hoover murphy assistant attorney general appearing on behalf of the people of the state of illinois in this case two children were adjudicated dependent to no fault of their parents and removed from the custody of their mother who is the respondent here a year and a half later after she failed to maintain a reasonable degree of interest or concern for their welfare she was found unfit and the court determined that it would be in the children's best interests to terminate her printer rights the appellate court majority reversed reading section two dash for one c of the juvenile court act to bar terminations of parental rights following an adjudication of no fault dependency we ask this court to reverse because both the language and the purpose of section two dash for one see show the legislatures intent to allow such germination when it is in the best interests of the child i'd like to start with the statutory language which is located on page three of our opening brief contrary to the  e majorities reasoning the no fault dependency provision can reasonably be read to allow terminations of parental rights when it is in the best interests of the child that section states that those who are dependent include any minor who is without proper care through no fault neglect or lack of concern by his parents provided that no order may be made terminating parental  have been raised in the circuit court but in the interests of justice the court would still rate would still address the issue it was not raised in or as far as i recall that that's correct turning back to the language after stating what a dependent minor no fault depended minor is the statute then has to provisos the first is that no order may be made terminating parental rights the second is that a minor may not be removed from the custody of his or her parents for longer than six months having stated these provisos the statute then clarif removal because the margins it does apply to the second thought but it also applies to the first thought and let me explain why the the  phrase immediately following the norm a minor be removed for more than six months is pursuant to an adjudication as a dependent minor under the subdivision that phrase itself logically applies to both of the provisos so what the norah does is state first we have the proviso about terminations then we have a proviso also about the six month limitation the phrase following that applies to both of them it clarifies that you you can't order term a nation or remove a child for more than six months but only under that dependency subdivision so that you could order terminations under subdivision b which is if the parent has a physical or mental disability but when you have to file a different petition for that no you would not if a child is a judge dependent under a b or d of section two dash or one you would not need to read you to kate the word chip in order to terminate parental rights  different i'm sorry but the findings of the first petition for words under dependency versus determination that's right whenever you go to terminations you have to then first find the parent to be unfit and that is whether the child has been adjudged award because he was neglected or dependent for lack of a parent or because the parent has a mental or physical disability under any of those reasons for war chip you before you can terminate parental rights you have to find the parent unfit by clear and convincing evidence and then you have to find that it's in the best interests of the child to terminate parental rights so what the legislature did by amending the statute in one thousand nine hundred three is to put children a judge towards under subdivision see an equal footing with those who are judged wards for any of the other reasons under to dash for one or because they are neglected none of those require an initial finding of parental fault and yet if the parent if their behavior deteriorates over the course of the warship then their rights can be terminated and so  justice cook stated in his dissent why is a parent's behavior not under scrutiny and subject to terminations regardless of the avenue by which he became a ward if that is what is in the child's best interests and this gets into the purpose of the act which if you accept that the statutory language can be read reasonably just as that the court finds of ambiguity the language of the sponsor seems to point to the portion that has to do with the removal from the parents in the six month provision  let me see if i can find is language the the sponsor of the bill amending the statute stated the bill quote repeals a six month limitation of minors allowed to be declared a dependent or allows a minor to be removed from his parents if it is determined to be in the best interest of the minor so that although you even cited that language in the language of the sponsor of the bill but doesn't that quote removed from his parents line which point to no your honor i think it can reasonably be read also to encompass the determination that the term of art of terminations or removal it may have been that  senator barack ows one who was the senate sponsor of the bill wasn't using the technical terms but that's a very important isn't it i mean the word removal is also the portion of the statute in question i mean the word removed is used in the statute yes and the sponsor uses the word removed in no where in his remarks does he talk about determination provision so isn't fast supportive of the fact that if there is any ambiguity to what legislative history would point to the fact that it was modifying the six month removal and that terminations of rort it's true that the both the house and the senate in their debates focused on the six month provision but the fact that they did not mention the prohibition on term a nation is not indicative that they did not also intend to amend that part of the statute their result be the word  removal goes to the children being removed in this oftentimes is removal without terminations for long periods of time yes so it really doesn't have anything to removal has nothing to do with and you removed children are removed all the time pending investigation so it really doesn't have anything to do with the ultimate which would be terminations rights i agree your honor i agree that the the senate and the house were focused on the six month provision but the fact that they did not also have a long debate about changing the prohibition on terminations does not mean that that was not their intent because if you look at the overall purpose of the act that's what i would get back to here section one down to if i may you are stalwart with your argument but i do want to just for a moment get past just i thought occleve say that we might agree with you and say that the best interest standard contained within that phrase does not apply to terminations it only applies to the six months or so that if you agree with the appellate majority that's what would what would what would be the next thing that would happen with this  that the the children would in order for terminations to occur the state would have to start over again and we adjudicate the warship under one of the other subdivisions of limbo while it's now been nearly three years since the children were adjudicated wards and to say that the state has to go back and start over again and really adjudicate ward ship puts them into uncertainty and goes against the legislature's goal of a permanent guest that's also a fair argument but if we look at the language and the language is clear do we have any alternative if you find that the language is clear as the appellate majority did i do not see an alternative and you would be back basically you would say the one nine hundred ninety three amendment did not affect any change to the termination provision and where were back in the old language before the legislature went in and added this best interest language and under that situation if you look at the in r case that was what the appellate court decided there the children are then put back at back at square one and you have lengthy new warship proceedings and in this case the third mean this would be allowing if we went along with your line which it would be allowing terminations proceedings in a case where there's been no allegation of all right so that the  are right now we could file in the glock petition i would disagree but it would be getting to the same point where we are now by the time that is adjudicated and sent through and a new service plan is put in place and then we get down the road to terminations of parental rights that's another two years down the line and any bill the word you just use now is permanency or service plan no removal of the child for dependency the focus of trying to keep the family intact and providing sir voces so the goal is different in under dependency vers yes that's right isn't that why you should have to file a new petition determination well you always have to file a new petition for a term a nation the goal during the board ship is as you s reunification and that was attempted here and that is attempted under any of the dependency subdivisions but at the point where the parent no longer shows a reasonable degree of concern for the child's welfare or under the other grounds for unfitness if they haven't made reasonable efforts to the return of the child or to correct the conditions that were the reason for the child's removal at that point the state can file a petition for term a nation and would have to prove the parent unfit by clear and convincing evidence and what we're saying is in amending the statute in  hundred three the legislature intended to give children adjudicated wards because their parents were not at fault at first but their parents behavior deteriorated over the course of the warship which can happen under on the glass finding or under a dependency finding under one of the other subdivisions is the legislature has been if we look at it from the perspective of the north if there were if the court finds no support the plain reading of the statute that it applies to the six months and then the third basis which is namely the length of time it's going to take and we're already at this point it at least seems arguably reasonable  legislature may not want to allow for terminations where there is no allegation of fault on the side of appearance so what exactly are you pointing to in asking us to to read this the way that you propose if i may make i hope you will get the purpose of the act your honor it is what we're pointing to and the fact that the best interests of the child are to be the paramount consideration and the act is to be liberally construed in moments of ambiguity to serve the best interests of the child above all other interests that is what we're pointing to and the fact that the the legislature went in and actively amended this statute so that the children who are in the same situation as as as the two here will have an opportunity expeditiously at permanency and having permanency at the earliest opportunity is one of the stated goals of the act that's against section one dash two so that's what we point to and that's why the that's correct that's correct your honor that is one of the protections that is given parents so even a parent whose child is found dependent under the no fault provision is not it risk of of suddenly having those rights terminated there has to be a petition for terminations the parent has to be found unfit by clear and convincing evidence and the parents are given ample notice as was done here they are admonished every step of the way you have to comply with the service plans you have to maintain responsibility for your child you cannot simply let the child be removed and not work actively towards maintaining your relationship with the child tha you thank you for these reasons we asked the court to reverse and affirm the circuit court's judgment terminating respondents parental rights case number one zero six zero five two will be taken under advise with his agenda number