we believe  the making or performance but contract recognizes contract with somewhere in the it required performance by mr brock and mr brock sent money on several occasions to arizona and entered into an agreement which of the undisputed facts in this case demonstrates very succinctly why personal jurisdiction was lacking in illinois this is a case in which a dissolved arizona corporation corteen a financial and gauged in arizona law firm initially to defend a quiet title lawsuit filed in maricopa county arizona that pertain to real property in arizona that was back in two thousand and one that lawsuit was subsequently dismissed and again in two thousand and five fourteen it engaged the arizona law firm once again to analyze issues related to a ground lease for a driveway adjacent to that real property in maricopa county arizona and there was a suggestion at the time that the arizona corporation could pursue a non judicial foreclosure under arizona's deed of trust that shoots to foreclose on the real property that was secured by that grounds and in two thousand and thirteen the arizona corporation engaged the arizona law firm to conduct that non judicial foreclosure subsequently the arizona law firm realized that the prospect of  foreclosure was both probably legally inadvisable and potentially represented a conflict of interest so they withdrew from the representation it should also be noted that this arizona corporation one hundred percent of its shares are owned by in arizona trust the david a north the second trust the beneficiaries of that trust have been residents of arizona since the mid one nine hundred eighty s the word illinois did not appear once in that recitation of the facts and that's why illinois lacks personal jurisdiction in this case i agree with mr royce's assertion that the trinity of personal jurisdiction is made up of for the form the defendant and the cause of action but when you look at those three components all of those clearly implicate arizona the defendants here are arizona citizens the forum in which they were engaged to perform legal services was arizona and the causes of action in this case we have one for negligence of breach of contract and breach of produce shiri duty but those are all really legal malpractise claims they all pertaining to services they were in the defendants were engaged to perform in arizona so if we look at the cases of walden versus fiore and then the subsequent seven circuit decision in advance tactical there can really be no question that the only link to illinois in this case is that the trustee of this trust happens to have an office here in chicago the trustee was also at one time the president of the defunct corporation that's correct it was an officer in some capacity i think be engagement letters were signed in this capacity secretary or treasurer but but i would agree with that your honor that the trustee was an officer of the defunct corporation but even that in light of  in an advanced tactical that alone would not confer personal jurisdiction in illinois what does the record speak to the backstory of flying a local arizona financial firm with would district court realized there appeared to be a defect in diversity jurisdiction so the original plaintiff fourteen a filed a supplemental jurisdictional statement which actually gave some very illuminating backstory on the trust in the corporation and it appears that when the trust was formed it was an illinois trust and the beneficiaries were chicago residents the subsequently relocated to illinois i'm sorry to arizona in the mid one nine hundred eighty s and then the trust itself  was made a arizona trust in america county superior court in two thousand and eleven so the party started out here in chicago and it would appear that they retained the services of mr brock who had served as the trustee an officer of this corporation for for many years so that that's the connection judge but lon since reconstituted in arizona i would i would say so judge definitely i really feel that the  real party in interest under rule seventeen doesn't necessarily confer personal jurisdiction and i think that's where there's a divergence of opinion between myself and my mike co counsel on the other side there  that an out of state attorney was retained to perform well it was a case in which a wisconsin resident engaged in michigan attorney in a medical malpractise case to sue a michigan doctor and is in most cases there's an engagement letter that signed by the plaintiff in wisconsin in the defendant lawyer in michigan the plaintiff in wisconsin pays a retainer to the lawyer in michigan and the court in ct held very unequivocal e that those actions were not enough to confer personal jurisdiction but those are the same actions that the appellant's keep pointing to in this case and they did that well it seems to me at home could  makes very clear that the analysis of personal jurisdiction with the long arm statute is coterminous with the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment so whatever tourist diction the long arm statute confers it can t have any greater with or expansive this that goes beyond the fourteenth amendment so whether we're looking at something that's actually the logic of the analysis is the same yes judge you know subject any questions on the issue of personal jurisdiction i will touch very briefly on the issue of subject matter jurisdiction candidly i don't think it's necessary for the court to resolve this case on the basis of subject matter jurisdiction i think the issue of personal jurisdiction is  really what the court is focused on here in what is clearly lacking on the issue of subject matter jurisdiction the lawsuit was initially brought in the name of cortinas which is a defunct arizona corporation the defendants themselves or or arizona citizens and judge conelly in the district court recognized sue a sponte that that presented a problem for purposes of diversity jurisdiction so the palance basically did a party swap the swapped mr brook in his capacity as the trustee for the trust that owns one hundred percent of the shares of this corporation as the real party in interest under rule seventeen and i will certainly grant  appellant's the fact that the supreme court case of newman vs green certainly allows the practice of dismissing non diverse dispensable parties at the district court and even on appeal to preserve diversity jurisdiction what newman green did not do was sanction what the appellant's did in this case which is do a wholesale switch out of one party for another and in our brief we cited the case the end of the late c p special contribution fund that's a district court case out of ohio but it actually does  cases from the second third and fifth circuits which all support the position we are advocating which is you can use rule twenty one to drop the party to curators of the effect and conceivably even add parties to