your argument next in case thirteen thirty three thirty nine c t s corporation versus well burger mr murray mr chief justice and may it please the court c t s should prevail here based on the text of section ninety six fifty eight as well as it structure historical context and other relevant considerations all of which make clear that it is a federalism compromise having no effect on statutes of repose section ninety six fifty eight should be construed narrowly to do the one thing that congress intended it to do which is to postpone in some situations a single state law statute of limitations commencement date we don't know how many think this is the general statute  or five there are also that have to do with personal injury and there are also myriad others that have to do with property damage so it gets a little confusing to give a strict answer to that but there were four statutes of repose squarely in the study group before before congress when they enacted narrower than saving all along late injury claims i think what congress was worried about was expedition and making sure that it didn't force people to come to court before under a statute of limitations before they would be expected to and that set out the statute itself accomplish es only one thing section eighty one and i'm reading from page one of our opening brief to the court it does one thing only which is if the applicable limitations period for one of these actions as specified in a state law statute limitations or under common law provides a commencement date that's earlier than the federal commencement date then it substitutes the more favorite commencement date commencement date in turn if we turn to page two and this is reading now from b three commencement date means the date specified in a statute of limitations as the beginning of the applicable imitations period which again be two applicable imitations period is defined as the period specified in a statute of limitations during which one of these civil actions may be brought up so doing the algebra on the definitions what congress surgically wanted to do here was to change one thing and one thing only if you had a less favorable state commencement day which is the beginning of which an action may be brought which is a cruel if you have one of these less favorable state commencement dates for statute of limitations congress wanted to move that keeping in place i wouldn't have wanted to do that and not also get rid of the statute of repose and then presumably the idea is you should have some chance to sue after you've discovered the injury and the cause of the injury and if your the statute of repose is preventing that why would congress have wanted to modify a statute of limitations but not get rid of the section of repose i think congress was trying to be very careful with what it was doing in this area because it knew it was operating in pretty much the heartland of state law and state derogative here and so while it was willing to go as far as the one study group recommendation and change ta limitations of procedural mechanism it wasn't willing to go right into the heart of the elements of the cause of action and start changing those because it perceived potentially serious federalism problems with doing it would be akin to congress passing a law that says rather th since the negligence is what's at issue here rather than negligence congress passing a law saying the duty of care will be strict liability and i think there are serious constitutional problems with that as we've set out and so congress was very careful to tread lightly here and preserve the parameters of the states and keep to the extent that's a statue of limitations period is not a problem but to the extent it were to affect a statute or oppose north carolina law is very clear that statutes of repose are an element of the cause of action in other words unless you clete and prove these element of the north carolina l sleep on their rights and so what congress did here was it left in place state law as it found it including the lid period the time period itself and all it did was make one slight modification for those who might not at the thought to be able to be as diligent as others and moved that date to a more favorable federal commencement date so suppose the state has most of these statutes of repose or piggyback on top of statutes of limitation right i mean you know you you have to sue within ten years after after you find you find the injury but in any case suit must be brought within within twenty years after this act of negligence must be brought within ten years after the act occurred is that still a statute of repose it seems to me then that would meet your your definition of  the commencement time for suit would have to be when when the act occurred and you have ten years from it a statute written in that sort of way which gives permission which is exactly what congress was focused on might well be a statute of limitation it doesn't sound like a statute of repose because again what congress wanted to move was the beginning of the period especially beginning it would probably get permission it just says you know you're liable for negligence in this in this area but any suit was brought within ten years after the act occurred to the extent that a statute was that have been the state had only a statute of repose then we don't believe nine hundred fifty eight would touch that at all and that makes sense because what congress was doing was taking state law as it found it and there's no obligation for states to have these causes action that all states could repeal these costs about action and they would be no right to sue states could change their statutes of limitations to a day after a cruel and that would be fine to single statute which is written as a set should have proposed what in the text is preventing you from saying that statute applies to let yes your honor be two and be three read together we believe are the two pieces that are the most relevant what congress has chosen to move is the commencement day when state law is less favorable than federal commencement aides defined as beginning of the applicable limitations period and applicable limitations period means a period in a satchel limitations when suit then assume that the statute of opposing or there is now in fact you're not going to get any suits because nobody's going to know that they're injured until that they know that they're injured but why wouldn't that be the commencement date is the thing that triggers the statute of repose situation it is no longer a statute of repose but it's a statute of limitations again so long as we're reading ninety six fifty eight to apply to and only to it comply of women only when there is a less favorable state law commencement date if the state law as you're positing it it might well be a statute of limitations if the state law as you're positing it allows someone to bring a cause of action that starts to sound like a cause of of like a statute of limitations here the statute of repose is in no way tied to anything having to do with the plaintiff it is an end date which begins with defendant's last act or a mission and ends ten years later and is the end of the cause of action none of that is the beginning of an applicable limitations period various laws some of which have been presented in the amicus briefs hear back and hard and dates after which causes of action may not be brought and all combine yes but have they ever they ever drawn a distinction between statutes of limitations and statutes of repose is there any federal statute that makes that distinction we're in or is there any federal statute which applies only to repose there's no federal statute that makes the distinction between limitations and repose but there are as we've had been set out here many federal statutes that give this hard and back and protection to defendants and for important reasons right remember that these now you do exists i mean these statutes exist but but but are they called statutes of repose or law better we think congress understood the distinction and this is a harder question to answer but for those who find resort to legislative history helpful here remember what congress did in one nine hundred eighty they passed circle and then they commission which was not about towards at all circ clean up statute focused on going without fault without viability cleaning up wind event commission to study group of leading folks to get together and figure out whether there should be a tort cause of action whether there should be other changes made to the law what else should be done in the toward arena and that study group before it was very clear on the distinction between statutes of repose on the one hand and statutes of limitations on the other because even john dingell mr murphy i think justice scalia is right that in general congress hasn't made this distinction in general this court has not made this distinction in general i think this goes back to just askin spritz point the purpose behind this law clearly it doesn't matter i mean either way if congress wanted to make sure that people could sue after discovering their injury a statute of repose prevents that as well as the statute of limitations does and yet you are asking us to imagine a congress that has this very much in in its head both the difference between these two things and you said the reason that they wanted only to alter the one and not to alter the other is because they thought of the statute of repose as an pigeon on the state's constitution of rockets and that's a very legally sophisticated congress has to imagine you know to understand this distinction and then to say oh yes look the statute of repose really an interference with substantive liability in a way that the statute of limitations it's not and that might raise constitutional avoidance issues i mean i think that's that's that's pretty sophisticated stuff and two points your honor one actually congress at least at this time was very sophisticated and we've set out again for those who find legislative history to be helpful we've set out several exchanges right on the floor between members of congress where one would ask what is the difference between a statute of limitations and are opposed to what i asked thank you for asking and explain it really quite simply so that at least about everybody was listening to that statute here which again only does one thing moving a commencement date defined as the beginning of the period in which one of these actions may be brought that simply does not define a statute of repose it uniform answer that question because the statute of repose does not meet the definition congress set out in the statute as the beginning of the period in which an action may be brought that is a cruel and that speaks to statute of limitations the beginning of which an action may be brought has nothing to do necessarily with the last act remission of a defendant which is a statute of repose and again it's a perfectly logical distinction for congress to make given what they were trying to do this the statute itself makes clear that state law otherwise controls they didn't touch any other part of state law all they did was this narrow surgical strike at the beginning of statutes of limitations because i reserve the rest of my time for a bottle  fifty i respectfully disagree justice ginsburg because congress had before it a report that identified the principle problem in this area as when statutes of limitations periods commenced and it i ed the problem as those that minority of states that commenced the running of statute of limitations period at the time of injury as opposed to discovery of injury and its cause it's critical to understand here that there were only four states as counsel said at the time that congress  this statute that had statutes of repose and those were states that all had discovery rules there's no inconsistency between a statute of repose and a statute of limitations with the discovery rule they typically go together and they represent a compromise and a balancing that the federal statute would still work in that setting but that wasn't the record before congress as i said before there were only four states who had statutes of repose there is no indication in the text of the legislative history that that was a focus of congress as attention and are you only if sort of north carolina didn't have a three year statute of limitations and only had this ten year statute of repose right i think our position would be the same that section nine hundred fifty eight would not apply i'm not aware of any state that has such such as statute there was no state there exists a course of action for wrecks and a separate statute which says any any suit for x cannot be brought after ten years from the act of the defendant that is the basis for the claim ok one isn't that the commencement date was on which you can bring suit where the act occurred i think it depends on whether under state law you have a complete cause of action and can go into court file a complaint and get relief and i don't think we have to ask in the abstract because if you look at page three a of the government's brief the appendix of the government's brief you see what north carolina law answers this question it says civil actions can only be commenced it actually uses the same word within the periods prescribed in this chapter after the cause of action has accrued so in north carolina as is typical of every state that i'm familiar with you the statute of limitations period begins to run when you haven't accrued a cause of action now north carolina has adopted had actually adopted a discovery rule so section ninety six fifty eight doesn't have any any purchase in this case because the commencement of the statute of limitations period is the same but i think there are serious thought it would at least what i take from scalia's question is that if you think of that if you imagine and you're quite right that the stars and exist in the real world but if you imagine a statute of repose existing independently it actually would fit the language of th statute quite you know find the commencement date would be different it would not be the date of a cruel it would be the date of the defendant's last act but still the statute would work perfectly well and i suppose if you think that  then then in a case in which there was both the question would be why wouldn't you just applied this statute to both why i'd like to go to that question because i think that that goes to the rather strained reading of the statute that respondents advance so respondent suggests that when a one talks about a comparison between the federal commencement date and the limitations period under state law congress would have contemplated that there would be a comparison to multiple limitations periods under state law furthermore it assumes that the solution that congress would have a i doubt to an issue with statutes of repose was to have a statute of repose period start with the discovery rule which would be a creature unknown to the law and third they assumed that what congress did was contemplate that in a state like north carolina that had two different time limitation periods of two different lengths that congress the solution was to require a common starting point for both rendering the longer limitations period strangely superfluous if congress would have gone about this in a much more straightforward way if it had wanted to accept the study group's suggestion that it repeal or that the suggestion was actually directed to the states that the states repealed statutes of repose congress would have done so expressly it wouldn't have done so by awkwardly layering of discovery rule on top of statutes of opposing justice scalia this distinction between statutes of limitations and statutes of repose we agreed not to label that controls we think congress here showed by the way the definitions of the way this provision works what it had in mind when it talked about statute of limitations but that the substantive difference between the two is something that both this court cases and the and the law generally recognize that the north carolina cases that we cite in our brief in the petition or cite black in boudreau in particular by clear and distinguishing between the two this court in lamps when talking about the one year three year limitations period under the securities laws distinguish between the two and said there would be no equitable tolling applied to the period of repose the three year limit in the securities laws they didn't turn on the label that turned on the substance of how these things were and they didn't want part because the i was looking at the opinion it talks about a statute of limitations so just so it's not that helps the other side although the riposte period help you it's right you just can't it's not a question of labels it's a question of the definitions in the statute and how this statute actually works we agree the labels aren't dispositive and as we discussed in our brief just scalia conflict of laws is another area in which the court's consistent draw distinction between statutes of limitations which they cause a fire is procedural and thus the form state can apply its own statute of limitations law and statutes of repose which cause of action sometimes it can be generally applicable the policy consideration behind a statute or poses is related but distinct from a statute of limitations which is about incentivizing the plaintiff to get into court quickly the statute of repose is intended to provide certainty at the back end to a defendant so it can order its affairs have insurance policies that make sense and that statute or pose as an element of substantive state law will go with that defendant if it's sued in any other state where there might be venue or personal jurisdiction as a substantive matter of north carolina law that statute of repose will follow so this is a distinction that the law has generally recognized and it wouldn't be at all surprising that in the context of a federalism compromise which is what nine hundred fifty eight really was that congress would have chosen to mirror that same distinction it would have decided to go after the principle problem that was before it which was an issue of discovery rules the absence of discovery rules in certain states without more deeply intruding into the substance of state law these are state law tort actions they're quintessentially within the responsibility and the sovereignty of the state mr palmer what do you think the commencement date in this case was the commencement date in this case i think was probably in two thousand and nine when under both north carolina law and the federal commencement date when these respondents were learned from the e p a but their well water was contaminated because at that time they both discovered their injury and they understood the cause but how could that be the beginning of the period during which his suit may be brought i mean he couldn't bring suit state or we think the best see the same something sort of internally contradictory in your interpretation here i am so we can go two ways of working out and either is correct one is if you look at just the statute of limitations period which is the likable limitations period for purposes of the statutes about two thousand and nine would be the commencement date there even if there might be a separate barrier to relief but second even if you say there is no o mr chief justice and may please the court i'd like to start with the plain wording of ninety six fifty eight but first just say a sentence or two about the purpose the purpose of section nine hundred fifty eight is to preserve claims for latent harm from environmental releases from the facility of hazardous waste until the person discovers the cause of that latent harm and latent harm which is all over the just his legislative history but with neither of my friends for the petitioners meant latent drop you know completely finish date said whatever was was latent or not it's over with it's a different purpose than a statute of limitations yes your honor but congress was concerned about preserving claims and it had one purpose here i agreed to have one purpose but the one purpose of nine hundred fifty eight was to give a uniform trigger date for everybody to have the time to bring a claim and start to run only after they discover their harm and that is cut off didn't have justice ginsburg law professor but i did this this was new for me your honor it was new if i could circle back to the study group in just a minute in fact the other than it was mentioned in length but in  and they were turned back to want to justice kagan's questions it expects an awful lot for congress to have been aware of that and and made this distinction that it's not even made to this day and it was aware of it because the study used the two terms and they knew there were two different statutes because they were told now how you make assumptions i'm assuming that if there's a report as there was with this that people would be responding to it in the legislation that's being drafted yes yes just a just a sort of my oh let me let me talk about that distinction for just a minute the study group report and it's it's a very impressive work of about seven hundred pages long one time time does it use the term statutes of repose and in that one use it's was in the heading of statute of limitations and what the study group said is that in a handful of states statutes of repose have the same effect of without a discovery rule as barring people's claims before they know they've been harmed and it said nothing about one is substantive one is procedural it just said they have the same effect and therefore and therefore should be repealed not and therefore should be covered by the federal statute both recommendations justice scalia both recommendations and this is crucial both recommendations in the study group report were directed at the states it said states should adopt discovery rules and states should repeal statutes repos congress didn't wait on either of those congress anyway you know is the government over again it it doesn't matter it's not a matter of terminology it's a matter of reality it's a matter that these two things whether they were given different names in the one nine hundred eighty six or not are quite different things and do you do you deny that they are quite different things and that therefore the statute may apply to quite differently i do you do to deny that they're quite different they have at core the same basic similarity of defining a period when action may be brought and that's the language used in the secondary authorities of the day and use congress they both define periods when action may be brought now there are some distinctions that again have emerged more clearly in some lower courts since one thousand nine hundred six but they have at that at bottom even to this day the fact that they are both fact the north carolina one here and you can see it on page three of the read brief it's it's not in the blue grief but the north carolina statute what we're talking about is one sentence out of paragraph sixteen in a statute of limitations but it's an important difference because in the states that have proposed statute there can be no tolling i mean that's huge a minor and incompetent person can through that is a difference your honor but it's not a difference that was   ific into congress congress was trying to preserve claims for people of late are and i'm saying that republicans statutes when they exist impose substantial hardships on people but the state otherwise and so it protects mine but the question is whether or not there's this other statute of repose supersedes that you can't look you can't you can't quote this to them to the minors part of the statute and say that it isn't because that doesn't address the point you still have the general equable point that for the position of the petitioner might frustrate congress it's ten well putting aside minors your honors the plain language here  applies to any type of period whether you call it a limitations period or a post period the plain language it is your understanding of the operation of the statute is the episcopal limitations period it do you see the statute as applying syria  first to the statute of limitations and then to the statute of repose or is the limitations period the period that you can sue when you combine those still in most states you just have one period so in this a single a political limitations period which represents the period when given both clauses you can sue or are you saying that there are two possible limitations harriet's in this statute too and in the small number of other states there are two periods both a three year period and a ten year then you stumbled into the difficulty that petitioner pointed out or maybe the government pointed out a one does not refer to two statutes of limitations it says v applicable limitations period for such action as specified in the state statute of limitations provides a commencement date which is earlier now you know if they were really covering two different or envisioned that in some states you had you had two statutes of limitations it seems to me that they should have phrased it differently if the applicable limitations period or periods for such action case with prejudice and in this case that's the ten year period that's the political limitations here now the petitioner on the other hand and the government they both say there's no period in this case notice no period in this case where a case may have been brought some other words under their reading there is no appreciable period but and that the statute here can easily read to have to pay i don't know why you're even caring isn't the applicable limitations period as far as you're concerned the that's that shows you get that gets to the contradiction that was brought up during the petitioners argument that the petitioner argues that congress only addressed one part of the study group's recommendations the discovery rule but not reposed periods but on the other hand they argue under our reading a riposte period would never apply and that's that shows that the study group's recommendations were carried out you know the snow issue does not refer to your cause of action so it's hard to say that the period refers to it it refers to is the period that you're trying to get around it says if the limitations period for such action that is any action brought understood any action brought under state  law i think that to to read that as applying to whatever limitations period is asserted by against a particular plaintiff i find it hard to read it that way it seems to me they're they're referring to  limitations period for the action that exists under state law regardless of what is alleged in the particular complaint anyway i think you've got a real problem with the singular versus  decision saying that's a rarely applied rule but it's i mean i take it mr course in that your argument is a little bit different i mean it seems justice scalia would have a point if it just said if the limitations period your argument is that you put in the word and it actually makes the statute read a little bit differently it suggests that there are poor old limitations period and the one that this provision applies to is whichever one happens to be a clickable as you apply the provision i think that's exactly right justice here except they're both a bit likable to this cause of action but they both of those periods are applicable you are run afoul of one of them but not of the other one doesn't mean they're not date commencement date is defined as the beginning of the period when an action may be brought and petition the government argue that there never was a period when an action may be brought here and in fact however on page eighteen we've cited numerous authorities petition relied on defining a statute or oppose exactly as that is a period when an action may be brought now in their reply brief petitioner says faced with those authorities petitioner says well no no or close period is actually a period after which an action may not brought but that's really just two ways of saying the same thing when it when it actually may be brought or a period after which an action make may not be brought into pens whether they have a discovery rule or not whether it's a period where an action may be broader whether it's a period after which an action may not be appealed and the whole purpose of this was to require a discovery rule and once you require a discovery rule the statue of repose has completely independent meaning complete serves a completely independent  office the purpose however mr chief justice was to preserve claims for latent harmed no matter what the period was that began the the purpose was to have a uniform trigger date that started the time to bring an action once you had discovered your harm and if you use the defined terms here then it applies to any type of period whether you call it a limitations period or opposed period no matter what you call it that will put the purpose of the statue of repose is not to preserve  causes of action it's quite the opposite it's to put an end to in particular late causes of action that haven't been brought yes your honor but congress is purpose was to preserve claims no matter what the period was congress's perm congress was concerned about people not having their day in court and this is in the house conference report it's all over the study group report people not having their day in court because a period ran before they began the ran before they discovered the harm and that that simply a decision that you just can't have a claim at all well if it's older than twenty years old well going back to the plain wording your honor it has a commencement date it has a beginning it begins from the defendant's last act it does have a beginning and it's not the time when you can commence a lawsuit it is the beginning of the period of a time when an action may be brought which is exactly how congress defined the term it is it does have a commencement date because it does have a beginning and it does  purpose congress wasn't in this specific area of hazardous waste released into the environment congress is purpose wasn't figuring out the difference between the these different statutes and whether the state wanted to bar claims or not congress was trying to preserve claims and use defined terms that to preserve claims no matter what no matter what you call the type of period congress is trying to preserve claims for a long latency illness that's that's very parents and my friends to petition the government you'll notice in their brief they may be mentioned late and see once today or largemouth neither mentioned latency that's that's what congress was concerned about it's all over the study group report it's in the house conference report more times than the name product here latency and long latency illness is exactly what congress was concerned about and riposte periods affect that more than any other type of limitations period so if i could talk a little bit about the purpose of the act the evolution of this statute is very important here it dates back to ninety six fifty one which was enacted in one thousand nine hundred eighty one circle itself was an act of ninety six fifty one set up the study group to study barriers to recovery to cases involving harm to man and the environment barriers to recovery and the study group was a very distinguished group with attorneys generals and others from the legal community and the study group determined that the main barrier to recovery were limitations periods that ran before people discovered their harm and unanimously right i mean one way to a another way is to say look congress seems to have said here which is move the first state of the period of up to a new federal commencement date so that the period of repose only is wholly redundant as to the limitations period and that's  kind of strange way to do a pretty simple thing isn't it i disagree justice kagan it's a very short statute and what you've just said as the amicus great as the amicus brief mentioning her and others pointed out it's a very simple and effective way of accomplishing this it's a short stacked statute and then as you say it does away with proposed periods that have already run so it's actually a fairly compact and effective way of doing that yet also it's also respectful for straight states rights in a couple of wa it rather than creating a new cause of action that allows state the content of state law to continue its just the starting point that was affected and respectful of states rights in that way and also very few states even have one of these riposte periods so it was a very simple and effective way to do it not to you know perhaps it could be done the done differently and we could always say congress could be more clear but it's actually very simple and clear an effective way to doing that and the other side by saying that this statute effectively eliminates repos periods shows how effective that is state law with respect to repose no but the state the state toward claims we're talking about such as nuisance and trespass and negligence and the entire content of state law is respected and i do have to correct something the my friend  cases say but it is race in the same way it's not an element it's not an element a court would look at it in like a twenty eight ball type situation and say well you didn't plead this as an element when if a state wanted to act a very long  statute of pose and they said look we want to protect only claims but there has to be some limit so we're going to i'm we're going to enact a statute of a pose of thirty years or fifty years on your reading that would be wiped out as well  it would your honor and the reason why the reason why is what the congress was concerned about here which was long latency periods in periods of up to forty years are mentioned in the study group report and though that seems like a long period the this is really a policy decision limitations periods are really pure policy this court said so back in one thousand nine hundred five and other times and congress made that as a policy decision if the polluter is not on the hope after thirty years who will be justice alito it would be the innocent neighbors living near nearby the innocent cancer victim all of us as taxpayers congress made that policy choice that it should be the polluting company that's put the environmental hazardous waste into the environment and again it has limited it does have a very specific focus the statute it's limited to hazaras waste released from a facility into the environment and in that situation congress made the policy choice the polluter you are on the hook you stay on the hook you clean it up as long as it takes and the other side the result think about what the result would be here for the other side after ten years no liability the incentive there would be instead of cleanup which is the reason nine hundred fifty eight has been passed instead of cleanup that would encourage coverage in congress did not want that congress wanted again to be on the hook as long as it took to clean up in the building but you just said you think upon to have polluters on the hook but they didn't even take if the state did not have any basis of recovery this did nothing about that at all it's not it did not require states to adopt particular remedies or extend the remedies to cover this if they didn't have remedies for this type of action the act of the provisions we're talking about now did nothing about that at all well ninety six fifty eight mr chief justice talks about any action under state law for harm to people or property from hazardous waste released into the environment and so ninety six fifty eight was specifically looking at actions for this type environmental harm but when you talk about horribles that could happen a state could could say with respect to the special cause of action for creating farm to individuals by hazardous waste the statute will begin upon discovery and it will last for three months a state could do that right and that would comply with this l even used in nine hundred fifty eight that the plane wording does not even use accrual and so that's something we wanted to point out and the study group report itself on page fifty nine envisioned tort liability under the federal tort claims act if the government was the owner of property and had been negligent with the property so actions against the government were for seen the study group report it again in  the concern expressed repeatedly about latency also noted that the problem here is due to groundwater contamination from industrial solve it's that's exactly what we have in this case so back in one nine hundred eighty two the study group i disagree as to not having done both your honor if you congress did not use the word repose in ninety six fifty eight the one you know but but the word choice doesn't matter if you used the definitions congress effectively did both and that argument conversely congress did do both rather than waiting on the states to do both congress itself did both in ninety six fifty eight and a follow up an earlier question of your just askin a result to the contrary here would result in could result in a race to the bottom as you if you will where it states or then incentivized or you know lobbied to enact or oppose periods other states could do this and that would be the sort of race to the bottom congress would would not want and so that is this that is possible is there any sign that that's happening seems to me that these are as we don't really are and have been rare for some time right i mean do you really expect states to start suddenly enacting statutes of repose with with today's lobbying climate i wouldn't put it past the realm of possibility and it was something i then ran both sides of the issue i don't want to hazard a guess as to the relative powers of the lobbyists but i think they i think they may go one  way and not in favor of the environment one is a right in that we can't trust state legislatures but no you're i would what i meant with that was to follow up an earlier question of justice ginsburg's that i thought was suggesting that if i could in with one with one final hypothetical a magine two individuals at age eighteen both in rolling in enlisting in the marines and one is stationed by the government in camp pendleton in california and after ten years of being transferred out of camp pendleton develops a fatal cancer his relatives would not at all be barred because there's no riposte period in california imagine another individual enlisted at the same time station by the government at camp was june in north carolina and after being sent from north carolina developed the same cancer the relatives in california would have a claim the north carolinians of the relatives of north carolina need would not thank court as well as tipton and young construction company four for six south east second six o three from the north carolina court of appeals both of which make clear that statutes of repose are conditions precedent that must be specifically pled under north carolina law but the broader point is simply this circle as originally enacted is a clean up statute designed to tag people who have touched the property at all with clean up responsibility regardless of fault that's what it did when it was an act of nine hundred eighty and that's what it still continues to do today when congress applicable limitations period doesn't mean anyone that might apply it is defined in the statute and may be brought is linked up with beginning of may be brought that is classic formulation of the beginning of the statue of limitations not a statue to repose which commences with defendant's  and again this just makes sense in drafting the statute congress was expressly trying to minimize it may or may not have had in its head specifically the presumption against preemption but this court presumes that it does it was seeking to minimize intrusion into a traditional area state regulation and we know that because the statute on its face says state law generally applies except as provided in this provision it leaves all of state law intact other than this commencement date and conspicuously does so and the presumption against preemption  legislative history only confirm this congress wanted fifty flowers to bloom in this area and it didn't cut that off and for good reason repose is an important piece of this puzzle it's the counterbalance to the discovery rules that were being  hundred seventy the suit was brought in two thousand and nine asking clients to defend these cases where the documents where the witnesses how do you avoid vexatious litigation designed to shake down settlements forty fifty and sixty years after you abandon the site what congress did here makes absolute sense and the narrow and surgical way in which they did it given that they were acting in a traditional field of state law supremacy makes all the sense in the world council that last argument about you know liability thirty forty years later  i think forty six states have that have it that way and so on and congress wasn't all that worried about that in that there isn't a very strong policy argument that well says it's not that it's so fundamentally unfair that you shouldn't do it we're going your honor actually a lot of those states have statutes repos that deal with property specifically not the personal injury it gets a little bit messy because there's not a perfect match there but the bottom line is the way in which congress acted here is not at all surprising given that they knew they were acting in a traditional state field the heartland of state authority which was state tort law unless the court has heard the questions thank you counsel and so the case is submitted