our next case is united states versus siana traffic stop in this case was illegal and everything that followed should be suppressed as fruit of the poisonous tree the park police officers in this case stopped mr feliciano vehicle without the required reasonable suspicion that he was in violation of federal regulation and up or hitting commercial vehicles from traveling on the george washington memorial parkway in addition inspection or purported inspection was not a valid inspection under the administrative exception under new york versus for we as the district court noted there sort of a dispute between the parties whether this case is properly analyzed under a dollar versus proust's or new york versus her i'll start with house  that there was reasonable suspicion in this case the government argues both that there was no reasonable suspicion required or sort of alternatively my understanding is that the mere existence of this truck is itself reasonable suspicion that mr feliciano was violating the c f r five point and thirty six we think that does not distinguish this case from proust because under subsection c of that regulation the park or the department of the interior united states park service shall you a permit to drive a commercial call on parkways and you know under certain circumstances and in this case there was no reasonable suspicion to believe that mr feliciana did not have such a permit it's the same as process where i need a lot of driver's license to drive my volks couldn't discern whether that reference to permits in general only the only permit that could be issued there is a permit for private to access private lands on a five dollars c or if it includes other permits is a big universe of permits or a small attorney's office to provide evidence such that the presumption that they're asking for which is to say a presumption of reasonable suspicion could be possibly shown on evidence presented but they did not do that here and so i'd like this is a hypothetical i don't know this evidence that there are five hundred thousand roads cars a day that drive between langley and the the national airport on the parkway this is you know in the d c area to just stop have only issued two permits for commercial vehicles in this distressed section of the national park service then i think the government could say that is a presumption of reasonable suspicion that this box truck is not one of those to get calls we know that those two vehicles are but the government didn't present that evidence and their burden to show reasonable suspicion they didn't ask officer also  officer had reason to believe that this box truck did not have a permit because they didn't show how scarce permits are and they could maybe just so you're saying they take it your view is they can't stop  commercial vehicles on g w parkway sort of way intimately it has to be with reasonable suspicion correct ok and they're one of the government's responses to your argument they didn't put up any evidence about where this is or nothing about you know the officers experience and knowledge you know every time i've ever stopped a commercial vehicle that hasn't had a permit is that that's because none of this came up until after evidence the evidence taken portion of the suppression hearing was over that this argument no reasonable suspicion wasn't made in the early part of the hearing and so i take it they're saying you can't you can't sort of charge us with putting on this evidence because you didn't order the fact that we need this evidence at the beginning of the hearing i mean about the legality of the search of his shoes which are also pursuing here and so and as we pointed out in our applied brief waiver which the government raised is that the court passed on the issue so so if they had said oh you're going to raise this of mean that day them you can in the next week i mean this is not an impossible situation and sort of that's what i was saying to judge king we're not saying you could never stop a truck on the parkway and we're not saying you couldn't have reasonable suspicion from seeing a truck on the parkway that's in violation we just saying the government  suspension existed for the stop but i'm not asking you to hold that you can never stop a truck on the parkway i'm asking to hold that the government has to do more to show that the reasonable suspicion was legally reasonable here and it's more a failure of proof than a and registration but they can't stop me to check to make sure that my driver's license and registration are you know in order it's also how it's illegal to have a commercial truck on the parkway unless you have this permit so why is this not like process the government doesn't show that they know that it think of nor that the government offered an example in any and any level of this case similarly so the government moves from from the sort of persons process bucket to new york versus burger to say it's an administrative exception if you look at the three prongs that we've laid out in that the government has laid out new york versus burger they all speak to a regulatory statutory scheme of administrative inspections and here while there is a prohibition  and a recognition of permits rushing noted there is no structural scheme of inspections such as the junkyard automobile inspections that issue in new york st as burger there's a prohibition as there are many prohibitions in the law but there is no scheme  as i said st of all i can't think of a case of any kind of cases where there is a presumption of suspension and here like i said i do think it's possible i think the court could write that it would be possible for evidence to be elicited that would allow for that it just wasn't elicited person and the th search over often include the search of the vehicle and i think as we said clearly i think in our opening brief there's got to be a point which probably caused just a piece marijuana cases are interesting because it's an hour you know there was at some point under humphries the same last name said you know they went into his pockets the st few times they weren't frisks they were such as a senator someone smells like marijuana and you search a couple of places and you don't find the marijuana i don't see how the probable cause dissipates until you search everywhere well morning your honour's may please the court and in chronicle for the united states although the defendant did not object to the initial traffic stop until after the close of evidence we believe the record is sufficient to conclude both that there was reasonable suspicion for a traffic stop and that the criteria for an administrative inspection is satisfied once that initial traffic stop is lawful the odor of marijuana creates probable cause to search both the vehicle and the defendant in this case as this court has presumption of reasonable suspicion which i don't think is quite the proper framing what we're talking about is an observable violation of the regulation the presence of the commercial vehicle on a road where commercial vehicles are prohibited there is a carve out for if you have specific special authorisation to be on that road at that time but no court that i'm aware of question about that i thought that was an attractive argument about the structure of the statute but then i would look at the virginia driver's license statute or commercial driver's license or even just a normal driver's license and it's phrased the same way no person children a commercial motor vehicle in the commonwealth unless he has a commercial driver's license same with a driver with a typical driver's license no insult without a driver's license so i'm not sure that this argument the structure of the statute helps you i understand your question i've actually thought about authorization and one is about whether the vehicle is authorized to be there self so you can see a prohibited vehicle on a road where it is for him but it absent special authorization you can't see from a person driving whether that person has a driver's license and  distinction the supreme court drew in prout's with that registration which is also not allowed you can't just stop a car and say i want to see your registration but nothing about seeing the car tells you whether that car is registered or not or is operating without registration here you're seeing an actual class a vehicle that is prohibited on these roads so it's pretty good if you don't have a permit just like you're prohibited to drive a commercial vehicle if you don't have a license i think that true your honor but again we're dealing with a situation where there's a categor you don't but do you know if this category of permits for the park includes permits other than the private lands access i don't know your honor i don't know one way or the other i can talk to the court about what we would  put on an evidence if we had notice but sticking to the record that we have it's not in here and i don't know what other permits are are authorized by the superintendent of parks just to be straightforward about my concern just i mean i can imagine all kinds of evidence the government could have put up at the hearing and it could have been statistical evidence it could have been the officers experience and knowledge but there was just none of that and in light of that i guess i don't see and that he's been with the park service for eleven years and on cross examination he specifically talked about the fact that the permanent process goes through the park service and that he stated he's basis for stopping the vehicle was that it was a commercial vehicle operating  permits think that's a fair inference i think it is just is just as reasonable to draw from that that he thought he was entitled to pull it over to see if it had a permit he didn't know one way or another and he wanted to check so your honor this goes back i think to some st principles on what reasonable suspicion requires the way the supreme court has defined probable cause in the st instance is that it doesn't require a prima fashion case of illegality it only requires a substantial chance of criminal behavior they've repeatedly said that reasonable suspicion is a cost less than that i think the rule all the defendant is asking for is as king pointed out a rule that you can't stop commercial vehicles on the parkway unless for some reason you know that's but you already know particularly doesn't seem especially particularized to me but that's a whole separate debate but it sounds like your opponent is conceding that might be enough but there's just but he didn't say that right now and again we're in a sort of odd posture here because we know the initial traffic stop was being challenged so my concern is that we shouldn't be making a lot of law based on this very odd posture where the government never put on a case for reasonable suspicion and you and i think if you find that the record is insufficient on the basis of both reasonable suspicion and that the administrative inspection doctrine doesn't apply we think the appropriate remedy would not be suppression of the evidence but remand to allow us to put that  center right like you really want to know whether this guy what was the sentence here i believe it was for an intermittent incarceration and a three hundred dollars fine so you want to remains that the government can put on a  case for purposes for purposes of what this case would mean in the future and when the government is sort of presented with a new argument at the end where the government doesn't put on a case there's no reasonable suspicion it wouldn't mean anything in a case where the government did commercial vehicle inspector to inspect commercial motor vehicles and so this sort of goes a little bit to the administrative inspection doctrine which i can turn to now so hard is interested this sort of overlap substantially with a lot of these facts but as seven federal circuits have held commercial trucking is so highly regulated that it falls within the administrative it's inspection doctrine and this is where of the statutory scheme sets out a pervasive set of regulations notifies individuals that they will be subject to periodic inspections and search and sets out a sort of essentially appropriate time place and manner saying your argument is that this was an administrative search authorized under the federal motor carrier safety administrative regulations by an authorized agent searching for compliance with those regulations correct your honor that's what he was looking for to make sure that they were in compliance with the f and c s a regulations and that he stops to check to make sure that he had the commercial has a permit for commercial vehicles on the parkway comes under the deal and park service regulations not under the federal motor carrier safety administrative regulations so which is a requirement that when operating a commercial motor vehicle you are in compliance with loss martin says and regulations governing the operation of those goals so that the deal i regulation is a part of a limitation on commercial motor vehicles on a particular road is incorporated into the administrative scheme in part forty nine of the c f r ok ok and does it matter is it not it doesn't matter that the dio i regulations and the permitting requirement that the officer was trying to enforce here extends not only to trucks but also the passenger vehicles i think we could not use  inspection doctrine if it's not a commercial motor vehicle within the d o t regulations but it doesn't matter that the permit requirement that being enforced here is not a trucking requirement right because the trucking requirements say they must be operated in accordance with these other regulations so now it doesn't specifically cross reference i don't mislead or doesn't specifically cross reference you are ok but it does say if you are operating in compliance then that's something that can be stopped and inspect or any case that's ever regulations there is no case i have not found adequate now delgado deals with a completely suspicion list stop of a commercial motor vehicle in transit there was no basis that just the officer didn't recognize the commercial dividing whether this is a reasonable suspicion case or an administrative inspection hands comes from the fact of the regulation that would provide the basis for reasonable suspicion as a regulation on commercial vehicles so they they overlap i think whichever path the court is most comfortable with is equally viable in this case i think that given with the amount of regulations that attach to commercial vehicles and given that my friend on the other side has already acknowledged that the a commercial vehicle the cleanest solution is probably to apply the administrative inspection doctrine and that way you can avoid judge harris what you were saying the concerns about on this record is there enough basis i think that court's precedents in united states st palmer and humphries smelling marijuana at that point creates an independent justification to continue the traffic stop and to conduct the probable cause based searches of the vehicle in one instance and of his judge stage but both of these issues were priest to you to the district court on appeal from that judgment unless the court has any further questions we will rest on our  read brief those are all about interstate commercial trucking cases and industries which is not the same thing as here so when i say that i can see that my client's vehicle was a commercial vehicle i am not conceding that as a commercial to  purposes i'm conceding it's a commercial vehicle under the department of the interior park regulation five point six at issue in this case which are two different definitions so for the purposes of the federal motor carrier safety act i have no idea  whether my client's what version of vehicle categorisation my client's vehicle would fall under i'm only conceding for purposes of five six which he is charged with filing here i think that's may or may not be an important concession regardless i think that judge rushing into your questions indicate you understand with regard to licensing scheme i don't think the existence of a permit is any different structurally or meaningfully as the existence of a requirement that my car or your car or anyone's passenger vehicle be licensed and registered and inspected by whatever state it is in or whatever state it lives in as a structural matter and that's why reasonable suspicion shoppy presume from the mere existence or visible view on the parkway