case called the docket is jenna number fifteen case number one one three four seven four robert lee coulter versus amy eleanor trinidad counsel for the agreement that are authorized by statute were incorporated into a judgment for dissolution of marriage and are consistent with illinois case law and these terms include of include her right to remove the children to southern california three years after the judgment for dissolution of marriage was entered and we think it's important to appoint now given the briefs in the issues in this case that the illinois merits and dissolution of marriage act obviously does not say that agreements regarding children are only forcible it says that they can be always be modified and unless and until they're modified we believe they remain as valid court orders that should be enforced we identified the central issues of this case before the court to be what waits for they remove all agreement be in a court order be given and under what standards in such remove all agreement be modified and we think these issues need to be resolved in order to a wearing boehmer of the trial court granted the wife's motion to enter an extradition will not a court approved agreement as for an order of court and that was done over the objection of the husband we think the most important distinguishing fact is that omer the court refusing really didn't hear any other evidence regarding the children's best interest it's limited itself to entering this extrajudicial not approved by the court agreement in some of law that agreements regarding children that are not entered into quote orders are not in forcible distinguishing fact about coulter of course is that the removal agreement was incorporated into a judgment for dissolution of marriage and when that happened the court was making the best interest finding it was simply making the best interest finding by removing excuse me by agreement as opposed to  a finding after litigation from my perspective we don't see any distinction between whether or not that finding was made either via agreement or via litigation and we think that any modification of the have proceeding of the of it the husband could have a petition to modify correct we believe under six ten b would be the proper and perhaps on remand the appropriate procedure to follow yes so instead of and in this instance to come into court show it needs to be modified and then his birth show changed circumstances correct and we think that's the appropriate procedure because the best interest fighting has been made and that's what  when when i say the best interest finding was made i'm relying on the judgement for dissolution of marriage in the case law i believe that ayers was a a case where the court recognized in illinois its longstanding that the parties can come true way they stipulated was authorized to do it by illinois law and that is the best interest finding that that we're arguing is flexible the one where the court entered the judgment for dissolution of marriage that incorporated the trying parenting agreement was any of that done when the emergency the joint parent agreement was entered in may of two thousand and eight when the judgment for dissolution of marriage and there was no subsequent litigation until mr colter brought his petition for a t r o and a pulmonary injunction the trial court found that the there was no emergency injunction or temporary restraining petition so it was raised in the pleadings i don't believe it was argued or referenced in any way in the court on dovetailing off just as garmin your position is this can all be handled but  you want the burden to rest on the husband here rather than the way we think that all the best evidence interest when it comes to children does come in we think that it's a post a judgment finding best interest you should be under six ten  and i suppose our fallback position looking at some of the case law would be it would just be a simple shift of the burden of proof to the husband to show best interests are now contrary to what's in the dream and that is our position what language in the seven that talks about removal it says three years after a judgment for dissolution of marriage of the wife is entitle to remove all three children two of southern california that's the language that  we are relying on and then amy amy trinidad waited three years she didn't go after three years she didn't seek to go after two years so she waited in reliance and based on her belief that that joint parenting agreement incorporated into a believe that the quote unquote best interest language is specifically in that agreement but i do believe the case law provides that when the parents agree with the parents amid a an agreement regarding the children to a court the presumption is incorporated the j p a and the issue that the removal issue that we're dealing with now can the court make a determination at that time that by the fact that they agreed back in zero eight that necessarily it's in the children's best interest and in two thousand and eleven if there's something different if something changes that the circumstances are now what or not what the parties thought so excuse me for saw then they come in under six ten b and then we show this is what they're  what's changed this is what we didn't foresee this is what we didn't contemplate therefore it's appropriate to modify the the agreement certainly i think it is as we argued if there's if there's no motion filed that there's no contest of it i believe she's entitled to move after three years i don't think there's be appropriate to suggest that in that circumstance she needs to come into court and get and get leave when there's no dispute it's only when mr coulter raises the issue that then you know  procedures in where we think six ten days the appropriate methodology didn't she in fact go to to court seek removal we filed and after mr coulter initiated the injunction litigation we did file for temporary and permanent removal and it was a situation where we thought the issue was before the court the law is unclear and we thought it was appropriate to frame the issues we did that with the pleadings for temporary and permanent removal and we diligently they had an agreement this is our basis for for going forward so we weren't taking a separate position worst it was unnecessary but i do think given the ambiguity in the in the uncertainty in terms of what that agreement meant once the contest began we certainly appropriate incident to file the petitions for temporary and permanent remov six months it was a the agreement was that she would then be able to remove to southern california may i ask what the current status of the case in this case have is he has had very complex twists and with the children the two children with her she did come back to illinois by december thirty first we had filed then our motion for stay in our motion for excuse me but titian for leave to appeal in this court and out of about january sixth this court granted the motion for stay in me and to with the children return to california and the removal hearings and where we go from here on that issue obviously is  jurisdiction yes right yes and then in that same period the time for running it to file appeal a was right so and then there's no dispute that you days the case went back to the trial court in the trial court had jurisdiction and went forward so we seem to have two different tracks going on we have something going on the trial court and we have something going on in the square at the same time i suppose i think the pushing in the trial court was limited to order still drives the ultimate outcome of this case and really still drives the the end of the you know the result of the removal war centrally what's the what's the meaning of the joint parenting agreement incorporated into a  judgement so i don't see it is moot i just see the issue concurrently you know playing for a limited purpose in the trial court again only to deal with the issue one on remand and i don't really think that would affect the  jurisdiction of this quarter cause a party to have to refile appeal they are a notice of appeal or anything after after a limited hearing on remain and i do agree that you couldn't have gone into any other issues related to the matter on appeal because of the jurisdictional question to follow up on justice tice's question and really to clarify in my mind as you pointed out the matter before us is the appellate court decision remanding doesn't have to go through the petition for remove will proceed we believe that in order to determine whether or not the of public court order was correct one needs to determine the validity of enforceability of the joint parenting agree don't think they can be segregated i don't think you can review the injunction or whether or not the public court was correct initially the injunction without deciding that that the threshold fact because that's the whole linchpin of the public court opinion and our leave to remove it again by agreement sure but still leave to remove and in a court order so if you want to modify that and we think it's this extent the situation  and again i would like to point out that sometimes of course you need to look at the the alternative and i think if you're saying to people you can't agree to all valid removal and agreements remove important in a court order that's not going to be binding you're going to be creating a situation where people are going to have to litigate these things we're not suggesting that you can enter into an order regarding a child pertaining to remove all or anything else that could never be modified that's kind of what they want our argument in the agreement about removal and one of the issues i want to to discuss with the court today if we get beyond this jurisdiction alicia just you never know is what does that remove provision nein now and to me all that removed who provision means now is that five years before this litigation started and six years before today the parties agreed to remove for some time down the road now certainly it's been brief that there is law about what such an agreement like this evidences so what such an agreement like this implies a laws very simple it is evidence that back in two thousand and six that this agreement was not in that was in the best interest the children it's evidence of it that's what the case law says but we're not talking about two thousand and six we're talking about one year ago and we're talking about three children two of them who are now in california one of them or i know who is in illinois separated by thousands of miles a family that has been torn apart by this and all you have to do is read the g a o report and the six zero four b report which are part of this record if you don't want to see the effect you want to see the effect that this has had thought of i thought of that and i and i and during the this case i thought of filing a petition just to modify that provision but what stopped me was that i had mr rooper filing a petition for temporary removal i ha rooper filing a petition for permanent removal and i had a court stating unequivocal e many times throughout the record you're entitle to your day in court on the issue of removal under section six zero nine so what those two petitions pending their position being it's necessary and the courts position being it necessary i don't see any reason to file a six ten petition to modify an agreement where we all agreed that you had to have a best interest the attempt to enforce this agreement meeting i don't think there's anything on the record about a for about attempting to mediate this issue i know that there were e mails and letters going back and forth correct and then there was they they sent notice and if you look at what mr culture did on july twenty first two thousand and ten after their first correspondence of may third two thousand sent mr coulter e mailed miss trinidad and informed her that are you not agree to move to california and if you look at the  back three years after the judgement is entered which means and it up being a two year drag out divorce case and a trial so it was five years down the road that at vatican time  they will allow miss trinidad to remove the case if the parties go through certain things such as mediation that's agreeing to something down the road regarding children's best interests and that's all we're concerned about here what does it mean says without any contest from the father as to that's true but it doesn't say without legal court either so there's a big difference but it never made a finding that this provision is in the best interests of the children it never made a finding in this remit and it never made a finding in the judgement which incorporated the agreement it was just attached here agreement so that so should the parties be encouraged as a matter of policy to in other words to settle in there when you're negotiating the dissolution sure  should the parties be encouraged to negotiate all these terms so they have less litigation them down the road you're always and that's one of the provisions in the statute to try and get matrimonial  parties to negotiate all the provisions of the agreement but there's a difference between negotiating something now that's in the children's best interest instead of just hoping and guessing what may be in the children's best interest five years from now there is a simple solution for this i said this is the first day in my opening statement for the here i said this many times why don't we just have a best interest hearing why are we guessing these  children we're dealing with here what are we doing going on with someone said six years ago it was so much time to do this i came in running into court in march the house was listed for sale even march first or march second march third i was in i didn't file a petition just modify visitation i want to petition to modify custody miss china dad was moving to california and we filed the petition modify custody contemporaneously with that petition for for injunction and then as the case played out when they fought those petitions for removal temporary which i don't understand to this day and permit which i certainly very well understand there was no need to file a petition for modification they were claiming by presenting those motions in my at least and the way the port was ruling that they had to have a hearing and we were entitled to a best interests hearing on removal those children are entitled to  needed protection was mr coulter's right to have parenting time with his children and that clearly ascertainable right is going to be severely restricted and was severely restricted and has been severely restricted by these children moving to california because if you look at the amount of time this man was spending with those children cub scout leader all the activities he was involved in he can't do that anymore and you know while mr coulter is losing out those children losing out too and that's the problem with this all you have do is have a best interest here it we wouldn't even be here if there had been a best this or a less we go on the abuse of discretion standard someone they don't like the best interest here but that's the issue court it's having the it's it's reversing now the preliminary injunction isn't it that which that's what you would be reversing because is is i read the order they didn't say go back and have a hearing i race they because otherwise if it was a new hearing you would think that the trial court would say one of my doing having a hearing until the supreme court chimes in on whether or not a preliminary injunction that the that the trial court abused its discretion when it denied petitioners request ripple in the range correct i don't see anything about having a new hearing here but i don't either and i never did it but they did it the judge didn't and that's what the judge said he was going to do and that's what we did is your public policy argument as as simple there should be vested interest hearings in these circumstances period i think you can't you know when you get an order like this and i'm not a judge but if i were sitting there i would have read it and i would have looked at it going i don't know about this i don't know whether or not i'm comfortable entering an order today allowing me removal potentially five years down the road because this was a complex property division case and i think that's something that i'm uncomfortable with doing and that is against public policy we can't preach a term and what's in the best interests of the children five years from now we should have a hearing at that time these are children these are real living breathing children that we're talking about let's not pre determined what's best for them now what's wrong with having the hearing all the litigation in this case and all the time that went by from march when we first came into late them started school in california in august we could have certainly done all the work had the six zero four p had everything i was asking for that since day one let's have that hearing they file their motions let's have that hearing it was sat if the court notices in june when we set this matter for a on june seventeenth after the denial of the injunction the matter was set for hearing in october then the appellate court came down so there was no need for hearing anymore by they didn't pursue that hearing maybe they should have pursued that hearing i don't know but the appellate court came down sent that back the mandate hadn't issued yet prior to october seventeenth but we have the decision from the court let's talk a little bit if i may about this injunction that i think we're here today i'm going to address one of the issues in the injunction likelihood of success on the merits and that issue also raises the sub issue of what is the status quo we're all familiar with the elements of an injunction a party seeking a status quo water does not have to establish that he's likely to succeed on the and what they've argued and they haven't argued today but it's in their brief what was the status quo at the time of the hearing they're saying as well she was anticipating a move to california i can't see how anyone can say that the two thousand and three as late as april two thousand and eleven miss trinidad was taking an exam for to get an illinois teaching certificate and again even as of the hearing there still weren't firm plans to move if you have a job she was staying with family she hadn't least an apartment or purchased a house and she hadn't enrolled the children in school so i believe the status quo was naperville but if the port looks differently if they look at this agreement as setting some status quo in two thousand and six for this remove will i think that judge braun put that to rest in his findings on the second he g when he said that after reviewing the jail report which recommended against removal and after removing the reviewing the six so for the report which recommended against removal it seems to me that this is no longer a close case on the issue of likelihood of success on the merits so however you want to say it if status quo is naperville we didn't have to prove it if we do have to prove status quo then i think judge braun made that finding and i think all you have to do is look at those two reports to impartial people who said no no removal it's not in the children's best interest don't amy trinidad herself realize that there was a need for a best interests hearing under six o nine because she filed a petition for one the court indicated that mr coulter would receive a stay in court on the underlying remov petitions and that there was a need for removal here in fact and i think the one part of this case that bothers me the most is when the trial judge even suggested to miss trinidad that she shouldn't go to california and i'll quote him probably the worst thing for everybody the children in the parties would be for the children to go out to california and then have to breed brought back next fall or winter and that was before the appellate court even rule we were all intice appending a best interest hearing when he was making those statements he thought it was close that was before he received the reports from everybody now it's not even you know according to and there has to be a six zero nine hearing everyone agreed to it was set for here and that has to occur prior if you look at illinois law you look at fisher versus waltrip and one of the cases prior to removing if you're if  there's a six zero nine hearing involved if it's required to have a six on one hearing you have to have that hearing prior to remove will so what i'm asking you justices to do is to  return to the status quo which i may add is naperville illinois not and please not southern illinois not central illinois even though it's beautiful was a beautiful drive down here not southern illinois or central the status quo was naperville she certainly receives enough money and support to afford to live there until we have a best interest hearing and let the cards fall where they may at that hearing thank you very much let me if i could please clarify the procedural aspects with the public court at the conclusion of mr body resting his case in chief in the motion for plumeri injunction we made a motion for directed finding that motion for directed finding was granted by the trial court that's the issue that went up on appeal when the appellate court order excuse me when the public court entered they had to order the stay after diane directed verdict say if it's denied defendant gets to go on and put on their case initial order they just outright reversed and remanded without giving us the opportunity to put on any evidence at all that was i believe procedurally improper i filed a motion to reconsider saying essentially you know we get to put on court order made it clear that they were the only way in their opinion that amy coulter can go to california is if in this proceeding she has an order permitting removal but gave no weight at all to the to the previous to the joint parent to either enter the preliminary injunction is they indicated they should in the order i mean they go through the elements i can see your position that it was based directed fine and you didn't get to put on your prove but again we get back to this a status quo issue from my perspective the status quo all is changed by the plumeria junction because the status quo changes the legal rights of the parties the status quo  court to establish the status quo in essence is if we live in a world without no laws there are no court orders there are no well there are no rules they see no difference between any having a valid judgment that says she can go and any having nothing and frankly the appellate court saw saw no difference in there or between amy having a court order and a me having nothing and that to me is not correct i don't think it's their physical location that matters it's their legal status i think that's the most significant point and in terms of consuls point that that we made this this agreement was entered five or six years ago and it involves children you know people agree to custody an infant that involves the next eighteen years of their life there's nothing wrong with people agreeing that this is going to be good for our children now this will be good for our children we believe in the future and again we're not suggesting that can't be modified or they can't be changed we're suggesting that the statute provides the methodology to change that so to me that it was five years ago ten years ago really is no different then people are going to cost the educational decisions medical decisions for their children to could last a lifetime  there is a methodology in the law to modify a court order and we think that we think that's six ten in terms of corruptible harm it was it was foreseeable meaning that mr coulter agreed to it it's hard for us to believe that you can agree to something and then and then say when the time comes to perform that it's up prejudicial and the other point i think that needs to be made is that there is no question that when moves children across the country it impacts the relationship the children have with the parent that doesn't remove i mean that's the difficulty in all removal cases that's why the law provides that the issue is whether or not you can has with his children or any party has with their children then you get into perhaps an issue of an irreparable harm but to make a blanket statement that says any time you're going to impact the relationship the camp or remove all  argument on status school isn't that the situation and you know every preliminary injunction where someone is trying to enforce what they say is a right that they have under a contract or an agreement that they can do something but isn't the status quo the actual physical facts that are in existence at that time that's being maintained couldn't wouldn't would that argument apply to every situation the status quo you've got a right to do this notion though he didn't do it until the court says otherwise i think the distinction is the court or coulter brought the issue in court via his poem or injunction hearing we did file at that point for temporary removal we did not file before hand when the temple removal petition we argued the joint parenting agreement and said you need six ten b to get out of it we were just  objection everybody's on board she leaves i don't think the court i don't think the law would require somebody to affirmatively come in file a petition cetera et cetera when there's already an agreement in a court order but she did file this after the issue was yes after the player injunction hearing started after the post agreed litigation started on the injunction we did have mr coulter not brought any litigation we were not because we already had from our perspective on order permitting permitting her to go mr ruber to follow up on justice tice's earlier question about the procedural posture how it may or may not impact your stiction he have mentioned there was a december fifth period that was and will county yes or there's not been any other peri since then only on on related issues persist stuff procedural but no ok but december fifth you filed if i've got this correct you found the p l a three days later on december eighth right and we would have acted on it even if we did act on it and january be the earliest wall and then the ruling from the court came out before the end as somebody thinks somebody said it was december twenty second is that right which ruling from the oh i thought maybe justice tice it quarrel with what happened with the woman or injunction however you mentioned earlier that the appellate court misconstrued in in their particular opinion they misconstrued the fact that you know there was a direct you know a motion for a directed finding you don't get to put on any proof reading but you probably don't have any quarrel mean there's no cause for this court to look at that aspect of it because the trial judge did have a hearing right correct a judge didn't rule no the judge tried to convince her to go in a in like a informal conference with the attorneys in the parties on the try to convince her to go to california because that was the only order of court at the time and she's fourteen or thirteen yes for thirteen or fourteen and she refused in is judge brown said he wasn't going to force her on the plane and that's the answer as to why one child said thank you thank you case