very on behalf of the plants as the court knows this is our second the p o in this case and so i really want to start with what was what has always been the central issue in this case we brought this case because under hackler regulations the tenants are entitled to a year in advance notice when there's going to be essentially an adverse change in the way that their rent is works and their rent support works how was from day one the sole issue in the case and so our argument was that the tenants had a property interest in the unique circumstances here and because of the regulation the tenants had a property interest not only in their benefits but when you combine that with the regulations ensuring a one year advance notice before any change occurs if that property interest extended to advance notice a year in advance so the issue was whether or not for due process purposes the notice that was given was adequate judge move move against us on that issue and in the court of appeal decision the central and really the only issue was that it was the first notice because it was never in dispute that thirty days before the change actually occurred the tenants got a much more refined notice that notice told them exactly what was going to happen to their rent and it notified them that they had the right to hearing and to contest that that was thirty dave before the change occurred we never disputed that that was what occurred and our argument was that was always in adequate ed that they needed to give them the precise information our position before the for in the first appeal was not that they had to give them the precise information because we agreed that the precise information could not be calculated because the reduction in the ballots for payment stand it was not the only factor that goes into the final determination of brant our position was though that the notice that was given and the court of appeal in the first decision agreed the notice that was given our position was it was inadequate as a matter of law the panel disagreed and found that there were disputed issues of fact as to whether it was adequate but the point is that everybody understood that what we were challenging was that first notice that the the fact that the first notice was in comprehensible and did not meaningfully advise the ten that they needed to understand that at least all things being equal hafele was going to reduce its support for their rent payments which meant that all other factors the same they were going to have to pay more and the purpose of that advance notice regulation because when hackle it when it changes so that hakluyt increases valid for payment standard which means it's providing more support you don't have to give notice a year in advance you only have to give notice a year in advance when your reducing your support so the and the the history of the regulation when the when the regulation was adopted indicated that the purpose of that was so that the tenant could understand and prepare and in fact tackle in meetings below told the commission the housing commission that sort of oversees this that that was its purpose this is so the the first decision the panel decision decided that there were disputed issues of fact regarding the adequacy of that first notice we went back down and on the identical record literally the identical record there was no new evidence submitted by h whatever well we wanted to do discovery to be able to are on our end to be able to serve in new evidence which is where the rule fifty six d issue comes in because we weren't able to get we were still trying to get the computerized data on the i mean it is a basic basic position was i think that they were not supposed to consider the prior material only the regulation i'm not sure i understand your honor they did you think they should consider at this hearing what went on prior to the regulation prior to the receipt of donors and which hearing are you referring to one of the district court what are our position was that the the whole case was about whether or not due process was didn't think it was but based on the ruling from the ninth circuit which said that there were disputed issues of fact they were entitled to introduce their evidence of training but we were entitled to do discovery from the tenant's about the extent of that training the understanding all that they presented would have her to do that if they have introduced any evidence correct and they didn't introduce any evidence they introduced a declaration from somebody from hakka who said ten and get trained but the only specific thing he said was we had a handful of meetings and at in the record it shows that by their description one hundred  tenants attended these meetings out of forty one thousand notices that were sent so when you said there was no additional addition to the rectory you mean except for the affidavit you know that was in conflict with absolutely because the district court decision it's in conflict with it the district court decision says ok there's a mandatory duty but what it did was say the mandatory duty  was satisfied because you have to look at the whole process that what what the disc recorded in the second round was say we guard us and what the ninth circuit said you look at the whole process and relied heavily and i would say primarily on this thirty day notice but if that was the language in the ninth circuit decision said that the tenants were protected from an abrupt and unexpected change which was a proxy for argument that the notice said your chip you have to give them this information a year in advance so the abrupt and unexpected change is not protection from the regulation is not satisfied by hearing that basically on the eve of the change tells people what the change is going to be so  in answer to your question judge reinhart i think that judge will address the issue from the perspective that there was a mandatory duty but found just as he found with the  process going that the mandatory duty was satisfied based on the whole process i want to emphasize that if the whole process was relevant then the pan should have affirmed the first summary judgment because we never contested ever that that first that the thirty day notice occurred it it it it was it satisfy due process that had told people the right to the hearing so the issue in the appeal always was it's the first notice that the first notice have to be on its own because it's intended to ensure that people get it in vance notice so that they can prepare do you judge this based on that no there's an if that notice did not satisfy due process do you have a  process violation but in in the the nosy one case the court the panel did direct a district court to apply the math these factors test to determine what process is due and was that what the district court did in fact concurrence give the discourse specific that remand was proper but that's really not factually correct in terms of the record we conceded that from the beginning of the case it was always conceded that notice was put in the in the record in the undisputed facts submitted by hakka and we did not dispute it so it was always there what judge so in my view the concurrence if not consistent with the decision that the tenants are protected from an abrupt and unexpected change that thirty day need vance notice does not protect them from an abrupt and unexpected change which the panel held that under the regulation to take the language of the panel decision because it's a very short decision when you read the briefing the argument was that led to this abrupt and unexpected change language which does not occur exist in the regulation what exists in the regulation was you're entitled to notice at that the second what's called the second annual reexamination because the way that it works is their annual sort of examinations of your benefits and so therefore the the panel used shorthand for that but you can only make sense of the panel decision that it was referring to that regulation because that's the regulation that was at issue that's the regulation that created the interest in the abrupt and unexpected change from in answer to your question judge do the it's not totally clear what the panel had in mind but mathews as a general proposition is basically something that says that there's flexibility we agree that there's that this was an unusual situation there's no hearing required that the direction to apply matthews can't be read that matthew could be applied in such a way as to undermine the first decision because the first decision was you must give them adequate notice in advance and if you don't you got it there they said there were disputed issues of fact about the due process violation so our to the way that we've always interpreted that language which i agree is somewhat hard to grasp because the the district court would have to determine the process but that doesn't change the fact that the district court could undo what the circuit court did in finding that the issue was the first notice and that there were disputed this is a fact about whether that was adequate exceeds a court panel said there was a mandatory duty to whether up of loose bridge boy this garden smith for the housing authority of the city of los angeles the threshold issue raised by the plaintiffs in their briefs and alluded to here is the effect of the law of the case doctrine and let me quote briefly from this court's decision in thomas versus bible authored by judge reinhardt as to what this doctrine requires under the doctrine a court is generally precluded from reconsidering an issue that has already been decided by the same court or a higher court in the identical case moreover under the law the case start for in one panel of court will not as a general rule reconsider questions which another panel has decided in a prior appeal in the same case for the doctrine to apply the issue in question must have been decided either opinion in the majority is read carefully it's merely decided that the trial judge heard the first time in failing to apply the matthews factors and basing his decision on your own yes reasoning which was the absence of proper in the interest and so the the key portion of the majority opinion in when then gives the scope of the re man makes this point clear on page four what process is due to protect planes as well settled property interest in their section eight benefits is controlled by the factors set forth in mathews versus eldritch in the citation the pondering mounts the district court shall apply the matthews factors to the here presented and the circumstances here presented are the statements of undisputed material fact produced by both sides which revealed the circumstances of the two notices involved in this case and if you continue reading that paragraph the panel in no he won also indicated that morrow but given the district courts recognize that quote the consequences of a certain reduction in benefits to section a participant could be potentially devastating unquote there exists a genuine issue of material fact as to whether hecla notice sufficiently protected plaintiff's property interests in the us and then the the district court was ordered to and there look at the facts under the mathews guidance factors that guide the determination and and the reference to the issue i think should be understood as a mixed issue of fact in law for the court to decide once the facts are determined and here as judge who found on  there was no material dispute in the facts that he accepted the statements of undisputed material fact of both sides and then examined the matthews factors and found that they were satisfied can draw all the inference is in favor of the plaintiff regarding whether that notice tells you that your contribution to rent is going to have to be increased and the district is regulatory process which it refers to both notices or if the question is did they get a year's notice it can be that what you kill them the month before gives them a year ago  they had a get together under the regulations they get a year's notice of the possibility that there will be a change depending on the circumstances and that that's a you can argue that people who are an educated poor mentally disabled would not understand from that notice the rent is likely to be reduce address the question of what evidence would injured his view but not the view of the past of course however the majority did not say what evidence could be considered and the not just the components of it depends on what you're looking for if you're looking for to answer the question were they told or here an event you can't look at what they were told a month and well  if they were told a month before they would they are not entitled to a year's know those of of what the reduction if any will they because it's the that depends on a lot of factors which  individual as specified but they do process does not depend on the regulations it depends on the constitutional notice of the of the notice notices and together they were sufficient and then but one what's your understanding as to what what they were required to do a year in advance only what the regulations said and only what was done th ey have to be notified that that there may be an adjustment in approximately a year but it won't take effect for a year and and if the adjustment is in the cordons with the  deceased housing authority decisions and the statutes and so forth and regulations that's what they were required to be notified and work and then the second notice completed the process engaged thirty days and that's here they read the requirement of notice no but in that case there was no regulation that we quire years notice that by the regulations is not required years notice of what the just learned if any will be but only that there might be an adjustment in this as the record shows only about half of the refit beer instead of this program were had and experienced a reduction because that depends on individual factors such as income that my chang's family size that might change if for the new child is born or if one leaves home in all these other individual factors and that's what the hearing is they're entitled to they get thirty days rather than the ten days as in row such and and the basic point as a judge will sound is that if you look at you you don't you don't consider the regulation but consider the whether you get advance notice and the right to be heard and that's was afforded here and by the second from the federal claims says as a judge will found that if there is no said room violation then there are no less independent state claims and the the for this proposition is the guzman versus county of monterey case where these california supreme court unanimously refused to find a mandatory because the this record correctly found that that that that notice was given but then they the that decision if you look only at the first notice then if that decision violated the federal regulation it might of violate the the state's mandatory duty provision they governs public employees but the deuce mon yes and the reference to the word notice refers to the to the whole process and not only to the first notice and that that was  dotage no because the two cannot be considered in isolation as the willis case another authority cited in our brief indicates that one has to look at the entire  notice process to determine whether that violates the constitution and if it violated the federal constitution it would also violate the state statutes will resolve it that you look at the state claims as derivative from the federal claims and then if the federal claims do not stand which he found that they do not because there was full you we've said we give you too many so let me go quickly on my suppose a concession of ambiguity what i said was that the courts reference to matthews was ambiguous i don't think that holding that the key issue was the advance notice and that there were disputed facts and that was ambiguous the willis case involved yes it did involve using other materials all of which were provided at the same time it did not involve a case where it was an eleven month separation and not involve a case where you were guaranteed notice at a certain point in time ro e was about whether or not congressional congress had to give advance notice when it changed the law which is different from agency implementation show the line of cases about the congressional discretion have nothing to do with this case our basic position is that whatever had to be communicated at a minimum it had to be communicated that  the change in regulation meant that hackle was going to contribute less of rent and all things being equal that meant the tenants were going to have to pay more that's pretty simple and straightforward it doesn't require knowing the  precise result in any individual case eight fifteen point six speaks for itself the panel clearly held that the regulation was violated which