ahead if one were to take a look at four fifteen i see yes five slash n clearly air pollution is prohibited by the only environmental protection act so therefore and the regulations go into more detail on this therefore your mission both will permit a lovable low threshold a lot of the permit is by operation harmful to the public health and the public welfare and the purpose statement of the clean air act itself basically states that a primary goal of this chapter is to encourage or otherwise for mobile reasonal federal state and local governments all action is for pollution prevention so we're dealing with a federal regulation that is designed to prevent pollution e l o i d act the permitting provisions are enacted into injunction with regulation for pollution control and they expressed it define what is and it was not your ship and they specifically go through an analysis on a very scientific basis and if you take the time to wade through which is certainly very unpleasant to the permitting process and there's a public notice and public hearing in the program process is very difficult i imagine as the case progresses they would have a very difficult time leading a fry standard of putting together a case question of whether the underlying plaintiffs can proceed in their case exemplifies the erroneous argument that imperial is making here because th a gesture in your question just as schmidt is there i believe the underlying plaintiffs are not barred from anything they don't care if there is a variable standard or regulatory standard or a state standard for the emissions period and as counsel conceded their claim is now barred regardless of whether the standards are exceeded or not or whether they are emitting their styrene in the other chemicals within  rmitted limits so my line is in a trick bag because with imperial wants is in the first part of the policy for the coverage clause is to say that the what they want is what they argue is that those emissions are hazardous enough for the duty to defend but they're not hazardous enough to trigger the absolute pollution exclusion and you simply can't have it both ways either the emissions are not hazardous and all and the underlying complaint should be dismissed or create ended which is clearly not the law or not the case is not going to happen or the underlying read as a consistent document such that is hazardous a way that hasn't already or they are not allege but if they are alleged then that automatically triggers the absolute pollution exclusion it's a zero sum game there's no way around it and to say that we have a duty to band but we can't rely on other other terms in the policy is would be entirely inappropriate from the contract construction point of view and from a calm commonsense point of view the regulatory argument that imperial is trying to make suffers from a number of  infirmities we believe in addition to that the trick bag if you're trying to put us in first of all the idea that the court should look beyond the four corners of the document into the regulatory scheme  and in that case the court was looking at another pleading to determine whether the self defense exception to the to the intentional tor exclusion should be invoked to find coverage in the whole burning root case and in other cases and then very ninety's they look at other pleadings but what they don't do with what the trial court we don't believe is authorized to do is to take a wholesale departure from the terms of the policy and the in the complaint and in craft its own view of what should be done in this case the regulations don't replace the whole body of coverage case law in illinois and there is no case that there that's right and i would allow though that there is room in the case law on certain occasions as i said where there are compelling circumstances to look beyond the four corners of the complaint and if we're corners  is to try and create a duty to defend the regulations say and we have quoted this in our brief that all of the laws apply except those laws that that relates to air pollution control coverage case law in illinois is not a law that relates to air pollution control this case has nothing to do with air pollution control it has to do with the construction of an insurance policy so the idea that the regulations as imperial claims should prove the end all of the case law again we believe is erroneous if that were the case there would be no cartridge case law in which to make an analysis of where there's a duty to due to defend the regulations would preempt the entire fields to the city and there would be nothing left because certainly the regulations don't discuss analysis of how to how to compare an insurance policy and how to drive it the decision as to whether there's a duty to abandon the insurance policy so the idea that the entire feel has been preempted we believe is in crack and as to break away shoes and sell say they don't preempt everything they only areas where there is air the allegations in the underlying complaint or i should say that the emissions from imperials plant are not hazardous seems to turn the entire idea of pollution and permitted pollution just on its head because the regulations never explicitly say that permeated emissions are not hazardous what they say is that they are designed to prevent pollution and the fact that the very fabric of the existence of the regulations in our view demonstrates that the emissions that imperial is conducting are potentially hazardous this back to the lawsuit is in your mind mining is also proof that the emissions that imperial is discharging into the environment are hazardous were potentially hazardous so contrary to the idea that permitted pollutions show that there is no hazard we believe that the existence of regulations is proof positive that they are hazardous otherwise why would why else would they be regulated and why else would the underlying wages have by a lawsuit that exactly  duis in duration of imperialist hazards of imperialist emissions are not hazardous they have made a bit of an implied argument that because they are in it it pursuant to the revs that they're not of using the hazard alleged to invoke the absolute pollution exclusion seems to me to be fundamentally unfair also fundamentally at odds with how you should interpret construct an insurance policy or any contract for that matter sufficient for us to be able to invoke the actual pollution pollution that's that's my first point my second point is that holmes is the beginning of the analysis and there is much that imperial in and in erie agree on and that is that the case screws in their policies but we are going to come up with something that's more workable and we're going to call it traditional environmental pollution and i think alex was also correct in saying that they didn't find that however since call ins and in particular in it's that's where the illinois law defining what traditional manon lucian is and there is no escaping the fact that our illinois courts have defined traditional environmental pollution blue paper and how it has been applied separately to lead paper has also been a very consistent approach and then approaches very simple if you have that if you discharge something into the atmosphere in leaves forth but if you look at the scope of the cases that have been decided under that standard it goes well beyond what the leaders in would consider traditional environmental pollution after example the industrial plant you know in our former marine we have got cases new paper itself is represented in the fact that we're not talking about traditional environmental pollution because lou people require the exclusion based on a for fired it was  a recycling plant that was set by the vandals in the smoke in the fumes went off to the neighboring property and the court said that's traditional environmental pollution because you had fumes that started on your property in one someplace else that's  very simple approach to how to apply that standard and in every case in the granddad case in the cases before holmes and in the cases after the cole was in every single case if there is a discharge into the air or into the ground of some type of pollution or continue the course will up all the exclusion and there has never there has never been a case that has enough of the pollution based on that standard and  proposition that it should be abandoned just because the manufacturer is emitting the pollution under a permit to the trick box argument i think there's two separate concepts on my client's consumed we have an insurance policy we have tenure the suit for college i l a law is pretty clear that if it falls story in the policy period and all those things and that's a separate higher analysis from whether or not an exclusion applies because the skin exclusion only comes into play when coverage is there and exclusion operates after a determination is made that the policy is and as a side note in the record and i is in furious permit it's part of the appendix to our brief as well as is in the record which lays out what is emitted in and levels as well as i declaration of a gentleman statute should apply or that they preempt what we're basically saying is that i disagree what we're saying is this is that there is an issue as to whether or not a permit division under title five permit constitutes pollution defense here these are the controlling authority is because they they define what who she is they issue the permits they review the permits they are the authorities to look at in defining this one term and