just to rely only on the the allocation of fault it's the our occasional fault in the judgement that lets hartford say this judgement shows that there are threats liability here and not responding as superior liability and therefore judgment but they may well take a position and they won't tell you why section five thirty three should not be applied on a comparative fault basis if you have the stipulation if this is the stipulation that she was the agent for the  company you're sure if the state court judge intended to give effect to that stipulation wouldn't the state court judgment of that have been that  company was liable for its own thirty percent and also under the stipulation liable for she's seventy percent on a pure respond yes period theory yes it seems to me that the problem i was with is a reason that we've i was with you all the way until i get stuck on the fact that the state for whatever reason the state court judge chose not to not to do that and that seems to be the end of the line i don't think it is the end of the line i think if it that creates the problem that allows hard for to say if you look at section five thirty three there is no coverage whatsoever i don't think it affects the argument that i'm making which is that given the way that the judge when are putting aside the stipulation just giving the allocation of fault that shows that jointly and severally liable for the entire amount of the economic damages even though it's only the folks allocated to it is thirty percent one point eight million that means that there is four point two million dollars of liability in this judgment it's not represented by tables on fault it's represented on tables being liable for the fault of she an argument is that that aspect of the judgment should be covered it should not be made uninsured by section five thirty three then you don't have to get to the stipulation or get to the judgment because i think that california is comparative fault principles should be applied in the application of section five thirty three if you're directly liable for forty percent of this intentional act five forty three would apply with not right that's why i think it should apply to the portion that you were held accountable for but to the extent that there is liability against you that's based on on the act someone else that you were all that liable for you have to pay for i see no reason in the language of the policy no language in the language of section five thirty three or the public policy if i thirty three were the cases the damages incurred as a result of her of personal liability personal injury or other who was insured and that people's was in insured i think he was given a defense i don't know he may have been another insured under the pertain to that forty percent it does pertain to the portion that they're liable for let me let me how do you expand it any further because they're held liable for any economic damages jointly and severally liable  tortfeasor taking care of each other somebody pays more so the joint several only resulted in forty percent direct liability for this intentional act from your mind i don't i damages both parties are liable for the entire amount jointly and severally for the non economic each party's why delivery is only is allocated but for the for the economic damages under prop fifty once both sides are fully liable for the entire amount that the jury awarded in the judgment if they are fully liable that only means that the contribution between the two of may be decided by subsequent acts and that means that all of the money could be collected from from cable here the only issue is we have a million dollar policy that was the only asset issue in this litigation and and there is a question as is the entire judgment every aspect of the judgment made unsure about us section five thirty three does the fact that that the insured is one percent liable i mean hartford is applying section five thirty three the way through courts used to apply the doctrine of contributory fault if you're one percent live off then you lose everything the question is if you're one percent while here or thirty percent liable do you lose all of your insurance coverage and argument as you should only lose the thirty percent of coverage that's available to the extent that there is a portion of the judgement that hold you liable for someone else's conduct that isn't your conduct then that portion should be insurable and there's no reason why five thirty three would bar recovery or bar the insurance company from paying that aspect of the judgment that's just the windfall to the insurance company vicariously responsible for that seventy percent yes and judge for whatever reason didn't do it that way judgment didn't get entered into the ballgame no because the judgment itself shows you don't have to said i'm not going to impose vicarious liability here but the parties didn't want to of a position to be to be in a position where there was a malicious prosecution judgment wasn't allocated at all and then harvard would say is having to pay should be insurable because it's not based on its own wrongdoing and so the only reason the hartford doesn't have to pay something is because of section five thirty three that's the bar it's not the policy language so they're going to say that seventy percent jointly and severally liable for the economic damages irrespective of the amount of the allocated and subsequent litigation if pursuing a hypothetical world where people had money they could they could get the money back the question is is is that fort somewhere else about someone saying i'm not going to pay at all but then somebody asks the judgement go further and allocate the damage right then we have two concurrent four features each alone or together they create they caused the same damage all of the damage so cables as a direct tortfeasor is liable for all of that it's not like areas they're directly liable what happened was at some point the legislature in california decided that for non economic damages they were going to create an is against public policy to allow an inch insurance coverage for insured which quote personally committed an act of malicious prosecution codebook that's what we have here cable's was adjudicated to have personally committed an act of most prosecution it is against public policy if you get the last word you or the time will give you a minute case shows that section five thirty three is not an absolute far even in a malicious prosecution case so that if you're held liable for someone else's more just prosecution if the law by the way it operates hold you liable to some extent that apply section five thirty three for malicious prosecution case has a been two defendants with an allocation of fault all that we're saying is that in applying section five thirty three and saying how far it extends to bar coverage it should not an all or nothing basis it should not be applied like the old doctrine of contributory fault if you are one percent liable then you lose all your insurance coverage should be cochairman as with the amount of salt that's applied if there is coverage for the part that you're not at fault for there