the court jody right there on behalf of petitioner emily vega i would like to first focus on the issue of custody by quoting the minutes from the sentencing proceeding at page a one hundred three in the appendix the sentence that was orally imposed on ms vega was as follows the court a sentencing you to a conditional discharge the condition of that discharge is that imposition of two year order of of protection that is the sentence that was imposed and that is the sentence that ms vega believes that she was required to comply with to stay away from the complainant for two years and she complied with that order that sentence imposed is severe restraint on ms vegas liberty because it was and because it's a man's to a requirement that you stay away from not harass a specific person and that's all it amounts to less i misunderstand well the words of the order on appendix page a one i want one hundred nine are to stay away from harass is a separate consideration so she was required to stay away from the complainant even and inadvertent sighting or interaction with the complainant could violate this order and that was a situation that was likely to occur in this case where the complainant visited this apartment building every day she didn't live there but her she dropped her children off there every single day and this was the apartment building where ms vega is a close family member lived her children's grandmother lives there it was her mother in law it was also the saying that the reward of protection places persons into custody am not saying that what i'm saying that you want to draw it along i would say that under the facts of this case where she should stay away from her husband's former lover where she should stay away from this individual and this individual goes to the building every day where two of the incidents underlying this case happened and where ms vega is close family member also lived one floor separated they had seen each other in the hallway in the past it was likely that she would risk violating this order this is unlike other situations where for example in the case of trees men where to stay away water from the defendant's daughter but he could be anywhere else other then near his daughter in this case she must stay away from this particular person whom she knows she is likely to run into in this apartment building so she is effectively banished from bringing her children to visit their grandmother she is effectively banished from going to visit her mother in law at this bill that amounts to orders of protection where the person you're supposed to stay away from happens to live in a place that you have in a neighborhood or a building you have other reasons to frequent well it's a case by case analysis and i submit that and in this likely that she will see the complainant in the hallway and violate his eyes and that's not this is the location where she ran into the complainant at least two times which are  some verity of the restrain this court recently decided no it koski and in that case the majority decision found there was a severe restraint where he was required to go to community service for one day and then to attend court for one day i would submit that in the dissent your honor pointed out that he even had a say in choosing which he wanted to go to to those to do his community service i would submit that two years being prevented from visiting from bringing her children to their mother in law's home from going to her mother in law's home is much more severe than the restriction that the court found  well she would not go or she would risk violating the order of protection she might choose to but it is and it is a strong risk that if she went there she could run into the complainant and would then violate the order of protection and be subject to criminal  arguments are your views again under this court's recent decision and no koski the presumption of collateral consequences applies here because a misdemeanor is a criminal conviction and this court s majority ruling in no cascade also said that future sentence and handsome and are typical collateral consequences that this court may look at and in this case we submitted a future sentence and handsome and in the  situations where a conviction for something like criminal possession of a weapon in the fourth degree goes automatically from a misdemeanor charge to a felony charge for the mere sentence and handsome and it is what it is she will be subject to that enhancement under the terms of the new york statute ma'am please the court katherine reno on behalf of respondent eric t schneiderman this petition should be dismissed because this court does not have jurisdiction to review it this case begins and ends on the determination in custody  petitioner on the day that she filed her petition and her sentence of a one year conditional discharge had expired three hundred sixty days earlier it was a one year sentence on page issued its written decision finding the get defendant guilty of the charges and then on the following page in light of the court's finding of your guilt this court is sentencing you to a conditional discharge so the court doesn't specify one year t a two year order of protection but the the sentence of a conditional discharge was only for one year new york statutory law makes clear that for a misdemeanor or a violation conviction the only length can be can be one year of a conditional discharge and new york new york courts have consistently held that if there is a condition that the court impose that exceeds that one year this week before the end of the second year of the order of protection want to do so three hundred sixty days after the one year conditional discharge had had ended so yes the order protection was still in in effect however if that was violated it would be a separate crime under the new york penal law two fifteen fifty and i would like to correct the record the record is quite clear that petitioner absolutely could go to this apartment building the prosecutor said as much at the trial the prosecutor it's on page seventy one two seventy three there's a discussion where the prosecutor says that  she still allowed to go to this building in the order of protection itself on page a one zero nine only says that she cannot go on we're in the complainants business her person or her business or her home but in order to constitute a violation of an order protection under the new york penal law this requires intentional disobedience so merely running into her at this building where they both have relatives residing would not be a violation would not be an additional crime there would be no unless she had some intentional intent to does disobey the order protection and specific language you're talking about because i'm looking at a seventy two and then the question is with the prosecutor say of course you can go there because your kids to take your kids there to be watched by the  you said if i look here i will see with the prosecutor said it's ok for her to go to twenty six seventy six decatur eleven and i don't see well there it explains that  business or residence she does not reside or work at this at this location therefore she is allowed to go to this location i thought the complainant does live and she does not her mother the complainants mother lives there and the petitioners mother in law lives there so they both have relatives that live in the building neither diff neither petitioner nor complaining actually resides at the building and stomps on one often one year two years so the sentence itself is a one year conditional discharge protect them with a was for two was a two year order of protection so during the one year of the could of the conditional discharge sentence if petitioner what were to violate the order of protection then the court would have jurisdiction to revoke that conditional discharge and impose more significant sentence such as jail time  no authority to change that conditional discharge to revoke it to modify it to add any additional penalties because it had just simply expired after one year pursuant to new york statutory law therefore if she did after that one year violate the order of protection it would be a separate prosecution based on criminal contempt under the new york penal law but it would be it would not be a continuation or modification of her actual one year sentence that had behind it by virtue of the conditional discharge maybe she just knew that but she didn't reference well an order of protection on its own is simply not a severe enough restraint to constitute in cost in custody  federal courts of appeals have held as much and fact the ninth circuit found exactly the opposite in holmes v souter berg here unlike in noah koski the petitioner didn't have any affirmative obligation to be anywhere at any specific time or place she simply had to stay away from one person who she admitted she didn't like and that was only for for two years it would this was a negligible restriction it wasn't banishment such as in the jury where time  follow this petition it was in the second year of the protective order that's correct and the protective room was a component of the of the sentence this person ms camacho would that be were protection no not unless she was going out of her way to see her age and an element of the crime of criminal contempt is intentional disobedience of a court order now we know that she if she goes intentionally to a building where she knows the of bruce's going neck could be viewed as intentionally putting yourself in a position where you will encounter that bruise it could be except that we have a very clear record that she goes there frequently because she has family there so that it would be unlikely that charges will be brought and if they were she would have an extremely solid record that she has a very she has long standing reasons two and a history of visiting her family there so it would be quite unlikely and how do you read our recent decision and no accounts and terms of collateral consequences and in particular your coll e points to the possibility of impeachment in a future proceeding and senate's unhandsome and saying these are collateral consequences and says well as as was mentioned before my adversary did not raise the issue of future possible impeachment until until this brief in this court she did not mention it in the certificate of appeal ability so this is the very first time us the district court didn't have an opportunity to pass on this with the supreme court precedent and i would respectfully ask that your honour's reconsider reconsider that but the important most important consideration as it is even if petitioner can show this claim is not moot she cannot show that she was in custody on the day she filed her petition and that's a completely separate jurisdictional requirement and therefore the petition should be dismissed because this court doesn't have jurisdiction to  your honors a sentence cannot just expire of its own accord even if the sentence was to back up the sentence that was pronounced here was a conditional discharge w year order of protection that world pronouncement under new york law is the sentence ms vega understood that she was required as her sentence to comply with a two year order for protection that who protection is not a punishment in a new york law under new article law conditional discharge it was after one year we keep going around and around the conditional discharge run out after one year after that or you ha the order of protection that i thought a punishment and in your law i submit that the conditional discharge did not run out after one year because the court pronounced it did not pronounce a one year conditional discharge whether that is invalid under new york law it was a valid order of the court that was never ruled otherwise so it was in place for the full two years ms vega believed it was in place and it was in place because it had never been ruled invalid you would need a court ruling to state that that water that judgment is invalid and that did not happen here the order of protection here was also the restraint that was imposed upon her that was the condition opposed upon her we don't know do we because because the objection was nonspecific your honor that statute is unconstitutional since one nine hundred seventy five that statute has been unconstitutional under your caring if you may if you made if you told that they may or may not be this court should not look at the merits of the case because of that court's ignorance the law of the land is herring haring requires a some nation and the fact that we may require a summation but the state of new york requires that you make an objection addressed in such a way to to the court addressed to the court in such a way that the court in the sense what the basis of it is  court can do with the practice commentaries to that statute even explained that the let the this was a parallel statute to the one that was invalidated and herring and it was purely a legislative oversight that this one was also law find will find that objections are preserved constitutional objections are preferred preserved under similar circumstances where it is so clear that the objection is a constitutional objection merely stating sixth amendment or intent to stay away is staying away intent to harass would be a different scenario but when the order says stay away and she does not stay away from