ability after denying mr pages twenty eight u s c twenty two forty one petition which was based on his claim that he had been deprived of his federal constitutional right to a speedy trial by virtue of the fact that he  alameda county for almost six years waiting for trial on a civil commitment if you under the sexually violent predators act the district court consider that single issue  we have briefed who issues one uncertified and i would like to address both those issues this morning if i may i think the strongest argument on the speedy trial issue is the length of the delay in context the supreme court's very clear it seems to me in parker that none of the four factors the length of that the lay the reasons whether the defendant has requested a trial explicitly and the matter of prejudice or necessary or sufficient in and of any one of them themselves so i think it's important to consider the length of the the delay in context here's a man admittedly in order to be eligible for consideration under the s e p a you have to have been in state prison but he's been in state prison on a sentence of twenty seven years for an actual ten years there's nothing different about sammy page's history or his person the day he is eligible for parole in one thousand nine hundred seven when compared to the date of his conviction in one nine hundred eighty seven in short if he had the n to have a probable cause hearing was filed a month before his eligibility for parole and i think it was your client was sponsored by well i think there's no doubt that my client was at very least acquiesce has his own representation in alameda county he must then bear full responsibility for any subsequent delay but that long interim period your honor is a period it seems to me and perhaps this is  where one we're talking about a two year period of civil commitment at maximum under the statute we have a man who is six years in the wings waiting for an adjudication as to whether he should be leave for two years we have a term of six years of waiting i think there's an extraordinary burden on the people in that instance and with all due respect on the superior court to move a case like that to familiar with those courtrooms they're very very busy and obviously the cases where a defendant is screaming for his day in court are going to take precedence but there's no indication that mr page simply because  simultaneously filing collateral attacks in both state and federal court isn't interested in moving this case forward i mean it defies simple human logic to think that a person who is going to find out one way or the other and at least have the clock running on the two years with modeling or in order to leave themself in a state of non decision for six years so i submit the prejudice is very great too it's not just but we've got a system that says you're responsible for your acts so you're going to state prison for twenty seven years you're culpable you understood what you were doing and you very sponsibility for nothing has changed about the person  action committed when he gets to the end of that road we say to him you're not mentally competent we can't trust you to go out and control yourself you have impulse problems so now we're going to start a civil proceeding that will keep you off the streets hears and say this man doesn't deserve consideration because he was filing papers elsewhere that's that's simply irrelevant in my humble opinion to the merits of this case and even again you're honest more more important  appeal in people this versus pearson people versus benson two very clear california supreme court decisions where the california supreme court invention calling its own decision pearson says that  if if the sentence on a conviction has been stated under six fifty four that conviction may not be used ok and i think this is important language subsequent penal or administrat action may not be based on those convictions but the state law question is and indeed it is but mr powell in state court was entitled to the protection of that state law and he was than i do process by virtue of its not being accorded him so he he did not know it's seems to me it's easy in our society to take someone who is guilty of heinous acts as someone who comes under the s v p is and without consciously making this decision to somehow act as if they deserve less under our laws than people who don't commit such acts i think as men also try the way we treat the least of our brother and says a lot about how much we really believe in our laws and inventions the california supreme court says the legislature was very careful about saying six fifty four does not apply under the three strikes law so in that instance the protection is not accord phrase so six fifty four should apply and however badly we feel about it societal a this man shouldn't even be caught up in the s v p a process to begin with but he is he has been in it at this juncture eight years on the basis of one hearing that didn't occur until six years after the petition was filed by the district attorney and it seems to me that that is a terrible terrible miscarriage of justice in terms of commitment proceedings against him at the outset of his present commitment back and while he was nine hundred eighty seven i was several problems with that not the least of which is that the speedy trial right attaches only at the time accusation that didn't come until ninety seven he was instead he was in prison on a valid conviction that is not contested here prior to the commitment the second he has to be committed for the commitment proceedings to commence for that filing to take place it also assumes that the are other arguments that palin is making are true and that is he assumes that the state caused a delay and would somehow know about the delay and thereby is at fault for commencing the s p p proceedings in ninety seven as opposed to eighty seven i would also say that there it's not clear that you can stack s p p proceedings or commitment on top of one another before before one is is is completely under under petitioner's argument the state would be commencing s p p proceedings every two years before the titian or is even eligible for however it is a presumption and is easily met here by the state every piece of evidence given to the district court indicated that all continuances were requested by petitioner petitioner says he acknowledges acquiescence there was affirmative requests for continuances for changes of counsel for self representation this was an extremely  defendant and as an aside our argument is not that that the appellant didn't have the right to pursue those actions he did and it's not our contention that that is what delayed this the argument is that those those proceedings especially the one to find s p p act unconstitutional is relevant to his motive it can corroborate the district court's finding as it pointed out that his motive was to get this overturn wouldn't have to be to have the hearing in the first place and consistent with that is the fact that he didn't assert his speedy trial right until this court had denied finally denied his last attempt or is appeal from the denial of his claim that the s b p act was unconstitutional only vended he say let's go let's go to the go to trial and the commitment and that was when that was in two thousand and three and when did the matter then go to trial matter then went to trial in two thousand and four now appellant except ownership of that one year span and the district court found as much that he was at fault for that year after he requested a speedy trial right which essentially cancels it out during that year after or from two thousand read two thousand and four he was actually requesting requests for a continuance change of counsel it was basically consistent with the claims that have been made before  all the evidence below indicates that the continuances were all that counsels i'm sorry counsel accounts passed there was no evidence to the contrary there was no evidence that the state because that could have been we imposed i guess every two years he could get another two year sentence isn't that correct that is correct  and there's no end to that and then two successive two year commitment i actually don't know if there's a limit on two year consecutive to your commitments i would also point out that it's not irrelevant that filed and he has not yet been found guilty he has been found guilty this is a parole release date issue he was eligible for release on parole in ninety seven he could be incarcerated depending on the administrative and what have ministry rules and what happened what he does and prison until two thousand and ten that's the end of a sentence he still under sentence one might say and you know rational system might seem a little bit strange to let somebody out on parole and say we've let you out on parole you deserve to be on parole they can so dangerous we can't let you be on the streets or starting a civil and then i agree with that and i i don't hurry no one else is it's not really good to have a six year delay for a two year commitment but i agree with that and i would agree with the district court's statement similarly his ability to defend its case and it was an argument of various that there's no pretense of rehabilitation here in fact mr page has refused treatment and could have actually benefited by treatment because the commitment proceedings are valid are based on an evaluation of his state at the time he is about to be released and during this delay there was no attempt in fact often a refusal to participate in substitute counsel he had a motion to relieve counsel and substitute in itself though should be construed as an objection our frustration with his right to speedy trial well the fact that he filed a speedy t motion pro se and written by himself demonstrates that he knew how to assert his speedy trial rights when he wanted to he didn't do that until two thousand and three and then because that subsequent delay  a moment or two for very briefly you know i think again it's important to look at this in context initially the district court when it tried to determine indeed there was a thankful speedy trial plain because this was a civil proceeding about which it was being addressed the commitment proceeding in judge walker i think quite appropriately looked for other the full panoply of constitutional rights does not apply because the civil proceeding is technically true that's where mr page has to start but in context we have a convicted petition now i realize this court is not here to sort out the as the p a put my head that's what kind of the society are we this man didn't refuse treatment matter of fact he refused even to be examined by the doctors who are going to testify for the state in the hearing that eventually took place is he a little bit cynical i'm afraid he probably is because nobody was interested in treating him while he was just playing prisoner three two seven nine eight interesting theories will be submitted for decision