developmental disabilities code sections three dash eight zero two and section treat their she eight hundred to create a two step roadmap for respondents to make it practically impossible to obtain an involuntary commitment w first by causing multiple delays in the case to the point that the trial cannot be held by the normal deadline and then by invoking a failure to meet that deadline as a basis to declare the entire proceeding a no it's the most troubling aspect of this case is that the respondent went through with a jury trial he requested only to take a position after the jury found him to be a person subject to involuntary admission that the trial was a meaningless exercise that the entire proceeding was in normally because the trial was delayed past the normal statutory deadline when the reason for that the lie was his only quest for a jury trial and before the trial he never complained about the delay and even indicated his agreement to it in these circumstances outright reversal of his commitment order cannot be the legally correct result based upon a proper interpretation of these two separate complaint about the trial delay by not invoking the circuit court or waive that delay like indicating his agreement to the schedule around eight i want to hold that the responder's jury demand was untimely because he made it on the eve of the trial deadline after first having required a continuance of the case to a county his demand for independent examination so that the his trial his jury trial demand was not absolute but could be subject to reasonable conditions including in this case the trial court's proposal that the trial date happened at a later time beyond the normal trial deadline and finally that the court rule that the remedy for non compliance with that trial deadline under section three days eight hundred of the mental health code is not automatic no of occasion of the proceedings and other words to hold that section three dash eight hundred it is not mandatory in the sense of the mandatory versus directory distinction or dichotomy in by that i don't mean that it's not an obligation that's a binding on the trial court it is we don't dispute that it's that the consequence for noncompliance is not to strip the court of authority to enter a valid commitment order at the end of the preceded according to the respondent the state's petition for leave to appeal feel to raise three suggest that the mandatory versus directory distinction the remedy for noncompliance with section three day actually eight hundred was not included in the p l o at the pilates specifically says and i are refer to it in our reply brief but i'll just quote from page eight of the p l o a that because the time frames in the mental health code are directory rather than mandatory dismissal of a petition for an involuntary commitment outside the statutory time frames should not dictate dismissal of the i think the first word dismissal was intended to be failure to meet those timeframes the petition for legal people repeatedly refers to this distinction between directory and mandatory which relates to the remedy but but it is true when i we want  not specifically refer to the appellate court's construction of the time to make a jury demand in these cases and one of the i think one of the benefits of being the supreme court is that for purposes of a scale issuing  coherent and uniform body of law the court can decide whether those emissions from the petition for leave to appeal should preclude the court from deciding those issues or instead whether the court believes that they should be decided but the mandatory directory  to seriously consider addressing those two other issues i mean the troubling aspect of this case is that there are things that can be done while the case is still in the circuit court to remedy ameliorate redress any claim noncompliance with the trial deadline set by section three dash eight hundred the old adage is that a stitch in time saves nine the best time to cure that type of violation is when you can prevent further characterization we disagree with that and we also submit that no deference is required to the appellate court's interpretation of the trial record we have a written trial record there was no we should raised in the circuit court of the time so this court can decide as well as somehow doesn't constitute reversible error it and we're in this strange sort of framework of analysis where the appellate court is saying well prejudice being detained without a trial isn't prejudice that constitutes reversible error in the prejudice is unreasonable well i'm not sure i understand that analysis and i think that going back to first principles the key question on that point is is section three d s eight hundred mandatory in the sense that it triggers automatic typical sponsibility to craft a remedy that fits the wrong and in this case if the warning here is the the under view detention of the respondent past the normal statutory deadline and we again we  see the importance of the liberty interest at stake here we can see that there is a statutory deadline the question is what should be the remedy and if the court interprets that provision as being directory then it gives the circuit courts the power to craft a remedy that matches that remedy it is important to remember that this violation has no bearing on the ultimate outcome of the case it is not something that affects the truth finding function it doesn't prejudice the responsibility to be able to say at the end of the day i am or i'm out of person subject of involuntary admission and in fact in this case because of the delay he had argued extensively to the trial court that his condition had improved and thus that he should not be found to be a person subject involuntary admission court every hundred eighty days for another hearing and i would also assume since this court sits in chester illinois that most of the inmates of chester make that same trip to this courthouse  hundred eighty days for these kind of hearings either there or the trials are sometimes depending upon the judge held at the facility but yes that's correct and so certainly for this court a significant part of their docket are these i would assume that is correct so finally i how do we deal with the fact that apparently this court adopted a policy that these hearings would not take place all summer long in other words that purely from the t come despite the language of the statute that these hearings have to be held within a certain time and continuance is going to be fifteen days this court has a policy of not doing juries for mental health all summer long doesn't factor into our analysis i would like to try and clarify the reason for the postponement in the jury about it's not stated in the record but my understanding is that that these cases are postponed on a regular basis for that period of time again the statute pursued bribes the time crew the court generally complies with that time period we're not aware of any pattern or policy of disregarding the time period but jury demands are somewhat unusual in these cases it's an important statutory right it's not a constitutional right but it's an important statutory right but it is really invoked in this case the fact that the respondent first said i want an independent examination then he said after the first continuance i want to jury trial appears somewhat to be an effort to try and string along the case in a way that maybe he was hoping for you know you know salvation to come from from the heavens but the reason i believe that the that this court in this smaller county has jury trial schedule for this type of proceeding only every three months is to comedy the speedy trial schedule for criminal cases and they can accommodate that speedy trial schedule whenever a criminal defendant makes a speedy trial demand by having veneers o juries come in in some and every ninety days for these criminal case a jury demand it in a involuntary given case is quite unusual that said if this court holds that when there was a jury demand and it is made in a timely fashion and i'll leave it to the side for a second what constitutes a jury timely timely jury demand and i mentioned that in briefs if the court rules that the circuit court must then schedule jury trial within say fifteen days which is where the mental health code says essentially is the permissible time for one continuance not of the respondents request i believe but have subjective checking with the clerk that there is a reasonable time within which the clerk  notify them that they would have to appear in schedule a trial but they can't do it at the drop of a hand and when you haven't responded who at the last possible moment did that at the stroke of midnight says oh by the way i want to jury come in and i have to have it now or jeep get out of jail free card or its equivalent that can't be a proper interpretation of these provisions of the mental health code put together that the appellate court's ruling here is essentially that the jury demand can be made up to the moment that the first witness is sworn war opening statements began given the strict deadline that exists in these cases for conducting these trials that cannot possibly be the relevant that there is not a deadline in the statute for making a jury demand it doesn't mean that there is no deadline you can't roll the dice on a jury trial and acted on it on a bench trial and then afterward say oh by the way i want a jury there has to be some deadline and the co essentially is given the responsibility to set that deadline and we think that the brazill tim case reaches a sensible accommodation of filling the gap in the statute by saying it must be a reasonable time after the case begins and in these cases if the first hearing which has to be within five days is certainly a reasonable time that would be a safe harbor time in which somebody could make a jury demand and the appellate court in essence relies upon other cases in which a jury demand was made at that first hearing it says it's reasonable but then it read language from those cases which we think is dicta to say it any time before the opening statements have begun and the first witness is called is reasonable we disagree with that in light of the fact that it creates an inherent problem and it invites this type of one two punch for a procedural loop pool where a respondent first gets a continuance by asking for an independent examination and then at the eve of the trial deadline in these cases demands a jury trial knowing that in most of the counties of this state that's impossible to accommodate you can't summon a jury on twenty four hours notice and then if we do since we discuss in one hundred eighty day commitment was the continuance for ninety seven days a reasonable one for the court to enter i am not going to take the position that as a matter of law in the abstract that is objective lee a reasonable period of time what i will say is that because the respondent himself triggered the delay and if the court accept the premise that his jury trial the man was late and the work then had discretion to impose conditions upon granting the jury trial the response of payment he volunteered his statement i'll wait a stab which is that at least in this case that amount of the way was reasonable especially where he did not say wait a minute can't we do something to move th can't we have a special sitting of a jury he didn't complain about that he essentially said i'm going nowhere no way so reasonable this in the abstract i think is a hard thing to decide i would certainly say that in the normal case a minimum continuance occasioned by the respondent similar to what happens in a speedy trial like cases of fifteen days would be would be a safe harbor definition of reasonable but in this case we believe it's reasonable in light of the respondents own response to the court's indication that the next scheduled jury sitting for this category of case was going to be in ninety plus days the the quantum is labor think considerably to try and clarify some of the confusion misunderstanding or even a disagreement among the lower courts about the distinction between mandatory and directory statutory provisions we think that's an important clarification and we submit that there are a lot of cases come up through the pipeline to the sport where that issue is going to continue to rise including specifically with respect to the mental health code and if the court does reach this issue which is which is the one that was specifically included in the people's pos regarding the distinction between mandatory and directory provision of the statute we submit that it is appropriate if the legislature doesn't say that the function impliedly treating that can that requirement as mandatory may make sense that's consistent with the court's precedent in election cases it affects the outcome if mandatory but doesn't affect the outcome probably it director the same thing should apply to adjudicate to proceeding said here where you have a procedural requirement that doesn't bear upon the guilt or innocence determination or the commitment versus not committed determination it is a very strong medicine to say that the legislature impliedly intended to have automatic notification be the necessary consequence of a violation especially where there are plenty of alternative remedies that could be applied if they  timely fashion again a stitch in time saves nine hundred can't wait for the little tear in the fabric to become some giant went and then say we'll just throw the thing away when you have the opportunity to fix the problem in the first place and the problem is unrelated to the ultimate factual determination and the outcome of the case we'll see when i caved in when you talk about fixed the problem at the time one of the because a couple of the things you suggested one was discharge pending the trial the other one was giving him credit i believe for if you were found to be that he should be committed giving him credit against the hundred eighty days with regard to your do your  concerns you say there is no prejudice is a part of the record or should bear on our consideration of the due process question of whether to respond  i think it should again the due process analysis is part of the traditional harmless error doctrine and its civil cognate the united states supreme court has said that every due process violation implicate questionis of the result it doesn't mean that there isn't a violation of there's no error it just means that the error didn't have any effect upon the outcome and so the remedy should not be to nullify the final judgment in the case is that part of the record as to counsel and so the the if you have a requirement that does not go to the truth finding the function and the ultimate outcome of the case and you can't show that type of prejudice maybe a mandatory reading makes sense where that is the only meaningful remedy that will fulfill the statutes purposes but that is not the case nor has it been established that that's the case in this type of circumstance where what you have is a delay past the trial to struggling to say well a little bit of delay is ok because it is reasonable therefore not prejudicial even though i think everybody realizes that it must be prejudicial in the fundamental sense that somebody is being detained without judicial review as to whether they should be detained but in those circumstances there are other meaningful remedies there are remedies that can be tailored to fit the wrong and the will of the court should have done up i think can benefit from this analysis that focuses on whether the violation does in fact affect the outcome and whether there are alternative remedies that will fill fulfill the statutory purpose thank you at the tail end of his argument with respect to the mandatory directory situation what is this court to do with the recent case law that this seems to indicate that when the word cheryl is used with the same strate legislative history of the code it is to protect the respondents rights and also to protect society but it is to the purposes of the code is to protect their rights through this process through the general liberty when they keep parts of it is a prompt hearing so we would argue that shelly should be considered mandatory because it's generally the way in that the felling you're to comply with that would generally just advantage way the average person being committed if you would like for that briefing on this we can submit it later on this but that's my understanding versus the directory versus mandatory nature of this stew process requirement for a person being committed is a right to the independent evaluation and right to be placed in the we should restrictive environment and because of the liberty interest in law on this court and others have said that the mental health core code should be construed in favor of the respondents rights through this on the mental health statutory scheme on promotes this promise of a hearing and briefly when a person gets committed within twelve hours they receive a copy of their rights within twenty four hours the petition must be filed within five days a hearing must be held on me and winters are limited to fifteen days for the state in the court and must be no eight hundred b where it does say the fifteen gay women in the six eleven which is the five business days does not make it distinguishment between a bench trial or jury trial or a petition for continuing com is to try to comply with the promise element with the commitment and the legislative intent was actually for a quick hearing under the mental health code the governor's commission for mental health which is considered the legislative history of this actually wanted even a quicker hearing forty eight hours to address the lack of probable cause hearing but the legislature decided that the five day was sufficient for the mo on just with the element of shallow on the step she uses mandatory shall and because these provisions are to protect the rights of the respondent we would restrictive environment to says faggy process and to review it furthermore that there is a strong interest in seeing promoting and revealing of this because it cost the state hundreds of dollars for each day a person is to tell me what's wrong with the sentences factually and you'll know as soon as i read the first couple of words it cannot be the law why this should be the law it reads it cannot be the law that a person subject to an involuntary commitment petition on the grounds that he is mentally ill and dangerous can deal with later trial by successfully invoking multiple statutory rights until the case can no longer be tried before the deadline established by section three dish eight hundred of the mental health code and then claim after losing a jury trial you requested that missing in the gulf dead line of fire the entire proceeding and then he goes on to say yep that is the position taken by responding here who makes no claim of the circuit boards failure to comply with that mine in any way prejudiced him with respect to the ultimate outcome of the case so when you look at wrong with what he's saying there are rationally and i know you psychiatric hospital and they have the delay of freedom for the poor in a mental health hospital they actually have a more restriction of rights than in a jail like i've been there they actually are and sometimes even well pens and pencils and and it's also a dangerous place for him james debbie actually got hit in the i had a broken facial so there is prejudice he really and i think the state and normal civil case for for sure is the issue or induced error then mental health case because the hero is basically considered way after the time of the commitment he does not gain any really material benefit by inducing error in this case so everything more it's not him who chose the court date it was the judge the judge said i can hear this in august you know there is a position power where because of the mental health code the crimes are induced they're actually promoted to respect authority if they challenge authority in the mental health system they get it actually in chester a bad mark so you know the court has a was short the ways are considered as substantial compliance with the mental health code this court has acknowledged the importance of the procedures and if the circuit courts are pretty weak if there is substantial compliance like for example someone didn't get actual notice but there were there are now the petition was filed one day blame there wasn't you know prejudice or it is that part of this respect it would take waiver off the table because they're told to respect authority there's no obligation on the curd of the respondent to say i want it in fifteen days do it well i think  not benefit from establishing this and there was really no substantial compliance in this issue one fast thing about remedy these cases are very important i handle the chester appeals when there is a alternatives which what happened here there was no disclosure there was no issue of whether he had the capacity to way since then the third step strict has reversed those cases and now they have the proper hearings for them or there ha been issues where they used to do sixteen medications ordered involuntary commitment urine involuntary medication since reversal that they've been more winded so the reversal it's a public interest exception in this the reversal of this sends the message to the circuit court that they have to comply with the mental health code you can chester's not that but when our county is not unsophisticated place with this they have mental health courts every week and there is a benefit for jury trial for these clients because they get a rule robust here i was there in used to be they had six hearings in a half an hour so the clients knew if they had a jury hearing they would have hearing in this park and furthermore one time quick by reversing these issues and mental health case they don't get credit for time served which is a distinction between the criminal court so you're going to be treated with regarding the prejudice i think that there was no prejudice in the trial itself or the outcome of the prejudice that is results from it's being held in ninety seven days and not getting credit for that time at the set correct right and the countries have been detained he could this is i think the state is trying to shift that outcome ok well he got committed so the procedural process does not it's not important but in this case it's the ones who are the most mentally ill are the most entitle and that's why you may it please the court i think everybody is somewhat troubled by this case it presented difficult facts and presents multiple difficult issues of law and i don't have the lack of humility to predict exactly which issues the blue dress and how it's going to rule on those but but i do understand the importance of the liberty interest in stake and we do want to emphasize that the state is not taking the position that this trial deadline is somehow a meaningless piece of paper our position is that if the court rules that that is a directory obligation that that is a statutory duty that the circuit courts are going to be required to comply with but it doesn't mean that the remedy is automatic   cation reversal is not the necessary message as an automatic remedy in the event of noncompliance to tell the circuit courts that this is the this is what's necessary to to fulfill the purpose of that statute a directory reading would be equally valid and i think more appropriately attributed to the general assembly and given the nature of the statute the general assembly knows how to make automatic notification explicit in a statute they've done that with a speedy trial and they've done that in the mental health code itself which repeatedly says for certain circumstances if a deadline is not met the respondent shall be discharged so that it is not necessary to h mandatory reading of the statute to get the message across to the circuit court what the remedy should be i think depends to a certain extent upon when it is raised when the problem is involved there is a suggestion that the respondents in these cases don't have any incentive to delay the proceedings or to forego complaining about objections it seems to me that if the court treats this statute as being mandatory they have every incentive not to complain about it well the problem can be best be addressed the injury that the statute is intended to avoid can most successfully and effectively be fulfilled by a timely objection and there is no argument that that's not the case here that if the respondent had said your honor i don't think ninety seven days is reasonable it's sort of like going into a restaurant without a reservation and the maitre d says well you have it a table next to the kitchen i usually say well do you have another better table because there's another restaurant you know down the street this person didn't have another restaurant down the street to go to but he didn't have counsel and to the extent that he sat on his hands didn't object and waited for the jury trial and then only then said headcounts ok but but and you're saying looking back now that was impossible to make it work to comply does the state not have an obligation to say judge we got to get this goes with earlier at that time on that one it's that out x number  you're telling us that the responded should have taken that table the rest what about this they'd say no way you know this isn't going to work either from our point of view i have difficulty in opposing upon the prosecutor the responsibility to ensure the appropriate representation of the other side and i understand that government attorneys representing the people have an ethical obligation to ensure that justice is done but there are limits to that and i think plain there are risks out of the you know the boundary line that is often drawn to distinguish between situations in which the prosecutor has sort of the sort of responsibility to say hey wait a minute let's not create a reversible error situation here let's try and fix it in retrospect it's hard to know whether the prosecutor or even the court should have said hey if you don't like that let's see what we can do but if there is a cost incurred in having clerks set up a special setting of a jury and for the to impose upon the court the obligation to do that in hindsight i don't know is fair if the court says in the future you better get it done and you better get it done within so many weeks after a timely jury demand is made that's a horse of a different color and in those circumstances certainly i think the prosecutor the people's representative it would be incumbent upon that person to say you want to pay we know the law here of the supreme court has spoken but let's not wait ninety seven days so i think i think that is relevant there is nothing in the record as to why there was so much delay but one of the reasons for that is that the respondent neither the respondent nora's counsel said your honor come can we do something soon or here he had been in custody first i guess seven years straight so the idea that a jury was going to somehow find him in light of all this evidence and that subject about one thirty admission may have been a bit of a wishful thinking here but the key point here is that if this problem is flying to the circuit court's attention in a timely fashion there are alternative remedies that will fulfill the purpose of section three dash eight hundred and accordingly it is that we believe that proper to interpret that provision is implied italy having a mandatory consequence of automatic notification the legislature should not be assumed to have intended that by silence when they know how to express that type of consequence where for this to the provision it's not in one where the injury that the statute intends to prevent is one this unrelated to the ultimate outcome of the  forfeiture grounds or because of the question regarding when a jury demand it must be made to have the unqualified right of the respondent they have a jury and finally would respect to the issue of whether section three days she eight hundred should be interpreted as mandatory or instead as directory it's always an allegation we're not disputing that the question is what should be the consequence from that when the legislature has not said that it's per se reversible error in a situation where the