sufficient to create federal jurisdiction right and that's consistent with the prior cases relating to the fact that a jurisdiction sixteen doesn't exist but respect to state toward actions for example well what it's not consistent with our prior decisions which is help to the contrary and now practice cases go ahead i'm sorry i have to plead ignorance and necessarily have helped me to understand what's going on here seems to be this big fight about what so that's probably the main reason why jurisdiction can't be asserted here the you know the first issue is whether whether the the claims assert a federal patent cause of action which they don't there are state law therefore state law causes of action one for consumer protection act violations two for intentional interference and one for misappropriation another raise the patent issue so the next level is whether the a substantial patent issue a patent was created that requires resolution in order to try things cases and that there was no such issue raised here because no one was asserting infringement or non infringement because they couldn't because that does this go if outside the scope law forrester had patents in the states covering his process but he as we said in the in the actual complaint they they were enforceable abroad and they're only pleaded just to essentially provide substance for what he was doing over there and we'll greater on the other side never asserted infringement by forrester as to any of his conduct in taiwan because they couldn't have done that which i think is well understood by everybody and then the third kind of christians and the cult level of inquiry is if there is a substantial issue of patent law which they really can't be because patent law doesn't extend to foreign conduct but if there is one is it necessary to resolution of the claims and there are two reasons why even if there was a substantial covered by that west x process and that can be litigated and resolved without reference to any patents whatsoever so that there is no need to refer to any substantial issue of u s pat treat an issue and there was a problem with odor and some other things like that and failing some tests that's why they brought in folks forester who was actually the inventor of us fixed process and since left wheel breaker using the same process and this is independent of the argument as to whether it is covered by the patent yet because of the license is limited to and covers all of west texas right i bloody license covers  own patent and they argued that it was within federal jurisdiction because you had to construe the u s patent to figure out whether what they did was incorrect under the state law causes of action court said no because the the claim of misappropriation formed an independent basis for determining whether it had been intentional interference and exactly the same result happened in the h simply the argument of misappropriation which has nothing to do a patent on necessarily so in this case we have centrally numerous reasons why there can't be jurisdiction for the most important being its conduct catalogue that was somehow race is not necessary to a resolution of the plane first of which being their assertions the that we relied on false assertions about wes fix their process and the second being the that the argument that or the count saying there had been this appropriation which under those two cases satisfies the elements of intentional interference for intentional intentional misconduct and those the state laws got the same in each of these three cases so there can't be any jurisdictions basically boils down and so we don't we have some arguments in the alternative essentially that relate to you know errors the court made  basis for him to decide that forrester had actual knowledge of this letter of war of march seventeenth two thousand and six about west six or about we'll raise the to the question it's a matter of new hampshire law that statute of limitations issues are for the court to decide yes there isn't factual questions quite apart from the fact i find it is that that's correct second you question thank you your honor i'd like to take advantage of opportunities and plainly there are classes of cases where state law claims articulated that have some patent issue i think to use a phrase the scores used in the air that don't necessarily require resolution of a substantial question but i think the issue before the jurisdictional issue before this court is is now real enough that we don't have to consider and until i read the supreme court's decision i made and having a different view but we don't have to consider those other classes the issue before this court is when a plaintiff's alleges that a defendant has made a false statement about patent rights whether or not that necessarily turns into a requirement that a substantial question of patent law needs to be resolved and the reason is i think as articulated by this court in both the dominant semiconductors and hunter douglas cases which are reefed in my brief is that there is a strong federal policy patent tactic pre amps it's a preemptive policy that so strong it is a patent holder has an absolute right to publicize his or her patents as long as the statements made are not objectively baseless this court talked about the the sort of federalism concerns in the preemption concerns that that raises and concluded that the although the cause of action is not preempted it has to be heard in federal court and the reason is it doesn't necessarily turn on federal law because the truth or falsity of the statement about the patent requires in something like a marksman hearing or something delves into what is i think historically and preemptively the problems of the federal courts to delve into this these statements well actually the the it's been a bit of a moving target the the amended petition which is the one we look at for removal purposes alleges that the statements were made in new hampshire i know the reply brief says unequivocal either conduct occurred in taiwan that's a direct quote said that the taiwanese this is the allegation i think counsel indicated somehow it was factual but it's merely an allegation at this point somehow the taiwanese company needed to know who had the u s patent rights they sent someone over to new hampshire to talk to my client located in new hampshire and at that point my client is alleged to have said we guarantee that we have the patent rights and then in paragraph forty nine of you men courts to avoid a kind of crazy quilt of state decisions applying federal patent law about the truth or falsity so that's the issue it's not it's not whether or not the taiwanese did or did not rely on it i agree that and in fact i don't know that those are even the subject of state courts of one point we had a lively discussion with judge and plant about whether this case  taiwan but but where the play differ a lie is on the allegation that a false statement was made by a us patent holder about his u s patent rights i would submit that the federal policy protects even if it's made to a taiwanese company or some other foreign company where the practice itself is not subject to the protection of u s patent law the fact that the statement patented expired but the taiwanese for reasons that are sufficient to themselves decided they wanted to make sure that the people who they were buying the products from and were actually that the two inventors and therefore had been the ones whose patent originally had covered that process and would you then say still that the case belongs in federal court if the allegation is named that you told the taiwanese that you were the actual inventors of the process and it was in within the scope of the now  think that's a more difficult case for the defendant will cost the the law on the policy i've i'm resting on refers to the patent holder and i do your honour's hypothetical i'm no longer the patent holder so i no defendant would have the right to to invoke federal jurisdiction because all of those issues are federal issues and do we want the state courts deciding scope of patton's claims construction o create tension or conflict between the state and federal courts as to whether the activity is covered or not covered by events pat that seems to be the situation here also not going to be a u s infringement state determinations and federalism i would actually respectfully disagree are suppose we were made in state court and the state court made a decision and adopted missed a farce years view that he invented a chemical which is what he said in his petition or later on as he says in his brief that he invented a method and a chemistry all of which is in sharp dispute at this moment but suppose we had proceeded to the merits in state  the state judge said i'm deciding that claims construction solubility means this isn't solid building means that infringement means this infringement means that there's no it is is within the scope of the p alleges that both parties remain engaged in the business of licensing these technologies to third parties so this is an ongoing these technologies are can be used wherever there is municipal waste incineration and in fact that the license  goard not to license it was a chemical supply contract that mr farrer surrendered in two granted the taiwanese company the right to practice a method of purchase these chemicals and resell them throughout the world in fact i asked mr far so that was deposition that was his interpretation of it so there is a there is a real problem like a malpractise case which presumably is you know failing to draw claims properly i don't know with the facts of gun law but  something along those lines that's not going to create the same kind of conflict i think the sharp policy at issue here is it is a narrow one it doesn't necessarily involve  precluded if under some circumstances the result would be limited to the parties and patents that have been before the state court such background it's desist situation specific attacks are not sufficient to establish federal rising and states for the explicitly deal with the i want to address briefly counsel's point that somehow they have pleaded alternative theories within the meaning of christians and because that's in my reading of the amended petition that's plainly not the case there is a statement using the and covered by the wessex license so it's not there's not there's no as a judge to the plan said in his oral order on remand there's no way to slice and dice it they they didn't say and it's not possible to tell that one misrepresentation was made one day and the next day another misrepresentation was made the way that the complaint or amended petition is drafted it's all one statement and so there what this is an after the fact attempt to rewrite the allegation as if there were separate mr or alleged separate misrepresentations in fact the way the amended complaint reads is that the west fix is used interchangeably with the scope of the patents that underlie the the technology so it's a it's not a model of clarity but i think the fair reading of it is that there is not an alternative theory there is one theory and that is that the taiwanese were concerned about who owned the u s patent rights the patent holder allegedly made a false statement about it and as a result of this court not this court rather but the trial board needs to go through the analysis set forth in dominant semiconductors was that statement objectively baseless within the meaning of or under the doctrine that a holder has a right to make statements about his or her patent rights as long as those statements are not objectively baseless i have about six seconds with my green light is still on so if i may continue briefly on the satchel limitations plaintiffs was aware of a ongoing dispute with my client about the scope of patents there are letters in two thousand and four there are letters in two thousand and five there are letters in two thousand and was not just one letter on march seventeenth two thousand and six and in february two thousand and six cold in the taiwanese company wrote to mr farceur and said we are very concerned about whether your process infringes and they said to mr farceur do will we infringe if we use your technology will we infringe the wheel of greater patent and he wrote back the same day through his agent mr xi saying no they're two completely different technologies and a month later they met and the notes the only surviving notes of the meetings a patent differences were discussed and it was based on that specific that it was more likely than not that that mark meetings despite mr farce denial they did indeed discuss the conflict between the two patents and in any event those inferences were well within the judge's discretion to draw and the failure of mr forrester to come forward with credible testimony also amounts to a failure of his burden of proof so my time's up  when that's a situation where they look to the remedy claimed to determine whether primarily sounds and patents are and contra and those are the typical those are that line of cases all of which involve assertions of  substantial issues of patent on and the cases that have to be resolved so they're really not applicable to this rather audible situation where the conduct was abroad and there can be no patent rights relating to conduct doesn't extend that far it's not true say that every time there is a statement that the terms of their contract patent have to be construed that automatically provides a basis the jurisdiction the university of texas case is a counterexample the board of regents and the university of texas where the that is the argument specifically made by the nippon company and it was rejected on the grounds that it was unnecessary to resolution of the case because of the fact that the state law the cause of action for misappropriation provided the basis for the determination of whether there had been internet interest intentionally interference as alleged so that the question is whether the statement made relating to conduct in taiwan was true or not right and if this is the conclusion the jury instruct the jury let's say suppose so the judge is instructed are concludes that the patent let's say does cover this conduct and then you go and sell the product to somebody in concord and they sue you for pat