lassie its side will have up to ten minutes for their argument the apollo also have five minutes for rebuttal you'll see the digital timekeeping device on my screen when time is expired i will bang the gal please remember no photographs mo that the one hundred and twenty days speedy trial term must be one continuous period of incarceration in computing that term separate periods cannot be combined if defendant is taken into cust differently and applied differently i'll go through a quick summary of the facts it's been briefed so i won't go through everything but i want to point out that in one thousand c s sex the defendant was charged and taken in find him for the nd day of trial because all the other witnesses that had been subpoenaed were showing up or were going to show up they just were having trouble finding woodson so the next day at trial the state again came in and said we can't find  had state local law enforcement look for him to no avail they asked for another continuance and the truck or informed them at that time that it would grant the continuance but if it wanted to use one of the three  charges and took different it back into custody and at that point the defendant said no my speedy trial demands been violated this needs to be dismissed and the court agreed with them and it did not start the count again it a zero it you know picked up where i had left off in the st case it's the state's position that the truck court was incorrect when it did this when it dismissed it because according to the statutory language of the amendments they were required to restart the truck park again it dacier also when the defendant was taken back into custody on august th two thousand and nineteen actually i think was the next day  means that it should be one continuous prosecution that instead in no way when s s take this messes are now a process under a files that doesn't count as the same offense it has to process it doesn't count the statute does not apply to it however if you read that they exact language the statute in nowhere does it say it has to be in one continuous prosecution prosecution in which they are incarcerated it's our position that the language is clear and on and big us and this and stance and the course must apply the statute as a reason that resort to either and use it as being one without addition and change or discontinuance basically identical in their argument that the best one of the three to five may only applies to the one continuous prosecution but  is so it's the state's position that we're looking at this amendment that is straight straightforward and clear plain language reads that if the state files a charge and then  happily may it please the court counsel my name is jennifer lassie and i represent the finn an apple e johnny johnny warren the state is asking this court to strip the speedy trial statute of its meaning and of its protection yet i don't believe that's written in there as far as i'm aware so that the state on page seven of its brief and its reply brief and just now in oral argument the state agreed that if a defendant out on bell and subject to section one hundred and thirty five dollars b if that defendant had charges dismissed against him and identical charges refiled the state of the state agrees that that defendant's speedy trial clock would not started a zero but would pick up where it left off so it would lead to observed results to find that a defendant in custody had fewer protections than a defendant out on bond and subject to section b so the amendment does not the amendment does not allow the state to start over again a days hero and when you look at the statute in its entirety that becomes clear if you focus solely on the two thousand amendment the state's argument at st appears reasonable but when you look at the statute in its entirety it's clear that this amendment was meant to apply to keep defendants from benefiting from delay that they had caused so the statute starts the very st sentence it begins every person in custody in the state for an alleged offense shall be tried within one hundred and twenty dollars days and then in that same sentence in less delay is occasioned by the defendant and the remainder of that paragraph talks about why delay would be attributed to a defendant this whole section is about keeping the defendant from benefiting from delay that he has caused so in that context it's clear that this amendment the two thousand amendment was meant to prevent a defendant from bonding out on day one hundred and fifteen violating his bond and then trying to force the state to bring him to trial within five days to make that one hundred and twenty day timeline that's what i in context when you look at the statute as a whole it's clear that this amendment was meant to apply to  same continuous uninterrupted prosecution to find otherwise would allow the state to dismiss charges and refile identical charges again and again now the elmo supreme court and people versus eleanor courts have long recognized that the state has unfettered discretion to naleo prost cases and because of the potential for a minute relation proscar does are treated differently with respect to speedy trial term when the state knowledge process charges only to refile identical charges eleanore courts have found that the clock is told during that interim following dismissal and the clock begins again when charges are refiled it doesn't make sense to have a distinction between defendants under section one hundred and thirty five a and the defendant's under one thousand and thirty five b and if you look at the supreme court's two thousand and nine decision invention i think that becomes clear now there the the defendant was under section one hundred and thirty five b but the principles are what are important there the court said the state may not avoid a speedy trial demand by dismissing a charge only to refile the identical charge for the no it's clear when you read this amendment in context with the whole of the statue it's clear that it's meant to keep defendants from causing delay so a defendant who post bond violates and rearrested his clock would start again at day's hero and the state argues that it doesn't make sense to distinguish between that defendant and a defendant like mr warren however a defendant who post bond violates and rearrested should started a zero because he should not benefit from his own you know bad conduct or his own actions he should be able to post bond on day one hundred and fifteen violate come back in and then force the state to bring him to trial only giving the state five days to do so to meet this one hundred and twenty dollars day deadline mr warren is distinct from that defendant because here it is the state that is bringing him back into custody it's not he who is bringing himself back into custody through his own actions is the state action that is bringing him back so when you read the statute as a whole i think that becomes clear now the state in its brief quote senator dillard's statement to support the argument that the bill here requires that you don't add separate periods of incarceration however i just wanted to clarify that dillard's statement only harriet's the wording of the statute and he does not actually clarify or explain any legislative intent within his statement another point is that the state  supplemented the record from the now would since the witness who failed to appear now the state argues in its reply and here during oral argument that this court should consider you know the state's attempts to secure his presence however the state never challenged the court's denial of its request for a continuance regarding the state attempted to get an extension and the state never challenge that the court denied that request in the statement challenge that the state only challenges whether the court can combine two distinct periods to two periods of incarceration so the record clear that the state not only prossed because it could not bring mr warren to trial within the one hundred and twenty dollars day time line however whether the state had malintent or acted with due diligence all of that is irrelevant in this appeal mr warren is not asking this court to ignore those facts it's just that they're simply irrelevant under illinois law because he is not asking for that interim period between dismissal and refiling he's not asking for that period to also count towards a speedy trial dog you only have to consider whether the state had malintent if the defendant is asking that you also count that time so for example if he wanted the period of time between dismissal and refiling to also be counted towards that one hundred it's meant to keep a defendant from benefiting from his own bad actions from from delay that he has caused and finally should this court find that the statute is ambiguous considering the fact that the statute is to be interpreted liberally and in favor of the defendant and taking into consideration the rule of libby this court should foreign bit the statute should be interpreted in the manner that mr warren jeffs does your honors have any questions filing the same charges but there's no cases that are exactly on point that deal with how to apply want to a three dash five a when there's a knowledge process so it's a safe and forty and took him back into custody are there any questions i see not court thank you