possessing was based on reasonable suspicion the district court two reasons why the traffic stop was proper neither supported by the facts or case law st it was a reasonable suspicion that mr wood range was not objectively reasonable because officer mester testify that he was confused about whether or not there was actually a warrant and did nothing to confer the existence of the warrant i st want to talk about the suspended license suspension until after the stop even though they were looking for mr wood range and they had several hours to verify the suspension before stopping him no officer besser testified relating to the nd aspect here  had st met mr wood range two years earlier he'd been involved with mr wood d grange in traffic stops where mr wood grange was a passenger a handful of times but he did not specifically testified as to when those stops were  mr wood ranges bisons had business spent in the past and the question then is how steel was that information the district court in its opinion and the government here relies upon this court's decision and caldwell in caldwell what it happened is the d officer had knowledge that caldwell's license had been suspended several months earlier there was no discussion in that case however as to what several months means several of them as a nonspecific term it could mean two to three months it could mean d some longer period of time i don't know that with caldwell there was an alternative basis d for affirming the traffic stop because the officer had stillness analysis prevents intrusions upon th amendment rights merely because a person has a prior criminal history in this particular case or instances of driving without a license or or drivers not have a license by senses can be reinstated does the passage of time increases the probability that the license has been reinstated and the driver is not driving without obeisance but the analysis here is folks with the u s supreme court's decision in delaware versus prouse which hello that random driver's license checks are it permissible on the th amendment the officer needs reasonable suspicion or probable cause for a traffic stop to then check the license license suspension was within what you say does the permissible time frame it's the government's burden to show when an officer messer acquired his knowledge the government is the one that has to prove i think that the traffic stop is proper that it doesn't violate the th amendment why is that because it's a lot will stop the government has the burden or is the defendant have the purdon in motion to  but i have it is it that we thought about this very much but i think the government would have the burden of proving it here the reason i ask is the district court says quote you know the question and answer about the ops or can't can't remember a specific date for the last encounter and then says defense counsel did not pursue the issue any further which might imply the district court thought it was defense counsel's responsibility to pin it down but if it was the government's responsibility then obviously didn't put it past him right and well as a practical matter nobody pursued that line of inquiry basically all we know from the evidence is that that officer besser had knowledge that mr wood granges license had been suspended in the past but we don't have any evidence as to when that knowledge was other than it had been d sometime in the prior two years right ok i understand the point if you want to address that further address the one business that's fine if you would mind though i'd like before  about the gun just who together with d the observations that the officers made during the investigation some robbery took up whether that would be an independent basis for  point out it would and based on bettman i think it has to be concluded that officer masters but we fear that there was an arrest warrant was not objectively reasonable to address the alternative argument magistrate judge found that there was reasonable suspicion based on the other issues such as the informant's tip and a couple of other aspects i know that officer messer testified that there was not probable cause to stop mr wood grange he was not asked about whether or not he thought there was reasonable suspicion outside of if you took away the license suspension issue or the possibility of a warrant the district court did not rule on this and this order  we know of that were just the you think it might be enough anyway ok well i think st up no i do not think it was enough with regard to the informant there's really no information on the out to be where he said he would be in a car and he said he would be again and ultimately had gotten just like he said that alternative basis to be to be proven here but my point on the informant is that there's just insufficient indication of reliability also i think the government  need a reason why officer could read this to believe that the informant had given the information about the hotels you know comes in the same three sentences starting with an informant and bides nussbaum of such and such need information from the c i which was to some degree about the observations pos the fact that he was driving a car that wasn't his own cars and what be observed when me encountered him in the in the parking area well the fact that he's driving a car that is not registered and i don't think it's sufficient because people can drive cars that are thirsty and there was d no indication that this was stolen that that he had no right to drive it other than potentially and not having a license with the point that the officer said that mr granger was trying to hide his face i don't think that rises to the level of the rest of my time for rebuttal oh well you may thank you for your argument mr cole will hear from you disaster within forty eight hours in been arrested before for driving under suspension d it was not his car which is the garcia case from the circuit where he was in the high crime area  district court left that to those factors primarily the driving under suspension and the reasonableness pay and relying on caldwell and north carolina behind noting that they didn't have to go any further because both to findings of the district court which the government did as well however noting that these other factors exist of well should this quote determine one of the two factors that the belmar case from hawaii which happened eleven years after well probably but i do have a problem on this issue is that the record doesn't seem to show knowledge that the suspensions occurred within the caldwell time period the record shows that they st encountered the man two years ago had a handful of encounters and knew on some prior occasion he and suspended but it doesn't seem likely questioning any answers established when they knew about the license allowance after he was already seized that's not really relevant to what they knew the reason the governor the reason the government contends that is relevant is the district court found that masters testimony was credible but the issue at the hearing was he said i know we've always been suspended and the confirmation of what we already knew was that never again the fact that he says i don't remember the last encountered the betterment clearly didn't pursue it he doesn't remember he doesn't remember it all the government attorney had to do is say was it within the last five months when you would have been covered by caldwell b twenty months ago eighteen months ago twelve months ago now caldwell though the difference is caldwell it's not a bright line about how long was it since the officer and cam and officer body cambodia o and further by what the officer did when he fired i mean ask him about that a concern i have with that rationale is that seems like the reasonable a stake is based on a memo put out by the police department itself that use the phrase wanted subject in a way that confusingly minded referred to this person even though he wasn't a wanted subject and so if we adopt a rationale query whether we owe our police departments are to be created song reasonable suspicion by bootstrapping a morning and the officer when they had been arrested anyway on unsubstantiated information that's not the case here there was the reasonable circumstance and the power of the suspicion furthermore d the officer waited for confirmation before they went ahead and arrested the defendant on on anything and that there's a difference between those two is there not now in maggie there was no warning so you're exactly right there was no warrant for mr le grange the officer had a mistake n belief that there was a warrant but he didn't act solely on that belief or that information right really happened we kind of put the cart before the horse in a way the officers  as soon as they recognize mr no grains they entered him in the computer for the n c i c and did the u turn in order to follow him waiting for confirmation do initiate the stop it's important to remember they never initiated the stop here mr le grange pulled into the burger king parking lot the officers testified they knew them blocked them in they were going to do a consensual encounter because one can assume they still don't have a confirmation but as soon as he gets out of the car and the hands are at the way they go right into crossing the defendant and detaining them and telling them they're detaining him because he has paperwork or a warrant and he's not able to drive and then in that three minute time theory that judge roberts found between the detention and the confirmation mr le grange and that he has a ni to mistakes is that true guys wanted subject could be different from someone with an outstanding arrest warrant no i'm asking whether want to subject even referred to le grange in the memo and magistrate judge says there for messrs a little reliance on the memo was reasonable moreover the officers did not rely on the memo alone to provide the reasonable suspicion necessary to about them to believe criminal activity was afoot if they if they had they would not have looked for the warrant or waited for proof that defend it was driving while his license was under suspension before searching the grand prix and defendant's prosensa to me that suggests that the magistrate judge thought that the to the gibson cases cited to page eighteen of my brief i actually looked back at that case again this morning i think fifteen months is quoted there is incorrect i think it's more like three mots but i looked at that case they had two different dates for the use so i'm not sure which is correct that i had asked that you look at that and then the final point i'd like to meet is on the go case there was a hit suggesting that there had been a warrant at least that the officer was unable to verify it at that