that they labeled it a principle of liberal construction of the rules the supreme court also didn't label it that and that's where this functional equivalent principle originates from i think if the supreme court thought it was a functional excuse me  lambert and there are actually determining in that case whether mandatory claim to prosper girls are subject equitable exceptions so this court doesn't want to take the stance that the functional equivalent principle is an equitable exceptions i think that i think live in this situation if the functional equivalent of the bankruptcy court transmission was insufficient that i think cambridge would apply if it was insincere patient and what the bankruptcy court transmitted over didn't have enough information to meet will five which is not the case here because what was transmitted over had a four page certification order the eight page bankruptcy court opinion and it also had the short record if that was insufficient and then the apple e objected then i think a move would be a political here because then you could say you didn't have sufficient content to meet the rule five and were objecting and now you have to dismiss but i think that's the only way he would could be a political here but it's not because what was brought for and then we can mr miller do i understand correctly your position is that the bankruptcy court clerk could have handed you this package of materials if you had walked them up to property or is in the bankruptcy estate well they would be able to go to three sixty two a and they could well it depends on what the piece of property is so if that piece of property is a house then you would have to look at what the confirmation order says every jurisdiction is different on what the term is what property the state or not so in the seventh circuit under a case called keith only property that's not necessary for a film in atlanta would not so if it's not necessary for filming of the planet here's my problem yes under the what you call the minorities a little the stay basically expires is to virtually everything within thirty days yes under the rule that you're advocating the creditor is very much at risk by not knowing which property is covered by the expired stay and which is covered by the continuing stay and it seems to me a very improbable well the chapter seven trustee and that in under the majority of you may not necessarily want to come and extend the state that's protected another property the state but there's other parties that interest they could come in such as an unflattering spouse so no feeling spouse could come in and they would have an interest to protect the filing spouse from combat abusive practices from creditors trying to go after the debtor such as phone calls personal losses or in persona and stuff like that ok i'm i'm i'm not tracking with you ok so under that view creditor excuse me a nonpublic spouse to come in to move to extend the automatic stay under three sixty because under the minority view you would have no protection for the property the state and it would provide you know unless you went into them by the bankruptcy court and convince the right with court that this is a good faith petition did you want to address the circuits opinion smith and let us know if we could affirm in this case without creating a circuit split yes i think i think that the smith court i think that the smith court actually one of the things they got wrong was that the plane so what you would do is you would look under three sixty two a which has been modified and anything that has to do with protecting a debtor or debtors property would be terminated for anything that has to do with property state would not be termed congress was modifying subsection name three sixty two c three eight but as you know they did not modify it under three sixty two c four hundred three sixty two c for ai why did congress use such simple language to terminate the entire state and such a similar statute three sixty no other property out of there are a few exceptions right there in that are talked about in the first circuits and so on so you really think this is about the day we panicked a little and i called right away and said if there's a problem we'll change care of it we're very sorry we don't violate the automatic stay and then when i looked at the actual dockets in the twenty thirteen case and the twenty fifteen case i saw what had happened and that there was actually in my reading of the statute and the case law in the district and i said so i called back up and then we got into the dispute where they're saying there is a stay and i'm saying there's not so that's how we got here and and like you know like i said there there is a minority view in majority view we're not making new arguments i think the minority view is that the better choice i think it's the written poorly it's hard to go by statute and i think the first circuit had it right when they said it's hard to apply rules of statutory interpretation to the statute which has been written to either one of the textual analysis i'm sorry you can win a textual calls back other than just your harassment which is prohibited by other federal statutes there's there's nothing that you can really do unless the case buyers with regard to everything i think that inadvertence however the property the state still remain protected based off the clear and unambiguous reading of three six three zero and as you were alluding to the first circuit even though they just one against us they did eviscerate the whole theory on this fossil exclusion which means that