may please the court counsel my name is daniel horowitz with the federal public defender's office and i represent mr john block in the subpoena he raises two issues first whether the just report made the necessary findings to impose three years of supervised release the second issue is whether the district court here by not orally pronouncing the conditions of supervised release that it did and furthermore by not making the necessary thirty five eighty three the findings to support the conditions of supervised release as for the first issued to validly imposed period of supervised release the judge must provide at the time of sentencing a statement of reasons related to the statutory sentence factor set forth eighteen u s c thirty five fifty three and a the district court didn't do that and the judge merely said that three years of supervision was appropriate so that does not satisfy all many times must a judge do it the judge should explain it before why can't a judge who's explained something how one does but i just want to make sure that this is your argument that a judge if the judge goes back to the transcript of his first hearing her sentence and just reads aloud everything he said before into the record again that would be fine but if the judge tries to incorporate it by reference he has to be reverse that seems well very absurd i'm not aware of anything in this relevant statutes that allow the judge to do this stuff and i'm not sure that there is the judge didn't retain their authority to do just one judge use the ropes no if that was an acceptable procedure we'd have to look to what the judge said at the previous sentencing hearing and i don't think the judge said enough that under thirty five eighty three c to satisfy the thirty five fifty three a requirements and furthermore if the park the practice has been by stating thirty five fifty three eight findings the judge has by implication this is what this court recently said and armor said enough to impose a period of supervised release that's contrary to the statutory interpretation came in that supreme court's announced numerous cases it's going through redundancy we have separate provisions in the statute because we have separate things that issue there's the length of sentence that's relevant to thirty five fifty three a day in those determinations need to be made separately from the determinations of thirty five eighty three see which again corporates thirty five fifty three factors but they are two different things and if we are to accept the reasoning of armor any case that says by saying it once or saying it previously we satisfy the requirements i think that's  contrary to the rule against redundancy it would make thirty five eighty three see ornamented and i don't think that congress ever intended that to be the case i moved into the second issue unless there are further questions on the first and that is the supervisor these conditions are invalid because they were not orally pronounced of course it's related to the first issue we're back to the same question why can't somebody incorporate something by reference and my other has and i'm imposing there's a list of conditions it's in the yes all right there just list the judge says i'm imposing everything on that lives and your argument seems to be that he has to read the list into the record  never enough for the judge just to point and say that's what i'm doing that's correct has kept what what is it that requires that well certainly this court is presidential opinion borders welfare act there has to be more for which the court reporter can charge by the word no i'd rather be last sat on supervised release and don't impose it or the conditions but if the judges want to do it has to be nine correctly and it wasn't you know happens is that a session on asking is what requires it if something requires it of course it has to be done certain what requires it capice one capital in this court's decision in capice requires oral pronouncement of the conditions of supervised release for them to ballot weren't were not you're not dealing with my question which is why an oral pronouncement cannot incorporate any other document by reference i completely understand the proposition that if there is a conflict between the world and the written judge the or said the last time but that be harmful or i think that it would be i think that's inconsistent with the procedural requirements and we need to remember how many but there's a really sick concept of harmless error right yes so when you know the harmless blockers heard it once in their hearing i don't think that he had heard it go on and i'd have to go back and look at the sentencing transcripts from the prior proceeding but i think they were summarily adopted that was the practice prior to thompson so i don't think that prior to this hearing that judge had gone through as exhaustively as he did or a should say especially because i don't think that he did it sufficiently and i mean that but i think that's a problem here so even if we were to try to link this back to prior proceedings you have to look at the prior proceedings and i don't think that it was sufficiently done then and certainly i think that we have grounds of though i'm mindful of your hundred five month prison sentence ultimately in three years of supervised release unthought yes and it's not what my my point was to get by that is now this is going to take place until at least eight years from now he's been in for a little while i'm not certain what his release date is but it's into the future certainly do any of these have any time or time sensitive given his  age he's not especially old and he'll be under the conditions but they're not time sensitive i guess in the sense that he is immediately imprisoned and they don't take effect until he's released but he is young and will be under the conditions for many decades may please the court good morning your highest judge posner to address your questions the district court did incorporate by reference the previous conditions in the first two sentencings but they were different conditions and so we went in to argue harmless error in that aspect in this case the district court took this court's guidance and thompson siegel to heart it reduced the number of conditions from twenty two to thirteen and then four days before sentencing it circulated this notice or proposed conditions as far as your questions judge easterbrook we believe that incorporation by reference both complies with capice and the concerns expressed in the cases cited there in judge posner i think you hit the nail on the head the the concerns of those cases is that the defendant should be able to stand there object to a sentence know his sentence as he leaves the court and that's what happened in this case the court confirmed at the beginning of this third sentencing hearing that he had read this notice of proposed supervised release he said he had he objected to one of the conditions and he knew what the conditions were they were being imposed on him as he left the courthouse that day and that complies with the concerns of capice the court orally pronounced the conditions and said i'm breaking by reference those conditions that you've admitted you read that you would i'm sorry that you've admitted that you've read that he had read it and keep in mind this is both the defendant speaking on his own behalf and his attorney who both said that they had read them  in terms of the length of supervision this court in armor said that the justifications for the term of imprisonment also can provide justification for the length of supervised release and that makes sense because they're part of the same sentence and the supervisor the statute tells us i'm sorry tell the district court judge to look at the thirty five fifty three factors it says look at the same factors that you consider for the term of imprisonment except for one don't look at a two way but if the same factors and the court in this case did consider all those factors extensively considered mr black's five previous convictions the court said he had trouble with supervised release the court to the fact that he had violated probation or had his probation revoked four times failed to comply with community service for at times the court considered the thirty five fifty three factors in this case that in terms of the challenges to the substantive opinions and the substantive conditions themselves i think as we stand here today that the landscape of the laws very different than mr when mr block filed his opening brief this court's issued opinions in armor and douglas in poland and speed that i believe deal with all of his objections and unless you think conditions are either identical virtually identical and this court rejected the same if the conditions are largely similar to what's recently been found sufficient pool in armor that doesn't get us where we need to go we need to start with whether the procedure was correct in the first place and the two arguments that we made the principal arguments and every show that it's not irrespective of the specifics of the conditions and i will again rely on the fact that supervised release and the length of sentence are two different things in the statutory factors that need to be assessed have to be addressed with the idea that those things serve different purposes the length of incarceration length of supervision and again i will go to the rule of redundancy because the government's interpretation not to mention what armor does