the language that perceives that definition and somehow then incorporate that into the definition there is no statutory thought there's no statutory interpretation of the word for such a reason a reading of the statute can you explain to me how your reading with sets of the statute i don't mean whether or not you have a plain meaning argument i understand your argument but how would it make sense to have a scenario in where you could not continue and the issue but you could be raising basically you've created a real disparity in hell this statute is going to apply whether you're maintaining a resume or initiating and line up and i mean how where it says you cannot maintain inner parties reexamined that was coping with the litigation on any issues that you raise or could have raised at the district court in the last insult so they just to be not what was happening here is the q s infringer who has watched that district court they've picked that they've lived there was a race they lost you save resources by then terminating that interparty reason and proceeding and then if the if is if the q s infringer for some reason needed to challenge other claims that had not been determined there still is an option but that current approach that you think the statute mandates between suits that are maintain and suits that are initiated because under your logic you have to accept the fact that the infringer who lost in the district court under your reading the statute is expressing written here that the there are two scenarios with two different scopes of the style and i would just lastly point before i move on on this issue if congress had intended this the scope of the stoppel to be the same in both scenarios it would have written the statute this w that's not the language of the statute big congress specifically said here's the stop over new petitions and here's the ones for currently pending but the other issue i would like to discuss with the cour examiner actually originally rejected in that read the claim but then interpreted a different he'd have decision to indicate that there was right mr p c or is that by one person and if they succeeded and it's no prosecution history of stop all it's not that stuff will be used on three seventeen you cite knoll legal support whatsoever for this notion of a stopper you have and the stoppel all seems to be which by the way you know i'm sympathetic but it's a fact question and so you know every once in a while we do get back findings by two different bodies and two different juries that you see look at the exact same facts and come out the opposite way and we for this court had said the second examination cannot decide issues that are already been decided in the pre in a proceeding examination the p t o makes no attempt to distinguish that ruling in responses and where this comes from is section three or three a you have that there has to be a substantial question new question of pad ability and that has to be maintained until the board makes a decision well before the board made its decision is in are very reasoned in the issue of priority had been reference combinations could no longer be the established a substantial new question a patently insult and just as the legislative history says the reason why we have substantial new question of patentability is to prevent the the district court only made a final determination of how to believe with regard to claims three twenty two twenty eight and so the p t o correctly terminated the intraparty reexamination with respect to those anything so the agency was free to fill gaps in i p r is there a provision that you can point you to use that simply applies in the region emanation context where the agency was expressly delegated substantive will make notes already i'm wondering has an agency get chevron deference if congress hasn't authorized them to fil all i think it's just kind of a common sense application it just doesn't make any sense to have this rule retreat earlier filed and later vital interest parties read sam's differently to be totally inefficient and it just doesn't make us all the reasons why the rules shouldn't existing reexamination to talks about such issues and i think the only fair interpretation of such issues this is referring to the language any such patents claim on the basis of such issues i think you have to interpret that such issues as referring back to the claim by claim analysis on the basis of such issues if there were a provision sandwiched in between that dealt with newly exams then that argument basis of such issues so all was that just total superfluous in this by congress there because if your view is the interpretation of one the basis of such issues should refer back to the earlier reference to any patent claim ensued in the triggering provision then why in the world of congress have felt the need to include the such patent claims language in the institution part of this provision i mean i think certainly could have do you think it's just superfluous i think they could use different words here i think they use such issues they could have actually just repeated the whole the whole portion about any patent claim and but i think they're using the word such issues you just have to look back and can interpret that is referring to the claim by claim basis on such issues that's the only logical interpretation of the statu te where where you want me to where do you want me to refer back to for that and so in the second clause it refers to terminations on the basis of such issues may not thereafter be maintained by the office such issues he's going to refer back to clause and not just the issues but also any such pappa claim on the basis of issues which that party raised could have ra that's certainly a permissible interpretation to the extent there's there's any ambiguity in the statu invalidity it doesn't prevent any any new party from challenging the validity of a patent so i think their argument that somehow that the decision by the subsequent decision by examiner the rose or the district court decision or  decision in a different case a different pattern that may be similar somehow conclusively determines that there's no new question that i have that i think i think here hearing is the crux of what's tough to us about this the boar word and we do have different claims nobody has argued that there was any meaningful difference between the claims that i'm aware of am i missing something that i did someone say there was some meaningful difference between the claim language that could have resulted in a different  device or a different device as opposed to here we have sockets so soft buttons i think are something you can actually like it's a button you can touch where selectable representation could be something different where you could use maybe like a remote control that hover over something it could there could be some difference i don't think the parties have actually gone into detail how that could be different but i think there are differences ok supposed to forgive forget about the facts of this case suppose that was the exact same limitation exact office is permitted to do yes that's that can definitely happen to the board decision in this other pattern this ninety six patent it's not a presidential decision that the panel the board in this case is certainly not bound by that decision they're fake they they can look and whether it's supported by substantial evidence and in this case i'm happy to delve into the two to eight paths back to show you how it's a reasonable interpretation it's supported by substantial evidence in the book you do that you didn't do it in his opening kind of why you want to open the door  but you're free to do whatever you want i mean we've got the next panel of if he's likely to him more than happy to do that to answer your question the board here is not bound in any way by that other board decision or the district court or the examiner exactly so there's no further question two very quick points one hundred three seventeen b it's clear that congress intended to funnel any new i p r petitions back into the the decision of if there is a substantial new question pat ability so it's not a waste of jute of  issue it is troubling to me that the patent office is taking the position that it is totally fine for inconsistent decisions to be made related to the same family on issues that are common across all continuation applications that cannot be the desired result that we want out of the agency and here i just want to be clear we're not relying on the district court decision as some sort of a stop of that pa same they raised the issue in their arguments were rejected and the decision was made on prior to that these are in tallinn march two thousand pair therefore even just under the basic principles of stop what they were bound by decision and again i did not hear counsel from the