weapons a far reaching nuclear nonproliferation network run by dr a q khan of pakistan and dismantle nuclear arms rivalries have intensified in asia in the middle east changes in nuclear power programs challenge the nonproliferation regime the spread of biotechnology has increased availability of technology for sinister purposes dangerous chemical r the president made that commitment is already undertaking that ambitious effort to ensure that the u s does whatever we can do to reduce the risk that weapons of mass destruction related material  ever fall into terrorists this includes an international effort to secure vulnerable nuclear material around the world within four years an effort to expand u s cooperation with russia and pursue new partnerships chairman for holding today's hearing on addressing a new generation of threats from weapons of mass destruction with a particular focus on efforts underway in the department of energy's nonproliferation programs and the department of defense is cooperative threat reduction program i'd also like to welcome our witnesses thomas undersecretary for security at the department of energy an administrator of the national nuclear security administration and dr michael knocked the assistant secretary of defense for global strategic affairs gentlemen thank you for being here this morning we look forward to your testimony as a chairman said to my first full committee hearing as ranking member i want to take a break moment the express my sincere and to see as i'm an amendment to work with chairman steele and our members on both sides of the aisle to ensure that america's men and women in uniform have the direction tools and resources they need to succeed that are that our defense policy evolving security demands facing our nation today we're focused on the next generation the threats i think it's fair to say that many would agree that we live in a complex security environment that includes nuclear capable states nations determined to be nuclear powers and terrorists who seek nuclear materials and know how if we look to the latest headlines in the news will find a defiant north korea which  international community with its nuclear test multiple ballistic missile launches and proliferation of knowledge and expertise a calculating iranian regime that is determined to develop its capabilities to build nuclear weapons and al qaeda and their affiliates who seek to undermine the pakistani government and nation with nuclear weapons program it's how we approach the w m d threat where we may have some disagreements from perspective we need a balanced and effective tool kit filled with unilateral and multilateral tools of nonproliferation counterproliferation and military preparedness including missile defense and emergency response today were focused on one set of tools at our disposal defense nonproliferation programs managed by the department of energy and the cooperative threat reduction program managed by the department of defense gentlemen i look forward to hearing your individual assessments of the major proliferation challenges facing the united states and the international community and how your respective organizations prioritize to meet these challenges i'm also interested in learning your thoughts on u russia nonproliferation cooperation as you know earlier this month president obama met with russian president dmitry medvedev and then a joint statement both nations confirmed their commitment to strengthen cooperation to prevent the not the proliferation of nuclear weapons and stop acts of terrorism based on this renewed commitment what will be the impact of anything on your existing programs with russia and in terms of  at this time i'd also like to raise two concerns first of all i recognize that addressing the w m d proliferation threat is in u s national security interests our success depends on our partnerships with russia and other nations i'm concerned that the united states often gets stuck paying the bills especially for those nations who have the financial means to contribute let me emphasize that a partnership is not a one way street it's not an assistance program and it is not effortless please describe how you are working with other nations to ensure they take the proliferation threat seriously and how they are contributing both in terms of capital and financial political and financial capital to address our share proliferation interests second in the recently passed national defense authorization act both the n s a and the d o d received funding above the president's budget request for their non proliferation programs while i support the bill that we passed i am concerned that the additional four hundred two point six million provided to the n s a came without a formal request from the administrator or secretary of energy and was based on a big commitment made during president  's april to speech in prague where he outlined his vision i quote to secure all vulnerable nuclear material around the world within the next four years and quote my concern is that where funding programs before the president's rhetoric has translated into an integrated interagency strategy or plan that has been shared with congress as further evidence of my concerns neither our colleagues on the senate armed services committee nor the house  provide additional funding for and in defense nonproliferation programs in addition both of these committees also reduce funding for it and then yes a program to disable and dismantle north korea's nuclear program next year north korea's rejection of the six party talks and recent provocative actions are strong indicators that the international community will be in a stalemate with north korea for the foreseeable future considering the circumstances would rather see this funding and additional increases designated by the committee for these programs be shifted to other priorities such as given the current threat before closing i want to reiterate that our nonproliferation programs are essential to u s national security interests especially our efforts to keep nuclear materials out of the hands of terrorists gentleman i look forward to your testimony in a candid discussion of follows and thank you  address today our subset of the department of energy's overall capabilities to address the weapons of mass destruction through these activities compliment the department's other recognized nonproliferation arms control and counterterrorism capabilities however my remarks today focus on our first and second line of defense activities to prevent the spread of weapons of mass destruction of materials and of technology president made clear in his april speech  in joint statements with our russian partners and elsewhere but nuclear weapons remain a fundamental issue facing the international community in the twenty first century that the most immediate and extreme threat to global security is  potential acquisition of nuclear weapons by terrorists to address the president has outlined an ambitious strategy to deal with the nuclear arsenals of weapons two additional states and prevent terrorists from acquiring weapons or the materials to build them i've had the opportunity to speak to members of this committee on the important work that the n s a has done and the enterprise carries out to ensure that nuclear united weapons stockpile remain safe secure and reliable to deter any adversary and to prevent the appropriate defensive umbrella to our allies while i'm speaking today about a major separate component of the n s a the nonproliferation component of our national security mission relies upon similar scientific and technical expertise it is that scientific and technical nuclear expertise combined with our proven track record on implementing programs in both domestically and abroad  vides a priority list of areas in which n s a will focus future nuclear security activities chief among those is the president's call vulnerable nuclear materials around the world and for years expand our cooperation with russia and pursue new partnerships to lock down these sensitive materials this is an urgent and ambitious goal however it is one that we stand prepared to support our work scope includes a priority basis of activities required to address security concerns specific sites worldwide and n s a will take the following actions to expand nuclear security cooperation with russia and other key partners secure nuclear material at the most vulnerable sites worldwide remove and eliminate weapons usable nuclear materials where possible strengthen international security standards practices and international safeguards improve international capabilities to detect and intercept smuggling of nuclear materials and to prevent terrorists from poaching on the international market in the dual use nuclear weapons related equipment and technologies to start addressing the for your timeline to secure vulnerable material some existing a activities will be accelerated including our material protection control and accounting program at our global threat reduction initiative and our nonproliferation and international security programs other aspects of the present agenda will or expanded efforts but in short we have our to do list this plan of work alone will not accomplish all of the president's nuclear security objectives under the leadership of the white house we work closely with the department of state department of defense homeland security and others which even the schools the joint statement on nuclear cooperation issued by presidents obama and medvedev in russia just last week as well as the march two thousand and ten global nuclear security summit announced the g eight summit in italy likewise a solid foundation for work with our international partners in closing as the administrator of the n s a i'm very proud of the work in accomplishments of an operation program that we have for the sake of not taking up too much of the committee's time today have not covered our other numerous activities and accomplishments in my oral statement however i have included the details on our nonproliferation programs and the achievements in written testimony you have my assurance that as we continue to support work to achieve the president's girls while closely working with our inner agency partners and n s a will do its best to make the world a safer place to chairman and members of the committee thank you very and i too have submitted written testimony for the record mr chairman and members of the services committee i'm very pleased to appear before you today to discuss these terrible threats posed by weapons of mass destruction and explain how the department of defense cooperate threat reduction program plays an important role in the overall u s strategy to mitigate these threats we all know that weapons of mass destruction pose a tremendous threat to our nation our interests and even our way of life and the department of fantasies with this challenge and we are determined to ensure that we develop and maintain the plans strategies capabilities and programs necessary to prevent proliferation wherever possible the undersecretary of defense for policy has identified four strategic priorities that provide our department with a mechanism for examining w m d challenges these four priorities are increasing barriers to w m c pullup ration and use identifying and mitigating emergent w m d threats developing an integrated layered these priorities provide a valuable framework to support the president's ambitious nuclear security agenda from his prague speech within d o d these priorities are shaping our efforts to address w m d related issues in the  defense review the q d r which is currently underway q d r provides an unparalleled opportunity to communicate the importance of w m d issues to the broader defense community let me briefly offer the committee  report on our current and future c t r activities and before i begin i do want to thank the committee for its continued strong support for the co op with their reduction program in the national defense authorization act the school year two thousand  and we take this as a vote of confidence in the parliament efforts thus far to implement the c t r program the chairman i know you and your colleagues are well acquainted with the history and activities of the of the program i just want to bring you up to date briefly on the status of some current projects some recent achievements and then some new initiatives c t r today is in a period of transition from a nuclear centric effort focused on the former soviet union to a more expansive effort to respond to w m d threats throughout the world c t r continues to oversee the destruction of strategic weapons delivery systems and associated infrastructure in accordance with all relevant st provisions and agreements security systems at twenty four nuclear weapons storage sites in russia have been upgraded in partnership with department of energy with the final upgrades completed in late two thousand and eight last year o d and v o a are now coordinating closely to give the russian military the means to sustain operational readiness into the future on march fifth of this year the first chemical munitions were destroyed in the shoot she chemical weapons a struct facility by two thousand and twelve the facility will destroy the chemical weapons stockpile at the nearby plan of the military base which contains approximately one seventh of russia's chemical arsenal azerbaijan c t r was helping the coast guard interdict w m d's smuggling in the caspian sea and we are installing a comprehensive surveillance system that will cover the major shipping lanes in the caspian and by the way  congressman mckeon i can cite some specific or sharing examples here perhaps and after i finish my test in the biological threat reduction program the b t r p continues its work to consolidate and secure pathogen collections develop a capability for disease detection diagnostics and reporting an enhanced scene to teach and research partnerships we've negotiated and implementing agreement with armenia which is pending signature this construction of the central reference laboratory in tbilisi georgia which is on track to be completed this year at the quest of the georgian government c t r was working to make the lab a joint disease surveillance and research center these are ongoing activities today what about the future first we must continue to have a strong c t r presence in russia as the president attempts to reset our relationship with russia w is currently assessing known locations of nuclear materials to determine the best way forward this initiative is a high priority for the president and c t r looks forward to assist in this effort in addition to c t r program is bracing for a wide range of emerg a national research council report on the biological threat reduction program noted that countries that lack the infrastructure necessary to detect diagnose and report disease outbreaks are at a greater risk of succumbing to a bio terror attack dual us technologies materials and expertise flow freely across international borders dangerous pathogens exist in nature and can be weaponized without special equipment or advanced technical skills to the increasing threat of animal to human transfer of pathogens underscores the importance of reporting on animal disease outbreaks as well as human to meet this threat the biological threat reduction program has built facilities such as the joint us georgia disease surveillance and research center that will have the unique capability of conducting research on both human and animal especially dangerous pathogens the t r p will continue to grow and evolve a c t r shift from a nuclear focus to more expansive vision for threat reduction efforts let me conclude my remarks by endorsing the new legal authorities this committee has included in the n d a i wish to emphasize to the committee that the odi understand the sensitivities associated with the use of these authorities and we will only utilize them within the guidelines set forth in the legislation so in conclusion mr chairman i would say c t r was one piece of an overarching national strategy to counter w have made significant progress over the history of the program but we have more to do across the growing spectrum of w m d threats department defense looks forward to continue close coordination congress and its interagency partners as we seek to address the threat radiological material can cause also panic if you will but may not have the destructive power that we have our look at both areas but it's all about the material so we have a program working with the defense department that integrates the whole material spectrum problem looking to secure material where it exists around the world is a key part of it and reducing the number of locations the material eliminating material trying to get rid of that has a material that has no energy value if you will converting highly and converting material from highland richer into low enriched uranium detecting material as it moves around the world having a specific program to focus on material detection and then ultimately stop adding to the material problem with programs and ideas as a material cut off treaty and reopening the discussion internationally get those pieces together so the threats come down to the material was kind of like that  real estate adage location location location i think it's material material material obviously technology and policies are big part of that but that's how i like to think about this as problems are so you d know because president obama some agree answered that question in prague when he said the most immediate and extreme threat to global security is a nuclear weapon in the hands of terrorists within the department of defense we are very much emphasizing that it is most expeditious to stop the proliferation of w m d at its source once it gets out into a transportation network it's much harder to interdict let me give you about several examples of how what's right to do this in cooperation with the department of energy will last year finish physical protection upgrades at every russian nuclear weapons storage site for which u s assistance has been requested to enhance the security of those sites make it less feasible for material to be stolen currently the two departments continue to work closely with the russian ministry of defense to develop a cadre of military personnel capable of operating maintaining and repairing those security systems far into the future in an effort to address the inside of threat which is really sensual to stopping the flow of material from the source we work closely with the russian  the three agencies of the m o d and russia and india we are involved in further developing m l g personnel liability programs intended to ensure that personnel within with access to eliminating nuclear arms in the delivery vehicles of course nuclear weapons are not the only form of w m d that poses a threat even using even in the hands of terrorists as i mentioned in the past already the  a great deal of attention focused on the securing all vulnerable nuclear material worldwide and for years again it's my understanding that at this time neither the department of energy or the department of defense or this congress has seen a formal strategy plan or timeline would you please tell us when should the congress expect to receive such a formal strategy or plan looked at our program which is structured as i mentioned earlier on securing material addressing what and being able to detect movement of items cross the world and looked at those elements of our program trying to push the end date which some of which are out in the twenty six twenty eight time frame and moving them closer within the next four year period so the scope of work that we've laid out we have we don't have an approved plan my process however in the meantime i don't need to have a final approved plan to know what work i have in front of me because i have a good sense of it and so we're looking at recalibrating the internals of our program to address what we think are the most vulnerable and most important areas to address and then the inner agency process as you've described in your opening remarks are exactly where ultimately i'd like to see this go this is not just about the n s a or this is not just about the department of give you a date it'll take a bit of time to sort out all those pieces but in the meantime i think dr knox and i have we know about our work that we have cut out for in front of us and we want to celebrate those pieces that we can particularly with our global server duction initiative in the national security administration as well as with our material protection and accounting program that we have those two pieces coupled with the right policy and safeguards framework will ultimately get us a lot closer to where we need to be four years from now and developing an overall strategy which is in progress there are several parts to this process that i can cite first where defining and scoping the problem in terms of the definitions and thresholds for vulnerable materials what is it we really are looking for what's included in our effort to lock down and what is exclusivity we are refining and prioritizing the list of key facilities and sources of all the materials worldwide we define where the problem is best addressed to expanding an accelerating existing programs where new activities and programs will be required to include an evaluation of roles and missions of the major departments in the federal government and i believe that we could be able to return to you in september and provide a more detailed report on the proposed way forward so you're expecting by september to give us the plan i'm optimistic that we will have something to report to you in september the n s c of course is overseeing this they're taking the lead on it of in terms of coordination and we're all on the job on this we know how critically important it is not only something that's been restated by president obama it was now endorsed at the g eight summit  able to we have an element of our plan we have our work scope identified and the key will be making sure that it's that our priority not just within the department of energy but our consistent with the rest of the federal government  n having those things lined up and mesh up nicely i believe we will have a plan that i'm comfortable with as you as you obviously know we are in the process of defining our fiscal year two thousand and eleven and out your program the details i have a personal desire and i know dr knox as well to make sure that things get settled quickly as possible on this plan because it helps inform the kind of program i will ultimately submit to the white house and negotiate to get into the president's budget next january so i think i will have enough information from a draft standpoint i don't know if it will be ready for congress yet but frankly i'm pushing very hard i know doc in office pushing very hard to get this thing done we understand it this is our it's a  focal point and we understand that this is the thing that's going to help us shape the details of our program whether more money needs to be put in category category where the priorities are we're right on top of that because it is important the president's quite serious about this plan sir i haven't talked to him personally about it but i have talked to my contacts at the national security council are very clear that we're going to get we're going to put together a plan we're going to work the details of it  i don't know when the cortical the official start date might be you know my view is the president said said he wants a plan done within four years i know what i know the date he said it i think it's april fo to communicate to this committee correct yes of course as soon as the plan is fully ready we will communicate this to the committee and then maybe ways we can brief you offline or in closed session  time the congress to continue the treaty while the ratification process goes forward but we're hopeful very hopeful that a treaty will be reached an agreement will be reached on a new treaty before december that was submitted to the senate and the relevant house committees as well but the consent for ratification which would then take place senator lugar has stated publicly it might take four months or so sometime by the spring of two thousand and ten we would hope to have a new agreement now the summit as you know from the joint understanding did reflect a lot of hard bargaining that's already taken place we haven't agreed range of operationally deployed strategic nuclear  weapons of fifteen hundred to six hundred seventy five we have an agreed range of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles five to eleven hundred each side has argued for one side or the other we've now bounded the problem and i think we can see our way through to an agreement on both those characteristics of the forces which are critically critically important there are other elements of the treaty as well and definitional issues that have to be resolved so there's a lot of hard negotiating head but i think our read out of the summit was that the russians although they're challenging to work with want an agreement actually their nuclear delivery vehicle programs are lagging by quite a lot in america leigh just the atrophying of their systems they're putting more weapons on fuel delivery vehicles which actually is quite destabilizing we would prefer to have single warhead weapons on delivery vehicles so it's not seen as a first strike weapon so this suggests to me  they may be evil they are not stupid they know and i suspect the true same is true of iran they know that if they launched a missile from their soil nuclear tipped that the quantum consequences of that would be that we would say prize their country gentleman they're just not going to do that i have no idea why we're watching to see when they get a missile which could reach us from their soil they are not going to launch a missile from their soil toward us if they launch a missile toward us it will be from the sea and if they if it is nuclear tipped the most probable use of that weapon is going to be to produce  detonation it really won't matter will it the most probable place the weapons are going to be launched from is this and the most probable use of the weapon is going to be an e m p attack why am i not seeing any meaningful preparation protect us against either one of these well let me just take a piece of what you said when the north koreans started testing missiles most recently after they tested a nuclear device secretary gates ordered redeployment of missile defense system the system and an aegis system to protect the why and island we are working on services if i might interrupt that's because we thought they were going to launch from their soil and the current missile would only reach a while you wouldn't reach our main line i'm saying that they are not going to launch from their soil they may be able they are not stupid they're not going to launch on their soil they're going to launch from the sea which means that all up and down both of our coast we are vulnerable why am i not seeing any meaningful preparation to protect us against that and if they do launch their most probable use of that weapon it's in all of their open letter journal all of their war games and if a non state actor had it that is absolutely what they would do is going to be an extra atmospheric detonation producing e m p i'm not seeing any meaningful preparation to prepare for that attack either why am i not seeing any preparations for either these two which are the most probable way that the missile is going to be used in the most probable way the nuclear weapons going to be detonated with respect to possible e m p attacks on the united states there is work being done which we could discuss in another venue with respect to a sea based system there are no current platforms or delivery vehicles available to the north koreans to launch an attack on the u s homeland  following of the korean ship the north korean port toward burma that turned around just recently we have excellent surveillance of all the north korean naval vessels so there are thousands of commercial ships out there and canvass is over you cannot tell whether it's a stack of bananas or a missile launcher on the deck we can't covering on the deck there is no way in today's world that we could detect whether that cargo on the deck is a launcher or caterpillar tractors i think congressman you made some good points and i think we can continue this perhaps with members of the defense intelligence agency and others you thank you general mr marshall please thank you chairman i second third and fourth what my colleague mr bartlett had to say this is so obvious one of the reasons why i agreed to co chair the missile defense caucus we are not adequately prepared to deal with missiles and a rogue missile launch the way mr bartlett described it would just be absolutely devastating to the united states significantly weaken the united states it would obviously be in the interests of all of our adversaries to do that and the possible consequences that human consequences within the united states are just  of additional funds available to you how would you what would you be doing with those funds how would you modify the program improve the program expand the program those sorts of resources one point immediately we are moving substantially into the bio terrorism threat space and we're still at the early stages it's not easy to collaborate with other countries on this or that we've made some progress a lot of the systems we're talking about a system that can be used to perfectly legitimate commercial research activities we could really scope out a broader effort to try to develop something that might begin to move down the road toward a locked out of pathogens even though it would be even more they deny that there is any malevolent intent or any military application so this we can't prove that we don't have the intelligence to know definitively so we need collaboration that sometimes comes actually from a broader framework i mean take for example the case of georgia georgia was invaded by russia last summer georgia has all kinds of security concerns we have signed an agreement that basically pledges to maintain their security they're very keen on collaborating with us even though it's a very sensitive matter dealing with their russian neighbors on this so there we have a substantial new program for a biological laboratory in georgia but other countries don't have that sense of security needs or concerns they don't think they're a transit point for bioterrorism and they're just more reticent sometimes funds can help if we say we'll put a down payment down on this activity or pay the majority share in the first tranche you know they might be more inches so i think additional funds could help but we you know we've been very careful not to go to the committee or the congress for requests for funds that we know we can't use effectively and right and you know you've been generous enough to support beyond our requests so you know we have not submitted we don't have a list really of  end we know how many facilities we're working on we've said we were going to work on in russia we've laid out that scope we know how many buildings we said we want to secure in russia we know how many ports and land crossings we have in russia and around the we've got sustainability agreements this is the this is the key point and i think you're absolutely right is making sure we have a transition plan with tom for example which is one of our major partners in russia we defense which we work closely with the defense department has already agreed that they are taking care of one hundred percent of the security that we jointly worked on so we are very very much in the mind of making sure that this is not the gift that keeps on giving if you will is a this is something where the we expect partnership relationship and frankly i'm pleased with the partnership relationship and given one more example the federal customs service in russia for example right now with them we are working on putting security upgrades at three hundred seventy land border crossings with the agreement right off the bat is they do fifty percent of the work we do fifty percent of the work and on the fifty percent of the work that we do they're picking up the maintenance costs on those facilities bit by bit so that over the next three years they'll have one hundred percent of the maintainability on that covered now of course we're going to watch them to make sure they follow through on talks about the training and export control and making sure that we are obviously have the majority of the material and the warheads we have a certain obligation significant obligation in that matter  because of our partnership with russia other nations have watched and we have agreement with our second line of defense activities where this isn't just a matter of the united states going over some foreign force will take care of everything we're going to  this is a tough nut and it's been an issue that's been addressed at least going back to the early clinton years so we're talking about at least a fifteen year old problem the fact of the matter is that there are many lucrative commercial arrangements between private entities in a number of allied countries with iran that  helpful because it was so many dimensions to our relationships with the european partners that you know we can go it's a very important matter but if we go overboard in this area we may pay a price in another area so i think with this is an area under review where we're struggling with it and we're looking for it's a very tailored approach have an overall policy i think because the situation is so different i mean to to to alter chinese behavior about acquisition of oil was orses from iran is one whole problem dealing with heavy machinery from siemens in germany to iran is a different problem dealing with the russians on their nuclear technologies we have not yet derived an umbrella approach to this problem but we're open to ideas it's critically important obviously as long iran believes and knows that they're not really being hurt very much economically and their economy is not in good shape as we all know then it gives them less of an incentive to  to alter their behavior or to sit down and talk with us in a meaningful way about the nuclear program to shift gears a little bit we saw with the outbreak of h one n one in mexico that we have places right their own backyard where there p with natural outbreaks but also having a surveillance system in place that that potentially can be helpful in bio terror attacks as well obviously the earlier we can detect the nerve agent elimination plan in russia they're helping to pay for the limitation of a plant in russia that we are helping with the russians to eliminate but it's british and canadian funding supporting that so there's a mix of country in the budget that was put forth by the president requested funding for the disablement and dismantlement of north korea's nuclear weapons program during our com markup i noted that the request for the disablement and dismantlement in north korea's nuclear weapons program totaled eighty million dollars that was the president's budget request at the same time the president requested a cut of one hundred twenty million dollars in missile defense funding that would have completed part of the missile field at fort greely alaska so we're setting aside eighty million dollars to  disablement and dismantlement of north korea's nuclear weapons program and we're eliminating one hundred twenty million dollars to finish a missile defense field that was two thirds of the way complete in greely alaska i offered an amendment that was defeated to offset that to take the eighty million dollars for north korea and offset it on one hundred twenty million that we were losing to actually defend ourselves now i support  nonproliferation programs and i certainly support this management and the disablement of north korea's nuclear program i am highly skeptical that kim jong il will return to the negotiation table and allow the united committee that north korea's return to the six party talks talks was impossible if not impossible i believe that those funds could be better spent i fear that we're going to the end of the year in that eighty million dollars is still going to be there sitting there  you only have to look at north korea's recent actions the six party talks have come to a complete halt north korea conducted another nuclear test on north korea did u s international inspectors north korea reverse most of the initial disable that was underway north korea has repeatedly tested crews and ballistic missiles to include intercontinental ballistic missile which threatens our homeland it appears that many senior officials within the obama administration are coming to the realization that the six party and diplomatic engagement with kim jong il are ineffective in the l a times they have all but lost hope that north korea will cooperate and some are arguing that it is time for a new approach others agree with my assessment and  have a great deal of expertise in this and i was wondering what your thoughts were if you thought that this year that the eighty million dollars designated in n a s a s budget to verify disable and dismantle north korea's nuclear program has technologies that we think is important for the united states to have at the ready to deploy anywhere frankly to work on disabling and dismantling nuclear weapons programs and material programs around the world yes let me first say a word about the missile defense budget situation obviously it's controversial in some elements of the congress secretary gates went to a very thorough review and analysis of missile defense needs detailed studies done by the missile defense agency that went right through review with the combatant commanders and the joint staff and going through some sort of succession process currently we don't know if it's going to take three months or three years by or by the leader is is very ill the son who he's  anointed is of uncertain stature twenty six years old and may well be that a number of the activities of the north in escalating kind of aggressive behavior in recent months is as much for domestic consumption as it is for international activities there are an opaque society as you know the quality of our information about them is not zero but it's limited and  we are actually developing scenarios we have developed scenarios for future north korean situations in which these funds could be used more effectively should those scenarios materialize i thin track on each one of those lines of work but we're not completed we're not finished down the track we're only thirty percent of the way there on our reactor conversion work we're looking at moving celebrating up as much as possible what we think are the most vulnerable in our material control and accountability program we have slightly better numbers completion of the work that we have to do about sixty percent of our sites we think that are in the works on eighty seven percent of the of with respect to these programs and it really depends on on the particular program we have we have agreements in place ready to execute for example additional work in mexico in the ukraine and i will have to give you specifics like to take that specific as a look up but if i can offer you some perspective and offer the committee some perspective we operate with over one hundred countries around the world  most cases to do the significant work that we have to do we sign memorandums of agreement with those nations where we define the type of coffee overall look along the process the general principle is we come up and kick start the work started and provide the equipment and technology and know how we have them pick up the work from there and carry it forward and then we can offer assistance i'll give you the well thank you mr chairman and thank you gentlemen for being here you know i guess i first want to commend the point of dr bartlett in mr marshall even though they're no longer here i do think their points are salient i'm looking forward to  primarily for the record and sometimes restating the obvious is important i believe missile defense and effective missile defense especially in the area related to iran and even the european site to be something that is making there coupled with the at least the notion that any leverage they might gain is ameliorated by our missile defense capabilities i think that's vitally important and i hope it's something that we don't overlook it's not just about stopping a missile it's about stopping deliberation missile defenses are probably one of our most important components in preventing a with that said let me shift gears here and ask you dr mr in your testimony page two you say that north korea's continued defiance of the international community through its w m d related missile and nuclear activities makes clear the urgency of today's global nuclear threat so i guess i'm hoping you can explain to the committee how north korea how you get north korea's defiance and certainly i agree with you but explain it to us how north korea's defiance drives a global nuclear threat i think i look at  this as an example real time that's dynamic and i think this is the piece that we just had a very clear example of when the president's budget for twenty two thousand and ten  so my sense is this is a dynamic problem it's a problem that is a lot faster than a budget process that we have on the executive branch as well obviously it outpaces everything so to me that drives a sense of urgency to get on top of the problem as quickly as possible to put the resources on the problems quickly as possible is very significant but it's something that we resources from other countries other countries the same ways we do canada united kingdom south korea japan other nations that actually contributed their resources towards our problems in the global  deal with here i do think that it is much larger than mentioned again the greatest challenge that we face leash or term is some type of device in the hands of terrorists because it's not so much that they're so much better at delivering that but i am convinced that their mindset of actually using it is really unquestionable and i think that's what makes it so dangerous it's likely that if they do gain some type of nuclear yield weapon it'll probably won't be a large w committee understand within the parameters that you can and what mechanisms do we have either at the ports and you mentioned in your second line of defense a lot about the ports within the ports and the border crossings what do we have here whose responsibility is it to be making sure that we screen for nuclear devices coming into this country homeland security has primary responsibility we provide technical support and backup with our radiation detectors as well as we have we also take with the department of homeland security we have our major ports program to make sure that we have detectors up and operating in a hundred of the largest ports around the world would send the materials goods and service goods significant as well to support the department of homeland security and it's a cure for aids initiative which has responsibility for looking at all the material that comes in here in the department defenses role is to to stop them from doing any more damage that they've done thank you gentlemen thank you mr chairman votes on the floor we will adjourn here to twenty three thirty seven for the classified hearings and those that have not had the opportunity to ask questions in the order they would have weapons of mass destruction testified before us and one of the conclusions they drew in that and presented to us was that they predicted there would be weapons of mass destruction attack upon the united states  i think this is like within the next three four years and that the opportunity to stop it was there but actually we were losing ground in terms of being able to stop it in other words we weren't making up that deficit towards being able to keep this from happening in your opinions what is that opportunity now that is that a growing situation or a lessening situation that we would have that attack not what i think my focus frankly i think we're getting better but only because what we are seeing an increased sense of urgency i think the sense of urgency is properly is do more and i'm looking internally at the program my properly prioritize but i'm also communicating with my colleagues at the national security council to make sure they recognize that i think what ubiquitous we want to make sure that we design in the safeguards into those systems so that we don't cause ourselves problems out in the out years five or ten years from now so from a technology standpoint i think the lights on the problem it's up to us to go out the end of twenty third so that's two and a half years now i don't know i'm a little point predictions are a little sometimes hard to justify but clearly we have a major problem here and i there is little i can say about that at this time we can provide you with more detailed information and perhaps in another setting with additional colleagues who have worked this problem most specifically with you very much i would really appreciate any information you can provide on that issue if in fact sanctions would help deterring iran attain nuclear weapons and we need to be  doing everything we can to promote those sanctions at the earliest possible time in order to deter them from from moving forward i wonder if you all would speak to if you were again the president answer that question by saying it would be a terrorist attack with nuclear weapons i mean i think the core difference between the terrorists even the suicide bomber obviously and the nation state is that they're very difficult if not impossible to deter you can dissuade them you can try to prevent them but they don't have anything to lose because they know that they are on an exalted mission and they go into a better ward after the detonation so  whether it's a biological attack or a nuclear attack by terrorists i think is now just the absolutely top priority for us to try to to deal with it we have varying degrees of judgment  ability to the tar other states but i think many of us believe that even iran and north korea are able from using these weapons because they have a tremendous amount to lose once they use them like they would tire societies are at risk was the terrorist does work we have our expert export controls experts who are in the process of working with pakistan on training them on what to look for with respect to what comes into the country and goes out of the country pakistan ha