reasons based on the district court errors first the district court erred in not considering whether statutory tolling could apply after equitable tolling as has been brief this past week for the court second the district court applied an overly burdensome standard of maximum feasible diligence rather than reasonable diligence as set forth in holland and this court's cases in sosa versus dia's and gibbs third the district court applied per se rules to the extraordinary circumstances pronk and used an impossible to file standard finding that there were certain factors that could never justify  and regarding this third factor under the excerpts of record pages two and three and also at ten you can see that the district court found misters the movie all relies  heavily relies on factors that cannot or do not justifiable tolling such as a lack of awareness of the law and his inability to build a relationship of trust with other inmates additionally the district court found that a lockdown in itself could not be considered for equitable tolling purposes and finally the district court said that based on mendoza if misters a moody zero showed at any time that he had procured the assistance of a inmate translator and helper during the one year at depth limitations period he would be barred from equitable tolling and the court was relying on mendosa the district court was relying on mendoza this violates this court's stop clock rule which the court applied and gives relying on so coppins all as for sit ins and the stop clock rule basically says that once an event tolls the limitations period we simply stop the clock and then we wait until a later event permits the statute to run again looking at reasonable diligence this court has clarified after hollande that reasonable diligence is looking at what the efforts of a reasonable person might be expected to deliver in his or her particular circumstances as set forth in gives diligence is also considered based on the petitioners overall level of care and caution based on his or her particular of record when he filed his opposition briefs that he said he took approximately two years which we know it was actually less to find an inmate to trust to then help him find a translator we know that he went to the law library at  soledad and did not find any spanish speaking materials we know that he wrote to the prison law office we know that he wrote to the innocence project to ice to the mexican consulate and we can see now based on the ad ministry of appeal in september and based on that time he filed an administrative appeal requesting his court documents and that administrative appeal was not resolved until january third and he was provided some of his court documents not all of them once he had those we know he per cured or he gets his documents in january yes he gets his documents in january so is it your position that the period from september to january is also equitably told are statutorily equitably told equitably told with the nuts because they were processing his administrative yes and he had requested the document specifically to provide to the innocence project to file a hate b s but why didn't he get those documents from the corner from someplace else was why did he have to rely on the well we know we know that at least in this record the factual record that we have that that's where he made the initial request we know he requested documents from other places because he eventually got the probation report that was not provided by the prison and when he filed this  parte motion in may of two thousand and twelve with a superior court to clarify the judgment and the convictions at issue he cited to the probation report so we know he did request documents from another source and eventually got the probation report then we're asking the court to apply statutory tolling and statutory tolling can be applied through section twenty two forty four d one b for the state created impediment or it can be applied under section twenty t forty four d two for the time that he pursued his state he be as petitions as well as his ex parte motion we are arguing that the ex parte motion was a request for a reexamined of the reexamination of his judgment so he thought he was just asking for some other documents from a related case or from a follow on something what he said actually an ex parte motion is he wanted to know based on his current case in he cites the case number what in the related case what was the judgment what was the disposition resolved at the may fourteenth two thousand and ten sentencing so we know he was trying to say in my judgment what counts of conviction  at issue so that he could then prepare his state he is position and know whether that count that related count was dismissed or whether it was as part of the judgment along with the underlying case i've been trying to do a sort of a back of the envelope calculation that i'm not sure either of you has reached in your written papers assuming that he's entitled to statutory tolling at some point once the equitable cooling period is finished i worked back from the time of the filing of the federal petition to figure out how far back that statutory period would take him one year taking out from that period to properly filed state petitions and so on and my eye may be off by a day or two because of the sort of the rounding error which days counted don't count it by my calculation he needs equitable coaling up until about the thirtieth of december two thousand and eleven and at that point he's got documents then we would actually the statue of limitations would want scuse me run from january to may and then our argument is that on may seventh of now last night can you answer the question i argument is through january two thousand and twelve and the statutory tolling periods would be if i may finish with a question and my answer statuary tolling would be between may seventeenth and june twelfth two thousand and twelve and would also be between october seventeenth two thousand and twelve through april seventeenth two thousand and thirteen and so there is a tolling for the statute has run for a period of approximately eight and a half months in two thousand and twelve because we are also asking for equable to may it please the court michelle swanson for respondent morden so i did that same calculation i had this morning on the way and bart and so i'm not super precise here but what i think i came up with is that the only has petitions but he would also need statutory tolling for the time that he was requesting clarification on that judgment in his other case in the speer your court that's the only way his petition would be timely  crossed paths and weren't communicating and then when he appealed he got what he wanted from his central prison file but he also has to show not only is an extraordinary circumstance which this circuit's case law has said it's a high burden for a petitioner so he has to show not just an ordinary circumstance but that an extraordinary circumstance but he also has to show that it actually student his way and prevented filing and the fact that he waited over a year and a half to file his federal petition documents prevented but that doesn't if you flip it around it doesn't mean once they have the documents that they weren't essential for it once he has the documents to you something else that holds him up but the fact that he waited after that doesn't tell us what the documents were essential sentence the information regarding a sentence scene he was there he knew these the facts he could have related these facts to his and my translator when he was filling out his form here's the hesitation i have it's a little difficult for us to sort this out here i understand that we don't it's all on paper it's pretty clear that the district court didn't quite understand the rules there is just as i read the district court opinion or order  impossible i think it's not the way that we do it should we just send us back to the district court after having for laid out the way the system is forced to work and let the district court sort it out no your honor first of all i do disagree about at the district court applying the proper standards this court has held before and after hall and that then possibility standard doesn't really need a literal in possibility this court has reaffirmed that as recently as twenty seventeen but the first mistake of law i think is pretty clear because as part of this order of the just record talks about the may two thousand and twelve as if that were to be held against him well my only other point is that the district court correctly under mendoza said is soon as he had translation assistance at that time we believed it was may two thousand and twelve because we did not have this and made appeal showing he had it in september twenty one but as soon as he had it for that particular extraordinary circumstance that you didn't understand my point ok if we have an equitable polling period the last for a certain time they don't ask you to concede let's say that the equitable tolling last till the end of september two thousand and eleven or maybe the beginning of october just to make sure there's some overlap once you get there year within the one year statutory tolling period so once you get there it doesn't matter that he might or might not have had translation help and in may of two thousand and twelve because it's within the statutory period it was not in within the statutory period the statutory period ended in july of two thousand and eleven he filed his and made appeal after the statutory period the statute of because of some impediment i am with you as soon as the equitable tolling period the statutory period starts yes i agree that as i calculate the statutory period working back from the time he files his federal petition the statutory period would start at the end of september two thousand and eleven so he needs equitable tolling up through the end of september two thousand and eleven if he has equitable polling during that statutory period then star's if you're within the statutory period whether he had translation help or anything else doesn't matter because it's within the statutory period therefore the fact that he might have had translation open may of two thousand and twelve doesn't matter it doesn't matter now yes or doesn't matter but the district court thought it did matter because it's right there in the district court order based on the facts and the arguments that were made to the district court that's all it can do is consider the facts that were presented to it and the arguments because he's pro se i'm not sure that that's right but i would not typically hold the pro se person to the same standard to making arguments at some point the district judge should have it in his or her head what the rules are well the are no standards it's not that there's no standards for pro se they are minimal standards for pro se and he didn't even meet those here and just quickly i want to address the fact about remount the even if the district court let's assume th district court misapplied the legal standards the review on appeal is to know this court is absolutely capable of deciding these questions let's assume he's entitled to equal tolling through september twenty ninth and you know let's assume he's entitled through the end of when he got his documents from his and if you are january three hundred twelve he still does not qualify for timeliness because that first superior court petition where he was merely asking what the judgment was in a different case does not qualify for statutory tolling under twenty two d two and if he doesn't get that by my calculations on bart this morning he is untimely he might be untimely by a few days but if untimely by a few days denial in the spirit for allowing the court of appeal and island the court of appeal filing was in the supreme court those are permissible intervals so he gets those periods as well so when he when we finally get to the denial by the  california supreme court that then run so he loses there that period counts against him between what the state supreme court did in the filing in federal court i get that but if he's entitled motion for clarification bad judgment of the case he doesn't get twenty for that so i did but so understand that we are not talking the same language ok well i'm starting with the filing on october twenty two two thousand and twelve of a state it what it would yes i don't quibble with that if he filed that within the it would be a one year he would file that i don't quibble that he would have continuous statutory tolling from the time he filed his first superior court petition for he is corpus through the supreme court's denial but my point is that is not still not and he doesn't have enough statutory his petition is still late by a month even with that time well i keep saying this and maybe you understand what i'm saying and statutory tolling the intervals between the superior court court of appeal and so on yes the only really only thing that is charged against beginning on october twentieth who is the gap between the supreme court of california the federal filing that's about twenty three days no the other gap that he doesn't get is between the conclusion of his intimate appeal and the final in of the spirit corp he doesn't get that ten months in your view the statute begins but i do understand the court's point now now that i have listened to what the court is saying is that if in september two thousand and eleven his equable tolling ended and then he had you know give or take with with the month october two thousand and eleven the statute of limitations would run he files in october two thousand and twelve his state b s petition so and i've done this many times is that we're only asking for tolling or there are only eight half months in two thousand and twelve where the statute was running we argue that he gets tolling not only through september april seventeenth two thousand and thirteen and then we're asking the court to give him time for reasonable reasonable notice to receive notice of the supreme court's denial that's not in our record right now so we're asking this court to decide that the petition was timely account for my purposes i just want to confirm your analysis that turns on whether or not we determine whether or not you treat the motion next party motion in superior court as statutory told if you don't get that if you don't get that chunk of time from made to june it's really i don't actually know because what i've calculated is there is form eight and a half months in two thousand and twelve where the statute is running so those twenty six days between may seventeenth and june twelfth if you add twenty six days to eight and a half months now you get approximately nine and a half even ten months ten months is well within the twelve month adept limitations period do you think that you're entitled to equitably told time in which the person was not on lockdown what we believe is that the circumstances at san quentin are a lockdown situation in the san quentin reception center because the c d c are brings inmates there before their designated has to take them through a an assessment to decide where they're going to be placed and even though this is not fully developed in the record so remain would be appropriate the san quentin reception center is essentially a lockdown so that really wasn't my question my question is if not an official lockdown no but we believe the conditions still amount to a lockdown and the record is not developed on that that's correct and if the record remains as it is th have what showing do you have we have we show that only the statute only ran for eight half months in two thousand and twelve and therefore eight and half months is well within the twelve month the dept of limitations period the petition is timely filed and we go