this case presents a question if a civilian employee who works as a radio dispatcher for a police department calls a drug dealer to inform him that there are police officers near his house is that person guilty of official misconduct that is the charge for which congress either williams the defendant was tried and convicted she was also tried together with other co defendants with criminal drug conspiracy the evidence showed that she was in ploy by the glenwood police department as a civilian employee as a dispatcher when she was hired she was informed of the rules of the glenwood police department which prohibit disclosure of confidential information on one particular day july twelfth o hundred ninety eight she placed three telephone calls to a codefendant greg strauss the first to call she placed from the police phone in the police station where she was working and she told him and there were short calls keep your scanner on you have i was at the college was she was a dispatcher for the glenwood police department codefendant greg stroud lived in south holland south suburban college's about two blocks from his house in the third call that she made she made a right after she got home from work and this was a longer call and in this call she explained to codefendant greg stroud there was a barricade situation in south holland glenwood police officers were dispatched to help the south holland police officers deal with this barricade situation they were part of a suburban emergency response team assert she explained to him that it was her duty to notify other police say officers in the area that a certain was coming through and that's when she learned that there was in strout on the phone i think it was f b i da or a t f i don't know which for sure but that's had to be one of the holes now the interesting thing about this was that these three calls came to light because the cook county state's attorney's office narcotics strike force was investigating greg structure and was conducting a long term that  contacts investigation and greg stroud and had a wiretap on greg strauss phone it was through that wiretap that these three calls were discovered and in fact through that wire a few weeks later police officers were able to catch greg stroud in his car transporting two kilograms of cocaine now in the bench trial where guilty of criminal drug conspiracy but found her guilty of official misconduct and the official misconduct was based on such heat of the statute which provides that a public employee commits misconduct when in his official capacity he knowingly performs an act which he knows he is forbidden by law  now the appellate court reversed pharmacy to williams conviction for official misconduct finding that what she did wasn't a forbidden by law i'm here to s this court to reverse the appellate court and to reinstate her conviction she committed acts which she knew were forbidden by law we proved that she violated the rules of the glenwood police department which prohibit members of the department from disseminating confidential information if that's t counsel that that's still leaves the problem with the difference between a municipal regulation and state regulation and whether the rules regulations here satisfy the judicial gloss of that expands law to include agency laws and yes this correct your honor and in fact that was one of the rulings of the appellate court that of the initial ruling before it even discussed fell however was to say well she didn't violate a law she violated a municipal ordinance so what she did wasn't for been by law because laws are passed by legislatures municipalities pass municipal ordinances therefore she's not guilty and i submit that that is the first thing that's wrong with the appellate court's opinion because that already ignores this court's statements and fell how or that law for purposes of the official misconduct still shoot encompasses not only penal statutes which have criminal penalties attached to them and indeed this interpretation by the appellate court goes against the purpose of the official misconduct statute which is to reach and public employees who are exploiting their official position the dutchman of the public good and also with any violation of the rules and regulations of the city that is an example i know that the defense has has used and all i can say is that that certainly is not this case whether a in a hypothetical case a police officer who  violates a a rule about a police report writing and tardiness should be guilty of an efficient misconduct i think is is the bait of all but under this or under these circumstances where there were very definite rules to officers out to members of a police department that they are to keep confidential police matters and here is a dispatcher who violates those rules by actually tipping off a drug dealer that forbidden by law and therefore violation i was saying that the particularly rules of the glenwood police department that this defendant viol qualify as an administrative rule regulation under this court's explanation in foul howard of what is a law for purposes of the official misconduct stage and i know the  disagreed because the appellate court read into your honour's decision info how or and into the statute a provision that administrative rule or regulation must mean an issue to arise but first and foremost we had testimony from mr alex the moderator who was a twenty five year veteran of the grunwick police department who retired as deputy chief of the police department in two thousand and he was the defendant's immediate supervisor he testified that that was his testimony so we proved that these were not simply rules of an employment manual as counsel for the defense wishes to hear arise does it matter that the indictment does indictment specified exactly what she did and then fast say which rules she violated it did not specify which rule she violated but mr damali when he testified testif specifically which rules she violated those rules he read into the record four of them and those were introduced into evidence as exhibits and neither attach them to my brief as in the  so there was no doubt whatsoever to the defendant as to what exactly she was charged with doing in fact her defense was completely different her defense was not that whole i'm not a member of the police department or those rules don't apply to be the defense was out these rules apply to me but i didn't violate them i didn't disclose anything confidential not to the vagaries of this lawyer of the potential to punish  that the defense sites on potentially innocent content are cases which deal which this court has invalidated statutes where the court found that the statute lacked a culpable mental state it may have had a mental state but it lacked a culpable mental state and that is why the court went further and said that therefore since there is a lack of a culpable mental state the statutes must could potentially honors innocent conduct and so must be on declared invalid that's not the case with the official misconduct stage you fishel misconduct statute says you have to the public a fish a public employee enter his or her official capacity knowingly performs an act which he or she knows is forbidden by law so the second element of knowledge is in fact  culpable mental state infected squired interesting the old adage ignorance of the law is not an excuse doesn't apply to section b of official misconduct ignorance of the law is an excuse for someone charged with official misconduct we have to prove that the person knew that what he or she was doing was forbidden by law so the bat i submit is the culpable mental know he knowingly he or she knowingly submitted a brief contrary to the agency rules would that person be subject to a class three felony persecution i would hope not but i i would submit the ba there he knows what the page limitation is there certainly rules that he's aware he or she is aware of so of mr state agency i mean is that official misconduct well i paid more or  we left with the discretion of the prosecutors i'm not i'm not going to punish that even though technically i'm not i'm not going to charge that even though it technically falls under the official misconduct well i think the essence of it is to look at the the statute as a statute which is geared towards public employees who are exploiting their official position to the detriment of the public  and i recall the defense attorney as well it's to cite people versus gray as an example of somewhat analogous to the example maybe not analogous but in the same vein as the example of your honor just this time this is just a person who lives in the in the veterans home and and is charged with official misconduct for violating a rule that employees are not supposed to have financial dealings with the people who live at the home and the court said and wait a minute we're talking about official capacity we're talking about a janitor what is that about his janitorial duties bat has  me that he has exploited to the detriment of the public good and i think that's that's a clear distinction between that case and the case is an example your honor has given and this particular case where we have a radio dispatcher who in fact there is a person in a position of public trust and exploits that public trust to the detriment of the  notifying a drug dealer that there are police officers in your home i think this case is a clear case of of  of official misconduct think the court the appellate court is absolutely mistaken when it says well she's not even a member of the police department right now that flies in the face of the testimony of alex demario a twenty five year veteran of the police department and deputy chief if anyone who should know who's the member of a police department would be him and the the decision actually as far as state agencies are actually makes no sense because the appellate court's decision would mean that if the defendant were an employee of the illinois state police a state agency she could be charged with official misconduct but because she happens to be an employee of the glenwood police department of municipality she can't are you saying then the test would be is you look to the employee and what the duties are for instance to employee confidentiality would be  her employment i mean that's that's the him that's why her employment is so a matter of public trust and that's why this is such an egregious violation of th  prosecutions for innocent conduct in addition the police department rules and regulations even if they apply as laws under the statute do not apply to ms williams under the expressed terms of the glenwood code and finally just briefly if the rules and regulations of plot qualify as laws under statute and apply despite the text of the glenwood code the statute is unconstitutional but isn't that kind of an absurd situation where the defendant has duties particularly state the extent the state is suggesting that the only possible way it could get after this kind of conduct of the criminal law is through this particular statute that's just not true there are other criminal statutes that they could have pursued here such as obstructing or instructing a peace officer or concealing or aiding a fugitive and to charge for those cases those might properly which this conduct the problem though is that this statute should not apply here because if it does there run the risk of enabling prosecutions for all sorts of innocent conduct for violations of other rules across the state first in this case obviously violation of each and every g p g one regulation could be a class  crime well the conduct is certainly different but the way the statute would operate to reach that conduct is definitely the same now the state's response to all of this is to say that the statute wouldn't really apply to these circumstances because they're not actually exploiting the public in any way in these in these situations however that's a completely illusory limitation on the statute it's not in the statutory text and actual exploitation is certainly not an element of the offense and therefore if this conduct reaches ms williams in this case and your honors reinstate her conviction that it must necessarily reach violations of supreme court rules report writing requirements of the c p s computer policy that we mentioned in the briefs that would allow a felony prosecution for a never held an official misconduct conviction from a violation of a rule of employment and your honor should not start in this case the people be great cases very persuasive here because i'm actually supports that district appellate court was presented with a situation where the prosecution was based on was an employment and the court concluded that such violations with respect to such violations we cannot believe that such behavior felonious is what the legislature had in mind when it enacted be official misconduct statu proceeded from the assumption that with police department general there was a proper basis for an official misconduct prosecution but the court was never called called upon to pass on that issue so we don't know the  circumstances behind you know an action of those regulations or anything like that so this case is a very different situation i was thinking of the gray case is really more of an issue of an official capacity but the great court was very concerned about this extending the statute too far and it indicated that was a rules and regulations of employment are not a proper basis of a prosecution the state also argues of these rules are more than just employment rules and regulations because they were actually adopted into law by the blind with board of trustees i would first this argument depends on matter from outside the evidence and should not even be considered in the first place in addition even the evidence from outside the  record does not indicate that these specific rules were but was actually adopted by the board of trustees back in one thousand and five they adopted something called the agreement board of the global police department rules and regulations policy and procedures package and did not indicate that these confidentiality rules were necessarily part of that still relies on mr de maurice testimony below but he never indicated that they remained in effect completely on altered until thirteen years later when ms williams i construe the statute not to apply to violations of the rules of employment first in order to prevent prosecution sue rules and regulations that have no application outside of an employee's workplace but also place reasonable restrictions on the statute by preventing it from applying to situations where innocent conduct is something often people grieve or cases a great example of an appropriate approach to take care orders and that case this court simply rejected the state's attempt to apply the with code was turning these rules and regulations into actual laws for the purposes of the statute but the same glenwood code indicates quite specifically that these rules apply only to members of the department and that ms williams is not a member as the appellate court found she's not among the members of the department because she's a civilian employee and not us one police officer of the state argues that she was a member because she fits into the category of such other and further employees as the going with a board of trustees and president can provide for from time to time however the state's basis for this is again as mr tomorrow is testimony and he never indicated anything regarding the action glenwood board or the glenwood president he only indicated that ms williams was hired at some point and that she worked as a dispatcher if the one with the code operates to make these rules and regulations and natural laws it surely excludes that application t he's in the police or that's correct and the state also relies on ms williams own testimony in this case because she said that she did not actually violate these rules as indicating that they actually applied to her however denial of violating the rules is in no way inconsistent with the fact that the glenwood code something outside the record explicitly excludes her from from the membership in the department she her testimony indicated her belief that they must have applied to her however even her subjective belief that the rules might have applied to her does not change the text of the glenwood code which explicitly i'm sorry first that's because the statute potentially punishes innocent conduct if it applies to ms williams his conduct in this particular case now the state focuses all exclusively on conduct in this case but the kind of conviction for a violation of a rule and regulation of the ground with the police department stands that it could certainly stand in the other cases we've talked about the chicago public schools computer policy violation the supreme court  them all manner of conduct that is not truly criminal no state claims that her conduct was automatically wrongful and that the difference is that those cases involved a situation where there was no culpable intent that might be reports on time all sorts of potentially innocent conduct in addition the statute is unconstitutionally vague as applied to ms williams because no reasonable person would think that violating the rules of employment which have no application whatsoever to anyone outside of  employment could possibly result would qualify as a law at all let alone a criminal or even one that could result in a felony conviction and accordingly if there are no further questions we have people from the reversal of  comma see the williams is not guilty of official misconduct because all of the rules prohibiting disclosure of confidential information only appl members of the department and she is the argument goes not a member of the department she's a civilian employee hired by the department to  be a radio dispatcher while that claim that she's not a member of the department just flies in the face of the testimony of mr de monnerie the deputy chief of the of the department if there is anyone who would know who was a member of the department it would be a twenty five year veteran of the gun with police department whose deputy chief of the department and would actually was her supervisor the the  the legal basis for this claim but she's not a member it is based on a provision of the municipal code of the village of glenwood which  spells out who is a member of the police department but includes any other members and as certified by the village board well to establish that she's a member of a police department  witness stand in this case and she did not challenge that in any way nor were there any other witnesses presented to challenge mr de mar is testament to do away with the vagaries of this as you don't we have to performing in act which you know is forbidden by law is an indication of culpable intent culpable mental state i mean i know for example in this around the case you had a situation where a theft statute based on receiving stolen property was invalidated on the grounds that and evidence technician who  transporting recovered burglary proceeds could technically be guilty of theft well he didn't have a culpable mental state he didn't have the intent to deprive the owner of it he was just bringing it to the police station to inventory  technically he'd come under that statute so it's it's invalidated how in under these circumstances could you possibly say that a radio dispatcher who knows that she's not to disclose  confidential information well then we're left with what we discussed before that if the law is if law is going to be as extended rules agency determinations that under that we're left with and we've cited some examples they will go bad that if you knowingly violate that rule i mean that's all that's required on you your analysis of this attitude and you're left t the discretion of the prosecutor well justice thomas and those those kind of cases well let me let me just say this in response to your question fell how or did specifically state that administrative rules and regulations are included in the meaning of law for purposes of the official misconduct sta can be the basis for a charge of official misconduct even if those rules and regulations do not in and of themselves contain a penalty clause or criminal sanctions and there is a whole of the regulations of the chicago police department which and becker it was the officer failed to chicago police department a rule or regulation and it was used as the basis of an official misconduct charge and other cases such as  books where regulations of the cook county sheriff's police and cook county department of corrections were violated and those served as as basis for an official misconduct charge it to adopt the defense attorney's argument then would be to eradicate that whole line of cases which followed this court's decision and fell how or and and  that he gave was that these rules apply to her so what is and that she was hired in one nine hundred ninety seven he was her supervisor and he testified that these rules were adopted in hundred eighty five and were still in effect in two thousand when he retired so they were ipso facto in effect in one thousand nine hundred eight when she placed these three calls and that was that the testimony and that was a factual issue and that the standard of review is but in fact on that issue the the the question is can any rational trier fed find the defendant guilty based on those facts and and  that the appellate court however treated it as an as a legal issue and claimed well we're going to just look at the definition of out of who's a member of the police department and then decide that she doesn't fit that definition and my response is that the testimony of mr de mari which is on challenge implicitly as spam malicious that she is a member of the police in his dissent and he looked at the facts of this case and said simply if this is an official misconduct i don't know what it is i would ask your honour's to reinstate her conviction