intentional violations in violation of the statute but even though we won and he awarded almost two million dollars in punitive damages the fact is that he did knight any compensatory damages to the class in the face of a respondents had to be refunded but that didn't happen he also the nine to reimburse me of costs six hundred seventy nine provide specific that the prevailing party is in title that's exactly correct your that's exactly correct ok and that's why the rule that respondents were pros or creditor eruptions aisha's if they were crossed because they received this money and they received it for right to sue includes at least with respect to crowbar the right to have a court review what the arbitrator did this current credit talking about this statute the standard says you have a right to and say that you don't have an obligation to see whether the statute was properly applied it was not properly applied clearly improperly applied it's not a question of debate it's amazing it's  and what the congress sat and played mind it's not only what they intended you have to apply what is said in plain language in the mandate of the statute that's your obligation as a court and if you and you cannot do what judgments with all due respect he was very good to us in many lower court rulings but in this case he just sort of abandoned his role he said i gave it a cursory review it was many pages and he didn't say it but he said i gave it a cursory review and i as further of indication of what are should have been done here we did fire payments even if you take the arbitrator statement that you have that it has to be required payments because the payments that they'd originally came from consumers they were paid to the credit counseling agencies and then the credit counseling agencies entered into a contract with the respondents for the provision of their support services so while there are quite a payment under those service contracts so getting into the woods here but the fish ship payments were payments from creditors to the respondents under contracts on behalf of the consumers payments that are trying to said well i can't i want those payments because if i did it would defeat predominance with that's not that's not an appropriate that's not true but the fact of the matter is that the amount of those payments was set forth in discovery and the individual contributions were out of payments by the way they were made by the consumers every month they got it they got it they got a statement from me from the credit counseling agency that said you gotta pay each month you've got to pay this amount and it include did he do that why would he do that he's a very serious man i think he's a very intelligent man and why he did that was that he did not he said himself any opinion he said the result of holding them a crow a cr crow is a harsh result but i have to hold him across that if he wasn't talking there about the damage provision at all when he got to decide damages after the whole thing was over when he what he did when he does he did not want to put them out of business he admired mr gannon down cellar he said it was an extraordinary businessman he said he was not an unscrupulous businessman he started out to do good  ruled against him but only to a limited degree because he felt he had to rule against him as i said he said that that the case law makes it clear that they are a crock it's also clear that they violated the credit repair organizations that so they had little against them but he did want to put them out of business and it was clear that if he had ordered the repayment of all paints response hundreds of millions of dollars couple hundred million dollars they would be out of business he didn't want to do that well unfortunately that the congress it's a strict liability necessarily share in the congress didn't share the view of this that that cell is not being unscrupulous but whether it was unscrupulous or not the congress made it clear that you have to refund the money now are traded in want to do that because he said he was an unscrupulous  prior payments there were prior payments under the service agreements and they were required payments under the fair share provisions so they were right caymans also what he did with respect to cost is totally and likable not only that it cut the cost fees themselves he completely failed to apply the johnson fact it's clear from from the mcafee case recently decided by iranians and a whole series of other cases this least a dozen cases that say in order to determine founts with these you have to go and concepts rather than calculations you can do that that's beyond his powers let alone a manifest disregard for the law you just can't do that in determining council feet so iran is i think that this case and there are two basic factors in this calculus the first is did the arbitrator exceed his powers under the federal arbitration and the supreme court and this court basically have placed that inquiry as one in which he hardly trader acted outside the sc arbitrator did the charge he was told that is whether he acted within the scope of his powers not whether he did it well correctly or recently simply whether he did no more then that the arbitrator error in some of his conclusions that is not manifest disregard the law manifest disregard means literally shows that the arbitrator analyzed the contentions did what the party he's engaged him to do and that is not manifest disregard the law now with respect to fees and costs and that revives issue in this case or secondly the amount paid by the person being the consumer to the credit repair organization the critical words in that section your honor are dictionary which says specifically that the definition of paid means is an exchange of money for something i give you money you give me that's where what did did they get services yes but not going to extremes for the voluntary contributions and that's the point that mr cocoa overlooks in this case the only basis for his claim for damages was so bolt voluntary contributions made by consumers that was he only maces for damages at the trial the trial work at sun light explained how the voluntary contributions were and referred to evidence there was substantial or not you contribute anything and there was evidence in the case you're on there was an exhibit to which the arbitrator specifically referred which shows something like one hundred forty five thousand people in the class at one time were another did not make voluntary contributions but still receive the services under the d m paid so the qui quo with respect to voluntary contributions simply was not there and that is the point and the arbitrator went through this and alice's and basically hel that under his interpretation of the session and i may have given you the wrong section over six hundred seventy nine she won the that's a specific and that's sixteen seventy nine eighty three which provides for a definition of crow and nasa says specifically that any person  i'll skip some words who performs any service in return for the payment of money is deemed to be a credit repair organization that is deception which does not go to damages it is the definition of a creator period organization and we were held to be a credit repair organization and there was a basis in the record independently of these voluntary contributions to hold us a credit repair organization we may disagree with what the arbitrator did but that's one who think and the other type of payment involved in this case is so c fair share which is a payment by a creditor to two others and basically the arbitrator help that we indirectly received a fair share and that consumers within the definition of credit repair organization that is different then whether voluntary contributions constitute an amount paid within the damage finance were basically people who provided backoff assurances accounting services computer services to the people who actually contract it with the consumers and the way we received our compensation was two fold we received money from the credit repair organization not the rhetoric from the consumers by way of the fair share that well it's a little it's a little bit more than that i think you need to look at the end it ends and where the evidence is that the people who talk to consumers were instructed to tell consumers this is not contribution some of them made no contribution whatsoever that is evidence upon which i suggest to you it's fair for arbitrator to review and reach a decision of barack and i fully reach a different conclusion but the arbitrator was hired to do this and that's what he did here is his opinion on yours is is is fairly detailed and i think based on a definition on our analysis it's correct could someone else or come out differently perhaps but it is not a man the payments by a person now after talking about it in terms of justifying the arbitrators were a refusal to award damages large well that that that you said that term pay it if the if b amount paid if the definition of a man pay means quid pro quo as the arbitrator found means providing money in exchange for something and the evidence w that i feel i think i think it's more than more than that your honor i think it's looking at the damages provision if you look at the if it means voluntary contributions then the arbitrator was wrong i don't think that would constitute manifest disregard of course that's his interpretation and he had a basis for it it board should overturn it and my response to that is that that's not the definition of manifest this regard in fact this circuit has specifically held that error even serious on his own personal notions of right and wrong such circumstances federal court has no choice but to refuse to force the war in this case explain to the arbitrator disregard the plain and unambiguous language of the governing arbitration agreement when he concluded that  own personal notions of right and wrong and impose the limitations period of the parties that they had specifically rejected when they are treading noisy unambiguous language chosen by the party arbitrated simply fails to do its job statute the standard is strict the court has to service out of it the statute is filing this is a statute that says any payments any payments include voluntary payments plus any payments also  've done it on the basis of fair share but he didn't do it on the basis of pay she said later in his opinion he could also and do it with respect to fish here but he specifically was talking and you look at his decision he was specifically talking about the payments made by consumers not the any person in question judge keenan referred to was a good question and it could have been the arbitrator could have decided could have decided that that this was not a payment from the individual consumer because the person because it came through the c c s of the income directly to the respondent that argument was rejected by the arbitrator not appeal we don't think it's a good argument we think the operator is right but that's the person argument i don't think that the person on it really  was not notified if you if you the payment of the as fines were not payments clearly these were paintings and clearly as paintings they have to be viewed as as being refundable the supreme court as us that it is the function of the court to make sure that the statute is properly bought and that was not done here by the district court and in order to do that your honour's with this this case hundreds of millions of dollars were paid the arbitrator ruled crowell was violated that was not appealed that determination was an appeal to even a want to punitive damages and the fact of the matter is of hundreds of