is pending before a foreigner international tribunal and therefore the district court's memorandum opinion denying mr rosen application for the production of documents should be reversed and remanded the st issue for this court to consider is whether this panel may overrule a prior decision of the court in this case and b c before i address the application of the standard let me address the standard itself the standard quoted in appellants briefs is from a tw fourteen nd circuit case loads kovar says hand high precision it is that where there has been an intervening supreme court decision that casts doubt on our controlling precedent one panel of this court may overrule a prior decision overrule if an intervening decision cast out therefore there actually is no disagreement between the parties here about the standard the nd circuit should apply either way it's a pretty demanding standard so why don't you tell us how arbitral tribunals that authority was an article written by what the supreme court a person supreme court has called the principal drafter of section seven hundred and eighty two professor hans schmidt that straightforwardly cast doubt on the holding in n in opposing that argument a pelleas claim that this is merely a two word snippet that this court should not place underweight on it's worth noting that this court has relied upon parent article citations of the supreme court before in exactly this case in exactly this in this article in intel the supreme court relied upon another portion of professor schmidt's article to support its conclusion about whether a proceeding needed to be pending when an application for discovery was made the nd circuit opinion eleven years after intel this court accepted that by citing that parent article intel had adopted its reasoning and as such the nd circuit stated that intel explain that it was not necessary for the adjudicative proceeding to be pending directly quoting the parent that a call that had been quoted in it until that same logic applies here by quoting a portion of the article as supported as support for its argument the supreme court has indicated that it adopts the logic and that casts doubt on the this court's contra contradictory case law however it's not is that current article holding of the supreme court i believe it is a holding your honor but you're anticipating my next point which is that it's not necessary that this court rates to the decision based solely on the parent got a call if this court does not is not comfortable that that was a holding this court should also look at the entirety of the reasoning set forth in intel and that reasoning similarly cast doubt on on the holding in n b c in the st way it does is that the supreme court instructs that the interpretation of seven hundred and eighty two dollars should be based on the plain meaning of statute the court instructs that that categorical limitations should not be placed on section seven hundred eighty two dollars and the reason is that the court states that if congress had intended to impose a sweeping restriction on the and private tribunals the court went forward to say that that was not sufficient that it then needed to consider legislative history to determine whether private are arbitrary tribunals must be included or early permitted to be included it's that nd step that we believe does not accord with the instructions in intel intel stated that the statutory language was to put a cloak really the be all and end all of the court's analysis as to section seventy two are nelson's begins or ends there now beyond the plain meaning of the statute the court also looked at legislative history and public policy and those are addressed in our brief but mindful of my time so i'll move on to the nd argument made in our briefs for the basis for overturning the court's decision which is that even if n b c remains good law after intel the court erred in finding that under n b c sea tac was not a state sponsored adjudicatory body in the briefing we identified five different reasons why the district court erred i just want to focus on one of those for the purposes of this argument it's judicial review  point the court towards two decisions both called in re clymer one was the nd best and why decision and one was the northern district of illinois decision both analyzing proceedings before the marriage the london maritime arbitration association both courts found that the l m a was a foreign tribunal in part and based on the driving concern that that panel's decisions were reviewable under the english arbitration act the court said that there were three aspects of judicial review that the english courts could challenge the basis of the tribunals substantial jurisdiction challenge who wore it on the basis of serious procedural irregularities and challenge the award on a point of law as is demonstrated by the expert opinion on chinese law submitted to the district court each of those three applies to sea tac arbitrations as well sea tac arbitration can be overturned based on the lack of substantial jurisdiction on serious irregularities or if the award is contrary to public interest therefore if this court does not reach the finding that n b c has been overruled we would ask that it still overturn the district court's decision based on the fact that sea tac is a state sponsored  please the court francis bivins of davis spoken word well on behalf of the ten cent entities which are the entities participating in the commercial arbitration that's pending in china and before this court we are interven polities i'll be arguing on behalf of both the respondent and the intervenor apple e s just to begin i would just like to clarify that i don't think we have any disagreement with the appellant as to the standard that should be applied by the panel in considering whether to overrule n b c on the basis of the intel decision we don't think that there's any inconsistency between the two cases that were cited by the appellant and we think that the standard is we we think it's very clear that intel does not cast doubt on n b c the supreme court in intel did not address the question of whether the congress intended itself not addressed to the question of whether congress intended seven hundred and eighty two dollars to apply to commercial arbitration the quote is from a an article by professor smith it's a footnote in an article and what the quote states is that in the author's opinion the seven hundred and eighty two congress intended seven hundred and eighty two to apply to arbitrate tribunal's but did not take on the question of whether that congress intended it to other words it's clearly dicta it's not the holding of the case but it's obviously the law of this circuit that under dos or that the circuit can consider under certain circumstances our position here is that this is dicta it's dicta that doesn't go even to address the question that's before the court here let alone the question that was before the court and intel but also that it's not a circumstance where you have a reasoned and considered to to overrule a prior opinion but here are where not only does the dicta not address the issue that's before the court right now it was something that appeared in apparent that a call and was not part of a considered or reasoned analysis the broader argument appears to be that intel expresses a philosophy of giving full scope to the language of seven thousand and eighty two and in providing this discovery in order to  promote the underlying policies of obtaining assistance for our own courts could you speak to that moving beyond the pier and sure what's interesting the th circuit made that point precisely in their decision and what's interesting is if you look at the analysis in and b c and then compare it to the court's analysis and intel the two courts are actually applying the very same standard in n b c this court st looked at the plain meaning of seven dollars looked to dictionaries and other legal sources for definitions of the term tribunal found positions or definitions on both sides of the issue and as on that basis found that the term tribunal was ambiguous therefore making it appropriate to look at the legislative history of the statute at that point intel the supreme court similarly starts with the proposition that the plain language of the statute should prevail they actually articulated that standard in a portion of the decision that was analyzing whether the complainant in that case was actually an interested party and found that the term interested party did have a plain language definition that could be applied by the court and they did so to find that the complainant qualified as an interested party the court then turned to the term tribunal and immediately looked to the legislative history and in fact to the very same senate report that this court looked to an n p c and while there isn't a statement by the supreme court at that point that they found the term tribunal to be in big u s the fact that the supreme court looked to the legislative history implies that finding and so in fact the analysis and the statutory interpretation that was done by the court in intel is analogous or almost identical to the to the analysis that was done by the court in c and there's certainly nothing about that approach that calls into question the analysis of the court here in and b c so we don't think that there's any basis for this court to go back and revisit the holding  it's worth noting that the reasoning of the court in n b c was persuasive at the time and remains persuasive after intel the court focused on the fact that if seven hundred and eighty two dollars is read to apply to foreign commercial arbitrations that would have meant at that time in one thousand nine hundred and sixty four in dramatic change in public policy on behalf of the united states the united states at that time only had discovery was and still to this day is only available in the context of private arbitrations as a result of the one thousand nine hundred and forty seven f a a section seven of the federal arbitration act allows for the purposes of domestic arbitration and very limited type of discovery the parties are not given subpoena power the tribunal members are the ones who can issue the subpoena and only under very limited circumstances associated with the hearing and with that backdrop what the court found in n b c was that if there were going to be a change in public policy that would be so dramatic to allow for the parties to a foreign commercial arbitration to come to the united states and have discovery rights that were greater than those available to the parties in a domestic arbitration the court would have expected some mention of that in the congress will record and that a change of that type would not happen without mention by congress and the court in fact found that it would be inappropriate to read a broad term an ambiguous term like tribunal in such a way that would affection way to public policy change of that kind in a circumstance where there was no indication that congress intended a change in public policy of that nature as to the u shoe of whether sea tac is a private or public institution under the meaning of n b c judge firman in hit that has been convened to decide this commercial arbitration is a tribunal that falls within the definition of a private tribunal under n b c and here the authority of the of the arbitral tribunal that has been conven decide this case derives entirely from a private commercial agreement between the parties there is no governmental authority that comes into play with respect to the authority of the tribunal and the appellant that the presence of a supervisory statutory scheme that allows for or recognizes the private arbitration would take every private arbitration in every country in the world and convert that i think that is a good question i would i would would argue that it doesn't matter here because here in both instances both the tribunal itself which is has authority that derives entirely from a private contract is of a private nature under c i also think that judge firman made factual findings about the nature of sea tac which is the supervisory institution and found that while sea tac had been created in one thousand nine hundred and fifty four by the chinese government that today it is a non governmental entity that act independently of the chinese government so even if you look at the supervisory institution in this case it is also of a private nature so i don't think the court has to rate that reach the question of whether it's the tribunal itself or whether it's the supervisory arbitral institution that needs to be analyzed cast doubt is the fact that the burden placed upon statutory interpretation in intel and in n b c was very different in intel the court stated that congressional intent to expand the scope of section seven reach can be interpreted from congress's failure to include limiting language in the statute and d c took exactly the opposite approach in the court and n b c acknowledged that the legislative history showed the congress intended to broaden the scope of the statu but reviewed the legislative history and found that the failure to explicitly mention private arbitrations meant that congress did not intend to expand the scope to that extent they're directly opposing burdens the process is the same but  intel says courts should only find that congress intended to limit a fair construction where congress says so and b c says the term should only be given it's common usage if congress tells us it should that that method has been