hello welcome everyone we're going to have a special treat it today's hearings in the past witnesses have been confined to only five minutes today's witnesses will be speaking for seven minutes or well of the questioning period will be five minutes and opening statements will be five or seven or a little over long we take there's been much recent attention to the threat of bioterrorism poses to our national security today's hearing provides a broad overview of our diplomatic international efforts to counter that threat earlier this year the weapons of mass destruction commission chaired by senators graham and talent issued a report card that included an assessment of our progress in bio defense their initial report found biological weapons are more likely to be acquired and used by terrorist groups  than nuclear weapons though i might add that it is my belief that bio weapons would cause a lesser total number of casualties a smaller though more likely disaster indeed the commission found that in less the world community acts decisively and with greater urgency it is more likely than not that a weapon of mass destruction would be used in a terrorist attack somewhere in the world by the end of tw thirteen since we've already seen the use of anthrax the use of chemical and biological weapons in japan over recent decades this seems to be a relatively safe prediction the report further identified several weaknesses in our national bio defense including the need for stronger congressional oversight this hearing is part of that oversight and follows my request that the international security and bio policy institute prepare a report on our international efforts to counter biological threats and without objection i'd like to put that study into the record of this hearing hearing no objections ordered the hearing also provides us an opportunity to examine the obama administration's national strategy to address biological threats when they ram talent commission issued it assessment report card on national progress in the w m d area it contains sharp criticism of our national efforts to improve bio defense the commission issued a failed grade a grade of f for u s efforts to mitigate the effects of biological that attack i don't fully agree with that grade and it found that our international efforts personified by our first witness here deserve degraded between a and b considerably better than most other aspects addressed in the report it is important to note that others have countered that the commission has  overestimated the threat of biological attack some critics contend that we have spent too much on domestic preparedness some sixty four billion dollars since nine eleven and the anthrax attacks have often the said that the use of the term w m d is misleading because it lumps into one category mustard gas and hydrogen bombs along with all chemical radiological and biological and nuclear threats even a crude nuclear explosive with a small yield could kill tens of thousands of people  those uses of biological and chemical weapons against first world countries here the united states japan and elsewhere have involved dozens of casualties rather than tens of thousands i would hope our witnesses will be able to describe how they believe biological threats could lead perhaps to a mass casualty event and it is important that we understand the  nature and the possible casualties of different types of biological attack when it comes to biological threats confronting us today we must consider the parallel threats from state sponsored the use of biological weapons and from biological attacks perpetrated by terrorist groups one of the longest standing efforts to counter a state sponsored biological weapons programs is the biological weapons convention the b w c which went into effect in one thousand nine hundred seventy five since that time the b w c has not had a verification regime anywhere similar to the verification regimes we have for nuclear and chemical weapons some including past administrations have argued that true dition a verification protocol could not keep pace with rapid developments in biological research that basically biological weapons can be created almost in so many different facilities legitimate facilities like a vaccine plant too hard to detect say some most recently in december our good friend undersecretary for arms control ellen tauscher reaffirmed to the u s position on seeking w rather b w c compliance without seeking a verification protocol the administration instead  has and i think this is somewhat controversial is trying to control biological weapons by disclosing the bio research they were doing in maryland and elsewhere some would say this is telling the terrorists what defenses we have others would say that this is reassuring other countries in the world that are bio research is only  defense and constitutes a confidence building measure a c b i look forward to learning more about how the u s can promote greater b w c compliance and  verification without letting the bad guys know what our defenses are the threat of a biological to from a terrorist group presents a more amorphous problem many of argued that recent progress in biological research is greatly give them something to focus on and not be up for higher by those seeking to create proliferation now focus on the biological sciences as well as nuclear science am eager to hear about the state department's efforts in this regard through a bio security engagement program another diplomatic efforts finally the ability to detect an assassin factious disease outbreaks whether  naturally occurring or intentionally instigated is both important from a global public health standpoint and from the standpoint of mitigating the impact of a biological attack the international health risk posed by h one n one and sars indicate that pathogen show little regard for national borders and modern jet travel can transport these infectious agents from anywhere in the world to the united states  national security strategy to counter biological attacks emphasizes the need for global disease surveillance as part of our national defense similarly instruments like the international health regulations provide a framework for improving disease surveillance and reporting worldwide in this regard i continue to be concerned that indonesia is not cooperating with the united states thought i think i'll conclude now since my time has expired and hear the words of our ranking member mr royce from the great state of california thank you very much mr chairman for calling this hearing and i think that bioterrorism really demands a lot greater attention by the administration by the congress frankly by everyone i biological warfare really dates back to the beginning of recorded history the world's first true historians to cities almost lost his life as a result of a technique that persians and greeks and romans used to throwing carcasses down a well to poison the well and i think athens lost a greater percentage of its population in the war with sparta by this biological effect than they did of the spartan war machine so it has a long history of being used in warfare and today germs present really a mass destruction threat if we think about it scientists have been able to assemble infects infectious viruses including the formerly extinct one nine hundred eighteen influenza strain that strain killed thirty million people so ever advancing technology and biotechnology just continues to proliferate these capabilities and several years ago just outside of moscow i met with the so called father of the plague and i think his monkey or might have been  overstated but that's how the rest russians were referred to him he was the top russian scientist and he had allegedly developed genetically altered pathogen that had no antidote he wanted us to meet with him because he had been able to at least put an alarm system into the moscow subways he'd never been outside of the country but presuming we use subways he wanted us to have this technology in his you know he really was sort of an inside he wanted jim saxon and i didn't know the extent of what they had done they had they had fifty thousand people in the soviet biological weapons program at one point a massive u s s r violation of the b treaty commitment by the way and he shared with me his concern that some of this legion had sold their expertise to middle east countries it's regrettable that the russians have lessened their cooperation with our joint effort to contain this proliferation over ten countries today may have bio weapons programs al qaeda has sought biological weapons evidence seized in the two thousand and three arrest of operations chief khalid shaikh mohammed revealed impressive technical sophistication including information on weaponized anthrax now that's one of the subjects that i that i discussed with a russian scientist that was seven years ago and by the way one of his students subsequently defected and we had a chance to talk with him here in the u s and he confirmed what his professor had taught him or what his mentor had taught him in this technology and he was now trying to help us better understand what had been developed and unfortunately i'm afraid that there's a great deal of complacency and maybe complacency is normal but the two thousand and one anthrax attack that little fiasco us six billion and cost us some american lives local officials speak of having to fight so isn't indifference to bolster our resilience to attack and that's just a reality reina launch is the bipartisan commission on the prevention of weapons of mass destruction proliferation and terrorism it concluded that quote our margin of safety is shrinking not growing the commission believes that unless decisive an urgent action is taken then  w m d terrorist attack is likely to occur somewhere within four years this attack the commission speculates is more likely to be biological than it would be nuclear the commission reports that each of the last three administrations have been slow to recognize and respond to bioterrorism the obama administration it found lacks a sense of urgency the commission gave the administration ath for not improving our biological attack response capabilities i'm looking forward to hearing from the administration probability and possibility of our bioterrorism attack in my capacity as chairman of our agriculture subcommittee on food safety it is an issue of soaring magnitude largely because because of our food supply that nature of it we move meant that the international aspects of it the fact that we are in fact the bread basket of the world  certainly lomas very large in terms of the attractiveness as a target by terrorists terrorist groups so as scientific progress marches on we certainly have the potential and increasingly the capabilities to address many of the threats that we are we are facing from the ballot being new strains of rice to address world hunger the back scenes that prevent the spread of disease like h one n one scientific knowledge can and largely has led to the betterment of mankind and continues to raise our living standards for all but however like any knowledge there is the potential for those who would wish us harm to unleash devastating attacks and we must not only prepare for that chance but do our very best to prevent it our most recent attack from a chemical biological weapon show sophistication and the the change of tactics of terrorists but our christmas day underwear bomber over a plane  d in new york who would of thought that may or may causing of a chemical and ones undergarments could blow a plane out of the sky but this is very serious scientific technological knowledge that we have to unleash great goodness across the world is the same technology that can be used in a in a warped backward evil sense to cause us great harm and we've got to be prepared to do everything we can to prevent this in my travels to russia and to africa every part of the nation we've been in every part of the world we've been and it just alarms me as to the laxness of our international approach and trying to get an international corporation to understand there is a sea of it i mean our food supplies are so interchange nationally it's just take one example ninety percent of all of the tomatoes that we use in this country come from outside this country we are so interdependent internationally that we must move very rapidly to understand and as i said biological science has led to great advances in addressing our food shortages and developed famine resistant crops are for the agriculture sector and our nation's food supply overall can be very enticing targets for acts of bio terrorism as our agricultural sector as i mentioned is known as the bread basket of the world is important to note that any attack on our food supply could have devastating effects for the rest of the world and i might mention we are moving very rapidly amount home state of georgia where the university of georgia is a very prestigious agricultural department is putting first world class food supply of food security a process  that we're all going to be taking even a closer look and while of course we must make sure to address preventing the spread of disease outbreaks or the event protecting our water supply or controverted and direct attacks  one man responsible for that devastating anthrax attract and so this this looms big mr chairman and i am very delighted that you put this together i think we can get get some answers some questions we need to have uniform definitions what constitutes about a logical weapon and is that constitution accurate for every country how can we tighten our international cooperation because that is the key very very serious questions i look forward to the witnesses and thank you mr chairman for putting this together thank you at this point will hear from  for witness excuse me bassett or watson has come and we wish to hear her opening statement and i would say good morning to the chairperson and thank you for convening today's hearing to review our national and international response to countering biological threats it is never too early to discuss any view  effectiveness of current policies and practices so that we might learn what works evaluate this what does not and we vies our strength and national and international efforts to put care for and hopefully prevent the next biological attack in recent history when we think of a biological terrorist attack it is not hard to forget the before mentioned tracks attacks here in washington after the tragedy of september eleventh two thousand and one where five people were killed and seventeen others infected since then agencies across state and local governments have taken steps to address issues of the vention training evaluating resources and coordinating efforts as well as increasing public education participate in an awareness some have noted that while there are many agencies and departments that have resources dedicated to prevention and mitigating damage and harm to the public there still a large gap in our agency and intergovernmental communications and coordination others have also noted that while it is important to have regulation oversight of by containment technologies and control of high containment laboratories the federal government must not stifle or inhibit international academic collaboration in order for the scientific community to continue its study on biological chemical us in this committee we have addressed export controls and review of the arms export control act and the export administration act which operates on the principle that the export of certain goods requires licensure specifically denying such licenses if the items will contribute to biological weapons proliferation mr chairman as lawmakers we have a responsibility to evaluate policy and close gaps in order to strengthen and protect our citizens we also have an obligation to work towards international transparency and diplomatic efforts and i appreciate the panel for taking time to appear before this committee i look forward to hearing and listening to the witnesses testimony and i do indeed want i think you and i yield back the balance of my time thank the ambassador for joining us here for their opening statement we now turn to our first witness security and nonproliferation since june two thousand and nine the international security and nonproliferation bureau spearheads u s efforts to promote consensus on w n d  liberation through by lateral and multilateral diplomacy mr benn deep thank you mr mr chairman members of the subcommittee i want to thank you for the opportunity to appear today the president's new national strategy for countering biological threats signals a major development in our international efforts to combat those threats and today i'd like to share more information on the activities that we conducted the state department to implement that strategy i'd like to request that my prepared testimony be included in the record of today's hearing and i will present a shorter version here in my oral statement  what i intend to do is to take a moment to outline the threat and then describe some key activities at the state department is undertaking internationally to implement the strategy as i already indicated in many of the opening statements congress is keenly aware that there is a real and present danger of biological attack given the two thousand and one anthrax attacks the most obvious and worrisome danger comes from terrorist groups that have expressed intent to obtain biological weapons especially al and we are also concerned about the ambitions of some nation states to develop biological weapons a successful attack using a pathogenic agent could not only result in sickness and death but could cause panic loss of public trust and enormous damage the president's strategy compliments our preparations to risk on to biological events by placing more effort emphasis on efforts to prevent such events or at least to reduce the likelihood that they will take place state's efforts to implement the strategy internationally are focused on reducing the likelihood that terrorists or states interested in biological weapons could obtain the experience or materials to develop and use them working with the international community to transform the dialogue on biological threats is a key objective in the strategy and state plays a critical role in this objective by working through existing multilateral mechanisms today i'm going to highlight our work in the biological weapons convention the state department's bio security engagement program and in the g eight global partnership against the spread of w m d in each of these four there is a newfound urgency related to the need to work together to strengthen our collective security against biological threats a key element of the strategy is revitalizing the biological weapons convention which we intend to use to promote and globally advance our biosecurity objectives through using the b w c as our premier forum for global outreach and coordination in particular we will tighten the linkage between global security against infectious disease through strengthening basic health capacities on the one hand and on the other hand the security community's need to counter man made disease threats last year the biological weapons convention states parties and experts from a wide range of health science and security organizations focused on disease surveillance and related capacity building had a particular emphasis on implementation of the world health organization's international health regulations the focus of the meetings in two thousand and ten is on providing assistance in the event of an unusual disease outbreak or an alleged use of biological weapons on our part we 're going to have the f b i and the centers for disease control refund their efforts at training for joint criminal de meo logical investigations and there will be several u s sponsored conferences on bio risk management and on the scientific and technical breakthroughs that can be applied to disease surveillance and we are looking forward to the seventy five year b w c review conference in two thousand and eleven as an opportunity to further the objectives of the strategy in addition the b w c states bio security engagement program is working to reduce the threat of bioterrorism through cooperative activities to prevent terrorist access to potentially dangerous biological materials and expertise while supporting legitimate efforts to combat infectious disease and enhance public and animal health worldwide since two thousand and six that the e p program has maturity into a thirty seven million dollars a year effort focused on regions in countries where there is a nexus of terrorism emerging infectious disease and rapid growth in biotechnology and high containment laboratories provide support for and closely coordinates activities abroad with other u s departments and agencies defense health and human services and agriculture to directly address several key objectives of the strategy  provides assistance to improve laboratory bio security and bio safety best practices improved capacity for infectious disease detection surveillance and control and engages biological scientists and public animal health experts to reduce the potential for exploitation of biological expertise information and material and b p not only improves international security but provides a dual benefit of improving global health we're also addressing another key challenge identified in the strategy of reinforcing norms for safe and responsible conduct of biological activities for example we are sponsoring biological safety associations across south and southeast asia in the middle east that can provide a sustained mechanism for countries to provide training to life scientists and public and animal health professionals bio risk management and responsible scientists conduct state also coordinates and promote additional cooperative international efforts to counter the biological threat by the g eight global partnership a ten year twenty billion dollars nonproliferation effort that was launched in two thousand and two and has thus far focused on programs in the former soviet union this year we are working closely with the canadian presidency and with the other partners to extend the partnership and twelve and this expanded program will bring additional resources from partner countries to bear on addressing global was logical threats and also threats beyond those in the former soviet union we are also working to help u n member states manage biological security threats by helping them implement un security council resolution fifteen forty which requires all un members to have proliferation export controls and to secure dangerous materials mr chairman i hope that i've been able to provide you with a better understanding of the serious efforts by the department of state against a biological threat i appreciate the opportunity to outline for the subcommittee what we are doing in concrete terms to implement the international aspects of the national strategy state of course does not work alone and relies on its close working relationship with other u s government agencies the congress and the international community to expand these efforts and make them more successful thank you thank you i'm going to recognize the other members of the subcommittee for questions first and to my questionings question last so first recognize mr scott thank you very much  let me ask you this question if i may and one respect we've been very fortunate that we haven't had a biological terrorist attack since two thousand and one with the anthrax scare course has been a very intensive u s counterterrorism effort assisted by international partners and various biological related activities have been disrupted such as the anthrax activities in afghanistan that are noted in my written testimony likewise i think biological attack is more difficult for a terrorist to perpetrate especially significant ones than the kinds of conventional attacks that they're used to perpetrating and of course there has been a lot of effort to try and improve our export controls border surveillance other kinds of activities to try and inhibit and deter such activity so i think it's probably a complex of variety of different things that have been happening since two thousand and one how would you describe for us a matter fact i'd like you to describe for us the federal government works from a standpoint of agency cooperation how do you coordinate what you do with other agencies and what are the agencies who work together with you to form this very strong front line defense of our country from a biological attack well and that of course is something that's a centerpiece of the president's new strategy to improve that interagency coordination but in terms of the international activities that we engage in everything that we do is very thoroughly interagency coordinated in fact many of the implement department programs in this area are in fact other agencies such as s and agriculture there are various standing working groups we try and coordinate and conflict our various programs to help implement the strategy the national security council staff has put together an ongoing effort to come up with detailed interagency implementation plans for each aspect of the strategy and those are in development right now and also we have in place a special coordinator for cooperate reduction the department ambassador bonnie jenkins and part of her job is to make sure that state department programs are well coordinated with those of other agencies as well as with similar activities that other countries conduct now let me ask you about the funding level do you believe that we in congress are giving you the necessary amount of resources to get the job done or are the areas or is there more funding that you feel we need to provide for you well congressman i suppose every bureaucrat would be remiss if he didn't say more money but i think realistically in terms is a lot of the countries that we're dealing with in terms of trying to make sure that we apply our resources in places where there are clearly identified threats and recognizing that there are all sorts of other tradeoffs  amounts of money are spent on it and let me ask you about our level of international cooperation if you could describe for us what that is how would you rate it and where are the weak link places in the middle east south asia sort of fall into that category but bioterrorism is something that for better or for worse can happen almost anywhere almost any country has within its borders a hospital or a scientific facility that has pathogens and so where we can we're reaching out to try and improve things in those areas as well so we have a new focus for example in trying to do so operations in africa and latin america to help deal with  aspect of the problem as well and one of the areas that as i mentioned i'm very much concerned about of course is the subcommittee chairman for food safety and agriculture is to keep our food supply  safe does your agent work in collaboration with our agriculture department especially in very critical areas where we're moving forward to help with  not sure i'm in a position to give you a meaningful response on the on the larger question i'm very glad that you identified the potential threat of biological attack against the food supply because oftentimes the discourse on this is only focuses on the human aspect of it and because of the indirect human aspect and the very significant economic impact of the agricultural part i'm very glad that you raised that and that and because of that that's always been a focus of our activities whether  it's securing dangerous pathogens those have always included pathogens against food crops and livestock whether it's building a culture of safety and security we include the animal agriculture health communities and those activities that i remember the gentleman has expired let me now recognize mr royce from california our ranking member thank you chairman chairman at least one of our witnesses today is going to speak of the importance of intelligence in the inadequacy of our intelligence bioterrorism and this is an issue that the chairman chairman and i were very involved in at the time but in two thousand and seven the intelligence community produced a national intelligence estimate which you were certainly involved with you were the national intelligence officer for nonproliferation that and i concluded with high confidence that iran had halted its effort to develop nuclear weapons in two thousand and three and it c'est with moderate confidence that iran had not restarted this program you know report last month  re cited a number of concerns about military related nucular activity in iran and asserted that these activities seem to have continued beyond two thousand and four now at the time the v was released the chairman and i denounced it as naive and harmful and you were centrally involved in that i remember at a press hearing with chairman brett sherman holding up the time magazine cover that exonerated the iranians exonerated them on the basis of your assessment which turned out to be wrong my question is what went wrong is now the time maybe to revisit the issues addressed in the end i  don't think the stakes could be any higher let me ask you that question thank you congressman i guess the starting point on that is of course that's that's not the business i'm in anymore  but i think the fair way to answer that question is community right now is preparing a follow on national intelligence estimate on that subject and i think the thing to do is to wait for that to come out and see the extent to which that assessment differs from the one in the two thousand and seven and i suggest that that should probably be the basis of deciding what was right and what was wrong i think the covert illegal enrichment facility at a military base outside qualm that was disclosed last fall to all the world so i think the case is pretty clear surely you agree that something went wrong in your assessment well one thing that is inherent is by definition information comes in after you publish the business the intelligence business is one of working with the information you happen to have at hand at any particular time comparing it to the old information and trying to then project both what is actually going on since objective reality is difficult to determine and what you think is likely to happen in the future and by definition new information keeps coming in it doesn't respect publication dates of  basically in the intelligence community or in the business of trying to predict the outcome of a movie you only get to see glimpses of you don't know how long the movie was going on before you started glimpsing you don't know how long the movie's go going on and half of your glimpses actually come from other people's glimpses of the movie and so you have to sort of put all that together and put together a picture and i think that and i was very clear and very responsible in its use of so called intelligence tradecraft confidence levels descriptions of alternative scenarios in fact i think there were eight alternative scenarios beyond the mainline estimate that were included in that assessment there is a very extensive discussion of what if we're wrong how can we be on so i think that i think i think part of your argument basically was the burden of proof to determine proliferation activities should be as high as in the average u s courtroom at least that's the way that that i recall sort of your assessment of the situation and as one press report said afterwards there was there was never a sanction that van deep in the liked never said one official it was a point of religion for him he thought anything we did outside of teacup diplomacy was counterproductive and wrong there are there are decisions we're going to make in terms of sanctions on the basis of assessments which you helped make that frankly turned out to be wrong and i'd like to just add a couple of other concerns i have i brought up russia the wm decommission noted that over the last several years russia has been less and less interested in cooperating with u biological threat reduction programs that had some success in redirecting former soviet bio weapons scientists to peaceful activities the commission expressed concern that quote the large cadre of former bio weapons scientists remains  global prolife aeration concern you barely mentioned russia in your testimony and i was going to ask you can you explain the russian position and the u s response and is there still a role for these programs congressman first of all i don't think i can let go to the first part of what you had to say and frankly those quotes against me are utter nonsense and i have in fact have been involved in sanctioning more entities and more countries for more ac and then any human being on the planet so i'm quite comfortable with the but the bottom line is for the chairman and me who were involved on the other side of the table from you in your last  position there was a very very different conclusion about what was going on in iran and what we should do about it so we just disagreed at the time i think that all that's in the papers subsequently bear out the chairman of my observations on this but but you've got your opinion i've got mine but but let's go to the to the question on russia the role of these programs are very happy to do that but anyway  yes clearly there's still an issue there's a fair amount of substantial amount of biological weapons applicable materials equipment and expertise in russia and in your opening stage statement mentioned some examples of that being the case and one of the longstanding objectives of our various engagement programs including the science energy program and others has been to work with the russians to try and put in place better barriers to make sure that that expertise does not go to b w programs in other countries or to terrorism and the russia russia now however is different than the russia we dealt with in the early ninety's in the sense that it is of than looking like they are partners and they are less interested in looking like they are a potential source of them they are looking like their partners and so the challenge that we face and continue to pursue these programs in russia which we are doing and which we think we still need to do because again that repository of expertise is unquestionably there is to try and work within the parameters set by the current russian government in the current situation within russia to continue to try to make progress let me ask you one last question why is that bipartisan panel they gave an f grade that was a bipartisan panel of nine experts why were they wrong  the w m d commission in january that gave you that grade what grade would you give yourself well i recall they mostly focused on the domestic side of things which of course the state department doesn't have responsibility for as the chairman noted in his opening statement the state department's end of this actually got relatively high grades i guess i guess what i would say is that would be less of an issue of grades than to realize that this is an extremely daunting and challenging problem the fact is that since bioterrorism ranges from everything from a disgruntled individual putting salmon eleana salad bar all the way up to all out strategic level attack by another country using i c b m s filled with genetically engineered pathogens there are a lot of potential opportunities for a biological attack against the united states and because we are a  sophisticated interdependent with other countries society a lot of her abilities that we have and so given all those opportunities for potential threat given all the vulnerabilities that we have it's a very daunting  task to try and totally protect ourselves against every aspect of such a threat thank you very much think of us chairman thank you before i recognize besar watson just a minute of personal privilege since my name was  mentioned i agree with the ranking member i'm even overstate his position by saying that the in i e e e was perhaps the worst example of a political document masquerading as an intelligence document i don't know the degree to which our witness was involved in it we in the legislative branch early helpless when it comes to missing the facts or mis character degree of confidence one has in facts and so we have to accept what the branch does in those two areas and i can't quibble with the nic on that but what makes a document political is where certain facts that are important are brushed off to the side and facts that are not important are brazened as major reasons to affect u s policy in that an i e the most important factor was left to the push to the side and mentioned in the first footnote and then most of the document including the first three paragraphs were all focused on facts and not only taught turned out to be irrelevant but were obviously irrelevant at the time the key to developing a nuclear weapon is getting the physical material and only a political document would focus on other far less important aspects of the nuclear  which will soon and be addressed by you thank you so much chairman speaking of other nations and continents i'd like to go to africa and talk about the act tobar two thousand and five  compact resulting from an african meeting and it states that it is illegitimate to address biological weapon threats without simultaneously addressing the descriptor illegitimate but certainly we've always tried to take it if i that was the statement quoting the contact but clearly we understand that we can get nonproliferation value out of both of those particularly where we're trying to promote improved surveillance improve public health you know we're doing that specifically because it also provides an important collateral benefit to protect us against potentially manmade biological threats experts from twenty african nations discussed the kinds of assistance they need in implementing better biological controls pursuant to un security council resolution fifteen forty and we work not only with other agencies but also the world health organization and the food and agriculture organization so i think that's a good example of how we're trying to do exactly that i thank you because the need is so great as you know on the continent in addition to an overarching federal strategy many agencies have developed their own strategic documents to address their responsibilities with respect to bioterrorism threat coordinating the strategies across multiple agencies is a challenge and so how is state working to harmonize its strategies with other agencies so as to be deuced unnecessary duplications and close security gaps and let me  disco on to my next you can answer them all together how did the state determine the optimal level of funding against bioterrorism threat and are there any areas that you feel are currently under resourced are should otherwise emphasize you congresswoman in terms of coordination i think the two main things we're doing is participating in the national security council led process to come up with specific implementation plans for the president's new bio strategy and then we  participate in and run a number of standing interagency working groups that deal specifically with the kinds of international systems programs like our bio security engagement program and in addition under this administration a new coordinator for coop funding that's a very complex issue but i think that the critical thing is what we try to do is determine where we put that funding based on a very clear assessment of the risk informed by the u s government scientific experts and by the intelligence community so we're trying to to identify and address the highest risks as a priority in our funding and then i'm sorry the last question  last question are there any other areas that you feel are currently under resourced are should otherwise be emphasized and i want to just so do you work with o s are do you work with their state departments in these various countries we work with various minutes not just state departments but ministries of health ministries of agriculture as well as n g o s and international organizations like the world health organization well as we look at aids and look at the funding we've given we are finding that a small amount of money in a village can go a long way when you use the in jails they know the customs traditions they know the people and how they responded and i'm finding that it looks like when you work through the actual inhabitants of a particular area a dollar goes a long way so if you can respond to how the state department looks at that and we do more business with the countries i think you and i back take a minute to address the witnesses statement that he's done more sanctions than anyone else that may in fact be true but it is pitiful compare yourself for example to the german foreign ministry their idea of sanctions is no such lead german business do everything they want you're comparing yourself to the rest of the state department you're basically bragging about being the tallest jockey at the at the at at at the at the race the race we are now being told by the state department that they favor smart sanctions by which they mean dumb sanctions which is to say they're in favor of sanctions so long as it doesn't actually hurt any the economy of iran and in fact no one at the state department has been able to point to a single publicly traded corporation anywhere in the world that is selling for one cent per share less as a result of american sanctions so our ideas were for sanctions as long as they don't inconvenience anyone  or at least they don't inconvenience anyone that has the slightest amount of political clout my best example is that we continue to import caviar from iran because why should american epicureans have to make do with northern putting aside by the state sponsors of terrorism countries and looking at the countries we look that we would hope would be cooperative which country is least cooperative in terms of controlling  biological proliferation and is to the least is the most troublesome as far as complying with un security council resolution fifteen forty i'm not sure that ever aside from the state countries that again just aren't in a position to put the kind of priority on that of those countries that are at least in the middle tier of wealth of countries which ones are devoting are giving the least cooperation or priority to council resolution fifteen forty i think probably the thing to do is to try and get back to you with a considered answer to the top of my head i'm not sure i'm able to now of those countries that are on the how long it take for you to get back to us with an answer on the week is that the week is fine of the countries that are state sponsors of terrorism which is the greatest a biological terrorism concern or because they are state sponsored terrorism and have provided other kinds of weapons to terrorist groups they would certainly be for me a concern how closely i mean there are two areas in the state department one is trying to coordinate our response to the spread of disease such as avian flu the other is your efforts the pathogens don't even know whether they were deliberately created or not  how closely do you work in a coordinated way so that we can respond internationally to the outbreak of a pathogen whether it's intentional or unintentional that that's exactly a key part of the philosophy behind much of  our security engagement program activity the idea that if we can assist in detecting surveillance and fighting a disease regardless of its origin by definition we're helping ourselves out on the biological weapons around indonesia has refused to let any of the developed countries in the world get adequate samples of avian flu they've taken the peculiar position that this is a property right of theirs which means they claim it as property on the theory that they can get money for it but all legal systems provide that if an animal is your property and it causes damage you're responsible for the damage and a pathogen is an animal  so from that standpoint is indonesia willing to claim not only the rights of ownership of these strains of avian flu but also to claim responsibility for the harm done by the avian flu and have they adequately set up set up reserves to reimburse the world for the harm that may be done by even if you flew in their failure  to provide developed nations with the samples necessary to develop a vaccine i'm really not in a position as that question mr chairman i just i'm not aware what the answers to those questions might be well  it's pretty apparent that we should we could see hundreds of thousands of innocent deaths because of the position of the indonesian government government where tens or hundreds of thousands of people were saved by the world eating in the after the tsunami and the fact that the state department is not making a bigger deal of this  that i believe i don't think there's interest in a second round with our first panel after all america does not torture and accordingly we will allow you to leave let's bring up the second testimony first i'd like to introduce barry kellerman president of the international security and bio policy institute mr kellerman is a professor of international law and director of the international weapons control center at the paul university college of law he has prepared for the subcommittee a report on united states foreign policies and programs to reduce bio dangers i want to thank you for that work our next witness is jonathan tucker who is a senior fellow at the james martin center for nonproliferation studies the cns of the monterey institute of international studies where he specializes in the control of biological and chemical weapons he joined cns main office in march one nine hundred ninety six as founding director of the chemical and biological weapons nonproliferation program make in two thousand and eight he was appointed to the congressional leadership by the congressional leadership to the u s commission on the prevention of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and terrorism he currently serves as senior counsel for the g r group government affairs mr gill chairman chairman congressman scott thank you for the opportunity to discuss policies for preventing and preparing for the violent infliction of disease invasion ten terrorists spreading highly weaponized anthrax in ten cities around the world nairobi warsaw tokyo mexico city etc assume not a single american is touched by any of these attacks none of which happened in american soil would anyone suggest that we are on harm if instead of smallpox pandemic is ignited killing perhaps millions worldwide if americans are effectively immunized does that mean that we're ok and if i might mr chairman i have to take issue with your your opening statement that  biological weapons will not kill more people than a nuclear weapon i simply disagree and we can come back to that if you like bio attacks that devastate allies transform developing societ into chaos stop transport and trade cause trillions of dollars of losses and so worldwide panic would be catastrophic lee when the united states has to buy all threats homeland security is international security and vice versa we cannot wall ourselves off from worldwide bio attacks mr chairman congressman global preparedness must be a high foreign policy priority of the united states working with our allies and the international system by global bio preparedness i mean having a global network of stockpiled medicines linked to delivery systems to get them where they are needed quickly with effective plans to ensure their distribution of principle value of global bio preparedness is deterrence why weaponized pathogens of populations can be effectively immunized or treated the best outcome of global bio preparedness is having medicines and delivery capabilities that are ready but never used precisely because our enemies cannot advance their horrific goals by committing bio attacks moreover allow me to say as the lead author of the kampala compact global bio preparedness can and must be a boon to public health global bio preparedness is in effect a highway system once built it can carry any medicines for any diseases rapidly and effectively  consider the diplomatic implications of the united states making global bio preparedness a top policy priority as the united states approaches the seventh review conference of the biological weapons convention next year strengthen security from threats strengthen the convention strengthen global public health all together exercise u s leadership for multiple benefits but there are challenges in small part there's a supply challenge having sufficient drugs for the spectrum of potential agents but at least with regard to anthrax antibiotics and vaccines there is vast on tap capacity the greater challenge is delivery return to the hypothetical anthrax in ten cities around the world the white powder must be collected and sent to diagnostic facilities for analysis once confirmed as anthrax vaccines and antibiotics must be transported perhaps thousands of miles to the target site where they must be dispensed to victims all this must happen in less than seventy two hours outside perhaps two dozen countries in the world mere fantasy of greater significance i posit is that there are legal pot holes scattered should medicines for weaponized pathogens be tested what standards are there for emergency use authorization also there is a prospect of ruinous liability for the manufacturers of such medicines if they have adverse consequences these issues must be resolved now if we want the private sector to supply a bio preparedness network to their legal challenges associated with stockpiling medicines regional stockpiling requires binding agreements so that victimized nations can get what they need when they need it also stockpile managers must have proper authority for maintaining the surety of their contents three their legal challenges associated with delivery what carriers will be involved what are their rights and responsibilities who is authorized to decide how to allocate scarce supplies a clear command and control architecture is imperative without elaborate planning what will be the authority of public health officials to commandeer resources and treat patients patients how will medical records be accessible how will quarantines be enforced mr chairman in the wake of bio attacks we cannot tolerate delay as officials question their legal authority to act we would not tolerate such delays challenges to domestic preparedness and our government deserves commendation for addressing many of these challenges inside the united states since nine eleven to call domestic preparedness a failure unjustifiably denigrates the enormous effort of dedicated public servants and suggests to our allies that they should not emulate our example when precisely the opposite message is required and appropriate mr chairman global bio preparedness is not about generosity it is about protecting the american people from international threats in an interconnected world taking the benefits of our experience and capacity to the international community epitomizes what america does best promoting the rule of law by building global bio preparedness we would engage all nations that share concern about bio threats we would advance public health readiness and we would establish a security framework upon which additional positive initiatives can be built for meeting the evolving threats moreover we would accelerate the development of biotechnology with positive implications for our economic recovery i asked the subcommittee to consider three questions one does the state department have all the authority it needs to plan negotiate and implement global bio preparedness to does the state department have the authority resources and capacity to develop optimal answers to the many legal challenges confronting global bio preparedness if not how can these issues be addressed three i've already mentioned the importance of taking global bio preparedness to the b w c but there are many opportunistic venues for advancing the subjective including the un security council nato the world economic forum in the g eight how precisely to do this is a matter for the subcommittee to consider finally allow me to ask you all what would congress do in the wake of bio catastrophes that relegate every other policy priority to in significance what would congress do to prevent a second series of attacks amid mass deaths and huge economic losses that demonstrate the horrible horrific implications of procrastination what will you do i respectfully ask you not to wait for the first attacks to prepare for the second attacks thank you very much for your attention chairman sherman and distinguished members of the subcommittee thank you for the invitation to appear before you today last november the obama administration released a national strategy for countering biological threats containing broad guidelines for u s policy the challenge facing the administration and congress in the months ahead will be to translate these guidelines into a set of concrete policy initiatives and to give them the political and budgetary support they were choir for  e implementation the key strength of the national strategy is that it integrates public health security concerns into a single paradigm this approach makes sense from a policy standpoint because it promotes efforts to strengthen global public health infrastructure in a way that bolsters u s defenses against both natural epidemics and bio terrorist attacks the national strategy also emphasizes the potential risks associated with emerging biotechnologies synthetic genomic for example provides the capability to synthesize long d n a molecules from scratch and assemble them into the genome of a virus this ability raises security concerns because it could potentially enable sophisticated terrorist groups to circumvent stringent controls on select agents of bioterrorism concerns such as a bowl of virus because the gene synthesis industry is international the united states will have to work with other countries to harmonize measures to prevent the misuse of this technology other international measures to enhance bio security revolve around the bio logical weapons inaction or complacency to move beyond the legacy of the failed b w c protocol a package of bold innovative measures will be needed to build confidence in compliance and to deter violations one critical element is to increase the transparency of bio defense research programs which have expanded dramatically in the united states and other countries since the terrorist attacks of two thousand and one and could theoretically serve as a cover for offensive bio weapons development enhanced transparency is in the u s interest for two reasons first it offers greater insight into the b w c related activities of other countries providing greater confidence that they are complying with their treaty obligations second it mitigates international suspicions about u s biodefense programs that might drive other nations to pursue questionable  useful approach to increasing the transparency of b w c related activities is to build cooperative relationships between bio defense scientists and institutions in the united states and those in countries  in recent years the defense department's biological threat reduction program and other u s biological engagement programs have reduced their activities in russia because of bureaucratic and political difficulties in dealing with the russian government nevertheless these engagement efforts are crucial for transparency and should be reinstated another important bio security measure lies with the united nations because of the failure to conclude the beat c protocol the only option for investigating an alleged use of biological weapons is a long standing mechanism under the auspices of the un secretary general at present however the un lacks the resources to rapidly field teams of suitably trained and equipped investigators to remedy this problem the united states should lead efforts to update and strengthen the secretary general's mechanism this capability would have an important deterrent effect by making it more likely that a covert biological attack will be attributed to a state or non state actor yet another way to strengthen global bio security is to improve systems for infectious disease surveillance and response in today's globalized world in outbreak of serious epidemic disease anywhere in the world poses potential risks to americans here at home global networks for infectious disease surveillance and response provide an extended defense perimeter for the united states by making it possible to detect and snuff out epidemics whether natural or human caused before they reach our shores but existing disease surveillance networks still contain many gaps in coverage preventing the timely detection and containment of breaks close to the source the international health regulations which were revised in two thousand  choir the member countries of the world health organization to report in a timely manner all public health emergencies of international concern that could potentially affect more than one country nevertheless because many developing countries lack the financial and technical resources to establish effective national surveillance and response capabilities the united states and other advanced countries must be prepared to help out a critical event for advancing all of these security objectives will be the seventh preview conference of the biological weapons convention which will convene late next year in geneva switzerland this comprehensive review of the treaties implementation will be a make or break political opportunity for the united states but the u s delegation will also have to navigate some treacherous political shoals it is likely that several b w c member states including iran and russia will seek to revive the protocol negotiations as a means bean's to pursue their negative agenda of attempting to weaken the convention itself to block these efforts the united states will have to offer an alternative package of bold and compelling measures to strengthen the b w c given the high strings involved in the review conference it is imperative that the state department revolve the result of the current internal dispute over which bureau is responsible for the  and begin preparing for next year's meeting as soon as possible another important task for the seventh review conference will be to address the institutional deficit of the b w c the last review conference in two thousand six established an implementation support unit consisting of three people at the un office in geneva but this entity has limited authority and a temporary mandate that must be renewed by member states in tw should push to make the unit permanent while expanding its staff and responsibilities in conclusion implementing the national strategy to counter biological threats will require the white house to give the same level of political attention to biological security that it is devoted to crafting and promoting its nuclear security initiatives it will then be up to congress to review the administration's agenda and pass legislation and funding needed to implement it effectively you want to turn on your microphone destruction and terrorism and therefore i especially welcome the opportunity to appear here to report to you and the other members of the subcommittee on the findings and recommendations of our commission i have  prepared statement which i've submitted for the record and mindful of your observation that we don't condone torture in america i will not sit here and read my prepared statement to you rather i will summarize it i also have copies of our commission report which i copies that will cover the whole subcommittee even those who are into the ten i have them the mandate of our commission extended to all weapons of mass destruction but in our work we focused on biological weapons and nuclear weapons because it was our conclusion that those were the two classes of weapons of mass destruction that would most likely be used by terrorists if there is a w m d attack by terrorists against the united states and as i think  earlier in your opening remarks one of our conclusions was that as between biological and nuclear weapons we thought the greater likelihood was that biological weapons would be used by terrorists and then the attack on the united states nation we spent a lot more time thinking about nuclear weapons and the nuclear weapons threat a lot less time thinking about biological weapons if we apply some of the lessons that we have drawn from the nuclear area to the biological area we will make some big mistakes and so it's important to bear in mind the differences between the two the most important difference is that nuclear weapons inflict their damage the moment they are used the destruction is immediate it's  reversible mitigation measures are extremely limited utility in dealing with the consequences the damage has been done biological weapons on the other hand do not inflict damage  immediately the damage will manifest itself fairly quickly but there is a window during which mitigation measures can minimize and if done properly perhaps even eliminate the  physical damage caused by a biological weapons attack and that that window is of critical importance to us as affords an opportunity to basically reduce the utility of these weapons to terrorists or to others who might consider using them against us if we can construct a mechanism within our country to promptly detect and promptly  take steps to counteract biological weapons attacks against us the idea of using these weapons against us will be much less appealing to terrorists and to others and so that was really the principal recommendation of our commission that the united needs to take advantage of that window to make sure that we have measures in place that will minimize the consequences of a bio attack the the f grade that  r commission gave in its report card in january to the efforts of the united states government in this area was really focused on the domestic steps that have been taken to build up consequence mitigation measures and fundamentally it was a judgment that not enough money was being put into the development of vaccines and other needed measures to permit us to minimize the damage caused by a bio weapons attack our focus today ours in the international area and so i wanted to turn to that issue as a commission we looked at the question the biological weapons convention we judged that it remains critically important as part of our international strategy for combating the bio weapons threat our principal recommendation with regard to the biological weapons convention was to redouble efforts to universalize the convention to persuade other governments to adhere the nuclear   something that is likely to come back the bush administration killed the biological weapons convention protocol that had been negotiated in the one nine hundred ninety s but certainly the efforts will be mounted to revive it as a commission we consider the proper policy of the united states should be on this question of stablish ing an international inspections regime for biological weapons as you know this has been a very controversial issue i headed the u s delegation to the continuation of the fifth review conference in two thousand and two and this was the focus of the entire review conference and passions ran extremely high on the issue and therefore to me it was surprising that within our commission we came to the unanimous conclusion that the bush administration had acted properly in killing the protocol in two thousand and two thousand and one when it announced its policy on the protocol and we also reached the unanimous conclusion that it would be a mistake for the next u s administration meaning the obama administration to agree to revive the inspections protocol and i was very pleased to see that the obama administration has accepted our commission's advice on this issue in december of last year under secretary tauscher announced in geneva that the obama administration will not support the revival of an inspections protocol for the biological weapons convention and i think this was a difficult decision for the administration to come to i think they were under a lot of political pressure to go in a different direction and so i have very high praise for them for taking the courageous and correct step to defy that pressure why why do you say we're doing the right thing by with using to engage in the protocol and what are the benefits and what are they downfalls for us doing  inspections it would be their their objective to seek to detect potential violations the biological weapons convention there might also be a mechanism for challenge inspections and other words if there was a suspicion of cheating on the biological weapons convention there might be a way now i think i can probably speak for the obama administration on it because they've embraced the policy of the bush administration it was our judgment that this idea simply would not work in the biological area and  of great deal of money would be spent a false sense of security would be created and there were actually very considerable risks to the u s biotechnology industry i don't know if you've ever talked to a biotech firm but i've never spoken to one of them who when he understood what was being proposed didn't immediately jump to the conclusion that what was being proposed was international industrial espionage that foreign inspectors were going to come to his firm to try and there was also great concern about false positives that you know unlike the nuclear area unlike the chemical area the things that biological weapons inspectors would be looking for an anthrax for that it did not occur naturally somebody put it there and there's a reason why they created it in the biological area when when we're dealing with with essentially germs of one type or another there could be and they could be manmade or they could be naturally occurring and so the fact that inspectors detect something really doesn't tell you very much right so thanks for that explanation so then what alternative do we have what would you recommend we do in place so that to ensure international compliance with the biological weapons convention if we don't use the protocols what do we do commission's report is full of recommendations about what should be done in this area to increase assurance that and to increase protections against the production of biological weapons the the range of measures required mostly   necessary and unproductive use of very limited resources it would help us confirm where biological weapons are not being produced it wouldn't tell us anything about where they are being produced so it would give us some security about information that we're really pretty secure about without the verification protocol and wouldn't really tell us anything about the threats that we face if i might congressman i gave a presentation at the biological weapons convention expert meeting last summer on the use of other techniques to detect noncompliance verify compliance but rather the important thing i think is to detect noncompliance international law affords us a number of tools and we don't have to go down the same road and in this i think all three of us agree that road is not a productive route but there are all there are ways that we can think about detecting noncompliance that could be advanced at the biological weapons convention thank you very much i think you are current nonproliferation policy with regard to nuclear weapons is obvious and manifest failure if we continue it or even if we adopt those changes that are currently under discussion in the administration either of those i think assures that iran will have nuclear weapons this decade and that will be the death knell of the n p t i say that only because when you then come kind of collectively as witnesses and say our efforts to control biological weapons are worse are the underfunded stepchild of our efforts to control nuclear weapons it is indeed harsh criticism to learn that our efforts in that area are worse than the manifest failure previously mentioned now we're dealing with this issue of build confidence building measures and the theory is what we provide this information voluntarily more or less this inspires certain countries say russia or china to overburden with confidence and then to do less to develop pathogens  now mr outta maker pointed out this is already a problem from an intellectual property perspective it's also a problem with regard to state sponsors of terrorism and terrorist groups extent would state would these confidence building measures provide information useful to terrorists and terrorist states because looking at this threat from those that angle the confidence building measures they'll do it a good did a job isn't sitting there saying well gee if only they had some confidence building measures i wouldn't want weapons of mass destruction so how do you confidence builder visa v russia and china disclosing no information to iran in north korea i think you've identified a very difficult problem but i do think that types of information that are for example included in the confidence building measure data declarations which are part of the biological weapons convention process are not particularly sensitive they are not providing cookbooks on how to produce anthrax they are simply identifying activities and facilities that are relevant to b w c compliance and i think the argument can be made as i made in my presentation that it united states demonstrates leadership with respect to the transparency of our activities puts us in a strong position to strong position to affect russia and china absolutely not a strong position do in any way affect the terrorist states are the  russia and china are very serious yes i mean the quest to that begs the question that we don't have time for that is what's our nightmare scenario russia or china  the terrorist states i would say if russia and china want to kill a million americans we they already have a guaranteed way to do so without further research called nuclear weapons so my concern is these terrorist states confidence building measures do nothing to diminish the threat from the terrorist states and do give them a view as to how many it least a roadmap to our counter counter efforts mr kellerman you give you say that our domestic preparedness deserves a grade far better than f and mr rodham i was part of the commission that gave it an f we spent sixty billion dollars on this and i think you correctly point out that if we spend sixty eight billion dollars and get an f other countries hardly going to be inspired but if it deserves an f it deserves an f how they get it wrong what grade you give our domestic  let me see if i can can justify that i think what the commission was trying to get at was that we are extremely vulnerable to bio attacks that probably each of us at this table certainly i can envision attacks against the united states for which our preparedness would be unsuccessful there is no question about that it is if if i can interrupt there  types of attacks those from those that are not deterrable i mean we have no countermeasures to the soviet nuclear ok direction act russian nuclear program so can you embellish a little bit and say are there attacks for which we have no defense and as to which we will not be able to effectively retaliate absolutely yes absolutely yes so that in the ultimate sense we are not and unfortunately mr chairman i don't think we seriously can be prepared i think that we have to think about here is risk management i think what we have to think about is a combination of prevention measures and preparedness measures but it would be folly of me and certainly disingenuous to testify before you today to say that there is a way to make america safe from biological threats that cannot be done if i can interrupt you seem to be saying we should grade america on a curve and if a series of countermeasures that we've adopted would limit the deaths under a particular scenario to one hundred thousand rather than one hundred million that you can't give that an f and say well that's one hundred thousand dead you have to say well that's ninety nine point nine million saved  are you saying that we that our countermeasures are useful not in preventing a terrible results but preventing a terrible result from being even more catastrophic i'm saying that government officials must operate in the real world with real conditions so yes they what the united states government has done since the anthrax attacks of two thousand and eleven put us in a substantially better ourselves in a position where the the deaths are catastrophic but less than that but dramatically less than they would be otherwise i think we've made a good start but there's an enormous amount of work that remains to be done and that was the basis of the commission's grade to be able to mitigate the consequences of bio attack  need detection capabilities we need a way to mobilize state local authorities to act in response to the attack we need vaccines and we need a way of dispensing the vaccines to the affected population it's a bit the issue did come up it's a bit outside this is the jurisdiction of the subcommittee but i'm going to go for the ask each of you to prepare or feel that it's within your competence to submit how we would spend ten or twenty billion dollars a year to prepare because it's easy to come in and say well sixty eight billion total expenditures not enough to be spending one hundred sixty billion a year and here's you know i i need a budget responsible approach to bio preparedness and hopefully the for the ten to twenty billion a year we're getting not only a capacity to respond to bio weapons but also to disease pathogens as well so i'd like to see what most and many of the things that i think we should be doing don't cost us money we need to buy cost of seats we have to go to the american people and tell them you honestly face a threat in an emergency your government will take the following highly controversial actions you will not be as free the day after a biological attack as you were the day before and as long as none of these are said in my district i'm fine so we have to not only spend money on this but we have to spend political capital we have to overcome inbred ideological dispositions and  that may be even more difficult but i hope that the program you lay out isn't just a list of things to spend money on but a list of things to do that don't cost money or cost only modest amounts and where the reason we're not doing them is not budgetary but political and psychological with that we have our ranking member mr royce who's now recognized for five minutes thank you as chairman and let me ask mr tucker you argue that actions by the us to increase the oversight and transparency of its own bio defense programs would not only demonstrate international leadership by providing a model for other countries to follow but would put the u s government in supposition that if we demonstrate leadership in this area that puts us in a stronger position to pressure other countries to follow suit i should clarify that confidence building alone is not the solution it's one complex of measures that will work together that are apparently not because you know i i opened with my comments about the russian scientist that congressman saxon and i met with and in response to my questions he said no we knew in sixty nine that nixon that we'd been told in sixty nine nixon had banded abandoned the program the chemical weapons convention what that dates from seventy two right so he told me that after seventy two they were the metal on this even told me a funny story which is not all that funny but it's definitely unique from the ones i've heard about him taking an elevator up to andropov's office because andropov wanted to make sure that he really had developed something for which there was no antidote and he said you know carrying the petri dish in there going up the elevator and then put it on the desk and saying don't open it i mean it really gave me an insight into what these fifty thousand employees were doing but given the fact that you testified that russia is moving away from transparency in these labs and given the fact that in the face of the convention he's telling me that they were doing that are you response are you suggesting that russia today is responding to our lab policies is is that's what's happened because that sounds fantastic to me given given the dialogue that i had i just i just don't sense a connection here between you and what was really going on in russia by weapons scientists were led to believe that the united states was secretly violating that's what that's what the soviet state told them and it was only when he came to the united states under the trilateral process which was a process of mutual visits to biological facilities that he suddenly realized that he had been misled and that the united states did not have an offensive program but it was the collapse of the soviet system that gave us the opportunity then he later defected to the united states but when he came to the united states for those transparency visits he was a soviet but here's the point here's the point there was a window as the soviet union was breaking up when we when i got access to this scientists that window is closed i'm just telling you china is not going to open its labs the russians are not going to open their labs i you testify that expanding international research partnerships and personal exchanges can provide valuable insight into foreign biodefense programs and i'd like to ask if you speak from personal experience here because i can't such exchanges also result in foreigners acquiring intelligence we'd rather not have them acquire i'm thinking about china right now and how much down this road we've already gone and what a cold isac it's been for us in terms of the consequences of it i think obviously these programs involve the cost and benefits they have to be very carefully designed so that they provide insights into foreign programs and the extent to which those programs are treated compliant while obviously limiting the risk of technology transfer but i think they can be structured in that way and if i believe it's important to engage with russia because if we russia i've spoken to many people who say that the best source of intelligence information about what's going on for laboratories of concern is the scientists themselves and establishing personal relationships with the scientists makes them much more likely if they are aware of something untoward to contact their former colleagues during an exchange program you think that might happen in china i think it's very very possible that it would to that i guess i don't know where to begin in responding to i think it's very rare for anyone to accuse the bush administration of not doing enough to combat terrorism generally  d specifically with reference to bioterrorism that was a very high priority most of what the chairman was talking to about the billions of dollars that have been spent in this area were spent during the bush administration so  the bush administration wrote this off i think i could bring in a whole raft of officials from the department of homeland security who i think would take great offense at hearing such and let me ask another question the a m d last question the  commission discussed the role of the citizen and called for better engagement of the populace to combat the threat of bioterrorism as the commission found that the u s public has become complacent service as you know he felt and persuaded the other members of the commission that public and engagement is critically important for our efforts against terrorism to succeed  involvement neighbors looking after the neighborhood being aware when you start talking about this is the specific measures that would be needed to respond for example to a biological attack  organized community is really the best preparation community in which it's possible where mechanisms are in place to distribute vaccines if that needs to happen where public health infrastructure is in place to detect outbreaks is there anyone still here listening from the bureau of international security and nonproliferation here sees not is there anyone here from the state department chair sees none one more demonstration of what the executive branch thinks of the legislative branch i'm going to send a copy the transcript of these hearings to mr then deep in the end i'm going to be asking him to confirm to me that he has read every word  the fact that we would put on a seminar directly relevant to his aeration and those of us who have responsibilities that go from a to z from southern california we're on different committees i'm missing financial services right now that i've got the time to be here when this is a part of my job and he doesn't have the time to be or even have his number two here  seems to indicate that he doesn't believe that and i realize this is typical of the entire state department does not to believe that anything useful happens here in congress that the sole purpose of congress is to give them money after getting false information as to why we should do it so in the future we will comment on whether the state department to be at least bothers to humor us by pretending to listen to hearings that we have somebody taking their work with the state department oh because i asked earlier and i saw the response please identify yourself for the record deputy director for what ok well then i hope that you will report to the p d s and others what happened here and i hope in the future that overcome your shyness when i ask whether there's someone here from the state department and report back is slightly more positive than the statements i just made we stand  let me make an announcement that all witnesses have seven days to submit additional statements for the record as do all members of the subcommittee