judgment alone when the shipper documents clearly demonstrated that mr bostons disputed convictions were for florida a principle to robbery and if and that is not a violent felony within the arm career criminal acts element seems to me that are in reiko one decision really forecloses the argument there we held that conviction a conviction for aiding and abetting a hobbs act robbery qualifies as a crime of violence under the elements clause we did that because accomplice liability makes the day they are in a better liable for all the acts of the of the principle of a princip and it seems to me that the same exact principle exist in florida law so without proof we wouldn't even have to get to sheppard documents it seemed to me that if you have a complex liability under florida law you're responsible every bit as as if as if you were the principal am i missing something requires an act so attaining one or another element and a state of mind extending to the entire crime and this quarter in the united states verses  stated of the aider and abettor that it is necessary that the government show that the accused shared in the principles criminal intent as to all of the necessary statutory elements of the offense it was within that framework that we have that in re cologne decision that your honor just discussed in cologne rested on that reasoning however cologne cannot be extended to mr bostons florida principal offenses because that reasoning does not exist in florida case law or statue where federal law expressly imputes all of the elements of an offense to a florida has a broader theory of liability for principles florida law is demonstrated through the case law in effect at the time of mr boston's conviction and the jury instructions explain the  weather re actually commits the crime or merely aids abets for her tears it's commission so it's immaterial which kind of little viability the indictment or information alleges right yes your honor however it's stated in florida that somebody was a principal offender the state had to prove that the offender knew what was going to have been intended to participate in the crime actively or by sharing an expected benefit and was going to assist the perpetrator and the case law interprets that to be doing or saying something that caused encouraged assisted or incited the perpetrator to actually commit the crime so florida is overbroad as to the act required and the intent requirement compared to the federal statute which requires the principal to commit an one or another element of the subs into the fence and have a state of mind extending to the entire crime in florida there is no overt act required by the principal offender the only thing that the principal offender has to do is intend to participate in the crime actively or expect to share and  and there is no state of mind required of the florida offender principal offender that needs to extend to the entire crime are held responsible for the reasonable consequences of their conduct that are forseeable unless there is an independent act that breaks the chain so at the time of mr boston's principal conviction then the least culpable act in florida was merely encouraging in offense while merely expecting to participate and the benefit from that  your honor my contention is that even the landscape of florida law at the time it is clear that a principal in florida was not held responsible for the element of it wasn't until one thousand and ninety five that florida changed the principle jury instruction to even require a conscious intent that the offense be committed in florida and the principle instruction and therefore at and ninety five when florida put a conscious intent that the offense be committed into their jury instruction a principle to robbery offender and could not have been considered under anything alternatively the district court expressly declined to address the beeman issue in these proceedings since the district court did not answer the question i would ask that the case of florida robbery  i don't know him or stand in the court's question ok i'm a joiner understand where you're coming from the district court found that two of the prior convictions even though they said principle to robbery or actually for armed robbery was that finding clearly erroneous yes your honor i knew it was clearly erroneous for a couple of reasons one is that there are for both of the disputed convictions at least five sep documents in the appendix that expressly state the conviction was principle to robbery the government's argument is that because the judgment records only one of the two statute numbers that could be recorded for principal to robbery that the conviction must be for substantive robbery however the recording of that statute number is superflui s it's not required to be recorded under florida law and the record of the facts of those underlying crimes would they have qualified as arm robbery as opposed to principal arm robbery you and i over my time  you can answer your p your question my question was the under law of the facts of those underlying crimes would he have qualified for conviction as of armed robbery as opposed to principle to arm robbery under florida law only about those two the only shepherd document that we have that has any facts and is the charging document which shows that in the st offense there were three offenders and one was alleged to have been armed which was not mr boston the nd shows that there were two offenders and one was alleged to have been armed which was not mr boston but does he have to have been armed to be charged with armed robbery or to be convicted of armed robbery no  we know is that somebody had who had then armed and present at the scene to be the principal to be that actual perpetrator and so we know that that person was not mr bost and to treat this case as addressing the issue of whether or not aiding and abetting a robbery today ought to qualify as the under the elements clause ignores the restrictions in section twenty to thirty five age t can and that's it is that do you agree with that i absolutely do your honor and i also absolutely agree that in red cologne fills the decision if you want to talk about it's the same principle of of law is and then yes it is in florida law it is and there it doesn't matter whether you're charged as a principle or not in florida law if the proof can go either way is what the florida supreme court says it's a right right that's exactly right if you're charged with a robbery and if we want to decide this case in a way that makes this easier for district courts to administer them isn't that the far easier way to decide it is it is easier your honor any of this in my view as opposed to just saying well you didn't establish it under your burden of proof under beeman and then we have to wait for the next case in the next case and i guess i do agree that the court should reach the substantive questions i absolutely do and i think that those questions in this case are a no brainer right i do but i also think that if this were a harder question on the elements clause the procedural context would matter that the tree and and that ignoring that procedural context treats this is a it is if it's a direct appeal and it's not there is no case that says that aiding and abetting a robbery is somehow not a robbery in florida if you're charged with a robbery and the evidence supports an aiding and abetting instruction the instruction is given and if the of even if you weren't charged with as facts a perfect that's correct and that was the law back in one thousand nine hundred and eighty four when the armed career criminal act was enacted that was the law in two thousand and seven with this if and it was sentenced and that is the law today a defendant who is charged with an armed robbery and who the armed robbery is guilty of armed robbery now there is some confusion from the defendant's brief about the effect of someone holding the firearm versus being not the person carrying the firearm the distinctions in florida law that depend on whether or not someone held the firearm they all derive from another statute the reclassification statute which is seven hundred and seventy five thousand and eighty seven has nothing to do with florida's theory of liability under the principle statute and that's what a principle is it's only a theory of liability it is not a distinct often it's they're not separate crimes so yes this court could dispose of this entire case by holding that aiding and abetting an armed robbery an armed robbery categorically categorically to answer the question of whether or not the district court erred in concluding that two of the six convictions that she examined were convictions for robbery and not aiding and abetting a robbery and that's the distinction that the court made robbery versus aiding and abetting a robbery the court looked at these six convictions and they all came from the same circuit judge on the same day september th eighty nine court looked at the judgments and the informations and if you look at the chart in our brief at page nineteen we'd explain the differences between those documents in the cases that she found were actually armed robberies the judgments did not charge aiding and abetting they said that the defendants together committed the robberies and during them a codefendant held the firearm they charged armed robbery under a twelve dollars they did not use the principle statute citation on either the judgments or the informations on the other for the informations charged boston with aiding and abetting and then on the judgments and in the informations the the statute cited pled to a lesser included i'm not sure that those are sheppard documents because they're not findings of the court regarding the character of the office to which he pled but even if they were that notation by the  is not probative at all because aiding and abetting is not a lesser included of anything it's just a theory of liability now you know these other documents we include them in our twenty five dollars response to any other documents  relevant to prove all kinds of things including the fact that it is boston who was convicted of the office as described in the judgment but those notations don't mean anything with respect to the character of the crime of which he was convicted so the nd question in the c e o way whether the district court clearly which we don't have to answer if we don't have to the st right or right just look at my notes real quick and make sure that there isn't anything that the court so defense counsel argue that florida hold abettors responsible for the reasonable consequences of a crime so as well so does the federal government but we do on rosemont addresses that lots of cases do florida does require an act it is a generic aiding and florida rewrote a whole bunch of statutes and remembered them and they added a phrase that said the act was committed or the crime was committed or attempted to be committed the pot's case discusses that because pot speaks the distinction that the actual perpetrator of the codefendant need not have been convicted of the same often says the aider and abettor but there's never been any implication that a defendant aiding and abetting only had intend the crime he has to intend and also commit an act that furthers the crime and i suppose in some contexts the further incident that the act that he commits might be encouragement or words certainly that was the case in the c robbery you are responsible because you should have been able to foresee that florida as foreseeability analysis is not akin at all to what that mr boston played to the lesser included offense indicates that florida treats principles differently and that the court and everybody there saw it that way the government argues now in our units brief that florida misapplied florida law the florida courts control the interpretation of florida state law florida looks at princip offenses differently than substantive offenses in florida you are not deemed as a matter of law to have committed the elements of your co perpetrators there is no case law in florida that states that principals are deemed to have committed the elements of the print the perpetrator and principals are not treated as having committed all of the acts like in federal right in instant for instance the florida supreme court in the flo legislature do not impute actual possession of a firearm to a principal federal court does yet the florida legislature does precisely that or aids abets council's hires or otherwise procure such offense to be committed and such offense is committed or is attempted to be committed is a principle and the st degree and may be charged convicted and punished as by his accomplices in furtherance of the scheme of a criminal scheme it's it describes a principle liability exactly the same way as federal law what am i missing you're on or in florida that is not required and sewed to hold that in aider and abettor responsible for the element of force to apply the ac enhancement window vialli do you process when the aider and abettor may have merely to encourage somebody as in these case the site they cited by the government and have hoped to have shared in a benefit and it nothing more where as a federal aid or an are better had to facilitate the fenced and have