pages one forty three to one forty four that decision the supreme court examine the legislative history of the residual clause and noted that congress and initially mirrored the language in the residual clause that tied it to sixteen b clause so actually sixteen day is reaches a broader scope of conduct sixteen b applies to violence that is committed in the course of committing the offense and  fact that the residual cause may may look at physical injury as opposed to violent physical force that that distinction is not was not germane to the supreme court's decision in johnson the supreme court and johnson was looking at analysis that the courts would have to perform in determining what the ordinary case is and that's the same analyses that a court has to perform and sixteen be sixteen be like the residual clause has produced a similar body of confusing case law for example this court in bend on when dealing with an auto determine that it's not a  crime of violence that the risk that force would be applied against the car to break into it or to steal it did not was not sufficient whereas the board of immigration appeals the matter  that a similar offense does carry a substantial risk of physical force because of the force that could be used to break into the car to strip the car of its parts or in an accident that could result from the the theft o faulty premise that sixteen b is not is applied in just as inconsistent a manner as the residual clause of the a c c a and to the any extent and that sixteen b is slightly narrower it's not any less be the analyses that it's been used in the sixteen b and the residual clause cases borrow from each other the case law borrows from each other for supreme court collapse at the sting distinction by finding that a dui would not be a violent felony under the residual clause because like just like sixteen b they both require purposeful violent and aggressive conduct and then it says otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious risk potential risk of physical injury to another sixteen be session sixteen b seems to be somewhat less offense for example with the crime of burglary we see that by its nature it involves substantial risk and this standard substantial risk has been easily evaluated in burglary cases so the court would have some form of guidance to apply so there is there is an argument that you're you're lum answer the question burglary was seen is the quintessential example of crime of violence under sixteen b or a violent felony under the c c a but the example that johnson provides in determining is an ordinary burglary offense does involve actually entering a home and confronting a homeowner or is it a situation where the homeowner startled by hearing the door knob rattle yells who's there in the burglar runs away with no confrontation at all that same that same indeterminancy determining what the ordinary burglary offense in the a c c a context also applies in the sixteen b context in the court provide a different example of witness tampering which could be a crime of violence under sixteen b if the ordinary case involves threatening a whip witness with violence but wouldn't be if the ordinary case would involve bribing a witness where there's no force involved in bribing the witness so sixteen be a while while it may reach somewhat different conduct from a c c a still has the same indeterminancy in determining what the ordinary offense would be as well as what the threshold is of  the morning may please the court for you to strictly on behalf of the respondent the attorney general of the united states your honors this court's recent decision in united states v taylor we would assert does create a circuit split and forecloses petitioners argument that sixteen b violence in the exact same way and i will quote by its nature involves a substantial risk that physical force against the person or property of another may be used in the course of committing the offense because this court has already analyzed this exact language and in fact has relied on cases that discuss the difference between the armed career criminal act and sixteen b and has found that sixteen b though the language of sixteen b which is identical is distinctly narrower than a c c s residual clause that the statutory language of sixteen b is not linked to a confusing set of examples like that in a c c s residual clause and because unlike the a c c residual clause which the supreme court struggled for nine years in trying to come up with a standard for sixteen b does uncertainty resolved with the methodology essentially how do you do this that's ordinary case the second was the degree of the risk was uncertain those two combined is what made the aca residual clause unconstitutional so the fact that it just the sixteen b analysis involves an ordinary case analysis does not automatically render it void for vagueness because there's manners in which the textual arguments about the language is much more specific and  analysis which was conducted in tailor is exactly transferable to the sixteen b contacts so for example the statutory language of sixteen b which is the same as the nine twenty four c three b this core in taylor went particular and that just seems to be a major difference between the twenty four c analysis and the sixteen billion now it's not the difference in line which it's the difference in application and which one of those runs afoul of jobs and so we were especially disagree in the sense that it's the combination johnson is there is an ordinary case application in the sixteen the context however that ordinary case is compared to an imprecise standard of risk so you're comparing the well there you're not applying a standard of risk at all in nine twenty four city you're looking at what that depend on that day you're looking at human implications of his conduct and that is really different from the problem that the courts are in jobs and in math and and that may be but it's also important to recognize that the john within the taylor court the court did walk through here is really i mean strictly you to be that's my point and we understand that but if nothing else even if your honor is inclined to realize that that is does not foreclose the argument it is certainly persuasive at a minimum because the same exact rationale that apply does apply here again this court found three primary reasons right the first was that their language was distinctly narrower than a c c a the court gave several reasons for this first the during the course of proceedings limits so under sixteen be unlike the a c c they were looking at conduct that has to occur during the course of proceedings secondly the court in taylor noted that the risk of physical force against a victim is much more definite than the risk of physical injury how the supreme court noted that the a c s residual clause focuses on the possible effect of a person's conduct whereas that by contrast sixteen be narrowly focuses on felony offenses as it were two nine twenty four b c you're not dealing with nine twenty four c unless the defendant has already been convicted of carrying the or using the weapon during a drug offense or a crime of violence so what you are doing is looking back at that specific conduct you're looking at what's been proved that's what the jury is looking at you don't tell a jury obviously anything the bat categorical approach is in the if instance general you tales a jury define what happened in that specific have to find he created risk by carrying or using the weapon they just test and that he carried or used to jury it in relation to the predicate crime that isn't i just an entirely different analysis it's also a factual analysis both for the for the jury and it's really a jury decision based on that particular case so all the standard stuff can up just really doesn't matter much to the nine twenty fourth's the contact but in any event the the language difference between a c c a and sixteen b exists regardless of this court's decision in taylor regardless whether this court finds that it's for closes the argument so we have again very significant textural and this isn't just in the taylor decision this court has recognize significant differences between a c c a and sixteen b and it's not my language using significance it's this cords so for example in the united states v so where's this court noted that the difference between the risk involved with each definition is significant under sixteen b the risk that force will be used requires an examination of defendant's actions in contrast the risk the injury will result under the residual clause focuses on the effect the score also noticed the difference in taylor that by its nature also narrows the language the phrase by its nature into courts that a court's analysis of whether there is a risk is combining to their offense itself and fourth and although this wasn't mentioned in the taylor decision this court in united states v sawyer noted that unlike sixteen as burglary arson or extortion involves use of explosives or otherwise involved conduct that presents a serious potential risk to physical injury to another now the supreme court explained that the use of this word otherwise requires it to look at the risk as evaluated with those other diverse crimes this provided to the court a confusing set of examples of how to reconcile it so justice scalia in a stated probably the most exemplary way the phrase that shades of red standing alone couldn't be confusing but when you combine it with other the supreme let's put aside sixteen for a minute what do you think the supreme court was talking about in different it just move ok i can't give you a perspective extract construction but with regards to that in that entire section he was looking at the court's majority decision was as really focusing on the fact that they carved out this was and in the decision if justice alito was writing a dissent where he had positive that this was going to result in a nuclear explosion if they found that the a c c as residual calls was unconstitutional because it would have all these outlying of facts on other types of statutes that in contain things of similar risk such as substantial risk and in response to that to address that concern justice alito specifically wrote that that was not the decision was limited to the as residual clause and pointed out specific precedent it was overturning and carved out an exception to say we're not hassling constitutional doubt on qualitative terms like substantial risk and statutes that involve that certainly i mean the categorical approach to telling shepard particularly in the immigration context which a civil proceeding is getting very convoluted to me that that that choosing this categorical approach and then the court's decision and johnson they had the precedent they had that had they wanted to overrule that or had they wanted to expand the scope they could have they chose not to mention it and specifically they carved out for these types of cases that are substantial risk so as a general matter the court held that it does not have a doubt the constitutionality of laws that call for the application of the qualitative standard such as this panel risk which is the standard that we are dealing with today i see that my time is running up so i would just like to focus on one last point that is because sixteen b is constitutional and johnson does not amount to intervening in law because it is applying to a different statutory provision  has conceded through attorney not once but twice both in written pleadings and in open court that he is removable as a crime of violence aggravated fallon for his crime of robbery he should be bound by this concession because we know as a general rule that petitioner that aliens are bound by the concessions of their attorneys but for agree just circumstances which this court has said would be intervening law because johnson is not intervening in law but she should be bound by his concession that he is removable as an thank your honor there are four reasons why the court's decision in taylor doesn't apply to sixteen b and in this case the first is that nine twenty four c three b deals with what the supreme court called the riskiness of conduct on a particular occasion whereas with the residual clause and sixteen be it court is required to look back at a prior conviction and not look at the facts of that offense or the minimum conduct necessary to violate it but what additional imagine ordinary case wouldn't second with sixteen being the board of immigration appeals has a role in interpreting it and applying that through the aggravated felony definition and the b i a treat sixteen b as the same as the residual clause in matter of seeing the board adopted the james analysis because of the similarities between the two clauses and the board relied on james as well as psychs and that all of the risk of injury is not the same as the risk of force the analysis that the board applies is the same because of the similarities and just several weeks before the supreme court decided johnson and matter francisco alonzo the board again noted in a footnote footnote five of that decision that the residual clause is similar to sixteen b in terms of the risk involved and it relied on james analysis of the risk in the residual clause circumstances third sixteen the cases in a c c a residual clause cases rely on each other  ashcroft in the sixteen b cases relied on residual clause case law and residual cause cases relied on sixteen b case law for example in amos which was whether involved whether sawed off shot circuit had noted prior to withdrawing its decision the aggravated felony definition at eleven o one a forty three f contains a political offense exception that a crime of violence it's a purely political offense sixteen b because it provides a benchmark for courts to compare the offenses before them were sixteen he doesn't even contain that that benchmark and as well to me it clear that johnson w based not on the numerated clauses but on the vagueness inherent in determining the ordinary case and the threshold amount of risk as this court noted in us vs smith april eight decision published decision that the numerator clauses and its clarity because it allows for traditional elements to elements analysis whereas the sixteen b or the residual cla