good morning may it please the court my name is rachel baird and i represent the appellant plaintiff hubert thompson in this case mr thompson was wrongfully incarcerated for four years and three months between december twelfth two thousand and seven and march third two thousand and twelve after a trial to the bench where he was convicted of sexual assault in the first degree and kidnapping in the first degree in that trial there were five pieces of evidence the evidence of the rape kit that was taken to st francis hospital was not entered and it was stipulated by counsel that the rape kit had not resulted in any positive results the results were negative so it as evidence although there was a substance on a piece of underwear that was in the rape kit at that time there was not the technology to go any further with the d n a in two thousand and six in compensation to individuals who have shown that they were innocent or that there were grounds to consistent with innocence in the course of mr thompson's hey b s matter his attorney in two thousand eleven went to the hartford police department obtained the rape kit submitted it and it ended up exonerating mr huber thompson he was brought to court in march of two thousand and twelve his case he was released from prison and on july nineteenth two thousand and twelve his case was dismissed by the prosecutor he subsequently brought a wrongful conviction claim under fifty four dash wanted to you and on january second two thousand fourteen which is the date that we the plaintiff contend is the important date for the statute of limitations in this case on january second two thousand and eleven the attorney general for the state of connecticut who was representing the state in that wrongful incarceration claim before the claims commissioner spoke to the prosecutor and maintained in a letter to the claims commissioner and to mr thompson's attorney that that his conviction had been dismissed or his case had been dismissed on grounds consistent with innocence but the case had been dismissed on july nineteenth two thousand and twelve i'm not sure why that isn't the critical date tell us because that that's the whole issue on this appeal why don't you tell us why we shouldn't that is the that determinative day if you look at the legislative history a fifty four dash want to go to you you it was first and acted in two thousand and eight prior to that there was no wrongful conviction statute and the statute at the time of it's an act meant to help that or stated that only two grounds could you obtain compensation under that statute in a sense or grounds consistent with it and i think the point of judge reggie's question has nothing to do with fifty four dash whatever it is it has to do with why the july nineteenth dismissal isn't a dispositive day in short we argue that the january second two thousand and fourteen letter  the prosecution that was the final what's happened what prosecution i don't understand that or who the final step in the prosecution would have been the dismissal on july nineteenth two thousand and twelve even if that subsequently excuse me even if that statute had never been passed right but because the statute was passed focus on my question please if that statute never existed the termination of the prosecution would have been on july nineteenth two thousand and twelve true or false true ok now on what basis do you say that suddenly what would have been a terminations of the prosecution terminations sufficient to predicate a civil claim for malicious prosecution for example was magically transformed into something different because it there's been one amendment to fifty four dash wanted to use since two thousand and eight and that occurred in two thousand and sixteen and the amendment to the statute states that you can obtain wrongful compensate you can obtain compensation under the wrongful conviction statute either by a dismissal of the case by a reversal and the charges are vacated or by innocence or grounds consistent with innocence and how does that help you if it helps you had the case dismissed i mean it would seem to me it would be the earliest of the dates that allows you to pursue this because after all waiting for the dismissal is itsel an expansion of the statute of limitations usually the false arrest claim would arise with the arrest but because you needed a favorable conclusion here the question becomes whether the all charges is a favorable conclusion you don't need anything more to bring your one thousand nine hundred three action i mean i'm not sure why the law should wait longer for this to be to be raised well is in our case there's an anomaly and the anomaly is the way that fifty four dash one zero two you enter x at least until the amendment in two thousand and sixteen the amendment in two thousand and sixteen has put it back to the three year statute limitations because it allows for you to it allows for compensation just with the dismissal or just with the reversal of the case but back in two thousand and eight when it required innocence or grounds consistent with innocence it required that the prosecutor step back in if he or she had not stated that on the date of dismissal july nineteenth two thousand and twelve and state and conclude the matter as the last act in the matter that the case was dismissed on the grounds of innocence or what was the ground for dismissal in july nineteenth the the d n a evidence was specifically what was the ground who was on the the state was unable to prove its case because of the results of the d n a evidence therefore it was on the moon and if they stayed and indicted him on july twentieth two thousand and twelve for the room that prosecution would have been bor on july twentieth two thousand units the day after the dismissal suppose they came back the next day and re indicted him for close run yes but again i would like to argue equitably as well equitable tolling in this case mr thompson was incarcerated for four years and three months wrongfully he reasonably looked at the statute of the wrongful conviction statute where it said that you had to have you had to have the prosecutor indicate whether there are grounds for innocence or grounds consistent with then in a sense that was the final act of the prosecution that january a remedy that nine hundred eighty three gives him a remedy and the one nine hundred eighty three action could be brought any time after the july nineteenth two thousand and twelve dismissal of charges it could certainly have been but so it away seems to me is what the decision you got in the fifty four to your proceeding was a decision in a civil case it had nothing to do with the criminal prosecution what am i missing the criminal prosecution had to step in and tell the attorney general who is representing the states the grounds for dismissal were consistent with in a sense or because he was in a july nineteenth was not good enough and that the statute doesn't begin to run until the attorney general comes into a compensation proceeding under the new statute and says yes the dismissal was because he was innocent or it was consistent with innocence right so far the prosecutor steps in yes all right so suppose he waited till two thousand one hundred the year two thousand one hundred let's just imagine to see compensation it would be the product of your logic that because he waited eighty years he's not too important because by waiting eighty years the attorney general hasn't stepped in to the civil matter didn't exist and the statute on the one nine hundred eighty three claim therefore doesn't begin to  run till two thousand one hundred isn't that your position or the statute requires that you follow her off a compensation claim within two years so well you know that may be and he has his wrongful compensation claim may be time barred but h time board on your logic is it well he would have never had to obtain that indication from the prosecutor and by the way this problem hasn't gone away with the two thousand and sixteen amendment that's my point it's a it's a blip in time for the stalker but that's my point your client had total control over when if ever he brought any compensation proceeding under the connecticut statute and your position is that the longer he waits to do that the longer he delays the attorney general from stepping in to say the criminal dismissal was on grounds of innocence and the longer he hundred three statute of limitations from running right well i understand what you're saying that could happen but the statute provides that he either brings the wrongful compensation claim within two years or it's gone so the of of the process wouldn't wouldn't go as long as that here guy i know you want to reserve some time  gave them the unilateral right to bring the charges again in a new prosecution in this case there was an actual dismissal which is your daughter's questions pointed out invoke double jeopardy that is more favorable the term nation wasn't spac and spak the statute started running on the date of the knowledge the fact that connecticut's wrongful compensation statute requires actual innocence has no bearing on what nine hundred eighty three requires was nine hundred eighty three looks to the analogous state law cause or causes of action and malicious prosecution only requires favorable termination the allegations as when he was let out of prison which was in march of two thousand and twelve four months before the dismissal on the equitable tolling issue i don't think this court actually has to look at the two prongs of equitable tolling because you can't tell w hasn't begun and all of the conduct that mr thompson claims prevented him from filing suit ended long before july nineteenth two thousand and twelve his claim because they withheld ex to hubert thompson were insufficient and didn't fully account for the intersection of fifty four dash one of two you and the three year statue of limitations of one nine hundred eighty three  he asked that the court consider equitable tolling because the law was inadequate at that time to inform him clearly and unambiguously when the last act of the prosecutor was which we claim was january second two thousand and fourteen and what date he should have used to calculate when to follow this one thousand nine hundred three action thank you thank you were to take the case and your advisement will get you