and particularized suspicion common sense judgments and inferences about ordinary expenses experiences of the touchstone reasonable suspicion here deputy mayor found a vehicle on the road learned that the registered driver was incapable of lawfull operating that vehicle i had the belief that under common sense the registered owner was likely the driver pulled the vehicle over initiated the stop side of the individual for being a habitual violator that common sense  one that has been recognized by so the judges in twelve states supreme courts for circuit courts of appeals across the country and that is that finding the registered owner of the vehicle as a driver is a commonsense inference and absent information to the contrary some may argue that the existence of a suspended license would undermine that suspicion but the of the sixteen courts that i just mentioned eleven of them have dealt with this precise situation and the judges of those courts have indicated that reasonable suspicion continues to exist even in that circumstance indeed the factual predicate for the head bitch will violate our laws across the country is that the registered owner may be to continuing to drive and the only thing we're asking here is whether or not there is reasonable suspicion to investigate further here deputy mare relied upon that common sense understanding that a registered owner given the pervasiveness of automobile use in the united states was likely to be driving again warranted additional investigation to borrow a phrase from terry it would have been poor police work for deputy mayor not to initiate the stop in this case and investigate further to confirm or dispel his suspicion at this point i would invite any questions from the court just across  many of those cases that you referenced involved at least an officer who testified speaking about his experience drivers tend to be owners we don't have anything like that here we don't we stipulation the parties have stipulated as to what the relevant facts were if they believe there was information absent from those facts that they could have been would have done that i think this court's cases of recognise i believe it was the christian legal society maybe i'm not being clear what i'm what i'm getting at in most cases officers have testified that in my experience so we have some factual basis for a judge to then make a legal conclusion that the officers stopped was reasonable yeah and here we don't have any facts from the government from the officer so i experience or realities on the ground and yet you're asking the judge to make a legal conclusion about certain facts on the ground that are not present in  it's almost like a judicial notice of facts not in record well sort of thing so what i what i would agree with is that there is no evidence or testimony as to the history and experience of this officer rather we know that he's a certified law enforcement officer and none of the cases that i've found have relied upon an officer's understanding of whether or not a registered owner is for going to drive or rather the courts of indicated as a matter of common sense and ordinary human experience but the registered owner is a officer doesn't say i assume he says something more like this is been my experience or this is the training or the statistics that you put into the record in this case are presented to the judge why is the supreme court better able than the trial court who's the finder of fact so make decisions about what commonsense teaches is so or in it the lack of anybody with experience in the field at least there was one judge below who said in my experience that presumption doesn't make sense and i'm presuming that three other courts of sits at the  terry cortez wardlow or any of the others may refer to the us terms of the reference as to assumption we don't read a difference into that but rather what we understand is that reasonable suspicion is something of common understanding an ordinary human experience that whether or not the registered owner is a driver is not something that we would look to the law enforcement officers to history and expectations about rather those cases come up such as cortez in which we would have an international  trafficking situation instead more like navarrette it's common understanding that individuals will be driving under the influence and have certain particular behavior in wardlow flight from the presence of long horsemen officers would be something of common ordinary i think never it had to do with the with the reliability of the tips so and not with questions i know that the majority in the center never it argued about what the presumption should be that's why it's so dangerous so us to make our own presumptions and not let the facts find the so a couple of things one is i think this court has done it in navarrette there was a reliability issue but also with regard to whether or not it's sufficient to justify an investigation as to that particular crime here the crime is driving while under the car driving while suspended and having that he was with us mention can be a number of things that have nothing to do or a wise policy choice that would justify the suspension rather this officer has an indication that mr glover's license has been suspended and incapable of lawful i was a little bit the technology of it was there is a way were this law enforcement officer would not have the ability to say you know it's driving while suspended for failing to pay any number of tickets i don't think i'm going to initiate the stop rather this law enforcement officer knows that the registered owner lawfully operating a motor vehicle and that give sufficient suspicion in order to investigate further much like the the conduct that was in terry that's maybe perfectly lawful conduct and maybe maybe it's a good idea maybe it's a bad idea but the officer at least has suspicion to generate additional inquiry to and make sure i understand you can see that if the officer acquires additional information in the course of the stop that suggests that his  suspicion that this is the driver with the suspended license is not the driver in that instance you would not be the officer would not be able to pursue that the stop further yeah if for example it's  you know mr so and so who's the registered owner in the part of the woman there is a woman in driving the car he would that would be the end of the matter right he would not be able to pursue the stop further he would not be able to initiate the stop if information to the contrary had been present on the archetype situation of the looking for a sixty year old man and as a twenty two year old female so that would be that would dispel the reasonable suspicion that we have with that question and probable cause we have dealt with if exculpatory material in the presence of probable cause that a police officer is not required to take that into consideration you're suggesting a different standard for reasonable commit this crime we don't obligate police officers to investigate that reasonable x to nation we see probable cause exists and the officer can arrest on probable cause we're creating a different rule for reasonable cause i don't know under reasonable cause you're prepared to say the rule is different if you have reason to believe it's not the driver who should have stopped the car identify that the driver is a twenty year old female then the suspicion that initially attracted the officer to that vehicle would be dispelled that's just an application of the since so that's what this court's cases have historically recognizes once the existence of reasonable suspicion is that there then there is no necessity to investigate further such as and the only basis for the reasonable suspicion is circumstances one circumstance the there just as owners driver's license has been suspended period that's that's only a factor so the totality depends on the particular crime that the officer is investigating i concede to the court that these particular facts that the officer knew in this situation are frequently going to be determinative but rather our rule permits the recognition that there could be situations that would come to the officer for example if again it's a convertible and you're able to see the person that suspicion is going to be dispelled but what once the officer in this situation has reasonable suspicion license and registration or i'm sorry the registration data behind the vehicle he's capable he or she is capable of determining any are characteristics of the driver that's one thing but for example if if the driver was expected to be a sixty year old man e it seems to me that a lot hinges on in your case on common sense assumption that the drivers of vehicles typically are the owners of the vehicle would you i think that's yes and that might be true in our contemporary contingent historical reality but the next generation for example often rents cars they don't they don't buy cars they don't own cars you're asking us to write a rule for the constitution that presumably has some duration to it this is one with a short expiration date so i don't think it is i think it it would be part of the totality of that could potentially come up i would envision a situation in which twenty or forty or sixty years from now our operation of motor vehicles are different and under the same facts perhaps there is no stipulation perhaps the criminal defendant that has been stopped would like to cross examine the officer and say well you know in two thousand the registered on it were frequently the driver but our life has changed we've become the b or b or air b n b of the society and that would be able is something that the court would then be able to consider general to do you know the florida v harris look search case you're familiar with that what struck me in reading this case is that you were asking for a very different approach than we unanimously decided was proper in that case was a probable cause clase but i don't think that much makes all that much difference the idea was that if you have a trained dog and it gives an alert there's a reason to think that there is drugs in the car and yet and yet unanimously we said you know but at that suppression hearing a person is entitled to say that's not all the circumstances that exist we know something about the dogs history we know something about the dogs training we know something about some other circumstance and i think what you're asking us to do is essentially to say that all of those some of the things in this context become yeah i actually think that's helpful because it depends upon what the nature of the inquiry is here it's driving while suspended and the registered owner and the connection to the driver is common with regard to a trained dog to sniff out particular drugs i think there the dog actually alerted to a drug that it was not trained to identify and so that does that's a more nuanced characterization then whether or not an individual is driving the vehicle because for example  the white mr glover could have cross examined on a similar sort of circumstance mr glover chose not to because the parties agreed with the facts were and they were tied to the particular crime of driving while suspended does it make a difference justice kagan pointed out that case was probable cause this is reasonable suspicion because the level of inquiry or examination vary depending upon whether it's probable cause or reasonable suspicion obviously both for the minute but the inquiry is much lower or the burden is much lower for an one fact is enough so we are not asking you to throw out the totality of circumstance you have to look at the particular crime that's in that is implicated whether it's in florida versus harris or or analyse versus i think united states those are relatively complicated crimes i  look at the cortez case in which the number of inferences and deductions in order to identify chevron as he he was scurrying people across the border those are some significant  educated understanding of the law enforced i'm just i'm just not seeing that i mean the question in the dog alert case is are there drugs in the car or they're not trucks in the car and it's like well the dog alerted that's an awfully good reason to think there are drugs in the car but still we're going to go further and say that there are other things that might be involved in a particular case yes grief we thank you so i wouldn't say that they're in this situation the database alerted that mr glover h a license for doing suspended he couldn't operate the vehicle we don't know why the dog alerted and we had to have information as to the officers training experience to answer that question thank you counsel mr houston mr chief justice and may it please the court the th amendment asked police officers to be reasonable it does not ask under set aside commonsense when they step into the patrol car the traffic stop at issue in this case was constitutional because it was based on a commonsense inference it was reasonable for the officer to think that charles glover might be the person driving the truck registered in his name that's an inference that police officers use all the time in a range of law enforcement situations  a that's an inference that we commonly rely on in a range of law enforcement situations and the prevalence of the inference supports its reliability moreover this court has repeatedly explained that reasonable suspicion is a minimal standard it is significantly less than a preponderance of the evidence and less also than probable cause the reason for that is that a traffic stop is much less intrusive than a custodial arrest and the point of a traffic stop just like every terry stop is simply to conduct further investigation who have had that license suspended will break the law i don't think we're positing that people will necessarily break the law your honor in every case where you're conducting a terry stop you're going to have equivocal facts and the whole point of terry is to provide there are hundreds of thousands of citations in this country every year for driving on a suspended license i think the statistics that are pointed to the study that's identified at page forty one dollars of respondents own brief talks about some of these statistics we have other miki in this case that have offered the court some of the statistics about seven thousand fatalities involving unlicensed drivers it's not alternately at the end of the day a detailed statistical question as the court has repeatedly explained in cases like wardlow it turns on a common sense judgment that the officer made because when i'm trying to say is what is that common sense judgment based on i mean i understand that if this goes back to justice course such as question if it were based on a particular officers training and experience and judgment but here we can't say that it's based on any of those things so what is it based on your i think we can i would respectfully dispute the idea that we can say it wasn't based on the officers training and experience i do think that there are going to be a wide range of crimes where reasonable suspicion turns on only one fact i think of a case like burkham or the officer is driving he sees a car swerving erotically any thinks that person might be drunk now they might not but i have a reasonable suspicion to investigate further there's only one fact i don't think we would say that the reasonableness of the stop in that case turned on whether the officer came into court and said here's how often in my particular experience i've found that people who are swerving end up being drunk i also think that the it dovetails with a wide variety of this court's cases which have explained that we don't want the permissibility of a th amendment stop to turned on something that's unique to this particular officer how he was trained at this particular time the court in navarette did not think that the permissibility of that traffic stop turned on the particular testimony that the officer had given it said instead of the court said you know i thought it was the opposite that we really do want particular risk to increase here whether that particular istic inquiry is related to the driver of the officer that we won some way of saying there's reasonable suspicion in this case not in i mean i mean for example would you just say suppose we just had a statistic that said you know that you know thirty percent of drivers are likely to do this would you say that you know that alone is enough if it's just a to stickle i'm just trying to find out like what's the basis is the basis purely statistical is it something about a particular driver experience and training what is the basis your honor is absolutely right that the suspicion has to be particular and objective that's the court's formulation but when the court has talked about particular it means particular to this suspect not particular office or indeed the court has said we don't want the availability of a traffic stop to turn on whether it's made by a junior officer versus a more experienced officer or something like that but that the stop has to be particularized to the information that was known about this suspect that's why i think to answer your honest question directly a generalized statistic about how many people in the world commit a certain kind of offense will not generally speed sufficient to establish we're not using most of the particular person doesn't that have to do with geography meaning i suspect there are some towns in the united states where people don't break you were no matter what that it would be you know if your license got suspended the police officer knows that in this jurisdiction that presumption is not a good one doesn't work it might work somewhere else but without having the officer testify as to where he's doing this star we don't know and so so you really are whose license has been suspended your honor we are asking the court to whole but as a general matter as a matter of common sense and ordinary human experience the owner of a driver is very often the vehicle the driver the owner of the vehicles very often the driver th absence of information to the contrary so in a circumstance in which based on geography or other conditions of the area there is a different standard and a reasonable officer and it was a no that is me that is a generalized to strict than that  to point out what justice kagan was saying are you relying on a generalized can you said no when answering just to sort of my or if i heard you correctly you're basically saying well the common sense is based on this general idea that people are driving their own cars my point to justice kagan was a generalized observation about how many people in the world commit a certain crime does not provide a speed limit give you a hypothetical suppose that a municipality has a law that says everybody has to carry their driver's license with the middle of times and suppose that a particular police department actually did a kind of survey or you know a study of their practices and found that actually fifty percent of teenagers do not carry their license with the middle of times all right so now it's that common sense that if you see a teenager she will be carrying her driver's license with her does that does that give the police officer the ability to stop every teenager that he sees generally not your own i think the court has said that that's what it means for the suspicion to be particularized to the individual you need a reason to plow this need a lot of hours are different for houser different from this case or you know you pull over teenage eye suspicion that this driver is committing a there's that particular a suspicion look she's a teenager i don't think as unless that inference was so overwhelmingly reliable it correlated so strongly i guess at a certain point the inference becomes so overwhelming that there's a particular behavior that's so closely correlated with criminal activity that it would provide me so why isn't the requirement as the council's court suggested that you have to corroborate and i take that word very generally that you just got a if you can safely because no one's asking police officers to do things unsafely ok but at least try it by and see if it's a older person make sure it's not a woman do something besides committing one fact to drive a conclusion that's no different than a generalized system to responses you're on a st it's actually not nearly as safe to do that as as one might suppose as we explained in our brief officers are trained instead to keep their vehicles position behind a suspect because that's the safest place for them to be but even in a circumstance where everybody would say you could reasonably attempt that sort of in vehicle pull aside and peek maneuver this court has repeatedly that you try plenty of police officers that let someone they want to stop move forward from where they are and then pulling behind them there's a whole lot of things that could be done to do that and if the officer does that your honor if the if the officer gains that type of information that absolutely would be part of the totality of the circumstances but i think this court has explained in socolow that where an officer develops reasonable suspicion a traffic stop is authorized and the permissibility of the stop does not depend on other less intrusive investigatory techniques that the officer might have pursued you could make the same argument in any reasonable suspicion case every defendant would come in and say there's always something that the officer could have easily done to investigate me further short of making a traffic stop the point of the reasonable suspicion standard is to be a minimal standard because the purpose of reasonable suspicion is simply to conduct further investigation thank you thank you counsel mr chief justice and may it please the court kansas and the united states ask this court to adopt a bright line nationwide rule that it is always reasonable to assume that a car is being driven by its unlicensed owner but in three briefs and now twenty seven minutes of oral argument they have offered literally no way for this court to assess whether that is in fact a reasonable assumption whether it is in fact based on common sense they disclaim reliance on the factual context they disclaim reliance on officers experience they disclaim reliance on statistical evidence this simply assert that it is common sense in every circumstance and in every community in the country but that's not true and that's not how the th amendment works here the only fact that would give rise to suspicion to suspicion of illegal activity is the identity of the driver and it was kansas's burden to establish that the officer had reason to suspect that mr glover was driving but the officer stipulated that actually he had no idea who was driving i mean officer decided not to come in and testify at the suppression hearing to explain why you would assume that an unlicensed driver would be driving his car kansas should not be permitted now to make up for its evidence or lapses by relying on a bright line nationwide rule that has no basis in facts or in the circumstances of this case or in statistical evidence the th amendment requires they can textual analysis this court has repeatedly declined to adopt bright line rules with respect to reasonable suspicion or probable cause and nothing about this case excuse me or this context would support departing from that ordinary contextual  type of analysis in an ordinary case it will be relatively easy for an officer to establish reasonable suspicion that a car is or is not being driven by its unlicensed owner but the officer in the state have to do at least that minimal amount of work before they can initiate the  kansas didn't do that work and so this court should affirm i'm happy to take any questions that last bit is what interests me that it's a minimal burden that you would impose on the state and it does seem like in many of the cases on which the government relies there's an officer comes in and says well in my experience owners drive their cars and if that's all that is at issue here is th kansas forgot neglected to put an officer on the stand to say in my experience the drivers usually deal in the car more often is what are we fighting about here and is this what's maybe he will maybe he won't right we don't know what the officers experience is i mean i think it's going to if you really want to the officer if the officer in this case had said i was trained that the that the driver of a car is usually the owner even when the driver has a suspended license so that may not be enough but it might be but there be an opportunity for cross examination about what the truth there was an opportunity here for for your client to put in any evidence that he done if that's all you're asking for would that be enough the officer says this is how i was trained you know i think you need an enough unity for cross examination you know i think it's empowering was stirring opportunity for cross examination here there is but there wasn't that if the officer had made that showing and made that that factual assertion then my client probably would have wanted to cross examine but they didn't even do that they didn't rely on any officer experience but it's not the defining if you are trying to my question very briefly is i think it's an assistant to justice alit if an officer comes in and says these magic words whatever they are right and that's the sum total of the evidence in the case in my experience in my training whatever it is that good enough to satisfy the constitution in your opportunity to ask those questions of the officer yes and i think if that if the state had chosen to rely on the african officers experience then certainly we would have asked questions about that but the state chose not to rely on the officers experience and that's up to the state if the state chooses to showing it's not up to the defendant to say well actually maybe you shouldn't put in evidence about this or that or the other thing right that's on the state and it really is not it's not a huge burden that the state has to do the sharing to do you do you think it's totally random who the dr ruse in other whether it's reasonable suspicion or not do you think it is at least for a five percent chance that the owner is driving that the owner of the car is driving the car on a suspended license or just with in general just in general yes in general ok and where are you going to stop surely one out of ten it's fred jones's car it's being driven and when the officer goes up he sees that it's it's whatever fred jones is a middle aged man and not a teenage girl is is it still like is it maybe one out of ten chances i don't i don't know what it is and if you really don't know you don't think it's one out of ten i think it is probably one out of ten when an owner with a valid license is driving his car ok well we know that probable cause is not fifty percent right it's somewhat less than fifty percent and even you are willing to agree that it's at least ten percent yes well what what reasonable suspicion cut off do you think do you think it's one out of five i can't say because this court has said we don't get in there are none of us can say we know the point is most of us can say and the reason is because probably reasonable suspicion does not have to be based on statistics it does not have to be based on specialized experience as we've said often it can be based on common sense and i'm sure that the number varies from sure if you're in a neighborhood that has that has a lot of you know kids who will drive their parents car that's fine and if it's an area where you don't that's fine but reasonable suspicion doesn't depend upon the kind of showing that you seem to demand where the just statistical study or special experience that mr chief justice i'm not saying that the state has to put in any particular type of evidence but if they're just relying on an assertion of common sense they have to give us some way to assess whether that is a reasonable common sense in phrase i don't know i was just going to say if they're relying on common sense they don't have to give you anything more than common sense but how do we know if it is common sense i mean i think you're going to actually to ten percent and i think that's about owners who have valid licenses i think sure it's i think it is not at all common sense it's the opposite of common sense i think that someone having a suspended  is going to have no effect at all on whether they drive i think of this the inference cuts the other way we know somebody has already broken the law in some sense he's got a suspended license i think it's probably more likely than not that he would break the law saying you can't drive with a suspended so st you know the facts on the gr basic proposition your basic proposition is that it doesn't rise to the level of reasonable suspicion to think that a car registered in fruit jones's name is being driven by for a jones that's different than the collateral point about whether it's more or less likely because it's the license suspended no that's not to our our basic proposition is not a reasonable inference when fred jones does not have a valid license yes and it's not reasonable to think that the that the statistics or the rate of driving on a suspended license are going to be the same in every community that in the country if someone lives in manhattan or chicago or downtown d c who has a suspended license i think it's significantly less likely that they're going to drive on a suspended license because they have access to public transportation and hooper and all these things to get to the places they need to go compared to someone who lives in say rural north dakota or some other place where there i hundred of ten when this kind of hit comes up on the computer it ends up being the suspended owner who is driving the car and officer could say the information that came up on the computer was that this person had previously been caught driving us and the license that's what can i go back for a nd and there's just decided exactly the same reaction and i would like to finish with this step further but i go outside we go outside there's a car driving but we happen to know the license plate and the license plate tells us that charles smith owns the car we see a friend he says i reasonably suspect that it's charles jones driving that car would you say the friend is wrong telling you this what his license was suspended now he says you know that's a good point but i still reasonably suspect he's driving now would you say that now that person is wrong yes you would well what you're asking me to say i would have said that person is a question but the question you're asking me to say that that person who still suspects the charles is driving is on reasonable that's pretty tough for me to say it's pretty tough for me to say that that person's wrong on reasonable when he still suspects now there we are and i can't get any further in this case now it may be that you have found some precedent the chose that this initial reaction which i'm showing you is higher than if he had been somewhere else and not enough you need something else and there's a footnote saying including just the officers explaining why in his experience so what the presence of they're going to experience and you making a distinction between th if that's something yeah i think i asked the question well there's an easy way to find out what was the reason for the suspension and the answer to that question was no searching on tests for this county at least but that's probably going to vary from accurate so as i said you can do things short of verifying it right you can rely on your experience if this hit comes up in one hundred dollars of town it's always the same and it under his driving if you know something specific that this person has previously been caught driving on a suspended license but also you know this stuff don't wouldn't it harm for the officer to pull up next to the car and look over i do not know just mr chief justice but that is certainly part of what officers do you know they examine the circumstances in the factual surroundings i have noticed since taking on th around how easy is it or how difficult is it to see the face of a driver in front of me just by looking in their side view mirror their rear view mirror and they're certainly circumstances where you can do it and it's not difficult if he peered into the window and  unless he can rely on one of the other several things i've mentioned like his experience with these details i mentioned one of the problems with experience if you make the distinction between the bookie and have experience and a veteran but that's going to be true in every th am rate where you're relying on officers experience if they have no experience it's going to be harder for them to justify the reason most especially about the manual that says if such a manual exists and it's not in the record you know then then you would need to rely on one of the other methods of establishing reasonable suspicion one thing officers often testify about is how the person that they're suspecting reacted to the driver and your brief suggests until they make wayne change or told they go too quickly on the right turn on red or don't come to a full stop what sense does that rule make so i think that that's one option and  said that's an option you articulated the brief from trying to figure out what what purpose that would serve just ok and stop stopping right away i'm going to i'm going to follow you until you go thirty one in the thirty and then i'm going to  anybody be followed until they do something wrong and you don't really require that a police officer goes and checks out who's sitting in the front seat if a police officer could do neither of those things as long as the police officer shows up to the suppressi he have to stop a car because he thinks well yes you can do it how do you get experience if you can't do the st time but i mean if you have some other basis to do it or you know he's driving with someone i don't know i mean it's just like the dog right  you know somebody certifies me somebody trains me i've seen this done by my partner i've heard about it being done by other people in my department it's just you subject yourself to something which is the point of suppression hearings as and i mean th suspicion that's absolutely what you need be the case that you don't need a level same level of training and experience and background to make the make the assumption that you've already said at least ten percent you may need less that you but that type of analysis even go through to determine if there is a car has a suspended license what are all of the considerations that you think the officer has to take into account before the shooting stopped checking trying to check with headquarters as to the basis for the license suspension whether it's an urban area or world area or someplace in between whether it's a highway or a city street whether it's raining whether it's dark maybe whether it's a law abiding community where people have suspended licenses never drive the officer has to take into account all those factors before initiating a stop necessarily he just has to take into account the full sort of factual context and well it wasn't real your world area or the city it was sort of in between and it was raining but it wasn't raining hard all those things would depend on and an evaluation of all of those factors just like in any th amendment case to that just as much as you should defer to the officers is that your argument that reasonable suspicion can never be based on a single fact on just one factor always has to be more than one fact not necessarily it depends on what the fact is if the fact is inherently point in the brief of you know the officer should just follow them around till they do something wrong on the traffic laws and if you think that really is a sufficient basis to stop someone in this exact circumstance of they've gone another mile down the road i think  hunch then they can just follow the person until you're not hurting pretextual stops that's not protection or if they see something that raises the probable cause for some other violation this court has said that's fine it doesn't matter what the subject of motivation was if they see something that objectively creates probable cause to make question there's a whole number of things an officer can do you know to to do more than just say i'm just assuming that i'm licensed on or is driving the car but just seem i think the word formal after this experience i you know i've done kind of these and twice it was the driver remember that mike writes me is the right number for reasonable suspicion it may be enough this court has never put a number on it has said that number of times they can't put a number on it and so i can't put a number on it but that might assume i'm an officer this is what i do write i assume this is the driver is ok and is not this is the owner ok i too should why why isn't that a fair reading though of the declaration before us and then it becomes incumbent upon the defendant if the defendant wishes to raise questions just as a defendant might about the dog training and sniffing abilities and record different substances to raise some questions about the officers training and experience or localities circumstances in lawrence which is a very law abiding community  whatever why shouldn't we read this is affectively exactly what you say would be sufficient i think the simple answer is because it is and that isn't what it says it just said that soon as i understand i'm literally council it says it's a state based on the lack of evidence in the record it permissibly relieves the state of that's right and very carefully it says here the problem is not that the state necessarily needs significantly more evidence and time again in this th amendment cases that you have to look at the totality of circumstances you can't just rely on a single sort of single fact that has a probability based correlation maybe to a crime you have to come in and explain the basis for your  n my friend mr cross talked about terry but terry did not adopt a bright line rule that anytime someone walks past a store window three times you automatically have reasonable suspicion right they relied on the officers experience his observations of other things that were going on and that's saying in this case you should just rely on other apps other things that were observed other things the officer knew maybe in his experience the database is extremely unreliable but that would be something that's relevant to know me and his experience it's extremely reliable also in development and you just need something more you said something it certainly caught my attention i thought the officer was probably saying the right thing in my experience people who own cars are likely to be the drivers and the amount or until you things and if there were other things that were relevant to this one call the officer and ask him about them and if you want to say no no it's not that some reasonable given my fact even my fact you probably didn't say that because actually the statistics show seventy five percent you know sixty percent but not here ok we're out of that but what is it what is it that you think is that extra thing in the facts here that should have been i mean is like ten things he could have done and he didn't do anything i didn't say that i said what is it i'm not talking about what he might have done i'm saying what fact is there other than the two he pointed to and the one you added that you think was relevant so that the dr the behavior of the driver could have been relevant it could have been relevant whether or not i'm not asking could have been i don't i don't know because they didn't  trivial decision or a revolutionary decision it's a trivial decision you have all the slacking here is a statement i've been trained that blah blah blah it's a revolutionary decision you have in every case involving reasonable suspicion there has to be a statistical showing or an examination of all the things that you think are necessary here is that not right answer sure justice alito what we're asking for is that the ordinary th amendment contextual analysis be required in every case it doesn't require statistics in every case it doesn't require any magic words it just requires something the three minutes journal cross thank you mr chief justice and i'd like to st start with regard to the officers training experience and lack of testimony of the reason that isn't in this case is because mr glover stipulated to the facts below in field to raise any question have to if you don't prove a no so they did they could you could could didn't see he wore red hat that's why i stopped and they would come back and say that's not enough to make out reasonable suspicion so if what they're saying is making an assumption without telling us what the basis of that assumption is is not enough so the point is they stipulated to deprive the facts that were relevant to the determination and the cancer supreme court made a determination as to th justice cavanaugh talked about we think that's a perfectly reasonable situation if we're going to eliminate reasonable suspicion rather if there's a traffic violation that's probable cause for a stop and that's not a basis this court's decisions as indicated but you don't have to wait for a probable cause an order to stop and so i think your question was right on rd statistics we agree with the red brief that indicates the statistics are rarely present and frequently are going to be distinguished by the parties and so we don't believe this to to stick around them forth apply differently based upon the age and experience of the office or or the time of day of the th amendment the rule that respondents propose would require the officers to let this vehicle go at night because it's impossible to identify this court's cases except for i believe the no knock warrant does not do that certainly the reasonable suspicion cases do not do that and th the states have a strong interest in regulating the roadways of the traffic situation here and they have a strong law enforcement interest for example if there is a report of a child that had been if you finish your thought thank you a child that had been abducted and we were looking for the mother the officers would be reasonable to rely upon the license plate thank you on the thank you counsel the case is submitted