outcome determinative facts and are not in dispute first fact is that at the time of the accident the automobile the truck being driven it was engaged in interstate commerce it was it was moving household goods from crystal lake illinois to crown point indiana that's important because that that the distinction between interstate and intrastate commerce controls what statute applies in this case  other fact which is important again not in dispute is the american service insurance company policy it insured two trucks neither of which was the one involved in this accident and also insurance two drivers i was ramos and  nobody most of the owners of ramos movers who was the named insured under the policy it did not insure the driver that was involved in this accident those those facts are are not disputed they're in the record i think they're conceded by all the parties now they may be argument whether or not they could be coming insured under a policy but as far as the policy itself is concerned it names to a church and it names two vehicles so with that in mind a aside my client  not insure the truck owned by elite will instead that was insured by national national casualty has admitted and it in it's the course of depositions that the driver and insured under their policy because he was driving the car without permission he was a permitted operator and therefore the on the best provision of their policy provides coverage in this case in this complaint that american service failed the two count complaint the first whether or not at the time of the accident the elite vehicle rez a temper a substitute vehicle as defined by the policy the second count of the need of a size complaint that with who would provide primary coverage in the event there was indeed coverage under american service insurance company's policy it is a size position and it has been since day one that national casualty is the primary insurer on this policy  upon that provision of the statute but as we point out and occasional points out that provision does not apply when you're dealing with interstate commerce and that's what we have here now the argument has been made you know that section eleven alone which is the transportation of as goods the movement of goods and that's what we're the best we're dealing with here the section that they rely upon tills with the business aspect if you are gullible silden illinois that provision would apply to you and the reason that is is is very simple it literally cannot regulate interstate commerce no state can it regulate interstate commerce there i guess there are some few exceptions to that but but if we were to take the irrational or the argument that cited every case in fact that every single case that dealt with this is on is on my side there's not a single fairly suggest that the just because the accident occurred in illinois that somehow we ignore the provisions of the cole it's still interstate commerce because interstate commerce is defined from which it is defined as a starting point and an end point that's what makes it interstate commerce as soon as they got in the truck it was heading the indian it becomes interstate commerce and you can't you can't truck was bound to have insurance under under twelve a one they already that it was it was mandatory insurance but the poll court came back and said no well it applies generally to u p s it doesn't apply to this service insurance company who did not insure the people who did not insure the driver ok and the other side of the face you had elite elite which is a rental that rents trucks not only insures the vehicle but also ensures the driver cabs personal rental vehicles commercial trucks and commercial run of trucks and every instance the illinois legislature has needed that the owner of the vehicle provide insurance nowhere near is it required that they drive every vehicle provides insurance and if there was ever an instance of establishing public policy that is it the public policy is that the owner of the vehicle has to provide primary insurance coverage for the vehicle and in the winter for in a rental rented the vehicle that the rental agreement which is part of the record is what it was rented by jules the driver who made this movie claims was an independent contractor but jones works in off the street rents a vehicle and gets involved in an accident the labor choirs the trucking company at least two to ensure that vehicle and you're sure into insured everyone who operates it and there's another key because the statute requires them to insure the operator and judge mason found that really came out of discovery would it make any difference i don't believe it i don't remember making a difference to my case i think what makes a difference to what makes a difference to my case is that they rented the vehicle to spake big rigs of the vehicle to a driver and they were required under the policy were bogus and whether or not he had permission or anything or whether not just the vehicle was insured under the policy but in this case there's no n c s ninety grossman because he was not permitted to move to move out of state and that's a very important point to make here because in the records this goes again to the factual issue but why was this truck rented in the first place general state a statement to american service insurance company which is in the record saying that the reason they rented the vehicle is doesn't apply and that's why the quote never got to the point of whether this temporary sets your vehicle or not we did not follow motion for summary judgment on count one for that reason because they have they had an argument to make that it was out of service and we had an argument to law but that brings to the to the second argument which is whose primary who secondary or policy on its face very clearly says that if it's a temporary substitute vehicle which is the only way that this car could become an insured if the other people's r maybe you could go back to what the general rule is in illinois the oldest policy is primary george mason even found that there was coverage under under elites policy so you have  finding of american service having coverage which we disagree with because we don't believe that there's poverty but you have the fact that there's coverage of new leads policy which state admit in their brief they've admitted to well that there's that there's coverage but so who's primary  says that we're secondary i don't know how we could become primary in these circumstances the other the other issue which i had which i point out with meet with the code section five nine zero five requires that the driver be in better just to insure the truck and it doesn't apply because of interstate commerce that the men traced to the wrong case watch i would point to the court which i think is directly on point is coming versus michigan mutual it's i believe cited in my sure that they're insured you got to keep in mind the access clause in any policy isn't triggered until there's a primary source doesn't deny coverage and that's why it doesn't violate public polls in any circumstance it shouldn't violate public policy unless public every one of them has it from a factual standpoint is distinguishable because in every instance it was an option for the person when they went in there and rented a vehicle to say i have my own insurance covered all have your insurance coverage and cover the very simple but here as here the car rental agent after him a choice between relies on his insurance company to provide primary coverage or paying a higher cost in order to be providing full coverage to the rental agenc as it relates to the to the amount of coverage for at least the judge judge mason found that there's a million dollars coverage under under national policy and that's in the value opinion and the case was very clear on it that it cannot stand because hundred thousand dollars as of four years ago right well you asked me with an easy way to address all your questions it's an advisory opinion because in order for the opinion to it to attach it is a but for  it a judgment's entered then there would be a billion dollars worth of coverage and that's what the courts have said that in every case that that's an advisory opinion the courts can't do it the case the judge basically relied upon saying oh it's not an advisory opinion we can make determination if the judge is going to head off and sit and keep the indemnification aspect as my case and hold onto it as she did because there has not been any judgment entered then how in the world can she say what the exposure is there it's the same thing it is the same thing that she it would apply stacey i would also apply equally to elite until there's a judgment entered because let's just let's let's just play you know they're going to argue wait a minute we're going to get a judgment let's just assume in this case that they go to trial and they lose moreover if we were to allow this action there's no reason why every tort claim it would not upon file a personal injury action folly declaratory judgment action to determine the maximum amount of coverage to which you would be entitled to an obviously if the court doesn't reverse its moves but in the event that the court reverses the issue did becomes potentially whether or not to call primary and work o primary or their primary and for that purpose i would ask to amend my complaint i had to the files in order to preserve it for  and the other issue was a discovery issue which arose which again if it event the court reverses this this is a significant discovery discovery issue the judge judge mason did not allow american service insurance company to get the tax records we didn't file them i den requested that they sign the appropriate docket for the i r s for me to get them from the i r s i attached an affidavit from an expert in my accountant uncontroverted that that would be standard accounting procedures and the judge refuse to allow me to get these these documents right important in the event that the trial in the event that this is reversed and there was ever going to be a trial as to whether this was a temporary sets to people these documents are critical in determining whether or not they rented believe that issues properly before this court the same goes with the discovery order that counsel is arguing about that order contain no feel for the language i don't think with jimmy that legitimately that was a step in the procedural progression leading to the of the partial summary judgment on the issue of duty to defend such that it could be properly reviewed under the notice of appeal that's currently before you so i don't think either of those issues are in play here now i would suggest to the court that you can decide y what is before you is an undisputed coverage under a s i policy and the reason for that is that as counsel mentioned a s i s declaratory judgment complaint contain two counts the first count alleged that there was no coverage because it's not a covered vehicle the second count alleged that this is a temporary substitute vehicle of the policy and therefore we owe only excess coverage there's no dispute that the policy covers temporary substitute vehicles both counts of a s i s complaint and the court entered summary judgment on both counts in front of this court a has side does not argue anywhere in its brief that this is not a temporary substitute vehicle and they the again reiterate to the court that they asked the trial court to assume that fact and i cited the steadfast insurance case which states when the parties fail cross motions for summary judgment they concede that there is no genuine issue of material fact and there are only issues of water for the court to address in this case what was conceded was that this is a temporary substitute vehicle and the only issue for the trial court to address was whether there is access for primary coverage under a s i s policy the end national casualties policy so before this court i think it is undisputed and cannot be disputed that this truck was a temporary substitute vehicle within the meaning of a s i policy and is therefore covered and the only issue therefore before you is whether that is primary coverage or access coverage that issue turns as it did in the state farm versus alamo case of state from vs hertz and find real vs alamo it turns on the enforcement of a contract between the two insurance under each policy find bureau and state farm both hurlbut and insured may contractually agree to look to its own insurance first before looking to the insurance of the rental company and that this does in this case there was no opt out provision there was no provision that you choose one of the other what this rental agreement says is our elites policy coverage it just applies after your own polic exhausted it was automatic coverage given it was just given as access it wasn't a question of you pay to have additional coverage for through us for you take your own it was you get ours you just get access to your own there is no difference in  that fact pattern that mitigates in favor of finding that this case is distinguishable it's a distinction without a difference while we're on that note i would just point out to the court in response to counsel stressed that the rental agreement which is part of the record the court was addressing earlier the status of ramos with respect to elite or to the jones and the rental agreement lists arthur jones as a driver and ramos movers as the company furthermore it's farm bureau and state farm holdback although that's the general rule where there's a contract contractual agreement between the parties to shift to a different policy that must be enforced and that's exactly what we have here th a driver of the street going to alamo or hertz to rent a car that's one difference and secondly i don't see that whether it's high legit or not makes a difference under the holdings in these cases farm bureau and state farm don't don't mention those as factors in the analysis the general rule is that the insurance runs with the vehicle but it is subject to the exception that that can be contractually modified by the insureds which is what was done here moreover as i said as i stated there is no question i s policy provided coverage this is a stamp or a substitute vehicle and that is that that issue has been waived as to whether it was an eye and so given that fact that policies in play it's really just a question of which one has access or not it's not a question whether there's coverage or not there is coverage it's just whether it's access or primary this contract says it's primary and under of farm bureau and state farm that is perfectly legitimate it's doesn't violate public policy and in fact in the peak an insurance person's fidelity case where the owner of a vehicle that had mandated required insurance the court held that it violated public policy underlying the mandatory insurance laws for the insur to attempt to disallow at their own coverage and choose a vehicles coverage but that's not what happened here here the insured opted to have their own policy apply first and to have elite were to insurance policies purport to offer only secondary coverage insurance of the vehicles owners primary all that the driver secondary and that i believe their point was that you are asserting that national policy is clearly excess because it the spring course decision in john byrne's construction versus indiana insurance teaches that and other insurance clause does not automatically reach into another policy out there if the insured doesn't choose to look to that policy and i suggest that here are the insured contractually agreed to look to their own policy first the other insurance provision in that policy does not allow the insurer to trump its insurers wishes to look to its own policy first and that's why as i said what i do think insurers such as they are yeah i think that the contract speaks for itself it says that this insurance we will provide coverage but all coverage is afforded under this agreement or a political only after all other valid collectible insurance whether primary excess or contingent has been paid and exhausted to the full limits of all such policies that's the contract ramos signed that's the agreement they made the agreed to look to their own coverage first  i'd like to turn to my cross appeal at this point unless the court has any further questions on that issue with respect to the prematurity advisory opinion issue i think the scottsdale insurance case is on point with that and  as justice quinn as you pointed out this kind of issue gets raised all the time a declaratory judgment actions it's not an advisory opinion and the reason it's not in the distinction between this case and the teesta for example is in between east the court held there was no actual controversy between the parties that could be the subject of a declaratory judgment action because there was no dispute as to coverage here there's a dispute is the coverage we have to ensure is one of them the name ensures only sure arguing we don't have coverage number one and number two if we do or excess we have the national casualty policy arguing that their access instead of primary there is a dispute versus coverage and there is in addition to that a dispute between national casualty and to the underly plaintiff as to the amount that as you put it that national casualty will be on the hook for and that is properly before the court as part of this the clear tory action there is an actual controversy moreover this does not involve a declaration as to any duty to indemnify that issue has been stayed by the trial court as it must be until the underlying case is resolved it's not a question of what amount national casually has to pay now it's not a question of whether they have a duty to indemnify it's merely a question of contract construction because the trial court held there was an ambiguity and construed the policy to require this amount of coverage limits we contend there is no ambiguity that's an issue of policy construction it does not concern thirty two indemnified or underlying facts governing the liability in the underlying case easily and therefore this is not a premature issue it would not be an advisory opinion and you can properly determine that issue given that fact i turned to the endorsements in the national casualty policy at the argument that mr torres makes and that judge mason accepted is that there is an ambiguity irreconcilable ambiguity between and the covered auto symbol endorsement has no provision whatsoever related to limits of liability it merely expands the covered classes of automobiles provided in the schedule in the main policy nothing about that endors conflicts with the daily auto rental interest with the conflict is between the daily auto rental indorsement and the main body of the policy the declarations page which lists that the coverage limit for all covered vehicles which is a class ten which includes all vehicles owned by elite whether went to the customers or used by elite in its business one million dollars the the g man this case the other cases i've cited state that because a policy initially sets up the broadest possible coverage and then through endorsements narrows that coverage is to certain risks does not render the policy ambiguous that is exactly what happened here it's what happens routinely with insurance policies for policies are used for the body that contain coverage limits for every possible risk for the insured and then a series of endorsements narrow that coverage or even a limited altogether as to certain specified risks in this case the daily auto rental endorsement limited coverage the scope of coverage for one particular class of additional insurance renter's of vehicles to fifty thousand dollars and moreover we went to great o thing national insurance will cover you up to a million dollars and they will then eventually turn while if you go through the people it is the paper it's really fifty thousand dollars for the vast majority of us absolutely not your honor because the rental agreement here specifically states rent or elite provides liability coverage for persons using the vehicle with the permission of the rental or in accordance with the provisions of an animal delivery liability automobile liability policy with limits equal to the minimum requirements of any a political statement into responsibility law the contract right there says the coverage is limited to the minimum under the financial responsibility law that minimum is fifty thousand dollars so right there in the contract there toll you get coverage up to the minimum of the financial responsibility law there's no there's no confusion on the part of the the rectory of the vehicle was a half hour because it had the number  number ten and then refer to one million dollars or ten is the again the symbol endorsement the symbol of divorce when expands the schedule in the main policy that list the classes of covered vehicles main policy has one through not the similar endorsement has ten it broadens it absolutely does and it doesn't compass granted vehicles but you can't stop it because then there is and that that endorsement has no limits of liability as i said then you've got the daily auto rattling doors and that says for any vehicle ran into a customer under written agreement for less than a year the limit of liability is fifty thousand the construction being urged here by torres would notify that endorsement and the case law says you can't do that you that you're raising this is not a stacking issue this is this is a limitation of liability issue it's merely just narrowing the coverage limits secondly it's under insured and uninsured motorist provisions i submit those are there's a specific statute addressing how those work and what's required to be in policies and that statute isn't in play here in fact there is no statute in play with respect to this we're really dealing with case law construing indorsements we're dealing with your typical situation where an insurance company wants to limit or exclude coverage under endorsements for particular risks that's what happened here that doesn't render the policy ambiguous if it did every time there was an endorsement attached to a policy that conflicted with making body of it you have to find any ambiguity and basically know if i that endorsement and that's essentially what the trial judge did here one million dollars a place to go initially at the outset that's owned by only indorsement the narrows that one million to fifty thousand for one particular class that is not ambiguous that is an acceptable method of narrowing coverage with endorsements and the indorsements have to control under g mathis and the other cases i've cited so again the insured contractually agreed minimum financial responsibility is the amount of coverage and getting insured agreed that coverage is excess over my own policy and for those reasons this court should affirm the trial court and i think that as i said you can do so commerce commission jurisdiction and the mandatory nature of coverage under forty nine a one forty nine zero three messages to the court that this is really a simple case of financial responsibility hundred three under federal regulations a single state registration system was put in place which required motor carriers commercial transporters in their home state of do  because of that system illinois dell serves the dual purpose of registering both interest state carriers as well as interest state carriers and it's also obvious that some carriers will operate typically intrastate with some interstate ventures what is i is asking this court and what they asked in the trial court to find is that there's a giant loophole for regulation under the financial responsibility interstate but that carrier is not covered by the financial responsibility was of the state of illinois who by the federal mandated m c s ninety indorsement that is required of all interstate carriers ramos movers was granted authority and it's only operation authority that it has it does not have interstate authority it has interest state and intrastate exempt i'll get to that term in a moment authority under its i c grant a certificate of public convenience this is all on the record but what it was granted was operations within a fifty mile radius of the city of the city of chicago  now clearly a fifty mile radius from the city of chicago could take you into wisconsin could take you into indiana both of those are interstate designations the federal system of regulation with financial responsibility laws recognizes that certain carriers that operate typically in larger municipalities like chicago may venture across state lines west staying within a commercial zone and this is specifically  defined under forty nine c f r of three seventy two point two three three it defines the chicago commercial zone as being a twenty mile radius from any point the city of chicago you'll see it one point southeast are i'm going to chicago which is head waist approximately fifteen and a half the sixteen miles away where the point of that is to say that under federal guidelines for financial responsibility this mode carrier was authorized to go to points within that commercial zone with our triggering federal regulation without triggering federal regulation now let me let me go back to the only commerce commission for a moment because  limited under twelve or one to strictly interest state regulation it can't regulate interstate commerce which is exclusive to the federal government however when it comes to financial responsibility laws and sub of transportation it is where we find the financial responsibility laws then it has a broader jurisdictional school forty one and one specifically states the jurisdiction of the commission shall extend to all more carriers of property operating within the state of illinois so we're not talking about regulating the size of the truck or the weights or the tariffs that companies might might be using in in intrastate commerce we're talking about public safety financial responsibility was for public safety and between the federal regulatory scheme for financial responsibility and the state which covers all motor carriers now if you look at it from that standpoint the federal and state as as the court pointed out in the biscoe case it was not a question of whether the financial responsibility law was triggered because of interstate travel it was a question of the type of use that the vehicle was being put into it was not the operations of the motor carrier that were at issue in biscoe it was incidental travel and that was the focus of that decision it was incidental travel because an auto body shop driver was take transporting the worse financial responsibility was  skipped over that because it does have to do with primacy undergo financial responsibility was it makes its eyes certified policy for public safety purposes the primary i think my co counsel will be addressing it is it it's i'm highlight that from the very first instant that a s i learned that this accident occurred they had been trying to search skirt the significance that a s i itself had twice certified this policy with the c this i c c certification was not cancel until after the accident on page twenty one of our brief we highlight the fact that this fight the certification of the policy failed to cooperate because they did not sit for examinations under oath although the policy did not require them now get to the reimbursement provision in a moment the certification of the a policy is a bear trap a s i cannot escape its grip the certification of this policy is required for the safety of the public and the policy carries with it an implied term of coverage which is a section forty nine  three that any field goals operated under the authority of ramos will be covered even though the vehicle was not presley scheduled for three years now founder's insurance vs american country insurance company has been on the books and we have cited it repeatedly and a s i refuses to grapple with it in that case the illinois appellate court compared the taxicab insurance provisions of the illinois vehicle code with section forty nine zero three and said that section forty nine o three is the type of public safety insurance statute that the legislator legislature and acted to cover all vehicles regardless of whether they're scheduled or not in the founders insurance case there was no statute that required american country the taxicab insurer to schedule or cover all vehicles whether or not their scheduled excise failure to grapple with founders versus american country to us is very troubling and more importantly a s i has ignored every single case that we cited that says that when insurance policy is issued pursuant to a public safety financial responsibility statute the insurer cannot use coverage defenses as to its insured or to deny members of the club the public who are statutory beneficiaries of the statute coverage under this policy we cited j johnson versus higher g enterprises of great american versus brad movers in issue illinois casualties versus crawl for that proposition johnson is a significant case and i'll talk about reimbursement in a moment we were talking a moment ago about the pekin insurance case in the reason why the owner of that vehicle was what's required to provide primary coverage i don't think it had anything to necessarily to do with who actually owned a vehicle except that it was a tow truck which was required like ramos movers to have public safety insurance and it was against public policy for the owner of the tow truck t coverage when there was a public statute that said otherwise and so that is a similarity between the tow truck insurance case and in our case here based on a high review of the case why your got justice is there has not been a reported decision that emphasizes the importance of reimbursement provisions since the johnson case in one thousand nine hundred eighty two johnson involved a predecessor to forty nine zero three where the inch surance company was held that it could not use late notice or like here a breach of the duty to cooperate to deprive an intern member of the public  coverage under a public safety statute the court went on to say that the insurer was not without a remedy it could pave the injured tort claim in and then seek reimbursement from its own insured  all of a us size efforts to invoke the temporary substitute vehicle provisions and more importantly when a s i issued this policy it assumed a risk it would not otherwise have been obligated to or tender a letter of credit so just in case like here there was an accident involving a vehicle that was not scheduled s s i is on the hook for it and they can seek reimbursement from it's own insured jose torres has been waging this battle from day one ramos mover's is no longer in business and is a tort claimant jose torres has been making all of these arguments do that before to shoot the policy to get give get some protection from its own insured in the event that a s i was on the hook by virtue of the section forty nine zero three we cited cases a gag legion of cases involving statutary and a lot similar to illinois from wisconsin georgia oklahoma tennessee all of which said it was perfectly appropriate for an insurance company who is required provide coverage by operation of a public safety statute to seek reimbursement from its own insured and again a s i does not address this issue in any way shape or form mr acosta briefly addressed the biscuit vs liberty case and i'll be quick about that this go had to do with a truck that was not involved in any sort of commercial activity and there was a repair exclusion in this case the ramos mover's truck was being used by a ramos a trainer employee in the transportation of household goods in illinois in route to an interstate exempt destination under an insurance policy with no geographical limitation after a s i itself the twice certified the policy with the illinois commerce commission and before it canceled the policy so biscoe is apples and oranges compared to this case i must briefly discuss the canal insurance case because a s i been talking about that case for ever we attach a complaint from that case that would in my view was a tortured effort by a driver of a truck not a member of the public to try and get coverage where there was no m c s ninety coverage even though the resents the us ninety endorsement there was no evidence in that case in any way shape or form that that policy in the canal case have been certified with the illinois commerce commission i would go so far as to argue that we believe that judge mason at the very beginning of the case granted our motion to dismiss a coverage case judge mason could have taken judicial notice of the certification with the i c c and look at the allegations of the complaint and see th was involved in transporting household goods in the state of illinois when that truck hit an illinois citizen the judge said she wanted to get more facts she needed more facts we went out and took whose expert analysis was infant tile he placed the battery of the truck he didn't simulate any conditions and he had no opinion whatsoever that that car was broken down or that truck  because the canal insurance case was at least the appellate opinion was kind of ambiguous on the underlying facts we went and got a copy of the complaint and we attached it made a part of this appellate record to show that the complaint was silent about i c c certification and this was a case where a truck driver not a member of the public in my view was was really struggling struggling mightily to try and create coverage where none exist i don't think canal insurance has any wait for the dispute before this court i'd like to move on to address  the issue of the limits of the policy and i completely agree with justice in that this issue is not premature  back action about how much money he would bring if he won the battle that's not what's happened here and i can understand that courts would look at that sort of circumstantial as presumptuous jose torres did not ask to be dragged into this coverage mass but  necessary party he's had to fight this coverage battle and we cited numerous cases in our brief and i will mention one of them safeco versus brian me i think it's pronounced where the resolution of coverage discussion of probabilistic injury in the well republik case to have a lot of power to it it makes no sense for jose torres to go through a trial and wait for a verdict before he knows what his limits of coverage are it makes no sense and a s i miss misread scottsdale in its in its opening briefs and they still insist that scott's the case that settled the case had not settled in scottsdale and they started to clear tory government action to find out what the coverage limits were so the issue was right and then finally  and someone unfortunately the issue of the limits of coverage for ramos movers under the national casualty policy is right for now than it was when the priests were filed and that's because of the it is no wonder in the underlying right now is the case presently stands is a seven hundred fifty thousand from under the a s i policy and the million dollars we argue under the uli policy and this is a situation where we have a man with eight hundred thirty five thousand dollars in medical expenses with a truck that cut over four lanes of traffic it is not an advisory opinion and i will now move on to the issue of the limits of the policy unless you have any a national casualty policy there's the elite elite as the named insured and then ramos movers who is an insured under the business side of coverage part because they use all van with would use the truck with four and neither indorsement refers to the other but class ten vehicles have two separate liability limits now mr coloccini with national casualty will tell you that this is a standard case of a a time the coverage form being limited by an endorsement but if you look at what happened here and you look at the s stating a rental period of less than one year that symbol ten simple ten vehicles constitute about ninety five percent of the entire risk that  me that elite was getting insurance for and in fact the business out of harvard for only contains nine classes of vehicles and this tenth class was added i would argue that the supplemental declarations are akin to an indorsement because they were specifically tailored to this particular insured it amends the supplement it amends the policy and it lists covered oddo section ten for a million dollars it uses the same definition of rental agreement as does the rental wars that the supplemental declarations must be read in conjunction with the covered auto designation symbol and here's what significant about that the liability limits for simple ten vehicles is a million dollars the premiums charged for class ten vehicles was one hundred fifty six thousand dollars he stopped all mental declarations and the liability limits for simple time vehicles do not distinguish between liability limits for lead on the one hand and ramos movers the renter on the other and i would direct the court's attention that national casualty readily could have done that and in fact they did so because in the uninsured motorist portion of the supplemental declarations they list class ten vehicles and they say what are the limits see indorsement see a twenty one zero seven and they have a split uninsured motorist coverage limits along the lines that you were talking about before judge justice quinn where they specifically differentiated different levels of insurance for different types of risk for the national casualty did not do that here the supplemental declarations and the liability limits for simple ten vehicles do not even refer to the daily auto no indorsement as i just mention the daily auto or smith creates a new class of insureds rents he's we pointed out in our brief that this creates an ambiguity insured from his business auto coverage form and replace it with the definition of insured as a renter the i argue that this creates an interviewee and this was folly since ninety percent of the premium was for class ten vehicles and then finally the daily auto rental indorsement has the same definition of rental agreement as a simple time endorsement even though nine hundred fifty thousand dollars is in the balance here  casualty only spends three pages of its brief addressing the limits issue and they cite two cases one is cheap the math is versus continental insurance that case presents the classic triumph classic issue where coverage is granted in the coverage form and limited by an endorsement here here we have two conflicting and irreconcilable endorsements immoral for the insured in cheat the math this was trying to get coverage even though there was no premium paid for completed operations and a reference on the declaration page said the coverage for completed operations was excluded i would argue g e massa supports our position in light of what the supplemental declarations say unabashedly and nakedly that cover ten autos to the limit a liability is a million dollars and that one hundred fifty six thousand dollars was paid for that coverage they are elite strike that national cancer c also addresses explicit and concise pollution exclusion which was muddied by the use of three little words notwithstanding the foregoing there's probably no appellate opinion that's ever gone in more detail about what the term notwithstanding the foregoing involves but see i p s did not have a conflict between two endorsements it was an endorsement that was clear on its face except for the use of the word  so we would ask that the the order of judge mason be affirmed in its entirety jose torres is a statutory beneficiary and if beneficiary of this policy a s i cannot use covered defenses against his own insured to deprive mr torres of his damages the primacy and significance of the certification of the policy with the i c c makes it primary insurance no one has a s i has not been able to overcome the presumption that in the rental car contacts  the policy is access and national casualty drafted a very sloppy policy with irreconcilable indorsements which as you said justice quinn must be construed in favor of coverage based on what a reasonable person would think and if i'm arthur jones or i'm ramos mover's i'm saying i have a million dollars of coverage under the supplemental declarations it doesn't mention the  rental endorsement the rental endorsement his need fifty thousand dollars of coverage that's a conflict national casualty could have corrected it they did not ambiguities must be resolved against the  insurer and in our favor and my final point on that is that while this case was pending the illinois supreme court came out with state farm versus illinois farmers which said that step down provisions are appropriate distinction in my mind between making a conscious of a rental company making a conscious offer to a renter to choose the rental cars insurance as primary on the one hand and not making that offer at all the presumption still hasn't been overcome and in any of that this is a public safety financial responsibility statute and the national casualty policy going to address the points that were raised by elite the first point that they raise is that somehow american service conceded that this was a temporary substitute vehicle that is absolutely not in the trial court made no such finding that they that this was a temporary substitute people and we didn't concede it we only conceded it for purposes of getting the court to look at camp two which is the only way to put could look at count two of our complaint that is if in fact we a size policy reads with respect to a temporary substitute automobile this insurance shall be accessed insurance the building surance policies here when you read them and apply the allegation to the complaint determine if you know from from that standpoint whose primary secondary it's not this contract this third party contact between their insured and someone else these you know the point that we made in the court below is that a leap provider has to provide primary coverage because the statutory compulsory insurance provisions which is what they're arguing his use of the vision in this instance was outside the purview of the statute that is exactly what we have here the purview of the statute twenty one takes it outside the limit and then to tell you there are forty one on forty one three hundred forty one or one judge if you justice if you will be forty one to one in the mirror in which the manner in which they're reading it it would render section twelve or one statutory construction you cannot do that what they're suggesting that they're suggesting here is that for the one zero one because of because it would it says operating within the state of illinois covers anybody that's operating within the state of illinois twelve or one is more specific and it says if you're being gauged into intra state commerce it's covered otherwise it is not he's trying to suggest well it's interstate commerce so therefore it's public because a for forty want to work that would mean that renting a vehicle that's what the case law says very specifically says and they say it doesn't matter and i suggest to you it absolutely does because when they sneak that suggests to you you make a knowing decision you may not even have insurance there's no way that it does there's no evidence here that  anybody at least checks to whether or not jones has insurance or doesn't at any time and also you can the jones when he walks in there when he has an opportunity to waive the charts and he also says he can also purchase the church and generally purchased decide whether or not he wants to have this type of coverage this type of coverage how much coverage we've already feel is that we don't you have a whole bunch of opportunities to have cover share but the bottom line here what they can't get around and nobody seems to be able to get around here is that the statute in illinois requiring insurance for this trucking company elite demands and requires that the leach provide insurance for the truck and for the driver nobody has addressed that statute that's the statute that controls  to the extent it conflicts with the declarations it controls and it was specifically referenced to the insured yet ramos o'rielly in the decorations for me as part of the policy thank you