and limited time available i'm going to try to concentrate on the jury charges shoes that were raised in point one of the main brief in the reply brief and if i have time i'll get to a little bit of the sentencing but it's the jury charge issues i'm going to try to focus on today financing john exercises right to go to trial and had a viable defense that he did not knowingly and in bad faith exploit any material nonpublic information of m s t in violation of duty and trust  confidence owed to amnesty on a critical jury charge issue relevant to that defense the district court chose the government's charge over the defense objection on the question of defendant's good faith critically while calling good faith a defense the district court failed to instruct the jury that the government at all times bore the burden of disproving good faith beyond a reasonable doubt that this repeated the flaw in the government's request to which defense counsel had object that if you calling something a defense and he calls it a defense good faith the defense it's important to emphasize that it's still the government's burden to disprove good faith when when you call something a defense and as this is  ys our point doesn't emphasize or even state and all that that the burden remains on the government to disprove good faith that's that's our point there was a sharp contrast between the jury charge request by the defendant and that put in by the government the government's request was basically put in word for word into the charge although there was one additional sentence and the the the defense of objected to that submitted a letter saying we disagree with the government's charge on these various points including that one and their their requests not in contrast to the government's submission which like i said the judge the there was no objection there was no objection to the good charge which is a bit of an unusual practice but what they did object to the government's charge it was the government's charge that the court instructed and when they had the charge conference it's true that the defense counsel did not reiterate government as to including the burden of disproving good faith but i don't think the jury could understand that especially when you're calling something at the facts not an element and i would point out that isn't that just the kind of thing that we would know but jurors wouldn't necessarily know i mean turning your argument around calling it a defense doesn't know may not signal to ensure that the burden  if they know what the government has to prove it how is the jury misled because because the the court has as interest properly that this concept of good faith has been introduced but it's called the defen and and the jury is not told that that despite it being a defense it's something that the government must disprove and if i can turn something else around you know the government on a different point gave us some sample jury charges in this case and i can hardly find a case where where they don't just make that point that the burden of proof is is on the defense perhaps i should move on i'm sorry the burden of proof is on the government theme i see the yellow light is on this is a theme that runs across all of our jury charge objections that that the court didn't put any bones on that on that instruction that it just said that you know good faith  honest belief that information was not material or or that it was public rather than nonpublic is a good defense if inside information was material in the public it went to the heart of the fence in this case that there was not knowingly or in bad faith exploitation let me ask you to talk briefly and i know from your point of view hypothetically about one aspect of the sentence which is the profit that was need from an investment following the the  and beyond what the government contends was yet made on the illegal trades that one your honor is it's a complicated issue and i deliberately excluded it from my list of things to walk up here and try to emphasize because it  requires several steps that it's kind of it's mind boggling for us as it is used so yeah and you just and it was a little rising little surprising not to see more and more case law on this topic but but i mean basically with we're talking about forfeiture of course the yeah so you've got you've got ninety one a two way and a to b and there's a contrast between them one is is lawful lawful behavior essentially doing something illegal and otherwise legal activity and the other is something that's inherently illegal and it's the government does not disagree that this is the insider trading falls under falls under b and so but at the trading with money that is alleged to have been illegally acquired the training afterward was legal activity exactly exactly and that's that's  that's the short version of our argument but but but but we're also contrast ing these these two provisions in the forfeiture statute where they define proceeds and one does mention the possibility of indirect  proceeds which might and compas such activity but the problem is that's not the provision of the statute that the government relies on here that's the one that relates to inherently illegal activity and of course you got the crazy case where the guy with the drug money  section but this court i don't think the government disputes is that that these cases fall under fall under the the don't don't fall into the inherently illegal activity i mean that's i don't think there's any dispute on that so i think it's please the court edward imperatori for the government i have represented the government billowing in the district court and in this court on appeal this court should affirm the judgment of the district court in all respects the district court committed no procedural  no procedural error here much less play an error in the district courts jury instructions on good faith and relationship of trust nor did the district court commit any plain error and meeting the testimony of an defense defense even if inside information was material and nonpublic and that was in that it is not a better statement a clear statement of the only defense that this defendant  a trial we disagree judge jacobs and the reason is that under this court's precedent in holland all that is required is that there be an instruction neck clearly sets forth the legal requirements particular words were required the instruction of the defendant for actually proposed reset that it was a quote unquote good defense is actually misleading there is no requirement that that instruction no legal requirement that at the given and the defendant certainly have had everything and that instruction he needed to mount the defense and the argument to the jury i would also know your honor that the standard here because what it what i just read you with a fair statement of the law is it not i mean what was proposed by the defendant as i don't know that we would agree that something is a quote good defense that i don't i don't think that characterizing something as a good defense is a correct statement of the law i mean it is correct that that if the defendant believed in good faith that he were not trading on m m p i and that would be a defense but the point is the judge angle myer's instruction already correctly put the burden of proof on the government it correctly said that good explained what good faith was and said it was a complete defense and that was all that was required this court's precedents in cases like doyle and do pray make clear that the the judge is not required to adopt the defendant's proposals on good faith and that this was was legally correct as given and it certainly was not playing error and i want to just briefly address the burden of proof here the point that the there was an objection there was no such objection all of freely did before trial once he submitted a letter to the district judge in which he said that the government's proposal on good faith was insufficient and the district court should give a free a proposed instruction that is plainly insufficient under rule thirty feet and this court's precedent in crowley and the reason for that is as this court explained in crowley things change as the trial develops the judge's understanding of things changes and in this case the defendant was actually during the charge conference and given the full opportunity to object he never objected the judge said is there anything on page twenty four he never responded clearly this would have been an opportunity for him to raise this issue and put judge i will hear that counsel well the letter to it was filed five days before trial started under this court's precedent in cr rule thirty that is insufficient that was never an objection to the judge's proposed charge that was simply commentary on what the government had proposed in his request a charge that is insufficient either of you then he was required to renew that leslie he did submit request a to charge on good faith in it at that before trial but the put to put it differently the judge made this observation that the good faith instruction was gave a free everything he needed he clearly could have stood up and said judge we have problems with this instruction for a couple of reasons and given the district court the ability to address it that never happened therefore the plain error standard applies and there and there certainly is no plain error here and as  court made clear in joyland there is no legal requirement that the district court instruct that it's the government's burden to disprove good faith or to prove bad faith it is simply sufficient that the government instruct on its questions about forfeiture i think the defense is is conflating different issues in making this forfeiture argument about capturing the the proceeds that we're capturing of the rapid saxa process so let me just take a step back and explain here the the the forfeiture standard is governed by twenty eight u s c nine eighty one a one c which permits forfeiture of any property real or personal which constitutes or is derives from proceeds traceable to the offense it's the derived from language that is at issue here the derive from really gets at what happens to the proceeds of the scheme and in this case the evidence showed that all of the all of the proceeds that exist that were initially in the account were proceeds of insider trading the defendant then took those proceeds to engage in additional trading there was no evidence that that was illegal trading thing in a in another stock that's correct he was a good trader in it with respect to that particular trade he did profit yes but there i need to see the procedure after he had the proceeds he then made money yes on that money because he was good at it correct well yes i mean he did he i believe he engaged in some additional equities trading and he made money on those trades yes so but the point is that done the under the law you can't take criminal proceeds and then turn them into more money and get to keep get to pocket the positive the money but he also had a sum of money of equal amount and then he traded in made more money than you than to be a problem tracing would have but here it's it's directly related to he trades  in insider information he gets x amount of dollars then he grows x amount of dollars two x plus two wrecks plus one million and but for not having had x he would have been able to trade legally and get x plus two right that's exactly right george wesley the money that was used to generate a lawful procedure to make it his argument that this is different than a drug transaction or money laundering because those are there for those fall under a different section that's just inaccurate as a matter of law again the language isn't ninety one a one c it's the derived from language and it's in the illegal activity that yes and so the idea is he's got proceeds and then the lawful into an account that already has fifty thousand dollars and now he's got seventy five takes out twenty five thousand and invests it in a very makes a very successful investment that's not traceable correct well i through insider trading that's that's correct judge for and i would also note that that would seem to be a limitation on your argument to the facts of this case in other words you would prevail on this assuming we reach the issue  there's no reason to reach the other and the only of the facts of those of us bellows traded on proceeds that the rationale for which he's convicted i don't i don't judge tickets i don't think the court gets there because bear in mind this is not an issue about sufficien evidence this is an issue about jury instructions there was a forfeiture determination by the jury the jury was instructed on how it could to determine what the forfeiture amount was the defendant was the one who requested a forfeiture jury instructions the only question is whether the jury was properly instructed there was no objection i don't even think the defendant is objecting now to the forfeiture instructions so that the standard is is at best for the defendant plain error  certainly was no plane error and judge angle myer's instructions on how the jury could make that determination i see i'm out of time unless the court has any other questions regarding residence as your rebuttal at the standard plane or no sufficiency but he's of account appreciation and that therefore the evidence is insufficient i recognize that as far as what was said to the d j the charge was whether it was derived here now you don't object to that so the jury makes a determination as to whether these profits were derived from the proceeds of his you know illegal insider trading right right so that's a fact question is not right that's why i'm saying how is it insufficient you don't think the proof was and there was no proof that he traded and he only used money that he derived from insider trading to make the subsequent trades what we're saying is that a hard question maybe i'm not understanding it but what what was the proof was there and what was your saying there's a failure proof as to someone a client of mine got a million dollars because he traded illegally and then he made another million dollars with that million dollars do you think that someone on the street would say well that was derived from the illegal trade in the re arguing that point your honor what i'm saying is that is that because the law we are saying that because the law doesn't cover this you can examine it through the lens of insufficiency i don't disagree that that there was no objection to that to that aspect of the jury charge but the supreme court has told us in a case that starts with an m i think it's in my reply brief that that when you examine sufficiency it's a justice thomas case of the last couple years that when you examine sufficiency you start with what the law is not what was charged to the jury that's what i'm saying that the law does not cover this up with that no it's in my reply brief i don't want to take up too much time because it's in my reply brief i believe it's a it starts with an m i'm sorry to i didn't and that's that's the argument i know that it doesn't sound like insufficiency because i'm not pointing to some critical block building block that's missing i'm i'm relying on the law but i'm saying i can make this argument under a sufficiency heading without being accused of of of waiver if i could just i beg the courts indulgence on the on the earlier discussion there's a contrast between the on on the issue of of the good faith there's a contrast doesn't separate it out that's that's my point in distinguishing doyle and i just want to say that on the other jury charge issues that i didn't really get a chance to get into there's a there's a common theme that the  judge gave these these very bare bones and i call them circular in my brief definitions of things like for example intent to defraud the court for all intents and purposes says that new of the f