we'll hear argument next in case seventeen forty three verses united states research i am a damn thank you mr chief justice and may it please the court the federal wiretap statute title three wasn't acted fifty years ago in response to national concern over wiretapping and the threat it posed to individual privacy title three prohibits wiretapping unless a series of detailed requirements is met and to ensure compliance with those requirements title three directs the suppression of the evidence derived from a wiretap order when there is an error in obtaining issuing or executing that order as is relevant here title three direct suppression if a judge issues an order that insufficient to authorize the thought was sufficient to authorize all of the interception that lee introduced in evidence the problem was that  court seemed to conclude that by virtue of the fact that all of the interceptions that were introduced were interceptions that took place within the court's territorial jurisdiction that there was no problem and that therefor suppression was not required i don't think that they really grappled with this argument that the government now makes about the meaning of the term insufficient let me address the merits of that argument directly justice ginsburg the government seems to make the argument now that these orders were not insufficient on their face because they were merely overbroad but i don't think that that's the better reading of the phrase insufficient on its face either as a matter of plain text or as a matter of the policies that were animating the inclusion of this particular provision let me state first what we think insufficient means we think that an order is insufficient on its face if the failure to comply with the requirements of title three is evident from the four corners of the order itself and the government now that under such a standard the orders here would be invalid because each of the orders here contained jurisdictional provisions that went too far that went beyond the power of the district court off with the letter those were only sufficient for a what in fact happened other than misery and leave that out but justice kennedy if the statute merely prohibited the introduction of evidence from unlawful interceptions i might be inclined to agree with you but of course we know that the suppression provision here does more it not merely prohibits and requires suppression where there is an unlawful interception it goes further and refers to some category of cases where the order is insufficient on its face now the government attempts to make this plain language distinction between orders that are overbroad and orders that are somehow otherwise insufficient but i think if you look at the very dictionary definitions that the government now relies on for the word insufficient you'll see that those definitions essentially define the terms insufficient and adequate and valid effectively synonymous elaine understand inadequate being the same is insufficient but i don't understand invalid commune if you have a requirement you know you must have these four things in your in your order when you have and you fill them out and you've got all four and then you've got another one that's not required it seems to me that might be invalid  but but you can't say it's insufficient you've got everything you have to have to have and you're saying if you add something else it's insufficient it seems to me it might be invalid under the statute as you say you can't with the fifty cents but i don't see why why it would be insufficient of mr chief justice i suppose that one could try to draw fine distinctions between all of these terms i think each of the three dictionaries on which the government relies defines the term invalid to mean an adequate and they define an adequate to mean and sufficient but i think even if you get would you need them to define insufficient to mean invalid but i'm happy to fight this case on the ground that we're talking about insufficiency or as you put it and adequacy we believe invalidity forget i said inadequacy you have to say that insufficient you have to say that invalid is the same as insufficient i don't think that that's necessarily true mr chief justice i think you could say that these orders were insufficient precisely because they lacked a valid limitation in other words because they were orders have been used for anything know if an order is in it's invalid well correct i mean in other words i'm i'm we certainly take the view that those terms are in fact synonymous here and indeed that's the view that the government took below when it referred to the potential facial invalidity of these orders but i did the order didn't need any statement with regard to the territorial limitation  did we believe that were not in this order the order would still be sufficient we believe that the orders would still be insufficient if they did not contain mout in other words we believe that the better reading of the statute is that it requires limitation to appear on the face of the order in of course very orderly for that i would rely on the language of the statute and you have any judicial authority interpreting the statute so i'm not aware of any case that presents the question of what would happen if a jurisdiction limitation were entirely omitted and my understanding where you said it in the statute as requiring that so i would point to twenty five eighteen three itself and while it is certainly true that twenty five eighteen three is not worded in terms of what an order shall specify i think in some sense it goes even further this is the one requirement the congress thought was so foundational that it included it in the very provision that authorizes the judge to enter a wiretap order in the first place the court will be aware of that language it's pages sixteen a way to seventeen of the government's brief and it says that the judge may enter an order authorizing interception of communications within the territorial jurisdiction of the court in which the judge is sitting s that doesn't say distinctive can i think that that would still be insufficient but mr chief justice to get back to your question that started this discussion i don't think that the court needs to answer that question where is here you have a number one or telephone number two yes i mean we're talking about or were you telephone number one or number two one of those two you know there were multiple communicate i know that would i mean for purposes yes order ok now where does it say in this order in respect to telephone number one or telephone number two that they can intercept within the jurisdiction of the issuing magistrate so the orders and let me take you to page ninety seven the joint that's what i'm on it says it doesn't say anything about it talks about outside the territorial jurisdiction in the in the relevant full paragraph on page ninety seven i don't see here anywhere i mean if what you said was true why didn't you challenge is on the ground that it's it says in the in the event that they are transported out saw the territorial jurisdiction of the court interception may take place in any other jurisdiction within the united states it nowhere says that power when he enters an order that authorizes effectively nationwide jurisdiction over the tapping of the real the i can't ask my question because you've stopped me cold that is what i thought was that we have an order which says you can tap in kansas and you can also tap outside of kansas and i find the paragraph which says you can tap outside of kansas ok but i can't find the paragraph which says you can tap in kansas so the first thing you say is well it's insufficient if an order does not say you can tap in kansas that's what you said you just said that and so i never thought of that and but no lo and behold i never thought of it although i read the briefs in this case and i read the opinion below and they never said anything about it so i started where the were you know i think i can remember the question i started saying it doesn't have to say that because that's not listed in title four that's in title three right yeah so so you see my puzzlement i do see your point just aspire so let me explain how you know again we think that all of this should work and i think that our position is you know a simple one that i think courts have consistently accepted at least up until now when the government is suddenly making this argument that is first of all that insufficient here really does  imply a failure to comply with any of title three as requirements and here the government concedes that this provision does not comply with those requirements because it goes further than even the language in the statute  there is one paragraph here saying which i just read you which says you can tap outside of kansas your client had nothing to do with that they were never outside or whatever ok so what we do is we excise that paragraph it's called severability case back to see with that paragraph excised whether there's some of the reason why this i mean you could do that it was a fire in other words i think that the failure expressly to authorize interception within the jurisdiction would and most be an additional reason why this is defective again our view as i indicated in response to justice kagan is that when you take a look at section twenty five eighty three it indicates that this is an additional requirement the order no because of the over breath of the order in other words as i indicated to justice prior i certainly think that to the extent that the failure specifically to refer to kansas matters it would only help our argument but at bottom our argument is on the face of the order yes that is correct in other words our view is that because there is a conceded failure to comply with one of title freeze requirements that's all that's needed and i think that the government's argument would really lead to strange and anomalous results here in our reply brief we give the example of an order that authorize interception for one hundred eighty days rather than thirty days i think the government would take i think the government would take the same position that that order would not under i think yes it's subsection one right so that was acquired illegally well i'm not sure about that justice alito in other words if subsection one were to apply in that context there would still be the additional inquiry about the core concerns of the statute that this court mandated in chavez and giordano but i think that that example really the point it's split that we had granted on was whether the core concern focus of the entire briefing in this case with the exception of the government's new argument that this wasn't insufficient yeah but in that aside i thought that we granted certain that that is the question on which the circuits are divided and i don't mean to fight too hard the courts addressing this threshold argument that the government is now making the government did make it albion in passing and it's brief in opposition i think that the court really did grant cert on the  were insufficient but i think that it's no surprise that before this court on the actual question on which this court granted review the government has comparatively little to say  phrase insufficient doesn't mean over grass why should we proceed to base a decision on a premise that we think is wrong and you know point about violate the statute it seems to me it would seem i think that that is a regime that congress could have enacted but i don't think justice ginsburg that that is the regime that congress didn't act in other words congress did not and act regime in which the sole focus was whether or not a particular application was on the wall if that had been what congress had intended it would have stopped after sub paragraph one and i tried to  insufficient on it's face language came from because it is somewhat curious and i'm sure that you have probably researched this more thoroughly but the best i could come up with was that it was taken from old rule forty one of the federal rules of criminal procedure so if that's the case should we look to the way that rule was applied so i don't think that we know that that is where the phrase came from it does not appear anywhere else in the united states code to which as far as i'm aware but i think quite frankly i would not go i would not think that the court would need to go any further than looking to again the plain meaning of the term insufficient but also the policies animating the inclusion of this provision and i do think it would lead to highly anomalous results to limit insufficiency and to exclude cases in which language is overbroad but yet legislation that they would have said yes this case mr dodd can't be convicted even though what happened here had don't effect whatsoever on i do think so and i think so precisely because of what  congress or the senate to be more precise and the senate report were aware of the senate made quite clear in this is it page ninety six of the report that it intended to compel compliance strict compliance with the requirements of the statute and again as i indicated at the outset title three was enacted against the backdrop of a vigorous national debate over whether wiretapping should even be permitted in the first place and i think as part of the compromise that was struck when congress enacted title three it included a very muscular suppression provision and i think what the government tries to do throughout its brief and i suspect you'll hear this from my friend mr tripp today is to try to get this court to think about this case in traditional fourth amendment terms where the court is always taking into account broader principles of prejudice and causation and the like and i think that where this is clearest is in the government's argument that the court should somehow sever the invalid applications of the orders he was now in than an application only intercepts that were introduced in the from the district of can in the order i want to write an invalid application but it was no six in down well in fact there were there were communications that were intercepted from a  wire in st louis in response to the motion to suppress the government i think quite wisely indicated that it was not going to introduce those communications but i think more broadly i would say two things about that justice ginsburg first i would say that when you have officially insufficient order any communications that are intercepted pursuant to that order are unlawfully intercepted i think that that was the promise of this court's decisions in chavez and giordano and second that to the extent that the government is making this back and argument about a severance principle and seeking to introduce a severance principle that the lower courts are recognized in the exclusionary rule context in the title three that there's just simply no textual sufficient potentially leaving aside our argument that you would have to affirmatively state a jurisdictional limitation but i think more probably if you agree with us on the issue of facial insufficiency the government's fallback argument leaving aside its relatively cursory argument on the actual question presented is that you should apply a severance principle and not only does that principle have no footing in the actual text of title three s suppression provision i think that that would really sort of effectively all that read sub paragraph two out of that statute what the government is attempting to do through these various arguments is to create a regime under which only when there is unlawful interception and the fruits of that unlawful interception are introduced can there be suppression again if that were true why did congress go on to say inside paragraph t essentially that even if communications were lawfully intercepted there should be suppression when an order is insufficient on its face and again the severance principle on which the government relies on the government cites various lower court decisions for that proposition is a principle that was not well established in the law in one thousand nine hundred sixty eight no federal court of appeals as far as i'm aware had even recognized that principle and of course that principle is animated by concerns about yes just point the look at the last page and it says district of kansas it says he will judge for it is title district of kansas there is the authority that's what they want exactly what you said that's where the authority comes from and title three makes clear they can't go beyond that authority except in some circumstances that are not present here so what we have with the paragraph you're pointing to is in addition it says in addition you can go outside of kansas that is wrong and by the way they didn't go outside of kansas in so far as your client is concerned and anything that was introduced into evidence is concerned so everybody's instinct or at least mine to say will sever that it's maybe the judge wrote poetry on the wrong paper you know i mean maybe he he he wrote down a joke maybe he he wrote something that was totally extraneous that had nothing to do with the case we would look at that we just say forget it it has nothing to do with this case and why shouldn't we do the same thing with this paragraph i understand that instinct justice prior because that would be and natural fourth amendment and stacked in other words lower courts to have looked at the issue have pretty universally now concluded that when you're in the traditional exclusionary rule context and when say you have an order that authorizes a warrant that authorizes the search of two apartments and there's probable cause us to one and not as to the other you sever i think that the only problem with that and in our view it's a dispositive problem is the actual language of the statute the statute draws a direct line between an invalid insufficient order of any communications obtained pursuant to that order will you keep it you keep mixing as you just did insufficient and invalid and i want to make sure i understand your view on it if somebody told you to bring two party apples bananas and piers and you brought apples bananas piers and cherries the person would not say that's insufficient right i think that  person might say that that's insufficient in other words i think i'm sorry i mean i don't think you would i don't think in that context you know you would ordinarily talk about insufficiency and i'm willing to also recognize mr chief justice that there are circumstances in which insufficiency necessarily means that something is lacking i mean i think that when we think about say evidentiary insufficiency that ordinarily you know you can't have too much evidence you can only have too little i think that this is a somewhat unusual formulation and again it's a formulation as i indicated to justice alito doesn't appear anywhere else in the united states code and i do think that the definition of the term insufficient even if you insufficient to me and lacking could easily mean lacking a valid limitation it doesn't necessarily mean lacking a provision that the order is required by statute to contain i see th isn't so i'll just say one thing about the actual question presented here and the government's argument i think that if this court were to read a core concerns requirement or a fundamental defect requirement and graft to it would essentially be creating the very problem that this court addressed when it adopted that requirement in chavez and giordano and i think it's really no accident that for that reason the government devotes most of its brief to these arguments that it had not previously made and  really don't go to that question and without all reserve the balance of my time thank you counsel mr tripp mr chief justice it may please the court i think is most of the question is already picked up the best way to encapsulate our basic position in this case it is just to imagine what would have happened if everything was exactly the same except this this language was missing from the orders it didn't this additional authority telling us that we could put the wire room outside kansas if that happened there would clearly be no basis for suppressing any of the evidence we relied on here it was all lawfully intercepted inside kansas the order say everything title three requires them to say to allow us to intercept let's go back to that point and justice briar is correct i don't find this in the sorter say you could intercept in kansas  doesn't say it directly all right so how is that sufficient is it your position that every order does not have to say it's limited to kansas forgetting that it says you can it's not the land so title three so in no uncertain terms what every title three order quote shall specify it's in twenty five eighteen sub for it's on seventeen and twenty five yes and i was reading that and  jurisdiction of the court in which the judge is sitting you take that within to mean that the judge has to be within the jurisdiction so we are you know that the water has to be within that jurors so we we now agree there was there was  in the lower courts about whether it tapped a mobile phone qualified as a mobile interception device within the next clause about saying that we could put our war room anywhere in the country we now agree with petitioners the answer is no we can't the war room needs to be in the same  i'm sorry do you agree that the order has to be within the four interceptions within the jurisdiction except for a mobile device and you agree this is a yes so an order from the district statute it is not if you're saying only a violation of those four of sub paragraph four even though the whole process of ordering is premised on it being an order within the jurisdiction of the fourth well i don't so this is obviously an order from the kansas court i don't think there's any dispute about that in the question was just where do we put our wire and i think i was trying to show a strange position that you would have an order that wouldn't tell you where you could do this or i think it just follows it's a background rule follows from the statute when you get an order that says that it's coming from the district of kansas then the rule is you can either intercept inside the district of kansas or outside the district of kansas if you're using a mobile interception device that's the rule wouldn't every single title the retirement of every aren't that you have to give a tie place we've known the rule requires a time  one it's hard to think of a situation where you have an order where on its face it's clear from the order that the judge didn't make any of those requisite findings really for two reasons one is again those findings don't actually need to appear in the order of title three doesn't require because i can't figure out how you could have an order that doesn't have jurisdiction it seems to me that that's a requirement of every war somewhere i think sense to me the it does not need to say where the wire run needs to be located indeed say that the applications in this case didn't even say where we're going to put the wire room but that went to how we were going to implement the order of the kansas court the jurisdiction that flowed from those orders from flowed from the fact that it was an order of the district of kansas so the district of kansas across the top and so the the upshot of that is that we either needed to put the wir whether it approves interception only within the territorial jurisdiction or instead outside that jet jurisdiction i think there's a there's a choice here depending on whether there's a mobile interception device right if there's a mobile interception device you can approve interception more widely than if there is not a mobile interception device so i would think look at this statute and i recognize that it's not included in one of the things that said a number four but that number three you know it just implicitly requires a court to say which one it is is it just within the jurisdiction or is it outside the jurisdiction because there's a mobile interception device at issue or so i think or first response is that this statute doesn't require it to appear in the order because the statute doesn't say that and then i think the second is that the baron and i guess what i'm saying is i appreciate that but how is anybody to know unless the court says that so i think that they're not going to know what they're they can do unless the court says what they can do right so i so i think it's clear to everybody that in all these cases that we can put the wire room inside kansas right that that flows from from this just background jurisdictional principle and the harder question and all these cases is that that prompted this line of cases was well what about the what is a mobile interception device when can you put it outside and in this case we got it vance judicial approval from the district court over the government's view at the time that mobile phone that is really the bug it's really the book that's right and now you know he's been in one good not never but you know the you might install a bug inside a car or something to track all the communications in the car  just the communications over a phone it's just a different kind of case and none of that let me say this in another way mr tripp seventeen a it says each order authorizing or approving the interception shall specify and you're right the jurisdictional thing does not appear in this list but then if you look at sixteen a what is an order authorizing a reproving the interception on sixteen a in paragraph three it says  well the judge enters an order authorizing or proven interception either within the territorial jurisdiction or outside that jurisdiction dependent on whether there's this mobile interception device so it just does seem to me that that's just going to be a necessary part of an order authorizing the interception well where is the interception supposed to take place certainly there within the jurisdiction or outside depending on whether there's a mobile interception device it's just got to be in the order because otherwise how would you know which of those two possible things is true so i think to follow up on that it doesn't say either or it's and right and so we can do it inside the territories or section and outside if we're using well no but it isn't easy or because if it's if there's a mobile interception device it's both and if it's not a mobile interception device it's only one right and i think that's a disjunctive thing it's only one or it's both yes but the but that is something that goes to how the government is going to implement the order how we're going to go about intercepting the communications it is not a determination that the judge needs to make up front when issuing the order actually i think another thing that drives that home is in three three goes on and lists a number of things that have to come after the structural provision that the judge must determine on the basis of facts submitted by the applicant and jurisdiction is not one of those things because the application doesn't need to say to say whether we're using a mobile interception thirty seven because i think it is a good illustration of the practical difference between our position and petitioners so it was are in full agreement that from days thirty one forward we can't use the evidence it would need to be suppressed the principal difference between our positions is that what we're saying is that from days one to thirty when the order has validly authorize us to intercept those communications in full conformity with title three we have that authority or as what petitioners are saying is that as soon as it goes across the line at all right if it said thirty one days instead of thirty their protests their position is you need to throw all the evidence out no matter what even if the government noticed the problem and never did any interception after day thirty so it is really a very extreme position we offer i'm a little bit still worried about what we discovered at the outset that at least they are claiming that this order passed to say you have authority to wiretap in kansas as well as outside so it occurs which worry me the first by the way it goes in kansas where it says kansas is under the signature of the district  be that they're thinking given three you know given what you read on this and when page sixteen where it says the judge can within his territorial jurisdiction authorize a wiretap but that's good enough it says he's in kansas it says in the statute that you can authorize it within the state you're in and therefore we know this authorizes kansas they're going to say if they if this were what the argument were about that isn't good enough it should say and you can do it now what i'm worried about is that there are thousands that this is a this is a form and that there are thousands of wiretap orders perhaps throughout the country which do not say in district x though it says i am a judge and district x they did do not say that you have authority to tap in district  in those words i'm worried about that because i wouldn't like this case suddenly to cast doubt without argument you know full argument on those thousands if there are those thousands do you know  i would say i'm quite worried about that as well i guess i don't have extensive imperial evidence of how often we were issuing orders when that didn't include that precise language in part because that has been the focus of the case i do know that language like this was quite common at the relevant time in two thousand and twelve when the only judicial precedent interpreted the phrase mobile interception device that held that included the tapped cell phone and so it was quite common for orders to include this language saying yes you can also put your wire run outside and i got that i see that there's one other poster and i have which is since that wasn't fully argued what do you say in response to their argument that these questions of sever ability and reading etc while very interesting were not the subject of any argument below well and so on that i think i'd like to echo what justice ginsburg pointed out earlier which is that we  won on the basis of severability in the district court i think the clearest indication of that is the magistrate judge's opinion page seventy three of the past up where the magistrate judge described it as quote academic whether there was a problem with without additional language in the orders and then in the pet shop at sixty four the district court said as applied the orders did not violate the statute and we're cox just simply i understand your argument your argument really is that that inquiry applies to those two subdivisions i think so let's assume for the sake of argument because i understand you're saying the only thing needed by the order  that if that miss is any one of these four things we apply the core concerns no i don't think that's a that's an accurate description of our so what is your your your your eight point so i think would help if i could clarify what exactly we mean by insufficient and overbroad so i don't want to know those terms i want what the circuit split is the d c circuit has said taking a position contrary to yours in this case what the d c circuit has said that the core concerns analysis that we use for giordano test is relevant we think the court of appeals put it in the wrong box there is no dispute that once you have an order that is insufficient and you're trying to decide whether to suppress teams of evidence on the grounds that the order is when you say insufficient i mean you know the chief justice raises a very good point that insufficient doesn't usually mean invalid that it usually means lacking something so then the question is where was this order lacking something and you say no it wasn't because it didn't have to have anything about the jurisdictional reach of the interception and i guess i'm a little bit concerned listening to you i mean if we if if we accepted that how are these orders supposed to read we're going to go tell every court you don't have to put anything in your order about whether this is only within the jurisdiction or outside that jurisdiction because again there are really two choices in the statute depending upon whether a mobile interception is is an issue and if we said well this is not insufficient because you don't have to have that what are we going to be create in the world of waters in which the judge doesn't tell anybody whether this is within the jurisdiction or whether it's also outside the jurisdiction no i don't think that's the upshot of our position i think one thing to just point out is as a practical matter these orders contain a large amount of material that title three does not actually require them to contain in order for interception of the communications to lawfully occur under title three like the orders in this case for example include these recitations of probable cause in the subsidy and other information that is not strictly required in the government often asks to have that in these orders because you know in practice they are heavily picked over and we like to have be sure that the district court knows in advance what it is that we're actually doing i think actually maybe this is a case where it backfired where we were you know trying to cover our bases be sure that the district would understand what we what we might do in this case it so happened that we didn't rely on any of the evidence in this trial that was intercepted from outside kansas so i think i don't i don't it would have to if you were seeking to use a mobile in a real mobile interception device would that appear in the application i think if we were going to actually seek for approval to put a bug in somebodies car like a mobile interception of  ice in that way i think it would be clear from the application that that's what we were talking about do in but the orders you know in the applications in the orders we didn't explain to the court that we were going to be tapping from a wire room on the registered at a particular place and it would be taken care of otherwise would you need to have a with the research process is at that time where you needed a separate provision of the order specifying where and no i think you know that the manner in which interception has very much changed in the last fifty years with the change in technology it is of course i think it is undisputed in this case that the interception of a cell phone occurs wherever we put the wire room and again our i'd like to  emphasize that not only did we only use evidence in this case that was intercepted from inside kansas we only used evidence in this case under orders where the interception was exclusively inside canisters trip there were there were thing that one thing that the statute requires that that allowed to do that now is that that's invalid would you say it's also insufficient maybe you could read the statute that way we don't take it that far we think that when this do you think something that literally complies with the statute  can be insufficient because it's invalid it's more that i think when the statute says that you need to identify and so each order needs to identify the identity of the person who approved the application and then when the title three tells you that that has to be a person of you know that that that incorporates out into the requirement and so if it were to identify somebody like me or the an executive assistant somebody who clearly didn't have the the authority then no it would be insufficient as  permitted under the statute i think it's so our our our our definition of what insufficient on its face means is that if it is lacking in something that is necessary for the government to actually just rely on the orders to intercept the communications issue i think in that case it would be quite clear that the order would be black in something that is necessary for the government to intercept those communications the order would tell you on its face that it was approved by an official who lacked the ability to do that that's actually in response to our brother that's wrong in my understanding of it the district court in the district of columbia authorized something that she had no authority to order because she ordered a book to be attached to a trial in another jurisdiction so it wasn't a question  sorority here and i think the sort of the the trickier questions in this area about well what do you do when the government is actually relying on evidence that was obtained outside the jurisdiction and in  particular based on the misreading of the phrase mobile interception device just none of that is presented here and i think they're there to just much easier threshold ways of resolving this case i think frankly the easiest is on the grounds of severability  the straightforward way we won this case below i think the other is just to say that the orders were not insufficient because they did include everything that title three required them to contain in order for the government to perform interception inside kansas and that's the only evidence we relied on a trial i think just one of the i just want to clarify one other thing i said i mean we were talking about easy ways to resolve this case i have to say the more i think about this the more it seems really complicated to me what's supposed to be in these letters and what's not supposed to be in these letters the only thing i'm sure of in this case is that there's no court concern requirement so why isn't that the easy way to decide this case and leave everything else for cases where actually people have briefed and addressed these questions of what has to be in and what has to be out and when you can score something insufficient and when not so of course we agree that the court could send a case back to the court of appeals on that basis although i just want to leave that out but i think another couple a couple of points on this is we've been making these arguments about that the order is not actually insufficient on its face and that it it just doesn't matter here because we didn't use any evidence that was intercepted outside kansas we've been making these arguments all along we want it on this basis in the district court we preserve these arguments in the court of appeals it flew by them and but i don't think that  the right result is to is to treat it as if we haven't made these arguments i think the appropriate course is is simply to affirm on that one point it might have been true that you did use some of the so we did not use any evidence that was the fruit of the poisonous tree we did not use any evidence obtained any under any order where we did any interception outside kansas there were ten orders entered in this case for nine of them including all the orders covering petitioners phones and all the orders we relied on a trial interception was all in kansas for the one remaining order we did the interception of the g e a headquarters in st louis where there was a better spanish language capability but we didn't use any evidence under that order at this trial here i think also one point i really do want to emphasize here is that i think our primary interest in this case is in being sure that the court and not adopt petitioners very extreme rule where it as long as there is any statutory violation of any kind of parent on the face of an order then you automatically and mechanically need to suppress all of the evidence obtained under that order no matter what even when there is no causal link between the error and the interception of the evidence that would be very damaging and i think this case is a good example of why that frankly doesn't make all that much sense i have a lot of trouble imagining that any congress would knowingly and act that rule i admit that the statute is ambiguous you could potentially read it petitioners way but i think with all due respect to petitioners it is also ambiguous and you could read it our way that insufficiency only means some errors and all of them only some things make an order insufficient something this error just made it over broad not insufficient and regardless even if you disagree with that that and that you can separate them a state the orders here were not insufficient to authorize the interception of these communications inside kansas and that's the only evidence we relied on in this trial so if there's no further questions asking the court to affirm thank you counsel for minutes just to show and again thank you mr chief justice the district court in this case exceeded its power under title three by authorizing what was effectively a nationwide wiretap for the phones it is shoe and in doing so the district court entered orders that under the statute it simply lack the power to order the orders at issue here firas now the government concedes that the orders did not comply with the jurisdictional requirement and instead it argues that the communications at issue could have been lawfully and receptive if the district court had only entered narrower orders but if in fact that is sufficient to avoid suppression it's really difficult to see what purpose so paragraph two serves in this statute all sub her graph its terms must apply in circumstances in which community communications at issue were in fact lawfully intercepted and i would no parent phatic lee in response to this back and forth both with me and with mr tripp on the issue of what would happen if the orders were completely silent but it's hard to see how these orders could be silent on something as fundamental as the question of where interception may occur and if anything in hundred sixty eight well before the advent of modern mobile telephone technology you might think that congress if anything would have been more concerned about the risk of form shopping and more desirous of ensuring that oversight over a buyer tap orders was performed by the courts with the closest geographic nexus to the investigations at issue but again whatever you think about this question of what would happen when an order is silent we have orders here that the government net no longer defense that the government recognizes exceeded the district court's power to enter i would say that just a couple of things about the government's argument on the issue of  glisten on that now admits that it was the wrong position but the courts were confused whether the mobile phone itself constitute the interception device that's right justice ginsburg but the government does not argue before this court or a good faith exception in footnote six the government concedes that that argument was waived and that would be the appropriate place to locate any such concern and so what we're left with is the government really again primarily relying on two arguments the argument about the meaning of insufficiency and its sufferance argument on the issue of insufficiency as i indicated in my opening argument that would really lead to absurd results and i think the most telling moment in mr tripp's argument was when he was asked about our hypothetical of an order that authorized a one hundred eighty day wiretap and in response to that tellingly he didn't attempt to make the argument that that would not fall within the scope of the phrase insufficient he turned it to the government severance argument instead and i think that that hypothetical and the chief justice is hypothetical of an order authorized by mr tripp itself really illustrates that narrowing insufficiency to exclude over breath would really weed out absurd result means our legal system usually does not give a party relief based on a mistake that had absolutely no effect on the party now i understand that the provision that's directly at issue here is an exception to that it is that it is a list it's some kind of a there's some requirements that have to be in the warrant and whether or not they had any effect whatsoever the statute says that there has to be suppression but when you have that kind of a rule that is surely a formal rule would you not expect to find in this statute a very clear specification of the things that have to be in the warrant a very clear check list so that somebody can be certain that all of those steps are are covered even if they have no a fact of justice alito that might be mary answer mr chief justice or that might be a better way to write the statute congress plainly didn't do that because it scattered those requirements across several subsections but i think that your question reflects this concern about the harshness of the rule the extremis of the rule and on that i think that we can be certain that what congress intended to do is this court said in giordano was to ensure strict compliance with the statutes requirements and it created a muscular suppression remedy in order to effectuate that goal and we would ask for a reversal of the judgments boy thank you thank you counsel the case is submitted