seven years to file suit after witnessing an alleged fraud against the united states government was entitle to rely on the equitable tolling principle of the discovery rule that is established by section thirty seven thirty one b two of the false claims act even though the government declined to intervene in the suit under this approach for a later could conceal from the united states and could wait to sue for a decade and still take advantage of the principle of equitable tolling this reading of section thirty seven thirty one b two contradicts this court's interpretive approach in the graham case it defies default tolling rules and it would produce counter intuitive results that congress cannot possibly have intended let me begin with the text in this court's decision and graham interpret the false claims act it held that these provisions must be interpreted in context not in isolation and in particular it focused on the language understood under  section thirty seven thirty which is in contained in section thirty seven thirty one b two and here the statutory context confirms that that language of action under section thirty seven thirty as incorporated into subsection b t is limited to those actions where the united states is a party either because it's intervened or it filed the complaint and graham said it's in the united states in something and a party even if it hasn't deveny after all or it's going to get the first are that the provision section thirty seven thirty one b two only refers to the united states and the statute refers to the later and united states separately throughout but it only refers to the united states and as judge wilkinson in the sanders case from the four circuit noted it makes no sense to apply this tolling provision to a later where the united states is not involved the language is that the knowledge of the official of the united states charged with responsibility to act in the circumstances triggers the statue limitations so knowledgeable third party that's not a party to the case would somehow put the plaintiff who's who's the the relator who's not an injured party on notice that there's a climate could start to talk to king without the rollator even knowing it i understand your argument that non intervention case is not a civil action under section thirty seven thirty for purposes of be to and the arguments you've just given aside i  those and in response to justice ginsburg but i believe you still take the position that the very same case is a civil action under thirty seven thirty for purposes of b one and so you'd have us interpret that introductory language to be in two different way this one for b one and the other for b two how do we manage that that's quite a feat i don't think it's difficult at all your honor any and in graham the court said side interrupt out there but i just put my cards on the table so you can you can play them as you wish it graeme we held that retaliation claims just simply are covered by this provision at all and they don't qualify under that introductory language for the purposes of the one or b to hear you're asking us to split the baby as a war and we normally don't read the same language to mean two different things and i believe that's the problem you face that we did not face in graham well actually there are a grand that exact issue was presented the court said in discussing section thirty seven thirty one d which at the time was subsection see that the language of action brought under section thirty seven thirty meant only actions brought under the united states and that provision in the court said it was the basically the exact same language in section thirty seven thirty one b one which is what the court was talking about the court said that congress spoke in precisely used the term actions under section thirty seven thirty in precisely and it sometimes used that phrase to refer to only a subset of actions under section thirty thirty and interpret ng section subsection d it's said that subset were actions only involving the united states that's exactly what we're arguing here so in the court has your honor in many instances interpreted the same phrase in the statute to mean different things in the utility regulatory err case for example the court said you have to look at what is the language doing in a particular provision housing interacting with the other provisions here sec subsections b one and b two are very different provisions it's not  just a word following a defined term be one is triggered by a violation of section twenty thirty just so i understand your argument we can we can put it in a nutshell then you can move on you read that language of civil action under thirty seven thirty to mean cases where there is no intervention when we come to be one but not be two is that right in b to we read it to mean there must yes that's correct there must be intervention under be two in section b why did states is a party for purposes of b one but not be to it but differently b b one does not refer does not distinguish between united states and the relator be two does it specifically calls out the united states  intervene doesn't change or order for a relator the statue of limitations would be six years after the violation occurred and that would end it for the united states if the relator for example sued  it and on its own in the government didn't intervene and it was more than six years the claim would be barred but that doesn't mean the set settlement patients is changing the united states would still have the opportunity to intervene and if it if the official charged with responsibility i acted learned in less than three years after the after before the filing the suit the claim would be timely so the special imitation stays the same i don't think it's at all complicated but think of the reverse here equitable had never applied equitable tolling or the discovery rule where the government is seeking penalties and not seeking compensation for itself that's what the relator is doing here if you see the problem i have is that i know that it appears to give the relator more of a statute of limitations than the government but if you look at this statute more broadly which is that it's curb this is to ensure that when so fraud has occurred against the us that there is recovery for the united states and the qui tam actions whether it's the relator or the us prosecuting it the recovery  bocas justice ginsburg mentioned goes to the government so there is a purpose to this and one that makes logical sense which is why should it matter that it's the government's knowledge that it issue when it's the government who stands to benefit from a longer sensitive limitations well they are you know the government would benefit from the longest actual imitations you would have the opportunity to know but you're forcing it to do something that the statute clearly doesn't want to force the government to do which is you're forcing it to step into the shoes of the relator but the statute clearly gives the government the option not to and you're saying read this in a way that forces the government to do what  went before strike i would consider the fact that the claim would be rendered untimely as part of the suite of factors that normally we consider here the government was not forced into intervening it decided that based on its evaluation of merits and up cost other factors he and there's all it's not just the recovery for the government it's rapid exposure of fraud congress in this court said way back when in the markets versus hess case the false claims act was meant to sp rapid ferreting out of fraud by privateers or bounty hunters or people who are on the scene this would do the opposite so it's inconsistent with the purposes of false claims act and with the purpose of statutes of limitations which i will no longer because in one nine ninety six congress one of the factors relevant to how much or really there recovers whether they were dilatory in bringing the action i know that has little to do with the original interpretation but that's not a consequence today the battle still in a direct and since he can have an effect on i think one of the cases that was cited by the other side showed that there was a modest reduction but the principle here that a relator for example mr hunt waited seven years and one of the cases that creates the conflict that brings us here was heater nine years it is so contrary to the very essence of equitable tolling to allow someone to lie in the weeds and conceal from the united that's that's really more of an academic concern the relievers for example they know if they don't move promptly there another relator might preempt them they know that if they don't move promptly the government itself might find out before they have a chance to file and that would preempt their action as well that the theory of a relator just sort of as you say waiting in the weeds i think is not a realistic one well your honor that this case proves the opposite it's not academic here the relator waited seven years in other cases in the sanders case i think it was seven or eight years but think of it this way if a reuters case is baseless if it's a concocted claim if it can if it's a maryland claim those incentives about moving quickly don't spark the relator to do anything they're better off just waiting letting damages that they're going to claim pile up treble damages and then they could they can amass whatever evidence they have while the defendant has no idea that someone is going to  proposed created such crimes i'm not saying they all are but what i am saying is that the incentives don't necessarily cause people to file quickly as this case and many others demonstrate but the point is even if the incentives are that there are incentives there this is another thing that are related to consider they can wait that's flatly contrary to equity will tolling and that's what the background will that congress was thinking of you're not arguing that seems to me that we would fit it you don't even have a claim that you can see one until the statute of limitations has already run that was one aspect of graham but the way the cork out there in the dissent in gra think it was an absurd position and it was there it was counter intuitive is what the majority said but your honor it graham didn't just talk about the retaliation prison provision subsection age it talked about thirty seven thirty one d that provide s in an action under section thirty sprott under section thirty seven thirty the united states must prove the elements by a preponderance of evidence and the court held that that provision only applied to actions brought by the united states or where they intervened even though it was even broader it said any action under section thirty seven thirty and the court held that congress was imprecise it's not that they didn't mean what they said they were imprecise when why is this it seems very clear now you then are you it doesn't make a ton of sense in terms of the policy objectives tolling principles and i get all that but it seems very clear as written we're on i think that one we have to it's you can only interpret the statute by understanding or viewing the language of action there's section thirty seven thirty as appearing in both provisions it really does it can't be that the decision turns on the fact that as a drafting technique congress said it wants and it goes into two very different provisions so when we get to section thirty seven thirty one b two the question is which actions is congress talking about and the fact it's not that it didn't mean what it said but it was imprecise in the sense that they didn't bottom down absolutely clearly that i relate or couldn't take advantage of that provision but everything else common sense logic the structure of the provision that the derivation  i'm common sense i'm sorry i don't know please god all your questions probably better than mine this common sense we keep coming back to i guess i'm struggling to get my head around but congress you suggest wants to encourage the relator is to act quickly but it has another number of other tools for ensuring that as the chief justice pointed out and in any event  really boils down these last three years seven through ten and whether congress would have thought that we want relate to we want to outsource work to related years one through six but not seven through ten for the reasons that we want to encourage our letters t quickly but could a rational congress think well we want to outsource the work to related seven through ten as well and why is that absurd or unlikely or why does that defy common sense i guess i'm to struggle to understand that argument because there are first six years is a long time for a statue limitations for fraud number one number two we're talking about equitable tolling that is peg diligence and the that the party who is bringing the case acted diligently as the court said in credit suisse it's inequitable to continue to toll the statue of limitations once the plaintiff knows there's been an injury and they have a claim it's inequitable so congress would never have thought that if it was importing equitable principle tolling principle into the statute that it would allow the plaintiffs to just lay back and wait for years and years and years to file a lawsuit it's contrary to the very essence of what equitable certainly could have wanted to give for a later as ten years to file suit but that's not really the question the question is did they want relator is to file suit between years seven and ten in those cases where a the government didn't know about the fraud until the year seven and the government chooses not to bring the case on its own correct and that's exactly right you're out of it when we're getting seven in ten years the memories are feeding the government that has which has as you know in a special responsibility to ensure justice is done statutes of limitations serve important purposes in gabelli the court repeated that this they are vital to the welfare of society there i mean this is a this is an interesting case because it really does create a stat a statutory interpretation dilemma this is a terribly drafted statute it may serve wonderful purposes but it it if you if i were to grade the whoever drafted it anyway but you have a real you have a real that they're advocating so what's your best shot at fitting this into the statutory text my best shot your honor is that the language action under section thirty seven thirty is incorporated in section thirty seven thirty one b two and that provision is triggered when it when the official who is charged with responsibility to file a timely action had knowledge and they must do so within three years and that's what the fourth circuit said in sanders the the it can only mean that we're talking about a case where i can not only mean i agree with you this statute to mass but but a totally reasonable mean is that it means that that's the official who was charged with getting a timely claim on file timely action under section thirty seven thirty and to say that the rule later when in the history of this this country we've never had a statute of limitations discovery rule triggered by the knowledge of a third party or we and we've never had this court apply the discovery rule to someone seeking penalties on behalf of an uninsured and injured third party that was go belly here the later is in that role well meaning these types of actions are exceptional in many many ways but the concerns you really about delay and all that aren't aren't the at least significantly addressed with a ten year statute a riposte no your honor ten years is a lifetime when we're talking about litigation six years as a long time and in these cases the washing legal foundation brief documents how the government will sometimes in will come in when they get the complaint the complaint will mean remain under seal and it will seek extension extension extension here was over a year so it can be ten years it could be twelve years so ten years in civil litigation memories people witnesses die they disappear and so that is that the difference between six years and ten years is a is a very long time and going back to we have quite a few cases that started you know ten years ago but they weren't filed at the ten year mark they were filed and they they go through all sorts of processes and you can take discovery and you can find out the information and the litigation has commenced and back to justice alito xp question about my best argument the other piece of it is we know that congress adopted this tolling provision directly from section twenty four sixteen which is the the tolling provision that only applies to actions brought by the united states in  contract actions so that's another i think flashing a red light that a bare minimum this language is not clear it's as ambiguous as the language was viewed to be in graham and then the question is what is it most likely that congress intended would do well the states the states have an amicus brief that says no no state has a statute of limitations that explicitly adopts the rules reflected in the rule reflected in petitioners torture six and some of their assessment does have some bearing on how we think about how it fits into the overall context of these kinds of cases and that's been really the thrust of your argument i think well i i think that the it does not have any i think it's incorrect because again i go back to the point that it's not applicable it's not fair it's it's contrary to the purposes of the false claims act which are meant to incentiv always relator is coming forward so i said we simply disagree with that assessment there's there's and i didn't have seen any real clear examples in that brief or from the government that our rule would cause any problems whatsoever our rules can see with history it's consistent with gabelli credit suisse with graham and basic principles governing statutes of limitations the it seems to me that you know this statute reflects a congress that just decided that it did not want the government's decision whether to intervene to affect the statute of limitations and that might be a bad policy choice  but but it's it's you can imagine reasons why congress would have made that choice just to say look we actually think that this is a very special kind of case and we want to you know have a statute of limitations that it's true it's not it's not what unary for a rule like this to be triggered by a third party but this is a special kind of third party which is going to get most of the money from the suit and we actually think it's just easier simpler better for any number of reasons but nothing turn on whether the government intervenes or not theoretically congress could have fought the through that carefully your honor and gone through that analysis but there's no indication that it did one of the indication is that they wrote a provision where nothing turns on intervention well you're i would respectfully submit that it's ambiguous it's not clear because the congress used the language of action under section thirty seven thirty in precisely what sometimes referred a subset of of those claims and here it's the actions by the only party mentioned in the provision who while you why do you argue that the two applies when the government intervenes why don't you just argue that b two applies only when the government itself bring suit but that would be another way to look at your i think that the government ultimately files a complaint in intervention if it intervenes and then that relate that relates back so i think it it's it gets us to the same place but i do think that it's really overreading graham to suggest that this is been decided that action under section thirty seven thirty necessarily covers be to support the government repeatedly cites and quotes graham suggesting that the court held that but it leaves out the fact that the court very carefully said the text of section thirty seven thirty one graham said congress used that language action under section thirty seven thirty in precisely to refer to different groupings of cases and when we when we look at that language as incorporated into b two and the only party reference there is the united states and it stricker it off the official united states charged with responsibility to act we say the better reading is that that means it's an action where the united states brought the action or intervene in the action the government is reading in the notion that the the decision to act responsibility act includes the decision not to act which we think is not clear from the t i don't think there is a statutory interpretation can in any longer that says we can conclude the congress didn't mean what it said the only avenues or the absurdity can or maybe scrivener's error but you're not arguing any of those so we conclude that it's not in the u s so anything left there is your honor the court's decision and barnhart which responded cite in their brief that page twenty says that if the text is if the the inquiry ceases if mayfield mr chief justice may it please the court section thirty one thirty seven thirty one be is an event based statute of limitations that makes no distinction as to the party to whom it applies it applies equally to both the united states and to relate or as who bring suits on behalf of the united states in keeping with this court's decision or vermont agency in every case the real party in interest is the united states and as many justice of  recognized at all times the united states maintains ultimate control over the suit and it is the ultimate beneficiary of the suit approximately seventy percent of key time suits are initiated by private relator the department of justice intervenes and only about a fifth of those but in every case where the result is successful either by settlement or by judgment the united states is the ultimate beneficiary in every case the united states gets at least seventy percent of the proceeds and this  in keeping with the entire rational purpose of the statute which is a number of what the court members have noted is the only reason to deviate from the plain language of the statute while counsel your argument would have a lot more appeal if we didn't have gra as you argue so what's your best argument for addressing how would you have us best distinguish graham yes just course in grand county we had the amount of situation where congress simply forgot to provide an applicable statue of limitations to the united states ever a party to a retaliation suit it is brought solely by the private person retaliated against so we had an ambiguity there in the court recognized that ambiguity had to choose between either of the six years which was the only solid number that was presented in terms of y the one or in the alternative the default statue limitations that the states had which is the avenue the court took but here by contrast we have it's plain language that applies on its face a civil action under thirty seven thirty it doesn't differentiate whether or not a party is intervening which the congress could easily have done in point of fact the congress did do so in the very next section in part c it says if the government elects to intervene and proceed with an action under brought under thirty seven thirty b congress could have simply taken that phrase and put it at the beginning of part b two that is what petitioners are after the court to do today but as this court has repeatedly help that's improper because there is no absurdity the absurdity here would be if the statute didn't result in the united states obtaining more funds or if there was some anomalous result but even petitioner admits that they're reading the literal one results in an outcome where as they said at the very end of the reply brief the government obtains more money that was the point of the ninety six amendments this court has said in both clarke and reno that when looking at statutory provisions if that provision term in the very same sentence it means the same thing every time a statute or not a femoral they are not shapeshifters we do not give them different meanings because we would prefer a different outcome your friend relied on the from remembering right the united arab regulatory case how do you distinguish that you don't want in this case we have a mechanism by which the department always screens the cases it's somewhat unique  the relevant official of the united states is always going to be a member of the department of justice very few other statute to act like that in vermont agency the court pointed out there were four key town statutes but in this case the department the official charged with that responsibility is a designee of the attorney general other statutes don't function like that but there is a good reason for this and that is congress one of the department to have the first bite of the apple to qualit pick the very best cases to have the optimal use of the department's resources and then when the department decides not to intervene in those cases where it makes that decision we have these other cases on the side the vast majority of them as it would happen and the year statute of limitations for everybody could have had a discovery rule for the rollator and let me give you two cases and you explain to me why congress would have wanted a different result in these two cases case a government does not want to intervene in the case it knows about the fraud before year seven case be government doesn't want to intervene it doesn't know about the fraud before yourself and what is the reason for allowing b to go forward but not a we are in all cases the tolling provision would act to defend its benefit so if the defendant could litigate the issue at the outset of a lawsuit and prevent the case from going forward if it could show the government had not acted in a timely manner be based on real knowledge constructive knowledge but within that scheme let's take your seven if the government didn't act in your setup and the relator brought the suit at any time after that the united states w still have the option of taking over the lawsuit the interventions avail is always available the government doesn't depend on when the relator brings a suit or the government could always bring this within ten years but in not it would depend your honor on the tolling provision if it's if it's actor the relevant government official for instance in a usa or some of the civil division had known about the last rate the no ok but i saw them quite understand your reason for saying congress would have treated those two cases differently well the reason you're right it's both to spur the department the that also your honor affection related for instance a relator might have a an impediment to bring suit such as not knowing about false claims i do well then you have a discovery will for the relator which congress elected not to do just a silly right exactly and so the question is why would that be rational and the reality of them struggling with the reason we rationally honor is because the government ultimately benefits from the reuters action if there is no knowledge issue in the reuters timely he brings a suit the government gets the money yeah i understand the government benefits but that would argue in favor of the ten year statute of limitations if the government chooses not to bring suit why does it matter whether the government knew about this fraud before year seven or didn't know about the hear about it before before year seven that's what i'm trying to get at it think congress created a balancing to protect else may decide that this case is meritorious and let's say the relator then brings the suit the congress rather the it department can always change its mind it could in your ten cases still going on come and take it over and that is to its benefit but  if the three year tolling applies because if we want defendants to get a protection against a department sitting and doing nothing the department was the institutional actor that testified before congress and congress said ok we're going to be more time than you had before but you've got to do something you can't just not do anything once you know about it but because the department wouldn't have that option if it didn't know and as the number of justice appointed now a relator has every incentive to bring it to the department's attention quickly although the relator may not be the only person who provides that information it could well be a witness it could be audit by the why didn't your client bring it to the government's attention so it's not in the record your honor but my client was first to serving in i'm taking that you're agreeing with the united states that officials of the united states you believe also are just the department of justice that is a great job sort of interesting that this statute doesn't define do we know in this case it wasn't done that there wasn't a u s attorney that this was discussed with in some way ultimately it was wrong or that happened after the initial meeting with the f b i it's not the record again because that was not developed in the court below did not consider it to be particularly relevant but it's for that reason your honor that it's the official charge his cabin and to the department of justice if he could just be any government official then that screening process that congress designed wouldn't wouldn't act there isn't anyone in the f b i or the zero i g or the contracting agency who's responsible for protecting the government right the attorney general however in section thirty seven thirty eight is the individual specifically charged with the statute to investigate every case it's a non discretionary duty so why did congress reference there why didn't they set of just saying officially the united states saying official designated under this su but they did borrow that i think there was some short hand from twenty four sixteen as my colleague pointed out but they borrowed only the tolling provision under twenty four sixteen they did not borrow the party limitation under twenty four fifteen so if it's petitioners would ha it congress admit this provision to somehow apply only the united states that would have broken twenty four fifteen and said in actions brought by the united states but they didn't do that flame language says it's a civil action under section thirty seven thirty so having written it that way question is why would we deviate from that is the biz the outcome absurd it is not and since there is a rational basis even if any of us in here might have taken a different path in designing the statute that is the outcome that prevails and what happens if a relator brings a suit the government chooses not to intervene but then as the suit goes on the if it appears that the of rollator is not fulfilling case diligently way what can the government do at that point justice alito the statute specifically provides for that because at any time the department justice can dismiss the false claims suit or in the alternative which also happens you can take it over they can do it if there are no it does not happen frequently there are occasions when the department looks at a suit that's been in the system for some years and says you know we will we will take that over after all so the relator does have some responsibilities with respect to the prosecution of this suit in the name of the united states but only with respect to his relationship through the partment for instance at the department of quests that he forwarded pleadings or if the department asked that discovery be truncated in some way those are responsible no that's not my point this is an action in the name of the united states correctly the relator is in effect representing the united states and the relator has responsibilities in that case otherwise the government can intervene and take over the case the government always has the ultimate ability to take over the case justice alito the relator is basically a free agent how well what i'm getting at i'm sure you realize this is why doesn't that suggest that the relator has is charged with responsibilities to act in the circumstances because under no circumstances relator who has taken no if the constitution is not employed in any way by the government and is not answerable to the government during the course of the litigation in terms of if he decides to take witness say or to ask if there are documents he's carrying out a government policy to differentiate from dixon which the petitioners relied on in that case you had individuals who by contract were dispensing federal housing funds how are you arguing that for mom agency was case whether or not it's dismissed intervened or settled is always up to the government the government always gets to make that decision bend over the relator objections if it's so chooses but in terms of if it doesn't intervene relator can act like a normal litigant and make his own tactical decisions but he's not an officer in any meaningful sense because he had he cannot obligate the united states if he signed a contract he's not doing so we have the united states no one would believe he  was he's carrying out no statutory duties and he is not answerable ultimately to anyone the department of justice if my client decided today that he wanted to walk away from this case because there's no one to make him do it and the only thing that could save it is if the department took it over right that in certain circumstances this statute actually gives the relator a longer statute of limitations than the government has another words take a case where the government finds out on day one about a fraud the government as i read the statute then has six years but if the relator finds out and day one about a fraud and thinks it's the kind of fraud that the government or any nobody else will ever find out about then that  on his rights for ten years so the relator actually gets four more years than the government itself does is that right and if it's right why on earth does it make any sense it's it's a hypothetical it's not likely to happen in the real world kagan but it is hypothetically right but at all times the government could still take over the case let's say the relator in that case waits till your ten files at that very moment the government can intervene if the related takes another five years to litigate that case and when you're fifteen before so inclined it could run it and if let's assume that the united states had a malign motive it could also sit on its rights for ten years and then pretend it didn't know which is really the fallacy of petitioners position which is the assumption that are somehow times are always acting based on malign interest but the government is always noble but let's assume they're both revenue maximizers the government could sit on its rights every harm point to exist in a scheme in which the relat play no role that same discovery occurs in terms of what the government knew and when it knew it and that government although that's more or less academic than your friends hypothetical but it certainly is academic that the united states would allow fraud to be continued practice for you know nine years and three hundred days or whatever with mr chief justice actually probably more likely but the reason would be different might not necessarily in line it might be a lack of resources but we know indeed that was what instigated the one thousand nine hundred six amendment that the department frequently find unable to timely respond to these kinds of frauds and often doesn't know again seventy percent of these cases are brought by private related to the department and its associated agencies simply lack the investigative power to discover all these frauds so it's in the government's interest for the relator to do it if you have that bad actor who waits till you're ten and assumes all along the way that the government doesn't otherwise know which is a foolhardy assumption on the part of a relator because the writer doesn't know what investigation the government's doing on his own he doesn't know if another whistleblowers coming forward he doesn't know if another witness who doesn't want to be related is going to come forward he controls none of these things he does not control the government's internal knowledge or decision a decision making power the only thing he controls is whether or not he comes forward and if someone else bea it he's out of what so it would be foolhardy for him to do it and it would be malpractise for any attorney to recommend that he do it but even if even if someone decided to take that insane gamble at the end of ten years where ever gets filed and let's assume the suit is successful he can walk into court and the united states can say when they try to settle the case that relator sat on his rights we don't think he deserves the full thirty percent and the court cannot get down so on both ends congress has built a statutory scheme that confines the very harms the petitioners raise here harms that they can't really point to exist in the real world because virtually all related bring their suit as quick soon as they get a lawyer who is able to identify the fraud and bring it forward because otherwise they may lose the lose everything it would be like taking a lottery ticket and dropping in the toilet no one does that mr neary mr chief justice it may please the court i'd like to begin by addressing a question that justice kagan posed to mr mayfield in our view the correct interpretation of the statute mandates that the relator and the united states always have the same deadlines for filing suit the six year limitations period in b one and a three year tolling rule and b two will expire on precisely the same day for both a potential relator and for the united states so under the correct interpretation of the statute a relator could never bring a timely action unless the united states could also bring an action on the same day alleging the same fraud the second point i'd like to address mr  alluded repeatedly earlier to principles of equitable tolling what's the textual basis for that both paragraphs two paragraph b two and paragraph b one both applied to a civil action under section thirty seven thirty so in any case a court the tolling rules will be identical whether or not the united states initiates the suit the united states intervenes in a suit and the initiated by  relator or the united states elects not to intervene in a suit initiated by a later the statute itself draws no distinction between those three categories of cases and therefore we think the tolling rule and the six year limitations period and be one will operate in the same way in and said well now we're dealing with a different case and in this case the federal government doesn't know of the fraud instead the relator notice of the fraud on day one and assuming that the government remains and blissful ignorance and everybody else does too he gets ten years isn't that right that's correct we think that that's how the statute would operate now the relator in that sense would also have more of the six year period to bring the suit if the relator learns of the fraud on day one the relator will have more of those six years in which to file suit than the united states will have we think that's of no consequence it's congress adopted a different form of parallel treatment and the form of parallel treatment that congress adopted ensures that the the deadlines expire for both the united states and the relator  suisse there is no occasion here to resort to principles of equitable tolling because there is a statute on point that dictates the tolling rule that applies in cases like this one and for all the reasons that have already been discussed this morning the statutory political even in a non intervened suit there's also been significant discussion this morning of this court's decision in graham county graham county interpreted the exact same language that i is at issue here that is the phrase a civil action under section thirty seven thirty as used in thirty seven thirty one b to refer to a subset of civil actions under the false claims act but the subset that the court identified in graham county includes a non intervening suit just like this one the court interpreted that language to refer to suits under thirty seven thirty a or b alleging a violation of thirty seven twenty nine this is such a suit this suit falls into that category regardless of whether or not the united states elects to intervene in the action there's also present been some discussion about why this was a sensible policy result we think the key thing to keep in mind in that respect is that a relator is permitted to sue to vindicate an interest of the united states the united states is the injured party in all of these cases the united states is a real party in interest regardless of whether or not it elects to intervene in the action the majority of any recovery would go to the united states and in that context it made good sense that congress chose to permit to make the tolling rule in the one a political based on the knowledge of the injured party that is the united states but if the government decides it doesn't want to intervene what difference does it make whether it knew about this fraud or not that's what i just can't understand congress choose to make the tolling rule a political based on the knowledge of the united states we think another way to pose a similar question justice alito would be why should the united states be deprived of the assistance of a private relat during that three year tolan period the petitioners have yet to identify a sensible reason congress would have wanted to deprive the united states of the assistance of the relator during those years the logic well its to archives them on the assistance of vera later during those years if the if the government knows about the fraud on day one right congress made a reasonable decision that the tolling period would extend only three years from that point in time but the same is true for a later or a later cannot rely on the tolling provision to bring a suit after those three years expired so you reasonable policy choice that's reflected in clear statutory text here all the court needs to do here is that it is follow the statute does written and apply the language of be using the same construction it applied in graham county there are no further questions i'd be happy to yield a balance my time thank you counsel three minutes mr thank your honor i will i will begin with the last point that the united states has made they made it in their brief repeatedly and it's just in correct the court did not in graham hold that the language action under section thirty seven thirty meant the same thing in b one and b two on page four twenty one and four twenty two which is what the government keeps citing the court began it sentence with section thirty seven thirty one the ones text is talking about the text of that particular provision and if you look at the analysis on page four eighteen where the court was specifically talking about the virtually identical language to what we have here in subsection d which was then c the court made exactly the point we're making that provision only reference the united states and the court said that congress to use that phrase action under section thirty seven in precisely sometimes to only refer to sub two subset of those actions and that's what it did here the united states is ignoring i don't hear one word about the purposes of statute to limitations from anyone on the other side statutes limitations serve valuable purposes they they support action quickly and more quickly and they're meant to protect defendants allowing a rule that allows tolling after so basically says self tolling the relator can just decide to press the button and told the statue limitations and then let it loose and it goes that's in congress would not have intended it implausible that it wouldn't intended that i'd like to briefly address the point justice sotomayor you're making and it's really our alternative argument about the official of the united i don't see why the united states shouldn't in responded should have a both ways they say the rollator stands in the shoes the united states the relator should be everything should be the same between the later in the united states if that's the case then i think our alternative argument is very appealing that where the government doesn't involve it doesn't intervene and the into the will later is acting under this court's decision in stevens as the designated agent of the united states and it's not an assigning one it's pursuing penalties on behalf of the united states and damages for the united states it's the agent it's the size of your officer is very different than representative it actually or even agent those are substantially different concepts and so i do think the word official sound means what it sounds like an official it is not a representative we are i would point to this court's decision two years before the one thousand nine hundred six amendment s in the united states versus sticks in a criminal case where the court held that the word public officials under the federal bribery statute encompassed private corporate officers who are performing public responsibilities here it's not fair to say that the government that reuters just on his own the government is doesn't intervene and then argue that our rule is wrong because the relator is doing this important work for the government it's acting as the agent for the giving an official but it is your honor but and agent who is performing official responsibilities i think they're like their knowledge should be imputed to the government thank you very much you coun