our next case is another immigration case hilton versus the attorney general and the issue as to whether a naturalized citizen of the us is removable for a conviction of crimes while a u s citizen is undeniably in the negative this court found in adams know it's just that's just wrong and a number of you know this isn't a huge issue where you can find a lot of course to talk about this but the courts that that have looked at this other than the one case  applies the law as they did here is this court should reverse that i mean to correct them and show them what you know the correct meaning and the correct reading of the law eyes looked at the same thing they did they said this they said there's no there's no material difference between that and this is exact same situation that is mr holton here that was an opera the you know the th circuit said there's no susceptible to to possible readings which last time i checked you know if languages can be read one of two ways oh absolutely that's the definition of ambiguity why  doesn't that mean we have that right there well again you look at the the plain meaning of the statute in the other the other controlling word here apart from the word i mean the verb is is alien ok and when you're when you're not a you not an alien if you're if you're a citizen if so that's that's the whole point if you you know if you're an alien you're deportable when in your natural life citizen you're not an alien anymore therefore if you commit a crime when you're not an alien you can be deported or not i mean that's just that's just just logical and and the nd i mean the supreme court setting to start you could read that to permit deportation only of a person who was an alien at the time of his conviction or i'm quoting the supreme court permit deportation of a person now an alien it any time after entry has been convicted of two crimes from the point of conviction going forward there's nothing in it to suggest that it has a relation back for these purposes direct i think that that makes this argument even stronger because there's no relation back issue but again i mean that was the same case you good morning your honour's may it please the court rebecca now has for the united states attorney general petitioner committed armed bank robbery while he was a lawful permanent resident and he concealed this criminal activity in his notice of naturalization knew immigration consequences would attach to his criminal activity shortly after he was naturalized through his fraud and convicted of armed bank bank robbery as a naturalized citizen he was then dean naturalized  castello and that the agency's interpretation of the statute is applying to any alien regardless of their status of conviction and i published this it seems to me that that  the the supreme court applied canons of interpretation to resolve any possible ambiguity and and concluded that the better interpretation is the what the papers the petitioner here and because the supreme court interpreted that materially similar language and that manner we are obliged to interpret sent material it similar language and the same matter here exist at the time of castello the court then went on after finding that the statute was ambiguous to interpret the statue and it did so based on a provision providing for a judicial recommendation against deportation agency can dance say that that they're going to resolve that ambiguity a different way it's it's received that prior construction from the supreme court of the united states well your honor i think which applied canons and resolve the ambiguity and one direction and then congress comes behind and passes another step statute is in the same language and and and and and the that proposition that is as a case i said it in my brief and inaccuracies the agency was interpreted in the persecutor bar and whether how to address exception and agency found itself bound by federal which was a prior supreme court  precedent that interpretive a similar statute under the displaced persons persons at the board said we're bound by veteran co there is no duress exception it went up to the supreme court the supreme court sent it back to the agency said no this statute is was different in and i think in a similar way that the provision before the court is different than the one in castello the court found the judicial recommendation against deportation to be released critical part of its provision just quote said considerable light on the issue they also said that the qualifying provision was an important part of the legislative scheme they also said to adopt a contrary interpretation an alternative ground for its construction or something it was it said this you know they portray stagnation issue as is really it seems to be a red herring because the supreme court said even the statute an ambiguous it resolves the ambiguity of it resolves the ambiguity yes correct but at the same time we honor that that's really invading the agency's authority to define these ambiguous terms in and the allowing for jay rehak but the chief judges pointed out after discuss the jailer and how that will was important then said but even if it didn't exist would reach the same conclusions when the it will stand on its own feet and it binds us right but it doesn't bind the agency to interpret an ambiguous statute i don't think that the rule of lenity supplants and a reasonable position and the reasoning so brand x of course was considering a judicial construction by a court of appeals but the same result little bit of difference don't you think your honor i think that you get there is at the ten stark it has come out and i'm happy to supply this in a twenty eight dollars j letter with a case explaining that brand x would apply to a supreme court construction of an ambiguous term and the reason the court provided was that that the reasoning a justification underlying brand x applies with equal force to a supreme court precedent in the idea was we don't want this to be the chevron framework to be a race to get to the to the  that that provision before it ambiguous in order for it to provide its own interpretation if not is it ambiguous rancor didn't say a word about it and i think that's a harder that is a harder hypothetical but that's not the can and comes into play at step one i think they can it comes into play when a statute is grievously let me reach a supreme court from three years ago and epic systems where is here the can and supply an answer chevron leads the state doesn't that tell us we construction i think it depends on the construction tool before the court and i think that the rule of lenity was intended to apply in really some courts call it greek previously ambiguous statutes right that we don't know how to interpret this there is no reasonable interpretation so let's let's look at the lemony and that really is at step three i mean now there is no step three but it's passed up to step two is whether the ambiguous thank you thank you