well your thank you your honor may it please the court my name is james patterson and i represent the petitioner mr armando navarro in this matter and i'd like to reserve excuse me a minute for r public conscience is inherently bass viol or deprived in matter of flores the board of immigration appeals held that an evil or malicious intent is said to be the essence of moral turpitude and that that the test is whether the act is accompanied by vicious motive or a corrupt mind california penal code section thirty two punishes the harboring concealing or aiding of a principal who has committed a felony with the intent that the principal me avoid at the statues and if the most minimum conduct punishable under this statute involves moral turpitude then it is a crime involving moral turpitude put another way if that most minimum conduct does not involve moral  a crime involving moral turpitude that's a categorical approach correct your honor and i believe that's the only approach that's of any value in this particular case because we really have no factual basis for this plea on the record page other than that there is no factual basis for this please so i modify categorical approach isn't really going to assist us we are i believe stuck with the categorical approach here and the most minimum conduct under this statute  code section thirty two and of the board of immigration appeals decisions in that matter of b and in matter of ga the board of immigration appeals held and those cases still stand that escape aiding one to escape from jail does not inherently require any evil intent and therefore does not involve moral turpitude those are two cases interpreting massachusetts law again of aiding someone to escape matter of jamie the individual actually help through some metal bars in a window apparently the board again did not find that that involved moral turpitude and under penal code section thirty two aiding someone who has committed a felony to escape arrests trial conviction or punishment is punishable under the statute and so again there is conduct here that is punishable under the statute that does not by the board's own precedent involve moral turpitude so what should the government of done differently  this kind of review down the road is one involving moral turpitude and i don't know that there is anything the government in this case could have done he could have been criminally charged with a different statute other than accessory at the turpitude we have is is count five and it's just written in and that's all we have that's what you're saying i believe right and our first step is again under the categorical approach to look at the statute and so that's what i believe we're we're they have dealt with cases that do involve moral turpitude and again they they go with this standard definition that moral turpitude is inherently bass viol or to pray they have said that it doesn't require necessarily fact that the moral turpitude would be involved yes your honor the government would need to show the categorical approach and if you go to a categorical approach  the this is a deal made by the state of california correct yeah and then they're not worried about moral turpitude or a thing like that they were not and they were not intent on mentioned slung yes your honor and you know order for this case to turn out in your favor we would have to refuse to follow sloan am i right no you honor you would not by not sloan as is more narrow sloan deals with harboring or concealing the penal code section thirty two talks about harboring concealing or aiding a felon so again we believe that you feel that that song is distinguished on that basis yes i believe that sloan is distinguished in that one the attorney general interpreted moral turpitude very broadly and she knew that they were dealing with what the sentence  provision requires less misconduct than being an assessor e after the fact does it not i don't know that i would concede that your honor again miss present a felony is more indifference or passive attitude toward it but again i believe under the california statute that could also be punishable conduct punishable as this prison of a felony could also be classified a aiding someone that you know has confirmed committed a crime all right well does it does does that lead you to suggest that we can do that we can distinguish or do we have to simply rule differently from the circuit you can distinguish that case your honor on the basis that there's something magical the difference between miscreation and being an assessor e after the fact correct that a being a known felon again which can be simply providing a believe again that the statutes are different and that looking to the boards of the board of immigration appeals decisions on escape which again is is a minimal amount of conduct punishable under that statute that this court could find i appreciate you section and that his name and their individual might have or could have done the question is does this statute by definition meet the definition of a crime involving moral turpitude then one if anyone if anyone  penal code mean meet the definition of for conviction under the california penal code if the california penal code or the california court said yes then the next step would be to could take it into the immigration context with with this court and petitioners coming close to doing this is raising all of the collateral challenge to the conviction saying that well we don't know what happened i would agree you're out of there's not anything in the record as to the actual conduct what short answer is yes or no are under under this under the statute under the california heading or under the california code i wouldn't want to speak as to how illinois or wisconsin or some other state defines accessory after the fact but but but that is by necessity that's the evidence before us to address the modified categorical approach yes it's your you're also conceding that there isn't sufficient evidence before us to look at the underlying crime to determine whether or not it should be considered in terms of determining whether or not this where it was a failure to comply with the government reporting requirements structuring financial transactions so as to not comply with those reporting requirements that same elements is involved in that in that crime which was found not to involve now a person can do a lot of things in the name of humanity that is not coupled with the motives of this guy escape or of avoid prosecution or punishment or whatever the let me hear directly but under the board decisions again that find that escape is not a crime involving moral turpitude even if you add that specific intent to help someone to escape you don't arrive at a crime involving moral turpitude so then you rely on the escape from jail does not require any evil intent and again a matter of j but this statute uses the word intent and i'm i'm focus now for a moment on the concept of whether or not this as aiding interstate would be an intentional thing under that under this statute that you're talking about you know yet the matter of be said the the intent that the principle may avoid or escape from arrest trial conviction or punishment specific intent is very fuzzy it is fuzzy and i don't believe that we've got to go there to make this decision i believe again the minimal conduct aiding someone to escape is punishable under california penal code section thirty two ever looked at was looking at immigration precedents here i believe there's enough case law we're talking about california law and i believe there's enough case law here to decide this case into the categorical approach without resorting to that thank you on this we basically have to define moral