sending to congress something that was adopted as a package by the federal rules committee i understood your honor however polar on both made a distinction if they thought there was it was to the same thing then it would render to read the statute out of the words by the plaintiff would render those words a perfect and of course statutory interpretation should not render any of the words in the statutes  dismissal by the plaintiff federal procedural more controls the characterization of federal procedure and yet you want us to ignore our rule forty one a one characterizes no your strikes me as a problem i don't actually want you to ignore what i want to do is look at well here's the critical distinction that has to be made your honor the to dismiss will rule cases first make a determination under federal procedure law how to characterize the dismissal record and then they apply it in that case under the federal conduct alleging that count was different from any conduct previously alleged and it had to be because the basis for that same only came to light after mr divorce had filed the previous complaints count six represented the first time that mr to work made claims against to a very specific type of dismissal one by a quote notice that's different than the definition that is set forth in the illinois one refiling rule that simply refers to a voluntary  dismissal by the planet they're not the same so when the case is determined in those in the federal to dismissal rule that the federal to dismissal rule applies that doesn't mean that it's necessarily so that the illinois one refining rule would come to the same very clearly identify what sort of dismissals are voluntary by the plaintiff it's under federal rule forty one a one it describes the distinction between voluntary and involuntary one of the involuntary being something for example under rule twelve where the plaintiff jacks where it doesn't want the case to be dismissed here the plaintiffs voluntarily chose to dismiss its case the manner in which you could do it was also defined in federal rule forty one in a one on there are two ways and it depends on whether or not he answers and filed by the defendant one is by filing a notice of dismissal that would have been the trigger under the federal troops to dismissal rule and the other one is  filing a stipulation signed by all parties but in either case make no mistake it's by the act of the plaintiff in filing that stipulation of dismissal signed by all parties under this case and again working to parties that's a voluntary act by the plaintiffs dismissing the case it's exactly what the only one refiling rule provides black and white there's really no gray area there at all there are two cases that we identified not i think that is accurate but how could it be disputed when a stipulation dismissal are entirely filed by the plaintiffs and their lawsuit it's clearly a voluntary act and the fact that the courts don't go into great detail about  why it could be read as something different doesn't mean it does any different the cases as i identified at the beginning cited by the plaintiffs really are in opposite they they relate to a rule that is not at issue here critically there's really nothing at all that's harsh about this result the appellant made very specific strategic decisions in litigating its claims and it's and this court shouldn't relieve them of the consequences of those decisions first the  claims in federal court based on diversity jurisdiction against an l l c and a limited partnership without knowing the citizenship of the specific members or the limited partners as the court i'm sure is aware the system ship of those parties is determined by the individuals who are the members or entities who are the members in the limited partners he did that with the hopes of getting into federal court because it preferred that for him when it turned determined when it came out that there wasn't diversity of citizenship they dismissing this primary claim they have the right to replete it in the state court but they made a strategic decision that rather than pursue those claims in a state court that had already dismissed the claim as pled they would go to the federal court and might have better luck there accordingly they barnes fairly dismissed that case in state court that was their strategic decision to move into the federal courts for and refile their case for the third time having done all of this they have to live with the consequences of those decisions and to relieve them from it it is not appropriate here quickly pointing out on these two additional issues which are the refile claim the statue of limitations first on the refile claim the p do not identify the right legal standard the right legal standard is whether the claim would be barred by the doctrine of res judicata that doesn't require a specific identity doesn't among either the claims or the parties all it has to do is a rise out of the same operative facts and this case a new claim which related to a statement that actions taken against the appellant were not approved by the small business administration that that was clearly central to first and second iteration of these complaints in the first lawsuit at paragraphs thirty one and thirty two and the second complaining that was filed at paragraph thirty and thirty one the appellant alleged that  the that the pardon should be taken actions without small business administration approval the exact same thing that they are now claiming also gave rise to a new claim against an individual and the partner and the  general partner of the partnership so they're really exactly the same claims and the fact that more evidence was obtained later allegedly supporting those claims doesn't mean that it's a different claim on the statute of limitations the last point what they're really claiming here is a breach produce your duty which would have by your statute of limitations and clearly expired years before this complaint was filed they try to preserve and save their claim by arguing that there is a continuing violation but that identified are are do not come within the case on the continuing violation doctrine the continuing violation doctrine identifies very specific additional acts of happened later all as part of one's name and here the later acts that are identified aren't even those of mr redlich they're those of the partnership itself when after the appellant faulted under the partnership the partnership took various actions against the appellant that it was permitted to thank you i just want to return to a few issues that are raised by a police council i think issue here is not whether the dismissal was voluntary or not the question is whether it was just done by a plaintiff's clearly it wasn't a joint stipulation is just that it's joint it can't be affected unilaterally and that matters that matters under the statute the only saving statute which doesn't provide for that and it matters because the case law under rule forty one has drawn that distinction as  also the police when you extensively about the reasons are the basis for why mr morris may have brought his complaints where he did that's not the issue here the merits of the motivations don't go issue here it's the question of what actually occurred