in other parts of the statute when we use the word comments there is that you have a uniform federal meaning for example under federal rule three or is not to have meaning that it would have in each state where any lawsuit would have to be commenced before it could be removed a federal  court term compasses a federal statute the term commenced in kava should be interpreted as a matter of federal law it should not be interpreted to incorporate every state instruction of the word commands because there are a whole myriad about how would you know when the last would have been commenced in state of removing it to federal court right my question is how can a lawsuit be commenced in state courts by filing if the rules of the state say a lawsuit in this state is not considered commenced until clearly to limit the jurisdiction of the federal court because they were raising the amount of controversy use the same analysis here the exact same analysis you're going to come to the same result in terms of the meaning of commenced you look at the word commands it's not clear if you look at the purpose of the statute the purpose of the class action fairness act was clearly to expand the federal court's jurisdiction as opposed to restrict federal court's jurisdiction given that purpose a construction of the term commenced to mean either to mean in this context at the time of removal clearly it fulfills the congress's purpose to expand the jurisdiction of the federal courts so the only way really to look at the work commence given lorillard given the right motors line of cases and given the history l how long theoretically one have to remove under the statute thirty days thirty days from what thirty days from the time and under forty forty six be cases after that you've got a look at you've got to figure out when the case say as one of you got this thing you know cap is affected as long as you remove all the or before march nineteenth and just be done with it well i could question i don't know why congress didn't do that in the only answer i have is that commenced they were looking back at the majority line of cases which and the amount of controversy under lorillard and commenced has always been construed to me at the time of filing were at the time of timely removal that's why because that's how it's been construed in the past clearly that had been filed well before two thousand and five those cases should have been remanded clearly but not because kathy didn't apply they should have been remanded because half applied because at the time the remov those cases both purchased and could have been and should have been really ended because they were not timely under fourteen forty six feet so no rewriting statute would have had to have been performed by the thais or court in order to achieve or to be consistent with the results and pri assume that any other decision would just open the doors of federal court to thousands of these take or class actions but it would not we're actually talking about a very very narrow range of cases here and those are just the cases that were timely removed after calf and we're definitely not arguing for retroactive application the only question is what is the operative act the triggers the application of power and whether or not the operative actually triggering the application is the data removal timely remov to federal court we're not trying to apply the katherine retroactively and we agree that it doesn't apply retroactively so that argument of the plaintiff's suits is pretty much of a red herring i think the other thing that supports the defendant's reading of substance of the diversity of the diversity statute this simply deals with an effective date in the act that's right that's right and the legislative history they rely on is statements by congress congress congressional people and that that the statute would not apply retroactively they were clearly if you look at the context talking about a number of class act attempt that's exactly what their arguments amount to this was a case that was rocked in was angeles superior court by california residents seeking to represent i understand but it doesn't matter in this case because the law's the same in the federal court in the state court federal rule civil procedure three says and action is commenced by filing the complaint california state law section commenced because it has to somehow be interpreted by federal law when the case is in state court so our position would be that at least for purposes of this case addressed it has resolved in the same fashion and there have been numerous when you consider both the district court records there is nothing in the legislative history case the court and where the court noted that the service occurred and removal occurred after the an act of the statute judge posner noted simply that nothing had really case means filing a complaint narrowly to limit federal jurisdiction whereas here if you construe the statute narrowly to limit jurisdiction it would support the meaning of distinguish between commencement and service right in the language of the statute in addition we would refer the court to the west the conrail c service is dealt with separately in the federal rules and federal rule of civil procedure for and discuss the service in terms of occurring after the complaint has been filed in addition both specifically referenced the fact that service from occurred after the statute had been enact