company that supplied marine fuel known as bunkers to the boat giuliana panamanian flagged vessel in singapore by using a singapore subcontractor name trans ocean and what the district court held in this case was that the plaintiff's right to a maritime lino to united states law was controlled by the choice of u s law clause in the plaintiff's contract with the german time charter of the vassal we believe that was wrong for a number of reasons of course been very heavily briefed i can't possibly address everything that has been addressed in the briefs so  on i want to point out that there's no evidence in the record either the vessel or the vessel owner knew that this plane of had any involvement whatsoever in the supply of these bunkers briefs and the reason it's important your honor is because they would want to argue that under singapore law we had access to or knew about their general terms and conditions and on that basis they could enforce those terms and conditions against us the vessel owner and the vessel and ram and i make that point simply to point out that without having any knowledge that they were even info in the transaction how could we access their terms and conditions how could we know what contractual terms w world fuel services was in attempting to impose on a transaction we didn't even know supplied it we possibly could but i'm simply addressing their contention that we somehow had knowledge of or access to the terms and conditions that they're trying to enforce against us and it is i think important i do agree with you judge jones that even if we knew they were involved we would still be making the same argument that singapore law controls this issue but i'm simply addressing what they have said singapore here we have a situation where they are now trying to enforce a contractual provision choice of law provision against a non party to the contract because the vessels owner in the vessel itself were not parties to the contract and so what we're dealing with here is a situation similar to what this court addressed in the gulf trading vs whole shield case judge brown's decision in which he specifically made a very specific point to distinguish the fuel suppliers right to a maritime lien from the contract between the fuel supplier and the charter and what the the import of that decision is the right to a mar counteracted not have a choice of law clause that is true but there are also some very important distinctions between the queen of the mind case and the whole shield case and also in this case one of which was the contract at issue in the queen of the mind case was entered into by the vessels over well as the prior owner of the vessel it was the prior art and the new owner claimed he didn't have notice of the prior contract right correct  the court rejected that well but for it mistaken because the claimant in that case had purchased the vessel from the prior owner and therefore acquired the prior owner's rights in the vas contract issue in that case that had the choice of law clause that gave rise to the lane was entered into by the vessel's owner so in that case you didn't have the concern of a party to the contract encumbering the property of someone who was not a party to the contract which is an issue here i mean and again if you're still focusing on the question whether your client and notice or not i mean the  e the district court seems to handle that as a matter of singapore law right which you didn't contest at the district what we said about the singapore law at the district court is the district court's findings don't go far enough or his analysis of singapore law does not go far enough because what the cases from singapore them are in the record and what the opinion said was that a the incorporated document is incorporated into the contract as between the parties to the contract and says then more never descended or objected to the applicability of the general terms properly incorporated by reference well that's done mark that's that's correct and done i was the time chartered daimler does not have a proprietary interest in the vessel and so what what we said is there was no evidence that under singapore law the parties to the contract couldn't convert the property of a non party to the contract now we know in the us law you can't do that so the presumption is that singapore law is the same there was no evidence in the singapore law parties to a contract can enforce that contract against not a part that's what's happening here again that's not generally allowed under u law so the presumption is that it's the same under singapore low so there is no evidence to establish that the plaintiff and denmark through their contract could impose simple law that a time charter or when ordering supplies can alter the legal regime that applies to that or so for instance under the federal maritime lien act in this country the charter a clearly has authority to procure necessaries for the vessel we don't dispute that we don't doubt that that's also true under singapore law the charter and so what we believe the district court erred in doing is it's one thing to say that a charter and order supplies can procure necessary such as bunkers and thereby u s law applicable in a situation where it otherwise would not be and especially where the effect of that is to encumber the vessel with a maritime lien that would not otherwise exist in the absence of the contract and so again we'll go back to what i mean because for that you know to put this in a slightly broader context mr tanner testified that this is a very standard term and condition and all of the  so a vessel owner is you know presumed to be knowledgeable about a how vessels get fuel around the world singapore being one of the most important ports and therefore it's not a stretch for someone in singapore clauses are common in this industry now we can see more cases coming out of it but there's no evidence that says you should anticipate when you order bunkers in singapore that the suppliers terms and conditions are going to call for the application of us law so i don't believe there's anything that would support that conclusion in the record but again i keep going back to hoshi old and the differences between hoshi old and the liverpool in london versus queen of law mind case because the owner in the queen of the mine case had entered into the contract that contain the choice of walk last so again there's no there's no concern about somebody encountering the vessel of a third party who was not involved in the contract is not there was no concern in that case about enforcing the contract against someone who is not a party to the contract now yes it was a question becomes whether the choice of law clause adequately incorporated the federal maritime law and it's our position that it did not it specified the general maritime law general maritime law this court the supreme court have specifically recognized it is the stating from federal statutory law you have a judge make common law which is the general maritime law and then you have a separate body of maritime statutes maritime lien act obviously  general merits on remedies have to conform to federal statutory romany's where there's that overlap that's different than saying if you designate a general maritime law you're also polling in federal statutes whether they have the right to rely on it or not does not make it correct it's it's a different animal they have and it's true that decision came out when it was after these bunkers were supplied i believe i think the district court decision came out in two thousand and thirteen these bunkers were supplied two thousand and twelve home but whether it's correct or not is really the issue a we disagreed with judge davis good morning your honor john with jane olson and fay on behalf of world fuel services i guess i would respond initially that we believe that all of the issues that both giuliani has raised are addressed in two very simple sources the case that the judge jones referred to and the focus on the fact that the in persona my own or did not have knowledge of this contract a couple of things on on that issue ship owners get balanced by these maritime liens all the time without having any knowledge and that's the gist and that's the basis behind the lean statute to begin with the names are silent  and and most times they the owner is is not knowing about them the vessel is charter to a charter like denmark in this case and under the charter party with respect to fuel the owner requires the charter to buy to buy the fuel for the vessel and under the lien statute the charter has the ability to bind the vessel this contract was clearly known to denmark and denmark clearly in this case had the ability to bind the vessel the vessel of course being a completely separate entity from her owner  absolutely and in the the singapore law expert whose declaration we submitted in connection with the motion went through in detail what a singapore what would happen under singapore law if this case were decided under singapore law and that was that the singapore court would look at singapore law to determine the scope of the contract essentially the issues related to the formulation of the contract and then once they reached a decision on the formulation and the scope they would see ok this contract has a choice of law provision in it and so the second step would be an analysis of whether under singapore law that choice of law provision was valid the singapore lawyer commented on that in his declaration and judge gilman consider that evidence in reaching his decision now the old juliana did not submit any evidence on singapore law and we don't quite know why judge feldman chose that tactic say because of course there are one of two ways to skin the cat here the first judge filming could have just looked at the queen of the mind case and said ok we we we have a contract for the supply of bunkers to a ship that contract has a choice of law provision and it of law provision says u s law actually was the choice of law provision in the queen of the mine case was a little more complicated because it was actually two choice of law clauses it was a broad general speaking english law to apply to this insurance contract and then secondarily there was a specific carve out to that choice of law calling for the application of u law in the context of obtaining a lien to secure the payment of the insurance premiums under the policy so that the the new owner as judge jones pointed out the new owner of the vessel in the queen of the mind case made the very same argument that council here is making namely hate i wasn't a party to that insurance contract that the prior owner had and quite frankly it doesn't seem to make any difference the fact that as as mr slawson characterized the success of the owner as a successor in interest the plain fact is that entity who purchased this vessel in good faith had absolutely no knowledge of the delinquency or the failure to pay the insurance premiums or the fact that there was a lien on the vessel he was light like the purported owner here he just didn't know and when the queen i'm on court here said it doesn't matter to sue except that argument would basically throw the lien statute on it's on its head because those liens arise all the time without the vessel owners knowing about well but there are there not enforceable in every country in the law other than the provision in the contract now judge feldman also as a footnote with said something to the effect of ice every respectfully disagree with professor davis is that is what stat about of impacting one's property who is not a party to transactional data that's generally the law well that that's exactly the point and he also disagrees with the second circuit in rainbow distinguishable in the fact that that involved a a charter party dispute and while there is case law indicating that a breach of a charter party gives rise to a maritime lien it's different in this case where the contract the subject of the contract are the providing of necessary because in the us there is a public policy decision made by the legislature that we are going to make it easy for suppliers of necessaries to secure the payment of their goods and services and so people in certain entities are presumed to have a vessels whether the owners know about the services purchased or the goods purchased or not if they are necessaries ordered by one with a thought or presumed authority like the charter then the l the lane arises and can be enforced to secure the payment it's a new doll so take that you know with regard to this question of what the general maritime law reference and compass is it says to be precise the contract says the general maritime law of the us shall apply with respect to the existence of a maritime lien so to the extent that there was ambiguity about general what davis's analysis and description of of whether general maritime law includes statutory law is is right on point i mean the evolution of maritime lien law has been initially it was it was a mess and there were there parties with with allegedly and were were were making claims under various state statute well both it was actually both if you read the cases that are cited in the in the briefs that talk about the history of maritime l court opinion that judge feldman relied on i mean i very much think that there should be something you have an interest in that case well we we do and we think it it simply supports the position that world fuel is taking here but as a supplier in order to facilitate these ship owners and their ships and in commerce cha suppliers like this need the benefit need to be able to protect their ability to get paid also added to the point would we be essentially creating a circuit conflict if we failed to go along with the fourth circuit in interpret in the consequences of a very similar prevention i think another very there would be a a conflict not only with that decision in the fourth circuit but also with the court's decision in in this circuit oh i know i'm on that that's just that's a this interest circuit which theoretically we can resolve it you know we can just say we don't agree but if we conflict with the fourth circuit on virtually identical language that means that you can enforce a lawyer lean in the port of new orleans but you can tick enforce it in you know virginia that would be a consistent with what discord said in the who shield case wade the supplies are provided pursue to contract the vessels owner is not a party to you don't look at the law governing the contract to determine whether a lien exists you apply the choice of law factors that were discussed in the hope of shield case and it's important to recognize that when judge brown did the choice of law analysis in home shield he did not look to choice of law factors governing claims for breach of contract he went beyond that recognizing there was no choice got caught up in my own job oh and what about my what about my point about circuit conflicts circuit conflicts sometimes are inevitable to reach the right result well you know the procedure in this court is that before we create a circuit conflict we have to priests or kill eight in opinion throughout to the entire court and and get approval so that a bit of a mechanical problem and in many cases we will say there is the rule of president sort of it does you know we can agree or disagree with the fourth circuit but for the sake of commerce why not just have a rule rather than hope that the supreme court would take up and resolve this kind of bite if well it will never get to the supreme court probably less there's a conflict that's that's one consideration to be given but but would just have to never dock in the fifth circuit again and since you've got two of the largest ports in the united states here that would be pretty silly thing one well it's i would look at it beyond just this one vessel we've already posted security i fundamental distinctions between the queen of lamont situation and this case which we've discussed and also the distinctions between queen of lemont and hoshi it and we can emphasize  how critical it is to acknowledge that and in this case just like in the home she'll case the vessels owner was not a party to the contract that is there they are arguing is the source of their right to a marathon lead we think that is a fundamental difference where you're talking about a choice of law clause the effect of which is effectively to encumber the vessel with a lien that would not arise in the absence of the united states the only country that has a federal maritime million like loan like this one like i believe france is the only one with a comparable statute i know there are other countries that do award liens for necessaries i don't know the details it's a minority of the maritime countries the majority of the maritime nations do not provide a marathon lead for necessary so what so i bet you it would be quite common for full fuel suppliers around the world to have american choice of law and merits implied contract it may well be but there's no evidence to suggest that suggests there's no i haven't the only contract we have in this case is we exploring the consequences of the decision that well again i would urge your honour's to consider the rule that you cannot in coming to contracting parties cannot incomer the property of a third party and you cannot generally enforce contractual provisions against known parties to the contrary and i'll leave it at that thank you very thank you sir that concludes arguments before this panel so this town stands