federal criminal offense our position is simple that a term of imprisonment is found in the statute of conviction and so in this case mr salazar was convicted section  what i think three responses on that morally we don't we don't need the statutory amendment we have precedent that doesn't work for us but with respect to the nine hundred and ninety four men and robinson it's footnote two does say that but when you look at the text and we're here the point basically is that it's just another reason for this court to be bound by robinson that's one point it's not that you know we're not here necessarily relying on that  know the longer was in effect if in fact robinson didn't rely on his that was no longer in fact anne robinson felt that the amendment didn't change the stat you i mean is that in fact in a store a leg of the stool that has any can also be in addition to the term of imprisonment and the only way to do that is sort of this conversion principle and this is what the government's relying on in this case to as i understand the argument that this idea that a term of supervised may still applies so this idea that you're just converting the term a supervised release to the term of prison that has been actually rejected by this by this court and i think that makes sense when you look at the text of all of term supervisor these does not run during any period in which the person is in prison on a federal offense and to highlight this i think is the supreme court's decision in monsters the few years ago where the supreme court said prison time is not interchangeable with supervised release so to the extent that the government is relying on this conversion principle i don't think it's anywhere in light of subsequent precedent now we focused on jo our opening brief because that's what we relied on below and the government did not make its conversion principle district court and so johnson supports all of this as well so johnson says post revocation sanctions are part prison that is attributed to imprisonment supervisor of east isn't tributed to supervise rooms it's really it's really that simple i think it's supervised release of the attributable to supervised needs absolutely yes been approved by by any court including this court well i think they i guess the question there is what what's what's left if this court says that you don't convert a term of supervised release to a term of imprisonment what's left what do you do with it and if johnson says that you have to attribute that post revocation saints and to as a part of the penalty for the when where and what are you relying on to say this current court says you don't convert as a term supervised and it has this theory about conversion and then immediately after that that this course it's the descent judge o'brien where he said where he finds no support for the mysteries position the idea the reason why tosi was incorrect is because it it helps when revoking supervisor at least the district judge is not recent in saying that if i'm right so the theory is that it's not every sentence and you just you're just putting him in prison during his term of israel and in fact if you go all the way back to johnson in footnote of the eleven the court talks about re sentencing accords powers at the original sentencing or the baseline from which powers if rescind singh are determined so this idea that it's not the sentencing is just wrong and again mot prison time is not interchangeable with supervisor weeks i don't know how i don't know how that conversion principle makes any sense in light of that quote from the supreme court prison time is not interchangeable supervisor leaves you don't convert to my part time seeing how this gets you where you're trying to go i mean it's not like we're deciding this blank slate you have to do you have to prove to us that we have decisively undercut i mean decisive robinson so that we're not bound by we're not doing this under st principles my own reasoning you know if that's the case then i just don't i don't see it and  in his concurrence what he explains that what that means is simply that the classifications that you have been three relate back to the severity of the original offense and so that makes the world that what he's saying is that what we're saying is that you have to go when you're not seven saying based upon the supervised release violation which of course raises all sorts of six amendment issues but your but what we're saying is you go back and look at what was the severity classification of the original fans and that determines where you fall on the sentencing scale and what i'm saying even if that's not undisputedly right every single decision in his name is dick and sadr our rule out of any of that is it isn't what we're asking this court to do we're not relying on him he ministers another piece of the puzzle that suggests that robinson needs reconsider and on that point i disagree that this core can't receive consider robinson this court panels of this court reconsider cision all the time based on intervening precedent that does not directly control perfect example of reckless crimes this court over reasoning of robinson and we think that is absolutely clear that the logic and reasoning has been superseded to the point where this court considered can consider the issue and you and you keep speaking of pieces of the puzzle what particular enough to get you be on the steps to a maximum and what we're saying is that that is not johnson necessarily projects that prop and explain that to me because as i said that there is a clear explanation for why you refer back to the original conviction which is just as prior davis in his concurrence so what is it in johnson that you feel undercuts the rationale of problems prison and that's the rationale robinson use units reasoning and that's the rationale that has been rejected that's why you can reconsider nine we out of time all right thank you very much coun the state's discords clear precedent in robinson control this case and result the outcome there's nothing in the intervening twenty five doesn't use you ticked off a few terms in those terms or have distinctions with a difference i mean i did not hear you or i didn't see in your brief that you contradict the argument that the senate is making which frankly is not self evident that that when president loses viability viability being offered a word that that therefore we don't have to follow you can push back on that at all as far as i can see in so do you agree with that principle that it's not a question of us abrogate a question of by building from and undermining the reason and logic is something you know the court has also said no matter how you formulated this case doesn't come anywhere close to it there's nothing in johnson there's nothing in haim and that comes close to undermining the logic reasoning of robinson so no matter how you could formulate the notion of our intervening precedent somehow sufficiently undermines this court's president it's not present in this case look at writing something there is something in a man but it's it's not controlling on this but there is something in human or the court basically does discuss this particular situation and says it may well raise th amendment issues language in the four justice concurrence by justice core search that suggests this this position is argument might have some credence but it is even if you take obviously number one justice briar's concurrence controlling things that that's number one but number two even if you take the plurality at its word it's not even reached that question here is just responding to the dissent and same worst case scenario it would reach a few cases so it didn't even really say that or take it we believe this to be the case this is the correct interpretation of how things work it just was more of a response in speculative response point to be made is that as we understand mr salazar's arguments there are two components of it one is a statutory interpretation question and that is just whether how do you read the statutes as it permit a  other part is a pretty question this constitutional question which is assuming that robinson is a correct interpretation of the statute is there some sort of constitutional problem there and that is and in light of tapia this court reconsider this precedent frankly the government agreed and the answer is no you cannot take into account the ability now in reaching a country conclusion so modifying enhancing the term of supervised release that was imposed at the time of sentencing and that is separate from the term of imprisonment that was imposed at the time of sentencing if you look at the overall statutory scheme it states that talks about modification of a sentence of imprisonment and it says that a sentence a judgement is final at the time of sentencing and there are only certain certain narrow circumstances when a sentence may be modified after judgment becomes final doesn't mention at all revocation it doesn't talk about a poster of acacia imprisonment it doesn't conceptualize post revocation imprisonment as a modification of the term of imprisonment that was imposed at the time  in prison it so after imprisonment is one superbugs release becomes effective it is separate from the prior term of imprisonment and then supervised release becomes effective at the time that that term ends and then there are separate release what the court is really doing is that just in the defendant's sentence for his original crime yes absolutely how does that fit with what you just said because it's an enhancement of the initial if you look at the statutory scheme you know honor there is the there is there are multiple types of punishment for a crime there is imprisonment there are fines and there's supervised release those are both all those are punishment for a crime and then but there are different statutes that that govern the maximum amount of a president initially and then the maximum amount of supervised release and close revocation sanctions of imprisonment for a violation of a term release but not only is the initial term of supervised release punishment for the initial crime so is the post revocation sanction of imprisonment for this that that is a punishing financial crime but the statutory provisions that govern  robinson and johnson and there's not any way undermine so because robinson itself embrace the rule of of johnson it says that wanted to talk about all the precedent it was relying on it said based on the reasoning that there's no double jeopardy problem for imprisonment for revocation and then imprisonment for substantive prosecution for that for that same conduct and so robinson and baked into robinson and johnson that ins