that there was exclusive rights to service these three subdivisions however section sixteen of that same contract he clears that that contract can never be construed or held case in the trilogy of all of that basically has a two step process one is not only is it your system will matter but is it something that the court can actually grant the relief that is requested and the contract doesn't grant that it doesn't commit them to grant the relief that his request goes so far as to say that because of the order and its interpretation of that ticket contract it is not moot because that declaration that it has exclusive rights or doesn't have this was right as the case may be has long lasting implications in essentially mean that any of those provisions in other words under the franchise agreement amran in exchange for being able to put their infrastructure in what would be the city right of way in the city of springfield i do not believe that a grandfather to not believe the terminate sense of the deep because it's like any other contract if there's a determination posit says these rights are granted for this specific period of time once those that period of time is over those rights go away and everybody's back to square however does create some publications with well i'm struck that let me go back this way with it the franchise agreement specifically provided rights to do certain things with on what was density on property not necessarily  annex property one way the other infrastructure was put into these other three subdivisions when it was not within the city limits so now you have a situation where infrastructure's been put in that if a structure simply subsequently or those territories or areas have subsequently been annexed and that was during the pendency of this contract so then what happens with the contract and so far as as an example the contract itself theoretically gave amran the right to the right that the city could not grant in the first place and that was the right to put stuff infrastructure on rights of way that didn't exist in the city they can one day in the future they mean an excellent piece of property so what you had in reality were the three subdivisions of concern is the fact that amran installed the infrastructure on the ground that was outside the corporate limits so there are structures there first then the city comes in an an under this ruling they're entitled to have that infrastructure of the customers to serve all of us and the avoiding of the contract if you will or the expiration of the contract may or may not and it probably does quite truthfully trigger some provisions about having to remove infrastructure and return the streets back to the way they were before the infrastructure was ever there that would include not only the infrastructure that is in the city limits before the  subdivisions but at least in theory the removal of the infrastructure that were in these three subdivisions as well none of which was provided for in this franchise agreement so the order itself creates some problems the utility company would have to get all of its equipment out of the ground and then the city if they wanted to provide service in other areas of the city proper i'm going to leave them free subdivisions out for right now would have to  either condemn the infrastructure that i am or have so that they would not disrupt service or install their own service after it's been torn out of the ground help me understand what happens if you  what happens next essentially what happens next is the statutory framework that has been put together between the electric suppliers act the electric service consumer choice and rate relief act the public utilities and us infrastructure out there they continue to provide a service or any alternative retail electric supplier to provide service and at the rate will be perfect for their choice law it was an acted in the summer of  that consumers and i'm sorry residential consumers had an easy media right to elect or make a change or modification of the distributor a generator as well as a supporter of electricity whereas the nonresidential customer under sixty had that two year hiatus and then had the election and they were saying it's basically understand tort construction guidelines see here this has to mean that because that the legislature was is in six b the word may continue to provide is actually the the word may is the verb and of course it means it's to be permitted to continue to provide that service this if you look at some paragraph six see that's where gas utilities are being natural gas service is being provided and the language in that is identical to six b with the exception of when you're talking about being able to continue to provide services to customers after an exception the only difference is is the leftward residential or the distinction between residential and nonresidential and if you go one step further and look at because you'll see that i believe it is six yes if he starts off with the exception of siding one seventeen dash one point one annexation that such language is not found in six b which deals with electrodes suppliers of electric suppliers of which hammond falls so clearly if the legislature wanted to give the residential customer that election they knew how to say they knew how to do it because it gave you they gave the court two examples of that one short a couple sentences down when they're talking about non residential customers and then eleven seventeen def seven point one where they specifically give the electric operative customer the election after it's been and so it's clear that the franchise agreement as well as a statutory framework coalesce to permit after an exception to the original letter supplier who's there to continue to supply those customers that existed at an but they can't extend unless don't have an opt out or an option the customers have an option not as to well let me back let me do it this way the customer has an option under the choice act and there the that went effect in december of sixteen to if the summer of ninety seven as to who the supplier is going to be but then that's different than decile best different than what we're talking about but under the choice act under both article sixteen of the public utilities act the city can be and is actually defined as being an alternative retail electric supplier or potential under such article seventeen they are exempted from that provision unless territory that they then become the alternative retails electric supplier to that particular portion so in other words by maintaining the status quo i reverse in the decision of the circuit  court would then be fulfilling the statutory framework that was meant to exist and does currently exist in its practice and would actually still fulfill the old terms of the franchise agree because if you look at the terms of the franchise agreement is even section nine you have to take into consideration that that was signed in october one thousand nine hundred seventy the choice act had already been passed was going to be effective some sixty days later that provision of the election as referenced in section nine of the franchise agreement coincides with the election that a customer any customer would have or any residential as would have under the choice  by making itself a choice yes or they could service but they could not generate electricity right and that's sort of right sure and if you want to assume all corpus here are different electric suppliers as opposed to generators that those customers in those subdivisions could choose any one of us to sell supply the service but what they do then is that supplier goes back to a generator and of course  generator of electricity sells the power to that supplier and as part of that they pay a fee to be able to transport it through lines of other people yours in this case office so which is why it's so r expect in two thousand and six to two thousand and eight area over several years so they were asking for a declaration that they had exclusive right to service all of those areas and that and i would also agree that they were asking for  the future right to service those areas are areas that were annexed you know the problem lies obviously with the future relief granted i don't know that the court could actually extended that far and the of award exclusive territories are monitoring the service areas of the utilities and i understand of course that the municipalities not governed by the illinois commerce commission however anytime there even under six feet as an example if there is a an agreement that gets entered into that requires the exclusive assignment or jurisdiction or transfer of the service area that has to go before the commerce commission and the commerce commission then can say under sixty a olive approval or no i won't approve it and the purpose of that of course is to sit here and make sure that all of the issues that arise from transferring a service area from one supplier if you will to another supplier or taking care of that means as an example under six a of once the vision of seventy that deals with making arrangements in the agreement for the purchase of the infrastructure that is already there or the transfer of that infrastructure or if the city wanted to bring somebody else in under a franchise agreement set of am providing for that other person to buy the infrastructure so that service isn't disrupted to the consumer and that's really the underpinning of all this is is the public policy of protecting the consumer not disrupting electric service and having the  transition so once you start talking exclusivity you have to go the end to the commerce commission first and we started a lot of cases of course it's sad even when you're the arms commission has determined that you know as little as three people transferred over under an exclusive agreement is subject to their regulation a determination as to whether or not it's proper and you know here you're talking about will subdivisions that are potentially getting transfer customer choice it comes back really to the silicone case and just to scream when you originally brought that up when a citizen an axis and they make up for a choice they're voting in to an extent to a city version of what they're seeing in most times oftentimes is ability to have the utilities those customers forever you're an extent you voted to be an extent you've made that decision now you think you're in and you say ok it's my choice then to choose do i stay with a hammer or go to the city this case the city of springfield i try to do that which  citizens did and says no no you don't have the right to do that you're ours you're always ours not perspire and that's where councils trying to just have a little bit of a sleight of hand so to speak that the supplier choice provider always stays  the point of that is simply such that the statutory system goes back into this faster interpretation of those code sections section eleven desh one seventeen dash six b in those two different sentences and it's is it is ridiculous it is to say because the court would not have reaffirmed silicone the very ruling we're seeking under if it statute no world somehow it didn't need to address the censored right they surely wouldn't have because what happens then is if the amarin statutory interpretation happens much of the language is gone and just simply says they'll have the right to serve and exclusive rights are and that's what the legislature would have simply say they would have used the maze and i  respectfully disagree and sense of because remember and when agree that may is optional when you talk about non essential it's only residential they say someone becomes a child and they gain that exclusive right to be the provider again it goes to the consistency of that agreement with the statute with the case law and in reading back the franchise agreement it is consistent with those sections and it's not an exclusive right to serve the franchise agreement does it have any effect on how we should address the appeal before so it should not it should not  honour's this is simply again about the right of citizens to make choice to rule as i am and seek you would be giving power to the corporation to hold hostage citizens who have an extent made voluntary choice to reason accent city provided services in these cases the three subdivisions in question i'm very familiar with the city provide services they are actually advertised with it's an excellent end you'll be able to have city services and as a selling point the reason bein place one of the types of it was one of the specific ones we're talking about here the subdivision you talk about here you can have certain areas there are served by sea develop in certain areas served by amarin jute very close by terms of where they're at power goes off big storm you know done of someone that or whatever might be and they'd look over the next day so it makes sense that they were worried about the sort of pace that could happen so they've created this to your buffer zone where they automatically keep them for two years and that huster of nonresidential can't appliance like two years yet that's the main a and maybe i'm digressing going off the reservation a little too much because this is actually not in the record why the developer why it was an extra wasn't an ex the statute that council doesn't want to address quite truthfully provides for the annexation what happens after we have excision he's trying to make an argument that well this may means permissive but this maybe just maybe needs shall are permitted and the shall mean shall and you've got to look at the sentences look at the structure nonresidential customer for a two year period it then goes on to say that during that two year period the nonresidential customer may seek permission from or may ask to change service to him in a civil provider so they can say that in that sense two lines down the legislature should have could have said it two lines up if they want to give that residential customer that same option they didn't want to give that option to the residential  read the utility in this case am or may continue to provide after annexation to residential customers they have to mandatorily do it for two years after the two years if the nonresidential customer does not make an election to change it may continue the maze mean the exact same thing amarin may provide the services are permitted to continue to provide the service there's actually a lot more choice under the choice act then what the city of springfield is alluding to they want to say that we're trying to do some sort of sleight of hand when the choice that one in effect and some group nine hundred ninety seven and one had to make a choice was it going to be a generator of power or was it going to be a supplier or a distributor and if i was appropriate paperwork and doesn't generate power they dish they supply power to customers residential and nonresidential springfield on the other hand is a generator and they impact sell power to the option that the state gets involved with that helps set rates and that generated powers and distributed through everybody's life be it how med people's gas or air the statutory framework is very consistent if these this court and quite perfect i would were close the court do in fact overrule the supreme court it would essentially be giving status it would follow the statutes and the only logical rational interpretation and application of the statutes where i am or is out asking for an exclusive right there is saying let me provide the service unless under the choice act there is an alternative retail energy supplier that is chosen by that customer it's still coming over my lines but that is separate apart from me supplying you or you or you as each of you would have a choice if you wanted another suppl and the city can sign up for it to be a on alternative supplier if they chose they don't want to do that they want to come in and build new lines take over distribution system sell it both as a generator and a suppl