court and remand the matter for further proceedings in the united states district court for minnesota as a preliminary note your honors the the waters settled their companion claims against case of a warrantless seizure on a possible allegedly misdemeanor of shoplifting a non violent offense under minnesota statute i charged without regard to that specific statute oh yes your honor yes off they have reason to believe this man was stealing something in his trunk there would be a basis to hold him even if it didn't lumberyard something you didn't purchase this your honor six twenty nine three sixty six would govern the situation at menards ok the exclusive basis under minnesota law to prosecute someone for stealing from a store your honor this is let me let me put the answer the short answer to your question is yes with this qualification that the six twenty nine point three sixty six governs what a merchant and what law enforcement officers may do in a in the face of a potential shopkeeping keeping city of shoplifting situation have a cause of action and could seize him under under terry well under terry for the fourth amendment let me let me clarify something that that six twenty nine three sixty six is is more relevant for the common law claims they from the officers perspective not from the perspective of mr waters if the officers knew that there were signing age open an obvious signage that says a purse consents to opening the trunk and then the person refuses the open the trunk why isn't there at least raise reasonable inference of suspicion that the person is trying this take something out well your honor the you know without purchasing it reasonable suspicion for an offense and mr waters a stand is asserting his constitutional right and he is simply saying look if you if you want a warrant go get a warrant when when the officers arrive what can what can they nine one one call they can take into consideration anything that they have in plain view and they have three choices one they can arrest two they can get a warrant three they can let him they can let people go they cannot prolong a seizure under the fourth amendment just to coerce an individual to do something that they otherwise could not do what we have your honor on the video and  audio is that first mr waters provide produced the receipt for the the merchandise showed it at thirty twenty the menards employee said thank you  thirty nine twenty one was officer newbury i think who's been married since said i don't have i get real reasonable suspicion just for not just because you didn't open the trunk prove a negative he did have something that is perfectly valid there's no there's no basis for there's no objective basis for saying that he's been he's been shoplifting under the statute nobody in m suspicion that you've broken the law it's not suspicion that you have something that you haven't returned it's just minorities policy and that's not a good enough reason under the fourth amendment it certainly isn't a good enough reason under the plain words at forty one on one we have mr waters demanding the officers names and badge is which he can do ok what happens the fact i understand i'm just ruins your legal point the legal point is it i coercing mrs waters saying listen if you don't open the door open this trunk you're not going to go home with your husband and by that point they were attempting to coerce her into giving up rights without without any supporting evidence and by prolonging the search that you can't do under that you can't do under keel against bertus and under minnesota law resting on the on the fourth amendment  incrementally increase the search without additional probable cause would with the suffices for reasonable suspicion doesn't suffice for probable cause for to prolong search i didn't understand the dischord to have said there was probable cause to end the building or that there was another nable suspicion or arguable reasonable suspicion for the that's not attention of mr waters and then there was consent by the wife to opening the trunk your honor there was there what what excuse me they needed probable cause to continue to first to handcuff mr waters and they needed probable cause to get into the trunk and what did they need more than reasonable suspicion to temporarily detain mr waters in the car ok they could temporarily detain but to handcuff him your honor we have a a twenty eleven a circuit case that says you can handcuff him if you have suspicion that he's armed if you have suspicion that he's dangerous if he has acted out you know in a fashion that handcuffs may be appropriate we don't have any of that circumstance you don't present acted out there i mean look he didn't act probably dangerously but but he certainly this court has found that it's not that you don't have enough reasonable suspicion by just the sorting a right that was actually florida against bostic which was a supreme court decision so what we also have a case is after brief when we had the circuit decided ross against city of jackson and johnson against the city of minneapolis saying what's necessary for arguable reasonable cases that may go on the beyond twelve minutes but we have a we have a case where this is the case of coercion where they could have got where they did not get a warrant but coerced mrs waters to to get to read issue from whether they violated the rights of mr waters by detaining him for twelve minutes right i mean he's just challenging a seizure he doesn't have standing to challenge you he's going to tell mrs waters was he has georgia against randolph is a case where you don't have where one pre one person who's got the power says no if the other one present says yes the the officers can't get any and i'll say the rest of my time thank you this court should affirm the dismissal of the plaintiffs of many complaints because one the coon rapids police officers acted reasonably within their cost to tional authority in conducting an investigation of a shoplifting allegation at the menards in coon rapids minnesota first appellate samina complaint failed state plausible claims of constitutional rights second plane to fail to meet their burden of a stab wishing that the coon rapids officers violently clearly established law to defeat the application of qualified immunity and finally the appellants have failed the state claims under minnesota state law could you address the search of the trunk yes your honor why that didn't violate the fourth amendment if it did not violate the fourth amendment because they received consent from this waters and if you look at you know the circumstances and really that the material valid concern and reasonable officer good think it's a valid concern and what do you think about that yeah i don't i don't think that's exactly what was said i don't think those words were exactly what was said but again the issue is not whether the individual isn't that what she alleged was said i believe in listening to the to the audio recordings and i think that's exactly what do you think was said i think it was more along the lines of is more along the lines of for us to get out of your in to get going  if you could just please let these gentlemen look look inside the truck and again i think if we go back ok if we if we go to if we go to a state the water and again if you look at the circumstances it's a multi pronged test it's a balancing test and if you look at the conduct the way the officers performed they were very calm they were respectful it was very conversational when the officers initially approached mrs waters and asked what's going on with your husband is there some issue going on the wife is kind of acknowledging yankee you take stuff seriously he kind of gets himself in the situation and again the is very conversational there decision here in this case the c p walker the court clearly looked at in that case and said under those circumstances the officers are entitled to qualified immunity under circumstances in which arguably  walk or the conduct was a lot more what about the fact that or that her husband was handcuffed at the time does that does that make it more course if it's a factor that is a factor to be considered and again the inherent in your situation which you're on in a seizure and police are waters says no and when he's asked and then later on they asked mrs waters and she says yes and at least in the context of a home that doesn't work in the context of a home that doesn't work and i think you kind of get the point your honor there's and appellant did not raise in their opening brief so we certainly didn't get have an opportunity respond to it the first time this shows up is in the reply brief the first time there's any mention of georgia georgia v randolph and that whole that line of cases so it didn't show up and in  automobile so therefore simply because one person is detained in the squad car you'll get asked the other person can i can open your trunk and again the other partner and there's a little bit deeper analysis is the idea is that case you're talking about is the idea that  to protections for automobiles and again fernandez we california that's a another case where the supreme court looked at it and we kind of made that distinction between if somebody is detained and  our position the one aren't we didn't make it and i think when you look at what the officers did in this case they were it might be they're very remarkably restrained they didn't immediately go to when they first confronted mr waters and he said i'm not  trunk didn't mean we say ok your honor russell peter truong and in the sense of going straight up to probable cause they went through the analysis in a reasonable suspicion in the sense of they're going to do the investigation they're going to determine is the any evidence just to say there's something in the trunk before they went to the next step which we never ran across a bridge we never had across the bridge of the automobile exception because they first went to mrs waters and said you know this waters would you show these gentlemen would you purchase you know to get consent they didn't have to cross the next bridge of ok do we are we going you know from our goal really reasonable suspicion which is a much lower level they didn't have to look to the next level of arguable probable cause to then get into the trunk so they're remarkably restrained in hollywood about this particular stuff i want to ask you about real quickly about that the handcuffing and the case you know one of the problems i'm having here is is he was in handcuffs because he had a weapon or was otherwise dangerous he wasn't he wasn't handcuffed because they thought you know they thought he might become dangerous areas or is it actively resisting arrest what are we and he wasn't arrested at all what do we make of that and what do we do with the case i think concerns for an officer is that number one you know is there worn on this person i'm not aware of that if we ran his name or something more serious out there have a history of criminal violence you know the other up the other thing is this a hero a serial shoplifter that ok now to explain why he's making a big deal about it because he got caught so the fact that he's not providing his name just kind of raised the concern for the office for the officers and again refusing to open the trunk the heightened concern is there something in there  contraband in there is there a weapon in there is there some reason why he doesn't want to skin that trunk is yours you know i'm not to leave him in this in his passenger vehicle to my back in the next you know see him in the trunk although there are dirt there wouldn't be i mean even if there is a goner a weapon in conversation for any discussion is meet we went straight to handcuffing handcuffing him the record shows he was call he was cooperative there was nothing in l ghazali to indicate that he was going to be difficult that he was going to pose a threat i think that's the another case in which he was it was a course of help that's unconstitutional if you handcuffing someone out of the circumstance there is nothing there to put an officer on notice or no case law identified putting an officer on notice that you should have known you could have handcuffed him or the circumstance you know and find somebody in the parking lot and say open the trunk and they open the trunk and say well now we think you might be shoplifting yeah that's what's the bases here it is stinks it is that you have somebody going to menards lumber yard where signs clearly marked as you're pulling into lumber yard that at on your exit we're going to ask you to pop the trunk so we can make sure that what you're taking out of our lumber yard is what you purchase so the signage is is key to this the signage is key and whether that's a valid whether the store can do that or not you're saying from the police perspective i think they can use perspective and i think if you listen to one of the officers she talked about she was when i go to menards i open my truck i can i think you know one of the officers like of this of this stop you know mr waters didn't shut down the exit there are people still exiting the area because again under these circumstances people know that if you're going to enter into a menorah lumber yard with a sign clearly marked say your you know you can open your trunk them unargued that that's something that they're going to do and that's what again going back to kind of what is objective what's a reasonable objective expectation of privacy subjective expectation of privacy and again he's in a lumberyard large area many things could be concealed in the back of his of his vehicle and again the the fact that that mr waters refused to open his truck again adoption to make a reasonable inference that you just drove into will into a lumber yard where the sign said were open your trunk as you exit and immediately starts objecting i'm an art claims relied on an absence of of the injury is that was not a valid kind of distinction that the district court drew is that something you would rely on before this quarter was a disc record low off base there well it's really the only area which would believe the district court dismissed based on the absence of the injury was again on the on the search claim in looking at it and looking strictly at the complaint of i would say that the way that it was played there is not a specific injury that was identified compensable injury identified in the complaint from simply the search  there's no pleading for a nominal damages or any requests for non damages on the other side though i would say that i probably are stronger argument on that issue as a qualified immunity based on the state state of walker i think that's probably the stronger argument of why the court should well i don't know there's a statement of the issue number six is where the district court says count twelve but maybe that's not the same as refers to false imprisonment but i have to check that thank you very argument court's attention to pages twenty three and twenty four of the principal brief and their reference to the page e c f fifty five appellant nineteen a page nine of twenty one the district court did find quote the court thus cannot conclude on a motion to dismiss that mrs waters voluntarily consented to open plaintiff's trunk now that here we assert the following that the court heard in failing to acknowledge mrs waters with her husband did plead emotional distress for this constitutional violation in excess of seventy five thousand dollars or whatever a jury would bear and that said e c f twenty eight appeal appendix fifty paragraph one five five as to the point about identification mr waters was the individual who called the police and summoned them to the scene identification was not a problem i was going to talk to you and i meant to do this in the using that term loosely was completely compliant there was no danger here as mentioned the your client wouldn't identify himself and there was no and he was being resistant i mean he was he was speaking but he was being resistant to some of those does that make a difference that we don't have clearly established law here he clears rule twelve a night and that the rule fifty six if we're back here he'd survive that as well because you don't have to produce id to to a cop in  minnesota that's the van against him and then what i'm really getting at is whether this is different enough that it officer would know that there's a clearly established right here it would be different enough under minnesota law and under the fourth amendment i just want to point out that in the shoplifting cases there was a distinction made between having a handbag the officers could search your handbag where they couldn't get into a car and the case unpublished decision stayed against it and actually cited a published minnesota supreme court decision and the schimmel against california case which basically the minnesota supreme court case was g m from one thousand nine hundred seven which is whatever you can reach ok an automobile that's different because to be clear i'm immediately there was nothing that he could do and mr waters was was in his vehicle having some of the police himself so there was something different and he was he was asserting by spoken word and  laboring under his asperger's condition which mrs waters disclosed to the officers but he was still being peaceful as houston against hill gainers against rogers and again the police and thank you for letting me go a little bit further but that then i turn around and preacher seemed a little different or maybe clearly out of the ordinary to reverse and remand for further proceedings with before the district court and thank you for allowing me a little over over time you're welcome thank you for the argument thank you the case is submitted and the court file an opinion in due course