morning honorees my name is emily philby and i represent at one twenty no in this matter this morning i'll be focusing my remarks on the first and third issues raised in the rates the twenty year sentencing add on for person who just charging a firearm does not apply to the offense of attemp five to life firearm add ons do not apply when the state proceeds under subsection may attempt first degree murder of a peace officer e m t or ideo c employee why this is clear from the format of the statute the way the statute is written it says that murder and then it says except it's for exceptions and there's nothing to say that these exceptions aren't equal i think i would my argument is that this woman of this statute in fact suggests that they are alternatives and that they are all equal and the state's reading would require and in and somewhere between the statutes also if the legislature did intend for the fifteen twenty twenty five to life to apply to subsection a they could've easily done that they could have integrated those that language into subsection a it might be this throwaway but the way it's worded it does seem that the judge i mean they just they say you know the plain ambiguous language of the statute that's what it says i feel like they statute and excepting the state's position would require reading in some language the statute if if the legislature didn't intend what it was so you know if they wanted these to the firearm add ons to apply to subsection a they could have done that or maybe that's what needs to happen maybe it needs to go back down to springfield for them to add that but as it stands right now we have a statute which doesn't say and doesn't say or it shows off work sections as equal an alternative and we have douglas and the twenty was the end i mean this was a very clearly delineated by the trial court and as such i don't believe that there's any need for it to go back down so i think that we can take care of that here by just striking the void portion of  that's not the part that we're arguing cannot be applied under douglas and under the plain language of the statute also destroying the sentence the statute as written gives prosecutors more options the state can choose how to charge they can proceed under subsection just shooting it katie he gets in his car he drives away the police are called and eventually they pull over his car gets out a car he throws throws down that weapon which the police recover and then he starts running the police chase after him and one point he pulls the forty five caliber from his waist in turns and shoots at a police officer and then goes and hides in a yard where he is picked up where he's arrested that second gun is never found but there are point forty five  it's the state's responsibility to apportion offenses at the trial and that a pushing on appeal for the first time is profoundly unfair this is similar to drug possession and distribution when a different has been convicted of both possession and the distribution of the same drug it's been hard to violate the want to one crime rule for remedy courts look to the relative punishments of the various offenses to determine which are more serious here is have first degree murder of a peace officer is a classic felony and so is the arms which will criminal whil first thank you the statute that prohibits the application of both subsection a the status provision and subsection c the means of commission or the fire and i'm prevention to defendants attempt murder every case that sets forth the principles of statutory construction support my position the defendant and the douglas quote air in in reading into the statute limiting language that is not there the on to commit a crime against his intended target a police officer there is nothing within any part of the sentencing section of the statute that prohibits the application of thought and felt that defend the defendant in this sentence was not void when it when applied in therefore perhaps it wouldn't it would be unfair to change it fouling shipe and it thr operate together as a unit they have an entirely different legislative purpose than the status provision the status provision was enacted seven years before it to adam provisions and it stood alone in the attempt murder statute for quite a while it has a different purpose and its purpose is to protect these particular victims police officers correctional guides e m t's because of the heightened risk that their status and poses the firearm provisions in acted well after the status provision were in acted like i said for a different purpose and that's to deter the use of firearms  coat they've been interpreted many multiple times to operate where you pick the fact finder finds the existence of one of the factors and one is imposed on a single conviction the legislature has acquiesced in that interpretation and neck construction with respect to these three fifteen twenty twenty five try provisions and has indicated by its acquiescence that it creates with that construction so no one has ever both of these provisions and controvert the legislative intent and it would lead to an absurd result that a defendant who happens to pick a police officer as his intended target and uses a firearm he and only he only ones who pick these protected status victims would be exempt from the firearm enhanced it's which a legislature enacted to deter the use of firearms so provision is that your question your honor then then the sentence is still proper because it's within the twenty to eighty here range of subsection a are separately long before these other enhancement provisions and the firearm provisions are very channel add on provisions that the legislature enacted to apply to multiple offenses yes absolutely there is in this case and both the status and they operate differently too by the way the status provision elevates the range the whole range and the firearm provision adds a term a specific amount of time on to the a clickable range whatever it is because it applies cherry to multiple offenses the supreme court has rejected the notion that there's multiple murder convictions delivery and robbery secondly defendant here as counsel indicate it went on an extended crime spree he committed multiple acts over  multiple locations over oh quite a long period of time he knew that he not only did he possessed the con in order to make the two shootings to commit the two shootings but because he had both conn's in his possession in the car and he went on a high speed police chase through out to me or hood for extended period of time while in possession of both of those counts after that and that possession of both of those is separate and distinct from the possession with the related to the shooting with katie and the possession related to the subsequent shooting of officer and officer chunk which during a subsequent foot chase so for convictions and sentences thank you the legislature could have come in and said we keep that subsection you know we keep that as an exception to the general sentence for peace officer and then put in the fire and as another another level another part didn't have to put it in us so the state the state mention the possible absurdity of a defendant who shoots at a peace officer being exempt from these fire on mounds and how that would be problematic but misty can choose how to charge just because the victim is a peace officer doesn't mean that the state has to proceed under that subsection i think it depends upon what evidence the state has sometimes they don't have strong evidence of that the defendant has a peace officer sometimes that section just isn't there and maybe they would prefer to go possession they're talking about it was a general onto which will criminal possessing a firearm and we just can't specify that at this point it's too late for these reasons we ask that you strike the twenty year and on and the arms which will criminal offense thank you thank you