resolution of mr shavers case was an abuse of discretion for three reasons st because mr schaffer's alleged misstep failing to update his mailing address a single time nearly two years into litigation is not the type of agree just repeated litigation misconduct this court has required to justify that extreme sanction nd because the district court and its own words dismissed the case based on a presumption that mr shafer was no longer interested in pursuing his case it formed the presumption based only on the defendant's motion without offering mr shafer a chance to fix the elections day or later explaining why the court disbelieved mr shavers his judgment explanations and rd because this and delcarmen decisions made it clear that this court can and should reverse on this precise procedural posture the court's bare bones denial of mr shavers rule sixty b motion for really constituted abuse of discretion in this court should reverse as this court wrote dumb carmen sixty motion necessarily considers the circumstances of the underlying judgment albeit for the limited purpose of looking for a substantial risk in justice in the underlying dismissal multiple cases in this circuit from dickerson make that clear so despite what the government says in its response pretty there is one issue presented in this case and that is whether the denial of mr schaffer's rule sixty motion was an abuse of discretion and whether there is fundamental injustice in the underlying dismissal is one of the considerations that is relevant in that inquiry and that is why some consideration of the underlying business all is necessary as the court in delcarmen it was incumbent is a quote on the district court to consider whether the record at the time of dismissal supported the imposition of such a severe sanction so when we look to the circumstances of the underlying business and st as this court is written many times the punishment of a litigation sanction must fit the crime and in this case the punishment was extreme and the most extreme option is nestled with prejudice and that simply did not fit the crime this court's precedents provided the district court with a menu of procedural options it could have chosen to take to ensure that his presumption that schaefer was no longer interested in pursuing his case was correct it could have fired a warning shot as the court suggested in the buyer case it could have considered a less extreme sanction st or considered whether this actually was an extreme sanction an extreme situation warranting that extreme sanction and at the very least as the court wrote in johnson the district court could have explained why other lesser sanctions or other options would not have been fruitful the court here did none of these we should be clearer than that what the just record did in this case was dismissed the case conclusively based on a disputed fact which is whether mr shaper had in fact failed to update his address the key fact in this case or the plant in this case there was no miss conduct and there were no missed deadlines mr shafer was in fact not under orders to do anything at the time that his case was dismissed so well the record does not conclusively show that mr shafer in fact did fail to update his mailing address and the evidence in fact there is in fact evidence that he did attempt to update his mailing address even assuming for the sake of argument if he had not all he clearly wrong based on any of the court's precedents and we are not asking for a new procedural rule or any sort of new guidance to district courts only that this court apply what it wrote in don't carmen dickerson and sorok actually given a specific warning about the importance of attending a specific status hearing this court held that that warning was insufficient in light of the other procedural safeguards so the fact that there was a warning somewhere on the docket schieffer failed to establish excusable neglect under federal rule of civil procedure sixty one because he failed to inform the district court of his release from prison and he ignored his case for eight months relief from judgment is awarded only in extraordinary circumstances this court will reverse the denial or rule sixty one motion only if no reasonable person could agree with the district's decision and there is a danger that the line judgment was fundamentally unjust or can't meet that and he didn't contact the court or do anything to advance his case until he was reincarnated in may th interim crucial deadlines past including the discovery cutoff date and the dispositive motion deadline and the case discretion relies heavily on case law interpreting the standards for dismissal for dismissals for want of prosecution under federal rule of civil procedure forty one ignoring his failure to appeal that  dismissal order and that's important because even an abuse of discretion under rule forty one b is not enough to establish grounds for relief from judgment under rule sixty and this court as players council knows only examines the underlying dismissal to determine if there was some risk of fundamental injustice and there was nothing in just here as mr schaefer ignored his case for eight months  report waited another month after that until the dispositive motion deadline arrived at which point then it dismissed the case for one prosecution so this wasn't a circumstance of soroka carmen where there is a single mistake as conference in the district immediately dismiss case this is a long term pattern of delay and the district court had no way of contacting mr shafer so considering lesser sanctions such as issuing an order for rule to show cause would have been futile dismissed the case for prosecution i also dispute that this case was dismissed based on a disputed fact even taking mr schaffer's claim that he mailed a letter claim by attaching what he claimed to be a copy of one of those letters to israel sixty motion now it's important to remember that mr shafer supposedly sent that letter while he was on mandatory supervised release so he would not have had it with him to attach to the rule sixty motion after he was reading her story and in recognition of that fundamental factual dilemma mr schaffer tried to explain that under an identified family member or friend sent the letter relief from judgment rule sixty four which applies to void judgments does not apply here because it's obvious the district court had personal subject matter jurisdiction and also  sixty be poor and this court's cases make it clear that the district court is required to do more before conclusively presuming that a litigant is disinterested in his case and jumping to the extreme sanction of dismissal with prejudice  so there are that is the reason for the procedural safeguards and to simply assume that a procedural safeguard would not have worked in this case under any circumstance there are sort of two responses to that one is that the can definitively to rescue a plaintiff's case only to take appropriate procedural safeguards to make sure that there presumptions that plane just are disinterested in their case are actually true so if you have at least afford it mr schieffer an opportunity to respond to the allegation to correct any alleged mistakes that really is the bare minimum of what this court has required and while the procedural safeguards do not establish an especially high bar on district or its a court here failed to follow any of that as of the circuits precedence and that was a mistake secondly the government's post hoc rationalisations for the reasonableness of the district court's order really do not appear appear anywhere in the district court record as a result mr schieffer had very little opportunity to respond to the dismissal of this case in sufficient time to correct it and the explanations for why the district court might have acted reasonably in hindsight still do not comply with this court's requirements for the procedural