sir thank you judge king who made please the court the district court in this case and a policeman area injunction they did two things st the injunction prohibited county boards of election for matching the signature on an absentee ballot it's the issue of standing was not worried by either party but i have a question about the league's organizational standing do you have a matching without proper procedures but in light of the directive that was issued by director and dino the day before the injunction was entered there is no more signature matching in south carolina which means there is no injury in fact for any member of the basis i don't believe so your honor and they certainly have been leaked certainly haven't played anything other than a diversion of resources theory the other issue here is that they don't need they're not needed to pursue these claims on behalf of anyone because certainly the individual members are more than capable of filing this lawsuit were they to have any injury that could arise from what happened and just one of them i think you're right to go to the article three issues in the st instance and while we think standing is a concern the other problem here is movement so even if they can get over this standing hurdle the case is moot the very day director randy you know followed her supplemental declaration that said in fact our survey revealed dying counties were matching signature she also issued a directive that said simply if you are matching signatures you must cease immediately and if you have set any ballots aside based on signature matching you must put them with the ballots to be counted therefore there  carolina law in dispute is unambiguous because as unambiguous there is no need for agency interpretation of this they are bound to apply the law as the general assembly wrote it i think this statute is unambiguous for at least two reasons explicitly say there may be no signature matching with absentee ballots but two rules of statutory construction mean that's exactly what the statute provides for and the st is i was just so you're saying it is split leigh sales where you're saying did said that and it does not say that your honor if i said the statute explicitly said no signature matching that i misspoke to be precise the statute using standard tools of statutory construction statue of your arm but we think that would be unnecessary for two reasons one is this statute does not explicitly provide for signature matching and because agencies only have the authority granted them by the general assembly the lack of authority to match signatures means that the thief a doesn't exist the nd rule of statutory construction is the rule that when a legislature uses words in one part of a statute but does not use them in another that means that the omission is intentional in south carolina as voting laws kalen these were engaged in the managing that led to the judge in the st ones just call up whether or not the counties are right can interpret it now fundamentally south carolina law gives the executive director of the commission the authority to resolve disputes with county boards that section seven dash three dash twenty five when directors and dinos directive was issued on october th that for bait any county board from continuing signature matching however it may interpret section four hundred and twenty and what's there forbidden from doing that that was the end of any possibility of signature matching and it's important to be clear on a couple of points one is the district court found below the commission was genuinely unaware that signature matching was taking place and director randy you know said that her seventeen years as executive director which is how far back our institutional memory goes there been no policies no training there's been nothing about signature matching and if you compare the conversations with charles but i don't know the details of all of them what i do know ultimately is they were told they couldn't use commission funds because it wasn't a procedure that had been approved charleston county never brought it back up again and as far as the commission knew that was the end of any attempt to match signatures so that no one of the commission thought that any county was going to go ahead and proceed with doing that but the other my going back to the petition ken is because i do think this is particularly important interpret in the statute that section says that signatures must be checked for validity against the signatures of the voters on the original application for registration the general assembly knew how to require signature matching when he wanted to we did that for petition candidates in and four just two years before and section four hundred and twenty eight did not require that would suggest that if the journalist simply had thought it was already requiring signature matching and for twenty it could have used the exact same language it was in for twenty the difference there is it was moot i couldn't you won't act after the appeal was bought and claimed it was moot the the urgency we moved within this court was simply because election day was seven days away and we needed it was a resolution to whether or not any part of could be state pending during the appeal the district court has since stayed the case pending this appeal to see how that might impact anything going forward i see that my time has expired and i look forward to reply senate we join in the argument that mr lambert just advance and want to reinforce a couple of important points pacifically from the perspective of the legislature itself as mr labor began effect is that way but the reasoning is based on the federal constitution how this been hearse the plot well you know we don't read the the the court's order with regard particularly to the portion of the injunction that is ordering state officials to follow a law is being rooted in the state in the federal constitution the court says you know follow your own rules that's exactly what pin her suppress i think in flated or fused those two steps it's awarded to say hey this is about the united states constitution but it's not about you know a state's constitution in the st instance in the st issue because the question there is is are irrelevant a lot of the answer the st question and i think that's why there is perhaps a confusion as to just girls references to the constitution again i would stress all the parties and is it your position that the injunction order was improper at the time because it did not consider the direct i don't think the order addresses it all and i think the timing that would just reference maybe maybe part of the reason for that or is that the direct changes the circumstances which might or might not lead to a modification for the general sent his perspective there was there was never and never has been afforded a signature match so the fact that the executive director said this much in a directive didn't create new all didn't change anything didn't do anything but clear that from the director's perspective that was not possible and the statute makes clear that in differences of opinion of that kind the directors opinion or directive governs such an extent there was a big unity in the minds of the matching to review reject otherwise thousands submitted absentee ballots they were doing so without any training they were doing so largely without providing notice to voters any opportunity to cure or any other procedural protections so the gesture court considered this conduct and concluded that it likely violated the constitution that the other winter factors were met and issued a preliminary injunction on that it basis oppose respectfully request that this court affirm the injunction at the likelihood of success issue for an injunction and the irreparable harm issue for the injunction seems to me that it leads needs to be  reason that you can look at those two issues with the directive employees and not consider that in the analysis well i think it's important to look at the circumstances that were for the court signature matching after those allegations on october th plaintiff amended the complaint with additional allegations there was certainly no outreach to the county boards in response of those allegations there wasn't any investigation of those allegations instead the also submitted in that affidavit that they had been contacted by charleston county to inquire about the purchase of signature matching software for absentee ballots which at the very least suggests that charleston county was considering signature matching but there no evidence that in response to that the state did anything to prevent signature mashing so you know contrary to the arguments that a balance of mate they didn't act immediately they they didn't act until they were ordered by the district court on the st after all argument remain completely unknown including charleston county one county berkeley county said simply that they were planning to follow section seven hundred and fifteen dollars for twenty of the statute which defendants acknowledged was unclear as to whether they were actually engaging in signature matching so it was only at this point that the october th directive is filed so than the question is really you know at that point is it an abuse of discretion for the district court looking at this record to conclude that that directive which doesn't say anything about whether the state is going to take any steps to you know to confirm whether it's been complied with which you know didn't itself confirm if it had been received by the county courts it was  likelihood of success in the reparable harm when even if it's just a couple hours before the order is issued there's a directive that says don't do it so even if everything you're saying and you know yonder stand that but you know with that in place it seems like we would need to know the effect of the directive if it went to poise before the order in order to determine whether the order was appropriate position and the teacher so i think you know this really again good just goes back to the to the record before the court so appellants decision is that this is the longstanding interpretation of south carolina law but the problem is that interpretation doesn't appear to have been conveyed at any point it certainly wasn't conveyed to the county boards you know the the affidavit from defendant and you know you know basically says we th directive and the problem with the directive is that it's really the type of executive action that can be changed at any time so you know they entered it essentially overnight there's nothing preventing the defendants from entering a different directive or resending that directives were not aware of and what what what what what more would you want to what they did so i mean they they have a couple of options i think i mean  the election commission has the authority to enter binding regulations which can't be revoked at a moment's notice because they're you know issued through the administrative procedures act there  you know they could i suppose take further action relating to compliance supervision and force that that they haven't taken to the stage to our knowledge you know again the only thing that they have pointed to is the october th directive they haven't actually submitted any evidence that signature matching didn't take place after the director was entered now certainly we're not opposed have no evidence that the preliminary injunction has been sort of specify mootness as such that was really in the reply brief in response to the issues that we raised that they were really talking about witness but again we think that it's also we also think that the case case law that action taken such as a directive that defendant retains the authority and the capacity to withdraw doesn't serve to move the case so we would suggest that the mood is that she just simply isn't no we wouldn't we wouldn't agree i don't think that this portion of the i don't think this portion of the order is is you know rewriting state law as i believe it was characterized before i think this is the district court t state and federal law that results from helen's argument but it's not about whether south carolina law you know permits for hits notice inter periods it's about what would be required to bring the state well i can that the question is really you know whether to cut it's absolutely clear that the conduct in question is not going to reoccur in the future and the october th directive because of the way that it was issued and also because of the history you know leading up to the issuance of the directive which was really one of you know of a lack of supervision a lack of action i think you know it's they simply haven't defined and simply to our lane disses the issue of interference with mission and diversion of resources sure absolutely your honor and of course as as you're well aware the court needs only find standing with respect to one of the plaintiffs so anyone will be sufficient but but with respect to the to the league in particular and accepting it's true all the material allegations in the complaint and considering in favor of the complaining party  standing because they have th demonstrated that on the allegations that their ability to provide services that are essential to their functions so the advocacy advocacy services that they provide such as voter registration and educational assistance fund raising have been impaired by the un consitutional signature matching procedures because they've had to divert resources away from those away from those essential functions in order to address the inquiries from  you know from their members and other members of the voting public to investigate ballot rejection and provide additional education as to how to attempt to comply with with the various how to tend to comply with the various requirements in effect and so so because those because the excuse me because the challenge for c ger's interfere with that essential it's really about whether it's the essential functions of the organization that are being undermined and stone you know if this isn't a case where they have simply made a discretionary decision to use resources  for you know for something for something for to address exceed need to address the conduct that's ongoing this is a case where they really have no other choice but to expend resources that otherwise would be used for for active you to central to their function and and so it impairs their ability to to exercise essential functions as a result of that we think is sort of squarely on point here sense since you pelleas are challenging the program as it exists at the time the complaint was filed and not some sort of his future course of action but really we think that this is along with the standing arguments that are violates south carolina law and that this relates to the court's authority to enter the injunction is just incorrect and hearst doesn't stand for the proposition that the court's authority hinges on whether the conduct is lawful under state law it's whether the federal court enjoined conduct on the basis of state as opposed to federal law and that's that's just not what the just reported here clearly assessed plaintiff's claims which are federal constitutional claims assessed him on that case let's assess them according to the the state cannot engage in signature matching without providing notice i'm sure and i see that i see that my time is concluded so i'd be happy to answer any further questions but otherwise thank you for your attention gets more good hard bob anything else are specific procedures for what d to do with an absentee ballot when it's returned that's pages one hundred and fifty two thousand one hundred and fifty one of the joint appendix if you contrast that with the process for checking signatures on petition applications at page one hundred and seventy two of the joint appendix you will see exactly what signature matching looks like in when counties have been told to do it the fact that they were not told not to do it isn't the question it's that they weren't told to do it because agency authority has to be an express grant we can't have rules for everything a county might do that's improper it be like having a rule for everything a child isn't supposed to do that you couldn't imagine you can imagine telling your seven year old don't spray paint the dog that will only happens when you to spray paint and spray paints the dog fundamentally here the statute has been and is unambiguous using basic tools of statutory construction this court frequently uses tools of statutory construction and step on which the doctrine recognized under south carolina law to determine whether a statute that is put into effect by an agency is in fact ambiguous or not and those tools here both the medical society decision from the supreme court of south carolina and the directive is what its position has always been which is there is no signature matching under south carolina law that ambiguity that lack of ambiguity goes to my nd point which is to the st part of the disk records injunction whether or not the directive was issued it would have been improper because the question here is not is signature matching without notice into a procedures sufficient it can you have signature matching and if you can all the procedure sufficient because the  texas department of corrections and injunction was entered by the district court in the fist arcade stated pending appeal writing the district court acknowledge that it's injunction largely overlap with the department's covert one thousand dollars policy requirements and recommendations and the district's court's view this was a virtue in not advice because it's injunction would promote compliance with its own policies and then the district excuse me the th circuit said ten hurst plainly prohibits such an injunction if you substitute texas department of corrections and coded one thousand dollars policies for south carolina election officials and signature matching the analysis is exactly this thing in my rd point goes to the nd part of the injunction the notice ensure procedures it's important to keep in mind here that signature matching is not required to the federal constitution for absentee voting to comply with constitutional requirements therefore the district courts in johnson ignores one of two statues a four hundred and twenty dollars is unambiguous it reads that the prohibition or lack of authority for signature matching out of state law allows it if somehow that provision is ambiguous the district court injunction means the executive directors authority under seven thousand three hundred and twenty five dollars to settle disputes with county maybe next year we'll be able to do that but the new circumstances will simply take the this case under advisement wish you all the best