states versus ramirez given a below guideline sentence seventeen and a half years a substantial reduction below thirty years to life when mr mir is applied for a sentence modification in twenty fourteen he could have gotten fourteen and a half years a comparable reduction below the amended guidelines twenty seven years the only reason judge cole couldn't modify his sentence to consequences to an act that did the law in place when we act of her there was no opportunity for this kind of an amendment to the time of your client's condition of the crime indeed the whole notion of these amendments is that they provide some leniency beyond what was in place after the time the crime occurred so i don't know how they ever implicate the ex post facto clause but i'll limit myself to this one in particular help me and your honor as of two thousand and six mr near is in fact was eligible for a future comparable reduction on sentence modification of doubt amendments that warren even thought about let alone existed at the time so i understand that the law with respect to eligibility was different but there was no such amendment to place your honor in fact in two thousand and six there are twenty four still in the united states still in versus united states in fact says that the policy amendments are are binding on the courts on sentencing modification and the problematic part for you is th dylan says sentence modification proceedings authorized by thirty five eighty q c to are not constitutionally compelled and no constitutional requirement of retro activity in title retroactively to your client your honor dylan did not address next post facto clause challenge the policy statement and that reading of dinner bill and i would submit is irreconcilable with president like lens versus mathis and we sentencing for early release as a result of future overcrowding now that overcrowding may not have taken place the state had different ways of addressing the possibility of overcrowding but when the state after sentencing made defendant in about the good conduct formulating weaver having already been in existence at the time of the defendant's offense so if you're talking about a scheme already in existence you can't  scheme but that's not at all it can to what's happening here there was no formula that app apply to your life your honor in fact it was in existence as of two thousand and six because in two thousand and six one be one point and that  guideline sentence initially is eligible for comparable ram we're talking about apples and oranges you're talking about eligibility and then a change in eligibility across the board without regard to whether there every is an amendment now we're talking about though your client wants the benefit of an amendment that was nowhere on the horizon at the time he committed this crime your honor the twenty four attractive amendments were already on the books and i would add the fact the book or i'm sorry good morning and may please the court i am amanda while i'm an assistant united states attorney in the southern district of new york and i am representing the united states on this appeal the district court's denial of this thirty five eighty two motion should be a farm because the district court was without authority to order a sentence below the amended guidelines range section one b one point ten specifically provides that the district court may not reduce the defendant's sentence below the newly calculated ineligible works and it's versity that violates the ex post facto law you're going to have to tell us why that's not right and as your honor has noted there was no amendment in place in two thousand and six that or at the time when the defendant committed his notice issue and the notice issue in weaver was that there were laws on the books at the time the defendant committed his crime that would have allowed for a reduction in punishment and that's not the case here there was no law on the books that would  a departure but not based on a variance and while the guidelines at the time didn't address the difference between departures and variances if we look to what the guidelines later determined when they did specifically address variances it was t give reductions if the prisoner earned them and so the only contingency was whether the prisoner world earned them but the the the state stop location was fixed at the time is that the is that what you're arguing yes your honor  some hypothetical van and so once it had set its own obligation it couldn't pull it back yes your honor and additionally wever does not address the specific context of thirty five eighty two whereas dylan as your honor noted has address thirty five eighty two and aside from saying that there is not a constitutional entitlement to any reduction based on subsequent amendments to the guidelines and also specifically says that thirty five eighty two does not operate to  increase sentences but only to decrease them as well your honor has noted that each of the six courts of appeals to address this question have distinguished weaver and have found that there is no  discuss this important eligibility for future reduction even if there's an element of discretion that the sentencing authority would so in the garner rhesus jones cases there's an entitlement to have  role hearings every three years no naturally the defendant wasn't entitled to parole wasn't certainly going to get parole but the supreme court considered whether the de lay in her role in the interval between the parole hearings that the state put in place after sentencing violated the ex post facto class into the government that what's going on in those cases is that the government has committed itself to doing certain things certain contingencies arise but it has committed itself to tap and in that circumstance there's an expectation that that cannot be changed why do you think that's and now it gets to th situation your honor under the language of one b one point in two thousand and six which says a comp for defendant who received a below guideline sentence a comparable reduction below the amended guidelines may be appropriate in which such as the only floor for such reduction time served that is a commitment on behalf of the sentencing commission which is the relevant authority here that on sentence modification a defendant could request in the district court's discretion a comparable reduction in difference and this is what i need to address is in the first example i gave you here's the possibility of the  prisoner earning good time credits or whatever unless there's a change here by contrast there's no opportunity for the reduction your client is seeking unless in the future there's an amendment judge the change that's a problem in the other cases is a change from the status quo is that exists a time of the original sentence here you need a change in the law to get any benefit and that seems to me to be quite different your honor as we've heard itself indicates what we and cases like lindsey vs washington as well will we look to is the standard that has been changed in the standard that's been changed here is th eligibility for a comparable reduction i would agree with us to amendments that were already in existence but there is no the the amendment your client wants the benefit of didn't exist your honor of it's a bit that there's no