never been on a case where the loser below has asked us to certify but not at the same time said well if you don't certify you should reverse that is first you decide to question yourself and if you're unable to decide the question yourself then you certify i find this very unusual approach and seems to me that what you're asking for is you brought the case in the federal district work you didn't like the result and now rather than asking for a merits review by the federal court of appeals you would like the merits review to be done by the d c court of appeals am i wrong in this and this is a very unusual it seems to me  of any other cases where either we've ever done that or in fact anyone has ever asked us to do that well your honor we thought about the approach that you're talking about which is affirmatively asked for to reverse  the district but after thinking about the matter we thought that the more intellectually honest approach here would be to represent the or how the matter actually is and how the matter actually court in the first place why not bring it in the only court which you think can resolve the confusion i mean if that same confusion was present in the district court i assume correct well we've made that argument through to the district or this report did not agree that it was  fusion but the reason why the court case was brought in federal court is because the original complaint had a federal claim in it that had a clean for relief under the federal declaratory relief at the declaratory judgment that to declare the itself create a federal cause of action that just allows you to court to declare the validity of a claim do you have an actual federal claim the claim was under that i cite and the reason for it is because our experience court's concern we we do think that it was sort of the the more and as i said before the intellectually honest approach to be honest with the court about what the state of the law is in d c and the state of law in d c is in flux court's opinion and man as the trial court ruled that because appellant was an at will employee and make knowledge that he did not have a contract he could not proceed on the claim of tortious interference with a contractual relationship because she was an agent of the employer and because she was a supervisor and the courts as it's not enough but she doesn't seem to have made the argument that because this was a at will contract she can't be live says that a breach of contract is not required but merely a favor of failure of performance when the by terms of the contract in question or not which once again seems to be a different question than the held on this ground but they didn't say on your side if a federal court assuming we're not going to certify the case of the federal court have to make a determination based on just that record in front of it seems like the best conclusion is that the d c court of appeals position is that you don't have a case now that doesn't mean that the d c court of a piece feels couldn't give you a case in another case but our job isn't to guess what they might do in extending their back and isn't it depends on who the judges in your district or six judges below have said it one form or another i want to tell you just for purposes of this argument that it doesn't matter what our district judges think the disrespect do i want just one last question if we decide not to certify then i'm right and i'm not you haven't made an argument that we should reverse your only request to us in the briefs is to certify that that's correct that is gross we thought that was the federal claim in the original complaint i don't believe so your honor the statement that has been made by the plaintiff which is that there was a claim for declaratory relief is accurate to the extent the count one saw the clavichord leave but that doesn't make count one federal talk a little bit about castro because i think this case has been thrown around without any reference to what the case was actually about this case had nothing to do with an at will employment relationship whatsoever this is a case in which  the only qualification was that if the district of columbia said that they were in default under the original lease agreement then they couldn't assign it so they went to the district of columbia said look we want to assign our leas and we're not in the full certify and let's go forward with the assignment well the district messed around and messed around delayed and delayed and finally on the very last day when the assignment was supposed to go be closed the district says oh you're in before you can assign without our approval and in order to get our approval we want to renegotiate the underlying lease now it was in those circumstances that pascoe sued the district of columbia and said wait a minute you're interfering with our lease assignment deal with m i f now it is true that at a certain point in time namely after november twenty second one nine hundred ninety nine that assignment agreement between m i f and pascoe became terminable but they were months and months before the determination in which the agreement was in no way terminable not only was it not an at will employment agreement it wasn't terminable at all m i f would have would have had no right to terminate that agreement and the district of columbia interfered with the performance of the agreement until such time as m i a s right to terminate was triggered and then has been waiting m i f decided what we're going to terminate we can't just keep going here indefinitely  totally distinguishable has nothing to do with the situation that we have here and as far as sorrels is concerned you're i have a couple of points to make number one as i think charles green recognize enough to go to the jury and they went to the jury and she was found liable she never said because sorrels was an at will employee there can't be any tortious interference with contractual relations and perhaps the reason she didn't make that argument was because  four of the cases in which the c quart of appeals has said there is no such claim kane after sorrels so all four of bible way mcmanus futrell and now little just earlier this year are all an effort to say that his need for certifications relied on sorrels and pascoe whichever dress he's asserted there may be some factual distinction that in plaintiff you might make a difference first in the district court he tried to say will this on the third were that the defendant here would be a defendant is a third party that's different from the situation in some of the other cases but of course the defendant in three trailed in little was also a third party and for trial the defendant was the bonding company the district court the question of whether the interferer is or is not a third party is irrelevant to the question of whether an at will employment agreement can constitute a contract for purposes of porsches interference with contract claim so that distinction doesn't help and now in this court the plaintiff has tried to say well there's bad faith here but again their faith was alleged if you trail the bonding company i'm sorry the yes the bonding company of your trial was said to have acted in bad faith in refusing to continue to bond barber if you travel as an employee of the department of letter of labor federal credit union and again the station of whether or not there's a bad faith out a geisha doesn't have a thing to do with case if i remember correctly and the adams case said that you could if i remember the holding i think it said you could bring a wrongful discharge claim if your claim was that they were requiring you to violate that law right and i but that's not you know that's not in this case so whatever they might say in that circumstance that we don't we don't have that the there's really no grounds for certification based on decisions in other jurisdictions are based on a lleged disagreements among judges on the u s district court here in the district of columbia it seems to us pretty clear that not only with the d c court of appeals we ask the changes prior rulings but it could only do so by sitting little so for all those reasons your honor we don't think that the court should certify any question we don't think that would be appropriate under this court's case law about one certification is proper we've cited those cases on page fourteen of our her case we've said that the case has to be one of the extreme public importance is there a case in which we've actually relied on background as compared to the uncertainty around i don't know of  honor but i can't say that i have every case in mind that i i think that in this case the claim is that there is genuine uncertainty and we don't think that claim can withstand scrutiny question formulation of of a of a third party interference with employment if the employment was procured by improper meet and so  him proper means that you're talking about the improper means in this case were several i mean there was there was a misrepresentation of fact about with the nine compete sued for it and there was also the threat of civil litigation but not not the kind  importance would be of the relationship between businesses and it is a commercial issue come up my here's my question about this is of you know the other underlying thing that's bothering me we're dealing with a number court of equal stature to our own and we can't just send them and the question that there are uncertain about we are uncertain about a lot of things too and my guess is that we would not like it if the third circuit or the second circuit sent every question that we are uncertain about to us and  so we have to sort of pick our causes with some care and how do we decide even if there is some degree of uncertainty and we have to think that that's why i would suggest sorrels and mcmanus is a doctoral adoption of the os or formulation which it's appears to be carving out an exception to the general rule of no tortious interference with that will employ me in a situation where there's third party interference