amend the terms of the lease that is our main issue on this appeal is that the nd causal it is part of her will the will there was a will and there was a st cut of which created the unit trust and the nd card is so wish has to have some meaning it was directed towards the tenant and so many dependent it was a direction it was not predatory language they will that at least continue on two conditions as long as wayne or one of his adult children were able and physically actively involved in the leasing range but as long as they were  agricultural practices our position is that that is the term of the lease that the lease will continue subject to being terminated only if one of those conditions exist a nothing in the saying god so that says a trustee cannot stay it's only what interest the trustee can sell in the farm and he can sell of entire interest in the farm it just must be not the terms of the lease or and controversy but i think the fact that the thing here for a moment your honor the i think that the pleadings create the controversy the the plaintiffs said that there is an actual controversy because a plane of wanted to sell three of the lease of the incorrect it should have it will of the deceiving includes not only her will but both kata souls and all of those parts have to be read and given equal weight you must try to read the will in such a way it each one of those provisions have meaning and if you don't say that the meiers have a lease or other than they have them be even is year to year ten and at the death of the testator they could not be just kicked off immediately they would have to be given a notice under the statute or months prior to the end of the lease year so they would be because there is no rights recognized by the court beyond the basic rights it's to execute ensures every farmer in the state of illinois whether they have a lease or they don't  think that it seemed added at an estate plan where she wanted to recognized both the shriners and the myer family she had gifts to both of those those gifts  court and the inner judgement in favor of the meier defendants recognising that they have at least under those l first jew addressed your question your honor directly as to the question of the lease the lease in this case is an integrated unambiguous document that is binding on the and i don't believe there's any dispute between the parties as to that fact that if if you read the terms of the lease it clearly is a year to year lease to can be terminated by the trustee on or months notice that the question is that the appellants are seeking to use something outside of the terms of the lease to change the terms of the lease that is to alter the fact that it is a year to year lease and that is the  before we get to the actual merits of the issue there were two threshold issues that we raised on behalf of the shriners hospitals in our appellate brief the st was the question of standing in this case and that is the standing of a private party the the myer family to essentially challenge the actions of the trustee now certainly the trustees named them as a necessary party in the declaratory judgment as they did the attorney general's office but the attorney general's office filed an answer in this case in which they supported the position of the trustee and they have not appealed or challenged the ruling so under the wilson case which we've cited to the court we believe that there is a lack of standing of a private party in this case that is the meiers to proceed with an appeal when the attorney general or the state's attorney is not pursuing that position the nd issue that we raised was the question of forfeit sure and we certainly acknowledge that that is a limitation only on the parties and not t court the argument below was that there were all of these facts and circumstances given the relationship between the testator in the mire family that were important to consider and that the parties disagreed as to the interpretation of the lease and therefore there was a question of fact the principle argument now advanced by the appellants is that there is this concept of incorporation by reference of a document into a will and because the lease was not in existence in one thousand nine hundred and ninety four when the nd caucus it was drafted it cannot be incorporated into the will itself that particular issue was nowhere raised a lot in the trial court and so we would suggest that was forced into turning to the issue of the merits of the appeal in this case if the court chooses to reach the merits based on the two  would suggest that the way that that can be done is the roadmap that was laid out by the duvall court from the rd district from one thousand nine hundred and eighty eight it was a very similar circumstance in which the had a will that created a trust for the principal benefit of her husband there was language in the well giving the trustee the an ambiguous right to sell and to lease the property there was also language in the will which specifically granted to the nephew of the testate or the right to lease the property and in fact the language was expressly and i'm quoting from the case your honour's any of my farms the nephew was found to be mandatory it would conflict with the unfettered right in the will itself to lease the property and it would also diminish the primary in setting up the trust for her husband similarly in this case we have the unfettered right within the document itself that is paragraph three b of the st got a cell for the trustee to lease the property without restriction and there is no dispute that the primary purpose of the testator's plan in this case was a charitable purpose to benefit my client the shriners hospitals for children therefore if the court as  chester's wishes for the past twenty three years and till they reached the point where it became necessary to do something different with the property given the that apply under the i code so i and i will yield any remaining time i have to the co op only miss harold unless the court has any questions for me i see no questions thank you your honor good morning may it please the court american herald and i represent the apple e prospect bank which serves as the successor trustee of the trust at issue in this case in the same way that the lease is unambiguous mary louise will is similarly under bikie and to the extent that this court considers extrinsic evidence mary louise testamentary intent as expressed in her will was the accordance with the internal revenue code marilu provided that the farmland at issue here was to be held in such a trust and that specified amounts of income were to be paid to her sister upon her sister's debt the will provided that the principal income were to be held in the trust and used for the benefit of the shriners to the extent the shriner ceased to exist or no longer constituted a charitable organization in accordance with the code the bill provides that the trustee is to distribute that income to other qualified charitable organizations based on the will and the internal revenue code the meiers cannot be a beneficiary of this charitable remainder unit trust st the shriners still are in existence and constitute a charitable organization nd the meiers do not constitute a charitable organization rd the will prohibits the trustee from exercising any power discretion in a manner that would be inconsistent treating the will as creating a long term tendency for the myers would harm the shriner's in two fundamental ways st if the trustee must continue receiving the farmland to the miers then the trust favorable tax position could be at this point but in the past there have been years in which the trust income has not equal five percent of the farmlands where their market value and so the trustee was able to use liquid assets on hand to be able to make remember there has not been undistributed income in terms of not making the required distributions to the shriners we have to make at least five percent but there will come a point in time in the future where the trustee or the trust will not have sufficient liquid assets to make the requisite distributions to the shriners artist's name to know we're not y and if i understand your honor's question there would be undistributed income in terms of not being able to make the actual just distribution and the farmland itself will still exist and so there will be a circumstance in which there will be excise taxes because the liquidity position of the trust itself will not be able to enable the trustee to make that requisite distribution the trustee is required to maintain the favorable tax position for the trust and so continuing to receive the farmland to the miers in a way that potentially jeopardizes that would harm the charitable beneficiary which is the shriners furthermore if the trustee sells the farmland but is compelled to do so subject to a long term lease hold interest then the striker still would be harmed because there's no dispute that the price for which it could be sold would be substantially diminished this would then substantially decrease the trust principle and therefore the amount of income that could be distributed to the shriners and interpretation of the bill that results in unnecessary depletion of the trust assets or undermines the interests of the trust sole beneficiary would be untenable the interpretation of the bill that best reflects mary was overall dispositive evidenced by the type of interrupt trustee created and the words of the will itself was the creation of a charitable remainder unit trust for the benefit of the shriners not the preservation of a life time tendency for the myers however we maintain that the court me not to reach the issue of a value waiting extrinsic evidence as the farm lease is plain language and ambiguously provides for a year to year tenancy it contains an integration indeed the myers you're not contend that this release is in any way ambiguous the nd cotta still there or is extrinsic evidence that cannot be used to either create an ambiguity or alter the lease is unambiguous year to year tenancy declaratory judgment action the filing was prompted by the fact that the trustee intended to sell at least part of the land and therefore wanted to terminate the year two year lease that existed w dan meyer and when the check when the trustee went to mr meyer mr meyer said well i believe i have a lifetime tenancy based on this will and as a result the declaratory judgment complaint was filed she would be able to seek a declaration because the trustee did not want to put land on the market with this sort of an issue hanging out there because it would obviously undermine the ability to sell for a full market value thank you all of it but they don't want to do it while the testator's wishes desires and the intent this court has a long history with supporting the intent of testator's may have and you have that ability right now in reading and giving meaning to the nd consul the very essence of what has happened here is we part we just heard it to harm to the shriners st term being that allegedly there could be a tax consequence court should not support simply because there could be a tax consequence at that happens there can be tax consequences intentionally but that does not give a reason or basis and it advocates this testator's wishes that in the nd we heard of the of the income of your honors i think the decision in this area is we're the ability of this court to correct the wrong and give value and give meaning sitter's wishes and be done here i think the court and be happy to answer any of the questions of the court otherwise a very much appreciate everyone's time and ability to handle this even in these times by observing them and it means that you allow this to