we know all of this you have unlimited time there are some very difficult legal issues here can we start with the question of whether there is an ambiguity as to the side phrase and as you ran through that question please answer the question of whether we can look to happily the standard for determining whether the critical phrase such members is envied us here is whether that phrase as this court put it in oh god where you deal in all this yet though whether it is at least plausible that there are two issue here but we're now in the st definition of india that decision is never the less instructive in terms of how one goes about determining whether a phrase like such members here is in fact  and consistent a line of cases that when turning the word now in the context of when a statute is data back it's as a point at time in which congress actually acted that statute rd the supreme court looked at  own or in other sections of the statute where there was an intention of congress to refer term don't forget that now we're here after in contrast on each of those three points here a pelleas phaedo show that there is any ambiguity whatsoever on the point of dictionary definitions there is no dictionary definition they have said to work on which the district court the line that says that such necessarily refers back to the entirety class nothing no point in fact the th circuit and christine looked at dictionary definitions and came to the exact opposite conclusion of the district court here because are you saying the suction is an inherently a canons of construction work or answers the initial question of ambiguity what i am saying though is that looking at the statute as reading any statute on its face courts take into consideration the background in light of the is not hypothetical it is meant to capture a particular group and those are indians that were residing on a reservation at the time the sensex using of members of a recognized indian tribe residing on an indian reservation reservation if you w hobby indian tribe was not under federal jurisdiction in fact according to the legislative history to which we've cited the federal government was nowhere to be exist but they were living on a reservation in south carolina at exactly the time jurisdiction because they were recognized indian tribe on that was on reservation land in other words the mashie wanted not been exactly those characteristics there's been no terminations whether they were under federal jurisdiction direction in fact in the only piece in this circuit which this court has had occasion to consider whether such necessarily refers back to the entirety of an unbroken into seating clogging as a police say without commas other housing acts into discrimination provisions would apply to a single family owner look at the proviso it provides that an individual owner is not subject to those anti discrimination provisions and less among other things or she does not own more than three such single family houses so the question was whether the phrase such single family houses necessarily refers to the entirety but that unbroken here to see implies quote any single family house on the highest level only ballot there or that the rod intent of the statute to see as many channels and round as possible provided benefits indians under the act certainly the nd definition it particular quo reservation indians as a separate category of indians and so although i don't have my fingertips them all at the moment all the other potential definitions of india certainly that's one distinct out of this court's recognized that the supreme court is not reversed on and on definitions are reflective of the broad intent to really entirely the reverse the indian tribes treatment by the united states thank you thank you four and what congress was intending and clearly if you look at the legislative history there you see in fact if you commissioner john collier very strong i will add that the described as the principal trafficker of the ira coming to congress with a very ambitious program you see the senate in keeping with the from our perspective it is about the plaintext and i think the there you can't look at a matter of grammar syntax basic rules find it actually stated in justice stevens dissenting carcieri and you know his main wage is directly just kind of continuing the idea of there being every descendant it's going to be part of and subject to the category of members of recognized tribes under federal jurisdiction he puts them together the supreme court in united states purchased john just in reciting the statu puts them together and this court in two thousand five hundred kurt cherry adopting the language of united states versus john naturally puts them together there isn't a way to split them up ar other then to say well we think we should redraw lines to congress actually drew we think that there's something here that should be done differently even though the text of the statute doesn't give you a clue there's nothing in the language as your honor was saying there's nothing in the text and this is totally unlike hogarth and totally unlike christic where the statutes were confounding the court even said  master piece of obfuscation in christic this corps in hobart was calling the use of the language in the term such curious and using such ten times and having to get to the point where in that case you're looking at all kinds of inconsistency in the fact that the nd proviso of would be entirely wiped out under the fair housing act if you gave the reading of just be plain text there's gotta be to anything else to find the language does make sense there isn't any inconsistency that can honestly be this standard have any other reading and i believe that's the intense can you just there my understanding of why you are is that there has to be an interpretive clue something actually in the text something in the structure of the statute itself that would allow zero reading that locks off half of an antecedent phrase such members naturally if you just if you gave it to a one hundred it was teachers they would all say it includes the old antecedent there isn't anything  shows they inserted the under federal jurisdiction requirement for the st definition they also increased the blood quantum requirement for the rd definition from twenty five percent or more to fifty percent or more so congress was trying to narrow the field what they were trying to do with the nd category is to have at it again the plain reading a vat is the descendants this reservation of residency requirement that is different from the st definition and it is just like the supreme court in part cherry with justice thomas in his majority opinion and justice pryor and concurring opinion specifically looking at the collier memo for the very same mel and finding in history justice thomas in his majority opinion looked at it said this is not an usually reliable source but we'll have to defer and justice prior use it in his analysis as he didn't consider legislative history to resolve the question of whether now was ambiguous or not i would say now is a whole lot more ambiguous than such now actually has you know you can now in here after we're there all you can look to legislative history of these contemporaneous pronouncements but to check on the reading that is naturally coming from the taps that kind of chat is in the language of this court and it's also in the language of justice thomas so it's a limited consideration of a single circular to get you to the point of understanding oh yeah this is the nd category make perfect sense to be a draft or end the implementor as the indian commissioner he's saying and that circular two years after  for that we're going to give you it out in the field you don't even have an entry for definition to indians they're going to be just a handful under old and whether they're minors or indians category eight group residing under servatius who are really tribal indians that the ira congress wanted to sweep up but wouldn't have any way to do it because they're not enroll members of the truck so that is the purpose of that nd category at work completely insane with the st and the rd category is a standalone that doesn't require any kind of tribal affiliation and you know this is coming back to just reading the text as written with out having to go beyond but if you do go beyond it like the supreme court did in carcieri you can look to the  of the ira and that would include other things and certainly the the indians who were brought within the ira would typically have other members in role with the office of indian affairs they would get services through that and would otherwise benefit so i think that that's the way in which the ira was to use these definitions to basically serve the population is defined by the three definitions which the supreme court virtually said are detail and unyielding and justice prior said to make it your position is the fact that they're used for different purposes i say i'm over my time loss or other questions about the no thank you thank you and i think this is the appropriate analysis for this court all of here is to consider whether by looking at dictionary definitions the case law in the natural meaning by looking at the structure of the statute the meaning was clear here it is not and i think that that is the appropriate for this court to consider under i want people i said before about the analysis under car share here what my brother argues is that simply the natural meaning struggling to understand your honor it is not most natural me it is not necessarily the most natural reading the consistent theme of dictionary definitions and the case law that when the parties you have  you to draw the line there your honor we're not drawing any lines we're not arguing that that is the right answer because the st question is not whether the reading is right or one reading is more natural or another's less natural the question is whether more than one meeting is permissible and because it's not crystal clear that such necessarily refers back to the entirety of you know to see implies including because of the incoherence that results that you know didn't question my brother we resulting in duty and when we have been cuti we don't have three principles of statutory construction that are not disputed that required this court to interpret the the the such language in favor drafting history of the statute indicates an effort to narrow rather than who will expand and that that should take precedence over the sort of general statutory or you know  interpretive presumptions in favor of of indian tribes you're the st point that i would make is that by his reliance on that that legislative history isn't the lines on that it's reflective of the fact that he needs to resort to absolutely nothing in the legislative history on that specific point of what the nd definition means in the such members phrase i'm nobody what do you say about the drafting history which shows an inclination to too narrow rather than expand  is to strike a body blow at the twin evils of economic and social situation of the indians including through the quote sinister liquidation of indian property which is exactly what we're talking about here this was not just that you meant to nibble around the edges  but rather to hit a body blow against the centuries of mistreatment of indian tribes by the united states and it was a business it was far reaching and for that reason among other things a cornerstone purpose of the artery in this again is from the legislative history was to quote provide for the acquisition through purchase of land for indians now they in this who are anxious and fitted to make a living on such lane tell your better argument was the didn't want to repeat myself but in the opening course the structure of the statute reflects that there are three distinct channels that congress established through which indians could obtain benefits under the indian reorganization using the language and the st ruling