three minutes of my time for a bottle by the commission asked us quarter of or summary judgment as to both of the claims that the e e o c brought below that includes a sex discrimination claim on behalf of amy stevens a transgender woman as well as a clothing benefit claim that we brought on behalf of a class of women who were denied the benefits accorded their male counterparts with this court's permission i'd like to start with what i think is the heart of the matter an appeal and the most difficult issue for you to resolve which is that this district court judge's ruling that river of bars or titles have been claimed on behalf of any stevens this case really pits the religious liberties of the company against misty vince title seven right which congress gave her to be free of discrimination in the workplace the district court judge rule the religious liberties of the company override misstatements rights for respectfully we disagree as this court knows refrig imposes a two part burden shifting framework the first part of that requires the religious claimant here the company to establish that the exercise of religion was substantially burdened by the government action that's a two part in bedded into that frame mark exercise of religion a substantial burden which are separate in the view the exercise of religion  hobby lobby does have language which makes it harder for us after hobby lobby but even hobby lobby itself doesn't go so far as to say a religious claimant can simply declare that i'm being forced to run my business in some way that offends my religious beliefs there's language and hobby lobby even the beginning of the decision where justice alito is trying to cabin the impact of hobby lobby going down the line he says our holding is very specific we do not hold that for profit companies can opt out of any law they judged incompatible with their sincerely held religious beliefs so i think that there's still room for you to decide whether exercise of religion and substantial burden were impacted and you did that in the united states versus bonds case which is a case where the religious claimant stated that he as part of his religion was required to grow marijuana and donate it back to the church and this court said we don't get into the business is just citing the central the a religious will least a tax we do still have to look to see whether your exercise of religion was actually impacted whether your religion requires you to donate the cot and donate it back to to grow the pot and donate it back to the church so i think there's still room for you to do an analysis and we've cited several cases in our brief they're not employment cases like that this one is but we're courts still have found that exercise of religion wasn't impacted for instance a case where somebody wrote an e mail saying i'm against same sex marriages i don't think you should have them in the religion in the chapel at their force academy and the court there said there's nothing about your exercise of religion that's implicated because you haven't said your religion requires you to publicly voice your dissent to same sex marriages  that they serve people of every religion or no religion he mentions people who are jewish people who are hindu chinese religions no religions at all so it seems that they open their doors to everybody but nothing specific about involving transgender workers i mean  transgender people who have passed away suppose a religion as a central tenet that men and women could not work in the same workplace would there be a substantial  burden if the employment laws were going to were asserted to apply there so you're positing to me a hypothetical where the employer points to an actual tenant of the religion right it's a small religion and developed its own views relatively recently and when they can stop obviously i don't know whether it interfere with their exercise or religion if they could point to the tenant that said that it be hard to show how that would perhaps they could show exercise or religion if they said that but that would just move the analysis over to what i think is my opponent's most difficult part of the argument which is compelling interest and least restrictive means because the leafs are restrictive means talks about and encompasses idea of do we impose burdens on third parties so in your hypothetical to me it would impose a burden on men and women and before referent after to the court has recognized that when we're talking about alternatives they can't impose burdens on third parties cutter versus wilkinson talks about that hobby lobby itself talks about that justice alito talks about that and just as opinion cites a kind of versus wilkinson acknowledges we can't burden others and in hobby lobby they were the court was able to rule in favor of the company because according to justice alito using his words the impact on women was precisely zero because h s health and human services there was a pre established way for women to access to four methods of birth control to which the employer had a religious objection and in whole versus hobbs which came after hobby lobby justice ginsburg wrote a concurring opinion she said i can join this opinion here and because there is no burden imposed when we allow a muslim prisoner to grow a longer beard so that's that's critical t analysis and burdens you don't want to wander into a territory where you're confronting the establishment clause as wilkinson said there is no establishment clause problem because we do consider the burdens imposed on others so i can't think of any other a court has held under title seven that river provides a diff fence and bars of a title seven suit seeking to enforce the statutory rights of an individual because of the religious beliefs of the company i hope that you don't become the first to hold that so as i said religious exercise substantial burden i think there is still space for you to do analysis i think it's important but the easier path for us to move forward and secure reversal of summary judgment here would be for the least restrictive means and you haven't asked me but we think that the lower court judge was correct in recognizing that we do have a compelling interest in enforcing mysti vince writes under the statute the rights that congress gave to her we agree that under referee  supreme court precedent in your precedent we're talking about here the compelling interest is in forcing her misstatements rights to work free of discrimination so the least restrictive means that the company is worded on appeal if they seem to abandon their argument that the e e o c had to pick up the tab to pay ms stevens her salary over a course of time or to pay of another funeral home to employ her but they argue on appeal as i understand it that we just should not have this we shouldn't enforce title seven at all against a company that deals with the mostly distressed individuals or a company that has public facing employees respectfully that is not least restrictive alternative that works because the least restrictive alternative must achieve equally well those are the words of justice kenny it's  if you have more questions about reform happy to answer it or i could say a few words about our clothing benefit claim  claims if you'd like to address it is and it's important to the commission we believe that the court erred in holding that we couldn't relief on behalf of the women who were denied the same benefits accorded their male counterparts and to clarify it wasn't just funeral directors who were stephen closed it w people who work for the public short of being a funeral director and for many years the company provided those benefits only to men and not to women now during the course of our reasonable investigation here we learned the clothing benefit violation so to be sure the charge was just about sex discrimination and discharge from a new stevens but when our investigator was talking to the business manager and was asking why was amy stevens fired the answer was because she refused to wear the company provided suit  tie and jacket there the follow up question for our investigator was do women receive the same and the answer was no not in the last ten or fifteen years so we found it during the course of a reasonable investigation and we believe that bailey slightly mistakes with the standard should be it's not an abstract question of what could we reasonably have expected to follow from the charge the whether the investigation actually occurred was reasonable and whether we found the violation during that you d which says an intervening supreme court case entitles you to reconsider a panel decision and we say in our brief to say versus shoney's which shows some tension at least with bailey decision because in that case when we received a charge of national origin and sex discrimination we sued but we added race well under bailey that doesn't really we fly so it seems like there's some inconsistency in your own precedent but in our view the commission does not have to turn a blind eye to a violation that we find her in the course of are we asked again it would be an abdication of our duties or responsibility to enforce a public interest and ensure workplace free of discrimination the district courts just have to go backwards and file a commission or charge respectfully that would not be a good use of our time and our resources investigation that we can do when we find the violation is the same one we could do we have to start over and do a commissioner's charge is there any additional process that happens if no the investigation will be the same so whether it be a little messy geisha a big investigation it doesn't hinge on whether we have a commissioner's charge or we found investigation or found a violation during our investigation and here i think our investigation was adequate to show it's really undisputed that there were no clothing benefits given to women at all until october twenty fourth teen a year after we filed our lawsuit and even then it was an equal and there were client facing women correct morning your honour's john knight for the intervenor amy stevens i'd like to reserve two minutes rebuttal if i could this case is about my client being fired from her job at a funeral home because  she is transgender and was going to present as a woman consistent with the person she knew she herself to be referred does not provide a license to discriminate to employers because of their religious beliefs and getting rid of the dress code here failed to address the government's interests because those interests were about her loss of job her interest those interests were about  stopping discrimination and the harm to my client in terms of losing her job the the district court erred by reading the sees case very narrowly as about sex stereotypes motivated or finding that it was about the sex stereotypes with respect to the gender dress code only the years see it argued more broadly that this case was about sex based stereotypes in general motivating my clients firing that makes first of all that the factual record here the funeral homes owner mr ross testified that that he fired misty vince because she was no longer going to represent herself and she said himself as a man since he refused to recognize my client's identities a woman and that he wanted to dress as a woman so it wasn't just the dressing it was the being and presenting fully as a woman so addressing or fixing the dress code was not going to address the problem this chords rulings in previous cases have addressed already that discrimination against transgender people is by its very nature sex stereotyping it is so it is discrimination on the basis of sex so in dogs the court recognize that the discrimination was against transgender person is because a person is sex discrimination because it's discrimination against a person who is defined precisely because of the perception that his or her behavior transgress is gender stereotypes those stereotypes come into play in things like dress but but in many other ways including the identity as a woman which be male for the rest or lives and to not have a male or to not have a female gender or gender identity is my client did that makes a difference for this case your honor both in terms of the least restrictive alternative analysis since the district court looked at the government's interest very narrowly as about gender or stereotypes with respect to dress codes but it also will make a difference in terms of an ultimate trial respect to the damage to my client what we would and therefore it's important to under for this court to apply its precedents from the dot decision as well as barn and smith to address the full scope of discrimination here all of those cases where sex stereotype cases rape they were ok is this is that stereotype case this is a state stereotyping case ok and is it a sex stereotyping case in each of its incarnations i mean whether it's about breasts whether  all of the claims are sex stereotyping claims the way they are although i would say i would submit your honor that this is discrimination not only on the basis of sex stereotyping but because it is based on sex based characteristics that is it is the discrimination against it is the the the the conflict between my client's gender identity and her sex assigned a birth that is also a sex or type so that's why in in the dot decision this court recognized that a person is defined as transgender price lee because precisely because of the perception that his or her behavior trance cresses gender stereotypes so by its very nature discrimination against a transgender person is sex or typing this is turning to the to the to the burden here your hon leno addressed the supreme court has repeatedly recognized that harm to third parties is something that must be taken into account and that there was not and the in the bar will case the court recognize there was not going to be harm to women that there was a zero damage to women by accepting the alternative that was proposed there and then i'd like to make simply  was another point about her will is that justice alito talked about title seven specifically or talked about discrimination in hiring said that refer provides you know she'll to discrimination hiring since the government has a compelling interest in providing equal opportunity to participate in the workplace without regard to race in prohibitions on racial discrimination are precisely tailored to achieve that critical goal and we believe the title seven is precisely tailored and therefore it should be enforced in general to stop discrimination that there should not be a riff or defense here or the court's analysis with respect to least restrictive alternative had it a number of problems one of those is that it simply because of the narrow way the court reviewed or or described a compelling interest he looked only at the dress code and so he said he suggested that the e e o c could simply get rid of the dress code or get or get rid of the dress code and that that would end the burden on the on the funeral and the problem of course was that my client had been fired and so so that was a simply not going to address the title seven's interests or the government's interests in passing title seven to stop discrimination district court didn't have any remedy then to to rectify the firing it was only for no remedy to rectify the filing and i had a women just didn't use it but the court could have ordered her back and ordered a uniform dress code and back pay it was well as in their damages to my clients in terms of emotional distress this was summary judgment right owners may please the court and the board low representing r g n g r harris funeral homes this case concerns the right of an employer tom ross to control the public face of his business and ministry and in this case that business code so could he have a policy based on his true sincere religion a very small religion that he should only employ men well if that was the case yes case it's a little bit different because there isn't any sex discrimination we're talking about is sex stereotyping and there's no compelling interest in radical sex stereotyping because you don't have sex discrimination unless exterior typing results in a disparate impact on one sex or the other so and that's really the point so moving first to the into the a sex discrimination piece of this and you said that that the your client should have the right to control the face of the business but in the business  he hired men and women correct that's correct your honor and in the business he professed to service basically people of all religions  religions of whatever so it's basically you know sort of all this so why is this inconsistent in his actions here how they consistent with his professed  and that's what tom ross feels that his religious calling is to do to care for and minister to the grieving and that is based on his christian principles he also operates the business according to the tenets of his faith including the principle that sex the readable gift from god  employ stevens when stevens is finally in sextus of dress code and dressing as a woman when ross no was that stevens is not a woman would send a message to the public and in a public facing position representing the fear of home that is contrary to his religious calling but it wouldn't send a message to the public that he believes that sex is immutable so so if somebody had a religion where they believed that their religion was the true religion and that everybody else who believed in other religions was violating their true principles would they be able to prevent anyone else from working for their business that was not a and here and to their i'm trying to figure out what the difference between my hypos which are purposefully trying to be very extreme and the actual case what is the real difference legally except for the fact that this is a very small group of people here as opposed to barring all women are barring anybody who is in this particular religion but one of the differences your honor is that legally here there is no compelling interest there's no compelling interest in eradicating sex discrimination i'm sorry reddick it ing sex stereotyping generally unless there's a disparate impact between men and women and we don't have a disparate impact here because the sex specific dress code and what is his me to be denying women i would point actually pricewaterhouse that proposition as well as the jesperson case of the ninth circuit but in pricewaterhouse yeah how does price waterhouse help you pricewaterhouse is very helpful your honor because pricewaterhouse actually states very clearly that congress's intent in prohibiting sex discrimination was to strike at the entire spectrum of disparate treatment between men and women resulting from sex stereotypes so there you see right there between men and women means there's a disparate disparity between men and women and th not at all your honor i don't think that barnes and smith dealt with dress codes or they did not deal with dress codes and they are they don't stand for the proposition that all sex stereotyping regardless of disparate impact is necessarily problematic under title seven in particular  smith which involved in firefighters all firefighters had to wear the same player fighting equipment no dress code was involved and the panel in the six of the panel in smith actually amended its opinion to remove the piece of that opinion that would have said transgender status essentially protected under title seven but smith is not a case that holds that you don't need to consider disparate impact you'd look at pricewaterhouse which requires that disparate impact analysis and to hold otherwise would be record's very clear as to the basis for the firing and stevens own deposition stevens testified that his understanding from what ross told him was that stevens coming to work dressed as a woman was not going to be acceptable and that said page eighty fourteen fifty six and rost did inform stevens that he could not violate the dress code for male female directors and that's at age eighty thirteen seventy one so what ross told it is because of ross believe that people should not change their sex the dress code is in place in part because ross believes that people should not change their sex but more generally it's because believes that he's called to the ministry of caring for grieving grieving people and in order to leave what because he believes he's called to the ministry of caring for grieving people in order to be sensitive to grieving people he has a dress code in place in this industry standard to make sure there are no distractions or other interruptions to people who are bereaved and that's why the dress codes in place but the business is also informed by his religious tenets including his belief that sex is an immutable gift from god that should not be changed so it seems a little bit narrowing your approach that it's only a dress code case if it's based on his immutable believes that people should not change their sex if he was compelled to have stevens in public facing and wearing a dark suit albeit a woman's dark suit that means that the dress code talked about suits and white shirts  and suits or dresses of a dark nature for women so seems to me that focusing nearly on the dress code just seems i'm almost a little bit specious to me because because you're looking to refer to of less restrictive means less restrictive means aren't means that require the employer to change their practices i mean you're saying it's the dress code and and i'm saying that that seems very narrow because but the examples i gave what is about the dress code that the testimony in the record is very clear that that is the reason that ross gave for the firing and that was stevens understanding of the reason for the termination as well and so that's why the dress code is so important and it was unfortunate that dress code that led to so it was the first of a dress code that led to the discharge and that's why it's so central to the case but putting that aside the simple  forcing stevens and for forcing ross to employ stevens in a public facing position would violate his religious beliefs concerning the mutability of sex because stevens was fired before he actually showed up wearing female correct that's correct your honor so stevens was terminated stephen indicated to rost that he would return from a cation after two weeks and then be dressing and presented as a woman and then shortly after after last informed stevens of the discharge and the reason was that he would that would work with the company's dress code i'm curious and you know you have a limited amount of time and i do want you to get to the other issue of the inclusion of the challenge to the disparate availability of financial remuneration for men and women in these and be their clothing allowance so if you be sure in the same time to address that i don't want to interfere with your argument no respect to the alternative bases for affirm the district court that there is no sex discrimination yes that is the core of the argument that there are if there is no disparate impact then there is no sex discrimination that's clear from pricewaterhouse itself and it's also clear from well that is the position of the b s your honor that that is that is really at the heart of the case but turning to the the riff or defense there is religious exercise here as protected by referring to the under speed record evidence shows that ross faith compel him to serve the grieving so the business is not just a business it's a ministry in addition he operates it consistently with the tenets of his faith including his belief that sex and we will get from god and for that reason rosabelle not purchase a tire  for the opposite sex for a person that's claiming to be a member of the opposite sex just as hobby lobby's religiously motivated business practice of declining to pay for its employees importunate abortion inducing drugs is protected religious exercise under refresher so too is religiously motivated policy prohibiting public facing reps of the company from wearing the uniform for the opposite sex so what we really have here is two different ways that the those exercises substantially burden one because ross be forced to pay stevens was fired females were not provided any clothing allowance and therefore stephen's amy stevens would not be getting any clothing allowance when she came back after her to  vacation well that's not exactly correct or are these the record is very clear it was a question so i don't know how you can say my question is incorrect the record is very clear your honor that when you look at the position of fuel director that argee would provide the company issued suits to male and female female directors also before this case arose funeral directors were provided male and female directors you didn't have any female directors since the fifty's or something that's great there have been a few female directors for quite some time with record's clear that there simply haven't been any females that have applied for that have been qualify for the position of field director for quite some time was stevens a funeral director and stevens was a few no director so the dress code i'm sure the clothing allowance provisions are different depending on the position and for funeral directors because it's a position that is a most in contact with grieving families in the public  the dress codes are very clear and that the provision is that the company actually provides the conservative suits to the funeral directors so there be no it was that it was appreciate your clarification of the record the fact was according to the record according to you that other public facing employees other than funeral directors were the men were given an allowance but the women were the respect of the closing up clothing allowance we look at positions other than funeral directors since october two thousand and fourteen public facing employees other than funeral directors male employees have received a company issued suit and female employees have received a clothing would provide them if he had any female funeral directors he certainly would because the policy of the company is divide company issued suits to all field directors so moving on to the compelling interest analysis under ref that the substantial burden is either requiring us to pay for and provide company should suits or putting a player in a public facing position sending a message that contradicts itself we have held religious beliefs and with respect to peddling interest under  hobby lobby it's not enough i also wonder i can solace it's not enough to simply say that there is a compelling interest abroad compelling interest in ending discrimination of any type right you need to actually point at a specific compelling interest is specific to the person claiming the religious exemption and that's the language from hobby lobby and guns all as and so the question there then would be does the government have a specific compelling interest in allowing in forcing ross to allow stevens to be in a public facing position and contradicting the owner's religious beliefs and that yossi and stevens haven't demonstrated that could you see it being broadened to say the compelling interest is in stephen's not being fired for this reason as opposed to just focusing on a compelling interest in the clothing that is worn on noir honor because the compelling interest musical the compelling interest needs to look at what is the growing interest with respect to the person claiming the religious exemption and stevens claim hypothetically would be that he should not be fired because he is transitioning to become a me and one i want to be treated as such then maybe what steven is claims but then again there is no compelling interest in eradicating sex stereotyping discrimination unless there's a disparate impact between the sexes and there is none here for what i guess i get back to pricewaterhouse so in pricewaterhouse the woman was viewed by the employers not being sufficiently feminine and and was able to be fired for that reason so i would think that your position would be difficult to square with the holding and pricewaterhouse actually the holding price waterhouse in price waterhouse and hopkins of course was it was terminated because she wasn't sufficiently aggressive wasn't sufficiently forward and assertive and the court look to sex stereotyping as a proxy for sex to prove up sex discrimination and show the disparate impact but there was a disparate impact in pricewaterhouse because as the court describe the trait aggressiveness for which and hopkins was terminated because she didn't have a trade was actually required in order to succeed in the job so by imposing that sex stereotype it it allowed female employee it was a lot of male employees to advance in the company but not female employees and so there you have a disparate impact as a tween male and female employees but that's simply not the case that we have before us because in this case we have the force of the sex specific dress code evenly applied so if a biological woman had decided to dress as a man or present as a man in violation of dress code they would have been disciplined just as stevens was so there's no disparate impact in the snow sex discrimination in that's really not in issue here in carter the question was whether the religious land use an issue such persons act was problematic because it created an establishment clause problem and the court said no that it is not and so it's not at all similar to the situation i have in this case there's simply no establishment clause problem here because no particular religion is being furthered or fostered by providing a narrow exemption to ross in this case and that of course is what richard does it provides an exemption from the application of the law and that will necessarily mean that the law does not do in the particular instance what it normally would do so you can't simply so parents should not be able to simply say well stevens would be terminated and stuff in the term asian is a compelling interest because refresh does by its nature provide exemptions and the language of refers very broad applies to all federal laws passed before or after and finally with respect least restrictive means no so the e e o c the burden is very very heavy in this case to show that there is a compelling interest and also that there's no less restrictive alternative in here there would be a lesser what no less restrictive alternative and here there would be a less restrictive alternative and i could be simply prohibiting employers from terminating people for dressing not in conforming with or by a load while biological sex when they're outside of working hours of course in this case the records are very clear that ross would not have terminated stevens if stevens had simply indicated an intent to dress and present as a woman outside of work while not representing the company but i mean it's almost as if you're arguing that dressing consistent with your assigned gender is a qualification of the job is not a qualification  honor but it is it's rost sincerely held religious belief that sex should not be changed it cannot be changed and to allow somebody to dress inconsistently in a public facing position would send a message that contradicts rusts i believe i'm not hearing you said the public facing position to allow to force ross to have stevens to have to be in a public facing position representing the company while dressing as a woman would send a message that clearly contradicts ros sincerely held religious beliefs that's burdening his ok but why i don't understand the aspect that confines his religious belief to the public facing position i think there are two ways that ross religious exercise is one is he would be forced to pay for in a specific date the cross dressing behavior secondly he would be forced to put stevens in a public facing position a funeral director and thus sending a message director or give an allowance for it then that goes away right look at yes that particular organ will go away ok so that so we really because that's the very easily dealt with by the records very clearly under that rost would in fact pay for and provide company doesn't have to as part of his religion he doesn't have to his perv religion but it is part of the company policy and it's and it is something that he would normally do so refer to i mean the government should be able to come in and force ross to change the way that his company is structured even if it goes to issues of employment that normally the c is interested in protecting o talking about applying riffraff in your the question is whether there is a less restriction or restrictive alternative you don't look to see whether the employer the employer could change the structures in order to accommodate accommodate what the governor wants to do so it done in foresman agency the c could say you can't fire this person and reach some sort of an accommodation where the employer doesn't have to pay for the for the uniform right so if i understand your honour's question it's your position that it's simply this suit so if he came in with make up and other in dish a being a woman it would be fine as long as he wore that company issued suit it may or may not be fine with respect to the so what it may or not may not be fine with respect to compliance with the dress code but if stevens came to work presenting clearly as a woman and acting as it is as a woman when ross knows that stevens is a biological male that yes with respect to the i'm sorry with respect to the river defenses exclamation claim yes there's a lot to cover an answer but if i can i like to focus on three points unless you have questions right from the start and the first is a psyche a that we don't have a compelling interest in eliminating anything but sex stereotypes as they pertain to clothing i think this argument is very muddled a lot doesn't require there to be an impact on all women the or the law under title seven is that we protect individuals so you don't have to show an impact on the entire class of women i think that argument is clearly inconsistent with  pricewaterhouse where and hopkins prevail because she was singled out as as being too masculine of a woman not because all of the women in the workplace were being discriminated against but you could reach back even further than that go to martin marietta where there is discrimination against women with school age children not all women so that argument respectfully i think just doesn't work here also this court has said in smith the discrimination against a plaintiff who is transsexual and therefore fails to identify with his or her gender is the same as discrimination against and hopkins in pricewaterhouse who in sex stereotypical terms did not act like a woman so i think that your own president understands correctly the pricewaterhouse doesn't require you to show discrimination against everybody discrimination against one person whose outward appearance and demeanor doesn't match expectations of her sex is enough and that that's a compelling interest that we have to be and to be sure that amy stevens can go to work addressed consistently with her gender identity but not just dress but her entire appearance and secondly i'd like to talk about it's exercise of religion and whether employing somebody can interfere with a religious exercise i think that the company has a problem legally and factually with that argument mr ross testified in his deposition at page forty two that he understands that hiring somebody whose religion is different than his is not an endorsement of that person's religion he also testifies to page one hundred thirty  deposition that he has employed a gay worker and he said he would not fire somebody who was an adulterer who had an abortion so he seems to understand that and we pointed in our brief to the case summers versus witness which talks about an employee who had to issue same sex marriage licenses as part of her job duties she brought a title seven religious discrimination case and says it interferes with my christian beliefs the court rejected that and said no you're not endorsing same sex marriage by just executing your job duties and issuing a same sex marriage licenses and we invite this court to adopt that kind of analysis here and then finally i said at the beginning of my argument that this case really pits two important principles in our country against each other and their religious liberties and their right to work free of discrimination and just as candy perhaps said it best in his concurring opinion and hobby lobby when he said that in america we enjoy religious exercise and it is important in our country yet neither made that same exercise unduly restrict other persons such as employees and protecting their own interests interests the law deems compelling we ask that you are summary judgment thank you discrimination does not require a showing the men are being treated favorably than women or vice versa the court says that title seven focuses on the individual not a class of women or men and even a true true generalization about the class is an insufficient reason for disqualifying an individual to whom the generalization does not apply so relying on generalizations or requiring proof that all women were facing discrimination is just not what the court has ruled the supreme court is required either in man whored or in in pricewaterhouse i'd also like to address the record with respect to the firing here counsel has suggested that my client agreed that it was simply about the dress code but my client in her testimony said that ross told her it's not going to work and ross himself said that that he fired this specific reason in his deposition the specific reason he fired stevens was that she was no longer going to represent herself as as a man and that's understand that she's a woman that that that it was that violated his reason religious beliefs that someone would be violating what you know their beliefs with respect to their god given nature decision would just be around us in terms of the kinds of discrimination that could be opened by recognizing a riff or defense here thank you thank you offer your argument the case will be submitted and with the clerk called the next case