non recourse advance of funds which matures in thirty days from his extension can i can i ask you a question and i don't want to cause you to flip the order of your argument but it sounds like you're about to sort of launch off into the merits of the argument and would you mind if we you lodge an objection to confirmation of the plan before the confirmation is consummated right that's correct so you filed your motion for all for relief from the stay before confirmation  why in the briefing is there this analogy which i found a little odd to rule fifty nine which is a post judgment motion when in fact you filed something at least for a pretty confirmation well and i don't know frankly what it takes for something to be a valid objection under thirty fifty now did the motion for relief from stay qualify without analogy to rule fifteen on it in your honor our position is that the motion that we filed on jan where they that was a motion for relief from state itself constitute an objection to the terms of the proposed plan for the reason that the two principal arguments in the motion for relief from stay are the very same arguments that would have been raised in something called an of any race or to cut analysis is a final judgment on the merits in this case our position is that at the confirmation hearing that was held on january the twenty first the court indicated that the plan was confirmed or would be com d but no confirmation order was in fact entered in the case until february the ninth now under bankruptcy rule ninety twenty one an order is effective from the date of its intrigue as our position that the confirmation the operative date of confirmation was february the ninth at that time there was no we were we had a hearing on our motion for relief from stay on february the second one week before the confirmation order was in or we were in court  banks or ropes the judge arguing the merits of our opposition to the plan before the planet being confirmed there was no final judgment as to the confirmation order at that time if i could answer judge newsom's question about the may be perceived strain analogy to rule fifty nine the reason we made that argument is your honor is because we felt a motion for relief on january the eighth we argue that a hearing on february the second the court enter the confirmation order right in the middle of our briefing schedule from february the ninth so we filed our first hearing briefs after the confirmation order had been entered so it's our position that essentially what we were doing at that point is arguing that the core reverse course undo the confirmation order because we thought of that legal effect so in a sense although our motion was filed well before confirmation order was in or so soares of motions filed in the same day in the sun can not believe again your honor i don't believe it can and we cited in our brief at least one or maybe more supreme court decisions united states supreme court decisions that make that very point that typically those are to bar collateral attacks in subsequent proceedings where you have future litigation trying to unwind previously litigated to the full merits judgement and that simply doesn't happen when you think what happened here was know it's been kind of a challenge to annul both of these appeals given the various sequencing of events and our arguments have been slightly different in each appeal i think our strongest case happens to be in this case the wilber appeal where we were there before the court so setting aside residue to cut in the baggage that comes with it under thirty fifteen f so what's the consequence under thirty fifteen f and i'm asking you to teach me here because i don't know thirty fifteen out of not filing an objection to the plan before confirmation what's the consequence i think the cause of our yeah you're not entitled to come back later and make an objection say so and so then a lot rides i guess on whether your motion for relief from the stay constitutes an objection under thirty five that groove can you just tell me what like what is thirty fifteen f require you said that it was the same sort of substance of the argument that we're making now made the same two points that we're making now are there any bells and whistles that are required to make something  thirty fifteen f objection i don't think so your honor i mean i think any objection to the plan as proposed for example if you discuss disagree with the value of the collateral this listed in the debtor schedule if you disagree with the value of the claimant there some reason you think i'm not going to s  by and let this plan be confirmed without hearing from me i think that qualifies as minor standing of all that's required what my position is that in our motion for relief from stay we said to relevant things we said that as of this december the twenty ninth wilbur had not retained in full in compliance with georgia law of the full value of this pond automobile and as a result of that was number one and number two our position was that piece of property is no longer a property of the estate because as a matter of georgia law has been fully divest it of any property interest those are those twin arguments would have been the centerpiece of any objection to plan confirmation and the fact that they were litigated in the context of a motion for relief in our view does does not change the substance of what we were asking the court to do and in fact we found a rule twenty eight j letter that this spring to bring to the court's attention a decision got in re hole which was a northern district bankruptcy court is from march of this year and  go back and look at that case it arose in precisely this context the creditor filed a motion for relief from stay to bring to this you to the bankruptcy court that the failure of the debtor in that case to redeem the automobile in full by the extended sixty day time on rendered it not property of the estate and the bankruptcy court agreed with that argument granted relief but there's a section thirteen thirty two  can be modified by the bankruptcy court thirteen twenty two b two does confer a general right on debtors to modify claims it says secured claims or unsecured claims and i think the key to understanding the and our position is that as of the summer twenty nine upon the failure to redeem in full the balance and redeem the automobile title my ex had no right to payment for starters we never had a right to payment to an ember son judgment against mr wilbur because one of the characteristics of a title bond transaction is it's a non recourse advancement of funds but number two and more importantly we didn't have a right to payment from the proceeds of the automobile because as of the twenty ninth as a matter of georgia law we undid outright you're telling us we didn't have a claim we had a car we have a plane that is precisely right and i think we made the point that it doesn't it makes little sense to say that a person has a claim against property that  so for that matter i think is a textual matter i think faithful to the to the provision to be to in the use of the word claim in the definitional section i think the court went astray there because it didn't pay for delegate to the text of the statute is our position under that subsect indefinitely the state law redemption period i get at that want to wait i think suspends it for sixty days yes but beyond that what provision of the code are you relying on thirteen twenty two that is it because it says what it allows a the debtor to modify the men cure defaults and modify the claim to the credit lames right so i mean this is i think what your opponent would say is beyond december twenty ninth we didn't have a claim anymore so there's no we're thirteen twenty two where the reason they say that is because they say that the property disappears out of the estate which is established upon the commision of the filing of the case and they are saying that after sixty days under state law which  that the federal law supersedes the state but it seems like there are scads of cases saying that as to the definition of the property interest within the estate that's a function of state law the definition of property interest is a function of state law that's what happens when the case all the the redemption statute is in conflict with the federal law and therefore the federal law supersedes that statute so once you come into the into the sort of code land will say there is no residual room for state law to operate in and around i don't know that in any case there would not be residual room for stay low operate but once in the case of property this state when the state is created then after that state law has no bearing on it after the commit after the commision of the case once as determined in is there any distinction between between a case like this where you've got i keep calling this in my own head a snapback provision you know some sort of operation of law provision distinction between a case like that and a case where a creditor does something affirmatively to kind of claw the property out of the estate here i guess the other side says well you know it's just sort of a function of state law and magic happens and it leaves the estate is there a distinction between an automatic kind of case like this and a sort of an affirmative conduct case it's not nothing immediately comes to mind about infirmity of conduct case except in situations where in motions for relief from this day where the creditor is taking the property of the state for statutory reasons like it's not necessary for the effect of a reorganization or conduct of the debt or whatever the debtors condo would be that th taking something out of the estate i don't know of any provision that would allow for that then the this provision and you know there's some comparison to if it been a different type of secured agreement where the car was repossessed prior to two the bankruptcy being filed into whether that is still property of the state and whether the debtor tried to possession a lot of those issues are relevant to this type of case but there are some some ways case and amended it if i'm not mistaken but the fact is that the the definition of claim is been construed to be very broad and would include this type of creditor obviously they had  claim at the beginning because they they had nothing but a security interest in a car and the debtor had ownership possession and title and a ri redemption did title max and i can ask them too but did they file a proof of claim after the redemption period had expired i would have to look at the date on their proof claim i don't recall that and with that be some indication that they still thought it was a claim instead of a car that's what i guess that's what i'm kind of asking well they may say that even if they found whether they found it before or after the redemption period that they filed it is an abundance of caution in order to not be late on the filing a claim because there are consequences  so i didn't really like that issue in this case think it's you know it's good for my client was going to mention it in the argument the order of thing for kind of unusual in this case but in bankruptcy bankruptcy is like streamlined times not like a civil case in federal or state court where might take a very long time to get to a conclusion in bankruptcy we were in four months you have a confirmation order from the in the bankruptcy case there's a specific statute as you pointed out in thirty fifteen that you have to object to confirmation in their consequences for not objecting and emotion and there's a bankruptcy or bankruptcy rule i look for i can find it maybe a local rule that you can't ask for more than one type of relief in a motion so they couldn't follow a motion for relief and make and a objection a confirmation in the same motion so maybe i'm off base here but that actually matters to me whether whether their motion for relief from the stay constitutes a valid objection under thirty fifteen and you guys can tell me why that shouldn't matter to me but for the what we're calling the rescue to con argument it actually does matter to me yes it sounds like to i couldn't tell i thought you were about to say i've never really liked this argument it's good for my client but there are object and there are motion was good enough to constitute an objection but now it sounds like you're you do dispute that they are good i just don't think that  it we're going to have a hearing own i guess he said february second to appear there are the if his issues if title i x issues or confirmation related they need to be there on january twenty first arguing that these issues or something that you can't confirm the case because today there's no property of the estate or we don't have a clue there's no claim or whatever the issues are that's what we're here today arguing the but they didn't bring it to the attention of court filing the document on this train last time schedule doesn't bring it to the attention of the court the court is not there to review motions for relief at the time of confirmation and it makes sense generally motion for a leaf is not a confirmation related issue generally in this case it was in this case it would have been a good idea to have brought to the course a titian it been a good idea to follow thirty fifteen motion objecting to the confirmation but that's not what was done and the court was unaware of it now go in past that i don't know that the kind of motion itself sat out the reasons why they want relief and it was so it's the equivalent of an objection they could class that they could change the title of it and made it a thirty fifth day motion and not had to change anything else other than the request for the relief body off and it was exactly what they needed for an objection a confirmation in my the title of it is controlled and it doesn't but i think because of the streamlined method of the bankruptcy court that you have to get it to the courts attention and it what my responsibility to bring to the courts attention he did in the body but it  read it well in the sense that it's in the courts attention because it's in the electronic fall over there yes in the sense that the court's reviewing not reviewing contested matters while they're going to the kind of through the confirmation because as there's a statute rule on it that you have to bring it to the attention so we could still say that doctrine of rescue to conduct does not bar title max from objecting to the from plan right we could say that and you could still win based upon something else right well yes i didn't think that the res judicata was my strong i didn't even want to argue the rescue to cut out the judge in his order that bankruptcy judge in his order addressed court wants to use this kind of a unique set of facts to make law own the thirteen twenty seven there's been a lot because i don't know if there was some issue about whether you could object where the rest you got to apply on the same here and this yours even though it's not just chargeable and the so the so the court of blood in that instance help me out i'm still concerned about the fact that the bankruptcy states property rights are defined by state law right you agree with that obviously well the donors in the debtor's interest in the property is defined by state law then the bankruptcy takes over and in the argument say your opponent makes regarding georgia law help me out again with that it seems to me that georgia law is pretty clear as to it is and if we were in federal court they would have had that car and there would have been no recourse mr would have had the bankruptcy stepped in in the georgia law says there's an interest in this car he owns it is possession of it he has a title and if that time had expired if the time had expired property of the state was the vehicle in the title it called the ownership title and the the whole bundle of rights which would include possession yes it and the right to redemption  not a title and there's not any redemption prior to filing or there's not any on the chapter thirteen for tuition when you list the list your ass when you list your assets yes the car was listed was the title that a car had been repossessed particularly in alabama where the law is different here the all he would have had would have been the redemption he would have had to list the redemption right as a as a asset and i'm sorry i misspoke of course you filed your bankruptcy petition for the redemption period expired i thought what you were saying is that you had made some effort to redeem the vehicle well we believe that the chapter thirteen is a redemption the filing of a chapter thirteen is the redemption under what there there are some well there's really not a conflict because he has the redemption period and within that redemption time he found a plan that said we're going to pay for it and then under thirteen to twenty two years able to cure the cure the default and pay for that over we do with all those cases that ones that don't deal with title poems or are i think the debtors are better represented generally and the cases are better because they're dealing with more expensive property like redemption rights and real estate and that sort of thing in the debtor cases they just you read the cases and just not very well researched when they when they can just go in and say well section one away cystic days that's it that's all it in the proper losing state in the end it's like some cases i don't even bring up the winding pools case and and there's nowhere in the and property that is in the possession of the pawn shop where they say that property if is not redeemed according to state law prior to the bankruptcy or under one zero eight it's not proper to say so congress recognized that property can come out here's where we're going to allow it to come out of the estate so they knew how to do that they knew what to do they could it what title max wants you to do is to say well even if there's a title and they've got the car they want you to say b eight doesn't mean anything because th includes these items and includes everything else then you've rewritten the law that's not what they meant can i've asked you at wilson's indulgence to ask just one more quick can you just comment for me there's a case in eleventh circuit case called  alabama after the foreclosure of a piece of property the debtor has a bare right of redemption i think for one year to go in and pay cash for the property  had to get to a point i think that i read the case of read it several times if they had to get to a point where they said you know this right this type a right to redemption is very fragile there's not much there they have nothing they don't have ownership they don't just a handful of points if i may to start with i was startled by this statement by my colleague on the other side if we weren't in federal court title max would have the car that is exactly the kind of disparity that the supreme court case in butner said should not thirteen petition that that's right and let me explain your honor what i mean he's saying that because it's in bankruptcy this divestment provision of the georgia title proper title pawn statute has no application when what it says is there is an it would and it would similarly have full effect our position is in the bankruptcy proceeding after the right of redemption period expired that automatic forfeiture and automatic extinguishment provision should be given the same effect under state law regardless of whether you're in bankruptcy or not and that is the teaching of the supreme court's decision in the butler case it says what it says is what all reasonable on chapter thirteen debtors who are in trouble financially law has operation i think as you mentioned as a residual effect after the filing of a bankruptcy petition our tradition here is that is that the bankruptcy estate is not a one way ratchet right property doesn't come into the estate at the day the commencement and then there are provisions in the bankruptcy code that say if you have additions to property following the petition that does come to the bankruptcy estate and so if that's the case we know that the bankruptcy estate is not a static concept and so it should work just the correct that is a difference and in our view the fact that they were the best of the title pre partition does not distinguish the case in our view what matters is that in that case as in ours by the time the confirmation order was entered the debtor had no title to the property in that case it was lost pre partition in our case the interest was lost post petition but pretty confirmation and similarly both debtors in smith and here retained a stat a state law created statutory right of redemption that was not timely exercise in strict compliance with the requirements of state law and so from our perspective the fact that it was foreclosure and the fact that title was divest it pretty petition business and so what it does is extends credit and if it's repaid in full then it releases the title the lane is gone the person gets the car but if it's not they get the car that's the only recourse they have x is getting paid in full is just going to take a little longer and that's not the struck your honor in the contract and frankly in the general assembly's legislature on the georgia title pom provision that's not the business we're in and every day that we have to wait on another monthly instalment is a risk we face of not being paid that's not a risk we face if our interests are given effect under forty four i'm sorry no no please i didn't mean to stop you by inhaling defined by state law what sorts of property interests have been at stake i just can't recall all of the cases but what sorts of interests are we talking about here your position is you know sort of the definition of this thing as you're a car or his car  to title to a bank account title to a certificate of deposit title to a mobile piece of equipment i mean it can be any number of things as you might imagine but i did want to touch on the point i think that you made earlier you said what's the difference in  snap bet provision where it's an operation of law kind of thing versus an affirmative conduct kind of you know it's in there's a big distinction because when when a creditor to get possession of property the state has to take an affirmative that can't do that because of the state imposed rule but section three sixty two and if you look at the text of that statute it says that the commencement of a case creates a stay a political two into d's of an item as is all the things that people are into these cannot do all the affirmative action i cannot do unless they get relief from the bankruptcy court what you'll notice if you look at the text of three sixty two it doesn't operate to stay automatic provisions of state law that are operative of their own force it doesn't it doesn't have operation in that field