beginnings point today should be was the our view case from nine hundred fifty three that they relied on really a as a forte to visit they thought and if not why not  can't choose between different remedies doesn't seem to make much sense to anybody who's practiced worker's comp on illinois for the last thirty years because we do this all the time there are many types of injuries that could arguably be compensated under one section of the act or another and we make the choice disability or disfigurement which is greater for that particular part or permanent partial disability or wage differential depending on the like mr farview injured three body parts but was eight very seriously but was still able to go to work so he's not permanently totally disabled vocational if the three parts the medic enough medical evidence to justify individual awards of permanent partial disability adding up to similar to that case six hundred weeks of permanent partial disability the maximum award that he would receive despite that extent of injury would be four hundred sixteen weeks of compensation because there was then he section eight h that said other than permanent total disability the permanent total disability but it doesn't really work that way because in any other context the way we usually think of it permanent total disability means the end of the career no more earnings on account of the injury but this part of the expresso fi's that if you have the blindness amputation or paralysis of a member of the two members to qualify for it that's bad enough even if you never miss a paycheck and you're going to be entitled to the same compensation for those the loss of those two parts as if you were occupationally totally disabled by whatever that  standard may be in which changes from time to time and is defined in section a death so that's why it's those weeks or would have been called permanent toll disability compensation even though they didn't act that way so what they found objectionable at the time of our view was that to take two of those members that it would have added up to the six hundred  leaks and unclaimed them under eighteen where they would technically be weeks of permanent total disability compensation they would therefore circumvent the cap that the legislature had put in place on permanent partial disability from a single accident so at bat time the position of our view was rejected looked like a pretense to circumvent legislative that was right there in the statute well that cap on permanent partial disability was taken out of the act somewhere in the one nine hundred seventy s and ever since then there's never been any such c live damage for from an injury it's not there so the essence of why our view was decided the way it was may have been valid at the time for the way the act existed the legislative intent to have a cap of f nature was not only void of vindication but they took up the one they had which is an even stronger indication that they didn't want decision they were reciting the number of weeks six hundred something and then there were other side issues about weeks of temporary disability that don't really apply here but they were clearly doing the math of how much compensation that that our view could get under the law as it existed which made the attempt to relabel some of those weeks from p p d to p t d looked like  guess it was a drug an attempt to get around the cap of the statute the limited the options and but we don't have that anymore so that analysis of r d doesn't apply so that takes us to the next level of what is in section eight yeah eighteen and that's one of many copies like you get up to eighteen there have to be other sections in each section of each subsection of he is nothing more than for this particular body part here's the amount of compensation you can get this number of weeks in a few other conditions that may apply to some of them and just one of those list so nothing in any subsection he eighteen mentions refer or refers to any other section the only thing the act has in several places in section a b and he is that for any specific injury to a particular identifiable par that would be a one medical interpretation as a factual matter that was not the conclusion the commission reach the the factual analysis on the medical was clearly the right arm amputated is separate and the extent to which the left on him can be called a separate injury as opposed to a separate as opposed to part of the same specific injury is i don't think that limit you would be there if you have a chemical burn where you're splashed in multiples places you're still going to have  of the face and the hand in the arm from the same splash the same trauma to the skin and they should be individually assessed and i think to say that if they only even if medically only lesion for three of the four was at the cervical spine and it affected three extremities i don't think that the law requires it ignoring the third  think the statute as i get into the constitutional law concerns the statute reads just fine it was an it was an on reasonably narrow interpretation of what was implied by the statute where the appellate majority thought that just because it says once you have these two you're entitled to the same compensation as somebody vocational a total doubt that that ends the inquiry and the rest of your a legal matter the way the statute reads there is no limitation or preemption by one section over another other than a double recover the legislature intended to allow more than permanent total disability compensation from the single i simply needed to say it and i think that's backwards because we start with a common wall right to all recourse for all injuries that predated the compact and that right was already there unless the legislature were to specifically limit it at the time of our view they've made that choice capping the number of weeks at a certain level once they took that out then we're back to the right to read course for all injuries sustain other than an express limitation i'm not sure that the spinal injury was the lesion in the service spine may or may not have been the total reason for all of the disability to those three to those three extremities apart from the amputation there may have been other aspects of injury that you know we just didn't get that detailed in the medical because that was not were any dispute was so i don't know that the medical whether that fully answers the question well i don't recall if there might have been other evidence of bone fractures or other damage to the shoulder that on the left arm that  the the statutory permanent total disability was based on the paralysis of his legs and beyond that so those two parts qualified for that degree of interpretation of section eighteen and what it does or doesn't include or preclude is to look at the constitutional point of the illinois bill of rights section twelve  to prevail and impose this new limitation that it isn't in the act and they are taking away all recourse to some injuries for victims of very severe multiple even knew that was in the illinois constitution and thought the majority opinion at my desk i hadn't had any reason to look at it before doesn't that provision reflect the floss people should have access  i think as it used to be worded and was worded at the time of our view when it was every person ought to have been and i think it was in two places as ought to in the last constitutional convention they r caught to two shell which is so to the extent that there's a language in an opinion that says it's a goal rather than a promise or a commitment i think that overlooks the intensity of choosing the word shell and even if it's a goal it's a darn good one and particularly in a case like this i mean we're all aware of all the public sentiment about that's negative on personal injury claims and of various sorts and amounts of awards as as an economic social phenomenon but even to the extent that that's a factor subject to legislative shifts if there's anybody who shouldn't be caught up in that tide it's the type of worker who sustains an injury that qualifies him for this part of the yeah these are the ones who suffer the worst injuries of all and if there's so even if you say that that part of the bill of rights is a goal rather than a guarantee who better deserves the best effort to retrieve that goal than someone suffering the type of injuries th there was a recent opinion of the court but i think put that in the right context if statutory interpretation in bellville toyotas were  justice fitzgerald statement the judicial role in construing statutes is to ascertain legislative intent can give it affect you even accomplish this a court will seek to determine the object of the legislature sought  to accomplish going to evils a desire to remedy well in creating scheme of replacing common law rights to improve and some can reduce sacrum only between employers and employees for workplace injuries and in order to provide an adequate and fair and comprehensive analysis of these injuries in their effect and to compensate them appropriately and the  decision the first three levels of this case carry out that purpose and should be affirmed and as the in the parts that were still there and reinstated as to the key question here the cause this man become quadriplegic as a result of a cervical burst fracture i think i understand your glasses frustration that perhaps the illinois legislative scheme of the worker's compensation act didn't fully compensate mr carson for the extent of his injuries but under a legislative scheme the idea is that the legislature determines what is adequate compensation and that has been upheld over the years th n the initial arguments it was a question about our view in really does it still is it's still good long the state and my position is our view is still good law because section eight eighteen which is the statutory permit total section the language in that section has not changed other parts of the permanent rushnell statute have changed all the court this court was doing in our view in one nine hundred fifty three was merely going through what the other provisions of the primer partial statute said at that time but that was not determinative of how they interpret section eighteen essentially eight recognition by the legislature that certain kinds of injuries is going to be a special kind of compensation available to this employee anslem added to complete loss use of hands legs arms eyes or a combination of the two and once you reach that burden and it's no longer a permanent partial case it is then transferred into the area called permanent toral and section eight eighteen says that employee then there and thereafter shall be compensated as if they were prominent totally disabled under section eight at the big difference between eight f which is the standard vocational on the total can they still be employed  labor market is that as an employer an insurance carrier if they go back to work we cannot terminate their benefits the reason being is because the legislature has made this determination as discussed by this court  that this is a special kind of injury and we're going to create a special kind of benefit and because of that then we can't terminate benefits and this really happened saving now only for what happened in that whether the left arm injury came as a result the cervical burst fracture i read mr glass we didn't spend a lot of time to depose doctors because it really wasn't a question this man was was totally disabled there's no other explanation for to the issue well if the cervical burst fracture caused the inability use the left arm and then we compensate the left arm in addition to the statutory permit total that would in fact be a double recovery now section eight he is what we call the statutory law section it outlines for the first sixteen sections how much total disability available for each body part it's called the schedule injuries you'll see i think in the a brief that was filed by the aunt trollers association attempt to argue that because section eighteen is in easy it should be treated as other section easy injuries and i'm suggesting you that's simply not the correct repetition if you go through the first sixteen sections like i said you will see the definitions of how much is an eye worth how much is a leg worth how much is a is a finger  worth but in starting in section seventeen what the legislature has done is they start to explain how you apply the first sixteen sections seventeen had to do with credits one thousand has something to do with survivability of benefits and eight eight eight team specifically says if you have told us you use one of these special schedule members and you automatically go into section  section eight hundred eighteen remains the same the mechanism of how it works remains the same and therefore i think appellate court was correct in their interpretation that once you get to injuries that qualify for eighty a determination that if you reach this certain triggering mechanism in other words a loss of a hand the leg work two legs whatever that's the end of the discussion it's not precluding these party had workers compensation insurance or not and this court civil why should this an injured employee be treated differently depending on what some third party did in  acceptance of the workers compensation act or not he said that was not a rational basis to make that distinction so they deny that here we have very much have a rational basis the legislature said this kind of injury we think entitles a person to weekly wages have a sixty percent which is permanent or shall disability or they're entitled to there's a rate adjustment fund in the worker's compensation act which out from a total only totally disabled employees become entitled to  ially it's a cola cost of living adjustment that's available for them salt there are some additional benefits given to this type of ploy but the whole argument really comes down to can you attack this legislative scheme yes i think it is because the question is clearly he's entitled to promote told disability benefits under section eighty eighteen question then is is entitled to something more than that and  legislative scheme he has you're limited to the plain wording of the statute there's nothing that gives him the right to those benefits in fact if you look at section eight he it specifically states that you cannot get benefits under any other provision the act if you accept or you're entitle to this benefit so for example if if you have that total loss use the left arm but you're also being compensated for prominence will disability for what we call body as a whole injuries which is the five hundred week schedule which is for all those other injuries that are not covered by the schedule which are primarily trunk injuries head neck chest back and and  so that's a different what these cases say is that you can get compensated for a back injury under eight d and also get compensated for a right arm under eighty and they don't conflict because you're compensating two different body parts and two different injuries and so i that's much different than them going to section eighteen saying ok well we've got these two injuries these two body parts injured and  specific kind of injury we want to give them something more than what they would normally give them to the permit a partial schedule and so i actually think it's of course all that is needed for that remedy is to to to technically i don't think that they are there based upon to this specific body parts of this incident to life right and all the legislators are going to statutory mechanism that once you reach reach this threshold then you take into this lifetime pension under under other sections and what the course of said is that you can't recover under separate sections for the same injury you care to nobody but but prim and told disability is the complete total disability the statue talks about complete total disability course talk about complete total disability here now beyond the body part you're talking about the entire body everything that's injured that body i did want to address and you'll see this both in the carson brief as well as the this concept of other cases eighty eight hundred says that this happens the heavy injures we have a conversation and it shall not preclude other cases and there's an attempt to say that other cases means that it shall not preclude other body parts or that's not the plain meaning of other cases in the practice worker's compensation an application for adjustment claims filed for the entire claim one claim is accepted by the commission covers all the body parts all the injuries all the issues under one case now flamen is a different kind of case freeman tells us what the legislature the courts interpret the legislature to mean by either case needs in freeman statutory primmer total he goes back to work the same appoint or has a new injury court says yes you can get new compensation for this injury because at that point time the employees and statute says and shall not preclude those cases from proceeding and the court of freeman said yes you're right and i believe that's a correct application along other cases does not mean other body parts there are no cases  by carson or you know a trial lawyers association to support support their position on that and i think if you look at the plain meaning and the definition of case it's clear that that means the entire legal proceeding for that particular not exclude means a worker who does return to work and if for they're injured can receive additional compensation yet if a person is considered one hundred percent percent disabled under the one section under the eighteen returns to work serves a dual purpose first of all it's compensating employee for the injury that caused the disability the qualify them for that benefit they could back to work and they have this new injury  the second row of eighteen is to compensate them for the pain and suffering as a result of the original injury so there's a dual role of a v eighteen and that's why there's a difference there but injury this court said freeman you're entitled to dish will compensation and that i mean that's what case law says in the statement and who might to question that and it's but that's how it works and i was trying to work through that question in my mind to getting ready for this and the explanation is is again there's a dual purpose of a eighteen or compensating for the prior injury as you would in in every other case however because you can't terminate the benefits you can have the  use of the computer equipment or the purchase of computer equipment what the public or did is just say ok was this medically necessary i'm suggestions court to try to be a two point stand on it is it medically necessary and is it something that this employee needs above and beyond what the general public needs because the testimony mr carson gave in this case is he used his computer the same as you and i do in other words exchanging e mails checking the internet i had nothing to do with anything other than what the rest of the general public uses so suggest that we have to have an additional standard dowley medical not necessary but in fact if there's something additional need for this computer as oppose the general public regards the van rider insurance there's no case annoy on this missouri and i will have to consider this and said no that bans in the control of the employee and that insurance should be the employee's responsibility and i would just ask that you look at that and give us some guidance on that issue thank you doesn't preclude other cases and if they're arguing that other cases means subsequent accident which was already clearly your knowledge in the freeman decision by this court committee for now there's really two possibilities a so either way other cases means other entitle means from this injury but are still not preempted or the act is silent in which case our original position of the rights to reco the injured part were already there until and unless they were limited specifically in some way like the statutory cap that used to exist so what is it to me if you injure one way team replaces section twelve and of anna lynn h what would be a double recover you can't have statutory permanent totals for the loss of two legs and have twelve for permanent partial disability that extremity but you can have with multiple trauma as there's plenty of cases that have been cited permanent a loss of the man as a whole for the back and neck injury and a separate body parts where some of those are recognised for disfigurement and would go under eight c and others might be for the functional impairment and rated for permanent partial disability of the of the body under b so it happens all the time the point is not one of these statements about if you get this for this part but can you can't get something else for the injury to the same part that's all they mean making a choice on the menu but that only those limitations only apply to any one injured part so if you if you were to conclude that the injured part of the neck was responsible for the paralysis of three parts and and couldn't make any distinction then i can at least see that there's a possibility of limiting that part of the compensation in which case you would still reinstate the compensation for the amputation of the right arm which is clearly a separate trauma so depending on how you interpret the specific injured part you i can at least understand compensating statutory program parole disability and one on because that is a more clearly separate injury but as a practical matter if you have three injured parts you're really in for both legs in the end the left arm you're still involving in damage to nerves and hand connective tissue in all those places that relate to different acts of functional loss and i don't really think even as a medical matter that that limit should be there although it is a different argument than the a limitation of the right way harm by the appellate court basically there's nothing in section eighty eighteen that says this is all you get one chin qualify for this it just means that's all you get for the particular qualifying last parts and doesn't limit in any way what other injured parts would entitle the worker to and as to the equal protection i can't even imagine why there how anybody could find a rational basis for saying to a worker when you walk into the factory or as jack did get behind the wheel of that semi and put your whole body on the line for your job and for your employer that if you are becoming a quadriplegic instead of a paraplegic the two of those losses don't count but there's no rational basis for ignoring such profound