MLCommons/peoples_speech_v1.0 huggingface dataset:
not arise from the safety requirements that were barred by the employer as presented it had arbitration there were a number of boots available to her with a number of the type of place mechanisms it wasn't the requirement of the steel toed standard of review i think the proper standard of review here is the manifest way up i agree we don't have any real factual questions here but there are reasonable different inferences they're being drawn by the parties and i think commission as to and their decision that this was an employment related risk is not against the man as well if you have it now or her issue in the case is whether or not the injury rose out of her employment or an injury to rise out of the employment must be caused by a risk sti was safety equipment which was required by the employer to use the worker who was approved by the employer who employer had to review take a look at this book and approve it and they did a individual components really deals with the reality of the workplace you need all of the components of the boots for the boots to be effectively used in the workplace you're saying negate the connection between the employment and the risk here despite this was a personal choice to use this particular kind of boot but it was a reasonable choice it was a choice it was approved by the employer  was a choice perform exclusively for work related function i was thinking of good analogies to use in let's say the employee we have an employee who's a bitch and then let them choose a shovel and they say well you used the wrong type shovel if you would have used a shorter handle shovel this accident wouldn't happen but in that situation all of the choices are related to work related function here the laces have a work related function that's the he perceive d so it doesn't slip or so it doesn't fall off so any type of some employer employee requires a certain worker who whatever have metal tall whatever it is and there's an accident involving who use nothing more than someone's parkers yeah and leases and one are right essential to the function of performing the work related function of the boot to protect the foot because if you don't have this set of circumstances it could be because it would be different than what she would be wearing outside of work home as here and in your example there is still a risk associated with the employment because those
you may proceed counsel what your surly who's improper hearsay evidence for our purposes in determining sufficiency of the evidence we consider the hearsay evidence along with other admissible evidence and determining  to say it was just a straight up of criminal information that he was being prosecuted on the state would have to present some evidence to establish in the defendant's state of mind beyond you know what we would is that because of his mental state he didn't know he was there so that seems to suggest that even if the state proved that we notified me down to his stay off this property we gave him this notice he signed or whenever it given you with me so you also know the notice was given you talk about a situation where the defendant was trying to conceal himself in the parking lot you all along  be here if he has committed the crime of criminal trespass you have to prove that he knows he's not posed to be there that he's there i don't understand your argument on it doesn't it would be  essential elements and then that's something very different and if you think about why the investigative steps of an officer for example is allowed in then why a officer can if the person doesn't say i'm getting there trying to get a cigarette and my car i'm trying the cigarette out of my friend's car or my friend give me permission to turn the cigarette out his problem is they say something along those lines then it's a reasonable inference that
department and initially i would like to point out that a new case that come out recently however paving company vs rexford industrial real to use on points for this case is a california court of appeals discussing the rule the law important because it directly contradicts the findings of the just record in this case and it should be controlling on this case and it should not assess a tape reversal on the intentional interference claim now i will go into later  negligent or intentional and they make that distinction in that case follows the same guidelines as the hates free contract and in terms of at will there are certain established rights once the contract is signed so you can always be removed for cause so i wouldn't necessarily characterize the hate straight as an will contract because you can only be removed for cause as shown by the contract itself and by the application of the statutes the statutes say joe will be removed by the general contractor and they list reasons the california court of appeals after this lawsuit had been filed ruled that the city was unable to reduce energy but again for costs not just i would say at will city was very slow to see documents and it produced documents on the very last day the discovery was open that included out that included facts i believe e mails by new route and then statements maybe related by chalabi around that time that we wanted to precedent in rent tug which interprets the california supreme court's decision in telapak that any interference that perspective economic advantage towards must please and independent it there's no evidence in the record about the outcome of that but there can't be any kind of allegation that the city did anything other than an employ to the degree that the actions of the city have prevented synergy from being able to bid on teacher city contracts but there's no there's no the actually is that you quiet are that that you've got the money to
two hundred cases it could be discretionary election two steps the case that depend upon stipulation of the plaintiff in other words if both parties agree even those that was a technical issues generally seventy two hundred cases are a large cases generally they are not all that make any millions of policyholders and you have a common interest in that particular language because the language is coming to these prosecutors and in in  that would never be the case the insured is never going to collect any money under the liability part of their policy and i think that's your argument i'm not sure that that's true and i think that there are some well let me give you a construction that i would see where the fossil from a policy is that there weren't and in the queen there you could you would look down for the bodily injury park for the women patients but it would also include workman's compensation well i
has in this case dismissed those claims so how can a greedy file them when they have it's already been litigated but there is improper you've pointed to a problem ah for purposes of argument an exactly where i would be right what would happen if you were able and i don't know of course is it possible to limit the number of plaintiffs and the collective action that you seek to those with bro the same supervisors the same department the same employer so that maybe you only have forty eight as opposed to eight hundred is that a possibility that just is just not economical for you there is are gone and there can be no appellate review well we know the problem of picking off but that's the that's the very least conjectured what will happen we're confronted with what has happened here and one curiosity even after her judgment he can't appeal was it was no there was no border in his case just as a practical matter it would be yes be something it isn't so much a practical matter but i mean how much of the problem we're talking about is a function of the structure of the statute and the lack of any kind of procedural rules and even rules what have you in terms of how these cases are process this is these i would read more  least a few people soft on the merits that would seem to be a possibility would it not not address was his decision because she threw everyone out the problem is they would have to start a new action and by starting a new direction by i think it piece certification reviewers and i think we're all don't think there's any dispute that is not appropriate let's get you back in rebuttal thank you very much  premise number three that somehow the structure or the corner or west penn did anything to render this collective action quote claim in her only transitory which is the collective action on that basis but that's not what he did he went for that same system why every hospital every department every employee subject to this particular policy and so  you know many hundreds with the same types of claims and what mr vavasor saying how do i get them resolved as to all of them and i think the answer to that that's the rules and he could then try and take it out after death on it as it's been up there once before that it's the stage saying to me that they said look worse than it is because legally i am correct and i also am concerned about the presidential off decertification decision something i think we all agree should happen they have a right too there's answer was they tried individually there was no answer as to how you get a review that you sort of acacia decision because quite honestly of course the playing to for all purposes so they are a party bestirred rule twenty three and it also means that fine if you bought it all by off cash out whatever the word is
the separate and the record there are separate places i believe and the first section it just says male driver and then further down it does say that it is a white male there was a clarification of the question i'm asking you can i can work it either way the facts related to how the officer had reasonable are i'm sorry have probable cause for the defendant's arrest i am only after initially pulled over the defendant the defendant had his windows down when the officer approached the officer smelled alcohol  in addition to that the defendant also admitted to having three beers three beers six to seven hours you know and these factors are and i suppose we have his delusions of having a stroke these are not  the defendant smells like alcohol the the officer mentions this fact to him twice and that's in the video at three thirty six i believe a non story at four fifty five and five forty t the video exhibits that the defendant had issues complying in answering the officer's questions for example when go from the content of the nine one one call the court determined that there was equals income or that there was a disturbance to the  be created by the driver which is different than this case correct correct however that caller also indicated that the driver was intoxicated and while ordering food at the drive thru and similarily the officer responded very because there's testimony about the tip about the person driving erratically which is over the curb almost hitting the store and then the person is in the store and described as possibly grow that i was his or the we don't know what officer was if you're honest the timeline is correct in terms of the press it was contemporaneous and it wasn't a long time i mean the offer was i'm back responding to what potentially could be a dangerous situation into the car more over the officer testified that he parked and he parked and be out in family center because it was in the best position to see if the vehicle was still there and that's on the record ph forty one the truck to continue striving the officer would not be able to know where the car is going and if anyone would be harmed if the driver in the end if the driver was drunk  the video that does not mean that his and his words were slurred and theirs are you there is a difference between understandably you can you can when asked to you hand over his driver's license and insurance key of the officer a credit card on the video it indicates that he had trouble responding to some of the officers question and anyway what's the basis for your statement if somebody every three years within or outside of seven hours is under the influence of alcohol and
related to the original injury and fall ended just briefly recap the circumstance mr cooke is a firefighter and on fo
this is i think we can all agree a fairly unique set of circumstances correct and sometimes as highlights the tension between the real world and the statute or a coward to saying we have to construe the requirements in the pla of either war i mean i know that it says in there are two different parts of the statute the first one says that you shall provide notice them and then it gives two ways that maybe it orally or written and i think that has nothing to do with his right to recover against a corporation i think that there are other owners of the company and he did say that he told other owners of the company that got injured doesn't have to i think you might have to go that might be a nice thing to do but under have to give a written notice of the acts that there's an absolute obligation on the part of the employer to do that so if you're going to say that ascertain land or this employer then why is he not obligated under section section sixty which is the law  what it was boiled down to it would appear would be that i would have to ask my client on the stand in front of the orbit traitor whether he gave notice of the accident he had to himself and i hope that we will not throw common sense out can require councils in the future to ask those so questions is there under yellow freight i believe i cited the case law that says a management level employee with notice whether it be even though it was not oral or written constitutes actual notice so i think to answer your question no it wouldn't matter  before forty five as i think the panel has already pointed out is an employer's responsibility and not employees responsibility and i believe today put additional burdens on the employees who are injured to worry about  we knew about it who at the company did not know about it i think my client said i didn't tell this particular person this particular person he was severely injured he still is severely injured the people i believe that the company knew about he just did not talk specific in worker's compensation claim now in this particular case who's paying the premiums us for so the potential for abuse is going to leader had the ability to meet us really under oath to hear him testify to listen to the sincerity of his flight and make judgments upon his  between being a corporation and being an individual with notice and us public schedule when i was up here earlier in the last sentence of the statute sort of interesting and i thought it was not my brief you talked about  different ways i still think that there's an obligation absolutely under the act to give notice and then act gives two different forms a way of doing it again as the owner of the company if there's going to be a distinction made saying it's the next one is owner of the company he had a choice to make at the time of the zacks if he's paying premiums for group health insurance and for workers compensation insurance and he put everything through
familiar with the apartment you live near the apartment i remember the place very well i used to go very often do you remember anything unusual happened to that apartment to that place so many things happened that i don't know if you save you visited the place a lot to you have any recollection of anything unusual ever happening to you or at the place your daughter lived i don't remember then he says i know people were going there and they were attacking the house like i think that's a that's a general statement and he's been specifically asked if anything happen there by the time they left in february but there was four months between november and february that was when when the alleged fire took place and when they actually left and the the natural response to the question twelve or thirteen year old what happened to you  that that five and that became everyone's problem immigration judge well i mean you're not afraid for your daughter right now are you answering my daughter it's it's just that it's that she just could not completely simply could not live there anymore
what you've just talked about it and i'm familiar with the elements that were decided by the district court but don't we have to look more beyond the elements and look at the charge in its entirety where the judge does discuss the need for causation discusses it both before and after the elements it's not given exactly what it needs and the verdict the verdict piece i went into a lot of briefing on it was very confusing i think the two tell me that language does not clear the situation because insurance that's going to a different element that's still not sufficient it's not sufficient because we are told that this is what you have to do and then this is how you can read two different times this is how you do it and so the jury is told about a causal connection and then instructed this is the way to find th objection afterwards but in the end this is a very serious offense and very severe consequences and this is the time when the explicit nature of what makes it a federal the court indicated that it was going to provide before element instruction that the government had submitted acknowledging that counsel had seventy three of them instruction in the court and asked worry about the causation that's not an issue here it was the crux of the case and defense counsel even admitted in the brief on page thirty seven they complain that the structures were inappropriate because it was the core of the actually in a crime or benefiting financially from the crime and in the courtroom i think different times to talk about how the jury had to find the defendant guilty of each and every element of the event and frankly if something's league of first only element there obviously other elements and the jury was instructed detail on all four of altogether in response the government's argument that the definitions of coercion and then embedded within that the definition of serious harm was sufficient to put forth a causal connection that doesn't carry the day the
permitted by contract majority in that case expressly saying if i remember correctly that arm we're dealing with feel not confident preemption and secondly that the rates are at issue they are to conduct was being challenged have not been permitted don't recall when in the district court at least a small turn of the ruling dismissed the state more claims for want of supplementary jurisdiction because the federal claims didn't stand i don't recall any argument in your brief that the that that ruling was a rubio's or that the state claim should proceed independently notwithstanding that rule i think iran is correct there's no argument regulators they've looked at this very come about and what they said is that it is very risky for consumers for the little distribution company to release power because weather changes weather can change quickly and it risks a gas shortage fundamental distinction it also does not deal with company creation as you said we will soon if something in addition but those are the fundamental principle distinguishing characteristics that make one thousand as a clear distinction and also deals with direct purchase in the gas transportation work you ask a question two questions one is there any rational reason that some would not sell gas if they realized there was no capacity well there's nothing to complain about that but in fact there are plenty of reasons must sell what would the standard be that some would say yes apply that a court would have to apply in saying you must sell is it the temperature or not is it that upstream market conduct conduct in a market at this point it does not participate in is not a consumer is not a competitor is not a buyer is nothing affected prices downstream as a matter of when are who is safe when you have to ask that standing or anything else did not arise under state law what we said was that there is no decision in massachusetts who know him sure that follows the a g c factors programming standard and in fact just
think you're it please the court mr green my name is randy hale i represent a part time day with reference to this matter that is before you he has filed a claim of preference to an injury to his left shoulder is that there was a new injury as a result of the fall in zero five and were coming were contending based on dr weimer statement that it was a new injury that was different than what he saw before him when he did the surgery the the r t and the question becomes whether or not the power traders decision was against the manifest weight of the evidence our contention is that when you look at the doctors that gave opinions relating to this case the person best able to say whether something was related to a previous problem is the doctor who treated that previous problem doctor weimer dr wire and his deposition indicated that there was a new problem put on did complete surgery with reference of the shoulder and when he first saw him back in two thousand and five he recommended a different surgery be done and that was done as well as the road to warmer se evident that is that employee mr tung a had significant plates prior to this this accident in august two thousand and five that he went through a period treatment shortly after the august of two thousand and five accident
basis for their opinion on determining the credibility of the doctor and treatment and petitions in your name in leading it back to the february twenty ten incident do you think that the letter itself there some things in this case that the circuit court ruled and then we managed to the commission that were never raised to the commission level will happen or i'm sorry but they happened here i'm not sure if exactly if procedure of dealing with issues in ruling on issues there were number probably raised before the commission what do you ask us to do in light of that in later than that i mean to affirm the initial decision of the mission which the commission adopted the findings of the arbitrator  new reason that the commission decision is not against the manifest weight of the evidence but because the commission indicated by adopting the earlier triggers findings that there was a poor in the condition in july twenty ten was secondary to her feb twenty second accident but at the time top to now on made that opinion he was completely unaware that petitioner had been diagnosed with the exact and the commission cited that wrong according to the c t a combat that the commission improperly awarded benefits because it was based on unsupported medical the manifest weight of the evidence of course in fact based on things outside the record for the only thing that we have in the record for us are the two sessions of the of the commission but the weather clears up any issue regarding the commission's decision and that the decision is not against the manifest weight of the evidence the opposite conclusion is not clearly apparent based
i see no questions thank you