unique to the forum will bit different than what we're used to not a little bit on nonetheless our thanks this is a case about the marriage and a year of his former spouse at the time of the dissolution was a school cafeteria worker earning about eleven dollars an hour but she had previously been employed for eleven years by harrah's casino earning eighteen dollars an hour the proteas were able to resolve their parenting issues on prior to the entry of the judgement and amended judgment for dissolution by entering into a joint agreement which was approved and entered in january in january of two thousand stop the final judgment order in the form of an amended judgment for dissolution of marriage was which time could be reviewed that he paid guideline child support in the amount of twenty eight percent which amounted to approximately fifteen hundred dollars a month that he pay in addition to the support certain obligations in the future and certain obligations that had already been incurred such as sylvan learning center the seventy five percent of the cost of catholic school education seventy five percent of medical expenses for the children seventy five percent of all extracurricular expenses fairest was awarded her non marital pension of about twenty seven thousand dollars half of mr services marital pension she was awarded sup a contribution of seventeen thousand dollars towards attorney's fees eight percent of the net and all future accumulated comp time mr q saracens before this court and as we set out in our bringing disputing both the disproportionate division of the marital estate as decided in its findings and we dispute the dispersion disproportionate division of the items that mr seris was ordered to pay in addition to guidelines for the last disputed issue that we presented in our brief is off mr because sirius is ordered to pay certain of the expenses at all in this case to accumulate compensatory time which would allow him to take time off in the future and be paid for that time as if you work on for example if he accumulated five hours of compensatory time he would be paid time and a half that's all the time he paid time and a half or if you chose not to be paid he would get seven and a half hours of regular time off of work for which he would be paid when he exercised that time the court found that this was marital in nature even though mr  accumulated all of the time prior to the time the case was tried in order to computation of twenty eight percent of the net income that would be or could be derived from that compensatory time in awarded that to sixty percent of that to mrs poseurs at the time we filed their brief a very similar issue completely analogous to compensatory time was pending cation and sick days were speculative and uncertain until a party actually collects the compensation the evidence at trial and the argument in our brief sets forth clearly that  until mr seris leaves employment he cannot cash out the accountant just as in the abrupt case the vacation and sick pay were not cashed out could not be cashed out until with the way that the how time works when it's exercised it would be included will in his income and any of it if he if his union happened to change the rules in the last comp time he would have pre paid allowing the the trial court's ruling to stand would mean that he was paying twenty percent of his net income from his employment and in addition to that paying twenty eight percent of the comp time that he accrued prior to receiving it as income certainly this is disservice would not be prejudiced by merely getting her percentage of that when it was receive time instead of overtime pay was actually exercise during the course of the marriage it was not to receive i'm sorry to see us wondering does he have the right to be left whether he receives overtime pay at the time he works during the marriage and all of it was accrued prior to the time the case went to trial there was no order that the requiring mr service to not to make up that election during the marriage she was paid for all the hours  be paid support based on the income that he got so when he exercises those if he does exercise those come times he will be paid for the period of time that he doesn't work so there will be no interruption in support was not future income it was property when there was no present right mr service to convert that to capture so when the court orders that he has to pay four thousand dollars if it's a i don't understand what the original data judgment was and i've searched the record and cannot find and original they judge there was a there was a judgment presented that did not dispose of all the issues was it  decision a proposed judgment was prepared objections were were made the court ruled on those objections an amended judgment that incorporated the clarifications that the court made case and i want wellness that set out in our brief but the only testimony that was presented regarding the marital versus non marital nature of of those weapons was that mr pistorius testified that he purchased two of the twelve weapons during the course of the marriage and under spewed that those were marital property  those were valued at approximately fourteen hundred dollars yet in the judge's decision he included five thousand dollars worth of weapons in the marital estate and made a missta this characterization of what the testimony was and we discuss that in a free but i think quite clearly only two of the weapons were maryland should have been included in maryland st because of the time constraints i just want to make sure that the court know it was exactly what we're coming from this was a disproportionate division of the maryland state sixty four addition to that despite the fact that there was ample evidence that this was because sarah's was certainly able to earn a more substantial income than she was making maintenance awarded but if you look at what the division of this marital estate was it really wasn't sixty four if the court properly includes only the items that should have been in  he lemonades the items that weren't even if mr poe service even if the court's calculations were correct if you determine that mr serious was paying seventeen thousand dollars out of his portion of the maryland state on behalf of mr miska sarah's for attorney's fees if you add back in the ordered payment to sylvan learning center which we argue should not have been ordered because there was no agreement that was covered by the parenting agreement should not have been ordered if you add back in the cash value of the life insurance if you add back in the other items that mr q serious was ordered to pay the four thousand dollars for deferred for the comp time if you add back these things into the wife's portion of the m state subtracting from his he gets zero his portion of the maryland state  just to conclude as we set forth in our brief there are issues with respect to values there are issues of respect with respect to the nature there are issues with respect to the order that these children be raised as catholics that are clearly contrary to the man first weigh the evidence beyond the discretion of the trial court we ask the court to repair this justice advised of the basic background of this matter i will not get into again the specific details except to supplement where i feel necessary in response to the argument made by mr spook briefly and the first issue that was raised by mr sukkot and the compensatory time we believe that this is clearly an issue of first impression before the court there was in fact a similar issue pending at the time that the uplands brief was filed and subsequently the illinois supreme court did rule as mr spook o has previously addressed and the address matter that case deals with the issue of whether or not sick and or vacation time is to be considered marital property while it may be slightly similar it is not an exact application to this case clearly given the collective bargaining agreement that was attached to the brief it sets forth that sick and vacation time is something that is not within the plaintiff's control as to how or when he will receive compensation for because it couldn't have access to justice that would be correct except i believe it would be blindly applying federal if you look at it only from that standpoint you ignore the fact that the husband in this case voluntarily chose to convert his comp or his over time to come time he had the ability not to and that's an important distinction from what the illinois supreme court addressed there was no choice there was no ability to say i would choose to accept direct pay for my sick time on my vacation time they had to wait until their employment was terminated or retirement in this case it's critical to consider t knew full well what he was doing when he rolled over his overtime and to can and to comp time now it's my understanding that for for a number of years just as the patient i believe that was in into suppression of the divorce just as i will tell you that i was not trial counsel and all i can tell from the record from what i've seen is that it was  we look at what he did yeah i would suggest that in this case we should give the deference to the trial court the trial court heard all the evidence saw all the witnesses and clearly in line with other decisions that were made i believe that the court found as a credibility issue that mr serious intentionally for motives that were not necessarily the purest rolled them over and to the calm time as opposed to taking them directly he knew exactly what he was doing and he was just as trial counsel argued in his closing argument by doing this he denied additional child support and so in addition to that i believe counsel mr sukkot was arguing that it was not fair for the trial court to find that the comp time was marital property subject to division but then also to say that twenty percent of any additional comp time after the divorce should be child support i don't agree with that at all i think it's very clear under the statute under section five zero five when you're looking at setting child support you have to have  child support based on total income minus certain factors that are set out minus taxes minus mandatory contributions to retirement not voluntary contributions to retirement now obviously want to talk about retirement but i think the analogy is similar here calm time in this case with with these parties this individual had a collective bargaining agreement that clearly gave him the volunteer e option to take his pay when he earned the overtime or to roll it into come time and so it's not mandatory it's a voluntary so therefore being a voluntary choice it should be subject in the future comp time should be subject to child support and as a further note to that i believe counsel was asked if he  was appealing that issue and he's not he has not raised that in his brief he did not challenge the issue of the setting of child support or the fact that any future comp time would be subjected to child support now counsel also contest the the allocation or the valuation of mr sirius's weapons he is a police officer with the city of joliet at the time of the trial  he testified that he had seven firearms two of which he claimed to be marital leaving non marital five in the wife's trial memorandum that was submitted to the court and is entered in the record she said that the husband had seven marital firearms and valued those firearms at five thousand dollars at trial there was a defendant's exhibit that was used  that the trial court apparently relied upon and which the exhibit shows twelve separate firearms owned by mr seris and so i believe there is ample support in the record to support the trial court's finding of the evaluation in the number of the firearms again the trial court considered all the evidence heard the testimony and as i think was the main theme throughout this case was the issue of credibility the trial court did not believe  seris there was evidence to support his findings and for those reasons his findings should not be overturned and we'd asked the court to find that that was not an abuse of discretion now the the issue on the sylvan learning to addition in the joint parenting agreement that the parties entered into in january of two thousand and seven it set forth that the parties would have joint custody with the wife as the residential parent and we know that pursuant to section six zero eight of the only marriage dissolution of marriage act that the custodian absent a finding of the court that without a specific restriction on on her ability to make determinations regarding the children's upbringing including education including religious training that the custodian should be permitted to make those necessary decisions now in the joint pain agreement that provided that the parties were to consult with one another and try to share that responsibility in this case clearly the parties had a dispute the wife wanted to raise the children continue to raise the children in the catholic religion which apparently had been something that she testified that the parties had originally agreed upon both mr imus is a seris were raised in the catholic faith mr went to a catholic school grade school the children were baptized in the catholic religion and so this was something that i would submit to the court was just a continuation of an already ongoing practice and mr because sarah's coming in at trial saying that he did not agree he wanted to raise the children under the lutheran doctrine clearly created the dispute and obviously given the the late time and the issues all pending for the court on trial the judge and the parties agreed to waive mediation so there was no issue of mediation it was all going to be decided right then and there  expedient and efficient and the trial court ruled that the children could in fact be raised as catholics there is nothing in the judgment nothing in the court's decision to indicate there's any restriction whatsoever under section six  seven of the only marriage dissolution of marriage act preventing mr because sarah's from exposing his children to any other religion that he wishes to during his visitation time he can as deems appropriate to take them to the lutheran church if he so wishes that was expressed clearly by mrs carstairs counsel to the trial court it was again acknowledged in our briefs and again here today we're saying we have no issue with mr sarah's taking the children to any other church she wishes to during visitation we simply had asked the court to permit her to continue to raise them in the catholic church now in regards to the the sylvan bill as noted in our brief the party's oldest son who at the time of trial was approximately eight and a half years of age had significant special needs you know as attention deficit disorder he had pervasive this  pervasive developmental way and he also was possibly bipolar he was on medication daily medication he was under the care and treatment of psychologists psychiatrists social workers this was a young child that needed intensive care and extensive care in terms of these medical issues and as indicated in the letter written from his pediatrician the doctor was supporting the wife's decision to be available to the child after school that even if necessary if it needed to limit her ability to work she needed to be there to care for this child all of these all of these facts were not in the strictest  's brief he wants to argue that somehow it's improper the disproportionate or greater share in the marital assets to the wife somehow maintenance is not appropriate even though again in his brief he argues to the court that the trial ordered two years of maintenance without mentioning that it was rehabilitative without mentioning the special needs in the reasons why the wife needed to be home and have and working reasonable hours in addition and this is because sarah's has depression that she suffered since the birth of their first child that she's on medication for but she was a good age you know forty years old but with only a high school education at the time of the trial she had just recently been able to find employment that provided her the opportunity to work hours that would enable her to be home to care for bobbie working at a school district so yes school now i understand told him about it and she invited him and he came to a meeting prior to that to the school start yes and they left the meeting he said this is a good thing we're going to do it and he said lots of disputes that arise between the parties during the pendency of the bourse proceedings and a lot most short answer to your question justices i believe she did appropriately consult him and the reason i say that is and most cases where somebody is objecting to a lack of notice a lack of knowledge and inability to participate pursuant to the terms of the joint pain agreement it's in a situation where let's say mom took the child to sylvan learning center never even told father he had no idea all the sudden he finds out two months later when the child just happens to mention oh by the way i just took a test and i have to have some more homework to do for this tomorrow where all the sudden here's a bill a bill that's just dropped off in the father now is expected to pay that that would clearly be a lack of proper consulting a lack of proper notice and inability to consult so in this case i do think as we set forth in our brief that not only was he aware of sylvan aware of the special needs of his son aware that the mother wanted wanted this he was actually taken they were the two of them went together to the center he got an opportunity to see everything to talk to everybody to know what the costs were to know what the allegations were going to be and know that she had said yes i want to do this and if he was disputing it again under the under section six  exactly sure at what time this bill came up because if he was objecting and he was going to carry through on his objection he should have put it in writing sensitive counsel they would have done a motion they would have said let's go to mediation first there would have been something but there was sense there's none of that in the record it appears that he knew about it he participated in the initial you know visits to sell vns did nothing and waited to the time of trial when the issue was resolved by the trial court so again for all these reasons that the other issues that i have not had an opportunity to get to i would just ask the court to respectfully consider our response brief i believe everything is laid out there sufficiently and again to to submit to the court that in this case it was a question of credibility clearly the husband was earning five times almost five times as much income as the wife given her limited ability to earn both present and future income the needs of the child for her to be home to be available and the husband's continuing ability to earn very substantial good income  warrants that the trial court's decision be affirmed there was no abuse of discretion in this case thank you with respect to the misconceptions statement that the inclusion of the comp time  in the maryland state was some type of subterfuge on the part of mr because there is to limit his ability to this is a serious ability to collect support is not  incapacitated this simply allows him to continue to earn money and support his family and children during periods of time where he is not working on it doesn't diminish his income because it's paid when it's used it's a pure fiction to say that there was a fund of money available to divide up as part of the case which was decided and discussed in our reply brief goes into detail and a very detailed analysis beginning on page fourteen justice thomas refutes all of the arguments that that raise with respect to the sick pay and vacation issue that was before the court there encouraged the court to adopt their reasoning with respect to the court and by agreement and in with the permission of the toward the record was supplemented and defendant's exhibit seven is now part of the record in that exhibit the dates of the purchase of all the weapons are included and only two of the weapons were purchased during the marriage all of the others were prior to the marriage clearly prior to the marriage clearly not marital so the judge is determination that the property ordered to mr serious valued at five thousand dollars has no basis in the record the total value of all of the weapons all twelve of the weapons with only forty four dollars to marital weapons fourteen hundred dollars the parenting agreement in this case should be of at least two of the other issues page six of the parenting agreement which is also in the appendix or bring the parties further agree that they sh objections to that the court ordered the court usurped the parenting abilities of these two people to raise their children in religion that they want by ordering that that the children be raised catholic in that same paragraph and also a joint peer group agreement i mean it encourages people to talk to work things out to come to a decision and that doesn't happen the judge has to take over doesn't mean that it's a takeover the judge has to make that decision the judge guesstimated this i mean if if they enter into mediation try try to work it out try to come to an understanding that they both agree with that's fine but if it doesn't happen isn't the court literally the court of last resort on some issues yes i would i would agree with you  just as on certain issues no religion like politics is the right of the individual when children can't make that decision  right of the parents to make the determination but counsel didn't your client agree to allow the judge to make that decision absolutely not during the course of the dissolution proceedings there was testimony and then the parties way if neither parent has taken the responsibility as part of the parenting i don't believe that the court has the authority to order the parents to make bad decision with respect and religion meant that decision to baptize these children and to enter them into catholic train started before their divorce proceeding with ever begun yes and at that point at the beginning i knew saying that he never agreed they should be rescanned like or he changed his mind and some point he changed his mind at some point and it was basically the record will reflect that it was based primarily on the  abuse issues within the catholic church and he felt that the children would be better raised in the lutheran for which was close to its all about system but yet had not what is what is your take on that and i like your honor of her say it but i i don't know what it's based on what what if but what would your position on it be my position is that the parties had a head it had agreed to consult on issues impacting on education they did in fact consult but there was no agreement reached that does not give either party the right to make a unilateral decision and a current expense and then seek contribution and in this case contribution was ordered  to get a determination whether it should occur and whether the other side's going to intrude that wasn't done in this case it was a fait accompli the bill was presented i want you to