loitering and whether or not he was proved beyond reasonable doubt to have been wavering as it is defined in the statute alternatively whether that definition is on constitutionally play and must either be construed in a definition of the statute i'm sure the court is familiar but and that the facts are pretty simple and not really in dispute he drove a friend who didn't have a license to the school so she could deliver lunches to her grandchildren she was in the school building for what she for five minutes and returned by the time she returned a police officer had pulled up behind mr howard he was parked across the street from the school hit his car encroached into a crosswalk an officer at least in the opening brief here is the sitting idly provision because it's the one that specifically relates to whether or not you are in a vehicle so we're i guess cast with the question of what did the legislature mean when he said sitting idly because of sure i think this is kind of a point of debate and i think counsel for the state is also pointing to the remaining language you know as kind of are the same thing you're staying in the schools on although we suggest you can drive around you know you could circle the and mostly drive around the block can you you know is there a time limitation on it that other jurisdictions have similar legislation there's nothing no case in the that i can turn out of that seeking of addressing this particular line of maybe this is where we ought to look to what other jurisdictions are on the how they construed their statutes in the face of morass in the face of these broad loitering provisions that don't specifically define for what purpose something might be proper or in in star a south dakota case which we pointed to in our reefs lawyer and wavering in a community say stone was prohibited and it was defined as remaining for a time and under circumstances that a reasonable person would believe was for the purpose of observing or contacting minors so as a purpose physically related to you know not just your status as a child sex offender but what you're doing in that area what either could be inferred is your purpose or what sort of exclusion zones and child sex offenders were prohibited from loitering in those exclusion zones which is defined as remaining are circulating around the place under circumstances that would mean a reasonable person to believe the purpose or  only victims might be found in a place that had no link to why the offender was was loitering in the area and court construe that statute in such a way to require that the presence of the loitering be tied to the presence of the that provision to either wrote contract or communicate so loitering and either approaching contact here communicating with a child under the age of eighteen years old not present in school  contact them because you get the sex offenders can still be in the school zone if they're driving through if they're driving around apparently under this statute this doesn't accomplish that it's too vague it doesn't tell you purpose or overt act requirement because there was no question that he was not there for any purpose related to observing child ren trying to contact children satisfy any sort of sexual you know i look at the language of the statute and i think that the legislature could very easily that's the you just can't stop by a school for any improper and that this wasn't the sort of thing that the legislature intended to fall within the reach of this did taking it from the parks provision which would make perfect sense to have that seen language within five hundred feet of a park or five hundred feet of a school in attempting to approach or contact to communicate or teeth suit to have a purpose similar prohibited in considering the nature of the constitutional attack in this case i think the court's analysis is limited to basically the staff and circumstances in this case whatever might happen to some hypothetical situation is totally r just to speak it i want to address your point again about loitering versus just being there other provisions of nine point three seem to have it more probably just being in a place as a sex offender subsection it there's an awful for a child sex includes vehicle when you talk about sitting idly which i think would be one indication that your vehicle is not part of the remaining i also think it remaining is so probably construed to just staying in place without any kind of things consul is talking about would be covered and you know he says that's not relevant to the argument here but i think it is well the president talked about time you know very good right if you're just there but that's what the legislature said a not you're in a vehicle which to me would exclude the other two because they don't make reference to be standing sitting idly whether or not in a vehicle or remaining in the loitering definition but again the mean our position and maintain that they use loitering for a reason they find this week her reason they didn't need to simply vann the presence of the individual within five hundred feet for any or all purposes because they would have sat they said in other parts of the