appeals and the terminations of further litigation regarding attorney's fees by now does what this appeals about what home depot is entitle to in two thousand and seventeen the parties entered into a solomon agreement paragraph sixty three of that agreement states quote in the event that the award of attorney cost in expenses is reduced on appeal home depot shall only pay the reduced amount of such award home depot will pay interest on the i'm out with you as ultimately reduced on appeal at the same rate a political to any final judgment close quote and short the language of the settlement agreement agreement is clear and ambiguous and controlling the district court's interpretation of the solomon agreement was wrong the district court was bound to enforce paragraph sixty three and commit dollars to eleven million seven hundred and seventy three thousand dollars that's a three million five hundred and twenty seven thousand dollars reduction of the original us very severe ward the language  dollars makes clear that as a result of that reduction home depot was only obligated to pay the original lodestar of eleven million seven hundred and seventy three thousand dollars plus interest  deprived of the finality it contracted to and the settlement agreement but the actions of class council and the district court under georgia law public policy favors the script and paragraph sixty three dollars set and neither class council nor the district court are permitted to add words to the settlement agreement after the fact and rewrite the agreement the georgia court of appeals and levy mercury insurance says quote it is the duty of the courts to construe and enforce contracts as may not make them for the parties close quote furthermore nothing within the summit agreement suggest that the language of pirep sixty three  applies at the th circuit reduces the award of appeal to a specific dollar figure and that's for good reason as this court well know and the ordinary course of reviewing attorney's few words the th circuit does not typically step in and referring to an award as being quote reduced on appeal that simply reflects how the appellate decisions are customarily written the district court's interpretation of the settlement agreement is in direct contravention of georgia discretion and tell the district court the award that should have been given on re man was eleven million seven hundred and seventy three thousand dollars the mandate rule a lot of the case and the settlement agreement all suggest the same result awar the lodestar plus interest so with the settlement agreement when the court merely reduces a feat like it did in the home depot one appeal by rejecting the multiplier the settlement agreement calls for finality not further attempts by class counsel to argue alternative theories for more attorneys already man because the court reduced the award on me man the district court was for choir to follow the provisions of paragraph sixty three dollars it is class counsel who are advancing these tortured in strained construction agreements and they're doing that in a transparent attempt to circumvent what this court made clear as the u s supreme court recognized in produce b kenny there is a strong presumption that the lodestar figure is a reasonable attorney's fee so that reduced award of eleven million seven hundred and seventy three thousand dollars is presumed to be reasonable under the settlement agreement home depot is only obligated to pay a reasonable attorney's fee which the lodestar is and this court would not have in the st opinion affirmed the district court's decision and all respects except one if it had to term in the lodestar it was not a reasonable attorneys and sure to the district court have the ability to or perhaps the district court thought well with a multiplier this is reasonable and that remand without the multiplier well that's no longer reasonable so i but take a look at this this other option do you think that the district court had that type of leeway mr no no the district court did not have the discretion the district courts discretion was a limit to by the settlement agreement and they express then the so much agreement spells out what is to occur if its home depot is successful on the appeal which it was and that fee is reduced to contract then governments and as i cited previously georg makes it clear that though some agreements are to be strictly enforced and the settlement agreement says home depot's only obligation if there is a reduction at the appellate level is to pay that reduced amount and the law of the case and the mandate rule also make clear judge brandt that when that decision was affirmed in all respects that means that affirm it's extended to specifically the lodestar methodology the lodestar amount and the law of the case rule makes it clear that any subsequent issues not raised on the st appeal could not be raised below so the district court's discretion was limited by the settlement agreement the mandate rule and the law of the case so i decided that they could not have appealed at the list our determination that they had taken a strike fear which one argument that the lodestar approach should be used in the st instance we know that class counsel was well aware of their ability to in fact appeal and that they needed to by virtue of the fact that they f as they considered that the case could come back on to remain on and they wanted to preserve the right to have the attorney's fees included and a percentage cross check they should have similarly included in that conditional cross appeal a challenge to paragraph three that final order from two thousand and seventeen that says quote the court adopts home depot's argument that the lodestar approach should be used close at three of the district court's opinion a class council felt paragraph three of the district court's opinion was not correct it should have added to its conditional cross appeal and simply put this appeal can be disposed up based upon the settlement agreement itself and paragraph sixty three while there are other bases and other errors committed by the district court that also lead to the same result the lodestar of eleven million seven hundred and seventy three thousand dollars plus interest i'm going to quickly address those st of all as we set the mandate rule makes it clear like counsel here essentially let the district court to circumvent the mandate that's precisely what happened here and as i stated previously law the case and waiver present prevents cost council from raising the issue and trying to reinject the issue of percentage fund and finally it's very clear that this is a contract will be shipped in case that is precisely what this court found the st time around and as such as the lodestar methodology which again the us supreme court says presumptively results in a reasonable fee should apply here the district court's multiple areas of law require missile paragraph sixty three  the amount of the original lodestar eleven million seven hundred and seventy three thousand dollars plus interest the court should exercise discretion to award the specific amount under a c l u to ensure finality and hearings to the mandate in q th court did not say that express and it would have been contrary to what usual practice obviously this man is courts man that control and appeals over all that has to happen is that the case be remanded so d that the interests of work can be brought up to date but it would be the mandate of the court that controls the case not the settlement if the post war about the mandate then we would submit the main issue was not the settlement agreement but it's the issue that home depot's raised this court didn't answer in the st appeal and that is whether in the contractual the shifting case of matter of law a trial court support we didn't challenge it we had no obligation to challenge it it would have been frivolous for us to appeal the use of the lodestar method by judge thresh we had argued below that he had that discretion upon is limited to appellants fail to make arguments not a pelleas you have no obligation to appeal when they agree with the decision that the district court  not what the court said expressively so under the mandate rule it would only be binding if the court implicitly said that the decision before the district court was what was the amount of a reasonable fee but now i think that the other basis is more appropriate would have had the ability to do that had we it's reports are in full not i would say not but the point is that the decision in this case under the settlement agreement is what is a reasonable fit and judge fresh made that this list court reversed the legal standard that he used this court did not discuss whether a weapon point seven million dollars is a reasonable thing and fact judge press has already decided that eleven million seven hundred thousand dollars is not a reasonable and violates the settlement so  i'm not saying this court doesn't have the ability to decide that case of once to decide that issue but it didn't do that in the last appeal and as a result judge press had discretion to to reconsider the matter of what is a reasonable fifty using the correct legal standard and the great versus boss the case is directly on point a point that standard in the context decision that it intended him to reconsider on the issue of what is a reasonable fit we had a conditional cross appeal this court acknowledged that it would be not that it wasn't necessary to thousand dollars he was reasonable when he struck out this ability to use a multiplier he came to decision that was not a reasonable thing so i don't think that the mandate didn't bind in the do that also the law the case doctrine didn't prevent him from using a percentage method on appeal if this court changed the law and when the law changes all the case doctrine doesn't that she's based or argument on turns on the whole issue of finality as the district court found the language home depot relies on only applies if there's a final decision on this  wasn't a final decision and so she's saying that the settlement in the settlement agreement the parties agreed that whatever the court said on the st appeal regardless of whether that was a final decision regardless of whether there were further over or let me turn now to the question of whether the votes are where the percentage of method is appropriate the judge made a practical decision to use percentage rather than most only if this court determines that lodestar is required to be used in a contractual speech if we think it should not for three separate we first in camden one on this court has held that the percentage the is the best way to calculate these in a class action unless statutory shifting principles apply that's for a lot of reasons was the percentage method more closely  carry out congressional intent that victims have the ability to pursue meritorious claims of statutory violations and the supreme court test is the fiesta be sufficient to use a capable attorney to and the issue is not what is the minimal necessary to induce competent orders to see it to affection await the parties intent at home depot pay a reasonable fee in the context of a consumer class action in which the court would have been required to apply the percentage methods if the parties had agreed on the amount of the fee or on the case it also doesn't promote insist in the hall did have some what most class actions would use the percentage some would use that would store and you wouldn't know what method would apply until the cards have entered a sub and if they did and what the people did make the argument that we had said we're entitled to be paid for the time that we spent after july of two thousand and seventeen we should be able to use our power rates to account for the delay and payment you should be able to use our current market rates individual market rates rather than us read based on years of practice that was used in the case and that was what specifically recognized sort of agreement says that home depot agrees to pay the reasonable attorney's fees costs and expenses this language about finality that mr cantle raises is simply not in the agreements and the triggering of that in terms of home depot's obligation post appeal is if the award is reduced which it was and that triggers the language appear prop sixty three dollars and home depot is only obligated to pay that reduced amount so this language again that the class council is advocating in the district court did of sort of adding words and rewriting the agreement and that is simply incorrect contravention of stablish georgia law that says that the agreement as written should be enforced which leads to the result of the original lodestar plus interest being painful what all what at least be an argument that if the feet were reasonable the was examined exhaustively by the st panel have this st panel determined that the attorney's fee was not reasonable it would not have used this language we have firm the just a course decision and and the lodestar amount of eleven million seven hundred and seventy three thousand dollars let's just loves mr canfield argument that to do the lodestar the district court and remit would have yet to consider a lot of things that i hadn't considered before me grief that issue extensively all of the grounds that mr can feel has raised simply do not apply the language of the settlement agreement says with whom people's obligation was that's