issue was whether the bank wasn't title to take no it's not going to address that today because judge diamond in his or her did not address but that was one of the two issues the second issue that was presented and the one that i'm bringing before this court is whether or not the tolling provisions of section twenty two eighty five why situation just violent repeatedly during oral argument suggested the main issue is that i believe is i presume that city of chicago and bryant versus bowman city chicago basically outlines the tolling provisions section twenty two eighty five point three  of extension of the period of redemption to the county clerk's office within the currently denison period that's number one or number two the tax code requires that to perfect your tax of that in their case and what that began as a situation where the certificate holder was trying to to use the tolling provisions of twenty two eighty five in a motion for declaration of sale in their situation  parties that existed at the time these transactions occurred dealt with the vendor in a bend in a tax purchaser and different rights and interests were being tried were tried to be adjudicated during the period time the other thing that convoluted the process during that period of time was the fact that there was an attempt at settlement that at least some of us thought resolved all the issues in the case there were a lot of things that happened in the underlying litigation over the period of time from the time it commenced up until the time that judge diamond rule the bottom line is though that all of that really is irrelevant relative to the issues that are presented on this appeal and i'm happy to discuss any of them or wants to discuss any of those issues but i really don't have anything to do with why we're here today there is a statute that specifically governs the outcome of this particular matter the statute is thirty five i'll see s two hundred slash twenty two hundred eighty five and it provides that the holder of a certificate for a ta records the same within one year from an after the date that the period of redemption expires then the deed itself is voided has no effect and there is no right or prima versed in this particular case the redemption period expired october twenty five two thousand and twelve and order was entered by the circuit court in macon county granting the right to take out the deed on eleven sixteen of two thousand and twelve the petitioner was  required to record the deed that he was authorized to take out at any time between nov sixteenth two thousand and twelve and october twenty five of two thousand and thirteen he didn't record it there is no any doubt about the fact that it was a report the question then comes up is is there an exception that provides to theirs or is there an exception to the general rule that provides a remedy to the petitioner in this case the record is needed some time outside that one year period of time and there is an exception in the statute there is only one that exception is that if the holder of a certificate is prevented from obtaining it the by injection or order of court or by the refusal or inability of any court to act upon the application for the taxi or by the refusal of the clerk to execute then the time during which the petitioner has required to record the stay during that the last now the right of the petitioner in that case under that exception is very specific and it is that only where the certificate is prevented that the holder of the certificate is prevented from of the deed and in this case he wasn't a he wasn't prevented in any respect from obtaining or the refusal or inability of any court to act upon the application for that and the court acted directly on the application for that for the issu and did so in an appropriate and timely fashion based on the application that was presented by the titian or or by the refusal of the court to execute the same and in this case the clerk never got the opportunity to execute the same because apparently the order that was entered by the court was never presented to the clerk to issue the deed then that time period would be say in this particular case none of those things happened the time period wasn't stay in the cases that are described by the petitioner under those exceptions one of two things occurred either the issuance of the order by the court authorizing that be was delayed for a period of time that well it now that either happened because there was litigation between the parties as to whether it peaches even be issued or it happened because the litigation between the parties as to whether or not the each should be issued took so long that the period of time between the time that the order was entered and the one year period and the one year term after the expiration of the period of redemption then allow for the recording of the deed during that period of time there is no other circumstance where there is adequate time available for the petitioner to record and there was in this case almost a year where the petitioner has the opportunity to obtain the b the never takes it out and whether he period between the filing of the petition and order and the order directing the issue of the back seat was told meaning no matter what period of time the petitioner suggested that the term should be stay assuming argue endo that the period between the filing of the petition and the order directing the issue the taxi was told the record shows the surf able to record is the within the time prescribed by law which he would have been able to do prior to the filing of the motion  allowed to stay it debt because the exact exemption exemption that is provided under the statute was fulfilled in that case the reason the holder of the certificate purchased that tax sale under the code incited by the respondent here also that go to that saying that exact proposition whether or not there's litigation pending during the one year term is irrelevant whether or not there is litigation pending that would prevent the court from entering in order allow for the issuance of the text is very relevant that is in fact the operative term is the operative period of time during which we would expect to see a stay of that period of time for the and because of that the petitioner was not able to record the deed within the period of time that's allowed by the statute is not what we have here what we have here is the issuance of an order that allowed for well you have the expiration of the period of redemption in october twenty five two thousand and twelve you have the entry of an order on november sixteenth two thousand and twelve that says go get your deed they get recorded and we have the expiration of the period of time that's allowed under the statute as being november sixteenth or fifteen two thousand and thirteen during as being a period of time during which the petitioner should have reported that he had been making a difference if there's a whole lot of other stuff going on after the period of time after the time that the judge entered the order that the twenty provisions set out in thirty five i also yes two hundred slash twenty two dash eighty five does not apply when the application has already been or will go on and litigation involving the order is file after that application has been ruled on now one of the judicial canons judge dimond would have considered as when you because i come across a statute with that as a claim and ordinary mean that is clear and concise how do you interpret that and i briefly just want to read a quote from a i believe was the second district opinion it came on march i came across and i believe it correctly states what this court is supposed to do when it comes across a plain ordinary statute the court said to follow our obligation to effectuate the legislature's intent we must give the statutes plain meaning without reading and exceptions limitations or conditions that conflict with the expressed legislative intent it should be not considered by this court it considered waived the second one as the refusal or inability of any court to act upon the application where attacks the that is the only issue here because the third one the refusal of the clerk to execute  deed also hasn't been raised and should be deemed waived not considered by this court so let's go back to the second one the legislature very specifically put in a qualifier the court or been ability of the court to act upon the application that was specific in the statute it's very clear now if you look at the legislature legislator intent and the case precedent surrounding this statute you're going to see the legislature wanted the tax purchaser to have the ability to record it and you file a petition as a tax holder of these certificates you still need the court's authority to record a deed you need some type of thing to be able to enforce just like a regular judgment in any small claims case could have been forced to he chose not to in this case if we look at the cases they're going to be very clear you have city of chicago brian first moment he's involved in issues related to the application ok the application hasn't been granted and the statute very clear it's still pending and must be told until that stalin mr moore points i guess reading of brian where it says you had an opportunity to record the this is a specific qualifier once we've ruled on this and you have that authority you can no longer rely on that or intervene you must record the taxi mr morgan could have done it at any time there's no court order preventing him he has that authority  just felt to do so and i think the browser will court the district issuing all of i believe these opinions the first district was very clear about setting that out and you'll notice you the bottle