issues i think we would all agree with that as to the issue before this court now i think it's pretty straightforward and pretty clear and that simply is the plaintiffs have enough evidence to survive summary judgment and to my mind plaintiffs did and i'd like to illustrate that briefly very briefly by reference to two declarations that the plaintiffs put in the evidence in opposition to the summary judgment motion one was the declaration of jay carson who is a high level city department of transportation administrator with firsthand knowledge you know we put him in as a percent be an expert but he had firsthand knowledge of the issues that we're dealing with here in this case and i'll just give you a couple snippets from his declaration  he said with respect for example to the four or five dollars increase in the initial fine up through two thousand and eight that they were adopted soley to raise revenue for the cities general fund not for deterrence and the city did not seek with its increases to promote meter turnover ok and then the other declaration i want to reference just briefly is that  parking meter and th month as well as parking meter protocols and parking enforcement policies more generally anyway and i give the court cites to each of the relations if that's needed as to mr bieber and his declaration he agrees with mr carson on the points that i just reference and he added that the city does not look at the minimal nature of the offense in setting the amount of meter fines in instead it sets its fines as high or even higher than serious safety safety  assuming that we looked at that as relevant to the legal issue how does that establish gross disproportionality with regard to the city making a determination that on its streets  wants to make sure the park was armed force that people don't overstay that it cuts back on traffic congestion i mean how does that affect the gross disproportiona of the sixty three dollars why why isn't that the city's legislative branch entitle to make these kind of determinations for a number that clearly to me at least doesn't shock the conscience well i don't think the standard is shock the conscience i think that's a different process standard but the standards gross disproportionality and i think the plaintiffs are entitled to put in evidence that when the city  these fine amounts that they had considerations other than those that you just cited judge bennett for example just increasing general revenue all those relevant and what you know and the way the summary judgment rules work is the plaintiffs are entitled to have all of that considered but it seems like you're almost asking for a strict scrutiny type narrowly tailored deferential to the legislatures determination of a fine you know seem like you're asking that you ask me some very tightly narrowly tailored connection between the two but seems like we have to apply very differential standard well i agree that standard lee and go through those and and weigh them giving you no deference to the legislative determination but look at all the aspects of it and we think when you look at all the that the evidence was that this number hadn't gone up since two thousand and twelve but i might have the you're wrong santa was sixty three dollars plus fees if you don't pay so if it was thirty dollars but you had the same evidence you have the same declarations there have to be a trial if it was thirty instead of sixty three well st we sued way back in february two thousand and fourteen so it wasn't very long after two thousand and twelve and it may be you know when we look at it in two thousand and twenty if there is a trial we're going to come to a different conclusion than we came to when we filed the case but we've still got those years of over charges regardless of that passage of time but you know there's other factors you know but my question is if you would put in the same types of declarations but the number was thirty instead of sixty three in your view the log would still require there to be a trial if the fin thirty yet but your declarations have the same types of things in them that you say with regard to sixty three establishes disputed issues of fact it wouldn't really matter what the number was that if you have these kind of declarations you get a trial on whether it's an excessive fine oh no that's not our position at all in fact i think we can see a certain amount of the fine would pass consuls constitutional muster quite clearly thirty would we wouldn't challenge that so thirty would be ok sixty three dollars isn't because of your declarations but it ought to be us that makes that determination and not the city council well in  if we have sufficient evidence to cast in doubt the constitutionality of what they're doing and we think we do we're entitled to a trial yes that's their position can you clarify one thing you have brought this as a facial challenge right you're just saying that nobody i mean this is unconstitutional as to everybody is that right well you know we're not here to discuss the classes here to discuss a specific i'm just asking you are you bringing this as a facial challenge yes or no just tell me that i find it hard to answer frankly in this context why because well you can explain i think in the brief but i think it as to it's as applied to everybody kind of you know it's kind of right it's not it's not your position ok but that's true as to everybody even if i have i'm a billionaire it's forty dollars is too much for me to pay that's your position right that's a yeah ok you know and you know i haven't even mentioned the factor us which is poor people are very much affected by this that's why i was asking the question it seems to me there might be a different as applied analysis that could come into play but you have not i read your class definition it was not in any way geared toward how much somebody could analysis you're asking us to conduct because you frame this as a facial challenge that's how i that's why i put the question to you is not something the subclass maybe composed of people who lack the means to pay that would be different right i don't think it's irrelevant because for example if there was a trial please the court gerald sato for the city of los angeles could you start by addressing a question that i don't think your opponent raised but i'm concerned about and it's the separate one hundred percent penalty for nonpayment within what is it thirty or forty days well i guess there is no separate analysis i think by the district court of that question there is none in your brief i guess i find it seems to me there's an entirely different question as to whether that penalty is grossly disproportionate to whatever harm the city might have suffered by the violators failure to pay within the set time period i guess i'd like to hear you address that as a separate matter well st i think sometime earlier in the case the focus of the district court and the parties was going to be on the size of the st fine primary fighting the discussion i think we both discuss this case out of the providence rhode island case in which there was a penalty that unlike the city of los angeles is which is there's a one time doubling of the fine the penalty in  providence could have gone on for ever i think the original fine was thirty something dollars and then by the time the case got to trial the penalties it was several one thousand dollars so there is a limit and i think the i mean i'm not sure that the well put it this way i mean i'm assuming that the grossly dis think it's to the underlying harm of the city not getting the money within the thirty what how many days is it three thousand and forty i've i'm sorry i forgot in the exact what it is it's something it's not immediate but i would i would also emphasize that  the penalty is there not because the the city is hoping people well you know it's up their payments and have to pay the penalty it's there to encourage timely payment and that's important because in order administrative order that becomes final that a fine has to be paid my question at the end but sort of my question is simply this there was no separate analysis no separate th amendment analysis by the district court of the penalty and all i'm asking i think to you is and you fail to engage in any separate housing or break doesn't there need to be some kind of a separate analysis of whether the sixty three dollars penalty that's being imposed against you for not paying the money within thirty dollars or forty days whether that's grossly disproportionate to whatever underlying harm the city is suffering by not getting the money within that time period i i didn't i decide we didn't entitle the late penalties and collection fee in context are sufficiently facially disproportionate likewise warrant a trial and your brief doesn't address that argument at all and although the district court addresses this issue very briefly in a footnote does not appear to have conducted a separate disproportionality analysis so given that it was raised that the district court didn't separately address it in detail and that you haven't addressed it at all in your brief why shouldn't we remain on that question to the district court to look at separately  the excessive fines analysis compares the fine to the it cannot be grossly disproportionate to the offense but when we're talking about a penalty for nonpayment it's not the penalty is there not for the offense it's because the amount has the firing the sixty three dollars has not been paid but then if i want to send you one hundred percent of a late fee disproportionate gross it's disproportionate to the offense of paying late i mean one hundred percent late fee i mean the loan shark would blush at that kind of return rate i mean doesn't that if anything make it more grossly disproportionate if it's tied to being late by twenty one days well again the the purpose of the late fee is not to click more money on top of the fine it's to encourage timely payment we the city i mean sets up payment plans  for when an order becomes final and if there's going to be difficulty in paying that but no i mean we didn't address the that is a separate issue and i guess i've sort of given you my reasons for why i didn't anyway did the did the city ever argue that because these are the city's streets that the analysis of what the city can charge for over parking or not paying a fine on its streets is not subject to an excessive fines clause analysis at all we didn't make that argument because we understood case law to say whether a financial payment required is labeled civil or criminal if one of the purposes of that i'm out is deterrence then excessive fines analysis applies and our position has been well yes the the civil penalty the sixty three dollars is met at least in part to deter other person future parking violations and i think the district courts finding that that is so i think it's supported by the evidence i don't think there's evidence to contradict that so i i think excessive fines analysis is the correct the correct approach in this case i did want to make eleven point about the expert witnesses we had the professor i think of urban affairs and to kind of studies professor and the c p a they tried to compare the city's fines that structure to sort of different kinds of objective standards there's a labor analysis there's different hadn't in in any event those two experts that didn't opine one way or the other whether the city's fine or penalty amounted to a gross disproportionality compared to the offense and the other expert witness mr bieber he's not required to register as a lobbyist but that is what he does and and also his his analysis was it was very much a kind of strict proportionality kind of argument that is you can make generalisations about what residents in the city of los angeles and bases his argument about forty dollars or less than forty dollars on that but that is not what i understand of what i think the courts understand to be the gross proportionality standard  i was going to make a point about the whether this is a face or as applied challenge i think the the court's comments about that and what we've said about in our recent i don't know that there's anything more i could i could add to that if there's anything else i'd be happy to answer that the court's question happy may be a stretch but it looks like we don't have any other questions thank you very much for your very kind you want to put two minutes on the clock for a well i'd like to come back to the question about whether we're suggesting the standards the courts should engage in strict scrutiny of what the city does and in terms of the fine amounts that's not the standard we've proposed think you'll find that anywhere in our briefs what we're saying is what the th circuit us in excess of force cases which is the court must make a searching inquiry of the fine of the penalty and take into account you know certain basic aspects of the end corey such as you know how serious is the crime the offense that cetera but should take into other account other matters that  bear on the inquiry and that's the standard we've proposed here or are proposing let's just go back to these two declarations of the experts because mr sought to address them the city didn't even bother to put in declarations disputing what they said in the summary judgment motion so they were unchallenged and they said look these fines are set arbitrarily but what kind of deferen give the city council when they do set these fines arbitrarily they set them to raise revenue to the general fund not to deter violators it's what kind of difference is the city council entitled to and in that context you know circumstances and that's our argument we don't think very much but bottom line is that we put enough in there there's enough factors in this mix and enough questions and enough very dubious aspects of what the city is doing in terms of arbitrariness setting the fines for the for parking meter violations as high as safety of violations safety parking violations to not proceeding in a manner that really requires you know a great great but the difference in this particular factual context and we're saying to really sort this out we need a trial that's really what we're saying i'll just close on this you know there's something rotten in the city of l a when you look for example at the city of glendale in the city of pasadena and you take the initial fine in the initial way panel lete l a city is fifty two dollars higher than the city of pasadena and that and thirty four dollars higher than the city of glendale it just doesn't smell right and we think we