start with the standing issue because there are three issues here the plaintiff doesn't dispute that under supreme court jurisprudence and injury that sufficient to confer an article three standing can't be one that she personally didn't suffer and that's in lewis against case and she also doesn't dispute that a plaintiff has to demonstrate standing for every claim that she seeks to to press and that is in the daimler chrysler case also in the supreme court she personally suffered no injury under the laws of any state other than connecticut and she lacks even an arguable claim under any of the other state law she does not claim that she has this and this whole questions handling under the rule under rule twenty three analysis is in terms of whether or not there's a predominance of the issues there the issues are common or not and the commonality question and if it's commonality based upon you know the similarities of state statutes why would that why would that be enough i think because first of all i point to your honor's opinion in man against high court title company that the issue of standing has to be determined first and it cannot be determined on a class wide basis you have to look at whether the individual plaintiff has standing and your honour's opinion was based on those two supreme court cases that i just cited so i think that's the short answer to your question and that's the way most of the district courts who've confront that consistent with or any ca case i mean or how is it consistent with class actions in the first place if you interpret that strictly i mean i have no if if your client defrauds judge walker i don't have standing to file a lawsuit saying he was  hurt if i was hurt too normally i have standing to bring my own coin but in the class action context i'm allowed to represent other people who were injured that aren't me yes but they have to be injured in the same way and they have to have the plaintiffs but aren't they injured in the same way i see this is where i think any ca comes into play because there we said ok there it's the same statute but it's different instruments that were purchased by the class members the ones that the class representative bought and we said well that's not a problem because so long as they're injured or whatever the formulation is in a sufficiently similar way or something like that right well first of all in the end he seek a case was factually different as one factual difference i think you're i just pointed out the other is that the prospectus the shelf registration and the prospectus contain the same representation that's what that's what the plaintiff here is saying is that the label contains the same representation in oklahoma or new jersey as it does in connecticut but she doesn't have a claim under those statutes and those those statutes do not afford her standing i would i would guess seems to suggest that if the same set of concerns is implicated then then that's all you need even though you don't have a claim but the other claims raised the same concerns law that's the between the neck opinion and the man opinion and i think that's been recognized actually by some of the district courts that affect to grapple with this one of them is not cited in our brief it's a case called in re agra knocks and it's ninety four two twenty four or and it expressly deals with this conflict between the neck of opinion and the man opinion ultimately says that the man that man opinion is the one that governs the exact same issue as we're dealing with here because the man opinion addresses the supreme court's holding that the soup and i'm going to read from lewis against casey that a suit may be a class action is nothing to the question of standing for even name plaintiffs who represent a class must allege that they personally have been injured not that the injury has been suffered by other identified members of the class has been injured she's been injured but she's not she can't be redressed by the stones other statutes i'm interested why why  you not or do you contend that she also has no standing to represent people who bought the wash product as opposed to the beth brought i did we contend that because there is a body of law that directly addresses that issue and that actually why why isn't that the same problem she didn't she didn't buy it she admits that she has no recollection of ever buying one of the two products and i take it that the reason she th this body of case law that says that doesn't matter is the neck a case again yeah well i think that is the neck a case though that is the fact pattern the neck a case that she is the exact same label on that product label says that she will formula but conceptually why is it different that in one case we have the exact same statute but a different injury a different product that the fraud is about and the class representative having been injured by that misrepresentation is allowed to represent other plaintiffs injured by the same misrepresentation but on a different product well perhaps that's ok how is that different from having exactly the same product exactly the same misrepresentation but under a different but in some cases at least you'll concede identical statute is a different issue as to which states and wouldn't problems and how does that mess up the manageability of the class action which is our second argument that i don't think i'm going to have a chance to address but you know your honor and perhaps that argument needs to be addressed as well but that fact pattern is exactly the same as n where the person is what's the conceptual idea from x or trying to you can have a couple more minutes both sides thank you but what's the conceptual difference is what i'm trying to understand i mean i hear you that a different statute is a different thing than a different product but why well one what makes it what makes it article three significance in one case and not the one reason with the redress ability requirement her claims cannot be redressed under the laws of any of these other statues but a plaintiff in that state could be redressed absolutely but but but again again no i'm sorry don't let the minutes that's that's all i want to be clear yeah again your honor i think your own opinion and the supreme court opinion makes clear you've got to look at the standing of the plaintiff there is no you don't look at standing in gross and you don't look at the standing of the other unknown unnamed plaintiffs in the class you have to look first at whether the plaintiff has standing to bring the claim i think that's what man says and that's what louis against casey says and if the next argument made after this decision is actually the whole class action mechanism violates article three because lynch as named plaintiff is bringing claims on behalf of everybody else and including walker who is as far as anyone knows perfectly happy not to bring a suit i have no standing to bring a claim on behalf of walker so why isn't that the same problem well i think your honor that this actually case presents a slightly different situation than some others because of the connecticut statute the connecticut's that she does not permit nonresidents to have a claim in many of these class actions the first thing they do they do a choice of law analysis i'm not sure if i missed being under we all live in connecticut under such of medical why do i have standing to bring claims just by calling it a class action that are actually walker's claims or chin's claims or weinberger's claims or every consumer in the states claims it's because this is same claim you have standing to bring that claim is the same claim that those plaintiffs unnamed plaintiffs have and that's the analysis doesn't that analysis apply two to these facts it's the same claim even though it's under a different statute because it's under it's essentially the same club because essentially the same claim is again i will point the same set of concern services case exactly that it's the uniform commercial code yes that's that's the us food services case the uniform command but that that was that was not a standing case that we know there was no energy right there's no one no one vote to raise this apparently this as as i take it and this does not affect your ability to raise it here but this claim is a little marvel right you didn't raise this claim in the district we did raise the claim we absolutely did raise the claim the claim was not raised initially because we believe that they were making a different argument here as i was starting to explain that sometimes in these cases on the regional choice of law analysis the argument is that there's no difference in the state law and therefore you can apply the law of connecticut to all of these plaintiffs you can't do that here because the cup the statute does not permit it so this is a little bit unique when we realized when we made that argument and they came back and said no we're not arguing that the law of connecticut applies to everybody we did raise the standard but we're not for that provision cut you're saying they they would have standing to raise the fairly frivolous argument that they have claims under the oklahoma people could bring claims under connecticut law no but they would they what i'm saying is that if they we were able to show that there was no difference in the law of connecticut between connecticut and the other jurisdictions than the choice of an law analysis would simply revert to apply connecticut law to everybody and you wouldn't have this issue but want to take a little bit of time to address rule twenty three ok so i think i think that issue is simple simply the burden is clearly on the plaintiff the court is supposed to do an analysis we don't believe the court did any analysis at all what the court essentially did is say well the highest court of it none of these states requires reliance and therefore there's no difference and that is just not adequate first of all it's wrong i think in our brief we pointed out that illinois requires reliance new jersey and massachusetts require proximate cause ation which is in effect the same thing in these cases and but there are a host of other areas which the courts just simply didn't address which there are significant differences between the statutes some of them have safe harbors some of them require intent some of them award punitive damages some of them provide for jury trials and the the plaintiff has offered nothing in the of trial plan to alleviate these problems well he said you know will instruct the jury on connecticut law and then if there are any differences will will do will a subclass this is one paragraph in the courts some of these issues it seems to me would raise if you're right about the state laws significant questions about whether the common issues predominate if for example the statute requires reliance but if a statute is different in so far as it requires intent to deceive for example why would that be a big deal the jury is asked first decide whether there is a misrepresentation if there is none the defendant wins against everybody  then if you find that there is a misrepresentation in accuracy then next decide whether it's intentional and the jury then decides that question and if it finds intent then that clicks off another state and if it doesn't then the defendant wins under that state's law now saying that's great or anything i'm just saying why is that some unimaginably complicated thing do well i mean i'm not suggesting if that was the only issue that was different that that we would be here but it's not the only one well i understand that but i guess what i'm what i'm concerned about is if we get to this issue and this is after all something that's in the district courts discretion alternately are we talking about more than picking off certain states where for example a reliance issue strikes me as a fairly clear one where you would have the  kind of problem as in the next tell case where you know for a given jurisdiction the individual issues would predominate are there other things like that or is it just that there are a lot of states and too many things you have to click off and in having syria out of dreams there are there are a lot of states and there are a lot of things you have to click off that some of them have to do and i you know we detail this in our brief and in the appendix we have a chart with all of them there are very very substantial differences on on reliance and on proximate cause ation there are some states that have safe harbor defenses where you are not liable if you comply with certain regulations which we claim we did it becomes an enormously complex exercise and the fact of the matter is the issue just wasn't analyzed here at all it was just completely ignored in fact the court below said i say that i mean we have this very often that judges don't necessarily spell everything out but it seems a little harsh on the judge to say this issue was totally ignored both sides submitted their charts and the judge came to a certain conclusion conclusion may be wrong but that doesn't mean the judge didn't have evidence before him he took into account as i grant that he did cite one case and the one case blessing against serious goes the other way and find some of the very statutes now that are involved in this case contain variations that precluded certification so it's hard to want to finish up yeah i'm going to finish up right now i think on the ascertain ability point the only thing i want to say is that we knowledge that petra bost has held that there is no independent requirement but it's still relevant to the issue of superiority unmanageability and this is we are not asking the court to impose a career world this is a very unique case with is a cut off because the label changed and the memory test that's required of a class member here is not only did this is when did you have a baby i mean i know the first memory test is did you use this product or something and i but that's that would be true in virtually any consumer class action for a relatively inexpensive product it's not like remembering what kind of car you bought it's remembering what kind of soap you bought but once you're past that the date thing doesn't seem to be that big a deal with all the fun vying this this product and i say i've always bought this product because it was natural it had natural oats whatever that's supposed to mean and that attracted me so i bought that product always and i bought it in two thousand and eleven because my baby was born in two thousand and eleven or whatever the day the problem here if the person aboard it always that's that's that's a different issue but the person here has to know that they bought it before november of tw thirteen as opposed to november of two thousand and twelve that end date becomes critical because the label was changed that's something that's not present in most of these cases most of these cases someone has to say i bought it sometime between two thousand and ten and today but it becomes crucial you cannot be a classmate as there's always a statute of limitations there's always some kind of cutoff date where the date is going to be relevant you say well gee i bought it a while ago i don't buy it anymore because once i heard that it didn't have natural oats i stopped buying it but i bought it some time i wonder when that was that's is again a fairly common problem and in this case it seems to me the fact that it's a baby product puts some constraints on people's memory well i think if you have a baby in  going to have one in december and i think that's the basic problem is that is is very different from other cases hearkens you why don't we move on to the other side  upon god here and not not not revert to rule twenty three to resolve this problem so i think the standing issue how does a plaintiff in connecticut have standing to represent plaintiffs in other states i mean you with different statutes in other states no suits have been brought by any of these plaintiffs in these other states right correct your honor so i think that the reason why the plaintiffs can bring that suit is is really pretty well laid out as the court was just discussing in the neck a case and that is that first off you look at the article three issue has the point if suffered an injury in fact yes she bought a product she paid a premium price she was injured was that injury caused by the defendant yes it was the defendant's representation that caused her to pay that premium price is this injury redress a bill by a court of law yes she can recover money damages she can recover punitive damages these are quintessential legal remedies that are available in a court of law so under the article three analysis heidi lange absolutely has standing to bring a suit so then the question is all right she's got standing she can properly engage the jurisdiction of the court can she bring suit on behalf of a class that isn't identically situated with her that cannot sue under the connecticut stanching they can't sue under the connecticut statute but they could sue under their own statutes which are materially the same and if it's if they're materially the same as  for standing point goes and then somehow it might be sorted out later in the rule twenty three analysis as to whether or not there are differences that make it impossible to have a class but i think that your honor there are two different ways you could address this one would be to simply say look statutory standing is not a jurisdictional threshold so that question is one that is properly addressed through the rule twenty three analysis you could say that and i think that that would be consistent with neck of frankly because necker really doesn't speak to that issue the other way that you could address it which i think is probably more consistent with the spirit of america is to say well there does have to be a certain unity of the cause of action here in order to make it sensible for this to be a class you could do it that way and that is sensually doing what neka did and viewing two different products and saying yes they are they are somewhat different and yes it is true that the plaintiff in that case couldn't bring suit  itself to to rectify the wrong on this product that it didn't buy but the claims are sufficiently similar they raise sufficiently similar concerns that the plaintiff can in fact represent the class has standing to represent the class for both of those things and in that sense the statutory analysis you could you could analogize it exactly which is say are the concerns at issue in these other statutes sufficiently similar that it makes sense to allow how you langen a citizen of the state of connecticut who made her purchases in connecticut to represent this broader class and the answer there is yes absolutely each one of these states allows plaintiffs who are similarly situated to heidi allowing him to bring a personal action to recover money damages for a misrepresentation on a product and they don't have to prove individual reliance and they don't have to prove that there was some nefarious intent on the part of the defendants a very similar cause of action and that's not surprising because this is a little bit like the food services case in that there it was directly based on the u c see here all of these statutes are essentially many f t c acts that all of these states were passing around about the same time so it's actually not all that surprising that by a large you're going to find up a basket of states and we've assembled them that have laws that are very the defendant just addressed as well most of the issues that they've raised with respect to differences in the state laws i think rightly can be described as ones that aren't really going to defeat predominance is as your honor was getting to because it's in for example if you've got a if you've got an additional factor in a statute that says well you have to prove that there was an intent to induce realigns a couple of statutes do that well that's an additional element that isn't in the in the connecticut statute it isn't in a number of the statutes is this something that changes the nature of the case well that's not not in the facts of this case because this is a labeling case and generally speaking the reason why you put labels on products and you put representations on labels is that you want people to read the representation and decide to buy the product there's really no other reason to do it so in that in the context of this case that's not going to be a big issue when berger says and much i think this made this are going under the standing heading that the class representative has to have an incentive this is something to do with standing to bring a suit i take it that ms langan has no independent incentive to prove intent may be that something like intent would be what a jury might think when they hear her evidence but any lawyer representing a single client would prefer to tell the jury if it came to that well they'd make this whole big show over they didn't intend to mislead anybody but that's not a requirement of our statute the plaintiffs still wins if that's not there so why does ms lang and have an incentive and is this matter if she doesn't why would she have an incentive to to bring up the question of intent in pursuing her own claims in connecticut and that is fair point your honor but i think the reality of consumer class actions is that the plaintiff is not going to recover some staggering amount of money here and we're talking about people being willing to bring these cases because they see a wrong that's being done that they personally suffered from they see a practice that they oppose that they to stop and they want that to be as broad as possible that's what we see i mean why does heidi lange and i have a incentive to litigate to bring it to bring any action to bring an action on behalf of people in connecticut even on behalf of herself really because it's right it's an issue of principle at best right and it's an issue of principle that people would like to litigate frankly because people are offended by this heidi lang was offended by this she felt duped but they can't afford to the only way that they can afford to bring these lawsuits is through class actions and quite frankly when you're dealing with a product that costs a couple of bucks and a premium the district court really only has one paragraph of analysis and it indeed may have given a great deal of thought to this but we don't see it we don't see the reasoning we don't see analysis of the differences and whether the preclude finding a predominance on me what do we do with that well your honor i think that obviously it would have been an assistance to reviewing court to have a a broader discussion of the differences in state laws i don't think that the disqualifies judge miers decision nor do i think that in any way in undermines his analysis both parties did put in extensive evidence now i'm sorry i just didn't hear what you said i'm sorry both parties did put in extensive analyses of the different state laws now most of that was and both parties addressed some provisions in their briefing that were a little bit more important so for example in the plaintiff's briefs we stressed that each of the state statutes that we're bringing suit under allowed a private right of action didn't require individual reliance on behalf of absent class members didn't require nefarious intent things of that nature that really created the cohesive claim that everyone was pursuing the  defendants focused on a couple of issues in their brief and left the rest into their appendix to not surprisingly given how many different issues judge maher was addressing in his opinion he didn't devote a lot of attention to going through this line by line given that the parties in their briefs had really been fairly brief and it left the rest to an appendix i don't think that's terribly significant i think that the issues of reliance that we've addressed in the brief here are really the most significant ones and as you can see reading that the briefs of the of the parties here of the four states that the defendant says oh wait they do require reliance in one form or another either directly or what we call back door reliance through causation that's not really the case the that we challenge that we've briefed that we've said no you're misreading the cases other cases of come out the other way judge meyer was  certainly able to read those cases and reach the same decision i think that it's fair to assume that with the kountry o'connor briefing by the parties he reached the conclusion that we had proper italy proven our case  why is it efficient why is that a better solution than not to have a class action that stands all of these different jurisdictions rather than leaving each be well all we have supposed to decide is whether a class action is better than a lot of individual actions but don't we have to consider whether this class action is better than other class alternatives i think the answer your honor is that if you were to consider that issue and i think it's fair walk the answer is absolutely this is better it's better for a number of reasons first it's certainly better to have one case on these facts which are identical rather than seventeen i except a turning weinberger's correction of my number it's better to have one rather than seventeen you could have inconsistent verdicts you could have one jury saying they would be inconsistent necessarily if you got different state laws actually they would be inconsistent your honor because the state laws with respect to the most relevant points of liability are identical white why do we care about that actually i mean there are lots of cases where you have somebody suing on some claim and new york law of the new york law it's decided that they win and somebody else has what looks like an identical claim and new jersey and they bring their suit and they lose different trials different states different outcomes why do we care right i mean you certainly you certainly could but it's you know when you've got a absolute unity of what the facts are is just a a waste of judicial resources and a waste of the resources the parties to have seventeen trials rather than one so that's that's one issue but the second issue as a practical matter is even a class action for a case involving a consumer product that's a couple of bucks with a premium that's less becomes a difficult mechanism unless you're in new york or california or alaska there just are enough people there aren't enough people basis make it worthwhile to bring their hard enough people connecticut you know we if we if we don't have the ability to join our claims to the claims of other states consumer class actions like this in connecticut are not practical they are not practical you don't see them being brought thank you well here the above i'm going just come back to the stand point and to daimler chrysler where the court rejected the very argument that's been made here that standing is to one claim may suffice for all claims arising from the same nucleus of operative fact in a case called in re propranolol and trust litigation is two forty nine f supp third seven twelfth decided last year judge ray cough found and i know it's not binding on your honestly have to worry about daimler chrysler only have to worry about to drake of your rights itself out of the ninth circuit again yeah but he but he b asically concluded and i think it is the rationale applies here while it was the best valve state in the trust laws while the argument could be made that numerous state law any trust actions constitute one claim for the purposes of standing the supreme court has explicitly rejected the argument that federal jurisdiction extends to all claims sufficiently related to a claim with an article three to be part of the same case and i think that's the governing rule here i think that's the argument that they're making and i think it's simply it's wrong and it's not consistent with what the supreme court has held and frankly with what this court has held in the main against high court case thank you thank you will reserve decision