中华人民共和国(PRC)是一个集权国家，中国共产党（CCP）拥有至高无上的权威。政府及安全机构的所有最高层职务几乎都由共产党员担任。最高权力掌握在由25人组成的中共中央政治局以及由7名成员组成的政治局常务委员会手中。习近平仍然身居三个最重要的职位，即中国共产党总书记、国家主席以及中央军委主席。
 
国内主要的安全机构包括国家安全部、公安部以及人民武装警察。人民武装警察仍然受到中共中央委员会和中央军事委员会的双重管辖。人民解放军主要负责外部安全，但也承担一些国内安全责任。地方辖区往往使用平民市政安全部队，即“城市管理”人员，以推行行政措施。文职政府对安全部队保持有效的控制。
 
在这一年中，政府在新疆维吾尔自治区（新疆）继续对穆斯林少数民族人员展开大规模的拘押。据报当局将100多万维吾尔人、哈萨克人、吉尔吉斯人和其他穆斯林人士任意拘押在司法程序以外的集中营中，意图消除其宗教和民族身份特征。中国政府官员以打击恐怖主义、分裂主义和极端主义为借口来说明那些集中营正当性。国际媒体、人权组织和曾被拘留的人员报告说，安全官员在这些集中营中虐待、折磨和杀害被拘押者。被国际媒体发布出来的政府文件证实了该行动的强制性及其对新疆和国外的穆斯林少数民族成员造成的影响。
 
重大的人权问题包括：被政府任意或非法杀害；被政府强迫失踪；被政府实施酷刑；被政府任意拘押；严酷并且威及生命的监狱和拘留条件；政治犯；任意干涉隐私；司法独立方面的重大问题；对记者、律师、作家、博客作者、异见人士、上访者、其他人员以及他们的家人进行暴力攻击和刑事起诉；信息审查和屏蔽网站；干扰和平集会及结社自由的权利，包括施加于外国和国内非政府组织（NGO）的过度限制性的法律；对宗教自由的严厉限制；对行动自由的严厉限制（在国内和出国旅行）；遣返有充分理由担心会遭到迫害的寻求庇护的朝鲜人；公民无权选择自己的政府；腐败；在某些情况下包括强迫绝育或堕胎在内的强制生育限制政策；人口贩运；对劳工权利的严厉限制，包括禁止工人自行组织或选择参加的工会；以及童工。
 
官方对西藏自治区和其他藏族区域以及新疆主要是维吾尔族和其他少数民族的言论、宗教、迁徙、结社和集会自由的压制比对国内其他地区更为严厉。但是这种镇压在全国都在发生，对秋雨圣约教会领袖王怡牧师的镇压就是一个例子，他在一次未经宣布、没有律师到场的不公开审判中被指控“煽动颠覆国家政权”并被定罪。当局判他9年徒刑。
 
共产党继续主宰司法，控制着对所有法官的任命权，并对某些案件的判决直接作出指示。当局骚扰、关押并逮捕独立倡导打击滥用职权的公民。
 
在缺乏可靠数据的情况下很难确定国内安全机构逍遥法外的程度。当局往往在收到警方杀人案件的报告之后宣布展开调查。但是，尚不清楚这些调查是否得出了警方渎职的结论或给予了纪律处分。
 
第一节  尊重人格的完整，包括不受以下行为的侵犯：
 
有很多政府或其机构任意或非法杀人的报道。在许多情况下，这些案子极少或没有任何细节可循。
 
在新疆有与再教育营有关的在押人员死亡的报道。10月，自由亚洲电台（RFA）报道说在6个月期间“至少有150人”在押期间死于位于阿克苏市库车县的四个再教育营中。
 
2018年6月，阿依吐尔逊·艾力的母亲在同年发布的给官方的新疆妇女联合会的录音访谈中说，阿依吐尔逊·艾力在被官方收押讯问期间在新疆喀什死亡。据报道，当局在华安旅游公司这位维吾尔族导游从迪拜出差返回之后，便将其定为目标。官方随后声称，她死于某种“医疗状况“，并且阻止家人检视遗体。
 
尽管近年来的法律改革减少了对死刑的使用并改善了复议程序，当局仍然在未经过正当程序和无合理上诉渠道的情况下在定罪后处决了一些被告。官方的处决数字被归入国家机密。根据位于美国的“对话基金会”报告，随着2007年启动的死刑体制改革，被处决的人数在经过数年的下降之后已趋于稳定。对话基金会报告称，在新疆，对犯罪团伙头目和被判“恐怖主义”罪名者的处决数量有所增加，这可能抵消了其他处决人数的减少。
 
 
有多起报道称当局拘押了一些人并将他们长期关押在不明地点。
 
政府在新疆对维吾尔人、哈萨克人、吉尔吉斯人以及其它穆斯林人士进行了大规模的任意拘押。“中国人权捍卫者”报告说，这些拘押相当于强制失踪，因为家庭成员常常得不到关于拘押时限或者地点的信息。
 
据卢广的妻子称，获奖纪实摄影师卢广于2018年11月到新疆主持摄影讲座后失踪，似乎是在9月之前的“几个月”前被释放回他在浙江的家乡。尽管卢是美国的合法居民，据信他受到“监视居住”并被禁止离开中国。
 
维吾尔人权项目于1月发布了一份报告，详细报告了338名维吾尔知识分子所受到的强迫失踪、监禁和拘留。他们中有许多是著名的维吾尔学者和文化偶像。据报道，歌手塞努拜尔·吐尔逊已失踪。推动维吾尔族文化和历史工作的杂志编辑库尔班·马木提在再教育营中消失。报告中提到有5名知识分子在被拘留期间或被释放不久便死亡。其中包括40岁的穆塔力浦·努尔买买提（Mutellip Nurmehmet），他在从再教育营中释放后9天死亡。媒体还报道说，著名维吾尔作家努尔穆罕默德·托合提在再教育营中被拘留70天期间心脏病发作，获释后不久即去世。据报道，再教育营的医生无视他的健康状况，当局6月3日将他的遗体送回家时，他的双腿仍然被铐着。
 
据2019年12月的一份报告称，新疆伊斯兰研究所的中国历史教授、依明出版社创始人依明江·赛都力于2017年5月失踪，2019年5月在不公开审判中受审。一名家庭成员说，她数月之后于9月才得知该审判。
 
维吾尔族记者和企业家艾克拜尔·埃塞提的确切下落仍然不明。据报道他在美国参加了一个项目之后于2016年被拘押，随后被判处最高15年徒刑。
 
律师王全璋于2018年12月的不公开审判中以“颠覆国家政权”的罪名被定罪，随后在1月的不公开宣判之后，于4月从天津的拘留中心被转送到山东临沂的一个监狱。王从2015年起就被与外界隔离羁押，他在“709”全国大围捕中与另外300多名人权律师和法律助理一起被拘捕。在受到将近四年的拘押之后，他第一次得到许可于6月28日见到妻子和儿子。他的妻子告诉媒体说，王看上去“精神不振”，身心健康均差。她继续每月探望一次，这是监狱当局的最高许可。
 
2月，被拘押的劳工活动人士、“打工者之家”的职员付常国的亲属报告说，他们已无法确认付的下落。以前被认为付在押的深圳第二看守所于2月初告诉其家人，付并不在他们被拘留人员的名单上。早前，在2018年12月，坪山区派出所驳回了付的家人的保释申请，声称付可能会“销毁或捏造证据，干扰或密谋伪造证人证词。”付是2018年7月至1月期间因被指控参与或协助抗议佳士科技公司的劳工行动而被拘押、失踪或软禁在家的50多人中的一个。佳士科技公司是生产工业用焊接设备的公司（见第7节）。
 
政府仍然未就1989年对天安门示威游行进行暴力镇压时被杀害、失踪或被拘捕的人员提供全面、可信的说法。许多参与1989年示威游行的活动人士及其家属继续遭受官方骚扰。政府未就防止、调查或惩罚这类骚扰而做出任何努力。
 
 
法律禁止从肉体上伤害或虐待囚犯，并且禁止狱警逼供、侮辱囚犯的尊严、殴打或教唆其他人殴打囚犯。修订后的刑事诉讼法规定，通过非法手段取得的包括逼供出的口供在内的证据不得用于某些类型刑事案件的庭审。这些法律保护措施的执行仍然松弛。
 
不计其数的前囚犯或被拘押者报告说，他们遭到殴打、强奸、电击、强制数小时坐板凳边、绑手腕吊起、剥夺睡眠、强制灌食、违背本人意愿强迫服药以及其他形式的身心虐待。尽管狱管当局也会虐待普通犯人，但据报道，他们会特别恶劣地对待政治与宗教异议人士。
 
陈云飞于3月从四川监狱获释；他报告说，自己由于为1989年天安门游行的受难者扫墓而被监禁4年，期间狱警迫使他长时间保持艰难的身体姿势，并数月将他单独囚禁在黑暗的房间里。据报告，狱警还殴打他，并要求其他囚犯殴打他。在一次这样殴打之后，陈住了40多天的医院。在监禁期间不准他与家人或朋友联系。
 
据中国人权捍卫者报道，福建维权律师纪斯尊在4月26日获释之后，于7月10日在漳州市芗城医院重症监护室（ICU）去世；在监狱里他被剥夺了适当的医疗照护。在被监禁期间他有过中风和其他各种疾病，以致瘫痪。当局于5月6日第一次允许家人在重症监护室探望他。纪的营养不良，插管，不通过管道无法进食，只能认出三个姐妹中的两个。重症监护室中布置了四名保安，每次只允许一名探视者探视15分钟。了解此案的人士说，当局对纪的家人施压，要他们签署授权书，允许当局在纪去世后立即将遗体火化。
 
中国博客作者兼人权活动家吴淦于2017年因“颠覆国家政权”的罪名在遭到预防性拘留952天之后被天津一个法院判处8年徒刑。3月4日，吴的父亲到福建省的清流监狱去探望他。据吴的父亲称，在天津和北京被警方拘押期间，吴受到多重伤害，从而导致了一次心脏病突发、长期疼痛和一只手的瘫痪。
 
少数民族维吾尔族的人报告称，执法人员和惩戒系统及再教育营中的官员系统地采用酷刑和其他侮辱人格的手法。幸存者说，当局对被拘留者使用电击、水刑、殴打、强奸、艰难身体姿势折磨、注射不明物质以及低温监号等刑罚（见第6节，少数族裔/种族/民族）。
 
没有直接证据表明有非自愿或囚犯器官移植系统存在。但是，一些活动人士和团体继续指控政府强行摘取良心犯尤其是法轮功成员的器官。中国政府否认有这种情况，声称已经从2015年开始正式停止长期实行的强制摘取死刑犯器官用于移植的做法。澳大利亚国立大学对中国器官捐赠的官方统计进行的一项研究说，根据统计取证，“有很有力的证据”表明该数据是“伪造的”。此外，该研究论文还指出，政府的器官移植计划涉及“非自愿捐助者的捐赠，这些非自愿捐助者被标记为‘公民捐助人’”。6月，非政府组织“强迫摘取中国良心犯器官独立法庭”发布了一份报告，该报告指出，中国“有强迫摘取器官的直接和间接证据”，理由是“等候时间非常短”，“大规模的医疗设施建设和培养器官移植手术人员。” 一些新疆再教育营的幸存者报告说，健康的年轻人会免于遭受其他被拘留者受到的身体虐待，接受包括DNA样本在内的健康检查，随后失踪，这使这些幸存者担心再教育营中在采集被拘留人员的器官。
 
据媒体报道（见第4节），司法体系之外的“留置”制度是政府用来调查腐败的法律工具，在处理和虐待被拘押者方面使用的监管手段包括诸如长期单独监禁、剥夺睡眠、殴打、强制以令人难受的姿态连续站立或者坐数小时，有时是数日等。
 
法律规定精神治疗与入院应当遵从“自愿原则”，但法律又允许当局和家庭成员违背当事人意愿把他们送入精神病院，而且没有为被收容入院人员提供有意义的法律保护。法律不提供聘请律师的权利，并且限制当事人与精神病院以外的人员沟通的权利。
 
据官方媒体报道，公安部直接管辖着23所用来关押精神病罪犯的保安严密的精神病院。尽管被关进精神病院的人中有很多人被判有谋杀和其他暴力犯罪，但也有报告说有不少活动人士、宗教和信仰信徒以及上访人员因政治原因被迫接受精神病治疗。公安人员可以将人送进精神病院，强迫他们接受治疗，尽管他们的“病情”与精神病无关。
 
监狱和拘押中心的条件
 
关押政治犯和刑事犯的惩戒设施通常条件恶劣，而且威胁生命安全或有辱人格。
 
居住条件：当局经常将囚犯与在押人员关在拥挤不堪、卫生条件恶劣的环境中。食物往往量少质次，很多在押人员在得到允许的情况下都要依赖亲属提供额外的食品、药品和保暖衣物。经常有报告说囚犯因没有床铺或被褥而不得不睡在地上。在很多情况下，卫生、通风、取暖、照明和饮用水等条件都不合要求。
 
尽管官方保证囚犯有权得到及时治疗，但是，不能为囚犯提供及时、适当的医疗护理仍然是一个严重的问题。监狱当局有时拒绝为政治犯提供治疗。
 
政治犯有时会与普通犯人关在一起，据报狱警会教唆其他犯人殴打政治犯。有些人据说被与一些死刑犯关押在一起。当局不准一些异议人士从亲属处获得补充食物、药品以及保暖的衣物。
 
行政拘留所的条件与监狱的条件相似。在行政拘留所发生过殴打致死的事件。被关押的人报告说曾遭到殴打、性侵、缺乏适当的食物以及只有有限的或根本没有医疗服务。
 
新疆当局扩大了现有的维吾尔人、哈萨克人和其它穆斯林人士的再教育营。在有些情况下，当局用改建的学校、工厂和监狱来关押被拘押人员。根据人权观察报告，这些再教育营注重“对被收容者进行军事化纪律约束和全面的政治灌输”。
 
管理：法律规定囚犯写给监狱上级机关或司法机构的信件不需受到检查，但该法律在何种程度上得以执行尚不清楚。尽管当局偶尔会调查可信的非人道待遇指控，但并不对外公布调查结果。当局不准许多囚犯和在押人员得到合理的探视，也不能与家人通信联络。有些家庭成员不知道他们被监禁的亲属的下落。当局还禁止许多囚犯和被拘留人员从事宗教活动或获得宗教读物。
 
独立监督：有关当局将与监狱以及其他各类行政和法外拘押设施有关的信息视为国家机密，政府一般不允许对这些设施进行独立监督。
 
 
任意逮捕或关押的问题仍然非常严重。法律赋予公安人员广泛的行政拘留权以及在没有正式逮捕或刑事起诉的情况下长期拘留的权利。律师、人权活动人士、记者、宗教领袖及其支持者、前政治犯及其家属等群体继续成为任意拘留或逮捕的对象。
 
法律规定任何人都有权在法庭上质疑其被捕或羁押的合法性，但政府一般不履行这种规定。
 
四月初，四川省成都市的几个法院审判了四名活动人士：陈兵、符海陆、张隽勇和罗富誉；自2016年以来这四个人一直被拘押，未得到审判。他们在制作了贴有纪念1989年天安门示威标签的酒之后被控“寻衅滋事”罪，被判处3年到3年半徒刑。其中三人在审判过程中被迫使用法院指定的律师而不是他们自己聘请的律师。
 
四川的活动人士黄琦的母亲蒲文清于2018年12月失踪，之前便衣公安人员在北京的一个火车站拘捕了她。她曾于2018年10月到中央有关部门上访，以健康原因和拘留所中的不良医疗条件为由要求释放被拘押的儿子。截至年底，她仍然在软禁中，没有受到正式的起诉。另一个案件与此相关，7月，北京当局也拘捕了张宝成，他曾在2018年在北京陪同年迈的蒲文清因儿子被拘押而向中央有关部门上访。2018年12月30日，北京警方指控张宝成“寻衅滋事、宣扬恐怖主义、极端主义、煽动实施恐怖活动”等罪名；张是曾倡导民主和政府透明度的已不复存在的“新公民运动”成员。至年底张仍然在候审。
 
 
警方拘押若超过37天就必须由检察机关正式批捕，但对于涉及“国家安全、恐怖主义以及重大受贿”的案件，法律允许最高6个月的与外界隔绝的拘押而无须正式逮捕。在正式逮捕嫌疑人之后，警方还有权在案件调查期间将嫌疑人再拘押7个月。
 
在调查结束后，检察院在决定是否对其作出刑事指控时可将嫌疑人再拘押45天。一旦提出刑事指控，当局可以在司法程序开始之前再将嫌疑人拘押45天。有时公安人员拘留嫌疑人的时间会超过法律允许的期限，在案件开审前嫌疑人被拘押一年甚至更久是常见的情况。
 
法律规定，在押人员在受到刑事起诉之前可以会见自己的辩护律师。《刑事诉讼法》规定，法院要为没有委托律师的、有盲、聋、哑或精神病等情况的、未成年的以及面临无期徒刑或死刑的被告指派一名律师。无论被告是否有经济能力，该法律都适用。法院也可以为其他无力支付律师费用的刑事被告人指派律师，但是法院往往不会这样做。一些律师报告说，他们很难会见被关押在拘留所里的委托人，尤其是被认为是政治敏感案件的委托人。
 
刑事被告人在等候审理期间有权申请保释（也被称为“取保候审”），但该系统运作效率似乎不佳，当局很少让嫌疑人取保候审。
 
法律要求在拘留后24小时内通知被拘留者的家属；然而，当局常常在将一些人关押了远超出此规定的时间后也不发出通知，尤其是在涉及政治敏感案件的时候。有些案件从没有送过通知。根据一项笼统的例外规定，如果通知家属会“阻碍案件调查”，则警方不需要通知。修改后的《刑事诉讼法》将该例外情况局限于涉及国家安全或恐怖主义的案件，但公安人员对这些条款有着广泛的解释权。
 
在某些情况下，法律允许监视居住，而不是拘押在正式的设施中。假如警方怀疑有危害国家安全、恐怖活动或情节严重的受贿等罪行，而且认为在家监视居住有可能会妨碍调查，经由上一级部门批准后，警方可以对嫌疑人执行长达6个月的“在指定地点监视居住”。在这一类案件中，当局也可能不准辩护律师与嫌疑人见面。人权组织和被拘押过的人士报告说，这样的做法使被拘押人面临遭受酷刑的高风险，因为被关在一个既不是自己家又不是正式拘押设施的地方减少了对被拘押人士待遇以及上诉机制的监管。
 
当局使用行政拘留手段来恐吓政治与宗教维权人士并阻止公开示威。行政拘留的方式包括强制戒毒治疗（针对吸毒者）、“拘留教养”（针对未成年罪犯），以及用于拘留政治活动人士和宗教信徒尤其是法轮功学员的“法制教育”中心。在强制戒毒康复中心停留的最长时间是两年，其中有6个月通常是在解毒中心。政府对那些被控卖淫和拉皮条的人也有类似的康复中心。
 
任意逮捕:  当局以泄漏国家机密罪、颠覆罪和其他罪名实施拘留和逮捕，以此镇压持不同政见者，压制公众诉求。但这些指控，包括何谓国家机密，都定义不清，而且任何信息都可以通过追溯方式被认定为国家机密。当局还广泛使用语意不清的“寻衅滋事”罪名来对付许多维权人士。这个词至今语义不清。当局还以广义且模糊不清的保守国家秘密法来拘留有泄露刑事审判、商业活动和政府活动信息等行为的公民和外国人士。反间谍法授权当局可要求个人和团体停止任何被视为威胁国家安全的活动。不遵守该要求可能会导致财产和资产被没收。
 
有多起报告说，当局逮捕或长期拘押了一些律师、宗教领袖或者信徒、上访人员和其他维权人士以后，其指控却因为证据不足而被驳回。当局将许多公民非法软禁、剥夺旅行权、或者送进包括“黑监狱”在内的各种非法拘留设施实施行政拘留。在有些案件中，公安人员会给学校施加压力，不准接收知名政治犯的孩子入学。受软禁人士的情况各有不同，但有人在公安人员的监视下在家中与外界隔绝。安全官员经常会驻守在这些人家里。在外国高层官员来访、一年一度的全国人民代表大会、天安门广场屠杀纪念日，以及在藏区和新疆的敏感纪念日等敏感时期，当局都会软禁许多公民。公安人员还会将一些没有被软禁的人士送到很远的地方去“强制度假”。
 
1月，政府拘押了倡导中国民主改革的澳大利亚作家和博客作者杨恒均。政府将杨与世隔绝关押了数月，然后于8月以间谍罪正式逮捕了他。12月2日，澳大利亚外交部长玛丽斯·佩恩（Marise Payne）公开批评羁押杨的情况，指出他被“愈发与外界隔绝，禁止与家人和朋友联系，恢复了包括带着镣铐的日常审讯。”
 
2015年在泰国失踪的瑞典籍书商、香港居民桂敏海于2017年被中国当局释放，又于2018年1月乘火车去北京时被中国当局再次拘押；媒体报道说桂仍在被拘押中，但他的下落不明。中国驻斯德哥尔摩的大使馆2月发表声明，否认曾主动与桂的女儿安吉拉联系。这个声明是针对安吉拉网上发布的说法的回应，即瑞典驻中国大使在斯德哥尔摩为她和一名声称能够帮助他父亲案件的商人安排了一系列的会面。截至年底，瑞典政府还在调查此事。
 
媒体报道说，上海警方于3月20日拘捕了知名的人权活动人士陈建芳。7月，代表陈的一名律师说，上海当局向他告知，称陈因“煽动颠覆国家政权罪”被正式逮捕，但当局并没有公开宣布逮捕陈，也不准她见自己的律师。当局没有回应国际维权组织就陈的状况和下落提出的要求。
 
1月，当局以“寻衅滋事”的罪名起诉环保组织“绿叶行动”的领导人薛仁义。在薛号召为要求改善重庆的环境条件而示威之后，警方于2018年5月拘押了他。警方以在社交媒体上贴出的薛在公园里举着三片叶子——他们团体的象征——的图像为理由逮捕了他。至年底薛的下落与审判时间仍未知。1月，重庆当局还拘捕了“绿叶行动”成员潘斌。及至年底他的地点和状况尚未知。
 
4月27日，广州市越秀区的警方搜查了赖日福的家，然后将其带走。赖长期以来是呼吁结束一党专制的“南街运动”成员。警方以“寻衅滋事”的罪名在越秀区拘留所对赖实施了10天的行政拘留，原因是他穿了一件写着“公民抗命”的文化衫。他于5月8日获释。9月16日，当他在自己的微信和脸书账号上上传了“愿荣光归香港”的视频以后，警方再次以“寻衅滋事”为由拘押了他；“愿荣光归香港”是香港民主运动的非正式代表歌曲。刘被拘押了一个多月之后，于10月被释放。
 
2018年12月，《寒冬》杂志报告称，自2018年8月以来，警方至少拘捕了45名给该杂志投稿的人。在新疆被拘押的22人中，有4人于2月获释。另外23人被关押在河南、福建、浙江和山西省。有数人在经过洗脑教育之后获释。警方2018年10月逮捕了福建的一位作者并禁止他的家人探访。网上媒体有报道说他遭到了警方酷刑折磨。
 
10月，广西秘密警察以“煽动颠覆国家政权”的罪名拘押了覃永沛，随后于12月正式逮捕了他。至年底覃仍被拘押在南宁第一拘留所，无法接触自己的律师。覃曾经参与了包括“709”律师和法轮功学员在内的多个维权案件，帮助过许多贫困和弱势群体的人，并公布了政府和共产党高层官员的不当行为。他自1990年代中期开始从事法律工作，之后于2018年5月被吊销执照。执照被吊销之后，覃成立了“中国律师后俱乐部”以聘用被吊销执照的律师们。覃被捕的原因不明。
 
审前拘押：审前拘押可能会超过一年。据称，涉及“敏感案件”的被告在案件开审之前被拘押的时间更长。在2015到2018年期间，许多在“709”大抓捕中被当局拘留的人士和他们的辩护律师都遭到超过一年时间的审前拘押，无法接触他们的家人或律师。具体统计数字未见公布，公众也无法获得，但在政治犯的案件中，长期的审前拘押尤为常见。
 
地方当局2017年在沈阳拘留所拘押了在“709”镇压期间为人权律师辩护的北京律师李昱函，随后对李提出“寻衅滋事”的指控。由于李的健康原因，她的律师曾多次向沈阳当局提出要求让李保外就医，但每次都被驳回，不提供任何原因，也未经过听证。原定李将于4月9日出庭受审，但沈阳中级人民法院推迟了审判，并在具体日期不详的一天审理了此案。由于担心为自己辩护的律师受到压力，李于6月解聘了她的律师。至年底李仍然在拘留所中等候判决。
 
2016年，沈阳铁西区法院拘押了倡导人权的人士林明杰，其罪名是在北京公安部门前组织一群示威者抗议沈阳公安局长许文有滥用职权。在经过两年的审前拘押后，2018年6月林被判两年零6个月徒刑，刑期包括他已被拘押的时间。据报道林已于4月23日获释。但是，尽管林已经获释，他的律师仍然无法和他联系，也不知道他的下落。
 
 
尽管法律规定法院应当独立行使司法权，不受行政机关、社会团体以及个人的干涉，但司法并不独立。法官常常就如何裁决待审案件，特别是政治敏感案件，接到来自政府和中共的政治指导。中共政法委员会有权审查和指导各级法院的审理活动。法院与检察院的所有任命都必须得到中共组织部的批准。
 
由于防范司法腐败的措施模糊不清且执行不力，腐败常常会影响司法裁决。地方政府负责任命地方法官并支付他们的工资，从而经常对其辖区内法官的裁决施加影响。
 
一个由中共控制的委员会在大多数重大案件中作出决定，而一审法院和上诉法院法官的任务只是为该委员会的决定撰写一份法理依据。
 
法院无权裁决某项立法是否符合宪法。虽然法律允许团体和个人对法律法规是否符合宪法提出质疑，但是这些质疑只能向立法机构提出。因此，律师几乎没有机会在诉讼中就法律是否违宪进行辩护。2018年3月，律师及其他人得到中央政府的指示，要避免讨论宪法修正案中有关取消国家主席和副主席任期限制的做法是否符合宪法。
 
据媒体报道，公安部门通过电视播放律师、国外和国内博客作者、记者和企业高管认罪的镜头，以便在刑事审理开始之前将他们定罪。在有些案件中，这种认罪可能是释放的前提条件。非政府组织认为，这样的电视认罪很有可能是逼供或是使用酷刑的结果，而且一些曾经认罪的受押人在被释放之后撤回了自己的供词，并确认他们的认罪是被强迫的。法律并没有允许在审判前让犯罪嫌疑人通过电视认罪的规定。
 
5月，英国广播监管机构启动正式调查，就中国中央电视台（CCTV）国际新闻频道中国全球电视网播出的强迫一名被囚禁在中国的英国私人调查员认罪的指控进行了正式调查。
 
江天勇律师在服满两年刑期之后于2月获释；2017年他在湖南长沙被判犯有煽动颠覆国家罪。在审判中当局不准江自行选择辩护律师；多个分析家认为该次审判既不公正，也不公平。尽管江已获释，他立即被软禁在其父母位于河南的家中。截至年底他仍然受到地方当局严格的行动控制，罔顾他在狱中愈发严重的多种疾病。警方在其父母家门外建了监视站，那里是他主要的居住地，但他有时也可以去探望他的妹妹。当地警方禁止他乘坐公共交通出城。
 
据报道，“司法独立”仍然是中共命令大学教授回避的课题之一（见第二节a.“学术自由和文化活动”）。
 
 
尽管修订后的刑事诉讼法重申了无罪推定，但刑事司法系统依然倾向于有罪推定，那些受到高度关注或政治敏感的案件更是如此。
 
拒绝认罪的被告往往会受到比认罪的人更为严厉的判决。上诉程序极少推翻原判，也不能提供足够的复审途径；对侵犯被告权利的补偿不合理。
 
最高人民法院规定，除了涉及国家机密、隐私、未成年人或由当事人请求保护商业机密的案件之外，所有的审判都应向公众公开。当局利用涉及国家机密案件的例外规定向公众甚至有时对家属都封锁政治敏感案件的进展情况，并且剥夺被告寻求辩护律师的权利。法院条例规定，持有有效证件的外籍人士同中国公民一样拥有获准旁听审判的权利，但事实上只有获得邀请的外籍人士才能旁听庭审。如同往年一样，在几次审判时，当局禁止驻中国的外交官和记者旁听庭审。有些案件被重新归类为“国家机密”，或者以其他理由不对公众公开。
 
由政府经营的庭审公开网在互联网上播放庭审；其中大部分都是民事审判。
 
法规要求，除了涉及国家机密和未成年嫌疑人的案件外，法院官员要在判决生效后的7天之内公布判决结果。法院并没有公布所有的判决。他们有广泛的决定权，如果认为公布判决书“不适宜”就不公布。许多政治案件的判决都没有公布。
 
受到行政拘留的人没有寻求法律咨询的权利。刑事被告有权接受法律援助，但绝大多数刑事被告在受审时没有律师为其辩护。
 
律师按规定都必须是中共控制下的全国律师协会成员，而且司法部要求所有的律师在取得或每年更新其从业执照时都要宣誓效忠中共的领导。中共继续要求有3名或以上中共党员的律师事务所在所内成立党的组织。
 
尽管政府声言尽力改进让律师会见其委托人的做法，但是2017年全国律师协会的主席告诉《中国青年报》，辩护律师只参与了不到百分之三十的刑事案件。尤其是一些人权律师报告说，当局不允许他们为某些委托人辩护，或者威胁他们如果选择做辩护就会受到惩罚。有些律师拒绝为政治敏感的案件辩护，而这类案件的当事人往往很难找到辩护律师。在有些情况下，当局不准当事人自选的律师接受委托，却用法院指定的律师取而代之。
 
政府暂停或吊销一些接受敏感案件的律师的营业执照或律师执照；敏感案件的当事人包括民主异议人士、家庭教会活动人士、法轮功学员或批评政府者。当局利用全国律师协会的年度执照审查程序来拒绝或延迟给专业律师颁发执照。1月，广东省司法厅吊销了广东律师刘正清的执照；刘因为维权人士和法轮功学员辩护而知名。司法厅指控他在法庭为其委托人辩护时“危害国家安全”。
 
政府用来恐吓或对人权律师施压的其他手段包括非法拘押、对法律办公室做不明不白的“调查”、取消律师资格、骚扰以及人身恐吓，还有阻挠律师取得证据或接触委托人。2月，几个律师写了一封公开信，抗议政府对接受人权案件律师的骚扰。
 
2015年，全国人大常务委员会修订了关于法律从业人员的立法。修订过的法律将律师“侮辱、诽谤或威胁司法官员”、“不服从法庭警告”或“严重扰乱法庭秩序”的行为确定为违法。该修订法案还把向媒体披露委托人或案件信息或者以抗议、媒体报道或其他方式影响法庭裁决的行为也确定为违法。违反者会面临罚款和3年以下有期徒刑。
 
2015年制定的法规还规定，拘留中心的官员应当允许辩护律师会见嫌疑人或被告，或者要说明为什么此时不能安排会面。按照规定，这样的会面应当在48小时内即行安排。检察院和法院应当允许辩护律师在三个工作日内取得并阅读案情文件。根据该法规，辩护律师阅卷的时间和次数不应当受到限制。有些敏感案件的律师在庭审前无法见到他们的委托人，查看证据的时间有限，在审判中被告和律师也不能相互交流。与这个法律相悖，在案件提交法庭之前刑事被告往往没有被指定律师。法律规定刑事诉讼使用的书面语及口语都应该是当地常用的语言，政府翻译员要为不熟悉当地语言的被告提供语言服务。消息来源称大部分审判都使用汉语普通话，即使是在少数民族地区也是如此，在被告不会讲普通话时提供翻译员。
 
被告与原告当庭对质的机制不足。据报道只有一小部分案件有目击证人。在是否需要甚至是否允许证人当庭作证方面法官享有很大的自由裁量权。在大部分刑事审判中，证词都是由检察官宣读，被告及律师没有通过交叉询问进行反驳的机会。虽然法律规定预审期间的证人陈述不能作为定罪的唯一依据，但检察官高度依赖此类陈述。尽管辩护律师可以申请查看政府掌握的涉案证据，但无权强迫证人作证或要求进行证据开示。
 
依照法律，对于那些被判处死刑、在等候复核期间无经济能力聘请律师的囚犯要指派律师。
 
《中国劳工通讯》报道，深圳警方于1月20日拘押了活动人士吴贵军、张治儒、何远程、简辉和宋佳慧，罪名是“扰乱社会秩序”。据报道他们于2月下旬受到正式起诉。他们中有些人的家人从未收到过羁押通知，也不知道他们被关押在哪里。据媒体报道，当局禁止张和吴聘请律师，并警告他们的家人不许接受任何媒体采访。中国劳工观察的负责人称，他们的被羁押与任何具体的活动没有关联，当局的目的就是要在劳工抗议活动增加和经济停滞的背景下以此作为对其他劳工活动人士的警告。
 
7月22日，三名公益律师程渊、刘永泽和吴葛剑雄（又被称为“长沙公益仨”）因涉嫌“颠覆国家政权罪”被长沙市国家安全局拘捕。这些律师是长沙富能的工作人员，该组织对与歧视残疾人士、艾滋病毒携带者和乙型肝炎病毒携带者有关的案件提起诉讼。程渊还致力于与结束国家的独生子女政策并改革户口法相关的诉讼。尽管程渊的家人为他聘请了两名律师，但直到年底他们都无法会见程。当局还在不同场合多次就其丈夫的工作审问了程渊的妻子施明磊，包括7月22日强行进入她在深圳的家并没收了她的身份证、护照、手机、电脑和银行卡。
 
政治犯与被拘押者
 
政府官员继续否认关押了任何政治犯，声称拘押那些人不是由于他们的政治或宗教观点，而是因为他们触犯了法律。但是，当局继续因政治和宗教原因将公民投入监狱。人权组织估计有成千上万名政治犯仍然被关押，大多数被关在监狱，有的被关在行政拘留设施。政府不准国际人道主义组织探望政治犯。
 
政治犯获得提前释放的比例比其他犯人低。有数千人因“危害国家安全”和“从事邪教活动”等政治和宗教罪服刑。政府并未复议所有在1997年前因反革命罪和流氓罪被起诉的案例，也没有释放那些因刑法己经撤销的非暴力罪名入狱的人士。
 
直至本年底，许多政治犯仍然在狱中服刑或在获释后仍在其他形式的拘押中，其中包括作家杨茂东（笔名：郭飞雄）、维吾尔学者伊力哈木·土赫提和热依拉·达吾提、活动人士王炳章、活动人士刘贤斌、台湾民主活动人士李明哲、牧师张少杰、法轮功学员卞丽潮和马振宇、上海教区辅理主教马达钦、人权律师王全璋、夏霖、高智晟、余文生和江天勇、博客作者吴淦，以及上海工运活动人士蒋存德。
 
刑事处罚包括在获释后的一段固定时间内“剥夺政治权利”，在此期间获释者被剥夺言论、结社和出版自由。据前服刑人员说，其就业、出行、获得居住许可和护照、租房以及获得社会服务的能力受到严重限制。
 
前政治犯及其家属常常受到当局的监视、电话窃听、搜查以及其他形式的骚扰或威胁。例如，公安人员跟踪去会见外国记者或外交人员的被拘留或囚禁的维权人士的家人，要他们禁言，不许谈论案情。某些维权组织的成员被禁止会见来访的外宾。
 
 
有多个可靠的报告称，政府出于政治目的滥用国际执法工具，以报复身在国外的一些特定人士。另有可靠报告说，出于政治动机，政府试图向其他国家施加双边压力，以达到让其对特定人士采取有害行动的目的。
 
中国官员向康科迪亚大学附属蒙特利尔人权研究所施加压力，要求取消一个维吾尔著名流亡领袖参加的会议。康科迪亚大学蒙特利尔种族灭绝和人权研究所的执行董事凯尔·马修斯（Kyle Matthews）说，他于3月25日收到了中国驻蒙特利尔总领事的电子邮件，要紧急约见他，讨论计划中的关于中国的少数民族维吾尔族的会议。马修斯说，他选择不理会这个要求并按计划举行会议，同时发现总领事还向蒙特利尔的其他人施加压力，要求取消康科迪亚大学的这个活动。
 
身在国外、公开讲述新疆境内正在实施的拘留和虐待政策的人士，其新疆亲属受到来自中国政府的压力，这样的情况在全年中一直有所报告。塔希尔·依明（Tahir Imin）是一位居住在中国境外的维吾尔人，他说中国当局监禁了他的哥哥阿迪力（Adil）以报复塔希尔在境外的活动。中国官方媒体还发布了新疆的少数民族和宗教少数群体人士的视频，以反驳他们海外的亲戚对外国媒体的说法。视频中的人们要求他们的海外家人停止“散布有关新疆的谣言”。海外的亲属们说，他们在看到视频之前都与新疆的亲属失去了联系。美国公民法卡特·乔达特（Ferkat Jawdat）的母亲因为身处再教育营而与他失去联系已有一年之久，却在5月给他打电话，要求他停止活动和接受媒体采访。美国居民早木热·达吾提(Zumrat Dawut)向媒体讲述过她在新疆再教育营被关押的经历，其亲属于11月也出现在一个视频里，要求她停止“散布谣言”。海外的亲属们都说是中国政府强迫他们的家人制作这样的视频。
 
11月25日，自由亚洲电台报道称，泰国当局应江苏省公安官员的要求拘押了被联合国难民署认可的中国难民邢鉴（Xing Jian），据称是因为他“在网上散布谣言”。
 
 
法院审理民事案件时在司法独立方面面临与刑事案件相同的限制。《国家赔偿法》规定，给予权益受到政府机构或官员侵犯的原告行政与司法赔偿。该法律还允许对遭受错误拘押、精神损害或者由拘留所或狱管人员造成的身体伤害的人给予赔偿。
 
尽管因诉讼费用高、法院信誉低下以及很少有人意识到《国家赔偿法》的存在，过去很少有公民申请国家赔偿，但仍有法院推翻错误判罪的情况。官方媒体报道称，6月，在金哲宏故意杀人案被推翻之后，他就其服刑23年申请2130万元人民币（300万美元）的国家赔偿。吉林省高级人民法院在一次上诉听证会上裁定该案最初的定罪证据不足。
 
法律给予个人到政府部门上访以解决其不满的权利。大部分的不满都与土地、住房、权益、环境或腐败有关，大部分上访者都试图将其问题投送到当地“信访”办公室。政府报告说每年收到大约600万份上访信；但是，上访者的集会和表达不满的权利继续受到限制。
 
虽然有改善上访制度的努力，进展仍然不稳定。尽管中央政府重申禁止阻挠或限制“正常上访”，不准非法拘押上访人员，官方对上访人员的打击报复仍在继续。一些规定鼓励所有与诉讼有关的上访都在本地通过地方或省级法院得到解决，使地方官员防止访民到高层上访的鼓励机制得到强化。地方官员派人到北京将上访人员强制带回本省，以防止他们向中央政府投诉地方官员。这样的拘押都没有记录，上访者经常是被短暂关押在非法的“黑监狱”中。
 
上访人员陈春章的妻子叶木兰说，她的丈夫于11月6日在警方羁押期间的死亡很可疑，她呼吁省有关部门进行调查。据叶说，陈于8月在北京被来自福建省青口县截访人员拘押，随后被当地警方监禁。（“截访人员”是地方政府派出的执行人员，在上访者赴省会或北京就地方政府的问题上访的途中拘押他们。）。陈告诉过他的律师，他当时已经被警方做过4次笔录，但他拒绝就被控的罪名认罪。10月26日，地方警察叫叶到一个地方医院急救室去看陈；当时他还活着，但已处于昏迷状态。尽管家人曾向当局要求查验他是否有任何外伤，警方不准他们仔细验看。陈于11月6日做脑部紧急手术之后死亡。
 
5月15日，在天安门抗议30周年纪念日和6月9日香港示威前后，贵州警方拘押了黄燕明25天。国家安全部官员不准他与外界有任何联系，将他关押在贵阳的一个旅馆中。没有宣布任何指控。
 
6月，北京第二中级人民法院对于2017年涉嫌非法拘押和殴打一名来自江西的上访者的12个人进行刑事审判。来自上犹的上访者陈裕咸在北京被嫌疑人带走8小时之后死亡。据报道，这12名嫌疑人来自一个非法犯罪集团，他们以一个汽车租赁公司为幌子，与当地官员有密切联系，被其要求拦截这个访民。至年底北京法院尚未做出判决。
 
 
尽管法律规定“公民的通信自由和隐私受到法律保护”，但当局经常不尊重公民的隐私。法律要求执法人员在搜查房屋之前要获得搜查令，但执法人员往往对这一条款置若罔闻。公安局和检察官有权不经司法审查自行颁发搜查令。仍然不断有关于警察强行闯入的报道。
 
当局监控私人之间的电话、短信、传真、电子邮件、即时通讯和其他数码通信。当局还拆开并审查国内和国际邮件。安全部门经常监视并进入民宅和办公室搜查电脑、电话和传真机。外国记者在离开中国的时候发现他们的一些个人物品被搜查。在有些情况下，如果发现了被认为是政治敏感的材料，记者要被迫签署文件说明他们是“自愿”将这些文件留在中国的。
 
据媒体报道，公安部在全国设置了数以千万计的摄像头来监控一般民众。一些人权组织称，当局越来越依赖摄像头及其他一些手段来监视和恐吓政治异议人士、宗教领袖及其支持者、藏人以及维吾尔人。这其中包括面部特征识别和“步态识别”视频监控，使警察不但得以监控事态而且能够快速识别人群中的个体。对电话和互联网通讯的监控与干扰在新疆和西藏地区尤为普遍。政府在西藏自治区和自治区以外的藏区的寺庙中设置了监控摄像头（见“西藏”特别部分）。法律允许安全人员在发生“重大安全事件”时中断通讯联络。
 
“人权观察”称，国家安全部与信息技术公司合作创建一个“大规模自动化语音识别与监控系统”，这个系统与已经在新疆和安徽使用的系统相类似，用以帮助破解刑事案件。根据一个参与制造这个系统的公司所言，该系统的程序可以解读普通话以及包括藏语和维吾尔语在内的某些少数民族语言。在很多情况下其他与生物特征有关的数据，比如指纹和DNA，也都被储存起来。这个数据库中的信息不仅取自罪犯和犯罪嫌疑人，也包括全部的移民工以及所有申请护照的维吾尔人。
 
因城市开发而强制搬迁的事件在一些地区继续发生。对搬迁条件或补偿不满而举行抗议的现象很普遍，当局起诉了一些组织抗议的领导者。农村地区的基础设施建设和商业开发项目导致了成千上万的村民被迫搬迁。
 
公民与政府当局之间有关房地产的纠纷有时演变成暴力事件。造成这些纠纷的原因常常是当地官员与房地产开发商勾结，对拆迁居民赔偿很少甚至不予赔偿，而且对当地官员从事房地产交易又缺乏有效的政府或媒体监督，对被拆迁居民也没有提供法律救助或其他解决纠纷的机制。虽然中央政府声称已进一步加强了控制非法征地行为并制定赔偿标准，但问题仍然存在。
 
各级和各地政府继续试行“社会信用系统”，该系统收集大量信息用来为个体和公司评分，以解决“社会信任”缺失的问题，强化金融信贷工具的使用以及减少公共腐败。社会信用系统还收集学业记录、交通违规、社交媒体使用、交友、遵守计划生育规定程度、工作表现、购物习惯以及其他方面的内容。这些系统意在促进社会管控及自我审查，因为公民要为自己的言论、人际关系、甚至在关系密切的社交圈中别人与自己分享的信息承担责任。
 
通过监视公民的网上活动和人际关系，个人的“社会信用分”是可以用来量化其对政府忠诚度的标准之一。有迹象表明，这些系统通过个人到访网站的“忠诚度”和与其互动网民的“忠诚度”来加减分数。这些系统还建立了让公民互相监督的奖励机制。例如，在各种应用程序上创立聊天群的人要负责监督和报告任何违规内容，他们要对违规行为承担责任。
 
尽管政府意在创建一个统一的社会信用系统，有数个中国国内技术公司创建了几个完全不同的系统，而且这些系统的具体应用在不同省或城市各不相同。在杭州，评分系统应用于18岁以上的居民，包括了个人的教育、就业、遵纪守法（比如纳税）、缴纳医疗费用、偿还贷款、信守合同、参加义务活动以及自愿献血等信息。
 
个人的信用分数对其活动造成了具体的限制的案例有数起。社会信用分数低的用户面临不断增加的一系列后果，包括失去在国内社交平台交流的能力、旅行以及购置房产。
 
据人权活动人士报告说，另外一种使用社交媒体进行审查的情况是，当局就有关他们参与和人权有关的聊天群的事宜进行问询，其中包括了微信和WhatsApp。当局通过监视这些聊天群来识别活动人士，致使微信用户越来越多进行自我审查，甚至导致多起聊天群主被逮捕的事件。
 
5月，一个安全漏洞暴露了从监视北京居民小区的人脸识别系统收集到的个人信息。暴露出来的信息足以查明人们什么时候、多长时间到什么地方去过，让包括警察在内的任何能够访问这种数据的人能够形成一个人的日常生活画面。
 
政府在新疆继续施行“双联户”制度，该制度从已在西藏实行了多年的制度发展而来。这个制度将居民每10户分为一组，互相监视并向政府报告“安全问题”和贫困问题，从而将普通公民变成了举报人。在新疆，政府还继续要求维吾尔族家庭接受来自政府的“寄宿”者，由官员或志愿者强行入住维吾尔人家，以监控这些家庭，发现“极端主义”的线索。祷告、拥有宗教书籍、或戒用烟酒等，都被政府视为有“极端主义”迹象的行为，有这些行为的人都可能会被拘押在再教育营里。
 
政府限制夫妇生育子女（见第六节，妇女）。
 
广东省茂名当地的警方发起了一场羞辱运动，要求当地参与了电话欺诈的嫌疑人在春节期间自首。公安部将茂名列入国内电话欺诈的主要来源。据报道，对于那些仍然在逃的嫌疑人，警方在他们的房屋外面喷上“在逃犯之家”的字迹，切断他们的水电供应，并冻结嫌疑人直系亲属的银行账号和身份证。
 
4月，媒体的报道显示，政府把针对新疆和其它地区的少数民族尤其是维吾尔族成员使用的人脸识别系统扩大到其它地区，包括福建省。据称视频监视系统能够就在某个时期某社区中维吾尔人人数上升的情况提醒执法人员。
 
“自由之家”报告称，包括人工智能（AI）、面部识别和侵入性监视应用程序在内的监视技术的迅速发展和日渐增多的警方对用户数据的介入，已经使中国成为“技术的反乌托邦”国度，助长了对著名的持不同政见者以及普通用户的迫害。卡内基基金会的一份报告显示，中国是全球人工智能监控技术的主要供货商，包括面部识别系统、智能城市/安全城市平台，以及智能警务技术。
 
第二节 尊重公民自由，包括：
 
 
宪法阐明公民“享有言论、出版、集会、结社、游行和示威的自由”。但当局限制而且不尊重这些权利，当行使这些权利与中共利益相冲突时尤为如此。当局继续越来越严密地控制所有的平面、广播、电子和社交媒体，并经常利用它们宣传政府的观点和中共意识形态。当局审查和操控新闻媒体、社交媒体和互联网，在敏感的周年纪念日期间和议题上尤为如此。
 
言论和表达自由：公民可以在私下小范围地讨论许多政治话题而不会受到官方惩罚。但是，当局经常对那些质疑中共合法性的公民采取严厉的行动。一些独立的智库、研究小组或研讨会报告称受到压力，被迫取消某些涉及敏感议题的会议。在公开演讲、学术讨论和媒体评论或在网上发表政治敏感言论的人仍会遭到惩罚。此外，公共场所电子监控的增加，同时有许多公民的日常互动向数码空间转移，标志着政府监控日常生活的百分比正在增长。小组或同伴间在社交平台上和通过信息应用进行的聊天都受到当局的审查、监控并采取行动。
 
在政府多年来愈发增强的压力下，著名的经济智囊机构天则经济研究所于8月关闭了大门。推进市场化改革的天则经济研究所成立于1993年，10年前在中国还是一个备受尊重的机构，有传播理念和促进与政府领导人对话的空间。在过去几年里，其网站和公共办公室被关闭，至8月该机构已结算清盘。
 
4月19日，子肃被成都一家法院判处4年徒刑，罪名是颠覆罪。子肃是云南党校的退休教授，因写公开信质疑习近平是否适合继续担任中共领导人而于2017年被拘押。在他2018年年12月被审判之前，政府提出如果他解聘自选律师，改用政府指定的律师，就会缩减他的刑期。子肃同意了，他的刑期也从10年被减少到4年。
 
9月，四川省一家法院以“寻衅滋事”为由判处成都维权人士黄晓敏30个月有期徒刑。黄曾呼吁直接选举产生党内领导人。他被拘留了几个月，然后才被允许聘请律师。随后他被告知，如果解聘他的律师并接受法院指定的律师，能够换取更宽大的判决，他照做了。
 
9月19日，成都市古城乡的当地警方以陈云飞因发表评论支持香港反送中条例运动而被拘留。陈对香港的反送中抗议活动公开表示支持，并呼吁香港领导人林郑月娥与抗议者进行对话，以寻求解决方案。
 
无数公民因“传播虚假新闻”、“非法信息传播”或“在网上传播谣言”而被捕和拘押，其范围从分享政治观点或鼓吹宗教极端主义到分享与敏感议题有关的事实报道。 例如，在河南南乐，一名网民因在微信上传播有关化工厂爆炸的“假新闻”而被捕。在连云港，警方因“互联网谣言”逮捕了22人；在湖州，一名网友因“散布谣言”而被捕，他声称他只是在分享政治观点。
 
这种趋势在新疆尤为明显，政府在那里建立了一个多层面的现实与虚拟的控制系统，用来制止人们的自我表达或从事其宗教或传统信仰。除了在该地区建立的庞大的再教育营系统之外，政府和共产党还实施了一个限制个人言论和网上言论的系统。在新疆，警方经常拦截某些民族和信仰的人，要求检查他们的手机以获取被认为是不恰当对话的证据。该年度中，政府显著扩大了这个系统的自动化程度，通过手机应用程序、摄像头和其他电子设备来监控所有的言论及行动。新疆当局建立了一个全面的数据库，跟踪该地区居民的行动、移动电话应用程序甚至用电量和汽油用量。
 
政府还试图限制对他们的新疆政策的批评，甚至在境外也是如此，干扰世界各地的学术讨论，恐吓人权维权人士。新疆政府官员拘押了多名海外活动人士的家人。中国驻比利时大使馆要求一所比利时大学从其网页上移除对中国新疆政策的批评信息；2月，该条批评信息的比利时作者报告说，中国政府官员扰乱了在法国史特拉斯堡举行的以新疆为主题的一次学术会议。由于政府官员对其仍居住在中国的家人施加威胁，许多旅居海外的维吾尔人和哈萨克人因恐惧而禁言；那些威胁有时是传送到中国的家人那里，有时则由中国政府驻外官员传达。
 
中国政府对不受其认可的观点的限制越来越严厉，即使这种表达来自海外也是如此。在网上，中国政府扩大了控制全球信息传播的做法，同时还向外国政府输出其电子信息控制手段。该年度中，关于外国记者和海外华人因批评中国政策而受到中国政府人员骚扰的报告有所上升。这包括了发布在推特等被中国屏蔽的平台上的批评言论。
 
10月，中国当局公开谴责了职业篮球队休斯顿火箭队总经理对香港抗议者表示支持的推文，同时国有的中央电视台取消播放美国职业篮球队访问中国的比赛。外交部派他们驻休斯顿领事馆的一名官员亲自向休斯顿火箭队宣布这个声明。同样，12月中国国家电视台取消了一场英超足球比赛的转播，原因是该队的球员梅苏特·厄齐尔（Mesut Ozil）在推特和Instagram上发布消息，谴责中国政府对新疆穆斯林采取的政策；推特和Instagram在中国都是被屏蔽的。
 
7月，大连警方拘捕了仅被称为“卢某”的一名男子，原因是他在网上发布亲日反华内容的漫画。共产党控制的《环球时报》指控卢是“精日”分子，鼓吹日本右翼政治和军国主义。据报道，2018年3月，外交部长王毅批评这种画亲日漫画的人是“中国的人渣”。
 
5月，安徽警方以“寻衅滋事”的罪名逮捕了创作将中国人描绘成猪的漫画书的漫画家张东宁。警方声称，这些图像“歪曲了历史事实，践踏了民族尊严，伤害了中国人民的感情。”至年底张仍然在羁押中。
 
中国政府利用大陆的经济杠杆来压制香港的言论自由。为了回应8月份在香港举行的抗议活动，大陆政府告诉香港国泰航空，禁止任何参与“非法示威、暴力或有过于激进的行为”的员工在进入中国领空的航班上工作。
 
出版与新闻媒体，包括网上媒体：中共和政府继续对所有的出版物、网上及广播材料保持绝对控制权。只有官方媒体机构才能得到政府批准报道中共领导人的新闻或其他被认为是“敏感”的话题。尽管中共及政府没有对所有出版和广播的内容作出详尽指导，但却保有不受制约的权力来决定是否、何时以及如何报道某个问题，或者干脆下令禁止报道。
 
在本年度中，官方媒体报道报道说，高层当局发布了共产党内部规定，详细列出对没有坚守意识形态规定的人的惩罚，命令进一步打击非法的互联网账号和平台，并指示媒体进一步推进政府的利益。
 
继2018年重组监管制度之后，政府继续收紧对媒体和公共话语空间的管控。中宣部在监管和指导中国的媒体做法和政策方面拥有最终话语权。重组后形成了三个由中宣部控制的独立的行政实体：国家广播电视总局、新闻出版总署以及国家电影局。虽然从表面上看国家广播电视总局仍然在国务院的领导之下，但其党委书记还兼任着中宣部副部长。
 
中国国家互联网信息办公室直接管理包括网上新闻媒体在内互联网内容，同时也促进中共的宣传。国家网信办成为代表新近成立的中共中央网络安全和信息化委员会的办公室，该委员会名义上是由习近平主席主持的。中宣部的一位副部长负责该机构的日常运作。它在规范网上媒体做法方面享有广泛的权威，并在规范和管理网上信息传播方面发挥重要作用。
 
国家网信办于2018年11月宣布的“清理”互联网工作一直持续到2019年。作为网信办2018年提出要求的一部分，那些可能被用于“社会动员”或导致“公众舆论重大变化”的互联网平台必须提交有关其活动的报告。1月23日，国家网信办发布了一个声明，确认其打击互联网内容的又一个步骤。4月6日，全国“扫黄打非”工作小组办公室宣布为期8个月的打击网上“低俗内容”的措施。根据这个说明，全国“扫黄打非”工作小组办公室责成地方当局对包括社交媒体、直播、视频和网上游戏在内的网上平台进行检查。7月，国家网信办命令26个博客和音乐应用程序关闭、暂停服务或接受监管人员的约谈。根据网信办的一个通知，这些应用程序都受到了调查，并被认定它们传播了“历史虚无主义”。
 
2018年，政府指示将中国中央电视台、中国国际广播电台和中国国家广播电台合并成一个被称为“中国之声”的新的超级媒体集团，以“加强党对重要舆论立场的集中建设与管理”。
 
出版所有的图书和杂志仍旧需要国家颁发的出版号；出版号收费高昂，而且往往难以获得。与过去一样，几乎所有的平面媒体、广播媒体和图书出版商都隶属于党政机构。有为数不多的印刷出版企业有一些私人股权，但是没有民营性质的电视台或广播电台。中共指示国内媒体不要对某些议题进行报道，传统的广播电视节目都必须经过政府的批准。
 
在国有的《北京日报》指出一些电视剧“不符合社会主义核心价值”之后，2018年流行的多部国产电视剧被停播。其中一部电视剧是有关乾隆皇帝和他的嫔妃们的。尽管2018年播出的那些剧集在网上仍然存在，许多电视台都从其2019年的节目计划中取消了类似时代的剧集。国家广播电视总局随后于3月末也对历史剧发出临时禁令。中共还检查图像的政治正确性，以确保漫画以及纪录片都支持中共。其中一个例子是，在发现国产电视剧《亲爱的，热爱的》（Go, Go, Squid）中使用的地图没有展现台湾和海南是中国的一部分之后，该剧受到了调查。
 
记者在政府严格管控的环境中工作。只有获得政府官方认可的新闻记者才被许可发布平面或网上新闻。中共不断监测记者们各种形式的报道，包括平面新闻、电视报道以及包括直播在内的互联网新闻。记者和编辑们都进行自我审查以保持在中共划定的界限之内；越界会受到越来越严厉的惩罚，而这种界限可能是模糊的。尽管中国不断增加的互联网用户要求用最新技术来讲述有趣的故事，政府当局对那些新技术（例如网上直播）实施管控，压制新的数字媒体和社交媒体平台。
 
由于中共不认为互联网新闻公司是“官方”媒体，这些公司都受制于会削弱其运行的法规，并且被禁止报道潜在的“敏感”消息。据全国记者协会2017年在国家新闻媒体上的最新报道，中国有23万1564名具有正式资格的记者。只有1406名记者从事网络新闻工作，其中大部分都就职于诸如新华网或中国日报网等国有媒体。其他网络媒体也报道重要消息，但是他们必须限制自己的方式和话题，因为他们未获得官方批准。
 
1月，政府官员拘押了网上劳工新闻媒体“微工汇”的主编杨郑君，该媒体报道了中国劳工的有害工作环境。据自由亚洲电台报道，3月20日，警方在其广州的家里拘捕了劳工维权人士、公民媒体杂志《新生代》的编辑危志立。有19天的时间他被禁止与律师见面，期间警方在深圳第二拘留所5次审讯危。美国之音报道称，当局禁止危的妻子郑楚然对外国媒体讲述她丈夫被拘留的情况。3月20日警方在广州还拘押了危的同事柯成兵，但直到年底也没有关于其状况的信息。8月，当局正式逮捕了杨、危和柯，并以“寻衅滋事”的罪名起诉他们。
 
6月，重庆当局宣布，他们将刘鹏飞定罪并判处他两年徒刑，罪名不详。刘是一个转发外国媒体中文文章的微信群主，于2017年被拘押。在公布判决结果之前，刘的情况和拘押地点一直不明。
 
8月1日，重庆警方逮捕了以前是记者的张家龙。尽管据说警方是因张在2017年及以前在社交媒体上发文而逮捕他，却没有正式公布罪名。张是著名的记者和反新闻审查活动人士，曾任腾讯的编辑，因与当时的美国国务卿约翰·克里见面而被解雇以后，于2014年停止公开发表文章。至年底张的下落仍然不明。
 
暴力与骚扰：政府经常妨碍媒体工作，包括阻挠公民记者。一些记者报告说，在报道敏感话题时会受到人身攻击、骚扰、监视和恐吓。政府官员使用刑事起诉、民事诉讼和包括暴力、拘押和其他形式的骚扰在内的其他惩罚手段来恐吓作者和记者，以阻止他们就广泛的话题发布未经批准的信息。
 
海外记者的家人也面临骚扰，时有拘押发生，藉此来报复他们海外亲属所做的报道。截至年底，位于美国的自由亚洲电台维吾尔语组的记者们仍有几十名亲属在新疆失踪或被任意拘押。
 
记者如果发表质疑政府的观点就可能要面临降职或失业。在很多情况下可能的信息源会因为实际存在的政府压力或对政府压力的恐惧而拒绝与记者会面。据多名记者报告称，在本年度中，审查的范围扩大到“几乎所有的话题都被认为是敏感的”。比如，尽管在过去几年中商业新闻报道相对不受控制，但即使是这类话题，许多记者的联系人也都不愿再公开谈论。本年度中当局关押了许多从事传统媒体和新媒体工作的记者。
 
6月10日，中共北京纪律检查委员会以“严重违纪违法”的罪名指控备受欢迎的《新京报》前出版商和联合创始人戴子庚。
 
中国记者黄雪琴因报道中国的“#我也是”（#MeToo）运动而著名；她在发表了与香港的反政府抗议有关的文章之后于10月在广州被捕。官方指控她“寻衅滋事”。直至年底她仍在被拘押中。
 
中央和地方的中共宣传部门仍然严格限制外国记者，尤其是在敏感时期和各种纪念日。在中国的外国记者俱乐部（FCCC）于1月发布了一个报告，详细描述了在中国的外国记者的情况。在对外国记者俱乐部问卷作出回应的记者中，有超出半数（55%）的人说在过去的12个月中报道环境进一步恶化。他们报告说，政府一直监视外国记者，手段包括使用人员和越来越多地使用电子手段。在回答问卷的人中，有91%的记者对自己电话的安全性表示担心，66%的人担心在自己家里和办公室里受到的监控。有半数的记者说，这种监控削弱了他们在中国进行报道的能力。
 
8月，一名为外国媒体工作的加拿大记者在广东作报道时被拘押。当地警察在一个农村地区拘押了该记者和一名中国新闻助理，然后用车将他们带到一个较大城市的派出所，扣押了7个小时，没收了他们的电子设备，复制了两人手机里的所有信息，并且在将他们送上火车离开前试图迫使中国同事签署认罪书。官员跟随他们上了火车，将二人分开，并继续恐吓他们。
 
在香港抗议期间，大陆政府当局加剧骚扰外国记者，在香港附近的过境点、北京机场和其他地方阻拦了许多记者，以签证问题威胁他们，并复制他们的电子设备内容。记者们说，这妨碍了他们收集和传播抗议活动的报道的能力。
 
外国媒体机构报道说，外国新闻机构的中国当地的雇员受到官方骚扰和恐吓。一名中国公民在协助一位外国记者报道的旅途中被当地警方拘押，他被绑在椅子上整整一天之后才获释。政府官员联系并骚扰了许多中国公民雇员的家人，试图以此施压来迫使他们离开工作岗位。这类案件中的中国公民和他们的外国雇主都缺少求助途径，而且他们由于担心遭受更大的压迫而不愿向当局告状。
 
在新疆，政府对外国记者的骚扰尤甚。据外国记者俱乐部1月的报告，2018年到新疆去的28名外国记者中，有26人报告说政府官员告诉他们限制或禁止报道。这种情况在2019年仍然继续，许多外国记者报告说他们在新疆总是受到跟踪，政府机构插手阻拦他们进入一些地区，恐吓当地居民使他们不敢与记者交谈，并叫停记者，抢走他们的像机，强迫他们删除图像；这样的情况有时一天会发生多次。
 
外交部官员继续将特别面谈作为绝大多数外国记者签证年度更新的一部分。在面谈中，官员会对记者施压，要他们少报道人权问题，提出记者们不能逾越的报道“红线”，有时候还会威胁他们不给续签签证。由于难以得到签证，许多外国媒体机构仍然难以扩大或维持他们在中国的业务。在《华尔街日报》刊登了新加坡公民王春翰撰写的有关习近平主席表弟有财务问题的文章之后，外交部取消了作者的记者证，实际上就是剥夺了他在中国工作的能力。在对取消王的证件的决定做出解释时，外交部特别指出，“外国记者在恶意抹黑中国，我们不欢迎这样的记者。”在一些情况下，记者发表了批评中国政府的新闻之后只得到6个月甚至3个月的签证，使他们无法在中国有效地工作。其他一些媒体组织无法在透明的系统中为新记者提交签证申请，外国记者在提交或处理签证申请之前就要受到政府官员的审查。一些外国媒体机构不愿意公开这些问题，因为他们担心会引起政府进一步的反弹。
 
当局继续对在外国媒体机构中供职的中国公民实行严格限制。外国媒体机构中国籍员工行为准则用开除或取消资格来威胁那些进行独立报道的中国员工。该准则还指示中国员工向其雇主提供有助于树立“中国良好形象”的信息。
 
报道商业问题的传媒机构相对受到较少限制，但是宣传官员的事后审查体制鼓励编辑们做自我审查，以避免无意中刊登未经授权的内容而受到处罚带来的损失。
 
政府官员还试图压制中国境外的媒体。尽管在前些年这样的做法主要针对的是中文媒体，但在本年度中有更多的报道说，无论批评中国的媒体使用的是什么语言或位于什么地方，都可能会受到压制。3月，政府官员警告瑞典一传媒机构停止其“严重政治挑衅”的行为，原因是该机构发表了一个瑞典语的社论，对一个中国官方反对的观点表示支持。另外一个政府官员威胁一名俄罗斯记者，如果他不将在俄语报纸上发表的一份详细讲述中国负面经济统计数据的文章撤回的话，就要把他列入黑名单，
 
审查或内容限制：中国国务院的《出版管理条例》给予各级政府宽泛的权力来根据内容限制出版，包括规定是否、何时以及如何报道特定问题。尽管外交部每日的例行新闻发布会基本上是对外开放的，国务院信息办公室也安排了其他政府机构的发布会，但记者不能自由地参加其他新闻活动。国防部和商务部继续有选择地允许外国媒体参加有时举办的新闻发布会。
 
供本国记者使用的官方指南通常语焉不详，宣传官员可随意修改，并可追溯执行。宣传部门强迫报社和网上媒体解雇发表内容与官方政策不一致的文章的编辑和记者，并暂停或取缔出版物。记者、作者和编辑仍然要进行广泛的自我审查，尤其是因为宣传官员进行的出版后审查包含了不同程度的责罚。
 
报道了敏感问题的记者依旧会被逮捕和解雇。刘万永是中国少数几个著名的调查记者之一，他宣布退出记者职业，指责调查和发布准确新闻的空间在不断缩小。包括前国家广播电台评论员王志安在内的多个博客作者的微博账号被封。
 
中共中央宣传部命令媒体严格按照权威部门提供的信息报道，尤其是对敏感事件或重大事件的报道。这类指示往往还警告媒体不准报道与党和官员的名誉、健康和安全以及外交事务相关的内容。
 
对公众对习主席描述的控制有所增加，审查员会迅速关闭任何与官方媒体表述不同的内容。社交媒体仍然继续阻止发布维尼熊卡通形象，因为互联网用户用维尼熊来代表习近平主席。社交媒体帖文不允许与习近平和中国其他主要领导有关的评论。
 
外国记者要进入西藏自治区、其他藏区或者新疆从事报道而不受到严重的干扰极为困难。试图在其他敏感地区做报道的外国记者也遇到限制进入或受干扰的问题。根据外国记者俱乐部1月的报告，回复问卷的记者报告说，在新疆（93%）、朝鲜边境地区（56%）、内蒙古（67%）、钢铁生产区等工业区（100%）以及其它地区都遭遇到政府的干扰。
 
国内电影继续受到政府的审查。7月，政府的电影监管机构国家电影局的负责人在一次对政府官员和电影制造业代表的讲话中说，勉励他们利用电影来宣传中国的政治价值观。该年度中政府禁止发行许多新电影，包括一些著名导演和高额预算的制作，因为它们没有通过政府审查。尽管已经播放过多个剧情预告片，花费8000万美元制作的历史战争片《八百壮士》还是在7月5日发行日之前从发行名单上被去除。同样的，2月，由世界著名导演张艺谋制作的电影《一秒钟》因“技术问题”在柏林电影节开幕前数日退出；这是中国电影审查惯用的委婉说法。由于没有得到中国当局必要的许可，另外一部电影《好日子》也退出了同一个电影节。国家电影局局长明确鼓励国内的电影制作人寻找更“有价值和重大”的主题，从国家的“优秀传统文化”、“革命文化”和“社会主义先进文化”中获取素材。
 
10月，当美国的喜剧节目《南方公园》播出了一集描述中国审查制度的节目以后，当局禁止电视台和互联网播放该集以及其它《南方公园》的内容。
 
主要限于在宾馆和外国人聚居区播放的海外新闻播报也要受到审查。一些外国报纸和杂志的个别日期的报纸和期刊偶尔也会因为含有过于敏感的文章而被禁。国际杂志上有关敏感问题的文章会被拿掉。电视新闻在播放敏感主题的时候会遭到屏蔽。
 
就政治敏感事件的报道而言，对中文的审查最严格，其次是英文，然后才是其他语言。政府禁止一些被认为过于敏感的国内外电影在中国上映，或者会将有关部分删除才允许上映，其中包括了《波西米亚狂想曲》和《壮志凌云：独行侠》（Top Gun: Maverick）。根据政府规定，当局必须对在中国放映的每一部外国电影授权，每年放映总数不得超过50部。
 
当局继续禁止出版他们认为内容与官方观点不同的图书。法律仅允许获得政府批准的出版社出版图书。未经国家新闻出版广播电影电视总局和有关省级出版机构批准的报纸、期刊、图书、音像制品或电子出版物不得出版发行。未经政府批准试图出版的个人面临监禁、罚款、没收图书和其他形式的处罚。中共控制出版行业的手段还包括事先将某些议题列为国家机密。
 
5月，媒体报道说，重庆和云南有3名政府官员因“秘密购买、阅读和保存有严重政治问题的海外图书及出版物”而受到处分。
 
秋季，教育部指示所有的学校图书馆审查其收藏的图书，销毁那些“破坏国家统一、主权或领土；破坏社会秩序及社会稳定；违反党的指导方针和政策；以及抹黑或污蔑党、国家领导人和英雄人物”的书籍。甘肃省镇原县国有图书馆的官员对此作出回应，将“非法图书、宗教出版物，尤其是有偏见的图书和文章”成堆焚毁；图书馆的网页发布了相关通知和照片，在网上广为传播。
 
出现了新的境外图书审查案件：政府审查员要求在国内印刷的图书都必须符合政府的宣传指南，即使那些书是外国作者写给外国读者看的也不能例外。2月，澳大利亚的一个书商报告说，中国官员不准一个中国公司出版一本含有他们不认可的政治内容的书籍，即使该书印刷后马上就会被运送出中国也不行。
 
政府颁布禁令禁止销售未获得进口许可的外国出版物。这也包括了禁止网上销售平台销售未经政府批准的“海外出版物”，包括图书、电影和游戏。该禁令也适用于与出版物有关的服务。
 
在1989年6月4日天安门广场大屠杀30周年纪念日，政府采取了一系列手段来阻止公开提及那个历史事件，不仅是在中国，甚至在其他国家也是如此。在国内，政府提前针对包括大屠杀受害者年迈的父母在内的那些潜在批评者，将他们关押起来或者暂时将他们赶出主要城市。网上审查幅度有所提升，即使是间接提及该事件和相关图像，政府的审查员也会粗暴地将其从所有的网上平台屏蔽掉；例如，被屏蔽的图像中包括一个用几本书排列成队面对一只烟盒的图像，它会提醒人们联想到那个在北京街头一名男子面对坦克的著名视频。在正常情况下能够在中国登录CNN网站，但6月4日却被屏蔽；而且在CNN做现场报道之时，有关官员在新闻播报员和摄影师之间往返奔走，强制要求他们终止报道。其他国际媒体机构也因针对该纪念日做报道而面临更多的监管和拘押，包括有一名记者被拘押了6个小时。审查人员和国内的互联网公司都说，在机器学习和语音及图像识别技术的帮助下，用来发现和屏蔽与1989年镇压有关内容的工具达到了前所未有的准确度。
 
新颁布的《英烈保护法》将侮辱和诋毁著名共产党员视为非法。国家网信办援引该法律，命令国内一个主要的新闻应用程序Bytedance更正“诋毁”著名的共产党历史人物方志敏的信息，并惩处发布该信息的个人。四川警方以违反《英烈法》的名义逮捕了一位知名的女性博客作者，因为她发布了一个视频，视频中她将一条“象征着革命传统”的红围巾与“不合时宜的超短裙”搭配。3月28日，这名在判决书中仅被称为“唐”（Tang,音译）的博主被法院判处了12天监禁、罚款并命其删除该视频。
 
当局经常以保护国家安全为理由说明限制言论的正当性。尤其是政府领导人通常以恐怖主义威胁的借口来限制穆斯林人士和其他宗教少数民族的言论自由。这些都是限制新闻传播、出版物以及其他言论压制的基本理由。
 
互联网自由
 
政府严格控制并高度审查国内的互联网使用情况。大部分互联网用户通过移动设备上网。有6亿8600多万人，或者说是有四分之三的移动互联网用户通过社交和网上媒体获取新闻。
 
尽管互联网非常普及，其内容却受到当局严格的审查。政府在全国、各省和地方继续雇用成千上万的人来监督电子通讯和网上内容。据报政府雇用人员在各种网站上推广官方观点、反击网上出现的不同观点。互联网公司也自行雇用数以千计的审查员来执行中共和政府的禁令。一旦政府官员因其内容而批评或暂时屏蔽了一个网上平台，该平台的上级公司就必须雇用更多的内部审查员，致使每个公司要为此雇用成千上万以至数万人，极大地增加了员工需求量。
 
1月的前三个星期，国家网信办关闭了730个网站和9300个移动应用程序，而且在这年的第二个季度关闭了总共2899个网站。国家网信办宣称，到4月为止已经删除了700万条网上信息和9382个移动应用程序。这些被移除的信息都因含有不当内容而被视为“有害”，其中包括政治敏感的材料。例如，据报道仅在7月份国家网信办就收到将近1200万条关于“非法和有害的”网上信息的“有效”举报。
 
国家网信办还专门命令腾讯的“天天快报”新闻应用程序做出改变，国家网信办的声明指责它一直在扩散“有害的并且损害互联网生态环境的低俗信息”。2018年，作为全行业收紧视频游戏市场的一部分，腾讯游戏平台上的视频游戏新产品审批被冻结了9个月，但批评新闻应用程序这还是第一次。2月下旬，腾讯的流行信息应用程序“微信”宣布，自年初以来已经关闭了4万多个公众号，删除了7万9000篇文章。该声明说，被关掉的公号内容“虚假、夸张和粗俗”，“传播了绝望和沮丧的文化”，“损害了用户的品味”以及该平台的整体环境。
 
法律规定在中国国内运行的互联网平台公司须控制在自己平台上发布的内容，否则就会面临惩罚。据公民实验室（Citizen Lab）说，在中国国内的微信用户其聊天信息和图像都要受到自动过滤，这限制了他们自由交流的能力。
 
4月8日，流行的社交媒体“微博”（与推特相似，由新浪拥有）宣布，它“根据相关法律法规”暂停了50多个受欢迎的账号，因为这些账号里包含了“政治上有害的信息”。这些账号的拥有者收到微博的通知说，账号暂停90到180天。账号拥有者包括著名学者于建嵘，据报道他已经数年没有发布敏感信息了，但在他的账号被关闭的时候仍受到720万人的关注。
 
政府继续发布一系列规定，用于实施2017年生效的《网络安全法》。该法允许政府“监督、保护和处理源自国内或国外的网络安全风险及威胁”，并确定，利用互联网“制造或传播虚假信息以破坏经济或社会秩序”属于犯罪。该法律还规定，允许安全机构在“重大安全事件”发生时中断某个地理区域全部的通讯网络，但在该法通过之前当局已经采取过这种措施。
 
1月，新华社发布了一条权威性的新闻，称中国网络视听节目服务协会发布了两个关于短视频市场规定的新文件，其中一个是有关网络平台的规定，另一个是关于内容审查的。新的审查措施对网上短视频施行了更为严格的标准。这个据信是根据政府指示发布的指南，禁止发布从视频用户穿着共产党的戏装到“提倡拜金和享乐主义”等100种不宜的内容。中国网络视听节目服务协会文件公开谈了要求那些网上视频服务商执行的“内容审查”标准。其他应该被删除的内容包括“攻击中国的政治制度和法律制度”、“损害中国形象的内容”、“恋脚癖和性呻吟”以及“调侃国歌”等。这些文件要求网络平台要随着业务的增长与改变扩大其内部审查团队，对每天在其平台上发布的每1000个新视频要配备至少一个“内容审查”员工。
 
国家网信办关于互联网新闻信息服务的规定要求网站、移动应用、论坛、博客、即时通讯服务和搜索引擎都要保证，对政治、经济、外交的新闻报道或评论都符合官方对“事实”的认定。这些规定将对传统媒体早已有之的控制扩展到了包括网络及社交媒体在内的新媒体，以保证这些新闻来源也符合中共的指示。
 
6月，审查人员突然关闭了从事金融新闻整合的《华尔街见闻》（wallstreetcn.com）的移动应用和网页；该移动应用已经被下载过1亿多次。该年度早些时候，监管机构因无许可证发送新闻、扰乱“网上新闻秩序”而对《华尔街见闻》施行罚款。在关闭通知中国家网信办称，《华尔街见闻》违反了网络安全措施。
 
国家网信办还规定所有的直播平台、视频平台、商业网站、门户网站以及应用都向国家网信办登记。有执照的中央媒体及其附属机构的网上内容平台不需登记。
 
法规规定在诸如微博和微信等博客或即时通信平台上传送视听材料必须具备特别许可。平台管理者直接负责保证用户发布的内容符合其许可范围。这包括电视节目、电影、新闻节目以及纪录片，很多网民仅仅通过社交媒体渠道来消费这些内容。规定禁止上传任何业余人士制作的、符合新闻节目定义或关于“敏感”话题的内容。
 
2017年完成的网络安全法也加强了在网站和社交媒体实行实名登记的规定，对向未提供实名信息的用户提供服务的网络运营商加以惩罚。作为回应，百度和新浪微博宣布，那些没有用实名登记的账户在使用一些网站功能（如对网贴的评论）方面会受到限制。邢台和上海的网吧也开始使用人脸识别手段来与用户身份证上的照片做比对。3月，在上海外围的一个化工厂爆炸以后，地方政府对媒体为了捕捉爆炸镜头而发送的无人机实施干扰。
 
政府继续致力于限制使用“未经授权”使用虚拟专用网络（VPN）服务。尽管政府允许包括一些主要的国际公司在内的用户继续使用经授权的虚拟专用网络，许多小公司、学术界以及公民都被禁止使用VPN。3月，河南省一家法院以“非法提供入侵电脑信息系统的工具”的罪名起诉孙东洋，因为他经营着一个提供VPN和其他翻越政府防火墙的网站。
 
中国政府定期惩罚那些被发现使用未经授权的VPN的人。而同时政府又默许网民使用VPN到访推特、脸书、电报（Telegram）以及其他通常在中国是无法到访的网站，目的是攻击那些批评中国政府的观点。例如，中国驻外大使馆和官媒分支机构经常在推特、脸书和油管用中文和英文发帖。
 
2018年12月，珠海法院在一次不公开庭审中以“煽动颠覆国家政权”的罪名判处著名反审查活动人士甄江华两年徒刑。他于11月8日获释。甄的网名是GuestZhen，据报道他曾经为国内互联网用户提供翻越防火墙的指导，使海外能够看到其帖文。他还曾经是一个名为“权利运动”网站的执行管理者，该网站帮助收集和传播维权信息。
 
包括《纽约时报》、《华尔街日报》在内的许多（如果不是大多数）主要国际新闻和信息的网站以及大赦国际和人权观察等人权组织的网站都被屏蔽。本年度中中国政府进一步限制了这一空间，又通过所谓的“防火墙”增加了对《华盛顿邮报》、《卫报》、《赫芬顿邮报》、澳大利亚的《时代与新闻》以及维基百科网站的屏蔽。
 
政府的审查人员继续屏蔽与敏感话题有关的网站或网上内容，诸如台湾、达赖喇嘛、西藏、新疆和1989天安门屠杀等。本年度发生的香港抗议受到了严厉的选择性审查：一开始中国政府压制媒体报道对抗议的任何提及和网上与抗议有关的任何讨论，随后开始允许甚至鼓励批评抗议者的报道，同时继续禁止正面或中立报道的与抗议者有关的消息，包括对抗议者详细的民主诉求和要追究警察责任的报道。
 
8月5日，中山大学的博士生陈纯加入了香港的抗议并在他的微博账号上发表了他对香港抗议者的支持。其他网民向广东警方举报了他，他的账号随即被关闭。
 
对中国拥有的社交媒体平台的国外用户的新闻审查也有所发生。11月，“字节跳动”（Bytedance）公司辖下的“抖音”屏蔽了一个外国用户的账户，该账户发布了一个关注新疆持续不断的侵犯人权行为的视频。在公众的强烈抗议之后抖音恢复了他的账号，并且承认，她的视频被暂时删除是“由于人为的管理错误”。
 
中国政府还惩罚中国公民在海外期间于外国社交媒体平台上表达意见的行为。11月，武汉的一个法院判决罗岱青6个月监禁，罪名是“寻衅滋事”；罗在推特上发布了一组讽刺中国领导人的图像。罗在明尼苏达留学期间发布了这些图像，他7月回武汉探亲时被逮捕。
 
中国政府还大力加强了对商业和经济信息的审查。6月，至少有10个知名的发布财经新闻与财经分析的博客被关闭，过去发布的所有内容都被删除。这一做法与中国政府宣传部门发布具体的关于中国经济新消息是同步发生的。
 
成千上万的社交媒体和其他网站仍然被屏蔽，包括脸书、推特、Instagram、谷歌以及油管。
 
尽管在中国受到屏蔽，推特估计仍然有数百万的中国用户。中国政府最近一轮对推特的注意始于2018年。居住在北京的一名中国异议人士说，北京市公安局因涉嫌“煽动颠覆国家政权”的罪名而两次传唤他，并拿出多页打印出来的他的推文作为证据。监视互联网的人和活动人士收集了至少40个由政府人员亲自出面要求用户删除其推文或关闭其推特账号的案例。一名用户在拘留所度过了15天，警方同时威胁了另外一位用户的家人，还有一位推特用户被铐在椅子上审讯达8小时之久。
 
在本年度中，当局继续操纵个人推特账号中的内容。有报道称，当局强迫一些人让其进入他们的推特账户，然后当局借此删除他们的推文。3月，一个专门使用公开数据来认真分析政府活动的推特账号@AirMovingDevice背后的匿名网民宣布，她或他将删除以前所有的推文并停止交流，并且说：“我无意颠覆国家或党的权威。”
 
当局继续监禁多个和平表达自己政治观点的互联网作者。7月29日，四川一个法院判决著名博客作者黄琦12年监禁，罪名是“故意泄漏国家机密”和“向外国机构非法提供国家机密”；黄是中国互联网先驱，中共曾经表扬他利用网络来“抵抗社会疾病”。该指控来自黄在“64天网”博客上公布侵犯人权案例的做法。黄琦以前已经入狱两次，共坐牢8年，原因是他在博客上揭露了地方政府的渎职和残暴行径。黄在被刑满释放之后继续进行其博客活动。
 
1月29日，湖北的一个法院判决刘云飞5年监禁，罪名是“煽动颠覆国家政权罪”，因为他经营着一个公布政府腐败和侵犯人权情况的新闻门户。此外还有接连不断的针对对外国网站、记者和新闻机构进行网络攻击的报告，这些媒体发布了中国政府限制中国互联网用户访问的信息。和过去一样，政府有选择地屏蔽由外国机构运营的网站，其中包括卫生组织、教育机构、非政府组织、社交网站以及搜索引擎等。
 
继2017年政府宣布同性行为/关系是“非正常的性关系”并禁止描述这些行为之后，有关同性恋行为/同性关系和使用准确的科学术语描述生殖器仍然受到禁止。一个以女同性恋者为主题的微博账户于4月突然被关闭，几个星期之后又重新开放，超过14万3千个用户在这个账户中交换信息。电影《波西米亚狂想曲》中有数个描述主角同性恋关系的场景，在中国影院版中都被剪除。
 
尽管这种审查能够有效地使普通用户远离有敏感内容的网站，但许多用户通过各种技术手段绕过了审查。在中国国内能够获取境外代理服务器的信息和规避审查的软件，但很多时候会受到防火墙的限制。诸如电报和WhatsApp之类的加密通讯应用程序经常被中断，尤其是在一年中的那些“敏感”时期。
 
《国家保密法》要求互联网公司全面配合对涉嫌泄露国家机密案件的调查，一经发现立即停止传输此类信息并向当局举报此类犯罪行为。此规定定义泛泛而且没有明确的限制。此外，这些公司还必须按照当局的指令从其网站上删除此类信息，否则将会受到警方和公安部等有关部门的惩罚。
 
6月9日，居住在深圳的基督徒和当地民主运动的前参与者郭永丰被九祥岭区警方传唤，这是对他在网上声言要起诉腾讯封禁他的几个社交媒体账户一事的回应。警方警告郭不准在网上发表有关维权和组织相关集会的信息，而且直到郭写了保证书之后才释放他。
 
 
政府继续限制学术自由和艺术自由，并在大专院校和研究机构限制讨论政治和社会课题。中宣部发布的限制规定和决定约束了人员和思想的交流。
 
许多知识分子和学者都做自我审查，他们知道与政治话题有关的书籍和文章会被认为内容过于敏感而不得发行。对艺术作品的审查与自我审查也很常见，尤其是那些被认为含有政治敏感内容的艺术作品。当局常常拒绝西方音乐家在中国举办音乐会的申请，严查文化活动的内容，并施加压力，鼓励讨论中的自我审查。
 
政府和中共组织部继续控制着大学里大多数领导职位的任命，包括系主任。尽管是否共产党员并不总是取得终身教职的必要条件，但没有党籍的学者能够得到的晋升机会往往很少。被认为是政治敏感的学术领域（例如，民权、高层裙带关系、公民社会等等）仍被禁止。一些学者要对自己发表的内容做自我审查，面临要得出预设的研究结果的压力，或者在政治敏感时期无法召开有国际人士参加的会议。外国学者声称，政府用拒签签证、阻止查阅档案、不让做实地调查或访谈等方式来迫使他们对自己的工作做自我审查。在课堂上使用外国教科书仍然受到限制，而国内出版的教科书的编辑继续受到中共的控制。
 
所有专业的本科生都要修习有关马克思、毛主义、邓小平思想以及习近平思想等政治意识形态课。2月，中共中央和国务院公布了中国政府的《中国教育现代化2035》,明确了10项战略任务，第一个任务就是学习以及在包括中小学在内的教育系统中全面贯彻习近平思想，并且加强高等教育机构中的政治思想教育。
 
多家媒体报道称在大学校园了加强了意识形态控制，表达偏离中共思想的观点的教授被解聘。3月，清华大学教授许章润被停职，原因是他撰写了一系列文章批评中共和习近平的政策。2018年8月，杨绍政教授因发表“政治上错误的言论和政治上有害的文章”被贵州大学开除，其中包括了一篇估算维持中共党政人员成本的文章。他被开除之后，政府剥夺了他的教学资格，致使他无法找到新的工作，同时在6月4日，公安人员以“寻衅滋事”为由逮捕了他。随后他被释放，但是当局于8月又一次拘押了他，并且取消了他的医保和社保福利。12月，复旦大学、南京大学和陕西师范大学都修改了章程，增加了立志坚持共产党在学校的领导地位的内容，删除了“思想自由”的文字。复旦大学的学生高唱校歌以示抗议，校歌里提到了“思想自由”。
 
被学生举报有政治敏感性或不当言论的大学教授继续受到审查。有时大学会安排学生作告密者。7月，成都的一个大学教授被停止教学两年，因为学生投诉说他对中国文化和发明表示不屑。重庆师范大学的教授唐云被禁止教学并降级，因为他在有关中国作家鲁迅的教学中发表了“政治不正确的言论”。在学生将其言论报告给学校的党组织以后，唐教授的教学资格被取消。
 
本年度早些时候，在大学校园里对学生劳工权利活动人士的镇压有所增加。1月，《纽约时报》报道说，多个著名中国大学的20多个学生被迫观看被逮捕的劳工维权人士认罪的录像，以此来向这些学生施压，要他们放弃自己的活动。据报道，还有一些北京大学和人民大学的学生以及近期离校的毕业生在发表声明谴责警察使用强迫认罪视频之后被拘押，并且与外界隔绝。5月，美国有线电视新闻网（CNN）报道说，在国际劳动节和五四运动100周年纪念日前夕，有6名信奉马克思主义的大学生失踪。失踪学生、劳工权利活动人士之一邱占萱发布了一个视频和一个书面陈述，详细描述了在警方羁押期间受到的虐待，包括遭到脱衣搜身以及被迫听高音量的习近平长篇讲话。
 
在中国联合开办学习项目的外国大学必须在校内建立中共的党委，赋予中共官员决策权。8月，路透社报道称，为了打击外国的影响，在过去6个月中逮捕和驱逐外国教师的情况有所上升。
 
在本学年中，学校都面临使用国际课程的新禁令。教育部强行终止了美国历史、世界历史、欧洲历史和人文地理等科目的美国大学预修课程考试（Advanced Placement Exam）。中国政府允许包括微积分、生物学和化学在内的其他科目的考试。
 
在若干情况下，当局阻止了被认为政治敏感的一些人入境，同时拒绝给一些应邀参加国际交流项目的中国公民发放护照，原因是当局认为他们“政治上不可靠”，尤其是藏人、维吾尔人以及其他一些少数民族地区的居民。另有多名应邀参加外国政府资助的交流活动并且已经有护照的人——包括一些学者——在申请出国参加项目时遭遇困难。一些学者报告说，他们必须经过批准才能够出国旅行。
 
中共的影响范围逐渐扩大，超越了中国的国土边境。在多次事件中，中国留学生监视和反对在校园里组织据信是批评中国的演讲或活动，这种事情经常和中国政府协调行动。2月，据《华盛顿邮报》报道，在加拿大安大略省的麦克马斯特大学的一些学生向中国大使馆寻求指示，将维吾尔族活动人士托度希（Rukiye Turdush）关于中国大规模关押穆斯林的演讲录像。8月，伦敦的《泰晤士报》报道称，中国意图操纵英国的媒体并通过英国的大学影响公职人员，其中提到了由与中国政府有关联的威斯敏斯特大学媒体研究中心提供如何应对英国媒体的培训，以及利兹大学商务孔子学院将英国政府官员、学者和企业高管设为目标。8月，澳大利亚成立了一个大学反外国干预工作组，以提高大学和政府之间的协商，保护国家利益；这一举动出于对澳大利亚校园受到外国干预的不断上升的担忧。11月14日，该工作组发布了一系列指导方针，旨在通过捍卫澳大利亚大学的声誉、保护学术自由以及确保学术机构和澳大利亚经济能够最大程度地利用研究成果，以此来防范此类外国干预。
 
当局在新疆造成多个知名的维吾尔族学者和知识分子失踪或被羁押。有些官员和学者被控是“两面人”，这是一种隐喻的说法，指的是那些在国家和党的工作岗位上工作，但具有“分裂主义”或“反对官方”倾向的少数民族人士，包括不同意官方限制少数民族的文化、语言和宗教。那些失踪了而且据信是被关在再教育营里或者关押在其他地方的人包括国际知名的民俗学者热依拉·达吾提、文学教授阿卜杜克里木·热合曼、新疆大学教授阿扎提·苏里坦、文学教授盖热提·奥斯曼、语言教授阿尔斯兰·阿卜杜拉、诗人阿卜杜拉迪尔·贾拉拉丁，以及作家亚力坤·茹孜。热依拉·达吾提的汉族学生冯思雨（音）也被羁押。当局拘押了前新疆教育厅厅长沙塔尔·沙吾提，将喀什大学校长艾尔肯·乌买尔和副校长姆赫提· 阿布杜吾普尔撤职，他们在年底均已失踪。法院以“分裂主义”罪名判处前新疆医科大学医院院长哈木拉提·乌普尔死刑，缓期执行。根据该年度一些国际组织的报道，宗教学者穆罕默德·萨利赫·阿吉和阿卜杜勒赫德·买合苏力在再教育营中死亡。前新疆大学校长塔西甫拉提·特依拜仍然因“分裂主义”罪名被拘押，有些人权组织报告称他已经被判死刑。经济学家伊利哈木·土赫提自2014年因与分裂主义有关的罪名被判无期徒刑，至今仍在狱中。
 
政府限制和平集会和结社的自由。
 
 
尽管宪法规定和平集会自由，但政府严格限制这一权利。法律规定这种活动不得挑战“党的领导”或侵犯“国家利益”。对政治体制或国家领导人的抗议遭到禁止。对于表达不同政治观点的示威，当局不予批准，并且迅速压制。
 
全国各地的公民继续公开集结以抗议驱赶、强迫搬迁和不当补偿，经常会导致与当局的冲突或正式起诉。媒体报道，本年度在全国各地发生了数千起请愿。尽管和平请愿是合法的，公安官员却极少发放许可。尽管有限制，仍有很多示威发生，但当局会迅速驱散那些因各种政治不满或社会不满而起的示威，有时甚至过度使用武力。
 
7月，来自湖北省省会武汉市的居民抗议该市阳逻区计划修建一座垃圾焚烧厂。媒体在2013年报道说，武汉的五家此类工厂不合格，并排放出危险污染物。抗议活动持续了数天，涉及多达1万名示威者，后来地方政府将他们驱散。
 
12月26日，山东省警察与全国其他地方的警察配合，逮捕了12月初聚集在福建厦门的人权活动人士和参与者，这些人组织了民间团体并计划在全国开展非暴力社会运动。人们怀疑他们受到的指控包括“煽动颠覆国家政权”和“颠覆国家政权”；如果定罪，后一种罪行的最低刑期为10年。年底，警察至少拘捕了四名活动人士，将其“在指定地点监视居住”：包括组织者丁家喜、活动人士张忠顺、李英俊和戴振亚。他们的家人都没有关于他们下落的消息。一些人权活动人士或与会者有间接关系的人逃离了中国或躲藏在国内。参加会议的其他几人，包括人权律师，在不同的管辖区被警察拘留了几天，以进行询问和调查。
 
所有超过200人参加的音乐会、体育活动、健身班或其他集会都需要经过公安部门的批准。在北京和其他地方有大量的公众集会在开始前的最后一分钟被取消，或者政府拒绝为之发放许可，名义上是要确保公共安全。
 
结社自由
 
宪法规定有结社自由，但政府限制这项权利。中共的政策和政府法规要求所有的专业、社会和经济团体在政府正式登记并获得批准。这些法规阻止了成立自治的政治、人权、宗教、精神、劳工和其他政府认为有可能在任何领域挑战其权威的团体。政府依旧严密控制民间组织，有时会拘押或骚扰非政府组织的工作人员。
 
对非政府组织的监管系统非常严格，但是具体的规定会因外国或国内的组织而不同。国内的非政府组织受到《慈善法》以及其他许多相关规定的管理。国内非政府组织可以登记为以下三个类别之一：社会团体、社会组织或者基金会。国内的非政府组织都要在民政部登记，而且要挂靠一个得到正式认可的、作为其“专业监督单位”的机构。寻找一个挂靠单位并非易事，因为挂靠单位要为挂靠的非政府组织的活动承担民事或法律责任。所有的团体组织都必须报告其资金来源，包括来自外国的资金。国内非政府组织在继续调整以适应这个新的监管框架。
 
2016年，中共中央委员会发布了一项指示，要求到2020年在所有非政府组织里建立党组织。当局称，这些在非政府组织内部运作的中共党组织能够对非政府组织在“为重要的项目、重要的专业活动、主要的开支和资金、接受大额捐款以及有外国人参与的活动等方面做决策时”“加强指导”。该指示还要求当局进行年度抽查以确认“意识形态政治工作、党建、财务和人员管理、学习班、对外交流、接受外国捐助和帮助、以及按照该组织的章程运作”等方面是否合规。
 
2017年，《中华人民共和国境外非政府组织境内活动管理法》（简称《境外非政府组织管理法》）生效。该法要求境外非政府组织在公安部登记，而且要为其运作找到一个被国家认可的挂靠单位。未能符合该规定的非政府组织可能会面临民事或刑事处罚。该法不给没有得到批准登记的非政府组织申诉的机会，并且申明，被发现违反某些规定的非政府组织可以被禁止在中国运作。该法还称，与没有登记的境外非政府组织合作的国内团体会受到惩罚，并可能被取缔。11月25日，外交部首次公开证实，公安部门已经因开展未经授权的活动对一个境外非政府组织进行了调查并处以罚款，该组织是总部位于纽约的亚洲促进会。
 
一些国际非政府组织报告说，由于法律反映了中共的认知，即境外非政府组织是对“国家安全”的一种威胁，与大学，政府机构和其他国内非政府组织等当地合作伙伴开展合作越来越困难。对于大多数境外非政府组织来说，找到正式的挂靠单位很困难，因为挂靠单位要为非政府组织的行为负责，并且必须按规定承担繁重的报告工作。在公安部公布可挂靠机构名单后，非政府组织报告说，大多数政府机构仍然没有负责境外非政府组织挂靠事宜的部门。专业监督部门报告说，他们对如何执行法律以及当局对他们的期望知之甚少。如何定义非政府组织，哪些活动构成“政治”活动因而非法，这些都含糊不清，使许多商业组织和校友会不能确定自己是否处于法律的管辖范围。政府缺乏明确的沟通，再加上安全部门的骚扰，导致一些境外非政府组织暂停或停止了在中国的活动。截至12月31日，大约有510个境外非政府组织代表处（代表420个不同的组织）已根据《境外非政府组织管理法》进行了登记，其中近一半是侧重于产业或贸易促进活动。
 
据民政部统计，截止于2017年底，有80多万个合法登记的社会团体、公共机构和基金会。许多专家认为，国内非政府组织的实际数目要多得多。国内非政府组织报告说，来自国外的资金继续减少，因为很多国内非政府组织都力图避免这样的资助，面对新法带来的越来越多的限制，他们担心会被贴上“颠覆”的标签。非政府组织以各种正式和非正式的名义存在着，包括由中共创建并资助的全国性群众团体，即官办非政府组织。这样的组织被禁止拥有任何独立性。
 
如果境外非政府组织要向国内团体捐款，《境外非政府组织管理法》要求境外非政府组织在中国必须拥有办公室或者使用本国非政府组织的银行账户才能为举办临时活动收取款项。根据法律，禁止境外非政府组织用任何其他方式汇出或接收资金，而且这样的资金必须向公安部报告。该法还禁止境外非政府组织募捐或进行“营利活动”。
 
尽管所有的登记团体都在政府一定程度的控制之下，有些非政府组织，主要是以服务为目的的官办非营利组织，在运作中能够少一些例行检查。当局支持一些针对扶贫救灾等社会问题的非政府组织发展。法律法规明确禁止团体从事政治或宗教活动，拒绝服从的团体会面临刑事处罚。
 
当局继续限制和取缔接受外国资助的本国非政府组织以及为西藏自治区和其他藏区的藏民社区提供帮助的国际非政府组织。由于旅行限制、官方对其工作人员的恐吓以及无法与当地的合作伙伴续签项目协议，几乎所有这些团体都被迫减少其活动。
 
 
请参见美国国务院发布的《国际宗教自由报告》：
https://www.state.gov/religiousfreedomreport/。
 
 
 
政府越来越多地通过不给予国际和国内出行许可或非正式软禁的形式来禁止活动人士发声。
 
境内出行：当局继续严格限制出行自由，特别是在重要纪念日、外国政要来访或重大政治事件之前限制政治敏感人士的出行，并防范游行示威。在西藏自治区和其他藏区，藏人的出行自由仍受到严重限制。维吾尔人在新疆和新疆之外的地区也面临苛刻的出行限制。尽管在前往其它地方旅行前要得到地方官员批准的“国内护照”已经于2016年停止使用，在进入或者离开城市时以及在公路上仍然还有证件检查站。在新疆，安全官员在诸如市场和清真寺等公共区域的入口设立检查站，要求维吾尔人扫描身份证，接受面部识别检查，并将所有的包袋放入机场式的安全检查机器。当地的汉人不受这些限制。
 
虽然政府仍然限制更换工作地或居住地的自由，但是全国户籍登记制度（户口）继续发生变化，大部分公民去往国内各地工作和居住的能力继续提高。尽管许多农村居民继续迁入城市，城市人均可支配收入约为农村人均收入的三倍，但是他们常常不能更改他们在国内正式的居住地或工作地。大多数城市对每年可签发的新的暂住证实行配额管理制度，因此，所有的就业者，包括大学毕业生，都必须努力争取数目有限的暂住证。农村居民尤其难以在经济较发达的城市地区获得户口。
 
户籍登记制度增加了农村居民在城市面临的困难，即使他们在那里安家并找到了工作。根据国家统计局2月发布的《中国人民共和国2019年国民经济和社会发展统计公报》，居住在其户口所在地以外的人口为2.86亿。农民工及其家人在工作条件和劳工权利方面面临重重阻碍。由于农民工不是合法登记的城市居民，许多人在其工作与生活的城市无法享受公共服务，如子女接受公共教育或社会保障服务。
 
从5月到7月，非北京籍居民根据市政府新发布的积分系统来申请北京户口。根据2018年开始实施的这个新政策，未超过法定退休年龄、有北京暂住许可、在京连续七年缴纳社会保险、没有刑事犯罪的非京籍居民可以通过积分取得户口。据报道，那些“有稳定工作、稳定住所、良好教育背景、在京成功创新创业”的人更可能在积分竞争中取得高分。
 
根据适用于被行政拘留的惯犯的“留场就业”制度，当局不准某些服满刑期者回乡。一些获释或者假释人员回家后没有出行的自由。
 
出国旅行：政府准许大多数公民合法移居海外和出国旅行。政府部门——尤其是军队——的雇员和退休人员的出国旅行继续受到限制。政府在机场及其他边境口岸扩大了对离境乘客实施的出境管制，籍此禁止一些持不同政见者和在政府任职的人出国旅行。一年来，许多律师、艺术家、作家及其他活动人士被禁止出境的情况时有发生。当局还阻止一些维权人士以及贪腐官员和商人的家属旅行，其中包括外籍家庭成员。
 
边境检查人员和警方有时以威胁“国家安全”作为不准离境的理由，尽管当局经常不对这种禁止离境提供理由。此类人员中大部分人都是在准备出国旅行时被当局拦截在机场的。
 
绝大多数公民都能获得护照，但是那些被政府视为有潜在政治威胁的人说，他们经常被拒发护照或被禁止出国旅行，这些人包括宗教领袖、持不同政见者、上访者和少数民族人士。
 
据报，维吾尔人的护照申请，尤其是居住在新疆的维吾尔人的护照申请，很难获得地方当局批准。他们经常被拒发护照，无法去海外旅行，尤其是无法去沙特阿拉伯朝觐或去其他穆斯林国家，也无法因学术目的前往西方国家。2016年以来，当局命令新疆的居民交还护照，或者告诉居民没有新的护照。维吾尔活动人士的海外家人也被拒发进入中国的签证。政府继续开展协调行动，迫使在海外学习的维吾人返回中国，常常是向他们在新疆的亲属施加压力，要求他们在海外的亲属回国。当局还拒绝给住在海外的维吾尔人延期护照，迫使他们做出选择，或者返回中国，或者寻求途经在所在国保持合法身份。一旦回国，很多维吾尔人或者与新疆居民有联系的人就被拘留或者失踪了。
 
藏人申请护照面临重重困难，而对佛教僧尼来说则几乎是不可能的。当局不愿意给藏人发放甚至延期护照的做法对藏人而言等于是出国旅行禁令。藏区的汉族居民没有这样的困难。
 
政府继续试图禁止许多藏人和维吾尔人离开中国，很多试图离开的人被拘押。有些希望移民的维权活动人士的家属无法如愿。
 
流亡：法律没有规定公民的归国权，也没有涉及流亡问题。政府继续拒绝众多被视为持不同政见者、法轮功活动人士或“捣乱分子”的公民重新入境。尽管当局允许一些移居海外的持不同政见者回国，但因保外就医而获准出国的异议人士往往相当于被流放。
 
1月10日，《八九民运史》的作者陈小雅在试图出国旅行时被广西海关官员拒绝。海关官员告诉她，她被禁止出国的原因是她可能危害国家安全。
 
驻福州的人权活动人士庄磊曾于6月6日试图访问香港，但在边界被深圳执法官员拦下。自称没有犯罪记录的庄磊被深圳官员转交给福州的国保警察。庄磊认为，他被阻止前往香港是由于担心他可能会参加6月9日在香港举行的反送中条例的抗议活动。
 
“ 709”律师的家人在申请护照时遇到困难，或者被禁止离开中国。
 
佛山持不同政见者陈其堂（Chen Qitang）因“颠覆国家政权”入狱四年半后，于5月24日从四会监狱获释。释放后，他被阻止返回家园。
 
6月1日，桂林和柳州的警察传唤了一些互联网用户，这些用户在社交媒体上讨论了他们计划前往香港参加维多利亚公园纪念天安门大屠杀30周年的年度聚会，警察命令他们不要去香港。4月，1990年代流行的粤语歌曲《人间道》被禁止在全国范围内播放，包括在苹果音乐平台（Apple Music）上，因为这首歌的歌词被认为是指1989年的大屠杀。
 
 
不适用。
 
 
尽管限制进入边境地区，但政府定期与联合国难民事务高级专员公署（UNHCR）合作，后者在北京设有办事处。
 
对移民、难民和无国籍人士的虐待：有报道说，朝鲜特工在中国秘密行动，违背朝鲜公民的意愿将他们遣送回国。此外，被中国当局拘留的朝鲜人面临遣返，除非他们能够支付贿赂以确保释放。朝鲜难民要么被关押在拘留设施中，要么被软禁在秘密地点。希望防止朝鲜亲属被迫回国的家庭成员，据称必须向中国当局付费，以补偿拘留期间产生的费用。尽管被拘留的朝鲜人偶尔会被释放，但他们很少有人能获得安全进入第三国的必要许可。
 
驱回：政府继续将朝鲜人视为非法的“经济移民”，而不是难民或寻求庇护者，并将其中许多人驱逐回朝鲜。在中国参与帮助朝鲜人到达安全目的地的传教士说，自金正恩上台以来，中国当局加大了对朝鲜叛逃者的打击力度。
 
在4月份，中国当局逮捕了三名逃离朝鲜的朝鲜妇女、三名男子和一名10岁的女孩。自由亚洲电台（RFA）于8月报道说，中国已拘留了60名朝鲜叛逃者，并将他们驱回朝鲜，他们在朝鲜受到严厉的惩罚，包括酷刑，强迫流产，强迫劳动，性暴力或死亡。
 
庇护途径：没有授予难民或寻求庇护者身份的法律。政府没有制定难民保护制度，但是通常认可被联合国难民署记录在册的在中国的难民。这些留在中国的避难申请者和难民无法接受教育和社会服务，并且随时都可能被递解出境。
 
朝鲜难民和寻求庇护者，尤其是生活在社会边缘的年轻妇女，由于他们的地位不被承认，很容易遭受人口贩运和强迫婚姻的伤害。当局继续强行遣返朝鲜难民，包括人口贩运受害者，视他们为非法经济移民。政府拘押他们，并遣返回朝鲜，在朝鲜他们面临严厉的惩罚或死刑，包括被关入劳改营。政府没有为朝鲜人口贩运受害者提供遣返之外的其他合法选择。
 
当局继续强行遣返包括人口贩运受害者在内的朝鲜难民和寻求庇护者，通常将其视为非法经济移民。政府将他们拘留并驱逐到朝鲜，在那里他们面临严厉的惩罚或死亡，包括被关押在朝鲜的强迫劳动营地。政府没有向北朝鲜的人口贩运受害者提供遣返之外的合法选择。
 
联合国难民事务高级专员公署报告说，中国官员限制该机构人员进入中国边境地区。当局有时会拘留和起诉协助朝鲜难民的公民以及为非法越境提供便利的公民。
 
获得基本服务：难民，包括在中国寻求经济机会的朝鲜寻求庇护者通常由于没有合法身份而无法享受卫生保健、公费教育或其他社会服务。
 
持久解决办法：自越战时期以来，中国政府在重新安置来自越南和老挝的汉族及少数民族人员定居中国境内方面基本上与联合国难民署进行了合作。中国政府与联合国难民署继续就允许这些长期居民及其子女（许多人在中国出生）入籍的问题进行讨论。
 
 
国际媒体报道称，朝鲜妇女在中国生了多达3万个孩子，这些妇女大多是被贩运到中国并与中国配偶结婚，但由于她们没有合法身份，生的孩子无法登记户口，从而在事实上成为无国籍人。这些孩子无法获得包括教育和医疗在内的公共服务，尽管有法律条文称，只要有一名家长是中国公民，孩子就可以成为公民。据报道，中国父亲有时不为子女登记，以免暴露其朝鲜伴侣的非法身份。
 
第三节  自由参政的权利
 
宪法声明“中华人民共和国的所有权力属于人民”，人民行使国家权力的机构是全国人民代表大会以及省、地区和地方人民代表大会。事实上，中共决定人大的立法议程。尽管法律规定对县级或县级以下的人大代表进行选举，但公民并不能自由地选择统治他们的官员。中共控制了所有的选举，并继续掌控着政府官员的任命权。中共使用包括软禁在内的各种恐吓手段阻止独立候选人进入地方选举名单。
 
2018年3月的全国人大取消了国家主席和副主席任期不得超过两届的限制，为习近平继续留任扫清了障碍。
 
选举与参政
 
近期的选举：3月4日，全国人大的2980位代表选出了主席和副主席、总理和副总理以及中央军委主席。由175名成员组成的全国人大常务委员会监督这些选举并决定全国人大的议程和议事规则。全国人大代表每5年选举一次，其过程由中共控制。
 
全国人大常务委员会仍然在中共的直接管辖之下，所有重要的立法决定需要经中共的七人政治局常委会同意。虽然依照国家宪法，全国人大拥有广泛的权力，但它未曾在不经中共批准的情况下独立制定政策或罢免政治领导人。
 
根据民政部于2016年所做的统计，在中国60多万个村庄中，几乎所有的村庄都实行了对地方政府下属机构即村委会成员的直接选举。直接选举官员仍然在很小的范围内进行，并被严格限制在最低的地方级别。仍然存在腐败、贿选以及乡镇官员和中共干部干涉选举问题。法律允许每位选民最多为其他三位选民代理投票。
 
选举法管辖各级立法机关，然而对其遵守和执行的情况在全国各地各不相同。根据此法律，公民有机会每五年选举一次县级或县级以下的人大代表，但在大多数情况下，上级政府官员或中共干部在这些选举中控制了候选人的提名。在更高的级别，立法者在他们的同级别官员中选出人大代表。例如，省级人代会选出全国人大的代表。地方的中共党的书记一般同时在地方人代会的领导团队中担任职务，从而增强了中共对立法机构的控制。
 
政党与参政：官方声称中国采取的政党体系是在中国共产党领导下的“多党合作与政治协商”。然而，中共保持了对政治权力的垄断，而且政府禁止成立新的政党。政府正式承认1949年之前成立的九个党派，中共之外的党派在全国人大中占有百分之30的席位。这些非中共代表并不构成政治反对派。他们在立法或决策中的没有什么影响力，而且只能在中共统一战线工作部的指导下运作。
 
关于成立政党并没有具体的法律法规。中国民主党仍然被取缔，政府继续监视、拘押和监禁现在以及前民主党党员。民主党创始人秦永敏和他的妻子赵素丽于2015年被拘押，秦从2018年开始因“颠覆国家政权”在湖北的潜江监狱服刑13年。他的妻子被释放后，她和秦的哥哥于1月前往探视，注意到监狱当局不准他阅读和写材料，而且秦永敏的身心健康因强制劳动有所恶化。
 
妇女和少数民族的参与：妇女在政府或中共部门中担任了少数几个有重要影响的职位。在这一年参加十三届全国人大的 2987 位代表中有742位（25%）是妇女。在第十九届党代会之后，25名成员的中共政治局中有1名女性。政治局常委中没有女性。
 
选举法对妇女和少数民族代表的配额有一般性规定，但要达到这个配额，负责选举的机构经常不得不违反选举法。
 
第十三届全国人大中有438名来自55个少数民族的代表，占代表总数的16%。所有被官方承认的少数民族都有代表。第十九届中共党代会上选出了15名少数民族人士进入有202名成员的中央委员会。在政治局中没有少数民族委员，只有一名省级党委书记是少数民族，但是有数名少数民族人士在省政府中担任领导职务。蒙古族妇女布小林任内蒙古自治区主席，相当于省长职务。回族妇女咸辉担任宁夏回族自治区主席。
 
第四节 政府腐败及缺乏透明度
 
尽管官员腐败会面临刑事处罚，但政府和中共执法并不一致，也不透明。腐败行为依然很普遍，许多腐败案件都出现在受政府高度监管的领域，比如土地使用权、房地产、矿产以及基础设施建设等，这些领域都容易发生欺诈、贿赂和回扣。法院的判决常常无法对特权部门执行，这些部门包括政府机关、国有企业、军方人员以及一些中共党员。
 
透明国际”的分析显示，在中国腐败仍然是一个严重问题。本年度有大量的关于政府腐败以及后续审判和判决的报道。
 
2018年3月，全国人大通过了《国家监察法》，立法规定国家监察委员会和中央纪律检查委员会合署办公。国家监委-中纪委的职责是根除腐败，他们的调查可以针对任何公职人员，包括警察、法官和检察官；也可以调查和拘押与被调查公职人员有关联的人。建立国家监察委员会实际上赋予了中纪委这个中共内部的纪律检查机构以国家权力。对国家监委-中纪委调查、运作和拘押的管理规则仍然不清。
 
国家监委-中纪委的拘押被称为“留置”，被拘押人员指责说遭到虐待和酷刑。被留置人员遭到隔离监禁，没有就其拘押申诉的途径。尽管《国家监察法》禁止虐待在押人员，但在押人员向上报告受到虐待的机制不清。不过，根据赔偿法，被错误指控腐败的人员可以因其留置的时间获得赔偿。
 
尽管留置是在司法系统之外运作，在留置期间所做的坦白交代在司法程序中被用作证据。根据媒体报道和非政府组织8月发布的一份报告，留置关押者遭受了长期单独关押、剥夺睡眠、殴打以及被迫以不适的姿势站、坐数小时甚至数日。
 
据官方媒体，广东茂名市的纪委和监委于2018年3月和4月因调查受贿或渎职留置了11人。一位省级留置关押系统的负责人称，嫌疑人平均被关押42.5天之后才被移交至司法系统。
 
腐败： 在许多案件中，政府的检察官就腐败问题调查了公务员和国企领导，这些人通常还兼任党内高级职务。
 
虽然受到严密控制的国家媒体公布了一些值得关注的腐败案调查，但总体而言，对于党政官员因腐败接受调查的程序很少有细节披露。2018年9月，中国第一位在法国里昂担任国际刑警组织主席并保留中国公安部副部长职务的孟宏伟在乘9月25日的航班到达之后失踪。媒体报道说孟因涉嫌贪腐在到达中国以后被“纪检部门”拘留。政府宣布，在国家监委-中纪委对孟及其同事们就有关受贿指控进行调查期间他受到监视；直到年底此案仍然没有公布更多细节。
 
2018的反腐行动调查了廊坊城南骨科医院院长张毅的高调自杀，张指控了干涉医院管理并挪用资金的腐败活动。3月26日，河北廊坊市固安县开始庭审12名被控的嫌疑人，罪名包括组织、领导和参加犯罪集团；敲诈；闹事；故意伤害；故意破坏财产；强制交易；盗用资产；受贿和欺诈。法庭没有立即作出判决。固安法院判处杨玉忠25年徒刑，这是法律允许的最高刑期。杨的家人上诉之后，上诉法院维持了原判：判处杨玉忠25年徒刑，分别判处杨的犯罪组织中的两名主犯18年和10年徒刑。
 
财产公开：有规定要求县级或县级以上政府部门或国有企业中的官员申报个人财产，包括他们的配偶和子女名下的财产及其家庭的金融资产投资和企业投资。规定未要求公开申报，而是呈报上级和人事部门。对拒绝申报者有不同的处罚，包括接受法规培训、警示谈话、调动工作直至免职。规定还要求官员申报他们的所有收入，包括各类津贴、补助、奖金以及其他工作收入如演讲、写作、咨询、审稿、绘画及书法等。官员和配偶及与其共同居住的子女还要申报房产和金融投资状况，但这些申报也不对外公开。还规定他们报告他们的子女是否在国外居住以及子女和第三代的工作状况和职务（包括在国外居住者）。规定官员每年报告一次，个人身份发生改变后必须在30天以内报告。
 
在2018年末（但于本年报告），深圳市政府向湖南省300多名工人提供了一笔一次性付款，金额为3亿元人民币（4200万美元），以支付他们在湖南工作时所患的严重职业性肺病。
 
3月22日，佛山市顺德区的数百名村民在他们村子的入口处游行，抗议他们的官员涉嫌出售集体土地的腐败行为。警察包围了村庄，驱散了人群，并拘留了示威者。
 
第五节  政府对国际和非政府组织调查侵犯人权指控的态度
 
政府试图继续保持对公民社会团体的控制，遏止独立非政府组织的出现，并阻挠公民社会团体及维权活动团体的活动。政府经常对国内非政府组织进行骚扰，在很多情况下不允许他们公开监督或评论人权状况。政府声明表示对独立组织持怀疑态度，对在经济或其他方面与海外有关联的非政府组织严加审查。本年度里政府采取明显的步骤，将国内所有的非政府组织置于其法规的直接管控之下，从而缩小了独立非政府组织的生存空间。大多数大的非政府组织都是半官方性质，所有正式的非政府组织都必须挂靠政府机构。
 
联合国或其他国际组织：政府仍然不愿接受其他国家或国际组织对其人权状况提出的批评。政府严格限制联合国专家到访中国，而且很少就联合国人权机构的质询提供实质性回应。联合国专家提交的十多个访问中国的请求仍未得到回应。
 
中国政府还利用它在联合国经济及社会理事会非政府组织委员会成员的身份来阻挠批评中国的团体取得联合国的认证，并阻挠有认证的活动人士参与联合国的活动。政府报复与联合国合作的人权团体的行动引起了联合国秘书长安东尼奥·古特雷斯的批评。
 
政府的人权机构：中国政府坚持认为每个国家对待人权的方式都受到其经济、社会、文化和历史条件的制约。政府声称，它对待嫌疑人的方式是符合国家法律的，而那些嫌疑人却被国际社会认为是政府侵犯人权的受害者。中国政府没有设置人权专员或人权委员会。
 
第六节 歧视、社会虐待和人口贩卖
 
妇女
 
强奸和家庭暴力：强奸妇女是非法的，可被判三年有期徒刑至死刑。法律不保护同性伴侣或婚内强奸受害人。另一个有关性侵犯的法律包括男性受害人，但最高刑期只有5年徒刑。在被报道的案件中，大多数有关强奸的指控都通过私下和解而不是起诉来结案。有些被判强奸罪的人被处决。
 
家庭暴力仍然是一个严重的问题。有些学者说，受害者往往被鼓励通过调解来解决家庭暴力问题。社会上往往将家庭暴力看作是家庭和个人的私事，从而造成妇女面对家庭暴力时不报告，当局不采取行动的情况。《反家庭暴力法》将家庭暴力归入民事而非刑事犯罪。网络出版物《第六声》报告称，25%的家庭中出现过家庭暴力。
 
政府支持为家庭暴力受害者建立的收容所，有些法庭对受害者提供了保护，包括通过法院保护令来禁止家庭暴力施暴者接近受害者。但是，政府的帮助并不总是能够送达受害者，公安部门通常对家庭暴力视而不见。为家庭暴力受害者提供咨询和辩护的法律协助机构经常受到压力，要他们中断公共活动，停止任何形式的政策呼吁，因为那些都是只有政府资助的组织才能从事的活动。
 
据妇女维权人士称，在起诉家暴案件的过程中反复出现的一个问题是当局采证不足，包括照片、医院病历、警察笔录或孩子的证词。目击者很少在法庭上作证。
 
法院对家庭暴力的认识有所改善，使配偶虐待成为出于自卫而犯罪的辩护中的一个减罪因素。
 
性骚扰：法律禁止对妇女进行性骚扰；但是，法律对性骚扰的定义不清。据北京公安局规定，对违法者可实施最多15天拘留。受害人仍然难以就性骚扰提出控告，法官对此类案件也难以作出判决。官方媒体称，很多妇女仍然不愿意投诉性骚扰事件，认为司法系统对此无能为力。有几起关于性骚扰的重大新闻报道在社交媒体上广为传播，有助于增强对这个问题的认识，尤其是在工作场所。
 
2018年9月，梁颂基和张五州在广州荔湾区的一个派出所目睹了警官殴打女律师孙世华并强迫她脱光衣服。他们在社交媒体中公布了这个事件的报道，为此广州警方在2018年10月把他们关押。检方指控他们造谣并妨碍警察执行公务。在8月11日的初审之后，荔湾区法院将案子退回检方进行进一步的调查，但检方没有提交新的证据。梁和张于10月25日被判罪，梁因“寻衅滋事”被判18个月徒刑，张因“寻衅滋事”和“妨碍公务”被判16个月徒刑。
 
尽管很多女性在工作场所遭到性骚扰，极少有人会提出报告。人权观察援引一个统计数字显示，有将近40%的妇女说她们在工作场所受到过性骚扰。
 
《保护妇女权益法》使受害人能够向自己的雇主和当局投诉性骚扰问题。如果雇主不能采取有效措施防止性骚扰，可以被罚款。
 
一些寻求提高公众对性骚扰认识的妇女非政府组织报告说，曾受到公安的骚扰，在执行其项目时遭遇困难。
 
强迫计划生育：该年度中有强迫流产和绝育的报告，但没有强迫流产的官方统计数字与百分比。中共限制父母选择生育子女数的权利，利用从省级到村级的计划生育单位来推行人口限制及分布。《人口与计划生育法》允许已婚夫妇生育两个孩子，并允许符合本地或本省相应规定条件的夫妇申请生育第三个孩子。
 
国家媒体声称，近年来在宽松的法规之下，包括推行的二孩政策，强迫流产的数量已经有所减少。但是，违反法律的夫妇会受到巨额罚款，而只生一个孩子的夫妇则会获得一个证书，使他们每月得以获取奖励金及其他优惠；每个省的奖励额度从每月6到12元人民币（1-2美元）到给予贫困地区的农民或牧民3000元人民币（420美元）不等。有些省份的夫妇需要得到批准并登记才能怀孕。国家卫生健康委员会拒绝了关于取消计划生育法律依据的呼吁，引述国家宪法的规定“国家推行计划生育，使人口的增长同经济和社会发展计划相适应。”
 
据其他国际报告，数名维吾尔妇女称她们在拘留中心关押时被强迫绝育。一名维吾尔妇女说她和其他妇女被强迫服用不明药品并喝下白色液体，造成失去意识，在有些情况下引起了闭经。她说有些妇女因过度失血而死亡。
 
在法律规定以及实际操作中，超出生育限制或违反规定的生育仍然会受到经济和行政处罚。实施的法律要求每个未经批准的孕妇做人工流产或者交付最高可达个人年度可支配收入10倍的社会抚养费。具体的罚金数量因省而异，大不相同。那些有经济能力的人往往会交付罚款，这样他们违规出生的孩子便可以得到广泛的社会服务和权利。有些家长为逃避罚款将违规出生的孩子藏在朋友或亲戚家中。但是一些省份的少数民族家庭可以生育更多孩子。
 
法律依旧表明，“公民有依照法律计划生育的义务”，还说“育龄夫妇自愿选择计划生育和避孕方法以避免和减少意外怀孕”。
 
由于国家计划生育法只提到了已婚夫妇的权利，地方上对法规的实施并不一致，未婚人员避孕必须缴费。尽管《民事法》和《婚姻法》都规定，单身妇女的孩子与已婚夫妇的孩子们享有同样的权利，但事实上单身母亲和未婚同居者生的孩子被看作是“政策之外”的产物，需缴付社会抚养费，而且无法获得出生证和“户口”等法律文件。在孩子出生60天之内结婚的单身妇女可以避免这些惩罚。
 
与往年一样，人口控制政策仍然依靠社会压力、教育、宣传和经济惩罚，也依靠诸如强制性孕检以及时有发生的强迫堕胎以及强迫结扎等手段。根据是否能够达到其行政区域规定的人口目标，各级官员会获得奖励或受到惩处。生育上限的提高，加上大部分人不希望有两个以上的孩子，要达到人口目标相对容易了，因而地方官员的压力也比以前大大减轻了。被发现违反计划生育政策而超生或帮助他人逃避国家控制的人会受到处罚，例如高额罚款或被开除。
 
要求违反计划生育政策怀孕的妇女终止妊娠的规定在一些省份仍然存在并且在执行中，其中包括湖北、湖南和辽宁。其他的省份，例如贵州和云南，保留了要求采取“补救措施”（官方对于堕胎的委婉说法）的文字，以应对违规妊娠。
 
尽管很多地方政府鼓励夫妇生育二胎，有三个或更多孩子的家庭仍然需要交付“社会抚养费”。山东地方上一个区在一个家庭生育了第三个孩子后未交64626元（约9000美元）的社会抚养费，因而没收了他们的银行存款22987元（约3200美元）。在山东的另一起案件中，一名67岁的妇女因生育第三胎面临地方计划生育委员会的罚款。至年底，当地政府尚未决定是否会惩罚该妇女，但一名政府官员承诺将公布最终决定。在前些年，拒绝交付社会抚养费的人会被列入“个人信用黑名单”上。这个黑名单会影响一个人申请贷款、乘坐公共交通、购物、孩子的教育以及参加旅游团的能力。估计这笔补偿费占了一些地方政府可支出预算的15%到30%。
 
法律要求计划生育委员会对已婚育龄妇女进行孕检，并向他们提供有关计划生育的基本知识和孕期服务。有些省份对没有定期按照国家规定做孕检的妇女罚款。
 
在推行计划生育政策的过程中，如果负责计划生育的官员被发现侵犯了公民的人权或财产权、滥用权利、接受贿赂、挪用或侵占计划生育经费或者虚报计划生育统计数字，就会面临刑事指控或行政处分。强制堕胎并没有被专门列为被禁止的活动。法律还禁止医务人员提供非法手术、对胎儿做医学上不必要的超声波性别探查、性别选择性堕胎、虚假医学鉴定以及虚假的生育证明。根据法律，公民可以正式投诉越权实施计划生育政策的官员，其投诉会受到调查并得到及时的处理。
 
歧视：宪法规定“妇女在所有方面享有与男子平等的权利”。法律赋予妇女平等的财产所有权、继承权、受教育机会以及同工同酬权利。但是，妇女们报告说，存在歧视、不公平解雇、降职和工资差别等严重问题。
 
从事同样工作的妇女收入平均比男性少35%。在乡村地区这种工资差距更大。尽管女性参加工作的比例很高，但在领导岗位上任职的女性仍然很少。
 
当局通常不能切实执行保护妇女权利的法律。法律专家认为，由于模糊的法律定义，提出性别歧视诉讼的难度很大。一些观察人士注意到，负责妇女权利保护的机构倾向于注重与产期有关的福利以及产假期间的不正当解雇问题，而不是性别歧视、对妇女的暴力侵害和性骚扰问题。有其他人士指出，全国妇联在新的反家庭暴力立法中扮演了积极的角色。
 
7月11日，成都法院判决刘莉（化名）胜诉，刘起诉她的前雇主对她性骚扰。法院下令该前雇主道歉。
 
7月1日，一名男子在地铁上抚摸了一名成年妇女和一名未成年女孩。静安区人民法院于10月判处该男子六个月的徒刑。
 
妇女维权人士指出，在农村的离婚诉讼中，妇女往往会丧失土地和财产权利。农村土地承包法和其他保护妇女权益的法律规定，在土地管理方面妇女享有同等权利，但专家认为由于法律的复杂性和执行上的难度，实际情况很少如此。
 
带有性别歧视的性别选择：来自中国国家统计局的最新信息显示，2017年男女婴出生比率是111.9比100，低于世界银行当年统计的115比100。
 
中国国家卫生和计划生育委员会，国家工商行政管理总局和国家食品药品监督管理局2016年发布的法规禁止非医学胎儿性别诊断和基于性别选择的流产。它规定任何单位或个人均不得执行或促进此类手术。
 
2018年9月，包括国家卫生委员会和国家食品药品监督管理局等五个政府部门联合发布了一项禁止使用超声波诊断设备拍摄“胎儿照片”的法规，因为政府发现这些工具已被用来揭示胎儿的性别。
 
儿童
 
出生登记：公民身份来自父母。父母必须在孩子出生后一个月内遵照全国户籍登记制度为其登记户口。没有户口的儿童无法获得公共服务，包括教育。
 
教育：尽管法律规定儿童必须接受九年义务教育，但在经济落后的农村，许多儿童没有完成规定的教育年限，有些甚至从未上过学。虽然公立学校不准收学费，但由于地方与中央政府提供的经费不足，很多学校仍然收取各种杂费。这些费用以及上学需要的其他费用使贫困家庭和一些流动工人难以送子女上学。城乡青少年受教育的城乡差别仍然巨大，大多数外来务工人员的孩子只能在未获官方许可、设备条件差的学校就读。
 
虐待儿童：对儿童进行身体虐待者可受到刑事起诉。《反家庭暴力法》也保护儿童。对儿童尤其是乡村儿童的性虐待是一个严重的问题。
 
童婚及强迫婚姻：法定最低结婚年龄为男性22周岁、女性20周岁。就所知信息而言，童婚不是一个问题。
 
对儿童的性剥削：法律规定自愿性行为的最低年龄为14岁。强迫14岁以下幼女卖淫的人可被判处10年有期徒刑直至无期徒刑，并处以罚款或没收财产。对情节特别严重者，除没收财产外，可判处无期徒刑或死刑。嫖宿14岁以下被迫卖淫的幼女者可被判处5年或以上有期徒刑，并处以罚款。
 
包括儿童色情制品在内的所有色情制品都是非法的。《刑法》规定，以牟利为目的制作、复制、出版、贩卖、传播淫秽制品者，可处三年以下有期徒刑、刑事拘留或者管制，并处以罚款。情节严重者判处三到十年有期徒刑，并处以罚款。
 
根据法律，向18岁以下未成年人播放或展示淫秽制品者会受到“严厉惩罚”。
 
杀婴或杀害残疾婴儿：法律禁止杀害婴儿，不清楚这种做法是否仍在继续。残疾婴儿的父母通常会将孩子留在医院，主要原因是无法支付将来的医疗费用。基于性别而进行的堕胎以及遗弃或忽视女婴的情况据信在减少，但是在一些情况下仍然是个问题，主要原因是传统上对男孩的偏好以及计划生育政策。
 
流浪儿童：在新疆，有大约100万或更多的维吾尔人、哈萨克人、吉尔吉斯人及其他穆斯林人员被关押，导致很多儿童失去照管人。尽管很多这样的孩子有其他亲戚愿意照看他们，政府开始将被拘押人士的孩子们送入孤儿院、寄宿学校，或“儿童福利指导中心”，在那里他们被迫呼喊爱国口号、学习汉语普通话，并回答有关他们父母宗教信仰和实际行动的问题。不清楚这样的儿童总共有多少，特别是因为很多这样的设施都接收孤儿和普通学生。一家媒体报道，根据一份政府计划文件，至少有50万儿童被与他们的家庭分开，送入这些“养育”中心。政府政策的目标是为这些孩子提供由国家支持的照管，直到他们18岁。媒体报道显示，在2017和2018年，新建的孤儿院数量大大增加，用于收留家长被关入再教育营的数以千计的儿童。在和田，有些寄宿学校安装了铁丝网。
 
福利院收容的儿童：见上节“流浪儿童”。
 
跨国拐骗儿童：中国不是1980年《国际儿童拐骗民事问题海牙公约》的缔约国。请参见美国国务院的《国际父母掳拐儿童年报》，网址为：https://travel.state.gov/content/travel/en/International-Parental-Child-Abduction/for-providers/legal-reports-and-data/reported-cases.html。
 
反犹太主义
 
政府不承认犹太人的民族或宗教地位。该年度未见有反犹太主义行为的报告。
 
人口贩运
 
请参见美国国务院发布的《人口贩运问题报告》：
http://www.state.gov/j/tip/rls/tiprpt/https://www.state.gov/trafficking-in-persons-report/。
 
残疾人
 
法律保护残疾人的权利，禁止歧视。但是，在很多情况下残疾人的现实处境与法律要求相去甚远，政府也没有向残疾人提供获取旨在帮助他们的项目的途径。
 
法律规定，残疾人“在政治、经济、文化和社会领域中，在家庭生活和其他方面都享有与其他公民平等的权利”。禁止歧视、侮辱或侵犯残疾人士。法律禁止歧视有残疾的未成年人，并制定了一系列法律为青少年提供司法保护。
据教育部报告，全国有2000余所专为残疾儿童设立的学校，但非政府组织的报告称，在2000万残疾儿童中，只有2%的孩子能够得到可以满足他们需求的教育。
 
残疾人士接受高等教育也面临困难。大学常常不录取各方面合格但有残疾的考生。一项法规要求，必须给残疾学生参加高考提供特别照顾。
 
成年残疾人失业仍然是一个严重问题，部分原因是对残疾人的歧视。法律规定地方政府必须为聘用残疾人的企业设立奖励机制。一些地方法规还规定，如果企业的残疾员工数量没能达到法定的最低百分比，雇主要向全国残疾人基金缴款。
 
《残疾人保障法》规定道路和建筑物应符合适于残疾人通行的标准，并要求“逐步”落实这些标准；但对该法律的遵从非常有限。
 
法律禁止患有某些精神疾病（如精神分裂症）的人结婚。如果医生发现一对夫妻有可能将先天缺陷遗传给孩子，这对夫妻只有在同意使用避孕措施或接受绝育手术的情况下才能结婚。在有些情况下，如果医生在产前检查中发现胎儿可能有残疾，官方仍会要求夫妻终止妊娠。法律规定地方政府必须采取这样的措施来消除残疾儿童的出生。
 
民族/种族/少数民族
 
政府政策要求对获得承认的少数民族在计划生育、大学录取、申请贷款和就业等方面给予优惠待遇。然而少数民族政策的实质性内容及其实施仍然不足，歧视少数民族的现象仍旧普遍存在。政府的“汉化”运动造成了基于种族的行动限制，包括削弱维吾尔人自由旅行或取得旅行文件的能力；新疆当局加强了监控以及武装警察的布署；以及限制文化及宗教活动的法规。
 
最近的政府人口普查（2015年）显示，在新疆的正式居民中有950万（40%）是汉族人。维吾尔族、回族、哈萨克族、吉尔吉斯族和其他少数民族居民总共为1410万，占新疆总人口的60%。官方的统计数字少报了汉族人口，因为居住在准军事地区（兵团）的270多万汉族人和作为长期 “临时工”的汉族人都未被计算在内；按照新疆政府2015年的报告，这类人口比前一年增加了1.2%。
 
政府鼓励汉人移居到少数民族地区的政策显著增加了新疆的汉族人口。汉族官员继续担任着少数民族自治地区的大部分权力最大的中共职务和许多政府职务，在新疆尤其如此。近几十年来在新疆急剧增长的汉族人口造成了维吾尔人的不满。
 
据新华社报道，2017年新疆政府还实施了新的《去极端化条例》，将“遏制和消除极端化”的做法法律化。自2017年以来，对极端化的宽泛定义造成了超过100万维吾尔人、哈萨克人、吉尔吉斯人和其它穆斯林人士被羁押在教育改造中心（或称再教育营）中。这种再教育营的目的是对被羁押人灌输爱国主义，消除他们的宗教和民族身份。被羁押人包括许多被命令回国的海外留学生或工人。国际媒体报道说，再教育营里的安全官员虐待、拷打并杀害了一些被羁押人。（见第1.a、1.b、1.c、1.d和2.d节。)
 
新疆官方继续维持对政府认定的“三股邪恶势力”（即宗教极端主义、民族分裂主义和暴力恐怖主义）的打击力度，包括继续集中开展再教育运动。现任新疆党委书记陈全国是前西藏自治区的共产党领导人，将在西藏实行的政策照搬到新疆，增加了超过300%的安保预算，招募了9万零800个与安保有关的工作人员。当局按照2016年新疆《反恐怖主义法》实施准则打一场“反恐怖主义的人民战争”，将监控手段升级，并加强了对旅行和民族以及宗教行为的限制。
 
在再教育营以外，政府还严格限制表达少数民族文化、语言和宗教身份的行为，其中包括法规禁止诸如“不正常”的蓄须、在公共场所戴面纱以及突然戒除烟酒等，以及其他一些行为；政府认为这些行为是“极端主义”的标志。法规禁止在给孩子起名字的时候使用一些伊斯兰名字，教孩子宗教内容也会受到惩罚。当局实行“住户调查”和“落户”等措施，官员或志愿者强行入住维吾尔家庭并监视这些家庭中可能的“极端主义”迹象。有媒体报道称，作为“结对认亲”计划的一部分，男性公务员会与被关押在拘留营里的男人的妻子睡在一张床上，他们把酒和猪肉带进这些家庭享用。
 
2018年10月，新疆政府发布了新的《去极端化条例》实施办法。法规的第17节称，县级政府“可以建立职业技能教育和培训中心以及其他类似的教育和改造机构以及管理系统，以便对受到激进主义影响的人进行教育和改造”。有些观察人员指出，尽管有这个新的地区法律，“再教育中心”仍然违反宪法。
 
居住在边境地区和其他一些地区的少数民族受教育的机会比汉族人少，在就业方面与汉族移民相比也受到歧视，收入大大低于其他地区的水平。政府的发展项目和工作条款破坏了少数民族的传统生活方式，有时还包括强制性搬迁和强迫游牧民族定居。少数民族地区的汉人从政府项目和经济增长中受益的程度明显超过了少数民族。为了强调建设“和谐社会”、维持社会稳定，政府对种族歧视及针对少数民族的体制性歧视等问题轻描淡写，并打击了关于民族文化和宗教信仰的和平表达，此类歧视仍然是新疆、内蒙古自治区、西藏自治区和其他藏区内严重不满情绪的根源。
 
法律规定，“以招收少数民族学生为主的学校(班和年级)和其他教育机构，在可能的情况下应当采用少数民族文字的课本，并用少数民族语言讲课”。尽管有保证这些文化和语言权利的条款，据国际媒体报道，在新疆普遍要求从幼儿园起全部使用普通话授课，并禁止在所有的教育活动和管理中使用维吾尔语。
 
许多警方临检、任意拘押和司法惩罚显然针对的是一些寻求和平表达其政治或宗教观点的团体或个人。拘押和惩罚扩展到了在互联网和社交媒体上表达意见，包括浏览、下载和传输被禁止的内容。有关官员继续以存在暴力威胁为借口对本地人、记者和来访的外国人采取极端的安全手段。据新华社报道，有关官员使用监视和面部识别软件、生物数据收集以及大数据等技术来建立一个新疆维吾尔人口数据库，目的是“预测、防范和制止社会动荡”。据官方媒体报道，安全部队经常在新疆各地举行有数千名武装警察参加的大规模阅兵。
 
维吾尔人和其他宗教少数民族继续遭受长期监禁，有些人在未经正当程序的情况下被处决，罪名是莫须有的分裂主义以及危害国家安全。国际媒体报道称，2016年和2017年，新疆地方政府公开招募了将近10万名安保人员。
 
法律将在互联网上讨论分裂主义定性为刑事犯罪，并且禁止以任何方式利用互联网破坏民族团结。法律还禁止煽动民族分裂或“危害社会稳定”，要求互联网服务商和网络运营商建立监控系统来发现、报告并删除宗教内容，或强化现有监控系统，报告违法行为。据报道，当局在检查站以及在随机抽查维吾尔人住宅时查看手机内容，那些拥有所谓恐怖主义材料（包括具有一般宗教或文化意义的图像）的人会被逮捕并被控犯罪。国际媒体报道称在警方设置的安全检查站，安全官员使用监控应用软件来下载和观看手机里的内容。
据自由亚洲电台和其它国际媒体报道，中国的哈萨克族人也成为目标。2018年8月，哈萨克族中国公民萨依拉古丽·萨吾提拜在哈萨克斯坦出庭作证，称她曾在一个关押了大约2500名哈萨克人的中心被强制劳动。她告诉法庭，她在拘留营受到“政治灌输”。哈萨克人还被禁止在中国和哈萨克斯坦之间自由来往，一些回到中国的人被关押到拘留营。
 
中国政府给外国施加压力，要求遣返离开中国的维吾尔人或拒绝给他们发放签证，而被遣返的人回国后面临被监禁或虐待的危险。有些维吾尔人被遣返回中国后失踪。据国外媒体报道，在海外学习的维吾尔人的家人也受到压力，要他们说服学生回到中国，而回国的学生都遭到羁押或被迫参加再教育营。在海外的维吾尔族人，无论是中国公民还是其他国家的居民，有时会受到压力，让他们向中国政府的特工提供关于维吾尔移民社区的信息。
 
7月，媒体报道一名维吾尔妇女和她的两个女儿被给予塔吉克斯坦护照，并违反她们的意愿被从土耳其驱逐到塔吉克斯坦，尽管他们是土耳其的合法居民，但中国当局还是将其运往乌鲁木齐。 8月份，一名维吾尔男子逃离他在巴基斯坦的家，到欧洲寻求庇护，因为其他多名居住在巴基斯坦的维吾尔人被驱逐回中国。他被拒绝进入波斯尼亚，被送往卡塔尔，在那里他被驱回中国，最终被允许进入另一个国家。
 
本年度，集会自由在新疆遭到严重限制。有关在新疆践踏宗教自由的信息，见国务院的《国际宗教自由报告》，网址是：
https://www.state.gov/religiousfreedomreport/。
 
关于西藏的具体信息，请见西藏附录。
 
基于性取向和性别认同的暴力、歧视和其他虐待行为
 
没有法律规定成年人私下发生自愿的同性性行为是犯罪。与其他接受海外资助的团体一样，为男女同性恋、双性恋、变性人和双性人（LGBTI）事务工作的活动人士和团体继续报告说，他们受到来自当局的歧视和骚扰。
 
LGBTI人士报告了暴力事件，包括家庭暴力；但他们在寻求法律赔偿时遇到困难，因为关于家庭暴力的法规以及《反家庭暴力法》都没有包括对同性关系的承认。赔偿的评估进一步受到社会歧视和传统规范的限制，这造成多数LGBTI人士避免公开讨论他们的性取向和性别认同。
 
有关LGBTI的非政府组织报告说，尽管由于《境外非政府组织管理法》和《中国慈善法》，公共维权工作愈发困难，但他们仍然通过一些具体的反歧视案件在争取LBGTI权利方面取得了一些进展。
 
对艾滋病毒携带者和艾滋病患者的社会污名化
 
对艾滋病毒携带者的歧视仍然是一个问题，影响到这些人的就业、教育以及住房机会，妨碍了他们获得医疗保健。在有些情况下，保护艾滋病毒携带者免受歧视的法律与限制他们权利的法律相互矛盾。本年度中，官方媒体报告说，一些艾滋病毒携带者或艾滋病患者因带有艾滋病毒而在住房、教育或就业等方面受到阻碍。全国估计有125万艾滋病毒携带者。
 
今年年初，西安的一名叫“王明”的退休工人被当地一家公立医院的院长“劝说”回家，理由是他的咳嗽是一种慢性病。王明说，他相信公立医院拒绝给他治疗是因为发现他是艾滋病毒阳性。他是较早时在一家私人诊所进行牙科手术时被感染的。
 
根据法律，公司不得要求进行艾滋病毒抗体检验，也不得因雇员携带艾滋病毒而将其解雇。尽管如此，本年修订的《艾滋病防治条例》还规定，艾滋病毒呈阳性者不得从事被法律、行政法规和国务院卫生行政部门规定禁止从事的工作。
 
其他社会暴力或社会歧视
 
法律禁止针对传染病患者的歧视，并且允许这类人担任公职。尽管法律禁止歧视，但是在许多地区，歧视乙肝病毒携带者（包括2000万慢性乙肝病毒携带者）的现象在很多地区仍然非常普遍，地方政府有时也会试图限制他们的活动。尽管2010年的一项全国性规定禁止在招工、招生时强制进行乙肝病毒检测，很多企业仍然将检测乙肝病毒作为上岗前筛查的一部分。
 
法律没有对就业方面常见的一些歧视类型作出规定，包括基于身高、外貌或民族的歧视。
 
宣扬歧视行为
 
为了证明在新疆和其他地方拘留少数民族的合理性，中国官方媒体刊登了许多文章，把少数族裔或宗教团体的成员描述为暴力和低素质。这种宣传强调了宗教信仰，特别是对伊斯兰的信仰与暴力行为之间的联系。此外，许多文章将宗教信徒描述为文化落后且受教育程度较低，因此需要政府纠正。
 
第七节 劳工权利
 
 
法律不保护结社自由，而且工人不能自由组织工会或加入自己选择的工会。独立工会是非法的，罢工权不受法律保护。中华全国总工会（简称“全总”）是仅有的一个得到法律承认的工会。独立的工会是非法的，法律不保护罢工的权利。法律允许各类企业的员工为薪酬进行集体谈判。法律还允许有行业性或地区性集体合同，全国各地的企业集体合同通常是强制性的。有关规章要求政府控制的工会在与管理层协商之前必须征求工人的意见，并将集体合同提交工人或其代表大会审批。雇主没有法律责任进行谈判或本着诚信原则讨价还价，有些雇主拒绝这么做。
 
法律规定了保护，防止对官方批准的工会进行歧视，并且规定企业管理部门不得在工会代表的任期内将其调走或终止其工作。法律规定，因从事正式工会活动被解聘的工人必须予以复职，并且规定了对企业反工会活动的其他处罚。法律不保护在官方承认的工会之外独自向雇主提出要求或进行谈判的工人。
 
所有的工会活动必须由全总批准和组织。全总是中共的一个组织，由一名政治局委员任主席。全总及其省级和地方各级分支机构继续积极组建新的下属工会并增加新成员，特别是在技术公司中的年轻职工。法律授予全总对其下属所有工会的财务和行政控制权。全总的下属工会可以代表职工与企业及事业单位进行协商并签订集体合同。法律没有强制要求全总在劳动争议中代表工人的利益。
 
全总和中共通过多种机制来影响工会代表的挑选。虽然法律规定各级工会领导人必须通过选举产生，但全总下属的工会任命了大部分工厂层面的工会领导人，而且常常会与雇主协调产生。官方工会的领导人通常来自管理层。工人直接选举工会领导人的情况仍然罕见，仅仅发生于企业层面，并且受到上级工会或中共的监督。在直接选举工会领导人的企业中，全总地区官员和当地中共当局控制了对候选人的挑选和批准。即使在这些情况下，工人和非政府组织也对选举的公信力表示关切。
 
法律没有明令禁止停工，而且也不禁止工人自发的罢工。尽管一些地方当局容忍抗议拖欠工资和少付工资的罢工，在全年继续有警察镇压罢工的报告。例如，4月10日，河北张家口市的警察殴打并逮捕了一群钟楼啤酒厂员工，这些工人要求厂方支付拖欠的社会保险金。总部设在香港的劳工权利非政府组织《中国劳工通讯》在这一年记录的1386次罢工和集体抗议中，工资和福利拖欠占了84％。
 
有时地方当局在对这种罢工的镇压中对罢工领袖控以模糊不清的刑事罪名，比如“煽动颠覆国家政权”、“寻衅滋事”、“聚众扰乱公共秩序”、“破坏生产”等，或索性不提出任何指控即拘留他们。在罢工问题上，中华全国总工会的唯一法定角色是参加调查和协助人力资源及社会保障部解决纠纷。
 
执行劳工法律通常不足以震慑普遍存在的违反旨在保护劳工权利法律的行为。劳工检查员没有足够的授权和资源强迫雇主纠正违法行为。虽然法律规定了解决争议的一般性程序，但这些程序冗长且会被拖延。某些地区的地方当局着力限制独立民间团体和法律工作者的活动。有一些地区对调解未果而可以继续进行仲裁或者法庭审理的案件有非正式的限额。一些地方政府当局采取措施，增加调解或者仲裁。例如，3月6日茂名市中级法院和茂名市工会联合建立了劳工仲裁与和解协调办公室来协助更好的沟通并缓解纠纷。当地人大的一位官员称，日益增多的仲裁、冗长的诉讼和昂贵的官司成本无益于建立积极与和谐的劳资关系。根据《中国劳动统计年鉴》，2017年地方劳资纠纷仲裁委员会处理了78万5323起案件，其中16万9456起与解除劳动合同有关。
 
虽然看起来有一个强有力的劳工运动，工会参加率也相对很高，但真正的结社自由和工人代表权并不存在。附属于全总的工会在代表和保护工人权益方面的通常很小。工人通常不把全总当作自己权益的维权者，尤其是外来务工人员，他们与工会官员的接触微乎其微。
 
《中国劳工通讯》报道了全国各地有工人举行自发性罢工、停工或其他抗议活动，并称工人们的行动表明全总无力防止违法行为和解决纠纷。媒体报道了一批在全国各地的工厂以及服务和零售业发生的工人抗议活动。
 
政府在本年度逐渐加大了针对劳工活动人士、学生和其他维护工人权利的人士的行动。例如，自2018年7月开始对佳士科技（Jasic Technology）工厂的工人及其支持者进行拘留之后，政府继续以劳工组织者和劳工权利活动分子为打击目标。政府通过拘留和骚扰劳工权利倡导者，加大了反劳工运动的力度。这些倡导者包括工厂工人、活动人士、研究人员、非政府组织工作人员、社会工作者和媒体编辑，不仅是参与深圳佳士运动的人。在该运动中，佳士科技工厂的工人试图成立工会以应对低薪和恶劣的工作条件。广东的劳工活动人士、毛派组织乌有之乡、左派大学生和其他团体支持了这些抗议活动。深圳警方于2018年关押了十几名工人和一名学生劳工活动人士，4名工人—李展、刘鹏华、米久平和余浚聪截至年底仍被关押。据佳士工人声援团称，该组织的一些成员受到国安官员的问讯，并被要求观看一段视频，在该视频中，他们的同伴承认自己在支持针对佳士公司的劳工运动中的不法行为。据报道，沈梦雨和其他三名活动人士在一个视频中说，他们违反法律和极端主义思想的原因是激进组织洗脑的结果，这些组织希望利用他们来煽动对国家的不满。声援团批评了警察的录像，并且表示录像是违反学生意愿强行制作的，漏洞百出。
 
5月份，6名联合国独立专家写信给政府，对佳士事件拘留人的情况表示关切。在6月和10月，国际劳工组织（ILO）的结社自由委员会针对国际工会联合会提起的一项指控政府骚扰、恐吓、逮捕和人身虐待的案件，得出结论，政府对佳士工人的拘留和刑事指控严重干涉了公民自由和工会权利。国际劳工组织敦促政府释放因建立工会的活动而被拘留的工人，并且对有关指控做出详细答复。
 
尽管有对工人行动的限制，跨省的联合行动在其他几个部门也有发生。4月份，在山东、江西、陕西以及北京和上海的不同地点，快递公司员工就裁员、欠薪、社会保险和同工同酬进行了抗议。
 
中央、省级和地方政府的联手行动，包括监视、骚扰、拘押和监禁劳工维权人士并限制其旅行，还限制非政府组织的资金来源，瓦解劳工维权运动。在1月和3月，警方拘留了在线工人维权宣传平台的三名编辑，之前他们发布了一份信息，呼吁从湖南来的外来务工人员因职业性肺病尘肺病而争取获得逾期赔偿。5月，警察临检支持北京、广州和深圳的农民工的民间团体，拘留了4名社会工作者。12月15日，3名捍卫环卫工人合法权益的劳工活动人士在广州被拘留了15天。
 
 
法律禁止强迫或强制劳动。虽然国内媒体很少报道强迫劳动的案件和相关处罚，该法律规定了可酌情惩罚的范围，包括监禁、刑事拘留和罚款。这些惩罚是否足以威慑犯罪尚不清楚。
 
有多方媒体和非政府组织报告称，一些被关押在拘留营（见第6节）的人被强制劳动。被拘留者主要在生产服装的纺织工厂工作。今年6月，一份工厂调查报告称，在新疆的一个强迫劳动营中制造的服装由美国运动装备提供商进口。
 
100多万在海外的中国工人仍然容易受到雇主的剥削和强迫劳动。3月22日，一家中国建筑公司及其在美国的子公司的美国业务负责人在美国法院被判强迫劳动罪名成立，他在纽约市剥削了中国建筑工人。
 
尽管全国人大在2013年废除了劳改制度，即一个可不经司法审查任意行政拘留的体系，无数媒体和非政府组织报告说，强迫劳动继续在监狱和戒毒所中存在，在那些地方的人仍然未经司法程序而被拘押。8月，一份非政府组织报告称，新疆的棉花生产使用了监狱劳工。
 
数起报道称，在小型作坊和工厂中患有精神残疾的人被强制劳动。
 
另见美国国务院发布的《人口贩运问题报告》：https://www.state.gov/trafficking-in-persons-report/。
 
 
法律禁止最恶劣形式的童工。法律禁止雇用16岁以下的少年儿童。16至18岁的工人称为“未成年工”，禁止他们从事某些形式的危险工作，包括采矿业工作。在私营部门有童工的报告，据称政府对这种情况执行了该法律。
 
法律具体规定，对于非法雇用童工的企业给予行政审查、罚款和吊销经营执照的处罚，并且规定一旦发现童工必须遣返，交给父母或者原居住地的其他监护人。对雇用16岁以下儿童从事危险劳动或过长工时的劳动的惩罚是判处徒刑，但在立法与执法之间依然存在着差距，尽管在全国每年都有地方当局开展的检查活动。尚不清楚惩罚是否足以威慑犯罪。
 
旨在制止贩运儿童的法律可能不适用于14-17岁的男孩。目前尚不清楚处罚是否足以阻止违法行为。在本年中，有报告说，在小型制造作坊、农场和杂技表演中工作的儿童通常是没有报酬的。
 
4月，媒体报道说，长春科技大学的实习生被迫与河北和吉林的电子工厂签订合同，而往往是在没有阅读合同的情况签署。据报道，这些学生每天工作12个小时，没有休息，没有假日，没有病假，而且只有最低的工资。一名男学生被一名雇员殴打后被送往医院，一名女学生报告说在工作中受到性骚扰。
 
7月，教育部发布了监管学生实习的指南。但是，像过去几年一样，学生工制度的滥用仍在继续。有多份报告称，学校和地方官员不当地促进了学生工的供应。例如，有媒体和非政府组织报道说，富士康科技集团位于湖南衡阳的工厂里的职业实习学生占一个工厂劳动力的20％以上，是法律允许水平的两倍。一些学生被迫违法上夜班和加班。媒体报道说，在一个案例中，一位学生向她的生产线经理提出抱怨，却被一位老师告知，如果不遵从就可能危及她的毕业。在回应媒体询问时，富士康承认自己没有完全遵守相关法律法规，并补充说他们将立即采取措施，以确保实习生不再加班或做夜班。富士康此前曾因使用职业学校的童工而受到批评。
 
另见美国劳工部的《童工或强迫劳动生产的商品目录》：
https://www.dol.gov/agencies/ilab/reports/child-labor/list-of-goods。
 
 
法律为禁止基于民族、种族、性别、宗教信仰、残疾、年龄和传染病或职业病的就业歧视提供了法律保护的基础。政府没有有效地执行这些法律。2月，9个政府部门和团体发布通知，禁止招聘和雇用过程中性别歧视，中华全国总工会出版了促进工作中性别平等的手册。执行条款包括通过法院寻求民事赔偿的权利。有些法院不愿受理歧视案件，各级当局强调通过协调解决劳动纠纷。因此，很少有执法行动导致最终法律裁决的案例。就业歧视普遍存在，包括在招募广告中基于性别、年龄、身高、出生地、婚姻状况、残疾、外貌和健康状况的歧视（见第六节）。
 
本年度内工作场所普遍存在对妇女的歧视。从事蓝领工作的女性的强制退休年龄为50岁，从事白领工作的女性为55岁，而所有男性的退休年龄是60岁。
2018年11月，人权观察组织对2013年至2018年间的3万6000份公务员招聘广告进行了调查，发现其中五分之一要求或偏爱男性。歧视的例子包括招聘广告招募漂亮的女性，偏爱男性，或要求女性比男性从事相同工作的人具有更高的学历。调查结果表明，女性被邀请参加面试或被召回参加第二轮面试的可能性较小。在面试中，一些妇女被问及是否有孩子，有多少孩子，以及是否计划生孩子或如果已经有孩子，是否计划生育更多孩子。网上求职平台智联招聘在2018年对10万个求职者进行的调查发现，女性的薪水比男性低22％，超过10％的在职女性认为决定结婚或生孩子会对自己的晋升机会造成风险。8月，一位全国人民代表大会常务委员会委员指出，妇女在怀孕时面临歧视，雇主认为这涉及到额外成本。
 
最高法院于2018年12月发布指示，宣布平等就业权利受到侵犯属于提出诉讼的可接受理由。随后，10月28日，珠海市一名41岁的女工赢得了国家有史以来首例针对怀孕歧视提起的民事诉讼。媒体报道称，化名张敏的原告于2月20日，在一家地方医院确诊她怀孕后的第二天，被其雇主英利物业管理有限公司解雇。珠海地方法院裁定，雇主违反了《就业促进法》，并命令公司向原告发出书面道歉，赔偿她在怀孕期间和之后的未付工资，并支付1万元人民币（合1500美元）的精神损害赔偿。
 
户口制度仍然是最普遍的就业歧视的一种形式。它使外来务工人员不能得到与当地居民同等的全面社会福利，包括医疗保健、养老金和残疾福利等。
 
 
没有全国通行的最低工资标准，但是法律一般要求地方和省级政府依据人力资源和社会保障部设立的标准制定本地区正式或非正式部门中的最低工资。根据法律，限制雇员每天工作8小时，每周工作40小时；超过这个标准的工作属于加班。法律还禁止每天加班超过3小时或每月加班时间超过36小时，并且规定加班必须付超过正常工资的加班费。
 
在2018年建立的应急管理部负责制定并执行职业安全规章。国家卫健委负责制定并执行职业健康规章。法律要求雇主对在危险条件下工作的雇员提供免费健康检查并将结果告知他们。法律还规定，工人有权报告可能危及其健康的违法现象或离开此类工作场所，而不应当有因此被解雇的风险。
 
法规声明，县级和县以上的劳动和社会保障部门负责劳动法的执法工作。违反职业、安全与卫生法规的公司面临多种处罚，包括停止营业或吊销商业证书和营业执照。
 
政府没有有效地执行该法律。惩罚措施不足以威慑违规行为而且鲜有执行。监察员的数量不足以威慑违规行为，而且其检查范围不涉及非正式经济部门。尽管国内工人的安全记录在过去8年中有改善，本年度还是有一些工作场所发生事故。媒体和非政府组织将事故的原因归于缺乏安全检查、对法律法规执行不力、低效的监督和应急反应机制不足。
 
在许多领域，包括加班费和社保费在内的工资拖欠仍然是一个问题。此外，2018年中华全国总工会的一项调查发现，30％的白领雇员被鼓励不要使用他们有权享有的年假。政府很少执行加班法，每周工作72小时对于许多工人来说是很普遍的。年初，技术工作人员组织了一场网上活动，抗议“ 996文化”，代表了该行业典型的工作时间，从上午9点到晚上9点，每周六天。这场运动引发了公众辩论，并采取了有限的行动。例如，一些技术产品开发商开始拒绝向推行自愿或强制加班的工作文化的公司授予项目许可。此外，为响应这项运动，70多名律师签署了一封致人力资源和社会保障部的信，敦促政府执行劳动法。包括杭州在内的一些地方当局开展了调查，以确定公司是否违反劳动法鼓励加班工作。
 
数十年以来，由于普遍雇用分包的低薪流动工人，拖欠工资一直是建筑业的一个严重问题。这种非正式的招工体系使得农民工容易被拖欠工资，促使他们参加集体讨薪行动。各级政府继续努力防止欠薪并追回未付的工资和社保费。据最高人民检察院，他们在本年度的2396起欠薪案件中起诉了2609人，帮助工人追回了总共2.5亿元人民币（3520万美元）的欠薪。起诉导致2599起逮捕。工人们有时采取激烈措施讨薪。6月27日，两名河南冷水江的建筑工人威胁说如果不付工资，他们就要从吊车上跳下去。
 
公司仍然会在搬迁或关闭前的很短时间内发出通知，这经常使职工无法追索应得的报酬。7月23日，工人举行抗议示威，要求讨回欠薪，原因是浙江台州的一家汽车经销店突然无预警关闭。
 
非正式经济部门的工人常常缺乏劳动合同所涵盖的保障；即使有合同，特别是外来务工人员，也比较难以获得福利，尤其是社保福利。非正式经济部门的工人工作时间较长，却比正式经济部门的工人得到更少的工资。4月23日，河南大约100名环卫工人罢工抗议工作时间过长，工资停滞以及工作条件差。（见第七.a.节）
 
据本年度发表的几份官方文件，职业病普遍存在，而据媒体报道，数字被低估。病人来自许多行业，包括煤矿、化学工程和建筑业。国家卫健委报告每年诊断出2万8000例新增的职业病，其中尘肺病（黑肺病）几乎占了90%。在7月，媒体报道说，警察阻止了1万多名受到尘肺病感染的前建筑工人从陕西旅行到洛阳，要求为该职业病提供赔偿。
 
工作场所的事故和伤害仍然很普遍。尽管这一年中有关煤矿事故的新闻报道较少，但煤炭开采业的死亡事故仍然极多。根据中国煤炭安全生产网的数据，全年发生170起煤矿事故，造成3168人死亡。1月12日，陕西发生的煤尘爆炸造成21名矿工死亡。5月29日，江西一家煤矿塌方，造成两人死亡。7月31日，贵州某煤矿发生瓦斯爆炸，造成7人死亡。
 
在其他行业中，工伤事故也仍然很普遍。2月23日，内蒙古发生的一次银矿事故使22人死亡，28人受伤。3月21日，江苏某化工厂爆炸，造成78人死亡，600多人受伤。5月16日，10名建筑工人在他们在上海正在修建的建筑物倒塌时丧生。9月29日，浙江一家工厂发生火灾，导致19名工人死亡。

The People’s Republic of China (PRC) is an authoritarian state in which the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is the paramount authority. CCP members hold almost all top government and security apparatus positions. Ultimate authority rests with the CCP Central Committee’s 25-member Political Bureau (Politburo) and its seven-member Standing Committee. Xi Jinping continued to hold the three most powerful positions as CCP general secretary, state president, and chairman of the Central Military Commission.
The main domestic security agencies include the Ministry of State Security, the Ministry of Public Security, and the People’s Armed Police.  The People’s Armed Police continue to be under the dual authority of the Central Committee of the CCP and the Central Military Commission. The People’s Liberation Army is primarily responsible for external security but also has some domestic security responsibilities. Local jurisdictions also frequently use civilian municipal security forces, known as “urban management” officials, to enforce administrative measures. Civilian authorities maintained effective control of the security forces.
During the year the government continued its campaign of mass detention of members of Muslim minority groups in the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region (Xinjiang). Authorities were reported to have arbitrarily detained more than one million Uighurs, ethnic Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, and other Muslims in extrajudicial internment camps designed to erase religious and ethnic identities. Chinese government officials justified the camps under the pretense of combating terrorism, separatism, and extremism. International media, human rights organizations, and former detainees reported security officials in the camps abused, tortured, and killed detainees.  Government documents, as published by international media, corroborated the coercive nature of the campaign and its impact on members of Muslim minority groups in Xinjiang and abroad.
Significant human rights issues included:  arbitrary or unlawful killings by the government; forced disappearances by the government; torture by the government; arbitrary detention by the government; harsh and life-threatening prison and detention conditions; political prisoners; arbitrary interference with privacy; substantial problems with the independence of the judiciary; physical attacks on and criminal prosecution of journalists, lawyers, writers, bloggers, dissidents, petitioners, and others as well as their family members; censorship and site blocking; interference with the rights of peaceful assembly and freedom of association, including overly restrictive laws that apply to foreign and domestic nongovernmental organizations (NGOs); severe restrictions of religious freedom; substantial restrictions on freedom of movement (for travel within the country and overseas); refoulement of asylum seekers to North Korea, where they have a well- founded fear of persecution; the inability of citizens to choose their government; corruption; a coercive birth-limitation policy that in some cases included forced sterilization or abortions; trafficking in persons; and severe restrictions on labor rights, including a ban on workers organizing or joining unions of their own choosing; and child labor.
Official repression of the freedoms of speech, religion, movement, association, and assembly of Tibetans in the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) and other Tibetan areas, and of predominantly Uighurs and other ethnic and religious minorities in Xinjiang, was more severe than in other areas of the country. Such repression, however, occurred throughout the country, as exemplified by the case of Pastor Wang Yi, the leader of the Early Rain Church, who was charged and convicted of “inciting subversion of state power” in an unannounced, closed-door trial with no defense lawyer present. Authorities sentenced him to nine years in prison.
The CCP continued to dominate the judiciary and controlled the appointment of all judges and in certain cases directly dictated the court’s ruling. Authorities harassed, detained, and arrested citizens who promoted independent efforts to combat abuses of power.
In the absence of reliable data, it was difficult to ascertain the full extent of impunity for the domestic security apparatus. Authorities often announced investigations following cases of reported killings by police.  It remained unclear, however, whether these investigations resulted in findings of police malfeasance or disciplinary action.
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom from:
There were numerous reports that the government or its agents committed arbitrary or unlawful killings. In many instances few or no details were available.
In Xinjiang there were reports of custodial deaths related to detentions in the internment camps. In October Radio Free Asia (RFA) reported that “at least 150 people” died in a six-month period while detained at one of four internment camps in Kuchar (Chinese: Kuche), Aksu (Akesu) Prefecture.
In June 2018 Aytursun Eli died in Kashgar (Kashi), Xinjiang, while being questioned in official custody, according to a recorded interview, released during the year, which her mother gave to the official Xinjiang Women’s Federation. Authorities reportedly targeted the Uighur tour director at Hua An Tourism Company after she returned from a work trip to Dubai.  Officials later said she died of a “medical condition” and prevented family members from examining the body.
Although legal reforms in recent years decreased the use of the death penalty and improved the review process, authorities executed some defendants in criminal proceedings following convictions that lacked due process and adequate channels for appeal. Official figures on executions were classified as a state secret. According to the U.S.-based Dui Hua Foundation, the number of executions stabilized after years of decline following the reform of the capital punishment system initiated in 2007. Dui Hua reported an increase in the number of executions for bosses of criminal gangs and individuals convicted of “terrorism” in Xinjiang likely offset the drop in the number of other executions.
There were multiple reports authorities detained individuals and held them at undisclosed locations for extended periods.
The government conducted mass arbitrary detention of Uighurs, ethnic Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, and other Muslims in Xinjiang. China Human Rights Defenders reported these detentions amounted to enforced disappearance, since families were often not provided information about the length or location of the detention.
After disappearing in November 2018 following a trip to Xinjiang to lead a photography workshop, award-winning documentary photographer Lu Guang appeared to have been released to his hometown in Zhejiang a “few months” before September, according to his wife. Although Lu was a legal resident of the United States, he was believed to be under “residential surveillance” and restricted from leaving China.
The Uyghur Human Rights Project published a report in January detailing the forced disappearance, imprisonment, and internment of 338 Uighur intellectuals. Many were prominent Uighur scholars and cultural icons. Sanubar Tursun, a singer, was reported disappeared.  Qurban Mahmut, a magazine editor who encouraged works on Uighur culture and history, disappeared into an internment camp. Five intellectuals identified in the report died while interned in a camp or shortly after release. This included 40-year-old Mutellip Nurmehmet, who died nine days after his release from an internment camp. Media also reported that prominent Uighur writer Nurmuhammed Tohti suffered a heart attack during his 70-day detention in an internment camp and died shortly after being released. Camp doctors reportedly ignored his health conditions, and when authorities returned his body home on June 3, his legs were still chained.
According to a December 2019 report, Iminjan Seydin, a professor of Chinese history at the Xinjiang Islamic Institute and founder of the Imin Book Publishing Company who disappeared in May 2017, was tried in May 2019 in a closed-door hearing. A family member stated she learned of the trial months later, in September.
The exact whereabouts of Aikebaier Aisaiti, a Uighur journalist and entrepreneur, remained unknown. He was reportedly detained in Xinjiang in 2016 after participating in a program in the United States and subsequently sentenced to up to 15 years in prison.
Lawyer Wang Quanzhang was transferred in April from the Tianjin Detention Center to a prison in Linyi, Shandong, after his closed-session sentencing in January, which followed his December 2018 closed-court trial and conviction on charges of “subverting state power.”  Wang had been held in incommunicado detention since 2015 when he was detained in the “709” nationwide roundup of more than 300 human rights lawyers and legal associates. He was first allowed to see his wife and son on June 28, after nearly four years of detention.  His wife told media he appeared “lethargic” and was in poor physical and mental health.  She continued to see him once a month, the maximum prison authorities allowed.
In February relatives of detained labor activist Fu Changguo, an employee at the labor organization Dagongzhe, reported they could no longer determine Fu’s whereabouts. Shenzhen’s Second Detention Center, which was previously believed to be in custody of Fu, informed the family in early February that Fu was not on their detainee list. Earlier, in December 2018, the Pingshan District Police Station denied his family’s application for bail, claiming Fu might “destroy or fabricate evidence, and disrupt or conspire to falsify witness statements.”  Fu was among more than 50 individuals detained, disappeared, or placed under house arrest between July 2018 and January after being accused of participating in or aiding the labor movement against Shenzhen’s Jasic Technology, a manufacturer of industrial welding equipment (see section 7).
The government still had not provided a comprehensive, credible accounting of all those killed, missing, or detained in connection with the violent suppression of the 1989 Tiananmen demonstrations. Many activists who were involved in the 1989 demonstrations and their family members continued to suffer official harassment.
The government made no efforts to prevent, investigate, or punish such harassment.
Punishment
The law prohibits the physical abuse and mistreatment of detainees and forbids prison guards from coercing confessions, insulting prisoners’ dignity, and beating or encouraging others to beat prisoners. Amendments to the criminal procedure law exclude evidence obtained through illegal means, including coerced confessions, in certain categories of criminal cases. Enforcement of these legal protections continued to be lax.
Numerous former prisoners and detainees reported they were beaten, raped, subjected to electric shock, forced to sit on stools for hours on end, hung by the wrists, deprived of sleep, force fed, forced to take medication against their will, and otherwise subjected to physical and psychological abuse. Although prison authorities abused ordinary prisoners, they reportedly singled out political and religious dissidents for particularly harsh treatment.
Chen Yunfei, who was released from prison in Sichuan in March, reported that during his four-year imprisonment for sweeping the tombs of victims of the 1989 Tiananmen demonstrations, prison guards forced him to maintain stress positions for extended periods of time and held him in solitary confinement in a dark room for several months. The guards also reportedly beat him and ordered other prisoners to beat him as well.  After one such beating, Chen was hospitalized for 40 days. During his incarceration he was denied contact with family or friends.
According to China Human Rights Defenders, Fujian rights advocate lawyer Ji Sizun died on July 10 in the Zhangzhou Xiangcheng Intensive Care Unit (ICU) after his April 26 release from prison, where he was deprived of adequate medical care. During his imprisonment he suffered from strokes and various other diseases that resulted in his paralysis.  Authorities allowed his family to visit him for the first time in the ICU on May 6.  Ji was malnourished, intubated, unable to eat except through a tube, and could recognize only two of his three sisters. Four security guards were deployed at the ICU, which admitted only one visitor at a time for 15 minutes each.  Individuals with knowledge of the case said authorities pressured Ji’s family to sign a power of attorney, empowering authorities to immediately cremate his body after death.
In September media outlets reported the custodial death of prodemocracy activist Wang Meiyu.  Wang was detained in July after he held up a placard outside Hengyang Normal University in Hunan calling for Chairman Xi Jinping’s resignation and for democratic elections in the country. On September 23, police called Wang’s wife, Cao Shuxia, saying Wang had died suddenly in a military hospital in Hengyang, where he was detained. Cao said Wang’s body was “unrecognizable” when she went to identify it: He was bleeding from his eyes, mouth, ears and nose, and there were bruises on his face. His wife said Wang was a “healthy, normal man” when he was taken into custody.  Police did not offer any explanation of the cause of death.  Wang’s lawyers learned he was moved from a large cell with many other inmates to solitary confinement. Wang’s mother said she was offered compensation of 2.98 million yuan ($420,000). Wang and Cao lost their jobs due to his activism. Cao and her two children were reportedly under house arrest after his death.
Wu Gan, a Chinese blogger and human rights activist, received an eight-year prison sentence on a charge of “subverting state power” from a Tianjin court in 2017, after 952 days in preventive detention. On March 4, Wu’s father visited him in Fujian’s Qingliu Prison. According to Wu’s father, Wu reported sustaining multiple injuries while in police custody in Tianjin and Beijing, which resulted in a heart attack, chronic pain, and a paralyzed hand.
Members of the minority Uighur ethnic group reported systematic torture and other degrading treatment by law enforcement officers and officials working within the penal system and the internment camps. Survivors stated that authorities subjected individuals in custody to electric shock, waterboarding, beatings, rape, stress positions, injection of unknown substances, and cold cells (see section 6, National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities).
There was no direct evidence of an involuntary or prisoner-based organ transplant system. Nevertheless, some activists and organizations continued to accuse the government of involuntarily harvesting organs from prisoners of conscience, especially members of Falun Gong. The PRC government denied the claims, stating it had officially ended the long-standing practice of harvesting the organs of executed prisoners for use in transplants in 2015. One Australian National University study of PRC official statistics of organ donations said there was “highly compelling evidence” based on statistical forensics that the data was “falsified.” Furthermore, the research paper argued that the government’s organ transplant program involved donations from “nonvoluntary donors who are marked down as ‘citizen donors.’”  In June the nongovernmental Independent Tribunal into Forced Organ Harvesting of Prisoners of Conscience in China released a report which found “direct and indirect evidence of forced organ harvesting” in China, citing “extraordinarily short waiting times” and “massive infrastructure development of facilities and medical personnel for organ transplant operations.” Some Xinjiang internment camp survivors reported healthy young men would be spared the physical abuse that other detainees suffered and given health screenings including DNA samples before disappearing, raising these survivors’ concerns that organ harvesting from detainees was taking place in the camps.
The treatment and abuse of detainees under the liuzhi detention system, which operates outside the judicial system but is a legal tool for the government to investigate corruption, featured custodial treatment such as extended solitary confinement, sleep deprivation, beatings, and forced standing or sitting in uncomfortable positions for hours and sometimes days, according to press reports (see section 4).
The law states psychiatric treatment and hospitalization should be “on a voluntary basis,” but the law also allows authorities and family members to commit persons to psychiatric facilities against their will and fails to provide meaningful legal protections for persons sent to psychiatric facilities. The law does not provide for the right to a lawyer and restricts a person’s right to communicate with those outside the psychiatric institution.
Official media reported the Ministry of Public Security directly administered 23 high-security psychiatric hospitals for the criminally insane. While many of those committed to mental health facilities were convicted of murder and other violent crimes, there were also reports of activists, religious or spiritual adherents, and petitioners involuntarily subjected to psychiatric treatment for political reasons.
Public security officials may commit individuals to psychiatric facilities and force treatment for “conditions” that have no basis in psychiatry.
Prison and Detention Center Conditions
Conditions in penal institutions for both political prisoners and criminal offenders were generally harsh and often life threatening or degrading.
Physical Conditions: Authorities regularly held prisoners and detainees in overcrowded conditions with poor sanitation. Food often was inadequate and of poor quality, and many detainees relied on supplemental food, medicines, and warm clothing provided by relatives when allowed to receive them. Prisoners often reported sleeping on the floor because there were no beds or bedding. In many cases provisions for sanitation, ventilation, heating, lighting, and access to potable water were inadequate.
Adequate, timely medical care for prisoners remained a serious problem, despite official assurances prisoners have the right to prompt medical treatment.  Prison authorities at times withheld medical treatment from political prisoners.
Political prisoners were sometimes held with the general prison population and reported being beaten by other prisoners at the instigation of guards. Some reported being held in the same cells as death row inmates.  In some cases authorities did not allow dissidents to receive supplemental food, medicine, and warm clothing from relatives.
Conditions in administrative detention facilities were similar to those in prisons. Deaths from beatings occurred in administrative detention facilities. Detainees reported beatings, sexual assaults, lack of proper food, and limited or no access to medical care.
In Xinjiang authorities expanded existing internment camps for Uighurs, ethnic Kazakhs, and other Muslims. In some cases authorities used repurposed schools, factories, and prisons to hold detainees. According to Human Rights Watch, these camps focused on “military-style discipline and pervasive political indoctrination of the detainees.”
Administration:  The law states letters from a prisoner to higher authorities of the prison or to the judicial organs shall be free from examination; it was unclear to what extent the law was implemented. While authorities occasionally investigated credible allegations of inhuman conditions, their results were not documented in a publicly accessible manner.  Authorities denied many prisoners and detainees reasonable access to visitors and correspondence with family members. Some family members did not know the whereabouts of their relatives in custody. Authorities also prevented many prisoners and detainees from engaging in religious practices or gaining access to religious materials.
Independent Monitoring:  Authorities considered information about prisons and various other types of administrative and extralegal detention facilities to be a state secret, and the government typically did not permit independent monitoring.
Arbitrary arrest and detention remained serious problems. The law grants public security officers broad administrative detention powers and the ability to detain individuals for extended periods without formal arrest or criminal charges. Lawyers, human rights activists, journalists, religious leaders and adherents, and former political prisoners and their family members continued to be targeted for arbitrary detention or arrest.
The law provides for the right of any person to challenge the lawfulness of his or her arrest or detention in court, but the government generally did not observe this requirement.
In early April courts in Chengdu, Sichuan, tried and convicted four activists–Chen Bing, Fu Hailu, Zhang Junyong, and Luo Fuyu–who had been detained without trial since 2016. They were charged with “picking quarrels and provoking trouble” after producing liquor with a label commemorating the 1989 Tiananmen demonstrations and sentenced to prison terms between three and three-and-one-half years. Three of the accused were forced to use court-appointed lawyers during the trial instead of lawyers they had retained themselves.
Pu Wenqing, mother of Sichuan-based activist Huang Qi, disappeared in December 2018, after plainclothes security personnel detained her at a Beijing train station. She had petitioned central authorities in October 2018 to release her detained son for health reasons and poor treatment within his detention center.  At year’s end she remained under house arrest with no formal charges filed.  In a related case, in July Beijing authorities also detained and arrested Zhang Baocheng, who had assisted and escorted the elderly Pu Wenqing around Beijing in 2018 as she sought to petition central authorities over her son’s detention.
Beijing police on December 30 charged Zhang, a former member of the now- defunct New Citizens Movement that campaigned for democracy and government transparency, with “picking quarrels, promoting terrorism, extremism, and inciting terrorism.” At year’s end he was awaiting trial.
Arrest Procedures and Treatment of Detainees
Criminal detention beyond 37 days requires approval of a formal arrest by the procuratorate, but in cases pertaining to “national security, terrorism, and major bribery,” the law permits up to six months of incommunicado detention without formal arrest. After formally arresting a suspect, public security authorities are authorized to detain a suspect for up to an additional seven months while the case is investigated.
After the completion of an investigation, the procuratorate may detain a suspect an additional 45 days while determining whether to file criminal charges. If charges are filed, authorities may detain a suspect for an additional 45 days before beginning judicial proceedings.  Public security officials sometimes detained persons beyond the period allowed by law, and pretrial detention periods of a year or longer were common.
The law stipulates detainees be allowed to meet with defense counsel before criminal charges are filed. The criminal procedure law requires a court to provide a lawyer to a defendant who has not already retained one; is blind, deaf, mute, or mentally ill; is a minor; or faces a life sentence or the death penalty.  This law applies whether or not the defendant is indigent.  Courts may also provide lawyers to other criminal defendants who cannot afford them, although courts often did not do so. Lawyers reported significant difficulties meeting their clients in detention centers, especially in cases considered politically sensitive.
Criminal defendants are entitled to apply for bail (also translated as “a guarantor pending trial”) while awaiting trial, but the system did not appear to operate effectively, and authorities released few suspects on bail.
The law requires notification of family members within 24 hours of detention, but authorities often held individuals without providing such notification for significantly longer periods, especially in politically sensitive cases. In some cases notification did not occur. Under a sweeping exception, officials are not required to provide notification if doing so would “hinder the investigation” of a case. The criminal procedure law limits this exception to cases involving state security or terrorism, but public security officials have broad discretion to interpret these provisions.
Under certain circumstances the law allows for residential surveillance in the detainee’s home, rather than detention in a formal facility. With the approval of the next-higher-level authorities, officials also may place a suspect under “residential surveillance at a designated location” (RSDL) for up to six months when they suspect crimes of endangering state security, terrorism, or serious bribery and believe surveillance at the suspect’s home would impede the investigation.  Authorities may also prevent defense lawyers from meeting with suspects in these categories of cases.  Human rights organizations and detainees reported the practice of RSDL left detainees at a high risk for torture since being neither at home nor in a monitored detention facility reduced opportunities for oversight of detainee treatment and mechanisms for appeal.
Authorities used administrative detention to intimidate political and religious advocates and to prevent public demonstrations. Forms of administrative detention included compulsory drug rehabilitation treatment (for drug users), “custody and training” (for minor criminal offenders), and “legal education” centers for political activists and religious adherents, particularly Falun Gong practitioners.  The maximum stay in compulsory drug rehabilitation centers is two years, including commonly a six-month stay in a detoxification center.  The government maintained similar rehabilitation centers for those charged with prostitution and with soliciting prostitution.
Arbitrary Arrest:  Authorities detained or arrested persons on allegations of revealing state secrets, subversion, and other crimes as a means to suppress political dissent and public advocacy.  These charges, including what constitutes a state secret, remained ill defined, and any piece of information could be retroactively designated a state secret. Authorities also used the vaguely worded charges of “picking quarrels and provoking trouble” broadly against many civil rights advocates. It remained unclear what this term means.  Authorities also detained citizens and foreigners under broad and ambiguous state secret laws for, among other actions, disclosing information on criminal trials, commercial activity, and government activity. A counterespionage law grants authorities the power to require individuals and organizations to cease any activities deemed a threat to national security. Failure to comply could result in seizure of property and assets.
There were multiple reports authorities arrested or detained lawyers, religious leaders or adherents, petitioners, and other rights advocates for lengthy periods, only to have the charges later dismissed for lack of evidence.  Authorities subjected many of these citizens to extralegal house arrest, denial of travel rights, or administrative detention in different types of extralegal detention facilities, including “black jails.”  In some cases public security officials put pressure on schools not to allow the children of prominent political detainees to enroll. Conditions faced by those under house arrest varied but sometimes included isolation in their homes under guard by security agents. Security officials were frequently stationed inside the homes. Authorities placed many citizens under house arrest during sensitive times, such as during the visits of senior foreign government officials, annual plenary sessions of the National People’s Congress (NPC), the anniversary of the Tiananmen massacre, and sensitive anniversaries in Tibetan areas and Xinjiang. Security agents took some of those not placed under house arrest to remote areas on so-called forced vacations.
In January the government detained Yang Hengjun, an Australian author and blogger who encouraged democratic reform in China. The government held Yang incommunicado for several months before formally arresting him in August and charging him with spying.  On December 2, Australian foreign minister Marise Payne publicly criticized the circumstances of Yang’s detention, noting his “increased isolation from the outside world, with restrictions on his communications with family and friends, and the resumption of daily interrogation, including while shackled.”
Swedish bookseller and Hong Kong resident Gui Minhai–who went missing from Thailand in 2015, was released by Chinese authorities in 2017, and was detained again in January 2018 while traveling on a train to Beijing–remained in detention, according to press reports, although his whereabouts were unclear. The PRC embassy in Stockholm issued a statement in February denying it had initiated contact with Gui’s daughter Angela. This was in response to her account, published online, of how Sweden’s ambassador to the PRC organized a series of meetings in Stockholm between her and a businessman who claimed he could assist with her father’s case.  At year’s end the Swedish government was investigating the matter.
Media reported Shanghai police detained well-known human rights activist Chen Jianfang on March 20. In July a lawyer acting for Chen said Shanghai authorities informed him that Chen was formally arrested in June on charges of “inciting subversion of state power,” although the authorities did not publicly announce Chen’s arrest nor allow her to meet her lawyer. Authorities did not respond to requests by international advocacy organizations to account for Chen’s status and whereabouts.
In January authorities charged Xue Renyi, leader of the environmental activism group Green Leaf Action, with “picking quarrels and provoking trouble.”  Police detained Xue in May 2018 after he called for a demonstration demanding improved environmental conditions in Chongqing.  Police cited social media posts of Xue in a park holding three leaves, a symbol of his group, as the reason for his arrest. Xue’s location and trial date were unknown at year’s end. In January Chongqing authorities also detained Green Leaf Action-member Pan Bin. His location and status were unknown at year’s end.
On April 27, Yuexiu District police in Guangzhou searched the home of Lai Rifu before taking him away. Lai was a long-time member of the Southern Street Movement that called for an end to one-party rule.  Police detained Lai administratively for 10 days at the Yuexiu District Detention Center for the crime of “picking quarrels and provoking trouble” for wearing a T-shirt with the words “civil disobedience.”  He was released on May 8.  Police detained Lai again on September 16 on the suspicion of “picking quarrels and provoking trouble” after he uploaded a video with “Glory to Hong Kong,” the unofficial anthem of Hong Kong’s prodemocracy movement, on his WeChat and Facebook accounts. Liu was released in October after more than one month in detention.
In December 2018 Bitter Winter reported police had detained at least 45 of its contributors since August 2018.  Of the 22 detained in Xinjiang, four were released by February.  The other 23 detained were held in Henan, Fujian, Zhejiang, and Shanxi. Several had been released after indoctrination training.  Police arrested the Fujian contributors in October 2018 and prohibited family members from visiting them. Online media reported that police tortured them.
In October Guangxi secret police detained Qin Yongpei on charges of “inciting subversion of state power,” then formally arrested him in December.  He remained in Nanning No. 1 Detention Center without access to lawyers at year’s end. Qin had worked on several human rights cases, including those of “709” lawyers and Falun Gong practitioners, assisted many indigent and vulnerable persons, and publicized misconduct by high-level government and CCP officials. He was disbarred in May 2018 after having practiced law since the mid-1990s. After being disbarred, Qin founded the China Lawyers’ Club to employ disbarred lawyers.
The proximate reason for Qin’s arrest was unclear.
Pretrial Detention:  Pretrial detention could last longer than one year. Defendants in “sensitive cases” reported being subjected to prolonged pretrial detention. During the period of 2015 to 2018, authorities held many of the “709” detainees
and their defense attorneys in pretrial detention for more than a year without access to their families or their lawyers. Statistics were not published or made publicly available, but lengthy pretrial detentions were especially common in cases of political prisoners.
Local authorities initially detained Beijing-based lawyer Li Yuhan, who defended human rights lawyers during the “709” crackdown, at the Shenyang Detention Center in 2017 and later charged Li with “picking quarrels and provoking trouble.” Due to her poor health condition, Li’s attorney submitted multiple requests to Shenyang authorities to release her on medical parole, but each time her request was denied without reason or hearing. Li was scheduled to stand trial on April 9; however, the Shenyang Intermediate People’s Court postponed the trial and heard the case at an unspecified date. Li dismissed her attorneys in June because she was concerned by the pressure they faced defending her case. At year’s end Li remained in detention pending a verdict.
In 2016 the Tiexi District Court in Shenyang detained human rights advocate Lin Mingjie for assembling a group of demonstrators in front of the Ministry of Public Security in Beijing to protest Shenyang Public Security Bureau director Xu Wenyou’s abuse of power. After two years in pretrial detention, in June 2018 Lin was sentenced to two years and six months in prison, including time served. Lin was reportedly released on April 23.  Despite Lin’s having been released, however, his attorney had neither heard from him nor knew his whereabouts.
Although the law states the courts shall exercise judicial power independently, without interference from administrative organs, social organizations, and individuals, the judiciary did not exercise judicial power independently. Judges regularly received political guidance on pending cases, including instructions on how to rule, from both the government and the CCP, particularly in politically sensitive cases. The CCP Central Political and Legal Affairs Commission has the authority to review and direct court operations at all levels of the judiciary. All judicial and procuratorate appointments require approval by the CCP Organization Department.
Corruption often influenced court decisions, since safeguards against judicial corruption were vague and poorly enforced. Local governments appointed and paid local court judges and, as a result, often exerted influence over the rulings of those judges.
A CCP-controlled committee decided most major cases, and the duty of trial and appellate court judges was to craft a legal justification for the committee’s decision.
Courts are not authorized to rule on the constitutionality of legislation. The law permits organizations or individuals to question the constitutionality of laws and regulations, but a constitutional challenge may be directed only to the promulgating legislative body. Lawyers had little or no opportunity to rely on constitutional claims in litigation.  In March 2018 lawyers and others received central government instructions to avoid discussion of the constitutionality of the constitutional amendments that removed term limits for the president and vice president.
Media sources indicated public security authorities used televised confessions of lawyers, foreign and domestic bloggers, journalists, and business executives in an attempt to establish guilt before their criminal trial proceedings began. In some cases these confessions were likely a precondition for release.  NGOs asserted such statements were likely coerced, perhaps by torture, and some detainees who confessed recanted upon release and confirmed their confessions had been coerced. No provision in the law allows the pretrial broadcast of confessions by criminal suspects.
In May the United Kingdom broadcasting regulator launched a formal investigation into an allegation that China Global Television Network, the international news channel of China Central Television (CCTV), broadcast a confession forced from a British private investigator imprisoned in China.
Attorney Jiang Tianyong was released in February after fulfilling his two-year sentence for his 2017 conviction on charges of inciting state subversion in Changsha, Hunan. Authorities had prevented Jiang from selecting his own attorney to represent him at a trial that multiple analysts viewed as neither impartial nor fair. Despite his release Jiang was immediately placed under house arrest in his parents’ home in Henan. At year’s end he remained under strict movement controls by local authorities there despite mounting health problems that worsened in prison.  Police built a monitoring station outside his parents’ home, where he was supposed to spend most of his time, although sometimes he could visit his sister nearby. Local police prevented him from taking public transportation out of town.
“Judicial independence” remained one of the reportedly off-limit subjects the CCP ordered university professors not to discuss (see section 2.a., Academic Freedom and Cultural Events).
Trial Procedures
Although the amended criminal procedure law reaffirms the presumption of innocence, the criminal justice system remained biased toward a presumption of guilt, especially in high-profile or politically sensitive cases.
Courts often punished defendants who refused to acknowledge guilt with harsher sentences than those who confessed. The appeals process rarely reversed convictions, and it failed to provide sufficient avenues for review; remedies for violations of defendants’ rights were inadequate.
Regulations of the Supreme People’s Court require trials to be open to the public, with the exception of cases involving state secrets, privacy issues, minors, or, on the application of a party to the proceedings, commercial secrets. Authorities used the state secrets provision to keep politically sensitive proceedings closed to the public, sometimes even to family members, and to withhold a defendant’s access to defense counsel. Court regulations state foreigners with valid identification should be allowed to observe trials under the same criteria as citizens, but foreigners were permitted to attend court proceedings only by invitation. As in past years, authorities barred foreign diplomats and journalists from attending several trials.  In some instances authorities reclassified trials as “state secrets” cases or otherwise closed them to the public.
The Open Trial Network (Tingshen Wang), a government-run website, broadcast trials online; the majority were civil trials.
Regulations require the release of court judgments online and stipulate court officials should release judgments, with the exception of those involving state secrets and juvenile suspects, within seven days of their adoption. Courts did not post all judgments. They had wide discretion not to post if they found posting the judgment could be considered “inappropriate.”  Many political cases did not have judgments posted.
Individuals facing administrative detention do not have the right to seek legal counsel. Criminal defendants are eligible for legal assistance, but the vast majority of criminal defendants went to trial without a lawyer.
Lawyers are required to be members of the CCP-controlled All China Lawyers Association, and the Ministry of Justice requires all lawyers to pledge their loyalty to the leadership of the CCP upon issuance or annual renewal of their license to practice law. The CCP continued to require law firms with three or more party members to form a CCP unit within the firm.
Despite the government’s stated efforts to improve lawyers’ access to their clients, in 2017 the head of the All China Lawyers Association told China Youth Daily that defense attorneys had taken part in less than 30 percent of criminal cases. In particular, human rights lawyers reported authorities did not permit them to defend certain clients or threatened them with punishment if they chose to do so. Some lawyers declined to represent defendants in politically sensitive cases, and such defendants frequently found it difficult to find an attorney. In some instances authorities prevented defendant-selected attorneys from taking the case and instead appointed their own attorney.
The government suspended or revoked the business licenses or law licenses of some lawyers who took on sensitive cases, such as defending prodemocracy dissidents, house-church activists, Falun Gong practitioners, or government critics. Authorities used the annual licensing review process administered by the All China Lawyers Association to withhold or delay the renewal of professional lawyers’ licenses.  In January the Guangdong Department of Justice revoked the license of Liu Zhengqing, a Guangdong lawyer known for defending activists and Falun Gong practitioners. The department charged him with “jeopardizing national security” when defending his clients in court.
Other government tactics to intimidate or otherwise pressure human rights lawyers included unlawful detentions, vague “investigations” of legal offices, disbarment, harassment and physical intimidation, and denial of access to evidence and to clients. In February several lawyers wrote an open letter protesting the government’s harassment of lawyers who took on human rights cases.
In 2015 the National People’s Congress’s Standing Committee amended legislation concerning the legal profession. The amendments criminalize attorneys’ actions that “insult, defame, or threaten judicial officers,” “do not heed the court’s admonition,” or “severely disrupt courtroom order.”  The changes also criminalize disclosing client or case information to media outlets or using protests, media, or other means to influence court decisions. Violators face fines and up to three years in prison.
Regulations adopted in 2015 also state detention center officials should either allow defense attorneys to meet suspects or defendants or explain why the meeting cannot be arranged at that time. The regulations specify that a meeting should be arranged within 48 hours. Procuratorates and courts should allow defense attorneys to access and read case files within three working days. The time and frequency of opportunities available for defense attorneys to read case files shall not be limited, according to the guidelines. In some sensitive cases, lawyers had no pretrial access to their clients and limited time to review evidence, and defendants and lawyers were not allowed to communicate with one another during trials. In contravention of the law, criminal defendants frequently were not assigned an attorney until a case was brought to court. The law stipulates the spoken and written language of criminal proceedings shall be conducted in the language common to the specific locality, with government interpreters providing language services for defendants not proficient in the local language. Sources noted trials were predominantly conducted in Mandarin Chinese, even in minority areas, with interpreters provided for defendants who did not speak the language.
Mechanisms allowing defendants to confront their accusers were inadequate. Only a small percentage of trials reportedly involved witnesses. Judges retained significant discretion over whether live witness testimony was required or even allowed. In most criminal trials, prosecutors read witness statements, which neither the defendants nor their lawyers had an opportunity to rebut through cross- examination. Although the law states pretrial witness statements cannot serve as the sole basis for conviction, prosecutors relied heavily on such statements.
Defense attorneys had no authority to compel witnesses to testify or to mandate discovery, although they could apply for access to government-held evidence relevant to their case.
Under the law lawyers are assigned to convicted prisoners on death row who cannot afford one during the review of their sentences.
According to China Labor Bulletin, Shenzhen police detained labor activists Wu Guijun, Zhang Zhiru, He Yuancheng, Jian Hui, and Song Jiahui on January 20 on the charge of “disrupting social order.” They were reportedly formally charged in late February. The families of some of the activists never received formal notices of detention and did not know where they were held. According to media reports, authorities banned Zhang and Wu from hiring lawyers and warned their families not to take any media interviews. According to the head of China Labor Watch, the detentions were not connected to any specific activity but were intended to serve as a warning to other labor activists against the backdrop of increasing labor protests and economic stagnation.
On July 22, three public interest lawyers–Cheng Yuan, Liu Yongze, Wu Gejianxiong, also known as the “Changsha Three”–were detained by Changsha Municipal Bureau of State Security authorities on suspicion of “subversion of state power.” The lawyers worked for Changsha Funeng, an organization that litigated cases to end discrimination against persons with disabilities and carriers of HIV and Hepatitis B. Cheng Yuan had also worked on litigation to end the country’s one-child policy and reform its household registration laws. Although Cheng Yuan’s family retained two lawyers to represent him, neither had been able to meet with Cheng Yuan as of year’s end. Authorities also interrogated Cheng Yuan’s wife, Shi Minglei, on multiple occasions about her husband’s work, including forcibly entering her home in Shenzhen on July 22 and seizing her identification card, passport, cell phone, computer, and bank cards.
Political Prisoners and Detainees
Government officials continued to deny holding any political prisoners, asserting persons were detained not for their political or religious views but because they had violated the law. Authorities, however, continued to imprison citizens for reasons related to politics and religion. Human rights organizations estimated tens of thousands of political prisoners remained incarcerated, most in prisons and some in administrative detention. The government did not grant international humanitarian organizations access to political prisoners.
Authorities granted political prisoners early release at lower rates than other prisoners. Thousands of persons were serving sentences for political and religious offenses, including for “endangering state security” and carrying out “cult activities.”  The government neither reviewed the cases of those charged before 1997 with counterrevolution and hooliganism nor released persons imprisoned for nonviolent offenses under repealed provisions.
Many political prisoners remained either in prison, or under other forms of detention after release, at year’s end, including writer Yang Maodong (pen name: Guo Feixiong); Uighur scholars Ilham Tohti and Rahile Dawut; activist Wang Bingzhang; activist Liu Xianbin; Taiwan prodemocracy activist Lee Ming-Che; pastor Zhang Shaojie; Falun Gong practitioners Bian Lichao and Ma Zhenyu; Catholic Auxiliary Bishop of Shanghai Thaddeus Ma Daqin; rights lawyers Wang Quanzhang, Xia Lin, Gao Zhisheng, Yu Wensheng, and Jiang Tianyong; blogger Wu Gan; and Shanghai labor activist Jiang Cunde.
Criminal punishments included “deprivation of political rights” for a fixed period after release from prison, during which an individual could be denied rights of free speech, association, and publication. Former prisoners reported their ability to find employment, travel, obtain residence permits and passports, rent residences, and access social services was severely restricted.
Authorities frequently subjected former political prisoners and their families to surveillance, telephone wiretaps, searches, and other forms of harassment or threats. For example, security personnel followed the family members of detained or imprisoned rights activists to meetings with foreign reporters and diplomats and urged the family members to remain silent about the cases of their relatives. Authorities barred certain members of the rights community from meeting with visiting dignitaries.
Politically Motivated Reprisal Against Individuals Located Outside the Country
There were credible reports the government attempted to misuse international law enforcement tools for politically motivated purposes as a reprisal against specific individuals located outside the country.  There also were credible reports that for politically motivated purposes, the government attempted to exert bilateral pressure on other countries aimed at having them take adverse action against specific individuals.
PRC officials pressured a Montreal-based human rights research institute affiliated with Concordia University to cancel a conference featuring a prominent exiled Uighur leader. Executive director Kyle Matthews of the Montreal Institute for Genocide and Human Rights Studies at Concordia University said he received an email from the PRC consul general in Montreal on March 25, asking him for an urgent meeting to discuss a planned conference on the Uighur minority in the PRC. While he chose to ignore the request and went ahead with the conference as planned, Matthews said he later found out the consul general was also pressuring different individuals in Montreal to cancel the Concordia University event.
Other reports continued throughout the year regarding PRC pressure on Xinjiang- based relatives of persons located outside of China who spoke publicly about the detentions and abusive policies underway inside Xinjiang. Tahir Imin, a Uighur residing outside of China, said that PRC authorities had imprisoned his brother Adil to retaliate against Tahir’s activism abroad. PRC state media also released videos of Xinjiang-based ethnic and religious minorities to discredit their overseas relatives’ accounts to foreign media. The persons in the videos urged their foreign- based family members to stop “spreading rumors” about Xinjiang.  The overseas relatives said they had lost communication with their Xinjiang relatives until the videos were released. U.S. citizen Ferkat Jawdat’s mother, who had lost contact with him for a year because she was in an internment camp, called in May to urge Ferkat to stop his activism and media interviews. Relatives of U.S. resident Zumrat Dawut, who spoke to media about her detention in a Xinjiang re-education center, also joined in a video in November urging her to stop “spreading rumors.” The overseas-based relatives said the PRC government coerced their family members to produce such videos.
On November 25, RFA reported Thai authorities had detained Xing Jiang, a Chinese refugee accredited by UNHCR, at the request of Jiangsu provincial public security officials for allegedly “spreading rumors online.”
Civil Judicial Procedures and Remedies
Courts deciding civil matters faced the same limitations on judicial independence as criminal courts. The State Compensation Law provides administrative and judicial remedies for plaintiffs whose rights or interests government agencies or officials have infringed.  The law also allows compensation for wrongful detention, mental trauma, or physical injuries inflicted by detention center or prison officials.
Although historically citizens seldom applied for state compensation because of the high cost of bringing lawsuits, low credibility of courts, and citizens’ general lack of awareness of the law, there were instances of courts overturning wrongful convictions. Official media reported that in June Jin Zhehong applied for 21.3 million yuan ($3 million) in state compensation for his 23 years spent behind bars following an overturned conviction for intentional homicide. The Jilin High People’s Court in an appeal hearing ruled the evidence was insufficient to prove the initial conviction.
The law provides for the right of an individual to petition the government for resolution of grievances. Most petitions address grievances regarding land, housing, entitlements, the environment, or corruption, and most petitioners sought to present their complaints at local “letters and visits” offices. The government reported approximately six million petitions were submitted every year; however, persons petitioning the government continued to face restrictions on their rights to assemble and raise grievances.
Despite attempts at improving the petitioning system, progress was unsteady.
While the central government reiterated prohibitions against blocking or restricting “normal petitioning” and against unlawfully detaining petitioners, official retaliation against petitioners continued.  Regulations encourage that all litigation-related petitions be handled at the local level through local or provincial courts, reinforcing a system of incentives for local officials to prevent petitioners from raising complaints to higher levels.  Local officials sent security personnel to Beijing to force petitioners to return to their home provinces to prevent them from filing complaints against local officials with the central government.  Such detentions often went unrecorded and often resulted in brief periods of incarceration in extralegal “black jails.”
Ye Mulan, wife of petitioner Chen Chunzhang, said her husband’s death on November 6 while in police custody was suspicious, and she called on provincial authorities to investigate. According to Ye, Chen was detained in August in Beijing by “interceptors” from Qinkou Township, Fujian, and local police later imprisoned him.  (“Interceptors” are enforcement agents sent by local governments to detain petitioners on their way to complain to provincial capitals or to Beijing authorities about their local governments.) Chen had told his lawyer that he had made four statements to police so far but that he had refused to plead guilty to the charges against him. On October 26, local police called Ye to see Chen in a local hospital emergency room; he was alive but unconscious.  Police prevented the family from inspecting him up close, although they had asked authorities to check
if he had any external signs of injury.  Chen died on November 6 after undergoing emergency brain surgery.
On May 15, police in Guizhou detained Huang Yanming for 25 days around the 30th anniversary of the Tiananmen protests and the June 9 Hong Kong protests. Ministry of State Security officers denied him any outside communication and kept him detained in a hotel in Guiyang.  No charges were announced.
In June the Beijing Number 2 Intermediate People’s Court criminally tried 12 suspects accused of illegally detaining and beating a petitioner from Jiangxi in 2017. The petitioner, Chen Yuxian from Shangyou, died in Beijing eight hours after the suspects took him away. The 12 suspects were reportedly from an illegal crime group under the guise of a car rental company that had close connections to local government officials, who had demanded the petition be intercepted. The Beijing court had not issued a verdict as of year’s end.
The law states the “freedom and privacy of correspondence of citizens are protected by law,” but authorities often did not respect the privacy of citizens. Although the law requires warrants before officers can search premises, officials frequently ignored this requirement. The Public Security Bureau and prosecutors are authorized to issue search warrants on their own authority without judicial review. There continued to be reports of cases of forced entry by police officers.
Authorities monitored telephone calls, text messages, faxes, email, instant messaging, and other digital communications intended to remain private. Authorities also opened and censored domestic and international mail. Security services routinely monitored and entered residences and offices to gain access to computers, telephones, and fax machines. Foreign journalists leaving the country found some of their personal belongings searched. In some cases, when material deemed politically sensitive was uncovered, the journalists had to sign a statement stating they would “voluntarily” leave these documents in the country.
According to media reports, the Ministry of Public Security used tens of millions of surveillance cameras throughout the country to monitor the general public. Human rights groups stated authorities increasingly relied on the cameras and other forms of surveillance to monitor and intimidate political dissidents, religious leaders and adherents, Tibetans, and Uighurs. These included facial recognition and “gait recognition” video surveillance, allowing police not only to monitor a situation but also to quickly identify individuals in crowds.  The monitoring and disruption of telephone and internet communications were particularly widespread in Xinjiang and Tibetan areas.  The government installed surveillance cameras in monasteries in the TAR and Tibetan areas outside the TAR (see Special Annex, Tibet). The law allows security agencies to cut communication networks during “major security incidents.”
According to Human Rights Watch, the Ministry of State Security partnered with information technology firms to create a “mass automated voice recognition and monitoring system,” similar to ones already in use in Xinjiang and Anhui, to help with solving criminal cases. According to one company involved, the system was programmed to understand Mandarin Chinese and certain minority languages, including Tibetan and Uighur.  In many cases other biometric data such as fingerprints and DNA profiles were being stored as well. This database included information obtained not just from criminals and criminal suspects but also from entire populations of migrant workers and all Uighurs applying for passports.
Forced relocation because of urban development continued in some locations. Protests over relocation terms or compensation were common, and authorities prosecuted some protest leaders. In rural areas infrastructure and commercial development projects resulted in the forced relocation of thousands of persons.
Property-related disputes between citizens and government authorities sometimes turned violent. These disputes frequently stemmed from local officials’ collusion with property developers to pay little or no compensation to displaced residents, combined with a lack of effective government oversight or media scrutiny of local officials’ involvement in property transactions, as well as a lack of legal remedies or other dispute resolution mechanisms for displaced residents. The problem persisted despite central government claims it had imposed stronger controls over illegal land seizures and taken steps to standardize compensation.
The government at various levels and jurisdictions continued implementing pilot programs for “social credit systems” which collect vast amounts of data to create scores for individuals and companies in an effort to address deficiencies in “social trust,” strengthen access to financial credit instruments, and reduce public corruption.  The social credit system also collected information on academic records, traffic violations, social media presence, friendships, and adherence to birth control regulations, employment performance, consumption habits, and other topics. These systems were intended to promote social control and self-censorship, since citizens would be liable for their statements, relationships, and even information others shared within closed social media groups.
“Social credit scores,” among other things, quantify a person’s loyalty to the government by monitoring citizens’ online activity and relationships. There were indications the systems awarded and deducted points based on the “loyalty” of sites visited, as well as the “loyalty” of other netizens with whom a person interacted. The systems also created incentives for citizens to police each other. Organizers of chat groups on messaging apps, for example, were responsible for policing and reporting any posts with impermissible content, making them liable for violations.
Although the government’s goal is to create a unified government social credit system, there were several disparate social credit systems under several domestic technology companies, and the specific implementation of the system varied by province and city. In Hangzhou the scoring system, which applied to residents 18 years or older, included information on individuals’ education, employment, compliance with laws and regulations (such as tax payments), payment of medical bills, loan repayment, honoring contracts, participating in volunteer activities, and voluntary blood donations.
There were several cases in which an individual’s credit score resulted in concrete limitations on that person’s activities. Users with low social credit scores faced an increasing series of consequences, including losing the ability to communicate on domestic social media platforms, travel, and buy property.
In a separate use of social media for censorship, human rights activists reported authorities questioned them about their participation in human rights-related chat groups, including on WeChat and WhatsApp. Authorities monitored the groups to identify activists, which led to users’ increased self-censorship on WeChat as well as several separate arrests of chat group administrators.
In May a security lapse exposed personal information collected from facial recognition from a system that monitors housing communities in Beijing. The exposed data contained enough information to pinpoint where individuals went, when and for how long, allowing anyone with access to the data–including police–to build up a picture of a person’s day-to-day life.
The government continued to use the “double-linked household” system in Xinjiang developed through many years of use in Tibet. This system divides towns and neighborhoods into units of 10 households each, with the households in each unit instructed to watch over each other and report on “security issues” and poverty problems to the government, thus turning average citizens into informers. In Xinjiang the government also continued to require Uighur families to accept government “home stays,” in which officials or volunteers forcibly lived in Uighurs’ homes and monitored families for signs of “extremism.”  Those who exhibited behaviors the government considered to be signs of “extremism,” such as praying, possessing religious texts, or abstaining from alcohol or tobacco, could be detained in re-education camps.
The government restricted the rights of men and women to have children (see section 6, Women).
Local police in Maoming, Guangdong, launched a shaming campaign to urge local telephone fraud suspects to turn themselves in during the Spring Festival.  The Public Security Ministry listed Maoming as a major source of telephone fraud in the country. For the criminal suspects who remained at large, police reportedly spray-painted the letters “home of fugitive” on the outside walls of their houses, cut off their water and electricity supplies, and froze their immediate family members’ bank accounts and identification cards.
April media reports indicated the government expanded its use of facial recognition software targeting ethnic minorities, especially Uighurs, from Xinjiang to other areas, including Fujian.  The video monitoring system allegedly was able to alert law enforcement agencies to the increased presence of Uighurs in a community in a given period.
According to Freedom House, rapid advances in surveillance technology– including artificial intelligence (AI), facial recognition, and intrusive surveillance apps–coupled with growing police access to user data had turned the country into a “technodystopia” and helped facilitate the prosecution of prominent dissidents as well as ordinary users. A Carnegie Endowment report noted that the country was a major worldwide supplier of AI surveillance technology, such as facial recognition systems, smart city/safe city platforms, and smart policing technology.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
The constitution states citizens “enjoy freedom of speech, of the press, of assembly, of association, of procession and of demonstration.” Authorities limited and did not respect these rights, however, especially when their exercise conflicted with CCP interests. Authorities continued ever tighter control of all print, broadcast, electronic, and social media and regularly used them to propagate government views and CCP ideology. Authorities censored and manipulated the press, social media, and the internet, particularly around sensitive anniversaries and topics.
Freedom of Expression:  Citizens could discuss many political topics privately and in small groups without official punishment.  Authorities, however, routinely took harsh action against citizens who questioned the legitimacy of the CCP. Some independent think tanks, study groups, and seminars reported pressure to cancel sessions on sensitive topics. Those who made politically sensitive comments in public speeches, academic discussions, or remarks to media or posted sensitive comments online, remained subject to punitive measures.  In addition, an increase in electronic surveillance in public spaces, coupled with the movement of many citizens’ routine interactions to the digital space, signified the government was monitoring an increasing percentage of daily life.  Conversations in groups or peer- to-peer on social media platforms and via messaging applications were subject to censorship, monitoring, and action from the authorities.
In August the Unirule Institute of Economics, a prominent economic think tank, closed its doors after years of increasing government pressure. Founded in 1993 to promote market reforms, a decade ago Unirule was a well-respected institution in the country with the space to disseminate ideas and facilitate dialogue with government leaders. The last few years have seen the shutdown of its website and public office, and as of August the organization was in liquidation.
On April 19, Zi Su was sentenced by a Chengdu court to four years’ imprisonment on charges of subversion. Zi, a retired professor from the Yunnan Communist Party School, was detained in 2017 after releasing an open letter questioning Xi Jinping’s suitability to continue as the CCP’s leader.  Prior to his trial in December 2018, the government offered to shorten his sentence if he fired his lawyer and accepted a court-appointed attorney. Zi accepted, reducing his sentence from 10 to four years.
In September a Sichuan court convicted Chengdu-based activist Huang Xiaomin to 30 months’ imprisonment for “picking quarrels and provoking trouble.”  Huang had called for direct elections to select party leaders. He was detained for several months before being allowed to hire a lawyer.  He was then told to fire his lawyer and accept a court-appointed lawyer in exchange for a more lenient sentence, which he did.
On September 19, local police from Gucheng Township, Chengdu, detained Chen Yunfei for publishing comments in support of Hong Kong’s antiextradition bill movement. Chen had shown public support for the antiextradition protests in Hong Kong and called for a dialogue between Hong Kong leader Carrie Lam and protesters to try to reach a resolution.
Countless citizens were arrested and detained for “spreading fake news,” “illegal information dissemination,” or “spreading rumors online.”  These claims ranged from sharing political views or promoting religious extremism to sharing factual reports on sensitive issues. For example, in Nan Le, Henan, a netizen was arrested for spreading “fake news” about a chemical factory explosion on WeChat. In Lianyungang police arrested 22 persons for “internet rumors,” and in Huzhou a netizen was arrested for “spreading rumors,” while he claimed he was only sharing political views.
This trend was particularly apparent in Xinjiang, where the government had developed a multifaceted system of physical and cyber controls to stop individuals from expressing themselves or practicing their religion or traditional beliefs. Beyond the region’s expansive system of internment camps, the government and the CCP implemented a system to limit in-person speech and online speech. In Xinjiang police regularly stopped persons of certain ethnicities and faith and demanded to review their cell phones for any evidence of communication deemed inappropriate.  During the year the government significantly extended the automation of this system, using phone apps, cameras, and other electronics to monitor all speech and movement.  Authorities in Xinjiang built a comprehensive database that tracked the movements, mobile app usage, and even electricity and gasoline consumption of inhabitants in the region.
The government also sought to limit criticism of their Xinjiang policies even outside the country, disrupting academic discussions and intimidating human rights advocates across the world.  Government officials in Xinjiang detained the relatives of several overseas activists. Chinese embassy officials in Belgium asked a Belgian university to remove information critical of the PRC’s Xinjiang policies from their website, and in February the Belgian author of that critique reported that Chinese government officials disrupted a Xinjiang-focused academic conference in Strasbourg, France. Numerous ethnic Uighurs and Kazakhs living overseas were intimidated into silence by government officials making threats against members of their family who still lived in China, threats sometimes delivered in China to the relatives, and sometimes delivered by Chinese government officials in the foreign country.
The government increasingly moved to restrict the expression of views it found objectionable even when those expressions occurred abroad. Online, the government expanded attempts to control the global dissemination of information while also exporting its methods of electronic information control to other nations’ governments. During the year there was a rise in reports of journalists in foreign countries and ethnic Chinese living abroad experiencing harassment by Chinese government agents due to their criticisms of PRC politics. This included such criticisms posted on platforms such as Twitter that were blocked within China.
In October PRC authorities publicly condemned a tweet by the professional basketball team Houston Rockets’ general manager that expressed support for Hong Kong protesters, and the state-run CCTV cancelled broadcasts of games involving U.S. professional basketball teams visiting China. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs sent an official from its consulate general in Houston to personally denounce the statement to the Houston Rockets.  Similarly, in December Chinese state television cancelled the broadcast of an English Premier League soccer game after one of its players, Mesut Ozil, posted messages on Twitter and Instagram– both of which were blocked in China–denouncing the government’s policies towards Muslims in Xinjiang.
In July Dalian police detained a man only identified as “Lu” for distributing online cartoons that featured pro-Japanese and anti-Chinese contents. The CCP- controlled Global Times accused Lu of being “spiritually Japanese” by advocating for Japanese right-wing politics and militarism. In March 2018 Foreign Minister Wang Yi reportedly criticized such pro-Japanese cartoonists as “scum among Chinese people.”
In May Anhui police arrested cartoonist Zhang Dongning on charges of “picking quarrels and provoking trouble” for creating comic books that depicted the Chinese people as pigs. The drawings “distorted historical facts, trampled national dignity, and hurt the feelings of the Chinese people,” according to a police statement.
Zhang remained in custody at year’s end.
The government used economic leverage on the mainland to suppress freedom of expression in Hong Kong. In reaction to protests in Hong Kong in August, the mainland government told Hong Kong-based Cathay Airlines that any of its employees who had engaged in “illegal demonstrations, protests, and violent attacks, as well as those who have radical behaviors” were forbidden from working on flights that entered Chinese airspace.
Press and Media, Including Online Media: The CCP and government continued to maintain ultimate authority over all published, online, and broadcast material. Officially, only state-run media outlets have government approval to cover CCP leaders or other topics deemed “sensitive.” While it did not dictate all content to be published or broadcast, the CCP and the government had unchecked authority to mandate if, when, and how particular issues were reported or to order they not be reported at all.
During the year state media reported senior authorities issued internal CCP rules detailing punishments for those who failed to hew to ideological regulations, ordering a further crackdown on illegal internet accounts and platforms, and instructing media to further promote the interests of the government.
The government continued its tight ideological control over media and public discourse following the restructuring of its regulatory system in 2018. The CCP propaganda department has the ultimate say in regulating and directing media practices and policies in the country. The reorganization created three independent administrative entities controlled by the CCP propaganda department:  the National Radio and Television Administration (NART), the General Administration of Press and Publications, and the National Film Bureau. While NART is still ostensibly under the State Council, its party chief was also a deputy minister within the CCP’s propaganda department.
The Cyberspace Administration of China (CAC), which directly manages internet content, including online news media, also promotes CCP propaganda. The CAC served as the representative office to a recently formed CCP committee on cyberspace, which is nominally chaired by President Xi Jinping. One of the CCP propaganda department deputy ministers ran the organization’s day-to-day operations. It enjoyed broad authority in regulating online media practices and played a large role in regulating and shaping information dissemination online.
The internet “clean up” CAC announced in November 2018 continued into 2019. As part of CAC’s 2018 requirements, internet platforms had to submit reports on their activities if their platforms could be used to “socially mobilize” or could lead to “major changes in public opinion.”  On January 23, the CAC issued a statement confirming another step in its crackdown on internet content. On April 6, the National Office Against Pornographic and Illegal Publications announced an eight- month crackdown on “vulgar content” online. According to the announcement, the National Office tasked local authorities to conduct inspections of online platforms, including social media, livestreaming, videos, and online games.  In July the CAC ordered 26 podcast and music applications to terminate, suspend services, or have “talks” with regulators.  According to a CAC notice, these applications were investigated and deemed to have spread “historical nihilism.”
In 2018 the government directed consolidation of China Central Television, China Radio International, and China National Radio into a new super media group known as the “Voice of China,” which “strengthened the party’s concentrated development and management of important public opinion positions.”
All books and magazines continued to require state-issued publication numbers, which were expensive and often difficult to obtain. As in the past, nearly all print and broadcast media as well as book publishers were affiliated with the CCP or the government.  There were a small number of print publications with some private ownership interest but no privately owned television or radio stations. The CCP directed the domestic media to refrain from reporting on certain subjects, and traditional broadcast programming required government approval.
Several popular domestic soap operas from 2018 were taken off the air after state- owned newspaper the Beijing Daily called the dramas “incompatible with core socialist values.” One such popular show featured Emperor Qianlong and concubines. While episodes from 2018 remained available online, many television stations had canceled similar period dramas in their 2019 programming plans. The National Radio and Television Administration followed up with a temporary ban of historical dramas in late March.  The CCP also policed cartological political correctness to ensure that cartoons and documentaries supported the CCP. In one example the domestic television drama Go Go Squid was investigated after displaying a map that did not show Taiwan and Hainan Island as part of China.
Journalists operated in an environment tightly controlled by the government.  Only journalists with official government accreditation were allowed to publish news in print or online. The CCP constantly monitored all forms of journalist output, including printed news, television reporting, and online news, including livestreaming. Journalists and editors self-censored to stay within the lines dictated by the CCP, and they faced increasingly serious penalties for crossing those lines, which could be opaque. While the country’s increasingly internet- literate population demanded interesting stories told with the latest technologies, government authorities asserted control over those new technologies (such as livestreaming) and clamped down on new digital outlets and social media platforms.
Because the CCP does not consider internet news companies “official” media, they are subject to debilitating regulations and barred from reporting on potentially “sensitive” stories. According to the most recent All China Journalist Association report from 2017 on the nation’s news media, there were 231,564 officially credentialed reporters working in the country.  Only 1,406 worked for news websites, with the majority working at state-run outlets such as XinhuaNet.com and ChinaDaily.com. Other online outlets also reported on important issues but limited their tactics and topics, since they were acting without official approval.
In January government officials detained Yang Zhengjun, the editor in chief of an online labor rights news outlet, iLabour, which reported on harmful working conditions for Chinese laborers. According to RFA, on March 20, police detained Wei Zhili, editor of the citizen media magazine New Generation and a labor rights activist, at his Guangzhou home. He was not allowed to meet with his lawyer for 19 days, during which police interrogated Wei five times at the Shenzhen No. 2 Detention Center.  Voice of America reported that authorities forbade Wei’s wife, Zheng Churan, from speaking to foreign media about her husband’s detention. Police also detained Wei’s colleague Ke Chengbing in Guangzhou on March 20, but there was no information regarding his status as of year’s end. Authorities formally arrested and charged Yang, Wei, and Ke in August on charges of “picking quarrels.”
In June authorities in Chongqing announced they had convicted Liu Pengfei on unknown charges and sentenced him to two years’ imprisonment. Liu was detained in 2017 while running a WeChat group that reposted foreign press articles in Chinese.  Until his conviction was announced, Liu’s condition and location were unknown.
On August 1, Chongqing police arrested former journalist Zhang Jialong. No charges were formally announced, although police reportedly arrested him for social media posts he made in 2017 and earlier. Zhang, a well-known journalist and anticensorship activist, had stopped posting publicly in 2014 after being fired from Tencent, where he worked as an editor, for meeting with then secretary of state John Kerry. His location was unknown at year’s end.
Violence and Harassment: The government frequently impeded the work of the press, including citizen journalists. Journalists reported being subjected to physical attack, harassment, monitoring, and intimidation when reporting on sensitive topics. Government officials used criminal prosecution, civil lawsuits, and other punishment, including violence, detention, and other forms of harassment, to intimidate authors and journalists and to prevent the dissemination of unsanctioned information on a wide range of topics.
Family members of journalists based overseas also faced harassment, and in some cases detention, as retaliation for the reporting of their relatives abroad. As of year’s end, dozens of Uighur relatives of U.S.-based journalists working for RFA’s Uighur Service remained disappeared or arbitrarily detained in Xinjiang.
A journalist could face demotion or job loss for publishing views that challenged the government. In many cases potential sources refused to meet with journalists due to actual or feared government pressure.  During the year the scope of censorship grew to the point that, according to several journalists, “almost all topics are considered sensitive.”  For example, whereas in past years business news reporting had been relatively free of control, many journalists’ contacts were hesitant to express themselves openly even on this topic.  During the year authorities imprisoned numerous journalists working in traditional and new media.
On June 10, the discipline inspection commission of the CCP’s Beijing branch accused Dai Zigeng, former publisher and cofounder of popular daily newspaper the Beijing News, of “serious violations of discipline and law.”
Prominent Chinese journalist Huang Xueqin, known for her publications about the #MeToo movement in China, was arrested in Guangzhou in October after she wrote about antigovernment protests in Hong Kong. Officials charged her with “picking quarrels and provoking trouble.”  At year’s end she remained in detention.
Restrictions on foreign journalists by central and local CCP propaganda departments remained strict, especially during sensitive times and anniversaries. The Foreign Correspondents’ Club of China (FCCC) published a report in January detailing conditions for foreign journalists in the country. More than half (55 percent) of journalists who responded to the FCCC’s survey said reporting conditions had further deteriorated over the prior 12 months. They reported the government regularly surveilled foreign journalists, both in person and, increasingly, via electronic means. Of respondents, 91 percent expressed concern about the security of their telephones, and 66 percent worried about surveillance inside their homes and offices.  Half of the journalists said this surveillance diminished their ability to report in the country.
In August a Canadian journalist working for a foreign outlet was detained while reporting in Guangdong. Local police detained the journalist and a PRC news assistant in a rural area, then drove them to a police station in a larger town, held them for seven hours, confiscated their electronic devices, copied all the data on their cell phones, and tried to compel the PRC colleague to sign a confession before putting them on a train out of town.  The officials followed them onto the train, separated the two, and continued to intimidate them.
During the Hong Kong protests, mainland government authorities escalated their harassment of foreign journalists, stopping numerous journalists at border crossings near Hong Kong and at airports in Beijing and elsewhere, threatening them with visa obstacles, and making copies of their electronic devices. Journalists said this impeded their ability to gather and disseminate reports about the protests.
Foreign press outlets reported local employees of foreign news agencies were subjected to official harassment and intimidation. A citizen who was assisting a foreign journalist on a reporting trip was detained by local police, then chained to a chair for a full day before being released.  Government officials contacted and harassed many Chinese citizen employees’ family members in an attempt to pressure them away from their reporting work. Both the local citizens and their foreign employers lacked recourse in these cases and were generally hesitant to address grievances with authorities due to fear of experiencing even greater repression.
Government harassment of foreign journalists was particularly aggressive in Xinjiang.  According to the January FCCC report, 26 of 28 foreign journalists who traveled to Xinjiang in 2018 reported that government officials told them reporting was restricted or prohibited. This continued throughout the year, as numerous foreign journalists reported being followed constantly while in Xinjiang, with government agents stepping in to block access to some areas, intimidating local inhabitants so they would not talk to the journalists, and stopping the journalists– sometimes many times per day–to seize their cameras and force them to erase pictures.  Foreign journalists also had trouble securing hotel rooms, since authorities directed hotels to prohibit the journalists’ stays.
Foreign ministry officials again subjected a majority of foreign journalists to special interviews as part of their annual visa renewal process.  During these interviews the officials pressured journalists to report less on human rights issues, referencing reporting “red lines” journalists should not cross, and in some cases threatened them with nonrenewal of visas. Many foreign media organizations continued to have trouble expanding or maintaining their operations in the country due to the difficulty of receiving visas.  When the Wall Street Journal published an article by Singaporean citizen Chun Han Wong about the financial misdeeds of President Xi Jinping’s cousin, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs cancelled the author’s press credentials, effectively eliminating his ability to work in China. In explaining its decision to take away Chun’s credentials, the ministry specifically stated that “foreign reporters are maliciously tarnishing China, and we do not welcome such reporters.”  In several cases journalists who published news critical of the government subsequently received shorter-term visas of six or even three months, impeding their ability to work effectively in the country.  Other media organizations were unable to submit applications for new journalists in an opaque system where foreign journalists are reviewed by government officials before a visa request is even submitted or processed. Some foreign media companies were unwilling to publicize such issues due to fear of provoking further backlash by the government.
Authorities continued to enforce tight restrictions on citizens employed by foreign news organizations. The code of conduct for citizen employees of foreign media organizations threatens dismissal and loss of accreditation for those citizen employees who engage in independent reporting. It instructs them to provide their employers information that projects “a good image of the country.”
Media outlets that reported on commercial issues enjoyed comparatively fewer restrictions, but the system of post-publication review by propaganda officials encouraged self-censorship by editors seeking to avoid the losses associated with penalties for inadvertently printing unauthorized content.
Government officials also sought to suppress journalism outside their borders. While in past years these efforts largely focused on Chinese-language media, during the year additional reports emerged of attempts to suppress media critical of China regardless of language or location.  In March government officials warned a Swedish media outlet to cease its “serious political provocations,” for publishing a Swedish-language editorial that supported a position that Chinese officials opposed.  Another government official threatened to blacklist a Russian journalist if the journalist did not retract an article in a Russian newspaper detailing negative Chinese economic statistics.
Censorship or Content Restrictions:  The State Council’s Regulations on the Administration of Publishing grant broad authority to the government at all levels to restrict publications based on content, including mandating if, when, and how particular issues are reported. While the Ministry of Foreign Affairs daily press briefing was generally open, and the State Council Information Office organized some briefings by other government agencies, journalists did not have free access to other media events. The Ministries of Defense and Commerce continued allowing select foreign media outlets to attend occasional press briefings.
Official guidelines for domestic journalists were often vague, subject to change at the discretion of propaganda officials, and enforced retroactively. Propaganda authorities forced newspapers and online media providers to fire editors and journalists responsible for articles deemed inconsistent with official policy and suspended or closed publications. Self-censorship remained prevalent among journalists, authors, and editors, particularly with post facto government reviews carrying penalties of ranging severity.
Journalist arrests and dismissals for reporting on sensitive issues continued.  One of the country’s few prominent investigative reporters, Liu Wanyong, announced he was leaving the profession, blaming the shrinking space for investigating and publishing accurate news.  The Weibo accounts of several bloggers, including Wang Zhian, a former state broadcast commentator who wrote about social issues, were blocked.
The CCP Central Propaganda Department ordered media outlets to adhere strictly to the information provided by authoritative official departments, especially with respect to sensitive or prominent situations. Directives often warned against reporting on issues related to party and official reputation, health and safety, and foreign affairs.
Control over public depictions of President Xi increased, with censors aggressively shutting down any depiction that varied from official media storylines. Censors continued to block images of the Winnie the Pooh cartoon on social media because internet users used the symbol to represent President Xi Jinping.  Social media posts did not allow comments related to Xi Jinping and other prominent Chinese leaders.
It was extremely difficult for foreign journalists to report from the TAR, other Tibetan areas, or Xinjiang without experiencing serious interference.  Foreign reporters also experienced restricted access and interference when trying to report
in other areas the government considers sensitive. According to the January FCCC report, journalist respondents said they encountered government interference in Xinjiang (93 percent), the North Korean border region (56 percent), Inner Mongolia (67 percent), and industrial districts such as steel-producing areas (100 percent), among other locations.
Domestic films continued to be subject to government censorship.  In July the head of the government’s film regulatory body, the National Film Bureau, gave a speech to government officials and film industry representatives exhorting them to use films to promote Chinese political values. Throughout the year the government forbade the release of a number of new movies–including several films with prominent directors and large budgets–because they ran afoul of government censors.  Shortly before its July 5 release date, the historical war drama The Eight Hundred was removed from distribution despite numerous theatrical trailers and an $80 million budget.  Similarly, in February the film One Second by world-famous director Zhang Yimou was pulled from the Berlin Film Festival only days before its debut for “technical difficulties,” a common euphemism for censorship in China. Another film, Better Days, was pulled from the same festival after the movie failed to receive the necessary permissions from Chinese authorities. The head of the National Film Bureau explicitly encouraged domestic filmmakers to find more “valuable and heavy” topics and materials in the country’s “excellent traditional culture,” “revolution culture,” and “advanced culture of socialism.”
In October, when the U.S. comedy show South Park ran an episode depicting the PRC’s censorship practices, authorities banned the episode and other South Park content from local television and internet.
Newscasts from overseas news outlets, largely restricted to hotels and foreign residence compounds, were subject to censorship. Individual issues of foreign newspapers and magazines were occasionally banned when they contained articles deemed too sensitive. Articles on sensitive topics were removed from international magazines. Television newscasts were blacked out during segments on sensitive subjects.
Politically sensitive coverage in Chinese, and to a lesser extent in English, was censored more than coverage in other languages. The government prohibited some foreign and domestic films deemed too sensitive or selectively censored parts of films before they were released, including Bohemian Rhapsody and Top Gun: Maverick. Under government regulations, authorities must authorize each foreign film released in the country, with a restriction on the total number that keeps annual distribution below 50 films.
Authorities continued to ban books with content they deemed inconsistent with officially sanctioned views. The law permits only government-approved publishing houses to print books. Newspapers, periodicals, books, audio and video recordings, or electronic publications may not be printed or distributed without the approval of central authorities and relevant provincial publishing authorities. Individuals who attempted to publish without government approval faced imprisonment, fines, confiscation of their books, and other punishment. The CCP also exerted control over the publishing industry by preemptively classifying certain topics as state secrets.
In May media reported that three government officials in Chongqing and Yunnan were disciplined for “secretly purchasing, reading, and keeping overseas books and publications with serious political problems.”
In the fall the Ministry of Education directed all school libraries to review their holdings and dispose of books that “damage the unity of the country, sovereignty or its territory; books that upset society’s order and damage societal stability; books that violate the Party’s guidelines and policies, smear or defame the Party, the country’s leaders and heroes.”  Officials at a state-run library in Zhenyuan, Gansu, responded by burning a pile of “illegal books, religious publications, and especially books and articles with biases,” according to a notice and photograph on the library’s website, which circulated widely online.
New cases of extraterritorial book censorship occurred:  government censors required that books printed domestically conform to government propaganda guidelines, even if those books were written by a foreign author for a foreign audience.  In February an Australian bookseller reported that PRC officials forbade a Chinese company from publishing a book that included political content they found objectionable, even though the books would have been shipped out of China as soon as they were printed.
Government rules ban the sale of foreign publications without an import permit. This includes sales on online shopping platforms, which are banned from offering “overseas publications,” including books, movies, and games that do not already have government approval. The ban also applies to services related to publications.
On the 30th anniversary of the June 4, 1989, Tiananmen Square massacre, the government made an array of efforts to block all public mention of that historical event, not just in China but even in other countries. Within the country the government preemptively targeted potential critics, including elderly parents of the massacre victims, jailing them or temporarily removing them from major cities. Online censorship increased, with government censors aggressively blocking even indirect references and images from all online platforms, including, for example, an image of books lined up facing a cigarette packet in a pattern invoking the famous video of a man facing down tanks on a Beijing street.  The CNN website, normally accessible in the country, was blocked on June 4, and officials broke up a live CNN newscast in Beijing on June 4 by rushing between a news reporter and cameraman as they were broadcasting, demanding CNN staff stop reporting.  Other international media outlets faced increased monitoring and detentions for reporting focused on the anniversary, including one reporter who was detained for six hours. Censors at domestic internet companies said tools to detect and block content related to the 1989 crackdown reached unprecedented levels of accuracy, aided by machine learning as well as voice and image recognition.
The new Heroes and Martyrs Law makes it illegal to insult or defame prominent communists. Citing this law, the CAC ordered major domestic news app Bytedance to rectify information “slandering” Fang Zhimin, a prominent communist historical figure, and to punish the individuals responsible for publishing the defamatory information.  Sichuan police arrested a prominent female blogger for violating the Heroes and Martyrs Law because in one of her videos she paired a red scarf, “which symbolized the revolutionary tradition,” with an “inappropriately short” skirt.  On March 28, the court sentenced the blogger, identified in court documents only by her last name “Tang,” to 12 days’ incarceration, a fine, and removal of her videos.
Authorities often justified restrictions on expressions on national security protection grounds. In particular, government leaders generally cited the threat of terrorism in justifying restricting freedom of expressions by Muslims and other religious minorities. These justifications were a baseline rationale for restrictions on press movements, publications, and other forms of repression of expression.
Internet Freedom
The government tightly controlled and highly censored domestic internet usage. Most internet users accessed the internet on mobile devices. More than 686 million individuals, or more than three-quarters of mobile internet users, reportedly obtained their news from social and online media sources.
Although the internet was widely available, authorities heavily censored content. The government continued to employ tens of thousands of individuals at the national, provincial, and local levels to monitor electronic communications and online content. The government reportedly paid personnel to promote official views on various websites and social media and to combat alternative views posted online. Internet companies also independently employed thousands of censors to carry out CCP and government directives on censorship.  When government officials criticized or temporarily blocked online platforms due to content, the parent corporations were required to hire additional in-house censors, creating substantial staffing demands well into the thousands and even tens of thousands per company.
In the first three weeks of January, the CAC closed 730 websites and 9,300 mobile apps, and during the second quarter of the year, it shuttered a total of 2,899 websites.  The CAC announced that it had deleted more than seven million pieces of online information, and 9,382 mobile apps by April.  These were deemed “harmful” due to inappropriate content, which included politically sensitive materials.  For example, in July alone the CAC reportedly collected nearly 12 million “valid” reports of online “illegal and harmful” information.
The CAC also specifically ordered Tencent’s “Tiantian Kuaibao” news app to make changes, alleging it had been spreading “vulgar and low-brow information that was harmful and damaging to the internet ecosystem,” per the CAC statement. New approvals for offerings on Tencent’s gaming platforms were frozen for nine months in 2018 for any new video game approvals as part of an industry-wide tightening of the video game market, but this was the first time the news app had been criticized. Tencent’s popular messaging app WeChat announced in late February that it had closed more than 40,000 public accounts since the beginning
of the year and removed 79,000 articles. The announcement stated the contents of the closed accounts were “false, exaggerated and vulgar” and that they “conveyed a culture of hopelessness and depression,” which “tarnished users’ taste” and the overall environment of the platform.
The law requires internet platform companies operating in the country to control content on their platforms or face penalties. According to Citizen Lab, China- based users of the WeChat platform are subject to automatic filtering of chat messages and images, limiting their ability to freely communicate.
On April 8, popular social media site Weibo (similar to Twitter and owned by Sina) announced it had suspended more than 50 popular accounts “according to relevant laws and regulations,” as they included “politically harmful information.” Account owners received notifications from Weibo that the suspensions would last 90 to 180 days. Account holders included Yu Jianrong, a prominent scholar of rural development and activist for the country’s peasants, who reportedly had not published information deemed sensitive for several years but had 7.2 million followers at the time his Weibo account shut down.
The government continued to issue an array of regulations implementing the Cybersecurity Law, which took effect in 2017. The law allows the government to “monitor, defend, and handle cybersecurity risks and threats originating from within the country or overseas sources,” and criminalizes using the internet to “create or disseminate false information to disrupt the economic or social order.” The law also codifies the authority of security agencies to cut communication networks across an entire geographic region during “major security incidents,” although the government had previously implemented such measures before the law’s passage.
Xinhua issued an authoritative news piece in January stating that the China Netcasting Services Association (CNSA) had released two new documents regarding short-video market regulation: one on regulation of the platforms and one concerning censorship. The new censorship measures imposed stricter criteria for short videos online. The guidelines, which were believed to have been issued at the government’s direction, banned 100 types of inappropriate content, from videos of users dressing up in Communist Party costumes to those “promoting money worship and hedonism.”  The CNSA documents openly discussed the “content review” standards it expected of these online video services. Other content to be removed included anything that “attacks China’s political or legal systems,” “content that damages China’s image,” “foot fetishes or sexual moaning,” and “spoofing the national anthem.”  The documents called for platforms to expand their internal censorship teams as business grows and changes, and to keep at least one “content review” employee on staff for every 1,000 new videos posted to their platform each day.
CAC regulations on Internet News Information Services require websites, mobile apps, forums, blogs, instant communications services, and search engines to ensure news coverage of a political, economic, diplomatic, or commentary nature conforms to official views of “facts.”  These regulations extend longstanding traditional media controls to new media, including online and social media, to ensure these sources also adhere to CCP directives.
In June censors abruptly shut down the app of the financial news aggregator wallstreetcn.com, which had been downloaded more than 100 million times, as well as its website. Earlier in the year, regulators fined wallstreetcn.com for distributing news without a license, and disrupting “online news order.”  In the shutdown notice the CAC said that wallstreetcn.com was in breach of cybersecurity measures.
The CAC also required all live-streaming platforms, video platforms, commercial websites, web portals, and apps to register with the CAC. Online content platforms by licensed central media and their affiliates were not required to register.
Regulators required a special permit for transmission of audio and visual materials on blogging platforms such as Weibo and instant messaging platforms such as WeChat. Platform managers were made directly responsible for ensuring user- posted content complies with their permit’s scope. This includes television shows, movies, news programs, and documentaries, which many netizens consumed exclusively through social media channels. The rules prohibit the uploading of any amateur content that would fall under the definition of news programming or “sensitive” topics.
The finalization of the Cybersecurity Law in 2017 also bolstered real-name registration requirements for websites and social media platforms, imposing penalties on network operators that provide services to users who do not provide real-name information. In response, Baidu and Sina Weibo announced accounts without real name registration would have restricted access to certain website functions (e.g., commenting on posts).  Cybercafes in Xingtai and Shanghai also began using facial recognition to match users with their photographs printed on national identification documents. In March, following a chemical plant explosion outside of Shanghai, the local government jammed drones sent by media outlets to capture footage of the explosion.
The government continued efforts to limit unauthorized virtual private network (VPN) service use.  While the government permitted some users, including major international companies, to continue to utilize authorized VPNs, many smaller businesses, academics, and citizens were prohibited from using these tools. In March a Henan court charged Sun Dongyang with the crime of “illegally providing a tool for intruding into a computer information system” because he ran a website that promoted VPNs and other methods of circumventing the government’s firewall.
The government regularly penalized those caught using unauthorized VPNs. At the same time, the government tacitly allowed netizens to use VPNs to access Twitter, Facebook, Instagram, and other websites normally inaccessible in the country for the purpose of attacking views that criticized the government.  PRC embassies abroad and state-run media outlets, for example, regularly posted in Chinese and English on Twitter, Facebook, and YouTube.
In December 2018 the Zhuhai Court sentenced prominent anticensorship campaigner Zhen Jianghua to a jail term of two years for “inciting subversion of state power” in a closed-door trial.  He was released from prison on November 8. Zhen, also known by his online moniker GuestsZhen, reportedly provided technical guidance to domestic Internet users on how to circumvent the Great Firewall to make their posts visible overseas. He was also the executive governor of a website, Rights Movement, which helped collect and disseminate information on rights protections.
Many if not most of the major international news and information websites were blocked, including the New York Times and Wall Street Journal, as well as the websites of human rights organizations such as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch.  The government further restricted this space during the year, adding the Washington Post, the Guardian, Huffington Post, Australia’s the Age and News, and Wikipedia to the list of websites blocked by the so-called Great Firewall.
Government censors continued to block content from any source that discussed topics deemed sensitive, such as Taiwan, the Dalai Lama, Tibet, Xinjiang, and the 1989 Tiananmen Square massacre. The Hong Kong protests that occurred during the year were subject to heavy, selective censorship:  the government initially struck any mention of the protests from media and online discussions, then began to allow and even promote reports criticizing the protesters, while continuing to prohibit access to positive or neutral reporting on the protesters, including reporting that detailed the protesters’ demands for democracy and accountability for police actions.
On August 5, Sun Yat-sen University doctoral student Chen Chun joined the protests in Hong Kong and posted his support for the Hong Kong protesters on his Weibo account. Other netizens reported him to Guangdong police, and his account was shut down.
Censorship on Chinese-owned social media platforms of users in other countries also occurred.  In November TikTok, which was owned by Bytedance, blocked the account of a foreign-based user who had posted a video to raise awareness of the continuing human rights abuses in Xinjiang. After a public outcry, TikTok restored her account and admitted her video had been temporarily removed “due to human moderation error.”
The government also punished Chinese citizens for expressing their opinions on foreign social media platforms while outside the country. In November a court in Wuhan sentenced Luo Daiqing to six months’ imprisonment on charges of “provocation” for posting a set of images mocking Chinese leaders on Twitter. Luo posted the images while living in Minnesota, where he was a student; he was arrested in July on a visit home to Wuhan.
The government also significantly increased censorship of business and economic information. In June at least 10 prominent blogs that published financial news and analyses were shut down and had all past content erased. This happened at the same time that government propaganda sources were publishing specific new messages about the country’s economy.
Thousands of social media and other websites remained blocked, including Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, Google, and YouTube.
Despite being blocked in China, Twitter was estimated to have millions of users there. A recent round of government attention on Twitter users in China started in late 2018. A Chinese dissident who lived in Beijing said the Beijing Municipal Public Security Bureau summoned him twice on suspicion of “inciting subversion of state power” and presented printed pages of his tweets as evidence.  Internet monitors and activists tallied at least 40 cases of government authorities pressuring users in person to delete their tweets or their Twitter accounts. One user spent 15 days in a detention center, while police threatened another user’s family, and a third Twitter user was chained to a chair for eight hours of interrogation.
During the year authorities continued to manipulate the content of individual Twitter accounts. There were reports of authorities forcing individuals to give them access to their Twitter accounts, which authorities then used to delete their tweets. In March the anonymous netizen behind @AirMovingDevice, a Twitter account that specialized in using publicly available data to critically analyze government activity, declared she or he would be deleting all previous tweets and ceasing communication, adding, “it is not my intention to subvert state or Party authority.”
Authorities continued to jail numerous internet writers for their peaceful expression of political views.  On July 29, a court in Sichuan sentenced prominent blogger Huang Qi–a Chinese internet pioneer who once won CCP praise for using the web to “combat social ills”–to 12 years in prison for “deliberately disclosing state secrets” and “illegally providing state secrets to foreign entities.”  The charges arose from Huang’s efforts to publicize cases of human rights abuses on the 64Tianwang blog. Huang Qi had been jailed twice previously, for a total of eight years, as a result of his blogging that exposed local government malfeasance and brutality. After Huang’s release from those sentences, he continued his blogging activities.
On January 29, a court in Hubei sentenced Liu Feiyu to five years in prison for “inciting subversion of state power” because he ran a news portal publicizing government corruption and human rights abuses.  In addition, there were continuing reports of cyber operations against foreign websites, journalists, and media organizations carrying information that the government restricted internet users in the country from accessing. As in the past, the government selectively blocked access to sites operated by foreign entities, including the websites or social media platforms of health organizations, educational institutions, NGOs, socialnetworking sites, and search engines.
References to same-sex acts, same-sex relations, and the scientifically accurate words for genitalia remained banned following a 2017 government pronouncement listing same-sex acts/relations as an “abnormal sexual relation” and forbidding its depiction. A Weibo account featuring lesbian topics, where more than 143,000 users swapped information, was abruptly shut down in April and then reopened several weeks later. Several scenes in the movie Bohemian Rhapsody that depicted the main character’s gay relationships were cut out of the version shown in Chinese movie theaters.
While such censorship was effective in keeping casual users away from websites hosting sensitive content, many users circumvented online censorship by using various technologies. Information on proxy servers outside the country and software for defeating official censorship were available, although frequently limited by the Great Firewall. Encrypted communication apps such as Telegram and WhatsApp and VPN services were regularly disrupted, especially during “sensitive” times of the year.
The State Secrets Law obliges internet companies to cooperate fully with investigations of suspected leaks of state secrets, stop the transmission of such information once discovered, and report the crime to authorities. This was defined broadly and without clear limits. Furthermore, the companies must comply with authorities’ orders to delete such information from their websites; failure to do so is punishable by relevant departments, such as police and the Ministry of Public Security.
On June 9, police in Jiuxiangling District summoned Guo Yongfeng, a Christian and former participant of a local democratic movement who lived in Shenzhen, to Xili Police Station in response to his online post about his intention to sue Tencent for banning several of his social media accounts.  Police warned Guo against disseminating information online about rights protection and organizing related assemblies, and they did not release him until he wrote a letter of guarantee.
Academic Freedom and Cultural Events
The government continued restrictions on academic and artistic freedom and on political and social discourse at colleges, universities, and research institutes. Restrictive Central Propaganda Department regulations and decisions constrained the flow of ideas and persons.
Many intellectuals and scholars exercised self-censorship, anticipating that books or papers on political topics would be deemed too sensitive to be published. Censorship and self-censorship of artistic works was also common, particularly artworks deemed to involve politically sensitive subjects. Authorities frequently denied Western musicians permission to put on concerts, scrutinized the content of cultural events, and applied pressure to encourage self-censorship of discussions.
The government and the CCP Organization Department continued to control appointments to most leadership positions at universities, including department heads. While CCP membership was not always a requirement to obtain a tenured faculty position, scholars without CCP affiliation often had fewer chances for promotion. Academic subject areas deemed politically sensitive (e.g., civil rights, elite cronyism, civil society, etc.) continued to be off-limits. Some academics self- censored their publications, faced pressure to reach predetermined research results, or were unable to hold conferences with international participants during politically sensitive periods. Foreign academics claimed the government used visa denials, along with blocking access to archives, fieldwork, or interviews, to pressure them to self-censor their work. The use of foreign textbooks in classrooms remained restricted, and domestically produced textbooks continued to be under the editorial control of the CCP.
Undergraduate students, regardless of academic major, must complete political ideology coursework on subjects such as Marxism, Maoism, Deng Xiaoping thought, and Xi Jinping thought. In February the CCP’s Central Committee and the State Council made public the government’s Education Modernization Plan 2035, which specified 10 strategic tasks, the first task being to study Xi Jinping thought, implement it throughout the education system, including at primary and secondary education levels, and strengthen political thought education in institutes of higher education.
Multiple media reports cited a tightening of ideological controls on university campuses, with professors dismissed for expressing views not in line with CCP thought.  In March Tsinghua University Professor Xu Zhangrun was suspended due to a series of essays he wrote criticizing policies of the CCP and Xi Jinping.  In August 2018 Professor Yang Shaozheng was expelled from Guizhou University for publishing “politically mistaken speech and politically harmful articles,” including an article that estimated the total cost of maintaining the CCP apparatus. After his expulsion the government stripped his teaching credentials, prevented him from finding new employment, and on June 4, state security officials arrested him for “picking quarrels and provoking trouble.”  He was then released, but authorities detained him again in August and cancelled his health coverage and social benefits.  In December Fudan University, Nanjing University, and Shaanxi Normal University revised their charters, adding a pledge to highlight the party’s overall leadership in schoolwork and removing a reference to “freedom of thought.”  Students at Fudan University protested the revisions by singing the university’s official anthem, which included a reference to “freedom of thought.”
University professors also continued to come under scrutiny after their students reported them for comments deemed politically sensitive or inappropriate.  In some cases the university assigned the students to act as informants.  In July a university professor in Chengdu was suspended from teaching for two years after students filed a complaint for remarks deemed to have shown insufficient appreciation for Chinese culture and innovation.  Professor Tang Yun of Chongqing University was banned from teaching and demoted for making “politically incorrect statements” while lecturing on Chinese author Lu Xun. Professor Tang had his teaching credentials cancelled after students reported his statements to party representatives at the school.
Crackdowns against student labor activists on university campuses increased early in the year. In January the New York Times reported that more than 20 students at elite Chinese universities had been forced to watch videotaped confessions of detained labor activists to pressure the students to abandon their activism. Additional students and several recent graduates from Peking and Renmin Universities were reportedly detained and held incommunicado after releasing statements decrying police use of coerced confession videos. In May CNN reported six Marxist university students had been disappeared in the lead up to International Labor Day and the 100th anniversary of the May 4 student protests. One of the missing student labor activists, Qiu Zhanxuan, released a video and written testimony detailing abuse at the hands of police, including being strip- searched and forced to listen to a marathon speech by Xi Jinping at high volume.
Foreign universities establishing joint venture academic programs in the country must establish internal CCP committees and grant decision-making power to CCP officials. In August Reuters reported a surge in arrests and deportations of foreign teachers over the past six months as part of a continuing effort to crack down on foreign influence.
During the academic year, schools faced new prohibitions on the use of international curricula. The Ministry of Education forced the suspension of the advanced placement (AP) exams on U.S. history, world history, European history and human geography. The government allowed tests in other subjects, including calculus, biology, and chemistry, to continue.
Authorities on some occasions blocked entry into the country of individuals deemed politically sensitive and, in some cases, refused to issue passports to citizens selected for international exchange programs who were considered “politically unreliable,” singling out Tibetans, Uighurs, and individuals from other minority areas. A number of other foreign government-sponsored exchange selectees who already had passports, including some academics, encountered difficulties gaining approval to travel to participate in their programs. Academics reported having to request permission to travel overseas and, in some cases, said they were limited in the number of foreign trips they could take per year.
The CCP’s reach increasingly extended beyond the country’s physical borders. In multiple instances overseas Chinese students monitored and pushed back against on-campus speech or activity considered to be critical of China, oftentimes in coordination with the government.  In February the Washington Post reported a group of Chinese students at McMaster University in Ontario, Canada, sought guidance from the PRC embassy and filmed the presentation of Uighur activist Rukiye Turdush about China’s mass internment of Muslims.  In August the Times of London reported that China aimed to manipulate United Kingdom media and influence public officials through British universities, citing training provided by a University of Westminster media research center with links to the Chinese government on how to handle the British media, and the targeting of United Kingdom government officials, academics, and business executives by Leeds University’s Business Confucius Institute. In August Australia established a University Foreign Interference Task Force to increase consultation between its schools and government to protect national interests out of growing concern about foreign influence on Australian campuses.  On November 14, the task force released a set of guidelines designed to protect against such foreign interference by safeguarding the reputation of Australian universities, protecting academic freedom, and ensuring academic institutions and the Australian economy can maximize the benefits of research endeavors.
Authorities in Xinjiang disappeared or detained several prominent Uighur academics and intellectuals. Some officials and academics were charged with being “two-faced,” a euphemism referring to members of minority groups serving state and party occupations who harbor “separatist” or “antiofficial” tendencies, including disagreeing with official restrictions on minority culture, language, and religion. Those disappeared and believed to be held in the camps or otherwise detained included Rahile Dawut, an internationally known folklorist; Abdukerim Rahman, literature professor; Azat Sultan, Xinjiang University professor; Gheyretjan Osman, literature professor; Arslan Abdulla, language professor; Abdulqadir Jalaleddin, poet; and Yalqun Rozi, writer. Rahile Dawut’s Han Chinese student Feng Siyu was also detained.  Authorities detained former director of the Xinjiang Education Supervision Bureau Satar Sawut and removed Kashgar University president Erkin Omer and vice president Muhter Abdughopur; all were disappeared at year’s end. Courts delivered a suspended death sentence for “separatism” to Halmurat Ghopur, former president of Xinjiang Medical University Hospital.  Religious scholars Muhammad Salih Hajim and Abdulnehed Mehsum died in the camps, according to reports during the year from international organizations. Tashpolat Tiyip, former president of Xinjiang University, remained detained on charges of “separatism,” and some human rights groups reported he had been sentenced to death.  Economist Ilham Tohti remained in prison, where he was serving a life sentence after his conviction on separatism-related charges in 2014.
The government restricted freedoms of peaceful assembly and association.
Freedom of Peaceful Assembly
While the constitution provides for freedom of peaceful assembly, the government severely restricted this right. The law stipulates such activities may not challenge “party leadership” or infringe upon the “interests of the state.”  Protests against the political system or national leaders were prohibited.  Authorities denied permits and quickly suppressed demonstrations involving expression of dissenting political views.
Citizens throughout the country continued to gather publicly to protest evictions, forced relocations, and inadequate compensation, often resulting in conflict with authorities or formal charges. Media reported thousands of protests took place during the year across the country. Although peaceful protests are legal, public security officials rarely granted permits to demonstrate. Despite restrictions, many demonstrations occurred, but authorities quickly broke up those motivated by broad political or social grievances, sometimes with excessive force.
In July residents from Wuhan, the capital of Hubei, protested a planned waste incineration plant in the city’s Yangluo District.  Media had reported in 2013 that five such plants in Wuhan were substandard and emitted dangerous pollutants. Protests grew over several days, involving up to 10,000 demonstrators, until the local government dispersed them.
On December 26, police from Shandong coordinated with other police nationwide to arrest human rights activists and participants who gathered in Xiamen, Fujian, in early December to organize civil society and plan nonviolent social movements in the country. Suspected charges included “incitement to subvert state power” and “subversion of state power”; the latter crime carries a minimum 10-year prison sentence if convicted. At the end of the year, police held at least four activists in “residential surveillance at a designated location”:  organizer Ding Jiaxi and activists Zhang Zhongshun, Li Yingjun, and Dai Zhenya. Their families had no information on their whereabouts. Some human rights activists or those indirectly connected to the meeting participants fled the country or went into hiding inside the country. Several others involved in the meeting, including human rights lawyers, were held for several days in police custody in various jurisdictions for questioning and investigation.
Concerts, sports events, exercise classes, or other meetings of more than 200 persons require approval from public security authorities. Large numbers of public gatherings in Beijing and elsewhere were canceled at the last minute or denied government permits, ostensibly to ensure public safety.
Freedom of Association
The constitution provides for freedom of association, but the government restricted this right. CCP policy and government regulations require that all professional, social, and economic organizations officially register with and receive approval from the government. These regulations prevented the formation of autonomous political, human rights, religious, spiritual, labor, and other organizations that the government believed might challenge its authority in any area. The government maintained tight controls over civil society organizations and in some cases detained or harassed NGO workers.
The regulatory system for NGOs was highly restrictive, but specific requirements varied depending on whether an organization was foreign or domestic. Domestic NGOs were governed by the Charity Law and a host of related regulations. Domestic NGOs could register in one of three categories:  a social group, a social organization, or a foundation. All domestic NGOs are required to register under the Ministry of Civil Affairs and find an officially sanctioned sponsor to serve as their “professional supervisory unit.”  Finding a sponsor was often challenging, since the sponsor could be held civilly or criminally responsible for the NGO’s activities. All organizations are also required to report their sources of funding, including foreign funding. Domestic NGOs continued to adjust to this new regulatory framework.
In 2016 the CCP Central Committee issued a directive mandating the establishment of CCP cells within all domestic NGOs by 2020. According to authorities, these CCP organizations operating inside domestic NGOs would “strengthen guidance” of NGOs in areas such as “decision making for important projects, important professional activities, major expenditures and funds, acceptance of large donations, and activities involving foreigners.”  The directive also mandates authorities to conduct annual “spot checks” to ensure compliance on “ideological political work, party building, financial and personnel management, study sessions, foreign exchange, acceptance of foreign donations and assistance, and conducting activities according to their charter.”
In 2017 the Law on the Management of Foreign NGOs’ Activities in Mainland China (Foreign NGO Management Law) came into effect. The law requires foreign NGOs to register with the Ministry of Public Security and to find a state-sanctioned sponsor for their operations. NGOs that fail to comply face possible civil or criminal penalties. The law provides no appeal process for NGOs denied registration, and it stipulates NGOs found to have violated certain provisions could be banned from operating in the country. The law also states domestic groups cooperating with unregistered foreign NGOs will be punished and possibly banned. On November 25, the Foreign Ministry publicly confirmed for the first time that public security authorities had investigated and penalized a foreign NGO, in this case the New York-based Asia Catalyst, for carrying out unauthorized activities.
Some international NGOs reported it was more difficult to work with local partners, including universities, government agencies, and other domestic NGOs, as the law codified the CCP’s perception that foreign NGOs were a “national security” threat. Finding an official sponsor was difficult for most foreign NGOs, as sponsors could be held responsible for the NGOs’ conduct and had to undertake burdensome reporting requirements.  After the Ministry of Public Security published a list of sponsors, NGOs reported most government agencies still had no unit responsible for sponsoring foreign NGOs. Professional supervisory units reported they had little understanding of how to implement the law and what authorities would expect of them. The vague definition of an NGO, as well as of what activities constituted “political” and therefore illegal activities, left many business organizations and alumni associations uncertain whether they fell within the purview of the law. The lack of clear communication from the government, coupled with harassment by security authorities, caused some foreign NGOs to suspend or cease operations in the country. As of December 31, approximately 510 foreign NGO representative offices (representing 420 distinct organizations) had registered under the Foreign NGO Management Law, with nearly half of those focusing on industry or trade promotion activities.
According to the Ministry of Civil Affairs, by the end of 2017, there were more than 800,000 registered social organizations, public institutions, and foundations. Many experts believed the actual number of domestic NGOs to be much higher. Domestic NGOs reported foreign funding continued to drop, as many domestic NGOs sought to avoid such funding due to fear of being labeled as “subversive” in the face of growing restrictions imposed by new laws. NGOs existed under a variety of formal and informal guises, including national mass organizations created and funded by the CCP that are organizationally prohibited from exercising any independence, known as government-operated NGOs, or GONGOs.
For donations to a domestic organization from a foreign NGO, the Foreign NGO Management Law requires foreign NGOs to maintain a representative office in the country to receive funds, or to use the bank account of a domestic NGO when conducting temporary activities.  By law foreign NGOs are prohibited from using any other method to send and receive funds, and such funding must be reported to the Ministry of Public Security. Foreign NGOs are prohibited from fundraising and “for-profit activities” under the law.
Although all registered organizations came under some degree of government control, some NGOs, primarily service-oriented GONGOs, were able to operate with less day-to-day scrutiny.  Authorities supported the growth of some NGOs that focused on social problems, such as poverty alleviation and disaster relief. Law and regulations explicitly prohibit organizations from conducting political or religious activities, and organizations that refused to comply faced criminal penalties.
Authorities continued to restrict and evict local NGOs that received foreign funding and international NGOs that provided assistance to Tibetan communities in the TAR and other Tibetan areas. Almost all were forced to curtail their activities altogether due to travel restrictions, official intimidation of staff members, and the failure of local partners to renew project agreements.
See the Department of State’s International Religious Freedom Report at https://www.state.gov/religiousfreedomreport/.
The law provides for freedom of internal movement, foreign travel, emigration, and repatriation, but the government at times did not respect these rights.
The government increasingly silenced activists by denying them permission to travel, both internationally and domestically, or keeping them under unofficial house arrest.
In-country Movement: Authorities continued to maintain tight restrictions on freedom of movement, particularly to curtail the movement of individuals deemed politically sensitive before key anniversaries, visits by foreign dignitaries, or major political events, as well as to forestall demonstrations. Freedom of movement for Tibetans continued to be very limited in the TAR and other Tibetan areas. Uighurs faced draconian restrictions on movement within Xinjiang and outside the region.
Although the use of “domestic passports” that called for local official approval before traveling to another area was discontinued in 2016, identification checks remained in place when entering or leaving cities and on public roads.  In Xinjiang, security officials set up checkpoints managing entry into public places, including markets and mosques, that required Uighurs to scan their national identity card, undergo a facial recognition check, and put any baggage through airport-style security screening.  Such restrictions were not applied to Han Chinese in these areas.
The government maintained restrictions on the freedom to change one’s workplace or residence, the national household registration system (hukou) continued to change, and the ability of most citizens to move within the country to work and live continued to expand. While many rural residents migrated to the cities, where the per capita disposable income was approximately three times the rural per capita income, they often could not change their official residence or workplace within the country. Most cities had annual quotas for the number of new temporary residence permits they could issue, and all workers, including university graduates, had to compete for a limited number of such permits.  It was particularly difficult for rural residents to obtain household registration in more economically developed urban areas.
The household registration system added to the difficulties faced by rural residents, even after they relocated to urban areas and found employment. According to the Statistical Communique of the People’s Republic of China on 2019 National Economic and Social Development, published in February by the National Bureau of Statistics of China, 286 million individuals lived outside the jurisdiction of their household registration.  Migrant workers and their families faced numerous obstacles with regard to working conditions and labor rights. Many were unable to access public services, such as public education for their children or social insurance, in the cities where they lived and worked because they were not legally registered urban residents.
From May to July, non-Beijing residents applied for a Beijing hukou under the special municipality’s new points-based system. Under the new policy enacted in 2018, nonnatives of the city under the legal retirement age who have held a Beijing temporary residence permit with the city’s social insurance records for seven consecutive years and were without a criminal record were eligible to accumulate points for the hukou. Those with “good employment, stable homes in Beijing, strong educational background, and achievements in innovation and establishing start-ups in Beijing” were reportedly likely to obtain high scores in the point-based competition.
Under the “staying at prison employment” system applicable to recidivists incarcerated in administrative detention, authorities denied certain persons permission to return to their homes after serving their sentences. Some released or paroled prisoners returned home but did not have freedom of movement.
Foreign Travel:  The government permitted legal emigration and foreign travel for most citizens.  Government employees and retirees, especially from the military, continued to face foreign travel restrictions.  The government expanded the use of exit controls for departing passengers at airports and other border crossings to deny foreign travel to some dissidents and persons employed in government posts. Throughout the year many lawyers, artists, authors, and other activists were at times prevented from exiting the country. Authorities also blocked the travel of some family members of rights activists and of suspected corrupt officials and businesspersons, including foreign family members.
Border officials and police sometimes cited threats to “national security” as the reason for refusing permission to leave the country, although often authorities provided no reason for such exit bans. Authorities stopped most such persons at the airport at the time of their attempted travel.
Most citizens could obtain passports, although individuals the government deemed potential political threats, including religious leaders, political dissidents, petitioners, and ethnic minorities, routinely reported being refused passports or otherwise prevented from traveling overseas.
Uighurs, particularly those residing in Xinjiang, reported great difficulty in getting passport applications approved at the local level.  They were frequently denied passports to travel abroad, particularly to Saudi Arabia for the Hajj, to other Muslim countries, or to Western countries for academic purposes.  Since 2016 authorities ordered Xinjiang residents to turn in their passports or told residents no new passports were available.  Foreign national family members of Uighur activists living overseas were also denied visas to enter the country.  The government continued its concerted efforts to compel Uighurs studying abroad to return to China, often pressuring relatives in Xinjiang to ask their overseas relatives to return. Authorities also refused to renew passports for Uighurs living abroad, compelling them to either return to China or pursue ways to maintain legal status in other countries.  Upon return, many of these Uighurs, or persons connected with the Xinjiang residents, were detained or disappeared.
Tibetans faced significant hurdles in acquiring passports, and for Buddhist monks and nuns, it was virtually impossible. Authorities’ unwillingness to issue or even renew old passports for Tibetans created, in effect, a ban on foreign travel for the Tibetan population. Han Chinese residents of Tibetan areas did not experience the same difficulties.
The government continued to try to prevent many Tibetans and Uighurs from leaving the country and detained many when they attempted to leave.  Some family members of rights activists who tried to emigrate were unable to do so.
Exile: The law neither provides for a citizen’s right to repatriate nor addresses exile. The government continued to refuse re-entry to numerous citizens considered dissidents, Falun Gong activists, or “troublemakers.”  Although authorities allowed some dissidents living abroad to return, dissidents released on medical parole and allowed to leave the country often were effectively exiled.
Chen Xiaoya, author of the History of Civil Rights Movement 1989, was turned away by Guangxi customs officials when she tried to travel abroad on January 10. Customs officers told her that she was banned from leaving the country because she might jeopardize national security.
Fuzhou-based human rights activist Zhuang Lei attempted to visit Hong Kong on June 6 but was stopped by Shenzhen enforcement officers at the border. Zhuang, who claimed to have no criminal record, was referred to Fuzhou’s domestic security police by the Shenzhen officers. Zhuang believed he was prevented from traveling to Hong Kong due to concerns that he might participate in the Hong Kong protests against an extradition bill on June 9.
Families of “709” lawyers faced difficulties applying for passports or were barred from leaving the country.
Foshan dissident Chen Qitang was released from Sihui Prison on May 24, after serving four and one-half years in jail for “subversion of state power.” After his release, he was prevented from returning home.
On June 1, police in Guilin and Liuzhou summoned internet users who had discussed on social media their plans to travel to Hong Kong to participate in the annual gathering in Victoria Park commemorating the 30th anniversary of the Tiananmen Square massacre, and ordered them not to go to Hong Kong.  In April the 1990s Cantonese pop song “Ren Jian Dao” was banned nationwide, including on Apple Music, because the lyrics were believed to be making a reference to the 1989 massacre.
Not applicable.
Although restricting access to border areas, the government regularly cooperated with the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), which maintained an office in Beijing.
 Abuse of Migrants, Refugees, and Stateless Persons  : There were reports North Korean agents operated clandestinely within the country to repatriate North Korean citizens against their will. In addition, North Koreans detained by PRC authorities faced repatriation unless they could pay bribes to secure their release. North Korean refugees were either detained in holding facilities or placed under house arrest at undisclosed locations. Family members wanting to prevent forced returns of their North Korean relatives were required to pay fees to Chinese authorities purportedly to cover expenses incurred while in detention. While detained North Koreans were occasionally released, they were rarely given the necessary permissions for safe passage to a third country.
Refoulement:  The government continued to consider North Koreans as illegal “economic migrants” rather than refugees or asylum seekers and refouled many of them to North Korea. Missionaries in China involved in helping North Koreans reach safe destinations said that Chinese authorities’ crackdown on North Korean defectors had intensified since Kim Jong Un took power.
In April Chinese authorities apprehended three North Korean women, three men, and a 10-year-old girl who fled from North Korea. RFA reported in August that China had detained 60 North Korean defectors and had refouled them to North Korea where they faced harsh punishments including torture, forced abortions, forced labor, sexual violence, or death.
Access to Asylum:  The law does not provide for the granting of refugee or asylum status. The government did not have a system for providing protection to refugees but generally recognized UNHCR-registered refugees in China. Asylum applicants and refugees remained in the country without access to education or social services and were subject to deportation at any time.
North Korean refugees and asylum seekers, particularly young women living on the margins of society, were vulnerable to trafficking and forced marriages as a result of their unrecognized status.  Authorities continued to forcibly repatriate North Korean refugees and asylum seekers, including trafficking victims, generally treating them as illegal economic migrants. The government detained and deported them to North Korea, where they faced severe punishment or death, including in North Korean forced-labor camps. The government did not provide North Korean trafficking victims with legal alternatives to repatriation.
UNHCR reported that Chinese officials continued to restrict its access to border areas. Authorities sometimes detained and prosecuted citizens who assisted North Korean refugees, as well as those who facilitated illegal border crossings.
Access to Basic Services:  Refugees, including North Korean asylum seekers in the country seeking economic opportunities generally did not have access to health care, public education, or other social services due to lack of legal status.
Durable Solutions:  The government largely cooperated with UNHCR when dealing with the local settlement in China of Han Chinese or ethnic minorities from Vietnam and Laos living in the country since the Vietnam War era.  The government and UNHCR continued discussions concerning the granting of citizenship to these long-term residents and their children, many of whom were born in China.
International media reported as many as 30,000 children born to North Korean women in China, most of whom were trafficked and married to Chinese spouses, had not been registered because their North Korean parent was undocumented, leaving the children de facto stateless. These children were denied access to public services, including education and health care, despite provisions in the law that provide citizenship to children with at least one PRC citizen parent.  Chinese fathers reportedly sometimes do not register their children to avoid exposing the illegal status of their North Korean partners.
Section 3. Freedom to Participate in the Political Process
The constitution states, “all power in the People’s Republic of China belongs to the people” and the organs through which citizens exercise state power are the NPC and the people’s congresses at provincial, district, and local levels. In practice the CCP dictated the legislative agenda to the NPC. While the law provides for elections of people’s congress delegates at the county level and below, citizens could not freely choose the officials who governed them. The CCP controlled all elections and continued to control appointments to positions of political power.
The CCP used various intimidation tactics, including house arrest, to block independent candidates from standing for local elections.
In March the NPC removed the two-term limit for the positions of president and vice president, clearing the way for Xi Jinping to remain in office.
Elections and Political Participation
Recent Elections: On March 4, the NPC’s 2,980 delegates elected the president and vice president, the premier and vice premiers, and the chairman of the Central Military Commission. The NPC Standing Committee, which consisted of 175 members, oversaw the elections and determined the agenda and procedures for the NPC. The selection of NPC members takes place every five years, and the process is controlled by the CCP.
The NPC Standing Committee remained under the direct authority of the CCP, and all important legislative decisions required the concurrence of the CCP’s seven- member Politburo Standing Committee.  Despite its broad authority under the state constitution, the NPC did not set policy independently or remove political leaders without the CCP’s approval.
According to Ministry of Civil Affairs’ 2016 statistics, almost all of the country’s more than 600,000 villages had implemented direct elections by ordinary citizens for members of local sub-governmental organizations known as village committees. The direct election of officials remained narrow in scope and strictly confined to the lowest rungs of local governance.  Corruption, vote buying, and interference by township-level and CCP officials continued to be problems. The law permits each voter to cast proxy votes for up to three other voters.
The election law governs legislative bodies at all levels, although compliance and enforcement varied across the country. Under the law citizens have the opportunity every five years to vote for local people’s congress representatives at the county level and below, although in most cases higher-level government officials or CCP cadres controlled the nomination of candidates. At higher levels legislators selected people’s congress delegates from among their ranks. For example, provincial-level people’s congresses selected delegates to the NPC. Local CCP secretaries generally served concurrently within the leadership team of the local people’s congress, thus strengthening CCP control over legislatures.
Political Parties and Political Participation:  Official statements asserted “the political party system [that] China has adopted is multiparty cooperation and political consultation” under CCP leadership. The CCP, however, retained a monopoly on political power, and the government forbade the creation of new political parties. The government officially recognized nine parties founded prior to 1949, and parties other than the CCP held 30 percent of the seats in the NPC. These non-CCP members did not function as a political opposition. They exercised very little influence on legislation or policymaking and were only allowed to operate under the direction of the CCP United Front Work Department.
No laws or regulations specifically govern the formation of political parties.  The China Democracy Party (CDP) remained banned, and the government continued to monitor, detain, and imprison current and former CDP members. CDP founder Qin Yongmin, detained with his wife Zhao Suli in 2015, began his 13-year jail term in 2018 in Hubei’s Qianjiang Prison for “subversion of state power.”  After his wife was released, she and Qin’s brother visited him in January and noted prison authorities denied him reading and writing materials and that Qin’s physical and mental health were deteriorating due to his forced hard labor.
Participation of Women and Minorities:  Women and members of minority groups held few positions of significant influence in the government or CCP structure. Among the 2,987 appointed delegates to the 13th NPC during the year, 742 (25 percent) were women.  Following the 19th Party Congress, one member of the CCP Central Committee’s 25-member Politburo was a woman. There were no women in the Politburo Standing Committee.
The election law provides a general mandate for quotas for female and ethnic minority representatives, but achieving these quotas often required election authorities to violate the election law.
A total of 438 delegates from 55 ethnic minorities were members of the 13th NPC, accounting for 16 percent of the total number of delegates. All of the country’s officially recognized minority groups were represented.  The 19th Party Congress elected 15 members of ethnic minority groups as members of the 202-person Central Committee.  There was no ethnic minority member of the Politburo, and only one ethnic minority was serving as a party secretary of a provincial-level jurisdiction, although a handful of ethnic minority members were serving as leaders in provincial governments. An ethnic Mongolian woman, Bu Xiaolin, served as chair of the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region, equivalent to a provincial governor. An ethnic Hui woman, Xian Hui, also served as chair of the Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region.
Section 4. Corruption and Lack of Transparency in Government
Although officials faced criminal penalties for corruption, the government and the CCP did not implement the law consistently or transparently.  Corruption remained rampant, and many cases of corruption involved areas heavily regulated by the government, such as land-usage rights, real estate, mining, and infrastructure development, which were susceptible to fraud, bribery, and kickbacks. Court judgments often could not be enforced against powerful special entities, including government departments, state-owned enterprises, military personnel, and some members of the CCP.
Transparency International’s analysis indicated corruption remained a significant problem in the country. There were numerous reports of government corruption– and subsequent trials and sentences–during the year.
In March 2018 the NPC adopted the National Supervision Law, which codified the joint National Supervisory Commission-Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (NSC-CCDI). The NSC-CCDI is charged with rooting out corruption, and its investigations can target any public official, including police, judges, and prosecutors; the commission can investigate and detain individuals connected to targeted public officials. The creation of the NSC essentially vested the CCDI, the CCP’s internal discipline investigation unit that sits outside of the judicial system, with powers of the state.  Rules governing NSC-CCDI investigations, operations, and detentions remained unclear.
NSC-CCDI detention, known as liuzhi, faced allegations of detainee abuse and torture.  Liuzhi detainees are held incommunicado and have no recourse to appeal their detention.  While detainee abuse is proscribed by the National Supervision Law, the mechanism for detainees to report abuse is unclear. According to the compensation law, however, suspects wrongly accused of corruption can receive compensation for time spent in liuzhi.
Although liuzhi operates outside the judicial system, confessions given while in liuzhi were used as evidence in judicial proceedings.  According to press reports and an NGO report released in August, liuzhi detainees experienced extended solitary confinement, sleep deprivation, beatings, and forced standing or sitting in uncomfortable positions for hours and sometimes days.
According to state media, the Discipline Inspection Commission and Supervision Commission in Maoming City, Guangdong, put 11 individuals in liuzhi detention between March and April 2018 for investigation of bribery or negligence of duty. One provincial official head of the liuzhi detention system said suspects averaged 42.5 days in detention before being transferred into the criminal justice system.
Corruption:  In numerous cases government prosecutors investigated public officials and leaders of state-owned enterprises, who generally held high CCP ranks, for corruption.
While the tightly controlled state media apparatus publicized some notable corruption investigations, in general very few details were made public regarding the process by which CCP and government officials were investigated for corruption. In September Meng Hongwei, serving as the country’s first Interpol president in Lyon, France, while retaining his position as a PRC Ministry of Public Security vice minister, disappeared after arriving in China on a September 25 flight.  Media outlets reported Meng was taken into custody by “discipline authorities” upon his arrival for suspected corruption.  The government announced Meng was being monitored while the NSC-CCDI investigated him and his associates for allegedly taking bribes; at year’s end additional details about the case were unavailable.
In 2018 anticorruption investigations probed the high-profile suicide of Zhang Yi, president of the Langfang Chengnan Orthopedic Hospital, when he detailed the corrupt practices that interfered in hospital management and funds. On March 26, a Gu’an County court in Langfang City, Hebei, began hearing the trial for 12 suspects accused of committing crimes including organizing, leading, and participating in a criminal organization; extortion; provoking troubles; intentional injury; intentional destruction of property; forcing deals; capital embezzlement; graft; and fraud. The court did not pass its judgment immediately.  The Gu’an court sentenced Yang Yuzhong to 25-years’ imprisonment, the maximum prison sentence allowed. After Yang’s family appealed the ruling, an appeals court in August affirmed the original judgment:  25-years’ imprisonment for Yang Yuzhong and 18- and 10-years’ imprisonment for two major members of Yang’s organized crime group.
Financial Disclosure: A regulation requires officials in government agencies or state-owned enterprises at the county level or above to report their ownership of property, including that in their spouses’ or children’s names, as well as their families’ investments in financial assets and enterprises. The regulations do not require declarations be made public. Instead, they are submitted to a higher administrative level and a human resource department. Punishments for not declaring information vary from training on the regulations, warning talks, and adjusting one’s work position to being relieved of one’s position. Regulations further state officials should report all income, including allowances, subsidies, and bonuses, as well as income from other jobs, such as giving lectures, writing, consulting, reviewing articles, painting, and calligraphy.  Officials, their spouses, and the children who live with them also are required to report their real estate properties and financial investments, although these reports are not made public. They are required to report whether their children live abroad as well as the work status of their children and grandchildren (including those who live abroad). Officials are required to file reports annually and are required to report changes of personal status within 30 days.
In late 2018, but reported during the year, the Shenzhen government provided a one-off payment of 300 million yuan ($42 million) to more than 300 workers from Hunan for the serious occupational lung diseases they acquired while working there.
On March 22, several hundred villagers in Shunde District in Foshan demonstrated at the entrance of their village over their officials’ alleged corruption in selling their collectively owned farmland.  Police surrounded the village, dispersed the crowd, and detained demonstration participants.
Section 5. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Abuses of Human Rights
The government sought to maintain control over civil society groups, halt the emergence of independent NGOs, and hinder activities of civil society and human rights groups. The government frequently harassed independent domestic NGOs and in many cases did not permit them to openly monitor or comment on human rights conditions. The government made statements expressing suspicion of independent organizations and closely scrutinized NGOs with financial or other links overseas. The government took significant steps during the year to bring all domestic NGOs under its direct regulatory control, thereby curtailing the space for independent NGOs to exist. Most large NGOs were quasi-governmental, and government agencies had to sponsor all official NGOs.
The United Nations or Other International Bodies: The government remained reluctant to accept criticism of its human rights record by other nations or international organizations. The government sharply limited the visits of UN experts to the country and rarely provided substantive answers to queries by UN human rights bodies. A dozen requests for visits to the country by UN experts remained outstanding.
The government used its membership on the UN Economic and Social Council’s Committee on NGOs to block groups critical of China from obtaining UN accreditation and barring accredited activists from participating in UN events.  The government also retaliated against human rights groups working with the United Nations, eliciting the criticism of UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres.
Government Human Rights Bodies:  The government maintained each country’s economic, social, cultural, and historical conditions determined its approach to human rights. The government claimed its treatment of suspects, considered to be victims of human rights abuses by the international community, was in accordance with national law. The government did not have a human rights ombudsman or commission.
Section 6. Discrimination, Societal Abuses, and Trafficking in Persons
Women
Rape and Domestic Violence:  Rape of women is illegal and carries a sentence that ranges from three years in prison to death. The law does not safeguard same-sex couples or victims of marital rape.  The separate law on sexual assault includes male victims, but it has a maximum penalty of five years in prison. Of the reported cases, most allegations of rape were closed through private settlement rather than prosecution. Some persons convicted of rape were executed.
Domestic violence remained a significant problem. Some scholars said victims were encouraged to attempt to resolve domestic violence through mediation. Societal sentiment that domestic violence was a personal, private matter contributed to underreporting and inaction by authorities when women faced violence at home. The Family Violence Law defines domestic violence as a civil, rather than a criminal, offense.  Web publication Sixth Tone reported 25 percent of families had experienced domestic violence.
The government supported shelters for victims of domestic violence, and some courts provided protections to victims, including through court protective orders prohibiting a perpetrator of domestic violence from coming near a victim. Nonetheless, official assistance did not always reach victims, and public security forces often ignored domestic violence. Legal aid institutions working to provide counseling and defense to victims of domestic violence were often pressured to suspend public activities and cease all forms of policy advocacy, an area that was reserved only for government-sponsored organizations.
According to women’s rights activists, a recurring problem in the prosecution of domestic violence cases was a failure by authorities to collect evidence, including photographs, hospital records, police records, or children’s testimony. Witnesses seldom testified in court.
Courts’ recognition of domestic violence improved, making spousal abuse a mitigating factor in crimes committed in self-defense.
Sexual Harassment: The law prohibits sexual harassment against women; however, there is no clear legal definition of sexual harassment. Offenders are subject to a penalty of up to 15 days in detention, according to the Beijing Public Security Bureau. It remained difficult for victims to file a sexual harassment complaint and for judges to reach a ruling on such cases.  Many women remained unwilling to report incidents of sexual harassment, believing the justice system was ineffectual, according to official media. Several prominent media reports of sexual harassment went viral on social media, helping to raise awareness of the problem, particularly in the workplace.
In September 2018 Liang Songji and Zhang Wuzhou witnessed police officers beating and forcing female lawyer Sun Shihua to strip naked at a police station in Guangzhou’s Liwan District. They published accounts of the incident on social media, for which Guangzhou police detained both in October 2018. Prosecutors charged them with rumor mongering and obstructing police from performing official duties.  After an initial trial on August 11, the Liwan District Court sent the case back to the procuratorate for further investigation, but no new evidence was submitted.  Liang and Zhang were sentenced on October 25, Liang to 18 months in jail for “picking quarrels and provoking trouble” and Zhang to 16 months in jail on the charges of “picking quarrels and provoking trouble” and “obstruction of official duties.”
Although many women experienced workplace sexual harassment, very few reported it. Human Rights Watch cited one statistic showing nearly 40 percent of women said they experienced sexual harassment in the workplace.
The Law on the Protection of Women’s Rights and Interests empowers victims to file a sexual harassment complaint with their employer, authorities, or both. Employers who failed to take effective measures to prevent sexual harassment could be fined.
Some women’s NGOs that sought to increase public awareness of sexual harassment reported harassment by public security and faced challenges executing their programs.
Coercion in Population Control: There were reports of coerced abortions and sterilizations, although government statistics on the percentage of abortions that were coerced during the year were not available.  The CCP restricts the rights of parents to choose the number of children they have and utilizes family planning units from the provincial to the village level to enforce population limits and distributions. The Population and Family Planning Law permits married couples to have two children and allows couples to apply for permission to have a third child if they meet conditions stipulated in local and provincial regulations.
State media claimed the number of coerced abortions had declined in recent years in the wake of loosened regulations, including the implementation of the two-child policy. Nevertheless, citizens were subject to hefty fines for violating the law, while couples who had only one child received a certificate entitling them to collect a monthly incentive payment and other benefits that vary by province–from approximately six to 12 yuan (one to two dollars) per month up to 3,000 yuan ($420) for farmers and herders in poor areas.  Couples in some provinces were required to seek approval and register before a child was conceived. The National Health Commission rejected calls to eliminate legal references to family planning, citing the country’s constitutional provision that “the state promotes family planning so that population growth may fit the plans for economic and social development.”
According to other international reports, several Uighur women reported they were forced to undergo sterilization while detained in detention centers. A Uighur woman said she and other women were forced to ingest unknown drugs and drink a white liquid that caused them to lose consciousness and in some cases resulted in a loss of menstruation. She said some women died from excessive bleeding.
Under the law and in practice, there are financial and administrative penalties for births that exceed birth limits or otherwise violate regulations. The law, as implemented, requires each woman with an unauthorized pregnancy to abort or pay the social compensation fee, which can reach 10 times a person’s annual disposable income. The exact amount of the fee varied widely from province to province.  Those with financial means often paid the fee so that their children born in violation of the birth restrictions would have access to a wide array of government-provided social services and rights. Some parents avoided the fee by hiding children born in violation of the law with friends or relatives.  Minorities in some provinces, however, were entitled to higher limits on their family size.
The law maintains “citizens have an obligation to practice birth planning in accordance with the law” and also states “couples of child-bearing age shall voluntarily choose birth planning contraceptive and birth control measures to prevent and reduce unwanted pregnancies.”
Since the national family planning law mentions only the rights of married couples, local implementation was inconsistent, and unmarried persons must pay for contraception.  Although under both civil law and marriage law the children of single women are entitled to the same rights as those born to married parents, in practice children born to single mothers or unmarried couples are considered “outside of the policy” and subject to the social compensation fee and the denial of legal documents, such as birth documents and the hukou residence permit. Single women could avoid those penalties by marrying within 60 days of the baby’s birth.
As in prior years, population control policy continued to rely on social pressure, education, propaganda, and economic penalties, as well as on measures such as mandatory pregnancy examinations and, less frequently, coerced abortions and sterilizations. Officials at all levels could receive rewards or penalties based on whether or not they met the population targets set by their administrative region. With the higher birth limit, and since most persons wanted to have no more than two children, it was easier to achieve population targets, and the pressure on local officials was considerably less than before.  Those found to have a pregnancy in violation of the law or those who helped another to evade state controls could face punitive measures, such as onerous fines or job loss.
Regulations requiring women who violate the family planning policy to terminate their pregnancies still exist and were enforced in some provinces, such as Hubei, Hunan, and Liaoning. Other provinces, such as Guizhou and Yunnan, maintained provisions that require “remedial measures,” an official euphemism for abortion, to deal with pregnancies that violate the policy.
Although many local governments encouraged couples to have a second child, families with three or more children still must pay a “social compensation fee.”  In Shandong a local district seized a family’s bank account of 22,987 yuan ($3,200) for failure to pay the social compensation fee of 64,626 yuan ($9,000) after having their third child.  In a separate case in Shandong, a 67-year-old woman who gave birth to a third child faced fines from the local family planning commission.  In previous years those who did not pay the fee were added to a “personal credit black list,” restricting their ability to request loans, take public transportation, purchase items, educate their children, and join tours. The compensation fees were estimated to be 15 to 30 percent of some local governments’ discretionary spending budgets.  At year’s end the local government had not decided whether to fine the woman, but one government official promised to publicize the final decision.
The law mandates family planning bureaus administer pregnancy tests to married women of childbearing age and provide them with basic knowledge of family planning and prenatal services. Some provinces fined women who did not undergo periodic state-mandated pregnancy tests.
Family-planning officials face criminal charges and administrative sanctions if they are found to violate citizens’ human or property rights, abuse their power, accept bribes, misappropriate or embezzle family planning funds, or falsely report family planning statistics in the enforcement of birth limitation policy. Forced abortion is not specifically listed as a prohibited activity. The law also prohibits health-care providers from providing illegal surgeries, ultrasounds to determine the sex of the fetus that are not medically necessary, sex-selective abortions, fake medical identification, and fake birth certificates. By law citizens could submit formal complaints about officials who exceed their authority in implementing birth-planning policy, and complaints are to be investigated and dealt with in a timely manner.
Discrimination:  The constitution states, “women enjoy equal rights with men in all spheres of life.” The law provides for equality in ownership of property, inheritance rights, access to education, and equal pay for equal work.  Nonetheless, women reported discrimination, unfair dismissal, demotion, and wage discrepancies were significant problems.
On average, women earned 35 percent less than men who did similar work. This wage gap was greater in rural areas. Women also continued to be underrepresented in leadership positions, despite their high rate of participation in the labor force.
Authorities often did not enforce laws protecting the rights of women. According to legal experts, it was difficult to litigate sex discrimination suits because of vague legal definitions. Some observers noted the agencies tasked with protecting women’s rights tended to focus on maternity-related benefits and wrongful termination during maternity leave rather than on sex discrimination, violence against women, and sexual harassment; others pointed to the active role played by the All China Women’s Federation in passing the new domestic violence legislation.
On July 11, a Chengdu court ruled in favor of Liu Li, who used an alias, in a lawsuit against her former employer who she said sexually harassed her. The court ordered the former employer to apologize.
In October the Jing’an District People’s Court sentenced a man to six months in prison after he groped an adult woman and an under aged girl on a subway train on July 1.
Women’s rights advocates indicated in rural areas women often forfeited land and property rights to their husbands in divorce proceedings. Rural contract law and laws protecting women’s rights stipulate women enjoy equal rights in cases of land management, but experts asserted this was rarely the case due to the complexity of the law and difficulties in its implementation.
Gender-biased Sex Selection: The most recent information from the PRC’s National Bureau of Statistics stated the boy-girl birth ratio was 111.9 to 100 in 2017, which was lower than the World Bank’s statistic of 115 to 100 for the same year.
A 2016 regulation released by the PRC’s National Health and Family Planning Commission, the State Administration for Industry and Commerce, and the State Food and Drug Administration bans nonmedical fetal sex diagnosis and aborting a pregnancy based on gender selection.  It stipulates that no unit or individual should carry out or promote such procedures.
In September 2018 five government departments, including the National Health Commission and the State Drug Administration, jointly released a regulation on banning the use of ultrasonic diagnostic equipment to take “fetus photos” after the government found that such tools had been used to reveal the gender of the fetus.
Children
Birth Registration:  Citizenship is derived from parents. Parents must register their children in compliance with the national household registration system within one month of birth. Unregistered children could not access public services, including education.
Education:  Although the law provides for nine years of compulsory education for children, many children in economically disadvantaged rural areas did not attend school for the required period, and some never attended.  Public schools were not allowed to charge tuition, but many schools continued to charge miscellaneous fees because they received insufficient local and central government funding. Such fees and other school-related expenses made it difficult for poorer families and some migrant workers to send their children to school. The gap in education quality for rural and urban youth remained extensive, with many children of migrant workers attending unlicensed and poorly equipped schools.
Child Abuse:  The physical abuse of children is ground for criminal prosecution. The Domestic Violence Law also protects children. Sexual abuse of minors, particularly of rural children, was a significant problem.
Early and Forced Marriage:  The legal minimum age for marriage is 22 for men and 20 for women. Child marriage was not known to be a problem.
Sexual Exploitation of Children: The minimum legal age for consensual sex is 14. Persons who forced girls younger than 14 into prostitution could be sentenced to 10 years to life in prison in addition to a fine or confiscation of property. In especially serious cases, violators could receive a life sentence or death sentence, in addition to having their property confiscated. Those who visited girls forced into prostitution younger than 14 were subject to five years or more in prison in addition to paying a fine.
Pornography of any kind, including child pornography, is illegal. Under the criminal code, those producing, reproducing, publishing, selling, or disseminating obscene materials with the purpose of making a profit could be sentenced to up to three years in prison or put under criminal detention or surveillance in addition to paying a fine. Offenders in serious cases could receive prison sentences of three to 10 years in addition to paying a fine.
According to the law, persons broadcasting or showing obscene materials to minors younger than 18 are to be “severely punished.”
Infanticide or Infanticide of Children with Disabilities:  The law forbids infanticide; it was unknown if the practice continued. Parents of children with disabilities frequently left infants at hospitals, primarily because of the anticipated cost of medical care. Gender-biased abortions and the abandonment and neglect of baby girls were believed to be in decline but continued to be a problem in some circumstances due to the traditional preference for sons and the birth-limitation policy.
Displaced Children:  The detention of an estimated one million or more Uighurs, ethnic Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, and other Muslims in Xinjiang left many children without caregivers. While many of these children had other relatives willing to care for them, the government began placing the children of detainees in orphanages, boarding schools, or “child welfare guidance centers,” where they were forced to shout patriotic slogans, learn Mandarin Chinese, and answer questions about their parents’ religious beliefs and practices. The number of such children was unknown, especially as many of these facilities were also used for orphans and regular students, but one media outlet reported that, based on a 2017 government planning document, at least 500,000 children were separated from their parents and put into these “care” centers. Government policy aims to provide such children with state-sponsored care until they reach age 18. Media reports showed new construction for orphanages in Xinjiang greatly escalated in 2017 and 2018 to house thousands of children of parents being held in camps. In Hotan, some boarding schools were topped with barbed wire.
Institutionalized Children:  See “Displaced Children” section above.
International Child Abductions:  The country is not a party to the 1980 Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction. See the Department of State’s Annual Report on International Parental Child Abduction at https://travel.state.gov/content/travel/en/International-Parental-Child- Abduction/for-providers/legal-reports-and-data/reported-cases.html.
Anti-Semitism
The government does not recognize Judaism as an ethnicity or religion.  There were no reports of anti-Semitic acts during the year.
Trafficking in Persons
See the Department of State’s Trafficking in Persons Report at https://www.state.gov/trafficking-in-persons-report/.
Persons with Disabilities
The law protects the rights of persons with disabilities and prohibits discrimination, but in many instances conditions for such persons lagged behind legal requirements, and the government failed to provide persons with disabilities access to programs intended to assist them.
According to the law, persons with disabilities “are entitled to enjoyment of equal rights as other citizens in political, economic, cultural, and social fields, in family life, and in other aspects.” Discrimination against, insult of, and infringement upon persons with disabilities is prohibited.  The law prohibits discrimination against minors with disabilities and codifies a variety of judicial protections for juveniles.
The Ministry of Education reported there were more than 2,000 separate education schools for children with disabilities, but NGOs reported only 2 percent of the 20 million children with disabilities had access to education that met their needs.
Individuals with disabilities faced difficulties accessing higher education. Universities often excluded candidates with disabilities who would otherwise be qualified. A regulation mandates accommodations for students with disabilities when taking the national university entrance exam.
Unemployment among adults with disabilities, in part due to discrimination, remained a serious problem. The law requires local governments to offer incentives to enterprises that hire persons with disabilities. Regulations in some parts of the country also require employers to pay into a national fund for persons with disabilities when employees with disabilities do not make up a statutory minimum percentage of the total workforce.
Standards adopted for making roads and buildings accessible to persons with disabilities are subject to the Law on the Handicapped, which calls for their “gradual” implementation; compliance was limited.
The law forbids the marriage of persons with certain mental disabilities, such as schizophrenia. If doctors find a couple is at risk of transmitting congenital disabilities to their children, the couple may marry only if they agree to use birth control or undergo sterilization. In some instances officials continued to require couples to abort pregnancies when doctors discovered possible disabilities during prenatal examinations. The law stipulates local governments are to employ such practices to eliminate the births of children with disabilities.
National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities
Government policy called for members of recognized minorities to receive preferential treatment in birth planning, university admission, access to loans, and employment. The substance and implementation of ethnic minority policies nonetheless remained poor, and discrimination against minorities remained widespread.  The government “sinicization” campaign resulted in ethnically based restrictions on movement, including curtailed ability of ethnic Uighurs to travel freely or obtain travel documents; greater surveillance and presence of armed police in Xinjiang; and legislative restrictions on cultural and religious practices.
According to the most recent government census (in 2015), 9.5 million, or 40 percent, of the Xinjiang’s official residents were Han Chinese. Uighur, Hui, ethnic Kazakh, Kyrgyz, and other ethnic minorities constituted 14.1 million Xinjiang residents, or 60 percent of the total population.  Official statistics understated the Han Chinese population because they did not count the more than 2.7 million Han residents on paramilitary compounds (bingtuan) and those who were long-term “temporary workers,” an increase of 1.2 percent over the previous year, according to a 2015 government of Xinjiang report.
The government’s policy to encourage Han Chinese migration into minority areas significantly increased the population of Han in Xinjiang. Han Chinese officials continued to hold the majority of the most powerful CCP and many government positions in minority autonomous regions, particularly Xinjiang. The rapid influx of Han Chinese into Xinjiang in recent decades has provoked Uighur resentment.
In 2017 the Xinjiang government also implemented new “Deradicalization Regulations,” codifying efforts to “contain and eradicate extremism,” according to Xinhua. The broad definition of extremism resulted in the reported detention since 2017 of more than one million Uighurs, ethnic Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, and other Muslims in “transformation through education” centers, or detention centers, designed to instill patriotism and erase their religious and ethnic identities. This included many of those ordered to return to China from studying or working abroad. International media reported security officials in the centers abused, tortured, and killed some detainees (see sections 1.a, 1.b, 1.c, 1.d, and 2.d.).
Officials in Xinjiang sustained efforts to crack down on the government-designated “three evil forces” of religious extremism, ethnic separatism, and violent terrorism, including by continuing the concentrated re-education campaign. Xinjiang Communist Party secretary Chen Quanguo, former Communist leader in the TAR, replicated in Xinjiang policies similar to those credited with reducing opposition to CCP rule in Tibet, increasing the security budget by more than 300 percent and advertising more than 90,800 security-related jobs. Authorities cited the 2016 Xinjiang guidelines for the implementation of the national Counterterrorism Law and a “people’s war on terrorism” in its increased surveillance efforts and enhanced restrictions on movement and ethnic and religious practices.
Outside the internment camps, the government implemented severe restrictions on expressions of minorities’ culture, language, and religious identity, including regulations prohibiting behaviors the government considered signs of “extremism” such as growing “abnormal” beards, wearing of veils in public places, and suddenly stopping smoking and drinking alcohol, among other behaviors. The regulations banned the use of some Islamic names when naming children and set punishments for the teaching of religion to children. Authorities conducted “household surveys” and “home stays” in which officials or volunteers forcibly lived in Uighurs’ homes and monitored families for signs of “extremism.” There were media reports that male officials would sleep in the same bed as the wives of men who were detained in internment camps, as part of the “Pair Up and Become Family” program, and also bring alcohol and pork for consumption during the home stay.
In October 2018 the Xinjiang government released new implementing regulations on “de-extremification.”  Article 17 of the regulations states that county-level governments “may establish occupational skills education and training centers and other such education and transformation bodies and management departments to conduct education and transformation for persons influenced by extremism.”
Some observers noted, despite this new regional law, the “re-education centers” were still illegal under the constitution.
Minority groups in border and other regions had less access to education than their Han Chinese counterparts, faced job discrimination in favor of Han Chinese migrants, and earned incomes well below those in other parts of the country. Government development programs and job provisions disrupted traditional living patterns of minority groups and in some cases included the forced relocation of persons and the forced settlement of nomads. Han Chinese benefited disproportionately from government programs and economic growth in minority areas. As part of its emphasis on building a “harmonious society” and maintaining social stability, the government downplayed racism and institutional discrimination against minorities and cracked down on peaceful expressions of ethnic culture and religion, which remained a source of deep resentment in Xinjiang, the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region, the TAR, and other Tibetan areas.
The law states “schools (classes and grades) and other institutions of education where most of the students come from minority nationalities shall, whenever possible, use textbooks in their own languages and use their languages as the medium of instruction.”  Despite provisions to ensure cultural and linguistic rights, measures requiring full instruction in Mandarin beginning in preschool and banning the use of Uighur in all educational activities and management were implemented throughout Xinjiang, according to international media.
Many of the security raids, arbitrary detentions, and judicial punishments appeared to target groups or individuals peacefully seeking to express their political or religious views. Detention and punishment extended to expression on the internet and social media, including the browsing, downloading, and transmitting of banned content. Officials continued to use the threat of violence as justification for extreme security measures directed at the local population, journalists, and visiting foreigners. According to Xinhua, officials used surveillance and facial recognition software, biodata collection, and big data technology to create a database of Uighurs in Xinjiang for the purpose of conducting “social-instability forecasting, prevention, and containment.”  Security forces frequently staged large-scale parades involving thousands of armed police in cities across Xinjiang, according to state media.
Uighurs and other religious minorities continued to be sentenced to long prison terms and in some cases executed without due process on spurious charges of separatism and endangering state security. In 2016 and 2017, the Xinjiang regional government posted advertisements to recruit nearly 100,000 security personnel, international media reported.
The law criminalizes discussion of “separatism” on the internet and prohibits use of the internet in any way that undermines national unity.  It further bans inciting ethnic separatism or “harming social stability” and requires internet service providers and network operators to set up monitoring systems to detect, report, and delete religious content or to strengthen existing systems and report violations of the law. Authorities searched cell phones at checkpoints and during random inspections of Uighur households, and persons in possession of alleged terrorist material, including pictures of general religious or cultural importance, could be arrested and charged with crimes. International media reported security officials at police checkpoints used a surveillance application to download and view content on mobile phones.
Ethnic Kazakhs were also targeted, RFA and other international media reported.
In August 2018 Sayragul Sauytbay, an ethnic Kazakh Chinese citizen, testified in a Kazakhstan court that she was forced to work in a center where an estimated 2,500 ethnic Kazakhs were detained. She told the court she had to undergo “political indoctrination” at the camp. Kazakhs were also prevented from moving freely between China and neighboring Kazakhstan, and some were detained in internment camps upon their return to China.
The government pressured foreign countries to repatriate or deny visas to Uighurs who had left China and repatriated Uighurs faced the risk of imprisonment and mistreatment upon return. Some Uighurs who were forcibly repatriated disappeared after arriving in China. Family members of Uighurs studying overseas were also pressured to convince students to return to China, and returning students were detained or forced to attend re-education camps, according to overseas media. Overseas ethnic Uighurs, whether they were citizens of the PRC or their countries of residence, were sometimes pressured to provide information about the Uighur diaspora community to agents of the PRC government.
In July media reported a Uighur woman and her two daughters were given Tajik passports and deported against their will from Turkey to Tajikistan, where they were flown by PRC authorities to Urumqi, despite being legal residents of Turkey. In August a Uighur man fled his home in Pakistan to seek asylum in Europe because multiple other Pakistan-based Uighurs had been refouled back to China. He was refused in entry in Bosnia and sent to Qatar, where he faced refoulement back to China, before ultimately being granted entry to another country.
Freedom of assembly was severely limited during the year in Xinjiang. For information about abuse of religious freedom in Xinjiang, see the Department of State’s International Religious Freedom Report at https://www.state.gov/religiousfreedomreport/.
For specific information on Tibet, see the Tibet Annex.
Acts of Violence, Discrimination, and Other Abuses Based on Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity
No laws criminalize private consensual same-sex activities between adults. Individuals and organizations working on lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and intersex (LGBTI) issues continued to report discrimination and harassment from authorities similar to that experienced by other organizations that accept funding from overseas.
LGBTI individuals reported incidents of violence, including domestic violence; however, they encountered difficulties in seeking legal redress, since regulations on domestic violence, including the Family Violence Law, do not include recognition of same-sex relations. Accessing redress was further limited by societal discrimination and traditional norms, resulting in most LGBTI persons refraining to publicly discuss their sexual orientation or gender identity.
NGOs working on LGBTI issues reported that although public advocacy work became more difficult for them due to the Foreign NGO Management Law and the Domestic Charity Law, they made some progress in advocating for LGBTI rights through specific antidiscrimination cases.
HIV and AIDS Social Stigma
Discrimination against persons with HIV remained a problem, impacting individuals’ employment, educational, and housing opportunities and impeding access to health care. In some instances laws protecting persons with HIV from discrimination contradict laws restricting the rights of persons with HIV.  During the year state media outlets reported instances of persons with HIV/AIDS who were barred from housing, education, or employment due to their HIV status.  An estimated 1.25 million persons in the country had HIV.
Early in the year, a retired worker named “Wang Ming” in Xi’an was “persuaded” by the president of a local public hospital to return home, citing his coughing as a chronic disease.  Wang Ming stated his belief the public hospital declined him service after finding out he was HIV positive, infected earlier during a dental operation at a private clinic.
According to the law, companies may not demand HIV antibody tests nor dismiss employees for having HIV. Nonetheless, the regulation on Prevention and Treatment of HIV/AIDS revised during the year also stipulates that HIV-positive individuals shall not engage in work that is prohibited by laws, administrative regulations, and the Department of Health under the State Council.
Other Societal Violence or Discrimination
The law prohibits discrimination against persons carrying infectious diseases and allows such persons to work as civil servants. Despite provisions in the law, discrimination against hepatitis B carriers (including 20 million chronic carriers) remained widespread in many areas, and local governments sometimes tried to suppress their activities. Despite a 2010 nationwide rule banning mandatory hepatitis B virus tests in job and school admissions applications, many companies continued to use hepatitis B testing as part of their pre-employment screening.
The law does not address some common types of discrimination in employment, including discrimination based on height, physical appearance, or ethnic identity.
Promotion of Acts of Discrimination
In an effort to justify the detention of ethnic minorities in Xinjiang and elsewhere, official Chinese state media outlets published numerous articles describing members of minority ethnic or religious groups as violent and inferior.  Such propaganda emphasized the connection between religious beliefs, in particular belief in Islam, and acts of violence.  Moreover, many articles described religious adherents as culturally backward and less educated, and thus in need of government rectification.
Section 7. Workers’ Rights
The law does not provide for freedom of association, and workers are not free to organize or join unions of their own choosing.  The All China Federation of Trade Unions (ACFTU) is the only union recognized under the law.  Independent unions are illegal, and the law does not protect the right to strike. The law allows for collective wage bargaining for workers in all types of enterprises. The law further provides for industrial sector-wide or regional collective contracts, and enterprise- level collective contracts were generally compulsory throughout the country. Regulations require the government-controlled union to gather input from workers prior to consultation with management and to submit collective contracts to workers or their congress for approval. There is no legal obligation for employers to negotiate or to bargain in good faith, and some employers refused to do so.
The law provides for legal protections against discrimination against the officially sanctioned union and specifies union representatives may not be transferred or terminated by enterprise management during their term of office. The law provides for the reinstatement of workers dismissed for official union activity as well as for other penalties for enterprises that engage in antiunion activities. The law does not protect workers who request or take part in collective negotiations with their employers independent of the officially recognized union.
All union activity must be approved by and organized under the ACFTU, a CCP organ chaired by a member of the Politburo. The ACFTU and its provincial and local branches continued to establish new constituent unions and add new members, especially among younger workers in technology companies. The law gives the ACFTU financial and administrative control over constituent unions empowered to represent employees in negotiating and signing collective contracts with enterprises and public institutions. The law does not mandate the ACFTU to represent the interests of workers in disputes.
The ACFTU and the CCP used a variety of mechanisms to influence the selection of trade union representatives. Although the law states trade union officers at each level should be elected, ACFTU-affiliated unions appointed most factory-level officers, often in coordination with employers. Official union leaders were often drawn from the ranks of management. Direct election by workers of union leaders continued to be rare, occurred only at the enterprise level, and was subject to supervision by higher levels of the union or the CCP. In enterprises where direct election of union officers took place, regional ACFTU officers and local CCP authorities retained control over the selection and approval of candidates. Even in these cases, workers and NGOs expressed concern about the credibility of elections.
The law does not expressly prohibit work stoppages and does not prohibit workers from striking spontaneously. Although some local authorities tolerated strikes protesting unpaid or underpaid wages, reports of police crackdowns on strikes continued throughout the year. For example, on April 10, police in Zhangjiakou, Hebei, beat and arrested a group of Bell Tower Brewery employees calling for unpaid social insurance benefits.  Wage and benefit arrears constituted 84 percent of the 1,386 strikes and collective protests recorded during the year by the Hong Kong-based labor rights NGO China Labor Bulletin.
In cases where local authorities cracked down on strikes, they sometimes charged leaders with vague criminal offenses, such as “inciting subversion of state power,” “picking quarrels and provoking trouble,” “gathering a crowd to disturb public order,” or “damaging production operations,” or detained them without any charges. The only legally specified roles for the ACFTU in strikes are to participate in investigations and to assist the Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security in resolving disputes.
Enforcement was generally insufficient to deter wide-scale violations of laws designed to protect workers’ rights. Labor inspectors lacked authority and resources to compel employers to correct violations. While the law outlines general procedures for resolving disputes, procedures were lengthy and subject to delays. Local authorities in some areas actively sought to limit efforts by independent civil society organizations and legal practitioners. Some areas maintained informal quotas on the number of cases allowed to proceed beyond mediation to arbitration or the courts. Some local government authorities took steps to increase mediation or arbitration.  According to the China Labor Statistical Yearbook, in 2017 local labor dispute arbitration committees handled 785,323 cases, of which 169,456 were related to the termination of employment contracts.
Despite the appearances of a strong labor movement and relatively high levels of union registration, genuine freedom of association and worker representation did not exist. The ACFTU constituent unions were generally ineffective in representing and protecting the rights and interests of workers. Workers generally did not view the ACFTU as an advocate, especially migrant workers who rarely interacted with union officials.
China Labor Bulletin reported workers throughout the country engaged in wildcat strikes, work stoppages, and other protest actions and claimed the workers’ actions were indicative of the ACFTU’s inability to prevent violations and resolve disputes.  Media reported a number of protests at factories throughout the country and a number of worker protests in the service and retail sectors.
The government increasingly targeted labor activists, students, and others advocating for worker rights during the year.  For example, the government continued to target labor organizers and labor rights activists following the detention of Jasic Technology factory workers and their supporters that began in July 2018. The government ramped up its antilabor campaign by detaining and harassing labor rights advocates, including factory workers, activists, researchers, NGO workers, social workers, and media editors, beyond those involved in the Shenzhen Jasic movement in which workers at a Jasic Technology factory attempted to form a union in response to low pay and poor working conditions. Guangdong labor activists, the Maoist organization Wu-You-Zhi-Xiang, leftist university students, and other groups supported the protests, and Shenzhen police took into custody dozens of workers and one student labor activist in 2018, and four workers–Li Zhan, Liu Penghua, Mi Jiuping, and Yu Juncong–remained in custody at year’s end. According to the Jasic Workers’ Support Group, some of its members were interviewed by state security officials and asked to watch a video in which their peers confessed to their alleged wrongdoings in supporting the labor campaign against the Jasic company. In one video, Shen Mengyu and three other activists reportedly said their violations of the law and extremist thoughts were the result of brainwashing by radical organizations that wanted to utilize them to instigate dissent against the state. The Support Group criticized the police’s footage and described it as a forced production against the will of the students and full of loopholes.
Six UN independent experts wrote to the government in May expressing concern over the Jasic detentions.  In June and October, the International Labor Organization (ILO)’s Committee on the Freedom of Association, in response to a case filed by the International Trade Union Confederation alleging government harassment, intimidation, arrests, and physical abuse, concluded the government’s detention of and criminal charges against the Jasic workers constituted a serious interference with civil liberties and trade union rights. The ILO urged the government to release workers detained in relation to their activities to form a union and submit a detailed reply on the allegations.
Despite restrictions on worker action, joint action across provinces took place in several other sectors. In April protests by delivery company employees over layoffs, wage arrears, social insurance, and equal pay took place at various locations in Shandong, Jiangxi, and Shaanxi, as well as in Beijing and Shanghai.
Coordinated efforts by governments at the central, provincial, and local levels, including surveillance, harassment, detention, and the imposition of travel restrictions on labor rights defenders and restrictions on funding sources for NGOs, disrupted labor rights advocacy.  In January and March, police detained three editors of an online worker rights advocacy platform after they published information advocating for migrant workers from Hunan to receive overdue compensation for the occupational lung disease pneumoconiosis. In May police raided civil society organizations supporting migrant workers in Beijing, Guangzhou, and Shenzhen, detaining four social workers.  On December 15, three labor activists who worked to defend the legal rights of sanitation workers were detained for 15 days in Guangzhou.
The law prohibits forced and compulsory labor. Although domestic media rarely reported forced labor cases and the penalties imposed, the law provides a range of penalties depending on the circumstances, including imprisonment, criminal detention, and fines. It was unclear whether the penalties were sufficient to deter violations.
There were multiple media and NGO reports that persons detained in the internment camps in Xinjiang (see section 6) were subjected to forced labor.  The detainees mostly worked in textile factories producing garments.  In June a factory investigation report stated apparel made at a forced labor camp in Xinjiang was imported by a U.S. athletic gear provider.
The more than one million Chinese workers overseas remained vulnerable to employer exploitation and forced labor. On March 22, the head of U.S. operations for a Chinese construction firm and its U.S.-based subsidiaries was convicted in U.S. court on forced labor charges for exploiting Chinese construction workers in New York City.
Although in 2013 the NPC officially abolished the re-education through labor system, an arbitrary system of administrative detention without judicial review, numerous media outlets and NGOs reported forced labor continued in prisons as well as drug rehabilitation facilities where individuals continued to be detained without judicial process. In August an NGO report stated prison labor was used in cotton production in Xinjiang.
There were several reports small workshops and factories subjected persons with mental disabilities to forced labor.
Also see the Department of State’s Trafficking in Persons Report at https://www.state.gov/trafficking-in-persons-report/.
The law prohibits all of the worst forms of child labor.  The law prohibits the employment of children younger than 16. It refers to workers between the ages of 16 and 18 as “juvenile workers” and prohibits them from engaging in certain forms of dangerous work, including in mines.  Where there were reports of child labor in the private sector, the government reportedly enforced the law.
The law specifies administrative review, fines, and revocation of business licenses of enterprises that illegally hire minors and provides underage working children be returned to their parents or other custodians in their original place of residence.
The penalty is imprisonment for employing children younger than 16 in hazardous labor or for excessively long hours, but a gap remained between legislation and implementation despite annual inspection campaigns launched by local authorities across the country.  Laws aimed at stopping child trafficking may not apply to boys ages 14-17.  It was unclear whether the penalties were sufficient to deter violations.
During the year there were reports of children working, often unpaid, in small manufacturing workshops, on farms, and as acrobats.
In April media reported that student interns from Changchun University of Science and Technology were forced to sign contracts, often without reading them, with electronics factories in Hebei and Jilin. The students reportedly worked 12 hours a day with no breaks, no holidays, no sick leave, and minimal pay. One male student was taken to the hospital after being beaten by another employee, and one female student reported being sexually harassed on the job.
In July the Ministry of Education issued guidelines to regulate student internships. As in past years, however, abuse of the student-worker system continued.  There were multiple reports schools and local officials improperly facilitated the supply of student laborers. For example, there were media and NGO reports that vocational student interns at Foxconn Technology Group’s facility in Hengyang, Hunan, accounted for more than 20 percent of one facility’s workforce, double the level permitted by law. Some students were forced to work night shifts and overtime in violation of the law. Media reported that in one case, a student who complained to the manager of her production line was told by a teacher that noncompliance could jeopardize her graduation. In response to media inquiries, Foxconn acknowledged it was not in full compliance with relevant laws and regulations, adding it would take immediate steps to ensure interns no longer worked overtime or nights. Foxconn had previously been criticized for using child labor from vocational schools.
Also see the U.S. Department of Labor’s List of Goods Produced by Child Labor or Forced Labor at https://www.dol.gov/agencies/ilab/reports/child-labor/list-of- goods.
The law provides some basis for legal protection against employment discrimination on the grounds of ethnicity, race, gender, religious belief, disability, age, and infectious or occupational diseases. The government did not effectively implement the laws. In February nine government ministries and groups issued a notice prohibiting gender discrimination during recruitment and hiring and the ACFTU published a manual for promoting gender equality at work.  Enforcement clauses include the right to pursue civil damages through the courts.  Some courts were reluctant to accept discrimination cases, and authorities at all levels emphasized negotiated settlements to labor disputes. As a result, there were few examples of enforcement actions that resulted in final legal decisions. Discrimination in employment was widespread, including in recruitment advertisements that discriminated based on gender, age, height, birthplace, marital status, disability, and physical appearance and health status (see section 6).
Workplace discrimination against women was common during the year. The mandatory retirement age for women was 50 for those in blue-collar jobs and 55 for those in white-collar jobs.  The retirement age for all men was 60.
A November 2018 Human Rights Watch survey of 36,000 civil service job advertisements between 2013 and 2018 found one in five specified a requirement or preference for men.  Examples of discrimination included job advertisements seeking pretty women, preferring men, or requiring higher education qualifications from women compared with men for the same job.  Survey results showed women were less likely to be invited for interviews or called back for a second round of interviews. In interviews some women were asked whether they had children, how many children they had, and whether they planned to have children or more children if they had a child already. A 2018 survey of 100,000 job seekers by Zhaopin, an online job search platform, found women were paid 22 percent less than men and more than 10 percent of working women believed deciding to marry or have children would put their opportunities to advance at risk. In August a member of the National People’s Congress Standing Committee noted women faced discrimination when pregnant, which employers associated with additional costs.
In December 2018 the Supreme Court issued instructions announcing infringement of equal employment rights was an acceptable cause of action for litigation. Subsequently, on October 28, a 41-year-old female worker in Zhuhai won the country’s first-ever civil lawsuit filed for pregnancy discrimination. Media reported the plaintiff, pseudonym Zhang Min, was fired on February 20 by her employer, Yingli Property Management Company, Ltd., the day after her pregnancy was confirmed by a local hospital.  The Zhuhai District Court held the employer violated the Employment Promotion Law and ordered the company to issue the plaintiff a written apology, compensate her for unpaid wages during and after her pregnancy, and pay 10,000 yuan ($1,500) in psychological damages.
The hukou system remained the most pervasive form of employment-related discrimination, denying migrant workers access to the full range of social benefits, including health care, pensions, and disability programs, on an equal basis with local residents.
There is no national minimum wage, but the law generally requires local and provincial governments to set their own minimum wage rates for both the formal and informal sectors according to standards promulgated by the Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security. By law employees are limited to working eight hours a day and 40 hours per week; work beyond this standard is considered overtime. It also prohibits overtime work in excess of three hours per day or 36 hours per month and mandates premium pay for overtime work.
The Ministry of Emergency Management, established in 2018, sets and enforces occupational safety regulations.  The National Health Committee sets and enforces occupational health regulations.  The law requires employers to provide free health checkups for employees working in hazardous conditions and to inform them of
the results. The law also provides workers the right to report violations or remove themselves from workplace situations that could endanger their health without jeopardy to their employment.
Regulations state labor and social security bureaus at or above the county level are responsible for enforcement of labor laws. Companies that violate occupational, safety, and health regulations face various penalties, including suspension of business operations or rescission of business certificates and licenses.
The government did not effectively enforce the law. Penalties were not adequate to deter violations and were seldom enforced. The number of inspectors was insufficient to deter violations and did not operate in the informal sector. Although the country’s worker safety record improved over the preceding eight years, there were a number of workplace accidents during the year.  Media and NGO reports attributed them to a lack of safety checks, weak enforcement of laws and regulations, ineffective supervision, and inadequate emergency responses.
Nonpayment of wages, including overtime and premium pay, remained a problem in many areas.  Moreover, a 2018 ACFTU survey found 30 percent of white-collar employees were discouraged from taking annual leave to which they were entitled. The government seldom enforced overtime laws, and 72-hour workweeks were common for a wide range of workers. Early in the year, technology workers organized an online campaign protesting “996 culture,” representing typical working hours in the industry, from 9 a.m. to 9 p.m., six days a week. The campaign prompted public debate and limited action. For example, some technology product developers began refusing to license projects to companies that promoted a work culture of voluntary or mandatory overtime. Also, in response to the campaign, more than 70 lawyers signed a letter directed to the Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security urging the government to enforce labor laws. Some local authorities, including in Hangzhou, launched investigations to determine if companies violated labor laws by encouraging overtime work.
Unpaid wages have been an acute problem for decades due to the prevalence of hiring subcontracted low-wage migrant workers. This informal hiring scheme made rural laborers susceptible to delayed payment or nonpayment for their work, prompting them to join in collective action.  Governments at various levels continued efforts to prevent arrears and to recover payment of unpaid wages and insurance contributions.  According to the Supreme People’s Procuratorate, it prosecuted 2,609 individuals in 2,396 cases of nonpayment of wages during the year, helping workers recover 250 million yuan ($35.2 million) of unpaid wages. Prosecutions resulted in 2,599 arrests.  Workers, however, occasionally took drastic measures to demand payment.  On June 27, two construction workers in Lengshujiang, Hunan, threatened to jump from a crane unless they were paid for their work.
Companies continued to relocate or close on short notice, often leaving employees without adequate recourse for due compensation. On July 23, workers staged a protest demanding back wages when a car dealership in Taizhou, Zhejiang, suddenly closed without warning.
Workers in the informal sector often lacked coverage under labor contracts, and even with contracts, migrant workers in particular had less access to benefits, especially social insurance.  Workers in the informal sector worked longer hours and earned less than comparable workers in the formal sector. On April 23, a strike of approximately 100 sanitation workers in Henan protested excessive working hours, stagnant pay, and poor working conditions (also see section 7.a.).
According to several official documents published during the year, occupational diseases were prevalent, and, according to media reports, underreported. Patients came from many industries, including coal, chemical engineering, and construction. The National Health Commission reported 28,000 new cases of occupational illnesses were diagnosed annually, with pneumoconiosis, or black lung disease, accounting for nearly 90 percent of cases. In July media reported that police halted the travel of more than 10,000 former construction workers affected by pneumoconiosis from Shaanxi, as they traveled to Luoyang to petition for compensation for the occupational illness.
Workplace accidents and injuries remained common.  Although there were fewer news reports on coal mine accidents during the year, the coal mining industry remained extremely deadly. According to the China Coal Safety Production Network, during the year there were 170 coal mine accidents, causing 3,168 deaths. On January 12, a coal dust explosion in Shaanxi killed 21 miners.  A May 29 coal mine collapse in Jiangxi left two dead. On July 31, seven individuals died when methane gas exploded in a coal mine in Guizhou.
Work accidents also remained widespread in other industries.  On February 23, a silver mine accident in Inner Mongolia killed 22 persons and injured 28.  On March 21, a chemical plant explosion in Jiangsu killed 78 persons and injured more than 600. Ten construction workers died on May 16, when the building they were working on collapsed in Shanghai.  On September 29, a factory fire in Zhejiang killed 19 workers.
TIBET 2019 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) and Tibetan autonomous prefectures (TAPs) and counties in Sichuan, Qinghai, Yunnan, and Gansu are part of the People’s Republic of China (PRC).  The Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) Central Committee oversees Tibet policies.  As in other predominantly minority areas of the PRC, Han Chinese CCP members held the overwhelming majority of top party, government, police, and military positions in the TAR and other Tibetan areas.
Ultimate authority rests with the 25-member Political Bureau (Politburo) of the CCP Central Committee and its seven-member Standing Committee in Beijing, neither of which had any Tibetan members.
Civilian authorities maintained control over the security forces.
Significant human rights issues included:  forced disappearances; torture; arbitrary detention; political prisoners; censorship and website blocking; substantial interference with the rights of peaceful assembly and freedom of association; severe restrictions on religious freedom; severe restrictions on freedom of movement; and restrictions on political participation.
The government strictly controlled information about, and access to, the TAR and some Tibetan areas outside the TAR. The PRC government harassed or detained Tibetans as punishment for speaking to foreigners, attempting to provide information to persons abroad, or communicating information regarding protests or other expressions of discontent through cell phones, email, or the internet, and placed restrictions on their freedom of movement.
Disciplinary procedures for officials were opaque, and there was no publicly available information to indicate senior officials punished security personnel or other authorities for behavior defined under PRC laws and regulations as abuses of power and authority.
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom from:
There were no reports the government or its agents committed arbitrary or unlawful killings. There were no reports that officials investigated or punished those responsible for such killings that had previously taken place.
Authorities in Tibetan areas continued to detain Tibetans arbitrarily for indefinite periods.
Lodoe Gyatso was arrested outside the Potala Palace in January 2018 and has not been seen since.  In November 2018 sources reported Lodoe had been sentenced to 18 years in prison, but officials insisted his case was a state secret that could not be discussed. His whereabouts and condition were unknown.
Thubpa, a monk from Ngaba County, Sichuan, was detained in late 2017 and has not been heard from since. He had previously served 18 months in prison for burning a Chinese flag in protest in 2008. No charges have been announced and his whereabouts were unknown.
The whereabouts of the 11th Panchen Lama, Gedhun Choekyi Nyima, the second- most prominent figure after the Dalai Lama in Tibetan Buddhism’s Gelug school, remained unknown. Neither he nor his parents have been seen since PRC authorities disappeared them in 1995, when he was six years old.
Punishment
According to credible sources, police and prison authorities employed torture and cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment in dealing with some detainees and prisoners. There were reports during the year PRC officials severely beat some Tibetans who were incarcerated or otherwise in custody.  Such beatings reportedly led to death.
On May 1, Yeshi Gyatso, 50, died in Rebkong County of Malho TAP, Qinghai, following his release from prison where he was reportedly beaten and tortured. Authorities had arrested him in 2008 for taking part in peaceful protests against PRC policies in Tibet.
Prison and Detention Center Conditions
Prison conditions were harsh and potentially life threatening due to physical abuse and inadequate sanitary conditions and medical care.
There were reports of recently released prisoners who were permanently disabled or in extremely poor health because of the harsh treatment they endured in prison (see Political Prisoners and Detainees subsection below).  Former prisoners reported being isolated in small cells for months at a time and deprived of sleep, sunlight, and adequate food. According to individuals who completed their prison terms in recent years, prisoners rarely received medical care except in cases of serious illness.  There were many cases in which officials denied visitors access to detained and imprisoned persons.
Arbitrary arrest and detention remained serious problems. Public security agencies are required by law to notify the relatives or employer of a detained person within 24 hours of their detention, but they often failed to do so when Tibetans and others were detained for political reasons.  Public security officers may legally detain persons throughout the PRC for up to 37 days without formally arresting or charging them. Criminal detention beyond 37 days requires approval of a formal arrest by the procuratorate, but in cases pertaining to “national security, terrorism, and major bribery,” the law permits up to six months of incommunicado detention without formal arrest. After formally arresting a suspect, public security authorities are authorized to detain a suspect for up to an additional seven months while the case is investigated.  After the completion of an investigation, the procuratorate can detain a suspect an additional 45 days while determining whether to file criminal charges. If charges are filed, authorities can detain a suspect for an additional 45 days before beginning judicial proceedings.  Security officials frequently violated these legal requirements, with pretrial detention periods of more than a year being a common occurrence. It was unclear how many Tibetan detainees held by authorities under various forms of detention were not subject to judicial review.
On April 29, Wangchen, Lobsang, and Yonten (reports only indicated the use of one name) from Sershul County of Kardze TAP, Sichuan, were detained for praying for the release of the 11th Panchen Lama Gedhun Choekyi Nyima and for his reunification with the Dalai Lama in Tibet.  The Sershul County People’s Court sentenced Wangchen to four years and six months in prison. Authorities fined Lobsang and Yonten 15,000 yuan ($2,140) and ordered them to attend six months of political re-education classes.
Lobsang Thamkhe and Lobsang Dorjee, both monks at Kirti Monastery in Ngaba County, Ngaba Tibetan and Qiang Autonomous Prefecture, Sichuan, were detained in 2018 without stated cause. On July 31, Thamkhe was convicted on undisclosed charges and sentenced to four years’ imprisonment. Dorjee’s whereabouts and the reasons for his detention were unknown.
Legal safeguards for detained or imprisoned Tibetans were inadequate in both design and implementation. Criminal suspects in the PRC have the right to hire a lawyer or other defense representation, but many Tibetan defendants, particularly those facing politically motivated charges, did not have access to legal representation.  While some Tibetan lawyers are licensed in Tibetan areas, observers reported they were often unwilling to defend individuals in front of Han Chinese judges and prosecutors due to fear of reprisals or disbarment. In cases that authorities claimed involved “endangering state security” or “separatism,” trials often were cursory and closed. Local sources noted trials were predominantly conducted in Mandarin, with government interpreters provided for Tibetan defendants who did not speak Mandarin. Court decisions, proclamations, and other judicial documents, however, generally were not published in Tibetan.
Trial Procedures
In a report published in January, the TAR High People’s Court reportedly sentenced 25 persons for supporting the Dalai Lama, spreading reactionary information, and inciting separatism. Details of the trial proceedings were unknown.
In May officials in Nyintri City, TAR, announced the local court would hire 39 court clerks.  Among the requirements for new employees were loyalty to CCP leadership and a critical attitude towards the Dalai Lama.
Tibetan language activist Tashi Wangchuk, arrested in 2016, has not been granted access to a lawyer since his conviction in May 2018. Attorney access was limited prior to his trial, and petitions and motions to appeal the verdict filed by his lawyer during the year were not accepted by the government, despite provisions for such requests in the PRC legal system.
Security forces routinely subjected political prisoners and detainees known as “special criminal detainees” to “political re-education” sessions.
Political Prisoners and Detainees
An unknown number of Tibetans were detained, arrested, or sentenced because of their political or religious activities. Individuals detained for political or religious reasons were often held on national security charges, which had looser restrictions on the length of pretrial detention. Many political detainees were therefore held without trial far longer than other types of detainees. Authorities held many prisoners in extrajudicial detention centers without charge and never allowed them to appear in public court.
The U.S. Congressional-Executive Commission on China examined publicly available information, and as of November 7, its Political Prisoner Database (PPD) contained 273 records of Tibetans known or believed to be detained or imprisoned by PRC authorities in violation of international human rights standards.  Of the 115 cases for which there was available information on sentencing, punishment ranged from 15 months’ to life imprisonment.  The PPD is believed to contain only a small fraction of the actual number of political prisoners due to Chinese government censorship, and a change in the number of PPD records compared with previous years does not necessarily reflect a change in the human rights situation.
Politically Motivated Reprisal Against Individuals Located Outside the Country
Tibetans seeking asylum in neighboring countries were sometimes repatriated to China, with reports citing pressure by the PRC as a main cause for the repatriation. There were credible reports that the PRC put heavy pressure on the government of Nepal to approve an extradition treaty in which Nepal would commit to forcibly returning Tibetan refugees facing criminal prosecution in the PRC. While the Government of Nepal deferred the bill amid reported concerns about sovereignty infringement and the safety of Tibetan refugees, the government signed a mutual legal assistance treaty with China in October.  Rights groups expressed concerns that the PRC could use it to target Tibetan refugees in Nepal.
Tightened border controls sharply limited the number of Tibetans crossing the border from China into Nepal and India. The PRC government at times compelled Tibetans located in China to pressure their family members seeking asylum overseas to return to China.
Authorities in Tamil Nadu State, India, detained approximately 40 Tibetans, including the leader of the Tibetan Youth Congress, as “preventative arrests” ahead of the October 2019 state visit by PRC president Xi Jinping.  The government of Nepal also closed monasteries during Xi’s visit in October, despite no protests being planned. The Nepali government also refused requests by Tibetan residents for a public celebration on the Dalai Lama’s birthday.  When Tibetan Buddhists held private events in the largest settlement in Kathmandu, police intervened to stop the celebration.
Tibetan Self-Immolations
One case of self-immolation was reported in November. There have been 156 known immolations since 2009, more than half of which took place in 2012. Local contacts reported the decline in reported self-immolations was due to tightened security by authorities, the collective punishment of self-immolators’ relatives and associates, and the Dalai Lama’s public plea to his followers to find other ways to protest Chinese government repression.  Chinese officials in some Tibetan areas withheld public benefits from the family members of self-immolators and ordered friends and monastic personnel to refrain from participating in religious burial rites or mourning activities for self-immolators.
Self-immolators reportedly viewed their acts as protests against the government’s political and religious oppression. According to multiple reports, the law criminalizes various activities associated with self-immolation, including “organizing, plotting, inciting, compelling, luring, instigating, or helping others to commit self-immolation,” each of which may be prosecuted as “intentional homicide.”
On November 26, 24-year-old former monk Yonten self-immolated and died in Meruma Township, Ngaba County, Sichuan.
Arbitrary or Unlawful Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or Correspondence
The TAR regional government punished CCP members who followed the Dalai Lama, secretly harbored religious beliefs, made pilgrimages to India, or sent their children to study with Tibetans in exile. Authorities continued electronically and manually to monitor private correspondence and to search private homes and businesses for photographs of the Dalai Lama and other politically forbidden items.  Police examined the cell phones of TAR residents to search for “reactionary music” from India and photographs of the Dalai Lama.  Authorities also questioned and detained some individuals who disseminated writings and photographs over the internet.
The “grid system” (also known as the “double-linked household system”) continued. The grid system involves grouping households and establishments and encouraging them to report problems in other households, including monetary problems and transgressions, to the government.  Authorities reportedly rewarded individuals with money and other forms of compensation for reporting on others. While this system allows for greater provision of social services to those who need them, it also allows authorities to more easily control those it considers “extremists” and “splittists.” During the year maximum rewards for information leading to the arrests of social media users deemed disloyal to the government increased to RMB 300,000 ($42,800), six times the per capita GDP of the TAR.
According to contacts in the TAR, Tibetans frequently received telephone calls from security officials ordering them to remove from their cell phones photographs, articles, and information on international contacts the government deemed sensitive. Security officials visited the residences of those who did not comply with such orders.
The TAR Communist Party also launched specialized propaganda campaigns to counter “Tibetan independence” and undermine popular support for the Dalai Lama. Media reports indicated that in some areas, households were required to have photographs of President Xi Jinping placed in prominent positions in private homes and were subject to inspections and fines for noncompliance.  The PRC’s continuing campaign against organized crime also targeted supporters of the Dalai Lama, who were considered by police to be members of a criminal organization.
In July international media reported local officials detained and beat a number of Tibetan villagers from Palyul County of Kardze TAP, Sichuan, for possessing photographs of the Dalai Lama after raids on their residences.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
Freedom of Expression:  Tibetans who spoke to foreigners or foreign reporters, attempted to provide information to persons outside the country, or communicated information regarding protests or other expressions of discontent including via mobile phones and internet-based communications, were subject to harassment or detention under “crimes of undermining social stability and inciting separatism.” During the year authorities in the TAR and other Tibetan areas sought to strengthen control over electronic media and to punish individuals for the vaguely defined crime of “creating and spreading rumors.”  Supporting the CCP, criticizing the Dalai Lama, and “not creating and spreading rumors” were some of the major requirements Tibetans had to fulfill to apply for jobs and receive access to government benefits.
Media reports in October noted that advertisements for teaching positions within the TAR required applicants to “align ideologically, politically, and in action with the CCP Central Committee,” “oppose any splittist tendencies,” and “expose and criticize the Dalai Lama.”  The advertisements explained that all applicants were subject to a political review prior to employment.
Press and Media, Including Online Media: Foreign journalists may visit the TAR only after obtaining a special travel permit from the government, and authorities rarely granted this permission.
Authorities tightly controlled journalists who worked for the domestic press and could hire and fire them based on assessments of their political reliability.  In April the Shannan Newspaper, a daily newspaper in Lhoka City, TAR, included in a listing for new positions the requirement that employees “resolutely implement the party’s line, principles, policies, and political stance, fight against separatism, and safeguard the motherland’s unity and ethnic unity.”  CCP propaganda authorities remained in charge of journalist accreditation in the TAR and required journalists working in the TAR to display “loyalty to the party and motherland.” The deputy head of the TAR Propaganda Department simultaneously holds a prominent position in the TAR Journalist Association, a state-controlled professional association to which local journalists must belong.
Violence and Harassment:  PRC authorities arrested and sentenced many Tibetan writers, intellectuals, and singers for “inciting separatism.” Numerous prominent Tibetan political writers, including Jangtse Donkho, Kelsang Jinpa, Buddha, Tashi Rabten, Arik Dolma Kyab, Gangkye Drupa Kyab, and Shojkhang (also known as Druklo), reported security officers closely monitored them following their releases from prison between 2013 and 2019 and often ordered them to return to police stations for further interrogation. In addition, authorities banned some writers from publishing and prohibited them from receiving services and benefits such as government jobs, bank loans, passports, and membership in formal organizations.
Censorship or Content Restrictions:  Authorities prohibited domestic journalists from reporting on repression in Tibetan areas. Authorities promptly censored the postings of bloggers and users of WeChat who did so, and the authors sometimes faced punishment.
The TAR Internet and Information Office maintained tight control of a full range of social media platforms.  According to multiple observers, security officials often cancelled WeChat accounts carrying “sensitive information,” such as discussions about Tibetan-language education, and interrogated the account owners. Many sources also reported it was almost impossible to register with the government, as required by law, websites promoting Tibetan culture and language in the TAR.
The PRC continued to disrupt radio broadcasts of Radio Free Asia’s Tibetan- and Mandarin-language services in Tibetan areas, as well as those of the Voice of Tibet, an independent radio station based in Norway.
In addition to maintaining strict censorship of print and online content in Tibetan areas, PRC authorities sought to censor the expression of views or distribution of information related to Tibet in countries and regions outside mainland China.
Internet Freedom
As in past years, authorities curtailed cell phone and internet service in the TAR and other Tibetan areas, sometimes for weeks or even months at a time. Interruptions in internet service were especially pronounced during periods of unrest and political sensitivity, such as the March anniversaries of the 1959 and 2008 protests, “Serf Emancipation Day,” and around the Dalai Lama’s birthday in July. When authorities restored internet service, they closely monitored its usage. There were widespread reports of authorities searching cell phones they suspected of containing suspicious content. Many individuals in the TAR and other Tibetan areas reported receiving official warnings and being briefly detained and interrogated after using their cell phones to exchange what the government deemed to be sensitive information.  In July, in advance of the Dalai Lama’s birthday,
Radio Free Asia reported authorities warned Tibetans not to use social media chat groups to organize gatherings or celebrations of the spiritual leader’s birthday.  The TAR Internet and Information Office continued a research project known as Countermeasures to Internet-based Reactionary Infiltration by the Dalai Lama Clique.
In February, TAR Party Secretary Wu Yingjie urged authorities to “resolutely manage the internet, maintain the correct cybersecurity view, and win the online antiseparatist battle.”
Throughout the year authorities blocked users in China from accessing foreign- based, Tibet-related websites critical of official government policy in Tibetan areas. Technically sophisticated hacking attempts originating from China also targeted Tibetan activists and organizations outside mainland China.
Academic Freedom and Cultural Events
As in recent years, authorities in many Tibetan areas required professors and students at institutions of higher education to attend regular political education sessions, particularly during politically sensitive months, to prevent “separatist” political and religious activities on campus.  Authorities frequently encouraged Tibetan academics to participate in government propaganda efforts, both domestically and overseas, such as making public speeches supporting government policies. Academics who refused to cooperate with such efforts faced diminished prospects for promotion and research grants.
Academics in the PRC who publicly criticized CCP policies on Tibetan affairs faced official reprisal. The government controlled curricula, texts, and other course materials as well as the publication of historically or politically sensitive academic books. Authorities frequently denied Tibetan academics permission to travel overseas for conferences and academic or cultural exchanges the party had not organized or approved. Authorities in Tibetan areas regularly banned the sale and distribution of music they deemed to have sensitive political content.
The state-run TAR Academy of Social Science continued to encourage scholars to maintain “a correct political and academic direction” in its March conference to “improve scholars’ political ideology” and “fight against separatists” under the guidance of Xi Jinping.
In May police detained Sonam Lhundrub, a Tibetan university student in Lanzhou City, Gansu, after he wrote an essay criticizing the government. His essay noted the lack of government job positions available to Tibetans in the province and the difficulty of competing with Han Chinese applicants for jobs.
In accordance with government guidance on ethnic assimilation, state policies continued to disrupt traditional Tibetan living patterns and customs and accelerated forced assimilation through promoting the influx of non-Tibetans to traditionally Tibetan areas, expanding the domestic tourism industry, forcibly resettling and urbanizing nomads and farmers, and weakening Tibetan-language education in public schools and religious education in monasteries.
Tibetan and Mandarin Chinese are the official languages of the TAR. Both languages appeared on some, but not all, public and commercial signs.  Official buildings and businesses, including banks, post offices, and hospitals, frequently lacked signage in Tibetan. In many instances forms and documents were available only in Mandarin. Mandarin was used for most official communications and was the predominant language of instruction in public schools in many Tibetan areas. To print in the Tibetan language, private printing businesses in Chengdu needed special government approval, which was often difficult to obtain.
Financial and subsistence aid is sometimes tied to a reeducation program called “Unity and Love for the Motherland,” a program that continued to expand since its inception in 2017. In areas where this program was in place, state subsidies and incentives were given only to Tibetans who could demonstrate support and knowledge of CCP leaders and ideology, often requiring them to memorize party slogans and phrases of past CCP leaders and to sing the national anthem. These tests were carried out in Chinese, disadvantaging Tibetans who could not speak or read Chinese.
According to multiple sources, monasteries throughout Tibetan areas of China were required to integrate CCP members into their governance structure, with party members exercising control over monastic admission, education, security, and finances.  This requirement included geographic residency limitations on who can attend each monastery.  In August monks from prominent Tibetan monasteries attending a government training were told to “lead the religion in the direction of better compatibility with socialist society” and that the reincarnation of the Dalai Lama “would not be affected by the Dalai Lama’s separatist clique.”
PRC law states “schools (classes and grades) and other institutions of education where most of the students come from minority nationalities shall, whenever possible, use textbooks in their own languages and use their languages as the media of instruction.” Despite guarantees of cultural and linguistic rights, many primary, middle, high school, and college students had limited access to officially approved Tibetan-language instruction and textbooks, particularly in the areas of “modern-day education,” which refers to nontraditional, nonreligious education, particularly computers, physical education, arts, and other “modern” subjects.
The country’s most prestigious universities provided no instruction in Tibetan or other ethnic minority languages, although classes teaching the Tibetan language were available at a small number of universities.  “Nationalities” universities, established to serve ethnic minority students and Han Chinese students interested in ethnic minority subjects, offered Tibetan language instruction only in courses focused on the study of the Tibetan language or culture. Mandarin was used in courses for jobs that required technical skills and qualifications.
Tsering Dorjee, a Tibetan from the Shigatse area of the TAR, was detained in a reeducation camp for over a month after having a phone conversation with his brother about the importance of Tibetan language education. Security officials told family members that discussing Tibetan language instruction constituted a political crime.
Even in areas officially designated as “autonomous,” Tibetans generally lacked the right to organize and play a meaningful role in the protection of their cultural heritage and unique natural environment. Tibetans often faced government intimidation and arrest if they protested official policies or practices.
In March and July, local observers noted that many monasteries and rural villages in the TAR and Tibetan areas in Sichuan, Qinghai, and Gansu received official warnings not to organize certain gatherings, including the celebration of the Dalai Lama’s birthday.
See the Department of State’s International Religious Freedom Report at https://www.state.gov/religiousfreedomreport/.
PRC law provides for freedom of internal movement, foreign travel, emigration, and repatriation; however, the government severely restricted travel and freedom of movement for Tibetans, particularly Tibetan Buddhist monks and nuns as well as lay persons whom the government considered to have “poor political records.”
In-country Movement: The People’s Armed Police and local public security bureaus set up roadblocks and checkpoints in Tibetan areas on major roads, in cities, and on the outskirts of cities and monasteries, particularly around sensitive dates. Tibetans traveling in monastic attire were subject to extra scrutiny by police at roadside checkpoints and at airports.  Tibetans without local residency were turned away from many Tibetan areas deemed sensitive by the government.
Authorities sometimes banned Tibetans, particularly monks and nuns, from leaving the TAR and from traveling to the TAR without first obtaining special permission from multiple government offices. Some Tibetans reported encountering difficulties in obtaining the required permissions. Such restrictions not only made it difficult for Tibetans to make pilgrimages to sacred religious sites in the TAR, but they also made it difficult to visit family, conduct business, or travel for leisure. Tibetans from outside the TAR who traveled to Lhasa also reported that authorities there required them to surrender their national identification cards and notify authorities of their plans in detail on a daily basis. These requirements were not applied to Han Chinese visitors to the TAR.
Even outside the TAR, many Tibetan monks and nuns reported it remained difficult to travel beyond their home monasteries for religious and traditional Tibetan education, with officials frequently denying permission for visiting monks to stay at a monastery for religious education. Implementation of this restriction was especially rigorous in the TAR, and it undermined the traditional Tibetan Buddhist practice of seeking advanced teachings from a select number of senior teachers based at major monasteries scattered across the Tibetan Plateau.
Foreign Travel:  Many Tibetans continued to report difficulties in obtaining new or renewing existing passports. Sources reported that Tibetans and certain other ethnic minorities had to provide far more extensive documentation than other citizens when applying for a PRC passport. For Tibetans, the passport application process sometimes required years and frequently ended in rejection. Some Tibetans reported they were able to obtain passports only after paying substantial bribes and offering written promises to conduct only apolitical or nonsensitive international travel.
Tibetans continued to encounter significant obstacles in traveling to India for religious, educational, and other purposes.  In some instances the government refused to issue passports to Tibetans.  Many Tibetans who possessed passports were concerned authorities would place them on the government’s blacklist and therefore did not travel.  Tibetans who had traveled to Nepal and planned to continue to India reported that PRC officials visited their homes in Tibet and threatened their relatives if they did not return immediately.  Sources reported that explicit punishments included placing family members on a blacklist, which could lead to the loss of a government job or difficulty in finding employment; expulsion of children from the public education system; and revocation of national identification cards, thereby preventing access to other social services, such as health care and government aid.
The government restricted the movement of Tibetans in the period before and during sensitive anniversaries and events and increased controls over border areas at these times. According to local observers, travel agents in the cities of Chengdu, Xining, and Kunming were forbidden to sell overseas package tours to Tibetans for the months of March and July, the periods around Tibet Uprising Day (March 10) and the Dalai Lama’s birthday (July 6). Travel restrictions also increased around Chinese National Day (October 1).
The government strictly regulated travel of international visitors to the TAR, a restriction not applied to any other provincial-level entity of the PRC. In accordance with a 1989 regulation, international visitors had to obtain an official confirmation letter issued by the TAR government before entering the TAR. Most foreign tourists obtained such letters by booking tours through officially registered travel agencies. In the TAR a government-designated tour guide had to accompany international tourists at all times. It was rare for foreigners to obtain permission to enter the TAR by road.  As in prior years, authorities banned many international tourists from the TAR in the period before and during the March anniversary of the 1959 Tibetan uprising as well as during other periods the PRC government deemed politically sensitive. International tourists sometimes also faced restrictions traveling to Tibetan areas outside the TAR during such times.
The 2018 Reciprocal Access to Tibet Act defines open access to Tibet as meeting the following two criteria:  that U.S. diplomats, journalists, and citizens can access Tibetan areas in the same way as other areas in China, and that no special permits or procedures are required to access Tibetan areas.  During the year the PRC did not provide open access to Tibet based on either criterion. PRC authorities repeatedly denied requests for international journalists to visit the TAR and other Tibetan areas (see Freedom of Expression section).  The TAR government also frequently denied foreign diplomats’ requests for official travel.  Although foreign officials were able to travel more freely in Tibetan areas outside the TAR, the People’s Armed Police and local public security bureaus often subjected them to multiple checkpoints.  Local government officials routinely limited diplomatic travel within Sichuan Province.
From February to April, the local government reportedly banned foreign tourists from visiting the TAR in advance of Tibet Uprising Day and the convening of the PRC’s national legislature.
Exile
Approximately 150,000 Tibetans live in exile throughout the world. Tibetans live outside of China for many reasons, although policies enacted by the PRC government in Tibetan areas were frequently cited as the primary factor. Among those living outside of China are the 14th Dalai Lama and several other senior religious leaders who are not approved by the PRC government. These leaders were often unable to meet directly with their home monasteries and students.
The Tibetan overseas community is often subjected to harassment, monitoring, and cyberattacks believed to be carried out by the PRC government.  Individuals reported they were subjected to government harassment and investigation because of family members living overseas.  Observers also reported that many Tibetans traveling to visit family overseas were required to spend several weeks in political education classes after returning to China.
In September media outlets reported PRC government efforts to hack into the phones of several leaders in the Central Tibetan Administration, the governance organization of the overseas Tibetan community, as well as officials in the Office of the Dalai Lama.
Section 3. Freedom to Participate in the Political Process
According to the law, Tibetans and other Chinese citizens have the right to vote in some local elections. The PRC government, however, severely restricted its citizens’ ability to participate in any meaningful elections. Citizens could not freely choose the officials who governed them, and the CCP continued to control appointments to positions of political power.
Since 2015 the TAR and many Tibetan areas have strictly implemented the Regulation for Village Committee Management, which stipulates that the primary condition for participating in any local election is the “willingness to resolutely fight against separatism”; in some cases this condition was interpreted to require candidates to denounce the Dalai Lama. Several sources reported that newly appointed Communist Party cadres had replaced nearly all traditional village leaders in the TAR and in Tibetan areas outside the TAR over the last three years, despite the lack of village elections.
Section 4. Corruption and Lack of Transparency in Government
PRC law provides criminal penalties for corrupt acts by officials, but the government did not implement the law effectively in Tibetan areas, and high- ranking officials often engaged in corrupt practices with impunity. There were numerous reports of government corruption in Tibetan areas during the year; some low-ranked officials were punished.
In September 2018 Tibetan anticorruption activist A-nya Sengdra was arrested for “picking quarrels and provoking trouble” by Qinghai police after exposing corruption among local officials who were failing to pay for land appropriated from local Tibetans. A-nya’s detention was extended several times, and no trial had been scheduled.
Section 5. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Abuses of Human Rights
Some domestic human rights groups and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) were able to operate in Tibetan areas, although under substantial government restrictions. Their ability to investigate impartially and publish their findings on human rights cases was limited. Restrictions on foreign NGOs made it nearly impossible for foreign human rights groups to investigate or report findings within Tibetan areas.  PRC government officials were not cooperative or responsive to the views of foreign human rights groups.
In a July interview, the China director for Human Rights Watch noted that the PRC government was “making the stakes higher for people inside [of Tibet] to talk [to NGOs]. There can be consequences for family members … The authorities are trying very hard to not just cut people off from information sources but really to discourage certain kinds of research or enquiry.”
Section 6. Discrimination, Societal Abuses, and Trafficking in Persons
Women
Coercion in Population Control: As in the rest of China, there were reports of coerced abortions and sterilizations, although government statistics on the percentage of abortions coerced during the year were not available. The CCP restricts the rights of parents to choose the number of children they have and utilizes family planning units from the provincial to the village level to enforce population limits and distributions.
Discrimination:  There were no formal restrictions on women’s participation in the political system, and women held many lower-level government positions. Nevertheless, women were underrepresented at the provincial and prefectural levels of government.
See the Women section in the Mainland China section for more information.
Children
Many rural Tibetan areas have implemented the PRC’s nationwide “centralized education” policy, which forced the closure of many village and monastic schools and the transfer of students to boarding schools in towns and cities. Media reports indicated this program was expanding. The policy limited the ability of children to learn Tibetan language and culture by removing Tibetan children from their homes and communities where the Tibetan language is used.  It has also led to the removal of young monks from monasteries, forcing them instead into government- run schools. Authorities enforced regulations specifying that traditional monastic education is available only to monks older than 18, which has led to a reduction in younger students at monasteries. Instruction in Tibetan, while provided for by PRC law, was often inadequate or unavailable at schools in Tibetan areas.
Media outlets reported an increase in the scale of Tibetans attending government- sponsored boarding school outside Tibetan areas.  The PRC government reported the programs allowed students greater educational opportunities than they would have had in their home cities. Tibetans and reporters, however, noted the program prevented students from participating in Tibetan cultural activities, observing religious practices, or using the Tibetan language.  Media reports also highlighted discrimination within government boarding school programs. Tibetans attending government-arranged boarding schools in eastern China reported studying and living in ethnically segregated classrooms and dormitories justified as necessary security measures, despite cultural integration being the government’s stated purpose for these programs.
Trafficking in Persons
See the Department of State’s annual Trafficking in Persons Report at https://www.state.gov/trafficking-in-persons-report.
National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities
Although the 2010 TAR census figures showed that Tibetans made up 90.5 percent of the TAR’s permanently registered population, official figures did not include a large number of long-, medium-, and short-term Han Chinese migrants, such as cadres, skilled and unskilled laborers, military and paramilitary troops, and their respective dependents. Tibetans continued to make up nearly 98 percent of those registered as permanent residents in rural areas of the TAR, according to official census figures.
Migrants to the TAR and other parts of the Tibetan Plateau were overwhelmingly concentrated in urban areas. Government policies to subsidize economic development often benefited Han Chinese migrants more than Tibetans. In many predominantly Tibetan cities across the Tibetan Plateau, Han Chinese migrants owned and managed most of the small businesses, restaurants, and retail shops.
Observers continued to express concern that major development projects and other central government policies disproportionately benefited non-Tibetans and resulted in a considerable influx of Han Chinese persons into the TAR and other Tibetan areas. Large state-owned enterprises based outside the TAR engineered or implemented many major infrastructure projects across the Tibetan Plateau, with Han Chinese professionals and low-wage temporary migrant workers from other provinces, rather than local residents, managing and staffing the projects.
Economic and social exclusion was a major source of discontent among a varied cross section of Tibetans. Some Tibetans continued to report discrimination in employment. Some Tibetans reported it was more difficult for them than Han Chinese persons to obtain permits and loans to open businesses, and the government gave many Han Chinese persons, especially retired soldiers, incentives to move to Tibet. Increased restrictions in the three years since a foreign NGO management law was passed severely decreased the number of local NGOs that received foreign funding and international NGOs that provided assistance to Tibetan communities. For example, after the NGO law took effect in 2017, Trace Foundation, a U.S.-based nonprofit organization focusing on Tibetan areas, began closing its programs on the plateau and reported that it had not carried out any programs within China during the year. Other foreign NGOs reported being unable to find local partners.  Several Tibetan-run NGOs were also reportedly pressured to close. Throughout the year there were no known Tibetan Plateau- based international NGOs operating in the country.
Some employers specifically barred Tibetans and other minorities from applying to job openings. In August, Lens Technology in Hunan Province published a job opportunity specifically barring Tibetans, Uighurs, and Mongolians from applying.
The PRC government continued its campaign to resettle Tibetan nomads into urban areas and newly created communities in rural areas across the TAR and other Tibetan areas. Improving housing conditions, health care, and education for Tibet’s poorest persons were among the stated goals of resettlement, although there was a pattern of settling herders near townships and roads and away from monasteries, which were the traditional providers of community and social services. A requirement that herders bear a substantial part of the resettlement costs often forced resettled families into debt.  The government’s campaign resulted in many resettled herders losing their livelihoods and living in impoverished conditions in urban areas.
Although a 2015 media report noted that Tibetans and other minority ethnic groups made up 70 percent of government employees in the TAR, the top CCP position of TAR party secretary continued to be held by a Han Chinese person, and the corresponding positions in the vast majority of all TAR counties were Han Chinese. Within the TAR, Han Chinese persons also continued to hold a disproportionate number of the top security, military, financial, economic, legal, judicial, and educational positions.  The law requires CCP secretaries and governors of ethnic minority autonomous prefectures and regions to be from that ethnic minority; however, party secretaries were Han Chinese in eight of the nine TAPs located in Gansu, Qinghai, Sichuan, and Yunnan Provinces. One TAP in Qinghai had a Tibetan party secretary. Authorities strictly prohibited Tibetans holding government and CCP positions from openly worshipping at monasteries or otherwise publicly practicing their religion.
Promotion of Acts of Discrimination
Government propaganda against alleged Tibetan “proindependence forces” contributed to Chinese societal discrimination against ordinary Tibetans. Many Tibetan monks and nuns chose to wear nonreligious clothing to avoid harassment when traveling outside their monasteries and throughout China.  Some Tibetans reported that taxi drivers throughout China refused to stop for them, hotels refused to provide lodging, and Han Chinese landlords refused to rent to them.
HONG KONG 2019 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Hong Kong is a special administrative region (SAR) of the People’s Republic of China (PRC). The 1984 Sino-British Joint Declaration and the Basic Law of the SAR specify that the SAR enjoys a high degree of autonomy under the “one country, two systems” framework, except in matters of defense and foreign affairs. Throughout the year, however, domestic and international observers continued to express concerns about central PRC government encroachment on the SAR’s autonomy. In November district council elections, prodemocracy candidates won control of 17 out of 18 councils in elections widely regarded as free and fair, although the government barred one opposition figure’s candidacy. The turnout, 71 percent of all registered voters, was a record for Hong Kong. In March 2017 the 1,194-member Chief Executive Election Committee, dominated by proestablishment electors, selected Carrie Lam to be the SAR’s chief executive. In 2016 Hong Kong residents elected the 70 representatives who compose the SAR’s Legislative Council. Voters directly elected 40 representatives, while limited- franchise constituencies elected the remaining 30.
The Hong Kong police force maintains internal security and reports to the SAR’s Security Bureau. Civilian authorities maintained effective control over the security forces.
From June to year’s end, Hong Kong experienced frequent protests, with some exceeding more than one million participants. Most protesters were peaceful, but some engaged in violence and vandalism. The protests began as a movement against the government’s introduction of legislation that would have allowed the extradition of criminal suspects to any jurisdiction, including mainland China, but subsequently evolved to encompass broader concerns.
Significant human rights issues included:  police brutality against protesters and persons in custody; arbitrary arrest; substantial interference with the rights of peaceful assembly and freedom of association; and restrictions on political participation.
The government took steps to prosecute and punish officials who committed human rights abuses but resisted widespread calls for a special inquiry into alleged police brutality that occurred during the demonstrations. The government continued to rely on the Independent Police Complaints Council (IPCC) to review allegations against the police.
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom from:
There were no credible reports that the government or its agents committed arbitrary or unlawful killings.
There were no reports of disappearances by or on behalf of government authorities.
The law prohibits such practices, but there were several reports the police physically abused or degraded detainees.  In September Amnesty International alleged that police beat or otherwise mistreated individuals in custody. For example, the Amnesty International report stated that police severely beat and threatened to break the hands of a detained protester in August. Other protesters alleged police sexually assaulted them while in police custody. Several activists alleged that police abused detainees at the San Uk Ling Holding Center, including breaking bones and sexually assaulting detainees.  The police denied those allegations.
Many Hong Kong residents and experts alleged that police officers on several occasions used excessive force to disperse crowds or arrest individuals suspected of participating in violent protests. For example, on August 31, police rushed onto a subway train and beat several individuals while making arrests. In August the UN Human Rights Office stated there was “credible evidence” the Hong Kong police were “employing less lethal weapons in ways that are prohibited by international norms and standards” when conducting crowd dispersal operations. Critics also noted that police officers frequently did not show identification when conducting crowd dispersal operations, which made it difficult to identify officers who may have committed abuses.
Prison and Detention Center Conditions
There were reports regarding prison or detention center conditions that raised human rights concerns.
Physical Conditions: On several occasions police reportedly used the San Uk Ling Holding Center to detain persons arrested during protests. The center, originally used to hold illegal immigrants from mainland China, reportedly has no security cameras in meeting rooms or detention rooms.
Administration:  The government investigated allegations of problematic conditions and documented the results in a publicly accessible manner.  There was an external Office of the Ombudsman. Activists and legislators, however, urged the government to establish an independent prisoner complaint and monitoring mechanism for prisons and detention centers.
Independent Monitoring:  The government generally permitted legislators and justices of the peace to conduct prison visits. Justices of the peace may make suggestions and comments on matters, such as physical conditions, overcrowding, staff improvement, training and recreational programs and activities, and other matters affecting the welfare of inmates.
In August the government blocked legislators, journalists, and justices of the peace from visiting the San Uk Ling Holding Center, where many protesters were detained. In September Chief Executive Lam announced that the police would no longer hold protesters at the San Uk Ling Holding Center. The IPCC announced it visited the San Uk Ling Holding Center on October 8 and affirmed that it would “make recommendations to the Police should any area of improvement has been (sic) identified.” As of year’s end, however, the IPCC provided no report on its findings.
The law prohibits arbitrary arrest and detention and provides for the right of any person to challenge the lawfulness of his or her arrest or detention in court. Several claims of arbitrary arrest were made in connection with the protests. In August police arrested several democracy activists and prodemocracy legislators the day before a large planned protest. Police alleged the arrests arose out of the activists’ and legislators’ illegal acts, such as obstructing police officers, during their participation in prior protests. One arrested legislator was accused of assaulting police officers by loudly speaking through a bullhorn and thus hurting police officers’ ears. Critics said the arrests were an attempt to suppress turnout at protests.
The Hong Kong Police Force maintains internal security and reports to the SAR’s Security Bureau. The People’s Liberation Army is responsible for foreign defense. The Immigration Department controls passage of persons into and out of the SAR as well as the documentation of local residents. Civilian authorities maintained effective control over the police force, and the government had mechanisms to investigate and punish abuse and corruption.  The government’s apparent unwillingness to criticize the police force for its actions related to protests, including the force’s delayed response to a large July 21 vigilante attack on protesters and commuters, led to concerns that the police force operated with some degree of impunity.
Police officers frequently did not display identification when conducting crowd dispersal operations, a practice which made it difficult to identify officers who may have committed abuses. In August the head of the IPCC, the police watchdog, criticized police for not clearly displaying identification on uniforms, but the practice continued after August.
Multiple sources reported suspected members of the Chinese central government security services in the SAR monitored some political activists, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and academics who criticized the Chinese central government’s policies.
Activists expressed concern that the chief executive appointed all IPCC members and noted that the council’s lack of power to conduct independent investigations limited its oversight capacity. There was wide public support for the establishment of a commission of inquiry into alleged police abuses in handling the protests. The government continued to rely on the IPCC to investigate complaints, but in September it augmented the IPCC with international experts. In December all five experts announced in a statement they would “formally stand aside” from their role, citing “a shortfall in the powers, capacity and independent investigative capability of IPCC.”
Arrest Procedures and Treatment of Detainees
Police generally apprehended suspects openly when they observed suspects committing a crime or with warrants based on sufficient evidence and issued by a duly authorized official. Police must promptly charge arrested suspects. The government respected this right and generally brought arrested persons before a judicial officer within 48 hours. Detainees were generally informed promptly of charges against them. There was a functioning bail system.
Authorities allowed detainees access to a lawyer of their choice, although the Hong Kong Bar Association reported that lawyers experienced obstruction at police stations and delays in seeing clients arrested during protests. Suspects were not detained incommunicado or held under house arrest. Interviews of suspects are required to be videotaped.
The law provides for an independent judiciary, and the SAR government respected judicial independence and impartiality.
Trial Procedures
The law provides for the right to a fair and public trial, and an independent judiciary enforced this right.  Defendants are presumed innocent, except in official corruption cases. Under the law a sitting or former government official who maintains a standard of living above that commensurate with an official income or who controls monies or property disproportionate to an official income is considered guilty of an offense unless the official can satisfactorily explain the discrepancy. The courts upheld this ordinance. Defendants have the right to be informed promptly and in detail of the charges against them and the right to a trial without undue delay.
Trials are by jury except at the magistrate and district court level. An attorney is provided at public expense if defendants cannot afford counsel. Defendants have adequate time and facilities to prepare a defense. The government conducted court proceedings in either Cantonese or English, the SAR’s two official languages. The government provided interpretation service to those not conversant in Cantonese or English during all criminal court proceedings. Defendants could confront and question witnesses testifying against them and present witnesses to testify on their own behalf. Defendants have the right not to be compelled to testify or confess guilt, the right to be present at their trial, and the right of appeal.
The SAR’s courts are charged with interpreting those provisions of the Basic Law that address matters within the limits of the SAR’s autonomy. SAR courts also interpret provisions of the Basic Law that relate to central government responsibilities or the relationship between the central authorities and the SAR. The Court of Final Appeal may seek an interpretation of relevant provisions from the central government’s Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress (NPCSC). SAR courts must by law follow the NPCSC interpretations in cases involving central government jurisdiction, although judgments previously rendered are not affected. The NPCSC has issued five interpretations of the Basic Law since 1997. The most recent interpretation, issued in 2016, requires lawmakers to correctly, completely, and solemnly swear an oath to uphold the Basic Law and recognize the Hong Kong SAR as a part of China before taking office. This ruling was the basis, in 2017, for disqualifying six opposition figures from taking their Legislative Council seats.
Political Prisoners and Detainees
There were no reports of political prisoners or detainees.
Civil Judicial Procedures and Remedies
There is an independent and impartial judiciary for civil matters and access to a court to bring lawsuits seeking damages for human rights violations.
The law prohibits such actions, and there were no reports the SAR government failed to respect these prohibitions.  There were credible reports Chinese central government security services monitored prodemocracy and human rights activists and journalists in the SAR. There were also reports central government security services detained, questioned, and intimidated Hong Kong-based activists visiting the mainland. Media reports indicated that during the year thousands of persons, primarily police officers, protesters, and protest movement leaders, have been “doxed,” that is, their personal information was publicly revealed online. The Chinese Communist Youth League, a central-government-controlled organization, as well as mainland state-controlled media, have published individuals’ personal information or promoted sites containing apparently stolen personal information.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
The law provides for freedom of expression, including for the press, and the government generally respected this right. An independent press, an effective judiciary, and an unfettered internet combined to permit freedom of expression, including for the press, on most matters. During the year, however, some SAR and central government actions restricted or sought to restrict the right to express or report on dissenting political views, particularly support for Hong Kong independence.
Freedom of Expression:  There were some legal restrictions on the ability of individuals to criticize the government publicly without reprisal.  Police arrested several individuals for damaging the national flag, which is illegal. For example, in May police arrested a proindependence activist for damaging the Chinese national flag during a protest against the controversial extradition bill. In October, media reported police asked Facebook to remove user posts about police handling of protests. Facebook reportedly declined to do so.
Requirements for electoral candidacy and for taking the oath of office also limited free speech in the political arena. For example, the Electoral Affairs Commission requires all Legislative Council candidates to sign a pledge stating the SAR is an “inalienable part” of China in order to run for office.  The commission disqualified one candidate, democracy activist Joshua Wong, from running in the November district council election. The government determined that Wong could not “possibly comply with the requirements of the relevant electoral laws, since advocating or promoting ‘self-determination’ is contrary to the content of the declaration” candidates are required to sign.
In 2017 the government disqualified six legislators-elect from taking office because they took their oaths in ways that did not conform to a 2016 NPCSC interpretation of the Basic Law to demonstrate “sincerity” and “solemnity” when taking an oath.
Press and Media, Including Online Media: Independent media were active and expressed a wide variety of views. An April Hong Kong Journalists Association poll found, however, that 81 percent of journalists said press freedom in the SAR had worsened since 2018.
Violence and Harassment:  In September unknown persons threw firebombs at the home of Jimmy Lai, owner of the prodemocracy Apple Daily newspaper. Also in September, four unknown assailants attacked an Apple Daily reporter who was covering protests. In November protesters smashed windows and vandalized the offices of China’s state-controlled Xinhua News Agency. Several journalists alleged that police detained, assaulted, or harassed them while covering protests. In October the Foreign Correspondent’s Club condemned the arrest of a photojournalist who was covering a protest. Police reportedly ordered her and other journalists to remove their gas masks despite previous government assurances that the mask ban did not apply to those using masks to perform their professional duties.
Censorship or Content Restrictions:  Reports of media self-censorship and suspected content control continued. The April Hong Kong Journalists
Association survey showed that one in five journalists surveyed said their superiors had pressured them to reduce reporting about Hong Kong independence.  Many media outlets, bookstores, and publishers were owned by companies with business interests on the mainland or by companies directly controlled by the Chinese central government, a situation that led to claims they were vulnerable to self- censorship.
Internet Freedom
The SAR government did not restrict or disrupt access to the internet or censor online content, although activists claimed central government authorities monitored their email and internet use.
There were reports of suspected politically motivated cyberattacks against private persons and organizations. In June the creator of the encrypted messaging app Telegram said the app, frequently used by protesters in Hong Kong, was the target of a massive cyberattack, apparently originating from mainland China. In August a similar attack briefly disabled the LIHKG online-chat forum, also frequently used by protesters to organize activities.
Academic Freedom and Cultural Events
There were some restrictions on academic freedom and cultural events. A museum dedicated to memorializing the 1989 massacre in Beijing’s Tiananmen Square reopened in a new location in May after previously closing due to pressure from the museum’s prior landlord. In October Hong Kong Community College assigned Chan Wai-keung, a lecturer, to nonteaching duties after dozens of antigovernment protesters surrounded him and insulted him inside his classroom after Chan publicly called for stiffer penalties against violent protesters. In November the Education Bureau warned students in all government-run schools not to participate in “political activities” while at school.
The law provides for the freedoms of peaceful assembly and association, and the government allowed most public gatherings to proceed, but government actions, including prosecutions of activists and refusals to grant approval for some assemblies, infringed on the right of peaceful protest.
Freedom of Peaceful Assembly
The law provides for freedom of peaceful assembly, and the government generally respected this right. Before violence erupted at some protests, the police routinely issued the required “letter of no objection” for public meetings and demonstrations, including those critical of the SAR and Chinese central government. After violence began occurring at some protests, however, the police issued letters of objection against several gatherings, including large protest marches. The police also revoked permission for some gatherings after they started. Police on each occasion said they feared the gatherings would result in violence.  Police frequently warned participants in unapproved protests that they were participating in unlawful assemblies. As of year’s end, police confirmed more than 6,000 arrests on varying charges in connection with the protests.
Media reports indicated that on several occasions police arrested onlookers not involved in protests. Police also fired thousands of rounds of tear gas to disperse crowds. Several human rights organizations repeated longstanding concerns that the SAR’s legal definitions of illegal assembly and rioting, charges frequently brought against protesters, were overly broad.
On several occasions the MTR Corporation, the operator of Hong Kong’s subway system, suspended services before and during protests. For example, on August 24, the MTR suspended services to Kwun Tong Station, the site of a police-approved protest. Critics claimed the MTR Corporation was acting to suppress peaceful protest in response to mainland state media criticism that the rail operator was facilitating protest. The Hong Kong government owns a majority stake in the MTR Corporation.
In October Chief Executive Lam, through executive fiat under the colonial-era Emergency Regulations Ordinance (ERO), banned the wearing of masks.
Protesters frequently wore masks to protect themselves from tear gas and to hide their identity from police and from employers who might be pressured to punish employees who support the protests. In November a Hong Kong court ruled the government’s use of the ERO to implement the mask ban unconstitutional.
Continuing government prosecutions of peaceful protesters led to concerns the government was using the law to suppress political dissent. For example, in April and June, a court sentenced Benny Tai and eight other leaders of the 2014 “Occupy Central” protests following their convictions for actions related to peaceful protests. The court sentenced four of the nine to jail for eight to 16 months; the remaining five received community service or were given suspended sentences. All nine defendants have appealed their convictions.
On several occasions progovernment vigilantes, whom the international NGO Freedom House described in some cases as having “probable ties to the Chinese government,” violently attacked protesters and protest organizers.  The largest vigilante attack occurred on July 21. On that day a group of more than 100 men, which police sources told the South China Morning Post included persons with organized crime connections, beat protesters and commuters at the Yuen Long subway station, resulting in at least 45 injuries. In August, two unknown men attacked Jimmy Sham, the leader of the Civil Human Rights Front (CHRF), with baseball bats the day before the CHRF was scheduled to lead a large protest march. In October unknown men used hammers to attack Jimmy Sham again.  The CHRF was the organizer of the year’s largest protests. On several occasions, prodemocracy protesters also physically attacked allegedly progovernment individuals. For example, in November, one protester lit a man who was heckling him on fire.
Freedom of Association
SAR law provides for freedom of association, and the government generally respected it. In February, however, the Executive Council upheld the ban on the proindependence Hong Kong National Party (HKNP). The ban came after repeated SAR and Chinese central government warnings that advocacy for Hong Kong independence “crosses a red line.”
Under the law any person claiming to be an officer of a banned group may be sentenced to a fine of HK$100,000 ($12,800) and a maximum of three years in prison. Those providing meeting space or other aid to a banned group may also be sentenced to fines and jail time.
See the Department of State’s International Religious Freedom Report at https://www.state.gov/religiousfreedomreport/.
The law provides for freedom of internal movement, foreign travel, emigration, and repatriation, and the government generally respected these rights.
Reports that the Immigration Department refused entry to a small number of persons traveling to the SAR for political reasons continued. In May Immigration Department authorities denied entry to former Philippine supreme court justice Conchita Carpio-Morales, who previously accused Chinese president Xi Jinping of crimes against humanity, according to media reports. Activists and other observers contended that refusals, usually of persons holding, or suspected of holding, views critical of the Chinese central government, were made at the behest of mainland authorities.
Foreign Travel:  Most residents easily obtained travel documents from the SAR government, although Chinese central government authorities in the past did not permit some human rights activists, student protesters, and prodemocracy legislators to visit the mainland. There were reports of mainland security officials harassing and questioning Hong Kong residents suspected of participating in protests when they traveled to the mainland. In August central government officials detained an employee of the United Kingdom’s consulate in Hong Kong while he was returning from the mainland to his home in Hong Kong. He was released after more than two weeks in detention and later told media that mainland authorities tortured him.
Not applicable.
Abuse of Migrants, Refugees, and Stateless Persons: Activists indicated that persons seeking refugee status faced discrimination and were the frequent target of generalizations by some political parties and media organizations.
The government cooperated with the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and humanitarian organizations in providing protection and assistance to refugees, asylum seekers, stateless persons, or other persons of concern.
Access to Asylum:  The law does not provide for granting asylum or refugee status, but the SAR government has established a system for providing limited protection to persons who would be subject to torture or other abuses in their home country.
The SAR government used the term “nonrefoulement claim” to refer to a claim for protection against deportation. Persons subject to deportation could file a nonrefoulement claim if they either arrived in the SAR without proper authorization or had overstayed the terms of their entry. Filing such a claim typically resulted in a period of detention followed by release on recognizance. Activists and refugee rights groups expressed concerns about the quality of adjudications and the very low rate of approved claims, less than 1 percent.
Denied claimants may appeal to the Torture Claims Appeal Board. The government did not publish the board’s decisions, a practice which the Hong Kong Bar Association previously noted created concerns about the consistency and transparency of decisions. Persons whose claims were pending were required to appear periodically before the Immigration Department. An NGO reported the
government’s process for evaluating claims, which did not allow claimants to legally work in the SAR, made some refugees vulnerable to trafficking.
Employment:  “Nonrefoulement claimants” have no right to work in the SAR while their claims are under review, and they must rely on social welfare stipends and charities. The SAR government, however, frequently granted exceptions to this rule for persons granted nondeportation status and awaiting UNHCR resettlement.
Access to Basic Services:  Persons who made “nonrefoulement” claims were eligible to receive publicly funded legal assistance, including translation services, as well as small living subsidies. The children of such claimants could attend SAR public schools.
Temporary Protection:  Persons whose claims for “nonrefoulement” are substantiated do not obtain permanent resident status in the SAR. Instead the SAR government refers them to UNHCR for possible recognition as refugees and resettlement in a third country. Some such persons have waited years in the SAR before being resettled.
g. Stateless Persons Not applicable.
Section 3. Freedom to Participate in the Political Process
The Basic Law limits the ability of residents to change their government. Hong Kong voters do not enjoy universal suffrage in elections for the chief executive or equal suffrage in Legislative Council elections. Article 45 of the Basic Law establishes as the “ultimate aim” direct election of the chief executive through “universal suffrage upon nomination by a broadly representative nominating committee in accordance with democratic procedures.”
The chief executive is elected by an election committee (CEEC) of approximately
1,200 members (1,194 members in 2017). The election committee consists of the 70 members of the Legislative Council and a mix of professional, business, and trade elites.
Voters directly elect 40 of the Legislative Council’s 70 seats by secret ballot. Thirty-five seats are designated as “geographic constituencies” (GCs) and 35 as “functional constituencies” (FCs). All 35 GCs are directly elected by all voters in a geographic area. Thirty FC seats are selected by a set of voters representing various economic and social sectors, most of whom are probusiness and generally supportive of the Chinese central government. In 2016 the constituencies that elected these 30 FC Legislative Council seats consisted of 239,724 registered individual and institutional voters, of whom approximately 172,820 voted, according to the SAR’s Election Affairs Office’s statistics. The remaining five FC seats must be filled by district councilors (the so-called district council sector, known as “super seats,”) were directly elected by the approximately five million registered voters not represented in another FC, and therefore represented larger constituencies than any other seats in the Legislative Council.
Under the Basic Law, only the SAR government, not members of the legislature, may introduce bills that affect public expenditure, the political structure, or government policy.
In October Chief Executive Carrie Lam invoked the ERO, which grants the chief executive power to “make any regulations whatsoever” in times of “emergency or public danger,” to ban face masks. In November a court ruled that Lam’s use of the ERO was unconstitutional.
The SAR sends 36 deputies to China’s National People’s Congress (legislature, NPC) and had approximately 200 delegates in the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference–bodies that operate under the direction of the Chinese Communist Party and do not exercise legislative independence. The approval of the chief executive, two-thirds of the Legislative Council, and two-thirds of the SAR’s delegates to the NPC are required to place an amendment to the Basic Law on the agenda of the NPC, which has the sole power to amend the Basic Law.
Elections and Political Participation
Recent Elections: On November 24, registered voters elected district councilors in the SAR’s 18 districts. These elections are open to all voters on a one-person, one- vote basis. Turnout for the poll was a record 71 percent of registered voters. The election was considered generally peaceful, free, and fair, although the Hong Kong government barred one prodemocracy advocate, Joshua Wong, from running. Proestablishment candidates reported that attacks on party offices and candidates also negatively affected campaign activities.  Voters broadly endorsed prodemocracy and other nonestablishment candidates, who took control of 17 of the 18 councils and won 388 of the 452 contested seats (out of 479 total).
In March 2017 the 1,194-member Chief Executive Election Committee, dominated by proestablishment electors, selected Carrie Lam to be the SAR’s chief executive. Residents expressed concern the small-circle elections for the great majority of CEEC seats were open only to 239,724 of the SAR’s 7.5 million residents. Moreover, although the CEEC election (in 2016) saw a historically high voter turnout of 46 percent and a record number of contested seats across industrial, professional, grassroots, and political sectors, local political observers noted that 300 members–approximately 25 percent–of the committee were elected without a poll or other transparent election process to represent 12 uncontested subsectors and one sub-subsector.
In 2016 SAR residents elected representatives to the 70-member Legislative Council. Proestablishment candidates won 40 of the 70 Legislative Council seats, while prodemocracy candidates won 30.
Political Parties and Political Participation:  In 2018 the SAR government banned the proindependence HKNP.  This was the first ban of a political party since the establishment of the SAR.
All Legislative Council candidates must sign a confirmation form pledging their allegiance to the SAR and intent to uphold the Basic Law, including provisions stating that Hong Kong is an inalienable part of China. Since that requirement was instituted, the government barred several potential candidates from running for office.
The Chinese central government and its business supporters reportedly provided generous financial resources to parties that supported the Chinese central government’s political agenda in the SAR, giving them a major advantage in controlling the levers of government and senior positions.
Participation of Women and Minorities:  No law limits participation of women in the political process, and they did participate. Fifteen percent of the Legislative Council’s members were women. In March 2017, Carrie Lam was elected to be the SAR’s first female chief executive.
There is no legal restriction against ethnic minorities running for electoral office, serving as electoral monitors, or participating in the civil service. There were no members of ethnic minorities in the Legislative Council, and members of ethnic minorities reported they considered themselves unrepresented.
Section 4. Corruption and Lack of Transparency in Government
The law provides criminal penalties for corruption by officials, and the government generally implemented the law effectively.  Although the SAR continued to be relatively uncorrupt, there were isolated reports of government corruption.
Financial Disclosure: The SAR requires the most senior civil service and elected officials to declare their financial investments annually and senior working-level officials to do so biennially. Policy bureaus may impose additional reporting requirements for positions seen as having a greater risk of conflict of interest. The Civil Service Bureau monitors and verifies disclosures, which are available to the public. There are criminal and administrative sanctions for noncompliance.
Section 5. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Abuses of Human Rights
A variety of domestic and international human rights groups generally operated without government restriction, investigating and publishing their findings on human rights cases. Government officials were somewhat cooperative and responsive to their views. Prominent human rights activists and organizations critical of the central government also operated in the SAR.
Government Human Rights Bodies:  There is an Office of the Ombudsman and an Equal Opportunities Commission (EOC). The government recruits commissioners to represent both offices through a professional search committee, which solicits applications and vets candidates. Commissioners were independent in their operations. Both organizations operated without interference from the SAR government and published critical findings in their areas of responsibility. NGOs pointed out that the EOC had limited ability to conduct investigations.
Section 6. Discrimination, Societal Abuses, and Trafficking in Persons
Women
Rape and Domestic Violence: The law criminalizes rape only against women but includes spousal rape. Activists expressed concern that rape was underreported, especially within the ethnic minority community.
The law does not directly criminalize domestic violence, but the government regarded domestic violence against women as a serious concern. Abusers may be liable for criminal charges, such as offenses against person, sexual assault, and ill- treatment of a child, depending on which act constituted the domestic violence.
The government effectively prosecuted violators under existing criminal violations.
The Domestic and Cohabitation Relationships Violence Ordinance allows survivors to seek a three-month injunction, extendable to six months, against an abuser. The ordinance covers abuse between married couples, heterosexual and homosexual cohabitants, former spouses or cohabitants, and immediate and extended family members. It protects victims younger than 18, allowing them to apply for an injunction in their own right, with the assistance of an adult guardian, against abuse by parents, siblings, and specified immediate and extended family members. The law also empowers the court to require that the abuser attend an antiviolence program. In cases in which the abuser caused bodily harm, the court may attach an arrest warrant to an existing injunction and extend both injunctions and arrest warrants to two years.
The government maintained programs that provided intervention, counseling, and assistance to domestic violence victims and abusers.
Sexual Harassment: The law prohibits sexual harassment or discrimination based on sex, marital status, and pregnancy. The law applies to both men and women, and police generally enforced the law effectively. There were multiple reports, however, of sexual harassment in housing, the workplace, and in universities.
Coercion in Population Control: There were no reports of coerced abortion or involuntary sterilization.
Discrimination:  Women enjoy the same legal status and rights as men. The SAR’s sexual discrimination ordinance prohibits discrimination based on sex or pregnancy status, and the law authorizes the EOC to work towards the elimination of discrimination and harassment as well as to promote equal opportunity for men and women. Although the government generally enforced these laws, women reportedly faced some discrimination in employment, salary, welfare, inheritance, and promotion.
Children
Birth Registration: All Chinese nationals born in the SAR, on the mainland, or abroad to parents, of whom at least one is a Chinese national and Hong Kong permanent resident, acquire both Chinese citizenship and Hong Kong permanent residence. Children born in the SAR to non-Chinese parents, at least one of whom is a Hong Kong permanent resident, acquire SAR permanent residence and qualify to apply for naturalization as Chinese citizens. Authorities routinely registered all such statuses.
Child Abuse:  The law mandates protection for victims of child abuse (battery, assault, neglect, abandonment, and sexual exploitation), and the SAR government enforced the law. The law allows for the prosecution of certain sexual offenses, including against minors, committed outside the territory of the SAR.
The government provided parent education programs through its maternal and child health centers, public education programs, clinical psychologists, and social workers. Police maintained a child abuse investigation unit and, in collaboration with the Social Welfare Department, operated a child witness support program.
Early and Forced Marriage:  The legal minimum age of marriage is 16 for both men and women; however, parents’ written consent is required for marriage before the age of 21.
Sexual Exploitation of Children: Under the law a person having “unlawful sexual intercourse” with a victim younger than 16 is subject to five years’ imprisonment, while having unlawful sexual intercourse with a victim younger than 13 carries a sentence of life imprisonment. The law prohibits the commercial sexual exploitation of children and procuring children for prostitution. The law makes it an offense to possess, produce, copy, import, or export pornography involving a child or to publish or cause to be published any advertisement that conveys, or is likely to be understood as conveying, the message that a person has published, publishes, or intends to publish any child pornography. Authorities enforced the law. The penalty for creation, publication, or advertisement of child pornography is eight years’ imprisonment, while possession carries a penalty of five years’ imprisonment.
The legal age for consensual sex is 16.
International Child Abductions:  The SAR is a party to the 1980 Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction. See the Department of State’s Annual Report on International Parental Child Abduction at https://travel.state.gov/content/travel/en/International-Parental-Child-Abduction/for-providers/legal-reports-and-data/reported-cases.html.
Anti-Semitism
The Jewish community numbered 5,000 to 6,000 persons.  There were no reports of anti-Semitic acts.
Trafficking in Persons
See the Department of State’s Trafficking in Persons Report at https://www.state.gov/trafficking-in-persons-report/.
Persons with Disabilities
The law prohibits discrimination against persons with physical, sensory, intellectual, and mental disabilities, and the government generally enforced these provisions. The government took action to investigate and punish those responsible for violence or abuses against persons with disabilities. The government generally implemented laws and programs to provide persons with disabilities access to education, employment, the judicial system, and health services. The law on disabilities states that children with separate educational needs must have equal opportunity in accessing education. Some human rights groups reported the SAR’s disability law was too limited and that its implementation did not promote equal opportunities. The Social Welfare Department provided training and vocational rehabilitation services to assist persons with disabilities, offered subsidized resident-care services for persons considered unable to live independently, offered preschool services to children
with disabilities, and provided community support services for persons with mental disabilities, their families, and other local residents.
The government generally implemented laws and programs to provide persons with disabilities access to information, communications, and buildings, although there were reports of some restrictions. The law calls for improved building access and provides for sanctions against those who discriminate.
National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities
Although ethnic Chinese made up the vast majority of the population, the SAR is a multiethnic society, with persons from a number of ethnic groups recognized as permanent residents with full rights under the law. The law prohibits discrimination, and the EOC oversees implementation and enforcement of the law. The EOC maintained a hotline for inquiries and complaints concerning racial discrimination. Although the SAR government took steps to reduce
discrimination, there were frequent reports of discrimination against ethnic minorities; the law did not clearly cover racial discrimination occurring in the course of law enforcement activity.
The government has a policy to integrate non-Chinese students into SAR schools. Nevertheless, advocacy groups said schools were de-facto segregated. Advocates also expressed concerns that Chinese language teaching for minority students was inadequate. Students who did not learn Chinese had significant difficulty entering university and the labor market, according to experts.
Persons born in mainland China also experienced frequent discrimination. On several occasions, protesters verbally or physically attacked mainlanders.
Acts of Violence, Discrimination, and Other Abuses Based on Sexual
Orientation and Gender Identity
No laws criminalize consensual same-sex sexual conduct between adults. While the SAR has laws that ban discrimination on the grounds of race, sex, disability, and family status, no law prohibits companies or individuals from discriminating on grounds of sexual orientation or gender identity. There are also no laws that
specifically aid in the prosecution of bias-motivated crimes against members of the lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, or intersex community. In October a gay man sued the government because public housing rules did not allow his male spouse, whom he married overseas, to live with him because the rules only recognize opposite-sex partners as spouses.
Section 7. Worker Rights
The law provides for the right of workers to form and join independent unions without previous authorization or excessive requirements and to conduct legal strikes, but it does not protect the right to collective bargaining or obligate employers to bargain. Trade unions claimed the lack of collective bargaining rights and divisions in the labor movement weakened workers’ leverage in negotiations. The law explicitly prohibits civil servants from bargaining collectively.
The law prohibits firing an employee for striking and voids any section of an employment contract that punishes a worker for striking. The commissioner of police has broad authority to control and direct public gatherings, including strikes, in the interest of national security or public safety.
According to the law, an employer cannot fire, penalize, or discriminate against an employee who exercises his or her union rights and cannot prevent or deter the employee from exercising such rights.  Penalties for violations of laws protecting union and related worker rights included fines as well as legal damages paid to workers, and penalties were sufficient to deter violations. Dismissed employees, however, had difficulty proving antiunion discrimination. In August, according to media reports, Cathay Pacific Airways (Cathay) warned employees that they may be fired if they joined a city-wide general strike. Cathay’s cabin crew union head Rebecca Sy told the press in August that Cathay Dragon, a Cathay subsidiary, fired her after company officials showed her printouts of proprotest movement postings on her private Facebook account.
The law does not prohibit all forms of forced or compulsory labor, nor do laws specifically criminalize forced labor. Instead, the SAR uses its Employment and Theft Ordinances to prosecute labor violations and related offenses. Penalties for these offenses were not sufficient to deter violations.
NGOs expressed concerns some migrant workers, especially domestic workers in private homes, faced high levels of indebtedness assumed as part of the recruitment process, creating a risk they could fall victim to debt bondage. Domestic workers
in Hong Kong were mostly female and mainly came from the Philippines, Indonesia, and other Southeast Asian countries. The SAR allows for the collection of maximum placement fees of 10 percent of the first month’s wages, but some recruitment firms required large up-front fees in the country of origin that workers struggled to repay. Some locally licensed employment agencies were suspected of colluding with agencies overseas to profit from debt schemes, and some local agencies illegally confiscated the passports and employment contracts of domestic workers and withheld them until they repaid the debt.
SAR authorities stated they encouraged aggrieved workers to file complaints and make use of government conciliation services as well as actively pursued reports of any labor violations.
Also see the Department of State’s Trafficking in Persons Report at https://www.state.gov/trafficking-in-persons-report/.
The law prohibits the worst forms of child labor. Regulations prohibit employment of children younger than 15 in any industrial establishment. The law prohibits overtime in industrial establishments with employment in dangerous trades for persons younger than 18. Children between 13 and 14 may work in certain nonindustrial establishments, subject to conditions aimed at ensuring a minimum of nine years of education and protection for their safety, health, and welfare.
The Labor Department effectively enforced these laws and regularly inspected workplaces to enforce compliance with the regulations. Penalties for violations of child labor laws include fines and legal damages and were sufficient to deter violations.
The law and regulations prohibit employment discrimination based on race or ethnicity, disability, family status (marital status or pregnancy), or sex. The law stipulates employers must prove that proficiency in a particular language is a justifiable job requirement if they reject a candidate on those grounds. Regulations do not prohibit employment discrimination on the grounds of color, religion, political opinion, national origin or citizenship, sexual orientation or gender identity, HIV or other communicable disease status, or social status.
The government generally enforced these laws and regulations. In cases in which employment discrimination occurred, the SAR’s courts had broad powers to levy penalties on those who violated these laws and regulations.
Human rights activists and local scholars continued to raise concerns about job prospects for minority students, who were more likely to hold low-paying, low- skilled jobs and earn below-average wages. Experts assessed that a lack of Chinese-language skills was the greatest barrier to employment.
The statutory minimum wage was below the poverty line for an average-sized household. There were many press reports regarding poor conditions faced by and underpayment of wages to domestic workers.
There is no law concerning working hours, paid weekly rest, rest breaks, or compulsory overtime for most employees. Several labor groups reported that employers expected extremely long hours, and the groups called for legislation to address that concern.
Laws exist to provide for health and safety of workers in the workplace. Workers may remove themselves from situations that endanger health or safety without jeopardy to their employment. Employers are required to report any injuries sustained by their employees in work-related accidents.
The government effectively enforced the law, and the Labor Tribunal adjudicated disputes involving nonpayment or underpayment of wages and wrongful dismissal.
The number of labor inspectors was sufficient to deter violations except in the cases of nonpayment or underpayment of wages to and working conditions of domestic workers. Penalties for violations of the minimum wage or occupational safety and health violations include fines, payments of damages, and worker’s compensation payments. These penalties were sufficient to deter violations.
The Occupational Safety and Health Branch of the Labor Department is responsible for safety and health promotion, identification of unsafe conditions, enforcement of safety management legislation, and policy formulation and implementation; it enforced occupational safety and health laws effectively.
MACAU 2019 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Macau is a Special Administrative Region (SAR) of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and has a high degree of autonomy, except in defense and foreign affairs, according to the Basic Law. In 2017 residents elected 14 representatives to the SAR’s legislative assembly. In accordance with the law, limited franchise functional constituencies elected 12 representatives, and the chief executive nominated the remaining seven. In August a 400-member election committee selected Ho Iat-seng to be the chief executive, the head of government. He began a five-year term in December after being appointed by the government.
The Secretariat for Security oversees the Public Security Police, which has responsibility for general law enforcement, and the Judiciary Police, which has responsibility for criminal investigations. Civilian authorities maintained effective control over the security forces.
Significant human rights issues included interference with the rights of peaceful assembly and restrictions on political participation.
The government took steps to prosecute and punish officials who committed human rights abuses.
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom from:
There were no reports the government or its agents committed arbitrary or unlawful killings.
There were no reports of disappearances by or on behalf of government authorities.
Punishment
The law prohibits such practices, and there were no reports government officials employed them.
Prison and Detention Center Conditions
There were no significant reports regarding prison or detention center conditions that raised human rights concerns.
Physical Conditions: There were no major concerns in prisons and detention centers regarding physical conditions or inmate abuse.
Administration:  The law allows prisoners and detainees to submit complaints to judicial authorities without censorship and to request investigation of alleged deficiencies. Judges and prosecutors visited prisons at least once a month to hear prisoner complaints.
Independent Monitoring:  The government permits monitoring by independent nongovernmental observers.  According to the government, no independent human rights observers requested or made any visit to the prison in the SAR.
The law prohibits arbitrary arrest and detention and provides for the right of any person to challenge the lawfulness of his or her arrest or detention in court, and the government generally observed these requirements.
Arrest Procedures and Treatment of Detainees
Authorities detained persons with warrants issued by a duly authorized official based on sufficient evidence. Detainees had access to a lawyer of their choice or, if indigent, to one provided by the government. Detainees had prompt access to family members. Police must present persons in custody to an examining judge within 48 hours of detention. Authorities informed detainees promptly of charges against them. The examining judge, who conducts a pretrial inquiry in criminal cases, has wide powers to collect evidence, order or dismiss indictments, and determine whether to release detained persons. Investigations by the prosecuting attorney should end with charges or dismissal within eight months, or six months when the defendant is in detention. The pretrial inquiry stage must conclude within four months, or two months if the defendant is in detention. By law the maximum limits for pretrial detention range from six months to three years, depending on the charges and progress of the judicial process; there were no reported cases of lengthy pretrial detentions. There is a functioning bail system. Complaints of police mistreatment may be made to the Macau Security Forces and Services Disciplinary Supervisory Committee, the Commission against Corruption, or the Office of the Secretary for Security. The Macau Security Forces and Services Disciplinary Supervisory Committee report directly to the chief executive. The government has also established a website for receiving named or anonymous complaints about irregular police activity or behavior.
The law provides for an independent judiciary, and the government generally respected judicial independence and impartiality.
Trial Procedures
The law provides for the right to a fair public trial, and an independent judiciary generally enforced this right. A case may be presided over by one judge or a group of judges, depending on the type of crime and the maximum penalty involved.
Under the law, defendants enjoy a presumption of innocence and have a right to appeal. The law provides that trials be public except when the court rules otherwise to “safeguard the dignity of persons, public morality, or to provide for the normal functioning of the court.”  Defendants have the right to be informed promptly and in detail of the charges (with free interpretation), be present at their trials, confront witnesses, have adequate time to prepare a defense, not be compelled to testify or confess guilt, and consult with an attorney in a timely manner.  The government provides public attorneys for those financially incapable of engaging lawyers or paying expenses of proceedings. The law extends these rights to all residents.
The SAR’s unique civil-code judicial system derives from the judicial framework of the Portuguese legal system. The courts may rule on matters that are the responsibility of the PRC government or concern the relationship between central authorities and the SAR, but before making their final judgment, which is not subject to appeal, the courts must seek an interpretation of the relevant provisions from the National People’s Congress Standing Committee (NPCSC). The Basic Law requires that courts follow the NPCSC’s interpretations when cases intersect with central government jurisdiction, although judgments previously rendered are not affected, and when the NPCSC makes an interpretation of the provisions concerned, the courts, in applying those provisions, “shall follow the interpretation of the Standing Committee.” As the final interpreter of the Basic Law, the NPCSC also has the power to initiate interpretations of the Basic Law.
Political Prisoners and Detainees
There were no reports of political prisoners or detainees.
Civil Judicial Procedures and Remedies
There is an independent and impartial judiciary for civil matters, and citizens have access to a court to bring lawsuits seeking damages for a human rights violation.
Correspondence
The law prohibits such actions, and the government generally respected these prohibitions.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
The law provides for freedom of expression, including for the press, but the government occasionally sought to restrict this right. In January the Legislative Assembly passed legislation to amend an existing law that criminalized some actions that disrespect the Chinese national anthem.
Press and Media, Including Online Media: Local media expressed a wide range of views, but the government took steps to restrict unfavorable news coverage.
Censorship or Content Restrictions:  Media sometimes practiced self-censorship, in part because the government subsidized some media outlets. According to 2018 media reports, the Central Government Liaison Office in Hong Kong indirectly owns Plaza Cultural Macau, a local bookstore, raising concerns that central government authorities may restrict the sale of sensitive books.
Libel/Slander Laws:  Macau law criminalizes libel, slander, and defamation. If such offenses are committed through the media or online, they are punishable by up to two years’ imprisonment.
Internet Freedom
The government did not restrict or disrupt access to the internet or censor online content. Law enforcement entities may intercept communications under judicial supervision; there were no credible reports that the government monitored private online communications without appropriate legal authority.
Academic Freedom and Cultural Events
In September the Education and Youth Affairs Bureau director, according to media reports, said teachers should not discuss their own political viewpoint regarding protests in Hong Kong inside the classroom. Academics also reportedly practiced self-censorship.
The law provides for the freedoms of peaceful assembly and association but the government limited the freedom of peaceful assembly.
Freedom of Peaceful Assembly
The law requires prior notification, but not approval, of demonstrations involving public roads, public places, or places open to the public. Police may redirect demonstration marching routes, but organizers have the right to challenge such decisions in court.
In August, Macau police did not permit a silent protest against police brutality in Hong Kong. Despite organizers cancelling the protest, police still searched people at the intended protest site, according to media reports. In September a court upheld the police decision to disallow the protest.
Critics alleged that authorities were making a concerted effort to use both intimidation and criminal proceedings against participants in peaceful demonstrations to discourage their involvement. For example, in May a court upheld the conviction of Scott Chiang for illegal assembly, a charge which arose from his participation in a 2016 peaceful protest against the chief executive.
Freedom of Association
The law provides for freedom of association, and the government generally respected this right. No authorization is required to form an association, and the only restrictions on forming an organization are that it not promote racial discrimination, violence, crime, or disruption of public order, or be military or paramilitary in nature.
See the Department of State’s International Religious Freedom Report at https://www.state.gov/religiousfreedomreport/.
The law provides for freedom of internal movement, foreign travel, emigration, and repatriation, and the government generally respected these rights.
The law grants police authority to deport or deny entry to nonresidents whom they regard under the law as unwelcome, a threat to internal security and stability, or possibly implicated in transnational crimes. The government banned several Hong Kong activists from entering Macau throughout the year, claiming the activists posed threats to internal security, according to media reports. In December, Macau denied entry to both the president and the chairman of American Chamber of Commerce in Hong Kong.
Not applicable.
Access to Asylum:  The law provides for the granting of asylum or refugee status, and the government has established a system for providing protection to refugees. Persons granted refugee status would ultimately enjoy the same rights as other SAR residents.
Pending final decisions on their asylum claims, the government registered asylum seekers and provided protection against their expulsion or return to their countries of origin. There were few applicants for refugee or asylum status and no successful applicants. Persons with pending applications were eligible to receive government support, including basic needs such as housing, medical care, and education for children, but they were not allowed to work until their refugee status was granted.
Not applicable.
Section 3. Freedom to Participate in the Political Process
The law limits voters’ ability to change their government through free and fair periodic elections because there was no universal suffrage in elections for the majority of elected positions. Only a small fraction of citizens played a role in the selection of the chief executive, who was chosen in August by a 400-member election committee consisting of 344 members elected from four broad societal sectors (which themselves have a limited franchise) and 56 members chosen from and by the SAR’s legislators and representatives to the National People’s Congress and Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference.  In June critics protested against this “small circle” election.  Organizers of an unofficial online petition for universal suffrage said in August that the petition website suffered a severe cyberattack reportedly originating from mainland China, and unknown individuals physically threatened the petition’s organizers.
Elections and Political Participation
Recent Elections:  In August a 400-member election committee selected Ho Iat- seng to be chief executive. Ho was unopposed and received 98 percent of the vote. The most recent general election for the 14 directly elected seats in the 33-member Legislative Assembly occurred in 2017, with all Macau voters able to vote for candidate lists and seats, which were then allocated based on a proportional representation system. The election for these seats was generally free and fair. There were no reports of the government unduly restricting the list of candidates.
In accordance with the law, limited franchise functional constituencies, which represent particular industries and social sectors, elected 12 Legislative Assembly
representatives, and the chief executive appointed the remaining seven.
Political Parties and Political Participation:  The SAR has no laws on political parties. Politically active groups registered as societies or limited liability companies were active in promoting their political agendas. Those critical of the government generally did not face restrictions, but persons seeking elected office must swear to uphold the Basic Law.
Participation of Women and Minorities:  No laws limit participation of women and members of minorities in the political process, and they did participate. Six of the
33 Legislative Assembly members were women.
Section 4. Corruption and Lack of Transparency in Government
The law provides criminal penalties for official corruption, and the government generally implemented the law effectively.
Corruption:  The government’s Commission against Corruption (CAC) investigated the public and private sectors and had power to arrest and detain suspects. The Ombudsman Bureau within the CAC reviewed complaints of mismanagement or abuse by the CAC. An independent committee outside the CAC–the Monitoring Committee on Discipline of CAC Personnel–accepted and reviewed complaints about CAC personnel.
Financial Disclosure: By law the chief executive, judges, members of the Legislative Assembly and Executive Council, and executive agency directors must disclose their financial interests upon appointment, promotion, retirement, and at five-year intervals while encumbering the same position. The information is available to the public on the website of the Macau Courts. The law states that if the information contained in the declaration is intentionally incorrect, the declarant shall be liable to a maximum imprisonment of three years or a minimum fine equal to six months’ remuneration of the position held. Furthermore, the declarant may be prohibited from appointment to public office or performing public duties for a maximum of 10 years.
Section 5. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Abuses of Human Rights
Domestic and international groups monitoring human rights generally operated without government restriction, investigating and publishing their findings on human rights cases. Government officials were somewhat cooperative and responsive to their views.
Section 6. Discrimination, Societal Abuses, and Trafficking in Persons
Women
Rape and Domestic Violence: The law criminalizes rape, including spousal rape, and domestic violence, but the domestic violence law does not cover same-sex couples. The rate of investigation for domestic violence cases was low, with police initiating investigations in only two of the 104 cases of domestic violence reported to them in 2018, according to official statistics. Domestic violence law stipulates that a judge may order urgent coercive measures imposed upon the defendant individually or cumulatively, and the application of these measures does not preclude the possibility of prosecuting the perpetrators for criminal responsibilities as stipulated in the criminal code.
The government made referrals for victims to receive medical treatment, and social workers counseled victims and informed them of social welfare services. The government funded nongovernmental organizations to provide victim support services, including medical services, family counseling, and housing, until their complaints were resolved.
Sexual Harassment: The law criminalizes physical sexual harassment, but verbal and noncontact harassment are not covered by the law. Persons convicted of sexual harassment may be imprisoned for up to one year.
Coercion in Population Control: There were no reports of coerced abortion or involuntary sterilization.
Discrimination:  Equal opportunity legislation mandates that women receive equal pay for equal work. The law prohibits discrimination in hiring practices based on gender or physical ability and allows for civil suits. Penalties exist for employers who violate these guidelines and the government generally enforced the law effectively (see section 7.) Media reports, however, indicated that discrimination persisted and gender differences in occupation existed, with women concentrated in lower-paid sectors and lower-level jobs.
Children
Birth Registration: According to the Basic Law, children of Chinese national residents of the SAR who were born inside or outside the SAR and children born to non-Chinese national permanent residents inside the SAR are regarded as permanent residents. There is no differentiation between these categories in terms of access to registration of birth. Most births were registered immediately.
Early and Forced Marriage:  The minimum legal age of marriage is age 16; however, children from ages 16 to 18 who wish to marry must obtain approval from their parents or guardians.
Sexual Exploitation of Children: The law specifically provides for criminal punishment for sexual abuse of children and students, statutory rape, and procurement involving minors. The criminal code sets 14 years as the age of sexual consent. The law forbids procurement for prostitution of a person younger than age 18. The law also prohibits child pornography. The government generally enforced these laws effectively, but there were concerns about the participation of minors in sex work.
International Child Abductions:  The SAR is a party to the 1980 Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction. See the Department of State’s Annual Report on International Parental Child Abduction at https://travel.state.gov/content/travel/en/International-Parental-Child-Abduction/for-providers/legal-reports-and-data/reported-cases.html.
Anti-Semitism
The Jewish population was extremely small. There were no reports of anti-Semitic acts.
Trafficking in Persons
See the Department of State’s Trafficking in Persons Report at https://www.state.gov/trafficking-in-persons-report/.
Persons with Disabilities
The law prohibits discrimination against persons with physical, sensory, intellectual, and mental disabilities, and the government generally enforced these provisions. The law mandates access to buildings, public facilities, information, and communications for persons with disabilities. The government enforced the law effectively.
National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities
There were reports of societal discrimination against ethnic minorities, and the law did not fully define and criminalize racial discrimination.
Acts of Violence, Discrimination, and Other Abuses Based on Sexual
Orientation and Gender Identity
The law prohibits discrimination in employment on the grounds of sexual orientation; however, the law does not prohibit discrimination based on sexual orientation in other areas, such as housing.
Section 7. Worker Rights
The Basic Law provides workers the right to form and join unions, but the Legislative Assembly has not passed legislation to regulate this right. Workers may join labor associations of their choice, but employers and the government reportedly wielded considerable influence over some associations. The law does not provide that workers can collectively bargain, and, while workers have the right to strike, there is no specific protection in the law from retribution if workers exercise this right. The law prohibits antiunion discrimination, stating employees or job seekers shall not be prejudiced, deprived of any rights, or exempted from any duties based on their membership in an association. The law imposes financial penalties for antiunion discrimination, but observers noted this may not be sufficient to deter discriminatory activity. The law does not require reinstatement of workers dismissed for union activity.
The law forbids workers in certain professions, such as the security forces, to form unions, take part in protests, or to strike. Such groups had organizations that provided welfare and other services to members and could speak to the government on behalf of members. Vulnerable groups of workers, including domestic workers and migrant workers, could freely associate and form associations, as could public servants.
Workers who believed they were dismissed unlawfully could bring a case to court or lodge a complaint with the Labor Affairs Bureau (LAB) or the CAC, which also has an Ombudsman Bureau to handle complaints over administrative violations. The bureau makes recommendations to the relevant government departments after its investigation.
The law prohibits all forms of forced or compulsory labor. Penalties range from three to 12 years’ imprisonment, with the minimum and maximum sentences increased by one-third if the victim is younger than age 14. Observers previously noted these penalties generally were sufficient to deter the use of forced labor.
Children and migrants were vulnerable to sex and labor trafficking, including in construction and domestic work. The government investigated cases, but there were no convictions during the year.
Also see the Department of State’s Trafficking in Persons Report at https://www.state.gov/trafficking-in-persons-report/.
A law prohibits minors younger than age 16 from working, although minors from ages 14 and 15 may work in “exceptional circumstances” if they get a health certificate to prove they have the “necessary robust physique to engage in a professional activity.” The law defines “exceptional circumstances” as:  the minor (younger than age 16) has completed compulsory education and has the authorization of the LAB after hearing the Education and Youth Affairs Bureau’s opinions; minors between ages 14 and 16 may work for public or private entities during school summer holidays; minors of any age may be employed for cultural, artistic or advertising activities upon authorization of the LAB after hearing the Education and Youth Affairs Bureau’s opinions and when such employment does not adversely affect their school attendance. The law governing the number of working hours was equally applicable to adults and legally working minors, but the law prohibits minors from working overtime hours. According to the civil code, minors who are age 16 can acquire full legal capacity if they marry.
The law prohibits minors younger than age 16 from certain types of work, including but not limited to domestic work, employment between 9 p.m. and 7 a.m., and employment at places where admission of minors is forbidden, such as casinos. The government requires employers to assess the nature, extent, and duration of risk exposure at work before recruiting or employing a minor. These regulations serve to protect children from physically hazardous work, including exposure to dangerous chemicals, and jobs deemed inappropriate due to the child’s age.
The LAB enforced the law through periodic and targeted inspections, and prosecuted violators. Penalties were sufficient to deter violations.
The law provides that all residents shall be equal before the law and shall be free from discrimination, irrespective of national or social origin, descent, race, color, gender, sexual orientation, age, marital status, language, religion, political or ideological beliefs, membership in associations, education, or economic background. Equal opportunity legislation states that women are to receive equal pay for equal work. The law prohibits discrimination in hiring practices based on gender or physical ability and allows for civil suits. Penalties exist for employers who violate these guidelines and the government generally enforced the law effectively.
Some discrimination occurred.  According to official statistics, at the end of June, nonresident workers accounted for approximately 28 percent of the population. They frequently complained of discrimination in the workplace in hiring and wages.
Local labor laws establish the general principle of fair wages and mandate compliance with wage agreements. The SAR does not calculate an official poverty line. The law provides for a 48-hour workweek, an eight-hour workday, paid overtime, annual leave, and medical and maternity care. The law provides for a
24-hour rest period each week. All workers employed in the SAR, whether under a term contract or an indefinite contract, are entitled to such benefits as specified working hours, weekly leave, statutory holidays, annual leave, and sick leave. It was not clear whether penalties were sufficient to deter violations.  The law requires that employers provide a safe working environment, and the LAB sets
industry-appropriate occupational safety and health standards. The law prohibits excessive overtime but permits legal overtime (a maximum of eight hours and irrespective of workers’ consent) in force majeure cases or in response to external shocks, at the discretion of the employer.
All workers, including migrants, have access to the courts in cases in which an employee is unlawfully dismissed, an employer fails to pay compensation, or a worker believes his or her legitimate interests were violated.  If an employer dismisses staff “without just cause,” the employer must provide economic compensation indexed to an employee’s length of service.
The LAB provides assistance and legal advice to workers upon request, and cases of labor-related malpractice are referred to the LAB.
The LAB enforced occupational safety and health regulations, and failure to correct infractions could lead to prosecution. The number of labor inspectors was adequate to enforce compliance.
The law allows workers to remove themselves from hazardous conditions without jeopardy to their employment.