the morning you may please the court also my name is michael rhesus and i'm here this morning on behalf of mickey on hospital as epilogue i would have fifteen minutes and if i could carve out a five minute can read this quote resulted in injuries or death by reason of medical malpractise close quote so it seems clear enough thirteen to twelve eight we submit respectfully is in a  well now hayes tells us that for contribution we're looking at the all contributors liability or obligation to pay jamie just by reason of its tort liability to the point of that's what pace tells us that's the answer we're a as we have subsequently been instructed if i can go on based on the more recent supreme court case in favor sources bowman that when we're looking at  relationship between the hospital as the blamers principle and it's doctors the doctors who've been sued and allegedly are it's a parent's agents and we submit that we complied with a five year statute of limitations because of the not begin to run until we sold with the plaintiff on july twenty five two thousand and eight and we time we filed our color claim against the doctors who w e we get to gilbert in one thousand nine hundred three all over what we're talking about hades and then we're talking about actually we're talking about really active vs passive all right what talking about construction related activity in the courts said we're not talking about the nature of a construction related activity but instead we're talking about the liability that the construction defendants owed to the bonding company and obligated to pay in the underlying soup this leads us by reason of into the the contract obligations and done a fight here we have something which is implied the court is not going off on the idea that one is expressing the other's implied right that's got that's got nothing to do with whether it's a the case but thirteen to twelve which is talking about actions for damages or right when you're talking about ind you can't simply look at this from the standpoint of well whether we're talking about contribution or for talking about indemnification we're looking at the doctor's liability to the point that's now what the nature of the claim is that maybe what the nature of a contribution claim is right i mean that's what he says i'm not arguing against hayes if we're filing a contribution claim or we wouldn't be here this is an implied indemnification claim it's based on you're looking at the wrong end of the coin you're looking at the end of the claim all right a lot of patient care the doctor's liability to the point of which is what you're doing course the defense liability would have been for construction related activity if it was to the original point tough i mean granted it's expressed as implied but i don't think million we had to pay one they had three million in coverage they pay two we're going to care for them for the one they don't have any liability above the one that we paid their be here to extinguish their liability so they're not has interrupted that scheme it's nine hundred eighty two so for eighteen years lawyers and hospitals and insurance companies have been living under the regime of ash just in the interim citizen trillion consistent and you really only have actually out there that addresses the situation and as we've gone over ensley those apply hayes which on the supreme court case and it's least looking at the doctor's it be better for you to be this way the supreme court does think i'm not i'm not asking you to rewrite the statute i'm not asking you to decide what would be a better public policy all and i am saying and i think you can find plenty of cases to bear this out that public policy is found not only in this constitution and knowing the statutes and the knowing supreme court opinions but also i mean i think judge and justice hawkeye respectfully some of this distinctions are drawn between travelers in this case all right i don't believe i don't there's no you're not looking at their liability in the ongoing case you're looking at a very wide ability to the  plaintiff i believe my time is up but i say in conclusion all i can say is that we are mindful that all arguments is a privilege and not a right we are grateful for the chance to address these important issues this morning because they do touch on public policy as well as on statutes and how statutes will be interpreted and based on travellers based on trailers based on the arguments and our police we ask you to reverse and give us the opportunity to prove our claim  in interpreting the application of thirteen to one to the hayes court placed a great deal of emphasis on the or otherwise language in thirteen to one to no action for damages for injury or death against a physician whether based upon tort or beach or contract or other rights arising out of patient care shall be brought more than four years after the date of the occurrence the haze court interpret that to say what the legislature buttressed by the arising out of patient care language and hayes has focused on they have this is an action arising out of patient care we have a statute of limitations that dictates that all actions arising out  patient care are covered by the statute of repose so we have both the exceptions to thirteen to one who are specifically spelled out in their disability and fried there's nothing about indemnification be excepted from that statute whether express or implied the legislature clearly intended the scope of thirteen to one to be very broad and to encompass any action arising out of patient care there's no doubt that the have a statute that specifically sets for any actions arising out of patient care thirteen to one two in the statute of repose applies and that argument was addressed in both hayes and ashley and ashley said that i don't it doesn't matter if you call it an implied indemnity action what's happening is you are seeking damages against a physician or a hospital or a health care provider and under those circumstances thirteen to one to  think in the mail situation we don't need to look at this retort relationship but in the construction situation we do it and i don't think it's that simple your honor i think we can't work backwards from travelers we have to look at this is an implied indemnity agreement arising out of patient care the traveler situation is an interpretation of an express written contract for him i mean there were homes for yes but the the the underlying action arises out of patient care there is no implied indemnity action here ashley decision actually said we're going to follow hades has extended this to a contribution action we're going to follow hayes because it makes sense that this is also implied and extended to an implied indemnity action and that's exactly if if the underlying action did not arise out of patient care but that's not the situation here i'm going to ask you i mean and i said that i wanted to just see exactly what your argument right the occurrence complained actually the court covered a lot of what i was going to say in your questioning of their counsel but there were a couple of extra points that i wanted to make  yes the ashley court addressed the issue as to whether an implied indemnity action should be considered differently because it's a quasi contractual relationship in the ash the court stated that a suit for implied indemnity against a physician arising out of patient care exposes the insurance company and the medical care providers to the same liability as the patient's underlying lawsuit so there's no question that the particular issue before this court has been nationally therefore we das since we have a statute of limitations directly on point in the illinois supreme court decision and a decision from this district appellate court applying section thirteen to one a contribution the action not an implied indemnity issue but a contribution the action against a physician and their case was deemed to be within thirteen to twelve so again another case where the concept of there is a big difference between the reach of thirteen to twelve i think it's fundamentally different because of the policy reasons that even putting that aside and trying to look at thirteen to fourteen in the traverse case shareholder and you know i think it was a husband and wife who had an interest in the company they couldn't be sued on their contract on that underlying contract and i think that's a significant distinction but i think the probably the the the actually case and i think also in justice cunningham you raise this question at the outset of mr aris is argument about what about this policy about trying to avoid a long tail of viability and mr aris is like i believe seeking the position that's not the case or everybody came in at the same time but his argument would and if there were if it were accepted would mean that the hospital could have waited to sue and have two thousand and thirteen ten years after the surgery and i don't think that's what the legislature had in mind at all when it when it decided or when they had an eight to thirteen to twelfth because i'm sorry  but would have been ten years after the surgery because the settlement was in two thousand and seven and then you had another five years if you go to the thirteen to a five stitchers that's a long time i don't think that's what the legislature in mind justice tice i think you stole my thunder a little bit in raising the issue of the big picture we used to see change here that should call for this court to depart from ashley and i have to submit there's no sea change that's been signaled by the legislature there certainly is no sea change that's been signaled by the on our supreme court and so i would guess that the court follow its decision and actually follow the supreme court's decision and rising out of it as opposed to the language expert used against is this case really going to turn on the language in thirteen to twelve it talks about are rising out of patient care where store chain to approaching talks not about a