is case is about my clients having been denied early parole eligibility as a categorical matter of policy across the board in contradiction of their federal due g under this court's holding in really really oregon the issue is does the language create a presumption that my clients will be eligible for parole regardless of whether they'll ever be before profit he seven for this language was added their parole eligibility would have been at the expiration of the st number of years part of their life sentence twenty five to life the typical three strikes sentence what changed with proposition fifty seven with this language i just read was that once they complete the term for their primary offense then that at that point they're eligible for parole and the the constitutional amendment defines that in the next provision where it says the full term for the primary offense means the longest term of imprisonment by the court for any offenses xclusive the imposition of an enhancement consecutive the voters know the state of existing law and therefore it's perfectly clear that the intent of this provision and the plain text of this provision is that early eligibility right  the after sense or as we cleared in our complaint the allegation that on average it tends to be around seventy years as opposed to the twenty five years that we would have g and i think that it's three on each intermediate appellate talent nylander supreme court or up to something like two dozen judges there's no dissent there's no there's no concurrence all of them agree that that that it's doing so but that doesn't eat legislative unity does it legislatively unity does not apply your honor to the implementation of an across the board policy whether it's written in a regulation or not enjoyed the court's attention to the supreme court of virginia versus consumers union case that's cited in our rule twenty eight a letter from this weekend and there we had officials the supreme court found they were acting you know let you know in a legislative sense when they drafted certain rules regarding the conduct of attorneys but the court said that they could still be liable under section mean that's why i asked the question on consecutive sentences if the constitutional provision is clear that consecutive sentences should not be counted towards the primary term when the regulations violate that you don't need would have stablished bay have a federal constitutional right to that island ability the only cases they point to speak to what procedural protections they are entitled to at the parole or early parole in the case of a miller so the court conscious get over that portion of the analysis and go directly to the one issue that was before the court in both of those cases what procedural protections were due to those individuals so guideline at the end of two the last year found that the constitutional state constitutional provision that issue here quote may include some discretion to define what constitutes a nonviolent felony  delegation was why they legislator believes for so here there is a unique circumstance where that law making authority has been delegated which would not necessarily exist in other circumstances or with respect  but as to looking out what appellants are asking for it is a specific timetable to have there for all consideration hearing but all aspects of parole other than those procedural protections that are required by holds are determined by state law and here the california constitution does not include any statement of when april consideration hearing must be conducted from the point that an individual becomes eligible or from the point that proposition section thirty two went into effect so there is simply no federal or state law b says for the injunctive relief that opponents and in fact all the district courts that have considered this issue have found that there that there is no federal right implicated and that there proposition fifty seven dollars section section thirty two dollars of the california constitution does not create in liberty interest and those cases are cited if he has twenty six of our of our answer in brief so there is no consensus of the federal courts that there is even a federal right at issue here and so independent holdings in miller you heard from the state's attorney one of them is whether mr miller got the actual process that was due but there's eight earlier hold in miller in fact miller but that issues they weren't made the argument same arguments being made here that there is no such to process right under green apples and the th circuit allies that and tells us we therefore conclude that there is there is a right to their early april consideration that's the end of section x and then section b is miller's to process rights now that the error in the district court's opinion on page nine when when miller is discuss is that you have a right to early eligibility when the state law so provides so miller does clearly establish the right at issue here which is early eligibility legislative immunity there's a reason that all of the cases are about officials because that's how useful government tends to be structured the mayor tends to be a member of city council all the functions are kind of mixed up and there's a reason you don't find any state cases because state governments are set up with