proceed to the fourth case of the day williams against jaffe eighteen to twenty seven twenty six they please the court good morning my name is per paycheck and i represent the creditor converted williams she's here today asking that this court reversed the district court regarding bankruptcy after she and one of the bankruptcy court themselves say expressly and the point is to look at what the federal bankruptcy exemptions for tennessee by the entirety of property and then because it incorporates state law to look at what the state exemption says and then apply it to the facts it's our contention that the district court when it was first the bankruptcy court had a history of cases that agreed with the bankruptcy court simply made a mistake it it focused on the wrong part of the statute or perhaps more notably didn't focus on the last part of the statute and the statute that we're talking about regarding pertains to tenancy by the entirety property and whether somebody is contingent future interest in that property receives an exemption under the federal bankruptcy exemption which incorporates the protections and limitations of the state bankruptcy exemption for tenancy by the entirety is there a certain stretch to a ca change because of death divorce court even obtaining a new residence in here where fortunately the quality or the ownership changed because of the death of the apple i pad billie's white at that this is if i understand your interpretation of the illinois laws effect here your client from the outset had kind of wildly different possible outcomes of this case or if the debtor spouse had died first nothing correct you or read your the lien would be worthless well maybe i don't nothing correct correct ok and then it would mean that the whoever holds the lien has a great interest in either the divorce of the couple or there or selling the house or every with debt or die for through you know what you could say is a a quirk for a limited type of ownership that the issue that any other got or also has any other creditor is also faced with similar issues when they're trying to collect their exemptions there are rules that can block a creditor from collecting judgment besides just this one mr jeffries counsel has argued that if we agree with you we create an incentive or two to keep certain bankruptcy matters open indefinitely i just read i disagree with that it does not do anything to the point is that during the  case and perhaps even after it's close you could come back and reopen it yet or ask the court to under rule five twenty two l to address an existing lien that's our property and that's what happened here it's what would happen in any case if the lawyers are paying attention and the court was focused at the time on what the issue was and said you're right you do not have there is actually changed his mind as time went on and i think that that's a natural progression that the inclination is to look at this and say wow this is really something that you would not have expected could happen under the bankruptcy code but when you think about the different types of ownership of property anybody else if you have property as tenants in common or joint tenancy to a degree you're not prohibited from enforcing that judgment as soon as you get it it's only tenancy by the entirety it's a very valuable asset and one which ultimately could have proven under different circumstances to entirely avoided any collection activity at all if mr jaffe had died first but i think that if you focus on what the statute says it says exactly what the bankruptcy court said and what we're saying it says you have to focus on the fact that it says that it exempts and to the extent that the interest is exempt under state law and the completely distinct world for anybody that was a debtor that own property as tennessee by the entirety visa be the people that are credit or debt or is there owning property any other way and i think illinois legislative to please the court my name is steven rosenthal and i'm here on behalf of the happily ascot jaffe this matter turns on the clear language of federal law not not the state law it's the both the simple interest the presidential and also the contingent future interest that goes on in property in which the debtor had immediately before the commencement of the case an interest is attended by the entirety so here that would be the hierarchy property and then be a language your honor just mentioned to the extent that such interest as a tenant by the entirety is exempt from process under a political non bankruptcy law and fear the interest in property as attended by the entirety is exempt under seven thirty five i'll c s five slash twelve dash one twelve because this particular debt is against mr jaffe individual and not the husband and wife which means that illinois law exempt from process the tendency by the entirety interest against bankruptcy courts going one way or another the council have different protections or nearly construed as i understand the federal statute dispute it's whether the phrase interests modifies that  it doesn't modify the other interest and if you talk about statutory  and interesting point because among other judge posner this court just fell in on a number of professors who studied the way statutes actually get drafted show us that surpluses are actually very common people put belts and suspenders and statutes because they don't want the courts to mess them up and one of the ways we miss a lot is by pretending that there might be something that there couldn't possibly  where your honor i think that if you look at this statute in particular it's pretty clear that if if you take out the the word any thing from the statute which is basically what  the appalachian wants to do it does change the meeting and there has to be a reason for that word any interest in specially congress the words that's both better person of interest that's that's exactly right  entire property and there's a reason for that there's a there's a reason for that from a policy perspective and that's to give a debtor a press start and is as we mentioned in our brief different which is why i'm focusing primarily on the application here of the of the state statute to the federal law and that clear what i what i believe read that meaning are the correct way to read that is to say that if your interest is exempt under state law it's exempt under federal law and i think that there's actually a policy reason behind it to get to the larger exempted only county by the entirety of property and not something that would become later that's very normal in illinois law both from this court's perspective and illinois courts that property doesn't change character and i think that if the goal had bent to exempt