confirming foreclosure and confirmation of sale against miss mitchell and her home essentially without ever serving her with the process in this case and they got issue is undisputed the issue in this case is whether or not that the waiver only amounts to a waiver prospectively does not amount to a waiver of retroactive would when you want to just some brief details regarding the motion practice which i think the public find helpful in evaluating this case originally making america file a lawsuit in two thousand and nine against ms mitchell is in the southside of chicago painted a fall judgement in two thousand and ten against her and then obtained a order of foreclosure and sale confirmation of sale and distribution of proceeds in two thousand and eleven fifteen dash fifteen zero five which the court claimed was the exclusive mechanism to move to vacate service in foreclosure case subsequently a new motion was brought after the initial motion was withdrawn again moving to vacate the order of foreclosure of sale confirmation of sale again raising the singular argument that she had not the sort of process unfortunately that motion lacked exhibits what is it really before us whether she was served with process well i think it's important to stand the procedural history of the motion practice but that she and she never the point is that she never ever  when you didn't have any any requirement to be part of the litigation had been processed right before that i don't think i can write or i don't know these circumstances not when you've got done anything wrong i think the key is what do you forfeit anything when you follow the parents timely in a case i think it's i think of be of value to process for those rights to be forfeit it should done nothing wrong miss mitchell this case did nothing wrong and then we were done obviously stance the proposition that even when it even when your person jurisdiction is waived no there's nothing i have seen that there's no intent expressed and that no changes to that language that would suggest that the that the legislature essentially intended to take the process rights for or forfeit due process rights of  some consequences here it took almost three years from the time of the defendant's default until the order approving the foreclosure report of sound distribution and in the order for position indeed three years  if we find that a party who finally appears and and in some it's up to the jurisdiction of the court is bound by the prior orders of the court obviously we're not restarting the meter for what potentially could be another three years really so there's the opposite side of the coin you want to comment on that well i'm better so just saying i don't it's i don't think it's three years old you respect me it was two thousand and nine a complex filed they could afford it was ordered two thousand and ten person because to her knowledge she says should not the circuit process so she she indicated her intention to fight the issue of jurisdiction from the earliest possible moment that she could do it admittedly she would through the motion  took any other step other than a move to contest personal jurisdiction withdrawn or not she still her next motion are traditionally a one was nevertheless a motion to vacate on the grounds of purfleet your official the court seemed to be seem to be caught up in semantics quite frankly the sole defendant so she couldn't have moved to dismiss the case there was another defend in the case as well as her so the only recourse procedurally would be would be able to do one of two things a motion to vacate the order on the grounds of lack of service court relied upon a second district decision making it was a marzano decision maybe it was a decision as i read of the first district was not this issue was clearly an issue needs to be addressed i was regardless of how you come out because there is clearly a overruled but it's not going to get a lot i should say i think in the third in the fifth district come out differently as well so you know it's this is really something obviously it needs to know that i'm sure it's what you read the petition but something certainly needs to be dealt with but as far as we're concerned or others we gun is still the law it was not a law of the time it was it was some made and it was made for a the purpose of preserving some of these due process rights at least until the time that they a very clear language in the statute section two three a one way and subsection a bottle to the extent your honour's wish for me to address the issue whether or not she waved their sticks and i'm happy to do so but they would like to focus on  work and at that time section two three zero one was markedly different from its current form as counsel pointed out at that time provided that when a party wanted to appear in object to the courts and for some jurisdiction needed to file what was called judgments and so courts are left with the grey area and the definition of a general appearance especially a post judgment general parents was left up to determination on a case by case basis and so there involves some ambiguity language in section two three a want it did so in two key ways first it totally eliminated the special general clearance distinction and any temp oral restriction in that language and including the prior to judgment language it also added a subsection a body which provided that if a party filed any pleading or motion not in compliance with subsection a and other than a motion for extension of time to answer or otherwise hear that party waive all objections over the course jurisdiction over her person now counsel said that really the amendment only eliminated the timing issue in this special special general appearance decision or counsel completely ignores this subsection  filed what the legislature did was try to in senator harkin since words clean up what had been sort of gray area and what had created pitfalls for litigants and they did that by eliminating this special general appearance distinction and addressed i wouldn't i would say that the issue is not before the court today and you know in fact the only issue is whether or not when ms mitchell waived personal jurisdiction she did so both prospectively and retroactively and so we shouldn't comment on the fact that she raised the failure to serve her over and over and over again except for the title of emotions when i would argue now and if i may point out some clear for clarifying points yes the motions did raise the fact that she was not served or allegedly not served with process but in the prayer of relief they did not ask that service speak wash and she filed for judge motions not one of those motions mentioned in the are two tenets of legislative interpret interpretation that necessarily lead to this conclusion that when the legislature amended section two three zero one intended waiver to operate both prospectively and retroactively in the first is that the best indication of legislative intent is the expression language of the statute given its plain and ordinary meaning the second is that where a legislature amends a statute striking words it has to be concluded that it deliberately intended to change the law here the current section two three zero one a and a five are clear on their face there on him being us and so we really need to look no further than the four corners of the statute where it is the legislation indicate that that it's prospective and retro retroactively in i wouldn't posit because for don did not consider this a new language in fact the not have because it was decided so far before the statute was amended that it needs to be revisited and counsel argues that there was he can find a legislative intent that waiver was applied both prospectively retroactively again i say we need to look no further than the clear language of the statute on there any due process concerns with regard to that if we find that respectively i think that the due process concerns are sufficiently protected in the current section to the real line in that they provide litigants with a clear roadmap as to what they need to do in order to appear before a court and object to or a motion to quash service of process and you need to do that before you file any other motion or pleading other than a motion for extension of time to answer otherwise appear it still gives litigants opportunity to raise objections they still get their day in court but it also you know recognizes an interest in finality and in the interest that the court has in hearing objections to jurisdiction early on in the litigation by saying if you do not raise these objections in a very clear way that we say you must you waive all objections to the court's jurisdiction court here to avert dung which as i've stated is the freeman case and because of the amendment to section two zero one we're done is no longer controlling on the proper interpretation of this section of the code and a post judgment proceeding to give a trial court retroactive jurisdiction or to validate orders entered without jurisdiction that's simply not true as the opinion in my zone of points out both the old section two three zero one and the current section to thier line have been applied retroactively post judgment and that's in the lord berkeley decisions respectively marzano of the second district court opinion provides a lengthy thoughtful analysis section of section two three a one as amended the opinion runs through the statutory language of the statue as amended in two thousand and files something other than a motion to dismiss the motion of boss there is a process or a motion for an extension of time to answer otherwise  was the relief request it if i may i can refer to the record but i believe it was to vacate the order proving foreclosure a report of sale and distribution for an order for possession indeed  less than thirty days after the order was entered from time to time with and have been served with process to do that because they learned of the existence litigation they know that their name is a party and they wish for to say the case and protect their rights if the court would accept the the the t bank of america sets forth an essentially litigant that did that made that decision to do that without forming a comprehensive study of every order of the internet case and whether any order that entered that case had any effect on them directly or indirectly would essentially be submitting to all of those retroactive decisions made by the court long before that party filed their parents or had any time we have occasion about their parents so judges have been entered against this party by that appearance whatever reason they would be bound by that judgment wouldn't be able to contest that judgment so i suggested that the bank of america's read of three a one is extremely broad and it really should not be accepted by this court because it is a real trap with the  fact the johnson decision which is a decision the first district that conflicts with this decision actually said it page nine twelve there is no authority to suppose that this decision was decided in two thousand and eight in minnesota to destroy one were added  is timely that the litigant should have he should have the ability to bring a motion to challenge your stiction of course but if the litigant doesn't do that for whatever reason it litigant should not be it's require service it does for the court found that service was that the service was away on the part of make america waive service by responding to it well i only bring it up in light of affected my question with respect or with respected being a new action compared to the motion to vacate that was filed if that had been what it what is the difference in the effect of those two i don't believe there's any difference whatsoever because if the court were to find that there was no problem no service branch the motion aquash but natural