first case morning honor morning please the court counsel will be very very funny the he'll the initial appeal brought in this case arises out of just an interpretation of a fish if being provision of a contract rising we argued reached her triggered the fish shifting provision of the contract but the trial court denied any fees at all presumably because the shipping provision contains the word may but in this and as we've briefed we think that the word may has nothing to do with prout court discretion it has to do with whether the plaintiff is entitled to seek those fees which we argue she was absolutely entitled to in this case  by the plaintiffs is is whether the court erred in denying her attorneys fees under the contract provision the over arching argument which plaintiff fails to cite support fees under an attorney fees for vision in the contract or under attorney fees shifting provision in a statue where contract language contract language must be as the court knows  construed by explain in ordinary meaning unless the words are defined differently in the contract black's law dished dictionary specifically states that may i am is to be permitted to or the possibility where as shall is a mandatory and that's how courts interpret it the strict meaning under the contract as has already been the context beats that any fees and may be recovered may as i stated is possible meaning the trial court could have awarded the plaintiff her attorney's fees it is not in the mandatory sense as shown on it further illinois case law specifically states that may in private contracts is interpreted as being permitted where shall is interpreted as being mandatory also  but first and second district have issued cases on that same may and shall do not mean the same thing in private contracts additionally as far as interpretation of language and statutes interpretating terp reading contracts and the rules are essentially the same and as such i ask the court to look at cases that interpret mandatory first permission permissive attorney's fees provisions and statutes goldberg goldberg v aster i'm condominium first district case is is on point as far as it interprets a attorney for you provision statute has made be allowed by the court to recover beats that case sets forth the argument that be careful these are making here that may be recovered is permissive the trial court had discretion under the attorney three feet provision in a contract just as the goldberg or ruled that in one it's permissive attorney's fee per provision the court has discretion additionally there have been cases in illinois where the attorney's fees provision actually state shall be entitled to their fees and the court denied them anyway  that has been upheld one such case arm is med plus neck and back it's a second district case where the attorney fees provision specifically said shall be reimbursed for all reasonable expenses there the court determined that there were prevailing parties on hold both parties were prevailing parties in the matter in that matter the employer or on its claim that the employee breached the contract whereas the employee one in that the the employer could not show its actual damages am is it reasoned that ultimately the case was a draw that both parties had prevailed on the issues in the case and that due to this that neither party would be awarded feets essentially that is what i think the trial court reasoned here in that in the underlying case the plaintiff prevailed on count one sorry count three breach of contract the defendants they prevailed on counts one in two  which has been cited in the first and second districts and upheld that when a case is essentially a draw on either party should it is not to get abuse of discretion within the trial court side many cases that are before nine hundred thirty five which which are non binding on this court and have the defendants have cited current case law which specifically deals with me her shell argument mandatory permissive attorney provisions we request that the court file those cases i am and as like i said many of the cases do not cite attorney's fees provisions as a case of  obligated to grant that request they cited in re miro which is a fourth district case that it dealt with the transfer of venue open in involuntary commitment proceedings so it doesn't deal with attorney's fees in that matter however i mid field the section of the mental health cold and there are two sentences that are in the section together the one state the one provision states may request a transfer to another county the court said that the word request means to ask for something and it does not does not indicate certainty that there were plus will be granted here the plaintiff has admitted that she had the ability to request fees and she did but that doesn't mean that she is entitled to those fees and has to be granted them by the trial for it simply she can request them and the trial court then has discretion whether or not  additionally another case cited by the plaintiffs which again goes against this argument that the plaintiff is the only one that has the discretion here  request fees and must be awarded them isn't people be howard and again that was an attorney provision case however the court stated that the use of the word may was permissive or in defendant may submit a petition from  get a court order on the other hand the court held that the use of the word shall enter an order and set a may have a court order entered demonstrated the intent of the legislator and creating a mandatory as opposed to permissive saksh it they wished it to be mandatory they would have used the word shall where you think you're entitled to terms yes your honor i'm under we did not initially initially appeal the trials court award as was entitled to her it's very easy under a permissive statute permissive provision in the contract the residential real property i'm disclosure act which is what the defendants were cross appealing under they prevailed lotto mark on the wall received the inspection report which stated that there was issues with the roof and that basic jested a inspection by a qualified roofer she did not seek to to get another opinion to get it checked out when she went back to walk through the house i'm after the repairs were made to the watermark was still on the wall she took no other inspection to see that the repairs were made and that mike i said did not get the inspection done as well as the trial court stated that there if she would have just use ordinary prudence in determining what the leak on the wall was getting and inspection by a qualified roofer that she would have would have known about the issue but the while i believe that it's bad faith and that while the parties came to agreement about the doing of my resume the repair done them correct on her well what is the evidence of misconduct find was butler v harris and that's more of a complete in contrast case where the court found on the road that the residential real property act i believe it had to do with the system and an should have known and knew there was evidence that she knew about the issues with the system but the defendant they said also knew about the issues with the septic system and therefore they didn't believe even know the defendant won on that case that they weren't entitled to peace because they both know and here that is not the case there was no evidence presented that the defendants knew that they illinois supreme court stated that it doesn't have to just be with issues within the pleadings they can also be other conduct which amounts to bad faith and it is our argument that based on the the failure to to follow up the failure to that the defendants never received the inspection report and ultimately expected the defendants didn't know and the plaintiffs did know that that based on that that court awarded fees to the voter veiling party in this case the plaintiff basically brought an action in three different theories the first theory was you know the violation of the disclosure act and the proud court specifically found since the not have to update their disclosure so he held against us basically for failure burden of proof because we did show that they knew ahead of time when they made this closure that  it's clear that under any statutory provision to allow the fees that be the case is decided basically ruled to refer to rolling thirty seven saying if there's some sort of an error pleading that can be assessed as brought in bad faith some sort of knowing misconduct on the part of the police or then the court could allow those fees that's not the case here at all the defendants were guilty they didn't make apply here there's nothing akin to row one thirty seven that was invoked here was simply she didn't meet her burden of proof there was no suggestion that she was somehow guilty of knowing misconduct in bringing the