in morning we're ready for our next case which is case number four fifteen zero nine zero to the people of the state of illinois says mark is burke and for the appellant we have a shepherd and for the actually we have this sha support this case presents a question of statutory construction in order to receive the credit against the one hundred sixty days speedy trial term provided by speedy trial and subsection b what type of demand must a defendant may while in custody and identify a written speedy trial demand files after his release on bail that would open up publish decision has addressed that specific question of the construction of  automatic i mean when you're in custody and i realize we're looking at b but just to back up a little bit when you're in custody you have that right you don't have to make any type of demand as long as you don't occasion delay so i don't understand why you would assert that there has to be some type of speedy trial demand when a person is the past is of course we're talking about what credit they get for that if they are re we're certain that your honor because subsection requires a demand made by a study in order to get credit against a one hundred sixty day term from the time that such a demand is made and trial has been construed as me the demand for speedy trial but do you agree that a person who's in custody they don't have to make a demand for a speedy trial they don't have to make a demand for  cases that we cited in our brief apply it even in the speed trial context so it's true as applied to defendants they don't their arguments that they don't make in the trial court this court does review those arguments if they to forfeited arguments the only argument that might be subject to a stop all is one that doesn't apply to the statutory construction so here this case involve issues statutory construction it involves an issue of first impression which the supreme court in what was the supreme court in that case that ice hoffman applied addressed and argue that wasn't the state defendants and the parties and everyone who's guidance as to how that should be applied so in the state does have substantial right that's been recognized in cases including eluded spin alluded to in the supreme court limited authority to dismiss criminal charges prior to trial so and in the trial court the prosecutor talked about the statute talked about the cases and didn't make a this prosecutor talked about this and went so far as to kind of explore the case one the statute didn't get as far as we did on appeal in answering that question what does it mean under this trial at subsection be a demand for trial do you agree that you agree that on april thirtieth twenty fifteen the defendants made their initial demand for trial they were stone asleep but they needed me and they made a demand for a jury trial but that was not a demand for of cases that are cited in those decisions that say no if you say even i'm ready for trial right now i demand a jury trial i demand a trial that's not enough you have to say i d go in the cases that they cite so if a defendant says i'm ready for a trial i object to the state's request for a continuance i'm demanding trial that's not enough force the trial that's not enough under cases that so these are these are arguments that were addressed below they're not exactly the same as what we argued below they didn't go as far as saying well this is what the answer is they did talk about these are the cases this is that the of the apps and again the language of the act every reference in the end to demand has always been construed as meaning a demand for speedy trial and it has to speedy doesn't appear anywhere in the x and again that so that it's clear that it has to be made under this provision under the speedy trial it therefore has to be a demand for speed that they never made a demand for the trial while the custody so even if this court found that we were stopped from making that delay argument that would be irrelevant to the statutory structure that would make issue one were twenty one days that passed from april ninth through april thirtieth as to mr burke that should be twenty two days and that there were ten days as to mr lillard between april twentieth of april thirtieth that should be eleven days they're both one day short i apologize for that say have multiple hurdles to overcome in this case the first of which is that it did not it raises arguments for the first time on appeal that i did not raise or the ground court that denied my clients of the opportunity to respond to those arguments deny the trial court the opportunity to rule on those issues state to use narrow term technical interpretations of speedy trial act as a sword to poke holes in that statutory burden rather than as a shield to protect it from defendants who are apparently trying to avoid prosecution parties in the trial court in this case were all following the local customs and practices of how a defendant invokes their right to a speedy trial in vermillion county would be fundamentally unfair to now for the first time appeal say that that mutual understanding was not valid i'd like to first address a mutual understanding that when defense counsel answered ready for trial but that was understood by everybody in the room to be an objection for purposes of subsection a under the objection or demands being required but that was considered an miss shepherd's position is that speedy is the magic word if there is one i would suggest that demand is the important word because that's a word that triggers to everybody in the room particularly statement deserves to be on notice that we are demanding a speedy trial in this case when counsel on the abrupt thirtieth asked that the record reflect their demand for a jury trial a jury trials an automatic right to have a constitutional right to a jury trial as defendant everybody wanted it so it was important that she said she's demanding trial that's what the language of the statute requires is a written or oral demand for trial and that's exactly what defense counsel did here is demanded a trial it was inferred by everyone in the room that made no objection to the court's construction of that and we know from people being more than announcing ready for trial phone is insufficient to serve as a demand but that statement coupled with the court's construction and the lack of objection but that does constitute i mean case you're talking about that says well bad company by no objection by the state makes it that way but some nebulous i understand your concern your honor in this case i don't believe that is a  then argue that it was not clear in the back this that the state explicitly conceded that there were no delays attributable to the defense in that case of the state had two opportunities in this case to raise any concern i had about a delay being attributable to the defense that it was not clear that there had been a speedy trial demand it seems to me but that's kind of like the practice down there in the score so whether it's worked in the snow so but they way you're right i mean i know that the state conce in particular the state did seem to have that same understanding that when defense counsel that answer ready on july sixth as defense counsel objecting to the state heard the practices of the local custom and again that i mean that the exactly what this court is looking mean we were demanding a trial in ambiguous language and things that are not clear that's not what happened in this case in this case we know that the state's attorney was fully aware that the term was running the state conceded that it was aware that one hundred twenty days under subsection seventy four days from april thirtieth to october twenty first so in this case we don't have to resolve whether or not we're going to look at the date of harassed or the date of the first demand we can just look to the data that first demand and we know that that's one hundred seventy four days which does to make a delay they closed that and then counsel jacket and then filed the written demands right away so i think that there's no concern in this case that any of the demands were premature also looking to court al the problem for dell end that's the demand and so is it your position that you have to literally say the word speedy you do and salute and that's what the case is holding there are cases that are cited in those cases that support that state say the same thing all of the arguments opposing counsel made as to delays again that's a great hearing as to the statutory construction that relates to whether or not counted from the date of that to let the issue here whether or not it has to do with whether or not the case turns out whether or not and it's established and it's their burden to establish a  demand no they did not because the only demanding was for a jury trial on april thirtieth at the end of the preliminary hearing they didn't make a demand for speedy trial the statute requires the statutes language says they have to demand demand for trial so if you were to construe subsection b s reference to demand for trial as only meaning a simple demand for trial that would mean that every other reference in the act would have to because your honor it's an issue of statutory construction subject to the noble review it's an issue of first impression it's an important issue which has been addressed by this court in cases  including well has been addressed and so the clearly there is guidance needed on this issue and and also because the prosecutor in good faith said what is the answer and and