be found in the mental health code specifically under section one dash one zero nine what is it mission the answer that question can also be found him in the mental health code admission is found in several sections of the code each serving a specific purpose reflected in the sections is the source of authority to confine an individual for instance under article three informal admission the source of authority to confine an individual comes from their consent likewise with voluntary mission the source of authority to confine the individual comes from their consent with article six emergency admission the source of authority to confine the individual and detain them comes from the exercise of the state's powers to confine the individual parents patrick i and police powers would you have the same problem counsel the person was momentarily relieved momentar court we know of one thing and that is a facility does not want to release them so the options that the court has is teeth or discharge the individual or have them committed in the here event that they are to be committed of course there should be a dis equation prepared by the state if they are to be discharged then the individual leaves and no i don't have a problem with the individual being discharged by the court will what  one outlines what should be contained in the petition and it's it's the guide for other sections of the code to fill out petitions section eight thirteen section article four  that petition must be filed within twenty four hours of admission and there's no exception in such and three to six eleven for an article six petition to be filed within twenty four hours the appellate court here is created a new rule and that is that there is a court order for discharge restarts the admission clock for article or section three six eleven and that's not found in three to six eleven notably mr b was not discharged by the court or by the facility he was discharged by the court but he was not permitted to leave so his admission went back to the admitted original admission date and therefore that petition and with a petition and ask for examination under that section of the code in addition to creating a new type of admission the court has also created a new type of commitment and that is kind of a de facto commitment where the individual is brought to court there may be errors in the petition and it may be procedural errors that are the procedures are designed to protect the individual the court of the state can only dismiss that petition and refile and this can happen repeatedly i don't as it did in this case that creates kind of a de facto commitment because the individuals can find without a court hearing and without a court order for commitment in this case mr b was held on four consecutive petitions for seventy nine days and water for commitment can be for up to ninety days so he had almost reached a full order of commitment without a court order for commitment and without a court hearing now detention under article six contemplates physical entry into the facility under six  at the petition must be accompanied by a certificate that was completed not more than seventy two hours prior to admission under six o five the section discuss how to bring a person into custody and transport them to a facility under six of six then the co provides a peace officer can take a person into custody to a facility and then complete the petition under six of seven the court can order court that does not agree with that is the second district in this case in that they believe filing under article six is permissible we disagree with that and we would ask the court to  please the court counsel i am assistant attorney general richard haas ak counsel for the people of the state of illinois in this case and i urge the court to affirm the well reasoned decision of the appellate court in this case that decision held that we are a petition for involuntary commitment under article six of the mental health and developmental disabilities code complies with all of the provisions of that article a judgment based upon a trial and evidence supporting the petition is not invalidated by the sole reason that the proceeding was commenced after the involuntary  voluntary dismissal of an earlier proceeding resulting in a discharge order but before the discharge order was fully implemented by the physical release of the respond the  the court carefully looked at the relevant code provisions this is an issue of statutory construction and we recommended the reasoning of the court in this case and we disagree that that reasoning is an outlier or inconsistent with the decisions of the courts of other districts although the issue before this court is not you know toting up how many decisions there were on each side of these issues our position is that there is a conflict the fifth district has in fact disagreed with the second district in this case but we believe that the second district's decision is in fact in line with prior decisions of that same court on similar but not identical issues as well as decisions of the fourth district this was it is there any remedy  would we argue would be valid in this case with the commencement of a new involuntary commitment petition and the facility unlawfully continues to detain a person despite their duty to discharge we don't dispute the definition of discharge o the code then either a hades proceeding could be brought there is the possibility of a civil proceeding for false imprisonment the courts are not without tools to remedy and even punish arguments raised by the by the respondent in this case has to do with whether an article six petition which is otherwise in compliance with all the requirements of that article does not operate as a superseding event that then authorizes detention after the prior authority for confinement and detention has expired pursuant to an earlier proceeding their position is that although i don't find any language to that effect in article six and i also don't read the definition of discharge is carrying with it that additional gloss or or requirement of immunity against the commencement of a new proceeding but the state's position is that the commencement of a new article six proceeding can be valid at least three the order is charity or no i don't think it does i think it implements the how many times are in this be repeated the code itself does not impose any limits our position however is that the that the respondents position in this case is really overkill what they're trying to say is that the that the evil that needs to be addressed is that our interpretation of code opens the door to abuse and i would i would i would candidly say the court needs to address that possibility certainly there's a presumption of good faith by public officials but that doesn't mean that nobody ever does anything improper or wrong and so what we would say is to the court that it is important to protect against abuse but not  some one size fits all rule that that says for any discharge or regardless of the circumstances behind it you can never have a new proceeding commenced on to article six in less the person has been fully physically released from the facility and so we think that position is overbroad and under inclusive at the some time just that there were other alternatives that might happen well it the alternative she provides in unique because it authorizes a one day ex parte involuntary confinement of somebody before anything is filed in court and without any court scrutiny it's an unusual proceeding and it's limited to emerge circumstances and as an assessor the for that provision of the legislature anticipated in this case i think illustrates that type of emergency situation this person was not just a paranoid schizophrenic but had a physical malady where he would drink excessive quantities of water to the point that his blood wasn't even able to hold oxygen and he would pass out and die unless he was under supervision and treatment and came close to doing that they point to section three six zero seven of the code but that's specifically says that the can order temporary detention and examination as a result of personal observation in testimony in open court well that's a very narrow and limited window of opportunity to commence a detention and confinement when that may be therapeutically and medically necessary because you're not always going to have testimony in open court to justify that type of order we submit that article six itself contains all the provisions necessary to comply with release of the person from the facility and then be in a position to restrain the same person again who may be a danger to himself and others it may be a bit of an oversimplification i'm not exactly sure what  y embrace here there replied if says that a momentary release is not enough it has to be a full physical release but i'm not sure how far that goes is it you know twenty seconds forty five seconds is a hundred yards you know if in fact their position is that doing that is sufficient to satisfy their interpretation of the claim to discharge definition under the code and that a new proceeding there after may be commenced it i reinforces my point that there remedy for potentially vexatious or abusive refiling as of cases especially bad faith doesn't really solve the problem because if if that's the rule then nothing would prevent a theoretical bad  faith prosecutor in facility from just letting a person leave you know for one hundred yards or whatever definition they want the court to adopt and then bring him back again i believe that that would need to be therapeutically beneficial nor consistent with the spirit and purpose of the code but i want to emphasize that we have said that the court has to retain the power and courts have that power to prevent officers of the court and people before the  abusive refiling of these proceedings if it appears that doing so is designed to circumvent the careful protections for the liberty interests of respondents and we don't want to diminish the importance of those but that's  a goal is joined with the other goal of the code which is to protect the safety of the public and to protect the safety of these individuals when the elements of the statute have been met and so we would urge that this power that the courts retain which is similar to the ability to refuse the repetitive exercise of a knowledge process in criminal cases is one that should be sensitive to the circumstances of the individual cases in which the the court was presented with a type of problem there's a full spectrum of circumstances in which dismissal orders could be entered it could be afterward judgment after a trial on the merits and there's no change in the relevant circumstances regarding the respondents mental condition a propensity to be dangerous to himself or others or you could have a single one time misstep for a procedural mistake and i guess that the position of the respondent in his case is that a single facility and then at that moment being able to commence a new proceeding that doesn't seem to fulfill the purpose that they're trying to accomplish here which is preventing that the type of vexatious or bad faith misuse of these powers under article s x and it's really over kill because at the same time it it prevents those situations in which the evidence will show as in this case it did that there is a basis for involuntary detention i think the evidence was compelling here it would prevent the commencement of that proceeding for some artificial time period when detention is justified the respondent also did make a second argument with respect to the definition of admission under the code and they invoke section three six eleven of the code here the argument is not that the petition was commenced too early but that it was filed too late and there is that provision that says that you have to file a petition within twenty four hours after a person is it mid after their admission under this article meeting under article s and they read the word admission in the phrase admission under this article to mean physical intreat into the facility from first being outside and it is our position that that is not the proper and correct interpretation of that language as a matter of stature interpretation the word it mission is used in multiple places in the code in it does not always mean physical entry in fact the expression subject to involuntary which is at the quare of the codes authority for detaining somebody refers to the status of being subject to authorized detention it doesn't mean transfer physically from outside the facility to being inside the facility and in fact article six contemplate situations in which somebody would already be in the facility and they would go from a voluntary admission to an involuntary admission this was a somewhat similar circumstance the person w as in on an informal admission which is slightly different from a voluntary admission and then sought requested to leave in a petition was delivered to the facility director urging that the  person was subject to involuntary admission and needed to be detained on an emergency basis and in that context it is clear the did mission does not mean going from outside the facility to the insensitive solti it means essentially being subject to authorized detention and due to compliance with all of the criteria and elements of article six there was i think a great concern in some of the cases that the circuit courts have on occasion cut corners and they have disregarded some of the mandatory requirements of the code and there has been a culture of less than careful compliance with the codes provisions which are quite extensive shorter than the tax code perhaps and we do not urge the court to disregard in any respect the need for full compliance with those provisions many of which have specific deadlines and state that if a deadline is met then the respondent shall be released forthwith but that is not this case this is a case in which there is an unusual situation where the code language i think is susceptible to different possible interpretations or plausible interpretations but then the question before the court is what did the legislature mean did they intended that if there's for any reason  or voluntary or involuntary with a attendant discharge provision that that provision must be implemented before the powers under the code can be further implemented by the commencement of a new petition and we would urge the courts to accept it and adopt the interpretation that the legislature did not intend that provision and that and i would use a sort of a rough analogy i don't want this to be followed to strictly but if for example somebody were to bring a claim that there are the good time credits and inmates good time credits had been miscalculated and that they were entitled to be released because of that miscalculation and they were to obtain a court order for example in the h proceeding that they shall be released that doesn't give them immunity from detention if before they leave the gates of the facility they commit another crime that authorizes that detention the order itself is valid but it is superceded by circumstances that the law anticipates may justify detention and we assert that in this case article six provides a similar type of circumstance where if there is compliance with all of its provisions authorizes a detention that would essentially supersede the duty to implement the discharge order not that that water was invalid or that public officials can flout it but if there is compliance with the alternative regimen specified in article six that that satisfies the code but that the courts retain a power not this one size fits all but you have to step out of the facility before you can be brought back in but the courts retain the power to prevent an abusive and vexatious refiling of these proceedings essentially in bad faith and if if the court lacks any sense of how those powers might be exercised i could venture suggestions but i think the court is well aware of how to deal with people that misuse the authority that they have under the law so for those reasons and those set forth in our brief we are to the court to affirm the appellate course decision in this case and unless you have any further questions i relinquish the rest of my time just to clarify a point there was the mention of what to do in the event of a momentary release do you follow the person now and bring him back when i'm talking when i speak of the state's alternatives i'm not i'm speaking of alternatives to be exercised before the release of the individual and going under section three to six zero seven is not a hardship the parties are there for court the testimony can take place the court or can enter an order before the release of an individual likewise with an article seven petition the parties are there the state is there the petition can be presented to the court the court can order detainment and there is no threat to himself or others that would be part of under article seven yes they would present to the court that information in this case we accept here to be patient the actual issues of the patient's condition shouldn't cause the court to disregard the procedural protections that's why they're there and it's to fit in the balance between the state's interest and respond its interests and liberty and the procedural protections especially with an article seven and the patient is in the facility and the the facility staff are parties to the petition it is no hardship to bring forth that specific information and inform the court why it's urgent that the individual not be discharged what has the acceptable dis would make arrangements for transportation medication follow up and follow ups with the community mental health center to ease that transition yes they do walk out the door and catch the bus quite often that does happen what i'm talking about is prior to that discharge if that is if the state is determined not to let that individual go they should be ever more vigilant to put play in place the procedures to prevent that i would ask the court to reverse the appellate court's decision thank you