only one issue properly before the court today and it's a narrow issue the issue is whether an unconstitutional judicial the office was created by the preeminent version of section fifteen does fifteen o four point one day of the code of civil procedure imposing a fifty dollars fee on plaintiffs who filed for closure his before i go on should that i should emphasize of course that statutes are presumed constitutional plaintiffs in this case have brought a facial challenge which is a particularly high bar they must show that there is no circumstance in which the statute they challenge is constitutional the statute itself here provides as i said the plainest was filed let's pay up in a foreclosure auctions with pay fifty dollars fee to support the foreclosure prevention program the statute provides the circuit court clerk collects that expenses related to the implementation of this section which is the section setting forth the new filing fee whether or not this provision creates an unconstitutional judicial officer is the only issue the supreme court decided and this is the only issue on which the supreme court made the required findings under supreme court will eighteen and there is no question that the supreme court was wrong the statute does not violate the judicial  turning first to the application of article six section fourteen six circuit per section fourteen consists of is has a has a heading the heading is judicial salaries and expenses the officers eliminated and that consists of three sentences the first sentence says talks about how judges will be paid by salary as provided by law the second sentence sentence talks about how the salaries and expenses of judges will be paid by the state although it allows counties to supplement for judges  the third sentence which is what the place of rest his entire argument on says there shall be you know the officers in the judicial system but that sentence must be read in its context and its context looking at the heading of se fourteen and the rest of the language of section fourteen makes clear that that section is addressed to judges and specifically judges alone it says nothing about the non adjudicative members of the judicial branch and there is another provision in article six section eighteen that addresses the compensation of janov judicial members of the judicial branch branch that section is entitled clerks of courts and explains that the general assembly provide for clerks to be elected were pointed and it says the salaries of clerks and not other nontraditional officers shall be provided by law so section eighteen provides deals with nontraditional compensation and section fort the office languages deals with traditional compensation however even if there was the oceans be the in addition we know we know that the judicial the office provision of section fourteen is address specifically to judges and other adjudicate of officers when we look at the history of the provision it structed its proper to consider the constitutional language in light of the history and condition of the times and the particular problem the convention sought to address and here the history shows that the concern was to eliminate officials who have some role in with litigation and some financial interest in the in and some to be some role of education and some financial interest in the litigation in particular masters in chancery is actually eighty seven the constitution was amended to eliminate masters and chancery it said so explicitly and that is where the first few office prohibition appears the nine hundred seventy constitution adopted that provision with no substantive change it did eliminate the specific reference to masters and chancery for two reasons one because it was redundant of the overall prohibition on the officers and two because salaried masters and chance actually could be allowed and they were the convention wanted to make that theory we have extremely clear history about this from the constitutional convention cited at pages thirteen and fourteen after opening three finally this court's precedent  address that has nothing to do with these collected that fun is used to offset court costs incurred quote in performing the additional duties required to collect and disperse funds to the entities of the state and local governments as provided by law and that's exactly what is happening here the general assembly has imposed an obligation on the target for kirk to collect and disperse money and as all allow the supreme court to put some of a small amount of that money in its fun that exists exactly for the purpose of defraying costs related to such duties this court cracker require that one hundred percent of the fees be raised that raised are implemented and administered within the court system itself he's on litigation must be used in a way that relates to the court system says nothing about who must maintain those funds who must disperse those funds and we can see that that in fact was not part of the consideration of of proper when we look at how it talks about early only as a case in which this court upheld a few that went to the establishment of law libraries in every county and some of those counties you did not say upholding this provision did not express any concert that about this county board having responsibility for establishing and maintaining this library only says nothing to suggest nor  crocker that had the few been instead even to say the secretary of state as our state librarian for him to establish these libraries that there would be in any problem the concern and in crocker was whether or not the fees related to the court system and had some connection to the purpose for which they were imposed also put your point seems to suggest that the prohibition of a few office at times i think that's what he's arguing there is no basis to reach that conclusion the reason why the few office provisions provision is in the constitution is to avoid the improper financial interest of a none of the concerns behind the creation of the fee office provision apply at all and this fund that exists for exactly the purpose i've described as you have been challenged by the p is the standard of review for a violation of the right to obtain justice freely and what does that mean just as freely under article one section twel on for the most part in crocker the court said that the court explained that it had to excuse me that there was no fees on a rational basis test they crossed her itself evaluated the fyi at issue for a reasonable relationship between the fee which was a fee for divorce litigants and what was being funded which was a domestic violence program the problem improper was if the court did not find a rational relationship between those the fee itself and its purpose now every gold goes on to explain that in a regular due process challenge for a ta tax unlike the due process challenge and proper there is not even the same necessity to show the reasonable relationship between the tax and the and the purpose for which it's been imposed but  license and in that case the court concluded that that that he itself was particular was was particularly high therefore impinge on the right to marry and impose strict scrutiny for that reason it distinguishes itself w from crocker's use a rational basis review because of the need for because of the fundamental right to marry that's at stake is the cracker issue before us you know the proper issues now before you the only you to uphold the statute at issue here on a rational basis review we have provided a rational basis for the statute and this court can and should it should it reach those questions can go ahead  court really cannot do at this time is anything is make any rulings on any matter were further evidence would need to be introduced people have not had an opportunity to develop any evidence about whether the an as applied challenge would be appropriate about any justifications for the new aspects of of the statute that was amended in twenty thirteen about which that the plaintiff has never amended its complaint his procedurally and why it is that the field office issue is the only issue directly in front of the court and why it is it would be improper to do anything other than appalled statutes on a rational under rational basis at this time that the filed in october of two thousand and twelve at that point it challenges the statute as it existed fifty dollars collected for for closure prevention program ninety eight percent sent to the state two percent kept for the  imposed on foreclosure plaintiffs but they are graduated depending on the number of foreclosure filings a plaintiff made in the prior calendar year the money from this these fees are is split between money is used for something different somewhat different from the original statute that they challenged but nonetheless this complaint does not amended in july twenty thirty in the circuit or ask for supplemental briefing on among other things whether the amendments have the amendments from the prior month have any effect on the issues before it and the plane of student amend their complaint in september twenty thirty letters of the people file one quick point the statute he says he was not simply forty in the money the legislation says two percent is for implementing the efforts to thirteen version which now clear five is where the theory goes so you're attacking the twenty thirteen statute yeah even though your complaint was never minded even though the trial court's opinion rejected any analysis you there was some part of the problem is they don't here or the court say it wasn't necessary when the court's order said it would not it was not going to consider twenty thirteen that was the final word when we got the final order if you look at the court corrected the issues supplemented and i believe there is a four to the effect statute is amended prior that i'm a court rules the issue of the version before the court because i've had that same argument was made in other case his decision on the field office part of it was based on the people's claim that given the two thousand and thirteen changes you just heard now it's in the administrative fund that sure is the problem we have a number of cases that have come before us in which there's a statute that's been amended in the stairs had before us only affects the pearls before us and maybe a few other people in the similar situation where the amended statute has taken place going forward and while the case was still pending paid pursuant to the twenty thirteen statute we had he had the concept not just on the fee issue but on the entire mortgage foreclosure concept of fees being taken out of the court system and being applied outside the court system for me others that were part of the court system violating crocker and also further and we even raised issues dealing with the propriety o was amended before the court rules the class was certified by the court and the court had before a class of those who pay the mortgage foreclosure feet where if you look at the two thousand and thirteen too another key topic here in your briefs you i don't see you in gauging the state's argument that the definition of field office in the judicial article masses in chancery i want to say that the term fee office of course is not one that we use all the time it's been banned for over fifty years i'm not sure the constitutionally doesn't define it so i really am trying to get to what them in the first two clerks of court are part of the judicial system explicit language says no field offices in the judicial system there are three the produces clerks really because what they're arguing is clerks if you look at their brief i saw they had in this morning closure not part of the judicial system because there are nine adjudicative well that's not what this court has said so we know they're part of the judicial system so what the state is arguing is the last sentence really is redundant because of that only bars adjudicative offices which are the first two sentences then you read the third sentence out of existence which this court has said we don't interpret statutes by taking sentences or portions of the statute out and ignoring so i would respectfully submit that the obvious meaning one of them was we do not allow the field offices  system and then we come back to the question of this legislation doesn't treat them as earning a few even earning a fee and the system because the legislation says you get your fee for your effort implementing this retail you know the housing program into the housing mortgage foreclosure counseling program which we know is being done by the executive branch so then what we're saying is they're not  adjudicative you can charge a fee but you can then take a judicial member's you dish will branch and this court i think has been very clear the clerks are part of this branch not part of the executive branch and i've heard local government and allow them to be paid you're doing we're allowing you to collect a fee for what you're not doing the other words you're not implementing the program the legislation says we can take this two percent if you read the statute it's very clearly in there or breeze and court but it is one of the sense of where he's going so it is is it isn't for the court it's all right because you're putting it within the administrative fun my point is what is it doing there what is being charged for in the first place referred to encompass is to the two percent fee is it also impacts on the have been in property from the clerk of the court is absolutely should have absolutely zero to do with implementing how a municipality spends money taken from court fees to cut down wheat and yet that is exactly what the legislature said and that's exactly how the legislature attempts to justify this heat but you know i really general revenue obligation we made that argument below long for this world pension reform i'm not even sure if the pension reform litigation had been drafted and we addressed this or what the court does is it takes eleven we argue when the court yes just addressed in reeves and we say you can't do this you can't take court funds and use it for what's basically a general welfare purpose you also can't  and we pointed that out in our priest when the court asked and again we come back to the priest before this court the two thousand and thirteen seattle has been cited was cited below as a basis to knock out the two thousand and eleven  well claiming that he legislator legislature in two thousand and thirteen merely clarify the eleven see engine it trial court was asked to rule based on two thousand and thirteen version and before the court and they were already defending the two thousand and thirteen version so you had all the parties were before the trial court on the news here or the humans the court was this section fifteen zero four point one provides that the court that the clerk collects this fee and then forwards it nothing in the section creates any font nothing in the section creates any program those provisions are in the only housing development act that is where the program is created it's just scribed its purposes and operations are set out so the corp has nothing to do with the operation of those programs it's simply  fee and then forwards and second that the court order illo that the court below ordered the parties to brief the question of what effect the twenty thirteen statute had on the issues in front of it it did not order the parties to brief the constitutionality of the twenty thirteen amended version of the statute and this idea that perhaps the court made a mistake when it reached its ruling saying it was considering only an amended version of the statute as a this is the first that idea has been presented it's not raised in the briefs and even to the extent that any aspect of the twenty thirteen a this is a transparent system so if it hasn't been that should become readily apparent just trace you asked about the judicial the office of provision and whether it's fact it applies to the trying to address the local office provision which is in article seven section nine of the constitution is wholly irrelevant here that in fact it's addressed only to local officials and circuit assembly has created finally i want to emphasize that crocker does not say that money except that money is a privilege a geisha and must remain within the judicial system foreclosures the courts were having some difficulty dealing with the foreclosure present prevention project was created in order in in order to help reduce the number of foreclosures that found their way into the court system initially foreclosure plaintiffs have to give their the the there are defendants thirty days notice before they file and encourage them to see housing counseling that the few that is create that is used here goes to fund acted locally they are part of the court system but if they're not considered i feel offices part of the system since are elected locally in their salaries are paid by each individual county they would come under s issues before the court which was that whether it's only the two thousand and eleven the two thousand and thirteen the two thousand and thirteen theoretically modified the fee issue dealing with where the money go to our position is whether even if it's the truth if it's the two thousand and thirteen which it is it's in firm even if he was just because it comes with it it would be under the barn nine rather than was asked not to consider you were across a few that the trial court ruled on one specific ground yes and that's what we have before us except life this court his repeatedly said the issue is not what the trial  all of these were presented to the trial court trial court rule and short selective route if you look at the arguments and there is no cross appeal the comment was well they can argue this in support of their position but it's better for this