duplicative lawsuits against mr nettle one such case in the united states district court for the northern district of indiana and a second duplicative case in sao paulo brazil the bank originally filed this case in the northern district of indiana because the form selection clause in the contract between the parties requires that quote all the eagle proceedings in connection with this guarantee shall be brought in the united states district court for the district of indiana located in south bend indiana over a year later on the fourth of july and twenty sixteen the bank filed the substantively identical lawsuit against mr net zero in so paulo mr no move to enjoined the bank from action in brazil and the district court denied that request for an anti suit injunction based first on the district court for erroneous interpretation of the contract between the parties and second on what we believe was an incorrect application of the law in this court regarding issuance of anti suit injunction the district court held that mr nettle had agreed to subject himself and defend himself in multiple identical sighting simultaneous lawsuits in both indiana and wherever mr nettle happened to have assets and that's not what mr nettle agreed to he agreed that the bank could sue him to recover under the guarantee in the northern district of indiana limited to collections in the permissive it's true that it doesn't expressly for limit itself to collections but the the first section of the clause provides that as i stated all the go proceeding shall be brought in st joseph county indiana the second permissive section which the bank in the district court relied states that the lender shall have the option and so on exclusive discretion in addition to the two courts mentioned above that's the federal court st joseph county and state court in st joseph county yeah to institute legal proceedings against the guarantor for repossession of the aircraft in any jurisdiction where the aircraft may be located from time to time or against the guarant for a covering of monies due to the lender from the guarantor in any jurisdiction where the guarantor maintains temporarily or permanently any assets and while it doesn't explicitly reference collection of a judgment in that context take a step back if it if what it means is that the bank by virtue of filing the first lawsuit in indiana can then file a second duplicate of lawsuit anywhere in the world where mr nettle has an  asset that just duplicate the very same action over and over again there would be no purpose to require the bank to bring the court to bring the case initially in the northern district of indiana if only to bring it elsewhere around the world so what it has to mean and what the parties intended for it to mean was for the bank to be able to follow mr net zero to wherever he does have assets and try to collect on a judgment after an indiana court adjudicates the bank's rights under the guarantee what language supports that interpretation it's really a reading of the contract as a whole it's like i said the logical i can claim going elsewhere in the country supports about interpretation while section three point  three also supports it where the bank had gone to great lengths to make sure that they could sue mr mesereau in its own jurisdiction let's just take a step back and what we're talking about is a personal guarantee between an indiana bank and a foreign national and what the document recall provides is that all proceedings shall be brought in the bank's backyard in south bend indiana where it's located the document is governed by indiana law mr net require much appoint an agent for service of process in indiana it's clear that the purpose here is to provide the bank the benefit of its home form to adjudicate its rights right and to get your client he can't contest that but he also agrees to this broad permissive clause that says the bank can chase him anywhere in the world he has an asset that's and it doesn't have any limiting language at all so it can't possibly refer only to judgment enforcement well and collection actions i think what what the banks construction and the district courts construction of this language of this language has asked this court to believe that  of the first clause what more could it be because we're required to read me directly what it's been ordered strode to mean by the district judge and by three judges of this court that he can sue anywhere you're effectively asking us to over a panel decision that's already issued in this case which construed this language exactly the way the district court did i'm not asking i do that was a request for a temporary injunction pending this appeal it was denied but then  it just because the soup was consistent with the contract and you're now asking us to hold the suit is not consistent with the tract my understanding of this panel's decision was  that that it felt that we had not demonstrated that there was a sufficient well that was a second trial but there was more than one reason why you need your honor i believe that when you take a step back and look at the purpose of the contract if the contract is interpreted as it has been by the district court and it reads out the meaning of mandatory language and it's not a form selection clause at all in order to read the contract will provisions so that they are in harmony with one another i submit that mr meadows reading makes the most sense otherwise the mandatory language in the first section would be meaningless it also creates the potential for absurd results and from system judgments if there are identical suits and around the world on the same substantive legal issues that are being addressed in the district court i think the district court's reading frankly asks this court to believe that a court sitting in brazil or a court sitting wherever else mr nettle has an asset is as well situated or better situated than in vienna court to adjudicate those claims and that just simply can't can't make sense the purpose of the guarantee was to provide additional security and able the bank to have an indiana court determine its rights and the reason why that the language in the second clause is linked to mr nettles assets is so it can go get his assets once it gets a judgment and mr nettle has an objected to that this is not a situation where mr nettle hasn't defended himself he has he appeared and we know the bank intended that this was the purpose of the language among other reasons because that's what the bank specifically alleged in its original complaint and in its amended complaint it didn't simply allege that venue was property in the northern district of and out of indiana it said that quote first source and defendants have contractually agreed that any litigation between them must be venue in st joseph county indiana and that quote any judicial proceeding shall be brought in a federal district court in south bend so that those judicial admissions demonstrate what the bank intended by language in the agreement the banks argue that they don't really mean what they say and that it was simply reciting the terms of the form selection clause but it wasn't until a year later that the bank filed its action in brazil and even if the bank is not traditionally a stopped from reversing course on that there's this position which we submit that it should be those admissions demonstrate at a minimum that when the bank filed the suit in the northern district of indiana it knew that it was compelled to do so under the terms of the document and the district court also found that although if it rested its decision primarily on its interpretation of farm selection process that mr nettle wasn't entitled to any an injunction because he hadn't satisfy the necessary criteria for obtaining one we believe that the district court didn't properly apply the law in this circuit because this court allows an injunction against litigating in a forum forum data systems the district court expressly found that these two cases were duplicate found that they had the same parties at the same substantive legal issues and that a judgment in the district court would be determin same legal issues in a brazilian court these findings along for the purposes of this circuit would be sufficient for the court to find that the action was duplicate asli gratuitously  the last the district court again relying on a form selection process found mr nettle had agreed to the action and we believe that this motivated the district court statement and mr nettle it failed to establish that the brazilian action was we know in this case that international comedy is of no concern the parties don't dispute that and we believe that based on philips medical systems versus bergman in a case where international comedy is not of concern there may be a lesser showing of a need for the relief for an for an anti feud injunction perhaps nothing more than a duplication of the parties and issues and then in the court opine and that sort of thing might suffice and such is the case here have pleased the court of this case is straightforward and simple and the two levels relevant to this appeal one is in terms of the underlying business transaction excuse me first source bank made a loan secured by an aircraft that was previously purchased by one of nettles companies and put into a trust so while there is an owner trustee which signed the underlying promissory note the owner trustee has no personal life bill and the reason for the guarantee is that if there is a default which is the case the the bank wants to be able to go to the guarantor to get its money back there has been a default the bank wants its money back the second straightforward and simple situation before the court is the guarantee itself controlled by indiana law but state which time and time again up holds the freedom of contract between parties and forces contracts as they are written says that someone who signs a contract is deemed to have read and understood what he signed and courts that will not rewrite contracts just because their application down the line is not to the liking of one of the parties who signed that's exactly what's going on here now don't was not happy that first source is exercising the full range of rights against him under the g and all one has to do is dissect section three point zero two of the guarantee this is not a boilerplate document the first shunk of section three point two specifically is a citizen of the federated public republic of brazil sure the guarantee says the guarantor who are hereby your revoke oblivion unconditionally agrees that all legal proceedings shall be brought in the northern district of indiana or indiana state court that gives the bank the right to sue obviously the bank doesn't want to be able to do that in its own backyard to use the council's term but what it also means is that if the guarantor is going to come in and make some kind of affirmative claim against the back that indiana is the place where the guarantor has to do that so this provision is intended to make the guarantor come to indiana and assert any claims he might have or think she has against first source bank in indiana and not in some far flung foreign jurisdiction and this provision goes on to say as you already know that the lender has the option and its sole can exclusive discretion in addition to the state and federal courts referenced in indiana to sue the guarantor for repossession of the plane or seek to recovery of monies due to the lender any jurisdiction where the guarantor maintains temporarily or permanently any assets words matter the contract doesn't say instead of or alternatively the bank can go to a different place it says in addition to and to seek recovery of monies to doesn't necessarily mean that there is a judgment entered by a court in the united states and that this then becomes a chase for collection of that judgment the guaranteed could have set recovery of monies d means as established by a court of competent jurisdiction in st joseph county indiana but it does this provision this discretionary provision is not limited to the enforcement of a us judgment and why would you even say that in the contract the right certainly exists anyway when someone recovers a judgment in a united states court against a foreign national the recovery the part of recovering the judgment always house that liked to subject to the laws of the and friendliness of the courts in the jurisdiction where the judgment better lives to pursue collection in that country so there's be there no reason to have included this language if the court were to accept nettles interpretation of of the contract the provision is not indiscriminate it specifically says where the plane may be located and unfortunately for netto the plane is located in the possession of the brazilian authorities and is unavailable to the bank and it's unavailable to  temporarily or permanently and he asked so the confines of the venue provision are governed by where he has his assets and the fact that it talks in terms of a temporary location of an asset shows that this provision is intended to give first source bank the maximum flexibility needed to effect collection on the guarantee in the event of default the goal here is payment from the guarantor and under this contract more than one rope leads to rob and the bank has done nothing wrong by filing a lawsuit in brazil it's done something that is clearly within its right under the clear and unambiguous language of this guarantee the cases are not substantively identical i keep hearing that there is no prejudgment attachment remedy available to first source bank in the united states because no has no assets within the reach of the court sitting in the northern district of india brazil affords the pre paid prejudgment attachment remedy that's when adults hear you know all candor because he doesn't want to have to deal with the attachment process in brazil and run the risk that the law of his own country presents to em but that alone isn't enough for an anti suit injunction to issue from this court now most of the cases cited in the brief are readily discuss it both groups are readily distinguishable from this case because they don't involve one plaintiff who is availing itself of the right under a specific contract to sue in two different jurisdictions most of them fall involve races to the courthouse for attempts to circumvent an arbitration provision or wait until deep deep into scullery and it looks like someone thinks they're going to lose so they decided to play safe to reverse course and seek a remedy elsewhere this case is most like the rosenbloom case which both sides cited their briefs you have a former law partner of an international law firm suing in the united states claiming fraud in a long transaction where the loan agreement requires actions to be filed in the english courts and where the point of law part are agreed to be sued and it was in the court held that that law partner failed to demonstrate that domestic interests presence here and rosenblum articulated the standard to be applied parties in issues in both proceedings are the same with the parties here are the same the issues are not because of the prejudgment attachment distinction in brazil resolution of the first action would be to speiser that of the action to be enjoyed there's an affidavit or declaration from brazilian counsel in the record that explains that the resolution the first action meaning the one in district court may not at the end of the day be the one that is controlling and then it's up to nettle to show that the balance of domestic interests such as the prevention of harassment or oppressive litigation outweighs the concerns of international comedy none of none of this is presence here he's being sued in his home country it's certainly less inconvenient for him to deal with first source bank in brazil than it than it is up here and he hasn't really been put through very much appear one day of a deposition in one day of a failed mediation the last point i'd like to make here is first source bank has not made a judicial admission in alleging in a complaint the basic reason why this issue and claim is before the court of law if in fact this is this argument is actually a reversal of position by nettled who didn't even admit the basic jurisdictional allegations in the complaint if you look at his answer to the first amended complaint which is document number sixty three in the court below in response to the allegations of what the guarantee says and that the litigation belongs here the responses are things like the state legal conclusions we don't have to answer and if an answer is required or not the guarantee speaks for itself so now the venue provision that never wanted to run away from when he responded to the complaint he's here in precis so it's a reversal of position on his part in no event is it a judicial admission because you don't have an allegation another case because it wants to get more territory it's so it's not judicial admission it's not traditional stop and for all these reasons judge we got it right his analysis of the contract was in accord with india his refusal to issue an anti suit injunction was consistent with the reasonable range of options presented to him and it does not present this court with an abuse of discretion first i'd like to respond to something that counsel said about there's more than one road that leads to wrong and the bank's position in this case is that there have to you have to take two different roads to rome at the same time you have to file a case in the northern district of indiana and if you want to file a case elsewhere when mr meadow has an asset then you're permitted to do so simultaneously and both of those leave those roads lead to rome that's just not a commonsense reading of what was intended by the contract it was it was mentioned that there would be no reason to have the second permissive clause in the contract if in fact it was merely to collect a judgment and just like to comment on that because the last sentence of section three point zero two after the bank is granted the discretion to bring an action in any jurisdiction where mr nettle as an asset says quote the parties here by consent and agree to be subject to the jurisdiction of all the  aforesaid courts and to the greatest extent permitted by political law the heart of the parties here by waive any right to seek to avoid the jurisdiction of the above courts on the basis of the doctrine of form not convenience that's the purpose here is that they want to be able to go after mr not as assets even if there may not be personal jurisdiction over him in a particular country but where he has assets and they want to know that he's not going to object to that on the basis of form not convenience that's not happening here nettle hasn't run away from the venue he's participated in the litigation and defended himself from it determined to be a preemptive strike in order to control the venue of of the dispute the former do it above partner file the northern district of illinois when in fact the long document with barclays was governed by english law and specifically required by the submit to jurisdiction of the english courts so the case that was being sought to be enjoined was a case brought by barclays the defendant in england that was clearly in accord with the law and document the plaintiff and rosenblum if the plaintiff in rosenblum wanted to avoid duplicate of litigation all he had to do was voluntarily dismiss his case in the northern district of illinois mr nettle doesn't have that choice he has to defend himself on the same claim twice that's not