looking at the plain text of the statue the state has already conceded in their brief front page t v that degree with the defendant that simply possessing a firearm unlawfully clearly cannot serve as a pre reading into it an exception that fits this case and as the court is well aware that's not something bad the core is opposed to be doing is reading into exceptions plain text of the statute you know i think that the most important thing about this about the state's argument is that this would be one thing if this statute had never been amended and we are confronting for the st time in whether the legislature had intentionally omitted this charge or had a clue couldn't serve as you can offenses and then they added this entire residual clause which was added relatively contemporaneously when the fifteen two thousand and twenty five year cases that had found the underlying offenses to be inappropriate but also the problems that the supreme court had confronted in house trial with respect to worship penalties problems and that's exactly what we have here because if this core words you accept the state's argument then any time somebody had multiple discretion would be able to charge that if the core excepted this case interpretation now what i find interesting is back in the states brief unpaved eighteen despite the fact that th entire argument hinges on the legislator should have our legislator did in facts mean for this type conduct to be punished by the  statute they stayed in their brief clearly when the legislators who did offenses that made the possession or use of a dangerous weapon from being used as predicate offenses it simply did not conceive of a situation like that in the present case where the underlying felony happened to involve possessing a stone firearm for self transaction so i find it interesting that the state is saying that the legislature intended this but clearly not conceive of a situation like the present case so the legislature didn't conceive of a situation like that with the present kate present case and how could the legislator have tended when it wrote the statute to capture the offense conduct in this case it could because the legislature had already considered the problem that we're confronting in this case and that's the fact that if the states if the state's position is accepted by the score and up and the trial court is affirmed here then this core and presumably later the supreme court would be provided with the exact same problem that it was presented with and how it's a little bit different because of the way that the statutes were fixed after that but you still have a situation in which there's considerable variance between punishment for the exact scene and another problem for violence conviction but they're saying that the offense conduct itself should form the basis for violence conviction in other words the course is but as the state indicated below their theory of the case and the way that it was charged was the possession of a stolen car and that's the felony that's defined by the walker and the court isn't required to look at the offense condoms to determine whether whether a felony defined by and fifty percent sentence issue i think is pretty straightforward this was a case in way the family everybody was under the impression that it was eighty five percent back turns out to be legislative amendments that occurred after the house child case how they and in this residual clause and excluded specifically some other offenses one thing i would notice the history of this statute is that if it's been in its current form now in prior versions  statute started out regarding all felonies as armed violence and if he carried a weapon then the legislature added specifically enumerated offenses then it removed those offenses and subsequently added them again over the course of half a century or so we didn't really discuss that issue in our breeze but i stumble upon it actually this afternoon when i was reviewing some of the cases that were interpreting the armed violence statute but i think what's important here when the when the legislature made those house trial changes they weren't messing with the catch all because it was trying to avoid it doubled handsome and type situations like what we saw in house child level we saw in the cherry case but if you look at the the you know the language here in the tent we look at the playing the play really increase in of search result it result because the intent tells us this armed violence charges created because we want to deter individuals from using firearms in the conditions of felonies so what was the behavior that we saw in this case the defendant prearrange is to make a sale of a firearm which was later determined to be stolen with a person who doesn't actually know it was a police officer some time between that point and a prearranged meeting the defendant elects to arm himself with a pistol in order to facilitate the sale of that firearm they arrive at the prearranged meeting place and his codefendant who is also armed does precisely what this statute is meant to prevent which is flash a gun and then gunshots ensued it's crystal clear perfect fit for the intent of the statute and so the real issue for this court is not to consider what these other cases have had happened and then because those cases did involve more than one firearm they involve more than one type of act which is you know armed robbery but armed robbery with a guy was the same thing as far as house trials concerned what we have here is the elements don't match the intent so this court has to do what it what is authorized by law we talk about people be hanna i cited a judge posner specifically you look at those elements and look at that statute and it doesn't make sense you're allowed to read into it what was the purpose the purpose becomes the primary tool when you consider what the  i just think it's clear that that the intent of the statute is owed weight it's not simply a plain reading of what these elements are because it's clear that they're in conflict and that's what we have to resolve here do you want to give more weight to the ten which is to prevent we created this whole list this whole code dealing with this kind of our violence because we want to stop this behavior and so when they're doing that they just were imprecise in how they tried to stop the behavior that they were so worried about look in the statute talk simply about how much more dangerous is when people use crimes to commit felonies and so in essence here if we don't look at that intent and give it the weight that is owed we create a situation where this defend it gets to committed the conduct that the legislature wanted to prevent without actually dealing with the appropriate consequence and that's what gets to the crux of this matter and it is interesting in the th district in that griswold case they talk about how many absurd different really results could occur with the way the armed violence statute is currently written one of the most ridiculous to be full to what the legislature intended which was to stop people from using guns to commit crimes there's no question that's precisely what happened here in the unit up with exact result that the legislature was trying to prevent gun shots an innocent person to have been legislature to just write it they certainly could and it wouldn't hurt anything but but the issue that we have to look at here is his lawyer will write everybody you know that's why we're here if you are there that's why we have this checks and balances system so that when these odd situations percolate goal was which is to stop this type of crime it just doesn't fit quite as neatly in the situation that i think we can all agree these facts one thousand five hundred and ten probably are they could almost not be drawn better unless somebody actually got hurt in the end but that's what we're looking at here where you give more weight to the elements or will you give more weight to the intent and we know these elements have been messed with for years and years because it's such a hard thing to define i think the legislature thought and there is no debate on this in the legislature this is part of a huge criminal act and they didn't think about silly things like this that sometimes do happen but that's why you can look outside that plain language and capture what the intent was and when the plain language makes no sense you have to look at what the intent of the statue was that's what hannah different statutes basic intent you know they're all dealing with different situations and so that's why you have to you know use your experience and use the you know existing intent as it is and give that proper way it was just like you knew situation we can conceive of if we just say ok anything with possession of a weapon is an element just don't clear who would have thought that somebody would carry a gun to sell and it just it just doesn't come up very often and so that they just simply missed it but that's why we're needed it or i believe there's six subsections or something like that on it so that it's clear what they wanted to do they just simply didn't execute it properly when they created that residual clause it just was too far one of the o things i guess that we would say is well there are seventy questions on the other two issues or is our decision that i think one thing i do want to address briefly was with regard to the rd issue i realize this court has the authority under six the sentence here but i think the fact that this was a fully negotiated plea agreement makes it such that you sort of taking away the state's attorney's ability to handle its case if he did that there's no harm in remaining in this back you know contract principles apply and his counsel noticed nobody knew what the proper percentage was to serve the sentence everybody thought it was eighty five percent we can see it in the brief there was no great bodily harm finding so it's a fifty percent situation however given that that changes the calculus i think would be best if you just remained it's trying to interpret a term or trying to determine how certain clauses interact with each other in the same statute but it's not when a party asked to work to gauge  would happen or if that doesn't seem that usual to me i think that you know in in margarine measure areas when you're tracking guns somewhere where you're going to sell guns out on the street you're not going armed you're selling guns saying that that's probably i mean that's reasonable it's not that unique that that somebody would go to a fire sale themselves so i don't think that this case is that he with that set why is this the st time that this is never come up and i think that it's because the pla just because somebody can't be charged with a class next star and sent to prison for thirty years doesn't mean that he can't be charged with a felony and sent to prison for a significant amount of time anyway