and then she was dismissed as a party because she no longer had legal status once her guardianship was removed this dismissal was consistent with the practice in ordinary civil cases if you're no longer have a legal interest in a case you ordinarily dismiss from that case and there's nothing in the juvenile quote act that overrides this practice we can start by looking at the text of section one nash five one out which makes the guardian and parents and other individuals mandatory parties at the beginning of  proceeding if you look at why those persons are parties initially none of the strains on the best interests of the child there's no determination at the outset whether a parent's participation as a party in the case would benefit the children instead it's because of  individual's legal relationship with the minor in the preceding so follows that one said legal relationship is no longer present and that person should no longer be a party to the case but instead the court and t as requiring your best interests finding or some other limitation on the trial court's ability to dismiss a person from a case once they no longer had a legal relationship well and now she's biological grandmother exact first there's two minors involved and i don't remember the exact times for both of them but it was not it was not you know a situation where she was a guardian for a month or two you know it was there was acknowledged by both sides that what that is not why she was initially a party to the case if you look at the individuals again there is no requirement that the person in order to be a mandatory party at the outset somehow have a substantial role in the child's life for example a parent who's never played any role in the child's life may also may still be a mandatory party just because of the legal rights that parents have in relation to their children  was once a month i'm so you know because report recognized the relationship that she had with the children but the permanency wrong in this case was returned home to a biological parent and there was concern in fact the as a mother without having the for legal responsibility of being a parent so the concern was that because of this sort of in between relationship having responsibility taking care for the children on this long was at work and so on  same time not requiring that her daughter take legal responsibility for the children but that was inhibiting her daughter's ability to alter met lee you know take full you know custody and guardianship over the children important distinction between the reason why you would want someone to be a party and the reason why you wanted someone to participate in the same reason for example you might allow a name like a star participated in the circuit court an appellate court the reason why you don't allow an end like us to become a party in all instances is because party status comes with rights and other costs that democrats are participatory status doesn't bring so i think that strikes a balance between if if someone has a right to participate because of the legal relationship that they have be valuable in this case but it doesn't cost come with the cost and complexity of making that person a party because as we all know unfortunately once your party you can assert your own rights and those rights may be inconsistent or contrary  to you know those of the other parties in the case for making someone a participant rather than a party as a way of getting the benefits of their knowledge and their insight about the miners without the atlantic crossing complexity of making them a party text exactly i'm going to a and so is any crime or previously appointed foster parent or relative guardian has the right to be heard so that seems like it's not discretionary that difference because for example consider the case of a foster parent who is taking care of a child an extended period time a foster parent is allowed under the act to intervene in the proceeding but the act makes it clear that the foster parent must do so at their own expense know we may want to participation or even allow or some people to intervene in the proceeding but the you know the right state funded council in the right to state funded services should be limited to the people who have an explicit legal interest under it and then status and to reyes you know the right to state funded services and council and the second thing is just ordinary rights of the party you know as and as i am a case or a participant on you don't have the same ability to assert interests that  contrary to those of the other parties and so you just add complexity by making someone a party because they have the ability to assert legal rights in a way that they can assert them if they're merely purchased on her front of the court but this brief they're aware of the upcoming proceedings and so on and so forth i think that's similar to the rights that a person would have here you know obviously in the case is discretionary whereas under to a person who's a former foster parent or relative caregiver has those rights automatically but in terms of their involvement in a row and the actual proceedings i think that there are roughly comparable let me ask you a very different situation a trial court obviously yes not merely the filing of breeze what you think that means the right to be heard does the previously appointed caregiver have the right to testify to cross examine to call witnesses which means  case we can simply see that the general assembly did not intend to override the background of civil procedure based on its different treatment of foster parents and other people  look at the reasons why a person is made a priority in the first instance it's not because there's an assumption that that person is participation in the proceeding would benefit the child instead it's because of some legal relationship that that person has to the child so it seem unusual that initial reason their party will differ from you know the reason why they would remain apart it seems like if the legal status is removed then they're no longer a party to the case and then they could relative caregiver so if it was someone who is a guardian who had a substantial relationship but was not a relative then that would be you know that would be a more more difficult case so she's a great to be heard and she has the right to ask for menda force that right exactly as subject to the limitations of mandamus there would need to be you know clear and i think it would be difficult to find a mandamus action about you know whether or not the scope of cross examination was sufficient but if the  i just see the legislature's intentions and i think that's the primary thing here if the public court based its decision on the fact that the act did not directly say that a person who no longer is a guardian must be dismissed from the case and they treated that is as legislative silence but i think backed was it wasn't drafted in a vacuum it was drafted with you know the background as a civil procedure in mind and there's actually you know a provision in that this says the rules of civil procedure apply if not otherwise preempted by that your court act so i don't think that it's legislative silence i think that it's general assembly simply you persons mandatory parties and back specifically provides that if a foster parent wants to intervene it has to do so at some costs so i think it's again i think it's important to remember that the it seems like the part status and the rights and and the right to counsel the right you know all of the ordinary incidents of being a party those stem from one consideration the relationship to the minor and then the ability to participate in the case as an interested person the stem from another consideration which is you know it's likely that those persons will be able to provide valuable insight or from ation to the court so i guess you know to sum it up there's  no reason that this long has to remain a party in order to stay involved in this case now she did express some concerns about the cost on that it would be difficult for her to pay for the cost of services that would allow her to ultimately reinstate guardianship but again the general assembly you know you could say the same thing about a former foster parent who may be interested in adopting a child eventually they may have difficulty paying for the cost of those services but that does not provide them to those persons at the state's expense and also it's important to remember that the pregnancy goal in this case is returning home to a biological parent so you know unless we want to throw in the towel on that girl then her argument returned the guardianship as you know is not the primary consideration here the primary consideration is alternately  returning the child home to a to a biological parent so i think in summary on the part of the of the act there's nothing in the act that requires a person once they have legal status has been removed to remain a party to the case the appellate court viewed back so called silence as an end and vote to speculate about what the general assembly may have wanted but i think it's fair to view that silence as a recognition of the adoption of the ordinary rule that once you have no legal status that you did not remain a party in the case the second point i'd like to address is that even if we do believe that in some instances the trout cloyd should be required under the act to keep a person party was beneficial which is definitely true in some respects but it didn't really acknowledge or refute the reasons given by the trial court why her continued party status would not be beneficial to the children and we touched on that a bit earlier in essence there was this situation where ms long didn't want to cut off her daughter entirely from the children but it left as sort of an a half way state the mother was allowed to be with the children mother when she wanted to but she wasn't forced to take legal responsibility for the children and the trial quoi on the recommendations of the special advocate found that that was undermining the ultimate goal of know there were barriers to both the parents are not together as a couple at the time you know the mother was going through substance abuse treatment and had a history of that and the father had also had difficulties with that as well and also had not did not have a close relationship with the children at the time so you know that you know right at least on the basis of that other record there wasn't specified that it would be one prefers the other  not proper the detriment was to the ability of the mother to develop the necessary parenting skills in this situation where if you can have a relationship with your children  don't have to take on ours he you know if the burdens of being a parent i mean parenting is difficult it's something that brings a great deal of joy but it also brings a great deal of difficulty and a great deal of responsibility so if you're able to enjoy the benefits of spending time with your children but you don't automatically bear the burden of all of the difficult aspects of parenting would think that under the under the plan adopted by the trial court there was going to be supervised visitation with both of the biological parents so i think that bagwell can be achieved in a different way the concern here was just ongoing relationship between ms long and her daughter and the effect that that was having on her daughter daughter's ability to develop those skills so then this is not you know this is not an instance where you know there's allegations of child abuse under section two twenty nine but in any rate the appellate court looks at the grandmother here is a presume parent but for purposes of one dash five one grandmother is primarily looked at as a guardian right and i argued also that she was responsible relative under one dish five ok and one one dish five really doesn't take into account specific facts r you know it's let me tell you way where i'm getting at here i are holding will apply to augur yes you do agree with that i agree with that ok whether their grandmothers or not they will apply to all gary and in this case keeping a little bit with the theme that justice freeman started this is a guardian who didn't even appeal the term a nation over gerdy unship right that's correct i was ok but that's factual that's factual so we have a situation in which the appellate court there analysis argued by analogy presume parent because it's a grandmother but yet brief there are no fewer than fifty fourteen references to cost and complexity cost of appointed counsel and cost of services during his argument this warning mr truly written to say did cost me complexity at least three times the focus of the juvenile court action never be on the dollar it should only be on the best interests of the child that's why the kitchen you free of marlene long were permitted to remain a party i don't particularly think the juvenile court deck cares about how many cooks are in the kitchen i think they care about the ultimate result reuniting the child with its p using that presumed parent analogy ruled that even though he presumed father who was later found not to be a biological parent was permitted to remain a party because he had important information just disseminate as to the best interests of the child so yes i think so well as a party she would be entitled to services which would be designed to restore her guardianship to remove what their very impediments there were that resulted in the removal of or guardianship and those services which i don't know if the dispositional hearing and the wherewithal to pay for her own services which she had been dismissed as as a party i doubt it i think it's only a cost benefit analysis does an injury question madam justice cannot stress enough the distinction between her is guardian and hers responsible relative both her and title to be parties under one dash five and since she was basically receiving these children she was the sole the cases that are cited in this matter in re and they asked is the one that i relied upon mostly in my review to the fourth district he was not mr amass mr stone i'm sorry and his wife divorced his wife had two children i got custody of those two children and he became a necessary party because he was the custodian of my lien along with the custod guardianship of her of the child she chose not to had she been a parent the state most likely would have filed to a motion to terminator parental rights because she failed to make any progress whatsoever so in that regard i do agree with that speech but s p also stands for the proposition that they are a guardian was given could appoint a council and publicly funded services to cure the defects in her relationships also the juvenile court back is to be liberally construed to meet its sense and that is to meet the best interests of children if that involves him again a guardian or a responsible relative who is in a better position than anyone else to regarding the best interest right in made here at the trial court level right i think that he said was not looked at by the well no i don't think it was addressed by the public court from the filing of a petition and the decision to prosecute the petition involves the best interest of a minor i don't think you can escape that new juvenile court act make s siegel and so if you're going to read the act as the appellate court did to require the trial court to keep her from a guardian if it's in the best interest of the child then the decision should still be reversed because the trial court made that finding  one thing that he said about the best interest of the child in its relationship to the act it is true that the acts overall purpose is to advance the best interest of the child but i don't think that that  because of their legal status to the minor in many instances a mandatory party has no relationship at all to the child an absentee father for example or a store manager or party even if that person has no it's is shown that that their involvement with the children has been detrimental to the child so i think at least when it comes to party status now the defining issue is not whether or not the person's involvement in the case is best interests it's really about their really need the relationship to the minor to shoot the case the second band like to say about the best interest is that if his point about the best interest were true would be difficult to explain the choices that the general assembly made with respect to foster parents former foster parents and relative caregivers on for those classes of people just like ms long are likely to have or at least in many cases will have a close relationship with the child who will be able to offer the court a great deal of information about the child but those persons are not mandatory parties in the case to foster parents they're permitted to intervene but they must do it at their own expense so while it's true that the act