approved by this court by filing various quests the action against those trusts at a fairly early stage of the trust litigation before discovery had been completed importantly before any evidence had been presented to the trial work during oral argument crosspost is for summary judgment where there was no issue involving fraud or intent to dep where you need to stop it and i think that's where the relevance of our summary order comes into play because in that summary order i think we made clear and i think you state also made clear and i'm quoting from the summary order this the state responded that rush was not entitle to the pledge because actions intentionally had to lead to the provisions of the of the provisions for rush now intentionally is the position that you state tuck that mr sessions actions were intentional and i think if anything just the judge has in ski i was not only accurate in his statement may have been bound by the mandate of this court when we affirmed that in fact that mr sessions was intentional i'm not sure whether you're trying to finely divide intentional actions  versus project link actions i'm not sure perhaps that's what you could respond to but i have to say that i don't find any basis to call into question judge positions he's comments regarding and the promise that we said the estate was bound to a pool under the terms of that agreement respectfully or i disagree with some of what you said there's no question that mr sessions after the break two thousand and five concluded that he did not want to honor his pledge would that be an question that was never really get the press through evidence as to whether or not mr sessions in one thousand ninety four when he funded why didn't the summary order for close that question because a summary order only dealt with the issue of  given that the estate mr sessions was going to fulfill his promise which he had to filter in his lifetime or and upon his death and upon his death the state filled his shoes and had to fill that promise right how do you how how how can what avenue do you see that rush should have taken to enforce that says in effect sats that if a person makes a promise and the appellate court finds that that promise is binding on the person as well as to state that in order to avoid that i thought we should give relief to a party that is entitle to relief and you're saying that no relief is due to that part of yours but i'm saying the only avenue available to rush when he realize this verified complaint that they could prove those things that the trust denied they could prove those things at the time judge but since he was hearing russia's motion for summary judgment there had been no evidence whatsoever offered to judge but what did we resolve and yourself i think very clearly and correctly that the a state had made a promise i'm sorry the state was widely to pay russia million five and if it had vs if it should have been and why frustrate the state or frustrate russia's right to be given that one point five million given that they satisf only proceed through that illinois uniform project transfer act and because they did not well and then we raised it in the course of their complaint they did but there's a also whether he gets fish in the s s to pay those bills which he did and this would be a question of law no question the fed would have to find out i meant that we can resolve this based on the record as it stands position they're taking citing crane and miller are directly in conflict with five you want to be with the so you're saying that the yes back pretty much supplants only to focus or going to ask you have police and i rushed to two to address that particular question as to whether or not it is inconsistent whether or not the that act supplanted the common law really they were seeking joyce that you might you know maybe one of these unintentional consequences of your argument it would pretty much if we were to adopt your position it might be read by the circuit courts that they should  limit their discussion of the case for fear that they may say something that would create an i don't see how we sessions and that intentional act can be characterized as one reaching a fragile i think obviously our position would be that it is if you look at the whole exchange on that day between the bench let me let me rephrase that he asked you do you mean our summary order as as this concluding that there was an intentional act by mr sessions to deprive rush of the sort of normal and natural in the context in which they wrote this entire case is about fraud and to have a discussion with the judge three or more years into the case as to whether there's intentional conduct or  judges prejudging my issue because he made a comment i think there may be a sanctions motion here well you know the standard is that remarks can beat a hostile or disparaging against counsel or the clients of the case without rising to over again it's an asset protection trust and they'd like to make this keep going through two thousand and five point  and let me just say also that there are at least five host i used to cases we cited in our brief but there's no mention of any preemption in fact this court chapman and its three sixty six a five power were no party had raised it reached in on it that the child support case and said you've missed this issue there's a sell sell spendthrift rest period support is against predators doesn't matter if there's a child support issue but has been consistency five mean one yes  transfer or not there's no all the literature says the intent is irrelevant it's so i don't think the column was sell sell trust is his is inconsistent with five b two with the ak infected sort of got its own solvent she test you wouldn't be looking for those assets if the person had assets to pay their bills here are my receipt and transferred all those assets for the current violence reserves a very generous distribution standard for himself and there was even money in the estate to pay his own friends claim that they file and history of justice mcbride question as to what was in that two thousand and five press the only thing that was in it was the one percent general partnership interest that controls the rest of the money and the only thing we get was a charge or so just to answer that question but we don't we don't view it as inconsistent in fact you know there's a number of cases out there that say the statutes will not be construed as taking away common wall rights unless they're so repugnant to the statute that they strip it of its effectiveness that's a callahan and a second argument i think maybe you'll hear on rebuttal is is that mr sessions died and now it is no interest for us to reach it it's an interesting argument but we don't believe that the public policy of illinois is that you can transfer all your assets into a cell cell spendthrift trust pass them free of your debts to your remaining beneficiaries as long as they don't find out about the trust before you die which is exactly what happened here two to rush this this issue was addressed specifically in the morris case where they claimed exactly the same thing first the debt or it died and they claimed well there's now there's no interest to reach basically the morris court said you know listen two to the handling these trust as i'm sure you know is a northern district of illinois case from march of two thousand and nine almost exactly two years ago there are a number of pieces but that's the piece we rely on we relied on it mostly as a choice of last case but happily it also  yes i'm sorry there were two parties the attorney general involved in this case we intervene below and are party to the case and i urge the courts to affirm the circuit court's judgment rush university on the common cold common law claim regarding the ineffectiveness of the self settled trust by the settle or to defeat the rights of a creditor and that's consistent we believe with one standing illinois walk out but as you as you've heard part of the question is whether the transfer act inconsistent is it an appropriate characterization and i would submit that they are not inconsistent that the common law of trusts supplements the fraudulent transfer  that there can never be the situation where one applies but not the other or vice versa and you can think of an example where for example and i'm this gets a little bit into the self styled trust issues but assume that a set situation in which the statutory remedy of the creditor would apply but there would be no but there's also a separate possibility and that would be under the common law where there is a seller who creates a self self trust and the law i'm happy guard is that it doesn't matter whether the rights of the creditors exist at the time or thereafter and the common law as well established that it doesn't matter whether there was an intent to defeat the rights of predators or not it's strictly the war of trusts the policy behind which is that a person cannot have this cake and eat it too cannot play fast and loose with creditors can act keep the benefit of the s s but put them out of the reach of creditors you cannot simultaneously do those things and i find that it's interesting that this trust i think the witness of it robert dylan as a lawyer here who has a website and it's he ever ties to services as an asset protection trust so that you can keep your yacht or your creditors can't get and that is the very policy that illinois says you cannot implement because this the legislature is created a limited number of situations of the bankruptcy code recognizes a limited number of situations in which a person's assets are not subject to the claims of creditors homestead exemption tennessee by the entire u s those are recognized for the for the fundamental policies behind those walls but this general right of somebody to say i'm effect there isn't a case on what it really is a question as far as i can tell throughout the country but they screen mightily to distinguish the cases that go against them they don't have a single case that they can cite that's authoritative that supports their position on application of the common law which is if permissible in leicester is an application of portal and transfer statute is permissible to put in a spendthrift was for some other beneficiary your grandchildren or what have you and the lead to wrap up and they said that the death of the settle or in that case didn't change anything because it was the same born after the morris case which the marriage of chapman decision in this course approvingly cited by the first district i think it is consistent with  realistically portrayed on page twenty three of the response it begins with mr brooks and i i don't know who says it settled trust as to creditors they are per se invalid now i looked up that was it mr brooks speaking it was rather all right and then this is judge but since but if you have brought don't you go very interesting in morse and miller their bankruptcy court decisions were the issue was it the trustee in bankruptcy have control of the bankruptcy life interest in the cour fact as you have repeatedly stated right and it makes it very very difficult for us to say that ice was present here i would agree with you completely it would've been much easier had