agency's interpretation of a statute that agency is charged with administering that interpretation is entitled to substantial deference that was recognized by the court in chevron as the district court correctly noted though this case does not involve the construction or interpretation of a statute when an agency and sharpens its own regulations that interpretation is entitled to substantial deference however is that this or core correctly noted also in the present case this case does not involve the interpretation of regulation the fact that the regulations do incorporate or refer to special provisions but the only general reference does not make the provisions the substance of provisions of the special provision part of the regulations express purpose of considering the limits of judicial deference the agency interpretations and what the supreme court held is a judicial deference is only and in and i should say chevron deference to substantial deference is appropriate only when  one of the argument that the as made throughout this proceeding was that it would be illogical to afford chevron deference to the basic provisions and the rice crop provisions but not the special provisions we would disagree with that in our unit is entirely logical for that result one of the basis for the decision it made was the fact protection was simply prepared by the agency that agency can change it at the whim with the stroke of a pm which is exactly what they did here it's not that easy to row regulations or to adopt new regulations you have to go through the nose and comment rule making procedure which provides that safeguard it's completely lacking here we believe that several deference does not apply and it baskett more deference would be the standard to be considered under skidmore the court is required to further believe that when read as a whole the special provisions are fairly clear and support the interpretation that we advance that only those levies required to flush the field are required by the be construed to apply to that to that level and not to require the entire system of levees which have nothing to do with flushing the field in many cases i understand that argument but as i read the  special division certainly could have been drafted better and its support of our opposition i think is appropriate because if and when you look at the intent of the special provisions in the administration record makes pretty clear that the whole intent  special provision was still avoid paying clients to farmers that planted rice but did not take the steps to be able to flush that field if necessary as well parts of the special provision and why it was adopted in the first place so when you consider that not apply hasn't done that and now they want to argue preemption even though the court has told them exactly when preemption would apply and it does not apply here so we would assert respectfully that the state law and the laws on the rules governing construction of contract they are when you when you read the special provisions as they are currently written they would support very clearly the position that were taken and one of the thing i would like to point out that in the administrative record is a letter from the director of the  to senator roy blunt who made an inquiry regarding the special provisions and what the director says is with respect to the special provisions these provisions are based on published recommendations of the university of missouri the university of arkansas or louisiana state the ability to flush as opposed to the entire levee system that would be required maintain a permanent flood on that rise and we believe that that is farther evidence number one of how the dantin in the meaning of the original provision but only required an interpretation if it's of the statute or the regs and the agency has not adopted a procedure for issue and it's our protections of special provisions and for that reason we do not think they have the authority to issue a binding inter interpretation if order be set aside for that reason as well i would like to reserve the balance if there are no further questions you may do so thank you thank you very much  united states department of agriculture federal crop insurance corporation and risk management agency the lower court properly applied heightened deference to the interpretation that issue an up held it however before i get to that i'd like to briefly describe for you some of the basic parties at issue and statutes and regulations at issue appellants are farmers in southern missouri involved in an arbitration proceeding with their private insurance company regarding their rice crop from two thousand and twelve the private insurance company is not involved in the present litigation in federal court the arbitration is stayed pending resolution of the matter before your honor's that is where the facts will be heard the facts are not issue here the facts were not considered by f c c when it issued its interpretation the government is involved at this stage because the underlying policy of crop insurance is federally reinsured by the federal government pursuant to the federal crop insurance his act which is the statute that creates the entire large umbrella of federal crop insurance that was the act which created the other apple the federal crop insurance corporation an r m a risk management agency the f c c i see is a federal agency of the united states department of agriculture created to carry out the purposes of the statute it acts as the reinsurer for these federally reinsured policies it is a relatively small enti larger entity is are and may is essentially the worker bees are managing and running crop federally reinsured crop insurance it's also an agency of the united states department of agriculture it is by highly skilled agronomists and it regulates and oversees the implementation of federally reinsured crop insurance for the federal government to reinsure a crop insurance policy between a private farmer and that farmers private insurance company it requires a lot of things including it dictates exactly what must be in the policy now a policy includes three provisions first provision is a basic provision it is found in the codified regulations next is the crop specific provision which is of course rice next is the special provisions which pertain to rice grown in daughter county missouri for the year two thousand and twelve special provisions are not verbatim in the regulations and essentially that is what brings us here today special provisions are by definition highly specific extremely granular and include things as detailed as planting in reporting date for a specific crop season in the specific provisions which control now that rule is also found in the regulations the regulations mandate interpretations of that policy when there's a dispute between insurance company and  farmer about a term and remember they are defined as part of the policy and the regulations mandate but that would be binding in arbitration now standard of review is obviously the largest issue before this court the lower court properly found that the standard review should be that as articulated in our view robbins and agencies interpretation of its own regulations is controlling i must plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulations now this court in the rain in hale case at four twenty six said third nine seventy six applied hours controlling regulation the standard of review articulated in our view robins when inter when the s c i see the same party here interpreted its managers bulletin a manager's bulletin is not a regulation it has no force of law and it did not have formal rulemaking however this court wisely found that because of a police unique experience in the complex circumstances of federally re insuring crop insurance policies that was the appropriate standard of review the manager's bulletin at issue in rain and hail is different than the special provisions which are more important the main issues because it was not a part of the policy asked the question about this post two thousand and twelve changes to the special provisions that are mentioned in the pellets brief obviously they are now different from what they were before and they were changed to something else but what is at issue here is what special provisions were in effect in two thousand and twelve so whatever rationale for changing them is not before this court that is that it would be the underlying facts in some other matter or in some other forum what is it what is before this court is whether apple clearly erroneous in interpreting their own words their own mandate well if the if the terms of the terminology in the special provisions are unclear or subject to various interpretations would be would these changes couldn't couldn't it be argued that these changes clarify the meaning of the special provisions no your honor the special provisions first of all i disagree with your premise that they were not clear the special provisions at issue say the following must have occurred immediately following seating levees or surveyed in constructed levee gates are installed and budded and then a third section on irrigation c i c interpreted that as stating all that must be surveyed and constructed all levees must be installed and budget plaintiff's proposition to see as to what those plain words really meant added added more words then in the special provision at issue and added language in conditions that made it unknowing how to manage and monitor this provision of farm insurance plaint appellants at ask that the special provisions be defined as they only require that such levies levy gapes and irrigation pumps as are required to it issue here and the mere fact that they were changed confirms that they that they needed to be changed to be that do if you have that definition that support operation be permitted to do what it thinks it should be permitted to do your own i don't know i am not a specialist in farming and that is not what is before this court orders you have what was the purpose of the special provision to make sure that people couldn't double the appropriate standard of review was our interpretation plainly erroneous and that the lower court used the plain words of the statute of the plain words rather of the special provision in its interpretation i r the the fact that a dictionary definition was used it is not at all an important point because the words were so simple r m a was not there to justify it requirements of insurance it was there to interpret it specific words it's mandatory policy requirements and language well let me ask you this in the in the  two thousand and thirteen email that talks about the post two thousand and twelve changes it if it says there is it says the statement was intended to ensure that los not paid if producers did not have the means to flush the acres in order to obtain an adequate stand that isn't that what the appellant is arguing here that that is exactly exactly what this language means but that even getting to that argument where am i correct or not i don't know enough about farming to know that and that that's one of the point is that it would be most helpful if you did know and was maybe he can clarify when he comes back up but if that's what if we have a statement here we have a sentence that tells us what the statement was intended to ensure why can't we simply go with that because i'm clear in this up we've got a difference of opinion a difference of opinion as to what the special provision maine and we have wording here that tells us what the intent was because that e mail does not rise to the level of the formal interpretation the interpretation was made pursuant to codified mandate and and who knows what  person drafting that e mail made to confirm that that person was swelling on behalf of the federal government as far as what they intended in the special provisions hold on just a minute the special provisions as i understand them are the policies of insurance and and ensuring clause it's actually an exclusion to the insuring clause and a question that we have in a policy of insurance and i don't care who writes it is the person you look at is what does the plain language of the all disputes in favor of the insured right because of the you know nature of the take it or leave it position of an insurance he paused unsure of policy now in this case you have the language of the special provisions which are in fact what happens with with all crop insurance is at some point the department of agriculture acting through the risk management agency divides the nation into various divisions oftentimes counties sometimes regions and then that's worth insuring policy provisions right yet for in one sex between farmers and their private insurance great i mean there is this whole private insurance happens do we really ever go back to look at what was the intent of the policies of the day of the language unless there's that ambiguity once again the premise of your question would require an analysis of contract law and that was going to be my final section i wanted to talk about and it looks like i'm almost out of time so i will very quickly talk about contract law the underlying court correctly determine the proper standard of deference but then  this is not a contract which we appellants in at least there is a contract that is between a appellants and their insurance company now there are situations where there are contracts where the federal government is a party to the contract under those circumstances be arbitrary and capricious standard applies but that is not the situation here this situation there is no contract between the parties there is no contract dispute between the parties by mandatory regulatory language there is no privity of contract between the parties that is at seven c f r four hundred point ninety six and as a result the issue is the mandated interpretation by the federal government he is obviously in the superior position to tell the parties what its language means in this highly technical complex and specialized field of reinsurers crop insurance policies apple e's had a unique experience and they it is interpret ing its own words which constitute its most important requirements to qualify for federal reinsurance we ask that you affirm the lower court's ultimate decision but clarified that using contract law for any reason under these circumstances would be erroneous thank you very  that your argument mashed with this statement in the email that explained that the changes to the special provisions where it says that that immediately following seeding was removed and and then it says that the statement was intended to ensure that losses were not pa if producers did not have the means to flush the acres in order to obtain an adequate stand a modified provision clarifies this point and that was your argument that that's what the language that we're talking about was it said in the email to prevent paying clients of producers that did not have the ability to flush the field if necessary that was the purpose of it and it should be interpreted in accordance with that park has that answers your question of a pantry question is ye be in place as early as well process it clarified that issue now that i would point out that the subsequent changes made additional it wasn't simply a change to say that the argument of course but going back to the only part of your brief where the where the inter the policy of the provisions were interpreted deprive your clients of one i'm sorry what your clients were deprived of was well knowledge of the interpretation that the government has put on this what the government has done is issued an interpretation that the government asserts is binding on the arbitrator in arbitration so i mean ultimately when interpreted in the policy but the policy is forty pages long and as i think you noted that's where all your coverages are all your exclusions was made to your policy as they are the special provisions are one page and i do with geographic for the most part issues such as planning dates and things of that nature which are going to change your graphically the substantive provision and i would also just quickly point out that the subset of religion with the special provision that could have very easily been added to the rise provisions if the agency wanted it to carry the force of law and to be entitled to  and it was not very good very well we thank both sides for the argument the case is now submitted and we will take it under consideration thank you very much