restitution but the priest support probation officer who drafted the talking that suggested and later it came to pass that restitution was ordered the government then asked the probation officer recommended this the government's that stripper army medical center was a victim direct and proximate later when the brief was written the government kind of pulled away from that position that the army medical center was a victim of the crime and instead referenced the statute which said that doesn't matter it's took or is the victim or not what matters is whether or not the actual victim victim and then lately it's been interpreted to be the cost to the insurer and now it is being extended to this situation in which someone who's in the army who's not military care is paid for by the army about what's in the order of restitution and i mean i guess it seems to me that where it says hannah now equal to the cost of necessary medical related professional services that that is saying that this is what the order of restitution must require that that the defendant pay the cost of well there is a civil statute which i have cited which directly covers that situation and in fact also covers the situation of the defendant paying several federal medical care recovery act is a separate vehicle to recover money from third parties for medical services rendered by government and military hospitals what the court is doing is taking this particular language out of context and not looking at the rest of the language of the statute there's only been three cases that either the government or i could find in entire united states that has ever done anything close to this to wit ordering victim that step three six six whatever it was directly authorizes it without looking at tripler as a potential victim would we be able to not the victim has received compensation from trippler and my argument is that she has not received compensation from strict rule from any other so the united states in reply to the last question i heard before i came here i think your honor that there is no difficulty under the valentia case that we cited to affirm the district court's ruling for affirming the district court's decision here congress wanted insurance companies who reimburse for the cost of medical care to be covered by this act it's clear from the congressional intent which we have cited that that was their purpose and if the court were not to follow that line of reasoning we would be left with the nonsensical position of someone assaulting an individual who has no insurance has received compensation from insurance from any source any person who compensates from any source is reimbursed stand in this case as part of her pay as a military member of the united out of the tenth circuit shows how three six six three was interpreted even before the new scheme in some roads we have a gentleman who was living on an indian reservation who suffered injury and the medical payments for ordered paid to the indian h s whatever that stands for indian agency and the restitution was relocated in order to avoid injury and in that case restitution was ordered in every situation that's reported except the one case the council mentioned in their brief file restitution has been approved where the courts have ordered it and the final case is totally different from our case because it involves another statute that totally different statute relating to sexual assaults and in the fall of opinion which is the ninth circuit case though the court opined that it is refusing to allow restitution but had this case been under three six six three there would have been an entirely different result restitution  expansion of what is done today it is expansion of what the reality is today and i don't think the end the requires whenever anyone is injured that someone will pay i think there are