proceedings i realize that question has been raised and that really gets to the second point sander stickney's when and the financial pressures became great files and a quiet title on the property and she properly brought an action to expunge that lien and quiet title it herself is no longer really an action a client title is it i mean you're not asking for a title of the going to be a tax liability under thirty four thirty nine eighty one if i remember the citation correctly with there are three different test for when actual fraud occurs the first one which is what the court below focused on requires that there be a transfer that is fraudulent as to a creditor and if it's time the transportation agreement was executed and the trusts were created there was no creditor in existence  that would have carried over but in this case there was no creditor so under the first test a conveyance cannot be fraudulent because it has to be fraudulent as to some some d but it's really a question of the timing of when things occurred and when the government became a creditor and when the liens arose and this case is please the court my name is terry melton representing the government here as the court may imagine our primary argument is the jurisdictional argument that the court was lacking jurisdiction because although it had jurisdiction at the commencement of th action once the property had been sold and the i r s released its lien there was no longer any jurisdiction under section twenty four ten and then the district court allowed the plane gets to amend her complaint but as we discussed in our brief each of the causes of action alleged in the amended complaint is deficient also for a jurisdictional basis and i could discuss that further but i wanted to go back for just a minute to discussing the merits of the fraudulent would that would make the i r s the creditor his client arose after the transfer was made which supports the district court's finding based on the fact that the court found that there was actual intent to hinder the irises collection efforts i would abilities against a person's assets and what they've done here is try to set aside those assets so that the i r s can get to them and in the reply brief she says that the entire point was to forestall the irises ability to collect against the residence until after and again it's a pretty substantial ability to levy and place liens and foreclose on the assets of the taxpayer to collect the money and the taxpayer doesn't really get to decide when to pay if the taxpayer doesn't pay when the taxes are due then the i r s has a fair amount of control over when to that in my response is based on my rather superficial knowledge of california community property law i have looked into it but i believe that our lien against the residen residence that held as a tenant in common mr stickney had reduced his interest to half of that amount or the pool of money that the i r s have the access to then became sixty thousand dollars and then he gave away the remainder to his children before he conveyed as he conveyed the property into his trust which reduced its value again so i would not say it was a he didn't end up with the same thing at the end as he had had at the beginning although he ended up with the right to live in the house did the district trust i'm not clear about that and i recall thinking about that at the time it seems to me that there's some confusion in terminology the transmutation agreement is what the district court referred to repeatedly and i've seen many of the genesis of the problem here but again that's just interests i don't think i have anything more to say other than i don't think there's anything more to say other than what was said in our brief about the statutes that were raised in the amended complaint as possible grounds for jurisdiction there are reasons that none of those statutes would support the district court's jurisdiction and we point them out in our brief seventy five sections seventy four thirty two and section seventy four thirty three of the internal revenue code give taxpayers some rights against the i r s in terms of erroneous collection action but they are confined to the taxpayer  taxes are being collected and that's not miss a stick me in this case and the only other argument that was made was that there had been some kind of constructive fund set up under the statute under the internal revenue code which is a mechanism that that a third party can use to get a lien removed from property and fight later over who is entitle to the money that's going to come out of the property that had to lean against it but there's no claim that any of the procedures that would support that claim were followed in this case so our position is that what mrs stickney needed to do was to file a claim and her situation is very similar to that of the plaintiff and the u s b williams supreme court case and her failure to file such a refund claim a strange refund suit i agree it's like as i said it's like mrs williams in u s t williams where she wasn't a tax payer but she claimed it was her money that had been used to pay her husband's taxes and just supreme court so that would like to go back just for a moment to the nominee lien issue and the jurisdiction the money was taken it was a voluntary sale in that sense the more money was taken but the money was taken pursu and that really assumes the matter and issue because if that is assuming that it was proper because it was proper to record the nominee lien i would submit to you that trust is never proper to record a nominee lien against a trustee that's the trust itself is fraudulent and i can give you a quick example of one where it would be if charles stickney had transfer on timing wouldn't be technically but that would be a proper case for the recording of a nominee lien because she interact is standing both as the trustee and the beneficiary you know in his shoes but that isn't