proceed thank you your honor and met please the court my name is cliff pirlo i'm in a system attorney general and i'm here on behalf of the people of the state of illinois and beyond i secretary of state when the defendant in this case aaron jackson applied for an only driver's license he answered no to the following question is your driver's license or privilege to obtain a license suspended revoked canceled or refused by any state under this for any name that wasn't true in fact since his he pled guilty in one thousand nine hundred seven to driving under the influence of alcohol the defendant had been prohibited from driving what's more only one year after the suspension of his driving privileges the defendant was arrested and charged with driving while his driving privileges were suspended nevertheless because this inaccuracy was not detected the illinois secretary of state granted the defendant's application for a driver's license this case arises out of an event that took place several years after that the defendant at a routine traffic stop was identified to have been driving he was then sharjah with driving with while his driving privileges were suspended and so the fundamental issue in this case is whether it violates the due process clause of the only and federal constitution to prevent the defendant from arguing that he lacked a criminal purpose by driving on an illinois highway and to instead impose absolute liability for driving on a suspended license the circuit court here held that does that decision was wrong and this court should reverse it and it's wrong because the general assembly simply did not go beyond any of the limitations that have been identified by this court or the united states supreme court for when it may exercise discretion to impose absolute liability moreover there is nothing about the driver's license that the defendant obtained following his inaccurate application that changes that constitutional analysis and so i think it's there at least for the limitations that have been identified by the federal court system and this court for when absolute liability is improper as a matter of law i think it's common ground between the parties that two of those limitations are not issue here first this is not a circumstance in which the general somebody has eliminated the requirement of mens rea from a crime it would have been an offense a common law and second this is not a case that involves wholly innocent conduct and i want to be clear about what i mean when i say wholly innocent conduct wholly innocent conduct as this court has defined it most recently in holland but also in carpenter madrigal is conduct that is not germane to the purpose of the legislative purpose that led to the imposition of absolute liability and i don't think there can be any reasonable argument here that prohibiting individuals who are not legally competent to drive goes beyond the legislative purpose of creating a statute criminalizing driving while you're driving privileges are suspended and so that brings us to the other two  this is not a cut this one of them is there is a due process limit on the extent of criminal penalties that can be imposed through an absolute liability statute but this case certainly does not trigger that  that concern as this court made clear and people against men are anything as high as a class four felony is not an constitutionally severe penalty in this case the driving with a suspended license statu a class a misdemeanor most of the time and as this court made clear in lucas there is a sentence unhandsome and after that mr meaner offense has been proven based on the circumstances that led to the suspension but based upon men are and the united states supreme court's decision in staples against the united states i think it's very clear that the mere fact that there is a potential sentencing in handsome and to a class four felony does not trigger constitutional infirmity and that then brings us to what i think is the most disputed element of this case which is whether this statute is a legitimate public welfare or public safety offense and what we mean by public welfare or public safety offense is exactly what the united states supreme court and this court is affirmed going all the way back to justice jackson's opinion in more set against the united states it is an offense that is designed where there is a high probability of potential harm regardless of the intent of the wrongdoer and whether the harm occurs or not is a matter of sheer fortuity and to some extent luck and that is precisely what the law prohibiting driving with a suspended driver's license is it is a law that is designed to prevent the probability of harm that exists any time an incompetent driver  on the road gets on an illinois road or highway and the what the touchstone at least based upon both more sat and then in lambert against california the touchstone for when this is appropriate is the concept of notice and i want to be clear that there are real the term notice is used in a very loose fashion throughout this case and i think it's at the horror of the circuit courts misunderstanding here there is actual notice which is what the defendant is arguing that he lacked in this case because he had obtained a driver's license there is on this representation there is statutory notice under the driver suspension law which requires that notice be mailed to the last known address of anyone who has their driving privileges suspended and then there is constitutional notice as the united states supreme court has identified it and as this court has identified it and that is that there is a settled expectation of regulation over an activity and such that an ordinary person of reasonable intelligence of experience would expect that that activity on the case of possession case that that particular item would be regulated and we clearly have that here it is hardly a secret that driving is a highly regulated activity it certainly wasn't a secret to the defendant in this case he went to the trouble of applying for a driver's licen so it seems very clear that the defendant had all of the constitutional notice he was required to to have in order to in order to recognize that he could be engaging in potentially illegal act to illegal issue but build this case around this driver's license that he obtained through this inaccurate application and it seems to me that there are two ways in which the defendant could mean to rely on the driver's license the first would be to argue that that driver's license had the effect of restoring his driving privileges in illinois if our burden under the driving the driving with a suspended driver's license statute is to prove beyond a reasonable doubt two things that he drove on in illinois highway and that at the time he drove on an illinois highway that his driving privileges were suspended the defendant could potentially be arguing here that we can't meet our burden on that second element but our inability to meet our burden on an element of the crime is not a basis for declaring the statute unconstitutional and so i think it's common ground that to the extent that the offended wants true ally on this driver's license he's primitive to do so as a defense under that element of the statue oh absolutely i don't think it's a terribly effective defense for the simple reason that as this court made clear in people again stronger his driving privileges couldn't have been restored based upon a driver's license application that didn't disclose that his driving privileges were revoked at the time he was driving on an illinois highway but he's certainly free to make that argument and the second argument he could be meaning to make is that this driver's license effectively negated the notice at his constitutional notice and i think that that fell short because for a number of reasons first as a practical matter  illinois law requires and second if there is any ambiguity at that point i certainly think it was removed when only one year after the suspension he was arrested and charged and subsequently convicted of driving with a suspended driver's license so certainly the defendant had to have had notice that he was submitting and an accurate application his defense than would simply amount to i forgot well i didn't understand and i submit that as due process matter that simply cannot be an adequate defense it would simply thwart the entire purpose behind making driving with a suspended driver's license an absolute liability offense in addition i want to be clear here that the defendant is in essence arguing that he should be big better off because he submitted an inaccurate driver's license application and was essentially able to persuade the state of illinois to give him a driver's license it cannot be the case that as a constitutional matter you are better off misrepresenting the facts of the state then you are accurately representing to the state that you were driving privileges revoked and then not getting a driver's license that isn't what the due process clause of either the state or the federal constitution requires and i would urge this court not to embrace such a standard and so it seems to me that the circuit court here committed a fundamental error by declaring the statute declaring the driving with a suspended driver's license statute unconstitutional here and dismissing the indictment at the outset of the proceedings and unless in a specific questions from this court at this time i would just simply urge the court to recognize the infirmity of the constitutional holding by the circuit court and remember this case for trial question what's your understanding of the record was found unconstitutional and did they do the federal chief justice kilbride it's not clear under the record the court did cite both federal and state constitutional principles but i think that this court's decision in myanmar is relatively clear that the state constitution is in lockstep with the federal constitution when it comes to the due process line that's the limit on absolute due process clause and so i don't think that there's a great deal of ambiguous i don't think that there whatever ambiguity exists there i don't think it's terribly consequential best i understand that the ruling is unconstitutional as applied close quote that that is offended not just not official strike of the statute that chief justice kilbride that is what the circuit court that's what the circuit court said it was doing in this case i think we might quibble whether or not that this truly was an as applied holding because the substance of the decision is that the due process clause requires or entitles a defendant to proof of an element of mens rea and it's difficult to conceive of why some people would have a constitutional right to proof of a particular element while others would not i'm certainly not aware of any other case in which that's been declared to be a constitutional princip to the notion that this was an inaccurate driver's license application but i don't think that that is the most critical misrepresentation here the most important average that he knew  this use this week to get around well i certainly contributes to that notion justice frame and i think by misrepresenting that his driving privileges were suspended that had that profound profoundly consequential effect on ho driving driver's license application was reviewed here there are two different processes that there are two parallel paths for obtaining a driver's license one involves applying for the first time this is what every sixteen seventeen eighteen year old in the state goes for who gets it goes through when they get a driver's license it involves a drive test and eye test and a written test that is the problem the process that the defendant went through here in order to get a driver's license there is a second process when you're driving privileges have been previously suspended that requires a much more onerous examination of your driver competence and in a case such as this were driving privileges were suspended based upon an alcohol related offense that involves an investigation prior to a hearing before the secretary of state's office into the substance any substance abuse issues alcohol drug use that sort of that manner of thing so the defendant essentially evaded the only nene's under illinois law for getting your driving privileges reinstated by as a result of submitting a driver's license application that didn't place him into the pile that would have forced him to go through this more onerous examination the if the court concluded from the record that the defendant here did no i don't think that the court would necessarily have to address the constitutional question it could simply remain and on the grounds that this is improper application of a constitutional principle i wouldn't i would urge the court not to go down that road here because i think that this does require a degree of clarity here whether defendant knew or not that his driving privileges were suspended he still has the obligation to submit napal accurate driver's license application and he is still perceive a good from driving on the highways of the state of illinois now to the extent that the senate wants to offer some sort of human against the state i suppose he's free to do so is an affirmative sense to a jury but that doesn't rise to the level of constitutional imperative that would require the dismissal of the indictment at the outset of proceedings evers i'm an attorney with the state of pulp defender in mount vernon illinois representing mr jackson in this case as this court is where mr jackson was issued a driver's license by the only secretary of state on february twenty fourth two thousand and six and getting that license he used just correct name is correct date of birth and his correct social security number admittedly he answered no to the question that the state just read and the state points out but this would a misrepresentation and accuracy the question is whether this was a knowing fraud and i believe that is a jury question i don't think that the state really fully comes to terms with what that means in terms of that is a jury question because under the state's line of client was fifteen years old license was revoked suspended is should prevent the state from charging him with driving i believe that he got the license buyable defense before a jury and that simply the secretary of state saying that this is fraudulent act does not away from what they argued in the circuit court and in the circuit court they certainly argued that this was a fraudulent act and they relied upon this court's decision in people forces turner and which this court ruled that obtaining a driver's license by fraud can not be a defense to driving while a license suspended and the very important point turner is that that defense was presumed to the jury and rejected and in turn or this court up held the jury verdict finding that there was this fraudulent act and it was much more blatant and it was much more knowing in turner than and this case and turner he used a different name but he also testified that he never received notice says the name of frank turner of his suspension and that he always used carry for his driver's license application well what i understand them to argue now specifically from the reply brief is that it's really in consequential that the license is irrelevant  irrelevant whether it's admissible as to the mental state because driving with a suspended license isn't is an absolute it's a very circular loop of logic on that in their reply brief the state says it would be admissible that it would be something that could be presented to the jury but then they do not explain how the jury is going to be evaluating that and how that is a defense and basically that defense is the same as a perjury prosecution they would have to show that he no we really putdown no to commit that fraud i don't believe that the record can show either way on this i believe that is very possible that he did not understand did not know when he put down  to that question but that was untruthful or that was wrong with the state administratively suspended his driver's license he was fifteen years old he had never been given a driver's license he had all i can say is that sixteen year olds are not very bright sometimes and do not understand that over the passage of time that his knowledge of bad his license was suspended and privilege to obtain a license was suspended there is a very big legal difference between the privilege and the actual license again he never then and asked for a drivers license he was fifteen the secretary of state administratively did that the secretary of state administratively issued this  driver's license number to him and so what he know and what he thinks is occurring when he applies in two thousand and six and it is a very open question but it's why i'm having difficulty understanding your argument i mean how do you address the fact you know that you you parroted what they said they said it doesn't matter he knows he doesn't know those that matter suspended license absolute liability and i really don't care what he knows don't care when he signed up whether it was fraudulent or not thrive and that certainly is the state's argument right so but you seem at least in the first portion of this argument to be talking about what he knew or didn't  what he knows goes to whether he can rely upon us driver's license and it would be fundamentally unfair to have him convicted of this offense when he is issue driver's license and is not knowingly committing that offense so so basically you're saying there is a mens rea record there would have to be apparently everybody has a years and years and it's an assumption that there is no minister a requirement for this very unusual factual circumstance and it is a very unusual factual circumstance counsel you couldn't close you said fundamentally unfair so we're getting close to a constitutional argument but that's my question just what is your constitutional argument here  some of the questions that were asked was this an estate costs in the us its constitution is this applied or facial challenge i'm not really clear if you exactly what is your constitutional argument here the constitutional argument would be that is fundamentally unfair under both the due process and illinois constitution and the united states constitution to convict someone of driving while a license suspended when they actually believe that they have a ballot driver's license that was issued by the state of illinois and he had that driver's license now whether he although your honour's would be able to read into the statute this requirement simply because your honour's construe statutes all the time and you could say that this is a requirement that we just have not been faced with or recognized before now but it is a very circular loop of logic for the state it's a very convenient one for them too because it makes things very simple the simple part is that if they were prosecuting him for perjury and answering no to the question that they read and it's a very as i said is very long and detailed they would have to prove that he knowingly answered no no we had to be false honour's look at that and say this is basically the same thing that we have to have for driving while a license suspended in this situation because it would just be fundamentally unfair to convict him of this when they're not bothering to charge him with perjury not bothering to convict him of perjury but going to simple route and just saying that we don't have to prove that because it's an absolute liability  i'm not sure exactly what that meant but when i pick up your brief it talks completely about what you're talking about now and the state should have charged him with a fraudulent act and get a jury trial on that what's your argument with regard to simply the the fact that he was charged with driving while license suspended that has been held to be an absolute liability offense we would have to hold that it is not an absolute liability offense in order to uphold the trial court is that correct i believe that  pleasantly decided that it's not an absolute liability offense when you go back to turner now the state in sri pride birth says that you have never addressed the question of turner again you had to state that it was the that made that driver's license not a defense to driving while license suspended because it was bended earlier and it's that fraudulent act that is the he and most important part for this court to decide so if if this is not an absolute liability statute in this use we tell you sam there's no this knowing requirement it embedded has to be done because it is a constitutional problem so that's my next question if it is in fact an absolute because again it's a not unknown wean act in which the state of illinois the secretary of state has given him what he believes to be a valid driver's license and the same idea regarding why does that make it unconstitutional because it would be fundamentally unfair to allow the state to of the state as i understand your argument they say that the two thousand and six license would be absolutely admissible in relevant on the question of whether defendant possessed a valid driver's license at the time of the offense  we'd be ruling on is whether or not the trial court was right in saying there was a mens rare request requirement with respect to this offense it would still go back right and you could say that a license really wasn't revoked i had this valid there's there is constitutional infirmity in not having a men's rare requirement with respect to the offense char's right in terms of what the jury is to be instructed upon i depending on how you want to look at how it's framed and what or what the trial judge is really saying and whether or not he was correct in finding a constitutional infirmity in this case and the constitutional in court decision interpret ing turner involving the application for temporary driver's license the court found that it would be wrong to impose a conviction it gets to the circuit court struggle of what is a jury to be instructed pardoned it's instructions would just say it does not matter at all what this driver's license issued in two trial the state has to prove he was driving at a time when the license was suspended and your defenses his license was not suspended because you have won the jury would receive a proposition's instruction has if they prove those charges there's nothing here about the fraudulent obtaining in that simple cases or i'm sorry misunderstood what the third proposition would be and you know i think there's he just said to us driving drive the suspended notices suspension not a notice when its license was suspended the question would be that would be the question under the state's theory yes and i would suggest that that's just wrong and so you're saying there has to be a notice requirement under six three zero three and knowledge by the defendant and therefore absolute liability is unconstitutional well that in terms of whether there has been notice for  other people i'm not dealing with a whether they never got notice the state did not send them notice and just sent a notice straight of le suspended the license those aren't the questions before me the question before this court and that i'm dealing with is that he was issued what he can say i thought was a valid driver's license and to convict him of class four felony punish will by up to six years imprisonment is fundamentally unfair  he is doing that not knowingly and not fraudulent he's just doing that because he is not very bright and was trying to follow the procedures of getting a driver's license he went to jackson that could have been dealt with he paid them the amount of money took the test he was doing everything that he was required to do he thought that is for the jury to determine whether if in fact he was trying to commit some kind of fraud now the state the secretary of state administrative leave cancel that second driver's license from two thousand and six and then it's notice to mr jackson said that this license is no good on  future date which kind of also makes you wonder what that means and it means that even that is their part of the record yes or no or that's in the most thank you chief justice kilbride i want to begin by revisiting justice freeman's question to me about whether this court could rule on a narrower ground and say that regardless of what the law is this individual had notice i think the confusion in the defendant's argument here illustrates why clarity is needed here and i think what we need is clarity regarding the meaning of this court's decision and turner and the nature of the elements i'm somewhat surprised to say that but the nature of the reasoning of turner you'll find that it is that case is not dependent upon fraud the word fraud is used once in that opinion it is used in the last second to last or the last sentence of the opinion but the reasoning behind term is that an individual cannot rely upon a driver's license that was obtained through some sort of inaccuracy because it prevented that individual from going through the only statutory mechanism that allows that individual to have their driving privileges reinstated and so the reasoning is absolutely just as true where there is a deliberate fraud as when there's a simple oversight the law constitutionally places the onus on the individual to make sure that their driving privileges are valid when they drive and turn the defendant's argument seizing upon that use of the word fraudulent in turn or i think essentially disregards the reasoning and focuses in upon a single adjective second i want to focus in just briefly on the questions that you asked justice tice and you asked justice thomas about the theory of unconstitutionality being offered here by the defendant and the fence argument here seems to be is that that it is fundamentally unfair that those are his words and used them several times to impose absolute liability where the state gave him a driver's license fundamentally unfair is not is not the standard here the standard here under the due process clause is going all the way back to justice jackson in more set to justice douglas in the lambert is the concept of notice notice that that there would be there is a settled expectation of regulation over a particular app that's what the constitution requires fundamental fairness is certainly a notion that appears throughout the due process clause through analysis of the process cla but when it comes to absolute liability the specific permutation of what constitutes fundamental fairness is that notion of notice that an individual would understand that they are in gage in a regulated activity and that's why it was constitutional for this court that was constitutional for the illinois general assembly to impose absolute liability for the registration of sex offenders and why the united states supreme court said it is constitutional to employ absolute liability for of that matters what matters is that an individual of reasonable and ordinary intelligence would understand that the action they are engaged in is a potentially regulated action and as it places the onus on the in a moment of candor said that this court has never held that there is a mens rea element and i want to be clear as a matter of first principles that's absolutely correct the driving with a suspended driver's license statute does not include men read re element in its plain text the surrounding text repeatedly uses the word terms like knowingly and with intent and so it is striking but the general assembly omitted a menswear requirement for this  offense and in large measure this offense only what's more this is a statute that has been remanded over twenty times since it was put into the motor vehicle code in one thousand nine hundred sixty nine and never once to the general assembly despite an unbroken line of precedence holding that this is an absolute liability offense never once the general somebody even consider offering an amendment to the statute that would have added an express and then israel requirement and when you asked about whether or not this was actually in substance in the stoppel argument i would submit to you that that's really what the defendant's argument here is here the defense argument here is really a defense a statutory defense not a constitutional on statutory defense under section four dash eight of the criminal code and that is that defense i would submit is not going to be terribly effective here but there section four dash eight lays out the general principle that ignorance of the law is no defense but it does say that under certain circumstance where the state entity that is empowered to enforce a particular statute offers some sort of conclusive or definitive declaration as to the meaning of the wall that the individual may reasonably rely upon that representation i don't think that defense will have carry a great deal of weight here because the defendant because the state did not offer an interpretation of the law based upon all of the relevant facts the state offered a interpretation of the law based upon the application that the defendant submitted that's that application is simply inaccurate and so the secretary of state was in no position to give a definitive interpretation of the statute here where it didn't know all of the relevant details that would have allowed it to make this sort of advisory opinion that could form the basis of the defense but if the defendant wants to offer that defense that's certainly his prerogative but i don't think it rises to the level of a constitutional infirmity here and lastly justice thomas i think you correctly identified all of the relevant and  considerations to our to argue here the defendant's intent an understanding is not a relevant consideration under the statute and it is a constitutionally permissible circumstance that he's precluded from offering such a defense if there are no other questions yes and this does the administrative scheme and in the steps are not just what happens in the real world but in the statute in the brief says you know they created this license and then they suspended it and sent noticed was the last known address that's correct just to ask what is the stash very purpose of sending notice out how does that tie into the absolute liability concept if your question first i think the reason that the the notice requirement is included in the original suspension statute is that it's required to be there as a matter of federal constitutional law and delegates person which is a nine hundred seventy one decision  the united states supreme court held that in order to have an affection all suspension of a driver's license there must be a hearing and then there must be notice it has been subsequently held by me i believe every court that has examined this question that mail notice is adequate to satisfy the due process requirements here so there is not a constitutional requirement of individualized actual notice there is simply a kind of a good faith standard and mailing a notice to an individual's last known address would certainly satisfy that and i think to hold otherwise would be deeply troubling because it would simply allow any defendant to come into court with the defense i never received notice and it can't be that you can negate what is a valid public welfare and safety offense with i forgot or i didn't check the mail that  additional questions i'm happy to rest on our brief and simply urge the court to reverse the decision of the circuit court thank you thank you the case number one one three nine eight six people versus aaron jackson