per se and citing five hundred and fifty six dollars as the standard of care and that is what i believe this statute represents it represents a standard of  concluding ultimately the statute provides no greater rights or remedies then the common law no matter how you read it in that case the bell south that argued that because of the use of the phrase all damages all losses somehow it was entitle to recover from the electrical contractors anything and everything it suffered as a result of the in the gave rise to the case and the court went through not only the statue word for word but also of the legislative history and noted as we did in our brief that really the crux of what it does talk about the that if an excavator is found liable for a violation of the statute it's liable for the total sum of the losses to all parties involved we contend that that does not right i would think that this statute talks in terms of well it says all parties involved and as opposing counsel correctly noted we don't really know who parties is but it seems in the context to really refer to maybe the member operators well so are they talking about owners of underground facilities and all of the other people the statute talks in terms of the liability the member upper rater excavator and sit and it goes down section by section talking about the liability of each one of them and at no point does this particular section of the statute one o six talk in terms of personal injury liability in those cases brought by individuals or rd parties who might have been injured here  suggest that there are other losses in damages that are recoverable under oh yes absolutely we who are you who can you be liable to if a thirty if a person is walking on the street let's say you have a it talks about the liability of an excavator to parties which is undefined but why would i believe would be member operators owners of an underground compare the language of the statute to the language of a number of other statutes that we both have cited with similar language and similar intent you will see  specifically under actually the ita host at you which is discussed in the briefs does talk about damages to the facilities and all costs and expenses including damages t  rd persons incurred by the public utility by the public utility as a result of that contract this language has been deemed to be language authorizing a claim for indemn well i think that hinson really shows why they are truly isn't quote unquote substantial doubt while it is absolutely true that this statute has not been construed by the florida state courts in any great manner it's also true that as in hinson if one looks at the state law regarding statutory construction one can easily construe by virtue of the language used and the purpose behind the statute as specified in the statute itself which is damaged  and also the legislative history of the statute one can can reach a rational interpretation of the statute which meets its legislative goals which is damage prevention not every case of st impression warrants certification to the florida supreme court as court has mentioned this statutes been around since one thousand nine hundred and and no i don't think so i think different courts  that is correct that is absolutely but i think that the hanssen case although it doesn't directly address subset and b does talk in terms of the legislative  the way the statute is structured to talk about the relative liabilities of a member upbraid or the some of the board members etc as ultimately providing for standards of care but not creating a separate and distinct cause of action predicated on the violation of the statute and not basically trumping the common law not adding anything to the common law and if there is any change to the common law it would be in that specific portion of the statute that talks about a cap on liability for very specific economic damages but every case that i've seen that deals with this statute and actually cases in others that in other states dealings in miller's statues they're all planned in terms of negligence or for economic damages authorized under the statute the cause of action was for negligence and negligence per se and pose in counter claimed against  j s and interesting just as an aside was said p t s in that lawsuit actually sought compensation in the form of attorney fees that incurred in litigat say so actually my thought was why wasn't that case paired with this case why was there a cause of action for economic damages a separate cause of action for alleged indemnity one way or the other it's certainly could have been litigated all at one time but what's interesting to know is that in the underlying personal injury claim santos alleged that a number of different parties were clearly at fault and nobody at that point raised the argument or the affirmative defense that terms of a member operator who has failed to discharge a duty under the act and says that if the excavator risk found to be not at all at fault then the member operator is liable for all of the damages nothing in this talks in terms of comparative fault but i would suggest that that silence means nothing in so far trumping the common law what it does provide is where one party is totally at fault that party eats all of the damages i think that's all that this means i don't think that you can not that a to where is there anything in this debt that provides for of the monies they paid to an individual mr santos who sued them for the direct negligence for the violation of their duties with that would think no sense it would have no