mosquito but if a narrow issue presented on our appeal is whether of the two locker rooms involved in soul before we discuss what you think the narrow issue is we need to figure out whether we  restrict you you say that there is jurisdiction under the collateral order doctrine and i'm not sure what this order is collateral to what judge at the time we didn't think it a final order with respect to yes well i mean i certainly understand that because if you understand what's going on correctly there is the receiver collected something like eight million dollars and this order approves the distribution of about four million dollars that's right i could understand a collateral order argument if so much was being distributed that your client would have no chance  from what was left but there will be four million left which is way over the amount of your clients claims so there we still have a receivership a state with a lot of assets in it and a lot of claims against those assets that need to be wrapped up well i would respect to distribute judge i don't think that is the record if you read the motion filed by the receiver it's to to turn over the remainder of the receivership estate which was at that time four million there had been an interim transfer of i believe the more million that you were speaking of self at the time of the this particular notice to all of the creditors that was sent out in connection with this motion it was anticipated that based on this order of the remainder of all the assets to the extent there were no other claims recognized by the court or some other really made by the court with respect to some objection that all of those proceeds would be turned over to the parties file something supplemental explaining what what is left in the fund whether there are remaining disputes to the assets in the fund and whether there's whether this is despite the caption on it effectively the terminal order the district court is ever going to enter well in just for the record clear i thought we laid out and i think the counsel for the f t c did as well there were a number of what they described as ministerial acts that occurred after the date of october seventh when the judge to file the in my skin is whether this really is ending this receivership or whether there are a bunch more assets and there's still a fight one reason why i'm asking this question is not only the language of the statute but also the supreme court's holding last term in florida gets bluegills bank this receivership is effectively a bankruptcy proceeding by another name and all ard holds that in a bankruptcy proceeding there is no appeal until all the claims to the state assets have been ramped up you can't piecemeal it so if this were a bankruptcy proceeding it looks like the lard would block an appeal if as i suspect there's another ok let me talk then about what we believe it's a narrow issue here it was the issues that were presented here with respect to the objections that were made at the time to the order was motion to find mr truro in contempt and at the law firms and usually start recoupment from the trustee to trustee after the case was after the case was resolved because at that point time pursuant to that would be super ship order the there she was on able to pay any of the pre receivership claims which included a significant amount of the legal fees and costs that had been occurred incurred by both of these firms with respect to that underlying document production what do we know about the source of the funds in this in these accounts if these were funds that were the proceeds of fraud why don't the victims of the fraud have an unambiguously superior right to the spawn's i don't dispute that they have a right judge the question that we had we we believe that the time that the is that because the court on other occasions had allowed for certain of the previously or ship assets to be paid out of the receivership the state that we believe that based on what the law firms had done in connection with this case we provided some benefit to both the f t c and the receivership court with respect to the location of these various assets these documents that were produced were all e mails and other electronic documents primarily there were used penny wise and pound foolish that without paying without a willingness to pay for law firms under these circumstances the receiver would have collected less but what we have here is a review  district court's decision and the district court says as as between the fief and the victim the victim always wins and the thief can't hire lawyers to help divert the victim's money decision absent what we believe were the factual errors in his ruling then perhaps to the argue something else but what's clear from the record is that he made we believe four separate art factual errors with respect to the law firms who are seeking to obtain some relief with respect to this issue and including whether or not they had standing he said he didn't believe they had standing he he thought incorrectly i believe that the law firms were seeking to be repaid for the legal efforts that were made initially in the doctrine production to seek to limit or otherwise restrict some of the broader requests made by the f t c and he also suggested that perhaps or he thought that through forty five requests that had been made contemporaneous with the document request and the motions to compel were never made and in fact all those things actually occurred and he based i believe at least some of his decision with respect to that issue or whether or not these particular object or should receive any type of compensation based on the fact that he really didn't see that we deadlock from said sufficiently laid out a claim and he suggested somehow even though the order does not permit it they should have raised this claim sooner in the course of the two years that the receivership had been going on since the imposition back in august of  interest for that reason we believe that when you look at all these factors that although it is a difficult standard to establish that in this particular case we believe that judge got them in abuses particularly true as was just discussed the consumer for not getting reimbursed anywhere near the amount that they should be in fact there's a thirty seven point six million dollars judgment in the receiver it only found eight million dollars every penny taken to pay the lawyers fees would be taken away from consumers who are really only getting a quarter of the amount that they deserved when the key point that judge gentlemen made with regard to the room for overruling the objections secondly the court found properly that website fees the supreme court had a very long opinion last year in two weeks against the united states on the question where legal fees can be paid from a pot of money generated by a criminal  are you arguing that are the standards of luis this money properly belongs to the victims rather than the lawyers there are nothing in the briefs seems cognizant of the fact that the supreme court has grappled with holding of luis is that it is essential to distinguish between the proceeds of the crime which go back to the victims free of any claims by lawyers and substitute assets assets that the criminal may have say purchased with the proceeds of the crime and for substitute assets the court said lawyers get to be paid first a claim of very broad discretion for district judges to do what they want was expressly rejected by the justices they reversed an order that barred payment lawyers in this case would fall within the first category rather clearly the funds here which would have been the i would be more comfortable with a district court had made such a  what the district court said in fact is i've got very broad discretion to appoint this money where i think it's equitable and luis expressly disapprove of that approach  illegal activities so it even even given the perhaps more precise circumscribed level of review from the louise case the district court's ruling here should be affirmed the third reason given by the by the district court here treatment of these kinds of apportionment between victims of lawyers the part of the east that you need to pay attention to is what it says about the common law rules and it would be happy to do that and again our position routinely declined to pay lawyers fees from frozen or receivership funds which will lessen the amount that goes to defrauded consumers particularly where the amounts are going to injure consumers are less than what noble's metal's case that was reason enough the fact that the large shortfall going to consumer victims was reason enough to deny monies going to attorneys and that so therefore as an equitable matter the need to maximize the jurisdictional question that's another issue that we that we can address in you know in our in a supplemental briefing our positions you can tell from our briefs are that you took our seventh ruling was in fact a final decision of section twelve ninety one  under twelve ninety one for the for the reasons that we gave in our brief but by the way if the parties are going to address this in addition to telling us exactly what if anything is left to do sorry you the district court you might take a little look at twenty eight entities that were created after the the contempt citation and was our order was entered back in i believe maggie website solutions in particular was not been in existence prior to that date and in fact had the course of the receiver had collected proceeds that were they were able to locate primarily oh well as you'll discover when you go and look at the lease the supreme court cares about whether the assets are traceable to the crime or whether they are substitutes for assets traceable to the crime and the district court obviously did not make any findings about which these assets were i understand that judge i think i can go back and look at he dealt with i believe most of it was the incumbent that was generated in the procedure were generated that wound up in the receivership were primarily from the business activities that occurred in these entities after the date of the the l referring to was when the attorney client privilege large was finally produced to the parties in the case but with respect to all of these there with respect to the documents that were produced we believe they did benefit because they were all marke exhibits and used in the in the contempt citation or contempt hearings with respect to mr goodall there were e mails between him and my client their e mails with the various attorneys involved demonstrated his efforts to essentially a consequences of the contempt order so we believe for those reasons we would disagree with the with the court's finding with respect to no benefit but we think as the other grounds and the other errors of the court made are sufficient to warrant remain