or counsel it's our job to zip that with regard to the decision that was made by judge ever part in cumberland county that we're looking at the weather b v parenting time elements or as the judge pointed out there an increase in her wages over what it is that she was making in polls county there does not appear to be anything else that's least in our position that would have warranted a connected to the life of a minor child all of that was in coles county the parties had a schedule set up basically where they have a common schedule that they would use for purposes of communicating with each other for purposes of engaging in the activities of the minor child for purposes of who was going to take her and when type of thing and that schedule was not something that had been set up over the course of a short period of time was over the course of a period of fifteen to sixteen months that they had engaged in this neither one of these parties went to court to try to codified for lack of a better word that arrangement it just worked and both of these parties had significant involvement with regard to this child over the course of those fifteen to sixteen months the these parties were part of another divorce proceeding reconciled during a court heard on the at the map of the original divorce and then the course of being married again the second time led to these proceedings obviously what's interesting to note is that the original judgment from toledo would have suggested that mom joy had basically all the cards with regard to parenting time or custody back then it is over the course of the aftermath of that divorce that things evolved into the schedule that we're here about or at least as far as the testimony alito was concerned for fifteen to sixteen months i scoured the cases i can't find a case that stands for the propositions that are support the that are in this situation where you have parties who if it wasn't fifty fifty it was pretty darn close or you had parents who were as involved with their minor child as these were with their daughter  daughter of believe so when she testified in camera but there isn't anything that tipped those scales to remove all other than the fact that the petitioner was taking a job leaving col referred to it is she sort of held all the cards but she was the responsible decision making after the first books i don't your honor and i do you mean that's accurate but you don't gave any weight so that i don't respectfully speaking it is true that by agreement of the parties and there was no hearing with regard to a trial such as why we're here and mr dunning did in fact enter into those agreements however those agreements basically went quickly by the wayside as they developed this fifteen to sixteen month period of time not necessarily of one of them holding those cards as i crudely stated but that they co parent much as if they were married and on weird schedules but they were able to make it work for that period of time all in all in contradiction to the orders that had been entered the agreements reached in the original de case in in  cumberland county so if there had been basically a waxing and waning or an intern out of that arrangement but it was always defaulting because of some conflict between the parties back to what the original judgment w just i would say you know what i probably should give some weight to that but the fact that they came right out of the gate after the case was resolved several years ago and went right into this shared custody all situation the longer that we get removed from the entry of that judgment in that case originally the less weight that i would attach to those agreements that were reached in the original case if that answers your question we get to a point though where what judge everhart did or purposes of these proceedings was basically take this child away from all of that and now with the emphasis or at least what i thought the emphasis was on these new parenting time decision making statutes that were in place was that parents were supposed to basically have as much parenting time as they possibly can now i understand her the petitioner's standard of living for lack of better words as improved based on the back there have been wage increases from what she was making in polls the what she's making here in saying women however that may be in her best interest but it doesn't necessarily equate to being in the minor child's best interest when you start looking at all these other things that the minor child has been taken from that are collateral to these parties and then when you get to the nuts and bolts of it all of the things the uprooting that's been done by the courts for her allowing  lee removed and the connections that the minor child had on him it wasn't a matter of hey just when you watch your wallet go to the store kind of thing and i understand we probably wouldn't be here if that was the case but every indication from the record in this case is that this was a basically even in the aftermath of the first of orse and while the geisha was pending and this one was a co parenting situation so when you start looking at some of the older cases like calling warning eckert you know those are good factually as far as the laws are as far as the laws concerned but when you start looking at the facts of those things you don't see cases where a party such as mr dunning here had contact with who is technically speaking the the child of a divorce were these not leave a stone legal parent and that basically is how it came out from the original proceedings she was the custodial parent in mr dunn was the one but none of the cases that i've seen and certainly in the aftermath of the two statutes regarding parenting time and decision making significant decision making of the vast majority of them rule twenty three orders anyway but there isn't anything that strikes to how any of any trial court in illinois has evaluated these elements in this environment where there is a co parenting on such a grand scale where these parties are as as cooperative as they are with each other despite the fact that they're in divorce litigation so we believe that the mere fact and the only dunning was good for caylee the minor and said ok she can go it's a good job let her take it but if the trial court didn't go through and her each of the best interest factors identify how it evaluated that  elaborated on why he was allowing the request for relocation and when into discussing all of the mom's employment so we were invited to submit written final arguments and in our final argument which is obviously part of the record much like how we did in our brief we invited judge everhart to do that because we did go by element by element on parenting time element by element on the significant decision making and cited the evidence from the record at that time that existed and so we invited him to do that but it was not taken upon him to do that and it was as you said basically the same general conclusion was reached but in the context of his reasoning behind what he did and the judge spent a great deal of time with us explaining what he was doing and why there were the two things that he cited and i'll get to the other one here a moment but that of a positive nature being the fact that ms dunning had received an offer for and had accepted new employment here and sank so that was it then you get to what i would consider to be the negative component and the judge judge everhart did in fact reflect on certain incidents that took place caylee's school and also at the residence of one of the parties to stand for the proposition that there was some troubling aspect of mr dunning's personality that he would need to take into account but there was no supporting evidence with regard to those affecting as the statute suggests the ability of mr dunning t parents of those would somehow affect haleigh's best interest there was no reply action by the court on that statute and how that evidence somehow fit into that statute or didn't he just said this troubles and those are the two things that we believe are considerations that the judge made without regard to all of the other evidence about all of the collateral things that were connecting caylee to coles county including father where you look in the record judge because there was evidence as we have cited in the record that would suggest from the testimony of the parties that yes that was in fact the case i believe in mr weaver's brief he makes reference to the fact that there is a different portion i believe of the record that doesn't support that but i think either way you look at it however you want to characterize it is pretty darn close to that my second question  perhaps i'm one make sure when i read this correctly did i understand that the child was affected by tenets of membership at her or stone christian academy because of the incident with the father she was it was an incident that if i recall the record correctly or on or in a roundabout way yes well  not suggesting that's the primary factor here but that would be an example of the trial courts concern for how temperament can affect the rest of the family well if that's the case then judge and i and i'm not disputing the conclusion you're reaching as far as as far as your comment is concerned if that is the case and if you are a party to this arrangement whether it be something that petitioner or the respondent did it really wouldn't matter then this whole fifteen to sixteen month pattern or course of action of these parties taken in relation to a minor child that would cause me as a party to it the non offending party blit i wouldn't want to have my child exposed let's say to that kind of behavior i wouldn't want to have my child be around potentially a firecracker such as that but that's not what happened she and he continued in this fifteen to sixteen month relationship with their minor child that basically was not affected by what happened at the middle  so you know you can say that there was some impact effect or otherwise but the pattern of conduct of the parties in relation to the minor child certainly would not suggest that it was a concern of either so we just we believe that when you wait all of these components and obviously with regard to certain other components for parenting time there are the same as the ones for significant decision making that both of these parties played such an active role with regard to the parenting time that it was fair for judge everhart to not only use such little information to base removal on but also as far as the decision making is concerned to whole away from mr dunning all of those things that he had done in relation to that same decision making with regard to caylee as he had been doing prior to removal being allowed and we believe that was fair we said all along and i think we did in our final argument also is that if ms d please the court counsel with respect to the issues of allocation of parental responsibility for decision making as well as an allocation as to parenting time those are held to an abuse of discretion standard a manifest weight of the evidence standard and a manifest injustice standard i think let's be clear about the the standard of review here is to each of the issues that we're because of that there is a substantial burden on the appellant to show that there was error by the trial court and i think here that goes to a factual inquiry there is a full record on appeal we have greet these issues for the courts consideration and because of that your honor i was going to focus on the misconduct allegation and whether it was appropriate to make consideration of those allegations the respondent appellant once too narrowly read the dissolution act where it discusses conduct not affecting the parent child relationship that and presidents of the child is not the child was not aware of it then eventually not be something that is considered when we're talking about statutory construction we want to give consideration to what the legislature intended and here the legislature is of course focused on the best interests of children and if we engage in a narrow construction of that statute it would be in conflict with our best interest factors as certain best interest factors particularly about whether a party is a sex offender whether a party is engaged in domestic violence those do not necessarily involve the child so on one and two ex clued misconduct that was not direct that the child but then on the other hand reference factors that may include conduct not directed the child it would rather statute in the cock and i think here especially in light of section one zero two of the dissolution statute which says we are liberally interpret the statute again focused on many ideals including the best interest of children we're talking about that misconduct is almost a principle agent relationship the parent is the agent for the child the parent is tasked with making decisions for the child that will be in the child's best interest that is what we're here for that's what the dissolution act says it's going to come into an issue when you have the dissolution and so for if there are issues that may very well that the best interests of the child where we talk about that and pro forma stone christian academy and the agreement not to have contact with that staff if those situations were to occur again in the future mr dunning would be limited in what he could do as far as seeing to the best interests of the child he can't even communicate with her school and so that does come into play it is important that the court take consideration that i understand that that was several years ago and the court judge ever heard of this case can make a determination as to what weight to but it should be a consideration for best interests of the child the relocation was not based soley on a better job offer ms dunning did have a limited means in the wake of this dissolution as judge everhart noted her income was going to be less than thirty thousand dollars per year she had an opportunity almost double that income this is not a benefit solely to ms dunning and the case law where we were formally talking about removal and of course benefits to the parent seeking that move all can flow to the child and it's not required that we show a direct immediate benefit to the child we can recognize that that benefit will flow through because of that increase in income this child may have access as judge everhart noted to opportunity she did not have before there were consideration made beyond simply that income no we have of course have school schools to consider by comparison we introduced the school report cards at the only state board of education take pains it shows certainly that the education where the child would go which was i believe all chat was not of a lower standard than what she had in charleston it may have been better any relocation though necessarily does call into question what impact it would have on the parents that receives that parenting time that is not then the primary parent in this case mr dunning and the court was concerned about what we could do to minimize the effect on him counsel talks about how the parties co parenting i would disagree with that assessment did they have a calendar that indicated who was going to have the child when yes they did but by mr dunning's own testimony in the case he ha a child under that schedule five to six days out of fourteen that's not equal time there's a clear majority time parent and that was ms dunning under a temporary schedule which i would point out is dunning said she acquiesced to it because it's states way or the highway i believe that her direct quote and so where we do have a majority time parent i think the court gave consideration to that but also recognize what mr dunning schedule that this child was judge everhart wanted to minimize the impact on mr dunning and his relationship with caylee caylee's relationship with him i believe under what they had under the temporary arrangement mr dunning had every other weekend under what we have he still has every other weekend with the child the court acknowledged and if you've watched out on that time during the week and so it may not be replaced but we can do what we can to make up for that diminishment and that's why the court ordered additional time in the summer it gave him extended weekends when a holiday would fall on his around his weekends so that he would then have a three day weekend with the child instead of a two day weekend it should also be pointed out and and we're coming to grips with the new statute where up until a year and a half ago you could move anywhere in illinois just want you all to work you didn't have to ask for permission to do this worker to meet halfway that means yes mr dunning is going to have to drive a little less than an hour with the child started his parenting time and at the end that can still be a good time and it is a minimal burden to be placed on that parenting time and it certainly recognizes that there is a very distinct benefit by that relocation sometimes i think parents get a little myopic in their focus on parenting time schedules this is a this is the minimum to mr dunn there's nothing that prohibits especially where counsel is saying they effectively co parent to have this great relationship there's nothing that prohibits mr dunning asking his dunning for more time if they really have that relationship that's something he can do springfield is not so far away from charleston that it would require a great advance planning to pop over here on far away he may complain of it but i think the burdens are minimal in the work did take it into consideration when to determine whether or not to allow the relocation it certainly began with the recognition had a very good basis a good faith basis for why she was asking to relocate this was not frivolous as in some cases that we see going from there it weighed the benefits to her the benefit to the child against the effect it may have on mr dunning and his relationship with the child in the court came up with a schedule that we would be conducive to maintaining that relationship the remaining issues but there are other issues that certainly come into play i believe was asked earlier whether they had a past agreement by their first dissolution they did and again they chose to reconcile they chose to get remarried but our best interest statute recognizes that the parties have an agreement in the past yes they did that was an agreed upon dissolution they have had an agreement as far as how things would be orchestrated both in terms of trustees as well as visitation mrs ms dunning has also shown herself to be heavily involved in the parenting of the child i believe she indicated in her testimony that in all of the years of this child's life she missed one doctor's appointment she was primarily responsible for scheduling the doctors that she was always at the parent teacher conferences and the way that what the record shows was an incident between the parties in the child to swim lessons these behaviors i think go together to show a concern as to whether or not he will put bill his best interests or the child's those evidence cumulatively the trial court heard the trial court got to certainly in a position to assess the credibility of witnesses assess the credibility of party and meet with the child not to pointedly ask her questions about what do you keighley do you want to move to springfield to and i think the judge roberts said kind of dance around the issues to try to ask those open ended questions to hear her and one of the things that she said i know counsel is concerned that the child had a teacher in the school and friends in charleston she didn't say i don't want to go to springfield she said i'm pretty good at making friends and i think she was open to the possibilities and then from that in camera interview again we do not have a transcript of it but i think her testimony was positive to the judge about the location counsel makes mention of the fact that there wasn't a doctor lined up for her in this area that there wasn't a head teacher identified there was a school identified and there is certainly again i don't think it's that hard to charleston there should be a believe evidence in the record that indicated the child had gone even to that a certain degree of uncertainty is ok where parent has that perspective and those are things that would come time i know of believe that was by the closing argument the rate argument but with all but i would take exception to counsel's comment respectfully so with regard to a certain level ones of uncertainty being ok is the position the party they have the burden of proof they have the burden of proof putting to judge ever hard evidence that basically tries to remove i would hope every bit of uncertainty child's going to go here the trials are going to be here the trial is going to do this the child is going to have her as a teacher and as a teacher of the center of an all that ever hard judge ever hardhat was i'm serving here because all that we had was a new job and that was it all of the testimony that council relies on with the issue of relocation still gets back again to the issue of the single issue one person having a job here that is different and makes more money than the one holds county that was  there was nothing else mr weaver talked about schools judge everhart considered the schools to be equal he did not rely on that evidence as a as a tipper of a scale in one direction or another he weighed the charleston schools he waived the schools here because i believe it was we didn't know who's going to be chad and we didn't offer is going to be explained bill we didn't know at the time but the judge did not place any specific reliance in on that element in such a way around that fact in such a way that would have parent and candidly there still isn't anything that i have heard with them having the burden of proof that would suggest that what it is that mr dunning did that the court found to be improper went to an issue that impacted the relationship with the child given that fifteen to sixteen month period of time where they did what they did the parties did they acted in a co parenting action the record is clear on that and if they don't go to the same parent teacher conference that's not grounds obviously for relocation to be the case the five to six days that mr weaver talks about does not include the fact that there were alternating weekends ms dhoni had her alternating weekend mr dunning had his alternating weekend so these periods of time that are spoken to by counsel don't address the issue of the alternating weekends so there was additional time there with him and i believe we were looking at each party schedule a ten day sense because that's how they looked at it that's all the evidence was presented at the time tri whether it's dave's way my client whether it's dave's way or the highway would be more pressure i wouldn't bank on is going to do something like go to court and secure an order they never did there was mediation as is compelled now by supreme court rule but there was never an order that was put in place that said this party has this parenting time this party has this current they went along with this through this procedure for fifteen to sixteen months so i would have to say that it while she may say dave's way or the highway that certainly would seem to fly in the basic facts that are presented because you are didn't back say i want to provide for some additional time in the sun but that doesn't make up for lost opportunities for dinner or evening home or be done or contact with schools or or doctors or just to see your child's face as frequently as he did you can't do that now and i know we're not talking about polls county to same and being from here to honolulu but still the fact of the matter is when you have such a time frame and you're seeing your child on such you know within a ten day period of time being upwards of half of that time or more than half of that time some of  patient doesn't replace that and that would seem once again you get back to the idea that we believe there was an error that there isn't any other component other than a new job that you titian of and rely on here to