certainly the existence of limitations is not a reason not to allow attachment the details of which are not exactly reflected in the record and again that's because there's been no discovery and i can ask you assuming that they are property i have two questions about d c law which are actually questions if anything requires i can do that that there are limitations i mean if they want to transfer to korea that would be difficult because the daughter is obviously intended for the people who are in you know as a getting into korea would be a problem given to somebody who doesn't have the ability to manage it doesn't the typical technical skills to be able to manage it properly to see these had been delegated to the registry managers so that's the process by which i can give the middle if you know again i can created them forbes as to that purpose it was to benefit iran and in the so if it belongs to the federal government in iran really make it through anything that can really be the federal government or anything our federal government yeah so if that is if iran wanted to change the root zone directory to make a sale like you're talking you could so be it a minute that's what the market will if that's what the market will bear that's what the market will bear and that's the mother will recover but we're not going to recover more than yes it's worth but we certainly want to put it down whatever it is and i think we're title to ask the same question now about the  p addresses were they not already allocated to the regional registries and that from there down to the highest piece and around the answer is yes and that's the only question i think the record has that live everything else about think to go to the critical issues in this case which is whether or not these country code top level the meanings are attachable property i think that's the easiest way to resolve this without getting into the more esoteric questions as to whether the property in some sense even if you assume there's some even a factual dispute they've never disputed the fact that it's the old in the me i thought i'd tell you to when i asked well but if you look at what they actually saw discovery on they never saw discovery on any of this i think if you look at page seventeen of the blue brief they talk about what they want discovery on they want discovery on i can's assertion that the attached internet assets are not property i'm assuming for the sake of argument that they are in some sense property and they want discovery on whether i can is unable to transfer the assets so they're not questioning that i can plays a role they're simply questioning and there's simply question whether i can has the full sole for the or whether i can can only do it with the concurrence of the department of process in which i can in the department of commerce have separate and independent roles and they don't dispute that basic fundamental point that's what underscores how what the plaintiffs are trying to get here is greater power in the underlying c c t oh geez than iran  syria north korea have if iran syria north korea have no ability to transfer the c c children from one manager to another then it's an inappropriate use of the garnishment process to force the very type of transfer that the purported owners is that goods and chattels are limited to tangible personal process that is how the one i was asking about that has to be in the hands of is not one of your three no that also if you if you assume  these suits certain roles in the transfer from one to another they don't have that same rule with respect to the idea of them but i don't think in either way could you say that they're in their hands all right i interrupted you have two other sure of the other so i would like to defend  the basis upon the judgment be low because i think it was absolutely correct and that's the first principle that you cannot use garnishment law to insert yourself into the middle of an ongoing relationship to provide services here with plantains effectively want to do is to force internet users in iran syria and north korea to purchase internet services from either them or their designee to give an example suppose i have a contract with the government of iran where i pay them money in order to provide me with  legal services what plaintiffs are effectively trying to do is step into iran shoes and force me to purchase legal services from then well that is simply an inappropriate use for use of garnishment law can i ok so the problem that i have with the me very unlikely to be d c law i think that i think that it's based not just on the younger of case it's also based on the general principle as me is going green that the police is hurt d c it's unlikely that d c would say that i don't know porno dot com where you can imagine what they do and they all out of money to extra porno dot com and they don't pay an extra porno would be able to attach them just like in operate to control the porno dot com second level domain i have no obligation to actually use it say i'm a member of the christian right now i don't want to be use i can purchase that sit stick it on the shelf and let it collect dust the same is not true when it comes to a top level domain name the sole function of assigning a manager to a top level domain name is suppose upon then the duty to operate that name and that's why with respect the top level domain names the underlying property assuming for the sake of argument that we're going call it property is completely inseparable from the duty to operate the c c t and point to sort of quite candid in what they want they want to either be able to operate it themselves or as a council just explain license it to somebody else to operate it so in other words they're trying to force internet users in these countries to purchase a bundle of services from either of them or their designee it's not just that makes clear why that's inappropriate it's also cases like cummings general tire and shippers d appeals cases i'm not going to tell you that those cases are squarely at all for the other not but they stand for the basic proposition that when you've got an ongoing relationship to provide services garnishment isn't a inappropriate way to insert yourself into the middle that in order to essentially attach the payments that flow from the use of those services and under a certification like that you don't need a d c case on all fours in order for this court to resolve it you just need  again it's not an issue upon which point to have sought discovery in this case the third basis is the cleanest legal basis to resolve this and there's absolutely no question on anybody's part as to whether discovery is necessary and that's the meaning of the phrase goods and chattels in the d c attachment long as this court held in the heiser case when it comes to interpreting garnishment statutes d c applies the strict construction rule that means you have to adopt the narrowest reasonable interpretation of the words in order to safeguard the rights of innocent third party garnish she's like i can't and in the parson is that the case of hisor is talking about as a kid due process cases about the due process provided to the is that there isn't case directly on point but as you told me a few minutes ago all we have to do is be able to discern a path and the court of appeals there is pretty much explaining the path we know is it that we're no longer has a long discussion about this we're no longer going to distinguish between law equity and they are going to distinguish between tangible and intangible we're going to these words mean everything all kinds of property except your honor that and much more recent d c case law makes a much clearer discernible path and that strict construction rule and highs are they were citing the d c court of appeals case law that stands for the basic proposition that's widely accepted in other courts as well that when you interpret garnishment statutes you need to construe them narrowly in order to safeguard the rights of third party garnish recent decision in parsons parsons which involved trusts in a state crystal clear that one common definition of goods and chattels is limited to tangible personal property yes but this are events one from correct about that that's one where you take the context of the will and you make that it could be read either way but that the more common way is it covers everything and in that in that and in the context of that case and that will they said that they were going to read includes every form of personal property from whatever source it may be derived the context may show that it's limited to tangible and in the context of this will they decided it was but if you continue that sense your honor it would limit limited to tangible personal property chattels sure what it means is tangible personal property when only tangible yes your honor when you construe it in light of the strict construction rule because the strict construction requires you to adopt the narrower construction the fact that copyrights can't be  can't be attached and not under the d c attachment law limited to goods chapels and credit for me for example it also gives the word credits if goods and chattels does actually include all intangible property no the term credits would be completely superfluous so long even assuming for the sake of argument that there's some category of intangible property that gets swept into the phrase goods and chattels it certainly doesn't include the most esoteric form you could imagine this thing that we call  they're not subject to conversion that doesn't mean they're not subject to everything else but when you take a statutory phrase like good chattels and credits combine it with the strict construction of rule any clear recent d c court of appeals decision stating that one common understanding of that term is limited tangible personal property that's the construction you should apply and i would submit that the fact that it can be broader in the trust in the state's context absolutely actually helps us what the case law makes clear in d c is that when you them that's the austin case and the austin hayes as i said had to do with due process for the garnishee didn't have to do with the kind of property the garnishee and it said a common lawyer have a right to know this and in austin they weren't giving the garnishing any notice and of the common law but it doesn't appear to be the common law fat intangibles can't be attach your honor the common law all rules i think were broader than the century toward rules when you switched from a garnishment proceeding from common law interrogation the common law that is what it says it doesn't say we're going to strictly construe and i don't think there's any common mall rule that allowed in the attachment of all intangible property if there were a common law rule that allowed the attachment of all intangible property and goods and because i think that under the federal rules it turns on d c law rather than federal come along i think there are in addition to a judge go into the issue we've been talking about i think there are two other issues that don't require you  us in our briefing we made clear from the very beginning that that was issued in this case yet the plane this deliberately decided not to address it either in the court below or in this court in this is what i must take issue with one of the statements of my brother  here they have every opportunity to address these issues they are getting the six week extension to their opposition to our motion to quash and had full opportunity to address these issues if they wanted and they chose not to instead they chose to  at the last minute file a two page non substantive so called preliminary response when we got to this court you may recall that during the briefing on whether the issues should be certified to the d c court of appeals we made clear in our briefing there too that we were going to raise these issues we said it and yet again in their opening brief they chose to remain silent so one very simple way to resolve this issue would be on one of the d c attachment law questions another very simple way to so i think those provisions go to whether this court has jurisdiction over the statutory jurisdiction over the attachment proceeding in the first place and once you satisfy once you make that determination then you look to local law to determine whether it nonetheless is attachable once you know the court has jurisdiction and can determine the attach ability under local law if that's the case and does not have to be decided first you know your honor because that's what this court held in chalabi and also made pfizer the statutory jurisdiction question to you on the panel in that case i believe you can bypass a statutory jurisdictional question and it particularly involved in order to address the merits and it distinguished it from the steel company article three line of cases that basically said steel company knowledge that when you're talking about a statute as opposed to article three jurisdiction you didn't have to address it as a threshold matter which is why we would urge the court to resolve this we're perfectly happy if you want to resolve it in our favor on the pfizer injury issues as well but i think these a which way i was going to do this but i think the easier way to resolve this case would be under the sea attachment mall or just simply recognize that they have forfeited fi i'm having to answer any further questions your honor sam you're having thank you thank you