i represent the plan to proponents in this matter and i have a reserve three minutes for the bottle your honor your honors the plaintiffs are all career police officers sergeants lieutenants captains of the wayne county sheriff's department in detroit michigan in order to be eligible for this early retirement they had to have twenty years of service and they were also as an inducement to leave early were guaranteed by way of a memorandum of agreement and their existing contracts that they would not have to pay any premiums directed or to support their medical insurance for the rest of their lives at least fifty some police officers or entered into individual memorandums of agreement and and have paragraph three it states active employees in the bargaining unit who apply for apply to retire after october first two thousand and eight and retire on or before december first two thousand and eight will be allowed to retire with the same health care plan contribution liability as individuals who retired on or before the issuance of the of the may second two thousand and act three twelve arbitration award he said that that agreement was taught back to a previous agreement and didn't the previous agreement contain and the ability our clause in there that  allowed for a modification under certain circumstances yes rather but our argument is that it's a question of fact as to whether or not that health and welfare plan applied seeing that it was changed and the the issue is what plan applied the two thousand and six plan or the two thousand or the one nine hundred ninety plan the one nine hundred ninety plan has stated that the county has a right to make these modifications whereas the two thousand and six point and specifically states at p g ideally fifteen seventy seven million record below this benefit plan is not intended to replace conflicting provisions of any collective bargaining agreement or other labor agreement the labor agreement that they went out went out under just said one thing as a relates back to the on the our the contract that was in place prior to the act three twelve awarding issue in michigan police and firemen have binding arbitration on collective bargaining agreements and that's what the all about so the question is what health and welfare plan do these people rely upon in making their determination to give up their careers and march off into retirement so i believe it's a question of fact which health and welfare plan applied the county could have very easily when they drafted these memorandums of agreement state that the ninety's the health and calls for a construction of contract interpretation modeller lease and that would always be a question of law wouldn't it no your honor not with these facts with these facts our people were induced based upon the the contracts and the and the health and welfare plan that was in effect in two thousand and eight when they decided which stated that there if there was a conflict between the health and welfare plans presently in existence and their rights to retire without having to pay a contribution stores or insurance that this benefit plan is not intended to replace come conflicting provisions of any collective bargaining agreement or other labor agreements are you arguing there is any ambiguity in any of these contracts while there is ambiguity now because the county relied upon any specific language to us in these memorandums it would have to be paragraph three of the original memorandum which states active employees in the bargaining unit who apply to retire after october first two thousand and eight will be allowed to retire with the same health care contribution liability what does that mean in the courts state was  specificity that that means that the health and welfare plan that was in effect in two thousand and four or two three or two thousand and four is a controlling want to not the one that they retired under  and we also have an argument a promise serious stop what they were promised as an inducement to give up their careers in law enforcement was promissory estoppel raised as a claim yes it was a so it was a brief specific brief that was filed and for reconsideration of the court's original decision but it wasn't alleged in any complaint or amended complaint not that i can recall no it is an element of contract law in michigan though what is i would also point out to the court that  we also had an argument dealing with the forty two u s c one thousand nine hundred three as to whether or not under michigan law these contracts became a property right and could not be denied absent due process article nine section twenty four the michigan constitution states that the retirement benefits vested retirement benefits i can own can only be changed cannot be changed and are considered contractual in nature similar to many other states i would also point out that you're arguing the property interest was created by a state constitution is created is created by one of the contract which incorporates the state constitution because it's a retirement benefit and retirement benefits are covered by article nine section twenty four the mission constitution and more important and mostly important is the fact that in two thousand  fifteen the county and incorporated all post retirement medical benefits into the retirement ordinance and that's the mcdonnell argument that we raised the county raised it as an affirmative defense estimate donald settlement in the lawsuit which moved post retirement medical from under taggart and made it a vested benefit under makes its decisions i stated that it is utterly wrong that the court should not take into consideration the information in the news media a relates to the county's economic condition yes when the case was argued the county was in receivership annual and a receiver was appointed and they were arguing that there are billions of dollars in red so for i don't have the court to keep an open mind on this issue within the next five days the michigan employment relations commission will be ruling as to whether or not the county was in financial distress or not you know would like to get the court's attention to consider because if a judge of judge time now in fact made his ruling based upon what he perceived the economic condition of the county was that was totally unfair and i don't believe stand muster as a reason for finding a breach of contract with the potential outcome could be good morning matthew mcnaughton on behalf of the hell these are your honour's this case is about whether wayne county may require plaintiffs to contribute to the cost of the premiums for their county provided health insurance pla filed this lawsuit claiming that they were promised premium free health insurance for life but plaintiffs don't have any contractual language to support that position the plaintiffs all retired under collective bargaining agreements that were amended by incentive agreements they gave them many benefits not provided by the c v s for example they were allowed to retire earlier than they could have under the c b a's they were tired with higher pension benefits than the collective bargaining  agreements of pool provided and they received their pension benefits immediately the incentive agreements also provided the plainest will be allowed to retire with the same health care plan contribution liability individuals who retired before the institution of c b a's under act three twelve arbitration awards they're required to retore used to begin contributing to the cost of their health insurance premiums and it's this contractual language that contradicts plaintiff's claim that they were promised premium free healthcare for life instead their obligation to contribute to the cost of their health insurance premiums was tied to the cost the retirees identified in the recent of agreements we're required contribution liability as these prior retire rees and those prior retirees retired under c v a's that incorporated the one nine hundred ninety health and welfare benefit plan and under the hundred ninety health and welfare benefit plan there was a reservation of rights clause that provided that the county could change the health care benefits that those retirees received and when  incentive plan was instituted those prior retirees were not paying anything for the cost of their health insurance premiums so the incentive retirees were also not required to pay for the cost of their health insurance premiums but when the calories five or six years later eventually did require contributions from the pre x three twelve or retirees it also required the incentive of retirees to pay those insurance premiums as well is exactly what the incentive agreements provide what about his argument that there is some language in the two thousand and six plan that applies here that would bring down the no it's not intended to replace conflicting provisions you're out of the two thousand and six health and welfare benefit plan just isn't applicable at all because you have to look at who these incentive plan retirees were tied to they were tied to the pre act three twelve award retirees and their benefits were governed by the one nine hundred ninety health and welfare benefit plan so this these agreements specifically tied the incentive retirees to those prior retirees and because those high retire raise benefits were governed by the one nine hundred ninety health and welfare benefit plan when the county changed those prior retirees benefits so too to the extent of retirees benefits change and your are the district you're on is the district court decided the case just on those facts they found that there was just there was no contractual basis for plaintiffs claims but the record didn't you know it didn't address any of the defendants other defenses but even if the incentive agreements could be construed a promise premium free health insurance the contracts cannot permissibly be read to provide premium free health insurance for way they don't they don't say that the program that that the plaintiffs prima contribution liability is a lifetime benefit and pursuant to the supreme court's decisions and c h and decision in gallo versus mo and if a contract has a general durational clause and does not express we provided that the benefit is for life then the court is bound to apply the principle that contractual obligations cease when the contract terminate of the contract does not provide benefits beyond its term now the retirements of agreements themselves don't have a specific end date in them but it's important to remember that the retirement set of agreements were amendments t so did the rights of these retirees under the incentive agreements so whatever right the plaintiffs had with respect to their health insurance premiums and those expired when their c b s expired  and knowledge all drugs the section nine hundred eighty three claim even if the plaintiffs had a valid contractual claim the due process claim would still have to be dismissed plaintiff's complaint says that they have a claim under forty two u s c nine hundred eighty three for unconstitutional deprivation of property interest without due process of law but essential element of a section one thousand eight hundred three claim is that there be a constitutionally protected property interest and not every deprivation of a property interest rises to the level of a constitutional claim this court has held that when a deprivation is a simple breach of contract in the third and if there is an adequate remedy at law for that breach of contract a section one hundred eighty three claim is inappropriate in fact this court's recent case of kaminski v coulter this court's our case makes clear that a claim for due process while lation does not lie when the thrust of plaintiff's argument is simply breach of contract so the law is clear that a breach of contract remedy is adequate whereas here at the apo employees is alleging a deprivation of a property interest in a specific employment benefit or that benefit is is easily defined so where there's a pure economic benefit of employment this isn't a claim to be addressed as a constitutional plain it's from the is simply a breach of contract claim which they've also brought here they rely on a single paragraph in their complaint and that paragraph is actually within their breach of contract claim as the basis for their promissory estoppel claim and the alleged promise that plaintiffs rely is just that they wouldn't have to pay anything for the cost of their health insurance premiums which is exactly what these incentive agreements address so there was no separate  when you have a contract that addresses the very issue and that's exactly what plaintiffs are trying to do here they have brought a breach of contract claim saying that they were promised a premium for health insurance for life their concern that that's going to fail so they bring a promissory estoppel claim addressing exactly the same issue they can't do that he's cited it has nothing to do with the issues before the court here those issues deal with pension benefits that's not what we're dealing with here we're dealing with with health insurance and retirement there's nothing in the record showing what happened to those people who retired prior to the act three twelve arbitration award where they treated in the same manner in which these fifty four individuals were treated they have their insurance premiums increased there's not the defendants have not brought any evidence to your attention the only evidence in the record as to people who retired prior to that date being two thousand and seventy two concert two thousand and four is the mcdonald settlement and the mcdonnell settlement states retirees from this point forward are covered under the retirement ordinance for the purpose of medical insurance that then creates a property right because it's by statute that they have this guarantee there is no durational argument that they can make make and the individuals who retired under the two thousand and eight contract that went into effect that allowed for these memorandums of agreement now have what is known as mirror benefits and the mirror benefits and the clause in the contract states and you have  contract as an exhibit states that people who retire on an after two thousand and eight shall have the same retirement benefits as active employees so for anybody who took the head they just waited retired when their time came up they wouldn't be in this position they would have the mcdonald guarantees there door for anybody who retired on it after two thousand and eight they have your clauses i would point out to the court that judge judith levy in a lawsuit brought by the retirees also found that way that there is no durational argument to be made if you no longer in wayne county because people who retired under the two thousand and eight and after contracts are covered by mcdonald so what i'm what i'm suggesting is that there is no evidence in the record to show that the people who retired prior to two thousand and four did not have their medical benefits changed the same as these individuals who retired in two thousand and eight so i believe there