freezes the state of affairs as of the bankruptcy filing by enjoining creditors taking post petition x to improve their position to be the data as this court has repeatedly observed the automatic stays purpose is to preserve the status quo it does not require creditors to turn over property lawfully in their possession an entirely separate provision of the code turned over provision addresses that situation but unlike the automatic stay turnover provision does not operate as an injunction or mandate the taping of damages property is not immediately turned over to turn over provision contains a number of statutory exceptions and offenses for example a creditor is not required to turn over an asset if the debtor cannot provide adequate protection for the creditors interest in the s s a creditor that contends in good faith and that it is not subject to turn over is entitled to judicial process to resolve that dispute without owing damages if the de alternately prepare respondents contrary argument fails for multiple reasons st reading the automatic stay to require turnover contravenes the ordinary meaning of the term stay which is status quo preserv that congress so intended counsel you agree that you're exercising control over the car your argument is simply that exercising control is not an action right mr chief justice we don't we don't intend to our position doesn't turn on fine distinction between action and inaction our fundamental position is that the entire fresh statutory phrase ask to exercise control is a prohibition on actions that change the status quo and because what we did preserve the status quo is not inconsistent with a command of the automatic stay so we should understand that i understood your brief to put a different emphasis on it we should understand that you are covered by subsection three because your are engaged in an action you are are we think that the question here about whether or not this is or isn't an devolved into the work of metaphysical philosophy and just like you observe the commerce clause does not require or to engage in such an analysis we think the same is true of the bankruptcy code we think that that as long as nothing is happening wealth will get us false or if i could just interrupt once the dare ask you to give back the car that results this metaphysical debate right you make the action at that point to decide either to return it or not correct your honor we are our fundamental position is that the work of the automatic stay as long as we're preserving the status quo is not violate now it is true that the debtor there that the code would prevent you from even though you do have control it would prevent you from for example disposing of the cars that's correct that's correct justice th disposal of the cars our sales the cars anything that would hold or the status quo as between the debtor and creditor would violate the automatic stay that's the construction of the automatic stay that this court has given in cases going back to continental  entirely correct and consistent with our view what justice blackmun said for this court what judge friendly said for the nd circuit in the case that this court affirmed said that a the  entire asset becomes property of the state so it rejected the government's argument there that the possessory interest stayed out of the estate and was not subject to turn over but be turned over could proceed subject to the creditors ability to seek adequate protection in that regard whiting pools simply set out what was the understanding of how to turn over worked prior to the one hundred and eighty four amendment to the car shall deliver to the trustee the property is most deliberative the trustee unless it falls within the exceptions i don't think your life insurance company idea i don't know what the exception would be and now you say that a lot through so and but then the question here is whether the section before that which has it to stay without saying what you do with it says that you exercise control over the car and stay means you want to turn it over credit if the debtor cannot provide adequate protection to the creditor so here there was a good faith dispute about whether this this was subject to turn over in this case there was a there was a real dispute about the way in which the city's possessory means operated and the position that we took which had prevailed in district court entailed with the very decision below said this property was not subject to turnover you know telling you sum i think the answer to your question justify with respect is that the question of turnover is the subject of section five hundred and forty two and while that is they shall command that provision doesn't contain injunctive language and just as prior as you wrote for unanimous court just sixteen months ago  in the tagore case where there is a even even in the discharge injunction context where the statute does use injunctive language where there is fair grounds of doubt a court will not resort to content to punish a know what yes you say that the key is whether the status quo is being preserved or altered so suppose that a city's general practice is to keep a cars like cars at issue here and basically an guarded lot in a remote location so that there isn't very much preventing somebody who's car there  entering and driving off with it but when the city hears about a particular case and thinks that that's a let's say it's a particularly valuable cause things that there's a real danger that the owner is going to do just that the bankruptcy context the automatic state does a particular thing it freezes the relationship between the debtor and its creditors as of the moment the petition was filed at the moment the petition was filed there are a set of assets and liabilit of balance sheet so to speak and that balance sheet is frozen no one can engage in self help during the bankruptcy case to change that instead that's addressed through the bankruptcy process under the supervision of the bankruptcy judge makes any action to improve their position that would violate the stay here that the ad in your hypothetical that the car was held by the city as of the time of the bankruptcy and as long as that remains the case what the city was doing to preserve the status quo does not violate the automatic stay but what work that the addition of the exercise control language do with respect to tangible objects so  as i said in response to justice thomas question with respect to tangible property if he or the city had disposed of the car or had sold the car those would be actions that would alter the status quo and violate the automatic stay ok what that will do and cou d you give me examples of what congress might have with respect intangible property when it use this language sure the get the power did not example for example would be a derivative action if if a  party wanted to take over the state cause of action and go to state court and say the a state ought to be pursuing the cause of action that it's not and try to take over that claim bringing that to rid of action would be an act to exercise control hand over the state property there are cases involving the terminations of a lease agreement for example another piece of property that arguably isn't subject to possession but those actions would violate the in whether in bad weather or to be broken into or bumped into while in the city's position the stats change the status quo so just so that my or i don't believe duties on secured creditors to exercise appropriate care over property that they have reached the zest and may i give up you know moment because i'm limited in time or by your theory right now the plaintiffs must start an adversary proceeding which has a huge amount of costs associated with them as i understand it adversary proceedings take several months and to what end meaning you would go to court and say i have a lien they should give me security you could do that now even if you had to turn over the car immediately how can we ensure that these process seize would go fast enough to save the debtor from not being able to rehabilitate because for many of these people the cars are the only means they have to get to work so justice sotomayor bankruptcy judges has ample discretion and in my experience exercising quite wisely to say well they gauge within the council i want to point out that it took weeks if not weeks after bankruptcy orders in these cases to turn over the cars for the city to respond so justice sotomayor with respect in this case there was never even a turnover action brought only an action for violation of the stay in most cases these these matters are worked out pretty simply an consensually but to two responses to your sort of analytic question of does the system work it's a fair question but the answer is yes bankruptcy courts have plenty of ability to move these things quickly to set response dates promptly  ensure that the extent there is a dispute about a protection that gets worked out and then the cars are turned over but the city is entitled secured creditors in title to for example make sure that there is insurance so that if a car is destroyed while the debtor has real function of an automatic stay is to consolidate the a state so that it can be redistributed now in most cases consolidating of your state is going to me and keeping the status quo in place but in this unusual circumstance consolidating the state and changing the status quo and and and we should understand the bankruptcy code to accept that where that change is necessary to consolidate the state so justice kagan with respect i think that analysis sort of jumbles different provisions of the bankruptcy code we think that the analysis is that what section three hundred and sixty two of the automatic state does is preserve the status quo now to be sure the consolidation or marshalling of assets of the estate is work to be done in a bankruptcy case we think that the that section five hundred and forty two dollars the turnover and eighty four when the words exercise control are added to the automatic stay that the automatic stay did any of this work but this was always since the dawn of time the work of a trustee in bankruptcy to marshal the assets of the state for the benefit of its creditors and the way it worked is that the turnover provision gives one the authority to come into court and say you are holding my thing that i have it please and if the answer is i've got no debts that should be turned over and if there are disputes to be worked out those are counsel i know your client's practice of holding on to cars is well established and highly controversial but looking at the bankruptcy code i guess my question for you is the summa agree with you about if a statute that he that has injunctive language can be punished with contempt or damages where there is failed round of doubt and it must follow that five hundred and forty two also isn't isn't punishable by th where there is fair ground of doubt now if there is not fair grounds of doubt if there's just bad faith conduct where someone says i know five hundred and forty two or choir's me to turn this over to you i just don't feel like it come and get a weather sanctions could be ordered in that case raises a different and harder question not presented here but there is no question that that is all about the scope of five hundred and forty two and the question presented by this case is whether section three  would appreciate maybe a shorter maybe even possibly yes or no answer is there anything that would prohibit a court bankruptcy court from ordering the turnover of a car from the city of chicago i know it loves to hold on to these things but as kind of an off our view is consistent with this court's long line of jurisprudence that that isn't the type of exercise control that is prohibited by the automatic stay the automatic stay and one way of thinking about is just an ordinary language so if you're holding the property you're acting their exercise control just ordinary language you're exercising control but it's but the day that little bit of the language day which stays asked to is pretty fun others suggest the least which a cognos doing is seizing cars people ought to declare bankruptcy to get their cars back they can't get their cars back to get on their feet to get the work which they need to work to enable their debt repayment the goal of bankruptcy is fresh start according to this pretty chicago system is boarding that making the northern district of illinois a leader in the country and non business chapter thirteen bankruptcy filings because of what chicago's doing twenty give you a chance to respond to that sure so to two points if i may just as kavanagh we understand that the a c l u disagrees with the city's policy judgments regarding how it would force its parking lot for what it's worth since the time of the events at issue there have been some changes so that the policy is made by the city council which we respect is the proper body to make policy with respect parking enforcement with respect and traffic enforcement with respect to the way chapter thirteen works what actually happens in many of these cases chapter thirteen is designed to permit a debtor to maintain their property while coming up with a plan to repay their creditors in light of the g m doesn't seven circuits ruling here the practice has grown up in chicago where people file for bankruptcy not with any intent to complete a five year plan to repay their creditors but simply as a device to get their car back sanctions against the city and thereafter dismiss their cases and so  about you have about a minute to wrap up thank you mr chief justice we think the clearest answer to the question is this court has raised or likely set out in the d c circuits decision in ins law the critical language is there on possession of property mistakenly refuses to capitulate to a debtor's contention that the property is subject to turnover and serve the statutory defense attorney overcoat underscore the improbability that congress would have intended the automatic state to impose its provision in front and it should do the same here counsel one i want to try to get a better handle each for myself and what's at stake here the creditors not could be liable for any sanctions if he doesn't know about the bankruptcy and if he does at that point he's under obligations to turn over the property he's got protections as you just said under five hundred and forty two but the respondent says that he can also get protections sort of import the exceptions from five hundred and forty two into three hundred and sixty two but that's not the way the canada work in rab lacks justice scalia explained that where you have a specific provision in a factory scheme that governs a particular you counsel justice thomas yes thank you chief justice counsel i know others have sort of dismissed this is somewhat metaphysical but i'm not so sure that's right that having control of something or having possession of the car sitting on a lot how is that exercising control as opposed to i see if you disposed of justice thomas i think that when congress used the term the phrase an act to exercise control it was contemplating some affirmative act i think most naturally an act to seize control of something and it could also be battling the property or reallocating the property but i do think that merely passively retaining property doesn't doesn't quite fit as an act to exercise control we've offered other arguments but such as the fact read too broadly compel turnover of all property of the estate at the moment the bank of the mission is filed and i think that the court could reach that conclusion based on the tact of section three hundred and sixty two a three alone i pointing to the bankruptcy is filed by the student and the university refuses to release the transcript upon request those courts come to the conclusion that the decision to retain control of the transcript and not release it when demanded is is a violation of the code and of the automatic stay seems to me that your position would be that that's those cases are wrong am i right you know that there is a mental act that your refusal to do an act that the code requires to turn over property of the state forget about the sanctions i'm talking about just the brief usal to turn over something that's requested without taking the at the code requires for you to go to the bankruptcy court and ask for security or counsellor i'm going to interrupt because there's one last question to note that some turnover provisions are done by way of motion and not after surrey proceedings are you taking a position on whether that's pretty missable under the bankruptcy code to go i think either sorry proceedings or dictated actually by the rules of a bankruptcy and those could obviously be changed it's not in the code itself so we don't think that that's required by the products out but it is in required under and the creditor has only plea frivolous defenses to turn over that adversary proceeding could be decided very very quickly and in fact the creditor who has put forward frivolous defenses could be subject to very specific language that filing a bankruptcy petition well operate as a stay and congress merely barring a particular act and i think that's significant because as this court said in the can a stay is something that prevents the authority to alter the status quo so i do think they have to be have to be get doing some work they're asked to exercise control i think part of that is or goes back to my say response because i think even if you thought that exercising control might plausibly include merely passive or attention and i don't think that that's consistent with the use of the word gay i would also say that i think what what what respondents i think now are pointing to as the act is simply refusing  increase it to improve the status of the better it's merely designed to preserve the status quo now there are other provisions that do improve the status of the better like five hundred and forty two dollars like the avoidance provision and i think in whiting pools the court property is not always an ask a can to collect a debt for example for example in whiting pools the i r s had these property and they weren't trying to get the debtor to pay them back they actually just wanted to sell the property and get whatever money they could either get a payment from the debtor or or use the property to collect on the debt by selling well so is in the whiting pools if you actually wanted to sell the property in order to get money to so in order to collect on that you do have to make a motion to lift that and lighting pools that's what the i r s was in the process of doing they knew that you really possessing the property didn't put them in violation of the automatic stay but then they want to actually sell it and they worried that would in fact you know electronic that or perhaps cannot be exercising control over the property is that or lease an act exercise control is that an accurate summary of your position or what nuance would you have i think that's a fair description i would say that i think you can  status quo and act exercise control should be interpreted the same way but otherwise yes we're sort of saying as this court said in timbers and what or as maybe you could look at that provision in isolation but you can't look at the bankruptcy three might feel more pressure to surrender property even when it believes that it is clearly covered by the exception for income property as in consequential value or benefit so i think it essentially gives debtors a sort of project to force three is best interpreted to prevent acts that would alter the status quo with respect to the possession or control of the state property reading the automatic stay as respondents proposed would ignore the plain meaning of the terms say it would override the express exceptions to turn then please the court these cases present a single question their creditors stop the chapter thirteen debtor from recovering property that the creditor ceased before the bankruptcy filing if the debtor does not have a court order directing return for three reasons reflected in the court's questions today the creditor may not prevent recovery of the property st the automatic stay in section thirty six thousand two hundred and eighty three of the bankruptcy code provides that a creditor may not exercise control over a daughter's property the critical languages exercise control unlike action to obtain possession of property a future event that the stay also prohibits exercising control over property is ongoing action and the stay expressed which stops and nd the automatic stay works together with the turnover preclusion section by forty two a of the code which commands that any party holding a state property shall deliver it to the trustee or debtor this provision operates automatically with no requirement that the debtor obtain a court order mandating compliance urge the automatic stay and the turnover provisions support a major purpose of the bankruptcy code to place all estate property under the court jurisdiction and allow the trustee or debtor to control the property from the outset of the case this court recognized and whiting pools that in effect of reorganization of a business or individual will not likely succeed if creditors can withhold the state property to get better treatment for themselves the automatic stay protects reorganization it allows greater payments to all creditors by preventing any one creditor from withholding the debtors property until tw city of chicago complied with the code returning seized cars when debtors requested when the city changed its policy and used to return my clients cars it acted to exercise control over them a direct violation of the automatic sta th circuit correct we held council to the basic question here is when and it is exercising control over the property of the debtor has to turn over the property to the a state now why wouldn't we look to the section of the code entitled turnover of property to the estate to figure out the answer that question i think that that  a unless you incorporate them by reference under three hundred and sixty three a i'm just wondering why don't you assume those protections apply directly under five hundred and forty two rather than indirectly under any kind of sanctions before it learns of the bankruptcy what is the the practical difference between the two provisions the practical difference is one of timing and i think that's been reflected in some of the questions that  the court has asked if the debtor hash to wait for what could be chevra weeks before the court rules on the return of seized property the debtors ability to work to reorganize is likely to be washed i have by a period of a couple of weeks yes because the debtor needs to car to get to work it needs the card to have the income to support a family and if that is lost the debtor is going to be unable to make payments that would be required to keep the case going your friend on the other side mr gold lat says on page fifteen of his brief that the parties agree that long settled bankruptcy law permitted a creditor to retain possession of repossessed or impounded property ending the outcome of the turnover proceeding it is a right that you agree with that no is not correct necessary justice thomas because they so clearly deal with precisely the same issue control and possession of a state property so they treat the same issue and when we have two provisions of the code to treat the same issue we read them property of the state what to be delivered and it imposes a requirement of accounting for any wasson the value of the property so by forty two a even with the enforcement mechanism of three hundred and sixty two is entirely viable so as a matter of a couple of weeks i would give you more than that it could be much more than that if the creditor said you have to demonstrate adequate protection and there was a question about whether the value of property were sufficient to provide adequate protection to a creditor it could involve expert witnesses discovery and proceeding that went on for many weeks the i'm still interested in i know this is as i've said before this is deemed to be somewhat metaphysical but i'm still having a problem seeing that merely having a car on an impound lot is exercising control over it i understand if the city wanted to dispose of it to auction it off that would be exercising control over but merely passively holding it would you explain to me again why that is exercising control yes your honor the question arises when the debtor asks for return of the property at that moment the creditor has a choice either the creditor turns the property over or the creditor continues to hold that property against the ability of the debtor to obtain it and that holding of the property against the debtors wish to have a turned over is an exercise of control in the ordinary meaning of the words think that it would be exercising control of the debtor i mean if the creditor or the city actually delivered the property but if the city passively said look no it's we have it we're not going to go to the effort of delivering you i don't see how that is anything more than passively holding property rather than acting to exercise control of your own if you imagine the debtor with a key to the car coming to the gate of the impound lot and trying to get in so that the debtor can drive the car away i think it would be clearer that there is plainly an act to exercise control is the debtor is prevented from gaining access have the same questions i'm having a hard time figuring out what the difference is between the two sections if your right and a creditor has some property like a car you say three hundred and sixty two says turn it over immediately and if you don't you're going to be in trouble and five hundred and forty two says just the same thing by forty two says shall turn it over and then there are some exceptions in five hundred and forty two for the most part you you you read those in to the re sixty three except i don't know what happens t you were ready to get in the car but please give us protection and you can do that with your right or wrong so i can't get the difference in my mind your honor the difference again is a question of timing if the debtor needs to seek an order from the court to have the property turned over there could be a very warm delay between the time that the car is seized in the bankruptcy is filed and the time that the creditor turned over the car and immediately shot relief from the stay within a matter of hours the court could order that return but and i let me go even further the automatic stay can be a no if you know when you fill out the deal with five  two on your theory as to deal with vote that's that's completely true but the point is that if there is any we've done to nothing between the two statutes the redundancy should be resolved forty two only after a proceeding that could take a very long time to result in help of the debt or the creditor on the other hand can get relief from the automatic stay almost immediately and in the case of an element media so that  gives another reason why the congressional probes to bankruptcy put all of the property in the hands of the debtor with the trustee at the outset of the case is appropriate to enforce well to follow up d on justice briar's question if you are correct that five hundred and forty two is self executing then i don't really understand your answers to his questions could you just take a minute to clarify that we say self executing i think there's a need to look at that a little bit more shirt only true if we understand that section five hundred and forty two requires the turnover of property to a debtor outset of the debtors request for that property but it's not self forcing in the sense that the debtor would not have to take action to enforce that the claim if it's being violated if the creditor does not turn over property under five hundred and forty two dollars the debtor would have to go into court with the creditor still holding the property and the creditor would quite possibly argue there's no adequate protection for our claim and the matter could drag on for a considerable length of time whereas with the automatic stay the property must be turned over and then the creditor seeks relief and again it can be done quickly but the long and the short answer to your quest the bankruptcy act simply by anyone without any cross reference or other clarification the word exercise control the phrase exercise it certainly made a change but it was not a thought you just told me and it makes a big difference it makes a difference in the future i thought you just that it makes a difference whether it's under three hundred and sixty two or five hundred and forty two and then you told me well congress didn't need to do more than just add the words exercise control because it was no big deal it makes a big difference in the effectiveness of the enforcement mechanism but it doesn't make a big difference in the substantive obligation to turn over the seized property according to your argument it makes a difference in the relative rights of creditors and debtors and i don't know which is better as a policy argument but your i don't see how you can have it both ways either it's important or it's not important and if it's important then you have to explain why congress would have chosen to do it in this very oblique fashion the difference in the enforcement mechanism is important but the underlying substantive obligation was not changed and the language in three hundred and sixty two a three as we argued from the beginning could that be clearer there is an obligation to she she exercising control over the estate property and that requirement a three do you see a requirement that the debtor has to turn it over only upon request i thought under the terms of the automatic stay the minute the bankruptcy  code is filed the bankruptcy proceeding is filed the automatic stay requires immediate turnover in other situations without demand where do you get the demand your honor this is a necessity of abandoning property that is burdensome to them and of course the provisions of five hundred and forty two dollars are consistent with not turning over property then consequential value moreover a debtor in chapter thirteen has the ability to allow the creditor to keep the property as satisfaction of the creditors claim under section thirteen counties and council if i might interrupt your reading something into the provision why isn't it more natural to read and forty two is controlling when there's been no active exercise of control and that makes a debtor request the acting principal under five hundred and forty two a the be done and i know we wouldn't do it congress would or whatever appropriate bankruptcy committee would what would have to be done to expedite this proceeding for things like cars  in a way that doesn't give you everything you want but provides a reasonable opportunity for a debtor for a creditor like the city to come in and ask for adequate assurances of protection want of course i believe that they have that right now and this is counsel i just ask you to go outside this assume i ruled against you all right not me but the court but i think you've lost your legal argument all right what would be your then next step in congress or wherever is appropriate and what kind of legislation to ensure the purpose i spoke about well there could be language added to section five hundred and forty two dollars or there could be other circumstance in which the automatic stay provision compels an action that alters the status quo or is this one the only one in your view you know to some extent justice  judicial or administrative proceeding from going forward and that requires that creditor to take action to stop things like garnishments it's not enough for them to say we don't need to do anything for the garnishment to go forward we just allow that to take place maintaining the status quo no they have to take action to stop the garnishment and i think the underlying issue here is that the automatic stay is intended to prevent collection activity from going forward most of the time that can different provision of the bankruptcy yes there is a section five hundred and twenty one imposes many obligations on the debtor including the obligation to turn over property to the trustee but the automatic stay in force is that court in a germane is one that requires consideration of all statutes and harmonizing them to the extent possible and here the differences between the two are almost insignificant a debtor is not going to be asking for the return of property even six in consequential value to the jet or there's not an insurance issue here and there's not a situation where the property is already been transferred by the creditors and those are the only exceptions and five  was quiet and justice alito i think asked or you know do we have to decide those questions a similar question to you know does your argument really depend on a particular view of what fly forty own clearly says that the creditor may not continue to exercise control over the property by forty two as helpful though as i indicated before in indicating who should get possession of the property and what should be done if there is a decline prohibited obtaining possession in eighty four they added the ecb or exercise control provision and isn't there some linguistic gap in there for better or worse  congress never talked about just retaining possession didn't speak about keeping possession to didn't speak about anything else about possession it went on to add new and different language about exercising control what we do about that i think the best thing to do is to look at what would have happened if the interpretation by the city were put into effect really and that is it would use the same language that was already in or obtain or retain possession something like that and that certainly would have been another way to do it but i think that exercising control is that same kind of continuous action ok as i understand it your position is that on request or at least on request maybe automatically the city must hand over the card of the trustee where we get that and three hundred and sixty two nothing question entirely but certainly well i i think you i'm sure you do friend the point is you want to use this as a self executing requirement to hand things over not merely abandon the property and there's nothing in the in in this provision unlike five hundred and forty two that speaks to that that's correct and so it would not be a violation of the automatic stay in the city were to leave the car at least an obligation to have to account for any wash and value so they really do work together what do we do about the fact that a six seems to be the much more natural provision for your argument than a three that's to reflect the and forcing an obligation by sale all sorts of things that are separately prohibited by the automatic stay would be incorporated under three hundred and sixty dollars to eighty six dollars but that doesn't prevent each of them from being applied let's say that we thought your argument under a tree was unsuccessful having preserved in a six argument is it something to be remanded for consideration absolutely in fact one of the cases that was decided the shannon decision has expressed findings by the bankruptcy court that a six was violated by the city so in the event that the a three round of violations or stay were not accepted by the court a six would certainly have to be something considered and eighty four amendment he made the point and i think you agreed it obviously would have been simple enough to put retain possession in there or keep possession as just of course it's sad  as your point that exercise control covers that in covers other things is that the nature of your response to him i just want to make sure i have that nailed down to actually exactly that is precisely our position and what what can you give the universe of things or at least sample of things that are in compas within exercise control well among the things that would be encompassed is the exercise control over intangible property which one of the things that the city has argued and that's one of the things that's covered but also the exercise of control over tangible property and i'm going to ask you the same question i asked the assistant to the solicitor general in thinking about debtors and creditors and also the dedicated bankruptcy judges around the united states if you were to lose this case what would be the a fact in your view on day to day bankruptcy practice in bankruptcy courts it would make chapter much less effective attention because it would put debtors in the position of not being able to recover property that's essential to their livelihood and so chapter thirteen filings would decrease but also interestingly enough i believe payments to creditors would decrease payments to the other creditors who would be benefited by a chapter thirteen and even payments to the city of chicago itself because in chapter thirteen they would probably get more money payment of their claim than they would get by having that kind of liquidated in their impound lot thank you very much thank you mr wade off you can take up to ten additional minutes and during that time if any of my colleagues have questions th did not have an opportunity to ask they could ask them during that time a thank you mr chief justice i believe that the questions from the court today have spotlighted the underlying basic bankruptcy policy which is the thank groups the trustees and debtors in possession must be given prompt access to estate property the automatic stay advances this policy by preventing creditors from acting against property of your state prevents creditors who hold the debtors property before the bankruptcy filing from acting to control that property while the case is pending  the creditor were able to continue to exercise control over the property the creditor would have loved ridge over the debtor the debtor who needs the seized property would be willing to give the creditor better treatment in a chapter thirteen plan or make dish no payments at the outset to avoid the delay that otherwise would occur that kind of leverage in support of one last point if a turnover provision under five hundred and forty two is would result in the debtor coming in and saying i need the property to earn a living under five hundred and forty two you can come in and say i need to carry or raise any other sorts of defenses that would delay the proceedings you get to keep the property and deprive the other creditors of any parts possibility of recovery so isn't the gamesmanship the problem here who's going to suffer the loss to some extent but i think this but it's always the estate who suffers the loss under your theory because the estate is not getting back an instrument for the livelihood of the debtor well the state is getting that back under the interpretation we've given but again the question really is what does the interest according to the congressionally established bankruptcy procedures rather than by withholding seized property from the debtors efforts to reorganise so whiting pools itself recognizes that this once between the debtors need to reorganize and the on the creditors deed to have the property is balanced in favor of the debtor while the matter is being resolved by the bankruptcy court and again the creditor can get very prompt ruling from the bankruptcy court upon an opinion do you believe a motion for the motion instead of an adversary adversarial proceeding would be adequate to get the property back by the been is by saying that the rights of the creditor holding the property are protected by the automatic stay but the creditor has to take the action to enforce those rights and it can do it very quickly the delay that the city would impose on the debtors and trustees would be fatal to accomplish the reorganizational purposes of the bankruptcy code the seven circuit's interpretation of the stitch true language is not only correct according to its plain meeting but correct according to the underlying bankruptcy code policy of encouraging reorganization and so for all of those reasons we believe the seven circuits interpretation is correct and which judgment ought to be a and sixty to a six and whether any of these actions are prohibited as pretty as prohibited collection activity i think it's important to bear in mind as this court's opinion and whiting pools explains that the bankruptcy code a careful balance between the rights of secured creditors on the one hand and the rights of debtors to marshal the assets of the state on the other and provide specific rights and protections to secured creditors and w a secure a creditor is seeking to vindicate those rights by holding the property in order to maximize its recovery as a secured credit or whether that's through adequate protection or the treatment of its claim under a plan while in ordinary english one might call that debt collection activity that isn't rebutted by a six that simply acting to vindicate the rights that the code provides the chief justice asked my friend about whether we agreed about the pre nine hundred and eighty four conduct correct it requires a host of sort of a textual term workaround for example footnote three of the redgrave says that although the text says that the automatic state goes into effect upon the filing of the case the obligation to turn over a state property is not triggered until the debtor called you off and asks you for they have similar trouble with the exception to turnover on page forty seven they say that no one is likely to seek turn over a property even consequential value but then on page forty eight they acknowledge  someone were to do that the court could invent an exception to three hundred and sixty two a that mirrors the exceptions set out in section five hundred and forty two and none of that has any home in the actual text of the statute and they clear that a reading of section three sixty two can't be correct finally in response to justice or to my viewers question about the requirements of an adversarial proceeding as opposed to a motion the principal difference is that an adversary proceeding provides more elaborate notice and this is just a practical point about what bankruptcy judges do in actual bankruptcy courts in most bankruptcy courts if a creditor responds to a motion by saying i should have gotten an adversary bankruptcy judge will say did you get actual notice and if you did why do you care that much about the caption on the paper so while it is true that rules seven thousand and one says what it does and that's the rules committee could address that if things are appropriate in the real world this isn't a problem that is plaguing bankruptcy courts natural practice thank you count so the case is submitted