may please the court your honors money mr charlie name i'm here to represent the appellant's rainbow direct marketing and american charities for funding for reasonable fundraising regulation i'd like to reserve three minutes of my time for a little and i'm sure to argue two points first of all this case is not moot and second of all we palance of come here to ask this court for a ruling as to what the law is what is the standard for jurisdiction regulatory jurisdiction here in the tenth circuit it has been our contention all along that the standard should be a minimum contact analysis between rainbow direct and utah to be followed up by an increase in to whether it offends revision notions of fair play and substantial justice so that it would not so that if rainbow direct were hailed into a court it would have it reasonable expectation that it would have been hailed into a court in utah all the time both before and after the statute was amended it is when you toss a position that the central or at least permissible analysis was the contact between some third party and utah and that third party was rainbow direct clients which under and so moving on to move is in the old law before it was amended it was a simple right line two step process we said we think it was unconstitutional but it was at least easily understandable if the charity client had counter signed a contract with the  that charity client had then also registered with utah utah was going to enforce a registration requirement on rainbow direct they were going to require rainbow direct to register simply because that third party's wish had taken those actions on its own and of course the dispute was where those actions on their own anough for utah to constitutionally require rainbow direct to register which wasn't correct no your honor they would not have known whether or not swish was active in utah at least in terms of the mail if we had gone out and opened an office in utah for some reason they would know that either but in the regular course of the duties rainbow direct as you know from from the paperwork filed in the case has no idea what addresses are on the on this national mailing list they don't look for that they look for  instead they target certain behavior similarity in list appeal and also most recent guest but no your honor they are able to directly have been entirely unaware of whether general jurisdiction over swish well and i don't i don't see anything in the records that would establish general jurisdiction over swiss which is a dell or corporate company headquartered in new york right in general jurisdiction means a lot determine whether or not they can enforce a registration requirement on rainbow direct is whether or not swish is under the general jurisdiction of utah right and of course and they're saying they're not as there is green that they're not so they wouldn't be able can force registration requirement on me so i'm not going to register they refuse to bridge they can't be held into court to be have the registration requirement forced upon them they choose not to register they go forward with their plan somehow mail from swished appears in utah the attorney general the attorney general calls questions as why didn't you register your mail here you're subject to our regulatory jurisdiction switches that you can't force being you is more to conflating the merits with mootness so let me start with this question does ramo direct under the current stance you have an obligation to register or get a permit in utah with your argument to judge morrison which you are getting your reply brief i think is well the new statute is constitutionally infirm and that might be true who knows but we can't really address that a less we have jurisdiction and i don't know how your quiet even has i argued if i recall correctly we argued that the general jurisdiction standard as promulgated by utah is so vague and income prehensile as to give anyone any firm guidance as to whether or not this registration requirement applies to rainbow direct or not i thought i thought you are you just five minutes ago that at least the statute was clear it was before the amendment after the amendment it's much less clear pleading that the new statute is unconstitutional and we deal with a new statute and we have case law that says that we're less inclined to think that will we'll hear a moot case because it will have repetition if assist changes statute second it they still want to go forward with their ideas are all contract up with the record reflected that you no longer the rainbow director no longer represented swish in marketing advice their original contract has expired because they are not move forward in a contract is expired and there's no new contract in the record and you have an alleged you have an alleged a new contract so you not only don't have to represent a client that might want to do business in new mexico in utah but you have never alleged that the current statute was unconstitutional so while there are two movements problems right off the bat well i'd like to i'd like to push back on the first move this problem at the outset i believe we did allege in our reply brief that the new statute is unconstitutional because it focuses on the third party's relationship to utah to cure the  your honor i feel that the case is not moot because of the cut the new constitutional issues raised by the client by utah in its in its revised statute for the other reasons wish there are in our  in it's also unconstitutional for the outreach that utah has made through third parties to try to regulate rainbow that we election are opening brief i mean this new statute is it it it sets out to to have legislative jurisdiction over swished but not have the general jurisdiction to enforce it it essentially claims of knowledge what why would this  statute why would you toss that out to regulate someone when they can't force them to regulate them obviously the general jurisdiction is something a holding in their back pocket and pulling out later on to enforce a registration requirement do you think that you talk about his general jurisdiction over swish that that is proof that is triggered by general jurisdiction over swish when the attorney general for you type that there is not you say now will forget which said there may be or yes but application they did pay their fee they did subject themselves to utah's regulatory authority because it was their intent to solicit nationwide and they presume that some letters would appear in utah so for that reason alone and because they are for ever on the cusp of beginning this solicitation campaign if we can ever resolve this ten year lawsuit they they have that same situation perpetuating director of the division of consumer protection this case of the textbook example of this for the reasons the court has already identified the only claim on appeal right now the only issue is a pre enforcement as applied argument that the prior statue required right write a rainbow direct to register under the new statute the statute doesn't apply to rainbow direct attempts to provide consulting services to squish so the statute does not apply to rainbow direct rainbow directors not have to register or file an application under the current statute there is no or or not i mean under the new statute because we just have no knowledge at all about where this wish is trying to market where whether in utah whether it has an employer we in utah where the rainbow director rainbow directors allege they're claiming that they have no you try has no general or specific jurisdiction over them they don't have an office in utah they don't have an employee in utah that's their argument so as a matter of argument this case is moot because there's nothing in the record suggesting there's a live controversy if rainbow direct were to call the division tomorrow or this afternoon and say do we need to register to provide services to switch the answer w unequivocal no there is there has to be a case or controversy there is none here under this statute rainbow director is free to go forward with whatever contract they may have as the court said the contract expired in two thousand and ten that they can go forward to the extent they have a new contract providing services to swish but the only thing the were in the record their contract resigning as i recall it sets a contract was a two year term two thousand and two thousand i started two thousand and eight two thousand and ten they've argued in their briefs that there may still be some live issues as to damages because a matter of law and fact under this court's brown v human opinion there is no claim for damages in their complaint in fact they expressly told the district court below in document number seventy six that they were disclaiming any claim for damages the court in document eighty three relied on that and confirm that there is no claim for damages in this case is so much surprising that they are alleging in their reply brief that there is damages issue here also its black letter law that you cannot sue someone in their official capacity under nine hundred eighty three and seek damages they've sued the director here in forcible judgment they have no consent decree the district court ruled against them there was no ward of attorneys fees so therefore there is no issue of attorneys fees on on the hill and neither of the two merits unless the court has questions or wants to ask on that score