this case concerns details entitlement to alternative fuel mixture credits for producing mixture is a butane and gasoline for ultimate use by consumers this case is not about making conventional gasoline nor is it about the trace amounts of butane parties in the u s using a comprehensive process to mix that you ten with gasoline and creating a fuel that was better for the environment and that served to reduce this country's dependence on foreign oil the credits that you tell us speaking for these activities are available by statute to taxpayers who produce a mixture of an alternative fuel and a taxable fuel there's no dispute that gasoline is a taxable fuel and there's also no dispute that the term alternative fuel in the relevant statute which is twenty six answer to this question is yes the answer is yes because of the plain language of the statute which is supported by the statutes context structure and i'd like to start by discussing the statutes plain language the statute at issue here is section six types of fuels which qualify as alternative fuels the statute plainly states that one of those seven different types of fuels which qualifies as an alternative fuel under the statute is liquefied petroleum gas or l far let me remove you get you off track with apologies but what what do we do about i'm a little hung up admittedly on the statutory definition of taxable fuels under section eight four thousand and eighty one dash one blah blah blah but that definition when viewed through the prism of the is related regulatory provision seems to specifically include additionally except in that argument it would make a difference which would require the court to set aside the plain language of section six thousand four hundred and twenty six dollars which can only be done if the plain language would lead to results so bizarre that congress couldn't have intended it guess you think that argument also lead to two other explicit categories in your statute being declared not eligible so it would not just invalidate the  nothing in it going back again to the language of section six thousand four hundred and twenty six dollars there's just nothing in that language that disqualifies butane from being an alternative fuel by virtue of the fact that it may sometimes be a taxable fuel congress could have written in it is a finite list and the fuels that are listed in that flush language are fuels that would otherwise qualify as alternative fuels under the statutes definition but they're specifically excluded from that definition butane does not appear and  never appeared and that flesh language list of excuse exclusions taxable fuels as never appeared and that flesh language list of exclusions and congress has has had a practice of adding fuel to that plus language list when it determines they should no longer call piles of punch as alternative for purposes of these credits that's exactly what congress did with the fuel calmly commonly known as black liquor back in two thousand and ten but again congress never engaged in this exercise with respect to  citation but you can come up with to kind of support this assertion that butane is not a component of gasoline or used to produce gasoline so nixon's yes i think so your honor i don't have a record citation from below up the top of my head but i mean we certainly did brief it in response to the government's brief it's we don't play discussed it in our reply brief in this case and i think it's just it's supported by just the language of the statute itself so if you look at four thousand and forty one dollars itself i think it contains everything you need and there wouldn't have to be anything else the court would need to refer to besides the statute and the treasury regulation that goes with  council the district court seemed to be concerned about the absurdity would you like to address that yes your honor i think you this is a lower court was concerned about absurdity but the lower court erred and applying that principle in this case the lower court ups applied the absurdity principle to set aside the plain language of the statute and it should not done so the absurdity principle is reserved for extreme cases that shock the conscience where the absurdity and injustice of applying the plain meaning of a provision would be so monstrous that all mankind what without hesitation unite in rejecting the application that is that is just  he said that all gas and butane in it and so therefore it would mean every single is that that was that the source of the use of certainty ruling i do think that may have been part of the district court that the lower courts misunderstanding here which is one of the reasons why it started up by saying this is not this case is not about that this case is not about the trace amounts of butane that are left over from their buying process  one and not four thousand and eighty one and i think you have to look very closely at the regulation that defines gasoline blend stocks which are on a referenced earlier and with to the statute four hundred and eighty three the term gasoline blend stock is limited to any petroleum product component of gasoline so butane can only be a gasoline blend stock and that's a taxable fuel when it is both a petroleum product and a component of gasoline so that those two things have to be met and i think it just it just illustrates one of the problems with the us is taxable fuel argument here because it really only covers a small subset of our position is even though our position though is even if it covered all it wouldn't matter of on appeal here i think once you look at that and look at the plain language of the statute then if you're to consider if you were to consider the u s as taxable if you will argument you then go to the point that you would you would you would have to you would have to set aside the plain language of section six thousand four hundred and twenty six dollars which you can't do it unless it would lead to results so bizarre congress couldn't have intended it and that's just not the case because there's ample taxable or alternative that's a false dichotomy you can be both and that's not a problem at all in the statute and in fact there are other examples above is that your position yes your honor that's right it is definition on that there that is a taxable fuel and thus can't be an alternative fuel would also exclude butane from eligibility from the need credit and there's no justification whatsoever i believe my m of that credit and the nd alternative reason and we describe this on page five thousand and fifty one of our brief as well as in response to the court's questions this week is that words have to be interpreted in context and the phrase liquefied petroleum gas or l p as a taxable fuel come last it can't be both for a couple of reasons why and it's contrary to the longstanding interpretation of and dichotomy between taxable fuels an alcohol does not include alcohol created from petroleum and natural gas and of course to be a gasoline one stop with nina forty three dollars a two the substance has to be a petroleum product it made allegedly made from biomass are listed as gasoline plane stopped but those substances to be a gasoline blend stocks must be a petroleum product component of gasoline so therefore from oil or natural gas under the statute to qualify as a biomass the the substance cannot be derived from crude oil or natural gas and this is discussed on page fifty eight dollars of our brief with with cites to the taxable fuels so if the fuel is taxable under four thousand and eighty one it is not by definition an alternative fuel and this is then within the code for over you know almost seventy years it's reflected in treasury regulations it's reflected in treasuries notice providing interpretive guidance when the credit was st inactive in two thousand and five and notice provision two thousand and six test ninety two repeats that and then in the specific cont years and your written their servers argue that the context of that statute is alternative transportation fuels and i wonder does that argument rely exclusively on legislative history do you believe you can win as apart from any of those things where jubilee that we can win without looking at the revenue rolling or the absurdity prints one back that's how government the case and that's how the government won in the venture decision we do need to look a problem for you isn't it no it's not it's because the statute four thousand and eighty three congress said gasoline when stocks as listed by expressions that specifically directed treasury to identify what are the components you know idea that these credits were only meant to apply and the transportation industry council referenced the transportation industry again in her argument just now but i think it's very important to note that the language of the statute is actually a lot broader than that the mixture credit says the blend must be used as a fuel or sold for uses of fuel but that used is not limited to a car and it's not limited to the transportation industry at all and could be used in other things for example it could be used to power a generator to make electricity so there's really nothing in the language of the statute or in this idea that it applies to the transportation industry only to support the government's argument to respond to the government's argument on the taxable fuels a to alcohol produce from petroleum is actually in a political to e t e because that exclusion is for alcohol's and not for each others so that exclusion that she referenced doesn't apply with respect to the bio diesel mixture credit  and the guidance provided by the i r s on that credit for the government has has pressed this argument that congress somehow expressly authorized the treatment of renewable diesel for purposes of the bio diesel mixture credit but didn't express authorized the treatment of you chain but that's simply not correct congress didn't provide any such express authorization with regard to renewable diesel all congress did was define renewable diesel by stating that renewable diesel should be treated in the same and that statement from congress makes sense because renewable diesel is not in fact bio diesel and it wasn't previously defined as such and so congress had to provide that definition but butane by contrast has long been understood to be l p g by the scientific community and by the the government repeatedly points to section four thousand and forty one dollars for that definition but again that is the wrong definition for these purposes that definition was created for excise tax purposes it's section six sixty two that provides the definition to look at here and it did provide its own definition it didn't cross reference to anything else and that's the definition that has to be used here and i think it bears noting that the definitions of alternative fuel and those two statutes are that's really important here when i just briefly touch on the government's argument regarding natural gas derived butane which we responded to in our eight in our brief our our supplement from earlier a little lie of the alcohol fuel mixture credit congress distinguishes between alcohol produced from petroleum and alcohol produced from natural gas congress made that same distinction back in one thousand nine hundred and six when it enacted section forty three it made that same differentiation in the old version of section four thousand and eighty one c three between alcohol produced from petroleum alcohol produced from natural gas so there there is a difference between butane derived from natural gas butane derived from petroleum for purposes of whether it is a gasoline and finally let me close by saying that the government cannot win in this case without without setting aside the plain language of the statute nine that you would have to set aside the plain language of section six thousand four hundred and twenty six dollars for the government to prevail in this case and that is only done in very limited circumstances circumstances of absurdity which are simply not present here i think the