medical services rendered by its certified physician after he arrives at the transfer hospital assumes care in transports the patient to another hospital we suggest that the answer to that question should be in the affirmative the yes there is a meaning for two reasons the first reason is that immunity is conferred in this situation by section three point one five zero eight c m s affirmatively plain language of that section supports answering the a for answering the sort of question in the affirmative before i specifically turn to the language i just want to emphasize that on three occasions in front of the  court that court has interpreted either section a or its predecessor section eight and has confirmed that that language is clear and that that language is broad and has specifically rejected at times i pla to narrow the scope of section eight turning now to section eight if you guinn's with any person the certified physician in this case is certainly any person the legislature in drafting that specifically meant to keep the class of the time for defendants brought up who can take advantage of the immunity you can notice in section eight that the legislature did not list any specific trades or professions if they felt comfortable with any person now of course immediately following any person you you can see that they narrow or that they further define what person would be entitled to immunity in the do so by giving us a that we do not rely upon the edges of certified physician to suggest that he sort of fit under the act a certified flight physician is a physician who undergoes specific training with you can't the university of chicago area medical network and that the reason why we feel that he is licensed or authoress pursuant to the act we can get to that answer in two ways if we look at it from a rough picture and if we take a step back and look at exactly what university chicago hospital does here it's obvious that dr strain was licensed or authorized pursuant to the act let me stress a few things the university of chicago hospitals is one of very few e m s resource hospitals that is a very  regional plans pursuant to section three point two five and three point three of the act what the undisputed record shows and i believe it specifically page six or one of the record shows and some contradict that the design of the e m s system in regional plans specifically licensed you can into that plan so this everette is so as you can is specifically licensed into that plan you can is nothing other than a program made up patient well the the differences is remarkably vast if we look at the record and specifically of pages two thirty six to thirty one and to thirty seven dr frank explains what he did immediately after immediately putting him on the gurney immediately engaging in manual ventilation of this boy to keep him breathing in order to get him to point b to get a from a dangerous situation to hopefully a situation of safety and that is not what an emergency room doctor does a true quintessential emergency and that a true quintessential emergency room doctor doesn't have to necessarily run from one house will to another affect he never does or she never dies there in the emergency room certainly handling tough cases or what would be called emergency cases but that quintessential e r physician is not at a moment's notice jumping in a helicopter perhaps and or whether or even great but that physician is absolutely not jumping into an ambulance and running deafening i mean in the previous argument i was sitting in the gallery and the ambulance came by i could barely think dr strain as a sort of fight flight physician every certified physician is part of you can that's the situation under which they practice are right and this is the exact situation that i think this court so eloquently said in gleason versus peoria emergency situations are often fraught with tension confusion and as your difficult physical locations for care emergency personnel must not be afraid to do whatever they can under less than ideal circumstances and so and so i understand that that's plaintiff's theme that they want this court to believe that what university of chicago has done and has been doing for years pursuant to their v m s system a reasonable plan is simply sending your physicians to do your work at other people's gardens absolutely not back to strain the record shows arrived at that you kind of only made up of sort of five five positions and sort of like like nurses well then we suggest that the conclusion immediately follows that the certified physician is the least licensed or authorized under this act the act creates the resource hospital the described by virtue of his membership into you can assist in a program that's already licensed into the act he's authorized to do what you can train some to do that's the first answer the second answer is a very micro which is why i was moving next in my argument is that if you push everything aside and look specifically only at the date in question providence of university of chicago he was authorized because dr blumenthal can't go and that's why we said absolutely there is a specific off there's a yeah and it would seem to be under three point one five day that would entitle him to mean this yes this is his chemicals absolutely i mean him and therefore the university of chicago hospital which is being held into this case under three alternative argument well before i get the alternative argument let me let me remind the court i suppose i don't need to but this court will remember the washington decision i know mr bunning dusting a counsel table because he was the lawyer in washington and in washington versus  evanston this court was confronted with a physician and obstetrical resident who was drafted into duty by p you must directors designee coincidentally friend e m s resource possible st francis and in that case this court was presented with with that series of facts and was confronted with is this an a in unity situation or a b and unity situation now dr clamp them in that case who was the o b resident was handling  her emergency over the telephone at the specific instructions of of the most medical directors does it need and that case the support we recheck today you did not give her immunity and the reasons for not giving her immunity people meaning that there are any person he would argue that strain was also immune under b because you were supervising the nurse essentially yes essentially yes i mean there's really to be arguments t he certainly isn't your honor and and you'll notice from the record that at a certain point in this litigation plaintiffs decided to make judicial admissions during contested here ice and that they are that they want to they want to somehow they want to keep the nurse out of the deposition testimony in the nurses deposition testimony that they are a transfer team in the in the most in the most true sense of the work they're there they don't have the luxury of being in an emergency room please hand me this  clear and in simple terms it is to prevent e m s personnel from wired civil liability when they are rendering emergency and non emergency care soup patients and this is because as counsel pointed out these emergency situations are are difficult and they are some sometimes required to make split second decisions your honour's excuse me just as dr strange was an emergency room condition at providence by dr bowman dr strange was acting as an emergency room physician when he went to providence and provided care and treatment to dannielle as outlined in our honor i believe there's a difference between this case and the cases that the courts of decided on in the past the physicians in those cases were never providing you must personnel includes emergency medical responders first responders emergency medical distractors measures emergency medical technicians paramedics emergency communications section eight said like one that the legislature intended when they said any person i don't believe that any person would include an e r physician who is held to a completely different standard of broadening the scope of immunity in this case and in future cases to include emergency physicians who are on ambulances or provide care in the trance the the transporting  hospital as well as when the ambulance and then subsequent to the transport including at their own hospital would be disastrous it would lessen the standard of care that is required for emergency room physicians in the hospital from now on could just send the emergency room physicians on ambulances have them medically treat the patients at the transporting hospital and then they would be immune from negligence  getting getting these ill people to hospitals that are capable of taking care of them and when they come out of hospitals that don't have the facility i agree it also requires that the scope of their practice and what they're authorized to do physicians are not included in that they don't have in the definitions portion of the act they don't have physicians included as c m s personnel or or even any person who would be included and provided immunity in this situation i will the cases that have been cited stated the primary purpose of the immunity provision to encourage emergency medical response without the threat of malpractise liability for every bad outcome or unfortunate occurrence when rendering medical assistance and emergency situations medical personnel should not be afraid to do whatever they can under less than ideal circumstances that is this is not effective your argument to to deny the highest of standard of care that's going to require not require them to do what they would have needed to do if they were in the emergency room if they were in the emergency room providing treatment to a patient in these stressful and difficult times which is what emergency rooms often consist of they would be held to a standard of care that same standard of care should be her fire in there and the other hospital the hospital where the patients being transported from well when they're in their out their own hospital that we the transfer perform aggressive against my management in treatment prior to his transfer address the worsening rest recipe turi feel you prior to his transfer were recognized the improper  believe the during his transfer would include going from the bay at the university chicago to the  duty provision specifically states supervision it says no person including any private or governmental organization or institution that admin assistant authorize supports finances educates or supervise the functions what i'm having difficulty with the argument because there's no question that the curse is that there's no question drive him in it and there's no question that the whole reason he's transport is because  horribly ill child yes you get with the intensive care unit and yet you're willing to concede the immunization the nurse and the driver and not the doctor who's caring for him can you imagine what sat by the director o a child who's in the of emergency the emergency treatment we're simply arguing that that doctor should be held to the same standard that he would be held if he were practicing emergency medicine as he was trying to do so in medical school that he would do in the emergency room he was in an emergency room a private he was not in an ambulance it was not driving there's no evidence that there was no one what is the point of having them unity as i stated before is that we should not wear the letters legislature has stated before that we should not allow we should not have these  this because physicians are trained in medical school emergency room physicians are trained specifically for emergency situations they are told what to do in these situations they have more training than nurses they're not like e m s and in teas and paramedics they have more training in experience and that's why we have this professional negligence in the first place because i guess but the point of the matter is like a minute anybody even if your argument is well i mean you know if they violate their standard of care they should be awful why should it be any different are yes ok that's right looking at it now exactly i've i don't believe that it does justice to just look at section three point one five zero for immunity from a mess personnel and he was not covered by the act although he was authorized to act by doctor by doctor back you know through dr bloom and dr strange performed an emergency medical as a scope of services under section three point five and those scope of services if you look at dr strains here and that he provided as a transfer physician he falls into almost every single one of them the most the most the most obvious one listed in three points i team we're engaged into hospital transfer care that's specifically listed in three point plan so that would be my answer again the second plaintiff plaintiff really wants to pigeonhole this case into into the filing proposition if you're limit any person but you must personnel and referred to the defined term in the statute and said look there for any person and sort of putting any person they could have put any e m s person or any personnel as defined under and under the section incorporated by reference they did not do that in fact a section b when they do use the phrase elegy you must personnel what we have is of the same legislature in two different portions of the act using different words obviously the canons of construction i think would teach us that they intended for them to have different meanings but one of the most telling from my perspective in sort of from a fairness perspective is that she agrees or plaintiff agrees that the e m s medical director has immunity and nobody would disagree with that i suppose but what a what a sort of ironic immunity but the guy who goes out in the field and actually performs emergency care doesn't i think that would you know also right peter drucker didn't do anything he didn't run your medical treatment certainly certainly right so there's no medical malpractise case against him