validly limit insurance coverage in this case on insurance motors coverage and met pay benefits three quote requirements must be met in a standard that the clarity requirement the prominence requirement and requirement prohibiting double premiums in the present that are benefits which are dispute are the met pay benefits and uninsured motorist benefits i would ask the court to review e r four four eight which is the med pay provision in the subject but also must not be difficult to understand well the count so much is hard to understand about the sentence particularly that says that the maximum recovering under all coverage forms or policies combined make the flaw but not exceed the highest applicable limit for anyone fearful that easy to understand well the problem with that your honor is that for one the vast supreme court in taurus gives the example of what the court needs to address when evaluating whether or not the lng which is easy to understand the language itself feels to specify that the total un coverage is limited to the coverage of any single vehicle it does not state in simple terms that the insurer will not pay more than the limit of coverage court will do is they'll look at the entire policy and when you look at the other components and under the nevada uninsured endorsement on this particular policy there's conflicting lane which throughout the first page word has the end i stacking n coverage of one million dollars each in that p f ten thousand dollars each so when you look at all of the factors regard within that policy a average i'm sure is going to question whether or not one provision applying when it conflicts with the other provision that saying that there isn't this provision we're talking about with the language the maximum recovery highlighted it's in large or high it's very prominent in the policy prominence there's a section regarding exclusions which is different the limitations of liability and then the bass supreme court said that when you're looking at the promise requirement has to direct the reader's attention to that specific provision of the policy in the newman case there was multiple bold headings that directed the reader's attention away from the end i stacking language and they said by doing that that effectively rendered the prominence inadequate  the area where it does have the large when you look at the policy there's not only large wall premie guarding exclusion but there's various bold headings throughout there who isn't insured exclusions other insurance duties in the event of an accident claim place it in a box setting it apart from the rest of the policy so it directs the reader's attention to that specific part of the of the policy in the newman case because they have never had a supreme court has not specifically required that there be a box or any particular form and as long as the three general clark terry are met her at that's correct but what the supreme court said is that the insurance company has the draft of the of the of the insurance policy has to do something more to set it apart from the rest of the policy in  yesterday we reviewed the determination by the district court in noble or is it clearly erroneous with regard to the district court finding of fact on questions such as prominent i'm sorry could you please repeat that standard of review are we reviewing to novo we look at the language for ourselves and decide whether as a matter of law in light of all of these nevada supreme court cases this case falls in this box or that box or do we review the determined so then we would review those under a clearly erroneous standard would we not using the same analysis that the vast supreme court does when they evaluate lower court decisions regarding the three factors of six hundred seventy point one four five assuming the facts as found by the district court with regard to prominence and the other that directed the reader's attention away from the from the and i stacking language in the court found that because it directs you away from and not directly to it that the promise require had not been that  there's also the failure of the insurance company to a following the prohibition against double premiums in this case there was no discount given for the multi vehicles in fact the respondent emitted the response states that the premium was determined for each vehicle each vehicle had the u i and coverage of one million in ten thousand met pay and each vehicle was charged the same premium again the the testimony or the affidavit of the player's expert tom score again confirm that based upon his analysis of that that there was basically a separate premium was charged for each one of the district court strike that part of mr corrigan's declaration by sustaining an objection that it lacked foundation in terms of underwriting information as to how the premium was computed what the what the there was no specific order that was given by the court in their decision they did characterize it as him not having sufficient foundation to make that make that determination however that an evidentiary ruling yes it is your honor the the next issue is whether or not mr perk suffer any type of injury a corporation that cannot have a family member throughout the pleadings throughout everything in this case their position has been the name insured was the corporation so the bini case is the case and gives us guidance on what we do in that that's clear on its face morning or your honour's my name is larry panic i represent the kelly any i c c i'm also here today joined by co counsel philip to barry who also represents any i c c and what we would like to do a possible as i would like to address the the briefing as well as this morning there's been some discussion about the burden of proof and what the law applies and who has the responsibility of doing what this case involves i believe correctly a mix question of fact and of law clearly with respect to the questions of why it would be the novo review but there were questions of fact decided meaning the prominence and as well as the evidence relating to the premium calculations and the evidence supporting those premium calculations and and s piece would you address specific wentworth or in your view those should be treated differently and why your answer is yes what it is well i don't think they're treated differently and yes i'd be happy to address that your honor i don't think they're treated differently with respect to the legal analysis and this is why mr santos asserted that the policy contains no language or limiting anti stacking language with respect to the met payments and i think that's following and then it flips over to the next page at the beginning and it talks about the limits of insurance subsection d and that language is identical to the limit of insurance language which is included in the you am amendment or endorsement rather for the judgments which were decided by the district court sort of preempted any further discovery it's probably safe assumption that there are significant additional medical expenses that are out there that were not compensated under this policy i cannot speak on the record does not speak to whether those medical expenses been paid by some other source i don't know what is clear is that upon review of the claim any i c c paid what they believe was the complete limit under the policy the one million dollars on the un claim and then the ten thousand dollars on the auto medical payments claim for a total of one million ten thousand dollars so that that payment was made and then the question became is mr perkel able to stack these coverages or claims stacking under the test for policy and the court below of course concluded that because the language was clear and prominent and that there was no premium paid for this additional coverage that sacking was not allowed under nevada law was mr perkel on the employer's clock at the time the accident occurred  u may have been he appears that he was probably driving back but he had use of the vehicle we were not contesting that he was able to use the vehicle for personal use as well so he would have been as long as he was in the vehicle and occupying the vehicle he would have been following he would have felt alone within the coverage under the un provision what was my question really was whether or not he would have been entitle to workers compensation benefits i believe he isn't entitled to workers compensation benefits but again your honor that record is not clear and just to be fair i mean it's just doesn't speak to that we didn't get into that discovery because we believe as the district court agreed with us that we didn't have responsibility beyond what we've already paid just to address for a couple of moments if i could a couple of issues that mr santos raised as i'm sure you would expect we believe that the language is very clear and is not confusing at all the cases in the battle have made it clear that there are there is no magic formula for this language that as long as you clearly state what the purpose and effect of this anti stacking language is will and in fact in the both decision it found that the court found language that's almost identical to the language in our policy to be acceptable they both cases sent it back down but not for that reason and and they said that  e also found a language to be very similar to our language to be acceptable and i think there's little question that in fact in the both decision it's interesting because the court reviews its language and says something to the effect that it's difficult to imagine how the language could be much clearer if you're trying to tell an insured that they are going to receive but a single limit for uninsured motorist claims and of course this is the same language that is found in the medical payment coverage provision with respect to the prominent decision i think there some ironically confusion about the application of the newman decision in newman the court was faced with a policy that was in double space format and the original policy did not have and by stacking language so the insurer then issued an amendment to the policy which included this anti sacking language except that the problem the court found in newman is that this amendment was in exactly the same form and double space and not all caps it wasn't bold and it was simply the same format so and additionally the other problem that they found in human was that the the numbering or the outline format that was used in the meme and did not correlate with the outline format that had been used in the policy in other words it looked sort of like you may have had an amendment for the box there was no bolding there was no capitalization and so the numa court said this is simply inadequate in order to inform the insured and alert them to the fact that this language exists and the effect it might have in the case is not required that language be presented in a particular way it just has to be presented in some way to draw the insureds attention to the issue and in the both in the search decisions they were presented with language or a formatted language where the language was capitalized and voted and the courts included that it was sufficiently prominent and in fact the those decisions addressed a couple of the points that the opponents make in their brief they say first that it doesn't have to be on the same page in other words you can have the language on a couple of pages as the both court says the issue is one of prominence not immediacy so you don't have to read it the first thing you just have to be able to see to the stands out somewhere and they also said that the fact that you have more than one area of the policy highlighted does not diminish the adequacy of the prominence meaning that if there are multiple clauses that have been capitalized or bolded that's ok as long as you've taken the effort and have allowed the insurer to realize that there is some something unusual or something different about this language they need to pay attention to and this policy our policy there are a couple of things that do this first under the coverage form and this is true in the nevada changes which refers to  the referring to the medical payment provision it's also true in the un form both places the policy does this there's language which says that the anti stacking provisions are bold and highlighted and capitalized so they inform ensure that if you read this policy suddenly there's a paragraph t capitalized and bold and the reason it's there is because it's not by stacking ok and then when you go through the policy you come across these several places where the limits of insurance are indeed capitalized and bolted and the reason they do that is the policy is already saying this your honor it's exciting to be here it's a pleasure to be here so i get carried away let me just let me just do this your honor on the third issue i just want to address that briefly there is an evidentiary question question there was no objection the evidence we presented at the trial level the district court believed the evidence and found that it was persuasive and that it was adequate incomplete in them a straight in that there was no premium paid beyond a coverage of one million dollars per vehicle her accident which is exactly what the policy says is what the underwriting material say and what mr grant says and the court in declaration was discounted by the district court as set forth in the order and therefore should not be considered at this level because the record is simply absent of please the court good morning i'm here to address the distinction of the class one versus class two insured we believe that the lower court properly concluded that the appellant in this matter was a class to ensure the reliance upon that starts with the case of policy he did not pay any of the premiums on the policy he did not negotiate or bargain for any of the terms of the insurance contract he didn't have any right to modify or cancel the contract nor did he have any statutory right to accept or reject the coverage for us or medical payment benefits the reason the bini case is important because it's pacifically delineate between a class one a person who has the contract who has a reasonable expectation to have the contract honored and they are tied to no matter what vehicle there and it's personal in nature or as an employee such as the impelling just like in many cases with cunningham i believe linda or many of those line of cases that were cited within the case cite to the fact that the person is only covered because they're an occupant or permissive user that's what demonstrates them or makes them a class to they're not saying they're not insured they're just saying they're only insured for purposes of this one vehicle but they would not have any brown really have to address the second question right class two and so for honestly i believe you would not have to your honor and it's but it is interesting to note that and the minority of states that were cited to by plaintiff's counsel as being supportive of stacking they specifically said in fleet policy situations such as pennsylvania i believe rhode island and even mississippi said we won't allow an athlete covered situation and the basis for that a simple the rationale is simple public policy they don't want to rewrite insurance contracts every time an incident were to occur if we were to take appellant's argument to its logical conclusion they would simply say we insert the name of an employee of the named insured and he would distort the contract but more importantly in this specific situation thirty two vehicles in a million dollar liability limit for us coverage you would be asking for exponential coverage just short of just north of twenty four million past one billion dollars for three thousand five hundred twenty dollars premium and the courts have consistently held whether it was in cunningham whether it was and whitman which is a recent oklahoma supreme court case which follows the cunningham position that that's not what the parties bargained for that's not the risk that they anticipated and if you were to do that it would expose insurance or insures such as national american insurance company of california to risk that was not contemplated and would not be fair and such a decision which sends shock waves through a legal community and it's important consistent application be followed through the line of cases of cunningham up to the present we believe that public policy should be taken this case that to ask the insurer to go beyond what they contracted for it's clearly irrelevant due to the fact that we also believe anything that the underwriting risk was calculated on the assumption that there would be multiple vehicles on the road being driven by many different employees but the fact that mr perkel might drive different vehicles in the fleet does not make him a class submit your honor that this policy there's no if you follow their reason there's no class one insurer because a corporation cannot suffer a personal injury but there's no they've written policy where nasty court has said that when you when you're looking at the relationship of the person that is rich receiving the coverage where are they are they going to have a relationship to that contract or are they someone who's just because they were occupied inside i can be in the that the number of vehicles involved is greater so there's no distinction between a fleet policy and a personal policy but what we look at the supreme aspirin court said was that the decision is in part based on express provisions of the contract so you have a situation here when you look at underwriting paperwork that's part of the part of the of the record specifically says that all drivers must be endorsed on the policy so when you look on the declaration where it left the drivers you've got the namesake of the company jack corporations insured the corporation acts by and through its employees and so this is the way they work that's not the question i'm asking i mean the fact that the practice in the industry is to ask for a listing of all of the people who might be insured under the policy doesn't necessarily answer the question as to whether their class went to class to insure it depends on how the term insured is defined in the policy that's correct your honor but when an individual policy if the insured means you and your children then the courts say that all of those people might be class one insurance but guess might be class food that's correct ok and so the question here is whether or not employees are more like gas or more like children in a fleet policy well i think goes one step further because the way the way this policy was was underwritten all of the driving records of each of these employees had to be considered there were some employees that the company completely disagreed so they weren't going insure mr perkel the evidence is is rebutted that he would have to submit not only his driving record where they would get is where they would get information regarding his  instruction record i don't mean redundant but also they would look at other factors regarding whether or not they were going to insure whether or not there were accidents etc whether or not they even very able to have the the medical ability to apply for various types of licenses to drive some of those vehicles so all the people on that policy how to submit information to the insurer and it was a question whether or not they would be insured or they wouldn't be insured the and perhaps since nevada has not ruled on this that's a question that that