please the court morgan russell for petitioner look when they're saying i'll try to save two minutes for rebuttal because the last case concerns in the same issues i want to just jump in on some issues that are the same some that are a bit different  requiring or defining child abuse is requiring evolution of cruelty the prior sentence as by its common usage child abuse encompasses actions or inactions that also do not require physical contact right now physical contact and that's not what we're definition of cruelty from blacks last six edition which is sort of appropriately from before in one thousand nine hundred six subsequent comments gays made sort of looking at post nine hundred ninety six definitions and statutes kind of harm whether physical or not whether physical contact or not in for go so the below apply to the mistake at the back end of the categorical analysis because it ignored the endangerment part of two seventy three a b and that's what this court's decision there was about i think another important point that goes to both retroactivity and chevron issue and i think the world i was right that in this case  the court is necessarily need to reach the chevron issue because it could decide a merger activity which my understanding is that that is a case by case analysis it will be because of categorical it depends partly on the personal circumstances of  petitioner in terms of the burden here the burdens especially heavy it's he's been here for a very long time that makes the burden of deportation heavier on him he's got three this is the kid's a citizen wife but i don't think that means that aware of the immigration consequences and pled with an understanding of trying to minimize this on a point that i think goes to both chevron interactivity i just want to stress how much of a departure sorum is from the statutory text and thereby also from the from the very interpretations that had come before so there are sort of leaping beyond the three phrases in the tax which are child abuse  was something that existed quite distinctly in criminal law even by ninety six i think if congress had meant to include that distinct kind of notion would have done so and it has done so specifically i think the other even bigger distilling the elements of the generic federal offense rather than doing with is now six possibly said it's doing here which is going fluidly state by state and sort of in each case sort of and surprisingly finding that the state statute fits within its fluid at i guess you can call it a definition it's fluid approach and and i think that a really good case on that point so it's interesting environments that point in the second circuit in two dozen fifteen case called florida's disagreed with where the tenth circuit said it they said no no no in that that doesn't apply chevron we have to defer to the board's interpretation they don't have to use the same sort of generic elements approach took in rodriguez rodriguez that same case to the sexual abuse of the minor provision and there the board had said they were not really going to arrive at a specific definition or specific elements they were going to use federal statute as sort of a guide and take it state  they also just above that said that when the b s a hasn't done anything to particularize the meaning of the term given chevron deference to it's a determination of that meaning has no practical significance so here  has basically said i'm even know that the court will treat this as a severance situation because a b i has said that it's going to go case by case and so really we need to at the very least publish every decision that it's a size or less issue in order to get chevron no particular danger that anything would happen to someone left him alone after they dropped him off from school in a private for two and half hours alone i think that that shows that the board is not drawing any kind of reasonable line or distilling any kind of actual element here i think those are absolutely things that could be charged under a felony as well as a situation that with a small child could absolutely have to be likely to cause great bodily injury or death by drowning or a car crash there are cases  address this issue and give a well reasoned answer for why it was doing this part of the nelson a state by state basis notice that at the time criminal convictions used excuse me state statutes use different terms or talk about the level of harm that would be required under an dangerman statute they use various different terms such as immediate substantial and so rather than harmonize all those terms and inadvertently excludes the statutes based purely on the term that they use honor that in the subsequent case they have adopted it and i feel even if we even if we thought even thought that the board had made it all up if they've adopted it and applied it in subsequent cases then it becomes law in that case and then when the board  this this statute has two problems the endangerment prong and the direct inflection of harm and while i'm not suggesting that the statute is divisible in this court must find that the entire statute fits the definition it's unreasonable to think that and so even if this were to apply or the rodriguez rodriguez definition or or view retroactivity through that lens petitioner still has a burden to show that he relied on that l buckle the child in a seat belt is a form of cruelty the board's definition in that if the level of risk is sufficiently high then yes for the same reason the level of risk being  of serious bodily injury or death which is required by the statue right and that it has to be a categorical yes to be categorical approach so is failing to buckle a child in a seat belt categorically cruelty i'm complete flip of the standards here it required conditions other than those likely to cause serious bodily harm or death and also simply require that the child may be endangered where is this such a reprise of the child actually is in danger that i think part of the cruelty but the left it's horrible judgment it may be punishable it may be a lot of things i'm not sure i would call it cruelty but the specific question in this case is this a higher level of than regular endangerment and so while we might not think that a month but i'm looking at rodriguez i'm trying to figure out in two thousand and one when mr singh pled guilty what what was his the lawyer supposed to advise him about the status of the law even if he was applying the doesn't isn't tantamount to cruel but putting a child in a situation that could result in serious bodily harm or jack is karate and so really i don't know how to sleep in the backseat father negligently willfully horribly fails to buckle the child or not but the child is asleep in the back seat and we've been cruel to the child well again i would distinguish a situation like that which would be more properly now analyzed in the missing in a provision felony provision right sudden but that's but that's what he was charged with here and he was convicted under that is that does that make it cruel he was convicted under the felony provision and so categorically the court has to you that you that that he willfully placed hi child in risk of great harm i think i'm not just i don't think i'm disputing and i certainly don't think the government is disputing i don't even think opposing counsel is disputing the validity of his conviction under under two seventy three a the question is whether two seventy three a categorically cruelty if we look at this course and decision for goes well it talks about the nature distinctions between a and ag and i think that can inform my stance that there's a there's a huge difference between those two rodriguez if we were entitle to rely on the cruelty definition and rodriguez that i got to that i got to know how was this act how is to seventy three a day how does it encompass cruelty i understand would be it would be included within at their problem that i'm having with trying to sort through all of this these are guilty pleas we don't know what actually happened so we can't even really consider what actually happened we subcontract we have to look at what would be included and what would not be included in in that so i think it interacts with the fact that these are pleas as opposed to actual convictions i mean there are convictions that i mean actual that the states have changed their laws and one of the points that came up earlier is whether or not congress could have anticipated child endangerment are should have included that term in the actual statute but at the time there was a growing acceptance by the states to include child nature made in their child to be slugs and this fact is actually a perfect example of that where you have one problem that is traditionally what you would think of as child abuse direct infliction of unjust file pain and these child  stone and that is to reflect important policy and policy decision making arguments that the board might be better equipped to make them the court if there are no further questions that seem out of time we ask that you