percent interest of over thirty eight hundred dollars probably later revealed that the six percent was being charged at statutorily authorized rate this is so statute three thirty four point zero one one brought a complaint provides three three four point zero one if they attempt to claim for example that contractual interest applies it's at odds with the very entertaining or very understanding of the plain text of three three one point zero one particularly as three thirty to rather was attached to the complaint is the debt collection letter that was sent as to what was prior what was sold or otherwise transferred to middling funding the party that acquired the debt as a result of the sale after charge off that is an unknown we do not know we don't know the exact terms of the assignment or the sale to midline so so that we because it seems to me as if we've got that and we know  or depending on whether or not it may for example to more fully clarify it may provide the basis for understanding and i would think that the or not and so we don't know i mean there was this piece of paper that somebody that your that your opponent put in that put into evidence or purported to show that there was a twenty five percent but if that were the right would that be the end of your case if this court were to determine that says either one the terms could even be considered in determining whether or not it's in the contract or a contractual interest rate applied ultimately this comes down to a question of fact what happened that my question is a legal one assuming it was twenty five percent without reason and in your case if contractual interest was applied then yes they're ok any at any rate i guess yes that's another question i have it doesn't matter that it was the statutory rate specifically because minnesota statute three thirty four point zero one is a simple interest that you specifically contractual interest to write the rate doesn't matter what the right is in the statu matter and they can't do that you say unless the contract says it can correct ok well that's the case right likely yes your honor and the issue being you can't charge session or you can't charge simple interest on interest is plainly understood in minnesota statute three thirty four it's might otherwise be beneficial to the debtor in looking at the statute it provides that it provides that contracts shall bear the same rate of interest after they become due as before a party cannot just arbitrarily resign the percentage rate effectively it's six percent or it's contractional interest it's one or the other even though it might be beneficial to the debtor regardless of the application of the interest ultimately in certainly what we may try to claim which is blending a statutory verses contractual approach that's not provided in the minister's statute and certainly we don't have a contract to provide that that is allowed otherwise as well now particularly the claim plausibility arad material violations of  eighty two iolo own as the claims of false representations relating to authenticity of documents submitted in the underlying state court action three cases really matter for this for this case today stuffy vs land b charge off balance contained interest as it was alleged that compounded interest improperly and of an otherwise inflated the overall amount of these cases on all fours with the heaney decision therefore the porch is likely adopt the same approach there  it wasn't specifically addressed in the opinion as noted in the request for reconsideration in the order in the quest for reconsideration which states while this decision was not specifically contemplated in the order it no reference to a specific specific terms of conditions nothing and years most of the grounds for relief is that we should do what reversed the district court's opinion as to the interest upon interest argument note that it's important to take in kind when looking at the materiality analysis that it is an objective standard and not a subjective standard it's dangerous to apply a subjectivity approach to the  clients like all lawyers were subject to the rules of professional conduct and rules of the court but unlike most lawyers were also governed by the state's attorney generals and these consumer financial protection bureau and board a collection practices act and that's what finds us here today and i mentioned see if people because the letter at issue today is a letter that was sent at the direction of the sea of p v they wanted us to send letters out to all of our consumers that say you know here's information about your debt and here's how to obtain more information about your debt and but you know what has judge magnussen noted in his order that it was not a collection letter i nothing to do with midlands letters we're just simply looking at one disclosure letter the single issue remaining is whether that information letter sent by masculine crime or describing interest accruing violated the f one section of the f t c p a a by falsely misrepresentation and mis representing the character and amount of the debt that's one piece of vent and then the second piece of it is sixty nine hundred two f probably more specifically  to collect interest not authorized by the agreement or permitted by law now recently this court analyzed in hill a very very similar fact pattern in hill the creditor pursued a claim with to what you have here today the court adopted the materiality standard and noted that requesting statutory interest is not a violation of the f t c p a that was a right that the creditor had to do and the court noted the hogans in case that has not yet been determined by the state whether or not statutory interest could apply the court concluded that hill was not misled by the documents submitted to the court and he had although he hill had a valid defense to the interest claim it was not a violation for the creditor simply to request it now unlike the hill case in our case here today there has not been a determination that midland's claim was invalid and in fact to the contrary mr coyne does not dispute having his citibank credit card for nearly forty years paying interest all that time without contest station in fact paying a much higher percent interest all throughout that time thus the application of the hill reason hill reasoning is even more applicable in this case now he middle and submitted the terms governing the account stablish in that the interest rate is twenty five point two four percent not the six percent six percent disclosed in the letter of this issue of requesting less interest then it permitted by contract has been addressed many times to showing paper and this account absolutely your honor that's a great question and the way that credit cards work and they're governed by regulations either banks and banking act is that when credit cards are issued the terms and conditions governing that account are sent to the consumer and that consumer has the right to review those and once they use what is a connection between these conditions and this card so so the connections are that the terms and conditions specifically lay out these are the citibank correct based upon the fact that he says i didn't sign these and the court dispensers records but the court dispensed with that saying no when you when you use your account that's what invokes the terms and conditions and certainly that liberty with any credit card not to use it and to say you don't so i mean that's there's there's a whole body of case law regarding terms and conditions and how they are political and how they're  relevant it's not part of the appeal because it wasn't raised as a part of the appeal and we don't believe it was raised we disagree but we believe was raised in the motion to dismiss but it's certainly your honor was not raised on the appeal whether or not the terms and conditions should have i believe that's the heart of his claim is that he made the presumption that because we charge the rate consistent with the statutory rate therefore that we were charging statutory interest and statutory interest has a little bit of baggage with that that says you can only charge simple interest so i think that's the heart of his argument and your argument is you're not talking about statutory interest at all number one we're not talking much touched her at all and number two we believe we did charge simple interest on the charged off balance and so those are those are both arguments that we've made so there's so that argument addressed by the district court  this is a very large interest right twenty five percent that's that's a big hit why don't we do the right thing and lower it down to what the legislature has said is a more reasonable rate and so creditors frequently do this instead of charging twenty five plausible way for this to be anything is statutory because they use six percent and there's plenty of other reasons why including the actual reason why which is to have a consumer friendly approach and to try to charge  i know your honor i will promise to be truthful well i can't say it any better than the cases that i've talked about this concept about lowering the interest rate i mean that would be a walk that's the  versus medco case and then there's a there's a plethora of cases cited in our memorandum that talk about it and it really the court states that there's nothing unfair deceptive about lowering the interest rate and in fact  in our brief it wasn't it wasn't one that was a really main argument but i wanted to highlight that because i think it is a good point the way the credit cards work is that and again governed by regulations is you get a billing statement it might include charges it might include late fees it might include interest my food all kinds of things and you have a month to look at that and dispute anything and then after that all of those charges go back and go into principal and you get a new credit card billing statement and it's now got the the new principal and everything is what's called capitalized and so when you see a charge off balance it is capitalized everything in there is principal at that point it has gone through r but by statute though it is it is principle and so i understand that you know you it's you know a payment is made you don't know where that payments got applied over forty years you don't know what's left in that charge  everything has been capitalized into principle and yes one point it was interest during that billing cycle but it is now at charge off it's capitalized so that's where we're at but we talked a little bit about capitalization nor did they look at contract interest it was just a simple case that dealt with contracts or statutory interest and so that's why we think the reliance on hany is misplaced we're trying to go with this at the contract rate which is  not charging statutory so and statutory you may be able to prove that really were so you can charge statutory interest at four percent if you want it's up to it it doesn't mandate that you has to be six percent so  think it's relevant that nowhere in any communication with mr coyne as has there been any assertion that there was statutory interest alleged we made an argument in a court pleading about it and counsel has said that that's why they're claiming statutory interest and that's not exactly true there's no communication with mr coyne that says we're charging statutory interest so finally the disclosure of this interest had no impact on mr coyne he simply did not did not respond did not request more information it's clear that under the hill analysis that he had no it was not material to his decision making and all the the cases both cases a little bit off point because they deal with cases where they pursue debts that absolutely were barred and not permissible and so this is not our case here is we we respectfully request that you  two minutes and fifty six to try to clarify in my mind at least what we're talking about is your honor effectively we're talking about using simple interest to amplify an overall amount or rather simpler statute to amplify overall amount by compounding interest you can't use a simple answer statute to compound interest since the very foundation the very purpose of that simple interest debt is that you actively a debt collector is then collecting or getting more money more milind contrary to what the police claim here millen did not submit the terms and conditions measurably in cramer did through their attorney separately totally unconnected to the party that actually owns the debt totally unconnected to citibank totally unconnected to anyone it couldn't be can to considered an agreement creating the debt particularly because it was dated after mr coyne had allegedly defaulted on the debt it was created after or at least during the period in which shortly thereafter it was charged off in other words say perhaps however it's relevant for this case specifically including in the first paragraph within that letter it does state that this is an attempt to collected that bird in its wholly inaccurate to claim that it is not a collection letter and at the risk of confirming that which everyone knows already to be quite clear my lack of understanding suppose the interest rate had been five five percent of it least according to the statute it appears that there is a either or i can quote the statute if you like the interest writing it's six percent or it's a contracted rate collectors then have no safe harbor and as other words to protect themselves against a claim of this nature if you're charging statutory interest on a simple interest it effectively you must only apply to principle you can't compound interest on interest only thank you for your argument it's an interesting case and we will take it under consideration you very much your hon