we request that this court reverse the appellate court's determination that the wrongful death and survival claims predicated on the domestic violence act and asserted on mary when he sees behalf can proceed past the dismissal stage the trial court as this court is aware of planted the palatine defendants section two six one nine eighty nine motion to dismiss those claims predicated on the twelve immunity act that ruling was correct and should be reinstate i think it's important at the outset of the argument to note that this court need not determine whether section four one zero two and four one of seven of the toward immunity act take precedence over section three zero five of the domestic violence act this court already did that in more and more is not outcome determinative of this case for that reason instead the issue here is whether section three zero five of the domestic violence act applies at all if it does not and it does not here particularly where the palatine defendants are concerned section three o five of the domestic violence sac provides for a limited immunity limited liability where police act willfully and want only in rendering emergency assistance or otherwise enforcing the spoke as to right that phrase as used in section three all five of the act means the palatine defendants would submit that that phrase is found in section three zero five means responding to a domestic violence call investigating the violation of a protective order the analysis of how we get there is through looking at the cases that interpret through to will two of the twelve i'm the unity act here the palatine defendants were neither responding to a domestic violence call and more investigating the by a relation of the protective  complaint that contemporaneous to our investigation a protective order had been violated there was one protective order that remained in a fact at the time of our investigation further nothing that the palatine defendants did was consistent with the duties and numerated in section three zero four of the act we have to look at three zero four three act as well as three o five that that section of the act provides that an officer who has reason to believe that a person has been abused neglected or exploited shall immediately use all reasonable means to prevent further abuse neglect or exploitation some of those means include the arming a perpetrator that transporting a domestic violence victim to a medical facility or to a court if necessary providing a victim with social services information accompanying the victim to his or her home to retrieve their belongings or actions are not consistent with those duties is not present here another reason another bases for which this court can find that the palatine defendants were not otherwise in forcing the act is that way c was outside the palatine abused neglected work spoiled it and that a police officer shall immediately take necessary measures if you will to prevent further abuse neglect and exploitation there's a sense of the wor immediate appears in the statute and there there is a proximity if you will between when the officer has reason to believe that a person has been abused neglected and exploited and i guess when the officer learns of those acts in relation to when the acts actually occurred and here we don't have that what the point if the same is that there is a history here of protective orders being  violation of a protective order and now it's what makes this case different from the other cases that this court has decided the palatine defendants weren't investigating the violation of a protective order and they weren't responding to a domestic violence call and absent that they can't be held to have been otherwise enforcing the act as referenced in the statute well you see was importantly outside of the palatine defendant's territorial jurisdiction neither were you seen or serco would been palatine palatine is only connection to this is that because i will practice or to whom mr serco made comments had an office in palatine jurisdiction if you will because they also got the good one v police department involved that's where ms lee see with it not in our interest stiction the allegations to the effect in the complaint that  repeatedly called the police departments between october and december of two thousand and four is also something important and something that i suspect my opponent will emphasize before the court today but it's important to look at the substance of those allegations and what's being pled as to what the conversations the substance of the conversations were as between way seeing the police department ms lisi requested that the police either a westminster's  were promised the protect or provide the protection that they had promised her importantly neither of those things is required under the act arrest is not mandatory and could be act and ms le to the police department don't transform all conduct in our dealings with her as to being something that's governed by the act the other important point to note is that our investigation ended in october we certainly can't be held to have been otherwise enforcing the act at the time of the murder or some two months later and again there was nothing no car no activity to suggest that there was a violation of the protective order in that two month time that would have triggered the duties under the act the point of would have to be the case but just because lacy had been the recipient of protective orders in the past and there was a protective and in a fact during the relevant time period that our dealings with lacey are automatically governed by the domestic violence act respectfully that's not with the domestic violence act and there are preconditions to the application of section three or five in section three or four of that act that aren't present here in this case the result for which the palatine defendants advocate here also makes sense from a public policy standpoint detriment of their own citizens this is an instance where resources are spread too thin these public policy arguments which were brought out in moore and the court found to ring hollow don't ring hollow here if you consider that the domestic violence act does not apply and with that i will turn over the remainder of the appellant's argument absent any questions from the court to my codefendant representing the village  mr chief justice your honour's counsel the please the court richard statins and behalf of the glenview defendants i'm not going to repeat anything the counsel said but i'd like to do this i'd like to focus on that phrase enforcing act because that's the legislative key to this issue i would analogize it to the language in section two days to zero two of the tort of unity act which is that a police officer is on routine patrol for example the statute does not apply the standard is ordinary negligence when he starts to respond to some kind of a police call and goes to the city makes an investigation he's an gage when he leaves that city that's the end of engaged in the force and of the law up until it was quite specific in an aisle it was believed that well police officers are the team to be on duty twenty four hours a day and therefore the police officer and it was clear in moore and callaway the other two cases that came before this court one last year was the last year the year before in the other when in one thousand nine hundred six under the domestic violence act where the court had a situation where law enforcement officer comes to the scene of the mess that violence he's there he's outside and he doesn't do anything but he's there outside that's just like the police officer who goes to the when they went to see her at her house if they knew that there was an order of protection in effect and they saw her at her house but and that's in october the event here the tragedy of the death of mar doesn't occur until two months later and what the plaintiff seeks is to have the enforcement of the domestic violence act the enforcement of this act continue for that entire two months now there's good reason for the legislature to have passed the law and who phrased it as it did because the experience was police officers would go to the scene of a domestic violence call and they would say i remember myself doing a police ride a long way back in law school and they would say oh it's just a domestic and they go away exactly what the officers did in moore and cali but that's not what happened here when the  response misters i think the argument made by mr mcallister is the act of omission is not arresting verco based on knowing what they knew and i think that ms meant it wall indicated that they did have a duty to arrest is that your we could not to rest unless we had probable cause and then the statute further gives us police discretion whether to a restaurant and your way says we couldn't we  it's it's a close question it's a close question at that time but i think if we look at it back in with the benefit of hindsight we all wish that that's what had occurred but i think the police were acting in good faith was it the gladioli palatine police or both mission it made i don't what you'd call it at least a statement that they would protect protecting eventually that promise that's alleged in the complaint to protect the victim comes under forty one zero seven one zero two zero one zero seven of the toward immunity act it's a promise to make an arrest it's a promise to solve a crime it's a promise to provide adequate police protection and it's immunized is that any part of the domestic violence there's no statement about anything in the domestic violence act about the promise the promise doesn't give rise to conduct here because this falls under failure to solve a crime failure preventing crime failure to make arrest and so on but that alleged crime if it doesn't create liability under s i think we should start just with this notion about we're all in agreement we're not all in agreement by any stretch of the imagination that the omission on the part of the police departments and their respective  officers would be subject to the tort of unity act there's been a significant softening of the defense position from their path from the court of appeals to your honor's and now they are basically recognizing clearly that more controls with regard to the provisions of the domestic violence act and its duties and obligations upon these police officers this court in more of course has recognized the special character of the domestic violence cases in the duties imposed upon the enforcement officers in the municipalities this is not a case about a limited period of time that is not what is intended by the statute this is more about the enforcement of the act the domestic violence act and the protection of mary lacy in the in a course of conduct in this court has found in those two zero two cases that in more particularly in a domestic violence act callaway course of conduct is involved in in force moment of the act this act goes well beyond helping victims of the preamble of that act and the special character of this act is no stranger to this court and there's very good sound public being made aware of an abusive act as those terms are defined and i'll come to the specific definitions in a moment take immediate use all reasonable means to prevent further abuse they must arrest the abbrev user where appropriate in this case there was sufficient probable cause for them to arrest him for a violation of the domestic but act and based upon the the facts as a what is properly played in the complaint that it had a right to arrest and to further protect or from october the twenty i feel really from when we first learned of it october the fourteenth until the time of her death in this case the facts are presented in the complaint that repeated calls were made for her protection and so if if  that they didn't have probable cause for an arrest on the solicitation for murder but they're certainly under the definitions relating to what constitutes abuse behavior harassment intimidation and those particular  well one one is alleged to have solicited the murder of a person or to find someone to break through either kill her or to be hired to kill her that would constitute in at a honor i think that the i think that if if it constitutes one of the definitional sections of abuse threat of physical force which is presumed to cause emotional officers both of palatine in the glenview police officers which came to her home and that's really the distinguishing factor here i said i suspect the whole notion of this timeframe is what's really troubling this court and perhaps is the reason that you granted the the petition but in this situation the distinguishing factor in this case and the reason that the court of appeals got it right is that the defendants failed in their burden to come forth with any evidence they have the ever they have the burden to come forward with regard to the proof o immunity and more particularly the court found that the i lost my train of thought i apologize  that the duties were zero day and that they were breached to her because of the undertaking undertaking the promise made a photo of it by the police department to protect her counsel suggested here which group which obviously shows the question of fact found that she was requesting this protection the facts celestion the complaint is that the promise was made by the police departments the palatine and the one view police departments of their officers that they would provide her with protection there's no duty written into the act but when the officers come to the home in the face of the victim and the family and make that promise they create an undertaking what level of protection do you think i was  promised to provide her with twenty four hour surveillance then there are also on the allegation a complaint that says she knew protection was not in provided she was concerned that she wasn't being protected she was called according to the allegations of the complaint calls were made to insist upon the protection that had been provided and those those are well ploughed facts in this complaint the burden is on the defendant to come forward with the proof of the immunity and they failed to do so and i think an analysis of the court of appeals decision on this point is is telling the questions of fact that the court of appeals found on each and every issue the court found specifically that each element of the ac what facts did the court find to be material genuine issues of fact persisting whether the due tenants are guilty of willful and wanton conduct is purely a question of fact that's at page seventy three whether the defendants had probable cause to arrest  and arrest him on a violence act claim the defendant's claim there was no probable cause but they failed to satisfy their burden showing what their investigation ruled out with regard to probable cause page seventy four of the opinion question a fact is the circumstances of the promise of protection and surveillance page seventy four the defendants argue here that their promise expired by the date of the murders there was no event but on the evidence presented by the defendants or the officers who made the promise there is no evidence in this case to show a limitation was intended or conveyed whether the investigation was sufficient to avoid a finding of willful and wanton conduct page seventy four there's a complete failure of proof by the defendants they did not describe the extent of their as to the whole temple major argument how how does this case fit within the patterns of more and you know well first of all there there is an event that's occurring in october and it's clear in a few the court really i think as much as it took its direction from more callaway more being really setting that in place that how the exception of unity applies and then callaway looks at the course of conduct what is the enforcement of of the law in this context of domestic violation protection and that is a course of conduct over a period of time albeit five minutes an hour snead is the case i think that the court court appeals look at very closely and that has a seven day timeframe and that's that's a week and in this situation if you look between october the fourteenth when they begin their investigation and they had evidence from chiropractor and the twenty second when they supposedly completed the investigation and which they and thankful to inform mary that it had been concluded they failed to inform her that they were no longer providing protection they failed to perform to advise her that they were no longer surveilling and they failed to perform or the she had a right no sir i'm not i'm saying that there was a duty to arrest in this instance because that would have been an immediate response of all reasonable means they promised for the protection and they promised for the surveillance that's the overriding distinction here if that right is the distinguishing factor of the promise made on the facts as alleged by the department they didn't have to make a promise they didn't have to agree to the surveillance they did it and if they chose to stop they had an obligation to tell her so that she could have a reasonable opportunity to protect herself that makes the distinction here the undertaking in this case is the is really the hallmark as to why this case should not cause your honour's difficulty with regard to the temporal element if the legislature had intended there to be a temporal element they would have said so they did not and this court has clearly indicated there through more and callaway that certainly the enforcement can be of course  to inform when the investigation is over that the duty that was breached here that's one of the duties as bridge here yes or and there is a duty yes seven fifty zero c f sixty three zero four b they had an obligation to tell her when they enclosed this investigation that the crew criminal charges could be filed and that they could they were obliged to provide a specific time and place for meeting with the state's attorney's office or other representative to pursue that should that be her choice be at this their mission here in the context of the facts of this case and the promise that they made based upon the well pled facts creates questions of fact your honor just as the court of appeals found and i respectfully request that you just a few brief points counsel was asked how this case fits within the fact patterns of murrin callaway in the simple answers that it does not in more the domestic violence act was implicated because of the nine one one call me to the police there's a rendering of emergency assistance in callaway there were ports of violations of protective orders that's where the domestic violence act came into play in that case counselor also reference need and i point out that in that cain says well there were reports repeated reports of violations of protective orders chiropractor was not in violation of a protective order i think that's what's being asked and i answered that question would be no counsel points to the definitions of abuse and harassment and interference with personal liberty but there are important conditions within those definitions for something to constitute harassment and therefore be thought to be abuse as used in section three zero four of the act there has to be a causing of emotional distress it was pointed out by one of the trust a sister of today that absent the police telling ms lisi about this right she knew nothing it was on but no one's to her it hadn't caused her emotional distress it's a rebuttable presumption in the definitions the same is true with the interference of personal liberty under that definition  altered her course of conduct and when the police first alerted her to the plot there was no report yes i've noticed that mr circles following me or he's called my house and threatened me threatened my children  ever in a position to do on ms lee c s b half the army in the perpetrator taking her to a medical facility explaining to her the need to preserve evidence that's not the  situation i think your honor scan as as you did in morocco and obviously there was a stress upon the legislative intent to the domestic violence act how important today is that particular piece of legislation to recognize the seriousness of domestic violence but in a case such as this where the domestic violence act doesn't apply and section three o five is not triggered because there is either not a green doing of emergency assistance  in forcing the act were not at all detracting from the purposes behind the legislation again in this case is not more there is no agreement here amongst the parties that more controls in fact we've argued and i don't know how much had to prove a munity the defendants had to prove their immunity under for going to unfurl one of seven of the tort immunity act rather than examining whether in fact the domestic violence act applied at all we submit it does not and we ask