and also i'd like to reserve approximately five minutes all right what is what your time rebuttal will do so i think without saying the threshold issue in this case is whether mr johnson had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the parcel that was removed by law enforcement from the u p s stream of commerce and  s ultimately i'd driven to a location in orange county from los angeles subjected to a dog sniff at the location  these issues regarding reasonable expectation of privacy or legitimate expectation of privacy are stream lee fact specific there are no bright line rules that  none of the other judges on the panel joined in that decision and there is an abundance of case law on this issue and i think that both the supreme court in rake in this and several other  cases that we've cited indicate that this is a subject that it's not lend itself to a bright line rule and one of the reasons it might not lend itself to an absolute bright line rule is theoretically the name on the package could be an alias of the recipient but that's not the case here the name on the package was the actual possessor of the apartment right yes but i don't think that that's really the  party or other persons having access to it that it's so facto essentially that that down an individual would not have standing and i think it's her and that there was a declaration from as well as that she would not have access to lots of that was his basis for say it was in the privacy interest well i think looking at looking at the facts in this particular case it's clear that mr lopez was never at the location when mr johnson was at the location the judge made those factual findings and adopted those findings but there is no evidence on the record that when the package was supposed to arrive mr johnson actually was at the location right he got there the next day actually in his declaration and is found by the court he arrived on january th the day that the package was supposed to  e at the location in the evening it's unclear the declaration doesn't specifically say but he does say that he arrived on january th and that he was expecting a package he further says that whenever he arrived at the location that he would stay there alone that this lopez was never there when he arrived and so i think he does clearly state that he was there on i know he states that he was there on january th and that he was expecting a packet is he was expecting a package on january th or january th well it does he doesn't specifically say in the declaration i believe he does anything but if he was expecting a package on january th how could he have an expectation of privacy in the package that came on january th well or he was expecting so i that he could have an expectation of privacy is that he regularly stayed overnight at the apartment he was authorized to pick up any and all packages and mail addressed to mrs lopez  always stayed at the apartment overnight when he traveled to los angeles he had keys to the mailbox he had keys to the apartment he had a fall with access to the elevators in every part of the building  he indicated in its undisputed by the government that mrs lopez was never present at the apartment when mr johnson was there let me ask you this council if there were a package that were actually addressed to miss lopez and was intended for miss lopez is it your argument that your client would have an expectation of privacy in that package as well are you asking just and i'm asking you you said he has an expectation of privacy in any package that comes to that the location when he's there and i'm asking you are you saying that if there were a package addressed to mrs lopez that was unequivocally for judge made factual findings the district judge that miss lopez specifically notified the building management that mr johnson was authorized to pick up packages any packages that were dressed to her johnson indicated that he had the exclusive right to own possess and use the packages and now to get back to judge roland since question even if the package was intended for  said you can have anything in any package that comes whether it's for me or for you well you know indication that there was any mail ever sent to miss lopez at the location directly or personal mail or that mrs lopez was ever even the location at any time she was in new jersey all the rent checks were sent from new jersey it would appear that she was never at the location so i can't give a specific answer to that question but i think looking at the record and the way the record is laid out here in this particular context mr johnson would have access to and the no there were no exam pulls any time of packages being given to mrs lopez and mrs lopez even existed in reality or was anything more than an alias in this particular case that mrs lopez  is my alter ego there is no miss lopez i thought you just said she was in new jersey well that the checks were sent from new jersey so there's no indication that she was ever ever at the location at any time there was no one saw her was no mrs lopez ever at the location never signed any documents was never seen there mr news nic who who submitted the declaration that judge bennett asked about never indicated i spoke with mr lopez i know who broadhurst where the court indicates that a formalized arrangement indicating joint control and supervision is sufficient to support a legitimate expectation of privacy not even withstand or not with standing the use of a false name which was used in that particular case and broadhurst also cite us verse perec as which indicates that exercise of a joint of joint control in supervision of a vehicle can demonstrate a reasonable expectation of privacy there are numerous cases that are cited in the briefs where packages that were addressed to other good morning made please the court then balding on behalf of the united states this court should affirm the district court's denial of defense motion to suppress for several reasons and i'll start by talking about the standing issue and as your honors were talking as an initial matter whether or not an address see or not addressee or someone is not the sender of a package could ever have standing is something that this court could find but need not find in this case i think as you canons concurrence was well reasoned but even if as defendant suggests there is there are circumstances in which some sort of exception might apply for specific parcel someone might have a reasonable expectation of privacy in that parcel even though he or she is not neither the sender nor the odyssey the defendant has failed to set forth facts that those circumstances were met here fact and rejected that as concludes re and not credible in that absence of any declaration by miss lopez and whether or not just briefly that the issue wasn't really there is credibility finding without hearing any witnesses well your honor i  think he had evidence before him one was the declaration of mr rizk makes a that you know this is mrs lopez she said that you know he can pick up packages for her as her assistant and then he comes and says you know i'm exclusively have the right to pick up any package at any time even if you were to accept that that he has this exclusive right which the district court rejected and we think that factual finding was not clearly erroneous even if you were to accept that i think your honour's hit on there was no specific showing that those expectations are that defendants expectation applied to this particular parcel and i just want to make clear that there is nothing in the record that the defendant was here when this parcel was scheduled to arrive it was scheduled to arrive no later than noon on january th all he says in his declaration was that he arrived he traveled to los angeles on january th and was expecting a package on january th it is entirely within defendant's power to say what he wanted to say in his declaration to the extent he could and he didn't say that he could have said or if it were true he could have supposedly said that i was there i was expecting this package to arrive on the th there's nothing in the record that even if we were to accept this reasonable expectation back well your honor what i'm trying to suggest is that given the framework which is that ordinarily a non addressee has no expectation of privacy he's trying to carve out this limited set of circumstances and that is when i have exclusive use and his by his own argument that only applies when he is there in in the city at the apartment because that's the trigger under his theory of the trigger is it's addressed in a slow pace but when i'm there i have the exclusive right he has not met that so limited set of facts is not met here because he hasn't set forth facts that he was actually there when this package was going to arrive nor that this was a package he was he was expecting he was expecting a package to five paragraph fifteen your honor so our position is that even if he could set up a set a set of circumstances in which he might be able to assert the th amendment right in a parcel not addressed to him those circumstances were not met here and and for that reason i think the the st circuits recent opinion in the the stokes case which is cited in the briefs gives a framework that i think this court could follow which is essentially to state the general rule that see has no standing to assert this claim and even if there were such as such a right it's not met under the facts of the facts before this court so for all of those reasons i think this court could  the district court's denial of the motion to suppress based on the standing issue i'd like to turn briefly to the issues of reasonable suspicion or probable cause in turn which were not addressed in the opening argument but in terms of the reasonable suspicion i think there's a bit of a dispute as to whether or not it's the burden in terms of showing what time was the package supposed counsel i'm more interested in the facts i mean basically  the declaration was i got a call from a reliable informant and he described a package that's coming from new york to los angeles and the government's position is than that on which to base and it was not just a suspicious package it was a real out of an informant who had proven reliable at least two prior occasions but all the informant says is there's a package coming from new york to los angeles and here is the tracking number yes but then that package was found in los angeles it that certain circumstances that the officers knew were consistent at it with a better new york to los angeles well it was sent from an i said well there's the law enforcement law enforcement is entitled we should give a we have to analyze it in the from the context of suspecting legal wrongdoing as understood by those versed in law enforcement so through the law enforcement officer the law enforcement officers trained he has used an informant in the past or some sort of someone providing tips place that is proven reliable no indication that he's you it doesn't even say that the office of the informant said the package was suspicious it just says there's this package coming why why does that show anything i would i would add there is one additional in terms of the reasonable suspicion analysis and we we cited in our in our brief it wasn't in the officer declarations but it is in the record you are ninety nine dollars and it talks about an additional fact which is that was sent from a u p s store which is not the sender address was not their own address and that's additional factor jefferson clearly holds that if the dog sniffing happens prior to the guaranteed delivery time of the package regardless of whether the delivery can be completed on its scheduled time if the dog sniff occurs before that time there is no  confirm that the package was guaranteed either by ten thirty am or by noon there was no further information the party stipulated that that was the guaranteed delivery time the government did introduce evidence that the dog sniff occurred in the morning of that day not specifically before or after one thousand and thirty so that's where the gap is so if the defendant's burden to establish the facts so suggesting a th amendment violation which we think it is because it's wrapped up in the concept of standing then the record shows that the dogs have occurred before the latest guaranteed delivery time which is twelve on the other hand if it's the government's burden and one thousand and thirty dollars is the guaranteed delivery time at most you've got a minor up to ninety minute  between the time of guaranteed delivery and the time of the dogs now if that is the case your honour's i would submit the government has reason had reasonable suspicion to justify that brief detention to subjected to a dog's life which is what the with respect to this you know i just wanted to cite to jefferson on that one point and it says at page one hundred and thirty four we hold that an address e has no th amendment possessory interest in a package that has a guaranteed delivery time until such a livery time has passed before the guarantee delivery time law enforcement may detain such a package for inspection purposes without any th amendment curtail the errors that opposing counsel's as a career search a probable cause hearing that was based on a search that occurred without a search war in other words the frequent examples an officer walks and has a dog sniff a vehicle and decides to arrest based on the results of the dogs and that's not what happened here what happened was they submitted they sought a warrant they obtain a warrant which is what law enforcement are supposed to do and that's the way we want to encourage that i think that the cases show so what the fed it looks at is again tries to take piecemeal attacks at the pieces of war but we have to look at the tally of the circumstances as to what was in front of the magistrate now there was information about information being provided about the specific package it wasn't the detail that was available then the government concedes there certainly could have been more facts added to this affidavit and in fact it had the dog's qualifications been added there would really be a debate about whether or not that the warrant was valid because i think the case law shows that that alone can establish probable cause here there were no qualifications but there was enough so st with the tip the officer referenced specific information and then says that they seized the package so at the very least there's enough in the affidavit to show that the tip was specific a specific parcel and then you've got the information about that judge bennett did not give too much weight to but at least there were some factors the destination this place of shipping being consistent also the officers training and experience as a narcotics officer and finally shipping p s overnight and then add to that the reference to the drug detection dogs in the staff now again without the  dogs qualifications you don't strike the entirety of the fact of a dog sniff you can still look at it through the commonsense a even if the warrant should have been issued the proffer servers were entitled to rely on it in good faith absolutely or i think that's that's the the whole point here if even if the defendant could establish all these other arguments  those exceptions we think you not apply what they did was they failed to include better evidence that would have made it even more robust and more valid and warrant so we're not this is not the type of conduct we're trying to deter in that sense of police trying to do an end around on the magistrate they submitted it to a magistrate and they were entitled to rely on good faith even though it was lacking that dog the dog credibility was there happens in the record that the age was actually credentialed even the the actual qualifications were never submitted and they were produced but defense announcement them we did not some of them because they were not attached to the war and so for that reason but in terms of good faith there is evidence of the record from the declaration familiar with with page and her certifications in for training so at least in terms of good faith they were relying on what they believed was a valid warrant and not only that both a state magistrate a state judge and now  federal district judge have both confirm that that warrant was sufficient so even if this court were to disagree with those findings the mere fact that there is this disagreement among educated legal individuals should or the good faith exception as to the officers reading that i would just indicate that that judge scanlon talked about the assertion of dominion is made for he he proposes the rule for the for the premise that the assertion of dominion is made for wrongful reasons in some of these male cases and in this case there is no evidence of any alias in the present case and also that the privacy rights of an individual in a reasonable expectation of privacy must be determined before the search occurs without reference to the incriminating or innocent nature of the subsequently discovered fruits of the search so rake s and i think that the facts in this case are if you look at the facts that were undisputed and found by the court mr johnson clearly did have a reasonable expectation of privacy with regard to reasonable suspicion i would just indicate that essentially the reasonable suspicion was sort of farcical i think it's one of your honor's pointed out any pack it's basically anything achatz going from new york to l a or vice versa and there's nothing that would distinguish this nothing that the informant said that would distinguish it with regard to timing the government had the there's just no way of knowing what time the or not the search but the dog sniff took place with regard to the search warrant the the warrant was incredibly thin there was nothing with regard to the dog nothing about his certification it's nothing about his training nothing about false alerts this could have been any dog somebody standing there with a treat where the dog would alert both of the officers who said they knew the dog knew nothing about it and with regard to good faith i would just indicate that this is a situation where they relied on the dog sniff was which was unlawful and secondly any reasonably trained officer we believe would have known that there was a no basis for probable cause finding based on the information that was contained in the affidavit to the