and enter judgment in favor of states for two principal reasons the first is that the supreme court erred when it determined that the first district decision security mutual was binding precedent and then relied on that decision to conclude that the trigger it and determined that the definition of occurrence which our policy clearly defines terms of personal injury is the first offense to give rise to injury is the type  plain language in determining that claim again the trigger was done so in terms of the first basis and that is that the circuit court properly relied on the first district's analysis and security mutual a thousand and fourteen in the decision of  insurance policies cover is injurious acts or injury that results from conduct and for claim for malicious prosecution all of the injurious conduct that took place took place back at the time of year rest and wrongful again and the second district recognize that fact and decided not to do what the first district has done security mutual was try to impart the principles and elements of tours into an analysis of whether or not an insurance policy covers damages resulting from an injury so the set of circuit court by the line improperly in the first district decision and quite frankly that was the gist of the circuit court's decision was that security mutual controls that's occurring usual dictated the result that the court found that simply not the case in fact up until at that time there was no binding precedent really and in the state of illinois that governor bush is prosecution claims every court in the seventh circuit our in the security neutral for the moment the position i've advocated by states is that our particular policy of the policy language that we have requires that in order for there to be covered occurrence there must be personal injury  well let me step back from what our policy covers is we cover damages that result from a personal injury that results from an occurrence during the policy period we define occurrence in our policy uniquely in some sense we say that for any claim for personal injury the date of the occurrence is the date that the first offense took place or its alleged to have taken place then we provide a list of the types of personal injury for which we provide coverage now included in that this is als the malicious prosecution claim and again on the security mutuals analysis for system sales that it just ignored the plain policy language and went right to the conclusion that from which this prosecution the exoneration is the triggering event and that happened during your period  both of those claims could be covered if for example the wrongful acts giving rise to those claims the false arrest and incarceration occurred during our policy period but they did and so and what our policy goes on to define further is to say that if you have a series of offenses of personal injury the date of the occurrence for purposes of coverage is the date the first offenses and in in this case the acts giving rise to arrested and incarcerated is the policy that would get coverage if any does it county have to buy a tail light as some or something like that to maintain coverage because here we are x number of years later when malicious prosecution action basically arises because if exonerated no your honor this is an important distinction that i think the circuit court also wrestled with a little bit that is going to types of policies generally speaking in the policy because traditionally a claims made policy only covers a claim that is first made against the insured during the period and in some instance reported during that same window of time now insured by a tale to extend the reporting process so that they can comply and have coverage in that window but in the current space policy like the one state issued covers just in a bench or act that happens that results in injury and no matter when the claim manifests down the road in exactly made against the insured we have locked in a window of time where that the coverage is available so as long as the injurious act happens during that window of time the insurer can notify the carrier and put them on notice and activate the coverage but the majority of courts that have analyzed this issue have come to that very conclusive that it is the insurance companies the risk at the time of the arrest and incarceration that are the policies that respond to this loss and they've come up with a number of reasons why they reach that conclusion courts that have interpreted policy language like ours say that it covers an injury and the only injurious conduct that happened to mr beeman is when he was arrested and incarcerated and sentenced to fifty years in prison when he got out of but the insurance policies that we issued doesn't cover that it covers the injury and the injury again took place back in ninety four ninety five in terms of one of the things that the republicans have argued is that the policy language in our policy changed about two years after the policy at issue and they make a big deal about that because they suggest that by doing so it evidences that the policy we issue is ambiguous that it meant something different as we've outlined in our argument in our briefs that is the wrong analysis because principally what we have to first determine is whether or not the policy we're talking about is ambiguous to begin because what an insurance company does two years down the road to modify or is of no import as to whether or not the language before the court is in vigorous or not of the language is not it as it's clear and underlying principles has to be applied this rule and so this argument about changing to modify the language again as we've advocated before that happens i want to spend just a few moments talking about again why the search for charges should be reversed as it relates to the fair to look at the policy language and again it's important to note that we're not solely focused in our language just on the malicious prosecution claim and what i mean by that is even if this court were to determine that the security mutual analysis from the first district is the right analysis and that acts which give rise to a violation of the civil of federal civil rights so again because we have these separate definitions of personal injury we prevail under one or the other even if the most prosecution claim require all of the elements to be completed and again we are not advocating that position we are advocating that for malicious prosecution the trigger is the date of incarceration and arrest not the date of exoneration but again it's important to note that our policy language is different and that it allows us another opportunity to say why those things no policies in that case had slightly different language from each other but we would posit that our language is closer to in your heart because a given harbors language talks more about the injury and when when does the injury occur and that's the same way we really define our policy as well  and again the injury occurs for malicious prosecution back the time of incarceration arrest it's also important to note that both in both decisions the second district did take an opportunity to distinguish and explain why the seven circuits analysis in the city american states receive waukegan in the factory each and your field why all of those decisions were incorrect and that the general principle that can be gleaned from that is that all three of those cases relied in prison in permissibly on security and so in and of itself that's a problem because that's not the state of the law in addition mcphatter it's the courts really didn't focus on the policy language before them which the second district said is really important we have to look at i want to just at the at the risk of sounding repetitive i do want to just hammer home one last policy consideration for the court and that is this argument that placing the insurer on the risk at the time of the exoneration is the more appropriate thing to do because it is likely to be an insurer that has more assets available to them they are less likely to be solvent at that time they may have higher limits available at that time  respectfully that's not the proper analysis it's not helpful to have a system like that because it's not the insurance company again is issuing a policy to cover injury and again no injury happens at the time of exaggeration and so to ignore that fact is just because the insurance company may have a higher limit maybe more solid is not the right analysis please support the council in reviewing the various cases on this topic or the last few days what struck me is a lot of the cases seem to get sometimes so on bob with their own analysis of the legal points above they alleged wrongful conviction of and i would be even twelve years earlier well because that's because the how of the policy defiance coverage the policy in this particular case the fines coverage on the various aspects of it section all of the policy with defined personal injury which requires more coverage to think place they'd be a coexistence andry and offense so even if the an aspect of personal injury a good friend personal injury further well it makes in terms of all the answers and then that list various causes of action also wrongful arrest a malicious prosecution these are all courts so you play a point of view of the insurance you think when they subscribe for this policy two years ago they thought they were going to be covering claims brought by ellen damon for twelve years earlier i don't know when they took this ball z that any was arrested and prosecuted not when he was exonerated under the terms of policy they were correct because they talk about the injury but the court also isn't it isn't the injury what's at issue in this case the every plus  this case for only addressing the duty of the pm the bar of much longer lower and securing why should the lawyers just figure you now are going to hear this crap old argument be made to route our policies let's avoid them does that somehow indicate that there's a legitimacy to the argument not shouldn't be the question from the point of view turns company they should try to avoid any colorable claim or claims that aren't even color or both they can fix the policy by doing this and that just good policy can have on the fact in this case or can have a role in this case especially when the coverage your day and especially when at least some of the holdings of the finding of or  were there it wouldn't be i do anything to what the term personal injury means what it but it is true in a policy now so that i didn't did you understand my question i did our offender question my question was would there change if the term offenses wasn't even it wouldn't change its meaning at all what you're thinking you're in the innocent person or a jury means injury caused by one or more of the following code one two three four it wouldn't change at all w simple example may show that if for example this county of mclean had determined that in two thousand and eight they were going to release mr b they weren't sure whether or not they were going to prosecute him further or whether they were simply going to examine it he would have the opportunity at that point to purchase insurance coverage for the upcoming events which would be exoneration and by doing that they would remove the element of fortuity from that coverage nicely with the arguments that we raise with respect to north the seven circus northfield ironically struggled in some sense to apply the fact which test about when exoneration or when the triggering event for most a prosecution purpose because again we kept talking today about exoneration because exoneration was the event in this instance but the toward malicious prosecution requires the favorable terminations of the proceeding in favor of the criminal defendant there's a lot of acts that take place around that time period that norville struggle is that the release from prison isn't the decision by the state and not reprosecute is it ultimately the certificate of innocence that's issued and because all those states can change and they can change a different policy perio it doesn't make for a very good test to use those states as the date of the trigger what is clear in rooted in stone is the date the criminal was arrested the date he or she was convicted those things can change their the insured has the opportunity at the back end of the case twenty thirty years later to have some control over what those dates are and procure insurance to correspond and that's why again applying that mcphatter to the northfield analysis just isn't useful test going to be a situation where this the county and bought a policy twenty years earlier and the insurance companies are point the finger because the language keeps changing without some of the circular because the language changes all the time ruling that today's language is good for exoneration it doesn't help us virus was twenty years ago so that's sort of the arm doesn't really work what does work is to say that the triggering event for this is prosecution claim is the date of incarceration and the false arrests because everybody's policies cover that of that under a definition of personal injury and again it's very imperative to know it is the court has noted that this policy covers injury not torts not offenses but injury and the only personal injury that happened to mr beeman at least with respect to the coverage is concerning is when