act reflects that when the legislature wanted to address a particular bridge issue it did so explicitly section six of the act regulates the relationship between the u s and manufacturers as it relates to warranty reimbursement the question presented today is whether section six overrides nissan's contractual right to raise the prices of the vehicles itself to own always the dealers in order to recoup the increased cost it incurs an illinois in this case turns on what the language of that act says or more importantly what it doesn't say and in answering the question i submit to the court that it should consider three core rules of statutory construction first that the plain language of statue control and the action be interpreted as written second that where the statute is silent on a particular issue that silence is presumed to be intentional and finally in considering this issue the court can look to the decisions from other states construing similar statutes in order to answer the question that's presented if these rules are applied there's no basis to conclude that section six precludes cost for covering illinois and that's no accident section six has gotten a lot of attention from the legislature over the ten year period from two thousand to two thousand and ten the act was that section in particular was amended five different times and it occurred those amendments occurred against the backdrop of cases in illinois and elsewhere that reinforce the notion that where legislatures  up it did raise the wholesale price and did it by putting a separate line item on the invoice because well we deal with the dealers part here on it doesn't it doesn't fit into the price of the well it's on to read the entire statute together but i think means a good example where they specifically wanted to prohibit cost recovery after the initial decisions upheld that practice the main legislature included a single sentence to accomplish  statute in the first circuit up hell that's statutory prohibition on cost recovery if illinois had wanted to do the same thing it could easily have done so but even reading section sixty and sixty together i don't think that's a fair interpretation of the statute section six g addresses a particular option that was made available as a result of a compromise between man some manufacturers and the deal that they were proponents of that compromise ford in particular because i think it wanted to avoid the litigation it experienced elsewhere but but interestingly if you look at the if you look at the general motors agreement that the dealers have included in the record that agreement makes clear that in general motors view that if there was no section sixty agreement that there could be cost recovery which is exactly the position that we're advocating here section six g simply provides an option successful in entering into such an agreement then you may only cost recover from the non for to subpoena dealers which is an exception to the case law that says you can't just target those dealers that are insisting on their prevailing retail rate and what sixty six is it tries to provide some economic incentives to both sides to consider such an agreement for instance the manufacturers will have to pay a wall or reimbursement rate but they'll have to forgo cost recovery against the majority of the dealers but they also enjoy lower vehicle prices in illinois which they like because higher vehicle prices obviously can curtail the man on the other side the dealers have to accept a lower be embarrassment rate but they can of would cost recovery by entering into a six g agreement if you accept the dealer's interpretation of the statute they have no incentive to ever consider a sixty agreement because they could insist on their higher prevailing rate but also avoid cost recovery so that they have no reason to consider a six then rice lis in the wholesale price rather than as a separate item oh i see well you know the critics have considered that issue and originally in the acadia case the dealers were and the court and the war court was unhappy that the manufacturer that case didn't list it separately and they wanted it listed separately on the minority sticker and the first circuit said no we're there's no requirement in the statute to do that we're not going to read that limitation in here we've got the opposite the dealers are now complaining that it's not a separate line item but but again the statutory interpretation rules are the same if there's no limitation on the statute to precludes cost recovery there's no limitation about how you go  you go about accomplishing that the dealers the dealer still get the benefit of the legislative purpose of the statutes for the position that we advocate the concern here was that dealers were required under their dealer gramma's to perform warranty repairs they had no choice to turn those customers away and they had to perform those repairs at set reimbursement rates so the legislature addressed that issue and what it said was we're going to require you to pay prevailing retail rates and there's no dispute that that's being done by any sign you know want to illinois now as part of a separate and distinct transaction that may occur months later nissan has sought to recoup those costs through the wholesale price of the vehicles and i know it's not unusual for a manufacturer to try to try to recoup cost of feeling like pass some environmental regulation that required nissan and other manufacturers to modify their vehicles in order to comply with certain of my mental standards they'd be entitled to increase the price of the vehicles in illinois to recover those costs is the wholesale price uniform throughout the country for a vehicle particular vehicle in other words the wholesale price in wisconsin the same as in the one on it typically is your honor and last except in those states where manufacturers have imposed these kind of states specific price increases to recoup costs unless the state like maine happens to happens to prohibit that i think that i want reimbursement for parts as well at retail on the seventh circuit said that's not what the statute says and if the legislature had intended the statute to cover parts it could have very easily said so as five other states had done at the time and the court refused to extend the statute based on its purpose or intact and the legislature listened in responding and in one thousand two thousand amended section six b to include parts and that's the same statutory analysis that we're advocating here if the illinois legislature had wanted to go to bob recoupment it could have clicked easily said so and it's not it's not an oversight it's a ed the statute against the landscape of decisions and it required that type of explicit language and when there isn't any the the courts should resist the the effort to read one into th of a landscape against which the parties of operating and it it's unfair we suggest it would be unfair given that backdrop to hold the nissan libel in this case where there really wasn't clear notice or a clear mandate from the legislature that cost recovery which prohibited if that's something that needs to be addressed going forward the legislature can fill filling that void section sixty to address your concern your honor is clear in a couple of respects about cost it doesn't prohibit cost recovery in the absence of a grant and agreement first section sixty four says in the absence of a uniform agreement it shall have no effect whatsoever so because there's no agreement in this case together and six g only with the with the former only certain circumstances and that's where you've already answered in except sixteen but if you even putting aside the no effect whatsoever language if you look at the provision that says what they're arguing is you can only cost recovery if you have a uniform agreement but that's not what the language says and the language the language says is if you have a uniform agreement you're allowed to cost for cover in this manner which is is just targeting the nonparticipating dealers which is an exception to the rule that was laid out in and liberty of first liberty linking case so it doesn't say what they advocate which is you can only cost recover if you reach a uniform more to reimburse me agreement and we're reading six b and six g together as i think we should but but given that if six g has clear notice of what rip is required is illustrated by the fact that you have so many different approaches in the decisions borro and in the arguments being made by the other side and that's why clear language is really required the the motor vehicle review board reached the conclusion the cost recovery was prohibited because it violated the spirit and principle of the law and that's that's essentially a concession that the plain language doesn't doesn't doesn't say what what  cost recovery is prohibited the circuit court took a different approach to reaching essentially the same conclusion they the circuit court concluded that six g b represented a legislative clarification and reflected that the legislature in fact intended in acting six b to put cost recovery but it does that doesn't satisfy number one the requirements of a legislative clear from a clear fine amendment but number two if that was really the intent of the legislature why didn't they just include in six b a prohibition on cost recovery i'm less you comply with the requirements of sixty that's how the statute work together that's exactly what georgia has done georgia has the equivalent of sixty and sixty except the legislature there has included in six the equivalent six feet and express cross for the cover band it is a concern that there's a void in the statute just as the court did in the crowing case the seventh circuit case the message can be sent to the legislature to address the current concern through clear language if there's no further question about  will please the court counsel when sixty was in acted and when i was on these for the house the language comment that was made at the time it was introduced is exactly reflective of the only way that this act is recently read as a whole and constructed you have two options in manufacture and every manufacturer in this state has followed this law except nissan one you either go to your dealers and you make a deal with fifty percent or more of them and those who don't sign get a surcharge if they if they want to charge the full retail rate or otherwise you pay the retail rate those are the two options under the statute that's the well they have agreed to and the reason they've agreed to it is a function of how the auto industry works dealers have a day off with their manufacturers they always have aids team approach typically to be a partner with their manufacturers their allocation issues new franchise opportunities all sorts of things a lot a laundry list of why there is negotiation and a partnership with the factory itself and  compromise was specifically put in the place to plug the loophole that maine and new jersey talked about in their cases maine and new jersey statutes don't have a sixty doesn't exist in their statute so you're really talking about comparing fruits and vegetables as far as i'm concerned the early either statute that approached this which council talked about was georgia which had additional language in it which i only see as belt and suspenders no no no the drugs are said she hasn't been tested in any way but the statutes that they rely on which they suggest our legislature acquiesced when they passed six g not an argument that has any logic to it based on what happened you've got the main case and the new jersey case and what followed was a negotiation between the factory ford and general motors leading that pack and the illinois dealers association and what they did was they put in a specific provision dealing specifically with costs that they would like to lower in connection with reimbursing their dealers on par says if you want to recover your cost some of your costs not a factor this is what you have to do and this is in fact what the manufacturers have done except for nissan that has been the process since two thousand one when this section of the act was brought into play now the other side of the coin is nissan suggests you to this court that they still have the  to reduce costs with their dealers or have some wobble if they could simply turn around and surcharge their dealers reduce the cost anywhere they would want to it doesn't have any logic to it whatsoever what the legislature said and what the board the circuit court agreed was you look at this statute sixty can't be meaningless it's there for a reason and that was the compromise piece of legislation that created this mechanism by which the dealers and manufacturers and in fact proceeded down yes i have really nothing more than that i think steps towards statutory construction is the main issue there were some constitutional issues raised that were rejected by the circuit court i don't see any less yes some questions on those i'm that the board read a cost recovery bar into the act but that's an accurate to me of this case can be summed up as follows nissan had a statutory mechanism of cost recovery available to it it did not use it unilaterally implemented a cost recovery scheme not allowed by the act and the board quickly concluded that nissan violated the act the board could not disregard or read out section section sixty of the act and its construction of section six comports with that plain language as it is written if nissan is unhappy with the requirements of section six and its arguments of fairness and equity and the effect that section six ha charge as a method of cost recovery this isn't section sixty is not an alternative way to see cost recovery as nissan suggests section sixty conditions cost recovery by providing for wind and only one mechanism of cost recovery no statutory language like the sister states statutes nissan cite that a manufacturer may not or shall not quote otherwise recover its costs as not required it would be  the one mechanism automatically excludes all others nissan's construction of the language in sixty four is unsupported by the statutory language as a whole and would render a six g and six b meaningless sixty four again provides that if a manufacturer and a majority of its dealers do not enter into an agreement pursuant to section sixty one then quote is only an alternative way for manufacturers to recoup costs the language must mean that absent such a sixty one agreement that the duties imposed on a manufacturer listed in sixty three and sixty three point one when there is an agreement do not apply crack to the statute must be evaluated as a whole the consequences of nissan's construction is that there would be no incentive for a manufacturer to ever insure into a sixty one agreement there would be no need but that cannot be as the board pointed out in its order section sixty was made a part of section six for a reason it would also wonder construction of this provision would also render meaningless six b because then it would not really be reimbursing the dealers that there are stablish retell rates as the board explained in its order here hardy's of address the a caveat in liberty lincoln line of cases what's just to emphasize of course those statutes did not have  decisions there is no cost recovery bar but it does condition cost recovery on the mechanism specifically provided for in six g i will rest on my briefs that the court has no questions on the retroactivity an it's very briefly your honour's first of all the only evidence in the record with respect to sixty agreements is that three men three other manufacturers have entered into situ greenness and obviously there are there's over a dozen or maybe twenty different manufacturers operating in illinois and i think those agreements that do is put in the record are interesting because they show that for instance b m w is paying forty one percent versus its national rate of forty percent and general motors is paying forty five percent versus national rate of forty percent and the reason those rates are fairly close to the national reimbursement rates is because those manufacturers and the dealers and entered into those agreements were operating under the impression that in the absence of  agreement there could be costly cover and that's basically reflected in the general motors agreement and so you see very well i think if you read the statute as per cooling cost recovery in the absence of an agreement there will be no incentive for the parties to be reasonable want to stick entering into a six g agreement because the dealers could insist on their much higher retail rate without ever having to fear that there would be cost recovery the manufacturers wan avoid cost recovery because it raises the price of their vehicles and will curtail demand visa be the competition that that's why it was a compromise and at the time that they weren't in general motors ford's this compromise with the dealer association the lay of the land was in the absence of any language you could cause for cover so so to accept the the dealers in the states interpretation they were giving up a  significant right and getting the ability to cost recover only the incremental cost from of the minority of dealers which is pretty significant under sixteen and i'll just leave you with a thought from the legislature they should have and could have addressed that explicitly thank you thank you these cases will argue will brief the taking advisement and the decision will be issued in due course