the plain language of the rule states yes the court must answer judgment once the parties once the plaintiff has accepted the defendant's offer of judgment here there is no conflict with the fact i feel is say itself north any regulation or rule absolute the court has ruled that the rule itself is mandatory however you are correct that they have made exceptions in light of current contrary congressional staff statutes that require congressional statute the years decades of statutory construction rules were all sixty eight like other federal civil procedure rules are law they are interpreted as if there are statutes and so if there is plain meaning in the rule or absent some contr congressional language it should be read and with a fair or fair reading what is very sixty eight days policy which goes to saving damages and explicitly requires judicial review there's no explicit judicial review requirement in the f a say or any other rules it was a question action was intended to be a class action originally i don't believe so but this is just  collective but there is a distinction between class actions and collective actions and class actions because the representative even before class cert is a representative of the putative class because it is an opt out procedure as opposed say there are no exceptions to that requirement of no waiver of things who visit and the fifth circuit has a possible exception for certain kinds of bona fide  agreements to look at subsequent circuit decisions to look at it regard waiver and the enforceability of a waiver which is a release that was entered in there looking at later whether it's enforceable as a matter of public policy which is permissible and would be permissible in the context of a rule sixty eight offered judgment after it's been entered in accordance with the rule here we have a perspective and entry of judgment we are in the court which is also different from those certain their social circumstances in the other circuits so that we have the rules of civil procedure acting upon the situation it's distinct had there been any issue in terms of the issues brought up in cheeks or in those other are these are one thousand cases were in brooklyn savings and then also sheltie in and those as far as we know those cases still are on the books right i mean it's anger decided in the forty's right it's unclear protects an even more exploited group of workers which are seasonal or migrant agriculture workers who sometimes work in slave conditions there there is an explicit waiver provision in the statute and in the regulation against waivers but then states explicitly that this does not prevent private settlements of litigation i think that taking that act which is in the same title as a full a say and it's actually more targeted towards protecting a more exploited of workers that simply because there's some way for prohibits sions and the extent of that waiver prohibit and it's still a little bit unclear that doesn't prevent the parties from entering except in a rule sixty offer of judgment  and that does not waive their right to enforce their minimum wage or overtime substantive rights to see as i see it because of the points the judge calibration made a minute ago about the various kinds of cases that you're really drawing a distinction here between statutory requirements of court approval and we didn't cheat that's correct the statutory requirements are explicit in the statutes congress knows how to make one apply with equal force here no because they were interpreted in the ambiguous portion of rule forty one which is a political federal statute it determines that the f s a is such a statue answer further the public policy purpose of the f a let's judicial review requirement would be necessary however doesn't that amount in effect to saying that the f l s a itself whether it's in the text or not imposes a need for judicial approval or department of labor approval i mean cheeks found in the statute even if it's not in the text of the statute and i understand your argument there had i had the court believe that that was in the statue in some in some vain it wouldn't have needed to go through the statutory interpretation of rule forty one indeed it actually limited its holding to simply stipulated dismissals with prejudice it left in its in one of the footnotes for another day whether or not without prejudice those stipulated dismissals required to destroy approval and i asked the question about the practical effect of this our district courts are split on the on the issue we're arguing about today the court below said this we had very little you know burden on district courts this is just signing off on a letter it's all very easy for the court to make to do the approval what is your reaction to that observation first and just an experience it's not exactly true i've had cases where it's taken six months for an entry or approval of a submitted rule forty one settlement agreement in terms of what the burdens are that's that's not the question that the court could reach at this time if the court if the congress has not invited it through ambiguous language in a statute or through a you don't go forward with the settlement it just sets the money doesn't explain hands until the district court signs off that's correct although these clients have the capacity contract there is no issue with them agreeing to the agreement and there is actually in the end nothing that the court found objectionable in this settlement agreement it waited for six months nothing nothing happened for that time your response to the argument that was adopted by the corps and that was can be found in the judge could p different from the enforceability of a waiver for instance in the us a due to public policy concerns capacity has to do with for instance mental capacity to understand the terms minority if you're under the influence of some drugs or alcohol here court believe that capacity was an issue they want to simply said there's no contract here there's nothing to look at if you've mandatory means mandatory or as you say there are no exceptions which is really the isn't even apart from the f m in say policy and one could make the argument that was that the court should look at attorneys fees in any case because this is a possibility really in any case and it's the stance typically that the court will not involve itself in the creation of contracts and in court in this case in u v bronx medical center said that we presume that the retainer fee agreements between counsel and their client are are legitimate but there are other rules that protect clients not only in f s a cases but in all cases one is that they do have the ability to challenge the validity of that that of act if it's invalid under law because for instance they asked for too much in contingency fee in the professional rules of conduct one point five says that you cannot charge an illegal excessive fee attorneys appearing before this court or subject to those contact roles in our offices of the court and we do not please or the court does not typically police the conduct between their attorney and their client and say it so as a few shifting role that presumes that having an attorney is a much more to the benefit of the clients and in fact most most cases here are in the circuit and across the nation are represented in cases your argument is that if we accept this as a policy justification for deciding with the apple only that that would apply to that would certain that the clients would like more money out of a deal but then to submit retainer fees to the the court for approval or review and any other case me invite satellite litigation i think that this could be a rule that would have court order if they filed a stipulation signed by all of the parties subject to four federal rules and any applicable federal statute and if a statue isn't applicable federal statute the requirements of that statute apply necessarily determined that quarter d l approval was a requirement of the f l i say this one could distinguish the two the two rules so rule sixteen this is a public filing in the rule forty one context it would be  the possibility of a private settlement that would never be filed in the public record isn't that a pretty important distinction that is a distinction and that goes to whether there whether there can be abus under rule sixty eight settlements and there are certainly can still be abuses under rule sixty eight because of the unequal bargaining power between employers and employees and there can also be problems in terms of the percentage of the award that is going towards court to be respected it that the distinction between policy views isn't just something that somebody says this is a nice thing to do that rather that's what the b f m as a statute reads and if it means that then it's exactly the same as all the other cases and that we should be careful about talking about policy up here but if that's what the n f l is a means and there's no difference in that really be argument you are making that is the argument that are making that it is well established that the f l i say requires court approval of the settlements that is that well supervision that is the basis of cheeks and the non waiver is not directly controlling on that i mean one question here is whether a general six which is very general provision has perhaps exceptions clear it does not contain the applicable federal statute language but even appellants agree that when there is a requirement in a statute of court approval that that applies in the world sixty eight context as well and the  statute that requires court or geo l approval and appellants argue that it doesn't because that's not specifically written in its text but of course statutes requirements are not all explicitly stated in so many words in their text courts interpret statutes cases where there is a bona fide dispute over wages and hours although it's hard to see why there would be a difference in that circumstance and even if there were some differences in those sorts of controversies there still could not be of judgment on a rule sixty eight offer and purported acceptance because there would still need to be some some review by the court to determine whether there was in fact such a controversy in th case and i also want to get back to though the language overall succeed it does not contain the applicable federal statute language but it does base weather and fair judgment happens on whether there has been an offer and an acceptance and will succeed offers settlements are interpreted according to basic contract principles which require a valid offers and valid acceptances and in the f s a context employees because they cannot waive their claims do not have the authority already validly to accept only certain types of cases we think that that applies across the board to f l i say cases and cheeks did not distinguish between different controversies in holding that the f s a required order g a o l approval context there cannot be a valid acceptance of an offer without court approval so the language in rule sixty eight requiring the court to enter judgment on an accepted offer simply never comes into play because there has not been a valid acceptance of the offer without court approval and this does go to the capacity of the employee to enter into these sorts of claims that because they cannot waive their rights and the approval requirement is based on the recognition that employees cannot waived their rights to l f l a say to their rights under the f l i say that because of the on equal bargaining power they cannot agree to be paid less than a minimum wage or overtime i also do want to address the question about the burden that is whether there is a burden caused by by requiring approval and the district court explained that this does not cause a burden on the parties that courts have come up with systems of having the approval process work quickly so for example in sanchez versus burgers and cupcakes the court in that case after determining that settlement approval was necessary the parties filed a three page letter eight days later that explained why the settlement was fair that included an exhibit with the plaintiff's calculations and then five days after that the court i want to speak first to the point that this judicially made requirement of just sort of you should extend here one thing i want to know is recently the supreme court in siena motors l l c rejected a sort of similar judicial requirement that exemptions in the f s a be read narrowly based on the public policy purpose behind awful a say the court said that there is nothing in the statute that requires such an error or review when other statutes get a fair reading it rejected that stance stating that the court should not assume that whatever might appear to further the state the statutes primary objective must be the law so should the court rule here there is no indication in by congress in the statute or the regulation and indeed congress knows how to in a similar statute more protective statute provide for waiver prohibit and even in that instance allows for private settlements of litigation all saying undisputedly owed and in a time when liquidated damages would automatically and one hundred percent of the time be owed in that instance to uphold the public policy of the f s a they would not allow a waiver of the liquidated damages i want to come or well to the extent that it's meant to create a settlement where there are disputes about the facts and what's owed then that you could say that this is precisely a place where waiver would may be allowed because it is not a place where there's undisputed wages it's not a place where it's clear and undisputed that there are other damages that would automatically be in these cases typically there's always a dispute as to what the rate of pay is what the hours are and in that way there's there's no issue about public policy role sixty also provides other protections that cheeks thought were concerns in the context of roe forty one here it will have to be on the public docket this court was the dispute here was essentially whether or not the plaintiff was paid a salary consistently through their time and so essentially the rate of pay there was also a discrimination fact that those were not credible so there is a dispute not only as to what the record said but also as to the rate of pay and it went to mediation was unsuccessful ok thank you very well yes very well argue every