found that the warrantless search of room one fifty was unconstitutional it wasn't at all the time they were after the government burden to establish and prove up an exception to the exclusionary rule they did not when the case was presented to the extent that that sucks the good would be surprised if with the on the government i say i say that because we get back to the basis of how we function we have to have the district court taking the first look at arguments and more specifically and more helpful for us having the opportunity to take evidence that would either support or negate those have been aware to the record actually is is fully developed on this point that there's no more evidence of the government could put on that would change the outcome the evidence  remarkably candid to their credit in their testimony below and they affirmatively admitted that they entered that room to quote confirm what the maid had told them and to check out essentially her to that that they entered the room at this and say was there probable cause they started going to getting back to the district court to say well ok we'll exclude the illegal entry by the officers that we will consider what blacks s apply to a confidential informant now we're talking reliability you know and you know cases go usually believe witnesses when they go to law enforcement and sage and what i just saw  this is a where i work and everybody knew me it wasn't some person who broke into the room and tries to set somebody up i mean there isn't anything like that going on here yet this is you know i mean obviously with respect gates in a supreme court that in a rigorous  to that because murray because again very controlled and that's not the inquiry is not what they could have done but what they did do here look i'm sorry can you just address that point a little bit more is there any reason to question the credibility of the black here other than you're saying it was cursory but help help help me understand why her credibility officer and so i think there's enough red flags there or they should have done more and you know again there's they don't have too much the fact that they didn't do hardly anything here and i don't think that that cursory investigation coupled with those sort of red flags instance on his legal claims and that's what puts the issue in play not just saying if it's source or unlawful search you have to be more specific look at the chart as mark was right but help up the point that sins equals independent source that's what we are used to look we said we came with influence sins equals independence so to the extent that we say that we complied with sins we government you're wanting that that evidence in everything they found all related evidence you want to all and so is not your burden to say to the court at the suppression hearing here is a reason or five reasons why stop based on an unreasonable mistake in interpreting the state residential parking statute were the defendant's motion to suppress only discussed in recent suspicious inconclusive returns and did not talk about the residential parking statute they can't be written filings before the district court made only perfunctory references to the stop and search without mentioning the fact showing the roadblock was illegal so you can't just say we challenge the stop you have to give a specific reason you can't just be vague you can't  first point which is whether the agent's decision to seek the warrant was prompted by what they'd seen during the initial entry the record is first of all if i could back up i i don't want to confuse the quarter myself for that matter murray has has to pro first prong is whether the officers decision to seek the warrant sponsored by what they'd seen during the unlawful entry the second prong is whether the judge's decision to issue the warrant was affected by the illegal entry ok we argue in our brief officers decision to seek the warrant was prompted by what they've seen during initial entry we don't think the record was fully developed we didn't we just got no notice that that was and that was a factual dispute in play and the district court had no idea that record of doesn't contain factual findings which which we were never put on notice that we had to produce that's that's how this works so if we're going to let the defendant just stand back and make us back down every argument that they bagley the court took out the word ordinarily so now we're we're apparently stuck with a rule that a good faith exception does not apply unless the officers rely on the mistake of a third party our view is that that law is down the trail once we say we look at our cases and look at supreme court cases and we design from the to put together that probably spring court cases control in just essence and this is what they said this is the rule and now we're remand for the district court to determine facts instead not have what usually goes if the court the court the court can do what it wants obviously you know we're just we're just fighting for suggesting the court obviously has better ideas and suggestions and we have we're just trying to whether a reasonably well trained officer would have known that the search was illegal in light of all the circumstances terry courts that that is the question and whether the officer's a lot of the state is a third party has nothing to do with that question that's that's an irrelevancy at this exists when police act with an objective lee reasonable good faith belief that their conduct is lawful or that their conduct involves only simple negligence none of those questions and none of the standards of culpability of anything to do with whether the officer a lot of the sake of a third party is nothing to do with that the the the the court looks at the objectively ascertainable question according to herring which is whether a reasonably well trained officer would have known that the search was illegal in light of all the circumstances and then we get the money put in so whether the authors relied on think the third party really has nothing to do with whether the officers had knowledge or maybe properly charged with knowledge the search was unconstitutional in other words whether the officers relied on the say but their partnering is not then followed by a warrant to search of that same location based in part on information obtained during that prior search textbook classic case it was mr mcconnell had the burden to argue that the initial search was unconstitutional once she did that and once she prevailed on that claim the burden just entirely to the government to either accept suppression or to argue that a exception to the exclusionary rule process i think again it would be based on those five five facts that i mentioned before it would have been clearer on this record for the district court to find murray's first prong satisfied so i don't think that that there is anything more the government could prove that would be helpful on that thong and so that reversal is in the necessary remedy to the extent that that that that this court with inclines certainly a limited remand on the existing record