island in five different superior court cases language of the statute in those cases made it clear that there was no contract and it did that by having language showing that the legislature gave up its right to contract in certain aspects one of the cases had to do with us and because the corps and me sad the general assembly in maine said you're allowed to find a contractual obligation  we may not have met entitled to a i don't know that there would be a breach of contract claim under state law i'm not i'm not sure even if we crew to we we knew that their whole argument throughout this whole process has banned even if we breach the contract we had to do that we had a reason the necessary reason to do this and you know we did so as necessary as we could so using reasonable and necessary  that really wasn't the basis for the appeal second quarter can say the particular facts of that case they do find a contract and which case we will certainly be back in federal court arguing see there's a contract but the defense will certainly be arguing well the facts are different and the facts are different and if you think you just said if you win if they cling to sweden in the supreme court you're going to take that decision run across the good morning in may it please the court the cold engine and on behalf of the state defendants the governor the treasurer in the employee's retirement system for an island i will be addressing the constitutional issues as they relate to counts one and two to the extent that those constitutional claims are buys under the state's statute i will also be addressing count for a count that he district court correctly interpreted as purporting to state a claim on behalf of retirees my colleague nicholas if that surrender happened it would have happened back in one nine hundred ninety five but the second and more important point is that that language is simply not the type of language the courts look to to determine whether contractual rights have been made because that presumption is most important criteria and that the language is indicative of what the legislatures intention was this court has recognized that there are circumstances that can inform the court's analysis of what the legislature intended but said that while they were the court was sympathetic to those repeating is a dedicated service they were required to plead facts stating a clear intent of the legislature to create a contract right that's what we have here there is no allegation of a clear right to contract isn't it seems to me the first question we ask is is the statutory language sufficient to create a right if we answer th alleged circumstances are plausible you know there would have to be sufficient allegations to make such circumstances plausible here are the allegations are that there were negotiations with the city negotiations at the state relief for the state based on city documents the city there's no relief saw in the city and that's presumably one of the reasons why actually she decided it dismissed without prejudice was the fact that similarly harris county case and  there was some disagreement about owners i should say some confusion about the case caption the case was originally styled as the city of cranston as a defendant then he was later captioned as city of cranston again as a third contracts with the city so the state clearly would still be a party in interest in this case and briefly i just want to respond to the legislative intent that this court said it means association of retire