vacated in june of ninety ninety eight on state constitutional grounds and it's not the basis for the removal order however i mention it because the government the immigration judges decision the immigration judges decision of the government in its  has not been convicted of a crime of violence and we say that second he has not been convicted of a crime of domestic violence or family violence under the state laws of montana the third reason the conviction should be reversed concerts  to poison someone either killing them or damaging their lungs by carbon monoxide poisoning the government also alleges that the threatening to hit somebody is not violence against a protected person was reasonable and perfectly in line with the text of the federal and state statutes that she was required to interpret the problem i have with the jays analysis here and maybe you can provide some insight on on your views we had one of these cases under the taylor approach which is we take the statute we try to take the statute of conviction and see whether or not it matches up with the relevant statute in this case the immigration status and under taylor if a person could be convicted of conduct which would not fit the qualifying predicate statute then we can't use the statute of conviction its face qualifies not taylor requires just the opposite it says if you can be convicted of conduct that would not fit within the statute then you can't use the statute of conviction b specifically embraces negligent conduct we have said that you can't use negligent conduct as qualifying as a crime of violence so on this phase if someone could be convicted of negligent conduct you can't count injury that bodily injury language is what is important to this montana statute if you look at title eighteen it says you know where is the section of section sixteen and it says you know the used threatened  is purposely or knowingly causing a reasonable apprehension of bodily injury that necessarily takes this back then to totally teens requisite a physical force and you must have physical force to get to respond well i think you make an important and i understand that i think that's you're even getting to a very important distinction that might be being crossed here is it's not the underlying facts i mean that is clear from board this court would i'd like to also be available just as the court on the second prong of petitioner's argument just whether or not this actually needs to be a conviction for a crime of domestic violence the second part to thirty seven eight to eat little i put forth in the government's brief the immigration judge's decision in this regard to was quite reasonable under the text of the statute a protective person needs to be the victim of the conviction and the statute as you see from the plain reading of it goes on to list of the different categories or persons who can qualify as protected person and a person who is protected under a state domestic violence law that's just one of the types of person that language has to mean something if congress wanted any conviction against a protected person for a crime of violence to constitute a ground of removal it could have said that and it could have made this up this  so i think that that is a separate ground for movability excuse me a second ground on which the court could reverse the finding of remove ability and we are also wet eyes with the government's approach that  a crime of violence under a domestic violence law congress is i think we're going around in circles here