morning ladies and gentleman thank you for being in oregon i'm delighted to be here in oregon with like two oregonian members of the parallel and this is the time for argument the most significant precedence came down after briefing was concluded in particular i refer to the case of common versus the carman school district decided by the absolutely anything they want to do as i read it i'm looking at page two zero zero five the court concluded that parents have been in independent enforceable rights to procedural not restrict rights under other statutes so those questions were left open knowledge but i think that those statements by this court move to in the direction of then the courts have said there is this other procedure that may be in both your to address and injuries that i d e a simply doesn't provide a remedy for but it it's our position here your honor that what i have trouble with is how you transform her right to obtain an appropriate education for her child into a right to be compensated for the effort in move that which is entirely different in any administratively context in any lawsuit people expend time and energy effort aggregate aggravation and so forth in obtaining the thing to which they are entitled but that one of the court i d e a does not restrict rights under other statutes the implication was that there may be a nine hundred eighty three cause of action here and while this court did not say there was and did not say that mr lasher had a viable crime under nine hundred eighty three it certainly left open the argument that you  is of course winkleman the legal issue decided and winkelman with whether or not a parent can proceed pro se on a petition for judicial review from an id a administrative hearing the court concluded that  the parent had independent comma enforceable right and i say it that way to distinguish it from the one nine hundred eighty three jurisprudence that the for refers to individually enforceable right and i think that the supreme court meant something by that it does not explain what it meant but i think that that was an attempt to distinguish the independent and forcible right to peacefully protest say from the individually enforceable right to pursue a issues it did not reference section one nine hundred eighty three at all not anywhere in the opinion is it referenced i believe that the concept of a one nine hundred eighty three action was in the minds of the court because that this is an individual and enforceable right to support in one nine hundred eighty three claim that was the only reference to it but i believe that that was in the court's mind and therefore it's interesting significant that when it rendered its decision know it doesn't your honor an individual enforceable right is only the first factor that a individual must show to be able to pursue in one thousand nine hundred eighty three action based on a violation of the federal  second thing on my show is that that there's no reason in the intent that under the statute that it should be precluded and i think in this case the idea certainly does that it prevents it presents an extremely complicated significant and indulgent comprehensive than porson unfortunate skiing if you will and i don't mean indulgent in terms of it not being  appropriate for the issue at hand but indulgent in terms of how widespread it is and what can happen and i think that you know what what is a parent to do if a school district is obstinate in its refusal to review they can retain counsel and therefore have their attorney's fees reimbursed but there is nothing in the idea that leads to the conclusion that these that the things  honor it's not something that's been decided the reason because due to that is because we have a statute that identifies a duty and provides as well that out partly we have to rule that out nineteen eighty three wouldn't wouldn't wouldn't create i'd like to move to a w versus jersey city the third circuit opinion that was decided a couple of months ago this that this decision is externally significant because it is the first federal circuit court to apply the look to the comprehensive enforcement scheme and determine if congress left open the possibility of a section one thousand eight hundred three plain and also that the savings clause the closet this court reference with mr davis a few moments ago that it is supposed to be taken at its face it is not supposed to imply that there are other types of remedies that are available and finally jersey city concluded that legi overrule and that's kind of a complicated statement because so many courts have been believed that snit's versus robinson has been overruled and in fact that decision has been relied upon the comprehensive enforcement scheme of the educational handicapped children's act now the i d e a is what precludes resort to nine hundred eighty three if i could take just a moment and move site referenced by mr davis indicates that a parent has standing to pursue a five hundred four claim but doesn't say that that leads us to a conclusion that the field trip issue turns into a viable rehab playing here in any event mrs blanchard would have been obligated to pursue the field trip issue through the due process hearing procedures and in the  record on appeal here it is if it is shown that the field trip issue was part of the third due process hearing but miss flamm withdrew it her request for a hearing before it can before it occurred and then ultimately the a l j dismissed that hearing which the field trip issue was within i'm referring to flex papers one twenty two one twenty five successful representation of their child just she is not an attorney but she represented her child it would be anomalous for the attorney parent not to be able to get fees for representation but this is is there anything else i can offer for the court and a question i believe that some of my argument and as this court has previously on i v a is not the exclusive source of rights and remedies available for parents of children in special education programs well if the i think it is both i had never really thought of this issue in terms of plunker america but i can see how the court might see that in that way  contract you rather than x alecto isn't that i think you're right you're on and i think it's i had knowledge this court's previous decisions about recovery of attorney's fees make it difficult for us reimbursement in the situation but that's not all we're asking in terms of remedy we're also asking the court to determine whether in fact a remedies and procedures were provided some kind of remedy even if not exactly the form of remedy the parents sought and in those cases it is understandable and i think quite proper for the  say stop you can't do that but when the court confronts a situation where i d e a recognizes a right in parents as the supreme court has said it does and yet provides no remedy at all is a court going to tell the parents in that situation i'm sorry you simply have to walk away we don't think that the law requires that kind of of direction we think that the ra leaves open the possibility in this situation and ones like it for a parent to sue nine hundred eighty three claims and get regrets for the injury but they suffer if they can prove that injury yes i think at this point you can assume that but she still would have an obligation ultimately to prove that she had in fact suffered emotional distress that there were violations of id for rights under that  that in the absence of reeves a rebuttal of the presumption we have to go forward on the basis that there is a nine hundred eighty three cause of action potentially available and now miss