morning your honor is my name is lewis long and i represent country way insurance company in this case i would like to reserve two minutes for rebuttal if i may granted this is an insurance coverage dispute involving a farm is whether the insured used the motorized vehicle i don't understand why that is the question i don't either your honor because there's nothing in the policy language that says that correct or if i may address that point directly i believe that it violates the fundamental rule of contract interpretation to impose the requirement of insertion of that phrase by the  this exclusion makes no sense i mean can a bodily injury result from liability imposed by law i do agree that there is some troublesome aspect of that language your honor but sense at all well the way i would reconcile that your honor would be as i did in my brief parsed down the language of the exclusion and look at the constituent elements of it i think the intent of the exclusion is clear the attentive the exclusion was  negate coverage for vehicular incidents and i think if the court but goes past that phrase that you have focused upon your honor that no one else has focused upon as being a basis for and i would i would supplement that argument by pointing out that the phrase liability imposed by law upon the insured is has become a bit of a cottage phrase or term insurance industry meaning tort liability as opposed to breach of contract or things of that nature so i would submit that the intent of the exclusion is to liability tort liability for i'm sorry for bodily injuries resulting from the use of the motor vehicle and they use term i think is important here because use is a term is also a term of art in insurance policies and often courts see exclusions written in terms of maintenance operation or use or ownership sometimes is plugged in to the exclusion and not and none of those other words appear here it is just use and i would submit that the absence of the word ownership takes away from the district court's analysis here because if the insurance company meant for ownership to be important the insurance company would have used the word own or ownership or some cognate up that in the exclusion and here i will use to my advantage a different exclusion in the policy when the court considers exclusion c which i quoted in my brief because it was a point raised by opposition in the lower court exclusion c does use those other words that i've just mentioned including the word ownership it is clear to see has a different line that's correct your honor and the point i'm making is that if ownership was important for exclusion c and exclusion after the insurance company would have used honor that there is no ambiguity by using only the term use because they're the legion of cases including a significant body of cases from pennsylvania have applied use exclusions in cont this and have found the exclusion to be enforceable and have denied coverage i'm talking about the lay in line of cases i argued the pulling case before the superior court in back in one thousand nine hundred eighty two when i was just a young pup and the superior court adopted the position for pennsylvania in that case that use exclusions lebar coverage when someone in trusts a motor vehicle to another person now the other side argues back here in this case while this isn't a negligent entrustment case pish posh look at illustrations six and illustrations for to the restatement sections that are involved here they say this is a section three o two  similar there to running down see a is negligent word see so both illustrations under both sections of the restatement make clear that these are logically related tort clauses of action requiring the use of the motor vehicle and i submit that the very proof of the tort that was played against mr slogging hobb activates the use exclusion of this policy furthermore the lack of ownership as being a relevant factor was demonstrated by a case that cited by was cited in the district court by both parties the erie vs transamerica case that was decided by the superior court that case involved a child who gained access to a vip a car owned by a visitor to the child's household the child unwittingly activated the car the car rolled down the hill an injured  person and the superior court in that case held that was still within the use exclusion of the parent's homeowners policy in that case although the supreme court went on to reverse the erie case on different as a condition preceding to the application of that exclusion in summation on this point to require use by the owners to rewrite the exclusion something that no porters committed to do i what would that language been rising out of well the purpose of that language as i understand it your honor is to require a nexus or a connection causally between the vehicle and the injury in contradistinction to a situation and i realize i'm going beyond the facts of this case to deal with a hypothetical situation but suppose an individual is sitting in a car and  hunter in the field fires a gun and the got the bullet comes through the car sitting in a car that he's not up to nor is it using the vehicle yes and and what i submit is that arising from language requires that the in essence request the vehicle be in motion that the vehicle be part of the facts which give rise to the injury and give rise to the liability and even though those magic words arising from or arising out of are not in our exclusion i'd submit that the causal connection is nonetheless present in our policy language  because and i believe i can point to two different aspects of our exclusion which tie in the causal connection between the injury and the vehicle first of all the exclusion requires that the bo passing over your phrase to stapleton results from and i say i submit to the court that results from is pretty close to arising from or arising of but going beyond that what must that result from it must result from liability for the use of the vehicle so i'd submit that the word for or for the use of the trustment claims as well and because without that without the use of the vehicle you don't have a causal connection between the negligent act the exercise of bad judgment by the insured in either giving the in the driver the car keys or telling him to do something that requires the use of the motor vehicle and in this case we do have that we do have that connection here we do have that causal connection because without that without the sun telling the father go deliver that tire the accident never happens to be sung could never be held liable because just putting the tire into the truck wasn't tortious it wasn't a complete tort it didn't result in any injury until that truck left the premises and why did that truck leave the premises truck left the premises because the insured the son said dad go take that tire actually believe the words were there you go and he sent him on  coverage disputes when the insurance company denies coverage based upon an exclusionary provision it has the burden of proof and where there are costs that attempt to accept coverage there to in that policy it is to be resolved in favor of coverage and against the insured let me stop you right there you're oral health a there you are relieved the argument the argument ha an insured for the use of a vehicle i suggest to the court that it becomes in figures because when you look at the use of a vehicle as mr long has argued in his case he trusted you and you use the vehicle and the quotes in all the negligent entrustment cases have looked at that and said that you can't separate those two elements but i think in this case it is in big us because the liability arises and your honor in determining whether or not there's an ambiguity you have to look at the context of the policy and the particular set of facts and that's the last criteria for determining whether or not there is an ambiguity so if we look at the context of this policy there's a very simple paragraph that appendix ninety that provides liability coverage to insure that paragraph is then followed by twenty four paragraphs over three pages which limits the coverage which is provided in that initial paragraph and in this particular case it's paragraph f which is the one i just  to impose a liability by law on the insured for the use of the vehicle well are we imposing liability upon her saw going ha for using a vehicle i suggest to the court we're not we're imposing a liability on paul saw that hot for delegating a task to his father when he knew or should have known that that was going to expose someone else to an unreasonable risk of sa i don't think so so clearly hall sets into motion what occurs but is that when you narrowly interpret the term use in the postie in their the masters of their own fate they drafted this policy they chose the language and if it's interpreted narrow and ambiguity is conferred against the ensure there's no use in this case or at best now when you look at these negligent trust me cases in the point cases very interesting case because you have an employer engaging an employee who in the  the legal reasoning which i alluded to earlier which is the concurrence of those two elements and trust of the vehicle and use of the vehicle they're inseparable there was no vehicle in this case provided about is that the rationale of the court  engaged in as an employee so i submit that that is negligence and trust me cases on their facts every one of them on their facts and in the legal reasoning are distinguishable from the case that we have before you here today and the supreme court in that case said that that three and a half year olds operation of the vehicle did not constitute he says so therefore the homeowner's exclusion which excluded the use of the vehicle was not applicable because it cannot be said that a three and a half year old uses a vehicle because there has to be some intentional conduct and you can't impute that intentional conduct with three and a half year old so i suggest frankly your honor that that case supports my proposition because you can clearly say that in a practical sense he that three and a half year old used the vehicle he policy as a whole yes absolutely and i think it is and isn't the existence of exclusion see something we should take into consideration when looking at their school is now well frankly yes you should look at all twenty four screen i understand under that it is limited for a second right isn't the fact that it's clear that the insurance company knows how to limit an exclusion for the use you can have under step section after the exclusion for an agency theory you can have under subsection f solution for the negligent trust make it difficult to get to the ambiguity isn't one of the interpretations that this meant that the only applies there are the exclusion applies if a motor vehicle is used that's that's one reasonable interpretation correct i would posit that a second reasonable interpretation would be that the exclusion applies if in fact there is a liability imposed upon insured for using a motor vehicle correct ok so there's further broaden the exclusion and yet when they say that there's liability imposed by law for the use as the lower court says well who's use is it the necessarily the insurance use or can it that all slogging whop used a motor vehicle we can say he used his father and his father used a motor vehicle and perhaps that set into motion what occurred but the they used which was selected by the insurance companies is in big us as to whether or not in the particular set of these facts all used and if you go back to the criteria which is that the insurance  company has the burden of proof that provision has to be narrowly interpreted and any ambiguity has to be resolved in favor of the coverage and i submit to you that the summary judgment below was fallacy in the plaintiff's argument in this plaintiff i'm referring to the tort claim his argument for coverage in this case try as they might they try to drive a wedge between the judge mental act of sending the father to deliver the tire and the use of the automobile they can't drive that wedge between those two facts because the simple act of asking the father to deliver the tire was not an actionable tort until the father used the vehicle as your honor quoted from the plain case so they can't separate the use of the vehicle from their very cause of action upon which they rely and the use of the vehicle is what triggers the exclusion in this case employment is not a factor employment was not a factor in the play and case employment is not a factor in the proof or the employment is not a factor in the application of the exclusions comes from erie versus trans america nationwide versus wilcher and culpepper says nationwide or nationwide versus called by may have been a flip flop none of those cases none of those homeowner type cases play in being a business case but erie culp and we'll check are all homeowners cases which involve no employment connection between the person who exercised the bad judgment and the person who operated the vehicle employment is not a factor use is the factor we exclude use and on that