management of the remained on that issue of the reasonable royalty this court when it remained in the case to the district court was for purposes of the court conducting a jury trial if that and we briefed both in the alternative one of which is just what you identified and that is a reasonable royalty for the entire duration of the infringing sales that was ok the error and the abuse of discretion was to not consider the corollary related evidence relating to those same salesman and that evidence related to the period in which the junction was well it doesn't relate to the period in which the injunction was in effect because during that period there were no sales it was the sales that occurred after the original damages trial period and in the periods of time when the injunction was not in effect so we have really three different with based on both the district courts and deferral of its implementation and then this court's additional deferral of its implementation there were sales from february st of sixteen through march th of seventeen and those were and an number of sales unit sales and the district court did allow on remand that evidence solely for purposes of an accounting not for purposes of whether those additional unit sales would drive up the  reasonable royalty analysis no evidence was permitted as to the average selling price of those additional fifteen million dollars units and really if you look at that what it what do you explain to the judge of your evidence would be something different from the way you said here because as i just corrected my my understanding is that you have said is a t c raised its price fifty eight cents which was the last prophet award that this court reversed so what it was what it was later with the money never left the pocket of a t c they they told their customers that they needed to jack the price up by a one dollar fifty eight  looking at what the future facts come into being during the course of the infringement of the analysis would take place in the hypothetical negotiation of the data st infringement certainly this dramatic price increase taking that money under the guise that it was going to have to be paid out then it wasn't paid out and a t c has now profited by a one dollar fifty eight cents per unit times the you know ninety two percent of their sales of the judge just didn't permit this evidence and so she abused her discretion by partially reopening that record i e the additional number of unit sales but she the mistake was to not then open up the record in its entirety as you know but maybe maybe she could conclude that the additional evidence was and some of them are oh well we there was no opportunity to defer to divine that she did time segments of sales and the court like you said was going to allow just simply the number of units for purposes of an accounting but a jury trial juries are asked to do accounting they're asked to weigh evidence and we were ham strong right not allowing to quit in not only the evidence of the increased average selling price the increased profitability but in addition making any type of factual presentation and through our expert as to just the sheer volume of additional sales and how that will impact the reasonable royalty analysis so the court disallowed any of that additional evidence and we believe that is how the court there and abused her discretion by partially reopening the record not fully reopening it in the alternative and of course there's this court's mandate in the original appeal could have been taken in an entirely different way which  to have a new trial on the same period of time as the original trial the same number of units and all of the information and evidence that was presented and then take into account in the context of an ongoing royalty proceeding which would be district court would handle to take the additional evidence that we've just talked about into account now the district court didn't follow that potential eventuality from the mandate it followed the longer time period for its analysis but like i said limited the evidence that was going to allow presidio to present if this court has or this panel has a particular view on how its mandate should have been thing or another about a question that is usually just in the district courts you know reasonably exercise discretion is there a need for new evidence right so she was not the judge was not for to reopen and the judge did not say that she was forbidden so i think i as i keep thinking about this it comes back to what i think just i was was referring to earlier what basis did you provide to indicate that this would be a relevant and fruitful exercise when you point to the addition of a one dollar fifty eight in terms of a reasonable royalty based on what the parties and to support the profits to be at that seems to me to be a complete watch because the money was going to go in one pocket and then on the other  whatever happened and fact happened to it later and then the only remaining question is is the increased volume such that their costs on a per unit basis diminished and therefore their per unit profit increase and that all of this would have been part of an anticipation in a hypothetical negotiation why couldn't she said there's just not enough here for that potentially she could have but she didn't even allow that whole line of discussion through briefing or anything else she issued a scheduling order that simply said we'll get updated sales figures in units of the expert can't conduct any additional substantive damages analysis we offered and requested a proffer to present exactly what you were just outlining which is how this would actually impact a reasonable royalty and then she did not allow that and so back to the mandate issue which prissy agrees and doesn't take issue with the judge having the choice really between either of the two remedies that we're asking for here which is  either the full blown time period with all the relevant evidence presented to a jury as a jury is the one that finds what a reasonable royalty is not not the judge or alternatively the other analysis which is having the trial in the same time period but that having an ongoing royalty proceeding the fact that she chose the former presidio was perfectly fine with that and does not challenge that decision in other words her interpretation of the mandate to look at a reasonable royalty for all the units and if this court is to intends to or i'm sorry does affirm the injunction then the time periods for sales we have captured number of units that won't change if the injunction is  so under that scenario it would probably be the most efficient thing to have a new trial for the captured time period of all the units that are already on the books and won't be changing and then allowing the presentation through expert testimony and factual evidence shipped elated to accomplish i'm sorry figured that and and maybe you would have an argument that says the per unit award in this case is wrong because we needed new evidence on that that would have changed our evidence from from or even get back to the evidence that we had earlier that the stipulation of the parties both experts had agreed effectively agreed that zero dollars twenty five cents per unit was the appropriate about the prior right so we actually have a situation where the all of the analysis which not just the number of units but this average selling price in the profit that was not a dramatic increase relic from that from after the st trial ninety two percent of the total number of sales that are now it is shoe were made so effectively the district court would be having the jury take evidence of average selling price and profits on eight percent of the universe of units and apply that to come to a reasonable royalty for the other ninety two percent i'm not allowed to my question why should there be a stipulated him out the new royalty amount should be different because there's dramatically different evidence that would support are you relying on the amado and activision can succeed in iraq this argument not for this argument that was in connection court my name is running hale and together with my partner heather picky we represent american technical ceramics corporation i only want to touch briefly on the supplemental damages issue of may and we think it's a never at any time said well the damages are different after the verdict they wanted the damages to be the same after the birth and judge hough ordered the damages to be the same after the verdict in her supplemental damages cents per unit well the reasonable royalty is zero dollars twenty five cents per unit because we agreed to it after after after the hearing saying they couldn't put it put in any evidence because she was doing the same thing she had done on her supplemental damages she had chosen to extend to the damages number there that there was no reasonable royalty damages number from from the trust while there was a damages number from the trial damages for the trial period for zero dollars twenty five cents and she could within her discretion there's no case that says otherwise continue those damages for the additional sales after the verdict before the injunction probably went into effect and all she did was up is disregarding the not infringing alternative the five hundred and sixty but i think as i read her opinion what she's saying is well the test period that you federal circuit thought you were going to get didn't happen irreparable in her because the five hundred and sixty was in fact available and we know that customers have bought it in the past and we know that its performance is better than the presidio capacitor at a lower price it only makes sense that it would sell the way it had in the past and when it did go back on the market the data started to show that found judge huff decided that because the parties compete without an injunction issues and when it comes to causal next us the affected insertion loss of high frequencies and pursued his response to that was well we didn't have to do that it wasn't we did it it was we didn't have to do done the patent doesn't call for it and they never had to prove that and in fact they didn't prevent the testing was designed to show that one particular form of capacitance that a t c asserted was active in this capacitor wasn't that doesn't show that fringe effect passage ends has an impact on the performance of the customers by and so we think there is a lacking entirely of a link between infringement and why the customers buy the capacitor now judge huffs response to this is largely but they compete she actually said but they complained and cited the broadcom case and we think that doesn't make sense because in the broadco went up but that's not a clear link either right these parties do compete if pepsi took all of their soft drinks off the market coke sales would probably go up but that's not evidence that pepsi in french something that's just evidence that they compete and that's what we have here in charge off relied on that and then finally she relies on this one hypothetical statement that perseveres expert made a trial and it was a mathematical statement that the lowest value capacitance impacts the highest frequencies for capacitor performance and that's a mathematical truth and dr put it in those mathematical terms he said it varies with one over the square grid the problem with that is it's just math it's not the five hundred and fifty capacitor there's no evidence that the five hundred and fifty capacitor ha as we now have multiple repeated indications from the p t o that this patent will be found invalid and we're now past the final rejection and onto appeal of the p tab we think there's there's plenty of language and cases when we're not plenty but there is some including from justice kennedy saying that injunctive relief is extreme and we shouldn't be granting it when patents are of dubious validity and he was particularly two and a half years left on it that sounds about right characterizing those tests in the reexamination and we think those characterizations should be considered now we had asked this court for a study and it was denied but one always have the ability to modify the junction in light of these circumstances if you met that standard and it might mean i might simply be premature when all you have is an examiners decision which doesn't have the final effect until two layers of review which happened to be the chart showing the data relative to the selling price and the issue of the unit sales on the world the topic with regard to the issue of the injunction this court mandated that the district court capacitors have increased because the five hundred and fifty dollars series is no longer on the market that's what this court asked her to do and kind of in contradistinction to the royalty topic she did exactly that she took all kinds of new evidence which demonstrated precisely those two points a t c for one reason or another shows not to leave the five hundred and sixty on the market when the five hundred and fifty was enjoying that was their choice but the practical things that she looked at and cited twenty one is the juror nature of the direct competition between the parties in the same market with head head to head products the other was the fact that presidio doesn't license its pat and so those are both factors that supported her irreparable harm finding the st time around and those were undisturbed on appeal here it was only her rd stick in the in the bundle which was the last prophet analysis that she tacked on as an additional basis for finding irreparable harm and that's why when it that went back to her to consider she looked at what happened at presidio sales when the injunction went into place they went up dramatically what happened when the injunction was not in effect and five hundred and fifty was back in the market sales decrease those were directly on the issue of what this court asked her to consider she did not abuse her discretion by from taking that into account you can thank you  consider and then she did but she relied almost exclusively on competition now mr aarons makes a correct point the st time around judge huffs order was based on competition between the reconsideration by the court we understand and we think the court understands that competition isn't and there's got to be more than competition between the parties to justify irreparable harm in here we think that's