the morning of may have please the court my client crossroads g p s is entitled to intervene in this proceeding to defend itself against attack by public citizen and to defend the order of there institutional interests and their statutory authorities and responsibilities are very very different from those a crossroads g p s and that alone is a sufficient reason that they're not an adequate representative  anything is very limited so that any interest that you have they are you could be protected either when the district court reverses th law and presumably the district court will give reasons for that ruling of in mind the f e c and would bind us as a practical matter and remain taking away that dismissal order takes away our victory before the federal election commission and again exposes us to attack on the public citizen's employ and attack the congress sought to prevent by struck from the statute the way it is so you don't proceed on the complaint without a four majority a four part four party vote which requires a bi partisan vote so that brings us in to your question your honor of well why didn't congress provide for us to participate in the statute why did it not say anything about the artist but i let you go to that i just want to follow up on your answer so you go back to the agency the agency historically and we think properly views itself of valid at the administrative level by the rulings that have been made by the court in a case in which it is a participant and so it's going to proceed within the hour within the confines of what the court said but we have already put forward in our participation in our defense before the federal election commission we have put forth the strong reasons why the complaint against us should if the different this record now declares that those reasons are inadequate and the result in dismissal is contrary to law that is a very substantial prejudice to our position certainly a practical prejudice and a legal to dismiss your honor may say and this is a story of the what's happened we are now are bound to take a different view of the law and under the new view of the law that we are bound that they were going to proceed with the investigation and what we are for close from a doing is persuading any member of the commission commission to adopt a legal principle that the district court has rejected and declared contrary to law so our area of the yes has been greatly curtailed at that point now why didn't that this why didn't congress say and people in our position can protect and intervene in the district where the action the answer is because congress legislation against the background policy of the federal rules of civil procedure which provides for intervention in this kind of situation and congress has no need to address those kinds of issues because it's provided for in the statute if congress didn't want us to be able to intervene the appropriate approach would be for congress say and nobody else gets to intervene in this action they didn't do that intervention is permissible and we know that this court in fact in at least one case as authorized intervention to a party engine exactly our situation kind the reason we need to intervene yes because the federal election commission simply is not an adequate representative of our that was that was the issue on which the district ruled and problem of that is it doesn't acknowledge the very lenient standard for adequacy of representation which of course is merely an exception after under the first three parts rule twenty four write you a staff is your right to come in then there's an exception unless there's that representation and the law is clear that that's standard is none of it's lenient and intervention is to be allowed if there is any basis for a reasonable doubt as to whether the existing litigants will  did not address this court series of presidents holding that regulatory agencies typically are not adequate representatives of regulated entities with regulation is that issue  there's if there's a serious cases discussed in our brief where this court has made that point and thirdly he did not acknowledge or distinguish this court's precedent that the mere fact of this kind of sheared media litigation objective is not sufficient as a rule to establish adequacy of or this information and finally know after two more points next that an important way the district court did not fairly address the special circumstances that we face with this agency the federal election commission is three six members they're divided three three this isn't any any academic tea party kind of a light is the dream that they're fundamentally at odds with one another two of the dissenting commissioners are campaigning to have the district court reverse the dismissal order one through an op ed in the new york times and the other with a statement posted on the f e c website and so you have the office of general counsel sitting counsel has put out a public statement to which they say they still live here saying that they agree with the legal views of the dissenters and that all they're going to be able argue therefore in this litigation is well you know we think the best view of the law favor pursuing this complaint against crossroads g p s but these other guys they are so unreasonable outside the bounds of law that lawyers say things like that but that is not the most persuasive way t by golly in this case if there's ever a situation in which sound discretion requires letting us in letting a party and this is that case this weekend we are now otherwise the court is going to be deciding based on representation by counsel who publicly says the better view supports the other side and who won't even complete the administrative record relied on by the these three prevailing commissioners they said we have our decision supported by three commissioners so in the administrative record in the district court this memorandum that the controlling commissioners relied on say informed their decision has not been provided by the district court and the only way it's going to get it is we come into the case and we pursue completing the record is your argument on intervention as of right well as to that argument what is in your view the appropriate standard if the court doesn't apply the correct standards or goes outside the map so we think this is so clearly wrong that whether you call it legal error because he didn't acknowledge the correct standards or whether you call it an abuse of discretion because he limits and this court has been clear that the whole point of rule twenty four is to get before the court parties that are heads rested in the dispute and who can improve the the client now clearly i think we satisfy that and you say well  to the district court you could say we don't we don't understand why you exercise your discretion in this way please try again well that was what they didn't do with that because it's not that the other consideration but he did and we think mistakenly and we think this court and say and should say we're entitled to intervene as a right and therefore you don't have to worry about a discretionary issue either my point is simply we are preserving both of those are we think my question is going to be to you that something that the decision relied on yes we would intend to argue that as part of putting the administrator record before the court that's what happened now if that's how you're not putting a new claim before that we're not putting any new new legal claim before thought we would have the deficient arguments in support of existing issues because our position this is this is where we get to the difference in our institutional perspective with the office of general counsel we say that the first amendment here there prosecutors they're not going to make those arguments so these although the same issue will be there what are the legal standards what does the law mean how do you apply these facts we're going to argue that wall in a very different w the relief directly or indirectly against crossroads it can't require any particular legal conclusion by the f c c and this case that's presents no actual or imminent injury to crossroads where you heard has an anticipated future harm the standard is that harm must be certainly impending and crossroads does not merely meet that standard here the injuries that it it asserts are speculations about what the  the matter to the agency it can find that the particular reasons that the commissioners relied on in their statement in this case were contrary to law but it can't require an alternatives that of reasons andrina and indeed as the hen's the commission retains discretion to reach the same result for different reasons or to exercise its discretion and so crossroads is here speculating about what the f e c might do in the event the case is rema standing it found a very narrow issue that crossroads had standing on which was important to why it found that crossroads lacked any right because it found that given the narrow scope of judicial review provision the only issue that crossroads possibly could have an interest in is protecting and is protecting itself in the event the matter was remanded from having to likely spend deschanel resources to live are just similar decision and that is that that finding by the district court itself was both speculative and erroneous because it assumes that what happens on re now is that a respondent necessarily has to submit spends money and submit further submissions to the commission now if that be got gives administrative respondents a right to submit materials to the commission and to provide its view of the law and process and certainly took advantage of that right during the administrative proceedings in that case but that's a right that's afforded to administrative respondents it's not an obligation that they're required to submit anything and in this case particularly given the amount of the volume of materials crossroads already has made it it's far from clear that it would indeed need to submit anything initial decision and reach a different result but in fact in a not there in the very few cases that actually are remanded there have been a number of instances including ones we cite in our three for the commission reconsiders the issues issues alternative reasoning or was speculation it's not entirely clear that that would be true so in your view just the reversal of that dismissal would not be an injury not not under the because the reversal of business though i think that the injuries that crossroads has addressed that it's concern about including an investigation by the commission a determination that it might be a political committee a finding that it broke the law and none of those things are n the litigation if if new york lost litigation that that contingent liability would be reinstated and what the court in that case was saying was that where an injury has already occurred the possibility that a different result might occur after the challenge doesn't destroy that cause ation but this is not that case because here what crossroads is saying is let's assume what might happen on remount and create causation by that speculation so it's an entirely case was that the city had a contingent liability that it was challenging and the point was that well maybe some other outcome will still protected even though it has already suffered that harm and the court rejected that that fact that hypothetical because it wouldn't destroy causation i think the word destroy is really important because in this case there is no causation crossroads is trying to establish hypothetical circumstances that could create cause that you send where is and  clear that where the finding of intervention of right is based on adequacy of representation the standard of review is abuse of discretion and the court in the fun for animals case made clear that that was the standard of review but in that case there there hadn't been any explanation by the district court for the court to defer to and so even though the standard was of use of discretion it couldn't properly apply that standard in that case but it's very standard goes in that case as i just think from of the animals in question as endangered declare illegal existing import permits on those animals and also in joint issuance of the a further in part so the actual litigation in that case may briefly address the issue of the administrative record that was in council raised how this characterization of the administrative records situation is not accurate for a number of reasons as a preliminary matter we're talking about a staff legal analysis reports that had been submitted to the commission and withdrawn that the documents in the joint appendix in this case make very clear the whole circumstances and this court decision in the north hirshberg case make very clear that a staff recommendation of the type of document that is never included in administrative record in terms of what actually happened in this case it's not correct to say that the general counsel's office deleted or removed any sort of document from the administrative record we're talking about a privilege staff recommendation that was never included in the administrative record and has never been made public by the commission and the commissioners who attached document to a segment of reasons actually said in a separate statement that they themselves agreed to have them and the document redacted before their statement was publicly released based on disagreement among commissioners about whether the document was privileged and ultimately vote among commissioners to release that document filled so it didn't become publicly released but that doesn't prevent the district court from reviewing the only issue that it needs to review and he's with us to to rule on the privilege issue now  accusation that that a document that was had been excluded from the administrative record and i'm just trying to clarify based on the actual facts in the record that that's not a wound so far as it was and so they have a crissy of representation there was a  reflects the one of the commissioners have been bribed with money and they wanted to get into the record the district court might find an exception of this they have an argument for an exception from the ordinary course of proceedings  case is whether the commission's dismissal decision was reasonable and all that the court can look at is what the commissioner's own sed explanation of their decision was and the fact that crossroads has additional arguments that thinks the ports dismissal not only are not properly before the court they're not relevant they're not things that the court can consider in this case under this standard of review because the question is what the commission that in fact under the clickable standard the court can't even substitute its own rationale if it thinks that there's a different explanation that might telling us that the argument they want to make is so far out of bounds that it's not a basis for saying that there's something for the district court to resolve i think crossroads is saying that correct opposing counsel is saying that himself he's saying that he has arguments that are it's not for the court to consider the arguments of a crossroads in this case because crossroads had an opportunity through the administrative process to make any arguments it wanted to make to the commission the commission consider those arguments and then rendered its own decision on the question before the district court under section three zero one zero nine eight eight is the reasonability or the legality of the commission's explanation for its decision not whether the whether crossroads might have some additional reasons  complaint that would involve against it achieving the benefit that we sought in the congress intended for us to have the present litigation seeks to strip us of that benefit we were told we have no cause we're told two things number one we have no interest in preserving the benefit that we have pain through this procedure and number two we should rely for representation on the parties who argue that we have no interest we submit that cannot be the wall we're told well if you've got  an appeal you are now going to be telling the defendants when they seek to defend the dismissal order you don't have article three standing because even if we were versus dismissal just because it might dismiss on some other ground or the plaintiff might give up or the witness is my