when you're out a problem bridgeton for the count richard adams there is i think i know you've written briefs in the case i'm not going all the background there is one aspect of the contract issue which i'd period of time and it was through a sort of considerable amount of effort the anticipation was mr castro consistent with his previous history with the fault he was given the opportunity that concept of substantial compliance stansell compliance does not apply when you're talking about a payment of money particularly when you're talking about and we started the sniper case i realized that the state court opinion but it is very similar factually to what we have here when you're talking about an agreement to discount a final judgment we're not talking about of the beauty of the amount or liquidated amount it is an agreement to discount now if there had been a judicial sale and the shortfall had then the five thousand dollars bonaduce will say oh mr castner never did anything that would not be substantial i get to go after your husband who's the rat in this deal and get the rest of it is that what they said yes it is stupid right maybe it is but that's exactly what happened they said that it came up short so he went after the guy for the rest and he let really getting a vine what if he gave the vire under the table five thousand dollars and it came out even everybody would have gone home happy i don't know what happened at the end of the vehicle but the key was they had to get all the money that was  remain do i believe it's in the snow the next last whereas would be somewhere in excess of a million dollars but it was in that it was in a cast there and his wife's control as to what was going to come out of that asteroid correct was under nobody else additional questions that at this time  get eight hundred ninety thousand right go after cast and that's exactly what it says well it allowed different approaches and then allowed a private sale which was not part of the dream and at all parties is there anything in the record of why we're going to go into this and why the very early heels property was tendered when all three properties belonging to kennedy were under execution the settlement was the keep the execution off those other two pro you mentioned and i thought i read that somewhere am i wrong that all three properties that were in kennedy's name whether rightly or not were under execution at the time the settlement with me there are there are new york times that your honor that  know i'm asking the question is in the record were all three of the kennedy properties or her name address occasion at the time judge saying that with the district judges i'm going to figure out what the intent was all you want to say hundred ninety why would you take eight hundred nine thousand dollars when you had three properties under execution and you had just been one point three million why would you do that she did and the trial court should be a firm i take i i want to correct i made a misstatement i don't think necessarily that the proper all three properties were under execution your brief says is that the action was brought for friday to set aside the conventions to mrs kennedy on three properties and declare they were actually chasms property subject community property where so they all would be subject to execution that leads me to my next point if the if the standard of review on of the district court's interpretation agreement is clearly erroneous and if there's nothing in the record about the intent  of keeping off execution not for the other properties and why you went to the beverly hills then do we have any it should be stated we can't get any better than needed and the judge was there so it was unclear your own in other words the fraudulent conveyance might not work cast cast on me still prevailed but i thought i thought i so you get a settlement for eighty nine eight hundred ninety thousand everybody goes home that's like well iraq you're still  yes sure and if there are no further question i'd like to hear one more question because i did confuse a court again and counsel straightening out the settlement agreement actually acknowledges that that agreement should not affect the rights of out and to proceed with the sale of the executed properties in new york litigation receive the proceeds there have been partial satisfaction then when in fact so there was an attempt as i understand if i this agreement to slow down adams proceeding against the new york properties to shift the emphasis to sell the defendant the knife liability and in fact a sort of a counter claim because of the defective product the fact that claiming that disputed amount compromised by the reduced payment with the with an acceleration clause in the event of a fall and then the distinction that is made clear by the shepard case is when you're talking about a judgement which is they've already established