transfer the bank's claims against moody's for want of personal jurisdiction to support that transfer the bank has relied on two federal transfer statutes but i want to start this morning by focusing principally on twenty eight u s c sixteen thirty one which authorizes transfer for want of personal jurisdiction because of its taxed and its structure and because of its purposes the plain meaning of sixteen thirty one authorizes transfer for want of personal jurisdiction statute plain meaning of that phrase is just further confirms the statute authorizes transfer between a wide range of federal courts those courts include federal district court authorized to transfer from one federal district court to another and this is a strong indication that the statute authorizes trance for want of personal jurisdiction as well subject matter jurisdiction here's why you think of the main heads under a federal question or diversity and others don't by contrast it's very easy to imagine cases and this is one of them where wants of personal jurisdiction can be cured by transfer from one federal district court now because those two jurors diction as i understand it didn't you argue below that no federal court had any such not interested over this case because the banks charter was written court believes that the original jurisdiction of the district court is in question you know i would ask for further briefing on that but we again if the court feels that there are serious doubts about the original jurisdiction here we'd ask for at least an opportunity for supplemental briefing but to go back to the transfer statutes assuming that there is original jurisdiction in a district court i touched on why the taxed and the structure of sixteen very one supports the banks reading that's not all  the purposes of sixteen thirty one as this court has interpreted them in brits how also strongly support the banks position one of the purposes of this actually perhaps the most fundamental one is the goal of ensuring that meritorious cases are decided on the merits this is a paradigm case for that whole judge o'toole up held the bank's fraud claims against moody's against a twelve b six notion and if the bank's claims are dismissed rather than transfer there's a rather significant risk that if we filed in new york they would be time for that is precisely the kind of case where sixteen thirty one is supposed to come into operation and save the claims the attorneys for the second purpose that propelled touched on is ensuring that that against aren't deprived of their rights and the supreme court issued its daimler opinion and twenty fourteen more than two years after the case was removed and daimler changed the law that's what the district court said that's the basis on which the credit rating easily imagine a case where a litigant faced with a possible motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction goes out and files a second action in another federal district court well that purpose is served by  that sort of things prevented by reading the statute the way the bank does now the main argument that moody's has against us despite the structure and tax and purpose of the statute is that the legislative history supports it's sixteen thirty one in their judgment all says that even though in fact that case merely involves lack of subject matter jurisdiction judges leventhal was far sighted and he said he envisioned a decisively favors the bank's review of the stop so does the fact that an earlier version of the statute spoke of transfers of cases within the exclusive jurisdiction of the district courts work that language clearly refers to subject matter jurisdiction and yet that language was removed and replaced with a much broader want of jurisdiction when the statute was actually an act but i would focus you know heavily on on fresh levels opinion that that that seems to me to be very nearly conclusive and there actually is some irony in that because just leventhal was that the fellow who famously said that the lines on legislative history is like looking out over a crowd and picking out your friends and it seems to me that that one of the people that movies is back that jurisdiction can sometimes mean might mean both personal and subject matter jurisdiction does not mean that it must were necessarily does and does but it can always be both it may always be both it doesn't necessarily mean both because if you go through twenty second title twenty eight there are many times when it is not it is only says jurisdiction and it's not and there are other times in title twenty eight when it specifies personal and subject matter jurisdiction so there is not absolute consistency in the statute and  courts have consistently when there is some question look beyond the plain language of the statute although i'd like to say the plain language of the statute really does lead you to only one place which is subject matter jurisdiction for instance the phrase whenever that begins the language of the statute whenever a court finds that there is a want transfer and the court found here there was a long kersti yes yes you're right it did but the language of the statute anticipates situations where the court can do it at any time court cannot do it with personal jurisdiction if your personal jurisdiction has been waived for instance and i believe that the language if you were writing the statute you had in mind personal injuries fiction you wouldn't say whenever you wouldn't suggest a suicide bomb which it does in the course of remark that this suggests this it was spontaneous but whenever it finds there is a want jurisdiction right it depends on the case that might arise at any point in the if it doesn't have venue but another court has then you can transfer yes or if it doesn't have both subject matters action and then you got nothing to do with the case it can still transfer any right if it doesn't have subject matter  jurisdiction then you can't transfer absolute why would congress of wanted to make that the only exception to what seems to be a general rule that we don't have a case die on a technicality as far as you filed it in the long court because your honor there is a fundamental difference between personal jurisdiction and either venue which is a convenience matter and let me start a more narrow question to certainly nothing in the legislative record that would provide us with some reason why that has the broader word proves the normal thing i would do is assume that congress looked at apples and then generalized in the statute we've got here is a legislative history that says we have a problem it's referring in that context statute doesn't know but i believe that is because it never occurred to anyone in this process that this would ever be applied to personal jurisdiction and all the eleven former tiriel the letters the cases he cites everything relates to subject matter jurisdiction and there is not a whisper anywhere a personal jurisdiction so i do think that sometimes the absence is all humans and in the case of personal jurisdiction it's not a little matter it's not something that oh yeah they wanted to include but but you know they didn't say much about it this was a been a major thing to extended to personal jurisdiction as opposed to what they were all talking about and the statute and the legislative history of the improvement act itself is all about subject matter jurisdiction and i think you just telling before this argument i was struck by how illogical and incomplete they are the failure to look at the legislative history i think is a case of varying one's head in sand because one doesn't well in personal jurisdiction this is all there is in confusion about where there is nothing about the complexity of federal courts but some of the cases that the banks are to talk about it is a matter of confusion you can always find right court if the defendants homesteading so it's not a witch court it's a it's a question of strategy i want to get power over this and bring this defendant into another that were good point you say this one could be that sort of game play going on it could deny french it could but i think we've seen in the case law that there was a great tendency to transfer and i think more fundamentally it's about the federal and state balance it's about the fact that federal courts sitting in a state should be following essentially being limited in a way in some ways by its state and by their not being a different outcome if you happen to be in federal court as opposed to state and those are the principles of erie and that's exactly what this would set up and i think it may be one of the reasons why the congress has not done its and i and obviously we don't have the specifics but we do have the policies and they point very clearly to personal jurisdiction as being something that is different and and the idea that it should not be transferred just  for for convenience for me preserve a merits in every case it's not the same it's it would be a major change if that really were the law and it's it is a law of some circuits pursuing some decisions which don't look at the legislative history but i urge this court to look at it really closely to look at the language to look at the legit bit of history and think about  the issues of we pointed out about eerie that are raised in the van dusen case in other supreme court cases and i do think that this implicates more than the usual which court would be a b protecting a plaintive from additional expense and things like i think i think that the six or eight case is a very good example of your honor i believe it's one long graph of analysis but if you look down you will see that the court says this is primarily to levy at the problem raised by complex federal something or other personal jurisdiction has nothing to do with complex federal anything that's not so they they they have picked language from somewhere else and thrown it in trieste the conclusion they wanted to reach and they don't or the letter they believe they could have picked up on the premise that it's in the interests of the system generally to be simplified to be straightforward that you don't see the benefits of that in the same way you see the benefits in every case but the benefits are there the system has integrity personal jurisdiction means something it is real in terms of the ability to haul somebody out of their home state into a foreign court it's something that congress has been very very careful not to make to basically eliminate and to make really to eliminate the distinction between but i actually think that the other circumcisions are pretty instructive if you look at the roman case from the sec circuit and then you look at the process in the tenth circuit they take totally different approaches to task for interpretation process really purpose of  although i mean i will say that it's hardly a secret that in the last twenty five years the supreme court has taken a pretty textualist turn in that that strongly favors us but i guess just the other point about taps is that if congress of original or appellate jurisdiction both of those are subject matters to v it is certainly true that you need to look at the context but what the authority is and cases cited by both of the party show is that to limit the otherwise broad word jurisdiction to one kind of jurisdiction you have to have  answer i think that has to be answered again i you know i don't want to seem to be ignoring that issue but but i do want to go back to the transfer statute to sixteen thirty one and you know i guess i want to say a couple of the first is that this would create a circuit split and if there's any place where this court should be wary of creating  the interest of justice analysis i agree the court certainly has the power to be may end this case to the district court for it to determine the interest of justice on its own but the interest of justice decisively f bank in my view it's unclear what strategic choice my friend is referring to the choice would be you agree that remain and this is your core to make that determination yes yes it's the court certainly has the power to do so it also my point is merely that the court this court also has the power if it wishes to to make the interest of justice find you on its own whether or not it would be prudent for the court to do so as a matter of administration is a different question but i agree that that certainly the court has the power to remain and this case features meritorious claims they should be decided on the merits they shouldn't be time bar the court should apply the plain language structure and purposes of sixteen thirty one and hold that sixteen thirty one authorizes transfer