the clock and try to save about two minutes for in this appeal we are challenging two conditions of mr stevens supervised release st of those conditions reads as f must participate in a mental health assessment and or to submit in mental health treatment as determined to be necessary by a medical or a mental health professional and although many treatment directions by the treatment providers are germination of whether mr stevens will actually be required to just sit in treatment b follows sentencing every council isn't that language actually a big us on that question it i see what you're saying that it there's one way you can read it that it is delegation of it but another way to read it is that the mental health professionals can only dictate that the frequency and type of mental health treatment which is squarely allowed under our president  were but i will just tell you their rationale was that they needed to send it back and ask the district court what is just records intention was if the district courts intent really was to delegate then the court would have to be directed t assessment as to whether treatment will be required what what it might do is to require the assessment and directly predation officer following the assessment to its appropriate make a motion to modify the condition and now cetera but there is a lot of references to the relationship in the record with the woman who was a convicted felon and someone who had her own substance abuse history and issues and this court has said when when a condition infringes upon someone's intimate relationships of that nature including just a significant other including a serious dating relationship that it has to make special findings on the record that it's necessary for the purpose of the supervised release that it deprives no more liberty than reasonably necessary and there were no findings of that nature done here again this is also was plain or it was not pointed out it's certainly not something w and standard condition number eight that the district court imposed in this case as this court knows the district court has brought it discretion in imposing conditions of supervised release and the standard rule of review here on both conditions is plain error the reason for that is because the defendant did not raise objections kolo and i want to be very specific about how many opportunities the defendant had to raise objections when he didn't when the defendant's supervised release with st being revoked in january of two thousand and nineteen a written disposition report was was provided that had these conditions the defendant did not object to that written report nor did he object to these conditions in january th seen fast forward to the nd supervised release violation and the disposition report hearing so getting specifically to special condition number four the mental health assessment judgment boom is hey you asked if the language was ambiguous and the government argues based on the fact that are support that are in the raf word there is no ambiguity in this instance there could be if the facts were different for facts didn't support this condition but here are we do have facts that support the titian and i want to focus on a few words that might seem small but actually really direct us here one is the word must the judge use the word must both  disposition hearing in august th again as well as in her written order must means it's mandatory the district court does not delegate authority at all and the must appl assessment as well as the treatment how do we know that how do we know it's not ambiguous it's not ambiguous on the facts in this case because of the discussion on the record there was if the if the court looks to  excerpts of records nine thousand three hundred and ninety one as well as ninety three that the judge talks about the mental health treatment before she pronounces the condition and even more importantly the defendant himself essential requests mental health treatment there is discussion on pages ninety to ninety was honest with the defendants specifically says that he has had the underlying mental health issues and when he had given the resources to help those issues he's had improvement and then when the condition was imposed there was no objection the other a very key word here that might seem small but i think distinguishes this case from both franklin which my esteemed colleague mention as well as the truly case that was brought up in the twenty eight jail letter is the difference between as necessary versus if necessary as st the death the as necessary shows that this is a mandatory condition it's not whether or not the defend should get treatment he additionally as mentioned both peterson and franklin which came up earlier those were both abuse of discretion cases and i would also point out in the peterson case while the word it wasn't used the facts did not support the special condition there in the peterson case the special condition had to do with sex offender treatment and the underlying crime had to do with bank larceny so there was no t lee the rd key language here is that is different even though a probation officer can decide the manner and extent of treatment even better is if a medical provider makes that decision and in this case that's what we have the order is that a medical provider will make that decision and this court in the stevens case no relation a different stevens oh i'm sorry in the blast for the case this court in the black for case said that a medical provider is fast acquits to make that determination and several cases out of this circuit both stevens no relations latchford which i just mentioned are stereo and rewritten which are all in the breeze support the fact that that medical provider or or a probation officer can determine the extent pointed out the record does support that that that mental health treatment is not only necessary but the defendant himself essentially asked for it he said that he does better when he has those resources twenty eight j just a day or two ago asking the court to look at the record here's what we have in a factual timeline which leads us to the defendant essentially asking the district court judge to be there was discussion i don't think the word fiance was used in that discussion but there was discussion about a relationship someone that the defendant was in a in a romantic relationship with and that basically that person had their issues as well so that came up that it then we fast a on the some of the the documents that mr kaplan asked you to look at date back to november of two thousand and eighteen so late fall six months earlier we have no way of knowing and that's in the written report so then we're at the disposition hearing in august of two thousand and nineteen and there is no mention of a fiance a girlfriend nothing but what we do have is mention of other important people in the defendant's life both his mother and his daughter reference to to both of them came up and that's that are ninety so again the defendant didn't object to the disposition report and didn't object in at the at the oral disposition hearing and then seiler you asked this question did it come up the answer is no so we are basically asking the district court judge to that a girlfriend mentioned in a written report is the same person as a fiance from six months earlier and that they're even still together in august and my last point is judge seiler you asked if that could be modified will could have been modified i defendant brought it up that that you're in saying my girlfriend my fiance is is a felon and i still want to be in a relationship with her so for those reasons i see my time is up the government is asking the court to affirm both of these conditions that were thank you very much if you your honors the word must is mandatory but but you must do is was determined to be necessary by a nontraditional officer does the problem as far is the word as being significant in terms of a man the as far as the case which is side of the breeze which is asserting obvious this reason of this sort of language was made in good in patient treatment as approved and directed by the probation officer that was held to be an improper unlawful delegation