marine corps culture of mission accomplished because succeeding comment made it very clear that the number one priority is supporting our men and women who are engaged in combat we are a small  national security personnel system allowed us to reward this type of behavior operating with a sense of urgency and exploiting our part of our culture it's nested within the theory of maneuver warfare to great extent by the marine expeditionary unit the forward boy inherent in this is the willingness to accept risk to make decisions and to operate without complete information  amroth the foundation for its success was our mindset to accomplish the mission and the focus on the only metric that matter how many trucks got in the hands of the war fighter to be sure we tracked many those things how many were produced how many were in transit how many were being integrated or how many were being transported by united states transportation command but the thing that we focused on was how many vehicles were that award was made on the sixth of november coincident with the release of the full and open competition requests that same sense of urgency was fostered by dr ratner former assistant secretary of the navy for many others in the early days who are not well known contributed significantly to this effort in the spring secretary young was assigned to lead a task force to help remove an accelerated program certainly that brought the formidable resources of the entire department to bear in accelerated the program the program manager paul mann frankly refers to amroth as the ultimate team sport in fact it is throughout the department and with our industrial partners we've been able to ramp up many individuals and organizations have contributed to its success finally the entire program was accomplished within the existing acquisition regulations all of the actions normally require of an acquisition category one programs have been done by amref weren't all done in the normal sequence many of them were tailor to see opportunities and not challenges to look for possibilities and not out and always the focus was on the nineteen year old lance corporal we are char thank you for this opportunity i would forward your question general thank you very much mr welcome to the panel thank you chairman representative conway members of the panel thank you for the opportunity to speak with you here before  and before you today and also thank you for answering my comments for the record so i can speak a little more extemporaneously and little quicker probably than reading through this whole thing so let me make a couple of key points on rapid acquisition within the department as you noted that the partment early on in operation iraqi freedom recognized the need to be able to respond to unanticipated urgent needs identified out on the battlefield inside of a current execution year and with a two thousand and four and our charge is to track those joint urgent operational needs that are identified by the combatant commanders that fall outside of the service is normal responsibility j rack does not oversee all of the rapid acquisition efforts within the department under title ten each of the services have stablished processes to facilitate timely response to their service identified and there's been lots of those the army alone has had over seven thousand operative operational needs statement an those all of those various bodies have responded to needs ranging from the robot i asked our equipment and wraps of course and lots and lots of other sorts of capabilities i need to point out though and to echo  brogan the topic for today is rapid acquisition but you can't look at acquisition the acquisition process itself in isolation from the rest of the of the processes that lead to a  capability in order to produce up and get out something out into the field you begin by understanding and identifying what your requirements are be able to assess what those needs are rapidly assess what those needs are and identify potential solutions you need to provide adequately and timely resources inside of a current execution year in order to be able to respond to those proposals and then you need to initiate the acquisition process in order in order to actually produce and procure the selected solution of course provide the lifecycle support for that so as we look at what needs to be done in order to more rapidly provide capabilities into the into the field you need to consider not just the acquisition process itself but all of those elements which make up essentially the department planning program and budgeting execution system structures one for deliberate and one for rapid acquisition we're reviewing those recommendations still within the department but we recognize that there's a risk in accepting these two distinct structures we need to accept that all acquisitions whether in wartime or peacetime need to become more agile and responses in order to keep pace with accelerating development cycles which are unable through accelerated development cycles especially in terms of information technolog s communications technologies and cetera and we must prepare to echo representative conway's point we need to we need to have mature technology in the bank that can be rapidly fielded to that end leadership of the new undersecretary for acquisition technology logistics and his director of defense research and engineering mr zak let me else the department is restructured the directorate of the defense research and engineering to emphasize rapid development and fielding of these technologies the trick is being able to anticipate new threats and new requirements before they get to the point that they need to be urgent and in which starting from scratch within and within and within execution  we believe that we have begun the process and begun the building the foundation for future science and technology efforts within this new organization with the rapid fielding office within d a and m believe that we're on the path of developing that second ology that can be rapidly transitioned have to add one more thing and that is the support that we have received from congress and rap task force two great examples  of support that we've gotten primarily from the resource perspective as i mentioned earlier identify requirements be able to do want to provide ready resources in order to be able to do that in order to be able to provide something  difficult to find resources within a current execution we have submitted within our budget submission for f y ten requests for rapid acquisitions understand as of last night that request was not approved and will continue to struggle with finding resources in the current execution year for for a rapid acquisition so we appreciate the support that congress has provided appreciate the opportunity to speak with you today and i believe addressing operational needs coming out of the battlefield but very simply it's not agile enough to enable commanders to respond quickly in the most effective way possible to the demands of countering systems such  that's been around for a few years we have to find a way for the department of defense to militarily useful solutions more quickly because the nature of the current threat environment we need to have institutional changes in acquisition in programming and in budgetary systems to account for this growing flexibility on the part of in addition the department doesn't often employ operations research and systems analysis when it determines the best response for an urgent need that's the mission rather than a specific system or specific item we need to figure out what's the best choice let me run you through the findings very set of rapid acquisition process practices practices that can be tailored to expedite the rapid delivery of capabilities at war fighters and we believe that we've found that the cost of the notion of rapid is fundamentally counter cultural to the way the there are people getting killed out there in the meantime from all the t s got crossed so the issue is how do you create a system how do you create a culture of dealing with creativity and workarounds that goes totally counter to the  another finding approaches to implement rapid response is not sustainable as i said you can't have a permanent approach to what looks like a very long term challenge if everything is ad h capability to deliver joint capabilities rapidly inefficiently we've got to be aware of the global marketplace we have to increase the use of all contracting authorities we don't do that we need a different workforce culture and we need to incorporate good practices that do ways of dealing with these urgent needs and the definition ought to be that an urgent need is one that if left unfulfilled will seriously endanger personnel and or pose a major threat to ongoing operations period that's are really serious about rapid acquisition over the long term and in the way this is what you have to do this is a partnership between the executive branch and congress and we believe that the funding should be transparent we discussed this great length in the task force and i think you remember that we would issue quarterly reports for this congress could require additional notification there would be an oversight the group would not only involve  mr sullivan welcome thank you mr chairman it's a pleasure to be back before the panel i appeared a couple of months ago discussing other matters today is about rapid acquisitions last year we reviewed the mine resistant ambush protected rapid acquisition program to determine if it was able to deliver abilities to the field in a timely manner and we found it to be very successful in doing that  for essential keys to that success that are germane to today's discussion first the department kept operational requirements to a minimum the program used only mature technologies and stable designs something we've heard from everybody today third the program was given the highest priority and the d x rating by the secretary of defense and for the department ensured full and timely funding for the program the question today is can this formula be applied to all of these acquisitions and the broader acquisition process certainly the first two doable requirements and known technologies are possible under today's process and in fact due to recent acquisition reform legislation by the congress and the department's own changes the process has policies in place that five percent solution which is very much what those programs represent so they remain the exception and not the rule on the other hand that i mentioned above are not possible across the broader acquisition process today first not every program can be the highest priority and second there are constraints that every program must accept when it comes to funding therefore we see merit in the recommendation which he went through a rapid process in a deliberate process the study deals with the assignment of highest priority by suggesting a process that would characterize the urgency of the need and other non material solutions as  these are ideas that would improve our rapid acquisition processes and i think we agree with the report did not focus too much on the current process or the deliberate process in detail that wasn't necessarily a subject of i'd like to bring a new dimension to our discussion of acquisitions that has not received a lot of attention and could in our opinion be another game changer for the process mr referred to it a little bit it has to do with science and technology for over a decade has issued a broad body of work that examines best practices and underscores the need for we talk about faster development times more predictable costs and faster delivery to the field using best practices as early as nine hundred ninety nine we reported that successful enterprises achieve this by separating technology development from product development that means not allowing immature technologies into the acquisition process and investing significant time and money in maintaining a vibrant and relevant technology base that can fuel acquisition programs with needed technologies more quickly we have for years noted that while the department  depend on the state of the art technologies to maintain our national security it does not fund or organize its science and technology organizations and processes to bring technologies to acquisition programs that require  as a result our current acquisition programs are continually with needing amateur technologies to make great advances in weapons systems something they did not have to do we can do better than that with the current process so i'd like to submit an additional dimension for this panel to consider as a continues to work on improving acquisitions i believe we can improve the chances of the current process by examining the best ways to organize and coordinate the department's science and technology organization a more vibrant technology base would allow the department to manage significant risk in its proper environment where the investments are last and there is time for trial and error and  investing more upfront in gaining knowledge and demonstrating technologies before they have to go on to acquisition programs seems appropriate for a national security mission that demands cutting edge performance in concert with speedy delivery of critical would come under well this sort of segues into a point the doctor made about a legal definition of urgency which i think that you're on target with your definition should be the adjudicator of that definition satisfaction of the combatant commander in dialogue with the component task forces all of that you want that have been close that are considered resolved by the satisfaction of the matter now whether or not it met the performance criteria that was originally laid out in that we looked at which ones we needed in the program office to be able to do the job and accomplish the mission which ones satisfied statutory requirements for reporting which ones satisfied regulatory requirements and decided we would do the ones that the program office needed done to accomplish the mission we would each of the rest of them and either provide an abbreviated version or push it later in the process when we had more time and could in a deliberate manner things like that weapons on to the platform we didn't need a long drawn out systems engineering plan that told us all the steps we would go through with initial design review and critical design review and things of that nature so we tailored the sap early on and have just frankly in the last couple of months completed the full blown version and delivered why did you need to complete the full blown version we did need to document the configuration management process we feel of these vehicles quickly we have updated and added additional capability to them we have gone on one of the ones particularly important right now is the independent suspension help us distinguish between recommendation one and three as to why that was just one recommendation i think you've got to really focus quite specifically on the  culture side of things if you create a separate organization and you haven't really paid a lot of attention to the kinds of people you're bringing in that organization will wind up looking like the original defense i mean when i served in the eighty's the joint staff was a place where people went prior to remediate retirement it was a place frankly for  staff is exceedingly powerful and when my grogan said a few minutes ago that the raf a director wouldn't work on his or her own that's absolutely right that the report specifically says it works with the joint staff because the joint staff already has been making civilians we need to ensure the best military people come in because then you create a truly powerful organization that can make choices and so how does how does the report have recommendations are enough of a recommendation  resources that does go on in the joint world we do have a process that begins with the joint staff and their existing functional capabilities board to be able to look at potential solutions to this in a proper provider so we do have a process that goes on now what we what we do need to do quite honestly is to be able to have that better dialogue with the with the requestor and a recognition that these requirements that they need to be considered somewhat fungible based on the available technology  approach without setting up an organization quite frankly you're fully aware of how the building works that will be one of the arguments why do we need a new organization unless we believe unless you have a  testimony general you say that the initial requirement was eleven hundred and eighty five in november two thousand and six and now the requirement of twenty two thousand well so far with all of our success fourteen thousand have been six hundred and nine of our soldiers ended up being casualties due to slow fielding of and now it's painful to ever quantify a shortcoming like that but it's the joint forces quarterly this is not some attack from the french so you know it's always impossible to be perfect but i would suggest that by our own measures we're not even coming close certainly it took us a while to make the decision to pursue armor once that decision was made i think that's the topic of the success that was a requirement was sixteen thousand two hundred thirty eight for a long time after we got to that plateau and we have delivered all but a handful of those vehicles into the hands of the u s government now some of those have gone home station training bases some are being used for testing evaluation we have fulfilled the requirement for all of the baseline  ramp vehicles in iraq and afghanistan that has been satisfied just recently back in june of this year the wrap all terrain vehicle requirement went from two thousand five thousand two hundred forty four they were ahead of schedule in july august and september ramping up to be able to produce one thousand of those vehicles per month in december and are on track to get to that itself is a fascinating situation here we have slob in the automobile industry in america and we have sole source to one manufacturer that most people have never heard of and that's kind of remarkable when and world war two twenty four month requirement in world war two we didn't devote our entire aircraft to one company you know it's kind of interesting how we approach this again dealing with a third world enemy and perhaps we are perfectly an immaculately equipped for the first well enemies that the pentagon to beg borrow and steal to get monies from accounts to put any kind of embarrassing so is this something worth bragging on or not you know maybe congress doesn't get it meanwhile our own military publications are saying one thousand six hundred and nine unnecessary casualties due to slow fielding of one type of weapon system that all our brilliant strategist and tactician somehow didn't anticipate the need for until years years into these conflicts this is amazing mr de vere if i may just make couple comments on on your observations the comment concerning the nature of today's war and preparations for future capabilities i think what you're talking about you're looking at at our acquisition process i think it's important to remember the way that mr gates secretary gates is talking about future wars as hybrid wars and there's not going to be a big distinction between where there's going to be there's going to be a mix of capabilities and a mix of adversaries and a mix of weapons and threats that we're facing that range from the same things we're seeing today in terms of improvised explosive devices and other kind of improvised weapons and easily commercially available weapons and the high end future missile systems etc etc and you need to be able to do those all at once and recognizing that the that the technology is moving so quickly these days whatever we do for rapid acquisition needs to be applicable to that larger the way we think about longer term conventional warfare we need a capability and we need a system that can be responsive regardless of what enemy we're talking about we're always going to have unanticipated needs in war we did in world war two and we're going to have in the future wars as we have today on the funding thing there's a lot of there's a lot of discussion and congress has been very supportive and it's difficult problem because the department gets a lot of money so why can't the department just move money where they need to move it and just the reality is that there's a lot of competition in the department for resources because this conflict between building and responding to urgent needs so the ability to have a rapid acquisition fond pointed out the science for it and as the m rap task force has had and has had if you want to do things quickly you need immediate access to resources and without that you're going to get stuck into the competition for resources within the building and the reprogramming actions which all in and of themselves takes time to do if i could just inject doctors icon's proposals for a three billion dollars fund and he points out  well obviously money the problem is the best way to do it one of the things that i found when i was comptroller is that when you go and ask for something like three billion dollars we propose we actually censor ourselves in the department and the reason is we keep hearing from the hill these kinds of funds are slush funds and you're not going to manage the money right and so we're very hesitant to come up with these sorts of requests one of the reasons the d s p task force recommended this kind of oversight and the regular reporting on a quarterly that didn't really go anywhere because it would be thought of as a kind of a slush fund but there is a two year wait for any program that starts up the department of defense now that if it's not urgent and rap acquisition how would you invasion cut off and beyond that cut off maybe new requirements would have to come to a higher threshold i know was mentioned doctors and to sort of to discourage that would you any comments on that from anybody heard i mentioned a while ago that that the requirements need to be viewed as fungible and that's true as a requirement comes  needs to be balanced against the available the maturity of the technology what can be done quickly in order to provide a capability to the field but that dialogue needs to happen before the decision is made to produce something so as the street develops  need to have a dialogue with the seals you need to figure out what is good enough you have to answer the question what is good enough to mitigate your immediate capability that gap that you've got and then you reach a production decision and then you need to lock that requirement so that you can actually get on with it not t preclude future spirals or future improvements for the capability that you've delivered but you need to spend more time on that upfront dialogue figuring out what you need to have and when you figure it out and you agree to it in your resources then you get on with it and the next spiral is as big as the next the next iteration of something but it but you don't interrupt the production line you don't interrupt your acquisition efforts to continually continually mor the more the capability i think is to do just that it's very well if you've got a desire to have that ninety nine percent capability that's part of a dialogue with the and the joint staff and that additional twenty five percent as it were the system that gets you that twenty five percent that goes back in your regular acquisition system now one thing i think might be useful to clarify the task force deliberated as to whether we should look beyond just rapid acquisition of a larger system we decided that a little bit out of scope from what we were being asked but more importantly that is such a long standing headache as everyone knows that we figured if we could lay out a process for rapid acquisition that made some sense and develop some best practices those could then be imported into the larger acquisition system and let's face it we're not doing ourselves any favors with an acquisition system that takes fifteen years to get something out the door think about the fact that from the time hitler took power the germans were  training with broomsticks to the time he marched down the seans ailey's they was only seven years and technology now improved so much more quickly we have to do something about the larger acquisition system and we thought that perhaps if we can come up in the department working with the congress comes up with a viable rapid system we could then extract some best practices for that for the kinds of things that you were just talking about moving from that seventy five percent solution to that ninety nine percent with them wrapped in particular when the initial request came in and there was one requirement that we did not have the ability to immediately  of the j rod made it very clear to everyone involved that he would control not only key performance parameters which normally reside at that level but the key systematic abuse of the vehicle as well and that no one could change them  without jaywalking approval so that kept us from having to deal with requirements creep with all the good ideas that people want to add later on and allowed us to move forward very quickly and then when we later got a solution  everything that everyone here if you look at em ramp today in fact as an urgent need as a rapid acquisition it actually has become the first increment of what will probably become a regular acquisition program that has block upgrades for years to come and so that what they did right is they kept those requirements to what they can do right now get some breathing room get our troops some equipment and now they have an i mentioned in my oral statement were part of the regular acquisition process and more or less they did that if you go back and look at the it held the line on requirements and all of those others that i mentioned held the line on requirements one things that we're looking at now is it's such an exception in the regular process to be able to start a program with doable requirements we're trying to figure out how those programs were able to do that in this culture pieces that the first is we fielded some baseline m wraps and afghanistan prince with the r g thirty one because they were the smallest had the tightest turning radius which was one of the attributes that the war fighter there was looking for but then he asked for a vehicle that had the off road capability of a humvee but the survivability inherent in an m and that was really the genesis of the amount all terrain vehicle to clean my service because we didn't want to buy a whole additional fleet of vehicles the commandant was very interested in our ability to upgrade the suspension of those vehicles that we already purchased and be able to employ them in that environment and we've also been receiving the and we did that through the nevada automotive test center and we down selected to what turns out to be the same suspension that's on the marine corps seven ton medium tactical vehicle replacement built by osh kosh already in the system all repair parts are available and we were able to put that onto our cougars category one and category two we're now looking at putting it on the r g thirty three now we're in a process of upgrading  make use of those vehicles that were already purchased by the taxpayer in an environment that is far more inhospitable from a train standpoint so we've had those two tracks going on one a very memorable terrain vehicle is going to be much smaller on for em up all terrain in the fall of last year we conducted the competition through the late winter it was a full and open competition we required the vendors to deliver trucks with their proposal that kept all the power point guys away folks who just had good ideas but no hardware and then we whittled that down to who had actual viable candidates we gave each of them a contract with an initial delivery order for three more vehicles that we put through a rather rigorous test regime we provided them the results of the test gave them the chance to revise their proposals and what's called a fair opportunity revision and then we graded those proposals th test results and made our contract production order award to osh kosh we had thought that we may need to use more than one vendor we had also i met personally with the leadership of all five of those companies although one person represented two of them had two entries and two different visions and asked them before we made the production award decision would you be willing to license your vehicle else if you're the winner and would you be willing to produce someone else's vehicle if you were the loser and they all said will you help us with any monopoly issues with teaming arrangements and we agreed to do that preparation and contribution this morning as we proceed we're going to examine two questions as we make a report and legislative recommendations to the full committee for next spring one of them will be ways to further improve and fine tune the rapid acquisition process whether it is to assure the tech base that's necessary whether it is to tighten and explicitly defined the  definition of urgency whether it's to sharpen the process a lot of good ideas we've heard this morning will go into that consideration second area of inquiry will be the lessons learned extent to which we can take this exceptional process and use its lessons learned in the rule of what is not urgent and not rapid we would invite continued contribution to each of our four witnesses to each of those two questions as we go forward mr sullivan particularly welcome your thoughts about the way that this what i characterized as a tech bold plan could be created and funded and moving forward we had high hopes for this morning's hearings and you gentlemen have