submitted a lengthy brief in reply to the appeal we use responding brief in a nutshell this can be brought down to a very simple issue and it's a two step analysis the first being with regard to the judgment that was set forth without prejudice it was reviewed and rewritten by the district judge the question is is this court going to approve that fearne judgment that was entered by the second court judge fisher and said preston that a judgment can be challenging reviewed at any time such as in this case multiple years past that the judge counsel you you filed you took an appeal from judge morrow's order that's correct and you told this court that it was a final judgment is correct so why aren't you judicially a stopped from coming forward now and telling us that it was in the final judgment that would deprive us of jurisdiction you accept you allow this court to accept full jurisdiction over your appeal here the case it went against you and then you come back and tell us why you didn't really have jurisdiction not exactly understand the question it's a good point is we're not saying there was not jurisdiction a first time if it was without prejudice in this court in the cooper versus rameau's seven zero four if third seven seven to nine circuit twenty twelve case analyze the cases we talked about you know brief them a gallon defendants it was taken on appeal it was affirmed and so the judgment in favor of the defendant stands there still without prejudice here you can't then bring another action raising the same without prejudice and a plaintiff will choose to stand on the complaint not amend the complaint in which case it converts to a final judgment that is appealable even if the judges that are going to allow you time to do that at the very different situation here for reasons the judge judge  could is describing but what i'm concerned about is that you told us it was a final judgment and now you're telling us it's not a final judgment and i want to know why judicial stoppel isn't appropriate here to enter stand the questions anderson the point again going back to the same two issues i would have no you may i say still not understanding what you're hoping to him and well we're asking the court stay you have to file something you have to a man to file an amended something so what is the abandoned something said because i'm not allowing you to bring in these already yes there are no tribal issues of fact on those issues that the wrong parties are before the court in fact most and for summary judgment was based precisely on that that the parties brought before the court did not have haven't got that i don't even think i've gotten close to a satisfactory answer yet so i understand that you think that under cooper it depends on what the district judge intended so did you think at the time that judge morrow issued her judgment that she was not issuing a final final but without prejudice that the coupe report talks about and it's exactly with the technology and almost lines of cases talk about they say that it can be without prejudice that there can be dismissed without prejudice that final if the courts intention of those theories and or in this case those parties involved would be dismissed in denied the grant of leave certain of those cases actually went forward and said there are certain cases where there is without prejudice becomes in this case is we took a judgment in the judgment was clear and unambiguous and it was reviewed it was analyzing it was rewritten in essence passed rule fifty nine to twenty a day deadline for asking for a challenge statutory standing where we disagree with the being statutory standing we think is class court of oracle three still you're supposed to have the personal representatives of the suit and you didn't have that that's correct and that's an element of the where we would dispute that it's an element of the claim i know judge fisher determined that it was an element of the claim we don't believe it is a statutory standing we need it's basically a prerequisite for instance that was something you can phrase on appeal and i don't get back to where i was headed yes so now you have the correct personal representatives and it's you can't file a new action because you're barred by the statute of limitations is that right the decision took the plaintiffs we had which were family members not personal representatives and determined it was too late if the court would not allow us to use seventeen a which we believe was in error as judge reinhardt did when he descended to that appeal  those parties would not be allowed to proceed or following other action this is we're talking with different parties now is the proper parties in a case that the court ruled on with a personal representative  those who would have to have personal representatives and i didn't have it right i was basically in a case like why would you leave this in why would you believe this in the alternative if there was some question about whether you had personal representatives under dosa at the time we did it was not a question for us and did not refer to article three can you point to any place and judge and judge morrow's summary judgment grant that that reference is article three of the constitution it didn't records either statutory or article three but just basic analysis of article three standing we have the right people before the court and it's basically over there where article three standing cases cited in that can you point to anything in judge moore's order that suggested that she was referring to shed article three in mind she didn't suggest either standing there's no authority set forth at all did she refer to any cases in which article three standing is the principal issue she didn't argue either way the now i just mentioned argued either way i just wanted a simple yes or no i think that can be answered yes or no yes she did not it is part of your concern is that it was after the fact parties are going back and trying to say would her intention was rather than what the judgment says the judgment is not ambiguous there's been no argument that it was a million biggest is what her intentions were in so in effect with two places they were to reevaluation which she meant to do in fact that the judge fischer said that on the record that she knew what she meant to timeframes for doing so and allow them to do it without first determine if there's any ambiguity in the judgment which could have been challenged if counsel or obstructed the party pelley had an issue with that during the relevant time frames but was not morning christopher on behalf of international these finance corporation i think the court is well in tune with what's going on here in the original action and what we refer to as hostname one everyone involved understood that judge morals order was a final order the plaintiffs knew was a final order because they appealed it and how did they feel that they cited to twenty eight u s c twelve ninety one which is for final orders we didn't contest the fact that there was an appeal we accepted this court's jurisdiction on the first appeal and proceeded we briefed it we argued before this court and i didn't challenge any of the court's decision  this court knew it was a file an appeal the order from judge moral because jurisdiction was accepted the court entertain briefs argument and issued its decision judge morrow knew it was a final  decision because in there's a companion case that's referenced in the excerpts of record called abdala and at page one thirteen of the excerpts the record judge morrow in this companion case is talking about her ruling in the dollar case and judge fisher knew it was a final an appealable order and her analysis which is part of this appeal is clear that all parties understood we proceed as if it was a final an appealable order by judge or by judge morrow and it makes sense why if this was if judge marls two thousand and fourteen ruling was simply an interim order why would she have issued a judgment it doesn't make sense in two thousand and eleven in hostname one i o c had moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim and said plants are proceeding under california state law this case is governed by the death on the high seas act two thousand and eleven judge morell grants the motion to dismiss and says to plaintiffs you have twenty days to leave to amend your your complaint so clearly the court the district court understood that if it was dismissing and giving plaintiffs an opportunity to replete properly it knew how to proceed then why did she say without prejudice in a summary judgment order that's a good question and your honor i think we can all speculate as to the reasons but i do personally think it's a scrivener's they're there for whatever reason she put down her kidney that she expected perhaps the appointment at some point some reasonable point by the state courts of that person not represent the correct personal representatives and she might have been leaving that open for that to occur but instead the eleven the opportunity to commence that process which even they admit would take time if they did not meet and they did nothing they did nothing ok and through the appeal the first appeal they had done nothing and information to indicate that person representative that the plaintiffs are truly a court appointed person representatives as required by dosa now but if they're bringing it under current law is it the more law require a person represented consideration here because plaintiffs in the briefing in this appeal referenced some tack but some tech was a removal case based on general diversity jurisdiction or thirteen thirty two here we have kind of an overlay that removal and provides its own statute of limitations on murder forty six us c three zero three zero one i believe it is and that's a three year statue imitation that's what the court judge moral was relying on in two thousand and fourteen when she said those applies to this case the general maritime statue limitations applies because that's what dosa incorporates and therefore it's three years i don't think they get to apply the more and we don't even know if truly has this statue limitations and in fact that was one of the criticisms in judge morals two thousand and eleven order motion to dismiss in that order she discusses the fact that plaintiffs have pled generally foreign law and one of the things that judge morrow said was i can't rule on that that claim because you haven't even specified what countries law applies what that law is so plaintiffs knew in two thousand and eleven not only did they have to get appointments as personal representatives by the court but they also had to specify what foreign law applied to their claims and they didn't do that and they filed the second amended complaint and they filed the third amended complaint and simply repeated those types of general allegations about any other laws domestic or foreign and so they never corrected what judge morell had told them they needed to address so what we have here is nothing short of just basic claim splitting plaintiffs knew in the original action that they were looking at foreign law as a possible law to apply in haass not the one they that case it's had pled the specific more in law so that was already known it was out there and yet the plaintiffs in the house and not the one who are the players here today never amended to correct the pleading which judge moral told them that they in fact had to do provide the specifics and they chose not to do that so the errors here are just compounding we had the original errors of personal representatives being that they never took care of that they  never did what judge morell had directed them to do proceeded with the appeal having not done it last now they're coming back on a second point the judge moral had already pointed out to them in two thousand and eleven and they didn't correct since th just briefly the standing issue as the court noted article three standing was never an issue never raised never briefed never discussed this was always about dosa standing statutory stand which really is a misnomer it's not truly standing when you talk about statutory staying what we're talking about is do we have the right parties in front of the court and dosa specifies that you must be a personal represent and a personal representative is clearly understood to mean court appointed so that we know when we're dealing with a particular plaintiff who is court appointed and a judgment is entered and a payment has to issue as a result of that judgment that from my client's perspective the case is done we don't have to worry about a new plane of coming forward and saying that person wasn't the proper representative and that's why dosar requires personal representatives that they be court appointed that would never obtain and that was the basis of the first appeal so having lost on that issue they've now decided to try another route which is the standing issue claiming more law applies when they knew there was that possibility in the first action and that was the basis for why the judge fisher granted the motion to dismiss on hossa not to finding that they had every opportunity and they never took that opportunity up and had they done so perhaps we would still be going forward and hostname one we're not they knew it was a final order they appealed that they lost and now they're trying simply for a second bite at the apple the court has no further questions i will law proceeded without personal representative so those issues were resolved that we were able to do the same thing in this case just to give some point of reference in a quote from mclaughlin versus smith in answer your questions your honor is where it said that cases of dismiss without prejudice may be intended to in the litigation the court involved but not to act as an adjudication on the merits of the board find a similar action or another court the point being on the merits this is a case we never touched the marriage never addressed the merits was never ruled on merits it basically was having the right parties involved classic article three standing issues there's no showing that comal law would require personal representatives be appointed to proceed that case we believe that's accurate that's what happened in the up to a case they were not perceiving under personal representatives and the point in this case is that no merits were addressed in this case there was a judgment was entered the judgment was written clear in on a on a big never was there is no authority anywhere in the briefing in the orders in the rulings that say that those who are standing is statutory standing it turns the throng around a lot there is no case on point with  that basically in this case it's a classic article three standing you could be anybody named as a personal representative they don't have to have any connection to the families and if they any connection to the case to have any connection to the litigation it is not an element of the claim it was a basic pursue your requisite and with that also made i appreciate your time thank you thank you very much as i'm not a person necessarily finance corporation is