and now dropped out of a single provision of a stipulation an order executed with the department of labor in september of two thousand and order that mr grayson specifically instructed his counsel to sign for him on his behalf today did not matter that she did not know all the terms of the settlement agreement that didn't change the fact that she had given her council actual authority to go forward and signed the agreement it was her responsibility to learn those terms it was her councils responsibility to report case there is a parent already as well and says again our support for that is but kaiser case judge training in the district court and barclay grayson would have this court follow a principle that the only way they could be your parents already is if there was direct contact between the department of labor and mr grayson during the settlement negotiations however that is not true because she or the department of labor was accurately represented every action mr grayson took by through his counsel mr unger mr unger reported to the department of labor that he met with his client after mr unger had received drafts of the department of labor relations and order he represented to the department of labor that he and his client discussed the stipulation in order he represented to the department of labor as well as to the district court that his client consented to the stipulation in order and executed the stipulation on water on behalf of this client now even though the department of labor had never witnessed these actions every one of these actions happened every one of these actions was reported accurately and case arising out of southern district case in new york wason is a virginia case neither of which would have as much bearing as the kaiser case under under in that in the present case in both federal and wal the attorney acting on behalf of his client took action contrary to the expressed instructions of his client in both panel and wallsend the client had said don't do something that the attorney went ahead and did that is not the case before this court case now mr unger acted completely consistently w instructions from his client he discussed the well order with his client his client structed him to enter into a sensual arrangement and he went forward and did that that's what was represented to the department right your honor and then kaiser went on to know that the client in that case had instructed her attorney to go and execute a settlement agreement exactly as it happened in this case first he had the authority to negotiate then after discussing that to the agreement back and forth with his client he came back represented to the parties that he had authority to execute the agreement and in fact he had authority to execute the agreement exactly what's happened in the case w we're not relying on his authority to negotiate we're relying on his instructions to execute the deal well order i just want to quickly say that the remedy is in equitable because none of the cases cited by either the district court or by mr grayson support forming a contract entered into by the parties which is essentially what happened here there is not a shred of evidence offered by mr grayson that the department of good morning for you i'm bord green here for partly gracing where i address any of the comments made i want to make a couple of observations i was preparing i noticed some errors in the department that i wanted to call to the court's attention because they might have a bearing on the ultimate decision that the commissioner have page twenty two of her brief talks about the parties correcting an s t c order i think the court understands there were actually two stipulated orders that discussion is not supported in the record and i think should be disregarded then at page twenty six of the commissioners brief she argues about ratification and i wanted to papers more carefully i didn't realize that both ratification of page twenty six and then the a stop all argument that is raised to page twenty eight was raised at all below again i don't i don't think they're  to the outcome but i wanted to mention those things and before addressing the merits and we agree that the kaiser is the organ lot on this issue of apparent and actual authorities we don't disagree that that's the sort of underlying law but before we get there i think the court should remember the question of whether this order was even appealing the issue was raised earlier and then i think sort of put aside for the under of for this briefing motions to dismiss that might be reserved to her by the bankruptcy court returned the case to the bankruptcy court and indeed the chapter thirteen was fully administered and a confirmation order was issued now under eleven u s c thirteen twenty five this is the confirmation of a chapter thirteen the court has to find that the debtor complied with all applicable rules and then statue including of course eligibility now if the commissioner had wanted to appeal from the confirmations order she certainly could have done that didn't i just point out that the the argument about a few a village and what the commissioner gave up by accepting the stipulation doesn't really ring true the commissioner guy everything she could have been entitled to even putting aside to stipulate the language that refers to the receiver well your honor i i am a little bit puzzled by that because the underlying motion which was prepared but never filed by the commissioner didn't even request them really and it was no authority for that rel and understand what the order did your honor at least purported to do was to make a final adjudication that mr grayson was personally responsible for all of the fees and costs that might ever be incurred by this receiver normally receiver to make sure that no rights were impaired during the early phases of the litigation but to go this next step and make a final determination that you are personally liable with no education  answer the question of why was it there i think frankly it was a kind of a gotcha i think it was something that the lawyers didn't notice in the chaos of this day and as you know from the record judge king you might say presided over the last  let's say the last exchange of documents and what he really is doing here we contend is essentially correcting a stipulated order in one respect and i think he's correctly finding and i also would note for the cord that page five of the commissioner's reply brief she said the deal well does not dispute any relevant facts proffered by mr gra grayson testified point blank he did not know this term was in the documents he didn't even know that there were two stipulated orders and didn't know the deal well with doing what mr grayson thought was that surprise kind of overwhelming force by the department and the f c c were sort of unleashed on the lawyers they you might say signed or went along with the orders but there's no evidence  grayson even knew that there would be an order entered into that there was discussion of an agreement but the reality of this case is that the government got essentially everything it needed white collar criminal defense lawyers both said they didn't understand that there was a final juda cation that is that they understood that this was in effect a statement that my assets if it's determined that they were ill gotten gains or that there was some hour properly derived from capital consultants that they were to be frozen and that they could be applied to any any claim frankly not just the receivers claims the fact is the language  and i don't know what to say about the lawyers maybe not being as careful and you know in the chaos of those of those days in that hearing but the plain fact is that relief is something that the  think your honor you're quite right in kaiser there's a finding that she actually agreed and instructed her lawyer to agree and then and i had to smile when i read it she writes a letter two days later and says i re focus on this particular error although frankly one of the errors was that it if you're that even the lawyers have stipulated to be personally liable for the receiver series which i don't think anyone really thought it was intended department of labor isn't here saying there's something wrong with their claim of the treatment their claim is the receiver's fees that under their argument could possibly push just outside of the eligibility and the irony here  my opinion is that it was moot and we even thought about moving to dismiss the appeal on that ground but i'm not sure what the law would would tell us if you reverse and found that they should have been dismissed i'm i'm just and in any event we would certainly have the rights under our stimulation in order to then collect the receivership these which were paid by the state therefore having been paid by the state if they were not paid to the budgets pence and beneficiaries there is over three hundred million in lo anything over greece that's correct your honor but all we are entitled to the opportunity to try and we have the obligation to try the well it's some point would have to be an appealable order but it's certainly an appealable order because under the ninth circuit law even if there was a premature notice of appeal filed the ultimate anality is cured