eleventh he was employed by new york presbyterian hospital the relationship between the hospital in with the city of new york the contraction provisions were almost exactly the same is as would apply so both basically both men suffered catastrophic injuries as a result insult of their service on that day and a lot of the same factors would apply what's the difference what are the  from a legal point of view virtually of that there may be something or number their number differences in from the victim compensation fund but yes i do and that i there was a difference of about two hundred thousand dollars between between the two cases i'm not sure how they came up with those numbers or what they invest they saw as numbers on but basically both men are in the same position as a result of what happened to them one on september eleventh  holding is that an agency has no power to tailor legislation to suit your credit goals and i believe that's basically what happened here the two thousand and six regulation that again came five years after the fact basically narrowed grof more chance on these cases said it was ok for us to do this and we have done it in that set but there's never been an explanation as to why they made that distinction why why why  they're only counting public employ people serving public agencies who are in the language of the two thousand and six regulations authorized recognize designates make them function a part of the agency cover them for any legal liability this was an extremely extremely narrow definition which virtually changes the meaning of a statute and i definitely remember i said if i if i should went when the regulations  that i think they were citing tests on that they were there and of course the chazzan dealt with a prison inmate and you can understand why they wouldn't you know why wouldn't include a subset of these regulations predate two thousand and one retroactive regulations so we have an unusual situation here with the act as it existed on tooth in two thousand and one the statute is the two thousand and one statute applies but there we have to use the current definite regulatory  application and again i believe the weight that the definition of the court approved and in crawford it was it may have been applicable in grof it might not have merited too much but i believe it merits much too much for that interpretation by the agency they never actually came out and explained why they made that particular choice they didn't give a cogent explanation least i didn't find one and i think it at this stage especially with the is giving volunteer fire companies coverage under under or under the definition but even then if you look at it closely that is it's not really they're not required to do that they've created a definition which goes far beyond the are others line drawing of all sorts for all kinds of the eyes yes and i when i when i argued at the agency level i was saying they should they should apply that definition and ignore the two thousand and nine which they chose not to do but  which is why i am now arguing that if we actually look at the language of the two thousand the act that was in effect on september eleventh two thousand and one that that would cover basically all of the ambulance crews that were on that scene taking orders from the new york fire department to decide this case but just from a person observing that everybody was serving you  eighteen of our reef read brief and the at the purpose of the definition was that both individuals and so must be accepted as part of a public agency purposes and the twenty seventeen act does not apply but yeah that would apply if they  no because well you section b yes part two of section six of that act states that it applied to benefit claims received by the bureau on or after the date of an