i'll start with the internet ban and less the court prefers a different issue without question the internet ban imposed in this case implicates significant first amendment liberty interest there can be no doubt about that after united states versus packing him or excuse me packing him versus north carolina in which the supreme court held that individuals have a fundamental right to access the internet if they hang him as a statute writes a criminal as a sex offender using the internet so i'd sack lay on point here it's not on point in that way but what it does is that it is  that access to the internet is a significant first amendment fundamental liberty interest and under this court's clear precedent linking saw with child in other cases if a condition implicates significant liberty interest the district court has to do more than imposing the condition we don't do every liberty interest rights that we have this term of art particularly significant liberty interest and we only have three or four different things and we've said a rise to that level obviously there is there isn't any first him and protected interests but many of them can be impinged on by issues of explained that very well in packing him by saying that the internet is the most important place for the exercise of first amendment rights in today's society is essential to modern society it is today commission of the crime but you don't think that would apply here and you think those cases were also wrongly decided they should be reconsidered i mean but in those cases there was no consideration of the significance of the first amendment liberty issue at court but it was permissible to bar that for the people convicted or your honor that the issue with what i am arguing was not raised in those prior cases there was no discussion of the impact on the first amendment or the significance of the liberty interest so i do believe now in light of the significance of the internet to the exercise of first amendment rights this court needs to take a different approach and the district court mu t carefully consider in this court must carefully review conditions that implicate the first amendment and the district court should follow the protocol and set forth on the record with on the record finding plain or standard right look a couple of responses to that it's not exactly the same issue because what i'm my dear is i'd start with the simple and is it a plane or standard here well there was an objection as generic an objection as i've ever heard and was there anything suggesting to the judge that he was required to explain his particular decision about applying this particular special condition no your honor  was there any suggestion that because of a parking hammer the first amendment consideration that this kind of special condition was disfavored or required some justification no your honor but i would don't know telling district judges they have to be up on their ninth circuit unpublished dispositions if they don't want to go astray many usually play in error if you're following the precedent of your court of appeals you can't go astray under plain air well the precedent that i'm referring to your honor is with child and blink and stop and the cases that make clear when a condition implicates a significant liberty interest more is required and i submit that after packing him there's just no way dispute that a total internet and does not implicate a significant liberty interest and it could have made a difference as a third circuit reka recently held in halina in a case where the internet was enter grow to a child sex offense the third circuit said it still needs to be narrowly tailored and there's still no reason to preclude a defendant from using the vast educational news resources on the internet and that the district court really needs to go through this process and think carefully about what's going to be rich be per minute and what's not going to be permitted and i would note that a few years ago in the district of  arizona another judge did limit the internet ban to making threatening communications over the internet and a very similar case so it's not a foregone conclusion that the result would be the same at the district court went through the process i would like to address the notification of risks condition of the court which would like me to or if you have further questions on that internet ban ok i'll move on to the notification of risk this condition plainly is ambiguous as to the term risk and as to the individuals to whom risks must be just disclosed that is plain under this court's decision  evans court easily could have just remained to impose the new condition they didn't do that did they say anything about the new condition that indicates it wasn't acceptable yes they said we were going to remand it the evans court says it doesn't cure the problem is not cured by giving an unfettered power of interpretation to the probation officer both the condition most must provide guidance to both the probation officer and the defendant and i would note for the court that there's a growing consensus that this condition is to begun in every case in which it supplied the district court needs to set parameters for the probation officer that is the seventh circuit the tenth circuit in whole the second circuit and bowls the six thirty it and i would note that in the government cited hole in its twenty eight j but i actually cited it in the reply brief because i believe it strongly support our position in the hall at the sentencing hearing the district court gave guidance to the probation officer as to who to whom the risks must be disclosed employers and what kinds of risks must be disclosed those having to do with home invasions and bank robberies so the whole court said the probation officers discretion was cabot and and plainly under the reasoning of evans the  which says to impose such a condition the use of the computer in the internet has to be essential or interpol to the crime and that clearly is the case if the defendant used the computer in the internet to make his threats moreover  court's case law on this type of condition moreover you have to evaluate the condition in light of the evidence in this case of lack of evidence of this but the court had a tendency what the court knew was that the defendant w homeless and used a computer in a public library to make the file threats he made there is absolutely no evidence or no argument even that he had some legitimate need to use a computer early was making with human use of the computer it why couldn't the restriction be that he cannot post anything through a computer but what would prevent him from buying things from amazon or safeway delivery i mean there are lots of things you can use the internet for watching a movie or anything where he is just receiving information rather than sending information well in the condition actually into supports that that may be needed in the future because it allows the probation office to to basically approve the use and it also allows or requires a monitoring software on any computer he's using to clip the condition in as a whole clearly anticipates at some time he will be using the computer in the internet it lots of our cases say that allowing the probation officer to make exceptions doesn't solve something that is otherwise a problem so i'm not sure how that may be the problem is we have a conflict in our case law up between riordan and some of these other cases if you have conflict in your case law it can't be plainer for the judge to fall in line in cases over another and that is clearly the standard here because there was no real whether involved child procedural requirements needed to be taken and needed to be done i don't think so because i think you have to look at it in light of the facts that were presented to the judge as to what kind of interest was at issue here and like i said more specifically in the absence i mean this is unusual case in the sense that there is no suggestion that the defendant had any legitimate need or made job and i don't know what percentage of jobs in today's workforce require some contact with computers and internet but i suspect it's a pretty large number and as you say that the condition anticipate getting permission and anticipates that if adjustments need to be made the district court's in a position to make them but it does seem to provide at least a little bit of a handcuff at the beginning as he begins his supervised release and i guess he's on supervised release from our right is that correct that's correct it was time served and so now he's been supervised release for what half is time  and i've actually i think that makes sense that you would want the most severe restriction at first and then as the probation officer in the court sees how the defendant is progressing you can make adjustments in the  don't just like to note that the cost was pretty packing him in the first amendment wasn't raised this issue was not addressed and would cost riordan was i believe two thousand and three that was far before the internet was considered essential or considered to be a particularly significant liberty interest these are all pure questions of law so this court does have discretion to review them to know both but as i've tried to explain i believe that plain error is satisfied  and united states versus joseph seven sixteen f third twelve seventy three provide is authority for the pure question of law and upon the notification of wrists i've explained why i think evans plainly require the probation officer officers discretion in the m published case mentioned by my colleague there was no discussion of all of the other circuits that have been holding that this condition is plainly begun gives too much discretion and in fact the ron illegally imposed supervised release condition that is part of the court's sentence by definition effect substantial rights and undermines the integrity of the system thank you thank you in the case