chief justice and may please the court a criminal alien does not become exempt from mandatory detention by the happenstance that d h did not arrest them immediately or promptly after they got out of jail or prison and the best way to illustrate this point is just  look at the statutory text in the the key provision we're talking about here is twelve twenty six see to this is the prohibition against release in detained a criminal alien is on page four of our merits brief and what it says that the secretary may release an alien described in paragraph one only if it is for witness protection and it's fun just bitter here that the witness protection exception does not apply and that this categorically prohibits the released on bond of anybody who is an alien described in paragraph one so then the question is who are those aliens and on and paragraph one it's on the prior page and it just answers that in no uncertain terms it says the secretary shall take into custody quote any alien who is  inadmissible or is deportable under these different provisions that relate to their criminal history or terrorist activities and so an alien described in to in paragraph one is any alien who is inadmissible or is deportable under one of these provisions and the next part of the when the early in this release this is command you to do anything you know that the key function of that so is to tell the secretary when to act right so it's a line flush left along with the command that the secretary should i don't see is that the phrase when the alien is over tell me why would you have need transition rules under your reading of this statute which there were and the transition rules say you have two years essentially to put in place enough personnel and facilities to do what the statute requires you to do why did you need that two year period if in your view you have absolute discretion to pick an alien up whenever you want to to anyway i think that's really not a fair characterization of our position our understanding is that this is a mandate it is triggered immediately in a very large number of cases the arrest is going to occur immediately this is a mandate and this statute was going to direct that many more aliens be arrested and so under our stand are you know and that the real concern with the transition period rules was a lack of bed space and under both of our interpretations this is going to drive up the number of aliens arrested why did you need to transition the rules at all if you have discretion as you claim to have to decide when you're going to pick up an alien either the day of release or i mean one case before eleven years later you don't need the transition rules you could have just done what you needed to do to create the bed space would get the personnel and start arresting people when he was thought you could but again i want to be clear or we don't interpret this to say that we can arrest the person whenever we want we understand this to be a continuing urgent obligation to arrest them up right now we need to arrest them when they get out we need to arrest them the next day the next month whenever it happens  says when that might be right if it said something like the secretary shall take into custody anyone who is inadmissible under portable you know and who has not been released for more than such and such amount of time but that's not what it says it says when the alien is released which i think takes as a given that he's already been fully described but another i think important answer to this is the text of twelve twenty six a which i'd also like to old to walk through their basic theory is that these arrests are happening under a i don't think they're right about that but even if they were they would still arrest and the second is about custody in the first sentence says on a warrant issued by the attorney general an alien may be arrested and detained pending a decision on whether he is to be removed and see what c one does is it takes that discretionary authority and it turns it into a argument is there any limit on the government's so we understand that you want to be a continuing obligation does not lapse but can i if i could just follow through with a with the text of a and just how this supports us on the custody determination i think it would be helpful  our there's this first discretionary authority to arrest the alien and then the next sentence talks about what do you do after he's been arrested and what it says is except as provided in subsection c of this section and pending such a decision the secretary either may continue to detain him or may release him on bond to mr morris what she says is you can't release him at all just to think about how these two provisions interact with each other i'm wondering if you can tell me with respect to a group of people who are not involved  here as i understand it these a three d categories include some people who have never been in criminal custody at all so let's take spouses or children of terrorists but there are a number of categories of people who have never been in custody at all right so they fit within this a through d category and i'm wondering where you think the authority to detain them comes from has the authority to detain them come from c or does it come from year thirty two so i think actually in for all of them the authority to do the arrest comes from and what happens with c is c one makes the arrest mandatory and we do think it makes it mandatory including for those people who've never been in custody at all that when the alien is released describes when the duty is triggered but there are some aliens in particular with the c one d category that you're talking about the national security terrorist ones where the person has never been in one these aliens or it described in paragraph one even though they've never been in criminal custody that's right so that would suggest that c one is authorizing their detention and that's what you are saying respect to everybody under c one you're also a rest you know i'm wondering ok so that i'm not interested in you know that kind of you're saying that those people are under sea one to the same extent as people who have been in criminal custody  that's right so that seems odd to me because see one seems to me all about people who have been in criminal custody well i know you have this question about how about if there's a gap between the criminal custody but but but your interpretation is ness necessitates that you understand even people who have never been in criminal custody as part of the c one group that's right i think is just the one thing i would point out is in the overwhelming majority of applications of this statute it's i think still totally sensible because in the overwhelming majority of applications the person is about a criminal and in all of the criminal ones there's going to have been some a prior criminal custody and so that's you know that i think  small group relatively but it's definitely a group there are quite a number of subcategories that have never been in criminal custody here and we could go over what they are if anybody's interested but there are a number and and your statutory interpretation particularly you the view of the term described in paragraph one requires that those people be understood as within the c one custody authority and i don't know i look at the c one custody authority and it's all about criminal custody and what happens when you're released from coming across today and that makes me think that your interpretation of the words described in paragraph one is wrong i think it's more that you may disagree about whether the duty to erect the mandate to arrest them and see one kicks in when an alien has as not been in prior criminal custody of some some prior state or federal criminal custody but even if you disagree with us on that so first of all  respondents here have been in some prior custody and of course what we're really saying is that you know the timing of their arrest of the timing of their release is just is is totally irrelevant when it comes to see two and what about the first part i mean we've read the brief you've read them it seems to me reading there people here have been detained for eleven years  mean they were arrested you know fourteen years after being released and one for taking bus transfers he had been arrested and put on probation or something for stealing bus transfers or you can use read the briefs to me i'm not saying to you that isn't a parade of possible future horribles those are the horribles every person in the united states just about if he's arrested has hearing as you know for my opinion in jennings i think that's unconstitutional but the court didn't decide the contrary right so assume as i am assuming that this paragraph is ambiguous at most in your favor and if it's ambiguous and if there is a huge as i think a huge constitutional question then don't we read it not to apply or to apply to those who have been properly released but i take it you don't think the government could come back fifty years later and arrest somebody who's a grandfather or something you know he could be still some bus transfer is fifty years earlier is that what you think s o a couple of responses to that so first of course our top line answer is that this statute is not ambiguous that the only plausible reason to use a name a person fifty years later who is on his deathbed the this paragraph says that the attorney general shall release him and hold him without bail even though in this country a triple x murderer is given bail hearing a couple more answers to that so first whatever hypothetical it doesn't matter right fifty years later a minor crime you say yes the government must come and arrest him right so i'm not trying to quibble over what's a crime involving moral turpitude i'm saying that there's a  statute government's position that this graph which says she'll be arrested upon release applies to a person who has been released fifty years before what is your position i'm not  position is ok now my second question is this there is support for your position in the cases and the cases that support it i thought were the cases that says when the government misses a bail deadline then you can go ahead and have the bail hearing anyway when there's a bail deadline missed because that's not really said about what happens when you miss the bail right and the same is true here that's right and that i thought was your strong to me the strongest argument it's so i thought then and this is my question i thought this is this like those cases and the answer i thought was well yes in the sense that there is a no statement of what happens when you miss the deadline date right there and be the government bonuses are a is good enough but there is a big difference in the bail cases the result of missing the the deadline the result of reading in no deadline is you're going to have a bail hearing the community will be protected by your community w day a bail hearing and the individual will not be hurt much because all he'd be missing is a hearing that he should have had anyway but in this case if you read the statute the same way what you're doing to the individual is many who are knowledge no danger to the community no danger to the community you're depriving them of a hearing that could mean their release and you're keeping them instead for eleven twelve thirteen fourteen years and what you're doing to the community reading it your way if we read it the opposite way nothing you'll have the bail hearing the dangerous people won't get out is it so i thought in terms of the purposes are you following what i'm saying yes you see in terms of the purposes of the bail statute or this statute or any other statute we read it technically your way and we heard everybody in terms of the purposes we read it the opposite you know well a couple things one is you know what is the authority that you would lose the authority would lose see to the authority to hold them without bail hearing and the whole point of this statute is to stop doing bail hearings on the ground on the traditional forfeited whatever right you have to remain at large in the community and so to be looking back at the bail factors is to defeat the purpose of the statute and we have to i think very powerful examples here just among the name plaintiffs right we have  movie he did get cancellation of removal but then we have mr rodriguez moya who was out for three years he got a bond hearing he was released and he attempted to murder his ex girlfriend and succeeded in murdering her new boyfriend mr tripp what is the definition of a class that was certified by the district court  a consist of soley of people who have been who were released from criminal custody many years ago no not even close it's any preventing a criminal alien who is not arrested immediately so there's an extraordinary record on that and there aren't any published at this it's on this either i think one thing that might help is if i could just take a step back and explain the many reasons why gaps in custody can occur and why they're often fairly long so so first in order to arrest a alien under one of these provisions the h s of course first needs to know that the person is actually going alien and they've actually committed one of these crimes and in many cases that's going to take a real leg work by d h officers on the ground pulling the records of conviction looking to see the statute comparing the elements of the statute to the elements of the generic offense and i think is the court is painfully aware that that can be difficult and time consuming and then even when saying a reasonable cause the word  words that we know are there upon his relief means a reasonable calm within his release you know a reasonable time there for the people who have been hiding in the mountains for ten years  reasonable time but the people who have families and have jobs and it live to citizens of the community for fourteen years that was not a reasonable time when you went fourteen years later what about that typical legal term in order to satisfy what the government says as you say is its major interest so i think a couple of responses first to see two doesn't have a time in requirement at all and that's the statute that we're relying on  think second what you're really getting at and i think the force of what you're saying is that it feels different when the aliens been out for a really really long period time and i think what that's getting at is i think that it would've been perfectly rational for congress to add a statute of limitations here to say something and see to like an alien may be released only if it's for witness protection or is it only the person who's been out for ten years and hasn't gotten into trouble but i did eventually i would do you saying mr tripp that there is no constitutional claim  as to any of these people even if a person has been out for fifteen years has established ties in the community are you saying that there's no constitutional problem with that so i mean we certainly don't think there's a substantial constitutional problem that they've identified i mean do more versus kim squarely upheld this statute they are not asking the court overruled them or they're not saying that it's wrongly decided they're only argument is that more only applies if the person was arrested within a day of when they were that's what i'm saying it mean assume that this class were made up of people who had and who had lived after release from criminal custody for a very substantial period of time whatever it is five years ten years fifteen years  would they have constitutional serious constitutional claims in your view i think the answer is no under the analysis and the more so first of all when it when a criminal aliens finally put into removal proceedings they know this is happening they've been arrested all of that  if i'm right on those two things why would the government really care why does the government care why wouldn't it want to say ok we'll give him a bail hearing the  and the ones who are no risk won't be i think the real concern is really what congress was getting at here is that making this prediction of which criminal aliens are going to flee and which are going to offend is actually really really hard right and i think that know the example of mr rodriguez i think drives that home you know that when i g s we're doing this with the criminal alien in front of them on the basis of the traditional bail factors congress is basic judgment was that too many of them were going to released and that actually wasn't workin and so congress you know they experimented with this that was the rule for many decades until congress started narrowing down and building out these statutes almost a trip we made and were pushed on the question whether there might be some circumstances in which an alien who would otherwise fall within the statute would have a constitutional right to a bail hearing but i thought the question that we agreed to decide related to that what the ninth circuit saw as a requirement that the alien that homeland security take the alien into custody immediately and that was the class of aliens that was certified by the district court so if we were to reverse that determination with that preclude a challenge by an individual challenge and as applied challenge by an alley and who fell within the circumstances that have been described no of course not that safety valve is always available and i think it's frankly much much more faithful to what congress was trying to do to comp endure and you agree that an alien could bring that challenge notwithstanding twelve twenty six so twelve twenty six could reserve the balance of my time thank you counsel this one mr chief justice and may it please the court the government's reading is contrary to the text structure and purpose of the statute in at least three ways one that negates congress's directive to use finite mandatory detention resources on those who would otherwise be released into the community from criminal custody second it's not true that congress wanted to detain and deport all criminal aliens as the government claims in it at page twelve and three if congress really wanted what the executive branch claims here it would have simply written a statute that says people in these four categories shall be detained without a hearing until  is not what congress did instead congress wrote a statute twelve twenty six see as an exception to the general detention scheme in twelve twenty six a which applies except  provided in subsection c not as except not as a except as provided in sections c to as the government would have it congress wrote section twelve twenty six  paragraphs the first paragraph says who gets taken into custody and when and the second paragraph says of those people in paragraph one who can be released now the government cla instead in a stretch of a reading that you focus only on paragraphs a through d in paragraph one in other words they say section c two stands alone as an authorization for mandatory detention but that's not what congress said it said except as an alien described in paragraph one not an alien described in paragraph one a through d and the government's reading try whole section to see two out as that three standing authorization leads to three serious anomalies that they struggle to explain as they did with few justice kagan the first anomaly is as you noted that the transition rules which were meant to be a ramp up to the per minute rule are completely superfluous if the government really could delay for whatever reason picking up people subject to mandatory detention for as long as it needs or wants then congress would not need to have that intermediate step the second anomaly with the government's reading is and the government struggled with this in response again to your questions justice kagan is that if the only qualification to be subject to mandatory detention is that you fall into one of the four categories in a three d they necessarily read out the prior criminal custody requirement in and in addition to the example you gave justice kagan of a child of or spouse of a terrorist there is a very typical situation i'm an immigrant i show up for my green card interview and i live in california or washington and i confidently say yes i use marijuana on a regular basis i've never been arrested i've never been convicted of a controlled substance offense but based on my admission to possession of a controlled substance i might be subject to mandatory detention on the spot as i've said there in a c i s office under the government's reading now the government acknowledges that eliminating a requirement would be anomalous and they do far and they do acknowledge as a prior criminal custody requirement but instead a finding that in the natural and obvious place within the four corners of this statute that is just a sort of wire pointed out the phrase when the alien is released they go hunting around back to the un codified effective date provision for section twelve twenty six see which says it applies illions released after october eighth one thousand nine hundred eight that leads to a further anomaly the third anomaly which as judge baron explained in his opinion in cost in ada eight ten a third at twenty are well the person who is detained in mediately falls under congress's scheme congress provided that if you are within categories a through d and you are taken into custody when you're released from court decided into more in two thousand and three that applying the mandatory detention rule at least not considering the question before the court now is constitutional and that brings me i think to  answer the question about constitutional avoidance that you brought up just prior that when congress there are two reasons the government says better late than never there are lots of reasons why this congress did not want better late than never the first is the tax in the structure of the statute which indicate if the person is not taken into custody when they're released from criminal custody by ice then they're under twelve twenty six say and you get a hearing one into custody at that point that's the end of it and no your honor we would ask the court to affirm the ninth circuit which said that a reasonable degree of immediacy is appropriate is there let's get right to them what does a reasonable degree of immediacy i mean what's i don't know how many people will be released criminal custody today in let's say the state of california but i'm sure there are dozens probably hundreds i don't know a lot how is the federal government going to be able to determine quickly within forty eight hours or any short period of time whether those individuals would be subject to the mandatory detention requirement of this statute california is not going to tell the federal government releasing this person and this person is an alien not a citizen and this is what the person was convicted of how are they supposed to do that congress provided for how they would do that justice alito congress was thinking about state and local cooperation at the same time they were enacting section twelve twenty six c and what they did was set up mechanisms for state and local cooperation with federal authorities through statutes through section twelve twenty six d and adjacent provision through twelve fifty seven g also known colloquially as two eighty seven g agreements and three thirteen seventy three all in title eight the major innovation that congress wanted and god during that same timeframe as the ninety six act is described in the senate report one of four forty eight pages fifteen to sixteen and automated fingerprint system so congress when it was writing section twelve twenty six c knew that they didn't have in place all the pieces needed for this mechanism to work but they were putting other stats so the first part of your answer is that that the state the state governments the municipal governments are going to provide this and permission to to the department of homeland security that is what congress anticipated when it wrote the statute in ninety six you know it's not what is happening now your honor it's largely what is happening now the government said some data from  hundred six there's also data we've cited that show that in fiscal years fifteen three seventeen ninety four percent of federal requests to state and local jurisdictions were complied with but i think the larger point justice alito is that congress we have to read what congress was doing in one thousand nine hundred eighty six and whatever is happening today with controversies over so called sanctuary jurisdictions don't really shed light on what congress wanted in ninety six what does shed light on what congress honor and to the extent congress was thinking about state and local cooperation they dealt with out through the other three statutes i mentioned and through automated fingerprinting and communication between feds and state and local jurisdictions i know it finally justice ali that that the court dealt with similar parallel arguments by the government in the perera and moncrief cases and the court said look the government can point to these practical considerations but at the end of the day we're looking at the words that congress circuit said immediately within forty eight hours within some reasonable period work after the alienness release and simple terms that's the question before us right yes your honor and to answer your question i believe the court should affirm the ninth circuit which again said the government should act shall take the alien into custody with it with a reasonable degree of immediacy and i note that the b i a the board of immigration appeals and rojas said forty eight hours is outside that time  we think the same day would be appropriate we we don't think that if ice show is up to pick someone up on their release date and they encounter them in the parking lot or at the bus stop or or anywhere the same date i think that suffice wrong with when a real reasonable time has been in the law since lord cook i mean and courts have managed to deal with it so why wouldn't we avoid these problems if we just say when they say i'm on release you say reasonable cause that's exactly right justice but i'm not sure the ninth circuit said that well i mean there's a difference between reasonable degree of immediacy and reasonable time i don't see how the immediate is immediate you can have a reasonable degree of immediacy if it's an hour later it's not immediate now which are you arguing for a reasonable degree of immediacy which strikes me as a very short time for a reasonable time reasonable time would depend for example on the resources that are available to the department of homeland security it's not reasonable  if they don't have enough people to do it if it takes a week if it takes i don't know what's reasonable in the situation a month for a reasonable degree of immediacy is something else that strikes me as a half hour something because otherwise it's not immediately which is  reasonable to be the media see or reason the time you're in i think that the ninth circuit was using the phrase reasonable with respect to a temporal scope not with respect to whether the government was making reasonable efforts or acting in good faith the statute  b i acknowledged it connotes immediate but is judge judge chaotic pointed out in his opinion when it could be you know if you're saying it's not immediate then who knows maybe it's a year maybe it's six months well your honor i think it would certainly question there's no doubt and again the government accuses you can accuses us of cherry picking cases in which the gap was long in fact the date of the government has provided in the companion case of the parallel case in the first circuit shows that years delay is the mine one of cases that data shows that the average delay between criminal custody release and ice picking the person up is three years why don't you w in your class how many people have been what percentage of the class has been out for let's say let's just call it a year plus justice kagan we didn't get discovery in this case that's before the court we only have the discovery in the court and case in the first circuit so i unfortunately don't have the numbers for this one what what would it what was the answer in that case in court in the average delay was three years the median delay was thirteen months in that class in that class correct in the gordon case and that was again morning but he gets out at seven they then go looking for him and he's now gone underground never shows up at the parole office never talks to family or friends they look for him periodically over a period of time and all of a sudden he's rearrested do you see that is a different reasonable time situation than what happens here which is that the government for example i understand from the briefs that sometimes they put in a detainer and don't even bother to show up that's right just to set a my are so if there is a difference why are we man marking a temporal limit on what reasonable effort to comply with the statute might mean it seems to me justice briar's right that the law is filled with the reasonable effort to comply with the cerm of a command but i don't see how we could have set a temporal limit to that reasonable effort in the way that you promoting i think you can just just sort of my are because again i'm trying to stay true to the words congress wrote congress use the phrase when the alien is released which clearly as everyone acknowledges has a temporal component they didn't write a statute that pegged mandatory detention to some kind of good faith or reasonable effort standard for the government and just to give a counter example let's say the governor and i want to say first i agree with you that the record here the amicus brief filed by the advancement project and other civil rights groups shows most of these people who were picked up years later like mr santos had rodriguez who was detained many years after he was released from criminal custody at at home these people are being picked up as judge kleinfeld in the ninth circuit noted during oral argument in front of their house moeen the lawn at the job sometimes in an interview that they voluntarily appear for with six and in response to just the sort of bar went back to that language when the alien is released but if we're going to focus really carefully on the language what we do about the fact that that is an adverbial phrase and you're asking us to suggest that it modifies the noun alien and limits the class of aliens that are involved illions that now adverbs don't usually modify now it's the usually modify verbs and the take into custody so why isn't it that the duty shall take into custody is modified by the adverb when the ilian is released ok and so the government's obligation begins at that moment we know that when the shall take into custody duty starts with the class of aliens the who the now has nothing to do with the ad for now that's the question my fifth grade  well i think i'm a grand marian to the reason why justice course such is that sometimes adverbial phrases do describe a noun just as they do in the statute so first for all the reasons i've already said usually they modify the verb i left to start third i will consider why should we you're asking us to take a rather unusual view of grammar one i think i'd have to go pretty deep in the footnotes to follow it wouldn't be so why would i do that it wouldn't be the first time congress tortured grammar i was arguing with you about right so so to two reasons just discourse that for the reasons i've already said i think it's clear from the structure of the statute and the plain language that congress meant fo friend describes it the second reason is yes it may be uncommon for an adverbial phrase to describe a noun but it can happen let me give you a hypothetical example that track's this statute i might tell you in a two paragraph instruction number one harvest the grapes in vineyards a b and c when they ripen paragraph to make the wine from the grapes described in paragraph one the grapes refer to both the temporal component i want you to harvest them when they're right not when they're over right not when they're under ripe and it's from those three vineyards i'm not sure i follow the example but i'm not sure i buy it and let me tell you why it's a neat example i commend you i think i think my fifth grade grammar teach would love this discussion but i would say to you with this that again there you're modifying the verb  when you're supposed to harvest it ok and that's the first the first section the second section you're saying ok whatever you harvested the grapes that we've described you have harvested you still have to harvest them so it still depends upon the verb in that second as an adjective the hypothetical we gave in our brief about the red headed man wearing the blue jacket when he arrives on the three o'clock train from new york when he arrives on the three o'clock train from new york is really a characteristic of the man that's described in the same way your honor that i think congress in paragraph two again by by using the phrase an alien described in paragraph one not an alien described in paragraph one a through d i think it's simply that the the whole the entirety of paragraph one describes the alien in that paragraph to phrase and i think that's that's simply what congress would have known or thought that it wasn't going to be or two years or six months or forty eight hours and so when you combine those two points congress knew it wouldn't be immediate and yet congress did not put in a time limit that raises a real question for me whether we should be superimposing a time when the statute when congress at least as i read it did not itself do so want and he responded that well justice kavanagh we're not asking you to superimpose a time limit we're asking you to give meaning to all the words of the statue that congress enact it which say but you're starting up are you when you say when you are saying that is in essence a time limit of immediate same day i think you said in my point is that's very odd when you think about what congress was doing in one thousand nine hundred six because they were well aware that would not happen a because of resources b because they're not learning about it right away and it briers idea but but congress didn't do that i think i think your honor that congress in saying when meant what when means in the common sense reasonable within a reasonable time of the event happening we go to the dictionary definition as a judge i want to achieve justice and point is reasonable media see is different from reasonable time in your view i think that the ninth circuit used reasonable degree of immediacy and promptly interchangeably and as as the b i a again sad when connotes immediacy as judge karen pointed out when connotes immediacy that's the primary dictionary definition but i do i do want to say one other thing in response to justice cabin and that is remember that subsection c mandatory detention without any individual hearing is written as an exception to subsection a so the only consequence is you get a hearing and so the bad ones as justice buyers of the baddies will be detained i want to the problem is that congress did not trust those hearings on a certain class it is my understanding and correct me if i'm wrong about that but congress was concerned that those hearings were not working in the way that congress wanted and therefore for a certain class of criminal or terrorist you know and said no more that's right but the question here is what the class what's the class congress wrote h s general counsels said at page ten of their brief they agree with our reading of the statute and they say detention under section twenty six a is not meaningfully more burdensome for the government  first circuit panel and judge baron and the ninth circuit below got this right that reading gives full meaning to every word in the statute it makes sense of the two paragraphs structure and the fact that  written as an exception to a and i want to point out that at the time congress wrote this statute this court had never before approved of civil detention executive to tension without individual hearings on flight risk and danger and so the court should the congress should be presumed to have written that provision narrowly as as the ninth circuit and judge karen pointed out i think as judge pryor was alluding to it's constitutional overlay because what was really going through congress was time in one thousand nine hundred six was harshness on this topic is that not right congress was was certainly trying to deal with what they considered to be a problem with non citizens who've committed crimes the question again is who were they targeting with this statute and i think that the words that that congress chose are narrow ones they clearly say that people had to be in criminal custody under these four grounds and there's a serious constitutional problem if you by the government's reading my friend i cannot see the equities when the alien has been free for a number of years but congress wisely or not thought that  this class of aliens was dangerous and they should not be trusted bail hearings were unreliable so you would say that this statute requires their detention as soon as they get out now while if that's the case and it obviously is why would congress think differently about someone who's been out for a week for two reasons your honor the first is the legislative history especially as as outlined in the members of congress start green brief makes it clear congress wanted ice that ins to focus of limited capacity limited capacity to detain on people already in criminal custody who would otherwise be released if they said in other words don't spread yourself then my friend said it takes more effort to go find people in the community that's exactly right and that's the problem congress is what we do think of i see the problem reasonable time the do more concerned a case where the court fought that these people were detained without bail hearings for less than six months zedd vegas interprets a silent statute to imply a six month limitation on but related holding of aliens so what would you think of reading this statute in order in my opinion not to violate a principle it goes back to not not the magna carta at least the blackstone in it that really read this statute the same way there it is we have a degree of clarity we say we use we go to  congress chose and i remind you that the board of immigration appeals said forty eight hours was too long so if the court wishes to drop right line as you did inside beat us i think that would be fine but really we should follow the words congress justice thank you just a couple of points the key question here is not the meaning of when it's who are the aliens described in paragraph one and the answer is it's an alien any alien with the requisite criminal history at the time in is really not relevant to the question because they didn't say so paragraph one eighth they said the entire paragraph that's right but as why is the verb or the ads are part of the now in that situation because if they wanted to limit it to that class of a deed that's the easiest thing to have done because your council is ripping your adversaries right if they wanted to listen limit twelve twenty six egg to see to they would have said see to a couple responses but i think the main one is that the phrase when the alien is released does not modify the alien is it takes is a given he's already that there is a command that you have to follow to try to take these people into custody you say there's a command to do it but you don't have to do it you can choose not to do it i don't know what kind of thirty three responsible is renowned and of or i should say so first we just don't think it modifies who the alien is at all second even if you think that it does and there is some kind of timing requirement this court has said again and again and again that it's better to be late than never and then a drives us home right because it has two sentences the first is about arrest in the second is about custody and perhaps it's it has the exception for c and the only provision in c that talks about release is c two and that's the one that categorically prohibits really reasonable amount of time just as prior suggestion were part of a ruling what do you think is a reasonable amount of time or presumptively reasonable i know that's not your preferred position but do you have thoughts on the i think our main answer with that is that we really profoundly problematic because these graphic gaps in custody are often very long and the basic reason therefore you would say a long period is a reasonable period but do you have any  more me you want to put on those bones of what a reasonable period of time would be given all the circumstance i guess i was i would say that or i mean what often happens is you know once once an alien gets out i think this comes across in the in the brief that alien is often released before the h s is even aware become aware of them again until years later when they get arrested on a different offense and so i think it is difficult for me to give content to that i think the force of that argument that you know maybe it would be different after the passage of  we did arrest him just as he got out the second time but that second offense didn't trigger twelve twenty six e and so he's arguing that because he was out for years and years before he got arrested the second time that he's off the hook and i guess the problem that i have is you're  groups of people or not and they say that there are people who are released on bail who are dangerous and commit and commit serious crimes but if i look at the numbers that do that they're very very small compared to the people who are released on bail and don't commit more crimes or of the number of people who get cancellation of removal for various reasons at what point do we constitutionally ignore that we ignore that there's a whole class huge class of people who are being held where no one would consider them dangerous and you may or cancer briefly so none of those numbers are in the record and i don't think we would agree with them but just more fundamentally this is a statutory interpretation case i think the statute is unambiguous