good morning your honor is may it please the court john paul rich method on behalf of the shawn lawson the appellant in this case your honors there are numerous warrants in this case but i'm going to proceed to the rodriguez delay issue first and then proceed to the warrants on rodriguez the officer in this case violated the fourth amendment when he stopped mr lawson and immediately launched into an unrelated investigation this unrelated investigation covered eight different topics and lasted is several minutes the officer returned to his car and conducted other tasks but did not pursue the traffic infraction investigation at that point there was clearly a delay here because even if there were additional traffic investigation it had to have come after the kind of related to this to gauge the district  suspicion to justify this delay the government has argued on appeal in the district were also held that the reasonable suspicion to justify the delay was the lack of luggage the expensive the third remaining factor is the driving on i five eighty and obviously that is insufficient even if the cork consider these factors that were developed during the d the court should not hold these are sufficient let me go back to your premise from rodriguez and you suggested because the officer attended to something or focused on something other than the traffic stop that's automatically going to be too long rodriguez doesn't set a reasonable standard but rodriguez specifically talks about the officer looking to other things and i think the standard it's articulated there is what unduly prolonged or  measurably extend the duration of the stop how much longer was this stop extended because of what he was doing well i think that the court should find it was extended by approximately five minutes any how long would the traffic stop of taken if he's only paying attention to the fact of the car didn't have plates and was speeding at pretty high rate of speed well the traffic stop by itself would have taken longer than five minutes wouldn't perhaps but that's not the test rodriguez rejected a rule where is long the officer expeditiously investigates or gets his work done quickly he can go to unrelated matters so long as the entire stop is still shorter than the average stop blood review is says that you can play out the tape and and a k well how long would this reasonably have taken the and that's a case where the traffic stop we don't know because the officer stopped investigating it after he signs the driver's license i think we probably do know we know you would expect that if somebody was actually going to be cited for those offenses the process is going to take longer than five minutes and so why is this unduly prolonged because well to answer so that the first is that this is a pretext  and the and what the courts should find courts of said pretext ops are ok as long as you've got a real driving violation have a thing right but the reasonable time that it takes to wrap up a traffic investigation in a pretext stop should be rather short in this case the traffic investigation only amounted to checking the driver's license but the answer your court's question is the court needs to add the unconstitutional delay in this case to the reasonable time that it would have taken to play out the here that's correct and the consent happened during the unconstitutional delay so it can't be considered if the court looks at gorman evidence that the the evidence learned unconstitutional delay and again it's important not to misinterpret the line in rodriguez that says that one can figure out how long this would have taken according to the to a reasonable measure the court should say fine if the court if the police needed seven more minutes to adjudicate the traffic issue or to prosecute the traffic issue that needs to be added to the five minutes of the delay the five minutes of the delay came at the beginning it was not simultaneous if the court follows you got one officer in a walk and chew gum at the same time that you can't both investigate the potential drug concern here and also write him up for driving without plates and driving at a high rate of speed and supreme court hasn't said that you can only at the i mean you seem to be arguing that you can't have a traffic stop that leads to something else that the traffic stop you've got to quickly attend to what what you need to do to write him up for driving without plates and for speeding and that's the end of it you can't do anything else and that can't be the law because that would mean traffic stops never count for anything measurable extension of the stop once the traffic mission is completed any measurable extension that is not in furtherance of that mission is an uncultured but i'll bet if he'd pursued writing up the ticket and that would have taken longer than five minutes that's not unduly prolonged the traffic ticket would have taken that long and i think that's the point to rodriguez it doesn't say that you did you call time out you're only allowed to work on the traffic ticket you can't work on anything else and if you don't take longer than what the traffic ticket would have taken how does it violate rodrigues the courts suggestion would get rid of the rodriguez rule entirely but you get rid of traffic stops completely if we take your  because you couldn't do anything other than write a ticket you couldn't spend any time doing anything else unless you had a second officer in the car who could work independently but if you have only one officer the poor guy can only do one thing at a time and you wouldn't let him do anything but right up the ticket and would rodriguez rodriguez requires expeditious attendance to the traffic violations detouring from that mission causes delay and the if the court allows an officer to stop somebody and then investigate them for general evidence of crime for five minutes based on the idea that five minutes is a reasonable traffic stop time then the rule of rodriguez ceases to exist every officer can investigate anybody for any reason in a traffic stop for five minutes and that's not the rule of rodriguez you respond to the following proposition beyond  this explicit consent the officers search was by chris by fax providing independent reasonable suspicion that he was involved in criminal activity that this record here found the absence of luggage despite in the statement that he had spent three weeks in los angeles he stated employment as an entertainer an ironworker which arguably would not pay to for the car that he was driving and also the police officers knowledge that i s five eighty was a well known trafficking route from los angeles to san francisco don't these all provide  taken together ground independent grounds for reasons suspicion that watson was involved in criminal activity they do not your honor the officer gained all of this knowledge except for the travel on i five eighty during the unconstitutional unrelated investigation this case and so none of those are before the court the let me proceed to the equinox for briefly bentley warrant you can bet the word yes the bentley warrant is directly connected to the stop it causes the stop in this case it is composed of the fruits of the equinox war and the u p s war the equinox warrant is completely lacking in probable cause only gives one fact about the car that is owned by a rental agency in cincinnati that has to be suppressed there's already enough evidence in the record for this court to order that the u p s want should be suppressed as well the u p s warrant however is very important for for this reason the government would have to prove on re manta that the confidential informant is also not a fruit of the u p s warrant therefore already two legs of the bentley warrant are have to be suppressed and possibly a third the the gorman case is very is guides to the court on the bentley warrant the the case says that an impetus an illegal impetus to a chain of events can lead to suppression although it does lead to suppression all the way down the line and so it's clear that the equinox and u p s warrants are key and have to be litigated in terms of the fruit of the poisonous tree and so i will reserve three minutes of or bottle if the court doesn't have further questions all right i think you can thank first is that the officers conversation with the defendant was not unrelated to his reasons for the stop he asked him about the tinted windows because he was concerned about officer says this is the reason he was called ahead and tell them tell them to stop them and he you know happened to find you know much like into traffic related things but if may have altered the dynamic here o'gorman does say that a traffic violation is not enough but in norman the traffic violation was that the the the vehicle had crossed the yellow line it crossed the fog line in this case the vehicle was it was it was a you know i don't stop i think the government would concede that if the consent came after rodriguez after the reasonable after the stop and ceased to be reasonable that it would not be of alec and our not ok but in this case and i'm jumping all over the place here but in this case the the the consent was obtained in the first five minutes after the stop we're going to be running places because this is like a criminal procedure or  my god there's so many different issues in this case and them all down that's correct but but to go back to my original point the the the rodriguez sets a objective standard it does not certain set a subjective standard and the question is whether the the stop itself was reasonably prolonged by the the by by other activity by activity that was not related to the purpose of the stop in this case the  officer took seven minutes to to run the record check which he's not entitled to do under rodriguez he obtained consent in less time than that he can sink consent and within five minutes and that is sufficient to uphold the consent that was was was the district court found that the defendant had validly consented after hearing extensive testimony from both officer williams and the defendant as i mentioned before the defend it was not in custody there was only one officer that and the district court found that the officer did not draw his gun or even have his hand on his gun while he was approaching the defendant he never told the defendant that he could obtain a search warrant the officer never told the defendant and used a conversational tone throughout so i think even the i mean offending into detail on this well the only reason i go into detail is because of the washington case in this court which is that and for ninety f second or third where they the court said they consented not atten a basically did attenuate a prior illegality and in this case our position is that not only is the consent valid but it's but the district court found it to be valid and the district found it to be valid after hearing both sides testify and it where the da might have concealed that they were investigating the defendant so ok so it's think a method is not right i mean this is what they call in california a wall stop so away a wall stop which is from a case where they they conduct a pretextual stop and and in this case the pretext may have turned out to be the only thing that the the consent may have not turned up any any drugs or for money and in that case the police officer presumably would have let the defendant go on his way briefly i like to talk about the the the the warrants and as a as we set forth in our brief the none of the warrants are illegal but  even if they were they're all subject to the good faith exception so and i think that good faith exception applies to the last warrant so the it was there any hearing on the good faith exception here well there was no hearing the district court didn't reach a good faith exception because so what what can we what can we do about both of these are warriors if they weren't findings by district court well the they would have to be an exception to the good faith exception and and the district court found that there was probable cause so we think that the record is sufficiently developed to to rule out the for example the bare bones week with the exception to the good faith exception so and there aren't any other and in this report also found that there was no french violation so the court can this court can look at the at that to determine that the good faith exception applies can look at the district court's decision to determine that the  the district court did not reach the good faith exception but if it had it would have found that that well it might have found that it would have found that the that all of the warrants were valid and there was no reason for the dea agent who your honors i don't think it's possible to find that the consent in this case was untainted if the court finds under gorm and there that a probable cause traffic stop is tainted the only thing that happens after the probable different topics where he was going what he was doing there why he didn't have the amount of luggage he should have why he has such a fancy car for for the jobs that he has express whether he has any illegal items in the vehicle so he is being questioned and confronted both immediately following the probable cause traffic stop and i don't think that it's clear that gorman would not have come out differently if the officers had gotten consent from gorman as well the traffic stop suppressing a p c traffic stop is a much greater sweep of the exclusionary rule than the consent that follows that if the traffic stop hadn't happened there would be no consent and gorman said if the first illegal stop hadn't happened there wouldn't have been a second traffic stop the court and the government again repeated several times in the officer himself and testified that he done everything for the traffic stop but that wasn't the case here the officer had things yet to do if he decided to pursue the traffic stop why should that make a difference it doesn't matter what the order of the pro long cation is and that shouldn't allow the officers to to violate the fourth amendment just because they start with the impermissible de lay and rodriguez did plan for that contingency by essentially saying play out what would have happened with the reasonable traffic stop but here it's all at the beginning i want to well the doesn't that take away the possibility of using the traffic stop as a device to investigate something else because you won't let them investigate something else you're arguing even though the traffic stop wasn't finished that and do leave prolongs it you can't stop people just to question them the court can try to develop additional reasonable suspicion for example as in ran from plain view that tool is not taken away but the court is very concerned about turning all of these p c traffic stops into drug stops the last thing i want to say is that the government supplemental record were not before the district court and they should not properly be considered by this court i would also ask that the court reconsider the formant discovery issue if there is a rematch because the informant is becoming more and more important the informant is now also a fruit of the poisonous tree issue on remand and on that basis we respectfully request the court reversed the order denying suppressi