sentencing the only question is who should police that credit the circuit court or the department of corrections we are here to urge that the circuit court is the one responsible for policing that credit for four reasons first the statute makes it clear the general assembly intended for the trial court to have bad john second the circuit court is in a better position to police discredit third the best way to resolve ambiguities that exist now without creating new in consistenc from the defendant's arrest through his state sentencing and that the department correction should be responsible for crediting the day after sentencing and every day thereafter so first section five eighty seven b of the sentencing code calls trial court may give credit to the defendant for time spent home detention etc etc so when the second sentence has the trial court as the actor it's understood that the first sentence even though it is written in the pas voice so the offender is receiving the action the trial court is really still the actor in that sense as well if the defendant's not held and test before sentencing is the day is sentencing counted as a part of the sentence been in there for sentencing well your honor i would i would assume that let's say bond is revoked after the sentence is is it entered but then yes that would be you know if he's not free to leave at that point in time that that would be a day that would be credited as a pre sentence day although there's no question in this case i mean that regardless the defendant does get credit for that yes he  just has an ease of administration that wouldn't necessarily exist in other cases you know in every case you're going to know when to defend sentencing day yes so the department of corrections would would know would be able to presume that this the state's already been taken care of and circuit courts would know to take care of it so yes there's a practical application benefit to the rule that we seek but the real board thing is that we make a rule one reasonable to to presume that that's what they meant otherwise you would have to believe that somehow the legislature intended for the deal see to be the actor only for the day of sentencing in the first part of five eight seventy and then somehow for all the other days of the trial court would be the actor but the on the stand shoot itself we believe that the circuit court is in a better position to credit this they have sentencing for three reasons first of all sentencing is a judicial  function sentences must be certain by the time they get to the department of correction so that they can be applied without resort to supplement so that deal c doesn't have to go looking around doing its own investigations to find out how much pre sentence credit a person gets even the directives that the state attaches to its brief indicate that the department of corrections when in doubt looks to the circuit court and to the measurements to see how much credit is suppose to to grant that's in appendix b paragraph two e one moreover this calculation despite the state's argument is not merely an administrative function if it were it's hard to understand why five eight seven be the part that judicial function we also argue that this state since in credit is not discretionary most of the credit that the department of corrections is charged with policing is discretionary credit it's credit based on you know good good conduct or whether somebody is completing a ged different things that take place there and you know we are constantly in the position of telling our clients you know your good time was taken away there's nothing we can do about that that's in the o c's hands this is a different situation this is not discretionary credit this is mandatory credit and it is not dependent on something that happens in the future at the time of sentencing everything that you need to know to  grant the stay is already there so they could see the third point which is that the circuit court at the time of sentencing already has all that it needs to go ahead and credit the stay so that whatever happens in the future that day is taken care of so there's a stand shoot there's the fact that the court is in the best position to grant this credit third we argue that the best way to apply this creditor to guard this credit consistently throughout would say well the department corrections will take care of that the department of corrections could just not credit it and you know in some cases it's going to be litigated it could end up in the supreme court and other cases people may not take an appeal  somebody may be sentenced on a misdemeanor case say to the county custody and never even be in department corrections custody for this credit to be dealt with  is it appropriate for us to consider ideas you regulations where you are first of all we don't we don't the word regulations are something that we take issue with we don't believe that these are regulations if you're referring to the ones attached to the state's  let me go ahead and talk about those and i'll come back to this point if that's ok on the administrative directives first of all we don't believe that they're judicially noticeable you know these are not common knowledge but not facts capable of the media and accurate demonstration by resort to an easily accessible source of indisputable accuracy you know we don't know necessarily where these directors were located we don't know why what process they were created we don't know how consistently they're applying we don't know whether they'll be in effect tomorrow and frankly we don't know that they're in effect today we certainly don't know they will still be in effect at the time that mr williams gets out in two thousand and twelve  so we don't believe that these are traditionally noticeable however if the court wants to notice them we still would argue that justice garments point these were not properly promulgated rules because they did not go through notice and comment procedures they were not in the only register you know these are not the types of rules and regulations that this court would typically defer to the state mentions in this brief that this court should defer to these strict is almost as a judicial decision because they are a reasonable construction of an ambiguous legislative provision and contemporaneous consistent long continued and in concurrence with legislative acquiescence but we disagree with all those points i'm sure not surprisingly first of all the statute as as i mentioned is not ambiguous and if it is these directives certainly don't make it any more clear second  another sentence but and which was not created to another sentence is not in the stance you and this court has already decided in people versus robinson but that's a limiting condition it's not going to read into that statue so these directives are not a correct statement of the law and that would lead us to wonder whether they're correct statement of any other parts of the wall or whether they're maybe not even still in effect besides that there's no indication that these directives work contemporaneous with section five respectively there's been no showing that these directives are in effect now or certainly but they'll be in effect in the future when mr wade just thinking about getting out and there's been no showing that there's a lot of legislative acquiescence in this i said i'm not clear where they came from or how they were located i was unable to locate them when i was preparing my opening brief so you know i don't think this is something that we can presume that the general assembly is aware of and has sort of signed off on by default but even the directives are judicially noticeable even if they are rules we still have problems with them because they never explicitly say that is partly corrections credits  a has a question and we believe that's the appropriate place for the state of sensing credit but perhaps most importantly about these directives is the fact that if this court issues the rule that we seek there's going to be any risk of double credit circuit courts are going to be on notice they have to give the credit for the sentencing day department of corrections will know hey this is a circuit court's job we're not in the position to be messing with this day so you rule people are going to be on notice and we obviously believe our rule is the better rule for the other reasons i discuss but yes on that point and that's why either way i feel like the double credit presumption or situation is sort of a red herring nobody's here c is in charge of the sentencing day and all day staring after that would create a new conflict that didn't exist before with section one ten fourteen of the code of criminal procedure which provides a five dollar per diem for defendants any day in which a defendant spent part of that day in custody which includes the sentencing day so our rule the day of sentencing credit is department of corrections responsibility would mean that going for circuit days credit does he get for per diem purposes against this fine and again you know it's it may seem like just adding it up but the amanda litigation on these credit issues generally would seem to indicate that the simple rule is going to be better because the more complicated it gets the more calculations have to be performed the more room there is for error and result with a geisha the rule mr williams is here to proffer is clear it's consistent it's easily there's no question as defendant acknowledges that he is entitled to credit for time spent in custody as a result of the offense for which the sentence was imposed and no question before this court today is how does the defendant get credit is the mechanism by which the circuit court transfers legal custody of the up under to the department and based on the information that the department receives from the circuit court regarding the actual sentence impose under section five eight five which addresses the duty of the circuit court after the circuit court pronounce a sentence the court renders judgment and then is duty bound to commit the defendant to the custody of the sheriff or the department of corrections that judgment is embodied in the minima so order of commitment the minister order of commitment transfers authority from the circuit court to number two under section five eight seven two things happen a sentence of imprisonment begins and the date that the defendant is received by the department and our position is that that is the date that he is legally received by the department and then of course the defendant shall be great given credit for the time spent in custody as a result of the offense for which he was sentenced and the third provision of the uniform code talks about the responsibilities of of the department itself under section three six three the department is is mandated to calculate the dependents early release state regarding administrative directives why are they properly before the court what they do is provide authority for the fact that the appellate courts have already acknowledge that is namely to pass rules and regulations to calculate the early release of prisoners an account of their good conduct as quickly as again as prescribed by statute or statutory mandate section three six three and five a seven b the department must calculate credits to ensure that the defendant gets credit for every single day he spends in custody in this case and as a matter of fact that not only includes pre sentence credit which ambiguity however if you look at all the statutory provisions together they may make it clear that the first day the defendant passes into the custody of the department legally whether he is there physically or not he may still be in county jail or another county's jail it doesn't matter legal custody passes with the document that is called the middlemiss or the order of commitment and with fact with that document  date of imprisonment and they subtract the whole jail credits as provided by the circuit court from that date to arrive at a new custody date and then from that new custody date the jail i mean the the department then adds the six year sentence says in this case to come up with with the projected out date and then of course during those six years depending on how much time to find it actually gets in good  credit he he will be released in the department's discretion uniform code does not support the defendant suggested policy scheme the defendant cannot point to any say action that requires the circuit court to award credit for the day of sentencing as a matter of fact to award credit for that day what defendant wants to do in this case is essentially to rewrite the statute to guard against the possibility that the department will not credit him with the day the middlemiss issues he wants to replace the custodial credits scheme with what he considers a better policy with no statutory support for his claim however the department we know the department follows its administrative directives that  as they're required to count the day custody transfers from the court to the department as day one of imprisonment furthermore neither in this case nor in any other case the defendant has cited in and defendant has always gotten credit for that first day now at this point the defendant has made an artificial argument that perhaps it should be the circuit court who grants him credit for that day the defendant does not dispute that the legal custody over over the offender in fact all of the cases that defendant has cited both for and against this position all assume that the department gives credit for the defendant's first day of legal custody in the department defendant's five dollar priddy i'm analogy really has no merit in this case we are basically talking about apples and oranges if you look closely at the statute that addresses the five dollars for d m one ten dash fourteen a  it provides that any person who is incarcerated on a bailable offense who does not supply bail and against whom is for a fine is levied on conviction of such offense shall be allowed a credit of five dollars per day so incarcerated upon his application the purpose of that statute is to ensure that the defendant is not punished for his inability to make bail so once bail was revoked at the time of conviction old the entire argument that the defense has presented address is a different time period and then the pre and post sentencing credit that we are addressing in this case furthermore the defendant has not or cannot establish that his policy reasons are valid to change what is already in practice in place and supported by statute the whole purpose of correcting a minimum is for the minimum two hundred eighty days a defendant once in this case is to ensure that the offender is given the proper credit for each day he serves in custody as a result of the offense for which he was sentance a defendant has the right to have his middlemost corrected if  receive proper credit for every single day he spends in custody as a result of that offense but in this case the defendant has shown no injury and he is not entitled to a correction of the  gotten the day whether it's the last whether the day he was sentenced for which is the first day of his commitment to the department of corrections he has received credit for that day it does not entitle him to additional credit of one day because he was also sentenced on one day your honor is in conclusion for these reasons and the reasons for violating their brief the people respectfully ask this court to recheck the defendant's arguments and to affirm the  decision thank you thank you arse just briefly i want to obviously touch on some of these points counsel said that the department begins crediting counting credit on the day that it receives legal custody of the defendant and you know it said this also that the state said this and the brief that well it just follows as the night the day that if that's the first day of his sentence then they're going to credit him with that sentence but it doesn't follow and you know he's dead and the fender is going to spend part of his sentencing day in circuit court custody so you know i meant point obviously we say for other reasons the rule we seek is a superior rule but on this point to say well this is the first day of his sentence was also the last day of his pre sentence custody when he's in the you know under the jurisdiction of the circuit court the rule or a rule that the minimus is what sort of triggers the department of corrections to start counseling this custody we believe would only lead to more confusion and more ambiguity suppose for instance the middlemiss were stayed for a certain amount of time sometimes that happens just somebody is going to sick mother somebody wants to say a last farewell to their kid's ok final statement for a week what happens then in between time what happens if a defendant's going to be extradited to iowa or to indiana to stand charges someplace else after a conviction in illinois what happens if there's going to be another prosecution in a simple rule is this is the day he was sentenced the circuit court has already taken care of the state department corrections you don't need to worry about it everything after that is a different story and the stage is repeated again as it said in a spr let's get in the car we're going to the department corrections as soon as the gavel comes down these are things that take time and that's why we believe the state of sentencing is a good marker council also said the department corrections is the final arbiter of credit that it grants and we believe that's one of the problems that the o c is not the arbiter of this is not in the mistreated right this is not an administrative situation but it defendant should have to appeal to an administrative body to get a remedy for this is a statutory right this is a legal right that he has that should be guarded by the judiciary we disagree that there's anything that that section three six three of the sentencing code has to say about this you know its brief along with these directives to show well this is what the department of corrections uses to make these calculations but we didn't supply the worksheet in this case to prove that this particular defendant was getting the  the direct kids even as i said even if they're noticeable even if they are rules there's no guarantee that these directives are going to be the same tomorrow and i understand we just got a new director of prisons in the state of illinois i would assume that that new director could issue new directives could change how all of this is done and we don't believe that this day and the right to this day should be contingent upon the whims of a director the seventh circuit case that i cited i understand it's a different jurisdiction but i think it is good language to explain the situation miller versus him and when the policy manual can vanish with the wave of an administrator's wind or the ministry is free to disregard his own words the prisoner has nothing of substance and therefore neither liberty or property this is something that prisoners cannot rely on broadway department corrections will take care of this and suppose it gets to be a week before mr williams is scheduled to get out and this day somehow seven b to any extent that it is we believe that if you read the statute as a whole both sentences read together and the specific the more specific sentence is obviously sentence to the trial court is supposed to give this credit we believe that the rules of statutory construction make it pretty clear that even if this is an ambiguous stance you'd it's not rocket science to figure out who the general assembly intended to be doing this job in five eight seven b counsel also appellate court there was a rule twenty three case cited were excuse me decided where that was the issue they found that well yes department corrections usually does this however didn't do this in this case and that is  i guess that's all i have your items unless you have other questions thank you mr hurst thank you case number one zero nine three six one people versus williams was taken under advisement