quite well and so i certainly appreciate your arguments on these issues and we make it back to it but i'm kind of ages to get to what i want to get to so let me ask you if you were talk a little bit about the opposition that you opposing counsel vase and saying you're cherry picking the statute the language in the statute in saying that you're entitled to attorney's fees and they say that when we read the statute as a whole and consider the context of the language of the entire statute that have asked us once the document statement was final two to include that and i think we would have been happy to do so but we received no request and i think you know if the state is going to to argue that it did raise this money here in which  has even a full right about that discretion to reach the merits of the argument and if the court does that and we think your argument fails and we really think that it fails in in every way that an argument about the meaning of the statute ten is that is that right i think that's that's quite possibly right around a first of all of course you would need someone with standing to raise such a claim you'd need to have a cause of action and a court with jurisdiction over it but if and of course the challenger would need to prevail and to be candid your honour's i really do not see how bad it is that all in all the book it seems to me that the states essentially the policy argument that the state advances the parade of horribles that they put before you in that section of their brief are very far from the horrible i mean essentially what the state is saying i want to be construed against an award fees but we would submit to you that the simply no ambiguity here the text is clear the text says any action any action to enforce a right arising under the constitution there's no there's no textual limitation on with rights maybe  design of this this after this and so far as it concerned fee's was to restore the status quo before the buchanan case of united states supreme court which was the case that eliminated the catalyst theory feel recovery as a matter of federal law this actually designed to wish would mean that we should not be looking at comments by legislators whether from the house for the service that's correct and we think the statute is clear on its face and there's no need to look at the legislature but insofar as the court of inclined to do so we think again we think the legislative discrimination against one of the suspect classes so this court would be departing from the we think very persuasive persuasive authority of the first circuit were it to adopt this this whole the a textual limitation on one yeah  individuals against governmental bodies under former suspect class race color or national origin and gender it doesn't apply to any other type of claim and the reason that the act was passed in two thousand and you would think that for something that major what we call a sea change in our brief would have been some debate there was debate about whether they actually applied the prospect of the right to act which was a much smaller issue than whether the doors would be open to fees and all sorts of pastors plans now and you know you spoke about the pension laws earlier we had the supreme court not that i'd go straight down i'm going to the punch clause because they violated  diminishment pension sent under their reasoning yes those people could be fees but they didn't seek fees in that case and they weren't awarded them and i think it's because their attorneys realize that this key provision does not apply generally but only if you sort of title six cla waivers must be clear and deliberate it's not true that there is some sort of magic words required that the legislature must employ some sort of magical pass code to to eliminate sovereign immunity and that's clear from this this cour