black that's when we perceive hyperactivity disorder and she gets into a pushing and shoving match school with another student and for this she is charged with battery and following a hearing on the merits of this claim the judge finds her delinquent based upon battery insulting and provoking contact and furthermore and very importantly for this case he then says that my is a first offender and that he would place or on supervision if he could but the state objected and so he would place her on probation  veronica not going to middle school or and instead been senior high school and had she been seventeen the prosecution could not have vetoed supervision very much a minor because under the criminal code under this section entitled infancy i believe it's five forward slash sixty one she may not be convicted of any crime and under the juvenile court act she may not elect to be treated as an adult and my understanding of all the transfer of proceedings in juvenile law is that in order to be trains for to adult court a minor has to be at least thirteen so if we look at the case law involving the you know examination of the goals of the juvenile court act whether it's rehabilitative or whether it's punitive given  well the tenor of the cheetah subsequently after that to the minors lawyer definitely argued that probation was inappropriate their minors lawyer actually argued the case should have just been closed as you know i don't know exactly what that meant we don't have the record for that but there was another minor involved in this and another judge in this other case simply closed it closed the case  dismissed it so that is so that my clients royer can be said to have objected to probation even though they may not have specifically requested supervision my client is independently not eligible for supervision because of this case proceeded to a delinquency finding and there's debts and there's an independent basis there for denying supervision of continuance under supervision upon an admission or stipulation by the appropriate respondent or minor respondent of the facts supporting the petition and before proceeding to adjudication findings and education or after hearing evidence at the trial but before noting in the minutes of perceiving a finding of whether or not the minor is described is a person described in section two dash one to dash one with the jurisdictional section of the juvenile court act which is established at the act applied to delinquent minors were i'm going with this and i ask the courts forbearance for quoting this but that language but before noting in the minutes of proceeding a finding whether or not the minor is a person but i do is that the language that was removed from the statute controlling supervision and i believe it was removed in one nine hundred ninety and it is not there now so in essence i think a lot of their argument with regard to t w is to like put that back in to the code where both stro the minor in strong played guilty pursuant to a recommendation of probation the judge happened all of them always probation and vacated it later on  words that this and the record really doesn't indicate in strong that the state objected to supervision they recommended probation but we don't know whether they did they whether their position was that supervision would have been totally inappropriate and obviously if the if the state is only recommending assume a certain disposition and then as soon would lead they take they contemplate that there might be another  juvenile court but two and a half years of gone by and it's legislation appears to be or legislature appears to be happy with the statute is written at least to the point that they have changed it so wouldn't that guess it would be that but the the court here is he you know the ultimate exposure of the of state law and i don't think that that that there in activity could really be a you know indicative of anything  was even aside from in there in america over there would you agree that the the legislature could simply say that it was not allowing supervision for this class of offense or this particular crime in juvenile cases and there would be nothing wrong with it yeah i think that's been part of my argument i think if the legislature wants to say that well this case for instance was arguably chargeable as aggravated battery because it took place on public property as if they wanted to say that this assembly has made it so that supervision can only be allowed if interested interested parties do not object how does then throw that change in the equation throw it into a separation of powers maybe this will shed some light on this that this is not strictly a diversion program or a deferred prosecution statute it might be but it doesn't necessarily have to be that way the that the minor may feel as though i didn't do this and i don't even want to i don't want even supervision to be on my  lock on justice thomas question you you've acknowledged that the legislature could provide that say there's no continuance under supervision in juvenile cases and that would not be a violation of equal protection why putting some allowing for continuance under supervision but putting some at the seated conditions on the why does that violate separation of powers i think that was the question the answer i didn't ask rather than i didn't say i didn't would be a new look read there would be no separation excuse me no equal protection violation is that correct no i wouldn't i wouldn't agree to that i would i would i would say that would that would be an equal protection problem because you give an adult the advantage of this defer prosecution but you deprive a minor of that so you say there is yet the dirt there was a the legislature could not remove that option from the juvenile court i did and at the same time give it to an adult i could say they could not but doesn't that fly in the face of everything we've we do with the differences between adults and minors anyway the whole idea that we treat them differently for different purposes because they are minors  i would suggest not because the that the scheme that is in vision where an adult could perceive like this deferred prosecution and a minor could not is kind of a topsy turvy world in which the differences between you know a minor an adult but but i would suggest that is that they all cut in our favor and against that type of scheme but i want to get back to the scene i was he isn't the question no two who is objecting we have on a prosecutor who's still it's only prosecuting the offender and then has the opportunity also to determine away from the judge which discretion of what disposition to impose i mean isn't that kind of a problem well if i had to subpoena a statement i want to make it that the legislature is provided for this range i'm saying shit for a minor in her situation and the prosecutor's vetoing a perhaps the better the best as is the stronger decision points out the better the proper remedy there would have been for the minor to withdraw this admission he made because this was the deal that was made that he would receive probation so there's an element of equity involved there that's not involved here we walk in history and statute that this describes how supervision is supposed to be used and if you now court i personally think that that's probably simply throw out everything that had been agreed to is really fundamentally different than than giving into judge's discretion up front and saying what what is your decision and then living by that what gives them the discretion where does the discretion  have a right to just object to i just position it's within the right is i to argue in effect that that's where the constitutional infirmity yes yes so if we if we were to agree with you would we have to overturn a stro this is ok if this is constitutional i don't know what would stop the legislature from passing a law that says that the offender can receive probation unless the prosecutor objects and incidentally i want to get something about supervision you're going to mention that you think that as a general rule supervision is inappropriate for a line to get that right we ask but it's a gratuitous statement it's the same as a statement that i joined in a special concurrent oh and i think statements somewhat informational but at the time t w was decided the supervision statute was actually very skeletal matter and had only about four numbered paragraphs today if you look at host of incidents or conditions of supervision that mirror almost identically those that that are it can be and pose for probation i think there are about twenty of them so that to just take a minute or two if ok i'll give it some more thought but if i feel comfortable saying that the that we should have respected the judge's decision in this case that he would have preferred to impose a the first question in this case is whether respondent even has standing to raise her constitutional arguments here in the trial court here in the trial court during the completed the first part which is the trial that determine the facts of the offense and then it went on to the second stage second part of the findings phase and it expressly determine guilt if then went on to sentencing and has scheduled a sentencing hearing supervision there's no continuance under supervision your honor and after a finding of guilt is entered under section five seven ten the legislature has determined that supervision should not must mean yes your honor but the problem is that a continuance under supervision is it's not a sentence so we're talking about the sentencing power of the court it if supervision is not a sentence under the juvenile court act then there's no infringement on the sentencing power because a continuance under supervision is entered only before a finding of guilt and thus is not a consequence of the miners killed and therefore it cannot be a sentence and what's more important is that a minor has the same right as the state's attorney to object and say i don't want to continue it centers vision if it were an actual sentence the minor would never have the comparable rights do so the court would sentencing order to request to make it reflect a continuance under supervision under section five six fifteen guilt is on the record the statute is clear once guilt is on the record the court must proceed to sentencing and the sentencing orders authorized under section five seven ten are probation and conditional discharge but a continuance under supervision under spice six fifteen is not available so this court cannot give  she seeks because it would be required to read into the authorized sentencing orders under section five seven ten a continuance under supervision but that's not authorized in the general assembly determined that it shouldn't happen  the it would become extraordinary for this court to read that into the statue now and and then to address the const and so she has no remedy scuse me and if she has no remedy then the proceeding the first phase is called the findings phase and that phase consists of two parts the first part is a determination of the facts underlying the events and that is an admission a stipulation to the facts or evidence that a trial the second part is the determination of guilt and section five six fifteen comes in to play between the first part and the second part and that's exactly what the statute says at one point i believe it subsection to the statute says  proceedings after the conclusion of the findings phase after the determination of delinquency and at the adjudicatory base what the court does is determine whether it is in the best interests of the minor in the public to make the minor a ward of the court the court does have to even if the minor admitted to the facts does not have to make the minor work of the court and that's exactly what the same trial judge did for respondents codefendant it determined after listening to all the sentencing evidence that held requiring the consent of the state's attorney before a court may order a continuance under supervision does not violate the court's separation of powers doctrine and does not infringe upon the court's sentencing power does stare decisis princip cry that this court apply this binding president and rejects separate respondent separation of powers challenge to tell me it was correctly decided because requiring the state's attorney's consent for continuance under supervision did not interfere with the court sentencing power because a continu under supervision as it discussed is not a sentence and therefore it does not implicate a trial court sentencing power the general someways not authorized action five six fifteen as a sentence under five seven ten may be ordered only before a determination of guilt and not as the discretion to actually impose a sentence and in here in this case nobody is saying that the section five seven ten sentencing orders are unavailable to the trial or where the court retains the discretion to impose the sentence and where the prosecutor is exercising discretion at a stage of the proceedings traditionally within the prosecutor prosecutor's discretionary realm there can be no separation of powers problem and here are the prosecutors exercising its discretion as a representative of the people was a litigant to this case before the conclusion of the findings phase it's the prosecutor saying that society has an interest in obtaining a determination of guilt in this particular case that this particular case requires full prosecution section five six fifteen does by requiring the consent of both parties and all parties including the trial court it properly reflects the impermissible overlapping authority between the executive and judicial branches and  to the conclusion of the findings case it's an alternative to prosecution and sentencing imposed before a finding of guilt or delinquency it's not a sentence and thereby probably requires the consent of both litigants before a court may order that's consistent with this court separation procedures prudence requiring states trace consent does not infringe upon the court's sentencing power juveniles are different from adults because they lack the maturity that adults had they're more of a more vulnerable to peer pressure they're more susceptible to negative influences and their character is not as well well for skate juveniles charged under the act never face the possibility of a conviction or an adult criminal sentence in fact the goals in the legislative purpose of the actor significantly broader and material respects different from the goals and purposes of the code explain that it is the differences between juveniles and adults it is the fact that juveniles don't have experience they don't have the maturity they don't have the self restraint and they don't have the comprehension that these differences make minors more likely to recommit crimes because there's not a treated gamesmanship of minor gets away with something then appeals it's gone he or she has gotten away with something and so the idea is that society has a strong a legitimate interest in rehabilitating that minor the general assembly also has a really strong interest in protecting the public and in this particular case a generous general somebody was concerned with the dramatic increase in juvenile crime and the court's failure to adequately protect society to that end it was conceivable for the general assembly to believe that giving the state's attorney someone who is obligated and presumed to act in furtherance of acts purposes and who has investigated the particular crime and is intimately familiar with the facts and circumstances of that particular case give that state's attorney a say in whether particular criminal conduct receives folke prosecution and a determination of guilt rather than the possibility of a diversion and no delinquency finding at all that would better ensure public protection juvenile rehabilitation and accountability and that is not contrary to the acts purposes because if the state's training exercises his discretion to object to a continuance under supervision it's preventing the minor it's also all it's doing is requiring a delinquency finding and thus the minor does not believe that she got away with something that ensures that criminal conduct results in  through there's a little bit of an irony here because if you look at t w the state's attorney in that case said that he asked the court not to proceed to place the minor under supervision because the state's attorney had witnesses and when those witnesses testified they would have been able to demonstrate that supervision was not appropriate and now it seems as though she was on the on the interpretation of supervision statute proffered by my opponent is that there's there's there's like some kind of a race to this supervision if someone doesn't if someone pulls the trigger before someone else diversion statute in which the probation of the parole officer could could veto this diversion for drug treatment but that involved the cooperation of a of a of a third  party in the offender's rehabilitation this is this is a veto by an advocate there isn't any someone else out there there's no indication or the parents not going to cooperate with this it now becomes the parent and i think we should grant they have court the same type of discretion that a bit of that and idealized parent would have in directing the minors future so we're so we're only asking dad the judge be the decision maker and not be interfered with arbitrarily from from by someone else the state seems to be arguing that this is not  this position it's up to the judge but rather it's or general overall prosecution i guess of the case that this is a tenuous of the face under supervision under certain conditions which gives the prosecutor knowledge process a case named if the prosecution needs to consent and the approval of the court so i think that and if that analogy that this is an interference with the prosecutorial role kind of fails we're not suggesting that they can't charge someone as they think the facts you know merit or that they can charge whatever they want in this in a fray as they wish and we're not we're not i think what they're saying is that they should be constitutionally entitled to some kind of a hammer to kind of cool worse an admission of an in minor that well you know we're good we're not going to give you supervision but if you if you turn around and with this with enron board for that and i  don't think that's consistent with the with any constitutional vision of what a prosecutor's role is the i've actually there's a coercive kind of an element to any kind of a charge because of the offend disposition is not going to be as favorable following a full blown hearing as a would be if we had admitted but that's baked into the system