case with the hope that arguments will not be repeated unnecessarily and of course we have i think if in both cases identical or almost identical set of attorneys jurisdiction appeal because the justice against sponsors of terrorism act jasta most recently authorized civil aiding and abetting liability for material support and because we believe it's the best fit for the plaintiff claims i'd like to start with the aiding and abetting claims and focus my argument on three points st the district court conducted no independent analysis whatsoever of whether the correct standard for aiding and abetting liability was satisfied instead rony asli substituted the definitional requirements for an act of international terrorism in a single conclusory paragraph at the end of the opinion but in lynndie this court held that an aiding and abetting plaintiff does not have to prove that the definition requirements for an act of international terrorism have been satisfied and the court did no other analysis  secondly the bank here not only knew that it was providing material support for foreign terrorist organization as it has conceded and as the district court assumed for purposes of the summary judgment motions  it also repeatedly flagged its customer into pal on suspicions of terra financing not just two or three but multiple times in its records it now claims that the suspicions it had never rose to the level of absolute certainty or the standard required for criminal conviction but that's not the standard for aiding and abetting and literal red flags in its records raises a genuine dispute about it by its enumeration that there sufficient evidence to create a dispute whether hamas caused the attacks and whether the risk of the attacks is foreseeable so the issue for aiding and abetting liability that remains then is whether the bank gave substantial assistance to hamas the attacker and lindy this court also addressed that issue and said there are multiple factors that make up substantial assistance and the weight to be given them is best left to a jury  so let me turn to the st point and will more detail linda be held as i stated that the aiding abetting plaintive doesn't have to prove the definition work armaments for an act of international terrorism the standard instead is that drawn from the help of standards as well chase which congress specified is the proper legal standard for the new jazz to aiding and abetting liability and it is that the defendant must be generally aware of its role as part of an hamilton was held liable for aiding and abetting an unplanned murder despite the fact that she had no knowledge that a murder would take place or even a burglary she was only generally aware that she was assisting some kind of personal property crime from bank is assisting terrorist activities from which a risk of terror attacks is foreseeable it would have been enough also if the bank knew that it had actually assisted an act of international terrorism but that's the wrong that caused the injury in just those in however sam it was not necessary that the current better knew that she was assisting a murderer it wasn't necessary though sufficient here that the bank knew international terrorism in fact the court found that there was a genuine dispute whether the bank knew that it was providing material support to a foreign terrorist organization and that it was whether that was foreseeable that a terrorist act would result and then on the record we contend that there is clearly dispute about it was whether it was generally aware of its role in financing hamas from which its terror attacks could be foreseen i don't want to spend much time on it but from one thousand and ninety on the bank filed internal suspicious activity reports it received a report that said the customer was a front for hamas operatives and cells which it immediately filed again its own files a spec to terra financing in november it again  after the united kingdom its own regulator designated that donor to enter paul for supporting terrorists under the cover of giving money to widows and orphans it made another series of dispute whether it was reasonably foreseeable the terror attacks would take place let me turn to causation creating and abetting my filippi there the bank has totally missed the helper spam standard for terrorism international terrorism that injured the plaintiffs and they committed them and caused them both in the proximate and by poor sense of the word so the issue that remains for aiding and abetting liability than is whether the bank gave substantial assistance will not even helpful i'm not sure how they can say that with a straight face when their record shows it page by fifty three to depend ics that an attack cost around five hundred dollars the relationship here was not a  remote or a one time relationship the bank was the banker for enterprise which was designated by the united states as hamas as principle fundraiser and it was its banker for seven years and it didn't terminate the relationship even after the u s designation and of course the underlying wrong the principle tort is a horrific one which helps them says factors into the determination of substantial assistance and finally the assistance was direct because the district court also found here that there's no genuine dispute or i'm sorry there is a genuine dispute that we've shown enough evidence to show a genuine dispute whether the thirteen a mosque control charities were in fact hamas alter egos and interact in strauss the next case on exactly the same evidence the court said that there was evidence from which a jury could find that sending money to any of these thirteen charities was like sending money directly to mosques so in short it again betting liability to which the district court spent no attention really  requires a general awareness of a wrong or at rather of participation in a unlawful activity from which it is foreseeable that the wrong that caused the injury would occur and we think there's substantial evidence from multiple terrifying and suspicions in nat west phone records to establish that point a let me just turn quickly to primary liability there the district court found been repeated several times that there was no evidence that any money transferred had been used in the specific attacks on the plaintiffs or that the charities themselves had committed the backed away from that claim and houses and quotes the court as saying that providing routine financial services for charitable purposes to hamas charities cannot be a pilot or dangerous act in fact they are dangerous and you have a minute left thank you on that client the executive branch reported in holder versus humanitarian law foundation that the answer is in yes and i'd like to quote it because it actually picks up the words of the district court here you checked it rand said it is highly likely that any material supports these organizations will ultimately inert to the benefit of their criminal terrorist functions regardless of whether such support was ostensibly intended to support nonviolence and non terrorist activities congress made the same finding when it said that any contribution to a foreign terrorist organization facilitates terrorist acts and the expert in this case dr matthew levitt same expert that the supreme court quoted in holder said the same thing in this extensive report that's in the record here so we have an empirical finding which the supreme court says courts should give significant deference that contributions to hamas control charities are inherently dangerous regardless of how they are ostensibly purposed and the district courts contrary finding  only creates a dispute that the jury should have been entitled to resolve thank you thank you to educators and the questions no questions here that argument by my friend professor raven hansen and with all respect it would have sounded like the case had never been decided by this court rather what it sounded like is the argument that you made to the panel which i think should shake us was on in the prior case where summary judgment was reversed because the this court found b the material support statute but as the court pointed out in lynndie that's not in the past it's not enough either for prime or a liability where there's a requirement that counsel just skated over for showing that the defendant itself engaged in violent or life in danger ing activities and did so with apparent terrorist intent and it's also not enough for secondary liability under jasta where is this court said lynndie the defendant has to be generally aware of  as part of these terrorist activities are the principle and indeed to quote the court the bank has to be aware that by assisting the principle it is itself assuming a role in terrorist activities and also in addition that the bank knowingly and substantially assist the principle violation well the evidence in this case which is math doesn't support that obviously this is a summary judgment the record is key and the record with all respect is not what counsel argues but what's in the joint depend and what that joint depended show is indeed as counsel repeated again and again is that yes there is a triable issue of suspicion or even if you give the plaintiff and the benefit of the doubt knowledge that nat west thirty nine be violations that's material support to the organization the foreign terrorist organization essence of late and the reason why this court in lindy  ed the judgment below is that there's a difference between the organisation and the activities and the plaintiffs cannot fast filey conflate the two and say well you supported the organization therefore you must in the case of secondary liability be generally aware that you were playing a part in a terrorist activity and that is particularly critical on what the undisputed record shows which is that from day one from the time the enter pal account was opened at nat west nat west believed that interpol was a charity interpol represented itself to be a charity it wasn't did a regulated charity in the united kingdom it was investigated twice by the u k charity commission which is the official regulator of charities and determined to be engaging in charitable activities for every single one of these transfers to any of the thirteen charities alleged to be part of hamas the internal record of not wish without exception that they were designated by interpol for various charitable purposes education health care food it cetera no indication whatsoever that they were being used for any other purpose and very significantly the plaintiff sexpert who we just heard cited a doctoral level it says in his report that these charities in fact engaged in charitable activities these charities  may be affiliated with hamas but they engage in charitable activities he doesn't deny that so that west records show chartable activities the plaintiffs expert concedes charitable activities and the plaintiffs repeatedly have conceded in their expert reports were true sensually their only evidence in this beyond not own records and testimony  that they're unable to show that there was any connection between these transfers to these thirteen charities and any terrorist activity by the charities and the participation by the charities in terrorist activities any training or funding of terrorist activities not any no connection whatever with terrorist activities and that dispute and defeat as a matter of law in the absence of evidence the general awareness aspect of secondary liability it also defeat the substantial assistance aspect that i just want to touch on the facts hamilton in effect keeps the books and records and act as the back office of the nighttime criminal enterprise she knows all about it she goes to the bank and makes a deposit of the proceeds she receives checks back she helps file false tax returns to conceal the income on which she and he the primary wrongdoer live in a lifestyle which the d c circuit colorfully described as something that would be the envy of a barbering brigade those are worlds away from our case we have what this court refers to may be indeed a jury issue about whether there was constituted material support to hamas and that is simply not enough if it were enough lindy would not come out the way it did and the court would not have decided to let requires injury by reason of an act of international terrorism we all know that by reason of our words that have a legal significance it means proximate cause those words are taking directly from simple rico and supreme court has held holmes case and this court repeatedly that that's what those words mean and the same by reason of requirement moreover as a matter of the common law of aiding and abetting which is referred to when the when just that was and acted referring to federal common law under  proximate cause is an element of aiding and abetting liability so you can't just say well somehow just to dispense is that requirement that would be a very strange  tort cause of action since the essence of court law as opposed to criminal law is that the plaintiff has to have suffered an injury caused in some way by the conduct of the  of course does not have a conservation requirement criminal statutes rarely do i'd like to turn briefly to the question of personal jurisdiction these cases went on for an awfully long time and i would submit that there probably would never been brought if di miller had been the law at the time because while there is a passing reference in the complaints to specific jurisdiction they were really based on general jurisdiction which everyone concedes including the plaintiffs doesn't apply here if we look at the question of specific jurisdiction splatt collateral law that there has to be a nexus between the defendant's actions in or directed to the forum and the plaintiff's injury the claim has to arise out of or relate to the inform the court makes it clear that nexus has to have some kind of causal link the nature of the causal link as you pointed out into a person's dietrick depends on the quality of the activities but there has the precise numbers are not necessarily indicative what it is the case is that there is roughly four million dollars of transfers through  roughly three hundred and fifty million dollars and we have four million dollars dollars passing through new york at the behest of interpol there's clearly nexus i want to go back briefly to primary liability by adversary i think more or less conceded that there wasn't a case for it when he jumped in with secondary liability but it certainly is the case that under latency you've got to show as i said earlier that the defendant itself engaged in violent life in danger in activities and did so with apparent terrorist intent apparent terrorist intent meets apparent attempt to coerce or intimidate a fillion population or a government well this is a bank it's not liability whether under the primary liability requirements that i just mentioned or under just is very different and this record simply does not disclose  triable issue on that point congress knows that but it didn't create a special bank exception to the civil liability requirements and to because money is fungible and in the lindy case you were dealing with a bank or a bank and you required more you pointed out that there might be a tribal issue based on proper instructions because they are a bank did more than simply send money or a bank knew that it was in fact sending money to suicide bombers in one case it knew it was suicide bombers that was more than just transmitting money and i think it lets the court really wants to kind of back off from lindy which i don't think it should do someone who is suspected to be involved in terrorist activities the bank became therefore libel for any injury committed by that entity and that's exactly the distinction linda drew between supporting the entity and being involved in a meaningful way the terrorist activities it goes to the causation point to and  this court and lindsay said you know that's not enough banks always send money that's what they do but that's not sufficient to create civil liability  take it it's your view that vote for causation is required to establish pacific jurisdiction is that right i think certainly where there are no other relevant form related activities there has to be but for causation or something akin to it and i think in the  which is actually a bit earlier than the supreme court's current move which as reflected in bristol myers squibb is to take a more hard line on what properly bases specific jurisdiction i think you said that the issue of causation depends on the strength of the defendant's contact but here the only contact are in fact the transfer of funds and i think under those circumstances there has to be something close to but for causation i don't think in writing opinion need to be categorical about it but you could certainly say that we're all that happens is that dollars passed through new york which is by the way the only way that anyone in the world can ever transfer dollars to anyone attention to any case that actually supports the proposition that i have but for causation is required to establish an eighty a or that j s t a cla renominating and it says case i think yes i will but for maybe not proximate cause you certainly an eighty eight cases in the all rashi case which is actually quite similar to this in that the the bank was alleged to have provided funds to charities which in turn supported al qaida and you clearly there held that proximate cause a nation was necessary you also in the rough thing can you just help that proximate cause nation was necessary in case where again the defendants were international banks and but not but for causation well you know but it's tricky i mean as as we know from the case law i mean traditionally but for causation was there as a requirement of tort law but not enough you also matter show proximate   the pleading case so you're taking the allegations as being true but there the allegation is that the bank itself without knowing supporter of an intentional supporter in fact had a proclaimed official bank policy supporting the mosques and supporting the destruction of israel by and the heart of that pork was to utilize the u s banking system to support hamas it's very different than routine wire transfers done in the ordinary course of banking activity  that's true even if there is suspicion that the transfer reading might be connected to terrorist it's not as it was in the case of of leave the heart of the case i mean here after all the majority of transfers were sterling transfers from london and the only reason the us ever got involved is that the customer said in this particular case we want dollars to go to our don't meet in the occupied territories dollars necessarily means new york and we would say that that is not enough the use of the correspondent has to be to go back to what i said before linked in some causal way other than a sort of tautological one with the cause of action and  it just say well dollars were transferred and any dollar could in cleary be used to commit terrorist acts because that collapses personal jurisdiction causation and liability all into we transfer summary judgment in your favor another is what extent are there issues of fact here and why are not why aren't those issues material so that obvious result ought to be a rema and discovery in the normal course i think judge promised so i said before that there really aren't the plaintiffs have shown is what they showed the last time we were here which is a triable issue one material support but they have not shown a triable issue on any of the other required elements underlain to be the primary liability or secondary liability and they have not identifi elements in the record i mean it's a we've had years of discovery so it's not like one of the earlier cases you had the same afternoon where we're dealing with simply pleading we've had years of discovery i think the fourteen volumes of record here and i i groan sympathetically for court and your clerks and haven't go through those but there if you do you will see that there is a tract no evidence to suggest other than the bank thought it was dealing with a charity was told by and its internal records record the fact that every transfer w is not quite clear which it is although obviously legally that would make a huge difference if you had to get that but you don't because there's no evidence that he admits that any of these  payments were made used for other than charitable purposes or indeed that these charities had anything to do with the attacks on these plaintiffs other than this statement well they're connected in some way with us and our position is when you're dealing with an international bank where there's clearly no evidence of terrorist intent  mr a raise in the hands of his rebuttal time but st let me ask whether either of my colleagues has any further questions for you just curious no further questions here thank it's worth noting that in holder the supreme court said that the empirical question was whether armed terrorist organizations meaningfully segregate support of other gym it activities from support of terrorism and the answer that both the executive branch  congress gave was no and the court deferred to it no one knows better than the banks that money is fungible in that way and so relying on hamas is bookkeeping and chinese walls to keep general awareness standards for eating abetting liability it held that he was not enough as a matter of law and it then corrected the instructional error that the lower court had made on that regard but on the other hand we don't claim that a joined the peaceful political process think northern ireland then if for the bank sends a material support to it it violates two thousand three hundred and thirty nine dollars b but the bank could argue that it's not aware that it's supporting terrorist activities  that's not this case the bank sent four hundred and ninety six transfers to these thirteen hamas charities at a time when violence was escalating in the bank knew it and hamas publicly committed fifty two suicide explained that it was one of the web of charities and i'm quoting that moved money in ways that hide the money trail and then the money is often diverted or syphon to support terrorism it simply is not plausible  jurisdiction mr blackman said that some wire transfers went to new york actually the sum is one hundred and ninety six transfers through a new york branch not through some rd party correspondent account he also cited chu for rashid this court noted that one of the missing allegations with any money went to either is bola the foreign terrorist organization i think in rusting or al qaida the organization in all raji here of course the four hundred and seventy five  natwest has cherry picked one part but i think read in its entirety a jury would certainly find that the customer of nat west was supporting terrorism i'd also suggest looking at the suspicious activities force of will be called internal suspicious activities reports that net west filed in two thousand and one twice that mention suspected terrorism or terra financing as the reasons for the report and also in two thousand and two with respect to one of interpol's primary donors deol locks of foundation which described as an umbrella for funding terrorism in the middle east i think those multiple suspicions alone raise a dispute and raise an inference that nat west knew full well that its client i mean its customer was supporting terrorism  and they also indicate i think a dispute about whether it was aware that in processing these wire transfers it was supporting hamas in its basically non  activities ok thanks very much we're going to reserve decision