concluded that the plaintiffs complaints state a cause of action for several reasons neither of them do first the field of alcohol related liability has been preempted by the general second century old and one way jurisprudence has firmly held that the plaintiffs in this case cannot establish the essential element of proximate cause third there is no duty fourth even if preemption principles are set aside and the broader concepts of duty and proximate cause are overlooked the plaintiff's complaints do not establish cause of action restatement of section eight seventy six this court and many appellate courts have consistently held that the general assembly through its initial enactment the tram shot back back and eight hundred seventy two and its continued amendments and adjustments to that act indicate that the general semele has preemptive the field of alcohol related liability supreme court here over the past four or five  thousand and three the general assembly after years and years of debates and acted in additional piece of legislation called the drug or alcohol impaired man or responsibility act and that got somewhat wider and created  different remedies against different classes of defendants including nonresidential owner owners or operators of nonresidential premises who permit the consumption of alcohol now in addition to the supreme court cases that have uniformly held that the field of alcohol related liability is generally left bess to the legislature the public courts under extremely  quarrelsome and disorderly incoherent patron out to his car where five of his children are sitting an accident occurred killing some of his children and that case in addition to finding no duty public court held that deferrals of the legislature was it was appropriate the plaintiff's complaints in this case each contain references over fifty times to alcohol or intoxication characterization of these complaints as anything but alcohol related would be a considerable stretch the trial court in th preemption principles altogether and to do so here would be a radical departure from starry decisis and would also frustrate the idea of the separation of powers now i mentioned earlier that an eight hundred seventy two dram shop act was passed and it created a remedy on known a common law and the reason for that was prior to its an a the courts and when we jurisprudence for closed these types of actions based on a lack of proximate cause a common law in illinois the proximate cause the superseding cause of incidents like this was unable bodied man voluntary consumption of alcohol and that constituted the proximate cause of any of his foolish acts and the damages that resulted in this case mr m departure doesn't do anything to frustrate the common law analysis that the proximate cause is an adult who takes to the road after becoming a taxi it and that expression has been more it didn't depend on the circumstances surrounding the departure from the tavern or the home where the wedding or the sporting events operated as a superseding cause what  action for the foolish acts upon the tax good person it didn't matter that the intoxicated taxation resulted from the gift or sale of alcohol for instance in the minor responsibility act one of the provisions doesn't have anything to do with gift or sale bell call it has to do with the permission of alcohol being consumed by minors i'm not a residential property so the plaintiffs have made the argument that well this section eight seventy six c well it's on stages position that a seventy six can that can be a cause of action oh under the circumstances in this case because the legislature has occupied the entire field in addition to the argument with respect to preemption plucking restatement eight seventy six doesn't necessarily leave aside the general principles of duty and proximate cause and in addition to continuing to defer to the legislature many cases including women are and burdensome but even if those cases incidentally also stand for the proposition that you don't even a ride to a general duty analysis without first inquiring about whether a special relationship existed in this invited our relationship had ceased by the time this accident occurred ten miles away from preemption a couple times counsel doesn't back to the injuries arising out of the sale or gift of alcoholic beverages and that exactly what a minor they would have through the legislature cause of action against onstage but mr modest was forty five years old in fact in this case the legislature has provided an additional remedy  to the plaintiffs that didn't exist the common law they could have sued the commercial provider of alcohol to mr moggs which would give them an additional remedy in addition to those  that are being sought against mr modest but even if the broader notions of duty and proximate causes illinois common law knows them and even if you apply the individual factors that restatement eight seventy six lists under the circumstances here and even if you set aside preemption principles the complaints don't state a cause of action there are several factors that seventy six with someone is the nature of the alcohol devoid from the complaints as any allegations that onstage somehow encouraged mr motus to drive on the wrong side of the road eighty miles an hour ten miles away  district case they believe not mention that you can't substantially assist if you're not there and so that leaves only whether or not the type of encouragement amounts to a level that triggers eight seventy six and certainly in this a state of mind unlike the woods versus cole case where a diabolical plan was hatched amongst the defendants here it can't be said that onstage had any malicious intent  area that the general assembly has occupied certainly every tavern through its marketing plans encourages people to consume alcohol for instance i mentioned earlier the wimmer case and in the wimmera case that case involve s two tab runs over the state line in wisconsin and since at the time they weren't subjected to the tram shop backed the plaintiff attempted to lodge a negligence case against those two taverns  alerted underage illinois residents across state lines through its marketing and advertising in addition to that when those underage folks would leave the taverns and travel back to illinois they were provided with maps that directed them to take certain routes that would have weighed police detection even under those facts and those quote unquote encouraging to drink etc supreme court back in eighty five deferred to the legislature and in addition held that there could be no duty that extended from those taverns to the place of the ax that's been in this case did  filled with social host cases where the causes of action have been declined thompson vs trickle involves a case where sears sponsored a party and restaurant  folks were required to drink and so in those cases the voluntary ness was an issue but it's on stages position that neither of those cases survive when they put him in the car well i think that you know any tavern that has a parking lot next door to it and the general sense knows then tax creative people can be involved in automobile accidents whether they could specifically foresee someone going eighty miles an hour on the wrong side of the road ten miles away i think is a different question i do think that in common law when they analyzed whether to extend liability under these circumstances under  proximate cause analysis it doesn't need me fit into the two pronged analysis that this court has adopted over the years it would probably be better suited to be analyzed hundred to the analysis and when that has been done by the may please the court i'm robert spears i represent ray and simmons as a special administrator of the state of his wife april summons and his daughter had assumed simmons i'm also arguing here in behalf of the third pla well i think what we've tried to emphasize throughout this case from the trial court right through here to the supreme court is that we're you know to focus on one particular part of the entire course of conduct isn't really  it's not our position that is that that is the same case that we're talking about here and whether or not there is or if it's a different case and i would say under those circumstances that you describe there probably isn't a duty  difference it's a huge difference it's if the basis of our case and are the basis of our case here is that the entire course of conduct of onstage here knowingly encourage the substantial assistance and conduct of the tort the tortious conduct of hamas it's the whole course of conduct and it starts frankly with the business plan and the crew and the if he's as we allege she is he was intoxicated when he left the premises of onstage and was intoxicated when this occurrence took place that's all part of the tortious conduct  of the encourage men and assistance that on stage provided him that's the basis of our allegation in this case and so what we are really saying here and what we've alleged is that on about the two stages of what home i just did here it was one getting intoxicated and then to driving while intoxicated and what did onstage do to actively encourage doesn't want to talk about the facts in this case and when he filed his brief his dissertation on the facts is about a half a page whereas the complaints that were filed in this case and the supplemental statement of facts that were included in the briefs of both of the apple leads here contain a litany of conduct on the part of on stage that in fact clearly demonstrates encouragement and drink and then somebody like this got in tax and put him in his car and said leave the house there be liability well that's again that's a different case and i suppose it's up to this court to decide whether there would be less that different it's a different case for a couple of reasons number one it's a social host case this is not a social hose case this is a business enterprise this court has addressed the social host issue on several occasions finding no liability for social host secondly the part one of the tort that we are saying here driving while intoxicated involves getting intoxicated the social host in most cases and even in the example you have given to me here to respond to is not invested in the in tax occasion of the on the drunk that alternately drives the car here we are alleging and we believe we will prove in this case that onstage was invested not just in the drinking by home ottis but in the intoxication of home ottis and the whole business plan was focused on them their best customer in this fluidity strip club was a customer who was impaired and so their whole plan here was to encourage that impairment and as we have alleged in our complaints in this case they did many things to help them get an intoxicated customer here and they in fact got one in the form of john home on a sin this case that's different from the social host who simply provides the alcohol it is not invested in the intoxication and in fact probably doesn't want the intoxication of its social yes now the act of forcing someone to drive away it's certainly not a positive says a course of conduct but may not be a viable cause of action based on this court's prior social host declarations and based upon the fact that the social host was not court and the appellate court decision were very careful to limit the scope of of their decisions in this particular case and again what we're really talking about here is a knowing course of conduct that actively assists and encourages both the intoxication for the personal gain of the a sister in this particular case it's the financial gain of vine states they wanted drunks in their place because they would spend more money and then after they got the drunks spending more money the drunk got so drunk he was no longer useful to them and at that point what they decided to do was force the drunk not only encourage the drunk but force the drunk to drive his automobile away from the premises and foist them on to the public highways of the state and that's the conduct we're addressing and that is a very noble situation it is our position it is not we're not asking for a dramatic expansion of any social policy here it's a very narrow set of circumstances that apply to a very narrow set of defendants and that's what we're talking about  have the benefit of the dreams that absolutely isn't that rather inconsistent than wrong it may be or may not be but that's what this court has said if you're a dram shop you have dram shop liability and you don't have any other liability and that's i think the way i read the cases on that issue so if they if they sold the alcohol and this happened they would have dram shop liability but they didn't and of course because they didn't on section eight seventy six which the appellate court did or whether you want to make the analysis based on general common law do the analysis that the trial court would which are you basing it on i think we have a cause of action on either on either basis i think frankly the appellate court decision on eight seventy six really provides the most coherent and cordial and framework if you will for the analysis from inviting them into bringing the their own liquor in from providing mixes and also water early to enhance the drinking bringing him to the point where was he in the bathroom  at what point did the duty to the later victims the rounds in that string of well i'm not sure you can say that at any particular point the duty or role is the duty of course of the that people have generally you know depends on the on the circumstances and who who the duty extends to we say here the duty extends to the general public not to engage in a course of conduct where you actively encourage and assess the tortious acts of another and injured or because they were injured but it runs to the general public because he was the home of us was foisted out on to the public there and saw it again just to kind of continue with that with the discussion of what on stage did their business plan was to get this guy drunk and then when they got him so drunk that he was no longer useful they put him out on the roadway and that's i think the conduct that both the trial court and the appellate court focused on and why their decisions are in our in our minds very narrow the on stage defense are basically is is simply this we are not a dram shop so we have no dram shop liability and part two is it doesn't matter what we did here because there can never be a common law cause of action in any situation that involves alcohol cannot cannot ever be one and we say there can be under certain circumstances and in fact there have been under certain circumstances in the quinn and haven cases which although on stage takes the position that this court has disavowed those decisions both of those cases were decided before both charles and with coolidge and charles and will coolidge did not overrule those cases and in fact they were cool which decision which was written by chief justice fitzgerald here simply says the conduct in more coolidge does not rise to the level of the conduct in question in haven and so we won't get to that issue that's really what that case says and it's our position that really the conduct that was involved  haven is not as egregious as the conduct that is involved in our case before the court that those cases would be closer to the conduct involved in our case if after getting  pledge drunken quinn and the lacrosse rookie in haven then those two individuals would have been forced to drive an automobile on the public highway that's when those cases would be like our case our cases worse than those cases and those cases have not been over rule and in commenting on some of the cases that have been relied on by onstage in this case th winner case involving the wisconsin tavern again that's a dram shop case not the case like we have here we have a kind of a classic dram shop case here that in that particular case and simply what that case the gustafson case where the drunk was carried out to the car came to the court and kind of a crippled posture because the dram shop case that could have been filed was apparently not filed until after the statute of limitations had run and so the court said we can't consider the tavern's status as a tavern in this case and determining liability we must only look to the status of the defendants here as its property owners as perking law owners and so we can extend the duty to  ascertain for all parking lot owners whether or not people are intoxicated before they put them into the end of the car so that case is again i think in a little crippled posture for purposes of relying on it in our case  the one key case is is arguably closer and more problematic for us but again and in the wind he case we have a situation where it is a provision of alcohol case number one it's more like a social wholes case if you will and again the people providing the alcohol in that case the employers were not invested in the intoxication of the the eventual drunk they probably didn't want him to become drunk and we don't even know if they knew he was drunk when they took him to the car so that case is a totally different situation than we have here where we have a clear conscious effort to get somebody intoxicated and and then  literally insisting and forcing them to drive on the public roads was the mr modest choir to drink onstage no he was not not required to drink he didn't drink and he voluntarily brought the alcohol in and when he did that any and again this is what was on stage wanted him to do and encouraged him to do and assisted him to do and consuming the alcohol to the point of intoxication again we're not we're not asking this court in this case to establish some broad social policy and social wholes liability or any other broad policy this is a very narrow case involving very agreed just facts and that clearly is the kind of case that is anticipated by section eight seventy six of the restatement and as the appellate court clearly fond did in fact create a cause of action based on that restatement section thank you oh when the plaintiffs advocate that this is a narrow set of circumstances based on unique facts i believe that the plaintiffs are asking this court to anoint one of the many