protect children who have a country of high pitch will residents from the harmful effects of wrongful removal from that country in this case however the convention was applied to separate two year old a m t from her mother the only if there is no actual agreements between them tellingly neither tag leary nor the united states defends the six circuits of betrayal residence and would they instead urge this court to adopt and a more all relevant circumstances inquiry but in cases involving infants the foreign jurisdictions on which tag larry and the united states rely actually apply a different a bitch will residence standard that standard focuses on the primary caregivers connections to the country of removal a far more appropriate inquiry ultimately however under any of the competing definitions of habitual residence and standards of review the outcome of this case is the same eight week old amc was not  italy in the the district courts unchallenged finding that no nasty intended to return to the united states with a m t as soon as possible is virtually dispositive this court should put an end to this already four year old empties parents could share an intent for her to live in italy even if they had no meeting of the minds or actual agreement on that issue or any of a problem with the opposition i take it out of the inventions coverage of their young children with respect i disagree with the proposition that our approach would lead to a large number of children who do not have a country even with respect to infants we're dealing here with the unusual case where the breakdown of the parties relationship was simultaneous with one ask each pregnancy and the birth of the child in any case where the breakdown of the relationship occurs later in time in all likelihood there will be an agreement between the parents as to where the child will live for at least the foreseeable future but from the standpoint of the objectives of the hague convention there's nothing wrong with recognizing that a subset of children will have later in time and if there was a meeting of the minds after the child's birth that would be controlling a single parent could not unilaterally disavow that agreement but if you think this agreement is irrevocable if there is a i doubt that there are going to be very many cases where there's a written agreement so you think that if at the beginning at the time of the child's birth there's a tacit agreement between the parents that's irrevocable and then if the relationship breaks almost over a period of time that where you might otherwise infer that there is no longer any agreement that would not count that's exactly our approach or are the t agreement once it's in place is irrevocable until the standard for older children comes into play which would be in a climatized ation based standard but for infants once the parents have reached a meeting of the mind a single parent cannot unilaterally disavow that agreement counter the word we're talking about international convention and yet none of the other parties to the convention have adopted your position courts of canada the u k the e u australia and others have in fact rejected it we have said one of the important guiding principles when interpreted the convention is what the other countries do why should we depart from that guideline here they are every circuit that has addressed this issue applies some version of the shared parental intent standard to infants some circuits apply the additional actual agreement requirement that we're urging this court toward top but every circuit applies some version of shared parental intent you don't dispute the fact that no other country no other signatory to the convention has adopted your position i don't dispute that your honor but to the extent that this court is inclined to follow the approach of foreign jurisdictions then the relevant test here is not the all relevant circumstances test advocated by tag larry and the united states it's the primary caregiver a focus standard that the relevant foreign jurisdictions actually apply in cases involving infants and that's the e u court of justice in the murky decision it's the u k supreme court in a versus a decision it's the australian high court in the l k decision all of those courts have recognized that in cases involving infants it's the primary caregivers connections to the country of removal that determine whether the infant has a country of habitual residence at a cheap opinion and it seems to me that she made a huge point that this is family law you know families differ there are vast differences and don't treat these words of it to a residence as if it's like a black letter tax code they're more like a factual matter and let the judge who is closest to it even though he's not a family court judge unfortunately it's a federal system because it's a tricky let them hear all the evidence and decide it and that's it i mean not one hundred percent it but that's it and as soon as nine people who know i can for myself know very little about this start laying down black letter standards all we're going to do is maybe help people in some cases and just cause chaos and hardship in knows what they need so that's basically what i got out of her opinion it seemed to me that's the british court and that sounds pretty sensible to me your honor the u k supreme court makes clear that while and all relevant circumstances test is generally appropriate in the case of an infant the infants connections to her environment are formed through her primary caregiver opinion as just saying what i just said so judge be careful this is factual it involves families don't adopt a standard just let them apply these words oh where does it where is that we're at i get it room your honor the u k supreme court follows the approach of the european union court of justice in the murky decision and mark pretty makes very clear that in cases involving infants a primary caregiver a focused approach is the test that should be applied but under any of the competing tests that we're discussing here today the outcome is the same on these facts can i ask you a question about your position that somewhat puzzles me you think that in this case the dispositive question is whether there was an agreement between the parents and my right yes your honor and then you say that there should be review de novo but that's if if the question is whether there was an agreement between the parents isn't that a pure question of fact why would it be reviewed de novo it would be reviewed to know over iran or because while historical facts would be reviewed for clear between the parents it's a question of fact pure fact because there does not need to be a written agreement there doesn't even need to be an express oral agreement and dream and there are a tacit agreement legal standard your honor the fact that we're here today would suggest that the patrol resident standard is less then straightforward lower courts are in need of guidance from appellate court setting forth clear legal principles  how to make it happy to residence determination just as lower courts need guidance about how to ascertain the existence of reasonable suspicion and probable cause this court emphasized the need for clear guidance in the or nearly as case where it held  probable cause and reasonable suspicion are reviewed to novell and it's not only courts that need guidance it's parents who are confronted with these difficult decisions about whether to remove a child from a dangerous situation they need to know if a child is removed what is the likelihood that the child will be returned under the hague convention but when over in in the history of this convention is that they don't want that approach is that it will breed disunity form outcomes it will prolong hague convention litigation it will undermine the deterrent effect of the hague convention by undermining the clear rules that would otherwise apply in this setting but to the extent that this court is inclined to look at the approach of foreign courts we would urge the court to adopt a primary caregiver focus standard if the court applies in all relevant circumstances however it is essential that this court not only adopt that standard but then go on and apply that standard to the facts of this case the hague convention sets a goal of resolving these cases within six weeks this case has been going on for four and a half years under article two of the hague convention signatory states have an obligation to use the most expeditious procedures available to resolve our knees and says on the stand your review doesn't do novo review so people will take appeals much more readily given the stakes in these cases it's likely that the losing parent in the district court will appeal whatever the standard of review is to know appellate review promotes the development of clear legal principles that district courts can apply more readily more expeditiously and that appellate courts in turn can also apply in an expeditious manner if this court adopts and all relevant circumstances test then it would be displacing the shared parental intent standard that every circuit applies which is why it is of overriding importance that it is important that not the seven that that is not a case involving inference your honor the redmond case every circuit that looks at the hip ritual residence of an infant applies a test that looks to shared parental intent some circuits also look at actual agreement as part of that shared parental intent inquiry the need for guidance from this court is of so passing importance because this court would be adopting for the st time in all relevant circumstances test that no lower court currently applies in a case involving infants in order to live up to the united states his obligation to use the most expeditious procedures available to resolve these cases this court should not only adopt a standard of review and a definition of official residence but should go on and apply that standard to the facts of this case so that this four and a half year old litigation is brought to an end so that district courts have guidance about how the habitual residen cases don't determine custody they determine the venue in which child custody determinations will be made the appropriate venue for this to cut child custody determination is the united states and in fact there has been no child custody determination in italy the italian courts refused to make that determination because the nasty's parental rights were terminated in an ex parte proceeding of which she had no notice and no opportunity to be heard if a comments that the italian courts word return a m t and would end here because that is declared her parent you are as as a matter of comedy we believe that the italian would adhere to an order from this court directing the return of amc there is precedent for foreign courts following we return orders in the larby case which is one of the case cases that this court cited in chief in opinion as an example of a case where a district court issued a return order the case went all the way up to the u k supreme court as to whether to adhere to that we returned order and the u k supreme court ordered the child returned to the united states there hasn't been any case where we're talking about a time in the other country as long as this this would be the longest period of time which any return order has been i don't know if it is the longest period of time to the extent that tag larry has concerns about the propriety of re return those are issues that he could raise before an italian court when we move to enforce the return order but in the absolute it would just delay the proceedings that have already been delayed far longer than the convention contemplated but your honor in the absence of a return order the grave error committed by the lower court will remain on remedied as this court held in the chief in case a return order is typical appellate relief but i'm not interested hypothetically oddly enough in the law suppose  interested in how do we get to what's in the best interest of the child look at it from that point of view what do we do the best and i also think judges particularly federal judges don't know much about this so in italy is there a family court or what what do i do i don't know this is a genuinely open question i don't know what to do if my object is just to try to secure the best interest of the child and you're familiar with this case you tell me your honor the best interests of the child would be furthered by returning a m t to the united states so that there can be a full and fair child custody hearing at which a state court judge steeped in family law issues can make a determination about who should have custody and what is in fact in mts best interest but in the absence of a return order  that there was a special order of the italian court giving the mother of his some visitation rights out that limited it's not clear to me that you're representing to me that there is no method or manner for her to go back to the inn tell you in court and reopen or revisit the custody issue i'm not representing that there is no procedure so assuming as i do that there has to be something that can secure greater rights for her why should it be here instead of there assuming and you don't want me to assume this that the  circumstances suggests that she has acclimated your honor i mean after has two and a half years even under the convention you don't have to return a child italy in the st place the only one way to remedy that all right that's a really interesting question because i'm not sure x on this we accept your premise that the mother's intent controls but she was only here a couple of months when the father sought coast return of her but so it's hard to say she was acclimated in those couple of months either but your honor the question is whether a m t had the type of meaningful settled stable existence in italy when she was removed at eight weeks of age to establish a habitual residence there and almost how old is the child now she is four and a half years old you're on a m t did not have that type of existence within her fleeting eight weeks of living in italy the hague convention is designed to protect children who have a stable stable settled existence that is what is explained in paragraph seventy two with the accompanying explanatory report there will be some children such as a m t who don't form those types of settled connections to a country and whose return to the country of removal is actually possession would be ten tenth's of the law right that hague convention would not speak to that removal your honor that doesn't mean that the left behind parent would be without remedies the left behind parent could seek relief for example under the uniform child custody jurisdiction and enforcement act the left behind parent would have the opportunity to participate in a child custody hearing in the country of removal that it convincingly treatment this problem  would not apply to the convention would not apply if a child had no country of her betrayal residence but as the very foreign jurisdictions on which tangling area in the united states rely including the u k supreme court the australian high court and courts in new zealand have year two years well at a certain point around eighteen to twenty four months the focus would shift to the child's own acclimation to his or her surroundings because the child do you get where do you get that number from based on the development of a child child psychology at a certain point the lower courts shift their test from shared parental intent to a climatized ation once the child has formed his or her own connections under the shared parental intent standard inquiry looks at whether the intent of the parents is a proxy for the type of settled stable meaningful ties that an older child would be able to form and there will be some children who do not have a country of habitual residence because they did not form the type of settled stable ties that the hague convention is designed to protect returning a child to a country where it did not have meaningful connection is just as harmful to that child as committing the charge of removal from a country of habitual residence judge bugs suggests that in the case of children children who have lived in a single place for their entire lives in the case of infant children that is who have lived in a single country their entire lives with both parents that the usual rule should be dutch there had been a russian not a rebuttable but that that should be the usual route that there ha residence and that's certainly a very minister bill rule that provides a lot of guidance and it deters anybody either parent from taking the child anywhere else which seems to be of value to so why agreement that was all encompassing that applied to all children they would have precipitated the removal of a child from his country of residence without the approval of both parents what they instead did was an act a more targeted provision the child but they also recognize that returning a child to a country where it lacks those ties lacks those connections would be just as harmful to the child's interests that is the fundamental problem with the one country rule advocated the panel in the th circuit but whatever the test is that this court adopts the outcome is the same the facts are overwhelming here that as a result of the physical and sexual abuse to which men ascii was subject she formed to the intent during her pregnancy to return to the united states with her child as soon as possible that's what the district court found at pet at ninety four dollars a that meant ascii intended to return to the united states with a and c as soon as possible and that's what she did the day that empties us passport arrived monastic left and returned to the united states fled from the dangerous situation in which she found herself the signatories to the hague convention would never have intended to prevent a mother from a moving her where you don't return a job if there is a grave risk that his or her return would expose the child to physical or psychological harm or otherwise place the child in an intolerable situation that provision would seem designed and fortunately lower courts have construed that exception narrowly and in this case even though the district court credited monastics allegations about the extensive physical and sexual abuse to which she was subjected the court concluded that abuse directed to an ascii was not sufficient to create a grave risk of harm to mt thank you counsel straightforward question where does a child usually live there is a child at home answering that question requires looking at the case specific facts on the ground on income or by rigid mechanical per se tests that includes petitioners rigid mechanical person a task about a shared or i'm sorry a subjective agreement or a meeting of the minds that is not necessary to establishing a child which will residence it's not even necessary to establish a shared parental intent which itself is not necessary to establishing habitual residence and that test applies equally to infants and to older children nothing in the conventions text or structure suggests that habitual residence carries a different definition depending on the age of the child so that takes care of one question presented on the other one and because determining which will residence is primarily a factual inquiry and involves factual work this course framework in us banks or lake ridge applies and there is no reason to deviate from that rule in fact that rule would also provide we believe the most consistent results including consistency of outcome as petitioner asks for because the best way to be consistent is to be right and the best way to be right on a fact intensive question is to trust the district oh this is what puzzles me about your position which does seem to reflect the decisions of foreign courts and maybe something has just been lost in translation but it's fine to say take everything into account and be flexible but that's not very helpful unless one knows the question to be answered after taking everything into account and being flexible and so the the critical point is what is meant by have betrayal residents now you said it's where the child usually lives if that's the test the judge bogs  i understand it but if it's something more than that then i really don't know what a bitch will residence means so we think where a child usually lives is the test and it's sort of hard to explain it more than that in most cases it's going to be quite easy to tell where the child usually lives including for instance i mean i would wager if you walked on the streets of d c and found parents with infants and said where does your infant child usually live they'd say with us at home and it's often times when cases are in dispute when habitual residence is in dispute and it's a very small fraction even of hague convention cases in those situations it's going to be very hard to come up with an ex ante rule or test that's going to be useful in that circle what if the parents who live from the time of the child's birth until the time when that issue comes up in a particular country but it was never their intention to stay there permanently with that country be where the child usually lives that that's a very difficult question and i can imagine many factors that might push you one way or the other for example if that's where they had been living for quite some time but just had some future plans to move that might well be where the child was usually living on the date of the or you know immediately before the wrongful retention removal as article three calls for on the other hand if you're telling me that in fact they have a permanent residence in another country and they were you know in the country of birth just on haitian and she went into early labor and the child was born there but all their connections are back in the other country it might be a much more difficult question the point is where a bit will residence is disputed in the small fraction of cases there's very little guidance is going to be useful except to say the question is where does the child usually live or if it helps to think of it this way where is the child at home welcome sign of a meaningless concept where the child usually lives if you're talking about somebody who's eight weeks old again it's not as if they laid down roots that year old eight week old infant don't have habits well other than one or two but it doesn't seem to me that that's the notion that the convention drafters we're looking at think ask the parents of any newborn and i think if you asked where do you usually live they would have an answer just like what does that mean judge barnes is right that the place where an infant usually lives is the place where the infant has lived since birth with both parents judge barnes may well be right and he did add the qualification for absent unusual circumambient unusual circumstances and i think that's perfectly fine i think the problem though is if if there's any sort of guidance like that coming from this court lower courts will tend to rigidly follow it instead of answering the ultimate question which you asked about earlier which is where does a child usually live as a practical matter and as you know and in theory said the bottom line should be a real man not a determination and this child is now four and a half years old to remain and to do what what factor didn't the district court take into account that the district court should have taken into it can you see the circumstances not just sharon intent as a single factor g we don't take a position on the outcome of this case the course usual practice when announcing a new standard is to remain and the only thing i'll say is that both the court of appeals and the district court appear to view the facts through the lens of  notion that shared parental intent was the only thing that mattered and probably the parties brief the case that way in the court of appeals all to shared parental intent to the to the extent there are other facts that might have been germane to determining where the child usually lives that the parties  didn't bring forward you know what would be a i don't know and it's hard to predict you know i would as an example i'll give you a very recent case that's posted on the hague convention site that tracks cases under the convention it's called ex against why those are pseudonyms obviously from the court of appeals of the hague mom allege that the apartment in the netherlands was where they usually lived apartment in spain was a vacation home dad alleged exactly the opposite court had to decide who was right looked at a lot of fa the ground but the most compelling one that the court decided would tip the issue was that the mom had registered herself from the municipal persons database and put spain as her forwarding address and the registered the company she ran from the dutch chamber of commerce it's impossible to predict that that was going to be the fact ex ante but when you are looking at where the family in that case where the child usually lives it's the parties who are going to come forward with evidence and the judge is go assign decide whether it's relevant and if it's relevant assign weights to it so sure would you agree then with lady ales observation in terms of a young child infant and parent intent sure she says that these common sense observations are best seen as helpful generalisations of fact which will usually but not invariably be true not as propositions of law so pale boggs may be right except that he's calling it a proposition of law i would agree with that and i would just again i would i would caution this court from laying down principles like that because when this court says it lower courts usually take it as  then is is it less risky to send it back if we say it and don't send it back more likely to be taken as laying down propositions of  that's the definition debates court lady hill adopted i think once we say where a child ordinary lives ordinarily lives we fall into the trap that you had which is i think courts will be focusing on ordinary out of context are you disavowing what the other courts are doing no we're not if i may mr chief justice we think they are looking at the right question which is where the child ordinarily lives in difficult cases often translation they don't use those words we think the words they use are certainly relevant to that ultimate determination and in any event that is what the text of the convention says and we think that's what the court should apply here thank you coun think that to me is not that different from where the child usually lives it may avoid the problem of duration i think a lot of the problems in these cases sometimes result from the fact that  allegedly unlawful return we agree with the s g regarding the test and i just want to start by saying a few words about petitioners actual agreement test as justice ginsburg pointed out would largely eliminate the convention protection for very large for very young children because they would have no habitual residence and because one of the spouses in the cases where there is a barrel discord during the pregnancy and the birth  simply say i withhold agreement on where the child should live and that would be in there was no of a chill residence as long as there was no agreement that's obviously a significant gap petitioner cite some cases saying that a child may not have a habitual residence but i think it's important to point out that those statements were made in a very different context which is actually the one presented in the very large majority of decided convention cases and that's the situation where the child and the parents live together in country a then the child moves to country b with one or both parents it could be a temporary stay with grandparents could be for a job and then the parent who is with the child in country b says i'm not sending the child  back and so the question is what is the child's a betrayal residence country a or b and courts have said in that circumstance it's possible to lose a bit to residence in a before gaining it in b whether that's true or not that's obviously a very different situation from the one present here where the parents are in one country and the child is born there and stays there until the challenge removal and we agree with judge bugs as a factual matter not as a legal principle that those facts are very likely to lead to the that country absent unusual circumstances there can be different facts the child is born on vacation the child is born at a place of birth selected for medical benefits that were provided but that also makes you say is what judge said and so i'm curious as to why you're not just accepting that as a formulation of the legal standard judged by its was careful to say absent unusual circumstances and i suppose i would say that the benefit of doing is you know if you take this solicitor general's test this is on page twenty six and twenty seven i'm not going to read it because it would take too long to to do all the factors that they think want to go into this inquiry and i'm i guess i'm a little bit afraid i mean i don't mind totality of the circumstances and tests when they make sense but i guess i'm a little bit afraid that by the time you get through all those factors everybody's going to have forgotten what the ultimate question is and if the ultimate question is just where does the child usually live then why not just sort of say that when it comes to an infant or a very small child the child usually lives where the child has lived with both parents all her life well i don't want to resist a rule that would be beneficial to my client but i guess i will say that the courts especially in the u k have had a lot of experience with subsidiary legal principles like that being developed and i think the the result and i think justice hill bench and this is one decision is that they do get too much credence it how lower courts approach the case and so i think the danger of adopting subsidiary legal rules is that they will end up being applied as the solicitor general said in a broader sense in a broader context that then they should be when all the work be done on absent unusual circumstances though and so you would still have the out as justice kagan points out for people to argue that it's i think so and i'm not sure that just having all that there's much difference between saying that it's a legal principle or framing of the way justice brier did which is when the facts are that the child has lived in one country  with her parents for her whole life absent some unusual facts that is going to lead to this this is what this is take everything into account and be flexible standard seems to mean in practice tell me if this is wrong is there a lot of different considerations and they may be particular considerations may be more important in one case another case so we're just going to dump this in the hands of a particular judge to make a decision that that particular judge thinks is fair in accordance with that particular judge's value judgments and we're not going to make it we're going to make it very hard to get that reversed that's what this all seems to boil down to with a lot of high falutin language by the far courts i'm i wrong on that i'm going to sure that that's right justice alito i think there is an ultimate inquiry where does the child usually live or or in the european version of the family or and social environment in which the child's life is developed i think that gives you a northstar i think the problem is there are a lot of different facts in these in these cases you know it's one reason why in family law best interest of the child is a very broad standard because going to obtain absent something on the difficult cases really are these multiple country cases those are the cases where there are a myriad of fact patterns why did the child move what were the parents views when the child moved the child get acclimated to the new country in the closer very complicated the case of an infant why does it matter that the cut the infant has lived all all of his or her life in a particular country that it wouldn't matter to that infant what country the infant was living in or whether they have families living on the moon  the infants world is the home with the parents or a parent so why does it matter well it matters that the infant has lived in the same country with the parents that's the critical i think additional fact and i think it but what is the interest that is served by that the interest there are two interests that are served one is the theory of the convention is that a lot finding habitual residence is important for two reasons one is to identify the place where the custody determination should be made as opposed to leaving it to the unilateral decisions of one parent or another the nd is to discourage these abductions which are not only harmful in that they allow the gaming of jurisdictional rules but they are harmful because they take the child away from both parents home well she doesn't she doesn't have to she can escape domestic violence by separating from her husband and staying in the country she before she left she spent two weeks under the protection in safe houses under the protection of the mechanisms that italy has for that purpose so i don't think that that task requires that sheep stay with the husband i think one of the unusual facts could be in a situation where it was clear that abused parent wanted to get away was determined to get away and the evidence is the husband floored her at every turn that's not what the district court found here however because the district court found and just to quote two findings on petition ninety eight day she continued after the birth of her child to live in italy and had no definitive plans to bring her to the united states until the last  departure and at ninety four a most of the steps that men ask you took in march two thousand and fifteen seem to reflect a settled purpose and intent to remain in italy at least for an undetermined period of time so the district court looked at all this and said that wasn't the case here and i think those are mention this but it says you can't place the child in an intolerable situation well think where the mother is being beaten up that would be an intolerable situation what do you do if the mother is in a country where there are difficulties with abuse women finding adequate care and she's got to get out of there or out i thought what do we do about that as i say i think that could be  relevant fact that might lead to the general rule that we're told we put it in here or do you say indic there are something it was raised in an intolerable situation includes that or do we say nothing at all well there are two options for addressing that ri what one is to say that if the district court were to find that the mother was trying to get away and her at the she had it at the quickest possible moment but she was thwarted because the father was preventing it through abuse or otherwise then that might well mean that there is no habitual residence that it's not as like the findings that i read that's not the case here you could also look to that article thirteen exception and talk about the possibility that that to the way the lower courts as we discussed in our briefs the law the way the lower courts of the united states of applied that is what's the intent of each parent that can be proven by words deeds objective lee what's the what is the parent's of intent with respect to the location of the child that none there is perhaps one case in which a federal court of appeals indicated that that a meeting of the minds might be necessary even that court relied on it an alternative  question is is the intent of the parents with respect to where the child lives relevant i think yes it can be proved they don't have to have jointly agreed they can each have the same intent in terms of this case i think if if we prevail on the legal issues then that issue is determined because there is no clear or in the in the district court's determination so the question would be are there other facts that would be cognizable under the bitch resident standard that the lower courts didn't address in our submission is those other facts are all facts the way in favor of italy because they're principally the fact that the child has been located in italy for her whole life before she was removed and that's not something that was relevant necessarily to intent but that's clearly a highly important fact that she was there with both parents and so we don't see any other facts that can be a deuced in this record for the trial was quite comprehensive we don't see any other facts that could be relevant to that would require or even permit a different of the circumstances for older children does that mean rejecting the view of most of the circuit courts that the key thing is the climate  think the climate is ation as children get older it can be highly relevant and the the courts that have adopted this test the foreign courts have said that i think the problem i think most courts have done more than just say that's highly relevant most courts have said that's the question that we're trying to answer and and that provides a kind of anchoring mechanism for courts but ok now i understand what the question is it's kind of in bedded this in a particular country's life so  you know but if it's just like one thing that gets thrown in along with everything else that seems sort of different today i think the problem is there's no bright line between when you might think the young child standard applies and when you might think a climate is ation becomes relevant there probably are crossing lines at one point it's really about the young child then and is he or she with her parents and then at some point later when the kids are fifteen years old it may be much more about them than about parental intent i think most courts have been reluctant to say the parents intent becomes irrelevant i think they the courts generally say climate is ation becomes much more relevant so i wish i could help you with saying that th and there isn't that what the european court said with respect to infants it didn't say that you put parental intent or agreement as being the most important integrated into italy when the child was being the during those eight weeks she was moved from one spot to another she didn't live consistently with the father while they were separating two places between two places but the father wasn't in the st place then the mother went for a couple of weeks with her father and then brought her back into the shelter the mother i think had some fairly potent evidence that she was making plans to leave it alone everything about the entire search ration surrounding this child was simply up in the air well i think those what i call it and to court reasonably conclude that  no settled place no ordinary place had yet been formed to this child that's a possibility we haven't talked about but i have to presume that if we tell a court that it's a to charity of the circumstances that is in fact one of the options it has i think it is in this case i think the portions of the district court's opinion that i read on page ninety four and ninety eight a preclude that in this case because the district court rejected those that as mothers intent i think for the reasons that we've been talking about and i'd also say the movement from place to place is something that lower courts have rejected if it's within one country because the idea here is to places i wanted to mention the justice prior raised the question about italy and what the proceedings might be there there is a proceeding in italy a custody proceeding that a petition actually  of the child is with the italian authorities the father has generally physical custody the mother has visitation rights there are periodic reports being filed by the italian social services authority about what's going on so the italian authorities are pretty  matter so just to return to the the question of the remain and think our view is for the reasons i was discussing that district court's findings really deal with the intent issue his for his factual findings little putting aside his ultimate determination on a bitter residence all of the other facts that could possibly be relevant under the judge bugs standard friend is  factual presumption we think way in favor of italy as the place of the residents and we agree that that it would be great to cut off these proceedings tomorrow will be the three year anniversary of a m t being returned to  italy and it would certainly be good for that this uncertainty to be lifted so that she could then the italian authorities could proceed with the custody terminations without this issue being raised and i do think as several members of the court said that there would be significant problems with the issuance of a return order both in terms of the u s courts ability to issue such an order given the equitable considerations and also the extent to which such an order would be accepted by the italian authorities unless the court has any further questions thank you counsel two minutes mr tiran thank you three points your honor with respect to the standard applied by foreign court cases involving infants i would point the courts to paragraph fifty five in the european union court of justice is decision in them or critique case the court there stated that an infant necessarily shares the social and family environment of the circle of people on whom he or she is dependent consequently where the infant is in fact looked after by her mother is necessary to assess the mother's integration in her family and social environment that is the standard that lady hale adopt in the a vs a case for her return to the united states by looking for us health care and child care options u s employment and u s divorce lawyers this court need look no further than j a two hundred and j a two hundred and seventeen which are e mails between the parties sent in the critical days preceding and following amcs birth where an ascii reiterated her intent to return to the united states and to divorce tag larry and this court need look no further than one thousand for a where the district court found that more nasty intended to return to the united states with a m t as soon as possible that's precisely what she did the day and sees us passport arrive when a m t was eight weeks old when asked he fled the dangerous situation in which she found herself and returned to the united states this court can and should make that determination and it should order mts returned to the united states for a full and fair child custody hearing which is the only venue in that in which that hearing can take place thank you thank you counsel the case is submitted