we'll hear argument next in case fourteen ten fifty five lightfoot versus cendant mortgage corporation just rosencrantz thank you mr chief justice and may please the court there is only one natural way to read the language at his shoe here a court of competent jurisdiction is a quart that has an independent source of subject matter jurisdiction that is what this court has held five times those words mean so let's start with the plain language the statute grants fraidy quote the power in its corporate name to sue and be sued in any court of competent jurisdiction state or federal the only reference to jurisdiction in that passage is to say that you don't get to go to any federal court or any state court but rather you have to cho state or federal that must be a court of competent jurisdiction in the only way to find out whether a court is a court of competent jurisdiction is to examine the statutes creating that court in granting a hasten to add this court does not have subject matter jurisdiction over an original action it has appellate you know that it has searchers stiction but no a court of competent jurisdiction at a minimum has subject matter jurisdiction but i think it also has personal jurisdiction and the the cases that my friends rely upon it fanny that talk about personal jurisdiction are cases in which there was already subject matter jurisdiction in this court held hold on wait a minute it's not enough just to have subject matter jurisdiction which everyone agreed there was in those cases it needs to be personal jurisdiction now five times this court has interpreted the words competent jurisdiction to mean quote outside as outside sources of jurisdictional authority that's from phoenix or from show me this court held that any reference to competent jurisdiction excuse me that a reference to competent jurisdiction means and i quote it unquestionably meant that the competency of the court should be determined by rules there are two for prescribe in respect to the jurisdiction of the federal courts and fanny's interpretation simply does not map on to the statutory language that congress wrote look at the sentence fanny's interpretation would require the court to read the phrase competent jurisdiction to mean different things depending upon which word modifies it so fail the family concedes that the clause referring to any court of competent jurisdiction state cannot be read as a grant of jurisdiction to every state court a state court can't take jurisdiction unless you point to a statutory authority for the state what it will do you do understood justice ginsburg and i think the way to look at red cross is to look at what red cross referred to as the rule that just a souter was describing the rule is and i quote a congressional charters sue in be sued provision may be read to confer federal jurisdiction if but only if it specifically mentions the federal courts so you need a mention of federal courts in order to even have a conversation about whether the may is in play but a fat reference to federal courts is not sufficient and so the another way to think about it is sure if a clause says sue or be sued in any court state or weaker for you than here well you're not on without the other way and the red cross is weaker for you than here and it comes out the other way well you know what i see going for you is one page of legislative history which says explicitly your right now you and in the end in you don't you want to deny that legislative history to help who doesn't know no i accept the legislative history right but we have a lot more going for us than that this court's interpretation of the phrase of competent jurisdiction over and over again three times before this provision that those words were added to this provision this court interpreted that phrase twice in the statutory construction setting and said it must  an outside source of authority in arc are that's true but these cases that you're talking about are not directly in point denge delhomme is the leading case on this issue and he used the word competent jurisdiction and john marshall you know who is not say just as x did say that the language is absolutely clear this means because it refers probably to specific courts and isn't just a general to write a provision that parses the legislative language the way fannie does you would write the osborne provision that says sewin be soo in all state courts having competent jurisdiction great and  tome it says any court of law or equity state or federal this court did not analyze that provision in bench tome and so there's nothing we can figure out what this court was saying in den because it was a drive by jurisdictional reference in a situation in which there was clear federal jurisdiction because there was an arising under clause and then when you  district court of competent jurisdiction how do you deal with the fact that the generally is viewed as limited in jurisdictions of federal courts where your honor the the want your honor i disagree it means personal and subject matter tourist stiction it means show me where the court has subject matter jurisdiction easy there's a federal question under thirteen thirty one show me where there's personal jurisdiction ok that's where it gets a little bit harder to make sure that the person is within the confines of the court but i have played but i would also say just in just mapping again this language or the way family reads it on to this statute fanny admits that this grant of that this clause that says court of competent competent jurisdiction of state or federal does not mean a grant of jurisdiction to every federal court either the federal court of clay is used to the court of federal claims does not have competent jurisdiction except if those jurisdictional requirements are otherwise  satisfied and fanny is never explained how you can tag take the same language and map it out differently to reach different results depending upon which word it modifies and even different results when it modifies the same word and the statutory evolution also confirms this it it unfolded in three critical steps step one was the original an act made it was before dench and congress chose a language that per justice briar's question it was assured would not branch restriction step two was nine hundred fifty four so now dench has been decided and what did congress to do it did the opposite of what happened in red cross in red cross remember there was a provision that didn't match dench in congress takes a left turn and says we're going to match dinge here congress began with a provision that matched what was later as d in dench and took a right turn and added the words competent jurisdiction which this court had previously for example in phoenix defy mine to mean quote depends on other provisions of  diversity jurisdiction because there was no source of federal jurisdiction after fanny went private and then was no longer an agency if there was a source of jurisdiction in this sewer be sued clause there would be no purpose for diversity jurisdiction so congress changed beanies charter to say that it is a district of columbia corporation quote for purposes of jurisdiction and venue well that really should keep it in d c as opposed to somewhere else no your honor for purposes of venue doesn't mean all suits are in d c it means that d c is a permissible venue but look to the venue provisions to figure out where the suit is appropriately brought this was a grant of diversity jurisdiction every court that is ever evaluated this language has concluded it's a grant of diversity jurisdiction fani walks into federal court consistently with the only bases being diversity jurisdiction so a dozen times since this case was first briefed and just last friday fania still arguing to federal courts that this is a grant of diversity jurisdiction you don't need diversity jurisdiction if there is a sewer be sued clause that grants federal jurisdiction well with jeannie so jenny may has a federal jurisdiction and congress did not at the same time in one nine hundred seventy four know it's it's the same charter i mean that the suing be sued clause is actually in the same language not not not same language in separate provisions genie and fanny are treated together one's private one's public gini has federal jurisdiction because it is a federal agency congress in  seventy four does not add to diversity provision to genie's charter only to fanny's charter and i do you go ahead no no please god this is really what's bothering me here and i don't know if you can help or not after reading through the cases pretty quickly i would think you're right if i were doing this afresh and particular when you have that page of legislative history but when i finish reading the pace cases going back to marshall and eighteen sixteen i say oh you know there's something of a rule here it may not make too much sense but it's even there and then dolman and because it's  actually i do think it is more even stronger for the other side in the next one and and then i get the red cross and the only thing i can do there is they had some old sort of seem to support the result which is certainly weaker than your page of legislative history here but i see you know its jurisdiction we shouldn't get things too mixed up there hard enough and the seems to say if you say state and federal you see where i'm going this year i don't know whether to look into it deeply in this particular case where you're going to end up with a result that seems to be different than the other cases or to say well forget it it was all decided keep to the precedent forget the page of legislative history it'll be better for the lawyers and it'll be better for the judges it'll be simpler for yesterday that's a dilemma that i mean anything anybody wants to say to help me is welcome sure you want to let me let me answer quickly because i know that my white light is on and so look this is perfectly simple you need at the word federal in order to even have a conversation about federal jurisdiction of all you've got is any court state or federal  that will be enough but if congress after reading that opinion that you find so powerful justice prior says court of competent jurisdiction there is no case out there that is that has held that words those precise words court of competent jurisdiction means anything other than what this court has held it means and in one thousand nine hundred fifty four by the way congress was deeply concerned about one thing which is fannie was going private it was now going to be in the mortgage market i did a search there are sixty thousand cases that fannie is involved in sixty thousand cases of which seventy percent are in state court if all of a sudden this court says that there's federal jurisdiction all of those foreclosure cases are moving tomorrow to federal court thank you your arms thank you counsel mr connell mr chief justice and may it please the court the government's view is that the rule of red cross should not be extended to a statute that authorizes a federally chartered corporation to sue or be sued in a court of competent jurisdiction the best reading of that phrase in fannie mae's charter is that it authorizes the corporation to sue and be sued in a federal or state court that is vested with jurisdiction through some other provision of law we think there's a plausible story for why congress in one nine hundred fifty four wanted to eliminate the soon be sued clause as a basis for federal jurisdiction but even if you don't find that explanation completely satisfying the text of the statute should control the point of the red cross role was to tell congress if you use this specific language this sentence he may sue or be sued in any court of law or equity state or federal this court will take that to mean that congress is creating subject matter jurisdiction in the federal courts in this case the court should give congress the further guidance that if it uses the the language is authorized in a state or federal court of competent jurisdiction then that means that you have to look to some other provision of law to see if that court is vested with jurisdiction i've done my clear to a study in there or the she's been able to identify my eight other statutes that use  the competent jurisdiction which are in a are you aware of the number of other statutes that are identical to this and b are you troubled by the fact that some of the statutes may not be a private corporation fooling the way for many years i am aware of those statutes i have on my list seven that have just the soon to be sued cause and no other provision that says you know for purposes of any suit involving this and we're off by one but right only which is so no i'm i am not troubled by this in fact i think this is a reason two of the of the entities are federal agencies the department of housing and urban development and the department of veteran internal the federal agencies have the power to bring a suit in federal court they also have the power to remove a case from federal court but if the court interprets fanny's charter to mean that any case involving fannie can be brought in a federal court or can be removed to a federal court then all of those cases involving hud where hud is a party or where the v a is a party those cases can now be brought in federal court against the agency and they can also be removed to federal court when the agency is a party i'll give you an example that hud has given to me of a time often likes to litigate these cases in state court these are mortgage foreclosure cases they are quintessential state court questions there could be a case and this happens frequently where a lender will sue a borrower in state court hud may also be named as a defendant if hud has an interest in the mortgage hud may want to leave that case in the state court where the state courts address questions about mortgage foreclosure all the time they're all state law causes of action just as in this case if the court were to say that the the language which is also in hud's charter that it can sue or be sued in any state or federal court of competent jurisdiction means that there is federal subject matter over that suit then the private party can now remove the case to a federal court creating delay in the resolution of the case which is to the advantage of the borrower in a mortgage foreclosure suit it interprets its own soon be sued clause to just be a waiver of sovereign immunity and not to to authorize federal subject matter jurisdiction over any case involving hud so those other five statutes  interpreted the v a s soon be sued clause to only wave sovereign immunity and not to create federal subject matter jurisdiction i think there's a split in the district courts after red cross about the federal home loan banks soon be sued  e i don't we are definitely advocating for the approach that in all of those as in fannie mae's charter that federal subject matter jurisdiction is not created by the soon be sued cost in the one that use the  competent jurisdiction having competent jurisdiction as long as booker right but if you do both in i was born i think mr rosenkranz explained the language and born says all state courts having competent jurisdiction and any circuit court of the united states so i think in that case what the court said was congress clearly wanted to confer jurisdiction on all circuit courts of the united states it didn't use the language court of competent jurisdiction when it referred to the federal mean something different one of the main rationales of the court of appeals in this case was that the the work that court of competent jurisdiction is doing is that it's telling you that you can't file suit in a specialized court like a state traffic court or a federal bankruptcy court well the reason why the phrase court of competent jurisdiction would tell you to do that is because you've got to look at the statute authorizing those other specialized courts to see if the suit that's being brought can be brought in that pass cases in that split jurisdiction with district court school the way what happens to those judgments with it wasn't federal subject matter jurisdiction i would think that if they if we read things the way you street i would think if those cases are already finished that rescued or caught i would you know there those cases would still stand on their own but i think going forward if the court were to say there's no subject matter jurisdiction those cases could no longer be  the words court of competent jurisdiction in the statute tell you to look at the statutes authorizing that court to see if you could bring a claim there and we're just asking for the same role in the federal district  court we wanted to be in state court have you found i mean it's just something like in any court of law an equity state or federal and you want to be in federal court well those those can be in federal court per the court's decisions and bench two men in red cross if that's the way what we have to say is once you added these words in any competent jurisdiction where they did those words took the case out of federal court lists all the basis for getting there and require you to go to state court and  cut it's i mean as a matter of the english language the chelsea is a little tough no i think as a matter of an english language that's our strongest point is the natural reading of that phrase a court of competent jurisdiction means that you have to look somewhere else to determine if the core is a competent jurisdiction is a court of competent jurisdiction the court has observed that about various statutes and we're just asking for the same rule to be applied to the federal district courts the respondents refer to the federal district courts as courts of general jurisdiction but just like a federal bankruptcy court the federal district courts are courts of limited jurisdiction you cannot typically bring a pure state law claim in a federal district court unless there is complete diversity of citizenship and the requisite amount in controversy so that language court of competent jurisdiction should just tell you look at the statutes authorizing the federal court and check whether this suit is authorized to be brought there there's a few other textural points that i think reinforce the point we're trying to make one is that section thirteen forty nine should be an important point of reference congress established a general rule that having a government charter is not enough to confer federal job subject matter jurisdiction unless the united states owns fifty percent of the corporation stock and when you have a privately owned corporation like fannie mae you should be looking for a pretty clear indication from congress that they wanted to confer subject matter jurisdiction thank you counsel thank you mr chief justice and may it please the court the red cross decision reaffirmed a strong and longstanding rule going back through dench to all the way to osborne which sets a baseline for congress to follow when it chooses to pursue federal policy through the corporate form now when congress expressly provides that a federally chartered corporation like fannie mae may soon be sued in federal court that confers jurisdiction under dench do red cross osborn and their progeny congress can obviously displace that rule if it wants to there are a lot of ways congress can do that one way would be to eliminate the word federal as congress did in one thousand nine hundred fifty four in the very same statute that  to be understood in light of the whole phrase and petitioners case as you just heard it presented is all about the idea that the only phrases competent jurisdiction that is not the whole phrase the whole phrase is competent jurisdiction state or federal that entire phrase had been interpreted three times in three different appellate decisions in the one nine hundred forty s for a sister housing agency in the same statute and that is the language that congress adopted for fannie mae in one hundred fifty four each of those appell decisions at that time every one of them held that the full phrase court of competent jurisdiction state or federal conferred jurisdiction i'm talking about the ferguson case the george h evans case in the seven oaks case congress in one thousand nine hundred fifty four would have had no idea that the language it was borrowing from another agency in the same statute that had been repeatedly interpreted would restrict fannie mae's access to federal court and that history shows how this thing why did they do the same fizzling the federal savings and loan insurance corporation they change their language in the fifty four statute to remove the word federal we think the reason for that was that fizzling as understood at that time was truly a federal agency fannie mae by contrast as council s was transitioning into a new structure right there would eventually be private ownership and the idea here if anything shows we think the opposite of what the petitioners mean here they wanted to adopt the f h a way which the language that had been interpreted in the forty's and again at the time of the fifty four act there had been no case which had held that language didn't confer jurisdiction now counsel mentions five cases of this court that have interpreted the phrase competent jurisdiction what this court needs to understand about those cases is the number of those five cases that interpreted competent jurisdiction together with the phrase state or federal is zero no case not shoni not phoenix not california versus sanders looked at the two phrases together and when counsel argues that the phrase competent jurisdiction needs a separate source of jurisdiction they're right the separate source of jurisdiction is the and they don't mean well actually iran or in the context of the late new deal in the words competent jurisdiction meant a lot they just don't mean what the petitioner say and they mean right so the three things we think competent jurisdiction was doing in the contemporary history of the new deal of the forty's and early fifty's was was these three things so the first thing was there was a very vigorous debate in the appeals courts about the nature of these new new deal entities in terms of whether they were limited by the and could only be heard in the court of claims or whether they could be heard generally in the district courts this was the precise question presented in ferguson a case i might add that the solicitor general has previously interpreted in briefing to this court as conferring jurisdiction under these exact same words that was the yesterday's briefing in the portsmouth case ok but what competent jurisdiction in this context was held to mean at that time was a direction that general jurisdiction courts and not only specialized section courts could hear the case the way the fourth circuit put in ferguson at the time was that it would be puzzling if this exact phrase later borrowed for fannie mae could be heard in any state court but in federal court only in the court of claims and that issue was resolved the second  say the entire phrase court of competent jurisdiction state or federal have been unanimously held to confer subject matter jurisdiction are those the cases we talked about in there were no cases to the contrary at the time and the understanding of what competent jurisdiction was adding was twofold first of all from congress's perspective at the time i think it's fair to say they weren't thinking about much because the one nine hundred fifty four act was eight hundred fifty page comprehensive reform of federal housing policy having very little to do with jurisdiction and we think what happened is they simply borrowed a phrase that had been unanimously held to confer jurisdiction and they put it in for fannie mae there was no other reason to think they meant anything different from that but we also know that less than two years before the one nine hundred fifty four charter for fannie mae was adopted this court looked at the phrase competent jurisdiction on a standalone basis and said that all it referred to at that time in that context was personal jurisdiction that doesn't mean that's what competent jurisdiction means always but what we think it means is when coupled with the words state or federal it means personal jurisdiction courts of general jurisdiction now just a sort of my earlier asked the question about how many statutes had sue and be sued clauses like ours we have the same count your honor that your clerk has we have nine total including fannie mae we now have three versions so i'm going to go with nine but here's what else we know the number of statutes that have the phrase competent jurisdiction alone based on some lexis research very early this morning is seven hundred eighty one so if the phrase competent jurisdiction together with state or federal exists only nine times but competent jurisdiction as a generic matter occurs seven hundred eighty one times that's the rule that we urge on this court today the rule is when combined with the grant of jurisdiction embodied in the word federal under red cross you have personal jurisdiction and general jurisdiction holdings of other cases sixty thousand cases that are going to be added to the federal docket you've given an answer to that but i've many answers to that your honor but the easiest answer is this the easiest answer is no one don't tell us we're not working hard  and i do recall justice kennedy that once upon a time the court took one hundred fifty cases here maybe foreclosures could be among them they were easier perhaps i should sit down you're you're out of the easiest answer to that is that it's undisputed in issue about freddie mac is several fold so the first thing we know is when freddie was created in one nine hundred seventy the legislative history in both the house report and the senate report make crystal clear that congress is intention was to create an entity that had identical powers that would develop in parallel and that would have no advantage over fannie mae we know that was their intention in drafting in other words were unquestionably different just as the words in the red cross charter were different from the words in the second bank of the united states charter and yet the outcome was the same the reason the words were different at the time was because congress had the luxury in one nine hundred seventy of writing and a blank slate so congress sat down without sixty years of history without the need to extricate a legacy agency from ginnie mae with a privatization scheme over six different amendments and to simply sit down and say this is what we think the g s t should look like i just want you to talk at some point i mean there is a page of legislative history which could not be more clear it says exactly what the government said it says they're asked to do this aren't we giving these corporations the right to go into a federal court although the matter may be purely a state matter that's not what we intended and then then he said you know they have to look to see whether it's really a state case or whether it's really a federal case i mean and the words competent jurisdiction do is do that that is their natural meaning i hadn't quite taken that in but but but it is it is their natural meaning that what's the point of having these here if this statute without them would grant jurisdiction to go into federal court if you want well just as prior i'm going to be doing that what do i do maybe you could just say you should look at legislative history i'm not prepared to say that what what what what should i do justice prior to two points so first of all on the on the natural reading i would just urge that the natural reading of competent jurisdiction standing alone is different from the natural reading comp in the jurisdiction state or federal and there is no case i emphasize that holds those words together don't  but as it turns out the nine hundred thirty four statute that counsel cites in the briefing was not the statute that created fannie mae and so it's not that much more probative than if it had been the legislative history of an utterly unrelated statute ok in one thousand nine hundred four in the housing act congress authorized the creation of entirely different private mortgage associations which never came into being the so the hope in the middle depression in one thousand thirty four is that private capital would come into the market pursuant to that statute in place as if you read the rest of legislative history  places like houston texas and chicago and new york and would start creating liquidity to solve the problem they didn't happen so in one thousand thirty eight a new statute was passed that was the same year i might add that senator bulkley the senator whose legislative history is quoted lost his reelection campaign  for this reason we we can only assume or perhaps hope but in any case one hundred thirty eight was a different statute the congressional charter for fannie mae the wasn't even created in  so somebody has to prevail either the supreme court unanimously indenture doom or the failed senator boxer we think the answer is most likely discordant bench doom followed in red cross the federal courts may be stepping back a bit of limited jurisdiction and to get into them you have to carry i think a significant burden to establish your right to be there now you know i think you have to do more than when fifty one forty nine given a presumption against federal jurisdiction do you think that i suspect you think you do win by more than fifty one forty nine but there seems to me that is a consideration that we need to take into account so you're a chief mr chief justice there is no question that the courts are limited jurisdiction courts and that we should look at subject matter jurisdiction with a careful eye having said that this fundamentally is a case about statutory construction it's about what did congress mean to do with nine hundred fifty four that's really all it's in the united states versus morton in one thousand nine hundred four this court held that it sometimes refers to subject matter jurisdiction and sometimes refers to personal jurisdiction citing cases in the earlier case law of black marvel vs gare which was the case decided just two years before our statute was decided it said that in that context the phrase only referred to personal jurisdiction so i think the only way to harmonize all of these cases is to say that we're current competent jurisdiction is included in a phrase that has the red cross language slash osborne slash dench doom it means all of the other things that competent jurisdiction normally means personal jurisdiction courts of general jurisdiction etc and that's what the case law holds but the what is critical to understand is when congress borrowed this language that had preexisted for the federal housing administration for twenty years and grafted it on to fannie mae in its verbatim entirety every case that had interpreted that language had held it was sufficient to confer subject matter jurisdiction so strongly that in the seven oaks case in one nine hundred forty eight in the fourth circuit just six years before our statute the fourth circuit said that those words were no more restrictive than the phrase in any united states district court that's the tapestry on which congress was weaving at the time now let me address if i might just briefly the policy should we've talked about the text in the history but council spent a few moments talking about this privatization concept and how it would be that what what must have happened in the fifty's was congress is going to treat fannie mae like any other private company and deprive it of special access to the federal courts the presumption behind that argument is that naturally congress would never want a privately owned company to have special access except we know from the second bank of the united states you know has borne that there are times when a privately owned company is sufficiently important it can have special access the second bank was eighty percent owned by private shareholders fast forward two centuries to one thousand nine hundred seventy we know that freddie mac was created entirely privately owned at its inception with clear and undisputed access to the federal courts it middle with different language of course because it was writing in a different era and writing on a different slate with without all the baggage that fannie mae had gone through but there's no question that privately owned instrumentalities when pursuing a sufficiently important federal purpose like housing can qualify under these circumstances but the other problem with their theory if it fails as a theoretical matter is that it also fails in its mechanism the truth is this congress did not privatized fannie mae in one thousand nine hundred four on the contrary even when fannie mae be came privately owned under the one nine hundred fifty four act it remained a federal government agency and it still had special access to the federal courts under thirteen forty five so if there had been a conscious legislative judgment to take fanny out of the exact issue however i might point out was raised specifically in red cross it was a point of discussion in the red cross oral argument before this court that red cross had repeatedly removed on diversity grounds and that issue was pointed out in the opinion as not being particularly relevant lots of companies didn't have some negative implication for other sources and indeed the freddie mac charter is very powerful evidence that that shouldn't matter freddie mac talk about belt and suspenders has a charter which says soon be sued in state or federal court it also says freddie freddie doesn't say common jurisdiction but what else pretty says is freddie says that freddie should be deemed an agency for thirteen forty five purposes it separately says freddie shall have special statutory authorization to remove notwithstanding the charter but the original charter language was written in the thirty's and forty's it was written at a time when we were connected with multiple other agencies we were part of the department of housing and urban development we comprised what became ginnie mae and our language was an attempt to do essentially removal surgery to separate us from this big creation of language over decades freddie mac didn't have that problem so freddie macas what one would do if you were starting from scratch i will say i am reminded of justice kagan's colloquy in the last argument though about what would happen to a hill staffer looking at the one nine hundred fifty four statute and i'm trying to imagine what would happen to the poor hill staffer if he came in he said well listen we like to change fannie mae's language we want to add this competent jurisdiction language now that's only ever been looked at three times before and all of those cases said that confers jurisdiction but we think that was just dicta or perhaps wrong and so we would go ahead and use it as a way of removing jurisdiction that doesn't sound plausible anymore in this case than it did in the prior case to me given what the case law backdrop was of the time now if i might i'd like to say one point about the freddie mac issue because obviously you know we are sister companies obviously freddie macas different language the question is is this a good thing for our side is that a bad thing for our side our view basically is congress said what it meant in the one nine hundred seventy reports house and senate it said the companies were supposed to be parallel they were supposed to have no advantages over each other and have all the same powers the question for this court is why would congress although it used the different language across multiple powers why would it have wanted freddie mac to have the same mortgage acquisition powers the same securitization powers the same tax exemptions and s exemptions the same access to treasury lines of credit but have different federal court litigating powers there's no answer to that and all we know is that in terms of the federal interest in access to the federal courts what we know is that fannie is the freddie mac only much much bigger so it doesn't make a lot of sense to imagine that a three trillion dollar company the largest company in the united states by assets creating housing across the country just like freddie mac would  intended not to be protected by federal court did you by your way look it up i mean it is there are you did you try to find out where this language really came from i mean somebody wrote it or they didn't just have computers write it i mean there's a human being here's what we know we know the language preexisted we know wasn't created in one thousand those words confident that you know in any court of competent jurisdiction state or federal standard ever but you know i got that point i got i just want to know  language had been repeatedly held to mean one thing and congress had no indication it could have meant anything else we know from ferguson from george h evans and from the seven oaks case at a minimum ok that that phrase company jurisdiction state federal here's what else we know we know that in briefing before this court in the eighty's looking at this exact language at section seventeen zero two of the national housing act the solicitor general filed a brief in opposition to search this court in the portsmouth redevelopment case and in that brief citing ferguson the solicitor general's office said that phrase creates jurisdiction in the district courts ok that's what we know that has always been the understanding and if we didn't have that history and we didn't have that case law we might write it differently on a blank slate but writing two hundred years after osborne and in the wake of all of that new deal era case law we know what it means the disruption that would be created in the markets this court suddenly reverse the lower courts and there are multiple of them all coming to the same result at least three in the courts of appeals and hold the freddie mac has different powers than fannie mae has now there was a reason to get your friend on the other side suggest there was a reason for treating them differently which is that the board the pretty board is consists of federal officers while the idea of course is that families who are two thirds of it does not right but the family board unlike the freddie board was one third appointed by the president of the united states until conservatorship in two thousand and eight and at the same time had the same special treasury access the same tax exemptions the same as the c registration exemptions i mean your honor there is no material policy difference between these two agencies and again we have the legislative history that shows an intent to treat these the same i will say that since one thousand nine hundred seventy four every g s t statute and there have been many has simultaneously imposed identical amendments to both the fannie mae and the freddie mac charter so since freddie was created congress has never treated one differently not in the seventy's not today so there's no plausible reason why they would have one of these treated differently you know why they have that different structure on the board of directors well again your honor and it's interesting i've actually personally spoken to some of the original fannie mae directors from the late sixty's ok they were all former government officials because fannie was in sixty eight being extricated from it that's why the original board of the private fannie mae in one thousand nine hundred sixty eight consisted of paul volcker who at the time was a former hud undersecretary it consisted of a former general counsel of hud they were all federal officials at that time and it took multiple years before they c extricated there's just a history which makes it different but i would reemphasize fannie mae is the largest participant in the largest market in the u s economy holding that fannie mae has different powers and lesser powers than freddie mac has simply because the language of the fifty's and a complicated history differed a little bit from the language of the seventy's would be a significant policy shift that we would argue isn't justified by either policy or history or text if there are no further questions thank you would dispute the do the cases seem to boil another but my direct answer is this court has never gone look wrong by going with the language and in those previous cases what the court was trying to do when each case was go with the language right down to red cross where the operative principle was what did this very language mean last time this court addressed it just as prior you also asked which is simpler for lawyers you know no fanny doesn't dispute that  reading is a natural reading of the language doesn't even dispute that it's of the most natural reading instead its entire argument revolves around this proposition that it might actually mean other things but i still don't know what anything sit means fanny says it could mean personal jurisdiction it could be it could mean venue would could mean general jurisdiction plug each of those words into the statute and it just doesn't horse but the bottom line is you need to commit to what that meaning is in this court can't go wrong by interpret ing those words to mean what this court has said of competent jurisdiction i suppose it means person ok so now the statute says any can sue or be sued in any court that has personal jurisdiction over the party state or federal while the federal court of claims has personal jurisdiction over fanny but this was not a grant of jurisdiction because the a whole idea is that this now turns into a grant of federal subject matter jurisdiction it's not a grant of jurisdiction to fanny so what about the court of appeals cases that mr brooks has addressed those cases did not interpret the phrase of competent jurisdiction and they were not about federal jurisdiction everyone understood in those cases ferguson and so on that there was federal jurisdiction the question was whether something about the takur act trumped district court jurisdiction to move the cases to the federal court sees me to the court of federal claims positions courts well your honor i can explain the positions that the government has taken but the government has said that those were also kind of drive by jurisdictional references in cases that simply did not involve the question of what is the source of federal jurisdiction if i may one last point on fannie and fr treat them differently the answer is different era thirty two years apart and better a lobbyist's freddie was being supported and pressed by the federal home loan board what used to be called the home loan ban they were ardent that fannie was going to stop protecting federal interests they wanted an advantage so congress said we're not giving them any advantage but case after case has held that of course freddie has jurisdiction i i may just one more sentence but the vast majority of cases have held before this case came along the vast majority of cases have held that there was no automatic jurisdiction for fannie thank honor thank you counsel cases submitted