predicated on subsection eighty three to stop the role that part of subsection a three to requires proof at least two separate occasions of surveillance and requires proof at least two separate occasions where the victim was placed in the bought me surveillance is to find the relevant part by the statute is remaining present outside the victim's vehicle the state claims that miss amber v was placed under surveillance on three separate occasions all of which occurred at the exact same place miller park and all of which occurred at essentially the same time and i say this because the record indicates that miss hamburg the person arrived at miller park at twelve thirty four pm and that mr crawley was arrested twenty six minutes later at his home at one pm so the three allegedly separate occasions of surveillance overheard in no more than twenty six minutes and again they all occurred at the exact same location miller park really though the three allegedly separate occasions of surveillance all likely occurred within your minutes and i say this because after the final a legit occasion of surveillance mr foley ran to his car that was parked just outside the  park and the witnesses the browns followed him they watched as he got into his vehicle and they wrote down his plate number and then they drove to the bloomington police department and provided the police with the plate number the police were then  and ran the plate and determined that the vehicle was indeed registered to mr crawley they got his address and they dispatched a couple of police units out to his home where he was arrested roughly one pm so considering that all of this happened in just twenty six minutes and considering everything that happened after the final occasion of surveillance it seems likely that this entire incident lasted no more than perhaps ten minutes now  case that would indicate that surveilling her once or twice or three times within the same twenty's six minute period  because this all occurred in a very close period of time and because of all occurred at the exact same location we essentially have one single occasion now we're not dealing with actually we're dealing with occasions of surveillance and in that respect the stocking statute seems to be based on my research something of an outlier in the criminal code and it's use a specific use that is not only the words occasion but the word separate so it's requiring separate occasions  back why isn't that two occasions well the words it's not clear that he he made a loop the record indicates that he drove by at least once perhaps twice at another instance of the record he indicates it strangely a hypothetical that perhaps he drove by three or four times but nonetheless he is continually remaining and in close proximity to where this is this is a continuous occasion of surveillance and again it's important to remember that all this happened in a very short period of time so even if he you know left as the state claims he could you know he could have went very far because again we're dealing with mere minutes here we counsel that side you still have the issue of whether or not the to dream of this court interpreted the precise language at issue and held that as employed in the statute the language on at least two separate occasions relates only to the access surveillance but also to the particular apprehension felt by the victim this court's holding actually requires the victim to experience more harm before being protected by the statute but the statute does not if there's no record of the victim to experience any harm rather it merely requires a showing that the victim was twice placed in the mere apprehension of harm and the standard for what constitutes placing a victim in the apprehension of harm is actually remarkably low and reasonably so and it can also be satisfied by the mere sight of the defendant in a public place so good we don't have to separate occasions where the victim was placed in the apprehension of harm and going back to the surveillance we don't have two separate occasions before approaching her he a second occasion of surveillance occurred when he returned as the state described it an unspecified period of time later of course we're dealing with mere minutes here so this unspecified period of time is perhaps west miller street so essentially the state argues that basically because he crossed the street when he returned and unspecified period of time later an entirely new and separate occasion of surveillance  occurred but again it's important to point out that because of the tight time frame here he continually remained close geographic proximity to miss amber v during these three allegedly separate occasions of surveillance the city also attempts to partition these  with seemingly support separate occasions of surveillance is occurring anytime the victim blinks before going off the victim's own perception and it just seems a reasonable to contend that separate occasions of surveillance and deed occur or can occur that is at the exact same place as centrally the same time simply because of minor variations and the defendant's relative geographic proximity to the victim or because a minor variations in the victim's own perception and it's for that reason that i argue that separate occasions at a minimum require at least two distinctly individual and non continuous and siddons and incidents are distinctly individual not continuous when there is appreciable difference in the relative time and or location of each incident and i say this because in every single only case that i have found there was indeed so she i'm pretty sure will difference and the relative time or location of each separate occasion of surveillance that's exactly what made them separate here and appreciable difference in the roles of time simply does not exist when the three allegedly separate occasions of surveillance all occurred within mere minutes but  just later specifically included the word separate and occasion in the statute for a reason and it seems that their reason could not have been to invite the state to arbitrarily carve up what is likely a ten minute incident and just three distinctly separate  of surveillance by focusing on what are completely insignificant variances and what is continuous conduct the proposed definition here that these slight variations in pond suffice to divide furthermore the statutes current instruction make sense with respect to the placing the victim in the apprehension of harm as this court has interpreted under subsection a three one which is out issue here but the sister subsection stoping can occur two different ways either where there is an actual threat coupled with separate occasions of surveillance or there's not an actual threat stalking can nevertheless occur based on stopping can nevertheless occur  based upon a pattern of conduct from which a threat can be implied so in such a case where there is no actual threat stopping can nevertheless occur based upon both a pull act well under subsection e three to which we're dealing with here similarly does not involve an actual threat and thus reasonably requires at least two separate occasions where the victim is placed in the apprehension of harm again without requiring the victim to twice be placed in the apprehension of harm simple soul essentially becomes felony staffie finally mr darley had the fundamental right to be informed of the nature and the cause of the charges against him and the state did not charge that he twice address them at that at the court below and with respect to the theories that the state now raises in an attempt to meet its trial burden now on appeal the state first argues that one is placed in the mere excuse me one is placed in the apprehension of harm when one  becomes suspicious of misfortune and with that definition the state argues that was ever v was placed in the apprehension of harm which she simply put the block icon a mr rose profile as she admitted she did any time she was simply not noticed mr croy behind her car just before he approached her she became aware of her surroundings and because she became aware of her surroundings she was placed in the apprehension of our simply noticing unusual behavior as she did does not equate to being placed in the apprehension of harm and indeed his behavior a good place for the apprehension of our it seems unlikely that she would have rolled down the window and greeted him when he ultimately approached her apprehensive because she says things like he was wearing a face mask and he just looked out of place looked suspicious and was kind of weird it was obvious i noticed him  heard noticing unusual behavior and walking in the park and you know wearing a mask i guess to be clear he wasn't actually wearing a mask necessarily the witnesses had kind of inconsistent testimony in that respect but one said that he pulled the shirt of and the other one said that he was maybe wearing a bandana but nonetheless we're dealing with essentially we're dealing with the cells here and this sort of behavior seemingly would not suffice to come to constitute an assault in and of itself anyhow the fact is the state failed to prove at least two separate occasions of surveillance and the state failed to prove at least two separate entrances where miss amber view was placed in the apprehension of harm failure in either respect requires reversal of mr gross conviction for armed violence it was this court has any questions with respect to argument three i would i would just for respectfully request to fear for his or her safety are we looking at what the perpetrator knows or are we looking at what the victim knows mutants the state i'm sorry you argue that she couldn't misstatement of all my opening brief which the state correctly pointed out and i addressed it in my reply but you're correct it's actually viewed from the defendant's perspective and what he should have reasonably known as opposed to what she subjective mere minutes geographic proximity minor variations these are words that were repeated a lot here but what and it was said that these words and the fact that the statutes fixit the x are to be separate that it was an intentional use the word separate and that the actions here happened to close in time to be separate use of the word separate was intentional but i would also submit to you that the not using the word continuous or not inserting in their attempt or a limitation was also intentional addressing first the issue of whether there were two instances when that the victim is amber he was placed under surveillance and the defendant concedes that he participated in multiple acts he pacing behind the car the circling repeatedly up to four times around the car and the approaching the current pointing the gun he concedes that at least this was at least one occasion of surveillance but then this is where the argument goes off track he recognizes in his briefs that the courts have consistently said there is no minimum time frame when you will find a an occasion of surveillance and daniels and curtis and all the cases that i cite to support that and in curtis it was most obvious because the victim had called the police one i believe was an ex boyfriend possibly ex husband had been contacting her repeatedly and threatening her if he didn't see his child fearful of this she contacts the police and they set up a sting essentially where they'll go to a designated place she will tell her x that she will let him see the child as he walks in the car she is to put the car in reverse and drive away that is exactly the way it went down he went to the location he walked toward the car walks toward the car case is not safe you reach the car he walks toward the car she put in reverse and drove away and the court said that was sufficient and part of the reasoning was that this is a statute that differs from assault because it's meant to prevent the harm it's meant to put into place protections for victims before it reaches this higher escalation of an assault could i ask you about that analysis and i want to thank that this hypothetical which is the  clear that the repeated i mean we know the fact that if it placed the victim in a reasonable apprehension of harm that is something for the trier of fact determine if those were in fact separate occasions and the courts have said that when the trier of fact does consider whether there are separate occasions certainly that time frame the lapse of it or the existence of it is something that they get to take into consideration but there are facts that would support that being two separate occasions yes ok so you bad conduct would be sufficient to justify a conviction on the description i would say there are facts when there are circumstances when those facts would yes i cannot say just from that without more but yes there are times when those facts would support two separate occasions if you also look at the plain language of the statute the statute does not place again this temporal restrictions the courts have said there is no minimum amount of time the first the court hear from the first occasion was that circling of the victim and the defendant admitted in his interview he slowed significantly he was able to see she was reading a book he was able to see that she had her foot propped up there so it wasn't as if someone just drove by them on the street he was intentionally observing her and critically observing her to see and make these observations in terms of the record was that he had been to one or two times that he had passed by or there was also this reference to three to four times what what's what what do we know we know that the defendant did not testify or put on a defense by the admitted into evidence was his video recorded interview with the police and in that interview and i did cite that exact time for reference if you want to watch the tape he stated in there that he drove by as many as three or four times that is the quote that he that is the statement that he made in his videotaped interview that was the first occasion were not it was an alleged not argue that each of those was a separate occasion that's not the facts here then the second occasion that the court found and the court of knowledge that it was close in time is when he re entered the park and he was observed by two witnesses approaching the car before he tapped on the window and threatened her with a gun those are two separate and distinct occasions he had to leave the park he had to park he had to cross the street and re enter the park and it does appear that things did happen in a fairly short time span but it was still enough time for him to drive by repeatedly leave the park park come back in pace behind her car which is what the state argued was the third instance of surveillance but the trial court did address it then apparently leaving the park again because when miss amber he saw him coming to approach her car her testimony was he was crossing the street and coming toward my car which would suggest that between pacing and approaching the car he again left the park now i would like to point you to page three of defendant's reply brief because this is the quote that i think is significant so each of the three alleged instances of surveillance could be considered separate acts because each without the other could arguably stand alone as an occasion of surveillance that's my argument there stand alone occurrences there was a break time between them and there is not required to be any minimum period of time between those despite recognizing there is no minimum time though again we're talking around this and we're inserting into the statute language that doesn't exist we're inserting a continuous requirement and and a pushable amount of time that is not language found anywhere and again i do recognize that in the other cases there was more of a break of time between the instance than there was here but it still comes back that in those cases they even said the fact that there was a break is not an indication that there must be a minimal amount of time and if you look to be daniel descent which i also mentioned in my theory one of the justices there was arguing that there should be read into the definition of education of surveillance a continuation and a continuous behavior and the justices the majority justices flat out rejected it and said we have a statute that defines this and says that an occasion of surveillance is remaining present outside of something therefore it would be improper and we are not at least two occasions of reasonable apprehension we have a concession that pointing a gun at her was one occasion but then we also have the evidence that there was a series of opportunities where he approached her through these this website of plenty of fish dot com and she rejected him and each term originally he contacted her and the screen name the profile with a drawl the seven she said she wasn't interested his response she considered to be very irate in the interview with the police he said i was blunt i think her excuse was bogus and he acknowledged that maybe it was offensive to her then he contacted her a couple of months later she had been off the site because she had entered into a relationship and she put her profile back on and he contacted her again and yes she immediately blocked it then though the evidence that was presented and the state presented during the trial was that after that although she didn't know he was contacting her as built to the max what we do know is when she discovered that he had contacted her under this fictitious profile picture lured her to the park where her response to that was to go back she testifies she went back on that website of plenty of fish dot com wants she deleted her profile and she removed her profile and never visited another online dating site the reason that this is also a circumstance that should be considered in making that inference that you mentioned they are the court is allowed to make to infer a reasonable apprehension of harm is because the other testimony was that when her relationships and she always went back to the websites she testified she had tried several somewhere more expensive somewhere less expensive but following this occurrence with defendant where it escalated and he pursued her and despite her multiple rejections he continued to the point of deceptively pursuing her and ultimately threatening her based on that she removed her profile and she pretty directly connected to the surveilling of the following it is an inference from the overall circumstances and i believe that that is a circumstance in addition to the fact that she had blocked him when he was candid about his identity and then deceptive way and that prior to the gun he had engaged her and very personal conversations about sexual habits he had it on pressured her into providing him with seminude photos and somewhat criticized her for not providing full nudity pictures all this is part of the fun and all of this is part of what figures into the inference would be her decision to say online dating is no longer even an option for me because i have this reasonable apprehension that when i turn away suitors i am not interested in they're still going to come after me in a deceptive way but i think it was a marriage in france i guess counseling and seeing the flip side of that is in spite of all that warning on she did send photos she did show up at the party she agreed to meet this person so what influences to be drawn from that i mean it seems to me that you're saying because this is turning out so horribly i have learned my lesson i'm not going to ever do that again but are you really looking at whether or not she climax correct a different persona different picture and everything else and i do think that coming at this again it was a reasonable apprehension of harm looking at the circumstances as a whole and i mean did she form that reasonable apprehension i think it was a continuing thing she clearly apart from the gun when reasonable apprehension of far of harm is beyond a reasonable standard when she fully realized what had happened and she removed herself from being put in that position i would like to address the why i would ask you to reconsider  and not in jena this court did say that there had to be two experiences of a reasonable apprehension of them and going back to the original statute it was required that there be a threat the threat could form could cause a reasonable apprehension of harm but a reasonable apprehension of harm without the threat would not allow the state to take any actions to pretend to protest the victim there had to be a threat and there had to be these two instances of following or surveilling a year after the original enactment the legislature went back in with the specific goal of toughening this statute to make more protections for the intended victims and in doing so they've made it that you still have to have two instances of following or surveilling but now you could have a threat or a reasonable apprehension of harm it's one or two following and under a three  a a threat or under eighty three to a reasonable apprehension of harm when senator harkin since was speaking not on the original and accurate but on these amendments the language is clear she was talking in terms of a singular reasonable apprehension and a singular threat accompanied by two acts or following it was not based on the floor hearings intended that this language which by the way the language two or more haitian appears in the main heading for the statute in the general language and then it breaks out again a three one and a three t it was not in any of the discussions consider that this two or more would apply to only one of those and not the other if it applied one it applied to both but it didn't because they were speaking in terms of singular singular threats singular apprehension and in not in jena in finding to the contrary that that two or more did apply to the reason the lack or henchmen this court although not this panel put emphasis on this language in the threat that the threat that happen at any time based on the amendments to the statute that phrase at any time was given i would argue in appropriate si at any time is a reference to the fact that after the amendments the threat did not have to happen prior to the stalking which is what was required originally now the threat could be made at any time that is not the case when you have a reasonable apprehension of harm and there hasn't been a threat which is what a three two addresses you have to have some other act which is that surveilling and following to create that reasonable apprehension of harm the phrase at any time doesn't is not relevant in that particular section it's at any time was the reference to when the threat had to be made it was not a reference to the number of times  just like to try to replay dress a couple of points admittedly there is no minimum period of time for an occasion to occur but what i what i want to hear is that because the various acts as the state holds them are they're bound by continuity they're all happening at the same time this is this is a single occurrence so although admittedly perhaps they could be independent acts and perhaps they could if one happened without the other they could arguably be independent occasions of surveillance nevertheless because they all happen together at the basically the same time in the exact same place and perhaps less than ten minutes they are bound by continuity and therefore only give rise to  single occasion of surveillance and with respect to your concerns as to the driving by three or four times i decide to clarify that part of the record likely doesn't actually admit this road is not actually meant that he drove by three or four times when he says that what's happening is he doesn't yet he doesn't know at that point in time that the that the browns had followed him and got his plate and so he's merely speculating as to how somebody might have got his plate and so well you know somebody were to drive by three or four times they'd be kind of unusual and maybe they would maybe that's how they got by play but i wasn't the one who actually approached so we didn't actually admit that he drove by for your four times he merely speculates almost as if he's creating an alibi for himself in that respect as to the state's discussion regarding justice hartman's dissent and  of the charge against him this notion that he was talking about continuous conduct or you know and that was rejected by the court the only mention as i recall of continuous conduct in that dissent is was with specific reference to a dictionary definition of stalking that he uses he doesn't advocate that continuous conduct is necessary or there's really nothing there so i'm not really sure why the states focusing on justice are going to set in that respect moving on to indicate that you've been boxed he contacted her she responds back he responds with what she describes as an irate message but it should be noted that messages and is not on the record and she offers nothing as to why she described that message as i rate the significance of the irate message really is only being braced for the first time here on appeal and with respect finally with respect to subsection eighty three to i should first point out the language has not changed since that time as this court reason enough to jima subsection e three two unlike subsection e three one does not contain a temporal reference because and not because it does not contain a temporal reference this court reasoned that the