that the meaning of a plea agreement is to be term and at the time the parties entered into the agreement and not at some later point a fact that is confirmed by the record here and that both agreements include integration clauses requiring amendments or alterations to be made in writing the meaning of those motions those motions at most said that the defendants the government recommended a reduction of five levels of twenty five percent up to but not lower than the mandatory minimum this is because as the supreme court recognized  is invalid that's the point of taking a contract to take the bird in the hand instead of the uncertainty about what might happen if the guidelines have only been amended about a dozen times in a record a retroactive way that applies under section one b one ten in thirty years so the idea that the parties were contemplating are counting on some massive reduction in the guidelines coming into play or is i think fanciful be fair to would it be fair to assume that the government thought that there might still be a recess summer probably not much because i think it was one hundred twenty six months from florence but there might still be some room in the i'll tell you what my issue is were there so i understand the appeal of what the judge did here and why she did it but melendez does seem to be a problem i don't know how you how do you overcome melendez it says very departure only from the applicable guidelines and here there's nothing there's no thirty five fifty three that was actually filed there's no reference to it in the plea agreement so how do you how do you get district playgroup it's never contained thirty five fifty three language as a government conceded in its brief five k that language encompasses thirty five fifty three and what happens is when the guideline range is close to the mandatory minimum then the government orally moves for thirty five fifty three a motion at the sentencing for they didn't do so in this case because the guideline ranges were so high melton's guideline are interesting hundred thirty five to two hundred ninety three months that would have been an enormous five k that we just we never see maybe i've seen one or two of those in my entire career because it would have been more than a fifty percent reduction of a sentence and so the absence of that thirty five fifty three eagle language in the plea agreement agree we really can't negotiate for that because this is a standard plea agreement that well that is if it's a contract of adhesion we don't pay any attention to it is that the argument i mean no it's just that it's not done that way i the agreement is sort of a contract is actually kind of a contract plus and what the district court did in this case is construe the language of this plea agreement to avoid the unjust enrichment of the government at the expense of the defendant  there's a line between construction and rerunning on the question and it's one of the district court rewrote it according to the district court once the government decided that substantial assistance had been rendered and attached a value to it through the five k one point one that became part of the plea agreement that's the central reasoning of the district court where in the world the judge devotes get that i think i disagree with the district court that the language of the plea agreement is to reduce it that much but stay above the statutory a mandatory minimum where did she get the idea of that and therefore the government had written into the plea agreement that if there's ever a thirty five fifty three i mean thirty five eighty to see that that same amount asked to be factored in i don't understand where that came from she got that from one b one point ten c i believe she's trying to apply the comparably clear on the record i don't think there's any evidence on the record as to what the government's intent was with respect to a future thirty five eighty three thirty five eighty two motion there's just nothing on the record because i i don't think the government is correct about that this wasn't something that would have been explicitly discussed the question is just does the plea agreement which promised the defendants a five k if they provided substantial assistance which they did and also promised them the opportunity to seek a thirty five eighty two motion in the future if the guidelines were amended in a way that dennis and so the defendants reasonably understood those two provisions of the plea agreement read together to permit them to benefit both from their cooperation and from a future retroactive guideline amendment so you would have us read into all we bargain agreements that if there's a thirty five a day to see in the future and the government has to make the sighing so stand to assist us recommendation based on when you got mine right and that made based on the zero in the in these two cases you know i know but and where defendants have any standing that's more or less reasonable and anybody else's well that given the practice in our district of not including thirty five thirty five fifty three eight language in the play you could given the legal backdrop at the time these pleas were entered which included the williams case from the eighth circuit where the united states had taken the position that they could all that's still there well no they're arguing that now it's not still there they're arguing that williams affirmatively taken that position and that case which is the only published case on this issue still today i think informs the district court's interpretation of the defendant's reasonable understanding in this case one b one point ten c for the district court to determine if she had the power to go below the mandatory minimum also united states versus dylan doesn't prohibit this deal and dealt with booker variances wh some purposes truncated senate things but never the less than the things they held for the court held in a case called philips for example that it was a sentencing for purposes of rule thirty five a and a court does impose a sentence during a thirty five eighty district court did in this case didn't require bringing the defendant back and conducting a full blown hearing on thirty five fifty three a factors which is what i think dylan was really about if i could i'm almost out of time if i could end  on some factual matters i'd just like to remind the court that substantial assistance is no small thing for criminal defendants they put their lives and the lives of their family members at risk every time they cooperate in this case for example mr melt asked me not to mail copies of his appellate briefs to him within the bureau of prisons because he knew they would be intercepted and he'd be targeted as a cooperator also i want to make sure the court was not under the impression because ms flores has been deported that there are no practical consequence from the ruling in this case mr melton completed his custody here in montgomery and if the district court's ruling doesn't stand in this case he'll have to return to the bureau thank you your honor i'd like to clarify two minor things and then address some of the more major points first   not later during the modification the second is the concept that this idea about what we're dealing with today wasn't something on the minds of the parties at the time fair or not but as this court said in the  agreement simply makes no mention of something it is silent on that fact when a plea agreement is silent there is no promise there cannot be a breach of saying that the party did not promise to do and the third is the idea of why it makes sense that no one would think the kids would be time to be played by the men that filing a thirty five and fifty three emotion ten years after the fact would be contemplated and that's because it's going to be a legal remedy search based on the idea that thirty five eighty two c is a recent and saying it's a redo completely this court rejected that idea in bravo in two thousand many years before these defendants entered into their plea agreements and said in jackson it's confirmed by the idea as this court said embury that jurisdiction in thirty five eighty two c is limited to the revised guideline and not to other things such as the statutory change in the m by the text of guidelines one b one ten which says that the mandatory minimum only doesn't apply in the modification proceeding if the court had the authority to impose a sentence below the