an ineffective assistance of counsel case misrepresentations in this case came from the prosecutor not just jones's lawyers and its opposition to judges motion to withdraw his guilty  st the lawyers including the prosecutor assured jones that sex offender conditions would not apply to his plea nd jones asserted they would and  motion to withdraw is clearly i think his comments at sentencing can be described as in article i think in his dialogue with judge lindsey he sought to express his need to reconsider that motion to withdraw and he didn't articulate it as clearly as he did in his written motion but i don't think that means he abandoned the claim at all in fact he doesn't understand the difference between the motion to withdraw the plea or a section two thousand two hundred and fifty five i mean he  perceiving were winding down he wanted at that moment to file a two thousand two hundred and fifty five because through it out these proceedings mr jones has sought to pull the cli he doesn't know what method to use he didn't know how to raise that directly with the judge but he did during sentencing as you point out alert lindsey that he wanted to withdraw all played well in it i understand  that you know a non lawyer isn't the same thing as a lawyer but my experience with pro se litigants which is substantial is that when they have a guru who wait they're making it all the time even if it's not  article and here i don't see that at the sentencing which is typically you say you people say more rather than less when they're concerned about something because they're given a chance to see you know they had that allocution moment and typically don't get cut off the way other situations may involve so i'm just trying to understand that he's i also think it's important that the court look back at the under oath and they got into a dialogue about whether he should continue talking and i think the fact also that previously judge lindsey had advised mr jevons that mr jones needed to be speaking through his attorney may have killed his speech in his ability to press that point but i do think when you look at it absence of his lying consistently throughout these proceedings beginning immediately after the plea mr jones sought to pull that plea and he based that on s a direct appeal this is the constitutional challenge that the supreme court has allowed individuals to demonstrate that their plea is constitutionally invalid that it did not represent and knowing choice between alternative narratives and that because the prosecutor presented to the district court in its most its opposition to mr jones motion to withdraw his plea the prosecutor's position in this case has consistently been that sort of doesn't apply and that  motion is the opposition to the motion to a drug which is actually in the record before the sport so i believe the court has and lebanon's before it to realize that what the prosecutor and the prosecution has consistently indicated in this case is that sort of doesn't apply when in fact it does and mr jones play guilty based on those assurances so i don't think this is a two thousand two hundred and fifty five i don't think the record needs to be expanded but to the extent it does th maintained by any means django one and the defendant committed such an act knowing or in reckless disregard that django one had not a cane he age of eighteen years of age and would be used in a commercial sex act th voluntariness the supreme court has underscored that her guilty plea to be voluntary it must represent a voluntary an intelligent choice among alternative courses of action the misrepresentation regarding sorn and its applicability in this case prevented john from making an intelligent choice among options this is not a case where defendant has buyer's remorse because the sentence  c is more severe than he anticipated instead this is a case where a sentence that was promised would not be imposed has been posed the complaint isn't one of degree it is one of sort of the federal sex offender registration and notification act applies to jens rico conviction for the sex trafficking of two separate girls under the age of fifteen so one is residual cla expands soreness application by including within its provisions any conviction for a specified offense against a minor jones's conviction qualifies as a specified offense against a minor after circuit including this circuit has given broad application to soar not to meet its stated statutory purpose this circuit is found that congress enacted sorda to protect the public especially children from sex offenders and establish a comprehensive national system for the registration of those offenders begins allas medina cape court reminded soreness language confirms that congress cast a wide net to ensnare as many offenses against children as possible despite the broad purpose the government suggests that soreness application can be waived by prosecutors for the states like texas does not negate the fact that sort of speech directly to sex offenders not judges it's sort of like the gens in this case there are two possible approaches to determine whether soreness soreness residual clause covering a specified offense against a minor applies in a given case the majority view among the circuits is the non categorical or fact specific is not consistent but casting a wide net against sex offenders it seemingly goes against both the language and the structure of sora and repeatedly stated his belief that sort of biased his conviction well that may have been unclear at sentencing and the fact that he is perpetually challenge and has been the only one that's been accurate on this point sort of five to his conviction jones is already being subjected to sort of conditions within the bureau of prisons he knows that its application is not dependent on whether the district court ordered that it apply the state of texas can order  can order jones to register as a sex offender despite any assurances from federal prosecutors or the district court and in two thousand and two i will case the supreme court of iowa found that sex offender registration is set by the uncorking agency not by the courts hear the question be resolved by the texas department of public safety jones pled guilty to a crime with an essential element enticing harboring transporting providing obtaining or maintaining a person under the age of eighteen for use in a commercial sex act this federal crime aligns with the texas reportable fence of trafficking of person which requires a person younger than eighteen that has been transported in tights for crude it or provided or otherwise of k to be trafficked in prostitution the promotion of prostitution or online promotion of prostitution court's decision is not determinative in fact pennsylvania has found a sort of registration requirements can apply even when the federal court fails to check the sarna registration box its holding was based on state sovereignty or found a stated not agreed to the federal police agreement and it also found that the state was not bound by the federal omission in checking the sort of box jones faces a serious threat of sex offender status at the federal level and that is based on statutory language itself this court in past cases has looked to both the structure and change the language in the amendments under  when you go down to subsection seven it also states expansion of definition a specified offense against a minor means an offense against a minor that involves any of the following and it goes two separate fifteen year old girls harboring and enticing them to perform prostitution and engaging himself in prohibited sex acts with one of the girls makes him a sex offender  jones told his lawyers this was an issue a lawyer based on the prosecutor's assurances told him it wasn't the prosecutor told the district court this wasn't an issue and opposing john's motion to withdraw his plea yet here we are we're here because jones was misled he was told that if he pled guilty he would be immunized from sex offender conditions isn't his guilty plea is based on this inaccurate information rendering the plea constitutional constitutionally involuntary and only this court should  conviction on direct appeal where the district court committed no error much less a clear and obvious one were guarding mr jones is guilty plea the role of an colloquy was more than sufficient in this case and the district court properly struck jones as motion to withdraw because he filed that pro se when he was represented by counsel and despite the district court expressly giving mr jones the opportunity to file his motion to withdraw correctly and through counsel after it was struck in april t never did so before he was sentenced and so the district court judge james pointed out did not and rightfully did not develop a record on his claims on appeal jones tries to get around all that and get this court to look past it and consider documents that are not in the record on appeal and allegations that are outside of the work or put simply he wants this court to review his appeal as though he had properly filed a motion to withdraw his plea with evidence attached and that something he didn't do may i understood x and it was really wise so my plea is involuntary but the record doesn't reflect that and what about the twenty to fifty five on that wall so if the record which is you know a lot of what's  not in the record in the so called jones document that's not in the record on appeal there's an e mail that gets reference from the prosecutor that mr jones was on his appellate briefs but that is an issue because the record is not developed should be where the record was not developed especially where the record was not developed through no part of the district court here the proper avenue to seek will leave is not the route direct appeal because this court doesn't have everything that it would need at this point in time to  there was no sora issue a couple of answers on that judge oh and it's very unclear from the record why this didn't get addressed below i mean what we know is jones is pro se motion to withdraw was probably struck because he followed pro se when he was represented by counsel in early april and between then and sentencing in may nothing ever got we filed to raise this issue properly so the district court what does that actually mean surely that that the judge on notice that we got an issue here i  i think is really important here jones signed a plea agreement in october he pled guilty in front of the magistrate judge at the end of november he dated his pro se motion to withdraw in january january th of twenty nine c the e mail from the prosecutor that's not in the record but is in the jones document is dated january th after mr jones is already alleging through his pro se motion to withdraw sort of doesn't apply to me and the prosecutors were sponsor that  motion comes in march so regardless of what the prosecutor is saying by january jones doesn't believe it he believes that he is going to be subject to soren and he wants to withdraw his plea yet when his motion was struck properly and judge lindsay said i'm not going going to consider it unless you file properly and counsel jones didn't do anything he had the opportunity to raise these issues to be heard in front of the district court the st time around and he didn't do it also on the prosecutor point given the state of case law in this circuit and this is where on on the merits the point our standard of review is is really important here because there's no d objection to the rule of an colloquy below and because the district court properly struck his say with certainty whether he would prevail or not i do think there is an issue here that's running a round that it's important i'm playing a review and i think it ultimately will inform whether there was a deficient performance here or should this be raised in twenty to fifty five and that's the fact that this court has yet to adopt them on categorical approach to apply the residual cause of sora this court in show field did not reach that issue because it said sort of would apply under the categorical approach or the non categorical approach and i think whether iraq a tiering charge can subject someone to sort of under the residual clause and i think jones concedes us and in the in the opening brief we're choir's application of the non categorical quote you have to get that much i believe under the non categorical approach yes he would likely be subject to sort of but that's speculative that he's going to move and i don't think that the prosecutor's view of the law  that came out in november of twenty nine teen six months after he was sentenced here so this is an area of law that is developing and developing rapidly and again on this appeal in this direct appeal getting you know if th moves to some state in another circuit mean because the u s would still be the same party wouldn't it be valid by that ruling even if he moves to a different circuit and then the ballot will not talking about state courts sure a couple of things on that judge haynes st of all i think at this point in time based on what we know it is mere conjecture it is speculation whether b o p s or any other entity texas d p s or anyone else is going to subject mr jones to soren as we know from this record judge lindsey did not apply the mandatory condition of supervised release that must be applied if a defendant is subject to sort of my guess is it's likely the b o p s going to look at that judgment nothing beyond that and likely say you're government the u s government prosecute him for failing to register under sort of after we have said that would that not bind the u s that's my question sorry if i misunderstood judge and i believe it probably would because under a for a twenty dollars to fifty dollars motion to be fall for failing to register for sora there's got to be proper notice given to the defendant if this court holds out in a twenty to fifty five then he's not going to receive that proper notice and that gets back to the issue that i was notice person provision but you know i believe that it would my my overarching point here is i think it's speculative whether anyone's going to associate going to tell mr jones whether it's b o p or the texas department of public safety whether applies given that the district court here didn't apply the mandatory condition of supervisor or lease and nobody has challenged that ruling on appeal so you have an issue where sorn is mandatory by its terms but applying that mandatory condition supervised release is also mandatory and i'm not aware of a case that teases that out again getting back to this already being treated as a sex offender by the g o p so he is he's a that's a problem right now not just when he gets out in two hundred and four months minus how a long he's been there down the road right now is to be treated as a sex offender which i gather is different than everybody else in the prison you know i saw that reference in the brief in your honor i'm not aware of anything on that there's nothing in the record on that again pointing to the fact that under twenty dollars to fifty five dollars the district court would have the ability to fully develop the record see what b o p s doing see what the see what the  jones again i think this is speculative based on the state of the record and in the state of case law here that arguments made for the st time in jones's require brief and again the texas statute that jones argues would apply to him here has an element that includes the basically the the person traffic is a minor that's not in the racketeering statute so i think it's speculative i also think based on the language in the texas code of criminal procedure which references elements it's very likely that texas applies the categorical approach on this not the non categorical approach and if that's the case then i think it's a very difficult argument to make that sort of would apply withdraw the guilty plea under this court's precedents alvarado halse sanders the district court was acted properly in striking the pro se motion to withdraw that been preserved anything the district court wasn't required to dig into the car factors for a motion that was properly struck and so i think there's nothing preserve there under this court's opinion and or as opinion and under the pointer standard of review there's no no error the similarly on the request to hold a hearing there's nothing in this court's precedent that suggests that the district court did anything wrong by not building hearing where the underlying motion had been had been struck as invalid and so i think those sort of tag along arguments don't suggest any error let alone a clear on obvious one in the district court finally on the on the point about we may and there's a request in the reply brief that this court remained under appellate procedure to be to supplement the record with the jones document or other things that are outside the record i don't believe that that's what it will ten is designed to do it references an error or a mistake something or there being some lack of clarity as to what went on in the district court although that's not the case here we know what went on in the district court judge lindsey properly struck a pro se motion that was filed when the defendant was represented by counsel and because of that there was no record created that anything would be expanding the record beyond what it currently exists and the alternate requests to go back and be able to file a federal rule of civil procedure sixty motion obviously has no put the bill of a in the trial court it's not a valid basis to go back in and this court's decisions and have been in balance where it is said we don't have a valid we don't have a sufficient record in front of us to consider these claims they must proceed any basis in those requests for we made and for all the sort of reasons that we've discussed because there is no record or sufficient one below and because the district court didn't do anything wrong here you know like i said the role of an colloquy was more than sufficient the striking the pro se motion to withdraw that was filed in the jones was represented by counsel that that is absolutely a correct thing to do under this court's precedent so i don't think there's any basis to find error here because the district court did everything right while there is this question and i think it's an open question in the circuit given that this court has not yet applied the categorical or the non  think that there may be some issues that need to be fleshed out in a twenty dollars to fifty five dollars and so for those reasons and those outlined in the government's brief in the united states would request that this court affirmed jones as conviction without prejudice to his being able to raise these sort of because it was the government doesn't have the authority to weigh soreness applicability and conviction based on sex trafficking up to fifteen year old girls critical to the resolution of this appeal is the standard of review that the court's going to  constitutional error and in that regard didn't know or view is the appropriate standard in her view john change you asked the question about rescuing a cottage and what would happen but here's the issue or the problem with that sort of speaks directly to sex offenders it doesn't speak to judges it doesn't speak to the government and i'm not sure that under risk you get a pot of that's a defense that jones could have served the other thing that poses an impediment here is that the clear agreement itself is talking about us vs jones as a bind that was my question in what is your answer to that i'm sure not sure it does your honor because as i said it sort of speaks directly to sex offenders and so the question is is marcus johns under this conviction a sex offender every circuit including this circuit when you look at the consolidated case this circuit focused on the broad structure and language  emphasized section five that said expansion of sex offense definition emphasized section seven that said expansion of definition a specified offense against a minor and it is curious to see the government standing up saying that a man who is it exists to protect us and as a nation not as a circuit not in regions but to protect the nation from sex offenses committed by individuals and that is why i think judge kane's that the statute speaks to sex offenders are not prosecutors because if the government is correct in this case the prosecutors can weigh sort of application in cases so that sort of how to play one of the fish circuit or in the northern district of texas and an entirely