trial court's order denying defendants motion to suppress at issue in the suppression motion was the use for one day of a global positioning system g p s device to track the movement of a vehicle associated with the which the legitimate privacy interests of an individual intrude and the other the degree to which the search is needed to promote legitimate government interests now the property history has it doesn't it doesn't it mean that he would know about the search first and then consent your honor it's certainly true that the agreements the emissary make is that he will he shall consent to the search the question here though is whether the search was reasonable under the fourth amendment and the search provision is expansive it does not limit when the when the place what government agent may conduct the search and that informs the question of whether the search is reasonable of under the fourth amendment so the issues about what specific searches he says he consented to or are you rea look to the facts of wealth and wilson the officers came to his residence another individual opened the door and they saw that the defendant is opening his and sampson we find the same thing in samson they stop an individual walking on the street road and the officer searched him solely based on his early status it an the issue isn't that the absence of presence of a wants warrantless it that here there is no question that the search could have been conducted with a war but there are certain searches that might be so in case of  mean even even you made a point of talking about how this tracking device you know was brought up something pretty quickly after it's install first i do believe that under wilson sampson that would be that would would not be an unreasonable search from the fourth amendment regardless even if we can imagine that there's some outlying case or he's subjected to a tracking device where cameras audio surveillance are done with them all the time and for that at some point he might say there should be some other sort of a fireman's suspicion that is simply not question that there was no warrant point mr mammoth on that it's only for one day that's only because of the defendant was followed on a robbery within twenty four hours but needless to say without a time frame without a warrant the defendant that the tracking device could have been on until such time in a week that he might have done something is not right i mean it just got lucky that it was it within one day well your honor that sort of speak right whether it's laugh whether it was perhaps repeated roberts we don't know why it happened that very next day but you keep on saying one day but literally it could have been for two weeks or better a month until such time lasted only for one day and we have to assess the response of that one day search and moreover even if it again had taken a week a week is surely small enough that they wouldn't have a new hearing if there had been a new test we don't have that situation second the evidence that he suggested he would put forward at a new suppression hearing his relationship with the vehicle owner whether he secured a parking permit all carol cases i stood for the proposition that police could use a tracking vehicle to track a tracking device it's using to track a vehicle moving on public roads without conducting a fourth amendment search  and there's no argument that garcia wasn't overturned by john so regardless of the court's analysis of jones there's no there's no issue as to whether he's kindest was was  make sure the lights off please thank you percy yes and the very early morning hours in april up three or four in the morning a police officer from aurora snuck on to the parking lot for where the defendant lived and affixed a g p s tracking device without warrant without cause to a car the turns out to be owned by  his roommate stephanie powers that device was used it was so sad it was to track movements every fifteen minutes and there is no question that under jones not your position is the federal president should apply to police officers for purposes of exclusionary rule right now you're talking a good faith yeah exactly false are our position for that is under davis that applies to binding fact the jones case distinguished those cases so davis is limited to two good faith reliance on binding precedent not a good faith extension of precedent on the police and i really kind of lost it that distinction but our position is that there's no there couldn't be no good faith exception because under a bus because there's no good faith reliance on binding precedent because there was no by precedent thank you and a big part of the state's are going has to do with the fact that mr la flor was on parole at the time that the tracking device was affixed to the car and used and under the state's theory apparently people on parole have no rights and that's clearly not the case in the wilson and sampson the u s supreme court he's both make clear that sure people on parole do have reduced rights but they still have rights and they have more rights than someone who isn't actually in prison  person since he agreed to that and as a term of his release and he's required to consent anyway it's really he doesn't have a reasonable expectation to refuse the consent but this is completely different this court held in wilson that that provision that you shall consent to search is not respect it doesn't mean i here i hereby consent to all future searches of any county it means that when asked i shall consent to a search and by definition if you're doing a secretive search such as secretive g p s tracking or if they would of briggs sample i guess some of the state's theory they could put video cameras secretly and audio recording and this bill of words bad because that would be a search so our position is that what makes his expectations reasonable is controlled by search of your person property or residence on your control that's there are very few rights that are retained and this happens if you want to know that the state he did not agree and there is no reasonable he agreed to clandestine tracking of his movements by g p s map and so and also if you look even under the language it refers the search what's been the state's  until jones that this wasn't even a search so it makes no sense that that there was some type of an agreement here that a g p s tracking at the time this agreement was entered into was was read to be by the parties search and that's evidenced by the fact when you look further down in the document that there is a provision for electronic monitoring for ninety days whether that refers to only an ankle bracelet or g p s monitoring the fact is that if it's an ankle bracelet it's still there considering that to be not a search included in paragraph ten and something the more intrusive that is the civic we put a provision so our position is that bearing on what i would say that's favorable to us that's basically it's a complete without cause search this the tip was that he was suspect of committing burglaries because he was seen bringing property  ran and based on that and that's not their thing besides if they were really concerned if he had stolen property they could have under this agreement asked for his consent and search his property and and whatever but they did they decide to import already established that the davis exception does not apply and what the appellate court did was fair the ages essentially said well this jones decision is a new decision and the state makes a distinction well it's not a newly created will pretty much is i mean it was a dormant rule and we cited case our case burd where the appellate court gave the same relief to the state when they were on that supreme court case of amps was decided related to automobile searches and they said well that's a limit within the reach and that was that help belton had been  remain on a case for further hearing more evidence and that's fair because his theory down below was that his movements were being infringed on by the from any trespass and if you  you'll if you look at cat's analysis which the supreme court it's actually just a sort of my or in the jones case i believe five of the justices recognize that there is a cat's reese much attention to privacy apart from this trespass so you know for example if you're a passenger on a car and the police wanted to track say it was say a celebrity is in a limousine and a limousine company picks them up every day in the police are aware of this concerns of the people on the night of the of the delegates in the one nine hundred seventy constitution convention we're actually concerned about the possibility of technology forget progressing to the point where it's going to start and further invading on people's privacy to the point where they specifically put the protection of quote invasions of privacy that's not included in the constitution and our position is that even if this court finds that there's not  of violations under illinois constitution given the privacy clause that this is and biggs act lee what they were fearing thirty forty years ago or whatever that in now it's very intrusive means that the  there's no manpower requirement required anymore the police can just affix devices or even use g p s tracking devices already in our and just have a computer monitor people's movements in theory just hit a button and pop up where they've been of flora's interest in the car which by the way there was some good evidence that he did at an interest in that power the police were put this device on the car solely  to the same day of the robbery later in the day and that he referred to in other areas of the record this powell as his wife girlfriend and fiance there is evidence it's not really clear but clearly she's more than just an acquaintance of believe the maintenance manager for the apartment complex testified at trial that they mean powell and the still a floor had he he gave the parking permits to mr wood floor it was on the apartment complex parking lot so all of these facts show that it wouldn't be futile for the court to essentially proceed on the jones you're honest it's important to make clear the relevance of the imus argument in this case and the m s r agreement set forth various conditions which defendants had  stack and the question of whether there is a legitimate expectation of privacy for searches again has been answered by wilson and sampson there but neither search was consensual in both cases the government conceded that the search wasn't consensual and so it didn't fall under the exact wording of the emissary nonetheless the courts this court and the supreme court held that defendants the defendants had no legitimate expectation of privacy and so the search was reasonable regardless of whether the exact  and the court held that the state police officers were in fact deterred by the federal court case so this isn't an argument that's being made up a officers might have had a different footing if the prosecution happened in federal court in other words he suggests that the officer should think differently about the fourth amendment watch trying to predict