issue presents a mixed question of was in fact well for two reasons because we have a set statutory standard the supreme court has ruled that the standard the definition of the term active duty as used in section three does one one four point one of the pension code is the same definition of section five dash one one three of the pension code so we have a set statutory standard and we have admitted to facts so we're doing examination of the legal effect of a given set of facts and as such that's a mixed question of well in fact at least three other courts who have addressed this exact same issue have held that this presents a mixed question one fact subject to the clearly erroneous standard of review was moreover says orland hills which was the first first district decision from two thousand and eight showing first bloomington which i believe they were just citing a question of fact your honor and i think it's i don't know if i can break it down into a question of fact or a question of law but what they were doing they were taking that they were taking those facts and they were applying the law as established by the plain language of the statute as well as all the case law it's come down and they were applying those facts to the law so i think that's what makes the mix question subjective clearly erroneous turner which i think is important because it before some deference to the pension board's decision in this case but i can't say th case was performing active duty at the time he was injured it's not that his disabling injury resulted from that necessarily that he he act necessarily cause the injury it's that he was performing an active duty when he incurred the disabling injury and it's a horrid distinction to make it really is i think that's why a lot of the courts are kind of all over the map on the issue but i think that when you get into it first of all you have to read the plain language of the statute and the statute says that an active duty is an act of police duty inherently involving special risk not ordinarily assume by citizen in the ordinary course of life imposed upon the police and then by state law ordinance regulation case the first district case from one thousand eight so somewhere a bit older case in one of cases but in that case a police officer was at the police department writing a police report sitting in the chair the chair collapsed on him he fell down and he became disabled and what the court said in morgan is that completing police records i'll be with a function peculiar to police officers is not inherently of all special rest not ordinarily soon by citizens in the ordinary walks of life so the fact that the plaintiff in this not in the record and had you been responding to a call had there been a fire that they had to go back upon where their shots fired were they responding to citizens call for help such as in the johnson case it completely changes the character of the facts of this case and changes the legal outcome obligated to do that but the obligation to perform one shot doesn't necessarily elevate it to the performance of an active duty if that was the case and the statute would read differently it doesn't the statute would have said that the police judaism had been active duty as an act of police with everything up to the karma imposed upon the police and by state law by up by regulation by ordinance by special assignment but the statute doesn't say that the state of the statute has more in the statute says that no here i disagree with that i think that i think what the plaintiff is doing is looking out into the future and what that the plaintiff was going to do and had he actually been injured while performing that that function which would have constituted national activity that would have been different but what you have to look at the fashion circumstances attendant at the time of injury at the time of injury what was the person doing in johnson the supreme court says at the time of injury it was the police officer responding to the call of a citizen for help not that he was out walking his beat and had to walk his feet and do all these things but that he was actually responding to the call of a citizen for help and for dorsey it was that look at the second district so you look at the the fact of injury at the time of injury and at the time that the person was riding in the back of the car as an evidence technician nothing about that increased their capacity in the terms capacity as frank or uses increase their capacity such that the individual would be performing an act of police to be inherently involving special risk not ordinarily assume by assisting the ordinary walks of life so yes you may be going to do these things but the facts present at the time of the injury that's what's key if you look at all of me very very focused and i'm just trying to see if i understand is the stump place on that spectrum that you're seeing here it's an active duty but here it is and where it's going it's very difficult to say your points on the issue is that i think the plaintiff wants your argument and once you make the argument that because you're on duty or because you're in uniform or because you're assigned to the neighborhood enforcement team you have the specialized assignment that as a result of that you're performing an active duty inherently involving special risk not ordinarily soon by citizen in the ordinary walks of life and every court even the courts that if a word of the line of duty says said they prefaced their feelings by saying simply being on duty and in uniform is not enough job assignment alone job title alone that is not enough if that was enough then this statute would like i said before he wouldn't differently i think that you have a chicago fire police pension board case right after this one if you look at the definition of active duty and section six dash one one of the pension code there is no inherent risk of not ordinarily assumed by such in the ordinary walks of life language there it's just are you performing an active duty imposed upon you by law but he that mean and i think you have to go back to closely to the bill language and johnson and say in determining what the capacity was there's no comparable occupation of not a just a police officer on the beat but a police officer responding to the call  thing well i i disagree with i think with the wagner case was getting at is that they were trying to say that just simply because the eye can befall anybody doesn't necessarily mean that they're that a person precluded from obtaining a line of duty disability pension so we don't look at the mechanism of the injury the monday nature of having your foot run over by a vehicle instead you have to what the facts and circumstances attendant at the time the injury occurred to determine when at that time the person was performing i place to be inherently involving special r not ordinarily soon by citizens and they were never watched wife and going to the car under these otherwise ordinary circumstances to start your patrol to go out that doesn't that doesn't get us there and if it does get the pla meaningless i mean the only argument then will be is the police officer on duty at the time he receives or she receives for injury or is injury that's it and then the statute requires more than that so we know what the history of that language is for being ironic i can't answer that question i don't know anything about procedural history regarding it but it is there and i think it's striking that in other areas of the pension code it's not there so it has to mean something in terms of an case fits along that spectrum somewhere and i would submit that it gets closer to those individuals who are important not entitle to want to do just killing pensions similar to the police officer morgan who was sitting in the chair similar to the passenger in the vehicle in for do followed it the jones case which is our most recent case indicates that all he is is on route to patrol and he gets in a car accident everybody gets in a car accident therefore they're right that the plaintiffs are in there they have one side and that would have been well they says no it was what risk was he facing at the immediate time of the injury he doesn't need to face the exact wrist at the time of the injury what was his overall capacity at the time that the injury was there that's what we have to look at and there's even more here than routine patrol here what was his a site that's really what's here he not only had a routine patrol he had an activity which was limited to three people in the record of suppressing gang and drug activity that's not comparable to any citizen operation he also had they would up put him in separate cars because of the nature of and the danger of that he had no choice also when and as just as harrison when he was going back into the car for what reason he's going back might get in the car you get into a car when you're a police officer who are you yes the livery man if you're getting in the car you drive them crazy get in the car the same way so what's unique about  because he has to be there the citizen doesn't have to be there the second most important thing is if you look at the jones case all the officer in jones was on routine patrol and he gets in a car accident the same as every human being gets in a car accident every day ye duty because of it and in all and even goes further almost the guys on ice will patrol that's all he does there is not even indication in the record of how he enters himself it's just the continuing wear and tear of the bicycle now up everybody writes bicycles most people do plenty and should go where you don't ride bicycles but most people do right bicycles and that's the same as it is in ordinary citizen yet they awarded it because the court looked at why was his job he was there filling out a rest reports he's about to return to duty so you can't take a microcosm of a whole person's obligation which is what they're trying to do and saying that they had specific time he got injured by his partner i don't think that's the qualified to determine what is an active duty yes as to what these people are doing our best qualified to answer a question of fact is what is in the line of duty and what isn't in the patrol the facts in the evidence in evidence demonstrate that at the time of the injury the officer was actually responding to the call of an area where citizens were complaining about speeding not only that at the time of the injury the officer testif facts in the record that it's not routine driving a police car for as a police officer is not like you need driving a police car presume of or driving a car presumably he had to wear a cumbersome belt he had to pay attention to the computer or to his right he had to listen to radio traffic so there were facts to distinguish that to elevate the capacity of that particular off search to show that driving a police car off car responding to the scene was something involving a hair of west and i would dearly assume biases and