i shall try to describe why i believe my argument is distinct and we have ramirez paris we have tours i will arm we have martinez and this is the argument and i think we have to look at the argument that was advanced by the attorneys that then resulted in the decision essentially they were saying certainly in america paris they said that the standard developed by the v i i was so at variance with congressional intent that that was itself a violation of due process that was more or less the argument and tories aguilar my position is that those cases were not argued and viewed through the prism of repetitive statutory language a supreme court presumption that when congress uses a specific phrase they intended it to have a meaning that it was employed before and therefore the what i think both ramirez and tories did was engaging chevron chevron deference and  really looking at the standard so that's really the distinction i've been trying to make is that these cases were decided under the chevron deference and they shouldn't and it's not that well the argument advanced by the petitioners wasn't that and so think the petitioners argue that this should not have been chevron deference what they said was so why would you know it's kind of evaporates organ to me that the standard is so clearly at variance that that creates a due process violation in the courts that will know but i think when there's a slightly different argument advance it's not that it's pending on us i do believe there's some wiggle room here to say that the court could say  proper in this case and come up with a result different than ramirez paris and that's sort of my are going to reserve a little bit of time with thank you  in this case even looking at it purely as it is a question of law the government's position is that it does not have any merit and the court can still dismiss this case for lack of jurisdiction the court in ramirez perez also took into account that the board's interpretation of exceptional extremely unusual hardship was a statutory construction they looked at it in that framework if you will here petitioner is asserting that the board failed to take into account prior under former twelve fifty four a sub to regarding to criminal aliens whether they can get relief under suspension of you portray sion they looked at that case upon they said no this is a new context here and  argument that there is no textual support for the board's interpretation here the statute itself limits the hardship to qualifying relative all of the cases that preceded that aliens own hardship could be taken into account here we know that that's not the case any longer second the legislative history clearly states that it has to be in truly exceptional cases so we submit that the context here is different and therefore the board was correct in its interpretation  and they even said explicitly we're focusing solely on the language of the one thousand nine hundred sixty amendment and a legislative history because they didn't find any guidance in their previous case law specifically because this is a new context where it's exceptionally extremely unusual hardship is given the passage of the real i d act should we find at least that we have jurisdiction to hear the due process argument but given the fact that there has been no change in th case law with regard to reviewing hardship determinations then resolve on with recognition of that standard of review  resolved the case on the merits so that that it would be i guess we have jurisdiction in part but we may still have to dismiss once we get that far does that make any sense it does your honor and that's actually what the court in marching