disagree but the supreme court was talking about here is trying to determine whether the rooster may in the first five minutes face were made in this case as those trends are used in the statu yes i do make it very briefly but i can get there in my notes  hing to the extent that quote was guessing what the scope of this contract was in the minds of the parties there was something for the jury to do so something for him to do it's completely we can't do that because the you don't need to do it right because the judge reached the merits of the case and dismissed it for the same reasons as in the first case but bill if mr joyce i believe would wanting one set of conversations between mr cole go see mr murphy in which he allegedly made certain promises in the case he claimed that those promises induced him to join in the well i think case he claimed that he had the agreement to receive his fifty percent of the profits of v f p trades same promises to stimulate case same promise that was issued in the u b s case which was also ruled against the money integration clause by the northern district of illinois so that same question has been put to three chords you're now the third the first to have held that that integration clause despite the arguments here about it's going to apply in prohibited all of these coins so if we get the substitution on what the plaintiff makes a substitution motion with any for knowledge or indication of how the judge is going to rule and you know a lot of procedural contortions all of these cases are unique but they all have in common is that for whatever reason that plaintiff or movement has seen that judge make a ruling on the same issue and has the luxury of making that substitution without the appearance that the legislature presumed when they allowed the motion to exist what he's saying in of judge correct in this in this case you don't need to reach them because the first the major complaint was the operative complaint the time it was a claim against a i i so so it was the same parties on the same  yes that's true but well so they're different parties i don't know that there's a distinction between them for purposes of the case i think they're close enough or they did their interests are close enough aligned that they would be identical parties for mr condit purposes so so the reasons that i don't think it matters is because one tenth of the same parties are before the judge taylor on the same factual legal question in both cases so it's on all fours with every other prior case under the statute but even if there were a distinction in the parties the exact seems legal issue was decided by the same job does this plaintiffs conduct and does the agreement he signed prevent claims that he was promised something or induced to do something other than what was delivered to him and the judge ruled on that precise issue so at the moment he makes the substitution of judge motion he has perfect clarity about how this judge is going to view the legal claims that he's advancing and that fact is the common issue  all of the testing royce cases and boman whether the label is courts consistently refused to allow plaintiffs in that position with that knowledge about how a judge is going to rule on the precise issue before them to take a substitution because it up for the world bank of canada the bank of scotland and say you know we'd like a substitution a judge now i think they would quite follow and you would agree because i would be making that judgment with the exact clarity to know exactly what the judge was going to do and that's