collateral estoppel nd and independently because his attorney during that nd trial rendered ineffective assistance of counsel this court may grant mr coleman's requested relief under at because the indiana court's decision to deny  under the anti terrorism and effective death penalty act because the indiana court decision under the act because the decisions to renata to deny mr coleman relief on these two claims unreasonably applied clearly established federal law now it's important to distinguish between these two claims because they're supported by different facts mr coleman's collateral to stop a plane does not involve a real litigation of the actual shootings the collateral estoppel claim only involves examining what the  acquitting jury did and must have decided through its acquittal and this decision highlights the on the reasonableness of the indiana supreme court's decision to deny his collateral estoppel claim and reinstate his conviction in the indiana supreme court's opinion it mistakenly believed that collateral estoppel depended on when and whether mr coleman's d general fear applied to both die and jackson but the court's opinion was simply not relevant it answered a question that it was not asked and that was not at issue in the case collateral estoppel does not depend on whether or not both shootings were self defense most and more importantly is not with quiet to establish that both were justified by self defense the jury instructions didn't ask the jury to and determine that the st shooting was also self defense merely that it had to have been lawful for whatever reason now case the language does use the present progressive is committing however the cases in which this has been applied as the state points out have sometimes included cases like robbery or a lawful dunces action which would be ongoing throughout the subsequent events but it does also cover by the plain language of the statute events that were ongoing that were interrupted in our in our reply brief we cited cases for example that involve distribution crimes which would have been ongoing which would have been occurring and then interrupted by the use of force which followed but more importantly in this case the state's suggestion that the jury may have considered other crimes  for one is perfectly consistent with the idea that they necessarily considered the charged attempted murder in order to return a verdict of not guilty they had to on the basis of self defense the jury had to determine that mr coleman commit any crime so whether or not other crimes may have been considered alongside the attempted murder of die does not defeat his argument and furthermore there was no evidence in this case from which the jury could have rationally considered other potential crimes the state mentions for example whether or not his gun was unlicensed or robbery or something like that but there were no facts that would have enabled the jury to rationally consider those things given that there was a charge a defense that was clearly directly and immediately connected to the use of force against mr jackson and i would have been irrational to disregard that entirely at the expense of alternatives that were the case continuing on because we know that the jury acquitted mr coleman based on self defense this largely comes down to an issue of the of the burden of proof the state was asked to disprove at least one of the elements within the self defense instruction beyond a reasonable doubt because we know that the state failed d to do that it means that it could not establish that shooting di was a  crime bringing the full circle collateral estoppel applies here because the st jury had already necessarily decided that the prosecution could not establish the attempted murder charge beyond a reasonable doubt that is the exact question that was they are one of the points i would like to bring up is that the the real question here is whether a rational jury could have grounded its verdict upon any other issue that's the standard for mash and now in its response brief the state claims that  mr coleman confuses irrational jury with matters of probability it may have merely been unlikely now to that we respond that rational does not mean possible but it does not  mean that theoretically possible just because something may be possible under some very unique circumstances does not make it a rational conclusion and this is something that the supreme court and various circuit court develop over and over again when it comes to the standard we assume rightly or wrongly that rational juries follow the judge's instructions that they don't know if by of course those are theoretical possibilities but we assume that those are not rational decisions  furthermore it's limited by the evidence and by common sense there are decisions that simply based on the lack of evidence to support them a jury could not rationally reach even in some extremely  strange situation of a b c a radically possible no your honor as your honour's now mr coleman has also asserted a claim of innocence ineffective assistance of counsel we believe our grief thoroughly address the claim for relief and i'm happy to answer any additional questions you might could be rationally included him of jackson's murder without acquitting him of attempting to murder da coleman proposes one way the jury may have applied its instruction but that is not enough for issues inclusion to establish what the jury necessarily decided coleman must show that there was only one question before the jury and it was decided in his favor he cannot do that on his record he relies upon the contemporaneous crime exception in a sentence in the self defense instruction for support that died the die shooting resulted in an implicit acquittal in the context of the jackson acquittal but there are at least to read other rational interpretations any one of which is fatal to clemens issue preclusion claim instruction read a person may not use force if he is committing a crime that is directly and immediately connected to the confrontation the jury may have rationally understood st that committing a crime as judge rosen or pointed out would require coleman to have been committing a contemporaneous or on going crime at the time he shot jackson and they could have easily discounted the use of force exception and moved on and acquitted him wonders on self defense without considering the di shooting at all it was not irrational for the jury to apply the rules of basic grammar and interpret committing a crime to require something that was occurring at the time of the jackson shooting it was written in the present progressive tense and that specifically means there is a continuing action nd the jury may have interpreted the crime to require a crime against jackson meaning that coleman was committing a crime against jackson it was directly to immediately connected to his confrontation with jackson and that would have been rational because in the context of his trial the parties presented these two shootings as separate events they were two separate charges separate offenses and they were argued as such it's a jury in considering jackson and whether coleman was engaging in self defense in that shooting they may not have considered di at all because they knew they had to answer that question separately rd the jury may have viewed the term confrontation in a broader me in or than coleman suggests it could indicate the entire heated dispute at coleman's property which lasted twelve minutes leading up to the shooting in answering that question and they may have found that coleman was not committing any crime related to the broader scope of the confrontation on his property and in fact the parties used the word confrontation in this particular manner and the jury may have understood it in that way the prosecution in opening statement said between the confrontation and the shooting is roughly ten minutes and in closing coleman said in his arguments they came with guns they started the confrontation they came looking for trouble and it's certainly not irrational for the jury to share the same meaning of confrontation in this broader context of this larger dispute that coleman had no part of and he tried to act as peacemaker during the event the statement and counsel presented witnesses to impeach di's inconsistent statement that he did not say anything when he entered the yard through other witnesses and also on the video it can be  captured on video and they were unaccompanied the where is sharp at statement was unaccompanied by any movement towards the studio or threatening action towards coleman coleman remained on the phone  few steps back from jackson as di approached jackson and it was at that moment that coleman stepped forward while still speaking on the phone and shot guy in the temple and then again as he fell to the ground so i don't believe that this statement is critical particularly given that it already came into evidence and was used by the defense counsel in his closing and also is a company by the video evidence in which died is not make any threatening movement towards coleman whatsoever but getting back to the issue preclusion claim very briefly ashe requires that the evidence be viewed from any practical and realistic sense and not in a hyper technical way and that's precisely what coleman is asking he's latched on in a hyper technical reading of the contemporaneous crime language that was never discussed at trial the prosecution never suggested that coleman's use of force should be precluded because he committed a crime against guy and these these offenses were never linked in the way that he is set and they do not share any common element any critical issue of material fact that the supreme court cases have applied issue preclusion typically these are done in clear cut cases of identity was the defendant the robber was the defendant the the person who mailed the bomb and the jury in acquitting the defendant said no and that's not the case that we have here it's much more convoluted and the jury was presented not only with an unexplained and undefined sentence in a self defense instruction but coleman's counsel also presented to alternative to presented an alternative defense as to mens rea so at bottom coleman's argument rests on too many assumptions his reading of the contemporaneous crime exception language is not the only reading and he has the very high burden of showing that it is and he and live by presenting alternative defenses at trial it's nothing more than pure yes your honor i do you're responding to the state's point about the ash case on the supreme court's line of cases ash exists and the standard asks us to look into the pleading the evidence the charge and all of the relevant matter because it assumes that the basis for the jury's verdict is not entirely clear the supreme court's four cases that cited in the brief that all apply the standard grant relief none of those cases involve explicit statements by the defense counsel or the prosecution for that matter in which linking the offenses or informing the jury of the consequences a decision on one count would have on the other that's not a part of what the standard d asks furthermore the the core issue here is  and with respect to the contemporaneous crime exception itself the state it reads the language irrationally to produce absurd results the indiana supreme court has said that literal application of the exceptions would nullify claims for self defense and produce absurd results it's really the state here that is reading the contemporaneous crime exception in a tortured and untenable way we've already discussed the is committing present progressive tense element but this that instruction has never been used to limit events that were cut off that still triggered the other confrontation which felt that in the self defense is being invoked and furthermore the state's examples of crimes that are being discussed are simply not crimes that in some cases even involve mr coleman is also the jury would have no rational reason to think about them and furthermore are not directly and immediately connected to the confrontation in which self defense was used simply does not satisfy the strict causal nexus required by and the on a lot and very finally the confrontation here does have to be in the conference the exchange of gunfire with jackson the confrontation cannot include both the event in which self defense was claimed and everything leading up to it would swallow the d language thank you thank you very much mr harwood the cases