raises the same question that this current case presents to the court of the medina humanise case was about a year or two in front of this current case and this court sent it back to the  a in order to resolve the question at hand today administrate of lee in the first instance so the issue presented to the court today is whether or not an oregon contempt judgement will have immigration consequences for purposes of eligibility for non l p r cancellation and so the to be eligible for non l p r cancellation among other things an alien cannot be convicted of a crime described in eight us c twenty two twenty twelve twenty seven and so the oregon courts have uniformly held that contempt in oregon is not a crime and so responded argued below and mr medina jimenez also argued below that because oregon contempt is neither is civil contempt is  neither simple civil war criminal content but is a unique power inherent to the court that it consequently would not be a conviction for immigration purposes and therefore it would not the immigration nationality act that that definition could be used in order to capture what is neither a civil nor a criminal judgment and deem it to be a criminal conviction for immigration purposes and so if we look at the history of that definition it is very clear if you look at the the committee conference reports of which in acted the definition if you look at that provision or chill find is that the definition wasn't meant to be a substantive definition the definition wasn't meant to be a procedural definition the definition was meant to be an evidentiary definition that would guide  deportation officers and guide trial attorneys in obtaining criminal documents from the various criminal courts around the country in order to prove whether or not an alien was actually convicted of a crime now that's the historical context of the definition twenty years later the government wants to expand the scope of the definition to change it from an evidentiary definition that's meant to solve evidence re problems in order to  assist in order to change it into a substantive definition that can now capture not only criminal judgments but in this case it will capture quas i criminal chua's i simulate civil judgment and it also has the potential of capturing contempt decisions that come out of juvenile courts and so the court can certainly take judicial notice of organ statute for one line a point one eighty and so organ juvenile court has the ability to issue protective orders and an organ juvenile court has the ability to issue  to a small i for violation of protection order does not require a conviction how does this reconcile with the language of section twelve twenty nine b for counsel ation of re it is procedurally and six statutorily distinct from the relief phase and so within the context of the deportation portion of the trial and the deportation analysis there is no requirement for a conviction in contrast to that in the relief phase and that's the issue before the court in the context of twelve twenty nine b the applicant was asking for relief which is an entirely different statute and that state statute is plain and clear on its face that a conviction is required and so on the i believe no one yes or no or can statute though he could get jail he could go to jail more right he's on probation right yes for a period of time so i guess what your support for the argument that a conviction for immigration purposes requires that judgment in a criminal proceeding for immigration purposes can there be a finding of a conviction from a non criminal proceeding so i mean you know ira if you send someone to jail that certainly sounds like they're convicted of something we want others to arguments and so the first argument is the point language of the statute in the deportation context it doesn't require a conviction in contrast in the relief  why the court should rule in favor of the of the petitioner is that in mathis the the court the supreme court was concerned about errors associated with with with the prosecutor wants to impose jail time or not imposed jail time the standard of the burden of proof on the behalf of the prosecutor is going to change and so of jail time is required then they've got to be able to produce the  demonstrate the charges beyond a reasonable doubt whereas if they're not seeking time then it's just clear and convincing evidence so one the statute creates the difference because relief is is distinct from deportation and the statute is distinct a conviction is required and again the guiding the third guiding principle in mathis wants to impose convictions and the categorical analysis in order to avoid situations where there's a risk of erroneous deprivation of a benefit but the grass is benefited the the ground has shifted on you and i understand you couldn't anticipate it when you have your brief a year and a half ago and ever but we now have these two decisions by the b i a which among other things seem to say the categorical approach isn't the approach that we follow here so what do we do with these decisions that your is a year burden at this point to establish that the interpretations are unreasonable under the statute or what is it you're trying to persuade us of so in the first instance respondent doesn't actually have an issue with a choc we're spondon says is the the government is expanding the scope of the definition right this was never meant to be a substantive definition was meant to be an evidentiary definition and if the government is allowed to expand the is is a reasonable interpretation is an acceptable interpretation to which we must give deference under several i'm saying it's unreasonable because it leads to a reasonable result so so your argument is that it's not entitle to chevron deference we should reject being inconsistent with the statute given a second yes i'm saying it is unreasonable because it requires a conviction and this isn't a conviction the organ courts are unanimous in saying that contempt is not a conviction i mean another way of looking at the question is you can go through the matter of a slam on islam as our door which says that it has to be a genuine criminal proceeding and i think this court can go through that door and use that decision in order to find that because this is not a genuine criminal proceeding there's no conviction and the petitioner is not ineligible on the other hand if the court tries to go through the definition it's an unwieldy v wheeled lead vehicle in which to make the decision or render the decision because it was never intended to be you substantively was meant to be used evidence or well i have a question in your august twenty eighth chait letter you with your argument that section twelve twenty seven eighteen he i was a violation of a protection order does not require a conviction so do you agree with that a finding of a conviction is necessary for determining cancellation pre move all under twelve twenty nine be nose to working parts that's why the government initially agreed to for these two decisions mention the word conviction and so that was the mission argument that we don't need a conviction whatsoever in these proceedings even cancelation context however the board subsequently issued decision which stated one that agreed with the government's argument that there is no conviction required for movability for a protective order violation but otherwise stated that you do need a conviction the relief context that the sub's the definition of conviction still replies for cancellation rule because the cancellation will statute the government argues that correctly found the petitioner was ineligible for relief because this protection order violation because one it constitutes a conviction as the board has explained what a conviction means under matter as long as i am two tiered inquiry in the him of this one is there a conviction for immigration purposes and that's a matter of islamize our cases defining what it means to have a conviction for federal immigration purposes and once that satisfied move on to statute and that's also satisfied in this case that's the government's argument is that the government prevails because this judgment contempt of court equals the definition of conviction federal immigration purposes and when you turn to the record of first definition of a conviction and the second this protective order statute where has language unlike other statutes which does has the first is not have a conviction required and two it seems to refer to specific consequences or circumstance excuse me at a particular time so the challenge it appears to me is posed by the fact that the got my number that the twelve twenty nine pro includes the word convicted why doesn't that require what we would expect to be a criminal conviction i mean there is no there is no oregon document that that the claires that petitioner has been convicted so how does that fit within the two twelve twenty nine provision so if it's within that provision under the board's preston matter as long as i'm defining what a conviction means so we went to criminal proceeding that was so much disparity amongst the states that had to pretty soon inform definition of what a conviction is so near and active this conviction definition is simply said at the beginning judgement of guilt entered by a court and so there was question initially whether or not that meant any judgement of guilt civil or criminal proceedings so the board interpret that matter islamize are because it was not clear it was ambiguous whether five to criminal and civil interpreted to mean a criminal proceeding or committing in nature and that was to respond to all the differences in state laws like in oregon where they have labels for things that for a contempt of court like that do not match up to criminal or civil but otherwise have all the criminal procedural safeguards and that's the case that the government cited in our can state the house can specifically states that these contempt of court proceedings have every single criminal procedural safeguards that something is labeled a criminal proceeding has there's no difference they apply the beyond reasonable doubt to things like a right to counsel they have a charging document that is has all the same requirements as a criminal charge and document as no other provision in oregon law to punish is a violation of protective order so it's no risk of double jeopardy in all ways this is a criminal proceeding just not in name and that's what the board's responding to a matter of islamism and that's the first year under matter medina jimenez do you have a conviction definition that definition met for immigration purposes and second of all you move to the peculiar ground of the conviction in this case which here though is this actually does not require a convict is looking at conduct so it can include a conviction so twelve twenty seven eight to be double i can include but a judge has found this person violate a protective order protected against credible threats of violence so you're asking us to conclude that we should give deference to the more recent decisions of the b does not require convictions so it's someone who has these documents in the record reliable evidence such as here in the plea agreement we have the judgment of contempt we have the protective order itself and we have those reliable documents in even concluded before the board reached this issue and leaves a third circuit decision name read that also included the same so we only we have left is deference to meeting him in as whether or not when you're working with these two tiers the cancellation statute and a deportation ground whether a conviction is also required i believe that is a reasonable interpretation because it gives meaning to that term conviction as physically to find and they threw out all immigration thank you yours so just again on the chevron question on whether or not deference is warranted here if if the analysis is looked at strictly in terms of the definition of conviction than  different i would argue that deference isn't warranted here on the facts in the sense that the oregon contempt statute is clearly held not to be criminal in nature and on that basis it was unreasonable for the b whether or not the proceedings below or is a genuine criminal proceeding and in determining whether or not the proceedings were a genuine criminal proceeding of the court could certainly look at  case case law on that particular proceeding and the state's interpretation of whether or not the particular proceeding const did or did not constitute a criminal matter  position is that the criminal piece isn't necessary so i don't know that we're quite as interested in what oregon says as the weather was criminal the question is whether the d i s interpretation of convicted as encompassing non criminal determinations that have certain elements the constitutional protections the beyond reasonable doubt standard prove whether that qualifies happened was that the deportation till wag the relief dog and they said because we you know arrived at the decision that we arrived at in a shock oh well we're just going to do the same old thing that we did enough choco in the case somebody to humanise that's what that that's been trying to focus on what the positions are now because it seems to me your position has to be that the second step in medina is inconsistent stands on yes or there's no for the questions all right thank you for your argument this matter will stan