the court counsel a preliminary matter your honors there's tending in this court of the department's motion to cite supplemental authority filed march twenty fourth yukos this area  the holdings of the o'neil in the frederick cases the department withdraws our argument on pages twenty two and twenty seven of our reef that argument was that the circuit cour lacked subject matter jurisdiction under section ten eight of the full weight act because the appeal was properly to the director rather than to the circuit court both o'neill and franklin held that where is a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence that is in effect a revocation of the ford car based on domestic battery which is one of the statutes under section ten that th subject matter jurisdiction in the circuit court so therefore the department withdraws our argument and agree that the circuit court was the proper forum for m the second point regarding those cases is that both the frederick and o'neil opinions held in favor of our argument before this court that under the two thousand thirteen amendments to the point act the firearm owners identification card act the circuit court lacks authority to order here order mr  order the department to issue mr stoll before card contrary to federal law and as we argued in our briefs and they were essentially the same facts in both frederick neal  mr stoll is federally barred from possessing weapons under the federal gun control act because of his conviction for battery that had an element of a domestic relationship in it he was federally barred at the time that he at the time that the department revoked his car in two thousand and eight and he is certainly barred at the time that the circuit court issues its order in two thousand and thirteen and therefore the court's circuit court's order was contrary to section ten  hadn't been allowed that petition was not of record all that was pending before the court and all that was decided by the court was the law of the partons petition to intervene and it  what's the response we did argue in our brief your honor that the circuit court heard in regard to the section two four zero eight the titian to intervene in denying that the court's reasoning was that the state's here the state's attorney made no objection to the mr stopes the titian for his for a car on the record we argued in our petition to intervene that that was here to oppress the propriety of the denial of intervention and either affirm that denial or reversal and if it's reverse of then it goes back to the trial court to he the court first of all found that the petition for intervene was denied because as i said we the court erroneous we held that the state's attorney adequately represented our interests which is one of the requirements of section t that was basically that reason was that the court circuit court erroneous lee held that under the illinois supreme court decision in quorum despite the two thousand and thirteen fourteen months three judges three justices in corinth held that the circuit court could nevertheless issue for a card because that was essentially restoring the second rights isn't that just advisory the court's holding just to rule on the issue of law so we should ignore the fact that that that there is no ruling on the underlying two fourteen zero one proposed than and reach the merits of it certainly you have all the you have all the jurisdiction contrary to federal law after the two thousand and thirteen fourteen act amendments appear issue of law here issue of interpretation of the a forty of the court decision there isn't any need to send it back to the circuit court this court has all the subject matter jurisdiction that a circuit court would have to rule on that issue and assuming the court agrees that the circuit court erroneous lead intervene the section two fourteen zero one petition automatically arises as an issue of law that is before this court as well most of the cases you cite talk about either standing intervene or standing to appeal and the standards are basically the same if you sent it back to the circuit court the circuit court assuming would make the same erroneous decision well why would you assume that you have additional authority now that you would present i do but i'm saying it's that it's a pure issue of law and if you reverse the circuit court's petition to denial of our petition to intervene then you have subject ends there otherwise we come back up here and go through this argument so we think that's unnecessary unless the court has specific questions about amendments apply to prohibit circuit courts from issuing a card contrary federal law unless the court has specific questions about that we make the same arguments in our brief that are explored in great citing fredricka is there is one point in frederick that we are filing a motion for hearing about it doesn't change the decision in frederick but it does have a an impact in this case i like to take a moment just to explain that frederick considered which statute which versions of the four yack applied in that case the pre two thousand and thirteen act or the two thousand thirteen the distinction being priests two thousand and thirteen under the court's ruling in coram you had three justices holding and two justice  version of the statute applies determines whether the circuit court order here was good or not frederick paragraph twenty three of bad decisions held that the version of the statute that applies is the version at the time in effect at the time that the department issues department of state police issues its revocation letter now in frederick that doesn't make any difference because they were both post two thousand and thirteen revocation letter issued two thousand years here revocation letter issued in two thousand and eight so under the paragraph twenty three of frederick in this case mr stoll would get his card if the two that wrong and the reason frederick got that wrong and another issue in this case that mr stoke has raised is whether the two thousand and thirteen amendments are being retroactive applied to him when his conviction was in two thousand so now fredrick case addressed pro choice activity and got that part of it right as far as is frederick says the two thousand and thirteen amendments have no retro and at retroactive impact at all they are only to be applied prospect of lead to determine whether a card applicant paragraph twenty four and twenty five of the frederick case that opinion also cites and really are supreme court case chaos e h a y a a sigh which held in a similar issuance of a medical license that there was no ritual at ect in fact so frederick gets the facts correct that the two thousand and thirteen amendments do not involve any retroactive application but what that also means is that then the version of the statute that applies is not the version that was in effect at the time that the statutory law that unless it's us an intervening statute an amendment that's intervening in a case has a retroactive impact on the parties the court applies the law in effect at the time that the court makes its decision now this is a bit to throw a bit to throw out a court just merely an oral argument and if the court feels that it would like  further briefing on this issue or if the court requests we will file our motion for rehearing in fredrick also with this case where we lay out the law this is it's a bit complex but the basic argument is that unless an intervening statute has a retroactive impact on the case the court applies the statute in effect at the time that the court makes its decision fredricka erroneous lee held in paragraph twenty three that the statute that applies is the statute at the time the department issued its revocation letter that is just now says that i know that's a complex argument and the case law goes back to it in illinois s supreme court case land graph involving retroactive impact and then the illinois supreme court's case commonwealth edison which adopted the federal land graft test for its determination of retro activity those cases are fairly well exploited in the fredric decision and i would refer you to frederick paragraph twenty four  and the high aussie case that it cites illinois supreme court case paragraph twenty three and twenty four which explain the whole area of a trial activity and which statute why and again i would ask the court if the court has any concerns about that us leave to file in this case or petition for rehearing in frederick which you just haven't had time to parity for or date now that we're looking at is the date mr stiles boy card was revoked and that was in two thousand as counsel touched on frederick case as far as we can tell now that is the law in place this time is that that court said that appropriate statute to apply in determining whether or not the trial court would have had already to remove this federal firearms disability would be administrative action in the law in place at that time and again this ministry of action the revocation took place in two thousand and eight pre the two thousand and thirteen and it's also important to note in the tr daughter and just to clarify the record mr still did not have a daughter at that time it was a living girlfriend's child which may still in effect meet that standard but i want to make sure that that was clear for the record void card was september twenty sixth two thousand and thirteen or there was never a direct appeal taken from that order and in fact the department did not even seek intervention so some four months later on january twenty  so then that turns to whether or not the trial court properly exercises discretion and allowing or disallowing the motion to intervene at that time the department's argument was twofold for  one when you're faced with the petition to intervene as a matter of right it's discretion is more limited than under mr or mrs intervention first the the trial court has to determine whether or not the department's actions seeking intervention timely whether or not the party seeking intervention was adequately represented by the parties at the original hearing and whether or not the party intervention is affected by a ruling a back court i think it's important to note and denying the motion of mention the trial court specifically found that the interest if the department had any were adequately intervention as a bribe of do you believe that the trial court's exercise of discretion was proper when it then i intervention i do believe so because of the department's position that would be at last the state's attorney question in all sorts of matters in criminal and in these types of matters determine whether or not there is a viable legal argument or a viable reason to oppose relief west trial court found all the statutory reasons why or not what card would leave should be granted and they could be the ones named in the statute and that's not the case in fact the legislature has found just the opposite and it's taken most major crimes and major issues out of the administrative process and has put that upon the state's attorney and the local county court to make that determination so i think the state's position or the department's position that they're in a better position to make sure that the underlying requirements  is contrary to what the legislature has the term so i don't believe that that has a whole lot of marriage and there are also in regard to the intervention tra specifically found and there was again no direct appeal that granting mr still relief was not contrary to that not getting to that point that ruling i don't believe has ever been contradicted either i know the department is trying to take the next step and argue why that that's not a proper because of the holding corm and the inference is made by section of the criminal code that we've referenced wherein there is a procedure for the state to specifically establish a federal firearms disability within the criminal case itself and it requires providing of notice of the defendant back in fact the crime may fact be determined to be a crime of domestic violence a federal law they're given an opportunity to oppose that or  and if they either oppose it or stand huge then the state is required to prove that if they're wanting the state law to impose that same disability or to impose that disability to avoid issuance of a foid card they have to they due process would require that if you're going to on a domestic are on a straight battery later on have the penalties for a crime of domestic violence then that should be established not by the department reviewing arrest records or police records and establishing that be a hearsay when the person has not had their day in court and there's been no factual determination to make that true here going forward if that's going to be the case in the state wants to  that under federal law than the defendant will have an opportunity in court to have that determination made here if you take the leap beyond whether or not it was proper for the motion intervene and as partners argued that or simply rule that they should have been allowed to intervene and there are fourteen no one motion should be granted mr stokes has not ever had a day to contest that and in court whether it was a two thousand and six hearing where he played facts to the problem making that determination for the department later and then it's they so many i think taking that hours that it's contrary to a plain reading of the legislation legislative intent because that same the same two thousand and thirteen minutes the boy back were made under the same public act as the administer the criminal code establishing what procedures need to be followed if the the state is actually going to argue that  that is a federal firearms disability and that the battery or domestic battery is a crime of domestic violence under federal law so i think that the legislature had a vision to bad issuing and due process rights because otherwise if you under illinois law because virtually every crime that the party the petition to the surface horse for relief under the act would be a bar under federal law whether it be the felony well if that it was actually argued in the case and as much as there are distinguishing striking a stranger versus striking a family member i mean obviously either one or are appropriate but in that case there is really i'll just address two points raised by mr thomas first he argues that is regarding to whether the state's attorney adequately represented departments interests he argues that unless the state's attorney always a close the petition the department would say they're not representing arrangers well that's a straw man argument it's only where the there's an existing on the face of the petition holding a claim that is clearly contrary to the statute and in this case where there is a very clear legal reason to oppose of the petition if the state's attorney doesn't advance fat in the circuit court then the state's attorney is not representing the par record see one paragraph five of his petition he admitted it's a domestic battery he can't now argue that you know it's not a domestic rather he or the circuit court didn't term him that it was at the mystic battery he's admitted that fact so clearly on the face of the petition there is a legal basis to say that the court cannot issue before a card if the state's attorney doesn't make that argument the state's attorney has not adequately represented the department's interest and that's the case here it's not an all this thing we're not saying that the circuit that they the market should always have a right to come to him but it should have a right to come in if the state's attorney has not been found and is not present at all the legal defenses against ordering a petition the second point that mr thomas makes is that the two thousand and thirteen said in the underlying criminal case if it's a battery that court shall also make it but that the state's attorney will then come in and say yeah but there's of the mystic element here and therefore it's our under federal law that's part of the that's the other part of the two thousand and thirteen so if i understand mr thomas argument he's saying well he's denied due process because they didn't occur here and of course it couldn't occur because the battery convictions of two thousand seven  well that doesn't make application retroactive here and we argue on page seven of our reply brief first it is impossible of the state of the circuit court could have followed those in and said anybody who was convicted of battery loses their medical license no hearing nothing of medical license revoked the illinois supreme court case that is not a retroactive impact appellant's there raised the same argument that mr thomas is raising here that there were other provisions of that intervening statue that gave license medical  practitioner certain hearings and things like that that couldn't happen because you know their stuff happened many years earlier and mr thomas is arguing here well mr stokes battery happened many years earlier in the circuit co did make a finding that it was a misdemeanor crime in the midst of violence therefore used tonight his due process rights here but high as he said just because one part of the statute doesn't apply to these plaintiffs doesn't make the rest of the statute or retroactive impact yes hi ya see a paragraph nineteen of a case and so there's two answers to mr selves mr thomas argument first of all he's already admitted his domestic battery so it's irrelevant second just because part of the two thousand and thirteen nine hundred amendments require another circuit court proceeding that can't happen here because it should've happened in two thousand and seven that doesn't mean that it's a i know again that's a lot to talk about on the oral argument as you run out of time is there anything that you wish to say implosion then we would ask the court to reverse the circuit court's order denying our motion to intervene and