in a very standard list you know unfair fashion it's an important case because it needs to establish sound rules for governing fee awards in hybrid nasty action class action will geisha where the settlement three thousand total hours by one thousand dollars clients you've got less than four hours apiece that is a reasonable amount of work when you consider the necessity of explaining the case and the plan having the client understand their options and thousands of individual plans you can opt out and prosecute individual actions and then do you see how i get out in many instances in order to be able to prosecute individual actions you can't just write off that time that's necessary time judge lunchtime found that it was important time that i mean with gentle entry found that it was very important there were thousands of individual cases and with out back time there would not say from there from minnesota because you have these you know these thousands of lawsuits but then when you come in it comes time to do the nd phase of the analysis same within minnesota within kansas within illinois and dividing up that piece of the pie it seems to me that the problem that the jury didn't buy that the cause of the problem is that contingency fees in many of the johnson factors or empathetic over the whole notion of allocating a common benefit because one of the problems that existed in minnesota for example is that you have hundreds of law plans because for example you had caught that for example we're litigating individual cases they weren't litigating him to heel were any of the class action so they were litigate they were spending these these thousands of hours in that wasn't nearly enough because if that's an important factor you need to pay the lawyers at least their lone star you can't write off you know the vast majority of their time by putting them in the  lot of hours that doesn't mean that those hours correlate to a contribution to the result settlement and so those two things aren't necessarily the same in effect or case or recognize in fact the lodestar in eager to contingent c c agreement that they entered without which there would not have been the individual actions putting the pressure on syngenta or else it won't start because that's the attorney's musical hourly rate multiplied by the hours  that's got still got the largest chunk of the pie of that money that was out there my complaint isn't the kansas that too little money my complaint is that people in the kansas who thousands of clients in illinois state court and then they turn around and take the time and the hours that they've been talking about and they give themselves the money multipliers exceeding three in this court and rosen calculations that various fractions in percentages and and well across it st of all and you don't include any common benefit works that you would have been able to collect from one of the other  other than the individual poll and i think you have to look at the total failure in one of the problems i have is we don't know yet what the some certain is for any of the attorneys in this case as it's a common fund a so it's all relative to who did the most work to benefit the stat on him but i don't know how we come we compare the relative aramis of these awards notice an appeal we noticed appeals from these orders thinking that there is some risk someone might think their final but we didn't think they are we don't think that we're going to have a final appealable or quite frankly until there's a final earth of cool order w the appeals and start over again when you're been allocated another option would be to abate these of these appeals recognizing that your pool is now in the final stages the deadline for filing appeals from the initial proposed urban allocation was i think extended from february th to march th so it's currently in the appeals process i think there's likely to be a final order on the where we were determined that we don't have jurisdiction do we have jurisdiction to there to put this thing on hold again in a way i mean what's the more what would be the basis for us to do that i think the basis for doing that would be that there is a contest regarding jurisdiction there are arguments that are being made on both sides of whether there is furious detuned or not you know and knowing that there will be jurisdictions soon the most efficient course may be to abate sometimes federal courts do not operate on the principle of efficiency as i'm sure you know and beyond that beyond that if yes you would be efficient but i guess what i'm struggling with and frankly given i know the amount of inter and they kicked it to the merits panel for a determination as to whether we have jurisdiction which is and i don't want to keep eating up your time on this issue but it is it is one that i've given no short measure of thought to and i and i'm and i'm just struggling to mean we're sitting here hearing these eloquent arguments and we were way beyond it seems to me where we've traditionally referred it back to the district court to consider the rights that were sitting on it and and and i guess what i'm trying to and i'm not trying to make light of this is i think it's a very significant as you what i'm trying to understand is given the posture that we're in now you know at this late stage in the game are we still situated to back away from the jurisdictional issue and just say we're going to  jurisdiction i think it would be a good things are there because i think that on your side there was advocacy for lifting the abatement under the notion that the earth who distribution would be essentially a ministerial act un well if everybody stands to get a cut all of the appellant's fan to get a cut i soon learned your side to stand to get a cut from the school and there is no some certain as to what the attorney's fees will be and that are that in the prejudgment proceedings because you're trying to decide what is the universe that would make an appropriate appellate unit right and the appropriate appellate unit here in our view we met that bird because the com allocated and what what she what she said that year it was it would not change my recommendation as to how you allocate it because the guiding principle for the future terminations here are the allocation was what was the relative contribution of each of the individual offer us and the jurisdictions and that's not going to change based on how much you know that you spot them for gets versus how much someone else gets because the work that we went into reason was the about that they're going to get individually doesn't d change their relative contributions which we then that other interests which is what the district court cited well in my i mean we can't decide what's affected the special masters recommendation but it seems that it will inevitably affect how we adjudicate mr isaacson's argument for example that possibly is only getting six thousand so there's going to be an average and remember even be his plot his share of the earth was going to be compared to everyone else you hire lawyers not to the people who get so the notion that the idea that sometimes they raise that if you hired a lawyer you probably a bigger farmer probably is not going to impact your will but i understand the point that you're making on the practical matter obviously the amount that we have suggested they're likely to get there and if you know they would say that about misty well ok so if they get class actions and the other work that was undertaken by the attorneys office subsequent pieces of litigation no one was better equipped than the special master who oversaw the settlement negotiations and the three and the other herbalists may have filed lawsuits for thousands of individuals but those lawsuits are over ninety nine percent of those were state for the entire course of the litigation and when subsequent work was required they were compensated separately from the jurisdictional pools for that work second the with respect to the argument regarding the lute starr the so purported and almost entirely reconstructed lodestar of the kansas felons didn't have to consider the lodestar and in a common fund allocation it was required to consider the johnson factors correct the johnson factors i believe are is what th effectively considered and that argument as i understand it from the kansas apa least is that while the port considered them at one stage to be to fit to determine the overall size of the aggregate attorneys the and even the allocation on month olds it didn't consider the johnson factors with respect to individual allocations within  matters is relative path vision among the attorneys the litigation and the district more clearly considered that and i would argue that his consideration takes into account the fact that you know results achieve there is absolutely no evidence that was presented on appeal to stir that particular million dollars and liability there were billions of dollars at stake in the remaining certified class of this object to have to go to trial in the twelve months after the settlement was reached you know if they had not said so this was a case hours on cases that were state that's in the record that includes them and their ability to counsel so there is just never an explanation as to why these numbers were so high given the limited amount of work that the attorney to the kansas fun and once it was allocated to the kansas fund and the judge put them in charge of divvy up the fees within the kansas will at that point they started attacking troops kaufman's lodestar you know it was way they relied on it when they certain the fund is attorneys fees they relied on it when they got almost half of that sent to the kansas will for them to allocate they can't then turn around and say oh but we don't like to soften lodestar a hostile slow start that way it's just not right then you you can look to common fund principles in fact that is what out in mccutcheon well that is what happened in that section but here you've got retainer agreements that say thirty percent or that say i did not mean to say that you're all i heard you say that's true and so yeah i think there's a need for clarification i mean what i meant but i think i meant to say was that we're not trying to enforce these agreements against the clients at this point what i'm saying is the judge could not abrogate those hands without ensuring that we would get similar payment also you want a better deal than the continued fee agreement because in the contingency grima you'd be responsible for all of the expenses i'm here the court has the expenses being paid by out of the plaintiff's recovery and not add the attorneys one rd in the mints the expenses would come from the one rd assigned to the attorneys right i mean i'm not i'm not certain your honor but the fact is that we're not trying to get a better deal then the contingency agreements we're trying to get the deal of the contingency agreements if you override the agreement you want to make sure that the lawyers get paid what they had into the agreement because the amount is reasonable and maybe three months or even in the record if i understand mr wilders right so i mean how how talking about what the up was because of the geographic holes and so the point would be whether they would have been presented in the when the t v was taking place well that right well i think the way the whole thing was done as a problem we objected at the outset that you don't know how things are going to work out with this for cool three judge process you don't have in standards here you ought to wait until we know what the claims are and have the hard fa geographic per se the concept of geographic the concept of the geographic pools was a mental problem for two spot men because we didn't know how this stuff is going to come to say i when it comes to abatement or dismissal i can't come up with a good reason for why you would have power to abate all right thank you council as i indicated before going to the honorable judges of the united states appellants and i think that you have been given quite a bit of information very useful information by esteemed counsel on both sides of the kansas of one of the things that i believe was asked was regarding finality and whether or not this court had the authority to abate pending additional orders coming down and i wanted to direct this court perhaps to a couple of cases that might be in somewhat instructive on this issue there's a case in the th circuit or don't as o r d o in easy versus aviation and while the appeal was pending there was a motion to reconsider in a district court this court abated the appeal and then when the final judgment came down the court lifted the abatement and an amended notice of appeal was filed there are a couple of other the bowen case the abatements there was an abatement after oral argument after briefing there was a supreme court decision in another case and this court lifted the abatement and ordered supplemental briefing so this court does have the option entertain bowen and may have i don't know the case but i mean it's not unusual that we would have a supreme court case that would be looming and we would just wait for the supreme court case that's that's the but distinct matter from the question of whether as a matter of article three subject matter jurisdiction we have appellate jurisdiction at the side of the thing and whether we therefore can say ok even though we have serious doubts about her jurisdiction will they will take action to abate and allow for further proceedings to go on so that's of the sinks in that i think is relevant here and were the were these cases addressing that type of situation and not specifically  but i think they are still instructive on the issue and i also think it's interesting because my clients the shield law group and kohlberg law firm actually argued both sides of this finality argument and the finality issue initially we argued that it was final or final enough if you look at the interface case it was a long long term case there were a lot of things going on  a lot of feel orders coming down in the court said it is finally enough for us to take a look at it and it's rendering a decision now would smooth the road later on for the additional fee awards that would be coming down we later argued look we know that or we had been told back in early two thousand and twenty that the order was going to come down very soon and based on that we said well let's go ahead and keep the matter abated obviously that order hasn't come down although now we think it may very soon there's been some some movement in the trial court in the district court to rearrange the money so that payments could go out under the earth so we believe that based on that that maybe there will be a final word coming down in the earth nevertheless hopefully we have tried to address your your jurisdictional and finality concerns and if i may i would like to jump into the issue that is is somewhat separate from the tubes coffman issue the kansas issue and that is the joint prosecution agreement and you know if you take a step back and you think this is just attorneys fighting about money and we think it's actually more than that  it it factors into whether or not individual clients can hire contingent fee a turns because there was the mass action the individual e represented plaintiffs which my clients represented and then there was the class action and as this thing progressed as as this thing came towards settlement the mass actions were along with the class actions and that's how the one pool for pop process came down there was an initial term sheet that would have separated of two mass action and class action that term sheet was rejected by certain attorneys in favor of this for pop process so the individual e are the individual clients that my clients represented could have opted out of this class settlement but what would have happened if they had done now is according to the terms of the class action of the class which the district court certify and pursuant to the terms of the syngenta agreement the farmers that my clients represented would not have been able to even get a true ask for a trial date until a year after the settlement program had ended and as we know that settlement program is still ongoing so based on the fact that that the farmer's claims are cases would have been delayed indefinitely that there were potentially millions at risk for the farmers my clients had to do what was best for those farmers and that is recommend that they be lumped into the class then the court says ok we're going to separate it into the four pot process and much like  common in the kansas situation the the coolie counsel for minnesota the minnesota council took the hours that my clients devoted to the individual clients took those hours to justify the one rd total attorney's fees and then once they justified the one dollar rd term total attorneys fees then they told my clients that their hours were being cuts that that was a truly common benefit and the result of that was all of this time that my clients had spent on doing court order that time was cut when when minnesota lead counsel told the court that the p f s is where common benefits in the truest sense that is their quote in the truest sense they get the one rd and then they cut out my clients and the purpose of that was so that leadership could walk away with in my client's situation between six dollars and eight million dollars more because my clients were denied their hourly lodestar and how did how did the joint prosecution react to that i mean what's what is their significance in your argument i'm trying to get clear i'm sure yes your honor so the joint plot joint prosecution agreement that j p a was entered into very early on in the case before the class was certified it was an agreement between a minnesota counsel and kansas counsel and the that provided for the division of fees in the events that there was a so the j p a was in place everybody operated under the terms of the g p a when the kansas case went to trial my clients who were assigned to the minnesota had their kit many of their cases in the minnesota pool were they were positive with the damages experts in kansas for the benefit of the kansas case so you've got firms who are working across borders here including my clients but then at the last minute case was settled then there was a last minute what we like to refer to as the secret feed ial among certain attorneys not including byrd and shields and that secret feel that last minute renegotiation of of how fees should be distributed which majority of counsel did not agree to  changed the j p it changed how the course should distribute the fees and that is the agreement that the court relied on to distribute this money into the four pots the court aiming the court gave it said it's what supported the decision that the court i mean i think the argument that the court basically said i'm just following this isn't really consistent with the contributions of the various law firms and the court did rely on the last minute fee distribution agreement among some firms it did give some weight clients completed these over four thousand plaintiff actions that the court required and then the court then it depends on the value of that p obviously thought was necessary invaluable to the overall litigation then the court decided that if you are happened to be assigned to the minnesota pool that plaintiff factsheet is only worth three hundred dollars but if you had the benefit or the luxury of being assigned to the kansas pool that same path actually was worth six hundred dollars and i agree with you that's difficult to to justify thank you your honor we believe it is was it not that is what the courts said that is what the court said were did you make this j p a argument before that this record the i do not i do not have the exact psyche and type birds and objections wouldn't be our objections unless we adopted them or stated them on our own already and so the point is going to be whether when when you cited preservation issues cited where you reserved arguments in you that premise because because when i started looking through the briefing it wasn't clear to me that every argument that was girl made and that is now before us were and that your clients made individually and or adopted series but you accept the premise that you either have to adopt it or you have to make right correct and to the extent we did not make it clear in our brief your honor we can provide you with a citation to where we made those objections and preserve the issue for appeal lawyers that were battling for the piece of the pie in reality is there were just a whole bunch board in minnesota that it wasn't the i would say that one if the j p a had been followed that wouldn't have been a concern at all or if there j p had been considered and not completely thrown out then the allocation as far as who got what is on the p f s as would not be as as a big concern or a concern at all and secondly with respect to the the force of the j p or the force of the p f ss which jurisdictions were more important even if you assume that that is valid that th earlier j p the earlier p f s has meant more than later submitted p f s then it was incumbent we believe on the district court to decide which of those p f twice as much to kansas than they did in minnesota i'd say your position is if you want to st of all i'm not sure that that that the court the minnesota state court did not all that they had diminishing value in fact just the opposite everyone keeps quoting the part of that situation where the court is restating the position of the c l seeds position on that point but even if you were go is that they diminish when you have to decide what date they were collected and say ok up to this date no matter which state your hand they have this value but after this date they have a different value and i don't see anything that explains why geography matters more than date if you're saying that they diminish in value because at some point you have enough to put the fear in in suggest a suggestion to an additional ones of diminishing returns which difference does it make if it's kansas or illinois or minnesota i would not disagree geography seem to matter a lot and how the distributions were made well that's the point geography and not timing i mean if it is geography if it's diminishing yes but it's not temporarily necessarily diminished value is diminishing value a p f s is in connection with lawyers contributing to the result and so if the if the p f s is are linked to lawyers who are contributing to the result of this contributing more than minnesota then that logic is not strictly one of a time line is that it is not strictly a time time line no it's also a matter of common benefit contribution  now as to who contributed more why should think that because there has to be there has to be a way for attorneys and their clients to to go into litigation having a reasonable basis on which to know how they are going to be compensated and if if contracts at the beginning which the law favors are completely disregard then it then how can clients pursue cases how can contention the attorneys take cases and how can mass actions survive and not let everything be subsumed by class actions in which we all know that in class hacks and it's usually not the client's it's not the plaintiffs it's not the injured who recover it's usually the attorney's so the client the law i believe is very clear that the x and take contracts provide substantial basis for which to court in which the courts should rely and should consider in evaluating what the parties understood that their contributions would be and i see that i am out of time and i'd be happy to continue answering refers to additional minnesota council individual cases and in that provision as the abilities noted it specifically refers to the subject matter of the joint prosecution agreement as big the record the the a dent them says there are other lawyers like bert shields that can become party to this regional agreement and in doing that it's out in that referring to individual cases well that's right but that's the same provision that allowed bergenfield ever to become a party to the ring that it all so so the very provision that allowed the minnesota cases that my clients had were obviously individual cases right so when the and a dent in was created it was because they needed my client's cases to be filed in minnesota to create more pressure on syngenta and even though the j p a refers to individual clients that's what my individual farmers individual cases that's what my clients happen and it wasn't until the syngenta settlement agreement was finalized that my clients could he their opt out of the class or if they opted into the class then they would be party to whatever settlement provisions there work now even if even if the j p a doesn't isn't controlling in this case it should at least provide some guidance to the district court the district court should not have just ignored it and i believe that that the six johnson factor refers to agreements among council and  the a dent m provided for the some some measure of the agreement between the parties and what they expected to get in return for their representation for their involvement in not only the individual mass cases but in the class as well so other than by you're if i correct in thinking that you're not arguing that if a judge were to say ok i'm going to force the a dent that burr in shields will pay an assessment on any of the funds that their but you're arguing that it should apply by analogy is that beer that that would be fair your honor and we do believe that at least that burden she'll do believe that but before i do that i want to make i want to make really clear that the minnesota appellants and everybody really in the litigation they when they perform subsequent work on the litigation when they when they helped any class ever help could submit that time and they were all paid for that time they were paid not only their lives are but a multiplier for that time and that's true across the litigation so to say that through the minnesota pool you're sitting in the minnesota public for pay for the minnesota pool was the joint prosecution agreements obviously did not contemplate nationwide settlement class and it was quite clear they did not governor such a service to us and the district court when he reviewed the report confirmed that that is in their best interests and i'm going to exclude them here's their activities and if they did that they're out of the class so what they got in exchange for the joint prosecution agreements was access to the work product of the leadership which are just accepts so that they could use that were just obtained over coverage whether by trial or settlement on their uk and in that circumstance they paid this very modest more modest to the leadership attorneys for access to their work product it was intended and nowhere in their view to cover what would happen if there was a single settlement signed everyone had to figure out a way  i understand what you're saying on that the alternative argument that they made is even if it didn't apply that the judge was judge lawrence from was required to at least consider it and we laid out a lot of reasons in our previous to why they would be treated differently in a single someone thought versus separate funds because if you're going to say hey you only have to pay eleven percent and you get to use your product but then you have to go out and joined the agreement for the agenda even putting aside the language it's in for all they knew that there wasn't going to be an assessment if their clients participated in a class for over a bigger isn't because the court said from the get go it was not going to want her assessment not the court quoting an argument from each party saying diminishing returns i guess if you're going to it's a little strange in that she does discuss minnesota or minnesota leadership's recommendation they've made the argument she said they don't have no individual p f s provided a greater benefit than any other but look what they were making about image returns and i agree with judge baccarat earlier questions about that which is it was the number of if if you had taken the currently there where does they judge say that my donation yeah i don't think she makes that expressed finding but she did agree with the recommendation as to how much  minnesota and the issue is if if you took away the five thousand or so the estimates that were served by the minnesota appellants in minnesota you would still have over fifty thousand jurisdiction so the point being that it's sort of common sense which is there's only so many cases a court system can try and get once you get critical mass there really isn't a significant additional value so more it could have been that you know there was a different way to allocate the p f masses but ultimately when you're talking about the relative value of the yeses as a whole you know awarding it as six hundred dollars would have been over compensate for that work relative to i think it's benefited minnesota and in other words it will be it would be over compensation relative to the other work that occur in minnesota because she would have to reduce the fees that would be allocate the settlement in any way so the notion that they had some intrinsic value beyond simply telling syngenta that we would do this medical minimal clerical work in order to keep these cases alive for the point time i that they provided value that was beneficial to the settlement and to the common one absolutely and over seventy million dollars was was allocated to firms simply for the clerical w so you know they're at their worst in their district and the minnesota court very much does acknowledge this that there was a very wide disparity among the individual retained firms as to how much time they claimed to have spent on this task and that as opposed to explicitly rejecting the diminishing returns argument that had been presented by new counsel which d in the report that she had opted in part only only was certain off the case she certainly didn't reject that argument when sh wilder pointed out that if they contributed to the settlement they were paid according to their contribution no matter where they were that falls flat wherever you consider the illinois allocation in which firms were receiving millions just because money was left over in illinois and they didn't want to send it back to the pool the argument that the p f s is were merely symbolic they were court ordered and if to the extent they were clerical in nature then why did the district court will award millions to law firms for the expense of experts to complete the p f s you know the if you were in in force the j p this was never meant to be a class settlement the all of the law firms litigated under the g p a and we would ask that good morning and may it please the court david campbell here for the illinois appellants we only have a few minutes for argument i'll try to reserve one minute for rebuttal i think that we can be brief today your hono the court to meaningfully review that that allocation is undisputed in the briefing we raise that in our opening brief and in the response of briefs that was undisputed now what was disputed that you never raced up to such objections until after the illinois pool was allocated and at that point you were dissatisfied with the allocation is that not correct so so that your honor th exclusive jurisdiction or her a stale wish that the court had exclusive jurisdiction and in that order the district court expressly addressed whether or not the attorneys and waived an objection by failing to object prior to that point  st time that structural procedural came up as a term was in that exclusive jurisdiction order which was issued back is april of two thousand and nineteen before for it went if you look at the objection that illinois judge regarding factual the terminations but the parties understanding was that there was they'll be able to raise structural or procedural issues and one structural a procedural issue than the think is critical to do our issue in this case was the fact that if you look at the reason that the district court proposed this procedure the reason the district court gave was that those lower courts were in let me just quote the best position to understand the relative contributions of the attorneys so the idea was that the district court was going to rely on those who had the most knowledge on the ground of what had been done that the reason that that became so important later is because the courts where from the record the the special  judge judge herndon who had knowledge of this also disagree with her so that was where the just to close out the point that was where the parties needed the district court to step in and address that structural litigation going on in three separate fronts i've never been involved in a case that was this complex and had this many layers of review on it and judge long strong and had to put special master and in just went it's incredible scrutiny to try to make the right call on all these issues there in this case and so with respect to and you know under common benefit roads all hours are not created equal as we've already heard argued today an hour spent on document review is not the same as an hour spent cross examining an expert and while i've got a little bit of time left if you don't mind i would just like to weigh in on this jurisdiction issue since you know the way i look at it all the appeals here now are are based on what happened with the common benefit what are the common benefit allocations are they correct or were they handled in the right way and there are two pieces of this you've got the comma benefit part of it and you getting paid here but what i'm saying is if you've got people arguing that i should have gotten the lodestar then maybe in their head they have a figure for what it would have taken for me to be fairly compensated and did you out of the ar they get enough money that you said oh well that's close enough to me being fairly compensated maybe that lawyer then doesn't care about pursuing the common sense a benefit allegation because they have been  because you had a lot of clients and just a couple who reviewed a bunch of file it just because you taught the class on the phone doesn't mean that you said that drove the value of this case or drove the settlement of this case so in my way look at  asked by brief review our firm did work into space illinois and minnesota thirty percent of our cases were filed in illinois and forty percent of our traditional problem and if it were was performed in illinois yet we were put only into the minnesota pool now that's problematic because by my review record we were the only firm in the country who did work in two separate pools but was evaluated in one that was particularly problematic  the context of this case for three additional reasons st the special master during oral argument when commenting on the decision put us in to minnesota versus both for all of our illinois for that matter said that you could go either way as a direct quote in other words there was no rational reason for why we were in minnesota versus why we're in illinois and particularly given the fact that our work in those two jurisdictions essentially m  or in minnesota you know perhaps one could say well you could be could it either one of those tools but that's not it's not necessarily a ridiculous or irrational consideration to say look i have hundreds and hundreds and hundreds of law for they have some of these firms have thousands of of suits and that i am her require everybody to be in one rule because there is enough confusion in two separate pools and us exclusively in one for all it is arbitrary and the reason for that is found in a special master concession herself where she said we could go either way we could about him in no way or we could put him in minnesota wherever performs those are his words were never performed the problem was is that there were there were twenty three buckets of compensation across all of the jurisdictions but that one was for the p f s as you have heard about bucket two is for what we call the traditional notions of common benefit and bucket three was for this broader notion of a broader common benefit in illinois those firms were largely compensated based on their quote broader common benefit work things that would not be traditionally found in a common benefit application the judge in minnesota did not award any compensation for our broader come benefit work done in illinois but at the time that you saw a clarification didn't you say that you were confident the minute the thirty two fairly well so treated you fairly i mean by the standards of very wealthy in minnesota thought you would get doesn't mean you weren't treated fairly by the light of the minnesota judge run well i think is where we part company or the issue is not whether we're out we said we believe that the minnesota court will do what you are telling her to do judge on the issue is what the judge long strumming struck the illinois minnesota and itself to do and what that what judge long term specifically set was that the work would be compensated quote unquote wherever performed the problem is if you go back to the three buckets of compensation we were not compensated for this broader common benefit time that ultimately the illinois court compensated those counsel for that harm and our belief that we would be treated in all three of those buckets would be considered did not arise until the court in minnesota said i'm not going to consider any of it may not be the appropriate the proper word what i'm saying is alternately and there is no dispute about this the judge did not award that time so whether she considered it rejected it which i think is where you're going probably a fair stain on the record the fact of the matter still remains there's a rd bucket of time in illinois that we weren't compensated for so as it relates to the waiver argument when we're told by the district court in the motion to reconsider or the most for clarification rather you will be compensated for work quote where ever performed that rd bucket was never compensated so our harm our injury our our obligation to object to that it is triggered once the district court in minnesota refuses to follow the directive of judge lungs from so that's what our argument is it's not a waiver because of the fact that it does harm did not arise until the court in minnesota refused to this is this the language about consider or not consider is not just a matter of semantics because if the use you is that the court considered but decided not to worry as it relates to that bucket that doesn't mean that you were given that it just means that these different chords chose to value those hours differently and that doesn't mean that you there wasn't there wasn't attention paid to a valuation analysis of it just the court decided not to treat it in the same way and so why wouldn't judge lungs from statements still hold that that's exactly what they did you just don't end up with the same result because we were not compensated where the work was performed in other words if one court is saying i'm going to compensate you for this broader notion of common benefit and the other court decides i'm not going to pay you for that or you're not going to get paid for that that's not a waiver because that harm doesn't arise until the court fails to follow judge long streams edict that you must consider wherever the work well that's the point of making that the work consider it comes into play again and we consider means the court considers and then decide not to allocate it as opposed to sa categorically this is not on the table but let me just ask another point for which is are you saying that the so the disparity between what went on in illinois and what went on in minnesota is that based upon the points if i may or on a number one with respect to your immediate question what we're talking about is the notion that in you know annoying had we been in that pool we would have received compensation for that time in the brief spells out what we think the extent of the harm it nd and if i just to ten seconds on this the direct quote from judge long from says she the special master intended her recommendation that each for him would be compensated in the pool for all its common benefit work wherever performance our argument relates to the term would be compensated we were not compensated for that broader common benefit time which we would have been compensated for had we been in illinois and you're saying by the illinois district judge would have compensated you for that oh absolutely now while in fairness the judge the nd judge i forget her name apologize reduced the emphasis a broader common benefit time than judge turning gave she clearly awarded time and compensated people for this notion of a broader common benefit time and because judge long strums order from the bench or has a colloquy says that each firm would be compensated from its pool for all comments and if it were ever performed that is the genesis of the harm because we weren't compensated for that time every thank you and they on the record they were happy with that concludes that that's not disputed then later because the minnesota and the kansas leadership when they had submitted their application to the courts they both had firms or four or five firms that perform work to both jurisdictions at the direction of leadership and and because of that they had asked for their particular allocations based on the work that was we want to be treated but fools they can't do that they would continue to stick to the minnesota cool and so they have the opportunity to be treated like the five firms that were awarded for both schools and they chose not to they're not unique in this regard very st order didn't really talk tell them what they needed to know in terms of what was going to happen right so it but i doubt let me start of that so that that's their merits argument and the merits argument is that apparently judge miller didn't follow just luncheons order in that regard and i disagree with that i think this is another procedural tangle but nothing's quite simple in this case i want to back up wid johnson becker file a motion for reconsideration typically i thought the in our case law in tell me if i'm wrong says that you know once a judge issues in order in orders and orders an order you don't have to ask for reconsideration is the the argument at the hearing on the special master's recommendation when they characterized it as a motion for clarification and they said we just want to be sure that judge miller will be permitted to consider our illinois work and judge webster made clear that that was the intention so if they had withdrawn effectively their objection to being placed into minnesota at that time they did not over d the course the next fourteen days see reconsideration at the same time for example in the kansas and minnesota c l c said we've got some firms that we think should be compensated for both schools and so my point was if they didn't  and i think i think with the argument is that we still were operating under the assurance that when the allocation was actually made in minnesota we would be treated fairly in the sense that all of our common benefit work no matter where performed would be compensated and their position is that is not what happened and therefore they had a press objection after that allegation was made so but you know the issue was initially there was not going to be any opportunity to object from what judge miller pat was going to issue for if it were so there ultimately i mean if you look at the opening briefs of the appellant's here they don't make an argument that the work that they perform the judge will reject it was actually what they call expanded com and if that i mean they don't they don't really appeal  runs so i would say that that at that point they waive the argument on appeal because they haven't established that she'd need any air aside aside from the fact that you know whether they waive you mr becker to make sure that you walk away thinking you've been through to fairly we're going to we're going to give one minute here and then we're going to wrap this show up thank you judge h timeline was this we went to the oral argument before judge long from where he said we would be compensated and i read to you that quote following that then we went to minnesota and the court ultimately briefs are filed on what we've departed thought they should get the court ultimately ruled and we have acted at that point there was no obligation to re object to judge miller's findings because her findings were her findings and view they were inconsistent with what judge long term had so the only obligation we had to bat order was the appeal that we've now lodged following our trip back to judge long term i know it's complicated but as you alluded to earlier judge holmes the trigger for all of this was judge long strums assurance that we would be quote compensated for that time that's that never happened and that's what that's why there was never a waiver all right thank you coun