it please the court the key to understanding the issue of standing in this case is to recognize that a fraudulent transfer suit involves two sets of conduct producing two related injuries the first injury occurs when the debtor's conduct produces harm to the creditor that conduct might be a tort or might be a breach of contract or it might be any other action or inaction for which the law creates liability it produces a quantum of injury that may or may not be reduced to a judgment but that nevertheless exists from the moment illegal injury occurs the first injury is  concrete and particularized injury in fact that directly result from the debtors conduct and that can be redressed through the court and it thus meets the article three test for standing and indeed no one in this case contends otherwise the second injury occurs when the transfer ribeye accepting a transfer of the debtors acids under circumstances that the statute deems fraudulent reduces or eliminates the creditors opportunity to achieve satisfaction for the first injury that injury that second injury is likewise a concrete and particularized injury in fact because the creditor has established the first injury and has proven that the defendant's acceptance of the transfer has occurred under circumstances calculated to diminish his opportunity to collect now the common law and equity created on woman there you seem to be saying that in order for there to be the second injury the transfer has to have violated the statute that's correct your honor well in order to for these dynamics the merits with the standing let me back up and say in order for the second injury to be legally redress of all it must have violated the statute when i ran out or have a right either because we have cases all the time where people lose on the merits and therefore don't have any legal redress but standing well what i'm saying is if at trial we establish the creditors liability to us and we further a stamp then the transfers of the debtors assets have caused an injury to us is that injury legally regressive all that depends on whether we have further proven the elements of the statute right but you seem to be saying that this there was not an injury unless the transfer was done in a manner that violated the statute know that there was a second injury i misspoke in your honor there was a second injury the moment the transfers were made whether that injury is legally redress of old depends on whether we prove the elements of the statute and why is that a new injury that is a new injury because if the debtor had the assets that were transferred then we would have been able to obtain regret redress against those assets and so it is related to the first injury if we had no right of recovery then we would have had no injury from the transfer but if we had a right of recovery we were further injured by the incapacitation of the debtor to respond to that first all but five states have enacted the uniform fraudulent transfer act in which they have broadened the common law and equitable remedies available for fraudulent transfers and this is a prime example of the situation case that will give rise to a case or controversy where none exists before now the apple e's argue that standing requires causation and they cite this court's opinion in super value with which i know the court is familiar and the corresponding language from the one but we're call that the second injury is not the original injury itself but the creditors inability to collect for that a rigid original injury and so it is unnecessary and indeed irrelevant that the fraudulent transferees may have had no part in the creation of the original injury and further recall that the supreme court held in to ok of that the risk of real harm and satisfy the requirements of concrete most that why don't you say this is a spokeo case well i thought you said that there's an injury but we would have no right to recover unless we could meet the common law of fraudulent transfer that goes to whether you would have a successful cause of action that is correct it does not go to  well then why is that a spokeo case i'm just well only in the sense that spokeo articulate the general article three standards to be applied in every case we're not saying that he said a minute ago it's a spokeo case because there wasn't a cause of action i mean there wasn't standing in till congress or the legislature created this no remedy what i'm saying is it is unnecessary for us to prove proximate cause ation that the transfers actually in point of fact caused the debtor to be on able to pay for its original conduct it is sufficient that the missouri legislature has said under these circumstances there is a real risk of disabling the creditor from pursuing its remedies ok so i guess you're talking about on the causation on the causation side and furthermore we copius lee alleged proximate cause asian we alleged that the transferees denuded the debtor of its assets that allegation necessarily means that it prevented us from recovering from the better for that first injury good it doesn't matter that at this point you haven't obtained lab military from nabbous it absolutely does not matter probably will be so you won't lose on the merits you're saying but you think he would still have standing that is correct your honor we have standing in fact under missouri law we need not even sue nabbous not in texas not in missouri not anywhere we can proceed in a fraudulent transfer suit without ever naming the debtor as a defendant in any suit what's here for that i see that you claim the reply brief that is we found you familiar with curtis vs james from missouri court of appeal guess that that is our primary authority on the last as there has to be a pending or threatened lawsuit as  a guy i know i know i just want to try to understand the whole case you say we don't even have to do anything with regard to the debt or i thought it was your position we don't have to sue them we don't have to well in trying to honor there is a case and i don't have it on the tip of my tongue that says that where the debtor does not retain any interest in the original in the transfer of assets that the debtor is not even a necessary in this case the debtor retains no interest right i see now our standing is no less because we filed the texas action than it would be if we had not done so we do not need to to file texas action before i sit down and wait for a bottle i do want to apprised the court of a recent change in circumstances the debtor has filed for chapter seven bankruptcy and the texas litigation is under stay and we believe these developments do not impact this court's decision because they do not bear on the question of standing if the court concludes that we have standing and reverses and remands the case then the district court will have to address the effect of the pending bankruptcy determine whether the trustee intends to pursue a fraudulent transfer remedy on behalf of the estate under eleven u s c five forty four and five forty eight and litigation under the transfer act but it would seem logical to me in the right case to have a bifurcation of the debtors liability and then the issue of fraudulent transfer i don't know what you mean by it would be have showing a liability i guess before there's an injury well what i'm asking you is whether in your experience there are cases where in the transfer act case the liability of the debtor is adjudicated in the first instance as opposed to having it adjudicated in a separate action like in your texas case yes i can certainly occur and if it occurs it can occur in one big trial or into b trials where the first trial is the doctor's liability and the second trial is fraudulent transfer all within a transfer act case and that is correct ron do you know any published authority of example like  law i know it happens in texas where i'm from mike i don't have a citation on the top of my tongue your hon making and what i mean by that is they're taking the fact that they can arguably what we don't conceded state a claim under the state fraudulent conveyance statute that they can fit a claim for that and that necessarily means that they have standing now in their brief they pay lip service to the law which is clear and spokeo in other cases which says that's not enough in fact that's what spokeo is about that it was the bare procedural  violation of statute but here i think in essence that's what they're doing is they're saying we set a claim under the missouri fraudulent conveyance statute and missouri legislature has spoken but there's a claim and they define what a creditor is and because of that necessarily they need the constitutional requirements of standing and that law and i think that that the reason i think your honor that spokeo is important to discuss in general while it doesn't have specific applicability at least factually to this case is that i think that  showed a path for all the federal courts that the courts are to take a more restrictive view of standing and even in that case i thought that the court laid out the factors to look at the elements and even in that case rather than ruling on the merits of it sent it back to the ninth circuit and said apply the standard that we've given you and i think the clear message there is we're going to take a more restrictive you were going to be saying they have to have a judgment in texas before they have standing but if they allege the injury that they're litigating in texas why isn't that enough to have an injury i think well why do you need to determination of that as opposed to an allegation of it in order to elijah an adequate injury because you don't even get to the underlying transfer short it certainly does not get you to the causation element because the cases under the causation element your honor which is the second stand the requirement laid out a spokeo the fairly traceable requirement and in your case and super value this court case talked about the independent actions of third parties and how they would impact and that i think was judge autry's primary focus  said you have this case in texas and i want to talk about the bankruptcy issues because i disagree with counsel on the impact of the bankruptcy issues you have this case in texas a court could make a one marathon from a nation in texas two years from now this case could be tried a year from now in district court here and those could be two different determinations so what happens if that district that that state court down in texas says there's there's  no creditor status two years from now that issue squarely before that court fully being litigated and in this case the court finds a jury determined returns a verdict in judgment centered on transfer defendant in the texas litigation which i am not i argue that that was not fully and fairly litigated i was not before that court there were no identity of parties you know hot hot hot hot how do i you know so could impact the decision and interestingly that is language that's laid out in the super value case it's language of laid out in other cases we found two circuit court opinions one out of the four circuit one out of the tenth circuit and we cited those they are the fairly parkway decision in the habit or decision of the tenth and four circuit  those cases recognize they're not fraudulent transfer cases but both discussed the actions of independent third parties not before the court as impacting standing through the causation element and a couple of things are important there first of all those are both standing cases they're both crisco he o but they're both consistent with secondly there are circuit court decisions which talk about the independent actions of third parties in the moment i'll discuss how that impacts here the next thing i think important is that in the briefing appellants don't even address those issues in the reply brief they don't discuss them at all and those are the closest things that we believe this court has for guidance they're not on all fours are not fraudulent transfer cases but they're the closest thing that this court has i believe for guidance from other circuits on this issue of the impact of third parties not before the court which exactly what we have here now this is not before this court mr logan the senior mr christgau or not before this court and talk and that does sort of begs the question a little bit about the bankruptcy i believe that that trustee is the party who is now the holder of these fraudulent transfer claims no i'm not a bankruptcy expert but i can tell you that the trustee in the bankruptcy proceeding has taken that position so here if these transactions are going to be unwound which is the assertion here and funds are going to flow back they're going to flow back through nabbous and i flowing back through net as they become property of the estate which is managed by the trustee so i don't see how they can have standing here where the impact of that third party nabbous the trustee in bankruptcy rulings presumably litigated there or resolved there and some mr logan the seanie one of the other texas defend dance in owners of natters is a chapter eleven bankruptcy he's acting as a debtor in possession independent third parties those actors who are outside of this courtroom and outside of the district court necessarily impact this case and go to straight to the conservation issue diversity case why didn't why hasn't your client allegedly according to the complaint caused the injury by participating in the transfers why isn't the injury traceable to your client's participation is transferees because the link in the chain that is missing here is whether or not nabbous is mad as has creditor status and that issue is being litigated elsewhere and respond to him and part of one question you put to you know counsel doesn't have to go to final judgment i think the  answer's probably no but that creditor status that critical link of a creditor status yes that has to be determined and i think that was judge autry's focus in the district court he went farther and perhaps farther than he needed to absent that creditor status which is being litigated elsewhere you don't get standing here you don't get that traceable injury here you don't know if that link exist in and i will say your honor there was nothing precluding in that this goes to your questions to the counsel the appellate counsel there's nothing that precluded if g from filing this action here and bring all parties together and had they done so then i can tell you right now is trial counsel as well as hell accountable i would have either sought to stay the action against my clients i think we still have the same standing issues we might move to dismiss on that basis but certainly that would be it the real argument here that that's being made is that bootstrapping argument that you know if we state a claim under the states that you we therefore without doing anything further necessarily state a claim necessarily have standing in the cases are clear that article three standing is distinct and unique could they have brought this mistake or i think they could it would standing be an issue not article three standing i don't know what the what the missouri state is on that but they chose this forum by choosing this form they're required to to meet the standards couple final matters as i see my time is running out as i noted the two cases that any way in the briefing but the only case that's relied on in support of their position is and i'm sure i'm going to pronounce this and correctly i think it's the quinn da case which is a district court case out of the northern district of  california which is a standalone case that's been cited one time i believe by another northern district court at the district court level and that case is not a standing case at all  it's a ripeness case a related concept the rises out of article three but it is not a city in case it doesn't discuss the required spokeo elements and i say spokeo elements so if you really confirmed existing law and further described it but it doesn't talk at all about standing it's clearly the analysis was simply rightness and that's because there are no cases out there to that effect that case involved an alleged fraudulent transfer and that's why it cited and me please the court to brief points first of all with respect to the question of whether nabbous is a debtor and enterprise is a creditor at this stage of the twelve the one stage that is determined by our well pleaded allegations and we pled that in fact they were so there's nothing that the court can point to or the the council can point to in our allegations that negate standing second with respect to the pending bankruptcy the claim is that the trustee has a preferential right if you will to pursue fraudulent transfer claims so that if successful they in you are to the benefit of the estate rather than to individual creditors that may in all likelihood be correct the point is that at this point we do not know whether the trustee will be pursuing to final conclusion any such claims or will he not and i didn't come prepared to cited to the court but there's case law saying that if the trustee does not pursue the fraudulent transfer claims then the creditors are entitled to pursue them that is all a matter not shown of this record that is all a matter in our pinion to be resolved by the district court on remain and we are not attempting to crowd in ahead of the trustee and pursue claims on behalf of a limited subset of creditors if in fact the trustee is going to pursue those claims but that's a matter to be determined on remand finally judge politan i would just call your attention to in the kurdish vs james case what the court actually did was rely on cases from other jurisdictions this is of age four seventy six that a pending or threatened lawsuit is a claim i don't think the court reached the question of whether a pending or threatened lawsuit was an essential element of a claim under missouri uniform project transfer act thank you thank you very much and you may be