this case presents the the problem that many of the district courts in the social security cases are facing a lack of guidance on how to resolve the appeals or fee petitions for attorney fees runner in the case of her vs screen actors guild this court long ago set forth the factors for resolving the question of a reasonable fee some of those factors apply to a contingency fee and some do not i well your honor this court prior to the supreme court decision and his brother used a modified or hybrid lodestar approach by enhancing an hourly rate times the number of hours mr black did not hire my firm mr results in particular to invest a certain number of hours in his case case he hired in the hardest to achieve a certain result according to judge arrestees decision it doesn't matter whether mr black received forty thousand dollars and has even if it's or in this case ninety six thousand dollars in past due benefits it's the same five hundred dollars an hour rate for the attorney time and that is not a contingency fee that is not what mr black contract is for that is not with mr rizal is worked upon is not the agreement that i signed that that decision by applying a simple hourly rate even if it is in judge rest is mind and has several great is not a contingency fee because it does not give proper weight in consideration to the the amount involved in the results obtained nor does it give credit sufficient weight to the words in other cases are all contingency factors you spread it doesn't say that you have has to search for eight reasonable fee not necessarily the reasonable fee and it really is in the in the mild presumption in favor of the contingency fee contract the same judge arrestees decision we see no deference to or no weight given to the contingency contract just rescue just pick an hourly rate that he was comfortable with how much the contingency fee agreement was one of the first things he said in his opinion yes and then he said that the the effective hourly rate that would result from enforcing the contingency even though this result did not ask for the entire twenty five percent judge's rescue throughout the contingency awash with lawyers scrambling to handle these kinds of cases it simply isn't true our firm handles thirty five percent of the central districts docket because nobody else wants to do this kind of work let me ask you what the judge  spelled out adequately in the papers although it is hinted at mr was also was asking for an administrative fee under section four zero six subsection eight from the social security administration and he was asking for basically the roughly the balance of the twenty five percent in the district court there's some question as to whether or not you i mean i was confused by and i'm wondering on an abuse of discretion standard how we look at that because it's already reduced once but without an explanation as to why that's a big haircut so it seems to me or do you agree that that's the starting point the seventeen thousand i think it's seventy percent which i guess ends up to be about  that mr mr black received ninety six thousand dollars and passed the benefits the administration withheld slightly in excess of twenty four thousand dollars mr was also asked for seven thousand from the administration that's exhibit five and he that's a reasonable fee and then the judge looks at the fact that there's a contingency agreement yes and so so now ok so now you're the district judge and you have seventeen thousand you have a contingency fee agreement what in you contingency fee would give you a pumped up yes and it's your position that the contingency fee agreement if anything shouldn't put you in the hole but at least and as the the size the case changes the not of the fee would necessarily change and setting a flat hourly rate without consideration to the the amount involved in the risks endured in the delays rizal's probably could have been commanded as an hourly lawyer doing hourly work but when you look at it at the aggregate numbers and you look at judge justice o'connor's opinion in in delaware two and justice blackman's dissent that's five  votes you don't and this court's decision in football you don't look at the risk in an individual case you look at the risk in the class of cases and this was also his declaration in the papers that were attached from the social security stray should indicate that summer i did a survey of of that and found that in the majority of cases the court either awarded the full contingency fee or asked or awarded what the plaintiff's lawyer had reduced the fee requests to that seems to be the majority in other cases courts have resorted as judges rescued in this case to a hybrid or a modified lodestar approach and i think that that the the district  desperately need the guidance to to go back to that mild presumption in favor of the contingency contract mindful that the contingency fees are necessarily going to be enhanced and that in light of the risks of this class of cases taken as a whole on the aggregate not worry about laurie but on the whole that the kind of fee that this result was asked for which is not far different from what he got in other cases is not an unreasonable fee and art section four o six b actually requires us to handle these cases on a contingency fee basis where the object of the federal lawsuit is past due benefits whether disability retirement or with those benefits where the object is passed to benefit i believe that we are required by statute to have a contingency contract we cannot do it on an hourly basis nor could post my clients afford that and there's another question in the magistrate judges survey  especially in that in the central district of california in the ninth circuit where our officers are central district is our biggest district and as the supreme court says the judges who see these cases day in and day out are you know uniquely positioned to assess a reasonable fee so we defer to the to the district courts discretion i think that's what the supreme court was trying to get out and in g