days late and the state does not and never has disputed that your skinner's explanation for that when it's just going to say that during a period of nearly eight months at the heart of his twelve month statute of limitations period he was three times deprived of all access to legal materials and even to his property first for a period of about one hundred days when he was in administrative segregation for his own protection and could not go to law library second during a three week period when his all of his property was availability of parole in all those cases made constitutional what would have an unconstitutional undersell on the house and i do think that one issue the availability of parole is really an animating principle that underlies all of the course of the  person in this case quite like ramirez the first two strikes occurred fourteen years earlier when he was only twenty years old for burglaries for which he did not even go to prison and that's quite similar to the ramirez case where this court held that the two prior strikes  that i do think that's a critical distinction that person because the state court judge in this case the same guy actually declined to exercise his discretion to strike one of the priors which by the way would not have resulted in his release but in a prison term of about sixteen years we're not talking about releasing mr skinner we're talking look at a collection of nine nonviolent wobbler theft offenses place those in the context of mr skinner is very modest criminal history with very few felonies and one prison term it's still a sound case solemn seven nonviolent felonies away with the keys thrown away for a collection of nonviolent glop or theft offenses and i really do think i mean there's a sense in which the state is being somewhat greedy in this case that it's not enough for the state that you ing and sensually give them license to use the three strikes law to impose very harsh sentences on this offenders they don't want to have any judicial role whatsoever in enforcing the constitution i would argue that as in ramirez this is an unreasonable application before the triggering offenses i agree that ramirez his criminal history was on modest even when mr skinner's but remember that in ramirez this court said that even twenty five years to life was unconstitutional when he was released actually is not the argument here the argument here is that life without parole which has always had independent constitutional significance has always been a critical distinguishing factor between the cases that were upheld and those that were not i should point out i cited in my opening brief in this court transcript from the oral argument  a sentence under the three strikes law there may be examples where even under ed and even in this court's supervisory role and he views corpus where essentially could cross the line and on constitutionality we're not making some number priors and ramirez had a certain number and that's the fun of how to have a certain number i would like to point out that i don't agree that this defendant had a minor criminal history his criminal conviction his criminal conviction standard period of seventeen years appeals go you know which is an excerpt of record the california court of appeal catalogue his entire criminal history and i certainly think that it's something that should be considered i think that's probably the lack thereof i did speak on behalf of the court because every time i do something back up  i'll be brief i just want to address the few points made by closing counsel and by the first one i agree that it seems anonyma anomalous to look at the criminal history outside of the strikes especially when it comes from probation reports which have not been charged and proven that they were not arguments because mr skinner was an administrative segregation for a part of that time because of his own drug that's he's not entitled to at all of my staff limitations that at by that reasoning someone who misbehaved in prison could be denied the right to in danger and that their decision as to how to make him safe was to deprive him of access to the law library if they had wanted to put him in administrative segregation and have someone run down to the law library and give him the books they needed he would not have an agricultural and claim the point is that he was deprived  constitution there's any number of ways that the state on remand could make this a constitutional sentence if they struck one of the prior offenses this term would be between sixteen and twenty years if they got rid of the consecutive sentences perhaps you would get a sense of twenty five to life and there might be proceedings as to whether that's constitutional but i don't think this court needs to decide that in this case and if there are no further questions  and we lost our audience