court the primary issue today is whether or not this court should consider for should require the district court to have considered a recent to see mr hodge on count three in accordance with the st step bac eight and the two cases of the district court cited two specifically and jackson and really that if we wanted to cut to the chase the court could simply cut to our reply brief and look at the arguments set forth those cases and it was remanded back to the for them to consider a new a sentencing because it didn't exist any more we'll hear our court on review of mr sentance affirm the nine hundred and twenty four c's and so there was nothing to do new before the district court so aren't those significantly different rather than similar to your circumstance that is certainly one distinction yes all three cases involve nine hundred and twenty four c convictions and of course this the actual snipes what about it nd and nd was the practice of actually the sentencing occurring because our our prior decision in this case not only did not disturb the convictions on the place that the district court was to select double jeopardy had attached to at least two of the two hundred territorial law yes or the court district court was to decide which of the three counts to find our client guilty of  basically selecting so i didn't violate that job jeopardy clause but the court was also too recent in store as this court referenced that conduct the requisite re sentencing and that seems to be where the nuance matters what is the nuance created in your view of the use of the word requisite yes i think so because the district court was a certain extent at a loss here under the language of the supporting opinion was for the court here in the district in the virgin islands to conduct research and saying on the remaining territorial firearm conviction right well now that's that's the st time that language of what you're saying to me is different than what the mandate said in regard to the requisite re sentencing i didn't read that is saying just  recency on count seven it seemed as if and if you read the amended judgment the court revisited counts seven and still had to decide do i run this time consecutive or concurrent to the local counts do i run this time consecutive  or concurrent the federal counts and then we step in and of course the district more than a two separate hearing maybe i didn't make my question clear what what was intended was that there was no reset in this ng contemplated in the language of this court in chapter one on appeal that would suggest re sentencing on the federal counts right right and  i don't think this court was aware of the f s a and the possible benefit of that to our client because this judgment the mandate came back at least fifteen months before the f s a came into effect but for whatever in the district court can get around this recent and singer client until after the f s a was in effect but even if the decision even if the f s a was in effect at the time of the our court looked at this case it didn't just still would not have disturbed the federal sentencing the sentences would remain imposed as as delivered by the district court and therefore the ability to get relief would have been nonexistent as to those counts i understand the court's position and my position is simply we believe miller won miller too and davis allowed for the avenue to revisit the entire sentence because it was a multi count charging document you couldn't look at just count seven in this tunnel and the district court really felt like it needed the parties to brief the issue to see whether or not they did still have that discretion but miller is a sentencing package case and i know you raise an additional corporate i don't think you raised it with us that way we didn't i didn't your that's correct we didn't r that way but we still believe the combination of what would be a totality of the case whatever acquire the district judge to revisit how all he's how he had sentenced the mr hard on so is it i  mean clearly this is not is just words question indicated clearly this is not a sentencing package doctrine case right but it's not unless it hasn't been presented to us that way it wasn't developed that way before the district court that well we did we did brief the the novo standard and miller won two in davis and did reference the sentencing packets doctrine when we went back before the district court to attempt to have this entire sentence revisited how is that impacted in any way by the rather unique and is not only unique to the virgin islands but unique to sentences imposed in st thomas where you have both territorial counts and federal counsel appearing in the same indictment how is that impacted in any way by the practice of issuing separate j and  well i don't think it has any legal effect it is more of a ministerial roadmap for the bureau of corrections the bureau of prisons and the u s marshals when the judge decides i want you to serve your federal time st and then the transfer to  local person can occur i do think though the judge is contemplating all counts because it's the same course of conduct well things that he's of and i think what you just said makes sense but not necessarily limited only limited only to that that ministre to function what of the existence of those two orders for appellate purposes could that make a difference no  there is no significance for appellate purposes mr hodges interest is ensuring that the entire sentence is revisited and that's what the f s a we believe the interpretation as a position before us are you arguing that we should read the word impose in section four or three be to mean the same thing as finality no we danced around that in our opening brief the language is clear and of us and i don't know that there was anything in addition that i could give the court that would make the court think different so sentence was already imposed on hodge was it not it was but this court cited to tom cole and i think that tom cole requires a a sound judgment and there was no not a sound judgment in our command tom tom cole is all about how we review sentences of district courts i just felt like tom cole reflected that when there isn't a sound judgment from the district court like in this case because double jeopardy had attached at least two of the counts that in turn put that every sentence in the same light as the sentence because that is what congress intended if mr hodge and another be seen in the same light and sentence to court judge make he the clock is running down of wood would you like to ask some additional questions  was well i would have to go back to both day in jackson because i felt like both of those courts in those cases highlighted why a recent events is more consistent with the congressional intent under the st step act because of the value of hindsight of how the fair sentencing act was interpreted and that is essentially the background on the background principle that congress has at the time to create  larger group of counts and they are interdependent and now would be why they couldn't be singled out for considering some basis for retroactivity sentence or judgment a conviction is vacated or remanded whether an entire de novo sentencing of all counsel is required and miller to decline to lay down such a rule what it did was discuss the sentencing package doctrine which accounts trying to invoke here that doctrine requires that the sentences at issue be part of the overall plan or otherwise be interdependent in either of those the lions case in the also not argue sense in package us i would agree that was not raised it was briefed extensively before the district court and appeared to be the underlying argument of widely sentencing should apply and that the government's response to the extent that your honour's wish to consider that argument is that the district court on the st pass when sentence was imposed under the meaning of a violist treated the federal and territorial charges separately to different judgment of commitments were entered under eighteen u eighty four dollars the district judge had the discretion to determine whether those sentences would run concurrently or consecutively he chose to have each set of sentences run consecutively on the st appeal mr hodge did not challenge that that exercise of some of the territorials correct that's how the government understands it your honor and mr hodge has not made any proposal of how any interdependence would even apply the only relief that's being sought here is a shortening of the sentences for syrian to the st step back for the nd nine hundred and twenty four see conviction not that it is not reliant on any sort of interdependence or overall plan when you use the word interdependent twenty i'm referring to the language used in miller to where the e u had a situation there where there were a series of counts they were all brought under federal law there was a sentencing enhancement that had been determined to have been improperly applied and that that would have modified the entire sentence across the board so the reason that or at least one of the grounds on which the that the court had remanded in that case was applicable to all the sentences even though those underlying sentences were not otherwise disturbed and in that in that situation and how do you plan or  intra dependence between the counts that require revisiting all of them in order to in order to apply that change and the upward enhanced men that had been that had been  imposed in relation to one another here there's a clear bifurcation between the federal and the territorial council there is clearly no in interdependence they're both entered separately as judgments i would not and would your argument be different if has been point you're dealing with federal and territorial charges being handled by the same judge under a typical scenario the federal judge might be contemplating future state charges when imposing sentence and so the discretion afforded under eighteen u and eighty four dollars to have sentences run consecutively or concurrently would apply regardless of whether all the charges are federal charges if it's federal and territorial and whether they're all brought in the same indictment and imposed in the  same in the same judgment commitment if the district judge in his discretion makes the determination that two separate counts are to run consecutively that's a determination in our view the government's view that the two separate sentences were not the nature of the stacking the way that those two sets of those two sentences would be imposed because of a case in re man basically renders the st sentence an elohim get are we got to impose i don't think that we doubt the district court sorry revisit how that would work if there are no longer one of those counts is vacated but and given that they arise out of the same underlying conduct there might be a reason for that the judge to revisit those when they're all brought under federal law however in this case if the that's not the situation that we're dealing with right here the federal counts were affirmed there was no indication that the decision to run them concurrently and for them separately by the district judge was an abuse of discretion or in any way improper and so in the situation where you only have territorial counts being vacated the packaging doctrine would not apply there's no recent events and the st step back would contemplated by congress and passing the respect back and we're going to imposition of a sentence i'll just briefly address that the the case that cited in the reply brief havens it's you know in addition to being non binding authority doesn't actually support the proposition that it is cited for in haven's similar to this court in of us the court there used plain language of words plain meaning to interpret language in a finality or from a conviction which is a finding of guilt correct your honor and as the court there acknowledged there was different language in for one and for three verses in four of two and that would be the distinction that it's contrast an entry of it to the actual judgment of conviction the finding of guilt by the jury versus the imposition of sentence by the district court and the last thing i would say is that to the extent that a felon is still arguing that congress meant to use impose to mean finality elsewhere in the st step back congress explicitly refers to finality in amending the substantive language of nine hundred and twenty four see congress changed it to refer to a conviction that has become final so where congress didn't want to refer to but we know that the district court at least orally when asked by defense counsel to consider the st step back said of the fir the five federal council arraigned untouched and essentially gave a ruling your request that i apply that st act is denied without using those words that then enters the new judgment in the territorial in the form of the judgment that the only reference to the federal convictions and counts was the fact that the consecutive to the federal but r is it your position that he couldn't appeal that sentencing issue concerning one hundred and twenty four dollars c that's what your brief seems to say that's what you suggest i read correctly that your position your honor that that is what the brief says and that is the judgments generally were not properly before the district of you there and we do understand that he requested briefing on the question of whether they would be brought into an entirely sentencing because of the remand on the territorial  s however the this court did not disturb the initial finding on the federal charges and the proper course for a town at that point after they were fund was to then appeal them i will say that to the extent that here it's the governor's position is not properly before this court but to the extent that your honors were to take a different view and consider it it is the government's position that nothing compels exercise of under twenty one of six because they have a very retro act the non retroactive nature of the st step back and the supreme court in deal and in this court's holding and in deal is seem to indicate that there's nothing in the questions from judge words and for that matter does not really go to the old mit resolution of this case i think at least as both sides have argued it it's a matter of practice it's a matter of local this and i'm arise from the entry of two separate jagan seizes occurred in this case as opposed to one as again i understand the practice to be in st croix it seems to be responsibility of having to process such judgments in different fashions it is i think within the we don't do that very often do you know if the if the government has if not a position any concerns about the disparate practices that i've described briefs the fifteen years that mr hodge faces because he didn't receive the benefit of the f s a has to be preserved in every possible way it has been argued in the past that imposed means finally imposed and i would encourage the court to find any way to make sure that that language is broadened so that more defendants not just mr hodge but to really honor the remedial intent of congress in creating the f s a can benefit as many defendants as possible i don't dispute that but you will recall judgment piece question regarding the statutory requirement that if congress intends that there be some kind of recollect of application it is to say selling congress did not do so when it amended the statute and gave us the st step back so how do you get around that i mean how do you argue policy that is the remedial purposes of this and then meant when you are confronted with the specific language of all that says how congress is to express such intent explicitly sure and it isn't just the direct language because again it's inferred that congress can to background principles and have knowledge that because of how the sentencing act was interpreted that ultimately could result in defendants who have been recent times to receive that benefit they in turn would know in creating this f s a that we would contemplate defendants who have not yet been sentenced or are being recent and would receive the benefit because we want defendants who are being recent tensed and sentenced for the same question judge mickey do you have questions thank you or to you can i have them all right thank you thank you very much counsel for your helpful arguments  i'm pleased to have had the assistance of your arguments are my colleagues we will take the matter under advisement and judge mickey we will be tuning in with you shortly to