presented just a single issue to the court which is one of statutory construction over the court has requested supplemental briefing on jurisdiction i think it might be wise to start there so the question of court posing a question tufnell briefing was whether the twelve fifty two a five barred hideous review to challenge a removal order that in theory could have gone to the court of appeals and petition for review i think there are several reasons that it wouldn't in this case and that the court's recent decision absent specific to the statute congress twelve fifty two is exceedingly complex not well written but as i understand it twelve fifty to eighty five says that additions to review deportation orders should go to courts of appeals and a petition for review the problem is that top fifty to eighty five doesn't talk about what to do with judicial order removals which are an exception to the standard the standard is that immigration judges order remov would be the requirements that would govern judicial orders of removal right now i'm not and we had a similar case recently twenty sixteen others on a terrorism were essentially they said that that language in there about immigration  reviewed by a court of appeals and in a petition for you that's a twelve fifty two a to see why a sincere even relevant now thanks to the whole point of the real id act was to address certain problems that st cyr pointed out in a did exactly that ability to reopen their own orders there's a regulation for immigration judge to do it for you just to do it but there's no mechanism to go back to a district court and ask them to reopen their order and that's where we think atheist still has the law and why and why would that be i mean the only case you cite and so the question is i mean why should this convoluted as it may be elaborate mechanism why and why doesn't wife and congress open in a way that this whole judy or just to prevent a principal being able to reconsider your orders who cares i mean the point is congress is telling us what should be done the fact the district court can't post judgment go back and review its order as opposed to the analog to router situation i don't i'm not sure i understand why that should be persuasive it's persuasive to me because there's there's no other mechanism for a person in this downstairs ition to seek review of her order of removal or mechanism with a petition for review so i think there are more reasons we can get back to that and twelve that after the the naturalization and deportation order i don't think she could have because it was a criminal order it came from a criminal court and the the federal rules said those orders need to have a field in district court that's why her supplemental briefing we wanted to be clear what your position was on that this is not a criminal order as you have defined it your position has been that this judicial order removal with a civil order you took that position both you handed at that position your earlier briefing you took that position explicitly in your there is no rule that i can find that says you ought to take this this kind of removal order rising out of a criminal court and take it to a court of appeals and a petition for a view but if you categorize it as a civil war or removal then you look at the statute in sachin tells you clearly what you section c of except as provided in the paragraph i mean the point is the point is even if even if they had argued that you could not proceed in a petition for review why isn't this why would could you not seek to review this constitute well not constitutional but this the legal issue under subsection d it's not clear to me i mean you've got you've got a provision what is it twelve twenty five  when you have a judicial order removal then you have twelve twenty eight which tells you that bit if you've got an issue of law that's where you go right to it twelve twenty eight doesn't doesn't say that ok again with all right what provision are you talking about them i'm talking about twelve fifty two a to see that says notwithstanding other sections remove the ability under twelve twenty seven eight two it says give a complete release because it only lesser rate legal issues and constitutional issues she can't challenge the factual question of whether she's removal what other issue are you raising here you're raising a jurisdictional issue right that's illegal or she could she could have raised factual issues in an appeal about whether she was removable at all and were dark no but we're talking about this appeal and this appeal with the didn't feel based on the court's having jurisdiction below to do what it did that's a legal issue that if she would have been covered by this provision so she could have used it conceivably i mean i'm not and that there's no it s means that if it there would clearly be a basis to do that i'm not certain there are no cases on this question and i understand that this puts the court a tough position there are no cases that say a judicial for the district court to address whether estrus diction and what really struggled with this are going solid color and i was on that panel on you know a very difficult case about under these convoluted statutes where f and file a motion to reopen and if they don't reopen you could always petition for a view you always have that later out you can always go back to federal court if the agency declines to reopen right in the judicial removal context it just stands as quite bizarre to me that congress would intend that there to be no no mechanism now after the fact to say wait the district court didn't even have subject matter jurisdiction over this case because every other context that are removed removal arises there's a way to go back to the agency and say you've got  stipulated judicial order of removal and the government's position that that is this is clearly covered under twelve fifty to a five because this court is the sole revealing affording from that stipulated the what if there's a challenge to the subject matter jurisdiction why should the realize the act kick in there to defeat some sort of reviewing them so do we get into a suspension of trying to charles i think that that if you look at th if the issue of suspension it has to be an inadequate or ineffective process this court is certainly able to review that process just as well as the district court would under the under the circumstances if they were to bring a substantive challenge to the issue and so i don't think that there is a real question as to whether or not the suspension clause is a political shear under the circumstances i think under that hypothetical the government's hypothetical as to whether or not the court lower court had jurisdiction ok and i think the question becomes this can this court make the decision on that particular point of last whether or not the district court in kansas has jurisdiction to address this particular issue ok our position is that this court certainly has intrinsic to answer that question our position of course is the real i d act prevents all that was in her position initially was well no because everyone and the defense certainly didn't wasn't obligated to raise it but the government certainly must look only at this point was raised but i think this court certainly can address procedurally whether or not the lower court had jurisdiction and mark our position is very clear on that that the statute congress very clearly said that all removal orders are to if anyone wants to challenge that all removal orders are to be reviewed by the court of  and that seems fairly straightforward congress as what it means and means what it says under those circumstances and it appears the petitioners simply trying to sort of intertwine or graft certain provisions within each of the each of the provisions of chapter twelve to try to get the courts to believe that the congress somehow though not explicitly somehow broaden i don't know i don't know because in this case she asked for what she asked for the specific result she wanted to be deported as part of the agreement and so it's it's hard for the government to somehow fall back and say that she has an avenue when she created the problem to begin with when she asked for deportation as as a part of the plea agreement but she asked for that and there was a plea agreement i understand all of that and she has counsel and she is relying on her counsel who apparently didn't represent her well on these points why can she now say why can't she say to us that she challenges the person an appearance here on subject matter jurisdiction when we're talking about we can just look at a piece of paper if we agree we take back and we look at the removal order and we see that it was under twelve twenty seven a one instead of  there so let me begin with this i think the conduit for that type of a claim would have to come through twenty two fifty five as an ineffective assistance of counsel claim i'm not sure she can bury that ineffective assistance of counsel claim in a claim now under twenty to forty one to try to get the court to address whether or not she was either give import prices on this particular issue or not to the issue of whether or not the twelve twenty seven  issue is is really in place here you have to look i think at twelve twenty eight c to be remember this is a and i think you have to   course that's the stink the distinct difference is in twelve twenty eight c five of course which is this case is the defendant is agreeing to that again in that context for her to prevail for her to least get through the first gate she would have to say i didn't understand because my lawyer gave me poor advice i didn't understand what i was signing when i did this so you have to get through that first i think in order for the second case to be open to determine whether or not the district court had jurisdiction to address whether or not she could even raise the issue before she brought it here but again backing up to our original position i think it leaves from the jurisdictional standpoint there is not an inadequate remedy for this court to answer that question and i know it sounds as if we really don't have the question or the answer to the catch twenty two because that is a very unique situation and i think it highlights some of the problems that this particular statute creates with somebody who falls into this position but falling back to twelve twenty eight c five it's very clear that any stipulated judicial removal order twelve fifty to eighty five covers those orders directly because it any order under this chapter congress would have understood that when it said that so to have this court review that a removal order under this chapter which i think gets back to the chief judge  highlight that in our footnote that if she she is really lost her ability to challenge that because that was the timeframe when she had to do it did i understand you correctly to to indicate to judge phillips that she might have the potential for twenty t fifty i know that was the conduit that she would have to use she's out of time for a twenty to fifty five she could well could you raise a twenty to fifty five at all given twenty wealthy to see if she wanted to somehow claim an ineffective assistance  counsel argument with respect to that particular order i think within one year of of that being issued she could have gone back and said under twenty fifty five i didn't agree to the stipulation or because my lawyer told me  think she could have done that why would why wouldn't it be so because same restriction on hevia that brings us here to have a jurisdictional issue now the time limitations no not the time limitations but the whole ability to challenge the removal order at l that's absolutely true so why would that not apply just well funny fun twenty to fifty five to for purposes of this court's review i think it would that if that if he just simply wanted to challenge and say that my plea was well well then maybe  misunderstanding this it seems to me that if she goes if she goes to the district court and says i want to challenge based upon twelve twenty five in effect existence of the counts of twenty to fifty five i'm sorry why would the district court look at this provision which is that which you know it didn't the first time  could not divorce the two the twenty to fifty five would be a move to withdraw the plea for ineffective assistance of counsel and therein lies you could not then separate the removal order from the actual plea itself so she would be really challenging the  she lost that particular period of time to file that claim under twenty two fifty five again our position is she lost the ability to file under for fifty to eighty five at least have this court review the petition the removal order back to she in this court those times have passed again our position is that these these issues that she raises are simply academic i think the why should we apply that remedy right and i and i'm glad you raised that because i made a note of that michel really carries no weight under the circumstances here because remember masowe was looking at a very nuanced issue under ka under the transnational organized crime provision as to whether or not that would apply this court was very clear to say that everything before the court was premature that it needed some more got more guidance from the lower court to determine whether or not jurisdiction actually existed outside of this whether or not take talk provided some level of jurisdiction for the individual to come back and raise a claim it's both it said nothing with respect to what it said and g relevant why wouldn't take talk be another provision that would be covered by the restriction on seeking relief through hevia in a district court in that context too and tropic you had two minutes and thirty six seconds thank you try to be brief i want to focus on one of the things mr moggs mentioned in response to questions about what could she have done and if she had taken a petition for  intended lee agreed that they would have come and argued the court not jurisdiction under twelve fifty two and mr meg describes it as a catch twenty two that is a classic scenario where he's had to so it isn't really a catch twenty two she agreed to deportation i mean should we take that into account i don't why didn't she why does she need a remedy she's agreed to the agree to the outcome yeah so there's a lot more stuff briefed in our briefed about why the stipulation doesn't  doesn't necessarily get her doesn't seal the deal we can start with the plea agreement one of the problems is the plea agreement is so indeterminate if you look at page seven paragraph ten of the plea agreement it says there will be later jurisdiction even if you don't raise it at trial and so i don't know the situation gets her all that far i understand the government's argument that we had a deal and you're not giving up your end of the deal the difficulty is the court didn't have jurisdiction  and so it is a catch twenty two if if there really isn't any relief she could have gotten and i think candidly the government's conceded she wouldn't have been able to raise this issue in a court of appeals on a petition for review and be able to claim that the court had jurisdiction i think i don't think that's what the government says the government said it would challenge it under subsection see that doesn't mean the government would when it doesn't meet should when that's true the government says they would have taken the position they would have availed themselves of this argument the twelve fifty two c five i believe effective assistance claim under twenty to fifty five i think at home you're exactly right she couldn't have brought one of those either it took fifty two is in place because all claims have to go to the court of appeals and yet how does somebody bring a claim like that in a court of appeals without first filing a motion to reopen because the board said under this matter blows i don't we all know how to do motions to reopen for ineffective assistance of counsel there's no mechanism for that in this situation because there's no motion to reopen it