reverse the district court's ruling because the city ordinance chapter twelve is expressly preempted by family code section two ninety seven x x for two crucial reasons one a statewide interest others that later the further regardless of whether they have a contractual or proprietary relationship with the city the landscape has changed the legal landscape has changed since meyers won the stadium recognized the problem with their interpretation even in their own brief on page thirteen footnote nine it's a problem with extraterritorial regulation i realize that miers won it was it was addressed but because the landscape has changed at this point in time we have to look first to interpret ng the statute and interpret in the statute we want to take a look at section two ninety nine point six subsection now there  we are having to look at it facially it is a it is if we first look at the interpretation of the statue this court interprets the statute it must look to the language of the statute to interpret whether or not the phrase whether or not the right to impose duty it is limited to within the geographic territory of the city of san francisco and if this court agrees with with the position that we are forwarding it will then look and see that the statute pre amps the local ordinance because the statute does not prohibit does not permit extraterritorial regulation because within that jurisdiction that phrase must also apply to duties do not apply the phrase within that jurisdiction to the right to impose duties it would bring the statute into an unlawful position it conflict with general wants it specifically limited to within its limits if we allow the city's interpretation that duties navia imposed upon third parties and that's what that's the extent of  limitation that it's only to contractual proprietary relationships no limitation to the geographic region of the city but if we accept with the city would forward the phrase with then that jurisdiction does not apply to the right that were located outside the city of colorado and the court looked at that and said this is an unlawful extraterritorial power the city does not have hurt authority likewise in this situation with family code to ninety t ninety seven sec if we look at the right to impose duties the legislature must have intended when we look at the face of the statute but they would only have the right to impose the duties to individuals and companies that are located  within the jurisdiction within the territory to do otherwise will render the statute unconstitutional the only saving construction that can be made to keep import of their terms to allow in this case the right to impose duties upon third parties outside the jurist outside the geographic territory of the city of san francisco would be an exception that swallows  jurisdiction to pose rights and duties now rights and duties are called standstill where there is a right there must be a duty on the other side and where there is a duty there must be a right on the other side does not violate california constitution it must be interpreted that the must be interpreted that the right to impose duties may only be allowed within the geographic territory the city will then myers domestic partnerships when looking at the statute the phrase within that jurisdiction must apply to the right to impose duties otherwise as i previously discussed the statute would be unlawful as an extra territorial power therefore when looking at the statute it says that duties may be imposed upon third parties but they may only be imposed within the jurisdiction of the city within the geographic territory of the city the chapter that it would ultimately violate the provision of the state statute that that would say that duties may only be imposed upon parties with then the jurisdiction of the city within the geographic territory of the city and so effectively the statute pre amps the entire ordinary as it relates to domestic partnerships because the state has a statewide concern ordinance purporting to prescribe social behavior of individuals should not be held invalid if statutes cover the area of principal concern with reasonable accuracy we have expressed preemption in the statute that a preemption that duties may not be imposed on third parties outside the territory of the city of san francisco we haven't expressed preemption where to ninety seven  chapter twelve b the san francisco ordinance further state wide concern is revealed by the statute itself it provides a state wide definition statewide registration statewide rights with regard to hospital  joint responsibility with regard to basic living expenses where there's a question between state wide concern and a city's municipal affairs doubt must be resolved in favor of the legislative authority of the state that's reflected in california federal i still have trouble finding what duties the city is closing on contractor upon contractors that are outside the state and with the city's interpretation of the statute they would be able to impose those same duties on parties outside the state where there is no contractual and no proprietary relationship partnership and it's not that i will focus my comments but i want to point out that there is a second reason which if the court disagreed on the first point with a district court it would also have to address the issue of whether the san francisco  municipal affair which the prior hannele in this case decided it was and then go on to look at whether there was such an overriding state interest as to require preemption i don't think the courts need to address that issue and normally co that issue if they can determine that there is no genuine conflict because getting into the municipal affair versus state wide concern issue involves a delicate balance between home rule powers of city charter cities and the powers that it should not hear in for on the part of the legislature an intent to prevent the local ordinance and that concerns both the backdrop and the legislative history of your ordinance the adoption of san francisco's groundbreaking ordinance equal benefits on fracking purpose for the preemption provision and i would add a third thing which is you fall back to the basic principles that i mentioned earlier that preemption is just favored and that we don't imply it lightly and further that the court must make every effort to published decision of the district court in this case that was on record and that there are cases saying that the court that legislatures are presumed to be aware of case developments and there was a district court decision upholding so francisco's equal benefits or judiciary committee report on the state legislation made i mean that the goal of the prevention provisions was very limited it was designed to set a floor minimum floor is what the language of that report serves on on domestic partner rights and obligations and given that legislative history the only logical conclusion is that the express preservation and subsection c of local laws that impose duties on third parties regarding domestic partners that are in addition to the duty set out in this division but even if the court had that concern it has to follow its duty to try to adopt an interpretation that avoids a conflict and finally as i mentioned earlier if the court thinks there is a conflict then it has to go on to look at the provide an unconstitutional interpretation regardless of the legislative history and with regard to legislative history there is one thing that is very clear the domestic partner legislation is intended to promote uniformity within the state uniformity is not again i page thirteen paragraph and they recognize the problem with their interpretation of the statute but their interpretation as unconstitutional extra territorial problems if they say to the extent that miers is asserting that section  two nine point six cannot be interpreted to mean my jurisdiction to regulate beyond its boundaries and by imposing duties on third parties that are not commercial relationship with the jurisdiction there's a simple answer and they're going to say well the city does not advocate position but how can the city take what they want and leave what they don't want that's what they're trying to do the statute requires that the statute allows the imposition of duties upon third parties if their interpretation  but we don't think it's appropriate to apply to all other third parties but the fact of the matter is is the exception to the rule does not provide any limitation to contracting authority and therefore this court should overturn the lower court because