states against the growing threat of a blitz of missile attack particularly from iran as announcement the president said and i quote our new missile defense architecture in europe will provide stronger smarter and swifter defenses of american forces and american the administration's work on implementing the phased adaptive approach over the past year we will hear from four distinguished witnesses dr jim miller principal deputy undersecretary of defense for policy lieutenant general patrick j o reilly director of the missile defense agency rear admiral arthur macy jr director of the joint integrated air missile defense organization for the joint staff and finally mr frank rose deputy assistant secretary of  framework establishes the objective of cheating and i quote the capability of defend the case but to defend our populations and territories against ballistic missile attack as a core element of our collective defense which contributes to of the p a and open opportunities for sharing the burden a regional missile defenses with our allies and our friends today about a year and two months after the announcement the subcommittee will have an opportunity to hear from key administration witnesses on efforts to implement the p a a in that regard we asked our witnesses to address three key questions first one of the key technical milestones that we should be watching for in each phase of the plan and where we stand in achieving those milestones more broadly when we stand in defining the technical objectives and components but each phase second we do we stand in completing the operational plans and assessment of missile in vitoria requirements for each phase of the p a specifically when we expect to see the results of the next joint capabilities mix study in finally we do we stand in defining the requirements for basing elements of each phase of the p a on european soil and completing the necessary agreements with each of the host nations with that i want to say thanks again to each of our witnesses for making time to testify before the subcommittee today and forward to hearing your my last hearing as chairman let me just say it's been a pleasure to chair the subcommittee over the last year and a half and i'd like to thank all of my colleagues for their contributions to our work but specifically  issue of cyber threats i would like to welcome dr miller mr rose admiral macy in general riley let me start with a statement on the phase adaptive approach that i made last april at our missile defense budget hearing i offered there is an opportunity to gain bipartisan support on these plans but the committee must have confidence that the is the best approach for protecting the united states and our european allies our ability to do effective oversight and to hold the administration accountable for its implementation of the is based on a continuous dialogue and information exchange that must occur between the administration and our committee however since the administration's announcement over a year ago this committee has repeatedly sought greater detail on plans analysis and resource requirements for the lack of responsiveness to those requests led to the bipartisan legislative requirements that were placed in the house passed defense bill seeking information and cooperation with congress appreciate efforts by several of you over the last two months to remedy this situation i met with general riley in october to discuss program plans and yesterday the chairman and i received a briefing on how the p a decision was made we are beginning to get a greater insight into the piece but there is still a lot we don't know yet there's a two for defense analysis was tasked to conduct an independent assessment of the p a and report to congress by june first two thousand and ten i understand the bulk of their work was completed last summer but the report is stuck in in her department coordination and should been finding when we should expect to receive this report also at our committee's request the government accountability office  o conducted a review of the european phased adaptive approach and concluded although the e p a identified four phases of capability and timeframes for deployment several key activities necessary to establish an acquisition decision framework remain undefined these include finalizing e p a architectures systems quantities and locations determining key top level e p a acquisition decision points and a terminating what constitutes phase completion in short the department has a significant amount of work ahead of it to translate its policy decision into a concrete implementable architecture we still have several outstanding questions on the details of and i hope that our witnesses will address some of those today in their testimony first as stated by the white house last september the p a approach was based upon an assumption that the long range missile threat is quote slower to develop close  however since then troubling new details have emerged on both north korea and iran's long range missile programs and recent revelation show that iran has one thousand b m twenty five advanced ballistic missiles acquired north korea and its arsenals today that can reach berlin and moscow i have priest previously stated my concern about a gap in the coverage of the united states c b m threat from iran could materialize as early as two thousand and fifteen according to the latest intelligence assessments yet the p a is not planned to cover the united states in till twenty twenty now there would also appear to be a gap in defensive coverage against ballistic missiles that can reach western and central europe do these threat assessments change your approach in any way second the administration is committed to a hedging strategy for defense of the homeland in case the long range threat comes earlier or technical issues arise with the s m three block to a or to be intercept witnesses today discuss the details of the strategy including any acquisition plans and key decision points necessary to employ the hedge third the administration's approach to missile defense in europe places emphasis on proven technology yet we have since learned that the s m three block to be interceptor will be a new missile the s m three block to a interceptor an airborne infrared system are still in the early design and development in the p t s s satellite system doesn't yet exist the g a o found that quote system schedules are highly optimized in technical technology technology technology development testing production and then a gratian leaving little room for potential delays so how are these technological risks being addressed forth when will the department determine force structure and inventory requirements for the piece and when will a total cost estimate be completed our committee will be challenged in assessing whether the budget is sufficient if we do not know the required quantities and cost to implement the p a fifth i would appreciate an update on the status of host nation discussions for the land based just sites and forward based radar nato's indorsement of territorial missile defense of the summit is very positive and i commend you and your predecessors efforts toward this outcome i'm also interested in u s plans for nato allies in the as well as plans for allies contributions toward lasley press reports continue to surface that indicate that the u s and russia are negotiating some sort of missile defense agreement led by undersecretary of state house undersecretary of state how sure and a russian counterparts i remain concerned that the administration might allow russia to shape its missile defense plans particularly for long range missile defenses in europe and exchange for moscow's and hearings to the new start treaty i would appreciate our witnesses discussing the exact nature and scope of the missile defense discussions that are ongoing with russia to once again thank chairman landrigan i appreciate your leadership look forward to working with you on the port and bipartisan oversight issues that we face in the hundred twelfth congress and i want to thank our witnesses here today for their contribution to what is the important issues  national security thank you and we thank the right members now would turn over to our witnesses as each of them to summarize their written statement in about five minutes the me has received full written statements from each of the witnesses and without objection those statements made part of the record with that dr miller the floor is yours mr chairman ranking member turner members of the subcommittee thank you for the opportunity to testify today it is a pleasure to join my colleagues gen reilly and mr rose as chairman stated in september of two thousand and nine the president approved what was a unanimous recommendation of the secretary of defense and the joint chiefs of staff for a phased adaptive approach to missile defense in europe and in the interest of time we will briefly summarize our statements as you know the european phased adaptive approach as for faces the administration plans to deploy all four phases and has made excellent progress on each over the last year phase one which important phase one tasked to accomplish we plan to deploy a forward based radar in southern europe in two thousand and eleven we are currently in discussions with potential host nations and while no decision has been made we expect to meet the planning  deployment timeline in two thousand and eleven in phase two which starts in the twenty fifteen timeframe we will continue with ship based deployments and add a land based standard missile three site in romania romania agreed to host us intercept february of this year and follow on to go she sions are underway we plan to deploy twenty four s m three interceptors in romania during phase two these interceptors will be upgraded and will will add the improved black one be the standard missile three the department of defense is now developing the sim three block to be some one hundred eighty of these missiles will be delivered by fiscal year twenty fifteen one phase two starts and three hundred twenty four by fiscal year tw seventeen in phase three which starts in the twenty eighteen timeframe we will deploy at a land based s m three site in poland poland agreed to host this site in october two thousand and nine not long after we announced the european face adaptive approach in july of two thousand and ten poland and the united states signed a protocol amending our ballistic missile defense agreement and in addition we have signed and ratified supplemental status of forces agreement with poland in phase three will introduce another new variant of the s m three missile the two a which is currently in development in a cooperate program with the japanese it will have its first intercept test in twenty fourteen it will enter service by twenty eighteen we plan to deploy twenty four s three interceptors in poland that means we will have forty eight land based s m three interceptors deployed by phase three twenty four in romania and twenty four in poland that is about five times the number of interceptors planned on the previous third three interceptor the block to be this interceptor will provide early intercept capability against medium and an intermediate range ballistic missiles and very importantly against potential i c b m threats from iran or elsewhere in the middle east the missile defense agency is conducting concept development and component technology development during this fiscal year for the s m three block to be and the request for proposals for the concept of element for this missile was issued in october of two thousand and ten so we are on track for all four phases of the phase adaptive approach in europe we have also made tremendous progress in nato shortly after the announcement of the european phased adaptive approach in fall two thousand and nine nato secretary general r stated his trunk support in december two thousand and nine on nato foreign ministers unanimously welcomed the e p a and at the lisbon summit concluded about two weeks ago nato leaders agreed to a nato mission to protecting the alliances populations and territories against ballistic missile attacks as part of the announcement of the e p a last year the administration welcomed russian cooperation of missile defense is seeking missile defense cooperation with russia makes good sense but it is not new president reagan proposed such cooperation with the soviet union in the one nine hundred eighty s president president g w bush pursued cooperation on missile defense with russia she's meeting with russia throughout his administration some have suggested recently that the u s proposal for listing missile defense cooperation with russia represents a quote secret deal this is nonsense there is no secret deal on missile defense no negotiations for such a thing the administration has told congress repeatedly including in testimony that we are pursuing missile defense cooperation with russia these discussions are separate from new start discussions that have taken place and in conducting these discussions the administration has made clear to russia to allies to congress and to all others that the united states will not agree to any limitations or constraints on u s listed missile defenses and that the united states intends to continue improving and deploying b m d systems to defend united states are deployed forces and our allies and partners finally as we implement e p a we also continue to maintain and improve our defenses of the homeland the u s homeland is currently protected against the threat of limited i c b m attack by thirty ground based interceptors which will be the ploy by the end of this  fort greely alaska and vandenberg air force base california so we have a capability today to counter the projected threats from north korea iran at the same time because the threat is unpredictable we're hedging by completed missile field to an alaska to allow for rapid  placement of up to eight additional ground based interceptors and we're also continuing development of the two stage ground based interceptor and as i noted before the e p a european face adaptive approach a loss will contribute to defense to the united states homeland in conclusion the threat posed by ballistic missiles is real and it is growing as we said in our blistering missile defense review it's growing both qualitatively and quantitatively our missile defenses today are also very real and our capabilities are also growing both qualitatively and quantitatively we look forward to working with the subcommittee and with congress in implementing the european phased adaptive approach and and if one of the rest of our missile defense efforts as well thank you and i look forward to your questions is my honor to testify before you today on the status of the european phased adaptive approach or e p a for developing missile defense of our homeland deploying forces deployed forces and nato european allies the missile defense agency or india a is committed to disciplined management to efficiently create effective missile defense in the four phases outlined by the ballistic missile defense review over the next decade we are developing integrated missile defense that will provide robust capability using advanced sensors and a combination of interceptors for multiple intercept opportunities against short medium intermediate range and intercontinental ballistic missiles or m s during the past year we've made significant progress in implementing the e p a and i report to you that we are executing all of our programs according to the e p a timelines our greatest priority remains strengthening homeland missile defense we continue to upgrade our ground based midcourse defense system expand our sensor network and develop new a new interceptor the s m three two b which will add a layer of defense against potential future i c b m s launched from current regional threats during the past year we in place the thirty a ground based interceptor or g b i restarted the g b i production supply chain upgraded two of the original g b i says conducted the first two stage g b i flight test installed a training note at fort greely alaska upgraded the tuli greenland early warning radar in play in the clear early warning radar upgrade and alaska finally we are on track to complete construction of our missile fields at fort greely by february two thousand and twelve much progress has been made in two thousand and ten developing the e p a a phase one which will provide initial protection of southern europe from existing s r b m and m r b m threats during the past year we increased the number of b m d capable ships to twenty we delivered twenty six s and three one a system delivered a second thad battery and began the initial production of twenty six interceptors and two more as bad batteries additionally we demonstrated the integration of the a in t p y two radar with add or aegis in eight demonstrations with that nato active layer theater ballistic missile defense system e p a a development phase two will be completed by two thousand and fifteen and will provide greater defense against larger missile raid sizes and improved discrimination of ballistic missile threats using remote radars and the s m three one b and s m three one a interceptors at sea and in a land based or a shore configuration during the past ashore systems engineering contract and supported a us romanian site selection team for the first deployed aegis ashore site we also have begun at sea operational testing of the upgraded aegis fire control software for e p a face to on the u s s lake erie e p a a development phase three will be completed in twenty eighteen and provide defense against increasing rate sizes of and intermediate range ballistic missiles over large areas of europe using the s m three to a interceptors at sea and at aegis ashore sites in romania and poland airborne infrared or a b r remotely piloted vehicles and the persistent tracking space system or p t s s during the past year we began ground testing the s m three two a interceptor components with the japanese in preparation for flight test in tw fourteen we conducted five a b i our flight test demonstrating missile tracking accuracy we tracked missiles from space with the space surveillance tracking system and completed a concept review for the p t s s to support and potential i c b m s from today regional threats during the past year we completed the s m three to be system concept to review and solicited three imperative concept definition contracts of which one collaboration with the developmental and operational test communities updated our test plans for the e p a which include seventy two flight tests and a hundred seven ground tests over the next decade i look forward answering your questions and thank you thank you general before we go abu mazen we have a vote on right now i think we'll be able to get through them a testimony and then we source recess and then go to the vote there are five votes i appreciate the opportunity to discuss the face adaptive approach for ballistic missile defense along with dr miller general reilly and mr rose i will summarize the operational benefits of the p a a as a u s approach to missile defense which is responsive to both congressional direction and the war fighters needs i will also touch on the planning and analysis undertaken by the joint staff to help guide decisions on maximizing combatant commander war fighting capability additional details come contained in my submitted written testimony while a majority of our remarks today will address the european face the death of approach in some detail i want to emphasize here that the p a is a conceptual approach to providing ballistic missile defense capability for the homeland and our forces allies and partners in different regions circumstances and times is a realignment and an operational enhancement of rb m d s plans and it's not a replacement the realignment provides us with a greater capability through a flexible and adaptable approach which focuses on protecting those most at risk today while continuing to improve our capability against future threats as has been noted by the congress the most pressing threat for our deployed forces today is increasing number of short range and medium range ballistic missiles the p a addresses these issues head on the us cannot afford to build a number of launchers interceptors and sensors it would take for each combatant commander to have his own dedicated b capability that can address all the potential strikes that could be launched at any time but the p a provides instead is a balanced investment that has the capability to engage the range of threats can be tailored to the geography political circumstances and defense capabilities or regional partners and has the flexibility to rapidly deplore deploy more assets where and when they are needed the p a concept provides the united states with an enhance capability to respond to regional threats worldwide no matter where they emerge and the strength and defense of the homeland the p a s phase two advances in our own technical and operational capabilities for ballistic missile defense and it is adaptive  trends and advances in potential adversarial threats we speak of four phases in advance of our technical capabilities however the same number and timing of application of individual phases may not be applied in each combatant commanders a o r the same way we are developing plans for phases for each a o r with the european currently being the most advanced majority of which general riley has described i earlier alluded to the planning and analysis we have underway to support p a implementation and as the chairman mr turner noted this includes the joint capability make study we previously can conduct a j c m one in two thousand and five two thousand and six and j c m two in two thousand and seven two thousand and eight the latter was briefed to this subcommittee in september that last year the final report on a current assessment j c m three which focuses on the force requirements for the p a will not be completed until march of two thousand and eleven so i do not have any results i can discuss today however i think it is important understand what this study is how it's being executed and the kind results that will be produced i will note that i look forward to the opportunity next spring to discuss those results with this subcommittee when they're available j c m three is examining our missile defense strategy in the p a a to inform decisions on the number and type of sensors launchers and interceptors we require in order to determine force needs at this level of granularity we have to take into account how the combatant commands intend to employ them what the threats are and generally how the threat will be expected to be employed the analysis is being executed by jammed up my organization in conjunction with representatives from the combatant commands the missile agency the services and always the cape assess cost assessment program evaluation cape in parallel with the j c m three study the joint staff u s strategic command and the staff of pay com you are conducting formal planning for how the p a will be and implemented in areas of responsibility further eucom is working closely with nato to develop the concept of operations command control plans and planning factors for the implementation of the recent nato decision in lisbon to incorporate missile defense as a core element of the collective defense and conclusion the department is investing a significant portion of its budget in missile defense and the p a is providing the necessary framework to ensure it is invested effectively and wisely and most importantly meets the war fighters needs we have established a solid process and an analytic approach to monitor and guide the implementation of the p a and we expect to develop and field the phases in the most operationally effective and cost efficient manner possible thank you for the opportunity and i would ford answering your question it's very good thank you adam may see it said we're going to recess right now we'll begin to return with mr rose testimony that we're going to questions  testimony thank you chairman lance even ranking member turner members of the subcommittee thank you for the opportunity to testify today on the obama administration's efforts to implement the european phase adaptive approach or e p a as many of you know i work for the subcommittee for two and a half years in and this is my first opportunity to sit on the other side of the table and testify i look forward to answering your questions undersecretary t regrets that she could not participate in person instead she has prepared a statement and it has asked that it be included in the record of today's hearing mr chairman i'd like to focus my opening remarks today on the progress we have made in implementing the e p a over the past year last year president obama committed the united states to a comprehensive new plan to provide missile defense protection to our nato allies in the united states this plan will defend against the existing short medium range threat in of all as a threat of ault's this plan has opened up new opportunities for cooperation with our allies and has enhanced nato's article five commitment to collective summit two weeks ago nato agreed to develop a missile defense capability to defend its territory populations and forces against ballistic missile attack in the summ part of a broader response to counter this threat we have decided that the alliance will develop a missile defense capability to pursue its core task of collective defense in quote additionally the alliance agreed to expand its missile defense command and control system to include territorial missile defense this will be enable voluntary national contributions from the united states in other nato allies to plug into the overall nato capability finally the alliance welcome the e p a as an important national cop contribution to this nato contribution capability mr chairman it's important to no that while nato has been involved in missile defense since the late one nine hundred ninety s that work has been strictly limited to defending its military forces from ballistic missile attack not defending its territory in populations it has been a longstanding bipartisan goal of the united states to expand the alliances work on missile defense to include defense of territory in populations therefore the significance of nato's decision on missile defense at lisbon should not be underestimated it is a major diplomatic victory for the united states in the alliance as a whole in addition to the recent success at nato we have also made significant progress in implementing the bilateral agreements that are necessary to deploy elements of the e p a in your on the deployment of the phase one radar in south eastern europe once agreement on the location has been reached we prepared to immediately begin formal negotiations on a basing agreement for phase two romania has agreed to host a land based s m three site we begin negotiations on a basing agreement in june of this year in our making excellent progress towards a final document the united states and romania already have a supplemental status of forces agreement in force finally poland agreed in october two thousand and nine to host the three s m three site on july third two thousand and ten the united states in poland signed a protocol amending the original two thousand and eight ballistic missile defense agreement which will allow for the deployment o land based s m three interceptor site in poland the next step is to bring this agreement into force for ratification by the polish parliament earlier in february two thousand and ten the polish government ratified supplemental so for agreement with the united states before i close let me touch on the subject of missile defense in russia like the previous administration we believe that missile defense cooperation with russia both  bilaterally and nato is in the national security interest of the united states in lisbon two weeks ago nato and russia agreed on a number of missile defense cooperative activities including the resumption of theater missile defense exercise says as president obama stated by moving ahead with cooperation on missile defense we can turn a source of past tension into a source of cooperation against a shared threat that said even as we seek greater cooperation with russia on missile defense the united states will continue to reject any constraints or limitations on our missile defense programs restrictions or limitations on u s missile defense capabilities are not under discussion let me read a to reiterate what secretary miller said there are no secret deals with russia to limit our missile defenses finally let me also say that russia will not have a veto over u s missile defenses in europe or anywhere mr chairman ranking member turner let me stop there i will be happy to answer any questions thank you very much administration's policy committed d o d to a schedule that would be challenging to meet to meet based on the technical progress missile defense element development and testing programs and before the scope of the development efforts were fully understood and quote so general reilly could you tell us what measures are being considered to mitigate the consequences of a potential test failures or delays that might lead to production gaps or otherwise result and schedule delays for delivering high end capabilities to combatant commanders sir the plans we've laid out for each of the elements of the phase adaptive approach were designed based on  traditional development of missile systems and their fire control systems we've looked at the development timelines and the ones we've used in the face adaptive approach are actually longer than what  can compare them to with our other missile defense programs so our assessment is this is a conservative set of schedules we've also laid in decision points which i briefed the g a o on different technology equal maturity levels that will be reached before we move to each of the development phases of our program so we deem this to be a very manageable risk and laid out in a very prudent  approach to developing these systems i will note that some of their analysis was comparing our missile developments of just a missile to system developments which are more comprehensive and one of the advantages of using the aegis system as the mainstay for our capability for the e p a is we evolve it from one fire control capability to the next and in between we bring a new missile on board phases that are aimed at specific threat classes that we're trying to negate and as we said phase one is aimed at medium ballistic missiles and short range an intermediate range ballistic missiles as we if we had a problem with the subsequent face in each phase it would usually equate to producing or deploying additional numbers of missile defen systems since our systems are flexible and since they're mobile we have the ability to to add capability in f we found in fact we needed we only had shorter range interceptors versus using longer range ones of  subsequent phase so we believe the adaptability itself of the system allows you to adjust to the capability that is available at any given time thank you general dr miller  o also included that quote d o d has not fully implemented a management process that synchronizes the european phase adaptive approach acquisition activities and sure as transparency and accountability d s made progress in acquisition planning for technology development system engineering testing partial progress in defining requirements and identifying stakeholders but has not yet developed an e p a acquisition decision schedule or an overall and budget to track progress in each phase of the p a mr chairman i'd like to answer but then give an opportunity for general reilly also to answer is the acquisition executive for the for the systems and for the missile systems involved here at the outset of the of this effort and indeed throughout the book missile defense review we looked at the likely costs associated with the phase adaptive approach and had an overall estimate for those  costs so she with missiles sensors and so forth as the approaches each of those programs mature as we've seen we've seen in the refinement of those cost estimates and current currently believe that that we have a pretty good grasp on what the  what the overall cost of this program will be one of the uncertainties or one of the choices one makes is how do ascribe the costs of the ages b m d capable ships associated with that because they are a global asset we've generally don't don't include them in our in our cost estimates for the cost of phase adaptive approach for europe now with respect to with respect to oversight of the program in addition to the missile defense executive board which which meets regularly and reviews this and other elements of missile defense missile defense agency's programs including all of the phase adaptive approach related programs coming forward as you know an annual review through the department and get a pretty intensive scrub and that's been the case this year as it as it as it was throughout the course of the conduct of the listed missile defense review mice my sense is that we have a very good very good understanding of what the key technical risks are associated with each of the elements of the phase adaptive approach and that we have a and that generally in missile defense agency have a clear lined up program of activities that  stretch from today through the coming through the coming decade for when the key milestones will be when they need to get the systems on contract and what other key decisions are thank you s each one of our programs and the e p a as the acquisition executive i have established six baselines cost schedule technical operational contracts and test baselines this is far more descriptive that's in a typical acquisition program baseline ours is more detailed we have and if there's a lead service involved like the navy or army or air force i have asked and received the cooperation in from the their acquisition executives so when i signed these baselines the service that's going to be the lead service for these capabilities also science the baseline after they've conducted their own reviews so it's unprecedented that a joy program actually has to service acquisition executives for the service acquisition executive and myself as missile defense we perform twice the amount of reviews you would normally see also as dr miller said the missile defense executive board does perform a lot of the duties that a defense acquisition board would perform so instead of typically having the defense acquisition board review once every two to three years i have a review once every two to three months so it is a very integrated technical management approach it's very visible and i have provided those baselines and we will continue to update those and that is part of our baseline it's not only for each individual element but also the aggregate as we understand the definition of the architecture of the e p a and the reason i say that is we use an analytical architecture but it's the combatant commander the european command that determines what the war plans and the actual architecture will be and that is submitted to the joint staff for approval and that is currently going through that process i'll let admiral macy address that but once that's produced we can take our unit costs and very quickly be able to determine precisely what the the joint staff is leading a new reading of leading a review which includes an examination of how the global force management process will incorporate the updated missile defense policy planning guidance contained in the blissett missile defense review the review that inventory requirements and associated cost pacific to phase two three and four can be formulated and made available to congress thank you mr chairman the global forest management development project was a several months long effort to understand was there anything that was different about how you do ballistic missile defense and how you would handle the management of forces we have for many years of course had global force management it's how you determine which divisions go where which air force fighter squadrons go why where what ships go where in any given year this is an effort that's run between the joint staff strategic command and joint forces command so the study was to look at ok is there something different ballistic missiles that affect that there are some things learned out of that those have been folded into it and it did wrap up in the late spring early summer those have since been wrapped into the effort that i looted t earlier which is the ongoing planning effort being led by strategic command how to do management of ballistic missile defense in the different regions at different times and across the globe the problem of course being that you have a finite number of ships a number of sad batteries a number of tipi two radars and everybody wants them and so the question is who gets them and how often and when do you need them we don't envision either the need or the ability to station everything twenty four seven three sixty five wherever we might want it and that comes into the global force management on what will be if you will permanently emplaced what will be on a regular deployment schedule and what will be on a surge deployment schedule that process is going on now it goes through a series of reviews culminating with reviews led by the vice chairman and it will wrap up this coming spring so i would expect it to spring we'll be able to come back and talk to you about on a global scale on a management scale how we would do that obviously we're not going to get into the details of individual conclave lands we'll be able to describe to you what we think  will be the way we'll manage that at the same time and these are interrelated because part of the discussion that you have with the cocom about what do you think you need in a time of low tension versus what do you need in a time of high tension figures into how does cocom think he's going to fight and as i discussed in my testimony that drives how you do the jicama three study to figure out what do you think you're going to need how many interceptors how many launching platforms and how many sensor systems  and so as those two studies wind in and out between each other to figure out what is the answers they will result in a set of options that the senior decision makers can look at and say ok these are the ways in which i will deploy forces in times of low medium and high tension and where to and having decided that these are how many i need to handle the state the state and this is how i need to handle a surge condition we'll be looking at things like utility curves when do you not have to buy any more interceptors because it doesn't buy you that many more days within a particular conflict the details a lot of easily be classified and when we come back in the spring we'll have that discussion we'll be ready to go into a great deal of depth so the  date answer to your question if you will mr chairman is i hope to personally in the april timeframe be sitting down with your staff as an initial review of the details preparatory to taking them up to the members of the committee very good thank you move forward to that sort of thing when it occurs my final couple of the areas for each of the witnesses talking about basing agreements let me start with phase one we are discussing with a number of nations the potential deployment of the phase one radar we are confident that we can meet the from the legal perspective in getting the agreements in place the timeline of the end of twenty eleven with regards to phase two the land base s m three site in romania we are making good progress on the ballistic missile defense agreement we already have an existing supplemental sofa as well as a defense cooperation agreement so we hope to come to a conclusion on that soon i can't give you a day because these negotiations that's how negotiations go but we are very confident that we will have the agreements in place for phase two now that will need to be right to fide the ballistic missile defense agreement by the romanian parliament but we have been told by the romanian government they don't necessarily they don't foresee any challenges with regards to phase three in face for  poland we signed an protocol this july to the two thousand and eight basing agreement and we are awaiting ratification of that agreement by the polish parliament with regards to nato now that the political decision has been made the individual committees the operational side of the house the technical side of the house will begin the twenty eleven we currently a couple deployed overseas there can be moved relatively rapidly as you know mr chairman we have one in japan and we but what in israel and we were still confident that the timelines for moving that equipment to getting that established are very achievable sir and i would like to add as far as from point of interrupt ability our systems were built from the beginning using nato protocols and nato standards so that our systems are interoperable with other systems that have been built to nato standards as i said in my hearing the most effective missile defense or my testimony the most effective  missile defense is to have layers so you can have several opportunities to intercept an incoming missile the u s contribution to nato and the e p a is primarily an upper tier what we call would be a first shot opportunity either in outer space or in the upper atmosphere our fire control systems will be interlinked with the active layer theater ballistic missile missile defense system that nato is developing which  would coordinate the utilization of their lower tier systems such as patriot and some of the early ages missiles and some of the other missile systems and missile defense systems that they have already for cured so we will maximize the combined capability of both we began two years ago with a direct link between the test bed the laboratory that nato uses to develop their command and control and d haag is directly connected with our laboratory in colorado springs so that as we develop software we assure ourselves that they are interoperable and we have taken that into account and it is a very useful tool having both of those for their development of command and control approaches sir from an operational point of view i would defer to admiral macey mr chairman i have been in one of my other hats i have the privilege of being the u s representative to the nato air defense committee and as such have been involved in these discussions for quite some time nato has been discussing this over the past year at some length there have been a number of position papers done the nato air defense committee has done a number of papers coming out of previous tasking at the strasburg calles summits of several years ago there has already been initial con ops development going on it is both  convenient and useful of course that the commander of the european command is also sack you are and the commander of u s air forces europe is the command nato commander air north so those staff have been involved and are already looking at what are the con ops what are the processes and procedures after lisbon the secretary general has given direction that a number of committees look at this and be prepared to answer in some detail next spring such issues as sea to con ops and command and control so between that approach of course nato and the united states have shared command and control for air defense for a great number of years so we know how to do that and we take that and using the systems as general riley mentioned that have been built in conformance with nato specifications we believe that we are in a very well position to integrate the u s contribution to both the subject matter and the members approach issues from a bipartisan basis so i appreciate both kerry and bob's service and look forward to your dedication as we go into the hundred twelfth congress gentleman almost all of you when you were giving your statements gave us some sense of the obvious criticism and i know you feel that of the suspicion that there's a secret deal with that russia might have veto power over our missile defense systems and that this administration might agree to limitations on missile defense dr miller you stated in your testimony on page seven the administration has made clear to russia and allies that the united states will not agree to any limitations or constraints on u s ballistic missile defenses and the united states intends to continue improving and deploying b m d systems and the problem jim and i think is  that the phase adaptive approach though is borne out of a limitation and a constraint that's been placed on our missile defense system by having scrapped the third site where the ground based missiles were intended for poland including the radar that was included to check republic this administration unilaterally put a constraint limitation and proposed in the face adaptive approach which was not mutually exclusive to the third site it includes systems that were hurt concurrently  being developed and and that is an issue i think that that puts a light over the issue of the administration's need to continue to say that they would not agree to limitations because  they stepped forward initially with one the second issue i think that that causes each of you in your testimony to have to raise this issue is is the fact of the statements that the russians themselves are making i have the moscow times report today about president medvedev gives state of the nation address where he is reported to have said he warned that the west that if nato doesn't reach a deal with russia of the joint development of an anti missile shield over europe a new arms race would start in the next decade and russia would be forced to build up its offensive strategic forces washington post reports putin having said that if the missile defense system explodes russian includes installation along russia's borders moscow will see that as a threat and be forced to respond with an expansion and updating of its own weapons system this is a time when the senate is being called to take up the issue of the new start treaty where the russian leadership specifically singing singling out missile defense as a threat to their willingness to comply with the treaty that that our senate is now being asked to concur in which brings me to the issue i think that i would like you to deal with today and that is the issue of since the site was scrapped and the two stage was preserved according to the ballistic missile defense review as hedging strategy for homeland defense in case one the long range threat comes earlier or too technical issues arise with the later models of the three interceptor brings me to a question of well how do we evaluate this h e at what point would the department make a decision to employ the head what criteria would be used and what threat indications and warning would you need to see ahead to make such a decision to deploy that to stage how long would it take to deploy if the decision is made so and the third one is in light of the statements that we saw today from the leadership of russia does your hedge strategy if it's needed to be deployed already violate what the russian leaders are saying would be there their continued commitment to the new start treaty dr miller  your thoughts mr turner if i can let me start by taking exception if i if i can to your characterization of the face adaptive approach as a quote limitation frankly the  conclusion of the missile defense review work that we did and the conclusion of people at multiple levels in the department of defense is that it was a better idea a better approach that would provide more capability sooner for the threats we had to day and a more important delta to the capability for the longer range threats you may see in the future and i'll come back to that point when i talk about about hedging with respect to rus statements we can expect the russian federation to do what's in its natural national interest we are of course committed to do what's in united states national interest in the idea behind the politic missile defense cooperation is that in this area because we both face threats from iran and potentially other states that there is room for cooperation and there is room for both of us to advance our interests and improve our improve our security and similarly for nato and russia to the through the nato russia council that there is room for both to improve security i will state as well that there is a long history of many in russia wanting to slow down the u s missile defense program i don't think that we could be any more clear about the fact that we will not accept that and we will go forward and continue to improve our capabilities both qualitatively and quantitatively with respect to the question of the of the hedge i think it's useful to think in terms of of time frames  about as quickly as we would expect that we could get it in place and that's about when it would have been in place under the previous approach so it's it's i think useful to remind ourselves that the first heads well the backup the first of course is to prevent this from occurring in the first place and that's what the sanctions the sanctions with respect to nuclear program about and what the pressure track is about as well as our offers for diplomacy should they go that way but it's useful to remind ourselves that we currently have deployed thirty ground based interceptors and that these interceptors are our intent in fact capable of providing defensive united states next hedge that is a political before twenty seventeen is that the secretary of defense last year call if we thought it was a more sophisticated threat those eight interceptors will be available in those sales will be prepared so within that timeframe within the next seven years that's what the that's what the hedge looks like so the really comes into play on the other toward the toward the in the twenty seventeen timeframe and later and what we would what we would look for is a combination of progress if you can call it that rainy a nuclear program i c b m capabilities and i think it's probably preferable not to go into details or any indicators warning but i think it is fair to say that you look at that not just the independent activities of those two but the efforts to make them and to provide a weaponized capability you noted that some assessments have have suggested that iran could have a capability potentially as soon as twenty fifteen they don't take exception to that there's a tremendous amount of uncertainty about the timeline but as i said it's the first thing that it's essential to remember is that we have capabilities in place and we're prepared to augment them in that timeframe with our ground based interceptors sees me and the rest of the the rest of the hedge will come in later with respect to the technical heads for the for the if there are challenges with later versions of the s m three we will see the we'll see those in the coming years and then have a decision to make if that is indeed the case the you go back to because of that there was a lot in that answer so let me try to break it down the block missile defense review states that the hedge for the two stage is in case one the long range threat comes earlier or two technical issues arise with later models and you don't disagree with that right that's right ok so for this to be the policy and for this to be a policy that you agree with it must mean that the hedge would be available prior to the phase adapted approach being available because otherwise it wouldn't say earlier is that correct you know the phase for the well i  just had to ask you this because you said the phase that the prochoice going to be here sooner and i just want to be clear because my understanding of the ballistic missile defense review was that the hedge was in case it was needed earlier than the phase adaptive approach would be available and i just wanna earlier with respect to the earlier phases of the phase adaptive approach but not the portion that relates to protection for the united states homeland and the protection of the two stage would be provided specifically not with  will is intended to mainland you're right another layer for the united states it will also it will also provide an additional capability for stent phase intercept for medium range and intermediate range ballistic missiles as well now in light of  the comments that i know you're well versed in all the issues of start and missile defense in light of the comments that we're hearing from russia if you were in a position to deploy the hedge do you believe that their statements indicate that deployment of the head would be a violation of their perspective on start  mr turner i don't believe so i've not seen a definitive statement in that regard but i can say with some confidence that the answer to that would not affect a decision made certainly by this administration whether whether or not to go forward with a hedge great statement that there will be no constraints or limitations on missile defense certainly plies to the to the head as well as to all other elements of our program walk me through them for just a moment as to the timeline of the he if next week we were to a position where the hedge was to to be pursued because the threat had either come earlier or that we're now aware of technical issues with the later models of the three interceptor that moved  timeframe back what is the time frame for the deployment of the hajj for the two stage ground based interceptor the soonest that we currently expect that we'll be able to deploy in europe would be ication for the for poland czech republic that slipped into the twenty i'm i would say twenty sixteen to twenty eighteen timeframe is that a rolling six to seven years then i mean you say twenty seven now but i mean is it i mean it's three years year development of the missile field the six year development was triggered on successful testing of the two stage g b i we did a successful test the first of three in this february this year i'm sorry june of this year and you know june of this year and then we will next year have our first intercept and then we have another two stage g b i test currently scheduled for sixteen however a two sta is configured like a three stage and we confirmed its performance last summer except the third stage is literally missing i mean it literally is the same length and everything as a three stage so the two stage g b i we believe you can accelerate the qualification in the certification and the other requirements that were previously put by congress on the performance of the two stage before you begin construction we completed thirty five percent of the design of the missile field so we have archived all of that information and so if we had to execute we could in fact reduce that six year down to perhaps one or two years shorter than that again our trigger is the five to four years if yes or that wasn't our current plan the real one had previously but that's what you would do if you had to the reason i'm asking the question is to evaluate the viability of the head i mean i want to know i wanted your thoughts on will it be viewed as you know violating the russians view of start can it be delivered on time if the threat is  there that would cause you to turn to the hedge you know can you really deliver the hedge on time from where it would be effective and it sounds like your time periods of six five four that you could shorten it somewhat but you still have a relatively  receive and they all indicate that the greatest capability that's needed if there was a need for a hedge is not exist specifically more interceptors it's more capability to do discrimination and sensor management and so forth and that aspect of the previous program we're actually accelerating over the e p a as i mentioned the upgrade to the new radars and we do have greater capability being developed  an accelerated level to help us with discrimination which independent assessment indicates is where your greatest need would be if you wanted to dish and firepower beyond adding eight missiles which the timeframe for that is on the order of  eight weeks to complete the population of the missile field the next step would be to expand the number of missile field really refurbish missile field number one which is about a two year  it would take two years to do that so we do have some intermediate steps which you could employ f in fact a hedge was was necessary that could shorten going to a deployment in europe of several years build a new would it be there timely would it be viewed as a violation for the russians and so maybe i need to ask that in different way dr miller i mean do do you see a scenario in which the head would be  deployed sir i think that that scenario is quite unlikely and i think it's unlikely so you do not see a scenario in which so i think it's i think it's unlikely and i think it's unlikely for the following reason and that is that we have a good program in place for phase adaptive approach we have we have the capabilities coming into place for that will allow the testing in the next several years and allow us to get a good sense of the s m three two b and the technical risk there if we discover at that point that that test history that that the modeling that's led to the to the parameters of the system are incorrect and can't be rapidly adjusted then we have a decision in the general you may want talk about the timeline in that timeframe to go for a hedge i think that we've done an m v a in our teams have done the analysis deeply enough that that technical hedge is unlikely to be to be necessary with respect to the hedge for but we still but this is we're talking about the obviously the protection of the united states so that's why we despite a low probability there's a low probability of hope of attack in the first place but this is why it's still valuable to to do this age with respect to the hedging against against an early and earlier arrival of  threat as i said i think you have to think of that in a different sort of layer in that is that if it comes very quickly there's not going to be time to deploy to stage even when the compressed and then the addition of the addition of interceptors of g b i eyes at fort greely is going to be a sensible thing to do a doctor ordered to deal with it i can deal with not i really wasn't asking you a probability question i mean i understand and i'm certainly with you on the issue of let's certainly hope and have an expectation that the probability of any of these circumstances would be highly would be very low however the administration the ballistics missile defense review did establish this as a as a hedge and so i want to make certain that this language is not meaningless and therefore my question to  see solving quickly that that would be something that we will have inside in the next in the next few years and then see if we see in iranian capability for a two stage ground based interceptor thank you the whole concept of a hedge by the way is this issue that we're all struggling with which is a gap where the threat of merges or arrives prior to the capability being being provides us a five year gap of which we we have a concern but as our whole discussion with respect to the head and other issues of ten over capability goes to the emergence of that threat and the acceleration our facing that threat posing then a wider gap between cape technical capability and the present threat which takes me to the next portion of my questioning when the white house announced the p a last september it's of the new approach was based upon an assumption that the long range missile threat was quote slower to develop close quote recent reports indicate that iran perhaps has nineteen m twenty five advanced ballistic missiles that it acquired from north korea and its arsenal that are capable of reaching berlin and moscow now in all of the hearings that we've had and all the discussions that we've had about the capability of iran  the discussion of the issue of the possibility of their acquiring this capability and just milling really developing it has always been raised as an accelerator when is the face adaptive approach to  expected to provide coverage to berlin if the threat to berlin or other western and southern european population centers exist today according to these reports and the phase adaptive approach won't cover these areas until twenty eighteen at the earliest and there would appear to be a present gap in the defense and defensive coverage of europe what options are available to accelerate coverage of europe what appears to be very near term threats and any other thoughts that you'd like to  put out i will say that it's information that is being reported this is out in the public this is not something that that is a classified discussion that we're having what i've asked you is the reports  this is what is being reported your thoughts and how does that relate to the issue of a possible gap that we might have one of the advantages of the phased adaptive approach is that it is adaptive and that if we see if we later interceptors come on line to be able to put them in additional locations as well and other locations in the middle east if you take that distance next spring we are actually intercepting a range target of that range with our phase one capability and again we have said we took a very conservative approach to developing the e p a but just to to use the type of distances you're referring to which is in the range of an intermediate range ballistic missile we said we would deploy in phase one and my testimony interim any intermediate range ballistic missile range which is the range you're talking about to berlin and that will be phase one capability and we are testing  live fire test next spring against that range mr rose you indicated that there were no secret talks ongoing which we're all very glad to hear of course but press reports do continue to surface that undersecretary of state tell sure the russian counterparts are negotiating a missile defense agreement also we're told but sir tell us you're signed out a circular one seventy five men are last may for a missile defense agreement with russia the state department's website a circular one seventy five refers to regulations developed by the state department to ensure the proper exercise of the treaty making power and seeks to confirm it the making of trees or other international agreements but i'd say it's carried out the constitution under legal limitations what is the exact nature and scope of the missile defen negotiations are going on with russia and would you please tell us the contents of the circular one seventy five certainly thank you very much mr turner let me start by saying that our discussions are focused strictly on cooperation we are not discussing limiting our missile defenses in any way now in order to facilitate cooperation sir you need to have an agreement in place to exchange information back in two thousand and four the bush administration began negotiating with russia a defense technical cooperation agreement what this agreement was was a broad framework that allowed the two ministries of defense to exchange information not just on missile defense but a variety of issues the last d c d t c a as we call it negotiations with russia russia were held in two thousand and eight now earlier this year this administration decided decided to propose a more limited form of the d t c a which would only address missile defense issues the ballistic missile defense that's cooperation agreement  basically what the b m dca was was very simply a framework agreement which established a co operation working group and it basically was a framework in which you could stick individual projects under operationally your geographically or in any other way now we made this proposal to the russian government in last spring and they said that they were not interested in negotiating a ballistic missile defense cooperation agreement at that time what we understand and i will defer to dr miller is recently the russian him ody has indicated in interest in restarting the negotiations on the broader d t c a sir with your question about what sir one seventy five authority is it's basically a relatively routine matter in the state department to ensure that when there isn't any international agreement whether it be a supplemental sofa r and d agreement that there is adequate coordination across the inner agency in that us foreign policy objectives are fully cooperation a number of different areas m appreciate very much you being here and as happens quite often mr turner has stolen all of my questions so what i would give me a little do a little variation here  general riley you know i know that you have had to deal with a lot of questions about phased adaptive approach and i want you know that there is certainly no adversarial perspective in my mind at all because i think you're doing a magnificent  job and i think we're blessed to have you where you are in this country and i'm personally very grateful for that that said there isn't a lot of discussion about a be ing suggested or touted as capable of providing greater coverage sooner to all of our european allies compared to other missile defense plans and i'll try to make that a general comment but the previous approach of utilizing interceptors in poland radar in the czech republic was forecast at the time to provide about seventy five percent coverage of our european allies against longer range missiles by two thousand and thirteen with the remaining twenty five percent of the south east europe covered with u s and nato shorter range missile defense systems and given the time frame p a do you think that it will live up to the expectation of having greater coverage sooner  especially given the the reality it seems that the face adaptive approaches developed a little slower than we thought and we and our allies are already in my mind perilously vulnerable to a ballistic missile threat given especially with iran having new missile capability brought in from north korea and it was there enough for the questionnaire for you to to pull out an answer yes or except for  comment that the phase adaptive approach here was slower than is it is it now you say you believe that the phased adaptive approach is developing as quickly as you anticipated yes sir we're in track for phase one which will be next december by then we will have all the capabilities that we have described delivered and each one of those milestones are in fact the final date for the last delivery of a capability we are going to be delivering capability as it comes on board for example the fire control system for the next aegis ship it's a face to capability the navy will be certifying that operationally next summer so will be three years ahead in that regard so again we were very prudent and conservative when we laid out this but we are delivering capability as soon as we can and we're testing it in an integrated fashion and significant amount of schedule margin so that if we do have problems in development and they do occur but we have taken that into account historically and we will we have a very high confidence level to meet these milestones for all four of them and it remains your perspective that we will have greater coverage sooner with p a a than we did with the the european site yes or what the european site the coverage was was limited by the of the time a flight of a g b i the missiles we're talking about now fly a lot a lot significantly shorter in time and therefore they can engage earlier that's why we have a site in romania that has been chosen in that third site it was in poland which is significantly further back and so from that vantage point we do have a significant amount of coverage sir and i respect your question on coverage but i will say the major factor in our assessments was raid size yes and having ten missiles and deciding you needed more it would take several years to expand a missile field or in this capability you can expand it in weeks two additional sets of missiles last last question well kind of a two part question the b m twenty five from north korea in iran do you think those present any any new issues that the phased adaptive approach should take into consideration and secondly if there is any area of coverage and reach given that the again i cannot comment on intelligence type information in this form but as i said my testimony we will have intermediate range and demonstrated intermediate range ballistic missile capability next spring before we deploy and we have already shown we have very robust ten intercepts with the aegis system of short range missiles and we've had seven out of seven intercepts with the thad system seven out of seven close efforts and your overall efforts been stellar and outstanding a great service to the country while the p a is designed to move current technology into defense of europe as soon as possible they clearly a large technological developments are required to achieve a lot of phases of the strategy as we've seen with previous efforts for our domestic architecture these large systems are initially bid through open competition but it seems that once initial contract is done there are many years of sole source follow on contracts to provide support to these systems jobs you can drive up long term costs of large defense systems because it limits competition and later phases of the contract so general my question to you is how does m d a plan to reach these aggressive development goals while keeping costs low is there any thought about working with with more with the industry to better leverage the research and development  efforts already in development at small and medium sized businesses in terms of upgrades and support yes sir there is first of all and our advanced research area we have over three hundred forty contracts that are small businesses and universities today and they are focused on the technology we need for the later stages of the phase adaptive approach and i'm constantly engaged with small business second in our larger contracts i've required that they submit a plan of how they're going to utilize small business and we've made it a ward fee criteria that we evaluate the large businesses on how they comply with the plans they proposed at the time of award we're also going through a very large series of competitions and some of these competitions are programs that have not had competition in over a decade after example the ground based midcourse defense contract is up for competition we make our decisions on to compete or not not on the grass of ness of the schedule but on evaluating and surveys and input from  industry to see if there's more than one source out there that's a viable source and we've had great cooperation from industry and in some cases some of our proposals have had over ten ten industry teams indicate they're willing to propose and those are that's what we use for our criteria in the case of the aegis ashore we have extended the current locky contract because they're the ones that developed the aegis system to begin with but we have also notified that after the initial deployments of taking the aegis system on a ship and building it as close as possible to the one on the on land so that sailors don't have to go through retraining or anything when they're using or the logistics system after we do the initial deployments we will compete that also so sir there is no comp contract in m d a which we have  designated will not be competed in the future i appreciate your answer i have to say that that's encouraging to here it's been a kind of a pet peeve of mine that we have these big legacy systems i've heard this from numerous small and medium sized businesses that they find it frustrating to be able to offer a product that might be much more effective at a lower cost because it's just so much  been frustrated and shut out not a lot of ways but i'm courage by your answer and i hope that that continues to be the case getting a better product especially as technology improves so rapidly and be able to get it at a lower cost that would benefit not only capabilities but also the taxpayer with that my questions completed i'll turn to the ranking member for round t evolving threat from iran our discussion and again you know our concern here is to try to find where the gaps are and how we're going to be able to respond to those gaps in the face adaptive approach is viewed in the light of the scrapping of the third site is a is an approach that is in a race against emerging threats the information that we have had about the face dept approaches conferring with staff was that if the scenario is iran and berlin that it is coverage that does not that that is not available until twenty eighteen you indicated that in phase one you will have some intermediate range ballistic  as you all have described it evolving and responsive so that we can respond to those gaps if you please provide that information appreciate it the second thing goes again to the comparative of the phase adaptive approach and to the system that was scrapped the the third site and including the the radar that was intended for paul in the czech republic would have provided coverage for homeland united states and also provide coverage as franks was saying for seventy five percent of europe but there was coverage that was provided to homeland united states the look at the phase adaptive approach as you all have acknowledged face for is where coverage the united states comes in and that and that is the twenty twenty timeframe the prior phases one two and three are fairly focused on protecting europe and yet the united states is fully funding the phase it up to approach near is as i understand it and as i think our committee understands it with that shift of shared benefit there is arises the question of shared contribution can i know we certainly are all very excited of nato s interest in nato wising a missile defense shield but what is the current administration's approach to contributions from nato allies for the phase adaptive approach as you know we view the european phased adaptive approach as a u s contribution to missile defense for nato we have a vested in a very strong vested interest in that because as you also know we have more than one hundred thousand troops there and we have of course additional americans there as well so there's something very directly from an american perspective involved in being able to defend in europe we also as you know conduct operations and move our forces through europe and european command's area of responsibility as well now with risks with respect to shared resources the each of the countries in nato that wishes to contribute lower tier or if they contribute to an upper tier will obviously fund that themselves and we have shared nato resources into which  for the active layered theater blissett missile defense program that's the commanding control elements that both will make the face adaptive approach plug in to the lower tier systems and allow the lower tier systems in the other upper tier systems that are provide in the future to be able to work more effectively together so you've got national contributions including from the united states you've got the nato contributions for all that work and that is involved in integrating those systems and then you've got countries that have patriot and other systems in europe that will then tie into that and that fund their own fund those capabilities mr turner i also think it's important that we know the important contributions of landing territory that romania and poland are providing to the phase adaptive approach to defense of the united states as well as the defense of play alliance as a whole a need for you to touch on on anything sensitive i think mr turner's phrase was you know it's a race and certainly that seems to be the case and so i have two questions given the potential vulnerabilities that we have what areas of the phased adaptive approach the the knowledge points or what areas  the milestones would you like to see accelerated given the potential threats that are emerging four against any one missile for thirty interceptors even if you shot for interceptors you would need more than seven simultaneously launched i c b m s in order to overcome our current system so we believe that is a great capability over and as i say alluded to we are in fact upgrading the sensors and other parts of the system to make those thirty interceptors much more capable so that's for homeland defense however if you do not count the united states russia china or any of the european countries there are still over six thousand missiles out there and that is where our capability is needed yeah greatest we have  over were approaching about a thousand patriots but we're increasing rapidly the number of aegis against short range ballistic missiles but that by far is where we are outpaced and outnumbered and that is where our focus is on accelerating that that early capability this and phase two from a global point of view and i would defer to admiral macy to elaborate on   that we're doing to look at the number of interceptors and sensors and launch capabilities we need we have a parallel planning going on within the joint staff and the co conscious on how to fight in these areas and we are looking at ok we currently outgunned in the interceptors versus threat missiles we expected that will frankly continue so the question is how do you most effectively fight how do you fight in such a way that you bring other elements of national power into the fight to end the fight  as soon as you can do it but certainly in the near term i don't think it's going to be a great flash of brilliance to anyone this committee that additional sensors and additional interceptors are going to be requisite what we can answer to you right now is sort of what's the operand what's the total cost and we hope once we get through the studies that i promised the chairman we would be i would look forward to coming back in the april timeframe to discuss with you we'll start to give us that answer but in the anticipate an ability to intercept i c b m s coming to america from iran i realize that's pretty pretty fundamental but when you ant that i know that there's no way to anticipate when they will have them but when would you have in to support being able to fish just one of the raid issues is all is always a second question but if it's just one i c b m coming from tehran to new york when would we be able to with high likelihood be able to intercept that and and know that that's still redundant coverage but when would we be able to take given that redundant coverage due to the number of interceptors in which we have the probability will be well over in the high ninety's today of the g m t system being able to intercept that today and again our calculations along the same line says the number would have to be greater than europe yes or for the s m three to be our plans that we are again are in a competition to have companies come in propose but using historical plans our first flight testing will be in two thousand and sixteen and that is a significant indicator of the inter the integration of the missile and its performance and how it performs with the aegis them unlike other missile systems the aegis system is already our backbone so we can focus on just a missile development and way before that our ground systems and ground testing but the first flight testing would be twenty sixteen so potentially as early as twenty seventeen twenty eighteen we would have redundant capability i think it's important understand that the two stage g b i is still the g b i and so if you have a problem such that the three stage ground based interceptors at fort greely unvetted berg don't work and that's what and that's one of the reasons you're thinking about an independent capability there's a high probability that that same problem would apply to the two stage d b i that's one of the big reasons why we see so much value in it and a different approach with the same three to be because different phenomen ogy different different set of capabilities you can compensate for not having to stage g b i by launching more three stage g p s united states and in any event you're down very it's not exactly the direction i was going because i'm grateful that we don't have that problem right in front of us but i might one of my concerns here for a number of years actually has been the calculus that iran makes in moving forward with nuclear capabilities missile capabilities on a number of different fronts the to the degree that we can convince them that any effort on their part strategically and certainly tactically would be less than optimal for them i think that's important because it may add to some of the other pressures that they're dealing with you know threats from israel threats from probably not us unfortunately but threats from israel they  you just wonder what it will take to dissuade them and it's all a you know it's almost as much psychology it is as it is military strategy and science but i know you guys are doing your best and i'm grateful you're on the job thank you i thank the gentleman with that serious drawing to a close i want to thank our witnesses for your testimony today most especially i want to thank you all for your service to our nation and taking on this extraordinarily difficult and complicated issue partnership on this issue was these issues as well and i appreciated in value but input mr chairman could i could i just add you know sometimes you're thanking everyone else but you know in an adversarial political environment but i just want you to know we i don't know how we could have had a more reasonable more affable more dedicated chairman to try to do what was right for the country and i you certainly have my respect and i didn't vote for you