shall be the out for a fix pretty time not to exceed two year this is the this is important which it is the plain meaning of the statute saying that any plenary order of protection entered under this act which includes extensions of plenary orders of can be extended beyond good caution on trim it in effect until they hit or modified however that isn't that isn't that's the direction confliction with the with the requirements of subsection b and seventeen of the language has provided a list otherwise provided in a section which was removed from the twenty's from the language of some part b in two thousand and seventeen which further enhance of the view that subsection b is supposed to be know it is our position that the player of protection can only be extended two years it can be extended multiple times so they can come back and keep extending it just they can extend it indefinitely ago in defining subsection b you with a variant incorporate extensions as well what in the language of subsection be directly speaks to extensions and that doesn't change so the original limits would still apply to extension i suppose the distinction i'm referencing is the fact that a needs discusses extensions so you know it's a separate section of statute one speaking to the plenary or the original plan or and yeah they're speaking to extensions and you seem to be reading those together yes the legislature specifically removed language it says except as otherwise provided in the section which along with other language in the statute that says all plenary orders of protection entered under this act shall be valid for a fixed period of time the prior court order was entered based on the on the default of the respondent mr bennett and his and he didn't appear at the hearing in the court order no factual findings were made and the petitioners initial petition only indicated that no material change in circumstances at taken place given this fact that no ritual changes and circumstances had taken place and no factual findings swart any facts that occurred one can  quietly question they'll future course prevent this similar issue and secondly and more importantly is i i consider that this argument linked to our original argument because in part it deals with the interpretation of subsection e why didn't you that in order to have a coherent and strong body of law it'd be the course best interest to rule on this issue pleadings they put no material change in circumstances that that is not the same as good car shown and there is no factual finds in the court or is that indicate otherwise and that and and that there's been no violations that occurred since then circumstances were the same as a good car shown any particular can come to court with the same isn't the same facts of the line the initial plan or a protection and that would be enough to to warrant a caution for the extension of the plenary order of protection is specifically delineates some of the requirements that are required when you want to modify or alter a plan or a protection which is what happened here here the court rid the original i was for two years now the petitioner came back two years later asking for remedy greater than the remedy that she originally got when the initial plan or order of protection was entered into the petition was asking for an indefinite order of protection now this is this is also an unjust result it if if an individual is complying with the order of protection and then something called back later two years later and is asking for a greater remedy against them that makes little sense now we did cite both st violence act one can come to the conclusion that something more is required to the extent that the order of protection indefinitely and i want to be clear we're not arguing that they didn't have the right to a part that would most likely be controlling here would require some sort of new fact in order to get a greater rommany than was previously granted in addition it also provides the statute a little more bite for compliance and are in argument because an individual who has subsequent this case otherwise the the account would be faced with a permanent injunction and little recourse with which for them to be able to overturn that some preliminary injunction now wasn't which two years when they were initially extended his compliance was would have been had it would have been enough to extend the order and are asking as compliance be enough for him for the order to be terminated such a conclusion would be a little bit in opposite of each other legally represent in june the crux of the issue before the court is whether the plain meaning of the illinois domestic violence act allows a circuit court to extend an order protection after the initial plenary has expired upon terms determined within the circuit court's discretion including for an indefinite period of time there is no challenge to the trial court's authority to extend plenary orders of protection the only question is whether the trial court has the disc to murder his business partner that whenever he became angry he would threaten her that he had killed before and he had no problem killing again that a couple of months before she fled she found him loading her gun what wearing rubber gloves he brought home from work and told her he never knew when he would need a loaded gun it is against this background that before the plenary order was set to expire and two thousand and fifteen mistaya filed a motion asking the court to extend the order of protection definite after minute mr bennett was served and defaulted and when mr bennett appeared in court the trial court did grant an indefinite protection and all the court is well versed in the rules of statutory construction two of those rules of particular relevance here are that the court has the statutory language it's plain in ordinary meaning reading the statute as a whole and that the domestic violence act itself tells the court and twenty b one roman numeral two allows a plenary order of protection incorporated into a final judgment in the other proceeding such as a dissolution action to remain in effect until the order of protection is granted upon good color shown to remain in effect until the order of protection is vacated or modified the illinois legislature added this language to the domestic violence act by an end in two thousand and eight by allowing extensions of orders of protection after the initial klan or e is set to expire the legislature made the sensible decision to allow those victims of domestic violence who are still in need of protection to have a legal avenue to obtain their protection as this court has found the language of the statute yes to the case legislative interns courts know every situation is different and some situations are extremely dangerous often the danger does not expire on an arbitrary timetable and the legislature recognize that continued an indefinite protection may be needed and thus gave trial courts that power appellant asks you to read the two thousand  a mandatory language out of the statute and his interpretation must be rejected as contrary to the text and purpose of the domestic violence act the appellant's remedy is are to ask the legislature for the changes to the statute t modify the current order protection even if there is any ambiguity which there isn't the legislature has directed that demand that the domestic violence act be liberally construed the trial court's interpretation and ours supports the construction that would protect a mystic violence victims indefinitely when good cause is provided to them who're legislative intent is also demonstrated when the legislature amended the section in two thousand and seventeen plenary orders of protection incorporated into final judgments or if the legislature wanted to impose a two year limit on binary orders extended under two hundred and twenty he it could have done so but it did not and because  legislature did not ever to your limit to those provisions they must have intended that extension orders and orders incorporated into judgments be without limit until vacated or modif opponents interpretation would render the phrase until vacated or modify that was evident two thousand and eight as mere surplusage in violation of established rules of statutory construction and that interpretation must be rejected i would like to say that the motion was not the motion to terminate that appellant brought in the trial court was not brought under to twenty because if it were brought under to twenty a pound would have had to allege changes or learn facts but he alleged nothing interestingly appellant has never offered any reason why the extension order should be should be modified is never contended that he no longer poses a danger to misstate own children and has never argued the extension order is unnecessary for their continued protection plain appellant says today that there were no violations but there is nothing in the records indicate whether or not yes or no the i would like to address the good cause argument a little bit more appellant asked this court for the st time on appeal to go back to november th tina vine the trial court improperly extended the order protection alleging there was no dilatory and asking the court to excuse it excuse him without giving the court any reason why it should do so and he been concerned about an indefinite order protection he would have showed up for court in two thousand and fifteen after receiving noticed several weeks earlier failing that appellant could have filed a motion to set aside his default as soon as he was served with the indefinite order less than a week after was entered failing that the eleanor legislature is granted another two year to proceed with this argument is moot because a bell and did not avail himself of the court procedures available to him to set aside his to fall and to this day more than five years after the trial court granted the extension order appellant offers nothing to show he was diligent or that he had a meritorious defense to the motion to extend the order of protection aside from the issue of forfeiture and failure to proceed under the tools afforded by both the domestic violence act and the rules of civil procedure well aware of are only supreme court said that the appellant has a burden to prevent a sufficiently complete record of the proceedings and the in the absence of such a record will be presumed the order entered by the trial court was in conformity with the collins failure to cite the record on appeal arguments are not evidence the motion filed in two thousand and fifteen met the statutory requirements so we do not know what facts are testimony may have been presented to the trial court whether the trial court asked miss dale and questions from the branch when she was in open court we just don't know what happened that day in court because there's no report of proceedings so even if this court agrees that forfeiture should  and that he can set aside to follow funding for years after the fact says because there's no report of proceedings filed by the appellant it's presumed the trial court's grant of the extension order was in conformity with the law and was properly supported by evidence finally this was an uncontested request to extend the order of protection indefinitely appellant did not show up after being duly served the statute says a plenary order of protection can be extended when uncontested on the basis of mistake motion an f or affidavit that there's been no material change in relevant circumstances in stating that she was stating her reasons that she is fearful of her safety and the safety of the children she feared if he knew where she was he would show up unannounced and she was afraid how he would act and what he is capable of her fear is reasonable the cause does not require a violation of what the cause does not require a violation of an order of protection no violation demonstrates only that the order protection has been effective not that it is unnecessary or there is no good cause for extension we don't want to take away protection that is working you'll recall that over a period of years miss mr bennett told mrs dale that he hired someone to kill his partner and repeatedly threatened that he had no problem killing her that is good cause that have held that when a court doesn't set it terminations date the order of protection will be terminated upon two years now i understand that those cases are preeminent cases however we feel the holding the holding survives and the interpretation proceedings what is later had the knowledge and the foresight to differentiate between orders of protection entered under this act and orders of protection entered under in conjunction with other civil proceedings however it in that's adequately just assuming you're not going to be able to prepare by service record so you don't even have to drop you know based upon the initial motion and the court findings that that should be sufficient still requires that additional fact which and it's the fact which in this case he was held in a vault and there were no additional facts were found during that time