veterans court and now this court is how many months of post nine hundred and eleven g i benefits can he now receive from the v a luckily congress invision exactly the situation and provided an answer precisely to this question and that answer was provided in sections three thousand three hundred and twenty seven which was entitled a limitation on entitlement for certain individuals namely those individuals who had use shall be the number of months of on use entitlement under the montgomery g i bill and that is what the v a originally granted and there's no dispute about what the number of those mon period of service but fundamentally for the purposes of this case that's sort of not in dispute because we agree that mr ruda so had multiple periods of service where we disagree is that section three th mention of periods of service draws any distinction based on the number of periods of service or excludes veterans with multiple periods of service from it from its reach and that's just back up for period of service say twenty to seventy two months and with a veteran who has two separate thirty months six month period that's a that's a way of looking at it right yes i would agree with that issue was found applies specifically to the group of veterans who had used some but not all of their montgomery benefits but irrespective of whether they sort of started using montgomery benefit veteran has won thirty six month period of service and is trying to get benefits under both programs and congress says you can't do that dispute here is there that no matter how many periods a service you have no matter how lancy each of those periods to a maximum of forty eight months of months he could not exceed the forty eight months and i gather you're not asking to can see to exceed the total of forty eight months is that not what this case s limit it is separate from the entitlement because that applies not only to active duty service that applies to all g i bill education benefit no matter what sort of where they come from and including other programs that are that are not based on that sort of is an additional limit in addition to the forty eight months and so given the posture that he was that he has never reaches the forty eight month question because his entitlement is directly and more specifically addressed by thirty three explicit to whom does that limitation apply why does applied to to the veteran in this case your honor that it applies to a veteran who wants to convert  view is that the provisions applies to any veteran who wants to convert an existing title meant regardless of any period of service they have and use one of those periods to convert from m c i be for example into post nine  but it's a permissive mechanism it is actually and it was designed as an expansion of g i bill and title because veterans who had already credited their qualifying service to other benefits would have been unable to participate in the post nine hundred and eleven program because they if you're entitled to both that the number of months you get under the nine hundred and eleven thing is the same number of months thirty six months that you would get originally unless you be exhausted your montgomery benefits in which case you get more more money what's wrong with that is right on the face of well your honor the conversion ratio and the limitation there on months of benefits under the post nine hundred and eleven dollars program make sense when you visualize this as a conversion of existing intitled an existing entitlement which is established based on a specific period of qualifying service that the veteran has already locked into entitlement to say the montgomery program if they've started using that entitlement and have less than thirty six months of benefits available remaining to them under the montgomery program they are converting that into post ninety one thousand one hundred and eleven entitlement their redeeming what they have left for that period of service and is entitled to basic educational benefits under montgomery and has used but retained and used in title he's covered by that he's described there right yes your honor he does meet that definition that  he missed original chose a different path when he applied for benefits he identified service had never been used for establishing as montgomery entitlement he was seeking to meet the criteria of thirty eight u s c three thousand three hundred and eleven which defines  qualifying services and they answer a question that came out in opening argument it defines what period of service are provided for what what the qualifying service is that establishes entitlement to post nine hundred and eleven benefits and he was trying to credit that service under three th one a of that section that's your client isn't it he yes your honor i mean he is described by that but he is not choosing is not making an election he even though he had retained  him thirty six months of benefits if he's able to establish a has qualifying service not use for other benefits programs that's what he's trying to do and the v a has forced him into the three thousand three hundred and twenty seven trap by setting up it to say i want now post nine hundred and eleven benefits instead of instead of the the preexisting entitlement to montgomery benefits under that view this creates this allows all veterans who have qualifying service to have the freedom of choice into how they are going to use their benefits if they meet the qualifying service criteria of only they only have enough service if you need qualified service to only obtain benefits under one program they have to pick and choose and if they are going to for both programs consistent with historical practice and all other indications in the statutory regulatory scheme they are allowed to to establish those entitlements and use them separately up to the forty eight month aggregate  entitlement is based on very specific dates very specific qualifying service that the veteran had to identify and has locked into an existing program they want to convert that in time into something else ultimately there's there's no indication in the statute or in the legislative history or elsewhere that congress intended anything like what the secretary is providing for here the secretary's own regulations don't provide for that they they provide for a scheme exactly like what we argue for and what the veterans court held it's simply the form that contains in the state and requires veterans to abandon established entitlements to obtain post nine hundred and eleven a title meant that dictates this and anybody unless they elect to be under the sections that are slightly different way toward it our view is that it applies to everyone if they if they only if they want to that's correct but if that person sailing has thirty six months of service there is not a scenario in which they could get post nine hundred and eleven dollars benefits if they've already credited that service to montgomery benefits so they would have to if they want to take advantage of post nine hundred and eleven dollars g i bill they have t our client is not in that situation of the veterans what identifies there's no need for him to make that choice it would be against his interest to make that choice because he can separately credit his remaining qualifying service to the post nine  authority to make all decisions on appeals others have specific authority to take protective notices of appeals in a numerated cases this is not one of those cases however the solicitor general has explained the general rule in the flynn case which we cited in  our twenty's a letter there the solicitor general stated and i quote energies in the federal government generally must obtain authorisation from the solicitor general before filing appeals here in the pre and the motions practice before this court the secretary conceded that he did not have the solicitor general's authorization and that didn't come until seventy nine dollars days after the running of the statutory limitations period in response and its reply brief the secretary has always cited d o j directive one  directive applies only to what are explained or described as direct reference or delegate to cases those are cases where the us attorney should we once you look at that and say that's just an authority to do so in the st place that authority must be provided within the statutory limitations period otherwise the solicitor general for example could extend your sectional time limit of days weeks or months later exactly has happened here or general an attorney general have lot of time five please answer the question your honor the difference here is that hog did involve a a policy a directive a direction or what have you from from an official with a forty two dollars files in those appeal so there were was no issue there was an exception to the solicitor general's exclusive authority which implied here there is no such exception the only source of authority the government decided is the directive which doesn't which applies to cases handled by u s attorneys at the trial level or the lower court level not cases where the secretary has represented himself and the and the federal government hasn't decided yet whether it wants to press that appeal that appeal those arguments on appeal