rights and relationship with his or her children without any due process without any feeling before them without any findings of fact without hearing any evidence without the slightest possibility of a poet review during the course of the in this case the facts are pretty simple in late june two thousand and thirteen the trial court entered an order stating that there would be a status conference on july tenth two thousand and thirteen  child's representative had prepared it made no findings and specifically noted in the order that it was not finding that either party had engaged in any of the conduct that was restrained in joint under the order and further noted orally that the purpose of the order was to force the children into following its orders with respect to visitation the order itself restrain the parties restrained enjoy the parties their engine to their employees and their family members from gauging in fourteen different subject raf's of behavior examples of the activities restrained by that order grounding the girls to this interference with personal liberties any aspirin or putting one in the house restrain the parties from discussing any of the children's questions they might have regarding the divorce to restrain the parties from explaining what would be happening the divorce including that i mean that the children would spend with each of the parties going forward trend the parties from time to children if there ever have to come a court or if the children ask questions about what was going to happen to them after the divorce during this sensitive time what would likely have we believe this is a good case for the application of the public interest exception to the movement's action why if this one judge and one order that you argue was in error what is the public interest as my point is here acknowledged this type of order almost verbatim is entered nearly every day particularly in the first and second polity dissoluteness it's there and toured as a matter of course they are entered often and they're entered without reason  of us dismissing those netters and them well that fact alone i suppose would judge that the problem with this type of order is that it's a temporary order it lasts until the case is final judgments entered oftentimes final judgments going to be entered you're right they're inherently temporary so their effect in any given case is by their very nature limited justice because these orders affect the relationship between the pair and the child so much during the time the divorce is pending there's no harder time for a child than the euro more that they have to go through this divorce process and not have their parents ready and available to answer their questions during that period is in our view just downright law particularly where serous throughout the state they have some guidance as to the determination of how they are supposed to and when they're supposed to enter these orders certainly we acknowledge that there are times when it is readily appropriate for a court to restrain a parent behavior as they go through a divorce parents going through divorces are absolutely not acting at their best with respect to their children or most other things parents going through divorces can do better parents generally can do better certainly going through  are not of the best so the argument is not that this should never happen it's just when it should happen and that's why we think that it's important that the trial judge is presiding over custody matters have some guidance as to when it  not until their parent justice but until there is some threat of harm or some other type of activity that made harm their welfare safety or wellbeing generally it doesn't have to be that the court waits until the children are for example relationship and that's just simply because the parents have that right under the due process clause of the illinois in the federal constitution to parent their children how does that it's certainly it's not as easy for the courts to administratively do both but i think they have to have to have some kind of short hearing of evidence they have to have some sort of pleading before them and they have to make some sort of finding and tailoring of whatever order they're going to enter into the facts of the case simply stamping an order like this in every case where there's any concern or there's any custody dispute whatsoever is inappropriate because the parents have that right in this order in the absence of making a finding of the healthy if your well for the children is in jeopardy in some way shape or form violates that right s o b the appellate court for the first district's planning th order was not an injunction it rested on a few different issues one of which was that the order itself was ministerial which we think is clearly an error and that mr order is one that simply regulates the pretrial proceedings before the trial and is by definition one that does not affect the relationship between the parties outside the litigation here the order clearly affects the relationship of the parties in their children outside the litigation in fourteen plus different  injunction that it didn't make the appropriate findings for injunction that it could be an injunction which the standard itself or whether or not an order is an injunction whether or not it's in substance an injunction is an objective standard and now one of the  that the court out to rely on what the court found that were a court is simply declaring the parties rights and obligations statutory obligations that that out not to be an injunction even if it's course of in effect record is making a decision as to a temporary visitation order for example or a temporary custody order or temporary child support that are not to be an injunction since the court is simply granting a statutory right and is declaring the parties rights and obligations under that statute statute that you know in a case like this for the court is essentially protecting the children but the order itself is an equitable one where there's no statute specifically  the issue of injunction and if we agree with you would that mean that any corporate custody or visitation order would be immediately appealable if it had any restrictions or conditions no i don't believe so i mean technically a temporary custody order is killed all by permission under rule three of sixty five anyway but no i do not believe a temporary visitation order is sense that is simply declaring the rights of the parties to the rather revolving around their conduct that wouldn't be an injunction that's a good question justice i mean certainly the part of the order that would be ordering the parties to pick up and drop off the children i don't believe would be an injunction because again in substance i think it's just a declaration of the parties rights and obligations with most of the godhra what about an order that says you not to disparage the other party in presence i do believe that's an injunction your honor because it does not compel the parties the people  know some suspicion at least that the other parents disparaging them in practice i think it's going to continue to happen quite often that that kind of interest order is entered by rieman of the parties because usually they agree that it's a good thing not that a spiritual one another around the children in practice that happens in virtually all cases of this where it's not real clear between the parties that they don't have that issue before them by agreement and virtually every custody judge in those answers that kind of language is there the only issue here is whether or not you can appeal it as an interlocutory matter where the orders entered over your objection and you know i don't think it's going to be all that often that happens given that it's agreed to most of the time we take more issue with some of the other terms of the order such as the prohibition on videotaping the children or answering the children's age appropriate questions regarding the divorce it's a fine line but certainly disparagement is not something that anyone would say is appropriate original to this case was there any attempt to raise with the court that there were any of the terms or conditions that  were in catherine ties inappropriate yes just as when when the issue was before the court on july tenth two thousand and thirteen other parties each provided a version of the order that they felt would be appropriate and agreeable katherines differing in some respects primarily it's not the record i suppose i can answer to some degree the issue being that she didn't want to not be a lancer her children's questions about where they would be in the divorce she objected to have every one of these prohibitions in there but it wasn't that none of them were by agreement or would not have  ebbers the order and i should note the order itself and paragraph three i believe it is stated that each of the parties would be able to seek a full aventura hearing on the order at their request but noted and i believe it was m rosenberg brief that that provides another due process because she could've sought a review of the order and to that provision we don't believe that that's sufficient due process for several reasons first of all   second that the the standard proof during any such hearing i have no idea what it would be it's awfully hard of hearing when you have no feeling before you and have a rehearing out of hearing that there is no pleading in the first matter you know that no one is going to get a full hearing on that order for which there was no beginning predicating and and fourth there's affirmation of the decision by justice michael hyman is overturned we deal with the most important issues every day concerning our state's children this border is an attempt by experience judge other than those under the only marriage dissolution of marriage act are filed to remedy or want to restore preserve the status quo the nature of commercial injunctions is the nature of a commercial injunction under the property without regard to this kind of file for we were maintenance without regard misconduct and of course six o two the provisions for custody of six or seven visitation always not misconduct only the best interest of the children is the concern in re the marriage of davis twenty zero three case stated quote the overarching purpose of the i am p m a is to promote the best interest of the children therefore i think you have to three the other appropriate a temporary relief has been referred to as an all inclusive brew vision i think that the pipe will order for by good boy in this case clearly was appropriate and he had the ability to enter such its face visitation is injunction as a nobody would be silly enough to suggest that you have to prove up an injunction purpose a patient in my cases parents are of the worst and of course the most one of the most common things that i try to put in place when one parent picks up the kids the other or mom whoever it is stay in the car let the other parent stay in the house has come into my office they hate when the parents are simple really stay in the house stay in the car call a curbside pick up under the argument before you it's an injunction you imagine how phone calls they never answer the phone when i call simply put new york or people on our group but some people will i want the phone of seven o'clock whoever has that his has the obligation of all the other characters have a clock so simple you're compelling them to all of seven o'clock it's an injunction really who can be on the phone don't listen on the phone who everything all day every divorce involving children and they are for good reason this war was not intended as an injunction i read these cases the talk about former softens the fact  follows this order i've seen it for twenty five years i remember when somebody had three piped up because it was with a copy of the one way the order is center because what justice hyman referred to as the rules of the road that's what he referred to it is he's very insightful and i don't want to take time at the end of justice hymens decision as the appellate court he basically said language two of the cases were regarding money one was cats left where they talk about some money that would be held in escrow account another was meyer a twenty year old paste said when you sell a house during a divorce and there's the children so sometimes people are deprived of their rights because we balance those constitutional rights the children have rights the children have the right that one of somebody gets served with a petition for dissolution of marriage as happened in this case that they have petition isn't then shown to the children the parent the children have the right i can't tell you how many cases hit say well mom told us that they have left us  thousand and fourteen and that petition was granted on july twenty fourth two thousand qwirkle the july tenth two thousand and thirteen court order was a temporary order therefore is no longer a fact because the final judgment w when a divorce action becomes final the temporary order is billed as purpose and a superseded by the final decree in addition pursuant to section five of one d three of the i am d m a the temporary order term means when the final the court this court has held the net feel is moot when it involves no effort controversy or when the reviewing court cannot grant a complaining party effectual really which is what we have here this court has also held that it will not review cases merely exception does not apply in this case in order for the exception to apply there are three strip factors that must be present in order for the exception to apply the first factor is that the question presided must be of a substantial public nature in may two thousand and fourteen this court ruled in the case of enery the marriage of donald b and roberta b and this court held that the public interest exception did not case with respect to the first factor of the exception this court found that persons affected by section six o seven b which was at issue in that case was a limited group of people despite the fact that this order has been used in cook county for many years there's still a limited group of people affected by this order these orders are not entered in every case as how salissa just that they're entered in  cases in cook county where the court believes that the parties are acting in a manner that's detrimental to their children and they feel that being need to please conditions on the parties during their own time with the children the second and third factors of the exception can be taken together i believe the second factor is there is a need for authoritative determination for future guidance of public officers and the third factor is there's a likelihood recurrence of the question the july tenth two thousand work the two thousand and thirteen court order was a temporary order which as we have discussed has been a form order that has been used for many years in county in the domestic relations division it's a temporary band aid used to protect the children during the litigation and despite the fact that this order has been used for many years in the division it appears that this is the first yet you noted that there was no reported decisions which addressed the application of the provision the same is true here despite the fact that this type of order has been used for many many years in the division it appears that this is the first time such an order  been brought before reviewing court there is not and there is not a need for this court to issue an advisory opinion the public interest exception is nearly construed and requires a clear showing of each of the three factors the factors have not been met in this case i also want to spend a few moments talking with mr rosenberg also addressed was the best interest of the minor children this point i believe is the most important point the court needs to take into consideration this order was clearly entered to protect the best interest of the minor children one of the purposes of the i am d m a is defined in section one zero two is to mitigate potential harm to the spouses and their children caused by the dissolution of marriage process it is evident that the sole purpose of the july tenth two thousand and thirteen court order was to mitigate potential harm to the children and to protect their best interests if the primary charge of the court is to protect the children it's the primary charge of the child's representative these parties chose to participate in this litigation the children did not the conditions which is what they were were placed on these parties were reasonable and they were placed there to ensure the best interest of the children if you look at the order is mr rosenberg started pointing out the conditions are really reasonable provisions the parties cannot beat the children the parties cannot drink alcohol in the presence of the children the party cannot allow members of the opposite sex to sleep over when the children are present if a parent truly wants to protect their children during the litigation process they would never dispute such an order this order was drafted by mr rosenberg his charges to act in the best interest of the children the court who appointed mr rosenberg cannot now be faulted for going along with mr rosenberg recommendations in protecting the best interests of the children thank you so between the time this order was entered and the time that their judgement for dissolution of marriage was entered in may of two thousand and fourteen she was unable to answer her children's questions age appropriate or otherwise regarding the divorce in this case they had very highly intelligent children who had a lot of questions and a lot of concerns and were going through what was unquestionably the hardest time in their lives and suddenly as of july tenth without again any factual predicate whatsoever at least any heard actual predicate court restraint both of the parties from being able to communicate with their children regarding what would happen to them their fears and concerns about the divorce and essentially strip the children of the security blankets in the form of their parents so we do take issue suggestion of the order was entirely the children's best interest while the best interest of the child standard is certainly an important one does not mean that the constitutional rights of the parties to be cast aside the courts charges do will certainly it is to protect children but it is also to defend the constitutional rights of the parties litigating before the mr rosenberg suggestion of wrongdoing should be a consideration of whether or not an order is a an injunction or not there's simply no basis there's never been a case decided where wrongdoing was discussed or suggested that that was the basis of an injunction purpose of an injunction typically is to protect the parties rights and preserve those rights during the course of the case so it wrong doing has nothing to do with it maybe that i was the parties are wrong it's just that the court wants to preserve those rights until cases been judy we're not disputing by the way that the court could have authority to enter an order like this under section five zero one three of the illinois marriage and dissolution marriage act provided however that there was some pleading before the court in the court heard some evidence before from the parties or otherwise it doesn't take much and takes the court swearing in the parties where it typically they're anyway and hearing a little bit of testimony about what their concern is and what the harm maybe to the children from person like mr rosenberg in this case visitation was not ordered one student with the july tenth two thousand and thirteen  ordered some cases this kind of order is ordered with a temporary visitation order that was not the case here which is only significant because the appellate court's opinion suggested that it was this was an order fashion in terms of this nation w simply was that it was worth noting that mr rosenberg distinguished section seven or one of the illinois marriage and does this in the marriage act from this case and the cases we cited were we're dealing with a five through rules rio sixty five allows permissive appeals solely from cases where there's an order of introductory providing for the care and custody of the children in a case like this with the custody of the children was not decided in any way shape or class of people in illinois who are both sex offenders registered sex offenders and have children and are seeking visitation rights with their children the court this court in that case found that it was rather unlikely this case would come up  situation would come up again and therefore declined here under the third prong of the public interest exception of the moon's doctrine in this case the order in question applies or at least potentially applies to every parent undergoing a custody or divorce proceeding in the state of illinois that's a much broader class it's also worth noting this is not the first time that this type of order has ever been appealed in