this case which is why are we here the plaintiff and the defendant are both citizens of illinois and it seems that the issue being argued is the validity of some contract under illinois law that looks like it's an issue that ought to be in illinois court so why are we here well your honor our complaint alleges three counts of federal due process count and then the hearing under the contract there is only a right to be paid six months severance so the due process claim just evaporates like that and we come back to my question why are we here your honor while we dispute that that that's a different argument it's actually one you make in your brief and which the supreme court has rejected repeatedly there is an argument made that the property interest is the process that there was process promised either in the contract or by some stable decision called olam against walk in a coma in the supreme court says the existence of process as a matter of contract or state law does not create a property interest for purposes of the due process clause your brief just supposes that holden came out the other way and so we're back to my basic question why are we here again your honor we would assert that there's another whole branch of cases which both sides seem unaware of saying that a breach of contract claim based on a contract between somebody and a government agency cannot be litigat in federal court under the due process clause it is simply a contract claim and it must go to state court the foundational case for that sequence has made america way systems against the city of gary from hundred ninety five which brings me back to my question why are we here we can't overrule hole and no one has asked us to overrule mid america way systems and that line is a claim resting on state more that's the holding of olympians walk in account it's a decision of the supreme court we are not going to disagree with it i understand or based again on on these points of continued employment and based on the defendant's conduct based on what the defendants did they drafted not one but two contracts for one year they enacted not one  ordinances for lanier these contracts specify that to ration of one year's employment these contracts provide when you're with pre term anation protections and based on additionally the catalyst for the contracts that the defendants want one year for his x experience proven expertise familiar with municipal government it's these actions these words all from the defendants that created a reasonable expectation of continued of one additionally we would point out that the walters case which the district court cited and the defendants rely on in this court case is distinguishable on its face the ten year contract of walters is far removed from the one year extension here walters involved two separate it ministrations in contrast here the mayor signs a contract and a few months later tears it up because she says that she can enter the defendants here drafted the contract and if they cite the concerns of continuity and transition employment the employment contract with when you're here involved function pertaining to the villages government and its affairs so based on these principles the whole n alone please the court the focus of this case below has always been about the lack of notice the lack of hearings that is to the second element of the i would just like to point out that we are here again on an issue that got very little attention below very little and now plaintiff wants a do over basically five sentences for devoted in the summary judgment memory and to protecting property interest issue they called it axiomatic that the terminations deprived him of a protected property interest that was their position all along and i need to address something very important came up in the reply brief the plaintiff contend that they were he was justified in formulating his arguments in the way that he did because we first conceded the protected property interest element of the case and that's not so we filed an answer in the case that denied the plaint from the mayor saying this amendment to your employment agreement conferred no rights upon you we always urged that this amendment to the employment agreement was void and on enforceable to the distinction between state and federal law pretty fundamental distinction or legal system i understand your honor the point you're making and again it appears as long as this point of the arguments that have been raised in the briefs before the court and i don't agree that there's a distinction between natural use in this case it was a ten year contract and walters it's a one year contract here but but the violation of the municipal code is self evident it's there all the same there's also been a point raised about the fact that we hear of the mayor who signed the contract but also is the one seeking to trustee elected to this board so it's not the case in fact it is the same board they signed the contract or authorized the contract to be signed that is now seeking to repudiate it the composition of the crew were changed between when this amendment to the employment contract was signed and after post election so so the purposes underlying the municipal code provisions that we've been citing talking about eight one seven  the three point one dash thirty five are very much served here under these facts as well the fact that that miss covington you know one reelection doesn't doesn't matter this contract still municipal code and therefore there's no property interests that can arise or emanate from it the reliance on the municipal code procedures relative to appointment and removal of municipal officers gets plaintiff nowhere because case law is clear that procedural guarantees are not the same as a property right so that's that's a nonstarter and the ordinance that plaintiff is also focused on says nothing the ordinance just says the mayor and the clerk will sign this contract or there are no was sure and says are guarantees of continued employment network inside there recognizing that the contract the ordinance and the various illinois municipal code provisions don't get him anywhere plaintiff tries the whole was greater than the sum of it's parts kind of approach but that makes no sense if individually these components are insufficient protected property interest in continued employment altogether if it doesn't get them anywhere either and there's no case that's been cited adopting that approach that we can pull and all these different things and try to establish a protective property interest absent any additional questions from the panel i'll rest on on on our briefs about whose home rule or the home rule argument it was undeveloped at the district court level district for now it's short up a little bit here on appeal with just some generic propositions about how many home counties have broad powers and sure they do and in terms of local governance but there are honour's as far as some of these issues not being developed in the district court the reason that some of these weren't frankly was because of the funds and i would point the court to docket entries thirty two a page turner the defendant's explicit least state quote the defendants do not dispute that when you're in a protected property interest in his position as village manager those are their exact words so in their summary judgment memorandum they waived or conceded that point and that's why the issue was not fleshed out further as far as the home rule thirty again this is not an argument that we're making on our own this is this is based on the defendant's own words its own simply making up these are things we are adopting from what the defendants did and based based on all of this this gave him a reasonable expectation of continue to point to if there are no further questions thank