sentence as a whole including the st clause which is a general and absolute bar on appellate review freemantle orders so then when we look at the nd clause we have to look at the words not in isolation but is in in relation to their neighbors and there we see that an order is reviewable but only if it is an order that in which the removal was pursu six which is actually the procedure for removal of civil actions the removing party has the attorney has to file pursuant to rule eleven and rule eleven has both a procedural signature component and substantive that is that the grounds have to be done not for delay and with substantial basis in the evidence etc now the key point is that the issue isn't whether the order is reviewable but what the scope of that review is and both the structure of the sentence that is the tethering forty three and this court's treatment of similar language in other the language of the statute itself doesn't distinguish among those issues so for all those reasons the use of the word order and the use of the word reviewable have never meant to this court that that necessarily means a reviewing court has to address every single issue raised within in order to the contrary this court has has frequently disentangled issues and made clear in cases like swi baron's all of which petitioners ignore that you cannot use and an appealable issue as a ticket for multi issue appeals that are not allowed thank you counsel justice thomas thank you mr chief justice counsel i don't want to belabor the point but i think it's an important point because you have you mentioned some cases that support your requires the award of fees to be part of the order the circuits that have looked at this and it's twelve dollars of them only the federal circuit has not have held that the award of fees is review single order denying motions for summary summary judgment this court said that the portion of the order denying qualified immunity was reviewable but the not an order whether specific defendants were policymakers a portion of the order was not reviewable in abney there was a single order and it was ok for the appellate court to to review the order denying a motion to dismiss with respect to double jeopardy but not with respect to the same order denying the challenge to the sufficiency of an indictment and in baron's a wrongful district starch discharge case justice scalia explained that a single order  could be reviewed with respect to the issue of denying qualified immunity but not with respect to determinations of evidentiary sufficiency and in our brief we discussed the cases under the criminal peals act and as well as under section tw fifty seven you cannot allow a party that has a non meritorious issue as defendants sorry as petitioners have here to use that issue as a hook to open up issues that this  it's unfair not to give people appeal but if you give them appeals in the middle of the case too often you will really muck up the system take too long and so we allow some things to go ahead even though there was no appeal and it might be unfair and wrong because we don't want to muck up the system that's what i see underlying this to ten to eight hundred and eighty seven you know no  now they have an appeal on something so you're not going to waste a lot of time in the court of appeals anyway you'll waste some time if you like that other thing but the big waste the big time consuming thing is getting the appeal in the st place now it's here so we undercut the main reason for not giving people an appeal we undercut it not destroyed it now is that correct policy that on the other side if you're trying to argue so i want to see to it i don't i don't think it is your honor and these grounds for appeal as this court explained in the rue is case talking about why that provision was jurisdictional and limited to a single issue diversity jurisdiction is a good example your honor you don't obtain diversity jurisdiction by having a colorable argument that there is diversity or jurisdiction you either have it or you do not the same is true for federal office or jurisdiction it either exists or it does not and if it does not then the plain language of this we think the plain language of the statute limits and court scope of review and that's the end of the issue the notion that there is an efficiency that requires a court it is based on two assumptions both of which are wrong by the petitioners the st is that there's a link somehow between asserted grounds for removal but the fact that a party has asserted federal officer jurisdiction which it does not have and which in this court it doesn't challenge does not mean that it's  title to bankruptcy jurisdiction or admiralty jurisdiction or federal enclave jurisdiction or any of the other jurisdictional assertions that have been made by the petitioners in this case there is no link there's no reason to open up the other issues and nd just as a matter of statutory construction you don't have to read the nd clause narrowly to understand that it  our new shoes take a little known on the time that the mouse and the elephant is no longer there the elephant is takes a lot of time to appeal so let's not give him any your honor in this case is a good example of the reason that we should be concerned about this we've been three years in limbo between the federal and state courts and the record below if you look at the only thing you incorrect that the th circuit's that addressed this issue prior to two thousand and eleven contain no analysis they all found the language clear the commonsense reading of the statute clear and many of them pointed that that out in particular but with respect to the body of case law petitioners and the united states ignore and i think it's significant a couple of important cases from this court the st is he and nineteen a unanimous opinion in which the court was confronted with a line of cases from the federal circuit involving interpretation of patent law and the federal circuit of course had was the only one with jurisdiction over these issues the court relied on that land that line of cases out of the federal circuit and the fact that congress reenacted not just the same language but added only a new catch all phrase and as the court and the united states's amick is in that case said that would be an and a very open leak way of attempting to overturn the settled body of law the subtle body of law comes from one a practitioner looking at nine unanimous circuits over fifty years would think at the time and that is that where there is a federal officer or civil rights assertion and other issues the only issue that the court of appeals has jurisdiction to review are those issues and that's what congress ratified by reenacting the language and only adding four hundred and forty two dollars or there was also in and we  the house report which which points out that the reason for this edition was specifically to protect federal officers from removal as civil rights cases do because otherwise there is no way to get the issue into the court of appeal so congress put its thumb on the scales for two issues federal officer  and and civil rights because they were important public policy reasons to protect those kinds of defendants against district court error in all other cases congress has made clear and the courts have consistently held would would if the rule changes this way every confident lawyer will look for a way to assert federal officer simply so that other grounds can be can can be brought up on appeal and  hong the th circuit said that following our opinion it would be frivolous to assert federal officer removal as a basis for removal in future cases in fact there have been future cases in others i'll do it in other circuits raising circuit below was really based on doc doctrines that have been soundly disapproved and rejected by this court ranging from government regulation  supervision to a lack of connection between the conduct that's the basis of a tort which is misrepresentation and a campaign of deception and denial in any relationship to the government much less any appropriate federal interest in promoting those kinds of life than to see but we see them asserted continually and and again as the same amica us as well as the new york state and miki point out that removal has become a tactic of defendants in a wide range of cases including environmental regulation  opioids subprime lending and financial institutions and others and in every one of those instances there are these are involved national industries heavily regulated by the federal government and you could have colorful assertions  and a rule that broadly open the gates to other issues and appellate rights would not only result in longer delays but would burden the the records of the courts there's a these are not just not just are cases your honor but big cases involving large companies and important interests frequently bump up against federal interest and the issue review some of it and normally we where the question is what happens to the term order as it appears in the nd clause and normally we we read a statute that uses a single term to employ the same definition throughout the government charges that that that's one defect in your stash tray interpretation i didn't hear you address that concern with in your discussion with the chief and i was hoping you might now expenses incurred as a result of the removal and every circuit twelve circuits have looked at that and they have all concluded that regard list of whether the grounds for the removal is free is reviewable under the st cla for removal respectively so pursuant to section four hundred and forty two or four hundred and forty three must mean something other than simply that the notice of remove will reference them and this is why that language acts both as a tether as a matter of of common sense interpretation of the statute focusing the court of appeal's attention on those issues and those issues alone and as a substantive bar because pursuant to as this court has interpreted it in other contexts and as the constitution uses the phrase in pursuance to for legislation means not just procedural compliance but substantive compliance and what do you do about yama i understand that the question there was when and that's which order is the question here what part of it so the questions are different i get that but i'm not sure i understand why the different the difference makes makes a difference given the scope of our reasoning and yama you don't trust that yes thank you your honor it is because the key point in both yamaha and here is not the use of the term order but answering the question what is the scope of review on appeal and in yamaha looking at the language of what the district court can certify   other issues within the scope of the order it made that that the court set the scope of review under those conditions in that context made sense but justice here i'm sorry finish your answer please  similarly is filled with excellent judges i asked mr sham you know why he wanted to be in federal court give me a legal answer it didn't really go beyond that you really want to be in state court  why we don't believe federal court jurisdiction exists in that case is there is no federal claim to assert here your honor the that tort that is concerned about is that we're concerned with and the th circuit circuit court's opinion in the in the record pointed out that the that the conduct complained of is fraud deception and aisle and this information and it's i don't know if our traditional sta in isolation is a problem for you and that means the text is a problem for you but you also i think have a problem with yamaha and you know it's never certified of the court of appeals that is not tied to the particular question formulated by the district court and that language as you know well is is somewhat to what do we do with yamaha just this course which was touching on this is well what that sentence in particular seems problematic well i think you start with this court's interpretations section one thousand two hundred and ninety one in which the court has said that despite virtually identical language about what is appeal and yamaha's reference to order it was in the context of a particular statute setting aside congressional intent in purpose which i'm not which i think also cut in our favor here but simply looking at the language of section one thousand two hundred and ninety two dollars be it is not similar in its commonsense reading to the commonsense reading often used to borrow a phrase in a different context from justice kagan like icing on a cake already frost said when we use the doctrine now you cited helston and that was that's a good case for you to cite  agree but that that was relying mostly on the fact that our president we are sticking with our president and i did mention the reenactment but professor eskridge in his treatise is has pointed out that the presumed inten justification behind that doctrine is in his words unusually weak and quote and i just wonder how much work he can do here given that it is really not clear we don't have any indication that congress actually or members actually focused on this and intended in any way to ratify the interpretation he responded that yes your honor st of all in health sin the point was there was not practitioner at the time would view the issue as settled and here a practitioner in two thousand and eleven would look at the unanimous fifty years of precedent from nine circuits that a forty three unless it has been correctly removed pursuant to those cases so in other words in this case because the officer removal ground was flawed we couldn't say that this case had been removed pursuant to the office order was proper that it had not been properly removed under the federal officer removal statute that should have dismissed for lack of jurisdiction not affirm the remand order correct you're correct your honor the general practice so in fact the universal practice in the courts that have applied a commonsense language interpretation to the statute has been to dismiss the other grounds asserted for lack of jurisdiction and then either affirm or reverse  assistance particularly counsel that's inconsistent with your reading of the statute because if the court doesn't have jurisdiction unless the case has been properly removed pursuant to say the federal officer removal statute there's no jurisdiction it can't affirm it would have to dismiss the same result one is under a common sense language reading of the statute in which the words pursuant to qualify the exception and tether the appellate court's review to those issues but it's not necessarily as your honor points out it's not necessarily a jurisdictional analysis it just means that the appeal has to be limited in focus on those grounds the other reading is the jurisdictional analysis which we think flows from the use of terms that this court has consistently held have substance to jurisdictional meanings for instance in how merrick and in ruis the size plus the clarifying question when you point is that on appeal having been remanded the error that can be corrected by the court of appeals is limited to the specified ground and that's what the commonsense reading is nothing is the best common sense reading following up on this colloquy of the exception clause is that it creates a limited exception to one thousand four hundred and forty seven d's general bar on appellate review for federal officer and civil rights grounds and only for those grounds shooters reading would create an exception that swallows that rule an exception that would apply to one group and one group alone defendants who make their own list claims to removal on either of them the text does not compel this reading and it is implausible to think that is what congress intended the interpretation also runs contrary to the principles and purposes that animate section four hundred and forty seven d consistent with nearly unanimous view of the lower courts including the four circuit courts to with respondents argument today it finds no home in the actual language of section one thousand four hundred and forty seven d there's simply no way as a matter of ordinary english to construe order to mean merely a portion of an order in yamaha justice ginsburg writing for a unanimous court relied on that claim meaning to reach the same conclusion and respondents interpretation would have the added consequence of giving the phrase order remaining a case different meanings in different causes of the very same statutory history as justice scalia explained in his opinion for the court and alexander versus hand of all the relevant inquiry is whether one can quote assert with any degree of assurance that congressional failure to act represents affirmative congressional approval all of the court's statutory interpretation here there is simply no reason to believe that congress was preferring the unreason decisions of some courts of appeals construing this statute over the reason decisions of this chord construing materially identical ones particularly given the technical nature of the twenty thousand and seven amendment congress could well have concluded that it wanted plenary review in these cases and that the value of correcting erroneous these specific contexts outweighed the cost of any incremental delay justice thomas you expressed concern that this could lead to the smuggling and additional issues on appeal of course under section  review is the default not the exception in our appellate system but there is no reason to believe that there are going to be a lot of these cases as the d r i amicus brief notes in the five years since the th circuit adopted our interpretation there have only been six notices removal citing either of these statutes and only three appeals in those cases and again sanctions and fees are available to deter any abuse indeed the very provisions at issue here specifically state the notices of removal are subject to the requirements of rule of an and finally delay is not a significant concern here just a set of my or the reason there has been delay in this case has not been because of the other grounds for me to fall which because of its erroneous lee narrow view of its own jurisdiction the court of appeals after all did not reach our rule would enable courts of appeals to resolve these appeals more efficiently where a court concludes that there is an easier grounds for a move all than the often fact intensive federal officer ground and there would be the way only in a case in which a federal court stays the state court proceedings on remand which would occur only when the court determines that a defendant is likely to succeed on its appeal there is therefore no good policy reason to override the plain text of section four hundred and forty seven d and because there is plainly federal jurisdiction over these claims this court should therefore reverse the court of appeals judgment thank you thank you