seems to me the judge fisher very more thorough opinion in this case and if i understood her main point there were two one there were no allegations by the plaintive that's your kind as to the who what where and when of the material misrepresentations in other words great pacific did not say it was mr jones who read than two thousand and twelve for brewery pitch book and mr jones relied on those statements and did not place trades with other then use and placed trades with barclays that  sort of the kernel of judge fisher's opinion following the same sort of opinion from a new york district court judge a tell me what did you get wrong where in the your complain reliance on the materials and acting on reliance for the concealed or this represents facts would address those issues yes i am and the effort put forward in our papers just maybe i'm not making myself clear please point out to me the allegations in your complete where you say that a person an officer or he di securities actually read the pitch book in february two thousand and twelve and other materials and believed and relied on the statements in those materials and then as a result of that place trades with barclays where had they known the true facts he would have placed trade with deutsche bank merrill lynch or somebody else would you point t like judge fisher laid out a blueprint after your third amended complaint to give you the opportunity to flesh it out with the problem she identified but you elected not to file a fourth amended complaint why direct answer that you can five why do you think you have met the height standard here with respect to reliance and again we can just point to the earlier state that best evidence you have on that th barclays it was the truth came out about what's going on in the dark pool played did curtail its activity which is consistent with his allegation that he would not trade had known during the relevant period that's all that's required at this of dollars in securities each year and it cannot be said that this plane that it was not given a full some opportunity to plead its claims in this case it was actually as noted in the paper given for opportunities to amend the complaint it actually filed three amended complaints and that doesn't include of course the initial operative complaint and as judge millette i noted they were also given an opportunity by judge fisher after she gave a blueprint to amend the complaint again and she also offered to allow them the file a motion for discovery if they're able to plead the who what when and where and despite that numerous opportunities the plaintiff here who filed this opportunistic litigation hasn't played but the claim to be violated do not provide for a private cause of action but i don't see the use seal claim for unlawful conduct requires that a private action is there had to be in the c c probably cause of action no your honor i think the case which they relied on does say there has to be a private right of action i understood plaintiff's argument to be that the statute in question must express a bar but the cases cited by the defendants in their briefs make it clear that it just needs to be a principle of law that precludes the private right of action right and there are numerous cases on the federal level that say with respect to section seventeen a regulation a t s and the market access regular regulation here there is no private read their actions sure was she was correct to dismiss it on that ground she also dismissed it because it's crystal clear that the u c l is a statute which is designed to protect the public at large there are cases we cite  our papers the rural communications case the linear tech case which says that where you have a business dispute between sophisticated commercial entities is not a case that deals with the public at large and it and there are numerous federal cases your honor that say there is no private right of action would make no sense to allow the plane just to proceed under this prong just because section seventeen a does not say that you can't bring  private right of action on the federal level unless the statute makes it clear that you can bring a private action your precluded from doing that's a very clear federal law and so would be a very odd result indeed if this court were allowed to proceed but if the principle is violated why can't you california provide a remedy because in this case there is no violation of the underlying law that a private citizen can of force here it's only this are the allegations the who what when and where and particularly with respect to reliance what we were lines if you take a look at paragraph eighty four of the complaint is reliance sufficiently pleaded as the least of those items no no it is not your honor bring the record to the court counsel of so this is the allegation with respect to barclays algos and it's that amec router in and as judge fisher found right the allegation of the plaintiff with respect to the algos in the router is that because barclays allegedly preference fisher was correct to know that there was no allegations in the complaint that demonstrated just because barclays was sending trades to l x that the statements the specific statements with respect to the algos and the router's were actually false some of those statements were barclays maximises phil probability there was nothing about the fact that barclays was preference in elex that demonstrated that that statement was false and so the judge dismissed that claim on falsity grounds she also does dismissed it on reliance grounds and the reason is is because what was the point of his arguing here by sending trades to l x in other words preference saying l x great pacific securities was taken advantage of because it interacted with high frequency traders and with aggressive trader thought that goes back to the core of the case which is under the quiddity profiling which is the service that barclays offered to its clients they had the ability to pull off all trading with aggressive traders and they had the ability to block all trading with each of t s but the plaintiff here as judge fisher and judge firm and found did not collect and has conceded that never used liquidity profiling and because it never used liquidity profiling it couldn't make an allegation of justifiable reliance that it was trying to avoid interacting with each of teaser aggressive traders in fact the plaintiff here willingly engaged and i think in the book they receive your honour's correct they only received the february two thousand and twelve pitch book in that book barclays disclosed that thirty percent nearly one third of the pool was high frequency traders they also disclosed that fourteen percent of the pool was aggressive trading and that could be trading by h f t's or institutional firms different firms can agree and engage in aggressive trading and what great pacific securities did here is that they don't lect it to trade well that's exactly right and they freely traded with they did not block trading with aggressive traders or h f t traders and that's why i think also judge fisher found they haven't properly alleged damages because they said that somehow they received they didn't receive best execution another is not the best price is because h f t firms were trading in barclays l x but they elected not to block them so they can't now complain that they traded with a shifty traders or aggressive traders they also allege in the complainants actually on i think page three of their appeal their brief filed in this court that there were hordes of other high frequency traders in all the other venues so she said that you're not demonstrating you don't have any particular allegations that you suffered any damages if you traded in some other venue because you go allege that these other venues had more high of eighty traders and more aggressive traders this case is opportunistic litigation followed by great pacific securities it happened to have one pitch book in its path possession the february two thousand and twelve pitch book that pitch book they claimed and this is important we should just focus on for one moment in the first two complaints in this case they claim that they were misled because barclays had removed from that pitch book a bubble that allegedly corresponded with the largest high frequency trading firm called x that was their allegation and they said if they knew that you know that bubble was in there they would have known there was a large high frequency trading they would have traded well we pointed out in our original motion to dismiss before judge firman the book they attached actually had the bubble and they since have retracted that but what that demonstrates is what judge fisher had a concern with and what judge furhman had a concern is even though they can claim they received one pitch book they can't they didn't actually plead that they read it they reviewed it or they considered it and as a result of that they made this silly mistake in their complaint they claimed something that wasn't true was actually in the pitch book the bubble so this demonstrates why judge fisher and judge dismissed the case there were other central allegation right was their primary allegation is that they were trading with a higher number of aggressive traders than they thought they were trading with but judge permanent judge fisher pointed out that they elected to interact with aggressive trading they elected to interact with high frequency trading firms so they now can't complain that they interacted with those firms in addition with that they also said that the plaintiff here hadn't properly played that barclays definition its use of the phrase aggressive was actually an accurate and that's because the plaintiff here uses multiple definitions of aggressive trading and if your honor would just bear with me for one minute i will point out just in the appeal brief alone outpoint out the pages for you on page nine of their brief they say aggressive trading is predatory trading and they don't define what predatory trading means on page two or their sorry page twenty seven of their brief they claim that aggressive trading entails certain very specific trading practices on page twenty four they brief they say aggressive trading involves traders that are liquidity takers with high short term alpha and small orders sizes and aggressive measurement of aggressive passive a neutral and they did that through to two metrics which was high alpha take and small order sizes so it was not a subjective term and opinion they had some objective parameters with respect to the definition that barclays used in that very specific trade book yes now the problem is they try and render that statement false by referring to what judge firm called and judge fisher called the  aggressiveness analysis right and that was a nother document two documents actually one was created six months after the february two thousand and twelve pitch book the other was created eighteen months later which was october two thousand and thirteen so for one reason firm and then fisher found it was not actionable because it was from a subsequent period and this is a live trading environment where trading occurs every day and so if you took a measurement of the pool in any given day the levels of aggressive neutral and passive would change so they correctly pointed out you can't use this subsequent in one case year and a half later document to show that the earlier document was false they said in addition to that the execution aggressive analysis doesn't use the same metrics as the pitch book and i judge firman put it nicely when he said it might be that the new york attorney general and he was referring to the new york attorney general because the plaintive just copy the allegations  from the new york attorney general's complaint might be that the new york attorney general and great pacific securities preferred some other measurement of aggressiveness and that was the one in the execution aggressiveness analysis but that doesn't render false the statement about fourteen percent aggressive in the february two thousand and twelve pitch book because once an apple and another is an orange there are really two different metrics and so he dismissed that claim as well and so the judge fisher judge fisher noted noted in her opinion judge firman expressly gave them the right to amend to fix that and they did not fix that and so here you have an opportunistic claim of who relied on the one pitch book it received and with respect to that pitch book every one of the statements they couldn't lead were false and they clearly didn't rely on them so what has plain of done here plain of then goes to an end he was citing these when he was up before counsel for the plain of a whole number of paragraphs where he says in the  settlement in the new york a g settlement there was a reference to materials being sent to clients now they say you know there is a rule eleven obligation so they were careful in their complaint they didn't say they actually received those documents they  distributed or they were sent to and the reason they only say that is because they were just copying what the f c c said they attached the figure of two thousand and twelve pitch book but they attached no other pitch book and judge fisher correctly noted that because they didn't receive it read it review it or considerate it can't be an actionable claim now what do they do they turn to the back row tuvan of cases and they say well the tobacco to line of cases had this presumption of reliance but we know the into bac two and in maza and in the recent hyundai p a case from this court that those that line cases and the presumption of reliance only apply and i see it i'm a just about to run out but i would like to finish this answer that this line of cases only applies where there is one term and extensive advertising campaign and in those cases the absent class members could be entitle to a presumption of reliance and that makes sense right from a policy reason and as a policy reason and used a backhoe too because that's a great case there were a decade long advertising campaign and thousands and thousands of ads by the cigarette companies and so all the plaintiffs could come in in the plaintiffs could say well yeah over the last several years i saw advertising campaigns and i smoked because of that but when the defense lawyers asked me what ads to do look at when did you look at them and what cigarette was it they said well i really can't remember so in that context that makes good sense that policy but all of these cases do say that the name plaintive still has to plead actual lie and so we would ask this court to look at the block the big case where it says that the presumption of reliance or inference some coins courts called an inference is not available where the allegations of the complaint actually demonstrate they didn't rely right because otherwise if that were the case and i think that's what playing this is asking this court to do this court they're asking the say in fraud cases where it's difficult to actually plead reliance for the name plaintiff where we can't do it we can identify the one officer a great pacific securities that this court should just adopt a presumption of lions and if that were to happen in a fall cases  in the state of california and this circuit you wouldn't need to plead reliance anymore how you actually relied on it would be dispensed of and that's just simply not the long california and it's not the law on the ninth circuit so we'd ask you to affirm the district court's dismissal thank you very