well said here i think there's a lot that goes on in the government's brief that is not directly applicable to the facts of this case i agree with you that we're not discussing whether there's a general preemption for the statute here for state domestic relations a lot in general but i think what the failure of the c b c decision really to acknowledge was the specific con was the specific state agreement at issue here and so many of the cases that we talk about that are cited here this isn't a case about a percentage distribution or where there are some vested interest that has to be adjusted that's sort of the whole point of our argument and i don't think you're really addressing the point that i was making it seems to me that the decision of the veterans for and the government's position allows the state court to make all sorts of orders about these funds once they're received by the veteran or by his spouse former spouse in this case now all it's saying is that that becomes a matter that state law order here has already covered any and all distributions that either were made or could be made going forward that was very clear both parties agreed to that once the that spiles gets the money the state court can order her to pay it back potentially if that's the right construction of the state court to create there's nothing in the balance court decision or the government's position that would prevent that from happening perfectly adequate remedy for well it seems just a little to be doing it a little backwards here because if that were the case the veterans the veterans administration would be going contra to what the supreme court said i believe and rose the rose which is the veterans of the vet the v a should not be serving as some sort of a collections agency where if an agreement is made in state  and that agreement should cover everything past current and future and then there are some adjustments that that one of the parties needs to be made that adjustment should be made at the state level it should not be made by going to the veterans court and hear what happened in mrs ms vassar went and basically sought a readjustment of the fund we believe that any and all funds that could be distributed by the v a to mr baxter were appropriately considered in the original score state court to be elated agreements and then the ca v c accorded to agree to a court of those funds and said mr baxter veteran if you have a problem with this then you can go to state court and you know for breach of contract or seek readjustment there and our position is that that's backwards from what the supreme court seems to have indicated should be the case in the precedent should have gone to the state court to seek adjustment and if she believed he was entitled due to whatever circumstances of hardship that she might have put forward here to the veteran's administration she should have been putting that in the state court and the state court would have been within its rights as as we agree with the the cases that the state court didn't authorizing any sort of distribution of the better disability benefits per se we know that not community property we know that's not something the state court has the right to adjust but i think the supreme court made clear multiple times and most recently in the how case that the state court can still take full consideration of monies that m client yes yes that's correct the order didn't say that i'm not sure the order could could say that but what the ordered said plainly cover and that the transcript from the argument i think makes clear is that the agreement cover everything it covered things that might happen in the future and so she in full awareness represented by counsel everything agreed to that and by so doing she agreed that she would not then go back to another court to try and seek so  statutes after she had already agreed to the state court stipulation that all of the maintenance health insurance obligations etc were work ounds it for our position is that she cannot that was not the appropriate venue to do that and the regional office told her that and we believe that was correct they examined the evidence of the record and they clearly said to ms vaster she had a in the interpretation of the state court decree why why not just let the v a decide what it wants to do and then the state court can deal with what to do about those funds once they reach the hands of the spouse or in another case in the hands of the veteran what's what's the problem well that's an excellent question and i think there is a problem and the problem was in fact shown by the way this the evidence demonstrates that the the b d a was not in an appropriate position to make those assessments they in fact said they were having trouble and they couldn't on the evidence before them even out whether the veteran was reasonably discharging his responsibility for the stuff and support and so they essentially just jumped over the general parchment statues because they weren't the right body to adjudicate it and they couldn't do it on the evidence before them creates a hardship exception to new york state law and we think it's a good example of exactly why the v a is not their propre a body to be assessing that and those that's the type of the state court should look at and there are  as the supreme court has told us there any reasons why you would want the state court to be evaluating that sort of evidence leading to domestic relations law to family engagement we believe the holding and rose the rose or if they thought not you know at least give some rationale says that we do now the federal circuit could have some some basis to evaluate the potential preemption but instead the ca v c didn't do it they just said here we're giving the cement factor if mr badger has a problem with it go back and fight it in state court and that sort of creates perverse incentives where the v a is ultimately going to be dragged into these things and service some sort of a paid to the to the experts here that the state court has authority to distribute those sponsor require they be repaid or whatever you're only position if i understand correctly is that the state decree is not something that the be a has to concern itself that's correct your honor and that may be an important point of clarification here the veterans court held that this case was controlled by preemptive federal law but in its approach did not place the federal special of course i meant right that is the sole issue here an actual conflict  with the alleged stipulation or contract for new york state is only mr basters position that attempts to place the two of them in conflict and then of course if they were in conflict one runs into the federal preemption issue it's clearly the case that federal law controls here but this case presents the flipside of the issue that the supreme court decided in how as the veterans court extinguished any more than in howell the state court through contractor stipulation could have extinguished a veteran's right to waive a portion of his retirement in order to accept disability without paying it back to the veteran under the state court to curry i thought you were saying only that the veterans administration should do its job make it the terminations and that what happens to the money but the kansas court in that case in the matter badinage page ninety one dollars made a pretty succinct explanation of how it said how quote overruled cases relying on the sanctity of contract to escape federal preemption exercising federal right to apportionment which again is it is a separate federal right it's not maintenance under new york state law and mr baxter's arguments that in doing so that constitute a breach of contract a common law effectively state court breach of contract or breach of the stipulation that the state court had entered into and the separation proceedings i don't think we need to get into it but i should no e for the record here that we've gone through the evidence here and that there's it's worth mentioning that there's absolutely nothing in the record that indicates that when the parties were entering into that  until right before that last november two thousand and six to feel ation his actual application for in receipt of disability benefits so i don't think we are conceding that that the what the state with should have gotten into here that's a common law state court breach of contract action and in this case the the veterans court correctly said if that's what you believe occurred then the appropriate remedy is to pursue that and state court it is really reminiscent and certainly analogous to and the issue that was very recently before this court in the shilly decision we understand it's a different context that involved  a state law contract having to do with a fee agreement but the concept is the same in that case the appellants were arguing that the in that case the veteran had reached a state  and by refusing to support their ija application the court recognized that the decision whether or not to seek ija fees was the veteran's right in that case and that it may very well have been and in fact veterans court and this court recognized that the right of the federal right was the veteran's right to the extent it was potentially a breach of contract that was a matter of state law that could be enforced here but you know merely for convenience so the fact that it helped the appellant's in that case didn't bring that state law breach of contract issue under the end of the veterans court the same thing applies here and although i think i heard  a s distribution of benefits and they were not a party either the con the contract stipulation of the state court proceeding so this is just not benefits in the state court hearing transcript of course as the government is aware mr batra had begun receiving disability benefits by that time there's no reason to think that the disability benefits weren't in the minds of the part honor as as we pointed out in our opening brief that page twenty the v a is frequently called upon to interpret state court rulings or state court evidence this is no different than the examples we cite where you know in yemen be west the federal circuit discussed v a consideration of willful misconduct under state law or the v a looking to common law spouses under state law there's no particular reason that v a is unable to assess this court ordered stipulation between the parties and if i just may or honor that the government brings up the sheely case again a key difference between the feelie case and this case is that the case focused on a purely private contract between the parties this is a court ordered stipulation this is something that the parties entered into before the court and the court issued as an order of the court the government presents no reason it wants to that it will refuse to concern itself with this sort of state decree and it essentially does preempt the state law of domestic relations underoos what the state has done here in determining what the proper