may please the court dennis grossman appellant process more so an attorney there are so many issues it's hard to determine where to begin but i guess the best way is simply to cut to the chase the centerpiece of the trustee sanctions motion was the alleged frivolousness of the claim the claim was based on a one page contract it's in the record numerous times this one page contract notwithstanding the fact that the signatures  in individual form if you look about halfway down it shifts from personal obligations to corporate obligations it talks about an investment in the darlington nursing home that investment is to be returned on or before a date certain a reasonable argument can certainly be made that based upon the language rate their investment in the home to be returned on or before a specific date comes back from the party into which the investment is made there are other provisions in the substance of the contract it says interest in other matters are to be paid when the debt service covenant is met and when the bank says we can take the money out judge shay stone in her decision said that relates to corporate solvent see in other words when the corporation is doing well and the bank allows money to be paid it could be paid well another reasonable basis for arguing that the substance of the contract allows for corporate liability it also talks about dividends individuals don't pay dividends corporations do business is another reasonable basis for asserting corporate obligations are the signatures in corporate form no they're an individual for i'm the first to admit that but ohio law which i research was on that in ohio attorney in that in new york in florida one of the first things i did was to go to the hospital in fordham law school libraries of the york and research ohio law to see if it was consistent with the law of most other states and it is and basically that law is that notwithstanding signatures in individual form if contract substance indicates corporate liability the corporation is liable i've gone through several bases here showing corporate liability or a reason or at least a reasonable basis for asserting corporate liability on the basis of this agreement it gets better yet in addition to that i've cited several ohio public court decisions all of which stand for the proposition that i just articulated several from the ohio  ohio supreme court case which is still a good law decided in one thousand or five owns versus creek same thing exactly that notwithstanding the signature an individual form if there is a basis for corporate liability in the substance of the contract the corporation is liable judge katz northern district of ohio the good other case i cited held the same thing these are reasonable bases for asserting corporate liability ultimately the six circuit ruled against me but that doesn't mean that my arguments were frivolous in addition to that the six circuit after i lost before the sixth circuit on the merits the six circuit stayed its mandate to allow me to go to the supreme court the supreme court denied cert the supreme court judge in her two decisions on the first decision judge gone x in her first appeal expressly denied the trustees motion for sanctions holding that the appeal and the new claim arguments were not fergalicious she denied the trustee sanctions motion on the second appeal which dealt with the merits of this claim based upon this contract judge one who wrote a twenty four page opinion twenty four pages it's no frivolous judge going to spend several pages dealing with the liability issue she ruled against me but still an extensive discussion not frivolous when it came to the loan vs equity factors judge goldman discussed thirteen factors one three and then she ruled there was a tie or in four of them she ruled in my favor this was judge one on the second appeal on six she ruled in this major's favor trustee in essence on the loan versus equity factors i lost by six to four i respectfully submit the six to four is not frivolous this was a substantial basis for a cla where she swore under oath that this was a loan to the corporation i testified at the sanctions trial that her to her story to me when i was first retained was consistent with her interrupted tory answers so everything my research of ohio law the six circuits denial that you see granting of a stay the judge gone's decisions where i lost by a narrow six to four margin my client's representations to me which are confirmed in her into  answers ohio appellate case law all show a substantial basis for arguing corporate liability that i lose yes but that doesn't and i congratulated miss major on her win but that doesn't decision her sanctions not only to me i interpret her and construe her her sanctions decisions making basically two prong one a determination that that twenty seven and so i know you want to argue about whether or not that original claim was was frivolous and i appreciate that because she did i think that was part of her determination award sanctions but she also hundred twenty seven and what's your response to that they were not vexatious number one we're not dealing with a thirty five dollar perking ticket here this was a two point one million dollars claim it was the largest unsecured claim in the entire state in terms of due process the primary response there is in addition to the fact that we finally it's just we're not fixations there was no allegation of that in the trust the sanctions will look at the trustee sanctions motion docket number nine fifty three in the bankruptcy court on pages twenty four through thirty two is a section in titled quote actions warranting the imposition of sanctions that's the title of the subject of the operative section of the trustee sections motion actions warranting the imposition of sanctions beginning on page twenty four in that section the trustee lists ten items nine specific items and one kind of vegas item about replies and reconsiderations very quickly after my response to trustee withdrew four of them on the grounds that they were for a voice that leaves us with five specific items and one kind of in their bulis reply reconsideration argument six items in the trustees argument quote actions were in the imposition of sanctions what was my response ok i got to defend against these six items and then only in my written response i responded to those six items that when i see i reviewed that i viewed that much differently the way i read that motion was they asked for originally i believe in that motion for three hundred twenty six thousand dollars in sanctions something like that right then and on up but i'm backing out they ended up eventually backing out the fees related to that appeals i read that motion is seeking sanctions for all of their fees right incurred responding to you not with respect to items a b c d but with respect to everything they did relating to your pursuit of reason i interpret that because to me that it was requesting all of their fees for all of your conduct not for a b c and d well but they said they wanted all attorney's fees quote to  defend against the gordons claim quote unquote that's that was their language ice respectfully submit to you that the reasonable reading the fair reading of that is that ok here are the items for which sanctions are are short actions warning the imposition of sanctions one two three four five six whatever what's the damages what's the relief we request we want all our attorneys fees because of those actions which are allegedly sanctionable a fair reading just because they've requested all attorneys fees doesn't mean that they're a fair reading of that is that everything i did the entire sanctionable the fair reading is and the reading of their sanctions motion is that ok here are the items warranting the imposition of sanctions and they listed them what's the relief they requested we want all attorneys fees is damages that's the fair reading of any crime it just because they will ledged all attorney's fees as damages doesn't mean that a fair reading of that is that everything that i did is therefore sanctionable and that i'm somehow on notice of that they could have very easily said which they did not do in their sanctions motion they could have very easily said we won sanctions because everything that attorney grossman did from the get go for four years is sanctionable he engaged in fact is a she is conduct through his overall pattern of conduct they could have very easily said that in their in their section which said actions warningly imposition of sanctions that would have given me fair notice they didn't do that this is a quasi criminal procedure have don't do you think judge based on him but you have bare notice when she issued her show cause an order under hundred twenty seven no because her her show cause order was a show cause order under nine hundred twenty seven to incorporate the findings asserted by the trustee in the trustees prior sanctions motion the trustee had made a sanctions motion the first sanctions motion in october two thousand and nine under rule nine thousand eleven well they blew the one thousand and eleven deadline but you know but the trustee made that was the trustees first sanctions motion one thousand and eleven if you look at judge chase though it was ordered to show cause which he issued i believe it was january or february of two thousand and ten a few months later it said i should show cause why she shouldn't adopt the findings  fact asserted by the trustee in the trustees prior sanctions motion in that trustees prior sanctions motion the trustee did not allege that the entire the entirety of my conduct was sanctionable they focused to get indeed their first sanctions motion was even narrower than merely nude sanctions motion you know it was a narrow focus primarily focusing on the alleged frivolousness of a claim that was the focus of judge shea stone it was over at under nine hundred twenty seven if i prosecuted a frivolous claim or if an attorney prosecutes a frivolous claim that sanctionable prosecuting a frivolous claim sanctions or is this part of the damages under one nine hundred twenty seven s if the claim is frivolous yes if the claim is frivolous and we and we never should have been in court and there never should have been a claim absolutely absolutely right if the underlying complaint we're claim is frivolous and there should have been no case to begin with yes you can all work all attorney's fees i stammer edges but the fair reading of the allegation there is that mentioned in the trust most of them weren't even mentioned in the trustees motion ok i read i reviewed to tramp the docket and i counted one hundred twenty four different filings made in the estate case does that sound judge needed to put you on notice of everyone it owes one hundred twenty four items that they know they didn't know maybe they thought it was sanctioned they would not have to list them siriano but they would have to say something to the effect that everything i did my entire course of conduct in filing one twenty four over whatever it was was sanctionable that i engaged in allegedly frivolous or vexatious filings in the entirety of my conduct judge shay stoughton had no problem coming up with that language in her decision on march twenty eighth two thousand and thirteen it was a paragraph the trustee easily could have said that in the trustees motion they didn't have to list all one twenty four filings that i made or however many it was but they at least would have to give me notice which they did not do that i'm to defend the fact that i made all these filings which is a lot different than saying the claim is frivolous they gave me notice of the fact that they were seeking damages all attorneys fees for an allegedly frivolous claim i that claim was frivolous and i submit that it was not but if that claim was frivolous yes they would be entitled to all attorney's fees because the litigation never should have existed and therefore all attorneys fees were the proximate damages they suffered if the claim was frivolous but it was not that's what they gave notice of that's what i litigated that's what i focused on and i respectfully submit to you especially given the fact that this is a quasi criminal proceeding that due process requires that i be given specific notice of what it is i'm to defend against i was not given that i was given specific notice of ten items the trustee did not merely say these are ten items which are a last trade of of mr grossman is vexatious filings read the language in the trustees motion it says on page twenty four leading into the operative section it says quote actions were warranting the imposition of sanctions close quote i said ok this this is what i have to defend against all attorneys fees they're seeking damages for these alleged substantive alleged frivolous filings i submit to you that's a fair reading i submit to you that you know that's what it should be due process requires reasonably specific notice especially in these quasi criminal proceedings and you know i'm sorry for such a long winded response judge humphrey put you know that's that's my contention  they would not have to list all one hundred twenty four but they would at least have to say something to the effect as judge fixation on him succinctly said after the trial was over everything that grossman did was sanction  the entirety of his course of conduct she said that but it's two and a half months after the trial is over what kind of notice is that that's not fair notice let me talk you know let me talk about the trustee makes a point that i've allegedly engaged in they say she's filings because i'm constantly changing my legal theories not so this was a floozy or game in which the trustee keeps on harping on and judge based on him didn't even buy that because there's no basis for the trustee claims that i jumped from woen and then to equity and then to unjust enrichment and i was constantly changing back and forth not so look at my first filing  tenth two thousand and eight when i sought to vacate the default order against my client's pro se claim i expressly said in that first filing my client's our loan creditors and equity holders i was absolutely explicit were asserting both alone position as a loan creditor and an equity holder as my clients pointed out they had be given to me they had been given a ten percent equity position in the company as an additional inducement for making the long absolutely consistent throughout loan creditors and equity holders ten percent later three months later when my client's mother was confronted with an operating agreement that had been concealed from my clients and which contained their forged signatures i made a motion to file a new claim based upon the forgeries adding unjust enrichment and another claim based on the substance of those concealed operating agreements but i never abandon the original claim i never said ok i'm now switching to this this was an additional claim that was ultimately denied but i was not switching back and forth among different legal so frivolous which it was not for the reasons i mentioned where was the trustees early saying the early dismissal motion the trustee said this what from the outset it was obvious according to the trustee the claim had no legal basis no factual basis frivolous on its face from the outset that was their october two thousand and nine sanctioned motion and their december two thousand and twelve renewed sanctions motion well i submit to you that it was not but if it was where was there early dismissal motion on the basis of this one page contract which could have been litigated by an early dismissal motion maybe fifteen hundred dollars in attorney's fees which they didn't make instead if you look at the cumulative fees that the trustee has charged the estate for litigating the merits of this and for litigating the sanctions those fees are now pushing half a million dollars half a million dollars to litigate this and who's the fall guy me respectfully submit to you this was not frivolous claim i was not given fair notice that everything that i filed over the course of four years was allegedly frivolous where was the trustees early dismissal motion they saw a liquid  based on him has retired she's no longer involved in the case why is it not moot anymore it's not moot because if she should have recused herself her decision should be no employed i mean it obviously or in any remain and would obviously have to go back to a different judge but if a judge retires that does not move the recusal motion because if a judge is either biased or gave an improper appearance of pious she should never have decided the sanctions issues in the first i see the first the first sanctions decision was in march two thousand and thirteen which contained a denial of my recusal motion i filed an appeal from that right away in this measure made a motion to dismiss on the grounds that it was interloc this court granted the motion and in this court's decision dismissing that appeal as interlocutory the court said this court said yes we have the discretion to review mr grossman's immediate appeal of recusal but this court chose to exercise its great discretion to await a final judgment to get a better perspective on it so it's your opinion that if the if you were successful on your appeal of the motion of recuse that that vacates or should result in vacating the order granting sanctions and i understand that is that the scope of what you would have vacated based on the motion to recuse yes sure i mean that's my only remedy in this appellate court is to were the only grounds that this court were to reverse on yes i would pursue my defense back in the trial court hoping for an absolute reversal and in order dismissing all the sanctions for the reasons i've articulated but again i'll take any grounds that this court will give me and if refusal is the grounds yes i'll go back to the trial court and defend my actions that aren't isn't that isn't that argument lost once this court decides whether or not that the the order in granting sanctions should be affirmed or reversed i mean you're it sounds like you're asking for two bites of the same apple you'd appealed the order for sanctions if it's affirmed it would be on the basis that there was sufficient evidence in the record or a sufficient basis in the record for it to to have been in or properly by the court so i mean very very certain i mean if if judge safe just because judge say stoneham thought my herself i mean that's case of the six circuit has held i forget the name of the case but were a judge should have been recused the judge's decision gets reversed and it gets assigned to another judge i mean that's you know that's a basic legal proposition there are a couple six circuit cases that in other cases that i've cited in my recusal section that's it if the judge should be recused everything good afternoon your honors if you please the court i'm always maser i'm here on behalf of the app valley david worley liquidation trustee for the royal manor bankruptcy's sometimes all the best laid plans for preparation go for not so i'd like to directly deal with some of the issues that your honour's have raised during mr grossman argument and hopefully get through quickly enough to cover some other aspects of my argument incorrect when he says that the centerpiece of the motion for sanctions stems from the fact that the claim was frivolous that was part of the reason why the liquidation trustee requested sanctions and that was part of the postman was here at the renewed sanction motion and i believe to your point your honor it's very clear that there were two basis one the underlying claim was frivolous gertrude gordon knew it which is why she intentionally redacted key provisions of the agreement and mr grossman knew it which was the reason why he requested the opportunity to bury the terms of this agreement with pearl evidence offering testimony of gertrude groden her children and a former employee of royal manor and that is why yet again when he was led  realisation that there was no loan because k ones were issued to the gordons thus evidencing and equity contribution not a loan to the entities we then half after that realisation the motion to file a new claim based upon this purportedly forged operating agreement so we have a document on its four corners that doesn't and anything but a personal obligation of the schwarz's when the relation of that sinks in we have the motion to amend to bring in the parole evidence all the while requiring discovery on that issue and then when mr grossman is confronted with these k ones that i don't know if he realized were in documents he produced because he then asked me to email them to him and that's all part of the record shortly thereafter he files the motion to file a new claim which by the way he said in numerous instances in numerous pleadings that if the motion to file a new claim was granted he'd abandon all the other claims so for mr grossman to stand in front of this panel and say that he didn't continually change legal theories i believe that that was disingenuous we really had was this we had an attorney who was being paid on a forty percent contingent fee basis mr grossman admitting it during the hearing the second hearing on sanctions that he would be paid if and only if the claim was successful and he therefore had an economic interest in the outcome this is a clear example of grasping at legal structures however it's not the only basis through which the trustee cites sanctions please take time to look at the renewed sanction motion i think it's very clear with the fair reading we were giving examples of some of the most egregious conduct that mr grossman had engaged in but we were seeking sanctions for all the pieces because both he and gertrude engaged in a persistent course of conduct which was intended gordon and dennis grossman pursued gordon's claim in bad faith and for improper purposes there was no credible evidence or legal basis to support the claim that the gordons were general unsecured creditors of danny darlington or any other debtor entity despite this fact gertrude gordon and attorney grossman continued to file frivolous slee multiply these proceedings the actions of gertrude gordon and attorney grossman were intentionally geared to harass the trustee and his counsel to significantly increase the cost of these proceedings thereby forcing a settlement and cause the trustee to unnecessarily incur legal fees i could go on but i think you understand the point that i'm making here i believe that we made it evidently clear that we felt gertrude gordon and  intentionally pursued in litigation strategy that was intended to multiply the proceedings taxation slee so that we would incur additional fees so that it would dilute the money available for the general and secured creditors that's exactly the pattern of conduct an activity that the bankruptcy judge felt was inappropriate and that's exactly the type of activity that warrants the imposition of sanctions i want to also point out regarding the validity of the gordon's claim that every argument mr grossman just made to this panel has been rejected by each and every court the bankruptcy court the district court the sixth circuit so again the items cited in the brief were intended to be examples and examples only it would be impossible within the confines of page limits to go through each and every pleadings one hundred twenty want to also point out that mr grossman has admitted the obvious that if indeed this claim was a frivolous claim the bankruptcy court properly awarded all sanctions that were incurred by the liquidation nine eleven motion was pursued on the basis of invitation of the bankruptcy court to pursue that we then filed a supplemental brief concerning sanction motions requesting the imposition of sanctions pursuant to section  eleven u s c one hundred five in the court's inherent authority but you are correct that the initial briefing much of which detailed the conduct giving rise to the requests for sanctions was separately  you back away from pursuing it under nine eleven and i'm assuming that that's because the safe harbor provisions wrong one thousand and eleven were not complied with is that correct your honor that that was part of it we made numerous decisions during the course of this litigation to either abandon certain claims or certain theories based upon our hope to be able to narrow the appeals that would come out of it and based upon some of the law that we thought that there were arguments that could be advanced for sanctions to be imposed pursuant to a nine to eleven stepping back from it in looking at the course of conduct we believe that the inherent power of the court in the section twenty eight u s c nine hundred twenty seven would be more appropriate to deal with these issues because there were so many frivolous filings in the in the proceedings did  your committee ever give a send a safe harbor letter to mr grossman there was a letter that was sent to mr grossman from our office and it was discussed during the course of my testimony during the second sanction hearing when we discovered that the k ones had been issued to allison and david gordon we made it a point to sit down and have a discussion with mr grossman telling him at that time that we would possibly consider sanctions against him at that time my partner mark merkel and sent a letter to mr grossman outlining the fact that yes we had this conversation and we are contemplating whether or not to proceed with nine eleven we have to also put in context that these proceedings were fast paced there were a lot of changes and legal theories and we were simultaneously dealing with not only purpose preparing for the hearing in june but also the first appeal in the district court on the purported denial of the motion to file a claim mr grossman criticizes the trustee for not filing for early dismissal that would have been and possibility based upon the theories that were being advanced the initial theory was only on the four corners of the agreement when mr grossman i believe realized that the facts and law didn't support that interpretation that's when the amended claim came about through which he intended to offer parole evidence your honour's understand and realize that the standard that would be applied when a summary judgment motion is filed is that even if incredible the testimony of gertrude the testimony of her children would have to been accepted by the bankruptcy judge as being true it would have made no sense for us to file if spouse of motion because there were factual disputes that we could not overcome based upon their own self serving statement it wasn't until the actual day of the hearing that mr grossman for the first time agreed and stipulated that the agreement was clear and unambiguous on its face in the pro evidence was therefore not needed for its interpretation and we go back to the nine eleven motion yes ma'am that i believe that the the basis would be that ninety eleven motion set forth the various quote conduct giving rise to the requests for sanctions so while the motion itself was based upon the nine eleven it certainly had the predicate for the sanctions to be awarded percent to the court's inherent power and under section nine hundred twenty seven the factual predi so again because of the parole evidence issue it would not have been appropriate to file a dispositive motion when it was clear that the motion would have to been denied want to also point out that while again mr grossman criticizes the way that the trustee has handled this in the fees that happen incur each and every time the liquidation trustee or his attorney my firm ross mcdowell have requested fees there's been standard motion for fees notice to all parties and we've never had an objection we've never had a general unsecured creditor come to court and object to a the manner in which we were handling this or b the fees were being requested and i think that that contradicts the position that objecting because he wasn't a party to the the motions just for approval he may not have been but he was representing people who could have objected and again that's what we're getting into a little bit of an oddity here mr grossman represented the gordons for the vast majority of those fia locations i think the last one where he appealed to that relationship no longer existed so yes if he felt on behalf of his clients that the fees being charged were excessive in terms of the time bill or hourly rate he could have objected to what i think your point is judge harrison i want to also point out the following we had two separate hearings here the invoices we were questing the award upon were given at the time that the renewed sanction motion was filed and then the supplemental no notice i was physically there and present to be able to be questioned and to testify regarding the fees and the reasonableness and in fact testified during both of those hearings if mr grossman felt that there were certain portions of the fees that were being requested that were not reasonable in terms of the amount hourly rate or that they were necessary he certainly could have and should have raised those issues before the bankruptcy court level and in one instance he did because if you review the transcript of the hearing on the supplemental fees in the supplemental opinion by the bankruptcy court judge shays stoneham clearly stated that based upon the testimony that i went through with mr worley all those fees related to the approval of the  were withdrawn so i hope that that does address what i'm believing your concern to be again the invoices were their testimony was the liminal opinion that she felt that the testimony of myself and the liquidation trustee was trustworthy and believable in terms of the fees their necessity and their reasonableness in these proceedings let me ask you this ed what if the trustees position with respect to that argument well the trustees position would be first for me to admit to you that i mistakenly believed that there was an additional three days because the supreme court's court had denied the petition for writ of certiorari so i and i alone made the mistake of calculating that based upon the date of the mandate which would have been the shorter of the two when i thought at the time your honor i believe that the point is this the deadline that was established was in one that was created by the bankruptcy judge herself that was not a deadline that was established by statute such as a statute of limitations it was not a deadline established by any role it was one that the judge created herself and i submitted this panel she had within her discretion the right inability to modify that deadline but that begs the question because the fact of the matter is this please remember the renewed sanction motion was just that a renewal of the original sanction motion and supplemental sanction motion the trustee had filed in two thousand and nine it was also a renewal of the show cause order the judge shay stoneham issued in january of two thousand and ten none of those had been ruled upon because mr person took the position that the bankruptcy court was divested of jurisdiction of considering the sanction or show cause during the pendency of the three cordon appeals so the trustees motion for sanction in the show cause order were held in abeyance and as a matter of fact in the decision whereby the bankruptcy court decided not to make a ruling she specifically stated that she would hold the sanction in abeyance quote to consider a more complete picture of class expenses and fees incurred and i submit to you that that's what the renewed sanction motion was even if this court were to determine that the judge did not have the authority to permit the one day late filing that here was harmless because laying in wait where these unresolved motions for sanction and show cause order which the court would still have to hear so notwithstanding whether or not the decision to accept the route renewed motion was appropriate or inappropriate any error if any would be harmless because mr grossman was not going to be prejudiced at some point there was going to have to be a hearing on the show cause at some point there was going to have to be a hearing on the trustees motion for sanctions there also been some questions regarding the issue of like you saw and judge preston i would like to discuss i believe some of the questions that you posed to mr grossman first  not agree that recusal was warranted under the circumstances again we're talking about an abuse of discretion standard it's not enough to point to a few comments in this record which is  one hundred twenty four entries that mr grossman filed in a total of two hundred ninety eight in the bankruptcy court and while we had eleven hearings eleven hundreds of pages of hearing transcripts mr grossman has only been able to point to a few and not us caught comments that the judge made in the proceedings the supreme court has recognized that in order to warrant recusal you need something more than simply an opinion based upon facts that have been introduced in the proceedings even if a judge expresses annoyance anger or impatience that's not enough it has to be shown that there is clear bias such that the judge is incapable of rendering a fair decision and i believe if you look at the facts and record you will agree the judge say stoneham was capable of finding a fair to said she pointed out several times there were seven different recusal motions think about that seven i am however counting the requests for recusal that was contained in the motion to withdraw the reference and the motion to reconsider the decision to deny the motion to remove the reference judge based on him repeatedly affirm that she had no personal animus against mr grossman she didn't know the litigants before the proceedings and she was able to decide based on an unbiased fashion mr grossman puts points to a comments that were made regarding the appeals and the a fact that that had on the distribution to the legitimate unsecured creditors that's a statement of fact the money available to the creditors could not be distributed as soon as it otherwise would have been because of these appeals we had to reserve money for the gordons claim that was required under the plan but there were other an actor was comments that the judge made regarding settlement again within the span of four years of litigation five years of litigation on two occasions general comments about settlement that doesn't w grossman also criticize judge say stone him because she made comments in her decisions that stated that the actions he took were first lisp and i think that district judge pearson summed it up the best that if grossman's argument on this point were taken to its logical extreme that would mean that every judge would be disqualified from ruling upon a sanction motion that's been filed  simply because he identifies the problems that have occurred within that proceeding the judge was required to articulate the basis for her decision to impose sanctions that is what she was obligated to do that is what she did and that does not give rise to recusal to your point in a long winded way judge president i don't believe that recusal is warranted i do not believe that the judge abused her discretion  motion if this court would disagree i don't believe that this needs to be remanded for an independent hearing there's a wealth of evidence before this panel in the record and there is precedence in the sixth circuit and others that say that this court on review can independently look at the record there been instances where a judge will look at sanctions under nine hundred twenty seven and reviewing court will say sanctions under one hundred five they would also be appropriate so i think that this panel can independently make a determination from the facts at evidence with had two long hearings we've had a plethora of different i want to briefly stress one aspect of judge shays stones decision that i think deserves special attention by this panel and that is the context of what has occurred here we have a bankruptcy proceeding in the goal of it is to try to pay as much money as you can to the legitimate creditors of the debtor entities in her decision the bankruptcy judge look to two factors number one that the gordons really hadn't produced a shred of evidence that their claim was valid number two the repeated and pervasive course of conduct that mr grossman exhibited throughout the proceedings but also identified the fact that distributions have been diminished distributions have been delayed in the view of judge shays stoneham when you have this kind of tactic that delays multiplies and increases costs within the context of a bankruptcy proceeding even a heightened scrutiny should be employed i believe that that is a point that is well taken and one that i hope that this court would adopt i also want to stress what the bankruptcy judge stated in its supplemental decision and that is we're not talking about a single filing we're not talking about a single motion for reconsideration we're talking about a continued course of conduct throughout the proceedings that fixation slee multiply the proceedings delayed the proceedings and increase the litigation costs mr grossman wants to criticize the liquidation trustee and his attorney because of the amount of the fees but the fact of the matter is that the fees were as extensive as they were because of the number of frivolous crimes if we didn't have the number of threads for of loose filings that we did the fees would have been dramatically less and though we have not requested fees for anything that had occurred on appeal before the bankruptcy court you see that the continued pattern of that kind of conduct continues we've now had seven appeals we had three appeals from the gordons claim in four since that time we have this sanction appeal pending in this court we have the discovery appeal pending it's going to be decided on the brief we have an appeal of the trust fees that was dismissed for lack of standing and that we have a premature appeal of the march two thousand and thirteen finding of the bankruptcy judge that mr grossman had gauged in conduct that warranted the imposition of sanctions seven appeals in this case for a claim they could have been handled much more if it efficiently and effectively i've been a member of the practicing bar for longer than i care to admit it gives me no pleasure to sit here and take the time of this panel on this kind of a campus it's bothersome to me not only what happened in terms of an attorney with a vested interest trying to push a claim that lack merit but we added aggravation to the fact by the multitude of frivolous and fixations filing in then the third thing i want to touch on because i feel like i wouldn't be a loyal member of the bar unless i did the disrespect to the if all of these three components of mr grossman's conduct don't warrant sanctions i don't know what your honors i ask you on behalf of the liquidation trustee and on behalf of the creditors to a firm in its entirety the distant the decision of the bankruptcy judge which imposed sanctions against mr grossman i believe that the sanctions are warranted i believe that the amount of sanctions is proper and i thank you for your time admits the fact that the new motion was filed late she says it's harmless error it's harmless error allegedly because oh there were the other motions pending previously which had to be decided not so look at the notice of motion the renewed sanctions motion one day late was docket number nine fifty three nine fifty four was the notice of motion on which we went to trial that notice of motion also filed one day late specifies that the only issue to be decided at the trial is the renewed sanctions motion the notice of motion which they filed did not give me any notice that the prior sanctions motions were going to be litigated it gave notice only that the renewed sanctions motion the one day late sanctions motion was going to be tried due process requires that the decision be limited by their note their own notice of motion docket number nine fifty four limited to that which was one day late and they admit they were one  in addition to that the prior sanctions motions were narrow or they would not have been a basis for this entire gish dollar you know finding by judge she still is in addition to the fact that the notice of motion limited it to the rim sanctions motion mismeasure talks about a lot of other issues she talks about  judge harrison you review asked about the consequences of recusal i respectfully refer the court to the cases in the footnote on page five of my reply brief and in those cases the sixth circuit as well as every other circuit consistently holds that if a trial judge is recused that's it it's reversed it has to go back to a different judge that's clear mismeasure talks about the fact that  allegedly made some quote innocuous statements about my appeals i don't think the following statements are innocuous frivolous and repetitive designed to multiply and delay the whole dividend hostage during the appellate process any and every reason to multiply the proceedings the liquidation a state was harmed blockades to distribution to substitute for a lack of merit addition to the fact that judge say still in him ordered me over my repeated objections to disclose my settlement position on the record that's in addition to the fact that twice in her decision twice in her decisions she basically threatened me with further sanctions should i appeal totally inappropriate by a trial judge that's in addition to the fact that three times not once not twice but three times judge say stone and either initiated or invited sanctions proceedings i respectfully submit to you if a trial a judge feels so strongly about sanctions that he or she is going to adjudicating her own personal dispute against me i pointed out without dispute by the trustee the judge say still it constantly flip flopped she first told us to focus only on the service issues then when we made progress there she said stop focus only on the merits then when we made progress there she said stop go back to the service issues and then we made progress there she said stop go to the merits again four times she forced us to reverse i said judge you're a cause of a major you're a major cause of delay here you know you may have your reasons that's fine but don't blame me for delay when the record shows without dispute by the trustee that the trial  constantly reversing herself forcing us to stop and start on the issues we were permitted to pursue i clearly had a personal dispute with judge shay stoneham over who was the cause of the way two problems with that number one should judge says don't and didn't even address that even though my arguments were clearly supported by the record and not disputed by the trustee but in addition to that we're a judge clearly has a personal dispute with a litigant and i was a litigant that should step aside she adjudicated her own personal dispute with me very very predictably she found me guilty of the way nine times and i cited the nine times she accused me delay dilatory delay she never mentioned the delays which she herself caused not the least of which is the fact that she was anything but impartial for all these reasons you put all this together with all due respect this should be a slam dunk for recusal no federal judge no judge anywhere in this country should sit in a case where this kind of bias exists mismeasure talked about the k ones that they showed all the equity the k ones were only one of thirteen loan versus equity factors mismeasure talked about the fact that what i filed the new claim it allegedly showed the frivolousness of the original claim because i said i'd be willing to abandon the original claim of course i'm not seeking a double recovery i can only collect the money once if the original claim works fine for get the new claim if the new claim works fine for get the original claim i'm not seeking a double recovery here that doesn't mean i'm changing legal theories we just had different legal theories as a basis for recovering the one million dollars i was not seeking to double recovery i respectfully submit i see my time is up i respectfully submit your honour's should reverse on any one of the grounds and i thank the