good morning honors my name is emily filthy and i represent marquis in this matter today i'll be focusing my remarks on the second argument the non constitutional issue raised in my briefs and i'll be happy to answer any questions that you may have regarding the other two of juvenile jurisdiction prosecution statute or e g j p requires that a designation hearing be held within thirty or sixty days after the state files a does it nation motion here that the hearing was held ninety nine days after the state filed its motion all the while sixteen year old marquis was held in custody and due to this e j j p designation marcie received an indeterminate juvenile sentence as well as an additional twenty three year adult sentence in a case where no one was harmed the statute is mandatory whether the statute mandatory or directory is a matter of statutory construction the primary goal statutory construction is to give intents the effect effect the intent of the legislature traditionally the language of the statute is the most reliable indicator of legislative intent here the statute provides that the hearing shall be held within thirty six thirty days unless the cause shown in which case the hearing shall be held within sixty  particular language contemplates only one continuance it doesn't contemplate unlimited continuances only one and reading this as directory renders the spece specificity of this one continuance unless there's good cause language in  statute superfluous also good cause it's a tough burden that's not just asking for a continuance it shows the timeline is important to legislature and intended to be mandatory if the hearing it not been held within preparation of case because once the state files it you have to stop looking for that alibi or working up the guilt or innocence portion of the trial and you have to start essentially preparing for a sentencing hearing designated as e j because after that point the court loses its ability to rule on that motion unless the state we files which they didn't do in this case said you know effects the miners ability to prepare for the trial because they have to switch over to to looking at more sentencing related issues you know the minors background things like that and again it doesn't really matter it's like the ninety day rule import or the ninety day rule in court or for ruling on the first stage of post conviction titian it doesn't only apply if the petition has has merit it doesn't merit your force in the legislatures and ten because juveniles are are vulnerable people just like pro s although it it definitely interferes with the defense ability to prepare and to give advice to the minor i'm from counsel standpoint the advice that you're going to give a minor who's facing trial in juvenile court but facing  a maximum sentence of up to their twenty first birthday is vastly different than the advice that counsel might give to a juvenile who's facing an additional ten to forty five year adult sentence how does it play into the how does the timing of when the hearings held have any for the juvenile to learn this early in the early in the pendency of the case rather than later it definitely would be more advantageous to learn it right away because again it affects how counsel prepares you know instead of if it's easy a j then now coun possibly preparing a jury trial and it's a public trial and there's these significant adult consequences what right is the state to time the state she designed  because if it's easy a j it's a whole different ballgame here case is designated as e j the step the statute only uses shouts this indicates a purposeful selection of words and a different intent between the shout and the mates also the format of the statute suggests a mandatory intent statute lists all the steps required to obtain e j j p in one lengthy block paragraph instead of in separate subdivisions once the state files the motion notice shall be given hearing shall be commenced within thirty days most because then the hearing shall be held within sixty days notice the hearing shall be given to open to the public if a court determines that their probable cause the court show grant the motion the decision to include all these conditions and one lengthy block paragraph suggests that the legislature intended for all of these showers we read together and to be mandatory you can't just cherry pick some of these shells out and say that some of these shells are directory while some of these are mandatory because it just doesn't make sense in terms of format of the actual statu although the language of the statute is the best indicator of legislative intent courts also look to potential consequences well in the statute to be directory allows the state to indefinitely prolong the seating putting the child in a state of uncertainty about the nature of the trial and the possible consequences you know adult knows right from arraignment the possible sentencing range that he's facing if he is convicted and minors as we all know are different from adult and need more certainty one of the one of the topics during discussed during the debates on this  statute was that e j j p provides a juvenile with certainty over the consequences because children need to be taught that there are consequences to their behaviors as i mentioned it also affects defense strategy one of us child moreover if the child is in detention this will prolong their time in detention which is directly against the purpose and policy statement of the j c a this could also be used as a tactic or a weapon by the state to compel the child pleat particularly if the child's being held indefinitely in the adi home during this time the state wants to forgo the traditional rules of statutory construction arguing that shall is only mandatory when there's negative language or consequences listed in the statute under the state's logic much much of the criminal code would negative there's no negative language or consequences does not or closer to home in this case if shout when used in the e j j p statute is not mandatory then the provision in the e j p statute that the court shall order the imposition of the adult sentence if the minor commits a new fence is similarly not mandatory because a general rule a stretch for a construction is that when the same words appear in different parts of the same statute that they should be given the same meaning i've sent some indication that the legislature intended differently  note the state has all of the benefits under the statute is so easy for the state all they have to do is prove probable cause by proffer and if you violate the deadline the state can justify the state controls all part of this determination and this was for a purpose in the house debates representative cross address the concerns that could lead to increased attention time and increased attention costs representative cross explained that this legislation should not  matters because the statute makes it so easy for the state to get its case together probable cause by proffer you know they don't need to even present any live witnesses here because mark he's adult sentence was imposed in good morning chief justice co bright honorable members of the court again assistant state's attorney and that calls from cook county representing the people of the state of illinois in the matter before this court despite making no objections below despite agreeing to all of the continuances and despite the fact that there was absolutely no prejudice to this respondent in the hearing delay respondent would have this court strike the ruling of the circuit court and lift his adult sentence to make it go away i would suggest to your honor's that the mandatory construction that the defendant places on this statute is not just inconsistent with the statute itself in this court's case law interpret ing the question of whether a statute is mandatory directory it's also entirely inconsistent with the purpose and policy behind the statute and the mandatory construction actually does damage to the statute and likely intrudes on the circuit court juvenile courts role exclusive role to control its own docket for instance while the statute prescribes the word shall hold the hearing it does not anywhere describe what the result of noncompliance would be th describe a consequence and the absence of any negative language actually requires that this statute be presumed directory this is this court's pronouncement in bellville are where this court was viewing another procedural rule about admonishments in a plea context where the word shall told the circuit court to admonish the defendant regarding the consequences of deportation this court held that that word shall have a man excuse me a directory meaning the same must be said in this case in the same presumption must lie that presumption is only under overcome under two circumstances the first is where there's negative language prohibiting further act that's not present in this case council has conceded that the second circumstance is where a directory construction would do damage to the right that the statute was meant to protect and we know for a fact in this case  that will not happen while respondent supposes a number of reasons for this thirty to sixty day hearing timeframe the actual reason is most likely to protect a juvenile from being held unnecessarily in detention during this period of time the speedy trial act contained in the juvenile court mentions that e j j prosecution motion will allow for the court to hold the respondent in detention so this time frame is likely to ensure that the respondent isn't unnecessarily held beyond a reasonable period of time what's the purpose thirty sixty limit stage it's just to ensure that the proceedings take part in a reasonable period of time prior to trial and that the respondent is not unnecessarily detained for any lengthy pretrial period of time because he's a juvenile now respondent got up before this court and actually admitted that the state could just withdraw if it goes beyond the hearing date that the state could withdraw and just refile and in fact she mentions that in the reply brief is well well if all the state had to do in this case when it looked as if the hearing wouldn't be held within sixty days was to withdraw its e j petition only to refile another one and start another sixty day clock and start another detention hold on t not necessarily because the statute provides that this that the state may file in e j the dish petition at any time before trial and excuse me they filed a petition the petition correct but i'm only pointing this out because i don't want to do that i don't want to have to file a motion after motion simply because a hearing for some reason or another can't be heard this court can't be blind to the circumstances that occur in juvenile court where there's all kinds of reasons why a delay could happen that's not the result of either party still atory conduct in this case it offers the a lawsuit if example the first day that the hearing was scheduled to be heard defendant was represented by the p d the state was i had filed a motion and it was on the forty six days so within term defendant came into court excuse me respond it came into court with a brand new private attorney who'd never been on the case before he hadn't reviewed discovery he had just been provided the voluminous discovery by the public defender's office and when the state said judge i don't have all of respondents school records let's get a continu defense counsel private defense counsel understandably agreed this is the first time he was stepping up on the case the matter was continued by agreement to the following day which actually was the sixtieth day and that was continued for status to determine when the parties would have all agreed upon date to have the hearing on that day defense counsel didn't object to the hearing being outside sixty days rather he along with the court and the prosecutor determine when the most appropriate date was and that date just so happened to be thirty days hence in august and the hearing was had under these circumstances that particular delay not only didn't prejudice the defendant it allowed the court to control the docket and it also didn't unnecessarily detain the respondent for an unreasonable period of time now under respondants mandatory reading because it wasn't really the state's fault that the hearing couldn't be held within sixty days respondent suggests that all the state should do is just refile withdraw the original petition refile it and start that sixty days again what that could potentially add up to is one hundred twenty days delay if we give a mandatory construction to the statute and i would suggest to your honor's that that would be not just a hyper technical reading of the statute but it would also be absurd because a mandatory reading of the statute would actually prevent juvenile court from granting a continuance to a respondent who legitimately has expressed a need based reason for requesting a continuance it would also potentially allow dilatory conduct on the juveniles part does not appear for the hearing date and thereby rests jurisdiction from the circuit court so that circuit court can't impose an e j prosecution desiccation on the case with respect to counsel citation to other portions particularly the code of criminal procedure or some substantive statutes with respect to the sentencing ranges and are not tight cases in presenting those issues or those cases to this court counsel is confusing statutory substance substantive laws that describe the substance of what a court should do and procedural laws this is a procedural law this is merely a timing requirement that the legislature has set for without any consequence written into the statute as a result what the circuit court or what this court should do is  mic directory reading to the statute now very briefly counsel also mentioned the post conviction ninety day rule in porter and that was a mandatory finding by this court reading but that ninety days in the p c statute contains a direct consequence if the post conviction petition isn't ruled on within ninety days the court shall docket it for further considerations for the second stage so that contains several independent subsections to deal with both pretrial trial sentencing potential revocation procedures and then ends with when the minor turns twenty one the fact that the legislature bundles all of the pretrial procedures in subsection one and two doesn't mean that all the shells mean the same thing all that it means is the manner in form in which the statute was written was written in general to bundle the individual chronometer chronological events together so that alone shouldn't shouldn't be a basis to declare the statute reading under a mandatory construction the mandatory construction in this case is wrong as a matter of law it would be inconsistent with the manner in which this court has reviewed other timing provisions and other statutes it would operate an injustice in so far as this respondent never disagreed with a course of action chosen by the circuit court yet now an appeal has claimed that the circuit court's judgment is void and the timing provision in this case by contrast must be read as directory and unless a respondent is prejudiced by the delay he is not entitled to an unknown deserved windfall of reversal of the e j state adult sentence now counsel hasn't addressed the remaining two issues so i will not be labor those before the court because there's nothing to respond to but i will stand on the arguments that we presented in the briefs and ask that this court  the judgment of the appellate court in this case thank you thank you manner the court certainly has the inherent power to put a stop to this behavior if it's necessary to do so so it also points out argues that the minor agreed to these continuances pretrial first of all not  continuance is different from asking for a continuance but it was the state that is the one that asked for the continuance it wasn't the minor it's the state's burden at the first part of the ija hearing so is the state asking for a continuance to obtain school records even though their burden is probable cause that they can present by proffer and probable cause the state should have that at the time that they file the petition for adjudication in the very first place also parties cannot agree to an act that's not authorized by the statute as this court mentioned in its case pure white even when a defendant a prosecutor and a court all agree on a sentence the court cannot give the sentence effect if it's not authorized by law also as mentioned there's no negative language in the ija j p statute however there is limiting language and that's just the fact that the statute does provide for this one continuance for good cause so although it's not negative language per se it does limit what's going on in this does it nation finally state says that this is a procedural statute this is not just procedural it's about imposing this adult sentence on this kid it's more like an untimely dismissal and then on timely service more over which ultimately  start i mean this is this is about imposing this adult sentence on this kid the statute because this hearing once this hearing happens this kid's going to be getting this adult sentence when he's convicted this is about imposing this the sentence on this kid and ultimately whether it is a procedural statute or something else it comes down to a question of the intent of the legislature what did the legislature intend in putting this thirty and sixty day deadline violin another petition down the one closer to trial indicates that a directory reading should be given rather than a mandatory reading how do you  these deadlines are in the statute for a reason and the legislature wanted this to happen and what is the sixty days that says the court just has no authority anymore to rule on this on this motion  i mean they can keep under the statute obviously they can keep filing but that's not the intent here i mean the tennis to have this happen so that we know whether this is the j p or not maybe it is just one position is contemplated in the state and i have been arguing sort of over this fact in the briefs especially with her point that are her suggesting that the state can can keep refiling but remedy if you should lose on the issue of mandatory directory you lost in the appellate court on the standard issue and i think there's a second district case that would conflict with statute mandatory then obviously that would give relief for my client however if this court does not then he still seeking relief under the vagueness challenge or the apprentice challenge and you're right there is a appellate court over whether a juvenile has standing part of the revocation of the stay on the adult sentence to challenge e j however in this case the state has filed a petition to revoke marquees the stay on ricky's adult son and so he the revocation hearing actually occurs and until marchese jay jay status is actually terminated he still does have to abide by these conditions of the juvenile sentence and because he still has to abide he still under these conditions he does still have standing to challenge the vagueness of conditions in juvenile history but also so we find that you standing we could either rest the constitutional issues or  facing so i mean this is a state's argument is that it could the conditions could be anything in the j c a could be any of the rules and regulations the d j o but we just don't know so someone needs to speak to that and someone needs to be to clarify to juveniles and the juvenile courts what conditions is exactly are is it minor tickets in the d j will lead to a revocation of the stay i mean if a judge in all doesn't return a library book is that would you be concerned about the says it stands juveniles don't know so they might think that a minor ticket thirty done or they might think anything less short of a skate from the d j is sufficient so this court needs to speak to what exactly the statute