a defendant has a prior involuntary medication or treatment order or has a prior felony conviction then by definition the collateral consequences exception cannot apply the appellate court in many cases including already moot is dependent upon the court's jurisdictional authority and courts can that simply decide cases to generate precedent or to provide any therapeutic relief to the petitioner in the case to the respond in the case but that's exactly what happens in these cases where there is no clear collateral consequences associated with any of these cases in this case it is beyond any dispute that court ever consider the case in fact even before the respondent filed her opening brief in the appellate court that the matter was moved the trial court's involuntary medication order that lasted only for ninety days and is this court recognized in barbara  that this exception requires that whatever the issue being addressed in this case would have some determining factor for future litigation involving the same with against and as explained in alfred h h eight facts specific specific analysis as to whether or not in their case it was the fish and see the evidence cannot satisfy that instead it has to be a determination of a legal ruling of some sort that would have future future ramifications the example of the court  h h case gave was the in re a minor case involving a newspaper's challenge to a refusal by the trial judge to allow them to prepare and publish the offender's name in the of a juvenile criminal offense and what this court said in explaining offered it has that clearly then issues going to come up again for the newspaper they will have the exact same issues being presented they need the ability to be able to litigate in determine whether or not they're allowed to have to identify those names and in a newspaper in a publication that is not the same as the offered a j f k said it is not the same as a fact specific finding as to whether nappy allegations supporting the involuntary commitment in that case were sufficient in that case likewise in this case there is no challenge at all to the sufficiency of the evidence regarding the underlying involuntary treatment there is no challenge at all to any of the fairness of the proceedings at the trial itself instead the only issue that has court or here is whether or not the trial judges oral statement at the end of the hearing that the evidence was overwhelming that the witnesses testified and that the petition would be granted was not sufficient under the statute under section three hundred sixteen is we argued in the appellate court as we argue here that clearly cannot be the basis for reversal because that statute has to be identified as a directory statute as opposed to a mandatory one evidence it would be focusing upon the thought process of the judge himself instead of whether or not the evidence itself was sufficient to support the finding it would be examining what the judge said as opposed to what the parties did and whether or not the proceedings were proper under the statutes and under the constitution but going back to the newness for a second there is is this court said an effort h h in order for the collateral consequences exception to apply it must be identified that there are some consequences some political consequences which are solely attributable to the order in the case in his we stayed in our brief in our reply brief that does not exist in this case there are no collateral consequences which have been identified anywhere in the record that specifically fall upon the respondent in this case there are many hypothetical allegations about various licensure or employment restrictions that may exist but as we point out in a briefing as you not united states supreme court has recognized big him happy simply hypothetical or conjectural they have to have some basis in the facts of the case is the u s supreme court said they must comply with reality likewise doesn't the illness yes there is an extensive history of mental illness there are no to clarify there are no prior felony convictions and there are no prior involuntary treatment orders there are there is a history of mental illness so i could trophic medication yet in this case there is this is a in order for the input for the application of the giving of imbalance harry said problematic ation in this case however at the same time that this litigation was going forward there was a petition for involuntary commitment that was settled at the respondents request and it was converted into a voluntary commitment specifically at that point after the court ordered the involuntary treatment of the psychotherapist medication it is our position that that by itself that that she cannot be released for at least up to five days for can be held for up to five days against her will even after she asked for discharge that that itself is a commitment and that has its own collateral consequences associated with it in that because of her voluntary admission because of her is not an automatic it is not a presumption of collateral consequences that point instead it's going to be a searching of the record to determine whether or not there are any collateral consequences solely attributed to the order issue in that case if they apply presumption of collateral consequences from a federal standpoint should be limited soley to criminal convictions and there for other matters it will not be extended this courtly offered h h left it open in a footnote this court specifically identified that the question of whether now that the party claiming a move this exception for acquittal consequences bears the burden of demonstrating that collateral consequences exist or whether or not they should be pursued it is our position that this court should find like the come forward with a demonstration as to why the why the collateral consequences should exception should apply in the reason why is that is exactly what this court does with the other recognize exceptions to the move distracted in particular in the hernandez case dealing with the public interest exception this court stressed that it was the burden of the state is the proponent of the exception to demonstrate why those exceptions exist otherwise it particularly clear all consequences exception were left with only hypotheticals and conjecture is you can see from reading the the briefs in this case there are numerous statutes which place restrictions upon rice i'm sure a application licensure or employment issues when someone has been subjected to an involuntary treatment or soon is it very very few possibilities perhaps that there could be consequences you're not really quick to get to what they would be but what you're saying is in almost every other kind of case finding an involuntary commitment or in appeal despite the fact that it was moved you claim based upon the therapeutic needs you be entitled to challenge it this court rejected both of those categorically and then in for the three recognized munis exceptions the collateral consequences the public interest and the people reputation you debating review court held in that case it didn't satisfy it in so the all i'm asserting at this point your honor is that the collateral consequences exception should be applied the same for all types of cases whether mental health case or a criminal case or anything else that it should be applied with the expectation that the court should engage in hypothetical analysis what the consequences are which are actually search for determination as to what those upon just the the sheer fact is true what the claims are importantly one thing i'd like to point out is that one of the collateral consequences identified and offered h h is the ability to seek out a motion in limine a to preclude the admission of the prior judgment as we point in our briefs it is certainly true you could file a motion eliminate to preclude the prior judgment but importantly under the rules of evidence you could also even even if it was never vacated you could also move to exclude it because civil judgments are by little that would be excluded if any were based upon a finding in this case likewise though the appellate court here simply has a per se rule there's no way to review it what goes on in this case is anything other than a per se role where the appellate court held that a first time in dollar treatment order is always subject to exception to the mood status and that is clearly improper in light of alford a change but the other issue the substantive issue which was raised in this case which was whether or not the trial court's finding was specific enough under section three hundred sixteen as we argue in our brief the appellate court erred in finding that that is a mandatory statute in under the  case it should properly be identified as a directory statute is this court said in am i procedural commands in statutes to government actors are presumed to be directory except in two instances one is where the statute itself contains negative language calling for a particular consequence for failing to comply the other is if the rights that the statute was intended to protect would be somehow injured if there's a failure to comply neither of those situations occur here you tell court didn't engage in an under the proper analysis the mandatory directory analysis it's clear that this was a directory statute this section three eight sixteen has no negative language at all in fact it couldn't in light of the porter and davis cases that we cite because otherwise it would it would implicate separation of powers concerns because what it would be is the legislature telling the courts precisely the manner in which they must rule what they must say at any given point and that is ordered davis recognized in the criminal done the statute also is directory because the rights that are intended protect particularly the rights on appeal are not in any way injured by directory reading because the statute is intended to ensure that there is a clear finding by the trial court which there was the court found that the evidence was sufficient the court entered a written judgment detailing what the rule what medication should be given to the respond it were particular rate in time a more general one is here is not really relevant to the responsibility to appeal her case and for that reason we would ask this court to reverse the appellate court judgment and to either dismiss the appeal as root or to affirm the trial court's in the order of granting the petition for involuntary medication  court appointed trial counsel in this matter mis read a p c was fifty one years old at the time symptoms that were perceived as symptoms of mental illness struck her she had never been admitted to a mental health facility until one month before the hearing that is the issue of this case she has i'm sorry contrary to what mr spellberg said about an extensive history of mental illness she was never before diagnosed with mental illness she started out at evanston hospital but no insurance was transferred to chicago read by the health center never took psychotropic medications before and this at age fifty one having been an upstanding citizen in the community was facing her very first ever proceeding and mental health court this court recognizes that there is a fundamental liberty interest and the right to refuse medication and this is partly in the c e case where this court first found the involuntary treatment statute to be constitutional this court found the involuntary street treatment statute to be i'm sorry did i say unconstitutional i'm sorry i meant constitutionally this court found  that the involuntary treatment statute was constitutional because of the very specific criteria for medication are several criteria each of each of which must be shown by clear and convincing evidence at a hearing before a judge before the state can interfere with a person's liberty with their autonomy to decide what kind of medicines is going will be well  so i want to first talk about a mandatory construction of section three of actually sixteen a a mandatory construction of the findings requirement is warranted because a directory reading would generally injure the interests protected by the not to health code and first of all is the respondents liberty interest the findings that  help the court apply the law make sure that each and every element is found by clear and convincing evidence it keeps the court it makes sure that the order that is taking away the right to refuse is not entered for paternalistic reasons or as a rubber stamp of treating doctor's recommendation the reasons you give me are good for those findings but how do you respond to the state's argument that there is no negative consequence for failing to do it and that we should review the evidence as opposed to what the judge said well the case is discussing mandatory versus directory talk about how there has to be either the negative language that there can't be further action if the statutory provision is violated or there is going to be an injury to the to the interests protected by the statute so in this case and the statute does not provide a consequence for if no findings are given but there is also no further action at that point that's the end of the road when the when the hearing is over and the judge is entering findings it's not as if there is any further action that is going to be taken so i think the important thing here is that this generally injures the liberty interest under the mental health code by failing to specify that all of the elements have been that which this court required of which this court recognized in c e as a reason why the statute is constitutional is there an environment under this section or specific provision that the trial court recites the necessary findings it makes before ordering this treatment of medicine and why should we conclude that section three  six is mandatory if if there is no specifics well there there is the very specific section two one zero seven point one which is the involuntary medication statute and it sets out saw sets out all of the different requirements before a person can receive medication and for example one of the requirements is a three part requirement one of the criterion for involuntary treatment and that's the criterion that the state proved one of three things either deterioration of the ability to function as compared to the ability to function prior to the onset of symptoms or threatening behavior or suffering exhibiting suffering behavior so without the findings there's no way to know which of those three  has been has been shown by clear and convincing evidence but as it stands you require the statute requires only under section three dash eight sixteen a the findings and those article eight provisions  been and partly because of the lack of findings there was no sufficiency argument made in this case part of the reason for that was that the judge's findings were were were basically i find in favor of the state so there was no consideration for example of which of those three elements of the second criterion for medication was shown  the between two part question first there's a petition that was filed a five page petition that was verified by the doctor correct and each one of the elements that you're just talking about he provides a paragraph about each one of the elements so for example the this this issue by deterioration suffering and threatening behavior the doctor in his petition puts in facts about her for example threatening that she took a shooting class she bought gasoline and things but under each one of these elements in the petition doctor has put in that information the doctor testified and then the trial court finds that the evidence he heard was overwhelming would also the trial court have to do in your opinion to satisfy the structure i think the trial court had to at least distinguish whether one or all of those three the three part criterion for deterioration threatening or suffering the trial court needed to explain the basis whether one or all of those one that and the evidence in the record shows that the information about alleged threatening behavior happened long before  the medication petition and the hospitalization that is the subject of this proceeding approximately nine months to a a year before the evidence of deterioration  reading through the transcript you see that this woman was conducting a business during a time period where she was alleged to have some symptoms of mental illness she filed for bankruptcy on her own she filed for general assistance she closed her business she was even elected as a treasurer of a community board so this is a person who was functioning this is a person who was functioning in to the question that there was evidence to deterioration suffering and threatening behavior there was evidence that was presented in the trial court found orally that there was evidence was overwhelming most of the trial or have to say to satisfy the stitches first well i think based upon c e and the idea that you we don't want to as a state and voluntarily medicate someone unless each and every element of the statute as shown by clear and convincing evidence then i think the liberty interest requires at least that information to say here's the evidence to support deterioration or here's the evidence to support threatening or here's the evidence to support suffering and i would point out that there was one question only asked about suffering and the doctor gave an opinion that well based upon something that happened a year ago i would say she's suffering based upon the alleged choking behavior which was about a year before the trial i think she must be suffering i would also point out that this is say that was per se finally that it's mandatory but i would not say that it's a i thought he used the word per se and with respect to the  i don't know the answer to that because this is kind of new territory and civil mental health proceedings there's always been the consideration of strict compliance with the statute and  appeal is moot but no he would not have to i would i would happily address to the most exceptions i just would like to cover a few more points with respect to the the findings  language which you agree is not there i believe what you're saying is the right that the provision is to sign designed to protect i think you would say because every number of times is this liberty interest right that's one of them i'd like to talk about some of the other rights or some of the other injuries and when you do talk about liberty interest or these other words that you're going to bring up no adequately protected in appeal   the collateral consequences exception is as the state suggests there wouldn't be any review of sufficiency of the evidence in a case like this so the state is making a little bit of a circular argument we could not if if as the state claims collateral consequences would not apply to a situation where a respondent has a diagnosis of mental illness and has had a voluntary hospitalization then no a sufficiency of the evidence argument is never going to be permitted because according to alford a change that's fact specific and only the collateral consequences exception is going to apply to that but the respondent would have to raise a legal issue to be able to come under the public interest exception or the capable of repetition get it avoiding review exception i just get a drink of water but as far as a directory reading generally entering the rights protected under the code i've talked a bit about the liberty interest i wanted to talk about the notice to respond that the statutory scheme of the mental health code provides notice to respondents at every step of the way at every step along the way to hearing there's notice of hearing notice of rights notice of proposed medications notice of  alternatives and the courts reasons for that entering an order is the final and logical conclusion to that notice process because we are dealing with people here who are not criminals they have a mental illness through no fault of their own and the benefit the benefit of that final notice is quite valuable studies show that respondents value the process more so than the outcome if the respondent feels that she has been treated fairly and with respect and then the court explains its reasoning that allows a respondent to come to terms with the decision and anecdotally many times we have had clients say after a situation like that ok i'll take the medication it also prevents appeal because if the responde understands feels respected feels that everything was fair and the decision was made and explained that respondent is less likely to be one who wants to appeal it's the  person who feels disrespected and unsure of what went on what just happened who says what i'm going to exercise my right to appeal so the notice to the respondent is very important notice for purpose of appeal is also important the u s supreme court said in riggins versus nevada that no findings require a reviewing court to divine the trial court's logic logic as best as it can from the record  so so that of course is another difficulty but there is also a concern with notice to others as if if threatening is alleged in a medication because if the reckoning is found that can affect licensing rights for the card so these are all concerns that rick that reflect directly on that those in the the need for fin s mental health cases parents had try cases so the madison h case is really closer to these cases on the criminal the criminal cases that the state cite if findings are mandatory and mental health cases that section affects all respondents not just a few like in the double our case if findings are mandatory and meant to help cases it's mandatory and mental health cases it would not implicate separation of powers issue turning just briefly to the collateral consequences exception to move this this court sa felony conviction so the appellate courts have been using that as a sort of test does a respondent who has appealed have any past involuntary orders causes the the collateral consequences to attach for the first time does the respondent have any past felony conviction if either of those two things are present then collateral consequences don't apply voluntary mission does not mean that collateral consequences have attached voluntary admission as the preferred method of treatment that's reflected in the haze case that's reflected in the public policy it is a bechard if a person is voluntarily admitted this is the mental health and developmental disability confidentiality act provides that records are confidential and the court records a voluntary admission is not some kind of a public acknowledgement of a mental illness so based on that if there are any other questions i would be happy to answer them either of them so i said i don't think there are because this court to go to the issue in this case you've done just the opposite on the spirit probably sixty to seventy percent of your initial argument are going moot so i assume you're thinking there is a greater good what i would assume is your position that no two outlier cases from your perspective from the description can be allowed to stand and this issue yesterday i thank you for letting me clarify that point that the reason why the primary argument that i'm presenting in this case is in regards to the collateral consequences exceptions of the move in a sack and is because from our perspective it does seem to be the violence to use your term your honor to be doing stack and they shouldn't presume them in any way and yet that's exactly what's going on in these mental health cases the court was clear now for a change that there are no general moved this exceptions for mental health cases but the  this case in many other cases found what appears to be a per se general exception to modus and all we're asking for is a clarification that the presumption of a collateral consequence doesn't apply instead and is consistent with its other doctrine is the other case law regarding mootness in particular the hand as his where this court stressed that the state's argument demonstrating the public interest exception wasn't sufficient that they couldn't i'm sure that's that's the reason why over here because if there's no credible consequences then that exception want to apply as i said earlier the capable repetition you debating review wouldn't apply in this case because that claim that was raised in the heloc work is facts specific it is not really a legal interpretation of any sort and then the public interest exception at the time that this case was pending in the appellate court there were absolutely no cases in any way addressing any contrary ruling regarding the scope of section three eight sixteen the law was not in any disarray in this court said in command as the most important factor of the public interest exceptions that there be bought in disarray in hernandez that said even a case of first impression doesn't satisfy that in this case there were multiple cases which public interest exception because the law is now in disarray based upon what happened it is our position in light of the quarter and davis cases in the my cases we say this sibley in our reply brief i think it's on page twelve  recognizing but the problem here is that we have an appellate court published opinion in many public opinion specifically the citing a very broad scope of the collateral consequences exception and that has greater ramifications than this  relied on for the essentially per se ruling regarding collateral consequences can now be reconciled with the offered h h case this court was clear in that case that appellate courts must be vigilant about their jurisdiction and no further action was available while that's just blatantly not true counsel was there at the time no objection was made at the time and as we cite in our brief in the in re now case th has held that procedural violations which could have been objected to which could have been cured at the time without any hindrance or do not amount to a basis for relief in the now case in the hayes case are perfect examples as to why the claim of mandatory versus directory dichotomy is not new territory is counsel but is actually very old and understood manners of stature construction good middle league neither now nor hayes use the terms mandatory versus i in regards to the claim that the notice must be given i would point the court to the written order that appears in this record the trial court entered a written order specifically informing  only the respondent but the doctors in this case and anyone else who might need to know precisely what the court's ruling was noticed was clearly given the only thing which respondent doesn't know is what was going on and the judges had when he said the evidence was overwhelming  statute there was no argument regarding mandatory versus directory in that case at all it was not presented in any way but more importantly it was a juvenile case involving what findings the judge should make in informing the parents what they need to do in order to be able to get their children back there were ongoing proceedings in that point and so is this court held in particular just kilbride's concurrence in that case recognized that the necessity of specific findings by the judge in the case were important so that way the parties could know what was going to happen next it was not a case of where there was a final judgment which would then be appealed at that point it was a case where the court's ruling regarding what was going to happen with these parents in these children what would happen next and so the specific findings under the statute in madison age were necessary the rights that were that had to appear that were being protected were necessary to be forced by the specific findings and for their reasons and for all the reasons here that we would ask  dismissed as moot or to have to reverse it that it was wrong on its construction create sixteen thank you thank you robert he's number one five seven nine eight is taken on the vice news agenda number