is this court's decision and people versus montgomery one of the rules established by that case was that a defendant testifying in his own behalf could not be impeached with a prior juvenile judy cation the primary question here today is does montgomery fight with a firearm an aggravated discharge a firearm following a jury trial in boone county the charges arose out of a shooting that followed an incident in which my client was beaten by four other young men including the nephew of a me i who was later the victim of the shooting defendant who testifies as normally got admissible in the court reiterated that saying rational and sane finding of by a case just this past november there is a statute and undeniably has some connection to this issue section five dash one including the minor order and if he or she testifies i mean wouldn't your interpretation of the language you know visa be still including mine com discussed in the harris case or defend opens the door to did not like denies having a prior any prior criminal activity that could be exceptions such as other crimes evidence situations well i don't do i don't commit no crimes and of course he did and we don't want people to take the stand and why it's not right my client when he said it i've never been this position before i have been present before that was that was the truth and that's where the unique situation comes in when he says i've never been this position before being because examiner be interrogated by police the state had evidence which they rightly used that he had been interviewed by the same detectives twenty months earlier defendant made the statement in the context of i was in a pressure i was in the small room i didn't really know i tried to deny it the police wouldn't listen to me i made up some facts in the hopes of making my statement believable the context  purpose of his testimony of his denials was to show hey i i'm not used to being questioned by the police well the fact was he was in the state was thoroughly entitle to impeach him with his experience twenty months earlier  the fact that he was adjudicated delinquent for four earlier for burglary doesn't prove that he was in prison before it just shows that he has a prior in his reputation is bad that's the whole purpose of exit of of impeaching some of the means of a prior conviction is that they have a lousy reputation prez they're a prior felony and that's that what happened to my client here again there are rules there are exceptions to rules and harris is the one exception to the  rule the other exception might be the coleman case that i mentioned before from the fourth district where defense counsel believed there was a valid strategic reason benefit to his client to presenting the evidence of the prior as part of the defense case that that's an when my client's never been a situation like this before that could well be interpreted to mean i've never been a suspect in the shooting before i've never been accused of shooting a guy or being involved in the shooting before there's nothing untrue about that statement by that that would be proven use this he specifically said no in fact i believe the case law specifically says and then he's interrupted by the judge is a page one story for the record just yet there's no case by case law says you can use it well as a matter of fact value to decide whether to admit adjuvants or to cation my claim here was denied effective assistance because he had the judge known that there was montgomery out there and there was this wealth of case law that does hear i'm not sure if he did he did discuss it it was closing arguments of the jury right but again he had the you know offense house at that point he knows the odds are the cards are stacked against him that he's got a million right the damage the best he can i don't think th whether to pursue proceedings are intended to rehabilitate or sort of punish may be open to debate but that's not the question here in one thousand seventy nine again in two thousand and two american bar association recognize the crimes committed before a person turns eighteen should not carry the collateral consequences normally attendant to criminal convictions impeachment by prior record relates to a person's reputation in montgomery this court held certain prior violations felonies and from this crimes that relate the truth that happened within a ten year period those those prior convictions could be admitted because they relate to the president the witnesses present reputation but juvenile hasn't had the same opportunity to develop the reputation tha cation to come in to impeach his testimony on direct examination under section five dash one fifty one c of the juvenile court act a defendant's juvenile adjudication can come in to impeach his credibility because the that juvenile adjudications are not generally admissible under section five dash one fifty one see it became admissible when the defendant open the door to its mission through his testimony on direct examination and turn to the first issue i'd just like to briefly address the defendant sacha tori argument to read the statute as defendant suggests for this court to read the pursuant to the rules of evidence for criminal trials language to refer back to montgomery's prohibition against the admission of a juvenile adjudication to peter testifying defendant that would as just justice thomas you know it would read out the specific inclusion by the general assembly of the including the minor defendant if he or she testifies language it is presumed that when the general assembly amended section five dash one fifty one c the general assembly was aware of prohibition against the admission of juvenile adjudication to impeach a testifying defendant it was aware of prior versions of the juvenile court doesn't this court the constitutional authority to supervise boards why should we find that the legislators are broaching on this we would absolutely agree that this court has the supreme authority to regulate the court with respect to rules of evidence and why should we have been in the interpretation of this is because to read that reference as you refer back to montgomery is prohibition that would be contrary to interpretation which is to give all meanings of the section of the statute meaning the including the minor defendant if he or she testifies language did not exist in prior versions of the statute and so when the general  specifically included that reference to a testifying defendant in that section it meant to change the state of the law and the general assembly as my opposing counsel noted was certainly aware of this court's decision in montgomery for having the use of juvenile adjudications to impeach a testifying defend it so to include this specific language it must have meant that it wanted to abrogate the common law rule not allowing juvenile adjudications to come in you take you back to th state where a statute conflicts with the rule of evidence or supreme court decision adopting the rule of evidence courts are to follow the rule or decision what you think it means i will try to reduce that question we would agree that room one  be in tension with this court's prior decisions and orange in that role things marline of cases which hold that the general assembly has the authority to create new rules of evidence and to alter existing rules of evidence there does appear to be some tension between rule one and one and this court case law but in this case rule one one does not resolve the conflict in this case the confiscation of the illinois rules of evidence was not meant to change any of the existing rules of evidence it was simply meant to the committee was simply compiling rules of evidence from the common law from cases from statutes and putting them into one efficient easy to use guide for the trial courts and the practitioners but it was not meant to change any of the existing rules and the committee specifically recognized with respect to this conflict they saw that there was a conflict between the statute and the montgomery rule recognized and noted in its committee comments ruled six or ninety that the codification of the month dummy prohibition was not meant to resolve this conflict so the codification of roe want to one the codification of rule six or ninety does not resolve this question at all  this court can certainly look to the rules of evidence as to what the state of the law was before the codification but it doesn't resolve this question and then to answer your second question about the why include this pursuant to the rules of evidence for criminal trials language in the statute the legislature left that in because it wanted the the way that these educations would be admitted was to function in the way that criminal convictions are admissible to impeach  requirements with respect to time the conviction can't be more than ten years old and has to be for a crime of dishonesty the probative value balancing test that is among gummer is incorporated into this analysis of the general assembly was not changing any of those rules that it was allowing for the month gum rebalancing test to be incorporated into the analysis for the emission of juvenile adjudications but it did want juvenile adjudications which have been previously categorically inadmissible as a matter of law to be admissible subject to the trial court's discretion and that that's one of the reasons there is no separation of powers challenge issue in this case because there is limited encroachments into what could consider to be part of the running of a trial this court has been concerned with that separation of powers precedent with judicial excuse me legislative encroachment onto the inherent powers of the judiciary but there's no encroachment in this case because the ultimate decision maker as to how the juvenile judge occasion is to come in that is left of this russian of the trial court there simply juvenile adjudications are simply admissible only if the trial court in its discretion allows them to come in and this is perfectly consistent with the policy changes that the general assembly made to the juvenile court act in one thousand nine hundred nine this court is recognised in taylor that although rehabilitation still remains a chief goal of the act there has been the shift to include concerns of punishing juveniles for their crime and holding them accountable for their actions and this is part of the general assembly putting forth its policy determination that we're not as concerned with the collateral consequences of a juvenile adjudication as we were when montgomery was decided over thirty years ago never been challenged on separation of powers grounds given this court's prior precedent in orange and roll things miers and this court's decision in orange is directly on point with the facts of this case in orange this court recognized that in a prior case people versus collins their prior inconsistent statement cannot be used as substantive evidence of guilt it can only be admissible to impeach testimony and then the general assembly subsequently enacted section one fifteen dash temp point one of the code of criminal procedure and held that prior inconsistent statements could be used as substantive evidence this court in orange addressed the constitutionality of that section and held that it was it did not violate the separation of powers and that even though this court had said prior to the an act of that section that a contra rule applied that's not affect the general assembly's authority to enact a contrary rule and that's exactly the situation that we have here is a decision from this court meant comrie general assembly with its consistent with its changes the juvenile court acted cited it wanted to create a contrary rule of evidence and the fact that this court in the governor had said that that was not  prevent the legislature from creating a different  role just turning briefly to the opening the door question as your honour's acknowledged the test is whether the defendants testimony could reasonably be construed as an attempt to mislead the jury and here is testified that he never been in a situation like that before and then he went on to say that he had never been in prison or nothing like that and could be one reasonable interpretation which is that he just gave a false statement because he was afraid of police and that he had never been subject to studio interrogation however it's also equally reasonable to interpret his testimony in a broader context which is when he says i've never been in prison or nothing like that he's trying to tell the jury i've never been i'm not experience with the criminal justice system as a whole and that's not true because not only had he been subjected to  interrogation but he had also been charged with burglary under the as a criminal offense and then was also adjudicated delinquent for burglary and placed on probation and indeed he was on probation at the time that he committed the instant offenses so one reasonable interpretation which the jury could have it could you could have they could have construed the defendant's testimony in that way and because they could have it was reasonable to think that the defendant had opened the door to that testimony and then therefore  the admission of the adjudication was not an abuse of discretion and it doesn't matter that the trial court had ruled before trial that the adjudication can come in because this court can affirm the trial court's admission of the evidence on any basis that is supported by the record even if the trial court's reasoning was incorrect so this court were to find the defendant open the door that would be an alternative basis to affirm the defendant's conviction even if this court finds that section five desh one fifty state that we were going to be in the probative balancing test at the hearing on the motion in limine e but he also when read in context that can only mean that he was referring to the statue because the the only thing as defense counsel acknowledged is the only thing that was out there that allowed for that adjudication to come in at all because montgomery doesn't allow for that so when the defense counsel or when defense counsel trial was saying that case law allowed for the admission  to juvenile adjudication he was saying that the statute allows for it but it still had to satisfy my gum maries balancing test and in this case it didn't satisfy that test so counsel couldn't have rendered deficient performance because he was recognizing what was a reasonable interpretation the law indeed it was an open question so defense counsel couldn't have made an unreasonable argument based on a reasonable interpretation of the plain language of the statute on what was then an open question so  this court expressly reserved the quite the question about whether or not which version of the statute of montgomery governs and that was in two thousand and eight but there is some question in the lower courts as to which  statute or if montgomery governs  and then finally even if the even if defendant could show that counsel render deficient performance he can't demonstrate prejudice as a result of that deficient performance for one reason the defendant opened the door to the admission of his juvenile adjudication so it was admissible under that separate basis and in addition he can demonstrate that there is a reasonable probability that absent the admission of the adjudication he would been acquitted of the charge offenses because there was a number of other ways in which the defendant's testimony was impeached he gave numerous false statements to the police and that impeach his credibility and that defendant agrees that he was properly impeached with his prior custodial interrogation so given the the state is again going to pursue to the rules of evidence and looking at some of the rules of month every single some of them apply you know the ten years that applies to felonies that apply you simply can't pick and choose which parts of montgomery apply if montgomery of the fourth district in the cohen's case back many years ago in the second district before this case a messy as well as the fourth district in coleman and by an agreed we can read that we have to read that that clause as meaning montgomery still applies to as the state has pointed out that the the phrase the clause of the pursuant to clauses been existence in one form or another of the one five hundred fifty for many years now they haven't changed having taken that out and that means i think that the legislature wants to montgomery in the rules there is a notice in the committee comments about a conflict i don't think conference have to always result in a war here i think you can resolve them and in this case we certainly can resolve them by saying that the general rule is jubal should occasions do not come in with some exceptions none none of which exist here the state is trying to argue that well you go back to work that way they were simpler times and juveniles were viewed as just little kids and we're going to give them a cut of  some slack and i realize they should be punished as much as adults they may be the case as far as juveniles being punished for the offenses for which they are standing up and education charge it doesn't necessarily mean that applies to collateral consequences  rebuttal case when the prosecutor read the press read the judgment to the jury so that's when it first came out mr glaser clarify something for me justice thomas asked you earlier i think whether you would be reading out of this meant crime back as a juvenile and was unsure on trial for what let's say for example i know he's my client is an example but let's assume there's something distinctive about his prior burglary that stood out and he used the same m o as an adult then it could come in as an other impeachment similar to harris the state has made up what the fence council said defense council never mentioned the statue defense council in fact the state impeached for the brief quotes from says interrupting says u k and so we're normal balancing defense counsel yes no where this defense counsel mention one fifty one c i think the state's a czerny somewhere in the motion for new trial mentions the statute but the fence counsel didn't montgomery help he's not going on with the statute said he never said that sort of say that the feds counsel said case law but he meant statutory law is pure is pure conjecture pure fabrication as far as prejudice against the use of this prior meant a lot to the state mr weber the prosecutor is an experienced prosecutor no less than thirty times during his arguments to the jury he brought out the fact that my client had a prior to cation if it didn't mean anything he