and move on to the first part of argument one and argument by fifteen minutes if you want to reserve a little bit and move as quickly as i can and we're not going to discuss so here it was my time was not my intention unless you had  that the state somehow now has this interest free is is under invalid because there's no evidence that he was the owner the there isn't even evidence that he was a tenets he could have simply been staying there with a i mean the fact that a ninety year old person was living in this house was at least clear eight months before the fire correct there was testimony that the building was fake and there was testimony that actually squatters were in there there was testimony or some evidence of  you know it happening by lighters and things throughout out how do you not recently have to at least reasonably work from all that testimony that there was an interest in this building case that attempts to draw the bounds of a reasonable inference from proven facts and and i can understand your position is because i think your position is that there was squatters being present just efficient to establish the interest rate aggravated arson you would still have to prove that that building along with of another i mean the element that dip that doesn't take away the element that and under illinois  the defense to object or to the introduction of the death certificate as a problem which it was because they didn't as i'm arguing it didn't show that willie jones hadn't any interest in the property and this also could raise red flag to the state well let's go get something out for something a than not that fire will spread even across an alley and across make the lines to another building and he bears that risk given the wind conditions or given everything that existed at the time that he set the fire more likely that the fire is going to spread because it doesn't have to doesn't have to burn those other buildings in that process it's not as easy as just spread to another building it's spread to this building where he knows or has reason to know that people are present it's not just any building down the street and the building across the alley it's best specific building that he's charged with difficulty with knowing contains people and so it's not it's easy that's the state's argument that if you know he is reasonably certain that this fire is going to spread to another building it's not that's happened he was charged he was charged with being reasonably certain that the fire would spread to this particular building that he knew had people in and the state didn't ha spender they have to prove the knowledge of this and what you're saying is that there's really no scenario where let's say just the building next door that most people would presume that nobody lives anywhere and really buildings aren't bright so that you know you really don't have knowledge that you're going to burn a building with anybody in it because there's no reason to think here if people live in houses you don't think the jury could work that there was knowledge about i mean that's that and knowing in fact it's a high standard it's not that less which is leads me to my next point is that the judge at the very least here in refusing to instruct the jury on the lesser included offense of criminal damage to property  certainly evidence that the jury could have found that it was reckless and setting a fire on the back of the porch that the fire would spread to another building to read up without the intent to actually run into a building i can understand that argument but once we have to attend the first building it seems to me that the bad intention cannot be reduced just because it happens to reach a building elsewhere maybe the defendant clearly had a specific intent to burn a bill and he can't all of a sudden have a was not going to hew to him a lesser degree of culpability just because it reaches they'd given the wind conditions on the night of the fire was absolutely i'm quoting a possibility that it might spread to secondary if he's absolutely a possibility that it would spread to another structure is not practically as i say so what about ace there are very few are sane and aggravated arson cases in the state of illinois we can look at the state's case is that they faded outside of state of illinois one published when not but those don't prove i mean they're very difficult ms from a state that has an intentional intentional element to a little bit higher standard than no correct but they also talk about a perfect appurtenance that the buildings basically have to be directly next to each other imus can joins that's the case law that that case relied on the other case has a lower standard and the kids and talk really about where the buildings were in locations one another so they're not helped did you by the defendant that started the entire confrontation i can understand how you can argue that as to other buildings that intent has somehow been reduced and doesn't it doesn't firefighters like that and she would be aware of that doesn't necessarily mean that the fire you mean would be as the statute says substantially probable but my behavior is going to set a fire on the building across the street or across the alley in that way and maybe that's part of the point that had but i guess it's put your ear to decide well that they had the expert been asked that question directly at the fire marshal been asked that question fire would have spread from this building to another building down the line and missing those that were much closer and he wasn't saying no nobody did say it was absolutely a possibility that this fire would which you're suggesting that knowledge cast actually been established and is aware that it knew that the fire would spread in the way it did which is right that there's an issue about it the judge should have instructed the jury on the lesser included offens might have would you want to be the state's attorney arguing gets probably through the trial judge when you were trying to admit it if it were ten years old if the only other built building had been vacant for five years and there had been squatters and yeah but what we have here is that it was not five years demise he had to have an estate or you have to be the owner because once he dies unless he's the owner i don't understand how he could have any interest in the building once he died if he from the death of mr jones eight months before that somebody other than the arsonist now charged with this crime had an interest of the property on the night that the fire took place and is the trial judge i probably would have said to you how do i make that inference just on what you just told the experience cannot be made only with the death certificate but it's also relevant that the building was vacant and that there were squatters there ok living there and there are some lighters or something what is that what's the inference we get what is this the entrance we get is that defendant had zero interest in the body and so therefore someone then defendant had an interest and there was no testimony that house and when he had left when he was knowing in that sense that's a legal no right i mean that's what it that's what we impose on individuals who start fires we're going to say you know when we start of this other fire that that spread for that reason but that's the same sort of knowing the substantial now it's that it was willing to spread to that particular place defendant's mental state to the second house can be reached in two different ways one is because the evidence shows that he was consciously aware what he was doing was starting a fire that was actually starting to spread and she was no amateur showed up at his latex gloves with gas can he ran from the house through shirt that smelled of gasoline and he this was a huge fire with gasoline embers were seen flying across the alley to the second there were embers that were observed flying across towards the building that actually did yes believe it was just officer brian testified that he witnessed embers flying across the alley to the second property and that house caught fire we also have defendants mental state for the doctrine of transfer intact which says when he does an unlawful interest in seconds going on to address the issue of lesser included defendants an act of initially purposefully starting intentional criminal act in the first place not transfer over  based on the common understanding that fires will spread and if they do spread the bird the risk falls on the we were do you have there's no i'm sorry your question what circumstantial evidence do we have we have that it was going to spread to this particular building that we have but we have direct testimony first of all from the fire marshal rivera who testified it was practice certain on a spreading of the fire the evidence regarding now i mean not be quite as substantial as you would need for the evidence and the original fire because i don't see any evidence that he knew it was going to spread to this particular day or that he met the criminal conduct require of knowledge yes thank you very much of times in the neighborhood not that he knew that the defendant didn't live there only that he had seen the defendant a couple of times in the neighborhood and that was to show that he knew that stewart knew that people lived in the building at on princeton secondly transferred intent does not apply  telling if that were the case consider a scenario where you set fire to one building and embraer rise six miles one hundred miles to canada it's it's a miracle but it flies to a hospital that always contains people he's g terms of fire spreading and just one final point unfair lapse is not applicable in that in this case phillips the defendant set fire to a garbage can three feet away from the building this was not three hundred feet w