a specific intent crime and requires the jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant had the specific intent to defraud our primary contention on appeal is that the district courts jury instructions on the whole did not adequately guide the jury such that they made the specific intent finding the government had to prove for factors beyond a reasonable doubt for wire fraud to gather important here is one knowing participation in a scheme to defraud and two that the defendant acted with the specific intent to defraud that is deceive or cheat it's not enough that the defendant knowingly dissipative scheme she must have had the contemporaneous specific intent to defraud this brings us to the  the court committed in this case and that is in looking at your instructions out a whole specifically in denying miranda's good faith theory of the defense instruction and step giving a deliberate indifference instruction  inadequate to guide the jury to to find specific intent such that miranda was likely convicted of a general intent crime here i want to touch briefly on the lens that this court should be looking at this issue through it's our contention here that the dis court the instructions were confusing right that the jury did not get adequate instructions this is a novo review not not an abuse review ninth circuit precedent is plain that defendants are entitled to a theory of the case jury instruction if it's supported by the evidence and the law it's clear that good faith is a defense to wire fraud it's clear that miranda's theory at the district court was that she had good faith belief that the items were stolen and that she requested this instruction it's also true that the district court is not required to give a good faith instruction if it properly instructed the jury as to the specific content nature of the crime though the  us put them in a storage facility and then later claimed that her house had been burglarized these items were stolen i don't know if we can say whatever she may have been thinking it was of the facts are to that is that the the only piece of evidence tying miranda to the actual removal of the items with mr booker's testimony and it's our contention that he his testimony should not be believed by any rational fact finder not dependent on his impaired marijuana brain i don't agree with that because the video wasn't was not clear i think the government it wasn't clear and the police admitted it wasn't clear mr booker's testimony was crucial to tying her to that video and it comes back to the fact that the court gave the specific content instruction in number ten and when it offered this instruction during the discussions with the vote against miranda actually objected to this and said if you're going to give this instruction at least include the words with intent to defraud the district court was initially warmed to this idea but ultimately chose to use their words with regard to the first element of the wire fraud charges it's clear what she was trying to do which was tie it back it didn't go far enough here let me understand your argument that knowledge that a good faith instructions are not required or specific intent is appropriately instructed correct correct but then you're saying that the specific intent instruction is infected because it tied back to the specific element in the wire issue bishop was trying to do was tired back i don't think what she did was enough and that was my point with miranda's argument was look at least at least make it clear the jury still has to find specific intent here and the reason that is because you had the element instruction was given and then the district court went through each count so you had you know fourteen counts in detail right and then she got to the definition of each of the elements and it's my point that i don't think the jury was clearly understanding how to tie everything back to where it was supposed to go that's kind of an added thing a reediting of the instructions at this phase and it seems to me that if a willful blindness instruction was appropriate  what you're really quibbling about is that there is enough specific language to connect it to which specific intent and it seems to me on the kind of review we're doing here that that would fall into abuse of discretion not you know i don't think so i mean when it comes down to is by by giving instructions the way the court did our concern is that the jury didn't make a specific intent finding and by saying that's an abuse standard you're presuming that that's some sort of factual issue here and i guess our point is almost to the extreme when we have specific intent cases i think the instruction needs to be far more clear  she said i was here the day before and everything was normal but in the video shows the furniture being loaded the day before that so couldn't the jury just in any fraud case there's plenty of evidence here for the jury to think she was mexican has an uphill those instructions it's i was able to find a case where they specifically discussed the issue we've raised here which is the fact that you have the instructions given that the way that they were given the fact that the government didn't bring this theory at all in it and chief and the fact that you had two defendants it was are you confusing posher as it was that is why we contend that the construction should have been much more clear regarding history was there a motion to sever filed in this case i don't which is five five two f second thirteen twenty three we didn't know that that case was overturned on other grounds by heredia however heredia in footnote sixteen actually specifically disapproved of the language that we cited it for i apologize that should defraud state farm insurance with her husband arnold flowers she was an active participant in the scheme she was involved in the moving of the items from the house on january seventeenth she also was made two statements one to a state farm insurance investigator and also later to an interest police officer that she'd actually been at the home on january eighteenth and put inside the home and everything was fine at the time she later changed that statement at trial when she testified where she claimed then that her husband actually had been at home and told her everything was fine the difference between when she made the statement at trial and when she made the statement to the two investigators she didn't know that she'd been seen on videotape moving stuff into the storage unit on january seventeenth so she had to change her story at trial to fit her theory of defense the district court was well within its discretion to give the good faith jury instruction here the jury was properly instructed on the definition of specific intent the disco was also within its discretion to give the deliberate ignorance jury instruction particularly given the testimony of arnold flowers and also miranda flowers regarding her knowledge her whole defense was that her husband was the one who had ran this team and that she was an unknowing or unwilling participant in the scheme it's it doesn't eliminate the men's r it's an alternative theory to mens rea at the it's a proper instruction where defendant has disputed their actual knowledge or intent to commit the crime and that that's actually what happened here is that miss flower's put this theory in play for the district court with her theory of defense in addition given the overwhelming evidence of miss flower's involvement in the scheme to defraud we think the specific the  i don't have any further comments if there's any questions that you have let me answer you have to thank you thank you both for your arguments this morning case of united states versus flowers is submitted