be clear that time has been allotted to you to make any statement on behalf of the defend so if in the course of this argument this morning  have anything further to say i don't want to interrupt any other council's decision unlike you to tell me if that's that's a potential for you in this if you hear the others are you this morning i rebuttal ok well that was not what we originally were intending to do when he see that his time so but let me i hope i can just tell you i'm going to start with the promised that you have eight minutes ok thank you so this morning i'm representing mr rush and then also codefendant kristen chapman on the issue regarding their entitlement to have their pleas bake a they had because they were based upon the mistaken assumption that prior convictions under indiana law qualified as felony drug offenses under section eight hundred and fifty one miss eisenman a separately going to address the illinois issues as to mr chapman under the  government agreed to notice one prior friends under section eight fifty one dollars thereby reducing the defendant's mandatory minimum sentence from life to twenty years that was the reason they accepted the cli's the government does not dispute that plain error occurred if indiana criminalize a surprise or category of methamphetamine and state then federal law and if that is the case the court should vacate the pleas and asters you in your arguments to the court in your briefing you mr chatman mr russians prior indiana convictions together and it seems to me that they are separate and distinct and there are stronger arguments for one of them category bad a categorical approach and elder in the circuit that breath and differential and differentiation disqualifies the predicate offenses regardless of whether their possession but how does it come in for mr rush statute your honor we believe that that relates to appear or adulterated still relates to the definition of math in the statute that's including i s and that is our position so in fact we still believe that there's a broader federal broader state statute than federal and for on their end to the extent that there is some difference they have not raised that challenge themselves so we think that that is not a relevant point at this point in time and  agreement these arguments are before us in the context of a claim that the police were not knowing involuntary because we were dealing with appeal waivers for three of the defendants in this case that would from this court that that statute is not divisible that's the only thing that the government came forward with as to why those two would qualify and without those two even if this court found that the indiana predicate qualified at the time he made his flee and again the government has to come forward with any other arguments against those two predicates so much this court has any other questions i'll reserve my remaining time are i thank you argument that you're presenting here is different than the argument that was presented to the district courts the argument before the district court was about whether or not she supervised five participants individuals who she did supervise according to this just report in the government weren't part of the conspiracy so they don't qualify given that you didn't raise that argument before the district court why haven't you either waived  solace manager or supervisor a knowing participant and there is nothing in the records that shows that the court made the factual determination that would have had the guidelines apply or the would create that that particular argument was never raised with the district court namely that one of the individuals who she supervised actually participated conspiracy it appeared that none of the parties addressed that at most possibly forfeited however i believe based on because she talked about in her post statements change her story a little bit as it went on but she talked about how st he didn't want to send these wire transfers to a place in mexico where they didn't have any family members and then ultimately he said he would why wouldn't that provide sufficient evidence for a preponderance finding that because i believe also in her statement she stated that freddie did not like jose her new boyfriend there were allegations that there was a fight between  had had a history of doing that but she didn't have a history of sending it to this particular place and she didn't have any family member she admitted to the agent at this particular location correct however there is nothing in the record that indicates that party had any knowledge that it was illegal or that it involved drug activity and i believe the district court needed to make some type the finding that they were knowing participants in it simply did not do that mr bennett is it was thirty five years old at the time of assent and what we are looking at based upon the two hundred and twenty five months that he was sentenced to that this would place him in his fifty's when he's needed rehabilitation for his drug addiction there's no evidence before the trial court or this court that the additional time in prison would necessarily further benefit mr bennett or other disparity argument that data doesn't say anything about criminal history of the individual defendants were reflected in their or other comparative factors so how can you rely on the disparity argument on that and continue to benefit society upon his release and by allowing mr bennett hour and two to leave sooner this would provide more time for him to still stand on our original positions on whether or not chapman's convictions qualify to the extent necessary to preserve review however with an unheard rodriguez case controlling his illinois convictions we do concede that they no longer qualify and then would therefore necessitate a remand because the error would not be harmless in that case with regard to the remaining arguments i do have several points on rebuttal with regard to attent court president with regard to statutory construction specifically the statutory construction that taylor has has mentioned which is that construction cannot dictate an implausible result and what the defendant in russia is requesting is just that if the court were to read that the specific definition with  controlled substances code number for methamphetamine which further gives credence to the argument that indiana is nearing the controlled substances act and is not in fact defining it more broadly statutes your honor i do believe that the control in question regardless of the statute that the defendants receive convictions under that the control in question is how is nothing kind of mean defined in indiana and so yes i do agree that post miranda statements regarding the fact that she asked her son to make the transfers in his own name that he initially did not want to do those transfers and then subsequently decided to do a transfer and told her then he was not going to do another one you then successfully committed three additional transfers that that by itself shows that he knew what he was doing was wrong i think that circumstantially shows that he knew what he was doing was wrong and that it was criminal there was no other reason for though i think his relationship as well to misc is telling for his knowledge of the criminality this entire organization was family based the two heads of the organizations were brothers him so i think that is another factor that shows that he knew the commonality and again your honor with the fact that there are two permissible views on the court chose this one it is not clearly erroneous and if there are no further questions with regard to that and his argument completely overlooks the fact that the sentencing commission with the three thousand five hundred and fifty three a factors has not only considered unwarranted disparities but they've considered unwarranted does not take into consideration with the sentencing guidelines take into consideration the defendant as an individual and the fact that he had two prior felony conviction for drug offenses he had two prior possession offenses for go and he had a larger role and reinvest in the organization he went straight to the source so taking all of those things into consideration the court weighed and considered all of those as he laid out her sentence and just briefly it appears the government is trying to rely upon legislative history without providing the current legislative history to support its arguments we're relying on the general proposition of statutory interpretation regarding interpretation like such as sports are given they're common and ordinary meaning hard to apply that kind of construction to the term isomer but that's my understanding of your argument th because in the california statute there was a further definition that excluded  this court would need to have it narrowly drafted because as counsel for rush pointed out if you look at the indiana statute you really see that for amphetamine and methamphetamine and they're right next to each other and for amphetamine  there is simply no evidence in the record that any of these three individuals had criminal knowledge of the activity they were never indicted they never admitted they did or indicated they know the illegal activity and they simply were not