proper interest you have to understand the timeline a little bit some of the significant details in one thousand nine hundred one sharon has hired as a teacher and the mayor unified school district so that by nine hundred ninety four she was a tenured teacher and in  her contract got extended for two years so by the time they get around to not renewing her in april of two thousand and one her contract is running through two thousand and three so when they when they terminate are affected in june two thousand and two  deprive her of a year and the balance of the year of that contract and under the terms of that contract if they're going to terminate her in the middle of the contract period she's entitled to due process that's explicit in the contract it's also exp discussing employment and still there's nothing in the contract that says that well there wouldn't be because that's the statutory requirement in arizona it's that open meeting what's thirty eight hundred thirty one zero three the contract incorporates alleged and argued to the district court she was not given a due process year before they took off the last year for a contract that they did not give her due process hearing before taking away her teacher tenure rights that they did not that they violated the open meeting law when they had an executive session to discuss her employment that given her the contract you can't ok and the state statute says the state statute required a public hearing if she requested one if she requests and the way she gets requests is they give her twenty four hour notice that they're going to scratch an executive session gender discrimination what mrs hardy wanted to present were four witnesses who are going to testify and personal knowledge to their observation of his discriminatory conduct and their own personal victimhood at his hands the second part is those acts are among time in every single one of the acts that was alleged occurred while she was an employee from june july rather of two thousand up until the time the complaint was filed all those acts fell in that timeframe they were meets the four part test that evidence should not have been excluded the problem in some respects granting that motion women with was dispositive of the title seven can't claim because there was no evidence left for her to present rebuttal evidence mr hobson presented what the witnesses are going to say the board didn't say what they were going to respond to that way so that evidence they got in it would have been an contradicted except for mr nelson saying didn't happen that's not cross  her teacher tenure rights once they any if they had properly not renewed her as an administrator she automatically should have been put back in a teaching position with tenure because she did not give that up on the issue of self improvement plan is there evidence in the record that she said she had such a plan and where would that be in the record  in a pretrial motion and ultimately what happens is she does do it i don't know exactly what mr hobbs and he took the facts from the complaint created a statement of facts and put evidence into supported one of those facts and i know that sufficient to survive stymie judgment because previously judge carroll did look at the allegations in the complaint said you've stated a prime facie case in all your counts well now you have the exact same set of facts with evidence to support them all by the time the board comes in with its reply all they're doing is disputing employment contract actually was to work and if you could that would be helpful but if you could also just straight out to what extent the contract for each claim is severable independent from the gender i  hope to do that as well with regard to the term of the contract it was stipulated by the parties prior to trial in a joint stipulated description of the case which is in the record as item number seventy eight that she had a written employment contract with mayor unified from july one two thousand through june june thirtieth two thousand to that's the critical date june thirty two thousand and two it is not two thousand and three there are multiple other places in the record where that same contract terminations date or end date can be found it was stated in paragraph fifty thirty rather of defendants a statement of facts on the motion for summary judgment it was admitted by plaintiffs in response to that paragraph of the motions of the of the statement of facts supporting the motion it also has in her o c complaint which she herself signed under penalty of perjury which is in the record in several places one of which is in tab eighty she also states in her declaration supporting the response of the motion for summary judgment which is r fifty seven  that the statements that are made in the response to defendant statement of facts are are true so she's indirectly saying that what defendants have said about the end date of the contract two thousand two is correct but that is stated more expressly in other places as i have already outlined so if we're going to talk about a property interest we have to be certain what the term or duration of that property interest was it ended in june of two thousand and two not two thousand and three so she did not she was not terminated early her contract simply expired and there was a decision made by the board pursuant to statute not dispose of the argument that there is some property interest in continued employment as an administrator but there's there's one very important footnote to drop to that and that is this argument that she if terminated as an administrator was nevertheless still a tenured teacher the first time we hear that argument in this case is in the reply brief that was not an argument that was made before it was not made below it was not argued in the opening  brief whether she has that right or not i don't think we're really here to argue that today but it wasn't the basis of her claim that she had been denied a property interest in violation of one thousand you three yes trial was that  that claim presented to the court that she was still a tenured teacher no i don't believe it was your honor so on those bases she simply does not have a property interest in continued employment at least not one that was ever presented to the lower court and decided and i don't think we ought to be deciding here for the first time today whether in fact she has some right to go back and resume teaching well now if the contract terminated june thirtieth two thousand and two yes the these executive sessions and the things that went on complaining about the two thousand and one two thousand and two school year or was it in the two thousand two thousand and one school year which is what i thought it would be in the old one zero to school year your honor it was april eleventh of two thousand and two because the board needed to things was that in the previous year yet that was previous your honor yes because she had been on leave for some fourteen months i believe i can be more precise she took leave in  november of two thousand and she had been asked to do the evaluation in june of two thousand and while we're talking about that there was a she did submit a plan in response to the directive but the the plan was deemed to be on satisfactory she was simply talking about her accomplishments instead of talking about the things the areas in which she needed to make improvement and where is that a record please if you know i believe that that is compiled in the summary judgment materials this stab number in exhibit number i don't have at my fingertips i think that's fair thank you i have a question though same question i asked your colleague i want to make sure i understand the relationship between the title seven jury trial rejection of the sex discrimination why do we still have to reach all of the other claims that were dismissed on summary judgment  rm the district court then you don't need to reach anything any of the other issues all of her claims the state law claims the section one thousand nine hundred three claims they are all based upon the alleged sex discrimination i know that there's been some argument in the briefs about the accuracy of the statement that i just made they're saying that there's also this hostile environment client but that is part and parcel of the sex describe nation plan it's all the title southern plan this is not a case about sexual harassment it is not about quid pro quo or sexual harassment it's not about a sexually oriented a workplace where there are sexual improprieties misconduct what have you going on it's a question of gender discrimination well this is a very small school district yes they did eventually advertise in higher demand for the job and i guess what in terms of what the jury actually decided on this on the on the gender discrimination what what what what was that the jury decided that there was no discrimination they entered a series of about a dozen special erotic tories analyzing the issue from multiple different directions or angles and answered every one of those questions favorably to the district in mr nelson and the evidentiary ruling that you say he went to whether or not those prior at this those should go before the jury whether whether the other acts should be presented to the jury now the basic problem with with that evidence of other acts is that the evidence was never specified you can't even begin to decide whether the duran test is satisfied without first knowing what the other acts are and we don't know what they really were because what we have is a summary description that there was some someone wasn't someone other woman was mistreated and some other person filed an he got in response to that was basically almost word for word the same as what had been disclosed before that is in the joint pretrial order it can you direct us to a page where we're where judge ample said that y i actually quoted the passages in my briefs and i believe that  it comes from the transcript of the argument on october twenty eighth two thousand and four when the motion in limine the is being argued and we're actually looking for the language where the court asked that plaintiff's counsel state the testimony exactly and i believe that would be a page that i didn't have flagged that they are discussing the issue on october twenty fourth is unable to resolve the issue and you know in fairness to the defense counsel the disclosures about what these these witnesses are and what the exhibits were going to be and what they witnesses were going to say was all coming i understand somewhat belatedly so you know he filed his motion  arguing for the exclusion of this other actually evidence before it had yet been specified and he should be criticized for doing that because it never was specified  discrimination claim i'm remembering this right and that that was one of the one of one of the other bad acts that was excluded against him for doing that but i'll confess that i'm not very conversant with the details of mr cook so that could explain it i was trying to understand how a complaint of mr cook about sex incident is is as on point as perhaps some of the evidence or testimony from the other women who said they were mistreated because they were women i guess if we're talking about evidence of other actions to show mr nelson's motive or intent any of these things might go to that but but we need to know more specifically first what evidence is what testimony is going to be offered and that's where plaintiff fell short your honor judge schroeder it at page fourteen of my grief i see that i'm quoting from judge campbell where he uses the statements the word exactly and requesting that plaintive state exactly what evidence you intend to submit on this issue and i'm citing the transcript of the record of october twenty which i thought was correct and that was a proc with the you had crossed supported by federal law now i wonder if your answer on that my answer is that that claim has never been presented before in this case in the complaint no i don't believe that it is that what i have was argued to the district court that's right and it's not argued to you in the opening brief to my one of those things are true we have precedence on a waiver of contentions or that we don't normally issue would dispose of all issues in this appeal all of the other claims are dependent upon allegations of sex discrimination how  clarification but the property claim that she made in both of the nine hundred eighty three claims that she made were somehow rooted in this allegation of sex discrimination even sex discrimination that rose to the level of creating a hostile work environment so we don't need to argue about whether this is a hostile environment case or not let's just be clear that it's it's not the kind of possible hostile environment involving sexual misconduct only and i don't mean to hundred eighty three property claims and they're very they're very they're they're not specific in referring to her right to continue as a teacher and let me back up to something that i was going to point out earlier there's some confusion in this case and when i was answering your question earlier judge fodor about what happened when the board did not owe her a hearing when it decided not to renew her administrative contract there is some confusion here confusing to statute fifteen fifteen zero three and fifteen five i'm sorry not fifteen zero three five zero three and five thirty nine five thirty nine deals with  terminating a certificate a teacher someone who has tenure the the board here was acting to not renew the contract of an administrator under five zero three they simply had to make that decision before april fifteen and let her know of it by that date that her contract was not going to be renewed the following june and they didn't have to afford her a hearing on that she didn't have a property right in continued cover and i don't see where the argument or claim was ever specifically made that she was denied her employment as a tenured teacher so that she could continue on with that so a couple of points you asked about when the improvement plan occurred and that was in the fall of two thousand and that's important because the terminator in two thousand and two and there's a case in arizona called secure its persons phoenix unified high school district  reach back that far as a cause for terminations the cases when they got to april fifteenth of two thousand and one and had not known renewed or it's as if they considered that and decided it wasn't grounds for termination so after april fifteenth of two thousand one of they wan terminate her for cause they have to find some new misbehavior and since she never returned to work after november of two thousand and there's no there's no good for cause determination they can make her and her contract now with respect to the terms of the contract they stipulated facts tries to trial do say that the written contract has a term that says july two thousand and three june of two thousand and two that's the term written in the contract that's why that's to plate it's a document that's what it says that doesn't relieve the district of the operation of the law on the fifteenth five zero three that says it's automatically renewed when they don't not renew her so it's just that she did not return to work after november of two thousand correct she was on a medical leave from the stress of the situation you should be the burden of the party seeking to slots for i mean that's your argument but if the judge orders a party to specify what evidence do you intend to produce