put notice i represent credit bureau center and michael brown who's in and in case we have a number of issues for the court i'm going to launch into the legal issues as opposed to the fact and then don't think it does your honor and when you go to the plain meaning of the words the plain meaning of the words is just injunction and there's nothing like another statute like dodd frank or a risk or some of these other statutes you'll see you know the court is allowed to impose equitable relief or relief including but not limited to restitution discouragement or so on in this case this is a statute that when you look at the entire section section thirteen this was a stopgap measure as it was described by one of the legislators is a stopgap measure to prevent people from continuing acts practices you have what the courts have said here's the first proviso that talks about temporary t r o some temporary injunctions and then they've carved out the second proviso which then deals with permanent injunction that the court has to take a look at but then in light of coke cash and in light of recent decisions by the third circuit in sharper pharmaceutical and the panel decision in the ninth circuit  analysis that is required of circuit courts when they are called upon to review a statute and when the plain meaning is challenge and some of those cases like for i travel the court simply look at the ninth circuit decision has several provisos in it but i think that you have to view the entire proviso as a whole give each word in the provisos the plain meaning that congress intended now is the difference and the reason why i think that the court came to the wrong decision is that the words that are commission may file a suit and where you can they can file a suit under section thirteen b but then when it comes time to getting a permanent and that's to get injunctive relief but then when it comes time to seek a permanent injunction then the congressional words given are may seek a a permanent injunction and we think that that's important language because it's very different from filing a separate scandal and lawsuit it implies very clearly to to me anyway that that that there there are two things that were observed in that particular issue is that with the senate bill which appears i have the right it said page four court is reluctant to grant a champ or an injunction because he cannot be assured of an early hearing on the merits so clearly it's this is a court driven issue the court is concerned that it has a temporary injunction and then if they go on to study since a permanent injunction could only be granted after such a hearing this will assure the court of the ability of a definite hearing day or more the commission will have the ability and the routine fraud case merely seek a permanent injunction and those situations in which it does not desire to further expand on the prohibition of the f t c act through the issuance of a cease and desist order and then talks about commission resources will be grants and where it can get relief from the court well that's not you know that really does damage to the idea that congress says said after a after you know proper case proper proof the legislative history talks about certain conditions that the f t c is not there it's not a grant of unbridled standardless discretion for the f t c to file one point two status quo yes or no and that's that and then whatever else who is on this is sort of through is in place and then something else would be unrelated to an injunction that's actually rights or we we don't think that it was just a stop consumer redress was proposed in the bill the senate bill three fifty six which was rejected by congress and then they adopted section thirteen b in one nine hundred seventy three several months later i believe after they rejected consumer retreads and so what the f t c is asking the court to do it is asking the court to assume that congress you know even though it rejected consumer frankly congress obviously didn't intend it they rejected it and then seventy five two years later they had to set section nineteen section nineteen is even more interesting because it doesn't have to you know cancellation of contract rescission of contract to to monetary losses and so on so it doesn't authorize specifically  paid when we were below and talking about whether this is a deterrent or whether consumers got compensation on a timely basis at that point the record was pretty bleak in terms of consumers getting where the courts have recognized this is for the terms and so so the issue of restitution is there if they saw it and who are granted all the losses suffered by  consumers and so on that's not the proper measure of under principles of restitution the proper measure is the net gain of the wrongdoer so in this case my client got socked not only with all the losses you know that could be attributed to him supposedly but by pierce and lloyd which we think  just doesn't stand because none of these gains could be traced under principles established principles of restitution so i'd like to reserve my remaining time for  wound from the second part of the point i don't know how the agency actually interprets it in practice right you go to court you get your primary injunction and then you litigate over the permanent action you don't treat it as a standalone you also as a practical matter in looking at this as a trial attorney that statute was adopted in war time and in the court apparently the wartime powers and there's i would say a natural inclination to extend protection because of the war time conditions all that being said i do think that make greater does sell to the user the demise or at least implications for our president it you can't be collecting damages judgments against somebody on behalf of consumers it has to be restitution in its classic sense where there's tracing of assets or there's a sum that's felt that can be traced back to the to the people within the agency were very clear that section thirteen b did not authorize monetary relief and that article talks about how the devised ways  were brainstorming about how they could extend the statute to get equitable monetary relief and not have to go through section nineteen because section nineteen from their standpoint may be lengthier proceeding or it may involve different skill sets for people within the agency it's hard to know but when it comes right down to it it looks like the agency was trying to find a way