the sentencing judge more likely than not relied on the residual three thousand five hundred and fifty nine c f two to conclude that one or more of his prior convictions qualify as a serious violent felony now in this of life according to this court's walker decision and gallen vow is quote both in excess of the statutory maximum that applies to his bank robbery conviction which would be twenty five years under two thousand one hundred and thirteen andy and the sentence w as predicates i'd like to focus primarily on the one thousand nine hundred and seventy five conviction because i think that is certainly the more problematic of the two and not the few less concerns with some relevant circuit q thought of course i'd be happy to answer with that statement the court emphasized that the statute contains a component about force physical force targeted at the person of another in fact the farmer court actually recognize that there's ways that you can commit or we have no doubt it would qualify under section two as crimes that in their nature involve the substantial risk of physical injury binding case law that told judge longstaff in two thousand and five that that says he had to apply the new murray to class now bolstering this conclusion just a couple of years later is united states versus korea and ironically this is another case that the government run horrible before you leave  you're not focusing on the later conviction because of issues under our precedent do you think farmer is controlling the back deck and conviction because it dealt with that precise convention or would you argue that it's not controlling and if not why sure actually your armor or your honor i would argue that farmer is not controlling its to the letter conviction and that simply because of the way that the court conducted the analysis the only and now left is about the  minutes langford saying that well you know just like we said about hobbs act robbery that probably applies but you know we don't have any problem saying that for sure it's under the residual pot so i don't think if you look carefully at the court's holding in farmer says forcibly steals requires the immediate use of physical force against the person and we do not have anything like that in regard to the one thousand nine hundred and seventy i was statute that physical force putting in fear under the eye was statute does not require physical or it's a common law term and the government tries to say that that's just like intimidation but it's not it simply does not implicate the language as described and in fact if you look at all of the offenses let's turn in that's actually they're all very very serious so back to your honor's question regarding masters i think that when the court kind of says well house i threatened physical force but not against the person of another and so there's many ways in which the statute can be violated and i do think that mr langford has adequately carried his furniture that he's entitled to the realistic probability we just look at the plain language and the realistic probability comes from the fact that putting in thier is a common law term that i am a legislature pulled into its authority and so if you go back and look at those cases that i did cite from iowa and i have them here somewhere the one specifically that talked about a threat to your legal interest except for a clearly that i will common law incorporated this notion that putting in fear doesn't have to be physical and it doesn't have to be against a person absent eyes in that regard i just don't think we need a case specifically shows that because the cas of the constitution or in excess of that the maximum authorized by law so as an initial matter the government agrees with mr like that the mode of analysis is derived from walker and its progeny and that it should be applied in this context under the three strike laws i'm going to spend the bulk of my time today on the enumerated clauses and discuss why both of mr lankford robbery convictions qualify as serious violent felonies both at the time he was sentenced in january two thousand and five and still today before i do that though i do want to point out just longer two things about mr langford's argument about whether putting in fear requires physical force the threat of physical force against a person as opposed to property st of all the government cited and i believe quoted state v lewis that's the case from the iowa supreme court where the i was pretty court said and i quote the force and robbery is that necessary to overcome resistance or overcome the person rob and thus that would seem to be consistent with the supreme court's statements and stokely and moreover going to judge straw says question there at the end about whether mr langford is shown a realistic probability that the law would be applied in a manner such that you could put a person in fear of their property or or some other interests other than their body itself  and that case did not concern the robbery statute in any way whatsoever it was a case concerned contractual drag and in that case the court was considering whether a threat to charge somebody or report somebody to law enforcement could be perceived as contractual duress obviously that's not the same thing as robbery and it's not the same thing as what the i will robbery statutes require and thus it is the arguments position that that case says very little if anything about the force farmer case concerned an identical version of the i will robbery statutes and in farmer mr lankford is correct that farmer does make a statement about the residual clause but i'm going to quote as well from farmer before saying anything about the residual clause and this is specific to the i will robbery conviction at issue in farmer the court said that the conviction was a serious violent felony as well as another murder conviction that was issued was that issue and the court's  that it's binding because it the same as the same crime but boy i mean i think that's an uphill battle what's your response to that so i think the response is twofold your honor and st i'm going to just finish my point really quickly and i return to your question st i did want to point out that the court does seem to be making an alternative hold and as to the residual clause the court said quote further we have no doubt in quote that the i will robbery conviction also satisfied the residual cause turning back to government's brief both of those cases cite farmer for the proposition that robbery satisfies the enumerated crimes caused more over although the death of analysis and farmer to be disputed court at the time of sentencing before the camps before mathis had no choice but to follow the law that farmer laid down which well i don't i don't disagree with that but i gotta say i just say it can be disputed it's a little generous to the farmer or act robbery and discussing whether hobbs act robbery requires an element of force the court did go into some deeper analysis there and i think that analysis can text allies and perhaps some of the lack of analysis later in the opinion it seemed to be that the court was to an extent did not want to repeat any of the prior statements it was made however i do not dispute the point you're making which is that farmer was  however farmer was fairly consistent with the other cases in existence at that time if you look at the government's cases including monro from the th circuit was arielle delgado again from the th circuit the washington case from the l approach the same thing goes for the wicks case which is another th circuit case cited by mr langford in that case the th circuit didn't apply the categorical approach and said simply that robbery quote no matter what the name and no matter where they reason your honor and all the reasons i've discussed already i think at the time of sentencing far would have been controlling and binding on the district court and for that reason he cannot show that his one hundred and eighty nine conviction is not a serious violent felony under the enumer that time not turning to his one thousand and seventy five or robbery with aggravation conviction it is the government's position not that farmer is automatically controlling as to that conviction because as i said the farmer case can start united states versus house and also to judgment and opinion and stovall and in those cases how some stovall this court defined generic robbery as the misappropriation of property under circumstances posing quo answer that perhaps is more satisfactory i hope is more satisfactory house i think was taking into account that language from those that use that taking in section twenty want to leaven twenty one within the generic definition both of these statutes have two elements that pose an immediate danger to the victim the ninety five statute quires of taking by force violence or putting a beer and also while both of those dangerous elements now quickly i'll just point out that mr lankford sides to this court's opinion and dobbs to say that robbery must be especially agree just the one dobbs with two thousand and six case it would not be a through well thank you ms johnson and mr ashley we appreciate your appearance today and briefing cases submitted and we will decide