the tribes in this appeal i'd like to take less than fifteen minutes in the opening and reserve a few minutes for rebuttal if i could this case involves the relationship between two indian land acts with private reading of the statute is surely reasonable within the meaning of this court's govan decision for which we provided the court's up liminal authority and the basic goal reversion from this court was that when faced with two reasonable  one way or another enable tribes and or the secretary of interior to require lands lost to the allotment process but the acts employed distinctly different language one is an act of general application throughout indian country and the other is very specific to the flatted indian reservation and that's the ruling of the statute that would like this court to evaluate the ruling following the statute of general application throughout indian country is found if twenty five u s c four sixty five it was an accident one thousand nine hundred thirty four is part of the indian reorganization at the first major push of federal policy to overturn and to try to recoup lands lost through allotment basically authorized in his discretion unquote to acquire lands on behalf of indian tribes and people act then goes on to say the title shall be held in trust so that statute is a very clearly reservation it's a brief section that in section one the secretary is quote authorized unquote upon request of the tribes to dispose of students certain section two of the act is much briefer and its action to the secretary is quote off right and quote again upon the request of the tribes to acquire lands for the tribes and individual indian people authorization unquote to dispose of land in section one and an authorization quote unquote to acquire land upon the request of the tribes in sections two and a section to all lands required shall be held in for us it's a pretty straightforward reading of the statute there is no discretion and it is also important you have any theory that suggests that the word authorized means monster means shall i do and i would go to the plain meaning of the word and i would go to the plain meaning of the word as defined if i could without having actually seen the point i did intend to make here is a language not necessarily the particularized definition in the abstract of a word or another word but the fact that congress chose a very clearly different secretary had considered section four sixty five twelve developing the language for the flathead act and clearly the secretary again in legislative history was well aware of the tribe the very active land acquisition program and perceive the need to develop a a different statutory framework to factually it more fully the tribes acquisition program the secretary and congress both set of regulations generally deals with the transfer of a land from future trust by the secretary there's a specific exception from a long checklist of items that the secretary must go through and evolving local government views on such things as of general application throughout indian country and i think it's uncontestable the congress employed markedly different language on those two acts that serve similar though not identical purposes have but again and while i'm talking i'm talking about webster's and all the others well it looks you in the definition provided by the united states which i believe was a webster's there was no discussion of discretion there was no explicit discussion of discretion in the word authorizing the united states definition here in fact there was no mention of the word discretion in the definition provided to the court by the united states i don't happen to have that page cited there very but that was my reading  definition provided by the united states couldn't we determine the omission of the word discretionary in the later statute was determination by congress that it wasn't lacking speculation of the focus of the plain language of the statutes there's their governor there is no question about that and i was trying to explain this case to my sixteen year old who's got a driver's license and and i said well you know there's the basic ru a red light and if that's the only law you have that's what you do but some states some jurisdictions have a right turn on red and if you just read one and not the other you might find yourself in trouble and that's what that's the analogy i grew in trying to distinguish the two the two statutes you have to read them together because they touch on the same subject and that gets really to i think with the error of the court was one if it's within the same statute and i guess i'm struck by the use of the word shall in the following sentence you could replace is authorized to begin with shall and you clearly have a mandatory meaning i think that it goes to what the word authorize means authorized sort of the on off switch without that statute there would be no authority whatsoever so congress has to say to the secretary here's an issue we want you to work with and you are now authorized to work but the constraints upon your application of that which depend upon the language of the statute and the language of the statutes as your authorized upon request of the tribes so that the word authorized there is no forward motion on either stature perhaps you can answer for me mostly curiosity initially that appeared to me in looking at the record that the tribes got with they wanted at the first  not taking it on trust in a mandate under the flag of act it was in fact engaged in a trust transfer pursuant to the general authority for sixty five from that point on our question was not  from the reasons well the difference between the two has to do with the ability of a local government to comment or intervene or somehow stake its objection to the transfer in the factual scenario objections to other earlier tracts of land by local governments in this particular forty acre frak it has not yet gone into trust because the secretary is now awaiting a ruling on the significance of these two statutes read separately together but there's a third component too and that is in this current administration there is then a very strenuous move to amend the twenty five c f r one fifty one theater trust step regulatory framework significantly and to make it much more difficult and more onerous for tribes and the secretary to take on reservation and offer the ration land trust those regulations have been out impose significantly greater timeline burdens upon the tribe to prove things to its own trustee appreciate ultimately to the corpus of the trust the desire of the tribes to repatriate their lands that they lost during the allotment process it's a bit of a preemptive strike so if i understand correctly if you clear on the types of hurdles that local government can impose for example under twenty five c f r one fifty one absent a legislative mandate the local government is entitle several different shots per shot spices the there they would be precluded as a matter of statute and regulation from providing this otherwise extensive avenue for objections of the press and i think there are an abundance of faces off the platted that this court itself including several of the justice because of the local ill feelings in the states in which they live the citizens of this they are often the tribes most deadly enemies that i have cited to death because it's pretty it's one one eight us three seventy five page three eighty four in the actual footage because of the local ill feeling the people of the states where they are found are often their deadliest and and the manifestation in my lifetime working with the tribes our local government tribal relationships in the state of montana and i think according to mr carter you're something that his is not functional or appropriate in the government's view those things really don't case or controversy here or has everything asked for an advisory opinion i do believe that there is an issue for this court i believe there's an issue probably before the court and that's whether the district court interpreting what the  know not having been briefed at all they don't have anything to do with the issue before the court which is just the plain language of the flathead act and the questioning  really are to any attempt to change the subject which is what is the congress has allowed the secretary to chile do and based upon the definition that we provided in our briefing and frankly the mandatory language and the district court got it right and as a result the district court should be firm and the language that the government side and its brief talks about and he has continued to keep me on the fact that in the prior statute there is language it says in his discretion and somehow there's a suggestion that because the congress didn't include that propositional in the mandatory language and again based upon the plain understand plain meaning of the term is authorized the fact that the congress didn't include that propositional phrase this that make this mandatory moreover there seems to be a suggestion in a briefing both in the district court and in this court that there has to be some mandatory significance to the first two sentences in special one section two because concerned about the usefulness and some of the tracks that were in the possession of the tribe and this stash it was designed to allow the secretary of interior based upon a request from the tribes gave her the authority to do this to sell those properties and the tribe did not have that authority based upon the plain language of twenty five u s c for sixty five if finally the subsequent statute also allow the money and the tribal members and that was not something that if you the government was a part of that initial statute and therefore required it required but certainly it would provide some sort of briefed and unless the court has more questions for me at this time i'd be happy to rest power of the authorization to do something the question then is what condition is this congress put on that power and that that's our point that there's basic couple just fundamental flaws with the district court decision and one of them is that the court twice finds that the flat language and that it simply doesn't that's just factually inaccurate and the next part of it that's really confusing to me is that the court seems to treat the concept of off arise asian differently between sections one and section two for again i look at what section one does that and says that those lands shall be required in accordance with the provisions of section two title shall be dealt with in accordance with the provisions of section to two the only portion of the statute that actually addresses title and that applies by reference in section one two section one second as well as section two so you have the same operative language and he just section of the structure and the way that's that's our reading the tris analysis is that our horizon is authorized not authorized with discretion that's certainly a reasonable reading of the statutory language to read discretion into it you have to impute something that congress did not write and that statute and