essentially word pressing the correctness of the trial judge's decision to dean told the statutory speedy trial rights of defendant of yury from the period of april sixth two thousand and twelve to may two thousand and twelve and leave the state now is that that's really the operative issue here and this is really a if there if there were a case in which this war could underscore the importance of the statutory speedy trial right as it is this one getting right into the operative issue well now at that time your honor i'm happy to answer it wasn't really until july that that statement was made and i think it's the sequence of what happened on april sixth that really is the thrust of the defense's position here in the hearing opens clock started again it started so that we demand a speedy trial the next thing that happens is the state moves to continue and the judge then proposes a specific delays well i'm what about june will set in june many t it but the timing is the key because that was well after the delay had already been proposed and an objection had been made by the defense at that point there was nothing else that the defendant had to say and i appreciate the opportunity to review that sequence to its demand for jury trial state moves to continue judge proposes delay specifically to june defendant objects and it is later in the hearing that judge then i would still have had an obligation because the delay has been proposed before i have checked into the delay but that is not what happened here what happened here was the delay was proposed first and then there's an objection that's yet that's all that is required of the day isn't with our agreement or because the trial court it wasn't suffer trial work because the trial court you don't want the trial court puling speedy trial stage or i need basis to could possibly be attributed to explicitly said what would be the matter with its doing so it struck explicitly said well i was there it was my hear i heard and saw what everybody said this is a thought this would be the normal and reasonable way to handle the scheduling and therefore this is an agreement by the defendant to set the case for let's assume here articulated all that why would he be wrong it's the trial judges in the states obligation to get it right and then answer your question on both of those problems had the judge said that the reason he couldn't do the record just because it's inconsistent with what the record says there was in fact the possibility of taking the defendant your words your best case for a trial court halfway or two thirds through the speedy trial time having a defendant say oh we're ready for trial first date you can give us and that's when we're going to have trial now an appellate court looking back at that record what would it say on those facts all forgetting about the state moving to continue whatever is that the way reasonable the way that doesn't infringe on anybody's rights yes ye good under the circumstances you describe i don't accept the idea that the state's wealth was critical here in any sense can easily be said a short sentence judge then they say isn't agreeable to us and we are not agreeing to continuing this case we want to trial that in may we want to trial now i see my time to go boy i'm respond please and have the trial judge said and  what is required he did that the trial should not make a finding at all that the delay from april sixth of may would have been attributable to the defense and in fact i'm still standing here i'm very familiar with this case i don't have the slightest idea why it would have been attributable to us i mean we we demand a speedy trial which had to be a valid demand as the clock started again and the trial judge proposes a delay and the defendant of japs after the proposed delayed that's what kordell requires as an act as i tried to explain to the trial judge when he says what you have to prove to me that you demanded april ninth trial date there is no case no statute no rule that anyone has cited including the trial judge as to why that would be and you objected to any delays after they were proposed which under cordell cleanses you of all of the delayed critical to you but you should have demanded a faster speedy trial that's not required that's adding something to this free trial act it isn't there there was no beyond his next bail date over my objection and so the law doesn't say that i have to come back to him and say that judge and i realize i've already validly preserved and he says in the record they have a speedy trial time will be preserved at least for that delay through june in order to it's page twelve of the applicable record he never said i told him to clock until may and if you review the transcript it doesn't say that anywhere he says  eously later may eighth it didn't matter he could have said maybe two thousand and fourteen and here's the thrust of it i think that is a policy issue the print the legislature's principle the legislature statute makes sense if under date that's wrong scheming or not intentionally or not and that somehow frustrates or cancels in some way the earlier complete invocation of products and i respectfully submit the speedy trial act you by delaying till april sixth the night you make this request as effectively prevented this from giving you a tryout the may is the time between the demand for trial and may is