first the immigration judge failed to place the correct burden of initial proof that mr garcia was was convicted of a mandatory criminal bar for the relief that he was seeking before the immigration judge which was cancellation of removal second that even if mr garcia even if there was sufficient documented evidence that mr garcia was convicted of a mandatory bar that he did in fact meet his burden of proof showing that that conviction garcia was first brought to immigration proceedings in two thousand and ten following in arrest for a violation of border protection and this violation of water tension is what causes the appeal this morning the initial evidence of this crime the burden of proof was initially placed and they responded to show that the criminal bar ex proof makes any difference at this point in view of the evidence that we have about the conviction why does it matter who introduced the evidence at this point your honor it may not specifically matter in exists well and i understand you may have a theoretical objection to the way immigration judges deal with that issue you know other cases but i don't see how it affects the outcome here your i ask you to address something that actually does seem central to me yesterday which was that the board of immigration appeals here based its decision as i read it on the strider case which says in essence that a violation of a no contact provision of protected water qualifies as the violation of a provision that's intended to protect against violence that was the basis of the board's decision i didn't see addressed in your brief your honor i do believe challenge to a board decision that does not address the precedent upon which the board relied and to which i believe we are required to give chevron deference  and in this case i believe that the court of appeals meant they missed the greater picture here and that yes that that the strider  decision addresses the issue as to whether or not the no contact provision of the order was violated but it but there was no determination as to whether or not the violates a portion of that have a protection order that protects against credible threats of violence repeated harassment or finally injury is supportable and in this case it's the equitable statu e the the illinois state statute of violation of an order of protection because of the way that it's drafted doesn't fall doesn't fall squarely within the elements of the f in a valid order of protection authorized under current house several choices one of which is three which is the no contact  get to get we don't get to the modified categorical structure that in this case because of the way the statute is written and because a statute does not clearly delineate different different acts that are not qualified criminal can you know you can you can and there are a lot of different ways to violate the state statute different paths under one two and three and purpose one two three fourteen fourteen point five cetera know that would violate the federal statute and items that would not violate the federal statute so we have to look at roman numeral one two and three and in roman numeral three there is no way to distinguish whether or not there's no way to distinguish which crime would it the would specifically create a connection to two thirty seven eight to  which requires that the alien violate a portion of the order that involves protecting protection of the person to protect as a protection to get credible threats of violence repeated harassment  injury under under roman numeral three it is possible for example that the person who was a person who under a order of protection was ordered to for example and this is allowable on this and only one statute to pay child support under the under the order the failure of paying child support is criminalized in illinois has understand it but this isn't the case under roman three traditionally roman well but your honor my argument is that we cannot use a categorical approach to get to that point because taken as a whole of the statute doesn't matter allow us to do that it engaged in conduct that violates a portion of protection order suppose you had a very broad statute maybe you were just operating under members of roman three of the federal of the state statute but the court made an expressed finding on the record that the defendant had physically assaulted the person protected under the order should not be sufficient to satisfy the plain language of federal statu that that's a different place and i think it in particular because in this case that was that was not thinking they're wired i'm just asking the more it is not this case you're right but i'm asking you whether under two thirty seven eight to two with that language about whom the court determines has engaged in trying to act whether such an explicit factual finding by state criminal court would be sufficient even if the particular statute was bro challenges decision in two ways one she ledges of the immigration judge improperly place the burden of proof on her to establish the absence of disqualifying criminal offense and two that the statute is categorically overbroad  statute convictions not divisible not to convictions not otherwise establish twelve twenty seven eight to be double why most all these arguments are not exhausted first of all this are going about the burden of proof is not for the board broad argument the petitioner was making that was also not prepared for the board they soon the petitioner soon the modified categorical approach applied for the board and argued the record of conviction that streamlines this case to one issue which was it was raised before the board whether or not this no contact a vision part of protective order protects against credible threats of violence by doing injury and harassment as a board cited as a pressing decision on this issue matter no other point that no contact or vision when issued in a domestic violence context meant to separate the abuser from the abuse prevent any further escalation into violence and that's really opinion says alan holder two thousand and nine decision of the court referenced in our foot though it states that there is no conviction required for this particular move of graham and other moncrief beholder conviction that's the trigger for this but that language requiring a last nexus ten thousand dollars that was very factual specific unusual and was c language not decision words saying the immigration statutes asking what conduct was engaged and that is exactly the language used in this particular move a statute that asked what conduct was engaged in on the specific occasion i believe the exact language is a court has found that the  step right there doesn't allow the immigration judge to for example hold a factual hearing about what happened in the confrontation between mr garcia and the woman who was complaining to greg you've got to have a court fin documents but there are certainly cases where there could be a court finding where they found they violated this protective order but they were convicted of it it could be a term of probation for example and has to be reflected in docket more commonly a divorce endless variety of violations of no contact orders and in this context in the state courts in which these orders are issued you know criminal and otherwise cell phone telephone yes i think that's why the statute was so carefully worded it doesn't require that conviction how do you envision scenarios like this we can go outside the room the record of conviction or it could look at not just necessarily a comparison of elements so then i would suggest the court sees that approach is the best approach i would agree that's the best approach the statute it's more circumstance or civic approach it's not really necessary here though not just there in this case because the record of conviction clearly shows you look at a criminal complaint violation of paragraph