because it was the result of multiple errors of law contrary to the district court's conclusion this court should rule that the what we refer to as the ratification order entered by the washington state court was permissible collateral attack on the order of dismissal entered by the bankruptcy court i don't understand that to be honest because it seems to me is state court is minding its own business in a sense with respect to this state and it has created an input that could be taken back to the bankruptcy court for a motion under the bankruptcy equivalent of rule sixty b which is bankruptcy rule nineteen twenty four and the bankruptcy court will take it or leave it or say it's too late or do with it what it thinks appropriate for the bankruptcy so i guess i don't see why it does anything but for whatever state court purposes there may be indicate whether this assignment to a rally from long year is effective i think the we can break that apart into two pieces it's true that the whatever might if this court were to affirm and there was a subsequent proceeding under rule sixty b and the appeal has returned to state court and got the ratification order re entered which they'd have to do since it was vacated at some point strengthened the argument that really could make it a rule sixty b emotion but is that would that be enough to constitute an action to collect recover or offset any discharged debt  if we're now turning to the discharge malfunction issue i just answered the question yes i think it was absolutely because under the broad broad interpretation of the discharge injunction statute which authorities we cited in our briefs  definitely support and there is an absence from the on the appellee side of any sort of contrary thore this is intended to be a broad injunction and the first step it doesn't the act that's challenged does not have to be the final act of collection it can merely the legal relationships of the parties at all but merely recognized the legal status of the assignment she already possessed during the bankruptcy court proceedings so i don't understand at all how that can be considered an action to collect on the debt when the probate court explicitly clarified that its decision didn't change the judi's and obligations rejection as they pertain to taylor i'm not getting it i'd be pleased to try to explicate it a little the discharge injunction statute is the issue in this case is how broad is it does it is a broad enough to cover a first up like that that on its face doesn't really seem to seek to collect the jeff it's a first step i think jonah rover is trying to push you back one step earlier on and say if the assignment was there and some judges were saying gee you know we don't really know if this was really good enough to assign now the probate court said yes it was and we have to see carol things you know letters from the judges that are don't like formal court judgments to me is just speculation and so now we know actually at stepps zero that it was and just what the bankruptcy court had in front of it was what you see is what you get well let's not forget that that was a factual challenge to cairo standing on a motion to dismiss which under this court's decision apex digital is inherently an evidentiary proceeding both sides submitted evidence including the judge an assignment the letter from judge rogers which yes it wasn't an order because he wrote that letter after the automatic stay became effective but we submit it doesn't really matter that it wasn't a letter rather that it wasn't an order because from the bankruptcy courts perspective it was evidence it was documentary evidence but the judge apparently with the consent of the skier ellie was competent to consider as what the evidentiary force of the judgment aside it was i take it i think that it really is evidence actually it's it's an extra judicial act by a judge as you say with no jurisdiction at the moment because  of the automatic stay and you could have written an op ed that have been evidence to well let's return to what happened before the bankruptcy court i think it's it's what's done is done that was presented and accepted as evidence without objection from from anybody i think everybody was interested in discussing what the rajah's letter meant and i think if you were to review the record the transcript of the proceedings kyra we thought that the rogers letter actually  a stablish that that there wasn't really anything to worry about with regard to the judge an aside i think it's too late at this point in the proceeding to say well that should have been admitted as evidence it was certainly considered as i was along with also don't forget the record of the proceedings for the washington state court where the judge rogers who presided over the trial made it clear to miss cairo in her lawyers three times that it was inappropriate for her to keep asking to be the judgment creditor and that she would not in any set of circumstances be the judgment creditor and the judgment assignment was the reaction to that only reason judge rogers never got a chance to finally decide what the i believe the words were several steps were skipped in the execution of the assignment he never got to rule on what those were whether they were fixed because the automatic stay fit into their business to tell the california courts how to handle a sign or sorry washington state courts whatever any courts the washington state courts how to handle these assignments i want to go back to my big problem which is just this is so many steps away from collection or recovery or offset but let's just call it all  collection and the standards for sixty to be ninety twenty four believe are so stringent it strikes me as a hypothetical dispute well the certainly the collateral we would submit and i understand your honour's skepticism about the collateral attack analysis but let's boil it down to its most fundamental the bankruptcy court ruled first just because that was the temporal course of events that the bankruptcy court when for better or for worse looked at the judgment not appealed then became final then they went back to the state court and got the a different judge a court commissioner to rule no the judgment of simon is actually valid all the concerns in the rogers letter had been addressed nothing to worry about it was valid from the beginning the fact is under the collateral attack doctrine authorities that we cited basically you can't have a state court judge just undermine a judgment from a federal judge sure  happens all the time you know this is just a transfer of property basically transfers of property happened once the automatic stay is no longer a factor in this was in fact wasn't even a transfer it was an official judicial ruling about the effect of a purported transfer that had already happened so it's it's very difficult to see how this ratification order up end anything the bankruptcy court did with it only happens if the brant thank of seaport itself decides that perhaps this requires reopening of the case there's been there would be argument about that it might not meet you know i don't know what subsection of sixty b would be talking about it's not a mistake it's not new facts it's not anything yet it's entirely unclear that even if this court were to affirm or for whatever reason in a sixty motion were to follow that might still be unsuccessful for the reasons your honour's have noted the fact is that you know we should also talk about it seems to me that why are we why is rule sixty b even an issue in this case it's because you have to wonder why  when the bankruptcy case was filed and miss cairo her lawyers knew they had possession of the rogers letter why they didn't take advantage of certain procedural routine procedural steps they could have taken to go back to the state court get them out of the automatic modified and work things out with judge rogers to make sure that if you if those defects he noted in his letter could be fixed and get the extension of time to object to discharge ability of the debt which can be done in judge castling ruled on the record that he grants those motions routinely and usually without a hearing but what happened here instead is they decided to forge ahead with their standing sort of up and up in the air whether the law rogers letter is an order or not it clearly communicated to the people who receive that there might be a problem with the judgment aside so the one thing that rule sixty b and i realize this is not an appeal from an order granting or denying rule sixty b really but it's not designed and it's not intended to save litigants from their stick cheap strategic  bad product could be resolved in sixty if it's under the newly discovered evidence branch you've got to show reasonable diligence and you've just given us a preview of what your argument would be skeptical just point yes i see that and  that the appellee subsided that allows anyone in any context bankruptcy or otherwise to mount an impermissible kalat well attack sixty the sixty b part would not be a collateral attack that's part of the same case the only thing that you make the collateral argument about i that washington state court proceedings right and clearly there is a collateral some legal effect wholly apart from whatever happens in the bankruptcy yes and in clearly there is a collateral attack doctrine that this court and others have recognized but i guess our argument  have it collateral attack argument without reference to two orders the later or that's alleged to undermine the earlier order that was clearly the focus of the or at least part of the bankruptcy courts focus it was part of the judge cha ication order other than facilitating the ultimate collection of the debts from mr taylor i don't know that there was any purpose of it other than to clarify who actually owns this judgment and who know your wife's right like the debt racked up well as you indicated hopefully somewhere down the line i suppose the intermediate stage is to challenge whether that that in fact was discharged i don't think there's ever been any intent to attempt to collect that that so long as it remains a discharge not a moment it's a discharge debt absolutely and that for the moment nobody's trying to collect it what they're trying to do what they hope to do is to go back  indicated that it will be an uphill battle of course but persuade the bankruptcy judge to reconsider the order finding that she failed to adequately establish standing reopen the adversary proceeding as part of that attempt to collect or enforce the structure so i don't understand why she can create standing for herself at this late stage of the proceedings standings the kind of thing that you should have at the outset of the proceedings the bankruptcy court makes a factual finding that she hasn't carried her burden to establish standing you know coming along years later and manipulating various things and any kind of court  court strikes me as a very irregular way to run things i don't necessarily disagree with that analysis say as he indicated it will be an uphill battle to prevail on a sixty eight b motion challenging the standing finding  at this stage they haven't challenged the determination with respect to finding respect to standing at this point they're only they have only sought to clarify the status of the judgment assignment which are two distinct ruling the dismissal order adjudicated that the question of whether or not she had met her burden of a stablish expanding the ratification order as we've been referring to it adjudicated the question of whether or not that judgment  but yet and i don't know that there would necessarily be any issue remaining problem with their argument in terms of the it's argument is that there wasn't in fact a settlement you know they allowing you know based on the settlement offer by the malpractise ensures is that out there somewhere i think i think it's appropriate to to address the jurisdictional point on my i think we always have to but i don't think that settlement offer complete relief and offering to accept a portion of the damages that's not an offer of complete relief it's an offer of the reef the relief that they would be satisfied with was obviously not relief that my clients were satisfied with their there's no question is there were is there that the money is somewhere that the money but the money that they for the young man yeah i don't know the where where the money is or if who has it or if it's if somebody can recover it can sort of appear to me that there seem to be you know two races go or no one reduced to the state of washington with regard to the ratification of the other once they they obtained the judgment assignment that mr taylor filed for bankruptcy there was nothing more they could do well there was something making people go to the bankruptcy court all the time and as the automatic stable lifted for a purpose and i can't tell you why they  did not do that that the question came up sort of on a and i eve of the argument and the motion to dismiss the adversary proceeding where mr taylor came in issue within the bankruptcy proceeding i think i got i was not involved until this this appeal in the district court and here i'm psyched i can only speculate as to the strategies in the processes of w decisions were made below that that were made but she you're saying that she wasn't asked to provide a solid legal foundation for the assignment until the eleventh hour c merits i think there's also the question of what relief are seeking in terms of a finding that this is an improper collateral attack yes they're asking this court to declare the washington state courts or the boy i think that  contempt judgment entered by the bankruptcy court that's a concrete thing one could do they say well if it if we think it's moot because of the settlement we could simply just vacate with instructions and again for that for the reasons that have already been discussed there was no attempt here to collect to enforce to set aside to set off the the judgment all they sought was this clarification that who won't says judgment doesn't affect mr taylor's right seat there's a judgment against him and whether or not he's going to ever be you know called upon to satisfy that judgment is a question for another day but that the ratification motion the ratification order didn't seek to do any of those things it didn't seek to collect anything it wasn't seeking collection of a discharge that it was part of a long long game up strategy to try and overturn the finding that that that was discharged  but of course just to play the devil's argue the critical finding it seems of the district court of the bankruptcy court is that she had no standing because it wasn't really her you know the assignment was ineffective there's this letter and that does play a role so if you go right to the heart of that finding maybe the bankruptcy court would look at it and say she is a matter of equity which is what will sixty be is all about a nine hundred twenty four i then how can you and rabble there without collaterally attack when and i appreciate that you asked that question that was one of the points i wanted to clarify is that the banks of the bankruptcy judge when he dismissed the adversary proceeding and found that she had failed to meet her burden on standing he never made a finding that this judgment assignment was invalid that it that it failed to comply with certain steps as intimated in judge rogers letter but why would he make a sign to you if nobody was standing is challenging as i understood his ruling what hughes said is that this this letter from judge rogers raises questions about the validity yes the assignment because the burden of proof rested witness kyra only and because these questions are there ju kessler felt that you know what you haven't met your burden in fact that's what what though mr taylor's counsel argued they in fact argued that the assignment itself was a red herring that this was really just a question of the burden of proof and had she adequately proven that she had standing that that she was holding on to a valid assignment and judge casting obviously determined that she had met that burden of proof but he didn't he nobody ever litigated  know in the briefs below in bankruptcy court there's no argument about what are the steps that you have to comply with to have a valid judgment under washington state up bankruptcy law that that's not our view he didn't make a decision on that he simply said you know what judge rogers letter could fairly be right is raising some questions about that and based on that i'm going to find that she has not met her her burden of proof asked to stan obviously her hope is to come back and say ok well we've gotten the washing in court to clarify that and you know maybe judge casting a find that that was found in error and that it should be overturned but as everybody  i'd like to begin with the movement's argument there was the question from the panel what would be left for this court to do nothing is the answer and the reason is because moodiness in this context has to be looked at through the prism of what would not be resolved well your honor the that what was what was really when they were appellants what were they asking the district court to do what was their ultimate relief they wanted the contempt judgment the contempt order in the damages order which old ver judgment all vacated is precisely what taylor offered to do we went down to the bankruptcy court and we said to the judge would you vacate all this pursuant to a motion he said yes i would do that but we cannot be involved in this settlement twin city had the authority to even though the policy says they require consent it does say that they were the power that their policy holders can't on reasonably withhold consent you know that that to act that's a conjuring term sure it is an insurance policy doesn't mean you don't have to go get the consent but i think what we're doing is we're drifting into an insured versus insurer dispute which is not what was before the district court the only issue before the district court is what is to become of the contempt judgment which we which we secured trying to do and under this court's precedents they can't keep fighting once we've agreed to give them everything they say well you have not in fact given them everything they want and they've been objecting from the start all right because they want to leave you this in terms of the larger dispute and mootness is we're talking about one district courts article three case or controversy not talking about the larger dispute between these parties in the state court and even proceedings that might happen later in the bankruptcy court only talking about the contempt judgment and those two orders which they appealed and we agreed to vacate from a smith versus greystone alliance perspective that was it that killed the case or controversy as soon as we agreed to vacate all that stuff and it doesn't matter from from our perspective who is paying the judgment we agreed to vacate the orders they want to vacate which is all judge saying was asked to do so from a the limited perspective of what was the case or controversy thursley between before judge change it was extinguished at the time we agreed to vacate all the orders and to review i have only an m o and left so i want to talk about one other thing judge what i believe you asked why is it that cairo he tries to is trying to fix or standing at this late stage it's an excellent question we in our opening brief on page forty four in a footnote we noted that under this court's decision and pollack don't have the full name here and other authorities that a plaintiff must establish standing at the time the suit is filed and cannot established or manufacture standing afterwards so judge chang's response to that is that she isn't really trying to establish a dancer's she's trying to say that all along you know as a matter of washington law she's always had yes i think what we do then is it when you when i recognize that was the judge's analysis but what it once had strayed into from our point of view was what was there was already an adjudication on this issue in the bankruptcy court that it did that it was ineffective and that judgment has since become final it's just to go to a state court and say no no your view of the evidence judge cason was incorrect here's another one and that's why i started with that question whether there's any didn't mention at all of this is simon that extends beyond the bankruptcy does it mean as the custodian of the minor child you know she has other rights or responsibilities on behalf of the child you know there is this really purely a bankruptcy driven assignment or is there something else to it there's certainly something else to it because as we noted we discussed in our opening brief entirely and left not discussed this morning is this issue that the judge made the original tender judgment created a statutory trust which is a creature of washington rock right and that was the bucket if you will that the any monies recovered would flow into to be administered for the benefit of their minor monies as judge of who's asking under the control of the washington state court at this moment are they where are they while there is mr taylor's discharge debt or are all his assets were transferred pursuant to his confirmed plan of reorganization there are there is no pot of money somewhere that we're talking about in fact our opposing counsel as well