you know as an initial matter doesn't it sort of seem strange that a power would be deemed necessary to the disposition of case when apparently in the vast majority of ca in the otherwise would and i think memory poverty's of itself provides a perfect example that seems to be the only example in the record that i can find it's always the same example where c i s is making a determination with regard to a visa while and i was doing the removal remove ability to terminations and they have to drive the file back and forth i mean i haven't seen anything i would be if in the record which gives us more of who is a very slight burden on the immigration court because once the waiver is granted by d h s the only thing that is left for the immigration judge to do is grant voluntary departure so that the ilian can return to their native cannot apply for provisional waivers it will inevitably apply for more complicated forms of relief like asylum in cancellation of removal for which they could wait years to even receive a hearing and then if there was forms of relief or d will inevitably appeal to the board where is this case shows it's now taking more than a year for healings who are not detention to even receive a prison so the point is simply that simply because administrative closure may result in a upon the sentence that you rely upon you know about necessary and appropriate to the disposition of such cases so what kind of talk about the disposition part of that really is this in necessary and appropriate to disposition and i just wonder if that as well supports the attorney general's determination that this is not a provision that provides some general authority to i think a temporary suspension is a really charitable way of describing what happens here to put to put a case in a status where the  it will not be decided and as a matter of fact the department there's the burden of persuading the i j a to change that that the fall i mean how is that a power that is exercise in the service of quote deciding cases i would say if i don't think we can look at those regulations you know back i think we also have to look at the regulatory scheme as a whole and there is any doubt about whether it was i've read those i mean it just seems to say you know i mean you could read those a standalone regulations i mean i guess i'm just i'm trying to i really want to test some of the things i'm thinking about against your greater knowledge  there there might be two responses to your point the st is that this wasn't bad a widespread practice for many years administrative closure was happening when these regs were  promulgated in like two hundred three thousand nine hundred and ninety eight whatever so there was something to point to that doesn't mean it was a lawful practice but it was a practice and secondly i mean why isn't the government right that these provisions are our granting the authority mandating it in some cases permitting it in the case of a t v why not just leave it at that there's no nothing else that have a preexisting general power to do so so those regulations would not be rendered superfluid general matter after tom well ok but you know you get to a very strange result with the provision for people who are victims of you know especially bad trafficking and it says that if somebody is is a victim of especially bad like human trafficking that she can apply for a for this t v and if the i j a thinks that she is likely to is restricting that power in posing a pretty condition upon administrative closure in cases involving these these victims of a terrible crime whereas somebody doesn't show up or a removal hearing for times and the judge has no restriction that would seem to be a pretty strange regime if i mean answer the question sure i think that that is the only regulation that even if i js in the b i e lack that's an interesting question i mean it's when you step back and look at the much larger framework we're dealing with here part of it is the the executive has to follow the rules that the executive itself probably in with respect to the manner in which it's going to exercise its authority to the extent of probably its rules it's got a file now if if the judicial grange in exercising the judicial power in a case or controversy orders the executive albeit you know through a settlement but it's still a court order orders the executive to to take an action like administrative closure that's different it's the court is it the executive can can arguably do that because it's being ordered by a court and that excuses its violation of its own rule if we think of it in a separation of power authority a g d guide isn't it that the word he is consistent with the regulations and or should deny the positions of the now regarding the regulations and the rules governing the procedures and regulations if you look at one thousand three point one two so they see a far the purpose of the rules is to promote the expeditious fair and proper resolution of the matter is pending before the immigration judge expeditious would not involve a situation where a proceeding can be part indefinitely on the court's radar where it's not tracking it anymore and where two thirds of those decisions never make it back in front of the  follow and there are no constitutional requirements for premature cessation of immigration proceedings before they reach a final decision there's no compelling reason to derail immigration proceeding or reaches its conclusions specially in the face of the regulations calling for there regulations correct choir and administrative closure suggest that there may be an avenue for administrative closure in those circumstances yes or time did not specifically consider that but it did say that where the regulations authorize image did closure it's available as an opportunity and while there is not regulation in the one thousand dollars series of immigration regs which is the portion that applies to the executive office for immigration review addressing a provision waivers as far as i know that authorizes administrative closure if the d j s portions of the reg after all require administrative closure i'm not sure exactly how the agency would handle that but that would suggest to me that there should be a way us with the broad terms of any action person for most the actions must be necessary and appropriate but the necessary and appropriate applies to the exercise of it immigration judges authority under the regulations is not necessary or appropriate to take a case off the court's docket allow the court to lose track of the case entirely you know when the regulations actually required to court keep the case moving forward so that is of leaving the case open rather than administrative leave closing it in the government's view why are you trying to block administrative closure and maybe one has to wonder greg comes back he can talk about reason the attorney general is blocking the general exercise of administrative closure is because the way they educators have been applying ministre closure has been derailing cases and so the attorney general is trying to correct that problem and as far as this is the case is concerned it's the application of general rules so if there is no general thirty two dollars ministry really close the case the proper avenue would be through  continuance to obtain the delay now we continued you have to have a good cause shown which is tied to the likelihood really think granted and whether it's going to materially affect the case and we happen to know historically how this case is played out so that doesn't necessarily mean that there was one but existed before and in fact if you had one that existed before you would need a specific provision in the reg authorizing this as it would have all just but the attorney general the attorney general of attorney prior to the current one we entered into those settlement rickman's could have done so in the night towards creating the necessary delegations thorney to achieve the result of the settlement agreement and that's that is that appears to be what actually transpired if i may i'd like to ask about your permanent yankie argument and i just don't see how that works i mean vermont yankee was a case where the agency had not problem gaited regulation  will with respect to the matter issue and i guess the supreme court felt that that was a sufficiently kind of interstitial executing the laws kind of thing that they weren't going to tell the agency what he goes more towards the authority of the attorney general in controlling the administrative process is the attorney general who gets to who interprets the regulations for the road in the immigration judges a it is a real high level of generality i mean the a g controls the admin process and so he can he can misinterpret regulations in the view or some folks and that doesn't matter procedural approach to the situation i don't have any strong opinions about how to structure i j you know powers yes i guess and how does it allow us to i mean how does it prevent us from reviewing the merits of the attorney general's opinion and kastrup whom you can review your honor just to determine whether be true generals interpretation of the regulations is consistent with what the because of the rings don't talk about a mystery pleasure in a circumstance your honor is not available the bullet in the immigration judge only have the powers that are delegated to them and if the regulations don't delegate count administratively close in those circumstances then the burden immigration judges do not have that power to administrative lives so unless it appears in the regulations it doesn't exist for purposes of the board of the immigration judge and it's back to the bigger picture with the regulations administrative closure as a general matter does not exist in the regulations and therefore it does not exist for the board in the immigration judge what do you think i mean so i guess the flip side to judge clay's question you know in your i don't really see how that's true but other than that which is a significant thing but i mean where do you think they went wrong i think really i think you think where they went wrong was similar where the st circuit went wrong delegate that down to the board and immigration judges and basically it comes down to my earlier point about how it regulations don't authorize it or the statute doesn't authorize it in the blurred in the immigration judges don't have it now as far as administrative closure is concerned because of all the thirteen the seven have also been over reading or misreading necessary and appropriate necessary and appropriate is tied to the educators discharging of their duties and powers important as the others do these things you create a process where you can't get to a final resolution you're defeating the purpose  he think of any reason why the standards for granting a continuance namely good cause why that would you know why it why the regs would have kind of allowed a tougher standard there than they would for administrative administrative or closing the case altogether i mean the th circuit said well the reason why there's a continuance provision is because it includes a standard basically that they had to have that general authority for continuances unlike not having one here because they want to just spell out the standard right and so but why would they i mean so if if there is an implied authority for administrative closure under this rag there would seem to be an implied lesser authority for continuance but but yet there's a general provision that says you've got authority for express authority for a continuance in the argument the th circuit case was well you know why would you spell that out if all this is already implied in the th circuit said well is probably there to put the standard there and my question would be or why in the world would you have a tougher standard for continuances namely good cause then you do for this implied administrat closure which is a sort of this more of a loose necessary and appropriate thing i mean are you aware of any reason to be more restrictive of continued continuances than administrative closure immigration judges to continue the case they wouldn't have the authority so it's in there both to create the authority and to set the standard now when the balloon created administrative closure it did so not without imposing any kind of a standard on it it was mainly grew out of the initial response by some to be i mean they never involved this provision when they were purporting to exercises administr you also posed a question about one of the consequences of leaving the case open rather than yeah it's why is it why is it important in your view that your client get administrator what just as a clarification for the record my client no wonder there wouldn't have been an appeal to the board and so you know years would have gone by and we would have got the same case were my client's current it would become current and frankly my client would likely be a permanent resident by now h case that your client might already be a lawful permanent resident if the case of been closed because i mean he had to wait for his eligibility right and now he's not eligible he became eligible in may of this year  or under alternative argument my client over adjustment status and it would really be no reason why the board would not send the case back to recent judge did you keep the application that he requested from the very beginning what reg are provision of the immigration act her events him from applying for this lawful permanent resident visa where he is also subject to order removal because i mean it's like these programs contemplate that the person might be inadmissible otherwise you know that we're going to make an exception because you know unaccompanied child or what have you so remote inadmissibility and