may please the court steve city for the petitioners i hope the the supreme court has repeatedly made the point that every day of custody has constitutional significance this case involves the st step x amendment and clarification of the good time credit statute that credits are earned it fifty four dollars days for each year of the term of imprisonment with the extra seven days per year the petitioners here would be released weeks earlier with their than their actual projected or actual release dates the petitioners are requesting that the court consider the amendments and be the attlee affected effective in the absence of a clear statement from congress that this amendment was meant to be delayed alternatively the delay unrelated to good time credits the additional time of custody resulting from the delay would violate due process and equal protection because it's unrelated in any way to the length of the delay here up to two hundred and ten days for the risk needs assessment that has nothing to do with good time credits the supreme court has held that the latest fact to date depends on a clear statement and in the text of the st well the question was whether this subsection me is yes on the statutory and whether whether it refers to the entirety of this section for the earned credit times which have nothing to do with good time credits they are similar phrases but one whether identical phrases no no earned time credit is no no i mean this subsection that phrase yes and if so those twelve times that it's used is referring to this subsection as subsection twelve we are not saying that there is not that this subsection cannot be viewed in different ways but what we are saying is that it requires construction to decide which of those constructions is correct and looking at the basic rules of statutory construction involving context involving the light the where the statute is located but most critically the coupling of this subsection with the risk and needs assessment is in the effective date they're saying it's connected to the delay is connected to the risk and needs assessment that only has to do with subsection g it has nothing to do with the good time credits under subsection b and therefore i think that the reasoning also avoids the total illogic of having this st then then then group of people who just happened to be have their projected release dates during the time between the time the statute was and acted on the st of december and the july th when two hundred and ten days finally expires that those people are serving time that they don't need to serve there's no rational reason for that and if we were to conclude that the wording of the section is not ham big us and i know you disagree with that but if we were to include that what difference to the policy arguments make in other words whether it makes good sense or it doesn't if it were clear that we would have to enforce even if it's nonsensical from your perspective correct i think there is a doctrine of statutory construction that this court has adopted that says that we avoid absurd results in construction but i don't think it's not absurd necessarily just because we think there's a better policy now where that's i do not think that it's a matter of better policy it's one that has no rational connection and that gets to the if the court is to were determined that the that there is no other construction and that there is a clear statement then we would go to the constitutional question and the constitutional question is one of equal protection and due process where the delay additional time in custody could be weeks could be months of time in prison is basically for no rational reason even if there was some modicum of delay that would be appropriate why two hundred and ten days wh to a program that there has been absolutely no connection drawn to the good time credits it's utterly irrational even with the generous rational relation test there's no reason for that degree and i w suggest there's no reason for any delay whatsoever this isn't a surprise to anybody the bureau of prisons from two thousand and thirteen has been saying we want this legislation in effect now congress has not been able to get to it yet until finally under center st but it's not like that the executive branch wasn't in charge of the timing they knew that it was coming it's the simplest calculation you can think of mark walker the person who received a order from the judge saying recalculate the good time credits under the pursed up act if you look at the release date in the inmate locator from your prisons it is the same date february th as the judge signed the order it wasn't for release it was for recalculation they recalculated it like that is the simplest mathematical formula you can think of and it only applies to people who are facing immediate release when the bureau of prisons saying we have one hundred and eighty thousand people sure but how many people do you have that are coming up for release within a year of   st very few and they have massive ability to make those very simple calculations and they had plenty of warning because it's their legislation cathy i just want to understand the practical effect of the argument today so today is july th yes it is and the act and i know you've been pushing this case as best as you can i we appreciate that but the act i think it's undisputed if you agree with the government's view of the case july th is when this was all kick in correct yes so what is the practical effect on the petitioners that you represent between us deciding in your favor between now and july th or just july one thousand pounds worth of all i think that one of the lessons that we can take from a case called court t crabtree in which the this panel of this court determined that the bureau of prisons was over incarcerating what they did was they ordered the relief on that day with the opinion following about five or six weeks later and that's the case that it's ninety six dash three hundred and sixty two to six in the docket number seventeen to join the court ordered the relief immediately so some of our clients the other all of them would be potential beneficiaries because they would be able to file under three thousand five hundred and eighty three dollars easy the statute related to modifying terms of supervised release in the interests of justice and t court has a well the stablished jurisprudence on that being a potential remedy a rd thing to keep in mind is that in past cases where your prisons policies have been declared unlawful by this court i think if davis downey errington crick and court the bureau of prisons issued an operations memorandum for the night circuit and so for at least those people there was remedy for beyond just the petitioners and i know that the court requested supplemental briefing about mootness and right yes i hope that the briefing that has been has answered any questions along those lines but i'm prepared to address those also i don't have any questions one other case that the court that the government has been relying on is navarro a case involving a delay for the implementation of a retroactive amendment and as we pointed out in our briefing that case is completely distinguishable and for a number of reasons that in that case the sentencing commission itself articulated the reasons for why there would be a delay wh involve the potential reduction for years of time involved the filing of a subsequent sentence motion in the district court and it would require the district court to apply three thousand five hundred and fifty three dollars a factors none of that is here this is strictly a complete mathematical computation that happens in very little time but most distinguishing is the fact that here the statute includes an affirmative rationale as tying in prison for no reason when everybody else is a retroactive statute this is it applies to everybody and there is this just this tiny group of people that are being required to serve weeks and months more than any logical statute would require and unless court has other questions i'll reserve men you morning may please the court jared here on behalf of the united states this case raises the basic question of statutory interpretation the district court got it right and this court should affirm the st that act uses dependent on one another earning that's correct your honor they're not dependent but they are related in that and whether this works what's the policy rationale if any for delaying the good time changed it from parole and probation and to a supervised release situation but isn't that a lot more complicated than just figuring out the number of days that was more complicated but i would push back on the assertion that the only impact of the bureau of prisons is correcting algorithm or a sentence formula now that's a necessary prerequisite but eighteen u s c three thousand six hundred and twenty four dollars includes a host of obligations the federal government has when it releases a prisoner it's got to coordinate with supervised release it's got to confirm a prerelease custody location whether that's a residential reentry said i was things changed with this statute those obligations haven't changed but increasing the release date of several one hundred in we have on spoke to the o p s deputy counsel last week and there's three thousand five hundred inmates who are due for is the correct day so if it were earlier than that what is that number of people that the record shows would be affected we don't have that in the record but it would be less than the three thousand five hundred percent but it would be of clothing of a stipend of transportation sub eve requires coordination with supervised release service sub sea requires ordination and confirmation of a home confinement pla all of these statutory provisions have with them a corresponding program statement from the bureau of prisons that lays out the burden on the on the bureau and we believe that those are subject to judicial notice and the record itself is silent as to that burden but again under a rational basis or under just canons of statutory interpretation we believe that your honour's can take note of the obligations imposed by statute but instead of just clarifying this is a generic relation that they're both and one knows to be one i want to contrast the amendment and section six o two of the st act now that's an amendment to the exact same statute navarro say that when congress affirmatively chooses certain language in one place of a statute and not another that we assume that that's a deliberate choice now i want to make a couple of statements about the other two the effective date and the nd declares the amendments to be retroactive what's important here is that these two sub two and some three use the exact same language the amendments made by this  subsection petitioners to argue that the change to the good conduct credit is retroactive they can't do that if their interpretation of this subsection is accurate again we would read these subsections in pari materia so they have the same meaning we also think it's important that god bomb her ets which petitioners rely on interpreted the anti drug abuse act amendments section one thousand and four interpreted the phrase of this section and they interpret of the exact same way the government maintains in this case that this subsection refers to one thousand and four and nothing else not the whole anti drug abuse act and not some provision of the us code you can find further textual support in the st step back in section four hundred and one dollars now that changes the controlled substances substances act in two ways and then at the end it says the amendments made by this section shall be effective dot dot dot now that's clearly referring to the st step act because the amendment made are to two different statutes and so nowhere in the st step act does it use the phrase this section or this sub refer to the us code and i want to push back on petitioners argument that there are twelve instances of this section and ten to be that refer to the us code those aren't expressions of the  step act they are quoted provisions of the us code and as mentioned in our briefing of course that would refer to the us code because it's a quotation of what the us code is going to say everywhere that where the st act uses th the st act and so we think the language here is clear that congress intended to delay the effect of these amendments moving to the constitutional argument if your honor to have no other questions on the stat the law is clear that statutory classifications that don't implicate a fundamental right and don't implicate a suspect classification are entitled to a rational basis review and petitioners concede that rational basis  review is the standard that you all will employ today under a rational basis review they have to make eight every conceivable interpret every conceivable rationale for the statute in order to prevail and they have not done that  that it's simply absurd ignores the fact that with more than just a calculation fix there's a host of other requirements to actually implement the statute and we believe that the case law supports that as well every time there's been a change to credit calculations every time there's been a increased release of a prisoner that has been entitled to it has been a delayed statue that's a sentencing reform act and related statutes one of the reason why these amendments are related in a rational reason is that they operate on a continuum of release and the bureau of prisons application or computation of a sentence you have a term of imprisonment you subtract from that the credit for good conduct that and make can earn you subtract further from that the earned income credit that's created by sub section g and the risk and needs assessment system these are all on a continuum and so when petitioners claim that there's absolutely no relation or that it's absurd that these would be delayed together i think it ignores the fact that this all goes into one big computation puzzle that the bureau then implemented in order to calculate a release date and transfer inmates and prerelease custody whether that's a  or supervised release and hold them and leave home confined confinement moving to the clarification argument nothing in petitioners brief overcome th clear fact the fitzgerald which applies better to this case than either a b case c e o or the beverly community hospital those cases include an express statement of clarification intent and they expressly decided a circuit split in order to settle the law fitzgerald disagrees with those cases and says the clarification is actually a substantive change which is what the st step act amendments are they in effect change the state of law as decided by barbour v thomas that's what distinguishes this case from a b k c e o and from beverly community hospital is that we don't have a circuit split here and we don't have an express clarification i don't think congress could even overrule the supreme court's interpretation if they wanted to they had to change the statute and that's what makes it a substantive change not entitled to immediate  implementation the other basic distinguishing factor is that this case the st step act includes an express effective date that's in the future that didn't exist in either  o opinion or in beverly community hospital it did exist in the fitzgerald case which was i'm interpreting the amendments to the interstate land sales act and without it there are no other questions let's make five points your honor st there's been no showing that anything the late is needed and the reason is that the again they've had the pure prisons has had total control over when the statute was going forward they've known when it got through the house they know when it got through the senate and there's been plenty of time to do any type of preparation and remember the release planning for those who are eligible for pretrial custody which is less than half all that have started thirty months before release and under the program statement so what we're talking about is a minor tweak of when they start their release programming that has already been prepared so in terms of what we're looking for in terms of a clear statement there's no clear statement that applies here and there's no rationale that would require it to be tied especially tied to a system that has nothing to do with good time credits nd the government makes an argument i'm glad that we're getting to statutory construction about in part metairie and my response on that would be to barber in barber the same phrase term of imprisonment was in the same sentence of the statute but what the court did in barber was they looked to the statutes in basic purpose they looked to jury objective and they looked with context to decide that there's that phrase had a different meaning in the same sentence out congress clarified that that was not the correct analysis but the statutory analysis by barbour completely contradicts the argument that the government has about imparting  materia rd where the gazan peretti has provided clear direction to congress that is the only time that we delay the effective date and that hasn't occurred here again the we're looking in gaza in peru adds to the design of the statute as a whole and its object and policy again these are the types of that story construction in instructions that we are getting from the supreme court that i think guide the statutory argument here in favor of relief to be looking at it makes no sense to look at where the government is admitting twelve times that use the sex subsection that same phrase to refer only to subsection g and then they actually tie that this subsection to a risk needs assessment program that only relates to subsection g we have a lot of context we have a lot of policy and we have a lot of purpose that says this is should have been in effect immediately and on the roll out rational relation test yes it's a relatively forgiving standard but when we're applying a test we look to what is rational and that depends partly on what's the interest at stake we have here people who are sitting in prison for no good reason for weeks and months there should be at least some articulable reason that connects those two things to articulated by the agency and if not if we're just making it up what is the connection with a moving target it's up to two hundred and ten days to do the risk and its assessment that means that they didn't really care how long it was it had nothing to do with how long it took to implement the good time credits which could be done overnight it only had to do with a program that did take amount of time and if it took less time good was put into effect but it had nothing to do with good time credits they already