an insurance coverage issue that relates to whether they're consistent insured contract on it within the meeting of the of the insurance policy michael christie the injured person who was working at the jones contract put him in at that location and but for that contract christie was not at the scene and he would not have sustained a partly injury but for he would have made no claims against life nation which is in terms of what triggers the issue that's before this court the contract katie issue to the services or the work that squarely puts this case the underlying case by mr christie against life nation within the terms of that contract  it also puts in this contract where lee within the meaning of the policy definition of insured contract but why and why do you why he say that because you don't you have to read that language and i understand why you're emphasizing the language after the war but don't you have to read that to be a contract in which tort liability is a third party is being a violation of the new york labor law which is something a lot as i understand it something along the lines of what illinois previously had a structural work act but white nations liability if it had focus on x omissions negligence or by the vendor you know in other words there's no there's no reference to liability arising out of out of negligence or anything any other missions by caste or but then it goes on to say or in any way sustained or other so talk about the language in the fall but then it goes on to make a much more broad it does but it will use the words and this is what i think this is where i think your challenge lies includes the words by vendor and the work the work that was done by the vendor in this case great work in the services was providing the employee to the work site and so this claim came out of with but for what's the status of the christie claim at this point at this point we have counsel was hired i did new york and there are pending cross motions for summary judgment based upon the liability issue so fense that certainly could and should have been raised by counsel hired by acuity we have raised that issue as a substantive defense but that's that's a kin to the other party against that party's own negligence the only way coverage is potentially available here is if that insured contract exception applies to the employer's liability exclusion and the least trigger right the duty to defend so they've asserted a right to indemnity but they've not i mean the cause of action in the christie cases just a boilerplate cause of action for indemnity it say it simply cites the contract language and determining under illinois law the application of an insurance provision between acuity and casts or the the question of the language of the insurance policy and the master contract is what controls the court in virginia surety compare the allegations and in subsequent illinois case law following that for instance by two minutes they what they did was take ridging the surety ruling and applied the that definition of insured contract at the beginning of the case at the duty to defend stage all they did was say here we have this contract and we have an insurance policy and they compared t language that was in the insurance policy and they went and the issue really is just that the language in the contract must assume the tort liability of another party and that language i s strictly construed and so where it just needs to look at the the the insurance policy and the contract that casts are seeking coverage under be an unmistakable unequivocal clear and explicit expression of that intent and there simply is not that here as your honor pointed out the language in the contract specifically refers castor b m s catlike nation simply is not performing any work or services here making this language all the more clear it's an extraordinary shifting of risk to move engender before live nations own negligence here to cast her in this contract and if it's not contemplated by the language of the contract it's essentially you know the the language in the contract and the purpose of it appears to instead be to avoid the exclusive remedy for workers compensation under various states laws i would also submit that caster's other arguments are essentially red herrings quaestors talking about the force ability of the master contract and you were not talking about that issue at all  they're not at issue here all again that is at issue is the language of the insurance policy the name big us language of the insurance policy the language of the master vendor contract which must be strictly construed and then the fact that would arise without the existence of a contract to agreements that does not preclude it does not limit it to liability under illinois law it's not limited to liability with vacations findings that are similar to what are required under illinois law and the fact that a case was brought in new york for work done in new york is clearly covered by the language of the policy the are you saying it's unfair for us to apply only case law or what i'm saying is that the contract is supposed to be construed strictly against acuity as the grafter where w what they were what they were dealing with is whether the cap that was imposed by the worker's compensation law would be applied or whether it could be waived and that's what it really is not something that's directly at issue here