takes away at that requirement it does it explicitly in two ways it either says that that requirement does not apply or that the people trying to apply for that for adjustment of status are considered to have been inspected and admitted or  nonetheless we're here today because it's records in these cases held that despite liking the terms inspected and admitted the temporary protected status statute inherently includes an inspection and admission for its beneficiaries but those holdings are incorrect because they are contrary to the plain language of the statute and this court should reverse it now help me with the opening phrase of the f for for purposes of adjustment of status under section it was mirroring that provision to make it clear that t p s beneficiaries would be considered to be unlawful status and avoid that bar and this makes sense because the only way that you can get to an inspection an admission by considering that  point regarding lawful status not being an admission is that you can have an admission and not have lawful status or for a lot of the awful status but more importantly you could have lawful status and not have been admitted and some statute addresses both of those bars but does not extend to anything outside of that bar and the circuit circuit has actually agreed with that argument the th circuit has found in the context of the krooman bar to adjustment which is different from beneficiaries and computing that misstate by saying that in an immigrant as necessarily been admitted the simple fallacy and that argument is that one can be and not an immigrant status and not have been admitted for example victims of domestic immigrants to preclude them from being considered immigrants which would require an adjustment of status and my next plain language for you is neither of you talk about this but the titles to these laws in the subsections weren't acted by congress and they've been sorry it says adjustment of status of nonimmigrant to that of person and made it for permanent residence congress passed it several times it's beyond everything but i bet you any number of the congressmen senators only look at that title and passing it well i sure that i understand your honour's question but plain language the plain language of what congress passed and the plain language i think that this court should consider also in the context of the whole statute and in the context of the whole statute there is a distinction between lawful status and admission not withstanding that the title of the adjustment of status that it only says so in general and that is the one way that people can adjust status or know that the t p s beneficiaries can seek to adjust status and it is particularly telling again that when congress intend date under the statute and that's april two thousand and one so this reflects congress as way of acting that whenever it intends for people to not be subject to that threshold requirement it is explicit knows how to do it i think that when you when you talk when you have said they're deemed to have been admitted and inspected and that isn't in the statute but is that is deemed the same should that take on the same meaning as shall be considered immigrants i would like to reserve the remaining time i have to weigh in here because this case has been brief and argued so far today not taking into account h g g your brief was file position is that should if this court finds that that all is plain language stuff even if even if you're wrong on that that's only the st half of the analysis yes or minor and we believe that if the court reaches a conclusion that the language i sentient that should have been a response of twenty eight j letter it would have been it that would have been helpful information but as far as i'm concerned it's irrelevant to the task before us today and i would submit it is for two reasons one with the agency for over two years and had not been brought forth before they are the record decision is says we are being consistent with decades of a of the agency's position i reject it wrongly on our view by two circuits and consist salvador there were motions made to strip out provisions relative tell salvador and the awareness of congress at the time that the people who would benefit from the statute were in the country without inspection already well in the record but it also it wants you to run away from chevron and yes in simplify the nelson by going well look at congress was thinking about when the topic came up to justify where it is today and where the day is the language is crystal clear considered as being and maintaining which means to consider something is to get the exact their here's here's my problem with the plain language go back to the definition of admitted i and it says council me give you the question and it says for our purpose and then whole chapter of all immigration law that there ever is here in statute admitted means lawful entry in the united states  had actually been defined by the b a which is a meaning since two to comply with the procedural regularity that's why we have waiving cases that's why we have people waved in by the customs officer and they were presented they were inspected and they work in it in any status the board has recognised that going on i'm twenty years and into that into an immigration officer does not say customs officer it says an immigration officer which could be conceded in the cases that have already been established there is a form of inspection c i s does it they're really focusing on the admission component and so admission does not as the court has pointed out in some questioning  and has been noted here is not going to find to a land border there's nothing that actually says port of entry the location of the entry is not to actually is not limited by the words of the statute itself posed and practicality that happens you have border entries from canada all the time they don't happen literally on the border sometimes people to drive twenty five miles in are going to consider them at that point not admitted because they appeared the nd i would describe it as a nd tier question st you have to get through the admission inspection question in the application for adjustment of status starts with are you adjusting from something just conceptually that's why they call it an adjustment not a change or acquisition and so you have to have that's what a is testing do you have something that is worthy of adjusting you have to be in on or in status to then move on to permanent status it's logical it's not congress doesn't credit for that very too as an alternative you said it isn't here because they don't have a c two problem well but any of the c two discussion i mean i know it's referenced in a related and indians briefs but not by that by the a o n h g nevertheless it doesn't in terms of trying to identify which part of twenty five is addressed by the t p s statute my position is that language is very clear it addresses the section it doesn't try concluded whether deference is owed it can it was actually very clear in both decisions the language is clear there is no difference it's on him big u s government's argument six to inject ambiguity into very clear language  and so that's what he she does injects yes mightily hard basically said ok if you think that if you think there's if you think there's there's not that our view of the plain language is wrong there's clear plain language to the contrary so we moved to to show the chevron nd if a statute is ambiguous review understood that the alternative your honor instead of agency's interpretation need not be the best interpretation it need not be what the court would find most agreeable it need only be reasonable and she is a reasonable interpretation because it is consistent with how this has been is presidential and have basically argued at least the alien attorneys that unless it's presidential it's just getting more and you know they have to really worry about it because the agency always flunks under skidmore so now we position is not presidential and even if it weren't presidential has been consistent i want to address judge benton's question regarding the definition of admission my friend argues that i mission can also occur after an adjustment of status but  that occurs after an adjustment of status for those instances in which people can adjust status without having been admitted in the st place y to prevent oddities that would occur in immigration law if someone is under permanent lawful status and has not been admitted so you impute an admission in that case so they are not dean removable for example another instance in which an admission is imputed is whenever somebody obtains a temporary immigration benefit so you it without having been admitted with the family unit program for example so if somebody has a temporary immigration benefit and they weren't to admit it well we're going to impute an admission so that they are not deemed removable in immigration court counsel doesn't that the clarification a five provision doesn't your argument go right to making the a five decide this case that the granting of t p s is not inconsistent with the granting of nonimmigrant status well but that goes to the point or honor that just because you are not an immigrant doesn't mean that you have been  ed there's variances in which people are in an immigrant status and weren't admit it but for in those instances congress drafted a pathway to adjustment of status explicitly here my friend is saying that congress gave a benefit in silence when it does so by saying so explicitly in other cases thank you very much thank you