and it was a one year commitment and the commitment extended i think twice and had actually been released in an outpatient to the vice program the ninth circuit held that the appeal in the ninth circuit and to hear this petition was not moved and the reason why not moot was because this was a case that was being repetitious not in a general scheme of things but for him individually he was continually stuff that you seeing recommitment or think we can we can grant relief on we can't reach second guess the california appellate court ruling that that did not constitute a ground under the state statute to challenge the law past behavior and that that that doesn't have anything to do with the fact that he was initially custody but for him being in custody you cannot be committed on the s p p act that's what he has to do with it well i understand that that's the predicate but that's not the issue that the jury fourth amendment taint sort of an argument that that said that somehow pervades the fact finding by the jury that he does in fact meet the standard under the statute and and in the face of that california tell a court grounds for continuing to keep you in custody that's ok but i but that's where i'm that's where i lose you it's that's the grounds on which you're captain cassidy now the grounds on which you're kept in custody or the jury finding by proof beyond a reasonable doubt that you meet the standard of chance to address the issues and make a decision on the limited facts before it this is the same situation just seems to never have happened the fact that once you give him due process rights for something that should never have happened doesn't erase the fact that this wasn't supposed to occur and the court really is a changed argument there that follows him all the way through no matter how many of these commitments here correct because he was never supposed to be in the first place i understand your argument ok it's also an equal protection violation  sense that if he is just like their body else who was our own parole and obey the law and bail conditions of parole he like everybody else in that situation should not be committed and then just racial discrimination you don't have too much trouble seeing that it doesn't help to say when he's dissimilar scituate because he's black he's similar situated if he has the same as anyone else for example for employment  the state the only way the state could have initiated proceedings against him would be that he would have to reassess and and then become in custody as a result of of another sexual assault while he was out well that's wh put people in custody because they decide they need psychiatric treatment well what the court held that that's unconstitutional it was basically held to be holding to be quite honest is that it was beyond me it just fine mental illness more broadly he was find anywhere else in california statutory commitment schemes and other words on any other commitment scheme in california be mental illness i mean the equal protection clause you cannot say that because the one that starts the thing that we're going to broaden the definition for those people what mental illness means wouldn't violate without violating new president sane custody isn't required on because when they say it is required you can't put them there illegally in order to make them qualify well the state as i understand it kind of state court that reviewed that issue i believe has sort of said if it's a good faith error or something like that so if the state simply said well criminal conviction you can't presume collateral consequences from an order under the specially violent predator law and the response petitioner has suggested one particular collateral consequence to qualified as a especially violent predator for the first commitment they were acting in good faith so that means that there is no a sexual release that the court can grant as to the current two thousand commitment order that it issued before the court doesn't expire until august i don't so like to touch briefly on the capable of repetition yet evading review exception and in this case well there are two prongs to that one is that the action must be of cases can do if they're concerned about justice the ability if asked for their field to be expedited making astronaut in california court of appeal they can ask for it and the district court they can ask for that in this court and that didn't happen in this case but i think the burden has to be on every at every level of the california court system there and so he could if he wanted to file an original petition with directly with the california supreme court yes he could i think he actually did that at one point or another point in other point as to the capable of repetition yet evading review requirement has to this particular case in the second prong of that is that there must be a reasonable expectation that the same complaining party will be subject to the same action again and i think the court had a lot of discussion about that but in this case there is one challenge that is a facial challenge to the statute but really that the primary arguments deal with his claim that he went in unlawful cut to the when the first commitment or had a good faith attempt to put him in custody that first time so under state law even if even if the court found that the two thousand commitment order was invalid that wouldn't matter because they proceeded under that commitment order in good faith so this second commitment order the two thousand  finding that there was good faith and that factual finding is binding on this court and hasn't been rebutted so that's that's really over and done with but even if there was some question about it in this case the defendant rate the total of fo would think that might have even been a reason not to get a grant on that last argument and i think that that question is the separate question of whether the action is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling governmental interest and the governmental interest in this case could hardly be more compelling it's to protect the public from a very narrow subclass of people and the question here is whether the state courts determination on that point was reasonable well subjectively reasonable and the way the state court interpreted supreme court law that it's unclear whether there are any people that fall into either one of those categories i'm not aware of any cases where a person was simply released under that statute who didn't otherwise qualify for th identify confine and treat them under the s b p a a doesn't violate equal protection that the court decision is not an unreasonable application of the log equal protection and finally on the equal protection violation based on the definition of a mental disorder it's true that the f p p eight has a slightly different definition it includes personality disorders as well as mental disorders but in kansas we hundreds court made it very clear that you can define that natural disorder in many different ways medical terms are necessarily abstract the supreme court itself use a variety of different terms to describe the kind of mental thank you thank you