lisa s under section one fifteen dash seven point three the state was allowed to have met evidence of that alleged offense and the subsequent trial the evidence should have been prohibited by collateral gating issue of material fact that has been determined by a valid judgment to protect the defendant from having to run the gauntlet a second time for something he has already been prosecuted for this court has said and people  a lateral stop apply applies and the requirements are met first where the court in the prior judgment rendered a final judgment second where the party in the prior judgment is the same or improving with a part of the same party and the prior judgment and three where there is an issue decided in the prior judgment that is the same as an issue litigated and the subsequent judgment and i'm not a syrian issue full featured here  in council argued that the evidence was too prejudicial to come in so the talk also didn't make the exact argument he did make it based on collateral estoppel but it was on a similar grounds and even if  case we can determine that the issue that was litigated was one of consent the parties at trial they had the transcripts of lisa s case and they say that the only issue that was in dispute was whether or not the sex was consensual and again the united states supreme court says that we have to apply collateral stop with the realistic i'm not in the hyper technical fashion and it says that when you can tell when you can look on the record and you can tell what issue particular in particular was determin that is when collateral estoppel applies and in this case we can till we can tell that there was only one issue in dispute and that issue was litigated in favor of our client and so collateral stoppel says that particular issue cannot be related related ga theory of accountability for the crime against nature against the same complainant on the same date the defendant was acquitted of the rape charge and particularly one of the rape charges was for statutory rape meaning the only fact necessary to prove guilt was to show that there was intercourse and so this court held that the station had been a stopped from introducing evidence at the subsequent trial that the defendant had and of course with the complainant because the widow amounted to a determination by the jury that the defendant did not have intercourse with the complaining the same analysis applies in this case and lisa as this case more did not come contest that the sexual encounter but he asserted that it was consensual all that's not one of the three requirements that it has to be the same exact transaction it just has to be the issue that was litigated in the first trial that cannot be really related to begin and here that is what we have we have the same issue being brought in that he already ran the gauntlet for and was acquitted and is being litigated again in the subsequent trial in affirming wards conviction the appellate court completely ignored here and did not mention it or addressed it at all  held in the state also contends that collateral estoppel doesn't apply because the other crimes evidence in the i think case was governed by a lower standard of proof however to be clear the only standard that the jury has given it in illinois is one standard and that is to judge all of the evidence by proof beyond a reasonable doubt the jury is not given a separate struction by which to govern part of the evidence you know the other crimes that this for example they're given want to structure and that's two point zero three and that is that the presumption of innocence is not and i quote overcome unless from all of the evidence in this case you are convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that he is guilty so then attraction makes no  other standard that the jury is supposed to go to go governed be other crimes evidence by the same practice come using the judge's standards of admissibility with the jury's standard of proof that they used to assess the evidence the case is that the state aside it being bowled huddleston and even donahoe those cases address the standards that the judge uses to determine whether or not the evidence is that miscible to begin with it does not discuss the standard of proof that the jury uses once the evidence is in to assess issues of guilt innocence the state was welcome to use the evidence for example at the sentencing hearing where the standard of proof is lower jackson and now tell us that people rejected people being now that where this where the standard is lower the evidence can't come in and so those types of cases will be distinguishable and those are the cases that the appellate court cited for this position but here we had two criminal trials lisa s of proof was the same for both juries and that was proved beyond a reasonable doubt there was no other standard given instructed or anything like that so the standards are the same here this is different from people who jackson people be now where the evidence is being used at a sentencing hearing or at a determine that were already litigated in his favor in this prior case doesn't have to be the ultimate ultimate fact that would be a double jeopardy claim and we were saying he was this this is the ultimate fact in this case and he's being tried for the same thing again we'd have a pure double jeopardy  they're different the issue that was decided in the first case was whether or not mort sexually assaulted lisa s the jury in the mabel em's case was asked to determine that very same fact when that when that evidence was that made it to show his propensity they were given an instruction that they were to again determine whether or not they believe he committed the offense against lisa s and to determine what weight they want to give that evidence in regards to any propensity that he might have to commit sexual offenses so that issue was brought in so the mabel him strong and the jury is instructed to consider that offense and determine if they believe it happened and what weight they want to give and we're saying that that evidence should not be related gave it in the subsequent trial acquitted up your honor is aside from collateral estoppel there's nothing in the statute itself that indicates that the statute was intended to admit acquitted offenses as it did in this case if we just look at the pla language of the statute says under section one fifteen there are seven point three that evidence of the defendants and i hope commission of another offense in quo is that miserable to show a defendant's propensity to commit sexual offenses so someone who has been acquitted by law as it has not committed to an offense is virtually what what we're saying here is that twelve jurors have decided that that person is not guilty of committing an offense so how does that show evidence of a commission of an  the plain language i'm saying that the legislative history supports supports this interpretation as well when we look at what the comments were when enacting this new law that derogated the common law ban on propensity evidence senator  redondo he said that the statute was intended to protect society against sex offenders repeat offenders people like that and so by a lot mr war he had no sex convictions he was not a repeat offender he does not fall into that category that the statue was intended to target and also there are some other comments that that suggest that one charge just dances were also intended to fall within the purview of the statute not to put offenses but not charged offenses and the logic behind that was the commas were such that they want to give women an opportunity to come in who might have been fearful to come in at a prior time on their own but they would come in to corroborate someone else's testimony or whatever under either scenario though acquitted offense would not fall within that purview because if you have a situation where someone was scared to come forward and then they come forward at a subsequent subsequent trying to corral borate another person's testimony in our situation lisa as had her day in court she did come forward she did present her case the state prosecuted that case and the jury found him not guilty so we don't have the same concern that there's somebody out there who was scared to come forward so when we look at a hall and wh well i mean if the case is say that they don't pull does not mean that the person is innocent i can't say that acquittal means that someone is innocent but what it does say is is equally important and i think that in finding the statute that the legislature understood that which is why it wasn't included which is why they base that that is for sex offenders which doesn't apply to include people who have no convictions and why they said it's for you know people a situation where there is an unchartered offense where the person was scared to come forward i think that they understood the significance of an acquittal and did not intend to have the situation occur that occurred in mr ward's case finally if there be any ambiguity at all in the statute statutes such as one fifteen t limitations of the session we're trying to figure out what are the limitations in regards to acquit offenses and i think you have to look at the statute itself to determine that it's very much so intertwined with this issue in general and whether or not that i have been should have been precluded by collateral stop or whether or not that evidence is just precluded by the statue itself they both are trying to address the same thing we're just trying to understand what are the limits of the statue in a situation like we have now where someone has been acquitted of an offe at a minimum your honor if the evidence was allowable under the statute and if the evidence was not precluded by collateral stop then at the very least fundamental fairness requires that the jury be informed that mr ward had been acquitted of  as it stood the state got all the advantages they were allowed to present the evidence and then allowed to parse out the parts of the evidence that were unfavorable to them by preventing the jury from knowing that ward had been acquitted in the in the other fans as jury was left to speculate whether or not he was convicted of that offense or whether or not that the charges pending and he would be convicted in the future when all along he had been acquitted and the jury never knew this and it also denied the jury the benefit of public of evidence that it needed to weigh this other crimes evidence the jury was given instruction three point three point fourteen and they were told that they needed to wait that other crimes that is the term of what what the wait was that they want to give to it well and acquittal if they knew that he was acquitted of that fairness requires that the that the jury be told that the defendant is of been acquitted of the offense and the other crimes evidence and even the united states supreme court and down versus united states is that among the reasons why the admission of the other crimes evidence in that case did not violate fundamental fairness is because the jury was instructed that the defendant was acquitted the jury was actually instructed twice and united states supreme court mission that that's one of the reasons just like the fact of a prior conviction would not be rendered hearsay moreover it could be admitted under the illinois business records exception to the hearsay rule even the the case is that the state cites for this proposition that that an a is hearsay those are some federal some federal courts and there is a split in the federal circuit some courts follow that will some don't but here in illinois that the issue is the side it says is required  so there's really no reason for us to look to the federal courts for any guidance on that issue sorry for the foregoing reasons i asked this court reverse defendant's argument in his reply brief an evidentiary use of facts is very different than the ultimate use of facts those facts ultimate use of facts are facts that have to be proven beyond a reasonable doubt and this is a down one case it's not an asher trial he was acquitted the government used the v to henry case in the dowling a bank robbery case and the court specifically the united states supreme court said there's no ash issue here there's no ultimate use  fact this these facts are used to even if the jury didn't believe beyond a reasonable doubt that he committed the home invasion of mrs vina henry that still could be used because the evidence or use of facts is a lesser standard and so not every link in the chain of evidence needs to satisfy that ultimate issue effect so this is clearly a down case it home court exactly got this correct it's not ash in her hand it's not two issues the easiest case to identify ashes that six poker players and the government tries them on the first poker player identifications the issue there's an acquittal so the government tries him on the second poker player well identification was the ultimate issue in the first case you can't raise it again here clearly stop from from using it again or it is very similar in that there's a single sexual penetration single transaction same victim two different indictments as the defendant pointed out in her argument the reap indictment had a statutory rape and therefore sexual penetration was the only contested issue when that case resulted in an acquittal the government then use the second indictment to charge the crime against nature against the three jobs john connally john kerry and john moore the two were and how many were found guilty of the rape korean was not so when they use the sexual penetration as direct evidence of his participation in aiding and abetting the crime against nature that  here because this argument is entirely forfeited but there's nothing in the plain language of the statute that would limit to cases that have been proved beyond a reasonable doubt there's nothing that the statutory legislative intent would limit that that evidence in fact what it would do if there was some sort of acquittal bar is essentially encourage the use of the statue only in cases where victims have never come forward but not in cases where victims sought to come forward and have their cases considered because a prosecutor might say in a close calls that you know it's case or in a case where it was a nontraditional case you know what if i if we move forward in this case and we're not successful i can't use your evidence all basically there legislature intended at the end of the day with regard to this question i point out to the court that evidentiary rulings are always discretionary in nature and the real question here is to the court abuse discretion in deciding to allow the evidence defendant would have this court right a rule that says in fundamental fairness always requires disclosure to the jury of their but to draw that line requires a trial judge to balance what is probably admissible to avoid unfairness and at the same time doesn't invade the province of the jury in this case that's exactly what judge two men did and a number of courts examine this issue this is not unique i  cited i think the the first the second the fifth the seventh the tenth and the eleventh circuit's on the federal law who all have decided it's a matter of discretion in the trial court many many states have looked at this and the overwhelming majority of states have decided it's a matter of the discretion of the trial court in this in the federal courts the general consensus is that it's irrelevant that it's misleading that it introduces a high probability of jury confusion it's not even proper impeachment you take a single witness who's talking about their experience and there at the hands of the defendant and you measure that against all of the evidence in a given case and the hearsay view of jurors who are not present and evidence that is not present before the court federal courts say that's not proper impeachment and ultimately they find it to be hearsay now see courts analyze their cases based on their statutes in their case law but state courts overwhelmingly also find it to be a matter of discretion bright line rules do not work very well in every country decisions when does it come in and there are a couple cases couple types of cases that it does come in and i went through in my brief very carefully the types of cases so that this court could see the analysis it comes and in fairness when there is some sort of government stamp or imprimatur on the evidence that suggests and leads the inference that somehow defendant was convicted and that's not true and so to finish that information at times that information will come in front so how does it work well in the kidney case that's the two thousand and eight supreme court of colorado case in the king case there were a sexual assault there were two prior sexual assaults that had resulted in acquittals and he who looked at the evidence in that case twenty five times there were rougher and says to the prior proceedings there were a lengthy impeachment exchanges with the prior transcripts there were discussion of search warrants in other cases obviously the jury inferred that there were other proceedings and the jury even asked for the trial transcripts and that basis disclosure should have made me now the defendant says that and that's exactly what he did but these are separate crimes separate purposes again separate victims with separate motivations the extensive evidence of the arson came in is in the murder case and this court said there's no proper purpose for this evidence is not only extensive an overwhelming there's no purpose for this evidence and so it was a fundamental reversible error well but boy if you'll recall is that case where the milwaukee police officer or his partner came to chicago murder and these firearm offenses along with how much his partner and at first trial there was issues with regard to the murder so it had to be reversed on a self defense issue but with the way it was acquitted of those firearms offenses and then in the meantime cotch pled guilty to the firearms offenses and decided he would testify against but a way out and what happened is that in this trial that justice wilson author of the opinion in the in the retrial there were seven witnesses and twenty seven exhibits about this building shooting spree and justice watson wanted to make the point that this is a lingering case there really was no proper purpose except when the defense counsel said to punch about the building shooting scuffs the partner about the building shootings did you shoot the buildings up and he said no and defense counsel said to him well then why did you plead guilty to aggravated discharge of a firearm and patches the answer was by accountability well when you have someone sitting up there and says i pled by accountability the jury is going to look at the only other person involved in the case and go with the implication must be who is the shooter in that type of scenario fairness to kate's the jury be told and and that's what it's all about it's all about fairness it's all about trial courts making that decision it is all about the discretion of the trial court and there are courts that allow it there are courts that don't allow it and again its effect by fact on my kidney or by doing with a jury was overwhelmed with these references to warrants charges proceedings the criminal justice process here judge to ensure that the jury was never informed of any criminal justice process at all and that's the better practice the scope the breadth of the testimony limited judged him and said there's d n a evidence linking these cases you don't need it don't bring it in the state did not bring it in because defend it was claiming consent he was not claiming identification he had the testimony focused and illuminated on the limited purpose for which that testimony is admitted here the lack of innocent intent claiming these women are prostitutes and paying a nominal fees to have sex with me limiting instructions the court not only gave the looming instruction before ls testified even after ellis testified he gave it again before the jury deliberated and it was reinforced by the prosecutor in this case that said we cannot find the jury guilty ask you to find defending guilty of sexually assaulting m m because you believe what he did tell us that would be improper so the jury was specifically told and i would point out in boudoir there were no  instructions seven witnesses twenty seven exhibits not one single limiting instruction the jury was free to consider that evidence for whatever here judged him and kept the focus very narrow the focus was on and what happened to her the behavior the character of the pound the experience that alice had that was the limited testimony that came in as other crimes evidence it's for you to determine whether this crime occurred with regard to ls and also what w give it clearly there was a single fleeting reference to some prior to you testify prior the defendant when he asked if she knew how to dress for court if she had come on her own if the prosecutor prepared her that single fleeting reference is not sufficient to had the transcripts of the proceedings and it is well within the discretion of the court to keep the court justice process entirely in focus the jury on evaluating the credibility of the witness that's just before it and the credibility of the state criminal sexual assault thank you  terminations that he wasn't one of the people that entered henry's house meaning he wasn't able to show that the issue decided there was identity collateral stoppel only applies when you're able to narrow it down and tell what the mc what the determination w confusing or that it would be irrelevant to tell the jury about the acquittal but it would be fair it would be fair and it's almost as though the state is arguing that the acquittal has no significance that it means nothing that i insignificant when the united states supreme court has always held that it is very significant and has a lot of weight and it should be accorded that even to mr war no protection under the fifth amendment prohibitions of the double jeopardy clause and even when the evidence is that minute against him he cannot inform the jury of his acquittal is a double standard in which the state gets all the advantages and it is inconsistent with notions