and as soon as we all get up here please tell us who you are who you represent and then we'll talk about who's going to argue companies we have three different parties that are applebee's in this case your honor so before hand we headed great that i would take the lead in the arguments and take but nine minutes and then all states counsel would take four minutes and  entirely on the language of the policy is it is undisputed illinois law that the language of the policies controls this issue one of the seminal cases on issues u s gypsum company versus admiral insurance company the case that the insurers discussed at length and their briefing in that case when the court began its analysis of the number of occurrences issue it said we first must look to the language of the policies and that's what the that's what hennessey asked this court to do but we feel it is something  and many policies and i haven't seen many cases talking about are there any there are cases that talk about it there aren't any cases illinois that analyze the language there are cases that reference it but they don't actually analyze it there are cases where other jurisdictions but you reference languages well i think pretty much every case in the country that analyzed the language was cited in one of the two sets of proof in this case and you're right around there are not that many it is not very common language it does definitely exist i've seen in other policies it's not necessarily been an issue of dispute in those policies but it is it is a standard terminology just not by far not the most common terminology  definitions of number of occurrences is it possible that it's just because these are such old policies that over time the insurance companies have morphed into different language these policies state the same because the origin was so all you know i don't know event the language in the policy is drafted by the insurance company that is correct they are they write it for their own determination press that is quite right and for that reason the insurance companies need to be bound by the language it's actually in their policies not language that is in other policies that other cases cite and that's one of the fundamental flaws in the insurance argument is they rely entirely on cases that don't analyze this language that analyze different language it just said the your opponents in their briefs say they had the occurrence is neither the injury nor the location of injury and that you are run to have that term is used in the occurrence definition rather we're talking about exposure to conditions and in order for the conditions to be deemed to be want to currents they need to meet certain criteria and those particular in laid out in the definition they we do not argue that the claims are the occurrence whether the locations are the occurrence what we do argue is that the definition requires in order for these many hundreds and thousands of claims to be aggregated into a single  criteria must be met and they are spelled out in the definition the first criteria is they must relate to substantially the same conditions no dispute your exposure to a specificity is substantially the same conditions for all the claimants the second criteria that appears in insurer is saying that the premises location for purposes of their policies is where this equipment was manufactured by hans i don't believe the insurers actually make that particular argument and i don't really believe there's been any basis or authority put forward to say that it's not the locations where these people were exposed in the bios or two patients they're saying that it's this equipment that caused the injuries that give rise to the claims and all that when looked at in the context of the language of the policy it would make no sense for the premises locations to be i don't know i guess and this is headquarters at the time i mean they haven't specifically or to kill it what the premises location would be but why have that language in there at all it just wouldn't make any sense in this context why not just use the same language that appeared in us gypsum where the premises location condition for aggregating occurrences aggregating exposures was not present it only had the requirement they need to be related to substantially the same general conditions and that's the basis on which he was gypsum was able to aggregate all these claims but we have an additional condition here and to argue that you look at it used this break grinder with a brick shoe that doesn't have a specialist line and that had some other alignment there's no risk of exposure to assessed and that did happen in some uses of that and the operation of the hennessy product was not impacted at all by whether or not the brake components that was being used with it whether they contain to specify just really didn't have any bearing at all so the fact that some special part is could be used with it is not a reflection of hennessey making in a status proper part of the designed in a way that it will always expose its users to a specif that's just simply not the case here but there's also a very large piece of machinery they weighed the hundreds of pounds they were you can go down to your local home depot and pick one up i mean these these were equipment for mechanics or repair shops they were meant to stay in one place you could move it but it's not the type of thing we don't like a hammer where you take it with you from job to job it stayed in one place so the premises location language makes sense for these types of products as well for the types of things that i am cold was manufacturing at the time in a way that say ceiling tiles that u s troops was making it wouldn't actually make sense to me you're making you know possibly millions of ceiling tiles being stored in various places they're essentially a consumer goods these were not consumer goods they're not made a difference whether to consumer group good or good for business it doesn't directly make a difference in the pulse of but i think w does illustrate that there is a reason why the language is different here you know if you know that really doesn't matter with the language the reason for the language being different we just need to interpret the link i'm sorry i don't we did we just need to interpret is there is a matter not directly for the interpretation but i think it helps the court to understand that this language is not just it's not just a difference of wording that there's a real meaning behind the difference and it actually does make others i don't believe it's consistent with the language here i mean the especially exposure one location is not going to spread to another location would be a completely different machine at another location that would potentially result in exposure at that other location of what this close does in that it aggregates exposures at a premises location the insurers then stretch that definition i think beyond the breaking point to apply to all locations and effectively nullify the language that's in and it's used to interpret language that needs further interpretation i don't think there's any need for the course to steer i think with the additional condition that exists in this past that does not exist in others that it it doesn't what  stablish what the root cause is in terms of the policy than the typical us gypsum language would do so because test to the extent it's used here i think would be to determine whether the exposures had a given premises location have be substantially the same general conditions the exposures but what it does is it the aggregation aspect of this clause it says that when you have a particular site and you have lots of people be exposed was fast this that at that site it is all  occurrence and for purposes of argument hennessy does not dispute that proposition the question is whether it then spreads to well other sites where there are these machines being used and exposure to is fastest and that's what the insurers try to do with it language in the policy essentially known void right out of the policy and that is directly contrary to the rules of contract interpretation in illinois in just about every other state in the country to well the terms of policy need to be given meaning they need to be considered they can't just be ignored and the insurers argument ignores that critical language here that makes as a condition for finding a single occurrence that the words must exist at all and then it from a premises location and the fact that it location is one occurrence if you find that all of these dispersants losses are one single occurrence instead of one occurrence promises location you've taken that word each out of the definition insurance companies wrote that word in there and the fact that you have a modifier in both policies one says each one says one this was not some accidental unintentional inclusion of a word in this this was planned to be in their one premises occasionally each premises location and so that's why the language of the policy dictates that there can be no fewer than one it cohens per premises location you can still have more than one occurrence at a promises location that's not an issue that's really here that could be in other cases but best as containing materials into the conveyor systems that are designed for its customers correct there's there's no as best as containing material and impose brake quickly that's correct but it's still the injuries here are about and applying the cause test we need to look at what is the cause what's the conduct that tennessee's predecessor employed tools engaged in that led to the underlying liabilities ok underlying liabilities are specified only injury claims  this is one occurrence so why do we even mention premises i think it's important your honor to look at the entire definition of occurrence it's always is that right now we have a two sentence definition that we're looking at the first sentence defines what the occurrence is it's an event or continuous and repeated exposure to conditions which unexpectedly result in personal injury during the policy period that language defines what is the occurrence that language is really no different than the but we have a second set right there so the key is that the first the key is the second so well the key in determining what the occurrence is is the first no don't they both of the both define the term occurs both senses are included in the definition i grew through but so has the fine when the current right so let me let me let me explain the first sentence the events are continuous repeated exposure here is what is the conduct that engaged in the gave rise to his life billet is sold and manufactured and sold tool of breaking equipment ok that's what it did it put it into the stream of commerce called tools did not purchase the equipment install the equipment or do anything in a premises all it did was manufacture and sell the equipment just like us and u s g they manufacture and sold a specialist containing building materials they didn't install them they just sold and whoever purchased them and placed them wherever they placed them might be liable in these underlying cases for different reasons but the manufacture of the products the conduct that gives rise to their liability and the reasons all the cases in illinois involve product liability claims against insurers fine there's a single occurrence because the cause is the manufacture and distribution of the defective product if that's the conduct that this party was gives rise to their liability so we apply because of the second sentence now all such exposure to substantially the same general conditions existing at or emanating from a premises location that circuit court found that sentence doesn't apply and the circuit court was correct because if the manufacture and sale of the product is the occurrence which it is here if you try to put that round peg into the square hole the second sentence it doesn't make sense because ample didn't do anything to create an exposure yet it promises location someone else may have the purchaser of the products may have but ample tools didn't all they did was manufacture and sell the products cannot ignore the second sentence you would like us to ignore a second so i think you're braced very well and try to ignore the second set let's talk about the second sounds to me you win or lose and how we interpret the second sentence i don't think you disagree with you well you know what we mean is that it has it has meaning but it doesn't have the meet it doesn't have meaning in every single case yes it does because it says one or each premises now the question for us to determine say therefore if we don't look at it you have but i don't see it you can tell me how under i am like patrick why we can ignore the second set we're not saying you should look at it rather that the definition of occurrence even the first sentence includes language that we're not decisions that have user causes the second sentence is not part of that and so there's a lot of difference between all the case lawyer up there that you're talking about in this case where we have not decided this issue in illinois there's no discussion specifically with this being made here but the finding that the the language the second sentence of the occurrence definition would require a finding of multiple occurrences based on from this is where work claimants were exposed really takes the cost test and just toss it to the side and what my course says is we can't says in order to determine the number of occurrences we look to the cost us we don't second sentence by by not just isolating the second sentence you read the definition of occurrence starting with the first sentence so i guess the question is how can you make sense of the first sentence of the definition of occurrence what it is which is a finding what the cause of the insurance liability is and trying to make a finding that they were there liable for creating something of premises where there's no facts to show that they were it simply doesn't apply so besides the  project themselves were not inherently dangerous and nothing to do with us at all you want us to take your line of thinking and use the second sentence as a modifier of the first as well a couple resulted in espressos related injuries but they sometimes did not so if they were inherently dangerous it seems to me they'd be dangerous all the time which they weren't by definition they beat first of all when the products products were case but because there was a defective plumbing system it was the it was the cause of the insurers like believe there was an inherently defective product it doesn't have to contain a specified to be inherently defective product when it's used for its intended purpose no i don't think that's i think that's an inconsistent argument but i i think the bigger problem is that all of the cases that you've cited have different policy language and this polic unusual maybe it was a slip up by some underwriter i don't know but there it is and that's a language that you're stuck with and that's language that we're stuck with and it is what it is and no one can change it the company's been b this policy and the insurance company gets to write it why wouldn't we hold it against the insurance company because it doesn't make sense if you read the definition of occurrence and any conduct where those where those claimants were located so you it eliminates the cost test it's the only case in illinois that would eliminate the application of the cause test in determining the number of occurrences in cases rising  just right there must be a general condition existing at the premises the service station the gas station absent one of these machines there's no general condition existing at one of those premises if you years ok but again we're repeating ourselves but the fact is we've never had the second sentence before and so the second sentence has to mean something we read in tandem with the person it doesn't mean something material everywhere ok plate covering black and several different workers i mean hundreds of acres most likely there was a general condition that the plant people were being supposed to fry of of the plant they had as a general condition for which this language fits a glove but it's not our situation here we have somebody using a defective product of a gas station with or it's not a general condition on the premises there is just one location where a guy using we have just a defective product that one guy's using the one guy's getting sick if you look at the reported decisions involving the underlying cases these cases you know like case to go up in various things every case the auto mechanic just virtually every case  second issue is in their briefing and that has to do with whether the circuit court err in denying him if he's motion for some partial summary judgment as to the limits available under the american home policy under a the jurisdiction of this court as presented in our papers is simply to determine whether or not george allen's ruling on that was correct and i believe it was correct and i believe hennessy also doesn't present a significant argument in opposition to that rather at page fifteen of hennessy's reply and as you concedes that if this court is to reverse and find in favor of multiple occurrences then there is an actual controversy as to whether the five and a half month calls the extension to american home should provide a full five million dollar aggregate limit as though it was written for a twelve month one year period so we send that if we reverse then the issue will go back