cincinnati insurance the harley bill the insurance company that were on the record before your honor's and this case boils down to four of those six hundred seventy one pages and frankly boils down even further than that it really boils down to about seventy five words in those six hundred seventy one pages is that insurance coverage dispute it really revolves around whether or not two entities particular universe of rochester and chase corp qualify as an additional insured under a policy issued by my client harleysville to do so they must qualify under endorsement on the policy there are two endorsements to court surely as well where first i want to be clear do you concede that twenty thirty free does not cover that is a matter entirely of twenty ten that's been our position korea yes you have it you concede that that is not that the district court in so and ten endorsement and there in the endorsement which is founded at page eighty three of the record doesn't contain any information about an insured under the policy but it instructs the reader of the policy to refer back to the declaration pages so we can distill this down even further it really comes down to those seventy five words or so on pages twenty two and twenty three of the record there in there is a schedule of other coverages and endorsements the bottom of page twenty two of the of the record it identifies three specific coverage grants that are in addition to the main coverage grant by the policy so there's the typical grant and then three additions the first being employment but if employee benefits li your honour's already i think indicated we maintain doesn't apply in this case so therefore it's very very simple question is not really a question of law here it's simply a question of interpretation of what the seventy five words mean it is my client's contention that in order to qualify as an insured under c g twenty ten they needed to have been added they being university of rochester and will chase needed to have been specifically added to the schedule they are not university of rochester will chase do not qualify and in fact do not even show up in this policy of insurance and as such we maintain that do you agree that the camel moral subcontract requires kemel to name the hospital as an additional insured on policy i would agree that the kimmel moral sub contract created an obligation decide whether the insurance policy i understand  or my reading of the policy i would agree with the court if the contention is that university of rochester qualified or that the kimmel had an obligation to to obtain coverage for the university of rochester yes at the hospital you say is different from the university of rochester no you know the university of rochester is the hospital it's university of rochester slash strong memorial hospital it's there and then today ok it's the same entity it's a joint collaboration of the university  and that that is not the same as the name that is there about the institute of technology correct there are my my point would could speak probably better to the institutions of higher learning in rochester but there are two university of rochester is this is a school that is separate and distinct from the rochester institute of technology they're not at all related in this case what this schedule shows your honor is exactly that the rochester institute that's exactly correct my point toward you that that the second section or the or the third reference to an addition here again cloak with a twenty thirty thirty thirty three endorsement creates coverage we maintain that it doesn't and i think what and then there's a c g thirty three and under each of them it provides additional information that may be useful for instance a twenty thirty three endorsement to answer your honor's question it provides exactly what the standard is if you enter into a contract you being the named insured killall enter into a contract with such person i e privity then you would qualify under that endorsement we obviously there's no privity here that issues i think been resolved and conceded by all parties so you know it really beco morning your honour's glory be here on behalf of the appellee cincinnati insurance company and i've been to spain that you have a lot of questions and i think one thing i would like to address is your honor's question about whether there's an issue of the twenty thirty three and whether both sides can see that's the time to jump right into their i ask him but nobody's going to ask you the same thing i knew it was coming so twenty thirty three while it's not the primary argument of cincinnati insurance in page twenty one of our brief we did say to the extent the lower court relied on twenty thirty three we think it was correct and this is why so in the case are presented by harleysville insurance they focus on cases that say you have to have prayed just between the two contracting parties in order for there to be coverage as an additional insured if you have language that says with who with with is the keyword that those courts relied upon and here it's different the twenty thirty three endorsement says for whom you are operating for whom you are doing work and then it goes on and so to the extent that the lower court relied on that we think it was proper so you are not conceding that  argument really is under the two thousand and ten i think your honor hit it right nail right on the head what is that doing there when we're talking about the schedule so if we take just the two thousand and ten put the twenty thirty three to the side because what indorsements do as  allow your clients to be included the only thing is for the title is for anything other than a title this suggests any coverage but yours unless you're in a schedule or something and you're not in the schedule and you're not be lova schedule you know or except maybe the thought will make government we may differ on that your honor because we are in the schedule and this is why we are in the schedule when you look at twenty ten and it refers you to the thirty three what you look at the schedules so it says it gives meaning so twenty ten gives meaning to what's in the declaration schedule so when you give meaning to the words in the declaration schedule it doesn't matter if those mirror the name of another indorsement those words are given meaning so when you look at that schedule your honor what did that schedule say it is an address but also gives a blanket coverage which new york courts have clearly at eight eighty three this schedule says when it's blank information required to complete the schedule not shown above will be shown in the declarations as your honor knows and then it says underneath that section two who insured is amended to include it is an additional sure the person organization shown in the schedule so that takes this back to the schedule the declarations of a schedule that's in the schedule in the declarations if we look at the schedule which is before you rochester institute of technology but it also provided when you look at their schedule of other coverage is an endorsement and the second page of their declarations under schedules and organised in endorsements additional insured says it twice additional insured owners lessees or contractors automatic status required in construction agreement with you it doesn't matter that was given meaning by referral in the twenty ten back to those words why shouldn't that be interpreted exactly the same way twenty thirty three does i mean this is all part of one insurance failing why should this be different from what the requirement of twenty thirty three which i fork you had conceded required privity you haven't but so you haven't so bent the question comes back to hurt because the words within the schedule say automatic status when required in expecting construction agreement with you it does not require pretty so what happened when we look at the agreement between the party mean you would argue in this on page eight thirty three that you're referring us to i'm sorry was that your words that are on page eight thirty three of you dish will ensure language there yes your honor and were adamant that my colleagues question is why would that very why have the endorsement and then contradict it in in this portion of the agreement actually next we would contend it's not contradicting itself what it's doing is expanding coverage so the parties underlying agreement said you need to use the twenty tennis a most remarkable way over including somebody i mean your know you could perfectly well ever have in the schedule you could perfectly well have listed there but you're risking this to go all the way around to this which may or may not have meaning and then save it it isn't limited but what is very here you know even even to find an ambiguity which is not relevant here because in new york entrepreneur and it doesn't apply i wonder to insurance companies so we don't have that but this title harleysville chose to use these words it's harleysville who drafted this contract chose to use these words as a description of the type of coverage it would provide in order to get to the interpretation that harleysville i which your question is asking about your reading in the car the other indorsement the language requiring pretty into that language so what you're doing respectfully your honor if you're taking the twenty thirty three language which is talking about pretty you're taking that and you're putting that into the schedule that's not what the schedule requires the list of forms and endorsements to two thousand and ten and the twenty thirty three are listed below there's no other reason to have it in the schedule other than the fact that harleysville gave it meaning within the twenty ten twenty ten said go to the declaration hew as the insured so i would argue it is an ambiguity we think it's clear but at worst it's an ambiguity and if you are the insured in this instance and your contract said you have to insure not only kimmel had to insure the owner and there's others we contend le chase but the owner and used the two thousand and ten that was specifically referred to and it's come back you to the hilton and the h r each decisions in this matter be because i think we find as an industry standard with regards to these because these businesses are dealing with so many entities that they have these blanket descriptions it's highly typical almost i would argue the normal course of business to have these kind of contracts with what i would call blanket description as required by contract that this is just another form of doing it so by why would they buy th would they pay extra for this endorsement if it wasn't allowing more coverage that allowed in the two thousand and ten they thought they were buying more coverage because endorsements expand coverage and so here they had these contractual requirements provided for the owner everybody agrees the owner the university the medical center needed to be covered the reasonable insured in looking at this if there's ambiguity would certainly believe that this was providing coverage not reading in the twenty thirty three into that schedule that's improper it's looking at the schedule itself on its own giving the word's meaning that are there with respect to that i'm going to only have thirty seconds so i can be really brief with regards to live chase respectably disagree with the court below with regards to that there's a specific incorporation clause not a general incorporation cause of the overall contract we rely on our brief with regard to those arguments thank you for the opportunity to address you this morning and i'm glad that you're as interested as we are in this matter thank you  your honors i wanted to certainly apologize to the extent i missed missed something in cincinnati brief it was my understanding that the twenty thirty three had been been conceded obviously it wasn't and to the extent i wasn't event out of deference to my colleague i wanted to make sure that that was that was clear on the record and i also think the court for their interest in this again i'll simply hit what the schedule says it identifies three grants of coverage in addition to the obviously is there we're setting it out these are the three and these are the requirements they're on or the requirement that she speaks to go through the twenty thirty three which i think we all agree and we don't all agree it's myself again we don't all agree but certainly the new york courts have ruled on over and over again which twenty thirty three requires pretty in the endorsement in the language they're looking at goes to the twenty three which requires our money that you would contend that new york law is clear that when there is vis kind of language or there has to be privity it can be simply a contract with an agreement with someone else to be covered absolutely your honor literal over the city of new york you just one question you had your client did write the policy but counter professor random does not apply in new york because it is between two insurance companies i would agree with