all the evidence has has to be surprised despite a probable cause substantive authorization and a statute and felony fresh pursuit because illinois police officers failed to comply with a post arrest procedural provision of indian fresh pursuit statute i'd like to first focuses court's attention on what's not in dispute in this case there's no dispute that there was probable cause for the arrest nor is there a dispute that the officers were legitimately impression pursued in this case it's our position based on these two propositions that the inquiry can stop right here with these two propositions made a west was sufficient under the fourth amendment common law doctrine of felony fresh pursuit therefore it's not true as appellate court found that the officers derived a arrest authority from indiana statute it came from the fourth amendment and this common law doctrine of felony fresh even if we look to the statute there is no dispute that there was compliance with the substantive provisions of the statute and the any and i authorize our officers to effect this felony fresh pursuit arrest in its borders nor is there i dispute that wholly and separately apart from the statute itself so no construction issues whatsoever based on indiana statute the arrest was good and that's this antecedent common law principle of felony fresh pursuit that's part and parcel of the fourth amendment itself and ok i do have a construction issue with respect to that your honor and i'll turn now to the statute as i was saying substantively we did compile the statute it's only this question of this procedural provision where officers admittedly didn't comply with indiana statute so the real dispute here is about the consequences of this noncompliance doesn't noncompliance of this post arrest procedure provision of indiana statute warrant the massive remedy of  found was mandated in this case but we know it's not mandated pursuant to the fourth amendment exclusionary rule fourth remember exclusionary rule simply is not apply in this case whether this court views this the procedural provision as presentiment provision and extradition provision or a hybrid of both the fourth amendment simply cannot be used to invoke its exclusionary rule in this case nor is suppressi prescribed by indiana's fresh pursuit statute itself and this is your honour's construction question actually how court viewed the statute this procedural provision as a condition subsequent trial office were substantively authorized but because it in comply with this procedural provision according to pout or it undid the the propriety of the rest in the first instance but this statute in particular this procedural provision it can also looking at the statute itself there's nothing expressly within the statute there's no plain language in the statute that mandates suppression in fact for this court to read suppression into that stature which is basically what the appellate court has done and what defendant wants this court to do this court would actually be doing something contrary to what the indiana legislature itself refrain from doing more suppression mandated implicitly in this case and the only indications we have from the statute with respect to this implicit component is as your honor referenced the section three point three this construction provision it comes immediately after the procedural provision that we're talking about and wh pretty powerful implicit indicator that you can't use this provision to undo an otherwise valid arrest under the substantive component this provision what it does is implies a policy on the part of any and in favor of l ten basically is to protect the integrity of iraq just which is in keeping with my second implicit component part of this statute and that's the broader goal of the statute itself the statute was designed to broaden not constrict the powers of extra territorial arrest statutes goal is to facilitate apprehension of criminals who run for the border it's not to protect them from prosecution and it certainly shouldn't be construed by this  me i think they were saying that the only way our officers were entitled to effect this arrest was by virtue of the statute so the inherent authority which we dispute obviously because we say it's the fourth amendment so we and separately apart from the statute itself fourth amendment in common law doctrine of felony fresh pursuit so the a poker was saying the only way that this arrest is going to be good is through this indiana statute and moreover the only way the  rest is going to be good is if it compiles substantively and procedurally which are perceived in this current conditions subsequent about what the noncompliance with this procedural provision means so this body of illinois precedent does not dictate suppression in our procedure of iowa violation alone scenario that we have here in fact looking to the decision a lot of this court and in other areas this court has demonstrated and on willingness to suppress in sort of these kind of analogous situations this court's recent decision in common for example that's under our wiretap statue in illinois our own wiretap statue we have an explicit suppression romany and this court said no we're not going to suppress you have it it's because the federal authorities caught it pursue it and legitimately to federal law similarly and why is what i kind of use a parallel scenario to this is this court's decision and well us this court refused to suppress also and well us an otherwise constitutional confession based solely on a gerstein violation a gross to imprisonment violation this court specifically rejected in well as the lower court's reasoning which is really some order to the reasoning put forth by defendant in this case this court rejected the remedy of of suppression based solely on a post arrest to lay imprisonment so that's the squits construction of our own law within illinois that provides powerful powerful authority to say no no suppression in this scenario what is the remedy the ramlee in terms of the process that the criminal prosecution in illinois is or any there for instance and there's really nothing stopping for defendant from going back to indiana and saying indiana my rights my statutory rights in your state were violated i'd like to get a remedy from you he just shouldn't be proof permitted to come into our illinois courts and his criminal prosecution and get his remedy in the form of suppressing evidence it would be it would hurt it would hurt society at perhaps in this case it's not your honor because we haven't the only evidence in this record despite defendant's skepticism of of this is that our officers really didn't know that they had crossed that point eight case on a motion to suppress officer specifically said i didn't know i thought i was in illinois but if you say i was in indiana i guess i was in answers from other to question your honor that maybe play in the determination of this court is essentially so going to be asked to decide whether or not they want to invoke suppression to deter our officers violating other plays very heavily in this decision ditch on an aside up of pennsylvania cases said bart very case where exactly it went through this entire analysis that that we're going through here and it decided in and that additional authority i cited that say no for our state we're not going to suppress the exact scenario so this interests of comedy play and put other interests as well we would necessarily be disrespecting indiana by not giving their procedural provisions extraterritorial force in illinois what we'd be saying is in illinois it's this court's decision and our legislatures decision to decide what evidence is going to come in aren't out there willy nilly violating indiana other state's laws so in terms of the larger question of us respecting other states it really there really is no evidence of that and to date and our and in the ons case out of washington some of the other cases that are favorable for us are the other states the court said listen we're gonna not suppress for all the reasons that i'm making here today it's the it's not warrant it's a massive remedy the social costs are extraordinary in this case particularly given the situation it was inadvertent on the part of the officers everything about it was constitutional and defended himself would just be the windfall but beneficiary of this this sort of comedy situation the only only thing that was sort of affronted in this case was indiana so to afford to remedy this huge for remedy to our defendant in this case suppressing all the evidence in an illinois prosecution that that realistically could not go forward without the seven months is just not warranted in this case you're on it doesn't mean we're not respecting indiana it just means that in this case in this state of the law given what we know with respect to how our officers are actually complying with other state's laws by virtue of not being constantly presented with these kind of cases we're going to say no here in this case and that's why he has this court to do we asked this court to refrain from reflexive lee imposing the the exclusionary rule in this case once they knew he was running a drug enterprise back and forth between his two houses it's just because he ran for the border at this moment when they were had him under surveillance that they thought they knew that the surveillance was basically  they searched the the it's not necessarily a danger to him your honor it's that the added ins that we need to put proceed in this prosecution we knew was in that house and there's nothing unconstitutional illegal or even a rational irrational about an officer trying to get us someone leave consent it's perfectly constitutional that's what they did had everyone said no and then we would have had a different scenario than theoretically they would have gotten gotten a warrant correct correct and i might add your honor with respect to that the trial court had a full evidentiary hearing on that our parties presented extensive evidence on that the trial court didn't express the say i don't buy or consign argument but by virtue of granting that motion to suppress at that moment the trial court implicitly rejected that on the facts or it within the process of apart it comes with the deference afforded the trial court's finding the trial court entirely denied the motion implicit in that and this know this is this is not nothing out of the ordinary implicit in that means that the trial court has said by the way i'm not buying your consent defense otherwise i would have granted your motion at least with respect to the home so that's what i mean this court always always has the power to review issues that come before it they just comment in the whether or not it was correct and i raise that really only your honor that the evidence sheree component of this case doesn't really prevent this court from getting to the legal issues that are presented in what sort of effect indiana statute is going to have on our prosecution but should this quote depending on whatever the legal find is quote makes on that issue it can go ahead and then follow the logical chain of its finding relying on what happened alone the there were two searchers in this case police followed the defendant into indiana it went to the indiana toll booth on the indiana toll road and arrest of the defendant took him out of his car searched the car and found marijuana to suggest that the police did not know they were in indiana won't pass the laugh test they were right there at the indiana in home and found cocaine now before we get to the merits of this i would like to discuss for you the jurisdiction of this court to hear this part of your part of this case the defendant filed a motion to suppress evidence telling hearing and denied the motion to suppress the items seized from the car and denied the motion to quash we have set forth in our brief instant tarty entirety respect to the current street address before that could be heard if the defendant filed that several weeks later before that could be heard the defendant filed a motion to vacate the denial of the motion to suppress the items seized from the search of the car and suppress evidence and the denial of the state's motion to reconsider that's what they were peeling from the state never nor did the defendant nor going to trial court ever consider the search of a home in chicago that's not before the and later they say that motion when they when the state moved to reconsider that order the trial court denied that motion to reconsider at that point the state and the defendant read that his ruling on the motion t leave yes or is it is it your understanding the basis of suppressing suppressing the evidence from the house was the life of a lawful arrest and yes such as not not anything  that right now i just want to finish the jurisdictional point in me petition for leave to appeal from the appellate court this is what the state said to this court and upon which on is granted the petition for me to appeal yes it's true right so i mean if they are not there they are not necessarily comparable this this case involves hot pursuit at least under the indiana statute and maybe under a little a common law it maybe if i so that mean there is a distinction between our former it may and i don't think you answered well act i don't know of a case directly on it and i hesitate to waive a point when i haven't really researched the point and i don't think there is any case on it and i know that i've ever read of the property of the authority of a police officer to go and hot pursuit into another jurisdiction but i guess i have to assume they had that authority all over their factory doesn't given that authority and your case you now this court has held in the dog sniff case people versus about that this court will follow the law with respect to the fourth amendment as it is a none she aided by the united the jurisdiction where the rest take place govern in the analog numbers and under those circumstances this court should follow the dictates of the indiana law which happened to be the dictates delaware wherever just pick up somebody and bring them back illinois but doesn't using the fourth amendment to suppress evidence in this circumstance encourage individuals to run for the border on the well i doubt if many of those individuals have read or will have read that law but i would respectfully suggest that that's more or less a rare situation that a decision of a court would we have all been brought up with the idea that our word is our bond it would only as good as our word we are people that have to rely upon a word illinois gave its word in this case when they joined the pact if adopted the uniform act he gave my word we follow sovereign state of illinois is no better than an individual in that regard we said we would follow the law and the legislature in academic forty some station joined it and the large clear we won't follow  correct yes so if the arrest is lawful and the police officer had followed the indian and indiana law and brought the person before a judge in india it would have been ruled lawful i think it would have been i think it will clearly what makes it a law is violation of that section right i'd hesitate to hesitate on that question for the reason that i don't know what the indiana judge would have rule in a motion to suppress if he were not allowed to contest probable cause in this court because that would be across appeal the trial judge having found that there was a motion to vacate the denial of the motion to  all they've been taken before a indiana judge but of course that didn't happen and we are speaking hypothetically i hope that answers your initial question well but i still don't understand why the instructions section the rest specifically because the appellate court in this case got tickets wrong the rest in jacobs was not substantively authorized according to i was fresh pursuit stache in that case so what this is a case of first goes to this uniform act issue that defense counsel is raising as well different states permit different things under there are fresh pursuit statutes some permit do you why fresh pursuit some permit traffic violations some is some defined their fresh pursuit you know more narrowly or more broadly so specifically with respect to the the question substantively i do know that in say iowa statute didn't permit what happened in that case because they had probable cause before hand then they just went in taiwan scooped him up so it was no question about the felony fresh pursuit in the  there is a case though that it internally about are interesting to ross and i i did not cite it in my papers but i'd like to reference it if it's ok with your honor's it's a case called our once and it is out of the fifth district and that's three to three elapse third six fifty three i just raise this because it's very similar to it's not on all fours with our case because it doesn't have this inter state situation but it has an extraterritorial russ in illinois that violated our statutes and the court in that case said the notice provision in our statute at that time wasn't a hearing it was just notify the authorities within the county they didn't yes well then doesn't that discrepancy itself demonstrate the significance of place with the defendant would get very i would actually i would actually opposite i could the opposite your honor i would say that whatever indiana's going to do with respect to them passing on a law from less of the arrest assuming that it's just with respect to the probable cause determination that's all if you want to the statute it goes to more it actually goes to whether or not it falls under the substantive compart of the statute but then our courts and as happened in this case they do their own gerstein herring and that's what's significant in our internal prosecutions in illinois illinois yes yes we have fun we do have a fresh pursuit statute what does that does that give officers of other states the three to come here in the same way that we would have the authority to arrest in another state yes those are just illinois quote being inundated with these kind of cases the question really is and it wouldn't upset comedy in answer to your question justice freiman because we were here trying to decide what indiana statute says we should do in facts it's our position that we really don't need to even go to the question of the statute in this case but the statute the indiana statute that's it doesn't say suppression that's what this whole case this is whether or not we are violating indiana's statute substantively we know we're not procedurally we know we have it's not the question of compliance or noncompliance with indiana indiana's law as a matter of comedy it's a question this prosecution whether or not we're going to suppress this evidence in illinois and i prosecution for of that offense committed on our soil that's equally a component of comedy your honor a internal decision within a state policy wise to decide what that evidence is in or out in their courts in their prosecutions is just a matter much a matter of states rights and respect to other states as this question of whether or not we're going to wholesale superimpose indiana's entire body because that's what we could potentially be doing we could be going down that slippery slope of saying our choice a law or rules now say we need to apply himself said my mom said search it that's the third party consent that's never been contested so yes there is definitely evidence of concept trial court ruled it tonight it wholesale what happened was they came in and they changed theories on the trial court so they put this second motion to suppress out there never asked him to rule on it never did anything about it and came in under the guise of a motion to vacate under the auspices of this case is still alive the search we haven't addressed yet when realistically and truly based on the facts of the record they did presented a new theory which the theory we're talking about now to the trial court the trial court said you're right this thing is still alive and i'm going to go ahead and change my mind based on your new theory and i'm gonna grant your motion and that's what happened and that's how this the second motion to suppress got in this case specifically noted in the north of appeal as well so based on all the principles of constraining our sort of liberal construction and all of the principles in terms of constrain the use it's perfectly legitimate this quote absolutely has over the home search in this case and we never by the way i'm willing to concede that it wasn't in this case i'd like to point out very quickly others that credibly this this issue of state law under due way that council says virginia anymore and it's number zero six one zero eight two that's currently put it was argued mid january of this year so even this question which we don't have in this case obviously we don't have a substantive