good morning ron to initiate it say that the best i can figure out to do with time is to i'd like to spend ten times ten minutes making just me i take it i take it you're mr besser i'm sorry i am i'm sorry there are basically two appeals that my clients made one from the judgment below and one from the to the order of attorney's fees addressing first the judgment below i would like to hit briefly on the statute of limitations argument that we believe is certainly central to mr willis's ability to recover additional portions of the compositions that issue and by that i mean judge moscowitz ruled early on in the case that mr willis was entitled to recapture whatever his portion was of the composition and then he took a look and said well there is no agreement among the authors there are three a lot there's a record but he recognized there was a dispute as to whether one of the authors my client mr barlow had contributed sufficient amounts to the compositions so he said all right where there are three authors the presumption is and we will divide it third a third and a third on recapture so mr willis would get one third of the composition and  to the copyright to the composition if there were only two authors then mr willis would get a half and now we're going to have to decide whether they're one of two authors or excuse me two or three authors of all the twenty four compositions at issue and that became the major portion of the trial and of the case from the day that judge moscowitz had rendered his opinion on recapture throughout the end of the trial certainly was the bulk of this case below and we raised among other defenses to mr willis is claim we were raise the issue of the statute of limitations now under the ninth circuit that standard for statute of dealing with a legal issue or a factual issue the jury had all of this evidence in front of correct your honor but we believe the jury never should have considered it that legally given  contradicted facts we were entitled to rolling that the statute of limitations barred mr wilson's claim to more than a third of the compositions added and based on what theory based upon the theory that of express repudiation communicated to mr willis based upon the young contradicted facts which i'll go through right now if you'll allow me there they are what happened is just to back up for a second mr mr willis was hired to perform certain services with regard to each of the compositions after he performed his services on each composition he then signed the very first document which was the adaptation agreements that specifically said he had he was being paid a percentage to either translate the french l english lyrics or add new lyrics to a preexisting foreign work it defined it as a foreign word so he was told right at the beginning that his service is wearing thin action with a preexisting foreign work they  went through a series of events over the next ten or twelve years that are in this that are not in dispute for example the record albums that were released said that there were three on the inside and if you remember the old mr willis freely admitted at trial that he had seen those at the time then then there were a series of lawyers who did investigations for mr willis and we've outlined all that in the brief they asked for complete the accountings to his rowe pleas to his contract all of that and then we believe mr willis is charged with either what is the lawyers knew actually knew or should have known more importantly maybe the copyright certificates for each one of these compositions which was registered you know with filed with the copyright office or listed just below i'm a copyright certificates is there any evidence in the record that willis ever saw number to ficus know that any of his lawyers did no there's no evidence but we we we urge that a lawyer doing an investigation of mr willis the standards  you know the contracts and his standing as a county certainly should have looked at the copyright certificates if there is any question about who wrote the saw and mr willis should should have known there was at least  question when he knew there were three authors but counsel i want to make sure the argument you're making now should have is not a factual question of the jury rejected ultimately the reach the jury did reject it on yes it did reject it but we're saying it never should have gone to the jury and i would like to mention one other point which is the standard that the ninth circuit has set for express repudiation under the i'm mohammad versus meat case which i think is the the simple listing in the credits to the film of the plaintiff's contribution as being a technical consultant what they called the below the line less than and they said that was sufficient t constitute an express repudiating well what is important to note about that case is that mister the plaintiff had had attended a meeting before the film released in which he said according to the court which he raised the issue of whether or not he was an author and he had been told we'll deal with that later but there at least the film company knew that he was making that claim mr willis never made the claim it so when you talk about the need to express the repudiated claim what can you do other than what was done here which it every single point that mr billow or can't stop or scorpion were asked who the office were and what they contributed they said it was three mr willis is to blow and and  mr morality and then finally you get the business of mr willis admitting that month or quarter after quarter after quarter for many many years he received his b m i statements which mr billow i statements in the record in this no they're not they're not the actual statements or not but but mr willis depends upon b m i the information from b m i to say the statute of limitations began running  years before he filed the action and it was a simple request by his attorney to b m i questioning the b m i statements that resulted in mr levy's letter which is in evidence explaining why the statements were but this request was made in one thousand you know thirty thirty years later thirty thirty five years that i mr willis testified oh yes i got all my statements but i chose not to look at it i just took the check and cashed the check at some point he has an obligation i submit to it least read what he's presented with the only way he can claim ignorance of the running of his claim here is that he simply chose not to read anything now also very briefly while i still have a little bit of time mostly i'm running out i'd like to go to the legal fees issue for just a moment judge moscowitz below found that mr willis had prevailed to substantial such a substantial degree that's one of the factors he applied in the fogarty and it's my contention that he may have prevailed on the ability to recapture which was a small percentage of the case it was the first decision made that that was a unique question which i believe we had a right to bring but that being the case he did not prevail in the of any kind of almost overwhelming sense of what was the eighty or ninety percent of the case which was who gets what out of the songs and the way imagine for a second if we had prevailed on twenty four out of twenty four songs and it was  determined that mr willis only got a third which really the question that went to the jury did he get a third or have if we had prevailed on any twenty three all twenty four there would be no question that we were the prevailing party in the in the bulk of the trial as it turned out he prevailed on thirteen we prevailed on a level that's that's virtually a tide it's virtually a draw to say that was an overwhelming victory here by mr well this is just not accurate because after to finally judge my school which talks about the other purpose of the copyright act is to encourage authors to assert their rights and i would point out that once judge moscowitz decided that this was a  proper case where he had recaptured mr willis then filed the counterclaim bringing in mr billow for the first time as a party and it became a fight between two authors not of so to say  talking about whether reasonable whether reasonable it said lone could be the sole factor which they were afraid that the second circuit had applied there are a series of factors reasonable this is one of them i think under the more recent case of sal's soul in this circuit there's no question but that our position was reasonable where the court talked about simply going to the jury is sufficient to be reasonable i mean sure we had it and what's our standard of review here in terms of the it allocation of attorneys it's abuse of discretion by the court the same thing that you applied in the sals all cases it's officially flying on the particular focus of a factor that was not given significant consideration i'm saying that as a a majority of the grand tours on a grant must execute the notice of terminations where only one quintal are signed a grant he or she has standing to terminate that grant it is not or he had the absolute right to do terminate the grants at issue the court below correctly found that mr willis had standing to terminate training for a moment to the legislative intent of the copyright terminations statute congress an act of the copyright terminations provisions to redress the unequal bargaining position between young and inexperienced creators such as mr willis and the parties  the grant of rights at a time when the value of their work was unknown under the act the grand tour is to receive back the rights in the united states with respect to what he or she created mr billow at trial admitted having no role in writing the music or the lyrics to the twenty four songs in issue the jury determined that mr willis as the sole author the author of the lyrics the y m c a and twelve other disputed compositions was entitled to a fifty percent interest in each of those propositions the jury found th mr billow was not an author of the words or music to these thirteen songs even though he had been taking credit and receiving income from these along since one thousand nine hundred seventy eight or nine hundred seventy nine turning to the issue of the statute of limitations which was a central issue throughout the case and the issue was when mr willis reasonably knew his claim accrued repudiate the claim to authorship under the copyright is a question of fact it was submitted to the jury the jury determined that mr willis filed his claim in a timely manner in our case the question was not when mr willis warned that mr b claiming to be a co author of the compositions but when mr willis learned that mr bowler was claimed to be a co author of the lyrics to the songs at issue since mr willis claimed to be and  the sole lyricist of those songs a cruel mr will if this claim did not take place when the albums were released on containing the songs that issue in one nine hundred seventy eight and seventy nine because none of those mr willis had an obligation to read these copyright filings most if not all of the filings did not can turn is described that he was a colyer assistant just said he was a co writer so many of them would not have put mr wallis on notice of anything and since mr willis had signed contracts on the adaptation agreements giving him anywhere between twelve and twenty percent interest in each of the songs there would be the copyright registrations would not have put him on notice of anything and he'd have no incentive to read them copyright registration back then and there is no implied no evidence in the record that either mr willis's attorneys ever received them or that any communications had been passed on to mr willis concerning what was in those letters and i would submit even if you look at those letters they don't  wouldn't start the clock ticking on repudiation because they don't define what mr billow was claiming it wasn't until two thousand and nine that a pool took place in august of two thousand and nine bowles counsel wrote a letter to me for the first time claiming that mr billow wrote french lyrics that were adopted into english and it's in the record i believe it page seven eighty one is the seven eighty seven eighty two is the letter and in that letter quoting the accusations contained in your july two thousand and nine letter to gary roth assistant general counsel of b m i indicate that you do not have all the facts at your disposal the claim was brought within three years of the receipt of that letter i do not believe it should be the province of this court to overturn the jury's determination on a question of fact such as this most and the plaintiffs agreed to a jury charge i'm the issuer of repudiation that brought in the concept of being a carl lewis is they can't agree to that jury charge they didn't they didn't object to the jury charge that's exactly what i would win and they can't object to the jury charge or not object to the jury charge and now come in front of you and say it should be something other than that because the jury then determined when m author based upon the factual evidence the jury found that mr willis action was timely filed and such findings should not be disturbed by turning to a moment on the issue of latches the lower court in light of the supreme court decision and the trella correctly found that latches did not quote mr wilson's claim moreover appellants did not demonstrate any prejudice kolo lastly copyright term a nation under section two or three which takes place thirty five years after a grant was made will by its very nature involve factual issues from prior generations where witnesses will of past and proof issues will be created why the passage of time so i believe that a latch is argument when when it comes to the memory or people having passed away you're going to have that and many cases where you have copyright terminations issues to the question of response to the could saying now that as i understand it that came down after this decision or before it came down after and curtseying stance for the proposition that reasonableness is the applying the reasonableness prom because we believe that many things that were done by the plaintiff appellants in this case where objectively and reasonable it was objective leon reasonable to say that our client didn't have standing and there was motion practice relating to that we succeeded on three defending three motions one trip to dismiss and two for summary judgment  initially said that point was a worker for hire and that was ultimately ultimately withdrawn by the other side and we succeeded in convincing a jury that despite the fact that mr billow was claiming co authorship on thirteen songs going back to the one nine hundred seventy eight and reaping millions of dollars in the process that that had been a false hood for all those years so we believe factors and they can come to the conclusion that attorneys fees are warranted i would rather stay away from saying that somebody was on reasonable in the process and we believe that that's what our judge did below but we think that when you look at claim that he could not unilaterally terminate the grants under seventeen u s c section two or three he prevailed on a series of summary judgment motions and at trial he prevailed on thirteen of the twenty four song and most importantly on the deterrence issue he said that willis is a northern kurd significant attorney season trying to get back what he transferred to plaintiffs parties was to period bargaining power decades ago an award of attorney's fees is justified to encourage or things like willis to assert their rights to regain their copyright interests and to deter production companies and other trance reasoned copyright from attempting to interfere with those rights all right thank you castle we've got your argument th the denial of our rule fifty motion for judgment as a matter of law and or rule fifteen be renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law this motion is based on mr billows testimony and admissions that he provided no english we're exposed to the subject compositions and had no part whatsoever in the creation of music and as a result mr billow is not a co author of these compositions as a matter of law the second issue of the cross appeal is the denial of our request for relief under the declaratory judgment act for the discords mint improperly obtained writers royalties from the thirteen compositions that the jury did find that mr billow had falsely claim about their ship and had filed copyrights copyright on kerry so i have a question with respect to that latter point the rule fifty nine emotion was that made during the proceedings is in effect was was your motion timely made it seems to me that it wasn't even made until long after the final verdict was rendered no your honor we we made a motion for a judgment of matter of law orally prior to the case going to the jury and then renewed the motion after the trial after the verdict ok i'm not talking about the jail j m o l i'm talking about the motion to amend the judgment to order accounting of discouragement which was i gather that your second point that was made post trial your honor ok isn't that fatal no your honor because we had made the request prior to the judgment being issued in our proposed judgment and we had asked for it prior to the verdict as well  so quickly going to the rule the denial of the motions as to the eleven compositions even taking them at their word that there were these preexisting french works mr billow admits he did not write the lyrics to the us versions and did not write the music under black letter law if we are assisting collaborates with the musician and then the musician takes that music and collaborates with musician b for a second composition u s copyright laws only protects lyricist b and musician for that second composition that's the holding in the second circuit's shapiro bernstein versus jerry vogel decision that's consistent with nim or on copyright squares with this court's asked in tate decision and they do not even challenge or attempt to distinguish these these cases and as to the request for declaratory judgment by denying this request the district court abused its discretion because it allowed mr billow to retain ill gotten gains for the false claims of authorship and false copyright registrations now this request is limited in scope for the three years prior to the institution of the action but they would still be retaining the you know upwards of twenty here before the court now one appeal looking for mercy however scorpio led by mr billow approached my husband's former attorneys who represented  and since they purchased the judgment right in the midst of the scorpio vs willis case they took that judgment and started making all types of filings holding money saying hey you owe us money you have a judgment here and then standard as whether or not we were unreadable and he's arguing about whether or not we had been taking on reasonable positions in the lower court that the question is now are we not we're not reasonable as a matter of law which we were hold because we that the very mere fact that we raised issues that had to go to the jury as you pointed out statute of limitations you know these were reasonable legal arguments that jury had to respond to resolve so and to curtseying and sal's all the reasonable this factor is definitely in our favor i think that the purposes of the of the copyright act when you look at fifty thousand dollars worth of fees spent on the motions or fifty four thousand that you could argue that the purposes of the copyright act were furthered by mr willis being able to recapture i would argue we also further the purpose of the copyright act because that's the only reported decision now there has to have been there were no decisions that is the only decision that decides what a joint work is when you have three separate grants how do you how do you capture what they argue as three separate grants we argue it's three separate contracts one whole grant the grants only effective until only effective as and when all three authors sign their contracts and convey the rights then the publisher has a grant of the copyright prior to that there's no ability to exploit the copyright also to address the questions that were also applies to mr jazz nights motion motion he's talking about the motion they made for judgement on the eleven songs there never was presented in trial the theory of the rivet of works these were always treated as joint works the whole case went to the jury on the theory that they were joint works so there is it would be an entirely different trial the issue of joint works is this is a factual issue we would have had to have evidence directed to that jury instructions directed to that issue and as judge moscowitz correctly ruled it was never raised and to raise it after in a post trial motion or even at the moment that you're about to submit to the judgment never once did they raise the issue of whether or not the attorneys had sued should have suited as corporations rather than individuals the actually and the record of this case it looks to me like they did the proper thing that the fee agreements were signed by them as individuals the only mention of the corporation was an attachment or exhibit to the three agreement which which dealt with  the hourly rates of the lawyers in any event there is in the record a letter from mrs willis that was written prior to all of those proceedings that state court when she accused those two years of being idiots for proceeding in the individual capacities instead of corporate capacity she also neglected to mention that she she she later many years later filed an action in federal court before judge at tacking these judgments it was a five five or six or a cause of action complaint that she filed in federal court judge moskovitz ruled that time that they are is actually issued in order to show cause as to why there was any jurisdiction rather than oppose that she voluntarily dismissed the complaint acknowledging that there was no jurisdiction in federal court there simply was no jurisdiction to do instead of the issue now one further thing i want to emphasize is that on the attorneys fees issue to say that they were the overwhelmingly prevailing party when eighty or ninety percent of the fees in this case were devoted to the issue of who had what percentage of the composition whether it be a third or have this case primarily involve that issue from the fourth almost two years to say that we're not a prevailing party because we lost motions for summary judgment i do not believe is the standard at all we had the right to raise issues that we t legitimate issues that could have been decided by summary judgment i'm here today to say that the issues that you limitations i still believe should have been the subject of a motion for summary judgment never should have gone to the jury i believe that's a very reasonable rational position given all of the opportunities that mr willis had to to learn what he claims he never knew i don't know how much more you could tell him other than to give him a contract which says this is what you've done give