all right let's pick up our first case on the ten o'clock carl snider vs rrooksby argument for the panel please proceed thank you your honor may it please the court i'm frosty drake and i represent the appellant robert rooksby the appellee gregory snider sues brooksby for among other things a breach fiduciary seeking money damages snider also filed for an injunction seeking an order that brooksby to be enjoined from using half the proceeds that he obtained from the alleged breach of fiduciary duty and then he deposit half of the proceeds from the alleged breach of fiduciary duty with the court the court granted that injunction this is an appeal of the granting of that injunction and as i will explain in the grant of that injunction was erroneous that brings me to the facts the background of the case given the issues on appeal it's not necessary to state the facts in great detail brooksby and snider were business partners in an llc called carbon recovery carbon recovery's business model was to obtain a band and coal from coal storage companies process it and blend the coals so in that specific sales criteria and then sell it their buyer was a company called the southern illinois power cooperative a dispute arose between rooksby and snider as the operation of carbon recovery and snider wrote rrooksby an email on may 21st two thousand and fifteen telling him carbon recovery would not be making any payments to anyone except to snider meaning that there would be no further payments to suppliers or compensation for rooksby so rooksby thus began dealing with coal on his own account specifically contracting with peabody coal a company carbon recovery had not dealt with snider became aware of these dealings and sued him for breach of fiduciary duty essentially alleging that rooksby wasn't surfing corporate opportunities of carbon recovery as part of the lawsuit snider also sought an injunction ordering that rooksby be enjoined from using fifty of the net sales proceeds of his sale of coal from may 21st two thousand and fifteen forward which was the date that snider wrote the email and that he deposited fifty of the same into the court the court granted the injunction which brings me to the point that the injunction was wrong which brings me to the points on appeal the first point is that the injunction is erroneous because snider has an adequate remedy at law and thus there is no irreparable harm of course it's warned of law that an injunction can not issue if the move on has an adequate remedy at law here snider has an adequate remedy at law his money damages claim for breach of fiduciary duty indeed in his briefing below snider even stated that he should quote not have to wait for a monetary award but that's just the point because a monetary award is available there is an adequate remedy at law there is no irreparable harm the mere passage of time from the point of the suit to any monetary award is not irreparable harm and that makes this injunction essentially an equitable attachment and illinois law forbids that equitable attachments an equitable attachment is the enjoining of the defendant's control or property in his possession to satisfy a claim not yet reduced to judgment is there any kind of allegation that this breach of fiduciary duty would somehow permanently damage the relationship with their buyer southern illinois power cooperative i don't believe so i don't believe there was such an allegation if that allegation was made that certainly wasn't a focal point of the injunction hearing or in the briefing and in other words any kind of allegation over and above you owe me money well there were things like i'd like an accounting i'd like an accounting things like that but as to an allegation about a specific permanent harm to a customer i don't think there was even more even if that were the allegation the injunction forcing him to pay money into court would have no no barring to that allegation and that might support an injunction saying you can't go out and sell more coal you can't go contact these people but such an allegation would not create the need or irreparable harm for injunction to pay money into court what did the injunction bar him from doing the injunction barring the points of the appeal were anyway but paragraphs b and c of the injunction preventing them from using the net sales the net proceeds of his sale from may 21st two thousand and fifteen forward and to deposit into the court those net sales proceeds and the court eventually said you said to deposit the need for the deposit in your attorney's prosecutor account he was also enjoined from making any further sales to southern illinois power cooperative except through carbon recovery and we do not we did not appeal that that point i understand but the point i'm trying to make here is it seems to me like the claim was more than just he owes me money it's he's damaging our joint businesses relationship or substituting himself for our joint business relationship with southern illinois cooperative okay i'm sorry if i misstated that was the only claim at issue i apologize my point was this this goes to your your argument that he has an adequate remedy at law money damages and i'm saying but what about the potential damage to this relationship with the southern illinois power cooperative we don't appeal that we're not asking that he not be enjoined from having contact with southern illinois power cooperation we're only appealing the the injunction paragraphs b and c to the extent that they deposit money yeah deposit money and you can't use the net sales proceeds yes okay and also there was no allegation that your client was in solvent or if this money got away this is going to be gone there's no evidence of insolvency there's no binding a bankruptcy the closest that it comes to that there's an allegation that we're dissipating a corporate asset which is just a fancy way of saying you're causing me money damage which is you know one of the main points of my appeal and refresh my record how much are we talking about here the amount that was deposited is ten thousand so returning to the case law here it does function as a equitable attachment it may not be a right amount of money but they're they're instructing rooksby you can't use that money the court is describing you can't use that money you can't use that money you got to deposit it with the court and that's an equitable attachment and as the court stated in kurt kurty franz and the other cases in my brief the theory of taking away the control of property by means of an injunction for the purpose of anticipating a judgment which may or may not thereafter be obtained by a litigant is a point of horan to the principles of equitable justice and that's exactly what happened in this case rooksby had property in his control and it was taken away prior to judgment of course there are many cases that denying injunctions when the plaintiff has a claim for money damages and thus are essentially equitable attachments one particular one that i think deserves discussion here is the franz case due to a similarity to this case the franz case involved the fact pattern very similar to this one in franz a limited partner brought an action against a general partner and the chief operating officer of a partnership alleging breach of contract and breach of fiduciary duty after the partnership sold vacant loss at the low fair market value to an entity affiliated with the chief operating officer so the partnership is depleting partnership assets by selling vacant lots to an entity that's affiliated one of the partners for less than fair market value in less than the price stated in the partnership agreement so the lending partner sues and says that's a breach of your fiduciary duty to me and that's a breach of contract and i want an injunction stopping the partnership from selling those lots the trial court granted the plaintiff an injunction stopping the defendants from selling money for loss in order to protect the plaintiff's financial interests in the lots the second district for the trial court holding up the limited partners breach of contract and breach of fiduciary duty sued for money damages constituted an adequate remedy at law and thus there was no replicable harm in addition the second district rejected the plaintiff's argument that the injunction did not concern a financial interest because it concerned the partnership assets which were real estate as the court stated the plaintiff's entitlement based on the partnership agreement is to the profits and the partnership not an interest in the real estate the complainant alleges financial injury to the plaintiff by defendants conveyance of loss at a price less than set forth in the partnership agreement because the only leave requested by the plaintiff is monetary and jumped at relief is inappropriate and resembles a prejudgment attachment here the defendants are trying to basically do the same thing that the sorry the plaintiffs are trying to do the same thing that they the point of it in franz they're trying to recast their complaints one for dimunition in a corporate asset or interest but just as the franz plaintiffs were trying to recast their complaint is one for dimunition and the partnership assets but in both cases what the plaintiffs are really seeking is monetary damages they're seeking redress for financial harm and as franz and many other cases in other contexts point out that is no basis for injunction and there's essentially no in a legal equitable attachment and that brings me to my next point on the appeal the injunction is basically an end around illinois attachment statutes illinois has a statute that covers what snider seats one enforces the defendant to set aside money or other property prior to judgment and that's seven hundred and thirty five ilcs fifty four thousand one hundred and one the prejudgment attachment statute but of course that statute requires snider to post a bond to provide defendant a remedy in case the attachment is wrongful it forces snider before depriving the defendant of property that was in his control to put a little skin in the game himself he's got to post a bond he hasn't done that in this case and yet the injunction issue so the injunction has just done an end around the attachment statute and constitutes and then legal equitable attachment the final point on appeals the injunction is erroneous because it fails to preserve the status quo the status quo is defined as the least peaceable uncontested status between the parties that point was the five hundred and twenty one email from snider to rooksby stating that carbon recovery wasn't going to be making any more payments to anyone at that point carbon recovery certainly didn't have a receivable from peabody coal or sipc or anyone else for transactions after five hundred and twenty one but the injunction changes that it forces it forces rooksby to deposit money into the court and so the injunction does not preserve the status quo so in summary the injunction was erroneous because there was an avid remedy of law it was around the attachments statutes and it failed to preserve the status quo and against these pretty straightforward in my mind clear arguments that the injunction was improper snider makes just a few arguments which in my opinion are fairly easily dispatched first he attempts to distinguish the franz case because this case involves a derivative it's not received individually and derivatively on behalf of the corporation but that's just a distinction without a difference because the derivative claim is also for money damages and therefore is an adequate remedy at law to whatever dimunition and the corporate interest is being alleged he also attempts to compare this case to the bowman case but the bowman case involves a uniform fraudulent transfer act it was a case under a different statute and not the attachment law and any comparison to this case with attachment statutory cases it fails because snider did not post a bond finally snider argues that there is an exception to the rule against that will attachments based on the specific funds doctrine when the injunction involves a specific fund that issue in the lawsuit however this is clearly not a specific fund case first and foremost even a trial court stated that the basis for its injunction was not the specific fund doctrine it was not enjoining the use of order in the deposit of specific funds if the trial court didn't believe that that this order was going out in the attachment to specific funds how can rooksby claim that secondly there was no evidence that rooksby still had any of the specific funds from the transactions in his possession and of course it's their burden on their injunction to prove that and they did not thirdly the order doesn't refer to a specific fund instead it generally describes net sales proceeds from all full transactions rooksby engaged in after may of two thousand and fifteen a net sales proceeds is not a specific fund it's not a specific check with a check number or money sitting in a trust account it's a calculation of net profit after overhead there isn't one case in the jurisprudence of illinois that holds that someone's net profit after a calculation of overhead based on transactions is a specific fund that can be attached and the cases snider sites for this argument are in a positive and having criticized snider who relies heavily on all seasons excavating however all seasons stands for the proposition that if the defendant isn't solid and he only has one or two assets left in her real estate the coordinator joined the sale of the real estate based on the finding of insolvency i would also point out that the injunction and offseasons excavating was directed to specific real estate and preserve the status quo neither of which this injunction does snider also cites a case called amarin insurance but in amarin insurance there was a reinsurance contract that was at issue and both parties both payments under the reinsurance contract and the question in the case was going to be whether the reinsurance contract was valid or not and whether it should be rescinded and the court ordered that both parties make the payments that they were supposed to make pay each other under the contract to pay those into the court as the court was says that the question of whether the contract is valid was getting litigated so in that case both parties made deposits and since the franz were specifically earmarked as they are payments under the contract they were clearly specific funds for that contract they weren't net sale proceeds for six months worth of transactions finally the kishan case the kishan involves a case where money was already in trust the parties had agreed prior to the lawsuit to put money in trust then this dispute broke out about that trust account and the court enjoined the use of the proceeds in the trust account so it's a pure application of a specific fund doctrine in short none of basis support the specific fund theory that snider has alleged the injunction is erroneous for the reasons that i've stated and i would reserve further argument until my reply time unless there are further questions all right thank you counsel thank you argument for the appellate more injustice golden justice sherman and justice stewart my name is sandra tivoli may i please the court i represent plaintiff appellate gregory snider this court has to decide today weather the trial court abused discretion with the standard of review today did the court abuse the discretion when it enjoined mr rooksby from further dissipating fifty of the whole proceeds and whether the abuse of discretion when it ordered that that same fifty be deposited into mr rooksby's attorney's trust account after considering the evidence that was introduced at the hearings the motions the arguments the case law and the trial courts analysis and application of that it's very clear that the trial court did not abuse it's discretion for the reasons that the court found that the documented evidence that was introduced intended to show that the proceeds from the sale of the coal were a carbon recovery asset that's what the court was preserving it was a carbon recovery asset it was not taking away money from mr rooksby it was preserving an asset that mr snider and carbon recovery had an interest in second the preliminary junction was not about two or three judgment attachment because again this was a carbon recovery asset not mr rookbys asset and third there was no heir because the injunction involves specific funds that are the subject of the litigation and i just wanted to highlight a few facts that i think we're kind of left out or glossed over at the hearing at the first hearing on our motion which was the october 22nd hearing it was our original motion for preliminary injunction at that hearing we introduced six different documents one was the purchase order from southern power coop and it was given to general waste services in case you're not clear who general waste services is that was an agent of carbon recovery because general waste services help the insurance and that's not disputed so it was a general waste services was used by carbon recovery in order to gain the access to southern illinois power well so that is one document and again like i said it was that there was a vendor agreements where general waste services to supply coal to southern power and it was a longterm agreement it wasn't just for a period of time second we introduced greg's truck services invoices and those invoices all identified that the coal that was delivered from kinder morgan's facilities to southern illinois power coop and then identified general waste services on that as well we introduced four different access agreements there's a series of access agreements some that have terminated some that extended the time between general waste services and kinder morgan and those access agreements is what allowed generally services to even access kinder morgan's properties to remove the coal at that time mr rooksby i believe introduced the peabody coal contract at the rehearing so mr rooksbys attorneys filed the motion for a rehearing and at the rehearing we further introduced truck scale receipts so when the coal was delivered to southern illinois power coop a truck scale receipt was issued to the driver of the truck and that also identified general waste services this is for the same period of time let me just ask a question and the things you're talking about now to go liability and more or less at whether an injunction should have been entered at all but what i heard your opposing counsel say is he's not even appealing that he i guess agrees and he can correct me if i'm wrong here when he gets back up he agrees that there i guess there was sufficient evidence to enjoin his client from further sales and so forth he's only complaining about having to put the money up right right and our point there is that again he's claiming that the money held is mr rooksby's and i'm not trying to stop you from making your argument i guess my point is and i read in the briefs and there there was a lot on both sides about whether or not there really was whether or not the plaintiff showed a likelihood of success on the merits more or less whether it was reasonably likely that he'd be successful and so forth right it sounds to me like it doesn't matter if they're really not even appealing that issue and they're not asking that the injunction be wiped out completely no they're not its about putting up the money and the money that they put up that they think that they shouldn't have to because that was mr rooksby's money the court took away as an equitable attachment would it takes away a person's property in hopes that you're going to get a judgment but that's not what the trap we're here found and that's what it wasn't the evidence because the trial court went through a very lengthy analysis about this and said that the the evidence overwhelmingly show that those sale proceeds were a carbon recovery asset how else can we what other remedy do we have besides an injunction to enjoin mr rooksby from further dissipating a carbon recovery asset because he had it didn't tell us he diverted our allegations are that he diverted the funds but that it's that it's a carbon recovery asset that's what we've always contended did you ask for that other remedy and the alternative to not dissipate yes the corporate assets yes and that's exactly what the court says that he is to stop from further dissipating the corporate asset or sorry stop further dissipating fifty of the net sale proceeds because the court found that it was a corporate asset and the gross proceeds of the sales were something like four hundred thousand right and more down to ten thousand within four months mr so that the court invited we didn't know at first how much he had actually received because we couldn't get that out of him that information out of him so the court also asked for an accounting and when at the second hearing in november the november 16th hearing which we also have a report of those proceedings then he ended at the end of that hearing and accounting that showed that he made about three hundred and i have the number here three hundred and twelve thousand and within four months or less than four months he had spent or gone through almost three hundred thousand and i was only twenty thousand left so it was that twenty thousand figure that they have acknowledged through that accounting that they still had that the court decided was a corporate asset that only fifty of that was held there and asked to be the deposited just from further dissipation and it was it was held in their current attorneys trust accounts the court didn't feel a bond was necessary because it has essentially acts as as the protection that a bond would have so if we're wrong in the end after trial on the merits it can be returned to mr rooksby and there's no harm okay so this let me get back up again make sure i understand so when you're talking about this was all done through waste services that's because of the contract was set on my power property required that it go through waste services and he didn't present any new contract that provided anything else and so that's evidence that he was more or less playing off of the carbon recovery name to make the sale exactly your honor okay that's your point there yes yes let me try to get back on track yeah so i've highlighted the fact that that i wanted to highlight and again the court felt that by depositing the money into mr rooksby's own attorney account which especially you know in the surety capacity that the parties would be protected and the need for bond would be unnecessary as your honor pointed out mr brooksby did not produce a separate purchase order he did not produce access agreements with kinder morgan the peabody contract so it happens only was from july 9th and terminated on july 31st there's nothing that extended that peabody contract and the greg's truck service invoice actually reflects sale or pulled deliveries from through the month of august i'm sorry what through the month of august two thousand and fifteen as well as the trucks sale receipts so our first argument that's the plaintiff is entitled to an injunction to preserve a company asset in order to obtain an injunction mr snider did need a established four criteria clearly ascertainable ascertainable right that needs protection the appellant doesn't dispute that i don't think he raised that in his his appeal but even in the event that he did carbon recovery clearly had an ascertainable right and snider as a member of carbon property clearly had an ascertainable right that needed to be protected that being the assets of the company an irreparable injury that would resolve in the protection of an injunction is the second criteria and the proceeds from the sale of pole for carbon recovery that was the only source of income at the time it still is without an injunction in place mr rooksby would be allowed to further dissipate the little bit that's remaining and we would still have the super money judgment but the court is allowed to allow the court can has the authority to allow us to protect our own assets for instance you have a winning lottery ticket you've lost it someone picks it up and turns it in and do you have to wait until they spend the money or to get a money judgment against important or can you go in and ask the court stop them from spending all that money preserve it so that it's still there it's their asset it's the next akin to the specific fund stock and i disagreed with judge harrison when he did make the comment during his lengthy analysis that this was not a specific funds i disagree with that i believe that this is specific funds because it relates to specifically we're we're only looking at the sale proceeds the sipchem to pay for the full delivery for the time asserted and those specific funds are in the are part of the controversy here that we were saying that he's dissipating them that they're carbon recovery assets and they're they're specifically related to the case and in those circumstances then the court is allowed to attach or to enjoin the use of those specific funds and those were comments made by the trial court judge regarding the specific funds yes because i it's not an order for preliminary junction right that's correct it was comments during his analysis as to why he reached the conclusion that he did and your honor i'd also like to point out that the court took in consideration he very narrowly limited this injunction he took into consideration mr rooksbys interest as a fifty member of carbon recovery and that's why he only ordered fifty of the proceeds to be deposited into the account so he took the strictest and narrowest approach that he could that would that would favor an equitable result i didn't agree i wanted more deposited it but the court also acknowledged that that's all it's left at a twenty thousand well then you are stuck with getting a judgment for the balance your honor the i was looking into the criteria and both of the criteria for an injunction and there has to be an absence also in an adequate remedy of law and as i stated before there's no other remedy at law that can be utilized to continue to preserve an asset that's still there we know that there was twenty thousand left what other remedy can we have to preserve that asset that carbon recovery clearly has an interest in the fourth criteria and the likelihood of success in the merits was evident from the trial court's finding that the documented evidence tended to show that the proceeds from the sale of the whole wasn't asset of carbon recovery here's my second point your honor at the preliminary judge was not an equitable attachment and i touched on this earlier an equitable attachment consists of an injunction prohibiting a party from transferring or using his or her own property that's not what the court did here the court bound that the evidence show that it was not mr rooksby property that it was a carbon recovery property so the court was preserving and protecting carbon recoveries property not taking away mr rooksbys property and i agree with with mr petri that an equitable attachment you know is is an attempt by a party to get around the statutory requirements we're prejudging attachment if this word equitable attachment is true but as i stated before it's not equitable attachment because we're not taking us from that he owned further the prejudgment attachment statute under those factors there's eleven and numerated that allows you to get a prejudgment attachment there's no error for the court attaching these certain proceeds because we would have been entitled to a prejudgment attachment had it gone that way because mr rooksby is there's no dispute that mr rooksby is an outofstate resident that's one of the enumerated cases were prejudgment attachment but you would have had to post the bond and your honor abide has been subsequently and it's not for the record cause it happened you can't check that yeah you can't check that but you yeah you're you're you're correct and that bond is in case you know that they're they're wrong but the bond is also attached or used before there's your lab for hearing and time is your hearing so it's it's when the court goes or the person goes in and seeks attachment without what would that without giving notice to the defendant and the court does require a bond here the defendant had noticed we had a hearing on it and the court decided a bond was not required at first because of the minimal amount that was deposited and second because it was deposited into mrrooksbys own attorney's trust account you're on the case of franz v calico development corporation that is cited by the appellant it is distinguishable from this case in that case the court specifically found that the plaintiff who only sought monetary relief against the defendant for breach of contract didn't have an interest in the property that the plaintiff stopped to enjoy and the court found in that phase where they played it didn't have an interest in that property the court found that it was tantamount to an equitable attachment in this case the it's different from this case just been removed from this case because here again the court found that the assets that belong to carbon recovery at least the evidence that was presented at the time tended to show that it was a carbon recovery asset and that carbon recovery had an interest in the asset my third final argument was that the specific funds doctrine applies and i touched on this as well so even if the court were to find that it was tantamount to an equitable attachment we have always maintained that the specific doctrine fund applies the funds that issue in the case have specific connection to the underlying dispute and all of the trial judge did comment in his analysis that he didn't agree with that we respectfully objected to that and disagreed with the judge and then explain why we thought it was a specific funds doctrine case law in illinois is where the funds which are the subject of the injunction or also the subject matter of the litigation as there are in this case the issuance of an injunction is valid and has been held the existence of a remedy at law does not deprive equity of its power to grant conjunctive relief so the fact that plaintiff alternatively maybe a money judgment does not deprive a court of equity the power to grant a preliminary junction and we do cite all seasons excavating vs what heart which did not specifically find that they were entitled to it because of the insolvency it was again just specific funds doctrine v schultz where the preliminary injunction restraining payment of the escrow agent to the trust was proper to maintain the property in controversy and in remarriage of davenport where the exwife the court found exwife was entitled to a preliminary injunction preventing the exhusband from dissipating expected proceeds from the sale of family property that she had no interest in all examples where the party seeking the injunction has other remedies of law but injunctions were upheld because it preserved the funds and controversy during the hearings on the original motion for preliminary injunction the motion for hearing again the the documents were introduced and we contended that the board agreed that attended to show that this was a common recovery asset so the specific funds are at issue in the litigation and the specific funds are part of the injunction for all the hawthorne reasons your honor the plaintiff gregory snider individually and derivatively on behalf of carbon recovery present the court affirm paragraphs b and z of october 26th two thousand and fifteen order for a preliminary injunction and nothing further okay thank you counsel thank you first of all your honor there was evidence that the coal that was traced subsequent to may 21st two thousand and fifteen was the peabody coal and that it was a different type of coal than a sitc had allowed them to go in and process and so the the kind of allegations they're casting upon me here aren't taking into account the full evidence that was placed in the record of the hearing more importantly the the question here that they're saying well it's a carbon recovery asset its a carbon recovery asset but that's the question for the suit that is the question for the actual trial at the end of the day whether it's a carbon recovery asset or whether it was our asset whether it was rooksbys asset that's the final question on the trial but most importantly it is still just financial harm it's still just a suit for money damages what they're alleging as being their their asset is still just a financial asset and so they have a suit for that there was and that's why the finding that there's no finding of bankruptcy or insolvency the alleged there is no irreparable harm because it's still a financial asset and there has been no finding that he can't otherwise pay even worth the corporate assets and the important thing to look at there is the franz case in the franz case the real estate that was an issue was undisputedly a partnership asset undisputedly a partnership asset yes the court would not enter the appellate court reversed the trial court's injunction using the reasoning the trail court would used the reasoning well the lots are sold there's going to be a depletion of the partnership assets the appellate court says the second district said look even though they're partnership assets it doesn't matter because it's still just the financial interest that they're trying to vindicate and there's an adequate remedy at law for that and so this is kind of a sheldon they say oh it's a corporate asset therefore you put the junction on it when you say no it's our asset of course that's the final question at trial that's the final question of trial but more importantly whether it is a corporate asset whether it is rooksbys assets it's a financial harm and they have an adequate remedy of law and that's why the attachment law doesn't require that it be your property it requires that you be in possession of the property as we were we were in control of the of the monies we had made the sales we were in controlling that was deprived by this injunction and so the question of whose it is is not really the question for the injunction the question is is there an adequate remedy at law to vindicate the alleged wrong and here is counseling and make sure i'm correct on this you're you're appealing both the paragraphs that b and c b is a don't dissipate otherwise being fifty of the net sale proceeds paid to your client and c is deposit one half of the net proceeds didn't use fifty that said one half we're talking about the same money i was like well don't dissipate but i'm going to go further than that the court's saying i want you to deposit the ten thousand in the bank i believe i think he was there's net sale proceeds and i believe fifty he's ordered not to dissipate and fifty he's told to put in trust well and later the judge said ten thousand ten thousand is in trust but still a dispute about whether or not that is actually half of what's left i guess isn't there i mean i assume the plaintiff's claiming you know there ought to be more than that left or i suppose they're not bound by the counsel said that in the argument my question is is the fifty of the net sale proceeds referenced in paragraph b the same amount as referenced in paragraph c which is to be deposited in the trust i believe so i believe so i'd have to i'd have to i'd have to double check the record on that one all right please proceed okay and there was a lot of thought about the standard or you being discretion well in the franz case again the case that reads right in this case the standard review was abusive discretion for enjoining the sale of those slots and the court held yes it's an abuse of discretion when the person pays your sentence it is a abuse of discretion when a person has an adequate remedy at law to enjoy the sale thank you counsel thank both of you for your brief your arguments we'll take this case under