suffering shall be punished so if we look at the one under circumstance or conditions likely to produce great bodily harm or death that's a factual that's not a knowledge that's not an intent that's not a c and that's not as in the other situation where the kids were killed when a father was drunk driving something actually happened i think it's something happened yes now i'm not arguing and i'm not going to stand here and argue i'm also not conceding the point this is a seventeen year old you know person i don't think it has anything to do with anything my case differs because there is an actual physical contact absolutely and for purposes of this argument i can see  but but again yes here we do have that problem too not that it matters because we're dealing with a categorical approach but here we do have this problem too that says when it's direct inflection there's no object you know some kind of a risk that's going on in fact a sergeant really beautifully talks about what the state of california thinks of the jets and i'm going to quote and who love this i don't have t and you know if we look at it from a perspective of the only reason we're here with three different reason three different cases is because congress passed a law that literally makes no no sense from an objective level it needs all of this input from all of these places so i think as a general level it's preserved but again we felt you know the model kind to change it was impossible to raise it before to my came out that having been said your honor and i'm kind of loath to admit it american miles from the united states attorney general to st address the question about counsel's argument that this statute does not meet the board's definition because a is a general intent to commit the offense so there is a mens rea and the fact the sergeant case made that i held that in that case and then it was repeated by the supreme court valdez that for direct act falling under this there is a general intent and that intent is to commit the act nothing more is required under the board's definition and the board's definitions when at the end of that decision the court the board concluded that that colorado statute meets its definition and it says because it requires meets the mens  and as to the act and there is a juvenile juvenile status of the child showing that that the mens rea have there to the act and then you have the status of the child and then you have the likelihood of harm in that case to the child which is which met the mark maltreatment prong or the impairment prong the separate so under counsel's argument i agree the general intents and it is borne out  california supreme court cases that general intent is an intent to do the act that ends up harming the child creating that unjustifiable pain or suffering to a child and additionally then you have to separate up a man's that that infliction that intent to do the act that is a collection of harm is done under circumstances likely to cause great bodily injury or death of a child so squarely within the board's definition the mens rea requirement under the board's definition requires nothing more than a mens rea as to the act or omission you  as as whether or not it categorically matches because every average conduct on the board has repeatedly said this court has looked at repeatedly that all conduct and all mens rea under th of conviction not conduct not what happened in any given case what is the statute of conviction twenty seven a what is the board's definition and you are confined to matching those elements and nothing more given can you respond to that yes responses it has no place before this court where we where the case law has unfolded and my reason for saying that is because he does not say that the statutory term is that he does not say that the term a crime of child abuse child neglect or child  they are human but secondarily what he's taking issue with is the board giving meaning to a very narrow standard after interpret in the statute and narrow going in and narrowing it from abuse neglect abandonment giving very explicit examples of that it must be maltreatment impairment what types are maltreatment impairment including all of the sexual offenses and ringback exploitation then the board also said part of maltreatment a subset of not treatment includes endangerment type offenses but only if there's a sufficiently high risk of harm that but only  very very very narrow standard that the board said for endangerment types offenses is what counsel is trying to now say is void for vagueness and this is the opposite of vagueness with the board has been doing with the statutory term time and again authority and for an ordinary person to understand what could possibly get them removed for an offense called child abuse child neglect or child abandonment and ordinary person is on notice that harm that he should have read the below and he actually did like he said through his motion to reopen but ultimately at the end of the day it is a constitutional question invoking due process and the board is not necessarily within its authority to decide those issues so if properly raised and if this court's precedent allows for it then it could be raised before this court for the st time but for the reasons i said about precedent for closing it given that we are squarely within chevrons step to say that precedent for closes the argument because it is very clear that this is  not a vague term it's ambiguous so under chevron step two you analyze what the board has done and whether or not it's reasonable and this court has already deferred to that definition of being reasonable and should continue to do so or are in from your perspective do you believe these cases just rely on th circuit precedents even down to below was a candid i think it depends on how the court wants to decide these cases i mean the next case is an interesting case because it involves a sexual nature offense specifically that statute and there's a different rub there but i definitely think that we would benefit from having a published decision back on the books about whether or not element of injury is required because we see these challenges over and over we have so many briefs before the  now trying to dispel the notion that an additional element of proof of actual injury is required because that's how petitioners counsel keeps reading the for gozo decision so it would be helpful to have precedent saying that the board is reasonable and not requiring proof of actual injury and that the board is reasonable and interpretating the statutory term of abuse neglect and abandonment as