thank you very much for coming this afternoon the air and land forces subcommittee meet to receive testimony regarding the department the air force modernization programs certainly welcome our witnesses mr david hearn director of portfolio systems acquisition in the office of the secretary of defense attorney general daniel darnell air force deputy chief of staff for air space and information operations plans and requirements and lieutenant you and i want to underline this that we have just recently received some of the detail of the fiscal year two thousand and ten budget request request did not include any information or data regarding plans programs or budget for fiscal year two thousand and eleven and beyond that is of great concern to me because of some of the decisions that were being asked to make in this defense budget and what will be recommending to the committee involve decisions that obviously have implications that go beyond two thousand and eleven so i'm hoping that we can clear some of that up before the markup over all the air force base the number of challenges in executing its modernization programs the f twenty two the f thirty five the combat search and rescue helicopter  tanker and the next generation bomber programs have been the most prominently reviewed the current f twenty two program of record is one hundred eighty seven f twenty two yesterday the air force chief of staff general schwartz testified the two hundred forty three year craft is the right number but one hundred eighty seven is close to the affordable number on quote the budget request does not include any more f twenty two and line shut down activities are proposed to begin the fiscal year two thousand and ten the air force has just taken the lead in the joint strike fighter program office that program continues have cost and schedule problems with testing further delayed and greater development and procurement concurrency being incurred yesterday the secretary of the air force michael donnelly was quoted regarding the joint strike fighter as follows quote we need on cost and schedule on quote rather amazing statement but nonetheless one that i felt we needed to quote we have heard that refrain before on other major programs let me start the first line of the recent g a o report quote joint strike fighter development will cost more and take longer to complete than reported to congress in april two thousand and eight provided by the g a o our that the joint strike fighter development program in two thousand and one was estimated to cost thirty four billion dollars with an aircraft average aircraft procurement unit cost of sixty nine million dollars thousand and one the december two thousand and seven estimated development cost was forty four billion dollars a thirty percent increase in an aircraft average unit cost of one hundred four million dollars a fifty percent increase for aircraft over two thousand and one the initial operation capability date has slipped two years to two thousand and twelve i'm going over some of this detail ladies and gentlemen on the subcommittee and for members of the audience and into our witnesses not because i don't think you know it or this isn't part of the conversation but this is for the public record and for public consumption and we want to make sure that the public has at least all of the perspective and perception of what our  perspective is and in a context that may be new to them last year's projection for the joint strike fighter research and development two point one billion dollars this year the request is three point six billion dollars a sixty seven percent increase this is without the cost of an an alternate or competitive engine program i would also note that under the current for hyrum and plan two hundred seventy three joint strike fighters will be procured before flight testing is projected to be complete i want to make sure that that number is before you in case you want to want to dispute it or or amplify on it two hundred seventy three joint strike fighters will be for a cure before flight testing is projected to be complete under the current for chairman for land also yesterday general schwartz was quoted as saying that he would prefer a more rapid production rate for the joint strike fighter yet the air force request for the joint strike fighter this helicopters has been cancelled yes the search and rescue helicopter program would have one hundred forty one helicopters that has been cancelled in favor of a new undetermined search and rescue helicopter program that secretary gates believes will have a more realistic requirement and acquired be a joint service program the program that would procure one hundred seventy nine aerial refueling tankers to replace the forty eight year old k c one thirty five tankers was cancelled last year after the attempted a new request for proposals will be issued this summer that's the present plan of secretary gates with a sore selection planned for the spring of next year it has not yet been announced whether the office of the secretary of defense or the air force will execute the source selection perhaps you'll be able to enlighten us today the next generation bomber program which would have replaced the aging fleet has also been delayed we are told that a new program may be started pending a review of the requirement and technology during the quadrennial defense review to be done later this year facing funding challenges in two thousand and ten and in future years defense program the air force has decided to propose the accelerated retirement of about two hundred fifty fighter aircraft the air force indicates this will save three hundred fifty one million dollars in fiscal year two thousand and ten and three point five billion dollars across the years defense program in the aggregate the air force is facing significant changes in fiscal year two thousand and ten therefore to its modernization programs regarding now the specific issue of the joint strike fighter program and the competitive engine program overall as i mentioned the joint strike fighter testing schedule continues to slip to the right while the pentagon insists on maintaining the current production schedule this creates more development and production much like what was experienced with the army's arm reconnaissance helicopter program i'm using the word production concurrency here is to me is kind of like the that all the testing requirements and all the expectations of the fighter will continue apace with the production schedule i've never seen that happen in anything in my life but apparently they think that's going to happen with the joint strike fighter the current joint strike fighter baseline engine has barely begun flight testing has yet to even fly in the most stressing vertical flight and landing vertical landing the baseline engine for the joint strike fighter had been delayed failures within the past two years requiring redesign remanufacture and delaying the flight test program in e fiscal year two thousand and seven two thousand and eight joint strike fighter engine costs have grown causing a three million dollar increase to the short take off vertical landing aircraft unit flyaway cost without a competitive engine program current air force plans call for approximately ninety percent of all air force to man fighters and a substantial percentage of all other service man fighters to be dependent on one engine type from one manufacturer thousand and thirty the last time the air force proceeded with such a plan was the acquisition of the f fifteen and f sixteen aircraft that result in dependence on one engine type for a large proportion of the air force fighter fleet because of engine reliability and do ability problems in the one nine hundred seventy s the air force ended up with a large percentage of its f fifteen  grounded as a result in europe to keep up with the demand for refurbished engines due to much lower engine life than planned the air force brought bought a small fleet of cargo aircraft and shuttle f t f fifteen engines back and forth between bases and a centralized engine depot the engine problems that resulted in a alternate engine program in the late one nine hundred seventy s were not discovered until two years after initial operational capability was achieved for the f fifteen currently initial operation capability will not be achieved for the f thirty five until two thousand and twelve five years after the pentagon quit funding the current version of an alternate or competitive engine the pentagon fully funded the alternate engine program in the pentagon's annual budget request for ten years hundred seven through two thousand and six parents ethically forgive me if i'm giving you information you already know but again it's very important for the public to understand the context within which we have to make this decision cost overruns again i want to repeat the alternate engine or competitive engine was funded by the air force and by extension funded by the congress at the air force request for ten years cost overruns in other areas of the joint strike fighter program not the engine or the alternative alternate engine program in other areas of the joint program caused the pentagon to discontinue its budget request for the alternate engine the three studies the committee asked to have done in two thousand and seven were inconclusive with regard to the financial benefits of competition for engine development procurement and operations and support however all three report cited numerous likely nonfinancial benefits of engine competition including insurance against fleet grounding contractor responsiveness technological innovation force readiness and industrial base brett all of these benefits were derived from the experience of what came to be known as the great engine war g e w the great engine wars know virus in the pentagon lore that as our background we look forward to our witnesses opening remarks and i'm sure they look forward to making in the now with that  with that background but before we begin and i'd appreciate and thank all the members in the audience for their indulgence and in this rather lengthy and i hope informative opening remarks let me call on my good friend and a friend to the armed services members everywhere the ranking member of this subcommittee the honorable roscoe bartlett thank you mr chairman there's no doubt that this budget and the decisions that come along with it will fundamentally change the united states air force and the recent series of full committee posture hearings a consistent theme has carried through and i want to echo it here today i feel that there has been an of the subcommittee and by extension the full committee these are serious policy implications and i hope they can be addressed forthrightly today without objection all witness prepared remarks will be included in the hearing record so if you can summarize your views and or take the opportunity perhaps to respond even not necessarily in detail to the old nurse remarks that and ten defense budget as part of his remarks the secretary stated that one of his principal objectives was to rebalance the hartmans programs to institutionalize and enhance our capabilities to fight the wars we are in today and the scenarios where are most likely to face in the years ahead while at the same time providing a hedge against the risks and contingencies in terms of tactical air force structure the department position is the force structure we have programmed  the requirements for the national military strategy the capabilities contain with the in the air force and across the services to include strike fighter aircraft unmanned aircraft systems aerial refueling tankers and i asked our assets combined to form a robust program prepared to deter and defeat a wide range of threats to our security in terms of the f twenty two the department believes the program for some one hundred eighty seven f twenty two aircraft combined with a larger force of f thirty five aircraft to provide the necessary mix of strike fighter aircraft to meet the military strategy the department's analysis showed that while we have adequate air to air capability we need a significant amount of the say of the air to ground capability that the f thirty five provides one key area in regard to the f twenty two is that apartment must ensure that the program force can prevail against advanced threat the air force plans a seven billion dollar modernization effort across the f y d p important improvements for the f twenty two fleet for the joint strike fighter the budget request includes ten point eight billion dollars to continue development and to support the procurement of ten conventional sixteen stovl and the first four carrier variants the secretary has also stated his intention to increase the number of f thirty five aircraft across the f y d p that creates a more efficient ramp parade as we prepare to enter for a production recognizing the committee's interest in the f thirty five alternate engine i can tell you the f thirty five acquisition strategy contains provisions for a second engine program provided funds are available consistent with our past positions the department did not include funding in the budget for the f one thirty six engine because there is not a compelling business case to fine completion of the development effort the department does of course continue to execute appropriated development funds for the one thirty six engine among the secretary's decisions was out of cancelling the combat search and rescue program known as c s r x the services in the u s special operations command possess a wide spectrum of overlapping and complimentary personnel recovery capabilities a deep penetration mission to recover down crews in a complex threat environment requires a joint solution since this nation drives many of the c c r x requirements is imperative we reassess that mission in the context of joint force capabilities the joint cargo aircraft program is important to help address the aging force structure supporting the army's time sensitive mission critical airlift mission the decision to transfer the undersecretary for acquisition technology and then confirmed the secretary will meet that meet with them along with the air force secretary and the air force chief of staff to finalize an appropriate course of action with regard to the  secretary of state is his intention to consult with congress and to brief them before finalizing the department's approach we anticipate being able to solicit proposals proposals from industry this summer with award o contract by late spring two thousand and ten we are grateful for the continued support of congress which has been critical to ensuring our airmen are the best trained and best equipped air force in the world thank you for this opportunity to testify in the department's plans to continue to equip them for today's wars and tomorrow's challenges i look forward to answering any questions you may have thank you general darnell i have you next is that if you want to change the order you can is it all right that's just fine thank you thank you and thank you for your service as well general darnell good afternoon mr chairman ranking mem bartlett and distinguished members of the committee thank you for calling this hearing and for the opportunity to discuss programs your force continues to contribute to operations across the globe provide support to the combatant commanders ensuring that they have the means necessary to accomplish their mission as you know that level of continuous effort takes a toll on the right assets we're here today to discuss those of our plans to work within the f y twenty ten budget to ensure we find the correct balance of maintaining and preparing unnecessary assets to meet current and future force requirements i thank the subcommittee for allow me to appear before you for your continued support of the air force my opening comments are brief but i respectfully request our combined written statement for the record i look forward to your question opportunity to provide you with an update on air force modernization efforts and other matters that are important to our air force and the nation the secretary and the chief of staff of the air force have made recapturing acquisition excellence a top your force priority earlier this month they approved the air force acquisition improvement plan which identified the following five initiatives revitalize the air force acquisition workforce improve the requirements generation process instill budget and financial discipline improve air force major system source elections and establish clear lines of authority and accountability within that acquisition organizations we are developing more detailed implementation plans for the individual actions within each of these initiatives and will remain flexible with the ability to adjust as suggestions and initiatives proposed by congress and the office of the secretary of defense come our way i will conclude my opening remarks by saying that we are committed to recapturing acquisition excellence by rebuilding an air force acquisition culture that delivers products and services that are essential to air force modernization programs as promised on time within budget and in compliance with policies and regulations thank you for inviting me today i look forward to answering your questions and thank you for your service general shepperd and finally general jones i just wanted to mention for purposes of the members because their families also serve our nation i'm honored to be here and i stand ready to answer your question four point four billion is now projected to increase an additional two point four billion according to the program office and as much as seven point four billion dollars according to a joint  program the f thirty five program across roads with continuing manufacturing problems increasing costs and slowing deliveries of aircraft the flight test program remains about  that the aircraft will requirements will need additional work after they have been bought and well as eventually cost much more than expected in march we recommended that the department we examine its plan to ramp up an improved delivery schedule and contracting strategy the program can more effectively meet the needs of the war fighter mr chairman thank you for your time i'll do my best to answer any questions a committee might have will you be submitting your summary for the record that i understand that correctly we have a written statement that i think that we have that will be submitted for the record we also have we were asked to provide some  that was in your statement i want to make sure i'm reading it correctly on page four if you can look at page four i'm presuming you have the same material in front of you that we've given out to the committee i'll read it to you this is regard to the f twenty two analysis also shows has also showed that while we have adequate air to air capability we also need a significant amount of fifth generation air to ground capability it may be that i'm not quite clear as to what the implications of the phrase fifth generation are the reason i'm asking it is there's no which i believe fulfill that air to ground capability now may be that you're saying that you need more than that but it goes on mentioned i just want to make sure you consider that the f twenty two air to ground capability did you consider that when you were hirty five and it was a dressing scenario where there was both the air to air and air to ground targeting if you will yes and the essence that i took away but i'll be glad to come of this study that i failed to ask when i wrote and that was what was on my mind from that study yes not so much to get in an argument about it but i want to move because one of the advantages of the f twenty two at least the way it's presented to me is it does have that capability with air to ground and in my oral statement i mentioned and i'm sure that my compatriots from the air force today would would also talk about the modernization of the  your assets that you could meet the army's demand for like cargo planes with just thirty eight planes rather than the seventy eight it original study said they needed i believe that the original study said that the army needed seventy eight of these planes and  then since the air force also had a need for light cargo planes it was decided against air force which is my understanding that the air force should join this program that should be a joint  and that the number of planes that the air force needed for their responsibilities were yet to be added to the seventy eight that the army needed and my question sir is what we have asked the witnesses was there a study that indicated that the original need for seventy eight could now be reduced to thirty eight and each one of them told us  conviction they said they knew of no such study was or in fact the studies are that they did not know about that you cited when you made the claim that you had decided that you could not meet the needs of the army w be during the to determine if that's the right amount rather and on my left as the air force takes on the mission from the army in that specific area as a develop their concept of operator operations and their plans i would expect that number of different mixes of studies and classified report published march thirteenth of this year seems to indicate that and the reason i think the administration is hearing so many concerns from congress is not just mr barlow myself it's many others with regard to we've been listening to the pitch now for a number of years it's very credible and it's supported by independent studies now with regard to independent studies generally sir the two thousand and five ability capability study came up with two ninety two is the lowest permissible figure for strategic lift and lo and behold that's precisely what the pentagon decided to adopt  history would conclude aren't going to come true and if those things don't come true then the figure would be higher than two ninety two so in your opening remarks in your written statement the me is not true we don't know the exact number but we need we do know that it's well above two ninety two just based on that study and one thing that concerns me is the mobility capability requirement may be driven too much by the need to reach the right answer so we'd like to know a little bit more about how that analysis is being conducted and how independently the judgment is being made from senior officials who concerned about bottom line numbers and whether things are affordable could you describe that process and the independence of whoever it is that evolved in doing the from a directive that a certain result needs to be obtained and you just need to find out how to get to that result certainly ok with you we need to be very comfortable that whoever is conducting the study is actually trying to determine what the requirements are as opposed to coming up with a formula that will reach a result which is effectively already been dictated  you know that's that's backwards it's bad news is bad news bad news for the department's bad news country we need to hear that bad news just imagine that you can tell members of this committee do their homework and and they also listen to what is presented to them by the pentagon over time sometimes you know be careful what you wish for one year because somebody on this committee remember you wished for it and then of the wish changes  there has to be some accounting for it the main reason that we're pushing as hard as we are right now is we're getting into markup stage pretty quick here and we're going to try and stay on a schedule with regard to the two thousand two thousand and ten  defense bill and hopefully the the appropriations that go with it to try and finish on time that's the goal of the of i think all sides here this is not a partisan issue so that's the reason we're pressing it as much as we are to try and get some answers or some perspective that will help us make the decisions so we'll be following up particularly this joint cargo the cargo aircraft i think no does any air defense system in the world give you pause with our ability to strike  e right now i believe we can accomplish the missions before as we look at the next generation bomber in the future a long range strike we look to the future to say how can we ensure that the combatant commanders and leaders  you have the ability to hold any target at rest and strike it and resolve it as they need to be so i think we're good right now but again that's why the discussion in the q t r as we go through that is what does the future hold and is there anything the stopped the program that the acquisition of that when the it seems to me like the air force is pressed right now to perform a medal back to back because of the lack of ability for the other services to  birds to provide dedicated medivac birds while at the same time provide in a search and rescue birds because you have to have search and rescue all over where you're you're flying anything you have to have that ability and i would think that you would want dedicated  search and rescue and not have to do not have to say we're not going to go pick up these guys because you're able to do it you have gunners and you have the ability to do it in a kinetic firefight situation which is search and rescue would be or would be but out earlier i think in the secretary's comments regarding a joint program i think he's looking for a utility aircraft just service can fly our point in the air force is the only service that trains firefight basically to pick this young marine up the response from the marine doctors was he would not have survived had they not done that so it's our point the comment search and rescue mission is what we trained to it we equipped to it and you general darnell because the requirements as i said in my remarks is what we already have from secretary gates right now is that they're supposed to be more realistic requirements whatever they are think mr hunter is pretty well because of the nature of say the rescue helicopter both for medivac purposes and and other rescues or as mr hunter said simultaneous it may be that this requires joint but all we have  is the assertion and there are clear legislative implications for us in that so we need to get something definitive pretty quick i don't mean to i hope it amplified  long series of hearings eric excuse me can you speak a little more into the might live in my governmental but maybe there you go i'm very troubled i'm very troubled because throughout the course of this hearing in the course of hearings i have had the opportunity to sit and over the past several weeks i have heard and i will put this as candidly and yet as professionally as i can a series of testimonies it can only lightly be described as incredible pentagon double talk when i have a series of general officers appear before this committee and i'm a parent that it really tell you that i'm not a military expert i'm a i'm a country guy from western new york state but when i continuously hear people tell me that we can do more with less that the number of airframes available to afford to play commander that commitments and requirements were apt that were absolute just a year ago can be  raised with a fluke of a phrase saying we don't need them anymore that somehow the united states air force is willing to say we need to upgrade the f twenty two fighter which arguably by the testimony of those who have appeared before  the absolute air dominance aircraft today while we are accepting incredible risk in the predicament of an airplane that in my opinion and historical analysis will tell you will never be delivered on the timeframes currently be discussed today that the f thirty five i scratch my head in bewilderment we in the united states congress are burdened with the reality of a long historical knowledge and while those who come in front of us change and rotate and may never come back again we sit here and listen over and over and over again to program after program after program which i guarantee you today will not deliver as you have testified this afternoon the f thirty five and the numbers of the prices that you have discussed today simply will not happen it won't and i suggest for the record that you know it we know it and the people that s you over here know it and yet last year with equal passion in forcefulness your contemporaries appeared before the people of the united states of america and said we absolutely must have this tactical airlift aircraft we absolutely must have a dual engine brickyard strategy for the f thirty five and now we sit here and we're told well absolutely not it's not necessary we're going to do it through some incredible force of magic where fewer airframes will deliver more ordinance more combat flexibility and more operational capability to the generals and admirals at c n n shore for our forces deployed and gentlemen i'm sorry more cows back on my dairy farms don't give us more milk it just doesn't happen that way if it's an issue of funding in the pentagon should come before this committee as a representative the people's will and say we're getting short changed and we need to document this that it's not an issue of funding this someone has to look at me and say you know we really got it wrong last year blatantly either out of omission or commission  about some straight talk for the american people instead of a whole bunch of five sided pentagon jar again i just register for the record the fact that i am deeply concerned about the  testimony that i have heard not only at this committee and this hearing but in all of the acquisition hearings i close my statement and have no questions but it's awful hard for me two standoff jammer program cancelled in december two thousand and five without a core component jammer program which was also canceled this year the air force to compensate for the lack of this capability joe johns what is the long term air force strategy for airborne electronic attack to continue with the programs that general darnell talked about and look at the balance between what can you do stand off what you need to do in a penetrating environment because if you are forced to greater distances then the effectiveness of that standoff capability so we're going through the discussion to say where is the trade between penetrating capability in a stand in recapitalization effort the war of cultural you talk about of i fly the aircraft three hundred hours a year by the time it gets a thousand hours that's when we think that the aircraft or the longer be useful i think that's the genesis of the chart so we're working through that for example the tucson unit itself the tucson unit look at all the training you do globally i mean and as we sell more to the world they're there supporting importance continues on now they do some of the training with other nations aircraft we understand that plus we have a lot of organic aircraft that are out there so the mission and our commitment for them continue on as they are the question is as we look at the total requirements how do we flow the active duty aircraft to the guard unit messed up future integration problems we have a chance of taking planes away from us from a wing like  that not exactly sure what you're driving at but i think we did look very closely at that i guess the bottom line was integration a consideration when you came up with the number of planes that would be taken out sortie missions are we not putting more pressure on the existing ones we're already well past the design capacity by having fewer planes out there are we not making those that remain even more stressed as we go through them than the of the mill of the gentlemen i appreciate your service here i also think the air force is underfunded wishes were asked twenty two's we'd all be flying in then i'll pray for more wishes and some particular way thank you for what you're mr hunter we have a couple of minutes left of the first round before i get to my questions and i understand you had something you wanted to go a little further and so did mr marshall so we probably got three or four minutes and then mr kissel gave his time away but will go to mr hunter and then mr marshall and if there's any time left we'll give mr kissel a shot and then i have a few questions we'll go to a second round has it been looked at acquisitions some more for the regular guys so you have enough pilots and you have enough aircraft to be able to put them in r c south for instance even have a more specialized group and wants it to at the same time or a different agency wants to use it  as it been been thought about it all and to the ranking members as well but that's what we're trying to get at we're trying to get the right mix the right way right now and if you could give at least a perspective you know you're not expected to usurp secretary gates or anything of that nature will go to mr marshall their older planes they had older platforms many more hours on and the guard units were supplied with planes to fly that's how good they are so we obviously need to keep an eye on that and make sure that we take two s had a basic air to ground capability from the beginning that there would be two one thousand pound bombs carried internally which is the motive operation for the f twenty two the mission of the f twenty two is a largely in the as we have looked at the f twenty two as it is originally come off of the production line and we have wanted to to expand its air to ground capability to bring these newer weapons into play and this results in what i would call a pre planned product improvement program this is what is otherwise called modernization of the f twenty two which brings in incremental additional air to ground capability that is to add both to going from the one thousand pound j dam to up to eight small diameter bombs with the ability to self target by an upgrade to the radar that allows ground mapping the original radar was optimized for what an upgrade to the radar which allows us to do ground mapping of sufficient accuracy that we can self target these g p s guided weapons and to go beyond simply dropping one at a time to dropping multiples by taking advantage of  integration of the avionics so the the f twenty two uses these weapons in the suppression or really destruction of enemy air defense role for the advanced integrated air defense system that i is optimized to fly against high altitude cruise low signature capabilities so that it can in effect take down some of those higher threat systems before other forces come along so that's been part of the philosophy for the f twenty two for at least the last seven or eight years and is now working its way into the baseline for the system through these incremental modernization upgrades responsive to mr low beyond those questions maybe i need some time on it what i mean by responsive is i understand what you said i think we all do but the question was is what hat what is your plan do you have a plan and what is it with if this f thirty five slippage takes place or for or any of the other slippage is take place with regard to the real time do you want us to do yes or right now as we go through ten i'm comfortable to say we're going to go through ten and be ok time for us to affect whatever we need to do as we look at the f thirty five coming on board as we look at the aggregate requirement for fire attack platforms for our nation that the air force provide the problem with that general is that that sign taking little mr little beyond those time here but we've talked about the c for quite a bit and we can do this together the problem here is that we don't have any projection from you past next year i mentioned that in the beginning of my my remarks which is the ordinary way that we do this in fact i think it's legally required of us and what we're expected to when mr skelton is expecting us to recommend to the full committee is what is the lot what what are the likely requirements that we're going to have in terms of funding and numbers the numbers of airframes  and and funding requirements for the future if we don't have a plan we can't give it to him i understand what you're saying tactically speaking or or budget years speaking that well we can get through two thousand and ten and then we're going to take it up but i can't give mr skelton and the rest of the committee that answer is correct frank where we're going i apologize that we aren't going through the rest of the fired up and came into this thing though when i was a rookie and i came on this committee at all this is going to be a general palls going to be ninety six percent he could have told us we were all going to get those horses and the wishes would come true and everybody would have believed that he had and i think a ninety six percent approval rating and the other four percent were going to be committed so he could have done anything but that quadrennial review was a bunch of words on paper that never went anywhere and every other one that's come in has been the same i can't go to really honestly we can't go to mr skelton and say we're depending on the quadrennial defense review because we don't have to sit here and pretend that we thought that was going to mean something so my comment to come back to you and i apologize was you don't have to apologize for november toward the end of the review will take whatever information is available to us as and i apologize doesn't help  mr marshall as a last comment and then i know mister looking forward to our dialogue and you don't have to answer that question that is a suggestion and i would reiterate i would iterated as well that perhaps we could put some language together which will be in the bill not in the report about this to be able to address that thank you all mr a heart and i'd like to take my turn now and go through a few things if we can i have a letter here which i don't believe you have to secretary gates and in april with regard to the joint strike fighter program and the funding for the alternate engine that's ok you didn't look for it i don't believe you have i'm just referencing it for you i suspect it is wandering around in the vicinity of secretary len at the moment i should imagine i'm not so concerned that mr bartlett and i sent this letter six weeks ago that it hasn't been answered because of the obvious changes that have taken place in the department with the inauguration of a new president and and a new spin the wheel turning in o perhaps even another direction at the time however last year before this subcommittee then secretary committed to obligate the author and appropriated funding for the joint strike fighter alternate engine contrary to that commitment and that was a commitment and it was it was commanded if you will by the by the defense bill on a on a bipartisan basis we don't do things in this committee where at all possible on a partisan basis and i would say that's true ninety nine percent of the time contrary to th commitment the office of the secretary of defense has not released the fiscal year two thousand and nine funding for advance for kerim and as i say this is a letter this is a copy of a letter which i'll be happy to send to you but take my word for it is simply asking why advance for chairman funding had not been released are you sufficiently aware of the situation to be able to say to us today what is the status of that funding bill in this fiscal year after all and there's still time to get this moving and under way over and above the projection for two thousand and ten about the was planned i was afraid that that was going to be your answer i wasn't trying to trap you but you realize the logic of what you just said means that we're not going to fund anything that doesn't have exactly that i can see general john swallowing hard right at the moment because that means you can't do any long range planning all the rest of what we talked about today we don't have the exactly the same situation prevails for these other platforms by that i mean in four four  don't leave just discussed here and other then use exactly the same situation is that mean we shouldn't do you're not going to release funding for any of these other in these other directions of the fiscal year two thousand and ten budget request the request did not include any information or data regarding plans programs or budgets for cisco year two thousand and eleven and beyond we don't know what's going to be procured we don't know just what you just said to you said you can't release the funding for the alternate engine because we don't have what we just don't have for everything else i don't want to have somebody tell me what we don't have the everything worked out to two thousand and eleven meon and i said we don't have anything else worked out for two thousand and eleven beyond either this or i understand that i was addressing the specific case of the  the secretary for that matter and talk about this alternate engine i think we can work it out so that it's not in addition to and that we're not in the position for somebody to when somebody else has to lose i think if we look at this in terms of of some reallocation of funding some reallocation of of a reconsideration of numbers with regard to i've got them anyway i we can i'll provide them to you ok you do have the backup slide here this is the f six fifteen and joint strike fighter engine programs compared in terms of this engine difficulty that occurred and the time frame i mean when i look at this it gives makes my heart beat faster because i don't want to share or recommend to the subcommittee or the full committee funding and policy that i have trepidation is not going to be able to be fulfilled that's what we're trying to do the alternate engine or the competitive engine we're not trying to get into a contest of wills with the secretary or most certainly not with the air force we're trying to make this succeed i hope it's clear that the motivation here is to make sure that you get the joint strike fighter that you want to add in all of its permutations all of its iterations if you will that works and that maximizes the opportunity for it to work in a timeframe that that in turn maximizes your opportunity to carry out its strategic requirements the long term necessities that that you've outlined for  not that great comparatively and if we work this right i think we can we can do this and still accommodate everybody as we are well aware the numbers the numbers change all the time two hundred thirty one becomes one of the eighty seven and ninety eight becomes thirty eight or ninety two becomes thirty eight that kind of thing so i'm just putting on the table for your consideration that that let's not get off into the arguments about definitions of advance for kerim and funding and so on let's figure out how we can do this i believe you're going to find a very strong  school of thought in the congress for funding the alternate engine let's not make this by a boy or that people have to throw themselves on let's talk about it in a way that it's a see whether we can accommodate everybody's interest s the fact is that about almost seventy percent of the alternative engine development cost has already been obligated and and i think it's worth the investment and i hope that the secretary will give us the opportunity perhaps to have a little discussion about whether or not that makes sense  i can send some other questions on to you but in that context then i maybe i can ask general darnell in general shachar for if this is not news to you about the great engine war and so on i take it you're all familiar with it right  recitation of what happened during the seventy's and so on was correct i'm not trying to create a mess here that's the information i have is that these difficulties were encountered and i'm not saying that it's necessarily shuttled around because of the readiness problems and the maintenance problems mr chairman i was flying f fifteen to the time when that was going on ye comparison i apologize that was not the intention understand just to point out that there are other items in the one thirty five funding line that aren't directly part of the engine technology itself yes that's right equipment the common exhaust system and whatnot which is part of that cost increase as well as the redesign on the aircraft as a result of the stovl weight problems here a few years ago as we well aware that the weight problems anticipated i can say that was some of that already because i got the transcript out of even our close briefings and close discussions that we had to make sure that i wasn't dreaming up that oh yes i and i knew all latter i brought that up and then it turned out i was dreaming that i did it only wish that i had said it but even to myself not an aeronautical engineer or a pilot it was clear to me you start changing the weight around in some significant way you're going to change everything that has to do with design and and flight testing and everything else because it changes the physics will sense and send you some questions general shackleford if that's ok with regard to your prepared statement on the cost of the alternate engines through f y fifteen and because there are some differences that occurred there i mean from information we got in the past so i'm trying to get an accounting for that ok got it so that i have the right numbers in mind right now just for background information there's three has well over estimated from the outset how much learning they would have at this point in the context you are critical others were critical of the management plan approved in two thousand and  i think you've already stated some of the specific concerns that you had with the plan and the time how do you regard that now i think you've stated it in general terms but how do you regard the driven that we want to get this in the air so we want to get it to our people and so we just write down the number and say well we're going to have to do that why not take longer to do the testing or build out in the long range guy that's why i'm we're not looking here to trap anybody or anything we're just looking to be how can we be helpful and make it work and if you tell you know something we really wanted to do this and we really had our heart set on doing this but you know what the schedule is working out differently because we're getting a hold of the physics of this thing and the testing patterns and so on this is this is not a this is not a model a ford we're dealing with and we're going to have to take more time nobody's going to get me for a second i'll go back a little bit will history to when we were starting out with the thirty five program there was an understanding there was going to be a great deal of currency in the program typically that comes along as you balance  the needs of the test program versus the contractors need to man up to a certain level and then have it within their manning it goes from building developmental aircraft into production aircraft and that's often  several annual low rate initial production as you're trying to move into the production profile that you'd like to get to within the context of looking at the f thirty five as the recapitalization we can come down whatever learning curve exists also to reach more economic order quantity if you will to get the unit cost down as we're buying them from year to year so they're competing pressures to complete that development and at the same time get into production to mitigate that type of currency on the f thirty five program a great deal of up front investment was made in design tools for instance such that that we have at this point in time a greater level of confidence in the design of the aircraft than we would have for the legacy systems go back to that sixteen or f fifteen days as we look at where we stand in production right now the  the change traffic is stabilizing the building process as noted by by mr sullivan has found some issues not the least of which came along when the issue of the design of the wing root was discovered to be an issue a couple of years ago and it went to a redesign but as we have gone through the last six months or so of getting these stabilized into production these are the development to get beyond the production issues cited by mr solomon fairly quickly when you move over to the software side about seventy four percent complete for the entire weapons system software that at this point in time with the sensors and that software flying on the cooperative or avionics test bed or in the granite very elaborate laboratory infrastructure that was put together for the program also that we could have greater confidence earlier that moving forward with production would be a reasonable risk in the annual production buys as we go through the low rate initial production program has to meet certain entrance requirements are  criteria that are established by the defense acquisition executive and these would be key things that he doesn't give them permission to press ahead with the the negotiation of the contract for the next production lot last they have in the bar so to speak on certain technical characteristics of all engines would be an example of that that was part and parcel of that delay but got us to the point where the confidence of those who are closest to the program is high enough that they believe they have reasonable risk in terms of pressing forward with the further work in that area so the whole program was built with that philosophy in mind and  impression that i sleep well every night knowing nothing else going to happen of the j s f but they're really good indicators of this carefully orchestrated program that was based on that upfront investment that really focused the there's another example of it they've just finished some of the static testing on one of the ground aircraft and i believe the phrase is it was going to one hundred fifty percent of its design and it turned out to go to where that where the model it would be the three aircraft that are flying now the last time i asked anyway they're running about seventy five percent returning to the ground without any discrepancies on them at all so in comparison to my experience and just to put it in context i was unable in the sixties in the seventies and in the eighties we didn't have anything comparable to this it's not to say that we don't have challenges in the j s f going forward but the rate that much they're going to cost and whether they're going to want i don't necessarily even object to that by the way i'm not citing that is kind of of showstopper for this doesn't necessarily bother me because it's the sense of the nation and you get what you what you want to get out of and maybe that's the price you pay that doesn't necessarily disturb me but can i ask either any of you are or perhaps i'm sorry you want to of i mean this was one of the recommendations that we made in our report in march that they report to the congress they have to analyze the risk that's involved here and write a report that shows their path to getting to a fixed it right yes in order to get it right it requires cost reimbursement that's you know that's you you present your the professionals you're the ones that have to make those recommendations and and your people have to fly these planes i mean in the end human beings are going to be doing the testing and you have the responsibility for putting them in to those planes along the way and nobody wants to be reckless about it in some respects the reason i'm this is a predicate to what i want to say about or ask about the competitive engine what is your assessment of the competitive edge and over and above whether we should have what is your assessment about the progress of the competitive engine is that also making progress  from what i understand it is making progress it is not an orphan in other words your close attention to it absolutely because you are the congress has appropriated a significant amount of money and we have put a significant amount of money into the one thirty six engine  hoping that you will concluded that the secretary will conclude that perhaps if leak continue along with the alternate engine it is not an expense which is excess and it is one that is is reasonable within the present cost reimbursement universe as we move toward something tex just appreciate it if you would take it into account and perhaps take another look  and i looked at it again this year not only for this hearing but in the budgeting sense overall and it remains that there has been additional investment in the in that second engine the compelling business case to make that upfront investment to garner the benefits down down in the competition area down in the intangibles is still not there so that i can say well i appreciate that although you by way of full disclosure i have never i have said publicly and privately and in many contexts that a business case for say in the ordinary understanding of what a business case is doesn't apply were defenses concerned and that's not a criticism of your of your of your what you just stated so much as a perspective that i hold i believe the people of the united states will pay for their defense and if that requires precisely because it doesn't have all the strategic interests of the country as well as the military personnel expected to carry out the necessary requirements of airliner as opposed to something of an airframe or an and instrument of the air force requires more spending in order to maximize our capacity to produce what we want to produce i think we're willing to pay for it so i never at least in my own approach to this committee i've never tried to operate as if it was my dad's food brokerage business writ large i believe that there is a there's another element to it with regard to our obligations our constitutional obligations as a committee to fund the military of the united states that may involve expenditures that under ordinary circumstances general motors or or chrysler if they're still in business would be doing so i understand what you're saying but from a policy perspective it may be that i ask you once again and that is not necessarily the first consideration that i have in my recommendations i think what we're doing or our attempt here is to supplement and complement what you're doing and that that was in line with what the air force had in mind at least through the first ten years of this project's existence and there is a feeling or a thought in the in the committee that the change from having the alternate engine as part of the budget picture had more to do with budget considerations than it did with strategic considerations or even requirements and and acquisition considerations that was part of the driving force you don't have to comment on that one way or the other i'm just giving you an observation and it has reflected in the opinions that i get from members in the committee so i have my constituency here also that i have to address the bottom line for all of us is we want to provide the best possible foundation financially and in terms of defense policy as written in the defense bill for you to be able to carry out your very important mission which i know all of your completely devoted to aircraft could you tell us for the record the fundamental differences between the joint strike fighter and the twenty two that made it  plane if i can follow just for a moment the russian plane and or chinese variation in what way what do they mean by the next generation or fifteen aeration whatever generation it is for them is whether how much fuel is being used what's what is being required of the plane i mean it's one thing that just goes up in the air and flies as long as it can that's different than going up and and maneuvering and internal capacity i mean they build very large aircraft  yes but again because this is for the record as mr bartlett says and so people can understand it then finally does the the comparables well they're doing how do how do your projections of what you think you can talk about with regard to either the chinese or the the russians or whoever it may be how do how does the development projected as you understand it compared to the f twenty two and the joint strike fighter from our capability ok the reason i go into that in some detail just to amplify a bit mystery here and that's what i meant about the business case i don't think that this is a business you understand why the secretary might want to make that point or you would make that point because you're trying to be prudent with dollars i mean i take that as a given i don't think that there are people in the pentagon that are properly in that regard and don't show any concern and in that respect and perhaps some of the arguments that have been made in public or with regard to particular platforms in the past because there's been failures or miss or a combination of all of these sectors where it made made it seem there was waste or indifference to it i don't think that that's the case here and that's certainly not the position that we're taking  point simply is if that's whatever it takes to accomplish what general darnell has been describing in general terms and that's what we have to do and so if in order to blish that we have to expend funds that wouldn't fit an ordinary case about what the most efficient way of doing something sometimes the most efficient way of accomplishing something special like the joint strike fighter which you're going to it's variations are going to be asked to do different things right now that is an extraordinarily complicated detailed and lengthy process that it's going to require a whole lot of cooperation and teamwork to get accomplished so we're well aware that and we want to try and maximize your opportunity to accomplish that as soon as possible but more importantly the correct way the way that you're comfortable with professionally and saying yes i'd like to be in that plane i'm comfortable in that and i feel totally comfortable in asking someone who has to accept my orders to to take that plane and do what needs to be done so that's all motivation on that note thank you very very much for your candidacy by the way mr a her and i'm thank you very much for being a straightforward today and a lot of these areas where you said you'd be getting back to us we appreciate that because that means it's being taken the questions are being taken seriously and the implications are understood we want to be partners in this this is not a contest i can assure you and i hope that by in a in a short in short order we'll be able to put together a defense bill we can all look to and be proud of thank you very much everybody a