criminal case in this case the second district held that the state's notice of appeal from a suppression ruling was unprepared to speak up a little bit the second district held but the state's notice of appeal from a suppression was untimely even though it was filed within thirty days of the trial court's order to nine reconsideration of that ruling that decision was wrong for two reasons first because the state's notice was first it contradicts the plain language of the rule second it conflicts with nearly thirty years of appellate court interpretation of the rule and finally it leads to absurd results starting with the plain language of the rule the first sentence of rule six zero six says that the time for appeal does not begin sure ron intil the trial court disposes of any motion directed against the judgment the second district hold that hel well the first part about someone's talks about final judgments but what the polling provision says is that the time to appeal doesn't run until the court disposes of a motion directed against the judgment the second sentence of the rule makes clear that that phrase motion directed against the judgment is not limited to final judgments the second sentence goes on to speak to two specific types of motions that can be directed against a judgment a post trial motion and a post sentencing motion a post trial motion is always going to be directed to get something other than a final judgement because in a criminal case there is no final judgment until the sentences imposed so the fact that the rule goes on in the next sentence to list a post trial motion as a type of motion directed against the judgment makes it clear that that category encompasses more than just motions directed against final orders and in fact includes appeals from suppression orders as in this case so this court doesn't need to go any farther than those first two sentences of the rule so decide the tolling question but there are other parts of the rules that confirm that that interpretation is correct first there's the definition of the term judgement in rule two rule two doesn't limit a judgment to a final order because it a broader definition and encompasses any determination decision order decree or portion there up in addition there's the fact that the tolling provision doesn't use specific terms like final judgment or post judgment motion which would specifically limit it to appeals from final orders even though those terms are used elsewhere in six zero six the tolling provision doesn't defines judgment in the text of six it's clear from the text yes that encompasses more than just final judgments but it to the extent the rule uses a term that's defined elsewhere in the rules that definition applies throughout the rules that's what rule two says so it's our position that no the rule is not ambiguous because it's capable of only one reasonable interpretation in part because the other interpretation would lead to absurd results  there's also a comparison with rule three of seven which is the rule governing interlocutory appeals in civil cases that rule does pacifically preclude tolling but it does so by using very specific language that rule says that the time for appeal runs thirty days from the entry of entry lackey tory order rule six zero six doesn't use that specific language in addition to the plain language there is thirty years of case law from the appellate court that confirms that the tolling rule interlocutory appeals the rule was amended five times since stokes came down in one nine hundred seventy seven which is the first case in the line but the tolling provision of the roll was never modified also the cases are proof that the rule has been functioning well for thirty years it's completely workable finally the cases are evidence but the tolling rule is so well established that illinois practitioners have come to rely on it in an area that isn't as important and as complicated as appellate jurisdiction that reliance interest is critically important in addition to the plain language in the case law there is the fact that interpreted in the rule to prevent tolling would lead to absurd results the well established rule in illinois is that the state can seek both a trial court reconsideration and appellate review of the suppression really reconsideration is beneficial because it promotes judicial efficiency by allowing heirs to be corrected at the trial court level reconsideration has the potential to eliminate some appeals state appeals of suppression rulings are not just beneficial they are absolutely necessary for the reasons this court articulated in young state appeals ensure that the law develops but the development of the law is not distorted which would happen if only the defendant could appeal suppression ruling state appeals give necessary guidance to the trial courts must rule on suppression issues and to the police who must apply the rules and state appeals ensure that the erroneous suppression of evidence does not unduly hinder the state's case at trial and thereby undermine the truth finding function of the trial the absence of a tolling rule will lead to the absurd result of forcing the state to choose between reconsideration and appeal if the motion for reconsideration is not ruled on within the appeals line and the state decides to appeal anyway any opportunity to correct the error at the trial court level and any resulting efficiency would be lost once the state filed a notice of appeal the trial court is direct divest it of jurisdiction it can no longer reconsider its ruling if the sate decides to wait for reconsideration and allows the appeal deadline to pass the result can be even worse if the trial court does not ultimately correct the does apply trial courts do frequently entertain these motions and sometimes they change their minds the reconsideration process is particularly helpful in a suppression case because a lot of times as in this case the issues won't really be developed until the evan ensure a hearing as in this case the defendant filed a somewhat boilerplate motion didn't get into a lot of the details didn't even specify what evidence they wanted to suppress and the facts and the reasoning didn't become clear until the evidence you're hearing so any opportunity to flesh out those legal issues would happen on reconsideration and to the extent that reconsideration pin help ensure the accuracy of the ruling it should be encouraged of course the process is up to the individual trial judge but if the trial judge wants to entertain a motion for reconsideration they should be able to do anything that would help ensure the accuracy of the ruling whether it's another allowing more oral arguments as the court did in this case allowing briefing doing its own research maybe ordering that a transcript of the evidence your hearing could be prepared so that it would be clear exactly what the evidence was so so reconsideration can be potentially very helpful in regarding the fact that the defendant could be in pretrial custody that consideration is taken care of by the speedy trial act if the state seeks reconsideration and that causes additional pretrial delay to which the defendant does not agree that client time counts against the state on the speedy trial act so any delay puts the defendant that much closer to a discharge from custody under the act and has the potential to result in the charges so in that respect it's no different than any other pretrial delay so because of the plain language and the case law and the fact that not allowing for trolling would lead to absurd results the second district's ruling on the tolling question was incorrect and the state's notice was timely with respect to the original suppression really in addition the state's notice was also timely with respect to the order of the nine reconsideration which was itself independently appealable under six zero for the way the court handled the state's request for reconsideration in this case makes it clear that this court didn't simply reject the state's request outright instead the court this scheduled a hearing on the motion allowed the parties to present oral arguments made additional factual findings specifically it specifically found that officer vargas had testified that he smelled a strong odor of alcohol and the court also offered some additional analysis on the probable cause issue so the mere fact that the court reached the same conclusion after reevaluating this ruling as it did the first time this it mean that the second order didn't also have the effect of suppressing evidence the comments the court made at reconsideration to the effect of if the arrest is bad everything after it is bad those comments make clear that the court did intend reconsideration to have the effect of keeping certain evidence away from the fact finder at trial that's all that's needed to bring that ruling within the broad scope of rule six zero four because the state's notice was filed within thirty days of that ruling the state's notice was timely with respect to the just the trial court's second order as well as its first order so for all of these reasons this court should reverse the judgment of the appellate court and hold please the court my name is larry webster representing brant marker may first say that it's a privilege and it's exciting to be here on this historic day in front of you in the hometown of abraham lincoln the issue of course is correctly stated by the prosecution can a motion to reconsider an interlocutory order told a thirty day deadline for filing a notice of appeal in this particular case but notice of appeal was filed ten weeks after the court entered its suppression ruling following three continuances requested  by the state and mr markers case the first thing i'd like to say is that the state has mischaracterized this notion that a ruling on a motion to reconsider is substantively appealable that it makes some kind of a substantive decision in the case because the case law is clear that that is not correct on page nine of my brief eyesight to years and craning those cases hold that the denial of post judgment motions as well as the denial of interlocutor tory orders are not not in an of themselves judgments or appealable orders and therefore the denial of the motion for reconsideration has no substantive effect it's the order that's initially entered in this case on august eleventh of those six that order that suppresses the evidence the order denying reconsideration does not independently suppress the recall i was here last week in the klepper case not exactly the same situation but again another type of interlocking tory order the irony is in that case the trial judge ruled on the motion to reconsider within thirty days at that point time all the state had to do was walk across the court or and file its notice of appeal i mean a simpler act for a lawyer filling out filling in the blanks  notice is kind of hard to imagine so even in those cases and some of the cases that the skinny the appellate court overruled were situations where the trial judge had in fact extreme and rare cases your honor because as i said last week when you're an attorney litigating issues like this whether for the state or the defense you walk into that courtroom and you're prepared you're prepared with your witnesses with your memo if you need one with your research once the trial judge rules how much more is there typically to do in a case of this nature how much can you be taken more restrictive because of the shortened deadlines for filing appeals from interlocutory orders injunction cases i think the deadline is is two days in some circumstances and i would venture to say that in most civil cases of any complexity the complications the legal issues are much more complex than they are in criminal cases these these issues tend to be very wrote in routine after a while and it just seems to me that you lose a motion of this nature if you're the state you go back to her office maybe you need to do some research typically not because you've already done it it's really not that difficult to draw a motion for reconsideration  very short order and to file it and i think this court would have to assume that trial judges are going to ignore their duty knowing this thirty day deadline in order to to rule that a lot more time is really needed in this situation i don't i don't think trial judges are going to do that and i don't think it's that difficult to get a case before the court within thirty days to get a ruling so and here's the other problem with that situation absent some kind of a deadline the the restriction on filing a notice of appeal can go on for quite a lengthy period of time and as the as the majority says below that can keep the defend custody back and keep him held to bail while months go by until this matter is resolved i mean absent a rule of this court what's going to happen you can take your thirty days to just file your motion for reconsideration you can then go into the court and say judge i need a continuance he says ok fine you come back in another few weeks source or a month and you say no judge i've been really busy and i know you've been busy too we need another continuance ok fine what is the deadline now for doing this and the practical result would be that in int cases the deadline for filing a notice of appeal suddenly is much longer or open ended as compared to filing the notice and call in cases where there's a final judgment what about you your opponents a this morning speedy trial demand stops yeah i addressed that in the brief and i would say in response that that's not a complete answer to this problem because at the same time that there may be a motion to suppress or a motion to reconsider a motion to suppress that pending there may be other issues that are pending for the defense i mean it's not uncommon for the defense they have other motions on file if those are considered to be in part the cause of continuances in the case then their time is going to be attributable to the defense so it's really not an answer to this problem to say oh well the speedy trial statute protection it really doesn't what if the defense has other motions on file what if for other  reasons they don't demand an immediate trial i mean the statute now says you've got to me in the media trial if you don't want that time attributed to you what if they're not ready for the trial but they were fully prepared for the suppression hearing so i  i take serious issue with that with that comment and i think we need to remember to again in response to kind of made by the state it's not findings it's not findings that are appealable under any type of appeal it's the orders and judgments so the fact that the trial judge crosses more teaser dot's different eyes the second time when he he determines a motion to reconsider does not mean that the judgment has been modified and certainly has not been reversed the decision is the same at the conclusion of the suppression hearing and at the conclusion of the hearing to deny reconsideration so that argument is not well taken either things number one it's clear from the language of the statute unless you do some horrible contortions with the english language that the first sentence of rule six zero six be pertains to post judgment motions and that's the only circumstance under which you can told the time for filing the notice of appeal it's also clear that the next to the last sentence in that subsection speaks to interlock you tory orders so  i don't i don't see where there's ambiguity i don't see how the state can with a straight face indicate that there's that there's something that's not clear about that about that first sentence clearly it talks in terms of final judgement and if you want to appeal from that judgement from that judgement you can toll the time period if you file a motion to reconsider now with me now if the court would find that the rule is ambiguous in some respects the other thing that i addressed in a brief was that there's a considerable historical background to to this rule and to the practice of the courts going back quite a few years the the history tory orders and at that point in time there was only one tolling provision which was that defendants again if they're filing motions directed again at the judgment can get an additional time to file their notice of appeal so my point is that in the mid sixty's when we were all young everyone would have understood the practice in the court that there's only one way to toll that notice of appeal deadline which is for defendants in criminal cases after they've been convicted and sentenced to file a motion and the rule is amended a number of times after that if it wasn't clear then it's certainly absolutely clear now that that's the case and what the court is trying can get some additional time if you're attacking the judg it's there's no requirement of course that the criminal rules be consistent with the similar rules but it's interesting to compare them because i think there's an effort that's been made in these rules to make them consist civil cases the same rule apply with almost exactly the same language that an interlocutory appeals the filing of a motion to reconsider does not told the time for appeal period under any circumstance but when you have final judgments in civil cases if you file your motion to reconsider in a timely way you get additional time so i think it's clear that that's what the rules are designed to accomplish and it makes no sense to have a different rule here in criminal cases for interlocutory orders and i agree completely with justice freeman when he says you know as a practical matter how many judges overturn their ruling or anything that we should take into consideration well by now as to not taking a case means nothing i mean the denial of the petition for leave to appeal means nothing has no significance whatsoever other than the fact the court just didn't want to hear case yes there have been cases over the past thirty years saying you do get more time that you do get a tolling role in the situation but what the appellate court found and what i've always argued in this case is those decisions were decided in correctly every single one of them every single one of the real law alternately relies on a decision in a civil case in the childress case appellate court says we have this simple rule with respect to final judgment and tolling the time period by filing a motion to reconsider in a civil case involving a final judgment and then they just say obviously that applies in this criminal what happened in those cases was a complete absence of legal analysis it wasn't that they looked at the rule and said well this is what it means they just looked at childress and said oh well there's already a holding here and what's interesting is  the dissent even justice callinan the dissent in this case does not make any effort whatsoever to defend the children's are other cases on the merits they vary  frankly concedes that it's not the sensible and he says words to this effect that there is no valid pres precedent either civil or criminal for a polling rule with respect to interlocutory order none so yes there are cases out there but i hope it's not too thorough word to say they just decided incorrectly and that's why i and this issue apparently was never raised earlier notwithstanding what else has transpired up until this point and as this quarter this time does it not have the authority to say this is what the rule means no matter what oh it's been interpreted by other courts and perhaps you mean to contradict the previous really there have been two rulings by this court is that correct on this issue correct right i'm not sure the question the question is not withstanding what all of the arguments the state has made and you have made has this court at this point time have the authority simply say this is what the rule means it means or sorry the motion for reconsideration holds the we have the power to change rules to make rules i guess my question is to change that we do we have the authority to interpret rules and what our schools well i think i think that's always the case the court has the authority to  interpret the rules but the question to me as an attorney is what is the principle on which that decision would be made if the rule is unambiguous if there's any ambiguity involved there's clearly a long history as to why the courts rule the other way rule the majority way in marker on what basis are we going to do this you know the state raises this this bug bear about all these prior cases are going to be overturned and the dissent talks about this at great length all these cases are going to be overturned twenty thirty years old with people who've been incarcerated and can file post conviction petitions you know i just don't see that your honor once a court says we have jurisdiction and they decide a case i don't think you can come back ten years later twenty years later whatever it is and say the court really didn't have jurisdiction that's the defendant doesn't have a response to the state's plain language argument which is that by including post trial motions as well as post sentencing motions in the category of motions that are directed against the judgment the rule necessarily uses that phrase to refer to more than just final judgments because a post trial motion is never directed at a final judgment there hasn't been a sentence imposed so there is no final judgment in response to just question about whether this court can say what the rule means of course it can the court could clarify it interpret it say what it is not all along the court could even change the rule can do it and in opinion under rule through of three or  five the defendant made the point that findings are not appealable that's correct only the judgement is appealable only the suppression of the evidence is appealable what i meant in pointing out that the court made additional findings on reconsideration was to make it clear that reconsideration was not just a pro forma step that happened in this case if the court really did relook at the ruling and that's clear from the fact that the court made those additional findings the defendant made the point that all of the cases rely on three million children that's not true each of those cases relies on rule six zero six itself so to say there is no valid precedent for the tolling rule is wrong there might not be cases but the rule itself  gault each of those cases interpreted the language of the rule just because they didn't explicitly parse the language in the opinion doesn't make that any different the defendant also made the point that the denial of reconsideration is itself not appealable there are no cases in the defendant's brief that support that position the defendant says the serious case that was a civil case not a criminal case and it was not the denial  stokes in response to the question about the practicalities of the rule that the defendant urges what would happen is that the state would just stop seeking reconsideration it would just be too dangerous to lose any opportunity to correct the ruling on appeal said something to the effect of rule six zero six somehow functions as a timeline on the trial court's ruling on a motion for reconsideration there's nothing in the rule that suggests that it is intended to micromanage the trial court management of its own docket that interim interpretation is incorrect the court should be allowed to rule on motions on its own schedule as it the defendant also made a comment about de lay but this type of case is no different than any other pretrial motion if pretrial delay is caused in part by the defendant there is no speedy trial problem  what the defendant's really getting at is that the appeal by the state is somehow unfair to the defined it that question has already been resolved what the policy behind six o four and decisions like young is that yes a state appeal does cause some delay which could be a hardship for the defined it but the appeal is so important that the delay is necessary the public has an interest in ensuring that the fact that the allegations of the criminal allegations are accurately determined and state appeals are necessary to further that interest finally the defendant makes a comparison to the way the rule works in civil cases that comparison is unhelpful because for one thing the rules governing that or they can take an interim tory appeal they can wait for the entry of the final judgment and appeal from matt and that appeal will always bring up all of the underlying orders entered throughout the case in the case of a state appeal of the suppression really the state only has one chance to take the appeal they have to take it pretrial they can't take it at the end because there's a double jeopardy problem so there's only one chance to correct the error here so that's one way in which civil and criminal interlocutory appeals are different and then of course there is the fact that the consequences in a criminal case are much more severe there's consequences for the development of the body of law in general and then there's the public's interest in ensuring that the finder of fact determines the truth of the allegations accurately the defendant also suggested that a tolling rule would make the appeal deadline somehow open ended that's not true the appeal deadline would be the same it would be thirty days from the  order suppressing evidence or thirty days from the denial of reconsideration of that order finally in the defendant made a point about the history of the rule but the only version of the rule that's relevant here is the one that's been in effect