this court does in fact have the authority and the jurisdiction to hear this to feel though the appellant waived her right to appeal generally as she did not based on this court's prior case  law specifically wait for a right to appeal the restitution order issued by the just her court all but one of the arguments she has raised here are arguments that the district court exceeded its a appellant did not have notice under this court's precedent of what she was waiving when she implemented the waiver before the district court and that is because she had no idea  under the agreement how much i restitution she would be ordered to pay this court has held that it is appropriate for a district court judge to order restitution where a plea agreement does not contain a cap on that restitution but if  tough spot with respect to the third issue whether the government through the expenses i think you've got a good argument with respect to the first two the travel expenses being the threshold question as to what been waived here and what has not been waived the issue of medical expenses to my knowledge is not at issue here it was not raised by the government we did not have the four hundred fifty thousand dollar four hundred thousand dollars medical expense that the government was seeking below was rejected by the district court and the government did not appeal and talk about whether the government presented sufficient evidence to establish a claimed los that issue we would be required to show to address the no this issue that philips the united states versus phillips in the united states versus gordon cases address and that's what i was trying to address a moment ago which is that there was no cap on restitution and where there's no cap on restitution in the plea agreement and there is an ambiguity this court in those two previously mentioned cases has concluded that that the defendant the appellant did not have the appropriate subject to two different interpretations in fact we don't believe it's in the us at all our position is that the language is quite clear and that the district court was limited to ordering any expenses incurred by the victim which is what that phrase indicates it means absolutely need to find that the district court exceeded its authority to use the words you've used to get to the ultimate merits here i'm not sure that i understand your argument that the district court exceeded its authority and therefore this issue was properly before us right now but even if that is the case do we have to find that the court exceeded its authority in order to reach the ultimate issue here under thirty six sixty four what the defendant was agreeing to who the defendant was agreeing to pay is the physical victim who is now deceased and his assignees which in this case is the victim's family for any independent losses that they may have occurred completely unrelated to the physical victim but had they chose the language more carefully and had put the victim or his assignees that would be more clear because then one could argue that the defendant was required to pay the physical ficta him or in his absence because of death support why is that the case and that brings up the case of united states versus keith where the where the female i think was a rape victim was permitted by this court to recover her travel expenses when she herself travelled  and the statute in this context allows recovery for victims who have been physically or it sustained by the only injury and did these victims the family did not sustain bodily and listen this is just a logical extension of ke statutory language the panel there failed to cite the rest of the sentence and the rest of the sentence was that they were entitled to recover non medical care or treatment rendered in accordance with a method of healing recognized by the law of the place of treatment the court pigeonholed the travel expenses incurred by the victim there to get over the restrictive statute and to allow dismissed the respect i mean in every respect i believe in every respect except the jurisdictional issue which cannot wait is my understanding but what about the legal issues as opposed to let's say the factual issues i think the defendant appealed only a portion of the restitution order arguing that it was illegal or that the defendant didn't have sufficient information the court did find that it was vague that the that th amount there were and i believe that the issue is whether or not it was a knowing involuntary waiver at the time of the change of plea the p s r was after that but at the time of the change of plea the defendant did know that she was going to be responsible for restitution and she agreed to pay restitution she knew that medical expenses would be included in that restitution she knew that any expenses under thirty six sixty three or thirty six sixty three a whichever statute the court applied would be included in that let's assume that there's a valid there's a valid appeal here there's been no waiver this is the ultimate issue here who's going to be reimbursed whether it's going to be the friends of the of the family who at one point were identif prior opinions that the defendant and i believe that's crawford that the defendant needs to show that the amount it's like an offset the amount that he's entitled or she's entitled to an offset was for the exact same expenses that were paid by either an insurance company or friends that is not the record in this case in this case the defendant stepfather testified that they had received money from friends the defendant's step father testified that it was similar to a funeral are able to appreciate the existence of thirty six sixty four and he didn't know whether there could be restitution if if other people had stepped up to the plate he speculated as to whether or not the collateral source rule and toward would apply this record is not clear the record does say that mr hart the stepfather to testify that he received money he termed out loans but when he was asked whether or not he would have to pay that money back he said no one ever asked that it be paid back additionally he was given money that you ultimately use for these travel expenses and food expenses but the record does the defendant did not establish and there's nothing in the record to show that the money was given specifically for the purpose to travel to phoenix to be with his son he could have used it for babysitting expenses and i think there was testimony at the restitution here being that they had babysitters watching their other children every day they would travel from san carlos to phoenix which is about an hour and a half drive round trip so three hours round trip and all they were asking for where they're get was their gas money and their meals while they were in phoenix they didn't ask for babysitting expenses they didn't ask for in the restitution order and what was presented to the court so this money could have been used their living expenses while they were taking care of willie while he was in rehab facility in phoenix it could have been used for babysitting it could have been used for car repairs had the car needed to be repaired and i think there was testimony about  that it's the government's position that she has the burden of proving that that money came and was used for that specific source as in crawford this court held that the that i believe it was the insurance money from the defendant was not there was no the government also crawford the fed then in crawford there was a rule eleven violation that the defendant was never informed of his requirement to pay restitution this court found that failure to provide that rule eleven notice in his plea colloquy was not sufficient to abrogate the waiver of appeal the court still held the defendant to the way or appeal even though he didn't have notice about the specific requirement to pay restitution because he had been informed that he would have to pay a certain fine of two hundred fifty thousand dollars fine in the restitution order was much lower that and that in this case the government argues that the defendant had sufficient notice that the medical expenses just simply the were making medical decisions for their son and needed to be present at the hospital but we argue as in crawford and they knew who they had although they didn't have the bills they had the medical records were about which were about two inches thick the defendant had been in the hospital for ten months or in rehab facilities for ten months from the time of the accident until he passed away and that because of that they were on sufficient notice that the medical bills would be significant and in this case the court made the determination that the defendant was not required to pay the four hundred thousand dollars in medical bills but did require the defendant to pay the twenty three thousand based on the fact that we believe that she had sufficient notice during the  what she would be responsible for in restitution we believe she has waived her right to appeal and we would ask that you dismiss this appeal thank you counsel the case just argued will be submitted for decision and we