with the first case which is in great raymond ross mr burgess a ready to proceed ye think the court asked me to brief three questions i'm happy to talk about all of them i think question two is probably the most difficult i'd like to get straight to that if i can very well of course of course question she depends on the answers to question one but i think depends on whether it's permissible for a court to attach conditions to a dismissal so if the course just went on the base a motion to dismiss and assume that the bank had asked for a filing injunction and conditions along with that if it was just a see motion on the table i don't think there would necessarily be a problem with these conditions i think the problem arises from the intention on the debtors absolute right to dismiss one of her test seven b if that makes sense to the second question is n the right of the bankruptcy court to impose a founded restriction here i don't think it does i think there are other statutes that automatically impose consequences if you really use the rule for one analogy that you  is that they're automatically consequences built into the rule for repeat filings if the first business is a case they have an absolute right to do that and there's no right to impose conditions and under the restriction here had been for one hundred eighty days would there be a problem i think because one hundred eighty different restriction would be just repeating what the statute already automatically provides under one zero nine g the dismissal with prejudice i think that makes question two more difficult but i don't think it was the court orders otherwise for cause it's just or so far as to be an unlimited grant of authority to the court to order whatever conditions it wants i think that would be  i think did the introduction because of three forty nine they also can't reach quite that far to go when there are statutes dealing with those but whether it is and you're reaching too far is a different question whether it can be done at all and with the question of whether it's it makes it difficult to argue that it's imprimis of the dismissed with prejudice i think that that becomes harder in light of three forty nine and as we argue that doesn't burn an absolute right to dismiss and it does running it that we stand a tension with other parts of the overbroad and that the main reason i think is the last reason the state of grief is just that there's no there's no factual findings to support it there's no no indication of authority there's no no consideration of narrower alternatives and actually not even any has discretion assuming that questions wanted to have been decided the way they have and we're just in the end of the court can do the status was an abuse of discretion for the court to do these things i think again other statutes are at least relevant to the analysis and on question three there's no factual findings there's no indication of thirty there's no consideration of narrower alternatives no notice that the bankruptcy court was even considering a filing instruction anderson mr austin show up at the hearing that's a problem for him but there wasn't anything in america choices motion about perpetual filing injunction for the rest of his life without permission of the eastern district of pennsylvania bankruptcy court i think at the very least we got this of how the court decides questions wanted to injunction can stand on its own terms and this is regardless of what  reason to take it away and under these circumstances with no notice and no factual findings on protection of authority it's just that the amount of procedure mr ross received in this case before a right to congress was extended to others as been taken from him