me please the court my name is lawrence mulligan i am the appellant i am the debtor and i am the defendant in this action before i began i noticed before i came in that there is a recent case from the court of appeals in the state of connecticut on the subject of collateral stoppel it is no different than what is already in the brief but it is the highest court in the state and a recent statement i've given a copy to my opponent and i have several copies if the court would like them it's not yet reported it's only four weeks old you provid non discharge ability case it also runs the risk of the night in a debatable his right to a fresh start in the state of connecticut which is the law that applies to this case for collateral estoppel purposes collateral estoppel requires the moving party to direct the court tension to the portions of the trial record which show that the criteria for collateral estoppel exist in their record i don't think i can say it any better than the case of date and francis sprin on page twenty seven of appellants brief where he courts states the bankruptcy court has the obligation to carefully examine the record of the state court proceeding for the court to apply collateral estoppel in a discharge ability proceeding the requisite elements for a five twenty three a claim must have been specifically decided by the state court we submit i smote mulligan submit to your honor's that judge nevins in the bankruptcy court did not distinguish between reviewing the record for the purpose of the litigation facts as opposed to reviewing the record to satisfy the connecticut criteria judge nevins indicated that she was not permitted to be li court that enough of the elements exist so that the court can essentially deny an individual due process because it is justified because he had due process earlier  and my concern here is that before the in the in the before the bankruptcy court it was stated i thought and correct me if i'm wrong that the only issue to be decided was discharge billing and that you would rely on the the elements of the of the litigation the stakes were were not and not in dispute no your honor i don't believe that's correct issues and i think that's where judge nevins was in error they did what they did agree to that but we are not never suggested that the court should read litigator issues all of the connecticut cases discussing collateral estoppel including that are that not not not  just not really to gate but basically accept the findings accept the findings and then decide whether or not that amounted to something that would be dischargeable and i don't think that's correct and i think you would see that in the opposition that was filed in to the motion for summary judgment in the bankruptcy court where testimony from the record was used to explain to the court why collateral estoppel requirements could were not satisfied by the court and in that argument the counsel for mulligan at that time indicated that the trial court was obligated to look to the record in deciding whether or not collateral estoppel was appropriate so i think there are two issues one is the discharge ability issue but the pl sought to have summary judgment as to discharge ability so the summary judgment is where the collateral estoppel lies and those rules are set forth and they were not met in the motion  in essence what i indicated was that a mulligan never suggested to the court that they court was obligated to relive a gate i believe that the connecticut rules essentially state that we want the court to be satisfied from looking at the record not just the decision that the individual had some due process in the earlier proceeding before we deny him what could be due process in the current proceeding i think like summary judgment it's the court needs to be very careful not to invalidate those rights  i believe that's all i have the only thing i would point out is that the i find the enter a moses case which is cited in the parlance brief is an excellent case because it is very similar to the case presently before the court thank you good morning in may please the court name is benjamin watt maker i represent the police in this case bruce and pamela jabbered the appellant in this case appears to make one principle argument and that is that the bankruptcy court agreed or should have should be required to look at the entirety of the state trial court record to determine whether the factual findings made by the state trial court in its two thousand and thirteen memorandum of decision were correct we have two principal responses to that and your honor to be pointed at exactly the first one which is it's our position that all of the parties in a hearing before the motions for summary judgment on the collateral stop issue are submitted you know read directly from the bankruptcy court's decision the parties agreed that the court could not reconsider findings fact made by the trial court the issue was whether those findings of fact constitute a violation of eleven u s c five twenty three  and so having reached that agreement the parties proceeded with that understanding and filed rule fifteen local rule fifty six a one statements of material  fact which cited principally to the trial courts memorandum a decision i'd of identifying the issues that would be relevant for the bankruptcy courts review on the collateral stoppel issue and therefore in the first appeal of the bankruptcy court's decision to the district court judge mayer rejected this argument specifically for the reason that i just stated relying on this the existence of this agreement having reached the agreement you can't later on make an argument that there should be a requirement that all the records be spread wide to the bankruptcy court for the purposes of the collateral estop mayor went on to say that the whole point of collateral estoppel is to pre term it a review of the underlying evidence where there have been factual findings in another proceeding between the same parties by another competent court of jurisdiction and that is the point of collateral estoppel to avoid an incessant reality geisha of factual findings in subsequent courts and subsequent issues just like this one so in addition to this  oral agreement that was reached by the parties the law of this jurisdiction it's mark my position is fairly clear that the court the bankruptcy court had the authority to limit the parties soley to the factual findings of the tri state trial court's memorandum a decision particularly because the streets the state trial courts memorandum of decision was exhaustively detailed with ample citations to fact within the decision to support the factual findings that were made particularly with regard to the  perpetrated by attorney mulligan as found by the state trial court is a thirty five page memorandum a decision that he that did not leave any  anything to the imagination of the reader particularly on the question of the state law claim for statutory theft which the bankruptcy court judge held was producer of the issue of fiduciary under five twenty three beyond that i believe everything is stated in my brief unless the court has any questions for me thank you very much i think you can see that the single issue with respect to this collateral estoppel is is the term real it a geisha in the same as review i submit it is not if you go to the audio file which is referenced in the brief  you'll see the test the discussion at this conference with judge and evans and the parties and said yes we can't be litigate these facts and mulligan is very disappointed to know that but the reality is that a few moments later in the audio file mulligans then attorney argues from the transcript evidence which the court needs to be aware of judge nevins cut him off saying i cannot look at that so judge nevins was squarely in that camp which said we cannot really litigate therefore i cannot review i can't look at it i'm stuck with the decision if we're stuck with the decision and my pellet brief what i tempted to show the court the importance of this in this case and i think it's an excellent case to show the reasoning behind the connecticut case law is that if you look at the claims against mulligan in that thirty five page decision what you find is there are two primary facts that judge shapiro decided the first was that mulligan intentionally  jalabert with respect to the assumption of their defense in their neighbor's lawsuit that happened two years after mulligan started working on the file and the second fact that he had he weighs that melican lied to them about this assumption so that he could continue to work for them and thus justify fees which they agreed to pay him in may of the same year the importance of the record here is that that claim is not in the pleadings it doesn't exist in the pleadings there is no claim mulligan deceived them for the purpose of justifying these fees which he had not yet perform services for the record is clear that mulligan performed two years of services and that is those services which relate to this payment he did not charge a dime to the job or its for any services post the assumption but he was entitle to do so as was shown by the witness the attorney who was hired by chicago to represent them i also point out your honor that if you look at the appendix it is referred to in the appellate brief the assumption by chicago was not absolute it was filled with discussion now it doesn't matter that at that time connecticut did not permit limited appearances the bottom line is that the company only accepted at that time three of the seven counts in her testimony on cross jobber testified that yes mulligan advised us that the chicago title had agreed it would assume three of the seven counts so mulligan did disclose precisely what chicago told them their witness attorney marcus the attorney by sick aagot testified that at a meeting with jalabert four days after the letter he described them the fact that he had been hired by chicago to represent them in the case he also testified that mulligan was asked to continue to represent jalabert by the jalap it's the importance of the record to the issue of collateral estoppel i think is shown by those facts because indeed mulligan did not have a fair trial of that allegation nor of the other allegation in the decision which was that mulligan agreed that if chicago was still in the defense that he would then pay bruce jalabert for his services as opposed to the alleged bartering system and that claim is not in the pleadings either if it work you'll notice that in the brief to the u s district court mulligan explains how different the defense would have been if anyone had alerted him that those claims existed but they did not exist until judge shapiro issued his decision thank you thank you mr milligan thank you beth take the matter under indictment that's the last argue case on the calendar this morning so