contractors working in support of the united states military mr sibal was a decorated navy medic for twenty seven years and then after that for about a decade worked for various large contracting companies in both afghanistan  iraq as medics on embassies and other forward operating bases as he worked on here mr elliott is a skilled kemel minister who has his own company that serves local law enforcement as well as the federal government and training canine units and bomb sniffing dogs if my clients had been fired as they were in this case and there had been go back injury of mr elliott forward operating base shield iraq they would simply have a i suppose the question here is whether the way we be preemption that you have been interpreted as quid pro quo it's almost a h headed type preemption and as i read green it was offering the possibility for those two claims to go forward because they they were not going to related in any way to an injury or order because specifically referred the woman who was running the nursing home and she had a separate contract you get certain services you didn't get and then the absolutely they were threatened and actually terminated for not canting an injury report on the job as well as having an injury at all even though he had made a formal point it having  with his benefits it was all about the d b a claim but he rose independently because it was an independent contractor claim that didn't depend on there being an injury on the job to assert the coin is not within the dva because if you look at the text  contract claims they are they don't depend on there being an injury on the job they have a contract with the employer and the department of labor and the benefits review board that is the appellate court essentially right across the street here for those cases has held that the ministry of was judging people within the department they were powerless to make rulings on breach of contract issues powerless and we've cited that much other case in our brief visit this case arises out of a breach of contract is a absence of notice so i can see how that would be independent of what's bound up in the retaliation but then part it sounds like part of your state law actions are completely bound up with the evaluation allocation under nine forty a day and as to those under brink it's hard to see how those claims can go forward in the wake of the decision and bring that said that if something's bound up in remedial skiing wrongful discharge there are two separate counts and one of them is retaliatory discharge based on public policy the district of columbia allows you to rely on a federal statute for your public policy the public policy because you don't like people to be wrongfully discharged for claiming injuries so that that is the distinction just because we invoked the statute as the basis for the public policy does not mean we're proceeding under nine forty eight and and believe that it was out with the ball and binding in this case before the department of labor because by its very term does not mr sibal was not testifying and he was not about to testify mr elliott did not file the claim and he was not qualified to do the functions of the job and therefore he cannot fall within  didn't fall within the express way in which you can access it for the department where you can certainly invoke it as evidence of the public policy of the united states that's the division and if you look at the n nine forty it is not within the exclusive exclusive remedy i even medical benefits and temporary told disability and permanent disability you might be entitled to is exclusive on the health of the injury on the job in the course and scope of your employment not exclusive for any other now you may disagree with this court's interpretation of the statutory tax but that is the interpretation we have adopted is it not well i really disagree with that i did i'm sorry disagree with what the interpretation of hall as for closing all intentional torts hall itself cited to the case law that preceded it the found that if there's a genuine intentional to citing to the martin atkinson exceptions so they don't foreclose that there's any other kind of claim can be brought but when it comes to the injury on the job hall is very restrictive i would agree  but bring clarifies that and says we don't mean that it's an independent cause of action that doesn't depend on there being an injury on the job to have you don't have to have an injury on the job now and then we don't break is that it's not and it's not just limited to injury on the it's not just the fact that it's a state law it's not just the fact that it's a breach of contract claim it's not just the fact that it's an intentional tort claim that has that you have to look to see what kind of breach of contract claim it is or what kind of intentional talk claim that is to decide whether it's sufficiently bound up in the print and we would snip that it's not any different in fact both cases were presented by the same counsel were drafted the same time and of all the same claims that plame case was the second in the complaint which is the operative complaint in that case was actually filed two weeks claims in this case i believe and i guess the question is what how does it cover nine forty eight or nine forty eight style claims like retaliation claims when both when six hundred fifty one days speaks in terms of workers compensation laws which doesn't seem to have to do with that and the nine o five a talks about liability described in section nine zero four and then it says except that if an employer fails to secure payment of compensation as required by this chapter which also speaks in terms of what an employer does on our workers compensation scheme they all seem bound up in the administration of workers compensation benefits and this seems something that's arguably different from that because it has to do with an action that comes along later which is a retaliation action provisions and that's where i'm not entirely clear as to how it would because the su city provisions speak in terms of the administration of workers compensation benefits and retaliation just seems like it's something else it's not you don't ordinarily think about workers dependent on that claim one just like the claims we have here are also preempted by the wire but i don't think they're like the claims that we have here because i didn't see that in bringing there was any state law claim that spoke in terms of retaliation i thought they were all state law claims that had to do with the dissemination of benefits of workers companies and that the scheme had gone awry and workers comp benefits would be paid out in the right way but it didn't have to do there was no state law analog at least we didn't discuss that in our opinion that they could still have a state law claim that is grounded in the same sorts of stuff that's bound up in an unforeseen a claim i e retaliation and unfair action by the employer in response to somebody who's trying to get benefits but that doesn't bring it doesn't tell us that that's preempt to the point to judge miller brought up about mr circle he filed no report he had had a job as a medic and he had to fill all orders as part of that job if somebody came to the medics office with an injury even if it wasn't that they handed out medications and so on so he had to fill out a report that report existed he didn't create for a case he did fax it over to mr elliot but there was no claim filed at that time so he had nothing to do with the process and there was never a hearing before a judge and there was never a hearing before a board there was an informal conference as they call it before the office of workers compensation programs and the way that these cases work you file in new york and then it gets sent out to the various places in the country in districts where that are nearest to where the claimant lives and this went down to the long shore office in houston so there was a telephone call about the case the employer and the carrier did not oppose benefits at that point so there was no assertion of fraud in the case there was a comment to to myself about it which is noted which is noted in the complaint in this case of a comment was we think he faked an injury but then they do do anything about it so there was no claim in the case about been in federal court that court can make a decision that you know she was retaliate against no it wasn't valid no she didn't really suffer these things deviate can say the opposite this happens all the time you have social security disability determinations of told disability the different standards from those in the d b a and yet those can co exist in the same case for the same injuries so i believe that the growers have had adequately addressed this issue of conflict and feel preemption and expressed preemption this statute simply does not grant the claims of kamaal contract or wrongful discharge in this case and the basic unfairness of the ruling blows that mr elliott could not proceed under nine forty a day because he did not qualify and also mr sibal who had no remedy because there was no compensation claim that he had and he was not testifying or about to testify within it any reasonable meaning of the term so the