reason for that is because a roll fifty one well fifty one typically requires a party to stake their positions to their objection and once the judges rule party need not take exception to to the rul but there are some claims some errors that you're not going to be able to anticipate such as is that is the sentencing explanation going to be adequate because the sentencing explanation is when the judges and posing s and so this court has long held that reviews of those sorts of explanations are subject to do novo review and this case is no different the court did ask a couple of sort of wrap up questions at the ends you know have i missed anything and i misstated anything but those are not the types of inquiries that gave mr green no in a certain direction counsel to stand up and say we actually disagree with the way that your right to your sentence there there gran'pa questions trying to make sure that the case doesn't have any outstanding matters so mr henderson on the assumption at least for right now that there is no waiver of forfeiture problem we come down to this brief comment that the district court made that you focused on where he says i'm going to make it life meaning a life term of size release because your life will be short and then he has this one sentence if i did it ten years or fifteen it's effectively the same but then he goes on to say that i'm going to because of the past consequences of the experiences that you've had i think you need help so  going to do it for life now you read that as his indicating equivalence between a ten or fifteen year term of supervised release and a life term but if you look at this record as a  whole it sounds a lot like he says i just think you need a life term of supervised release that's what he wraps up with so may not be the most elegant lee phrased explanation but i'm having trouble working from the premise that yours well and i think that the question is how was how was the jobs arriving at the census and the judge starts off by saying look you're in your late sixty's if not early seventy's i'm going to make it life because your life will be short and so you know the government pointed out in their briefs that if the judge and said well if you know if you are thirty or thirty five maybe i'll consider ten or fifteen years but because because your life will be short i'm going to make it wise but then he goes on to say because of the experiences you need help even though you're older i really think it has to be the rest of your life so why doesn't that cure or at least taken as a whole why doesn't that seem an appropriate explanation particularly given the fact that you know the statute in the guidelines will contemplate lifetime terms of supervised release well i mean i think that the question is did the court comply with section three thousand five hundred and fifty three a and reaching the way you know i think that you're going to need a lengthy term anyway you know one of the things that we pointed out that often gets overlooked and determining the term a supervised is courts ought to consider the entire statutory framework and the fact that terms can be modified terms can be extended terms can be terminated early it's not just a i'm just go give you life because i feel like you know you're going to be in danger you're going to need something for the rest of your lives that's what the issue actually was and in our famous thompson case where the judge there said well i can't well it could have been but realistically what we know from this from federal statistics is that this was going to be one hundred and eight months you know realistically if i had been in clients there's looking at a i think that realistically though we're willing to take a chance i suppose you know if if you were to say let's send it back just to make sure we get the term a supervised release correct i'm fairly confident the gentry not just extended terms can be modified terms can be terminated her way that's it all play a part of it this requires calculus rather than jumping right to the maximum because jumping right to the maximum does conflict with parsimony principle account size judgment that he didn't sound right to the maximum he discussed the reasons for i'm closing the maximum and he did not appear to rely on his admittedly ill advised admiration that he probably wouldn't have more than ten to fifteen years left after release from prison he gave reasons why he thought the defendant to be unsupervised released for life that were independent of the brevity of his supposedly if expectancy there's one sentence after he explains i'm going to the government totally understands and so is our i'm having trouble in terms of the standard of review the government totally understands the defendant with vission but in the context of this kate it was a case where the guidelines recommended a thomas the garage release and the judge specifically asked have i misstated anything and the answer was no but nevertheless regard totally whatever the standard of review is in this case when placed in the context of the court's comments it's evidence that the conclusion of the court was that the lifetime of supervised release was necessary and why did the defendant history of securing  in child pornography and its escalation to in this case transmitting it as well as receiving it in possessing it in greater quantities than ever before the court was fully aware of its discretion it considered fully it options and it determined that he needed help using the courts language by way of supervision even when he was older the court fully considered what was involved in imposing a lifetime of supervise release and found that it was necessary in this case finally to require the court in every case which it seems to me is what the defense counsel suggesting that without any argument without raising the issue it's error for a court not to express we consider the fact that a court that it that it could later on extend a term of supervised release it when a court last in this case gives its rationale it's not incumbent upon it to articulate every possible configuration of the supervised release charm when it's not brought up by counsel so given the record here the context here this court fully considered it and we're really stretching and reaching to kind of contort things to say that it sounds fifteen or ten years to be equivalent so i would it would you agree at least new screen will that if if what the judge had said changing the facts a little bit if the judge had said i could give you ten to fifteen years of supervised release but you know your life expectancy in your early seventy's isn't any better than eighty five anyway so i'm just going to give you a life term there one in the same wouldn't that be a error i'm reluctant to say would be absolute error because it really just depends on the context of the proceeding but that's not what happened here what's happening i you know that but i just you know i've had in other contexts in yes terms of imprisonment you know exactly how the life expectancies factor into this and you know there are tables you can figure out how long somebody who's reached the age of seventy male or female you know with with other demographic characteristics thrown in to get at least a number and of course some people live longer than that and some people don't live that long and so the job is still there for the judge to decide what term should i give in to i mean i suppose for a seventy year old if you said fifty years i'm not aware of anybody one hundred and twenty but the judge is supposed justify the length and choose the shortest one that will achieve the goals of sentencing and i think that's what mr henderson is saying i don't see that in his i think i think what's happening here behind that is really an acceptable and i think what the court is saying here in my view is saying my rationale doesn't have to be that overwhelmingly extensive because what i'm just his conduct when he's not under some kind of supervision so i think his reference to tend to fifteen years in context was really an explanation for the justification required and that it based on this court's other decisions i mean i think this court was aware that if i was sitting here and imposing a fifty year supervised release sentence i've really got to have substantial rationale for that not that he doesn't need a substantial very reasonable one based on this that all of the facts in the context of this case that's what i that's what i think is going on as a reflection to this court's prior decisions and terms of what life time supervised release really means and in this context in this case where he had defended as he progressed as he got older his conduct escalated and  his need for treatment any for supervision escalated and so i think what the court was saying is that even as an old man you are going to need supervision which is essentially how the court summed it up and i think to take this case and put it in terms of the meaning of other cases where these facts are present does it hold so unless the court has any other questions the government would rest upon its  and the facts of this case and ask that the court affirm the sentence imposed on the judgment of the court all right i see no other questions so thank you very much mr henderson thank you our honor i guess the the last thought i'll leave you with as what we've asked for it is really a modest request to the extent that there is ambiguity in this record it's worth reminding to the district judge just to make sure that the court follow