FIFTH SECTION

CASE OF KOSMATSKA v. UKRAINE

(Application no. 9953/16)

JUDGMENT

Art 1 P1 • Peaceful enjoyment of possessions • Invalidation of the applicant’s title to plot of land, bought from private persons who had acquired the land from the State, as a result of the prosecutor’s action to have that land returned to the State, without compensation • Serious doubts as to lawfulness and legitimate aim of interference • Requiring the applicant to claim compensation from the sellers not justified in terms of the requisite proportionality of the interference • 2025 amendments to the domestic law providing for State compensation not applicable to the applicant’s case • Disproportionate burden imposed

Art 46 • Execution of judgment • Individual measures • Respondent State to ensure full restitution of applicant’s title to reclaimed land, or provision of monetary compensation or title to comparable property

Prepared by the Registry. Does not bind the Court.

STRASBOURG

4 December 2025

FINAL

04/03/2026

This judgment has become final under Article 44 § 2 of the Convention.
It may be subject to editorial revision.

In the case of Kosmatska v. Ukraine,

The European Court of Human Rights (Fifth Section), sitting as a Chamber composed of:

Kateřina Šimáčková, President,
Georgios A. Serghides,
Gilberto Felici,
Andreas Zünd,
Mykola Gnatovskyy,
Vahe Grigoryan,
Sébastien Biancheri, judges,
and Victor Soloveytchik, Section Registrar,

Having regard to:

the application (no. 9953/16) against Ukraine lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by a Ukrainian national, Ms Natalya Valeriyivna Kosmatska (“the applicant”), on 12 February 2016;

the decision to give notice to the Ukrainian Government (“the Government”);

the parties’ observations;

Having deliberated in private on 12 November 2025,

Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:

INTRODUCTION

1. The application concerns the applicant’s deprivation of a plot of land, which she had purchased from private persons, as a result of the courts’ judgments granting the prosecutor’s action to have the land returned to the State. The applicant relied on Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention.

THE FACTS

2. The applicant was born in 1977 and lives in Hatne, Kyiv region. The applicant was represented by Ms A.B. Kulchytska, a lawyer practising in Kyiv.

3. The Government were represented by their Agent, Ms M. Sokorenko.

4. The facts of the case may be summarised as follows.

Initial allocation of land

5. By several decisions adopted in April 2008, the Borodyanka District State Administration of Kyiv Region (“the Borodyanka DSA”) allocated plots of land of 2 hectares (ha) each by way of privatisation to 109 individuals for individual farming. The land was located near the village of Maidanivka. In July 2008 the persons concerned obtained titles to the land.

6. In October 2008, 14 individuals sold their plots of land to the applicant, who, two months later, obtained ownership documents to a consolidated plot of land measuring 28 ha. No copies of contracts of sale were provided to the Court. The applicant alleged that she had paid a total of 3,029,145 Ukrainian hryvnias (UAH; equivalent to approximately 436,000 euros (EUR) at the material time).

7. On an unknown date in 2008 a local prosecutor enquired into the allocation of land in issue. The Court was not provided with the materials of that enquiry, but it appears from other documents available in the file that it was established that some of the individuals to whom the land had been allocated had never applied to the Borodyanka DSA in view of the privatisation of the land or had lost their passports and/or other identity documents around the same period. Those facts pointed to the possibility that third persons, motivated by personal gain, might have exploited the situation.

8. On 21 October 2010, following an action by the prosecutor based on the results of the above-mentioned enquiry, the Kyiv Administrative Court of Appeal overturned the 2008 decisions of the Borodyanka DSA on the allocation of the land. The court essentially referred to the findings of the prosecutor. It mentioned in the judgment that “some” of the 109 individuals had never applied for the privatisation of the land, but did not state exactly who those persons were, how many of those 109 persons had not applied or whether such situation required that impugned decisions of the Borodyanka DSA be overturned in full. The judgment was not appealed against and became final. The individuals concerned were not involved in those proceedings.

Invalidation of the applicant’s title to the land

9. In November 2013 the prosecutor conducted another enquiry into the allocation of the land by the Borodyanka DSA and its further transfer to the applicant. The relevant resolution ordering the enquiry stated that it had been necessitated by the fact that “during the initial enquiry and court proceedings it had not been established that ownership documents had been issued to [the] private persons [involved]” and that after the 2008 decisions of the Borodyanka DSA had been overturned, the land plots in question had not been returned to the Maidanivka Village Council. That indicated that there might have been further violations of land legislation.

10. From the documents available, it also appears that in December 2013 a criminal case was initiated in relation to the allocation of land in question, which was classified as fraud.

11. No materials relating to the outcome of the above-mentioned 2013 enquiry or the criminal case (particularly, whether any person was a suspect or charged in that case and what its outcome was) have been provided to the Court.

12. It appears that, following the above-mentioned enquiry, the prosecutor brought separate actions against the persons who had obtained land in 2008, seeking the invalidation of their titles, including those persons who had sold their plots of land to the applicant. The relevant court decisions invalidating the titles were delivered between February and May 2014; they were rather brief and contained standard wording, referring essentially to the judgment of 21 October 2010 (see paragraph 8 above).

13. In April 2014 the prosecutor brought an action against the applicant to have her title to the 28 ha-plot of land invalidated and to have that land reclaimed in favour of the State. He relied on, inter alia, Articles 387 and 388 of the Civil Code (see paragraph 19 below) and referred to the previous proceedings leading to the 2008 decisions of the Borodyanka DSA being overturned and to the proceedings leading to the invalidation of the initial owners’ titles (see paragraphs 8 and 12 above). The prosecutor reiterated that during the 2008 enquiry and the 2010 court proceedings it had not been known that ownership documents had been issued to private persons.

14. In her comments to that action, the applicant argued that the prosecutor had missed the three-year limitation period, as he must have been aware of the alleged violations regarding the acquisition of the land in question well before April 2014. In particular, she argued that the prosecutor must already have known of the alleged violations in October 2010, when the court had overturned the 2008 decisions of the Borodyanka DSA. The applicant also argued that she was a bona fide owner of the land, which could not, therefore, be reclaimed from her, and that none of the grounds established in Article 140 of the Land Code (see paragraph 22 below) as grounds for termination of property rights to land were applicable in her case.

15. The prosecutor’s claims were granted by the courts at three levels of jurisdiction, with the final judgment delivered by the Higher Specialised Civil and Criminal Court on 12 August 2015. The courts essentially found that previous proceedings resulting in the 2008 decisions of the Borodyanka DSA being overturned and the invalidation of the initial owners’ titles had shown that the land had left the possession of the State unlawfully and that it could be reclaimed on the basis of Articles 387 and 388 § 3 of the Civil Code of Ukraine. The courts also dismissed the applicant’s arguments regarding the limitation period as ill-founded, considering that the prosecutor had only found out about the unlawfulness of the acquisition of the land in 2013 as a result of the second enquiry.

Other related facts

16. In her subsequent submissions to the Court, the applicant stated that another set of proceedings had been initiated by the prosecutor against her (a rei vindicatio claim) in respect of the acquisition of yet other plots of land. In a judgment delivered by the Supreme Court on 13 November 2019 (case no. 360/625/16-ц), the prosecutor’s claims had been rejected, as he had missed the three-year limitation period which had had to be calculated from the moment the prosecutor had conducted the enquiry in 2008. The court also noted that there had been no evidence that the applicant had had anything to do with the adoption of the Borodyanka DSA’s decisions of 2008 and that her title had been duly registered at the time.

17. The applicant also asserted that in 2020 the prosecutor had initiated another set of proceedings relating to those plots of land, this time seeking the removal of obstacles to the use of the land (negatory claim). His action had been rejected by the local court, as a negatory claim had been an incorrect remedy in the circumstances and the correct remedy – the rei vindicatio claim – had already been used. Appeal proceedings were pending.

RELEVANT LEGAL FRAMEWORK

I. Constitution of Ukraine

18. The relevant provisions of the Constitution of Ukraine read as follows:

Article 13

“The land, its subsoil, atmospheric air, water and other natural resources located within the territory of Ukraine, the natural resources of its continental shelf and exclusive (marine) economic zone are objects of property rights of the Ukrainian people. On behalf of the Ukrainian people, the owner’s rights are exercised by State authorities and local self-government bodies within the limits determined by this Constitution.

Every citizen has the right to use natural objects of property rights of the people in accordance with the law. ...”

Article 14

“The land is the main national asset and falls under special protection of the State. The right of ownership of land is guaranteed. This right shall be acquired and enjoyed by the citizens, legal entities, and the State exclusively in accordance with the law.

...”

Article 56

“Everyone has the right to compensation, at the expense of the State or bodies of local self-government, for material and non-pecuniary damages inflicted by unlawful decisions, actions or omission of bodies of State power, bodies of local self‑government, their officials and officers during the exercise of their authority.”

II.Civil Code of Ukraine (2003)

19. The relevant provisions of the Civil Code, as in force at the material time, read as follows:

Article 216. Legal consequences of the invalidity of a deed

“1. An invalid deed does not entail legal consequences other than those related to its invalidity.

2. In the event of the invalidity of a deed, each party shall return in kind to the other party everything that it has acquired by way of the deed or, if that is impossible because, for instance, the acquisition consists in the use of property, the performance of works or the provision of services, to reimburse the value of the acquired benefit at the market rate at the time of reimbursement ...”

...

Article 387. The owner’s right to reclaim property from someone else’s unlawful possession

“1. The owner has the right to reclaim his or her property from a person who unlawfully, without appropriate legal grounds, took possession of it.”

Article 388. The owner’s right to reclaim property from a bona fide acquirer

“1. If property was purchased under a contract from a person who did not have the right to alienate it, of which the acquirer did not know and could not have known (bona fide acquirer), the owner has the right to reclaim the property from the acquirer only if the property:

(1) was lost by the owner or the person into whose possession the owner had transferred it;

(2) was stolen from the owner or the person into whose possession the owner had transferred it;

(3) left the possession of the owner or the person into whose possession the owner had transferred it, not by their will, but in some other way.

2. Property may not be reclaimed from a bona fide acquirer if it was sold in accordance with the procedure established for the execution of court decisions.

3. If property was acquired free of charge from a person who did not have the right to alienate it, the owner has the right to claim it from the bona fide acquirer in all circumstances.

...”

Article 390. Settlement of financial claims related to reclaiming property from unlawful possession

“...

3. A bona fide or a mala fide acquirer shall have the right to claim from the owner the reimbursement of expenses necessary for the maintenance and preservation of the property [while it was in his or her possession] as of the moment the owner acquired the right to return the property or the transfer of the profits.

4. A bona fide acquirer shall have the right to retain the improvements made by him or her to the property if they can be separated from the property without damaging it. If the improvements cannot be separated from the property, a bona fide acquirer shall have a right to reimbursement of the relevant expenses in the amount by which the value of the property increased.”

...

Article 661. Liability of the seller in cases of seizure of goods from the buyer

“1. In the event of seizure of goods from a buyer on a court decision in favour of a third party on grounds that arose before the sale of the goods, the seller must compensate the buyer for the losses caused, provided that the buyer did not know or could not have known about the existence of those grounds.

2. A deed exempting or limiting the seller’s liability in the event goods are reclaimed from the buyer by a third party is null and void.

...”

Article 1173. Compensation for damage caused by a State authority, an authority of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea or a local self-government authority

“1. Damage caused to an individual or a legal entity by unlawful decisions, actions or omissions of State authorities, authorities of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea or local self-government authorities in the exercise of their powers shall be compensated for by the [relevant] State, the Autonomous Republic of Crimea or local self‑government body, irrespective of whether the body was at fault.”

20. On 12 March 2025 the Parliament of Ukraine adopted a law (Law no. 4292-IX) which introduced amendments to the Civil Code and to the Civil and Commercial Codes of Procedure aimed at protecting bona fide owners. The law came into force on 9 April 2025.

21. The amendments provide for a special ten-year limitation period to submit an action to reclaim property previously owned by the State or local authorities, to be calculated from the date that property left the possession of the State or the local authorities (as compared to the general three-year limitation period calculated as of the date when a person concerned got to know about the violation of his or her property rights). The amendments also stipulate that compensation for the value of a property, the amount of which shall be established according to the domestic property valuation procedures, is to be provided to the person from whom the property is being reclaimed by the State. The latter requirement is ensured by way of obliging the authorities, when bringing a relevant action in the courts, to transfer the value of the property into the court’s special account. Failure to comply with that requirement means that such action is left without consideration and returned to the claimant. The amendments introduced by Law no. 4292-IX apply “in the future”, with retroactive effect only for the relevant cases pending before the first-instance courts. After the property is reclaimed in favour of the State and its value paid to the former private power, the State (or local authorities) obtains the right to bring claims for the recovery of the amounts paid from the person whose actions had led to the property leaving the State’s possession.

LAND CODE (2002)

22. The relevant parts of the Land Code of Ukraine, as in force at the material time, read as follows:

Article 125. Emergence of the right to a plot of land

“The right of ownership over a plot of land, as well as the right of permanent use and the right to lease a plot of land, arise from the moment of the State registration of these rights.

...”

Article 140. Grounds for termination of ownership of a plot of land

“Ownership over a plot of land can be terminated on the following grounds:

(a) a voluntary waiver by the owner of the right to the plot of land;

(b) the death of the owner of the plot of land in the absence of an heir;

(c) the alienation of the plot of land by a decision of the owner;

(d) foreclosure on a plot of land at the request of a creditor;

(e) the alienation of a plot of land for reasons of public necessity or for public needs;

(f) confiscation ordered by a decision of a court;

(g) the non-alienation of the plot of land by foreigners and stateless persons within the prescribed period in circumstances specified by this Code.”.

THE LAW

ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 1 of protocol nO. 1 to THE CONVENTION

23. The applicant complained that her deprivation of property had been unlawful and disproportionate, as she had not been provided with any compensation. She also complained that the domestic courts had failed to apply the statutory limitation period in respect of the prosecutor’s action against her. She relied on Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention, which reads as follows:

“Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of international law.

The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties.”

Admissibility

24. The Government submitted that the applicant had failed to exhaust domestic remedies, as she had never lodged with the domestic courts either a claim (1) for damages against the State under Article 56 of the Constitution of Ukraine, or (2) for damages against the sellers to have the amount she had paid for the land reimbursed under Article 216 of the Civil Code, or (3) for compensation equal to the value of any investments made or costs for the maintenance of the property under Article 390 of the Civil Code. They provided examples of the domestic courts’ relevant case-law.

25. In connection with the need to exhaust a particular remedy the applicant emphasised, relying on Batkivska Turbota Foundation v. Ukraine (no. 5876/15, § 47, 9 October 2018) in which the Court noted that a remedy that could not lead to the reinstatement of title was not required to be pursued for the purposes of Article 35 § 1, that she had exhausted the available domestic remedies. The applicant also disputed the effectiveness of the remedies proposed by the Government. In particular, she asserted that Article 390 had been intended to compensate for investments made in the property or for its maintenance but not its value as such.

26. The Court notes that the applicant exhausted the appeals available to her against the judgment invalidating her title to the land in issue arguing, as she does before the Court, that the invalidation was unlawful and unjustified (see paragraph 15 above). In these circumstances, the question of any possibility for the applicant to obtain damages after the invalidation of her title does not concern the exhaustion of domestic remedies, but the assessment of the consequences of the interference and, therefore, its proportionality, as well as the calculation of pecuniary damage if a violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention is found. The Court therefore rejects the Government’s preliminary objection and will examine the issue of compensation under the proportionality analysis below (ibid., § 47 in fine).

27. The Court notes that the application is neither manifestly ill-founded nor inadmissible on any other grounds listed in Article 35 of the Convention. It must therefore be declared admissible.

Merits

The parties’ submissions

28. The applicant submitted that the interference in issue had not been in accordance with the law, as, in their judgments, the courts had referred to Article 388 § 3 of the Civil Code, which had related to situations where property was reclaimed from a person who had obtained it free of charge, which had not been the applicant’s situation, as she had paid for the land. Otherwise, Article 388 had allowed for the reclaiming of property from a bona fide owner only if it had left the owner’s possession “against his or her will”. In her case, the land had been allocated into private hands by an authority empowered to dispose of land within the privatisation procedure, that is, the authorities had had all the information about such transfer of land and had intended to do so.

29. As regards the lawfulness criteria, the applicant further argued that the courts had failed to duly assess the application of the limitation period, which, in her view, should have been calculated at the latest from 21 October 2010, the date of the delivery of the Kyiv Administrative Court of Appeal’s judgment, which had overturned the Borodyanka DSA’s 2008 decision on the allocation of land (if not from the prosecutor’s initial enquiry of 2008, when he must have learned about the entirety of events around the transfer of land in question). In that context, the applicant emphasised that the subsequent proceedings in respect of her other plots of land (see paragraph 16 above) proved that the domestic courts had considered 2008 as the correct start date for the calculation of the three-year limitation period.

30. In view of the circumstances above, the applicant asserted that the lawfulness criteria had not been met in her case.

31. As regards interference being in the public interest, the applicant noted that neither during the domestic proceedings nor before the Court had it been explained, with due precision, what exactly had been the public interest pursued by the interference in question. She considered the Government’s arguments in that regard too general. The applicant also noted that she had still been indicated as the owner of the land in question in the relevant State register and that the land had not been used by the State or “anyone else”.

32. Lastly, as to proportionality, the applicant noted that she had been deprived of her property without any compensation and, as the land had been reclaimed by the State, it had been the State which had had to provide such compensation and not the previous private owners.

33. The Government conceded that there has been an interference with the applicant’s property rights. They considered, however, that it had met the criteria set out in the second paragraph of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. As to lawfulness, they argued that the domestic legislation provided for the possibility of reclaiming property from a person who had acquired it unlawfully, as had been the circumstance in the present case. They did not mention any specific legal provisions in that respect.

34. As to public interest, the Government submitted that the reclaiming of land had been in the interest of the rule of law and society as a whole, as, under the Ukrainian Constitution, land was the property of the people of Ukraine. As regards proportionality, the Government maintained their position as to the possibility for the applicant to claim compensation as described above under the admissibility head (see paragraph 24 above).

The Court’s assessment

35. The Court considers that there was, in the present case, an interference with the applicant’s possessions considering that her title was invalidated by a final court decision. The fact she has, apparently, remained a registered owner of the land in issue does not affect the above conclusion since such registration without proper legal basis cannot be considered as bestowing any property rights. Whether that interference is seen as deprivation or control of the use of property, the applicable principles remain the same (see, for example, Ünsped Paket Servisi SaN. Ve TiC. A.Ş. v. Bulgaria, no. 3503/08, §§ 39-40, 13 October 2015, and Kryvenkyy v. Ukraine, no. 43768/07, §§ 41‑42 and § 45, 16 February 2017). The Court will therefore consider whether that interference was lawful, pursued a public interest and was proportionate.

36. On the issue of lawfulness, the Court observes that when submitting his action in 2014, the prosecutor relied on Articles 387 and 388 of the Civil Code without specifying any sections thereof. In their judgments, the domestic courts referred to Article 387 and, explicitly, to Article 388 § 3 as grounds for the granting of the prosecutor’s claim to invalidate the applicant’s title to the land (see paragraph 15 above).

37. As to the former provision, which referred to situations of unlawful acquisition of property, the Court notes that it is undisputed that the applicant acquired the land in question under several contracts of sale and had her title to the consolidated plot of land registered by the competent authorities. The Court is mindful of the particular situation around the purchase of the land by the applicant as, apparently, she acquired, at around the same time, a considerable number of smaller plots of land in the same locality and later formed several larger plots from them (see paragraphs 6 and 16 above). While it is true that, according to the prosecutor’s version of events, some of the initial owners had never themselves applied to the authorities to privatise land and third parties had acted fraudulently in representing them, in the absence of a finding in that respect by a competent domestic court or other conclusive information and documents, the Court cannot speculate on whether the applicant should have been aware of the related irregularities when purchasing the land in issue (contrast Vasylevska v. Ukraine (dec.), no. 37919/15, § 20, 4 July 2024). Furthermore, at no point in time did the domestic authorities involved consider that the applicant was acting mala fide or might herself have been involved in any misdeeds (see Beinarovič and Others v. Lithuania, nos. 70520/10 and 2 others, § 144, 12 June 2018, and Nadtochiy v. Ukraine [Committee], no. 32899/13, §§ 5 and 12, 20 September 2022). In that connection the Court notes the Supreme Court’s conclusions in the case no. 360/625/16-ц (see paragraph 16 above) concerning the applicant’s other plots of land to the effect that the applicant had had nothing to do with the unlawfulness of the initial allocation of land in 2008. Neither did the Government suggest that the applicant was somehow implicated in the situation around the allocation of the land in question. In view of those facts, it appears that the grounds for the applicability of Article 387 of the Civil Code in such a case were manifestly lacking.

38. As regards Article 388 § 3, which related to the reclaiming of property from a bona fide acquirer who had obtained that property free of charge from a person who had not had the right to alienate it, the Court agrees with the applicant’s argument that its applicability was equally manifestly questionable, as the applicant clearly acquired the land in question under contracts of sale, that is, not free of charge, as that provision specifies. No other sections of that Article which might have served as grounds to invalidate the applicant’s title were mentioned by the domestic courts.

39. In that connection, the Court also notes that during the domestic proceedings, the applicant argued that none of the grounds for termination of a property right in respect of land, as provided for in an exhaustive manner in Article 140 of the Land Code, had applied in her case (see paragraphs 14 and 22 above). It appears that that argument was left by the courts without any reply whatsoever. The Government have also not provided any explanations in that regard. The Court observes that it has already dealt with a similar situation in Drozdyk and Mikula v. Ukraine (nos. 27849/15 and 33358/15, §§ 44 and 47, 24 October 2024) and that argument was one of the reasons to doubt the lawfulness of the interference with the applicants’ rights in that case.

40. Furthermore, yet another element that must not be overlooked in the present case is the application of the statutory limitation period. It was not disputed by the parties that the statutory limitation period was three years, which had to be calculated as of the date on which a person or an institution (in this case, the prosecutor) learned or must have learned about the violations alleged. The prosecutor asserted, and the domestic courts agreed, that the starting date was in 2013, when the prosecutor had conducted the second enquiry into the allocation of the land by the Borodyanka DSA (see paragraph 15 above). The Court notes that the resolution ordering that enquiry stated that it was necessary as during the initial enquiry and court proceedings, that is in 2008 and 2010, it was not established that land ownership documents had been issued to private persons, although such documents were issued shortly after the adoption of the decisions on allocation of land (July and December 2008; see paragraphs 5 and 6 above). In that connection the Court also cannot overlook the fact that in subsequent proceedings, initiated by the prosecutor against the applicant in relation to other plots of land, the courts rejected the prosecutor’s action, finding that he had missed the limitation period which had to be calculated from 2008 (see paragraph 16 above).

41. The Court is mindful that it is not its task to take the place of the domestic courts in interpreting domestic legislation, but it considers that the approach adopted by the courts in the present case as regards the application of the statutory limitation period raises doubts as to its reasonableness and compatibility with the principle of legal certainty (see Kurşun v. Turkey, no. 22677/10, §§ 103-4, 30 October 2018, and, for a recent example, Guminskyy v. Ukraine [Committee], no. 7210/15, §§ 20-23, 11 September 2025).

42. As to the question of legitimate aim, it is beyond doubt that recovering by the State of its title to the land alienated unlawfully can be a justified ground for deprivation of property and that the proper management of land which serves the interests of society and the particular local community concerned is an aim in the public interest within the meaning of the second paragraph of Article 1 of Protocol no. 1 (see Ibrahimbeyov and Others v. Azerbaijan, no. 32380/13, § 48, 16 February 2023). However, in the light of the above mentioned serious doubts regarding the lawfulness of the interference in issue, the existence of an actual public interest capable of justifying the annulment of the applicant’s title also appears in doubt. Nevertheless, the Court considers it unnecessary to rule on those matters as the interference is in any case disproportionate for the reasons stated below (see, mutatis mutandis, Batkivska Turbota Foundation, cited above, §§ 57 and 62, and Drozdyk and Mikula, cited above, § 47).

43. As to proportionality, the Court reiterates that Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 requires of any interference that there should be a reasonable relationship of proportionality between the means employed and the aim pursued. This fair balance will be upset if the person concerned had to bear an individual and excessive burden. In this context, the Court has on many occasions emphasised the particular importance of the principle of “good governance”. That principle should not, as a general rule, prevent the authorities from correcting occasional mistakes, even those resulting from their own negligence. However, the need to correct an old “wrong” should not disproportionately interfere with a new right which has been acquired by an individual relying in good faith on the legitimacy of the public authority’s action. The risk of any mistake made by the State authority must be borne by the State itself and the errors must not be remedied at the expense of the individuals concerned. In the context of revoking ownership of a property that has been transferred erroneously, the “good governance principle” may not only impose on the authorities an obligation to act promptly in correcting their mistake but may also necessitate the payment of adequate compensation or some other type of appropriate reparation to its former bona fide holder. In making its assessment as to whether adequate compensation was available to an applicant, the Court must have regard to the circumstances of each case, including the amounts received and losses incurred and, as the case may be, the availability of compensation and the practical realities in which the applicant found himself or herself (see, for example, Maksymenko and Gerasymenko v. Ukraine, no. 49317/07, § 64, 16 May 2013, and the case-law cited therein). In that context, the Court has previously taken account of, inter alia, the possibility for applicants to claim compensation, obtain alternative property or make use of other forms of redress (see, for example, Gladysheva v. Russia, no. 7097/10, §§ 80-81, 6 December 2011, and Bērziņš and Others v. Latvia, no. 73105/12, §§ 99-106, 21 September 2021).

44. In that connection, the Court notes the Government’s argument that the applicant could have sued the sellers of the property in question, under the provisions of the Civil Code pertaining to the invalidity of deeds (see Articles 216 and 661 of the Civil Code as cited in paragraph 19 above), to recover the money she had paid for it.

45. The Court notes in that connection that, where domestic law so requires, applicants may be obliged either to initiate separate proceedings in order to obtain compensation for property lost as a result of the authorities’ mistake, or to demonstrate that an obstacle existed which prevented substantiated claims from being lodged or from succeeding (see, for recent examples, Lidiya Nikitina v. Russia, no. 8051/20, §§ 36-40, 15 March 2022; Ibrahimbeyov and Others, cited above, §§ 55-59; and, mutatis mutandis, Tverdokhlebova v. Ukraine, no. 15830/16, §§ 44-48, 16 January 2025).

46. At the same time, in Gladysheva (cited above), the Court found that a requirement to bring separate compensation proceedings against former owners was too formalistic and an excessive burden on the applicant. In that case the applicant had been stripped of ownership of a flat, which had left the State’s possession in a fraudulent manner and which the applicant had purchased from yet another person. She had not been provided with any compensation and had had no prospect of receiving replacement housing from the State. The Court considered that requiring the applicant to sue the seller of the property in question for damages would be tantamount to suggesting that the applicant pass her excessive individual burden on to another bona fide individual buyer. In such a situation, it was hard for the Court to see how that would improve the balance between the public interest and the need to protect individuals’ rights (see Gladysheva, cited above, §§ 80-83).

47. The Court notes that the situation in the present case is similar to that in Gladysheva, as, having regard to the prosecutor’s version of the events (albeit not established in any final judgments, according to the information submitted to the Court), the plots of land in question had initially left the State’s possession in a fraudulent manner adversely affecting not only the applicant, as the last bona fide owner, but also possibly the persons in whose name the land had been initially privatised. In such circumstances, it was in the first place for the State to ensure compliance with the existing procedure of privatisation of land (see, Gladysheva, cited above, §§ 57 and 78-79) and later, when possible misdeeds were discovered – to ensure that those responsible are held to account, including regarding possible civil liability for the losses sustained by the State. The Court considers that where no effective steps in that direction have been undertaken, as it apparently happened in the present case, with the consequence that the last bona fide owner would in all likelihood be unable to identify those ultimately responsible in order to obtain compensation from them, there arise doubts as to the proportionality of the State interference with the bona fide owner’s property rights. Furthermore, the prospect of the applicant securing full compensation with reasonable celerity by bringing an action against the sellers – about whose identity and role apparently also existed doubts – was likewise remote and highly uncertain.

48. On the basis of the above, the Court does not consider it justified in terms of the requisite proportionality of the interference and the need to maintain a fair balance between the interests at stake, to require the applicant to sue the initial owners of the land in question in order to obtain compensation. It follows that the interference with the applicant’s property rights cannot be said to have been a proportionate measure.

49. The Court notes, in addition, that the Ukrainian legislator, through the 2025 amendments to the Civil Code, which are aimed at protecting the rights of bona fide owners (see paragraphs 20-21 above), essentially acknowledged that in the event of the reclamation of property from such owners, it is the State which must bear the consequences, particularly financial ones. That is made clear by the requirement to ensure, at the time of submission of a rei vindicatio claim, the availability of funds to be awarded as compensation to the person concerned should that claim be granted. Furthermore, those amendments seem not to differentiate between the ways a property was acquired by the last (or the only) owner – either directly from the State (by way of privatisation) or through another transaction, such as a sale. What is important is that the property in question initially belonged to the State (or the local authorities) and that the last owner is a bona fide acquirer. It is true that the new legislation cannot remedy the present applicant’s situation, as it only applies to future cases (with retroactive effect only for cases pending before the first-instance courts), but the Court considers that that approach is indicative of the legislator’s view on the manner of resolving the kind of intricate situations that are at stake in the present case.

50. Lastly, as to the Government’s argument that the applicant could have claimed, under Article 390 of the Civil Code, compensation for the value of any investments made or cost of maintenance of the property incurred, the Court notes that, even assuming that that avenue was available in practice and effective, it was not intended to compensate for the loss of the property as such.

51. In view of the considerations above, the Court concludes that the interference with the applicant’s property rights, apart from raising doubts as to its lawfulness, imposed a disproportionate burden on her. There has, accordingly, been a violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention.

APPLICATION OF ARTICLEs 41 and 46 OF THE CONVENTION

52. Article 41 of the Convention provides:

“If the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.”

53. Article 46 of the Convention, in so far as relevant, provides:

“1. The High Contracting Parties undertake to abide by the final judgment of the Court in any case to which they are parties.

2. The final judgment of the Court shall be transmitted to the Committee of Ministers, which shall supervise its execution.”

54. The applicant claimed just satisfaction in the form of either the restitution of land or the provision of monetary compensation. The latter amounted, in her view, to 11,360,808.33 Ukrainian hryvnias (UAH; equivalent to approximately 279,300 euros (EUR) at the time of the submission of the applicant’s just satisfaction claim), comprising the total value of 14 plots of land (UAH 3,029,145), “inflation losses” for the period from 2014 to 2023 (UAH 7,491,075.59) and “a 3% interest rate” for the same period (UAH 840,587.74). In support she provided a valuation report of 11 January 2024 prepared by an expert.

55. The Government contested those claims, reiterating their position that the application was inadmissible or that there had been no violation of the applicants’ rights and that the applicant might still sue the sellers for the price paid and for damages.

56. Regarding the Government’s latter argument, the Court observes that, apparently, no such proceedings have been initiated by the applicant. Even assuming that this can still be done despite the passage of time, the Court, having regard to the contractual basis of the potential claims in issue, does not consider that the availability of such proceedings equates availability of “reparation” within the meaning of Article 41 of the Convention, with the effect that an award of just satisfaction by the Court might not be considered appropriate or necessary. The Court further considers that the Government have not claimed that it would be impossible for the domestic courts, if deciding on a claim by the applicant against the sellers in future, to take into account the award made by the Court in respect of pecuniary damage in this judgment. The Court will therefore proceed to examine the applicant’s claim for just satisfaction.

57. The Court found in the present case that the invalidation of the applicant’s title to 28 ha of land without compensation was a disproportionate measure. It therefore considers that there is a direct causal link between the violation found and the applicant’s claim for the value of property. Regarding the remainder of her claims for pecuniary damage, the Court does not see any causal connection between the established violation and the “inflation” or “interest” claimed, considering also that the applicant failed to explain those claims.

58. As regards Article 46 §§ 1 and 2 of the Convention, the Court reiterates that a judgment in which it finds a violation of the Convention or its Protocols imposes on the respondent State a duty to choose, subject to supervision by the Committee of Ministers, the general and/or, if appropriate, individual measures to be taken in its domestic legal order to end the violation and make all feasible reparation for its consequences by restoring as far as possible the situation which would have existed if it had not taken place. Furthermore, it follows from the Convention, in particular from Article 1, that in ratifying the Convention and its Protocols the Contracting States undertake to ensure that their domestic law is compatible with them (see, among other authorities, Centre for Legal Resources on behalf of Valentin Câmpeanu v. Romania [GC], no. 47848/08, §§ 158-59, ECHR 2014; Yuriy Nikolayevich Ivanov v. Ukraine, no. 40450/04, § 78, 15 October 2009; and Broniowski v. Poland [GC], no. 31443/96, § 194, ECHR 2004-V). However, in certain special circumstances the Court has found it useful to indicate to a respondent State the type of measure – individual and/or general – that might be taken to put an end to the situation which has given rise to the finding of a violation (see, for example, Broniowski, § 194, cited above).

59. Having due regard to its findings in the present case (see paragraph 48 above), the Court considers that the applicant should be placed as far as possible in a situation equivalent to the one in which she would have been had there not been a breach of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention by means of full restitution of the applicant’s title to the reclaimed land (by way of reopening the domestic proceedings, if applicable, or by other means). Failing that, the respondent State must provide monetary compensation (calculated in accordance with the domestic requirements on the valuation of property and the Court’s practice), or title to comparable property (see, Molla Sali v. Greece (just satisfaction) [GC], no. 20452/14, § 32, 18 June 2020; Drozdyk and Mikula, § 62, and Gladysheva, § 106, both cited above).

60. The applicant has not claimed non-pecuniary damages or costs and expenses. The Court therefore makes no award under those heads.

FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT, UNANIMOUSLY,

Declares the application admissible;
Holds that there has been a violation of Article 1 of Protocol No.1 to the Convention;
Holds that the respondent State shall ensure, by appropriate means and within a reasonable time, full restitution of the applicant’s title to the reclaimed land, or provision of monetary compensation or of comparable property to the applicant.
Dismisses the remainder of the applicant’s claims for just satisfaction.

Done in English, and notified in writing on 4 December 2025, pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.

Victor Soloveytchik Kateřina Šimáčková
Registrar President