hasn't been done yet in this case i feel because of that at that time it was unclear what that sentence meant in petition the second issue is that the judge found that my client had entered as a kid a one in adjusted on the same day which was november one of two thousand to jack said come the united states has a fan say on april nineteenth two thousand and two with status until july eighth so i eighteenth two thousand to me and within the ninety days  got married on may seventeenth two thousand two and the case was finally terminated after a denial of what's called the high seven fifty one well the question in this case is whether somebody like your client who entered on the k one visa still eligible for the fraud waiver right that's correct and that's what i'm going to now what's your best argument there well my best k one she married within the ninety days she got adjusted and then within the two years for the conditional to be removed she applied for it though was ultimately denied based upon the fraud that she had committed in the marriage and the pacific so she similarly situated it to the petitioner in the vasquez case except that she came in on the nonimmigrant visa versus that's it  what is wrong with the with the reasoning of the board of immigration appeals well basically states on an issue of eligibility whether she  cases where i argued that admission is the same mission that was changed in the statute and clint's both adjustment status and history and finally the boat in its case we send this back for the board to take another look at that issue and the board says ok she's eligible and then let's assume that the a g exercises question to grant her the fraud waiver what what becomes i've heard that because the case law as i understand it's quite clear that she can only adjust your status based on marriage to the original petitioning thouse was just right so what marriage to the fragile manage but then when they apply for this waiver gets granted because the weather is broader than just the marriage to the citizen includes any your eligible for the fraud waiver well so the child the child not yet twenty one and so that's what i believe but then that puts her in a position to just her status right well know what it does is it allows her to get the fr waiver of the remove ability statute and this court in taggart basically said that section two three so one age doesn't apply to convictions of document fraud so  our documents use each i think it was exactly what i'm saying is that it's that my argument is that she will be in a status what should be a permanent resident but technically she probably good morning your honour's may it please the court jeanette allen for respondent the attorney general your honors ms truong has freely admitted that she committed marriage fraud she entered the us on a very special visa the k one fiance visa and with that the so she agreed to comply with a specific and as this court has noted restrictive set of requirements in order to adjust status to lawful permanent residence in the united states one of those  under the specific and restrictive set of requirements for k visa holders congress has specifically provided that under a u s c section eleven fifty five d no k visa holder should be able to adjust status to lawful permanent residence through any means other than through marriage to the k one petitioning spouse in this case what ms truong asks this court to do is to circumvent that requirement and she as she just stated she wants to become lawful permanent resident through her new spouse because it is that right but i think that's mixing apples and oranges a little bit that goes with the question that i was asking counsel for petition under the reasoning of vasquez she should be similarly situated to an alien who entered as an immigrant spouse that renders her essentially eligible to apply for the fraud waiver once  exercise whether she can adjust status based on marriage to her current spouse or if the only way she can adjust status is through the original petitioning fiance that should be a separate inquiry i think what the board did here was to assess her eligibility for the waiver by looking ahead to what would happen and understanding that the effect of applying the waiver here as she requests well of fi u s c section eleven fifty five it would have no meaning if someone could enter on a k one piece of fraudulent plea intending never to carry forward with the marriage other than through obtaining an immigration benefit then obtain a new spouse and entirely circumvent that requirement and become a lawful permanent resident that for it so we don't have a determination whether she meets any of the requirements and one of them being that she would warrant the waiver as a matter of discretion if if  with respect to their eligibility for just one of status this that square with the argument that you're making just now that the two should be treated entirely differently the the so say case is distinguishable your honor because so say the the marriage was bona fide and the question was whether if a k one visa holder who could adjust status if they were timely married within if they complied with the ninety day marriage requirement and the marriage was bona fide then the question was whether if the marriage doesn't exist by the time the adjudication of the adjustment of status comes along does the k bar preclude them from adjusting status and the board said that divorce in that case did not render the cavies holder eligible to adjust status but the key difference here is we have a cavies a holder who never engaged in a but did not engage in a bona fide marriage it was not bona fide from the outset she has readily conceded that it was entirely for the purpose of obtaining immigration benefits and if you look at the legislative history of the i m s a the immigration marriage fraud amendments of one thousand nine hundred six congresses purpose enacting a u s c section eleven fifty five was specifically to deter immigration fraud and what she asked here essentially is to be rewarded for her fraud she if you commit fraud then you can get this waiver and you can just that that's the question that we're struggling with how is she different immigrant visa the other person came in first and then committed marriage fraud and the question is is there a logical reason to distinguish between those two particular applicants for chessman of status i take it your response to that if i understand it is that well those two should logically be tweeted different because one has a limitation on one visas and the other one doesn't mean that's the sole basis for treating them differently that is that is the key difference  yes that is the response because eight u s c section eleven fifty five d has to be given some meaning congress couldn't have intended when including a provision that specifically required adjustment only to take place through the petitioning spouse they couldn't have intended someone to then be able to adjust if they get a new spouse it would it would ultimately that that is a key distinction in and a logical distinction here because holding as  centrally render that provision meaningless so the case status of miss truong in this case is not something that can be ignored when comparing her case to the b case as this court noted in cologne all the k visa program is a specific restrictive process and in that case the petitioner similarly sought to adjust status in the united states after marriage to a spouse not the one who petition for her and this court was very clear that congress had carefully designed the case strictures to put an end to those who would take advantage of the u s government's solicitude and its and this court held we do not think congress would countenance the flouting of it's an act months or wish for the attorney general or this court to do so what petitioner asks the court to do is to countenance th a statute and should also be given fact basically it does prevent people it does prevent the way it does prevent marriage fraud in the sense that