constitutionality of section fifteen e c s of the property tax code the text of fifteen eighty six c requires issuance of a property tax exemption to hospital applicants of certain services provided equals or exceeds the hospital's estimated property tax liability there is no other required in the tax of fifteen eighty for issuing an exemption that's a constitutional problem and it's a problem because article nine section six of the one nine hundred seventy one white constitution requires property to be used exclusively for charitable purposes the test for satisfying exclusively is a very fact intensive task that is a kind of the court mean  in the so this is official challenge counsel it is wrong and um to indicate that you believe that there are circumstances in which the statute can be constitutionally required by below i read that there could be hypotheticals circumstances but i qualified it by saying it's really a fantasy and it's a little bit like saying the scientists in the physicists know that light can be bent by black hole and the way we measure time is by looking at plate so time travels i pathetically possible of the court question so the defendants here came up with multiple construction it's that they argue of boyd's section fifteen the six is constitutional to other events or construction they also say it is never proper for a court to depart from the statute clean way here texas extremely clear the process is limited means action must be granted by the department there is no permissive possibility there is no discretionary possibility it's absolute and that process is unconstitutional because  would be required to perform the course and crafters and else the form tends to prove that the department was reading at least at that time section fifteen years he says the same way one of the other arguments arising in the briefs is whether the word shall really mean shall and whether there's an interpretation is that the court going to die to take away the mandatory need one would i don't think that removes the constitutional or the constitutional exclusivity test to separate the legislature was free to had an ownership required requirement to modify ownership requirement but the legislature is not really to say we will issue an exemption if you are a hospital owner and you satisfy the mayor and in fact using the fact that it is a hospital owner i believe is an unconstitutional criterion by itself if that's the only basis no but i find it very challenging to get to that reading of the statute the way it works and that's the whole line of cases starting with mckenzie and it's progeny all the way to and what the court was able to do in each of those statutes was find if were which he did signal that the legislature was only giving an illustration it's a it's a very creative  says i think that's a very strong piece of evidence proving that the department itself was reading the statute as mandatory and not the plaintiff the power also disagrees with the use of the no set of circumstances test here we think it's problematic and the first problem is any intruder teaching it in the fifteen six has to reasonable that's a rule of law that comes out of this court even retired it's in we think it's not a reasonable interpretation to apply to no set of circumstances test if you interpret section fifty nice six is not valid under any circumstances because in every single instance it provides for exemptions that are not based on any consideration of the constitutionally mandated exclusive charitable use  acknowledged that the test is a little challenging it's problematic and then they went on to attempt to apply and they first know it and we agree and it is already known as well that you cannot use the fact that a hospital applicant is applying as he says issued the exemption that's unconstitutional using an unconstitutional criteria and the fourth district also focused on the validly applied aspect of the test and concluded that it can never be validly apply because it is using it  a we agree with that argument and we think that argument is also a pollster because again the playing taps of fifteen eighty six c and the way the statute is written in mechanically operates the department is forbidden from ever looking at the course and factors and thus it's forbidden from ever considering now this constitutional provision does not prevent the general assembly from adding conditions or limitations on the exclusive use past general assembly is simply forbidden from lowering it can add to the requirements of the constitutional cause and in fact it did so in an act in section fifteen sixty five which is the older version which is that it in at issue in this case of the exemption section fifteen sixty five sets out various categories of owners who may seek an exemption and makes requirements for each of them for example there is for harmful old people's homes and requirements for historical societies those requirements add to the constitutional association said that if the general assembly intended to lower the constitutional limit to the new provisions it was intended to create a new ownership category of charitable use exemptions that category language is a reference back to categories the fifty sixty five provide and it was not begins with statements about policy it is essential to ensure the tax exemption law relating to hospice account for the complexity of modern health care delivery systems health care is moving beyond the walls of the hospital goes on then to look at various factors i don't reach programs educational programs goods and services presided provided to the community and then requires that all of those factors both in the hospital and for the applicant to state all the factors considered by the board reviewing the recommended approval it has to be the constitutional analysis shown in the in the application if a local government denies an exemption because it doesn't meet this court's requirements for  so i would like to take a moment or two to address two issues with respect to th exemption is shelby issue regardless of compliance with the constitution the plaintiff is asking the court to add that additional language that regardless of compliance with the constitutional language statute it not expressly include exclusive use for school purposes this court held that it should be interpreted that way along with the constitution the chicago bears so situation case is another example relevant portion of the statute that was that issue in the see the case simply said there was the first part of the statute did use the constitutional way and gave some examples and then went on to say also included meaning there is and then there's a bunch of things including the provision that the see here relied on it there provision did not incorporate the constitutional language and that's really not surprising because since when the this tax applies so long as it's uniform property tax exemptions are no different there's precedent that shows that sure the court could have said that but it wasn't required if you the legislature could have said it but it wasn't required to say and so really the question then on that and this threshold interpretation issue comes down to how are we going to are going to read this when it doesn't specifically say one thing or the other about whether or not consistency with the constitution is required are we going to do it the player says and imply an intent to violate the constitution when this court has consistently said we  and we know that there is a constitutional uses they know how to distinguish they were distinguishing and they were only addressing in the statute the statutory ownership is can you explain to me the question that i asked the attorney general and when you submit a p t x three hundred page application that's not just one or two sheets of paper like this and the full room requires a great deal of additional documentation including documentation that goes to the use of the property so for example if you will see questions when one of the p techs form the form specifically asked about leases are we using the property or releasing it to somebody else is required and your honor when we know this is just just so innocent so that the hospital has wonderful outreach programs works in the community just lots of educational programs lots of clinics and then the piece of property that they use criteria might be set aside in that situation but the constitutional rip arment would not be satisfied unless the property is used exclusively for charitable purposes in the i'm aware of at least one instance and i believe there are others in which the department of revenue on the basis of information that financial information is provided a great wealth of information is provided in least one instance the department of revenue despite the seventies faction of the ownership criteria that i had application because it wasn't being used explicitly for charitable purposes so the statute is designed to work in a way where the really ownership rights area supplement the constitutional work criteria the department of revenue is properly implementing it  they get that information they act on the information and like to if i kill him if he answered your question just i like to just say a few words very quickly about those that circumstances test which decision by this court in the streeterville corporation case where this court held that a property used as a parking garage by northwestern memorial hospital was being used exclusively for charitable purposes to the extent that it was used by the hospital  and flies and him for the plate let us run us mr selection we've we've heard from everyone here that the constitution must still be complied with and the statute cannot be applied to the exclusion of the constitution requirement it seems to be that's what everybody seems to agree why wouldn't this case just be decided similar to what was said in chicago bursal see because you don't there is no hook in this statute would signal that the constitutional criteria can be apply the wording in the statute the actual text is absolute and there is there was argument discussion about also says is it is also the intent of the general assembly to establish quantifiable standards for the issuance of charitable exemptions for such property of descriptive of circumstances were exemptions are warranted provided that the a political constitutional requirements are satisfied that would not apply here that's our position and it's because the word that would enable the court to utilize that destruction tool is missing from the statu i wanted to address the attempt by the defendants to connect fifteen sixty five to fifteen e g six and the first point there is there is nothing in the t constitutionally the fact that we're not implying any pat intent by the legislature no one says they did this on purpose the words are what they are in the statute says what it says  counsel for the hospital association talked about the application process and the contents of the application i just want to caution the court because none of the things counsel is discussing are actually in the record before the trial court the only piece of evidence about the application before the trial court was the p tax three hundred eighty form i filed a motion under supreme court rule one ninety one b to seek additional discovery about the contents of the application and how it worked because i thought it might further develop the record and it may give a given rise to amending the complaint and adding an from fifteenth sixty five yes aren't we required to consume as a whole and to read the real provisions that have been added in a way that they will operate consistently within the stat but we think it is a monumental leap in mental gymnastics to move from one section of a statute that operates by itself in a mechanical fashion to another unconnected provision in the same revenue statute simply so you can get in a word or an interpretation he'd that would enable the court to say that the constitutional exclusivity test should also be  on the others at some point we use too many construction tools and have to go so far outside of the penumbra that it no longer makes sense and is just not a reasonable and shrug so for these alternatively based on the discussion of the additional evidence that was not the bulk in the record i would alternatively suggest to remain and to further develop the record and potentially added additional