two thousand and three it was amid the operator mino leslie at that time which was den berry with the keys paragraph eight of this service lease contract is this is the paragraph as they need to this case in that the lakes the district court table that a mineral listing cannot bargain away or limit its surface easement rights on the mineral state but executing a service contract that decision is wrong you know when contracts or even force their story conditions that are present and you can look at all the cases it was cited these three conditions had to be present for the contract to be in force one you know to the mineral estate and the operator limited the loan amount they did they did the rd requirement is that there has to be expressed limitations in the contract that requires the middle east they do something at the end of the lease to because a lot of these cases there was no the mineral list they did not sign the contract the mineral s c has all the rights to the mineral lease the operator did not train state was acting on behalf of excitement in that case and the trial that in the middle east they don't want not with this surface lease that modified it because mineral do they have the right to have that equipment there without the service lease just just with the middle east they would without the service lease involved why does this language that they can put the same equipment back up again so is your interpretation of this that they've got to take it down but then the next day they can put it back they can't do that they can't put in a grade to put it back in the same condition if they put it back in the same condition like in the come back on the acres can they put back up their pomps and well know that would to me say it superseding or not if i not only at four three acres they can put it next door in somebody else's property that it does so under the mineral lease before  service lease they had a certain bundled rights yes it is your point that you have the service lease and then the service lease expires we don't just go back to what they had another marilee's they have fewer the they could use it properly for any purpose or that contra surface contra he was brought i mean the case gave up a lot for that paragraph eight and now when it's time for a paragraph they can be inforced petro didn't want to do it you have to read that section section eight premises i would think would naturally refer to per buildings or houses as distinct from the overall four acres i guess i'm trying to get back thirty years to figure out what was going through their mind it seems to me they weren't trying to utterly nullify a mineral lease no so instead what it seems like they were concerned about were preexisting buildings and structures just as there was a separate section relating to the house that's been demolished so in section eight when  we parker that was a separate contract what was the surface lease restriction in mobile in mobile oil to bury the pipeline least twelve inches below the surface and to remove any foundations a company foundations that were left on the property after the lease terminated it was a duty to restore the property to its original condition that was a mobile goods and the service owner gave up gave them more property than they actually needed as rays were necessary to produce the oil and yes the case gave up a lot more than the the owner did in the mobile or corporation case but just to be clear your theory is tha whatever rights they had another under the mineral lease the day before the service lease they now have very different rights the day after the service lease they have all the rights that they have in the middle east except they can't conduct their operations on the f i guess what i'm getting at is if you're looking for a departure from the status quo you seem to be relying on language that reinforces the status quo it's not it's because it's not a an easy interpretation of this language i thought it was pretty clear because when it talks about restoring the premises it is not clear at all if same or similar let's go back to what we had before the same or similar which is very different from different and less well returning the premises to same a similar condition would be what it looked like it well this case is a straightforward case involving the dominant of the state and its reconciliation with the surface lace we would submit to this court that very issue has been decided in mississippi harsher operating company is the designated operator and it is a separate l l c properly organized they don't have no interest in the field other they in the right to operate it is the only party that can their rights at all or do you have a more subtle argument no sir yes we're not arguing that the surface lease did not exist we're not arguing why it was brought into existence what we're what we're stating is that it did exist and during the pendency of the of the surface lease it coexisted neural state we believe it actually granted additional rights and that was the right to use  mississippi supreme court addressed that issue in a rose case and they said that operator had the right to operate on behalf of everybody and in the field including the original lessee the  not involve in any respect the restriction of access to the dominant mineral state it's not that case i thought the st reason was the one they're relying on which is that in the coburn case the operator was not same time it executed a concurrent lease with the mineral lissie the exchange of rights flowed from the person who owned the damn mineral stuff they just lay on the surface as well and the case did not involve every single one of them there's not a single case that is ever considered this issue not one that is ever hailed that a subsequent service lease terminates limits  in so many words that that is paragraph eight in paragraph fourteen it also says that if any part of this leases on it forcible then the balance remains in effect that would hold true for any of the terminated it only had the right to that part of the land it was necessary for its own gas operations so of argument is not that the service lease had no effect whatsoever because we you lose in other words they get the loan amount restriction you get the enhanced lawful use anywhere but what he's saying a section eight was what they get after thirty years the property is restored i thought they meant to eighty tube and holes cost millions of dollars to drill we're not talking about picking pumps up and moving it next you're talking about plug in millions of dollars worth of whales that service example i would give and that is if what he's saying is true we have removed those wells plug them remove all equipment the next day after we turned it back to him under our state we come right back and do it again that makes no originally entering lease with you all they want the status quo preserved yes i would venture to say when that was executed i don't know this but i would venture to say when that was executed no one had any invasion that someone would argue that you're cover different sections one of them is called the consolidated and it covers it all basically all of the state but every one of those agreements takes that the operator which is has the power to do it it's not a grant to rd parties that are bringing in the person who owned the line and in this case the keys ratified it right we're not saying there we're saying that it independent right existed coexisted while the two were both into it and it when that service lease terminated we still had the right to be there under the dhamma mental state for the part of the land that was necessary for our exploration there's been no allegation whatsoever that we're using an unnecessary amount of land there's no allegation that we've been imprudent in our operations in fact i believe it's been conceded that we haven't so those echo of this bit of the stances such as a stop of don't apply those are when someone has really had bad conduct and his let somebody believe something is not true i don't believe this court or anyone else can read that surface agreement and read the case and believe that there was no intent to deceive anybody  but they don't have to follow through and keep their word on all the terms of the contract that they agreed to do which is at the end of the lace term move your equipment then you don't have the ability to contract with an oil company or hyperbolic you could've written a much better much clearer provision nobody's saying you can't affect you eat this concept i think the concern is that you haven't done this in this language well that would litigated in the use all this other property they still get the mineral lanes they still have the right to go on the surface of everybody else but not the four three that was explicit in the agreement it's been there for thirty years they're wrong about the sta limitations when you have knowledge of a of a provision in a contract going to the city morgan in washington case we cited a rate yet three years from the date you have knowledge of the terms of the conditions to bring a suit to cancel it or to know you know they want to throw all surface leases that's what the district court need a set of surface lease to limit a mineral ses rights well you can call it a mickey mouse contract adamant that the label means nothing it's the terms of the contract they control all of these are negotiated with the surface owner just look at the cases that were cited most of those cases didn't have expressed when he was limiting the restoration of the property what's your best case for not just limiting say ok we'll pay you for crop damage or if we have to build a pipe instead of your bar will do this where do you have a case that the surface lease actually ends the mineral and yet it doesn't refer to it well we're not