did to to state at this point these felonies were in no way regarded to his practice in the river in the mortgage industry they construct his personal income tax by two thousand and nine the law was amended the residential mortgage licensing act was occur battering patients and then that given a punishment and suspended or put out for patient care period and then subsequently if the legislature decided in its infinite wisdom to start taking it's a part of it is it is we are taking your license because he can't go back to school he can't take an exam there's nothing prospective he can do to remedy this is not like making a sex offender what is the pres law says you know we're not going to give any discretion you lose it forever it's mandatory it's permanent i believe that your and simple it's really it is that it would seem to me that if you looked in the dictionary looked up in the mortgage industry mr wilson does not contest whether or not the general assembly has the authority to exclude altogether people from participating in the mortgage industry based upon their prior convictions for acts that involve dishonesty his sole submission to the court is that applying this probation to individuals whose convictions predate the adoption of this statute is retroactive and therefore unconstitutional and mr wilson his role and he's wrong for the very simple reason first and foremost that even if you take the broadest interpretation imaginable of the statute the effect of the statute is not  prospect of and we know that because the act that is regulated here is the act of participating in the mortgage industry prospected fully it places a limitation on individuals when they work and they sell mortgages going for and where the act sought to be regulated incurs entirely after the adoption of the statute when a statute is not going to be considered to be retroactive there is an exception to be sure that some courts including the united states supreme court have recognized where it is very clear either from express statement or because of the nature of the the prohibition that the statute was intended to simply add on the  punishment that existed for prior acts that in fact what it's really doing is regulating what came before but that's not the case here and it's not the case because there is a very clear legitimate regulatory and first in protecting against the sorts of predatory lending practices that led congress to adopt the safe act in the first place and the general simply to follow suit and so in light of that extension simply cannot be called retroactive in the first instance and if the court agrees with that a retroactive statute in order for the court to even reach those steps land where i think there's at least some confusion i paul's eyes at least in my briefing and mr wilson's briefing this least some confusion here but landgrab is nothing more than a clearly that you look at what the statute even would constitute a retroactive wall before you get into the land graph analysis and if it's not rhetoric you don't get into yet that's exactly right just right taylor i would be the first to admit from the subjective point of view of mr wells that this may feel kinda but that's not the test the test is an objective test and there are two components to it the first component is what the legislature intend let's begin with the latter because i think that's more directly responsive with respect to what the department did here it made a decision under a regime in which it had discretion the general assembly took away back to scripture and then and then simply imposed a rule that applies respective way and says that the department no longer has the discretion to allow mr wilson to keep his license so it is difficult to say how the department could bind the legislature in the way that mr wilson's is not punitive and that factor is so critical and so important for the simple because this exact same action can be punitive or civil depending on the circumstance in which its original rises a ten thousand dollar fine where it's very clear as it is here that the legislature did not intend for the statute to be shielded the plaintiff bears the heavy burden of the status and through the kennedy factors that the effect of the statute is so plainly punitive i want to address as well mr wilson's argument to the core regarding the idea that there's a difference between license issuance and license renewal and there's actually a very simple answer to that question i  the mortgage loan originator continues to meet the minimum standards for license issuance under section seven dash three that means that every time you try to renew your license you have to meet the exact same standards you would have to meet when you s case justice house as you pointed out my response my first response to the argument that it's previous consent order was issued upon it is in fact that this is a renewal and not the issuance of a new license and whether or not it's a retroactive there are differences whether it's being issued for the first time or being issued for renewal i'm not sure which it is which which argument is being   and at the risk of being repetitive he had rights which were impaired and if there are there this is improper retroactive application as it relates to mr wilson  then addition to taking the discretion away they took away the rights of mr wilson and those similarly situated i want to thank you for your attention i would urge you to enter an order revers