that's just what we have that's correct today we asked the court to hold that alaska prejudgment interest law follows along with the alaska act governs the remedy under the alaskan act and is not preempted by maritime this court in exxon one found quote alaska strong interest in protecting its waters and providing a remedy for damages resulting from oil spills help ways that diminish federal interest in  come out that's our point your honor that's our argument that this is a state law claim it's necessary under the authorities we've cited you for the court to apply the whole of state law with all its conditions and qualifications and that includes well your honor columbia brick was a maritime cargo insurance case and it was there are special rules special rules apply to maritime car going surance and that's what the court cited to in its opinion those well the reason stated in that decision is it said that state law applies this is columbia brick quote in the absence of a judicially fashioned admiralty rule was one prong of the test and that's the standard rule for maritime insurance is that we have a judicially rule and that is the western pacific rule but that is a rule that is specifically applicable to maritime insurance policies and wh columbia prick never did was do a preamp chain analysis like this court did in exxon valdez one they didn't need to because it had the specialized claim of maritime insurance in front of it western pacific didn't need to either because it was a classic maritime claim involving a collision at sea but our case has just a state law claim and therefore the jensen preemption analysis is the correct analysis to determine what  rules applicable on land and water within its limits even though those rules incidentally affect maritime affairs provided the state action one does not contravene the essential purpose of an act of congress does not work material prejudice to a characteristic feature of maritime law or three does not interfere with the proper harmony and uniformity of american law this court already found in exxon  that application of robin's rule does not violate the same is true prejudgment interest first prong application of prejudgment interest law alaska does not contravene the essential rule of western pacific and columbia prick that you look to section one nine hundred sixty one of title twenty eight as a guideline for the rate unless the equities of tell you to do otherwise is the judge made with respect to section one nine hundred sixty one but congress didn't enacted clearly the essential purpose of section nine hundred sixty is to govern post judgment entries so and finally the judge made rule allows the purpose of the judge made rule in colombia brick because the purpose of the maritime rule and alaska law prejudgment interest is exactly the same two things to provide full compensation for the injured party and to discourage delay in litigation what is the difference between the two rigs the rate under state law that was granted was about three and a half percent for some of the damages about four percent for other of the damages the rate under alaska law is ten and a half percent the second prong of the jensen analysis is whether application of alaska prejudgment interest law would work material prejudice to a characteristic feature of but before this court's first decision maritime decision in western pacific on another risk the case came down and that's the time versus keystone resources case saying we're going to look to section nine hundred sixty one and paddle neither is it exclusively applicable in these cases i just cited indicated applies in a risk that applies employment discrimination other cases we've cited show that it's applied in bankruptcy it's been applied in civil rights indicate that the alaska pre judgment interest law should be preempted in very interesting way exxon you know they didn't even argue the contrary of our preemption analysis they didn't even take it on the final and third prong  there be no interference with proper harmony and uniformity in maritime law the case is recognized that perfect harmony is impossible therefore some lack of uniformity is not a basis for finding preemption for example in american dredging the united states supreme court said the requirement of uniformity is not absolute so the courts apply a balancing test they balance the state the federal interest in uniformity against the state interest in having its law apply the federal interest is quite low here for two reasons first the rule we're talking about prejudgment interest is not of primary maritime rule it doesn't govern primary conduct in other words it doesn't govern shipping lanes navigation outfitting of ships siemens liability or recovery for accidents those are the primary maritime areas of concern second the federal interest in uniform is quite low because the rule of western pacific is so discretionary that it doesn't really result in much in the way of uniformity certainly not as much as the robins rule that was already found not to be sufficient to outweigh the state's interest you'll climb under the western pacific columbia bridge rule you apply section nine hundred sixty one unless the equities of the particular case require a different result and that's le to a wide variation in results and we started examples in the grief of calendar pages thirty seven thirty eight also there is discretion for many judges read the rule as they're being discretion there may be some question about th require some different rate now that different rate could be a state rate or it could be some other guideline western pacific for example look borrowing rate we put in evidence of seahawks borrowing rate another rate might be your the company's return on equity over the time as i understand your argument is that there's no room for equity once the there's a legal question whether federal our state law is or would we do in our south what would be the outcome your honor there was some challenge by exxon about the correct rate in the lower court papers in this motion and they did not make any challenge about the the actual rate on appeal so i would say that issue is gone there is really no question ten and a half percent was the rate set by alaska nine thirty i forget the exact action but it's in the br and that section was later amended in one thousand nine hundred seven i believe it was and the act that amended it said very clearly this only applies for cases causes of action that accrued after the date it was a date in look that change only applies afterwards so i think it's rock solid law that ten and a half percent apply mest what you asked for and that's correct that's correct there is a there's a wrinkle on this and that's the question of  compound interest versus simple interest and i think that our position as we put forward in the brief is that exxon voluntarily stipulated to compound interest and that it's bound by that and you'll find that at seahawks supplemental excerpt of record page eight in the flick which is a brief from x i i submitted in the motion papers below we had presented to the court the question of whether it should be regime how would it be applying right so finally with respect to interference with proper harmony and uniformity also there's a wide range of case of outcomes in the federal decisions ninth circuit decision that used to fluctuating rate at different times so the basic point is that the federal interest in uniformity in application is rule so low because it doesn't result in uniform on the other side the state interest as i've already quoted to you has been characterized by the ninth circuit as both a strong interest in a great and legitimate interest in protecting its citizens against the and giving its citizens remedies against the arms of little spills so proffered interest rate so that settlement provided consistent with twenty eight u s c nine hundred sixty one for the court fix the interest rate which would be compound now seahawk didn't tell us at that time just what it was asking for and in fact when it came into court to talk about the interest rate it asked for a variety of different interest rates to its own supposed borrowing cost the alaska statute exxon supposed profit from the from the transaction but the fact is that the answer to the question the vast simple versus compound interest is that the application of the lastest statute to this case by its own terms is not possible because the stipulation provides for interest to be compounded the alaska statured provides for simple interest and the reason decision held that c hard to recover if at all only under state law so that you know that we're only under state law because that's the one thing that columbia brickworks clearly did not did but that is still the ordinary rule on last there is an exception for maritime those that is the ordinary rule in any diversity coverage and damages under the marine insurance policy jones then you say then yes well that's not true if they determined what was the extent of the coverage and what was the extent mean not only but not at all well i think the question is whether columbia brickworks is limited to contract cases or whether read of past to work cases as well  damage and so i don't see any reference to any type of law bottoming the decision as to coverage and damages other than maritime law in colombia  that's what this passage in columbia brickworks we think you stay which is that in marine insurance cases the substantive rules of law are states all just for tax is clearly with you on the long what is your view about what should happen next with the case more properly be remanded to the district court to consider all these questions about compound versus simple and what the parties intended by that and so forth or would we just do that here if it were merely a matter of compounding the interest rate or excuse me if it were merely a matter of calculating the interest rate think the court could either do it itself or just indicate what the right answer was and leave it to the parties given the simple versus compound interest question which i think does involve some interpretation of the seven on page fifteen are very clear cites to the other cases the other maritime cases throughout the country which have come to the same point and said that the interest rate in maritime cases  be the alaska liability statute and acts on long was allowed to apply but this is still an admiralty case maritime law still controls to the extent that it needs to and the interest rate issue is very important you think a vessel most cases do not say ok here's my state law fly and here's my maritime law klein you have different legal theories of relief and one of the reasons for the maritime rule of uniformity of interest rates and one of the very practical reasons for that is that to have different interest rates for state law claims without which claim is state law for which by misfit the uniform rule that most courts have adopted prevents that instead of they will figure out the damages we don't have to worry necessarily about whether the legal from the intervenor topic we've heard nothing about so far the tenth amendment is really our primary focus not so much the eleventh amendment and also changes in jersey prudence on the tenth amendment and the necessary improper clause that stayed in the brief for reconsideration mattson unless your questions  when and if you look at page eight of our supplemental excerpts of record that's where exxon said quote exxon voluntarily agreed to compound interest in factored that into the computation of what it agreed to tender to city hall the stipulation itself which is in the record or the letter reflecting the agreement doesn't really discuss compound ing at all except to say here's the amount of interest we're going to pay you and if you break it down you find out called yes and we recognize that and that's accurate however the the effect on one end and the the ruling in exxon valdez one and the only claim seahawk ever filed back when  robins for the point that judge via raised that if you really economic loss or only claim the state so to get back to this this whole stipulation in this brief where exxon said th how state law does not apply i mean at this point exxon knew that we were contending for the application of ten and a half percent under state law and yet it maintained its position that it had stipulated to compound interest so the court didn't need to decide it so it's not like we blindsided axon and made some you know got some agreement to to compound interest at a time when they didn't know what we wanted the state rate clearly knows even now  another point this mystical idea that somehow there's a state action that becomes an admiralty action i don't think that that's an accurate way to say to say that this supreme court in yama motors says the exercise of admiralty jurisdiction does not result in an automatic displacement of state law and that's the way the courts talk about it over and over including the supreme court the question is is are we going to apply state law in this case even though it might be an area in which there's an admiralty connection but that doesn't make the state claim nada and admiral declaiming and whatever it makes it still brings with it all the incidents under state law  not cover every single case the vast majority of maritime cases are like the jones act cases and seaworthiness maintenance and pure salvage collusion and seal all those kinds of cases this will have no application