favor as much as the equities may be in your parents favor the case law does not seem to support your position because you know that he says when he said yes and there is a parole evidence rule that bars you from trying to come in and say well no actually i know that's what it says but we really meant something different and see that's the key question for us right and the difficulty of course is that people make certain assumptions and the assuming the wife was going to survive the wife died so her heirs then game to get the money and the house and his parents got nothing and what we do what we always have to do in these cases go on the record sometimes the short cuts don't look i understand there are many exceptions the proof of it is in this case it's really want to is exactly that we have the brother and sister who took a property as joint tenants some time later there's a falling out amongst the family the brother seeks to enforce his joint tenancy and paid half of the house are going to either way so it's not as if you get to just say oh no i was what we meant and this was hiding this from creditors you have to resent some evidence that all kinds of evidence that established was really going on here but oh no i mean i think that i think that you're right that's the case right there ok that's why i think fifteen minutes is plenty because that really it is a straightforward choice that our court has to make i mean i don't know if you you can argue about the issue preclusion issue and the other appeal or you can lessen your pun come back in history one more short point yeah so if you follow what the trustee wants to do in this case you case there's lots of case law says you can provide parole evidence to performant the that's the whole point of reformation to show that was not was intended when it was filed and so they really should in the second case it's a new issue based i guess what doesn't make sense to me about that argument is that let's assume that we were to conclude that the district court was right in the first case that the pearl evidence room really does apply here with all of the unfairness that that entails if we nonetheless though that in the second action you could sort of get around that through this i mean it's really just kind of the form of the action then the private intro basically be nullified in this context so i don't it doesn't seem to me you can just not easily get around d i'm just i'm talking i'm not your focus i think on these rigid legal calm just saying from a practical standpoint you can't be right about this because it would mean that everybody would just take the end run around instead of getting shutdown going to f the court has pointed out there's really only maybe one major issue with regard to this case and that is what was this that was transferred by the debtors to the defendants that the trust findings made etc and that case plays pretty well the problem i have was was a second appeal i think i think the bankruptcy judge must have thought his work on his or her work was done after the first but there are two separate issues in the second case they're talking about reforming the deed and it's an equitable action and is entirely different from the first and maybe the banks the judge is getting confused as i am when you're arguing these cases together i just have very great difficulty knowing whether arguments are made with the first or the second because the analysis is completely different so let's set aside the first case which is for fairly clear and go to the second case where i think the bankruptcy judge may have been making  mistake so i made up my mind but my questions are essentially with the second case you know the banks the judge you seem to think it all works that way but there was this reformation is an entirely different and so tell me tell me how the bankruptcy judge was right in his analysis and just use you know says the bankruptcy judge used in the second case thank tenancy and i know that usually means fifty percent but we intended to do something different and because we had to do something different we want to change what that means precisely but the it didn't make any difference in first case what they intended to do because the first case was decided in the best basis it was not equitable change the second case has to do with what they intended to do with the contract and that's separate and different and i don't think the bankruptcy judge really focused upon that how you could tell me wh that they've at the that the real restatement comes up with and after you take a look at that i'm i'm just not sure in my own mind whether the bankruptcy judge got to that point so tell me tell  comparing excerpts of record one hundred seventy nine three hundred eighty with excerpts of record ninety five ninety seven in one case the defendants argue that fails to reflect the true intent of parties and the interest same evidence an argument with a very to whether or not you can put in evidence of intent or evidence of some different deal it's a different understanding of what was supposed to happen than what the deed itself says the face of the deed in the province rule and how that applies saying that there was something good but is it is completely different isn't it there the issue involved was whether there is equal if equal equities given back and forth there was an argument made that this was the intent behind what we did and if that changes somehow with the face of the d h would say that there's there's a different intent here and that's evidenced by we paid all you know six hundred thousand dollars but their intent in the first case made no difference you just about whether is equal value given here intent may make a difference it's an issue because it's what they intend to do with the it was it was irrelevant to the first case because you're looking at whether or not a particular value was given for what they were seeing in the second case it's a different issue it's what they intended to do i think in the field he's trying to reform the that he may not he may not be able to reform it but the way the case is now we're not even looking at whether or not it was in the first in a freshman transfer action there are two issues there's a value issue but there's also the issue of what was the interest rate and in the first issue what was the issue that what was the interest that was transferred part of what is argued in fact all of what is argued by the defendants is we had a different when we transferred it wasn't we have more value  gave but see the what they intend to do had nothing to do is irrelevant to the first case or to the value that actually was transferred and their argument is is i understand it that that was irrelevant to the first case but it's the key issue in the second case i disagree i think it was determined to be irrelevant in the first case because the pearl evidence rule applied and said you cannot change the face of it but that doesn't mean it was an issue that was argued  termonde on the merits and was essential to the judgment which is based in your argument is that comes within the sense of the the factors of the restraint yes definitely and one of the reasons it's easy to show that this was definitely essential because you say parole evidence is applicable and can be applied in the context of a fourth of those cases involved the same set of types of facts that were involved in a few cannot be a case that was rejected by the district court in reverse is out you had parties on the same side of a transaction that determined that there was going to be a side deal where one would pay twenty five thousand dollars to the other for the transfer of the title to the property and that collateral agreement was able to be proven to show that there was a different interest other than joint ten hawaiian law in the reformation context it didn't matter whether you had the parties on the same side of the course you said the pro level it rules just out in this particular because it's an acronym action or whatever the reason was it seems to me if that were the state of the law then you could not prevail on that because that would certainly make this really easy but if you don't then i guess i'm wondering whether judge lost his instinct might be right that the issues are different and they can't just be you know sort of summarily you can't just  cannot change what the joint tenancy interests are said to hold the exception you know the exception to that rule as outlined in fukunaga is where you have a collateral agreement that's between two parties in the same side of the deed and that's that makes sense because in that context you don't have the same issues of third parties relying on the deed or needing to be able to and that policy that enforces that i think in whether you're talking about a claim overbought of a presumption does the defendants argue that he's making an exception to an exception but i would say that this takes the case really from the exception just back into the general rule of full evidence rule applies in the face of the deep controls well i'm i'm on the he's overlooking completely that there's two different analyses there it just seems to me that the this is question where the bankruptcy work judge says there would be a den a code for the evidence in the first and be with decided in both cases yes it's in the context of a different way yes that involves a different legal moniker but it doesn't change the fact that the same issue was litigated decided it was essential to the judgement which is i think what happened w view and looks at a premarital agreement as evidence of what was intended by the d and so there are many cases i think where the intent of the parties or reformation actually goes outside it doesn't make any sense to me how you could even argue reformation and that there was a mistake of intent if you can't present evidence that what you had was well that's your promise not saying that he's just saying that it's that it's only limited to the context works the parties on the sort of same same side right in not not with respect to an action involving a third party as the trustee is here who would be arguing that what the intent of the deed was in this case is the henshaws in the debtor's right because they're the ones that me and me had an intent when they created the first not the second you they were trying to avoid by a third party coming in after the fact and saying what you did here is clearly a project advance because you transferred half the values for no apparent value that there is plenty of value that was given but that's convincing standard that should be applied which is a fairly high standard in this case and you present your evidence and you find out what the judge makes a determination of but you can't just say that that's you're just out of luck you don't get a reason to provide a defense that doesn't make any sense at all to me and that especially not in the context of a you're trying to reform a d that's a very different issue and i think i tried to argue this prior but the henshaws couldn't argue reformation the first because they didn't think what they had done was a mistake it was until the bankruptcy or rule in the first case that the mistake became apparent and i said well wait a minute that's not was that's not what we're trying to do and in the first case the issue was completely different than the catch is what we did what we did was there was beneficial interest and there was a title interest and those are separate thing we should be able to write evidence i still believe if he will provide evidence that proves what those relative interest were in that property i go back to my law school you know property is a bundle of sticks and you have to talk or use one of the sticks and in this case you're basically saying the stick is what it is because those on the deed cannot provide any evidence to any part of that ticket or part of the bond which you asking us to do i gather is look at whether or not we have jurisdiction and the issue became up in this case is when the henshaws from the trustee agreed to sell the property now there is an issue that just comes up on a magically a that is whether or not this moves any appeal that we might have there was an agreement between them that it could have her it's in for important we have to confirm whether or not we have jurisdiction in this case the appeal itself was concerned both the dismissal under section six three six three and and they allowing  obvious that we have to make a decision on it in order to determine whether we have jurisdiction to hear the appeal the second appeal so i wanted to give you a chance and it's very hard you have many chance research this issue yet  ouldn't the properties already been sold what hasn't already been sold and so if if it is sold under the stipulation why what would that do with the reformation case well it which is what were the underlying rights that became that pot of money at the end of the day has the property been sold yet it is ok well we'll give this some thought but i want to get your initial view and i thank