exception also applies here because the residual clause is unconstitutionally vague and subsequent precedent has applied it retroactively mr entry a should have been able to apply for voluntary departure and the court should vacate her reentry conviction what i have a an initial question which you probably won't find surprising and that has to do with the supreme court's consideration of the my yes i've tried to make like a little chart of what would happen if the court went this way and the court went that way guess my first question to you is if the supreme court for whatever miraculous reason were to reverse our decision and my then would inevitably this collateral attack not ok so let's say they affirm it and then they leave retroactivity up in the air so then what happens well then i think that the court needs to look at the principles of retroactivity that are generally applied and i think an indicative sign of that is what the supreme court did in welsh where it applied johnson retroactively and obviously we're not saying that kuli controls here but i think it's a really good sign because what the supreme court did in welsh is they basically did a t v land analysis and i think it is the overarching standard that we often use for retroactivity and in welsh it said yes read this is a substantive type of case that we will apply retroactively and because this court in the dollman dosa already set up this narrow an exception for similar cases where there was a constitutional issue of notice and the supreme court said we're applying this retroactively we think that it fits here in that narrow exception now i want to make sure that the court knows that we're not asking that you know this exception be bro beyond our case because there are a lot of changes in law for instance with de camp or with mathis where you know if if we were to expand this narrow section to them it could potentially swallow the rule but what  is that the camp and matheson thing cases like those are actually statutory construction cases and the court has said that in the hay vs context here unlike that this is a constitutional issue that applies retroactively and because of that that's why we believe that this is more like the narrow exception that deals with a constitutional issue as into twelve c then it is the standard the dolman dosa case here's a question i have pale by the supreme court the i j it vies your client at the time of the correct law at the time she was not eligible for voluntary departure haven't we also held that the i j a doesn't isn't required to anticipate future changes in the law and that if they give the correct advisement at the time that sufficient ye and that and that's what the court's decision in the past have relied on but what happened in leon paz which is the narrow exception to the dominoes it is that the court said that there are just some cases that are so fundamentally iranians that we don't necessarily look at whether the i j a made of steak or could have been clairvoyant there are some cases that it's just too egregious of an error to say that we are going to convict you even though the statute under which you would have her eligibility for voluntary departure and i'm wondering if that rises to the level of agree just in this as some of the other types of advisers and when there's actually the real substantive basis relief from the part ability is out there we believe it does your honor and the reason is you know the government has argued for instance that in this case and like and st cyr ms rand mentary didn't have a settled expectation and i have two responses to that the first response is that sincere didn't rely on people subject reliance it didn't say did you rely did you not and sort of parse it that way it said for this class of people we're going to say that this you are eligible for relief and then the other reason that i think this is more like st cyr is that even though ms wrench urrea had notice in the sense that this was an aggravated felony she did not have notice in the sense that she didn't know what the statute meant because it was void for vagueness so in the same way that a person doesn't have notice of of the later consequences similarly ms wrench urrea didn't have notice of what the residual clause meant and that's why we believe that it's the same here and if with your honor's permission i'll say the remainder of my time you ma statutory interpretation rule is that unless congress speaks clearly statutes apply prospectively only and so when the i g told mr lay on that he was ineligible for two one to see relief the i j a misinterpreted that law but it's just that sometime down the road the law changes because that statute becomes unconstitutional or is wiped out so can you think of a situation where in the govern you it would be proper then to the applicant the benefit of the doubt i don't think so i think that the dominoes is fairly clear that the pretty bright line rule and in fact the sort of question of need of a new interpreting statutory interpretation of the evolution of definition that aggravated felony they said this is new precedent it creates a new previously unavailable possibility of relief achieved in the law that didn't apply at the time of the hearing so r quotes the documents that is sufficient and also point out that although the defense defense counsel did object to the plus fifteen enhanced they are they never made the argument that the conviction documents were insufficient under the modify categor approach so for example in the objections to the p s r thirty six to forty there's never an argument about the documents being insufficient same thing at the i think at the sentencing hearing they never objection below and specifically gonzalez a person has said that it wouldn't apply where defense counsel did unsuccessfully argue before the district court admittedly on different grounds that he raised on appeal that the prior conviction should not trigger enhancement in other words read knowledge that the objection here was on a different basis but a priest to itself says even when the objection was on a different basis below that holding saying you can just read the faction the the documents or the content of the documents into the piece are denim that that that holding want to ply there and i think the other thing that there's a real concern that undergirds this whole idea that we don't look to the p s r and the reason is because there have been recent cases before this court where there are ambiguities in the conviction documents and for instance you know the complaint says this that it has count one and then it's count one a or that sort of thing and if you have a rule saying that the judge can just rely on what the p s r characterizes the conviction talk means to say a probation officer doesn't have any incentive to look for those ambiguities and to be aware of those ambiguities and when we're talking about this level of a a sentence and handsome and i think there needs to be more certainty then there would be from just relying on the probation crowding from them he must have them why wouldn't they be produced i don't understand why they wouldn't be produced i don't you know i'm not sure why and and it's it's mysterious and i don't have an explanation for your honor quite honestly chris you have this odd situation where maybe they have them but then nobody makes an objection because the defense counsel essentially stipulated right well we objected to the sixteen level sentencing and hansen correct on different grounds different grounds right but not on this ground where if there was a problem with in making the documents at that time it could have been fixed but now in the situation where holding it's holding doesn't apply even when the objection was on a different basis i don't think that this panel can go outside of that where are you talking about where it says the defense had raised some sort of objection exactly i have this it's six sixty three f bit mr the characterization of crime we can go back and look at that language either way i think that says that if it's on different grounds and that's it was on different grounds here and i think that's all  notice at the time that they pleaded guilty and that's a due process as issue st cyr characterized it as if we held to the contrary this would violate due process so i think that the issue that we have here as in st cyr into twelve c was constitutional it has been applied retroactively by the supreme court and that's why we believe that ms entry is eligible for relief thank you thank you thank both counsel this morning for your argument we appreciate the argument and the briefing in this case the case is now submitted