third please call the next  arbitration or whether that grievance and arbitration is clearly excluded from the grievance clause in their contract specifically the officer was given a one day suspension issued by the chief of police and filed a grievance the city instance they were not involved in the investigation of the officer they could not issue just one to the officer and they have not reviewed the discipline to the officer in determining whether this review should proceed to arbitration  students within the grievance arbitration procedure between the parties under the uniform arbitration act and the only publicly relations there there are three answers to the question of whether this use within the agreement as part of this analysis the court must look at section eight of the public labor relations act which states that all matters are article in a collective bargaining agreement between public employer and a labor organization unless the parties agree otherwise section eight of the act incorporates a uniform arbitration agreement by reference agreements arbitration provisions of any collector bargain agreement shall be subject to the uniform  moving along this particular  in this matter there is one clear stuff in the parties agree that exclude certain matters from the arbitration agreement specifically that however that exclusion does not include discipline imposed by the chief such as in this case with a cheat impose a one day suspension the board has not taken any action at this point other than has been notified by the chief of what could the board officer has an election whether he wants to appeal to the board or whether he wants to follow the greens seat or in the collective are right unless the chief elects to involve the board at the outset in terms of filing charges and then allowing them to this when the officer or unless the officer then aleck's to follow that appeal process rather than release procedure the board does not have control of the matter and it is not a proceeding or decision of ford that would be specifically excluded in the election the city also argues that the order fire police commissioner statute controls the collective bargaining agreement in this matter that because the statute permits that appeal process to the board when the chief issue suspensions the officer then is excluded from the arbitration procedure because he has this ultimate remedy however that's a misreading misunderstanding of the relationship between the statute and the contract the statute like the minimum wage law permits the minimum  process permitted to an officer who was suspended by the chief for less than five days similar to minimum wage law or the contract not an officer less than the minimum wage law i'm not sure what minimum wage laws exactly is around it or nine dollars the contract cannot say th enter to order the parties the facts of this case show that there city in the union are parties to a flutter bargaining agreement that has a grievance arbitration procedure but the collective bargaining agreement also includes a specific exclusion from  and arbitration procedure or just but eri proceedings and decisions that are quote within the scope of the board of fire and police commissioner's jurisdiction on the issue before the core is the and whether the determination is properly made by the court or by an arbitrary in this case the trial court determined that the disciplinary action that issue was clearly not subject to the grievance and arbitration procedure and the appellant hear appeals from that determination at the outset we should make clear what is at issue and what is not the collective bargaining agreement does contain a grievance arbitration procedure so there is compliance with the requirement of the illinois public labor relations act the collective bargaining agreement must have a grievance an arbitration procedure unless mutually agreed that's not an issue second the collective bargaining agreement does contain a specific exclusion from the grievance and arbitration procedure for disciplinary actions the ball in the scope of the border fire and police jurisdiction the issue is the scope of the exclusion not whether an exclusion exists there is no argument about the fact the disciplinary actions imposed in the first instance by the board the foreign police commissioners are excluded from the grievance procedure the impellor concedes that and agrees that disciplinary actions imposed by the board of armed police commissioners cannot be appealed arbitration but must be appealed if at all by means of the administrative review law similarly the city concedes the disciplinary actions not referenced in the mortar fire police commissioner statute so i chose oral and written reprimands are not subject to the jurisdiction of the board of fire commissioners and may be made the subject of a grievous and or appeal to arbitration so the question comes down to the disciplinary actions that are within the power of the police chief to impose by the in this section shall be construed to prevent the chief of the fire department or the chief of the police department from suspending without pay a member of his department a period of not more than five calendar days but shall notify the board in writing of such suspension the statute goes on to provide that a police officer or a firefighter so suspended may appeal to the board of firemen police commissioners for a few of the suspension within five calendar days after the it's a suspension the board then has great latitude as to what it will do with that appeal moreover the statutory disciplinary procedure applies according to the unless the employer and the labor organization have to go she added an alternative or supplemental form of due process based upon impartial arbitration as a term of the collective bargaining agreement in this respect or foreign police commissioners act and the illinois public labor relations act are in harm there is no conflict and no need to assert the precedence of the i p l are a in this regard the trout workaround that the particular display in question was not subject to an alternative or supplemental form of due process based upon impartial arbitration and therefore denied the union's application to compel arbitration we contend that the trial or was correct and the disciplinary actions that are within the chiefs of already to impose are excluded from arbitration the collective bargaining agreement says the chief of police has the authority to jurisdiction of the board of fire police commissioners and therefore is clearly excluded from arbitration so steve are to go to you we contend should be determined under the donaldson lufkin standard by the court and we say that because the collective bargaining agreement has conferred jurisdiction for these kinds of cases upon the board of fire and police commissioners that  therefore that was the only recourse available to him arbitration was not available to him that is our position ok the c d r argument is that the disciplinary action in this case is within the the jurisdiction of the mortar fire at least measures and therefore is clearly excluded from the agreements and arbitration procedure the reasons for our position are as follows while the authority of the chief to suspend an officer for up to five days derives exclusively from the board of fired police commissioner statute but for that statute cheap does not have that authority when he asks for two and pursuant to the statutory authority he is required to give notice to the board of fire and police commissioners as was done in this case this notice is mandatory and necessarily invokes the border far police commissioners jurisdiction there would be no point in the statute or providing for such notice unless that were the case the interpretation of the statue in this way enables consistency in the handling of disciplinary suspensions of one  mechanism applies whether the chief or the board of fire police commissioners imposes the discipline in the first instance inter breeding the statute or the interaction between the contract and the statute the way that the union  s creates anomalous results the unions argument who posits the existence of a choice this is not called for in the language of the contract the first choice of the unions mechanism is the one that is recognized by the statute and that is of the chief he can discipline the officer under a zone of already given to him by the statute or he can file charges is not recognized by the statute or the contract and that is if the chief uses his own sacha torrie authority to discipline the officer then the officer can now act between the board of fire and police commissioners and grievance procedure as his appeal route according to the union but there's nothing in the collective bargaining agreement that supports the proposition that the officer has any such choice as the court said of the village  court case the court should adopt a construction of the contract that is reasonable and does not produce an irrational result in our view the union's argument doesn't produce an irrational result that ought to be rejected moreover had the parties to the collective bargaining agreement wish to produce such a result as the union contends it could have done so in a much more explicit matter such as by specifically providing for a choice form they didn't do so rules of statutory interpretation establish the proposition that statutes are to be interpreted as being in harmony with one another unless a conflict is manifest there's no conflict here the two say the same thing that there is a collective bargaining agreement with agreements and arbitration procedure unless the parties agree otherwise the parties have agreed otherwise here at least with respect to certain classifications of disciplinary actions the union also devolves a lot of attention in its row reply brief to making new arguments rather than responding to the sit in in this regard we believe that a good part of the reply  by the second district county of cook versus illinois labor relations or at nine seventy six ne second for ninety three and one in april of this year address the waiver argument if the court would like me to do so but i don't think it really makes a difference because it comes down to the same thing and that is what is the scope of the exclusion that the parties direct an arbitration on the merits because it is clear that arbitration is provided in this case we believe that the court should efficiency in that if it goes to arbitration the arbitrator is going to have to interpret the statute and it's likely to come back here rather than do that we would suggest that the follows the question is whether the parties to their written agreement showed an intent to exclude from arbitration the disputed matter weir's to court to say yes to that question just of the second district sa i agree with mr anderson it or you make a decision however that decision is only whether this dispute is pacifically excluded from the contract not whether the parties intended to exclude it whether they thought it might exclude it whether this civically excluded by the contract language from the arbitration agreement i want to make sure that the court understand clearly what exception in the are from the arbitration clauses in contracts things clearly that proceedings and decisions of the board of fire police commissioners shall not be subject to the revisions the city has presented the argument that disputes within the jurisdiction of the board are specifically excluded however that is not what the language really is following that specific exclusion the next sentence states that violations outside of the jurisdiction are specifically part of the grievance procedure it does not state that matters within the jurisdiction the oxen in that statement are excluded specifically the implication cannot be a specific exclusion because it is not specifically clearly known as they could be written into the contract the sentence following that sentence makes it even clear that decisions by the city or the board are mutually exclusive achieve as an agent of the city city further argues that because the chief's authority of the discipline is derived only from the board police commissioner stashing but the only recourse is under that statute however the contract specifically grants the chief the ability of discipline in section eleven point decrease the situation where the chief is not receiving that right to discipline officers only from the statute and also is explicitly provided by the contract while the contract can restate state law that then brings that language into the contract which governs the parties i was arguing the the breadth of the exception that only proceedings in decisions of the board are specifically excluded and not items within the jurisdiction