we are asserting that columbia is was and always has been the habitual residence of this child we are also asking that you consider that your review today would be on a day novo basis and that would be because the the crux of this case was the ultimate determination by the trial court that the united states was the hitch and that  well your review would be a mixed question of law in fact you would apply a clearly erroneous standard to the findings of fact and then the court's application of the convention to the ultimate determination that the  fact i counted no less than five findings where the court found that mr klicks doe at least subjectively believed that the condition was that they were going to live as a family in the articulated in the order and i think i brought that up actually in my brief that there were findings that this was his condition but the court didn't reach the ultimate so that leads me to the next question  it strips court to make a finding of fact on that issue because it seems to me like it might affect the overall analysis i think that is one way that this court could address it but i think the court has the jurisdiction to make a day no we're de novo review of what the court did relating to her all to mitt finding that the u s was the hip residents by her application of the convention and if i might go into that a little document in that case was an actual an indefinite travel document there was no hard return date on that case and it involved you know a child born in other places it's not on all fours with ours but what it appears she did was she when taste for the proposition that i'm going to look to the time period prior to the wrongful removal or retention and i'm going to look at the timeframe after the rightful removal which was november of two thousand and fifteen and i'm going to look to two thousand and fifteen of november two thousand and sixteen of november two thousand and sixteen and i'm going to look at that time frame and determine what the habitual residence was during that time frame that's what she took for when to use to me but what that actually does is that takes the timeframe she's looking at to determine her bitch will residents and superimposes it over the timeframe that is the conditional consent so she actually brackets off the words in article three but you can't do that you've got to say what was what was the habitual residence at the time these parties last shared a mutual intent to change the residence and abandon the old conditioned on his joining them that's what i'm trying to figure out did this trip the court make actual finding on that issue the district court did not make a factual finding articulating what the condition was who believe the condition etc made findings of fact relating to the petitioner is subjective of intent i will state that the apple e's answer brief on page six though does make a statement an admission that the parties agreed that they were to come together and live as an intact family i believe the court has the power to look at the court's application of the convention and the laws relating to how she determines who bitch will residence but i sort of asking maybe and i'm not asking a clearly so i apologize let me try again it's a more nuanced question which i guess is did was there a finding of fact about whether the father wanted the daughter to live in the united states permanently regardless of weather i would say that there is there is no particular finding of fact in that regard but the record below surely supports that he did not want the child living without him i mean in fact the judge uses his words about a new beginning for the family so there's no finding of fact then on whether the father consents conditional intent are different there's no doubt that he conditionally consented to having her come to the u s for a limited period of time right was it was a rightful remit remove all right so it's undisputed that at the time that the mother took the child he agreed with a return date in anticipation yes or right that's undisputed undisputed so the question is as i think is rosen bomb was trying to get at is what are we to draw or what is a court to draw from the record with regard to the question of shared intent because shared intent is a factual finding right chared intent is a factual finding and so the question is what are we supposed to do with this record on that issue if the district court didn't express lee make findings on what that shared intent was and whether or not that shared intent at least on the part of one or both was c well we're we're not we don't have the parties in front of us we can't ask questions we don't have the lawyers cross examining or presenting evidence and so is or if we believe that we need us but then  factual finding on shared intent is that an appropriate basis on which to remand that is an appropriate basis on went all right now let me ask you this a question that goes that cuts in part against your position although i don't think it's necessarily determinative on the issue of that shared intent there is evidence in the record that at some point before the supposed return date the mother tells the father listen the only way you can come here is if i help you and we get married and we're not getting married because we're not a couple anymore at that point in time what does that say about the shared intent because some of those statements were presumably made before the rightful removal if those statements were made before the rightful removal and the father lets the mother go with the child knowing that the mother is on record saying the only way i can help you is if we get married and we're not getting married and we're not a couple and what does that do to the whole question of shared intent a high school education and doesn't know immigration law and i will add that it's important if you look at that they admit on page six also again that my client in fact at the time that the child was leaving to come back to the united states had applied for and he signed the consent in november i think twenty fourth of two thousand and fifteen at that time he had just applied for a tourist visa but he hadn't heard back because that's was going to take several months to hear back and he didn't know if he was going to be able to get a visa but he took actions consistent with going to united states subsequent to your honor's statements your honour's referring to so i think i think his actions that are confirmed in the record and also in the answer brief support that his intent was always to travel to the united states as a family and furthermore the other the other findings in the record about the fact that he had shared his custodial access up until the time of the proceedings fifty fifty in fact raising the child in colombia while the respondent was in the united states most of the child's three and a half years before the child came to florida  actions in in acting as the father would be totally inconsistent with signing a cause sent to let the child move to the united states on a permanent basis knowing he would never see the child again or thinking he would never see the child again so and there's substantial dispute about what the valid value of a tourist visa isn't that a kind of a temporary thing doesn't mean you can stay forever doesn't know that a lot of people do but that's not supposed to as i know i am not an immigration lawyer my understanding is that on a tourist visa you can stay originally maybe six months at a time and get one or two extensions on that how does applying for a tourist change the fact that he really wanted to come here to stay with the family how does it support that i think i think he doesn't well he was attempting to come to the united states and perhaps those statements had been made that that she was not going to marry him they were engaged at one point i mean i can't i can't go back in and recreate the record at this point but i think the record is just full of findings of fact that are in the record about his intent to stay as a family to travel as a the respondent made the respond it made a contract with the petitioner and with the colombian immigration authorities that this child would be returned on november twenty fourth of two thousand and six and she failed to honor that and you know we believe that that the colombian contracting state has a right to has a legitimate interest in having these travel consents travel forms immigration documents whatever you want to call them hon and our position would be that he there were two conditions one that the child would be returned no later than november of two thousand and sixteen and two as the court found that there would be a reunification of the family in the state of florida so it had actually had two conditions precedent and the fact that she refused to return the child in november of two thousand and sixteen violated the condition the cage it condition never occurred so our argument is that the consent fails as if the contract between the parties never existed the second condition was that they come as a family and that never occurred and frankly put the respondent took the position with our department of state that she never intended to return to colombia and wasn't going to return to colombia and that's in the record the letter and wasn't going to participate in any proceedings that might allow my client was the trial court from looking at all the other factor to be examined in this case with regards to that solves before you get to that sure can you answer my question did the trial court make such and she made a finding that even if the father's version of events was we can all agree that there was a shared intent for the child to relocate to the united states but that's not the question the question is whether there was a shared intent ever for the child to relocate to the united states permanently regardless of whether the father came they judge's findings was the mother also acknowledged that she had entered into a new relationship in florida and october twenty fifth before she returned to colombia to collect the child and that she had concealed that relationship from the father when father heard this testimony he stated that if he had known of the mother's new relationship in november two thousand and fifteen he never would have signed the consent allowing the child to go to the right and i would take you back to the fact that the mother testified and other witnesses corroborated that she had if those if and i understand were reviewing for clear errors so there may not be reversible error on this record but if you can find a climate is asian with a three and a half year old child in less than a year then you've certainly thought you've thrown that factor out the window because in every one of these cases that will exist is that they will have it in every single one of these cases but i think what what i would add to that the one of these factors are so to be looked at in a vacuum with regards to what that meant and the mother testified that she understood that document to mean that if the father's travel hadn't been approved yet by a year she'd be bringing that child back for well i speak only for myself and i as i said given the standard are reviewed there may not be reversible error on this record but as a matter of general hague convention law it sets a really bad precedent to have parents agree to the return of a child to their country of origin have one parent take the child not return as the parents had agreed and then come in with testimony to say all that return document really is and what it the type of verbal abuse that he had been doing that led to the break up and they were aware of the break up as well he would continue to insist no we're not going up until i say we're broken up that was in the record as well i can understand why this case testimony was i know what his testimony was i'm asking you from a court's perspective at what point in time in a scenario like this where there's a document that presumes a return for one reason or another at what point in time along the continuum do you measure shared intent at the time that the child leaves on a conditional trip or the time that the child is supposed to  intent at a time when the parties agree to have the child taken to a third country everything flowers everything is great the party's over green they expect something to happen may or may be another shared intent on that day is going to be very different when everything goes to hell in a handbasket a year later and the parties are each other's throat right so my question to you is where you measure shared tented what at what point in time do you say here i'm going to pick this date or this range of dates and decide what the parties had a shared intent of out you look back to  your honor the last question about when do you measure the shared intent goes to my superimposition argument but even if you don't like my particular argument the facts in this case in the record if you look at the testimony of dory simons which is honest of the respondent who testified on behalf of the respondent her testimony was very clear that in december of two thousand and fifteen one month or less than one month after the travel consent was signed my client found out about the boyfriend stateside and testified talked to a dory about it and said he was going to do something about this this was not he was duped and he was not happy about finding out about the boyfriend on facebook and that  one disputes that there's conflicting testimony about a lot of things in this case but there's also test and it goes to judge rosenbaum's question about whether or not the district court made findings but there is evidence in the record that before the mother left with the child she told your client we are done as a couple and we are not getting married and that's the only way that i would help you in being able to get residency in the united states now that testimony may not carry the day it may not be credible but there is evidence that contradicts the testimony given by the witness you just mentioned that is correct your honor and there's a lot of contradictory evidence in the record including respondents testimony that she believed that she was going to go back in two thousand and sixteen for a visit subsequently as you know she took the position with our department of state that she had no intention of ever returning so there's a lot of conflicting evidence even even evidence put on by the responded conflicts with other evidence put on by the response we saw this as some sort of a fraud upon upon the petitioner but i did want to briefly touch on the climate is ation argument i didn't i didn't mention much about that in the brief from a legal from a legal analysis standpoint i've always seen the a climate as ation argument as something the court looks to once they determine what the shared mutual intent was you would only look at to the climate is ation argument to try to trump the shared parental intent if you determine what it is and if there's a disputed parental attent you would be very slow to infer a climate is ation so i didn't touch on that a lot in the brief i believe that the climate is ation argument based on the tender age of the child the fact that she had maternal and paternal family in both locations a fact she was three and a half the resident columbia prior to moving we know that well our thanks to you as well we know that both of the the parties in this case were not of amp means from the indications in the record and we certainly could not do our jobs without lawyers like you take public