courts for purposes of obtaining any equitable remedies paragraphs six and seven specifically issued permanent injunctions which under you know it's we didn't brief it and nobody opposed the fact that th arbitrators authorities it also went on to state in paragraph six and seven something that ties into our other argument which is not just an issue of  all are ones where the actual parties stated that they will affirm or make efforts to ensure that under certain conditions they will try to keep their affiliates in line there is nothing in the agreement that binds the which i understand is the purview of an arbitrator in general but in this particular case by not only issuing permanent injunctions which were already outside the scope of his authority but also by issuing them with respect to affiliate who are not parties who had no opportunity to negotiate the contract in the first place much less participate in the arbitral process itself we posit that in that particular case those two paragraph in several cities within i believe two or three states and your question actually leads me into what my next point was which is directly to address this issue with respect t california and i don't want to get caught in a lie but i believe it's louisiana and texas but i could be wrong and so i don't want to misrepresent anything to the core and i confess i didn't specifically look at this after a year and a half the states themselves these geography i believe it would be permissible but i don't know that it ever needs to get to that i think there could be a preservation of judicial resources if the award is simply the portions of the award there are problematic or strict and exceeds the scope and is also in violation of california sixty six hundred and is of public policy consideration here first of all when you look at the arbitrator toward itself on its face in paragraph within the united states for example that already exceeded his authority because if you look at the definition of the territory in the underlying actual licensing agreement the territory is first of all limited sort of surprising inconceivable how the arbitrator believed that he could expand it to even beyond that and say within the united states because this is the last time i checked it was still fifty states so even that alone exceeds it on two bases that she portion of it if the court were inclined to say that nine on its face is actually valid in forcible that could conceivably work because as your honor pointed out it could work under the limited circumstances of the territory and the set forth in the actual agreement the term on the face of the agreement is a sorry defined term it's actually in the definition section and the term is defined to be the term of the district court to determine the reasonableness of those parameters is there a problem with you i don't believe so because we're appealing from the actual terms of the arbitration award itself i understand my understanding is that the court's concerned about the underlying order itself sending the parties to arbitration and now it was in the opposing brief and much as i don't like it i'm willing to concede that issue and not really take up the court's time arguing whether or not we should have been sent to arbitration in the first place but with respect to the actual issuance of the award the appeal from now was timely and i don't believe there was any mention same exactly the same as here which is as long as they're operating as a franchisee of improv they shall not operate any other comedy club i thought of those other agreements i'll check believe are reflected in the record but i would go back and check this as well are restrictions on clubs that are that my client improv west associates can license within a specific the center of the of that licensees club so for example if a licensee has a club in hollywood california it would say that we cannot license and that improv west associates cannot license another club in los angeles county if you w palace so we're dealing with this specific agreement at issue but what i was asking is with regard to all of your other licensees is it your are you telling me that the actually i can't make a representation with respect to each and every one in the record on that is what it is but i believe that that is the case that the purpose of those is to provide that if you're operating as an improv licensee that you devote all of your efforts and terms of developing a comedy club business to improv rather than having your time in your efforts split between improv and other franchises or other clubs whether it's in the same city the same county the same state or elsewhere because the intent is that when you're operating as a franchisee of a particular business all of your time and efforts you contractually agree to what should be devoted to that business and there's no case in california state court in the agreement is subject to any sort of reasonableness inquiry with respect to time with respect to do ya graphy or at least back to anything else that within the term of the agreement the franchise the necessarily is able to engage in their trade business or profession because they're operating the franchise and under the ninth circuit's authority in campbell and in fact general packaging the general commercial packaging the fact that the franch is not completely excluded from the gauging in a trade or profession is the beginning and the end of the inquiry and in fact the great frame up case from the northern district of illinois which was a case in which the franchisee operated the same goal picture fram store and the contract sat that so long as they operated that picture framing store as a franchisee they would not have an interest in any other are pictures from the store period interact directly or indirectly they simply would not own not for the specific franchise proposition but for the proposition that if the individual who is subject to the common enough to compete is not completely precluded from engaging in a trade or profession then it simply was in forcible it would it would dramatically create new walked not just for the ninth circuit it would go against ninth circuit it's already but for our california generally to hold that any sort of in term covenant i subject to any sort of scrutiny under sixteen six hundred so long as it does not outlive the term of the agreement which the common in this case does not and then the last issue that i'll touch on is the issue with hollywood california and then mcdonald's in their franchise agreement there and tries to be let's say a california  one six zero i am your honor and recognizing first of the caviar at the beginning that we are in this case dealing with a nationwide license the who has clocked in private clubs in maryland and pennsylvania in california so we really are talking across the country but even in the limited example that your honor has has proposed yes because if a franchise or a mcdonald's in that example one is to enter into a contract with someone that they want to ensure that for so long is there a mcdonald's franchisee is going to be devoting their efforts to mcdonald's and it's not going to be engaging in other fast food businesses is not going to be taking the information that they're learning even if not trade secrets the not to be taking the information they're learning from mcdonald's about promotions about the way the business is run and using that for a competing business and they're not going to be devoting time and resources that could be devoted to t mcdonald's in hollywood to their hamburger stand and men it's perfectly permissible under sixteen six hundred for mcdonald's to insist upon that we structure now the individual entering into the franchise and they decide for themselves it's not worth  that we don't want to enter into a mcdonald's franchise if we're not going to be able to operate a hamburger stand in maine but that's their decision there's nothing in sixteen six hundred that would say that they're not entitled to that agreement and the agreements not going to be enforced if they jurisdiction to reconsider whether the arbitrator had authority over claims for equitable relief the second reason is even if the court was to reach that issue the district court here correctly went through the agreement in light of the strong federal policy favoring arbitration in the presumption in favor of arbitration and found that whatever ambiguity makes just in the agreement with respect to whether equitable claims could be hard in arbitration as well as in federal the other jurisdictions that have considered sixteen six hundred every case is held that this type of covenant not to compete is enforceable without any reasonable missing corey and then finally there was one portion of one of the paragraph  agreed is is broader than agents and employees and it does it would encompass relatives of certain of the officers of directors the genesis of that provision in the in the order is that section don't think so generally know that the reason i'm focusing specifically on this case is this is a case in which the license answer my question please first generally now this is the case and you say this is an exception this is a case in which the license fee is specifically covenant as part of the equation she doesn't have the right to bind someone just because they're related isn't that true junction should have been tailored to that situation but you're not saying that it is you're saying that these people who were never served never got anything good  generally at that point meaning somebody who is affiliated in business with them is no correct no because affiliates is a defined term in the agreement they signed as you're talking about general law and i'm saying that and generally it talks about somebody that's in business with them and affiliate subsidiaries or affiliates and so on and so forth and the mother company is an affiliate that's the general term affiliate now you're saying oh well we defined  this time to include second cousins so therefore the second cousins can be bound even though they don't get a chance to come in the court i'm not going to buy that there is a lower case a which i agree generally speaking subsidiaries parent companies sister companies and there's a capital s eliot and the agreement here specifically uses the defined term capital a affiliate and the license  not be bound notwithstanding the fact that they are spelled out as being bound by the ninth in the in the agreement that if elliot should not be bound then the solution would be not to strike affiliates but either for this court to hold or to send back to the district court to modify the order so that would be a fairly yes i think it could be agents employees officers directors and affiliates acting in concert with any of the foregoing but clearly there can be no do strike it it can't be simply it cannot be simply striking affiliates to the extent they are acting in concert their wealth that's why i'm suggesting that striking at would take the award well below their permissible bounds if the arbitrary standard gone beyond the permissible bounds it should be only strict and to the extent to bring it within the permissible bounds which would be to limit it to agents officers directors employees or affiliates acting in concert broad authority specially resting with an arbitrator and f r c p sixty five which has been cited earlier and decided in the opposing brief is actually an exclusive listing of who can be downed by an injunction not a because it is in terms and without even having to address the issue of whether or not there's a reasonable next component to six thousand six hundred which i believe there is but we don't even need to get to that we don't have an in terms of it not to compete the almost face of the remit is the term of the license once the arbitrator cut off the license the term with respect to any other jurisdictions is cut off there's no license there anymore so how can you say there's an interim co