吉娜·雷蒙多（Gina M. Raimondo）
演讲稿
2022年11月30日，星期三
 
前言
今年恰逢中美建交50周年。此前大部分时间，美国都坚持认为与中国经济的往来符合双方共同利益：起先这是我们制衡苏联的一种途径，后来这成为两国深化政治经济合作关系的通道。这种交往也为美国企业进入中国市场提供了更多机会，同时促进了中国经济体系的进一步开放。有观点认为，随着时间的推移，中国将与美国及其他发达经济体并驾齐驱，成为战后自由主义国际秩序的支柱。
但是显然，中国走上了一条不同的道路——这对中美双边关系以及中国在世界舞台上的行动有着深远影响。
过去十年，中国领导人明确表示不打算深化政治和经济改革，他们寻求在未来实现替代性愿景目标；他们努力强化政府在社会和经济中的作用，限制资本的自由流动和信息的自由传播，同时推动多个领域与经济脱钩——这也包括许多未来技术领域；他们将中国的数据经济与世界其他国家或地区隔离开来；他们加快行动步伐，推动经济和技术政策与军事野心相融合。
随着中国经济规模的持续扩大、影响力的不断增强，该国开始采取更多非市场贸易和投资措施，迫使美国加强了对美国及其盟友和合作伙伴的企业和工作者的保护。中国把关注焦点从经济增长转向国家安全，再加上其在军事方面的强硬作风，意味着我们必须重新考虑如何保护美国的国家安全利益，同时促进我们在贸易和投资方面的利益。
随着战略环境的急剧变化，美国在经济领域的优先任务变得清晰明了：确保美国拥有所需人才、技术和制造能力，以在21世纪引领全球经济的发展——在这个前所未有的技术变革和竞争时代，走在全球创新最前沿；为美国劳动力提供参与未来竞争所需的教育和培训；捍卫美国国家安全和民主价值观；美国的增长方式应体现美国的价值观，即可持续、包容、开放、透明和法治。
为达成此类重要目标，美国未来发展战略的四大支柱是：
但是，美国国家政策只是解决方案的一部分，我们还需要与包括企业、劳工组织和高校在内的私营部门合作，确保美国的国家安全和长期繁荣。我们需要同时从各个方面推进这项工作，需要通力合作。 
我们需要与中国展开全球性竞争，在国内开始实施经济转型。美国经济竞争力和国家安全取决于如何在战略和关键领域制定大胆的国内投资议程。
在拜登政府执政的前20个月，国会先后批准了《两党基础设施建设法案》、《芯片与科学法案》以及《通胀削减法案》。统筹考虑，这代表了在美国国内超过1万亿美元的投资。美国政府在创新、技术、制造业、劳动力培训和基础设施（包括宽带在内）方面作出重大承诺，为国家安全和未来竞争力保驾护航。这就是拜登总统所说的“现代工业战略”——这种做法在美国历史中根深蒂固，比如美国第一任财长亚历山大·汉密尔顿所著的《关于制造业的报告》和林肯总统批准建设的太平洋铁路，同时也针对21世纪将出现的挑战和机遇进行了调整。
通过这些重大投资，美国也在重塑国家创新生态系统，除了硅谷和硅巷，美国还要在全国范围内打造新技术创新制造中心。这些中心将充分利用美国的多元化布局，促进企业、高校、劳工组织和地方社区加强合作，将美国建设为21世纪全球经济的领头羊。
在研发方面，美国政府在与顶尖学府和行业专家展开合作，确定我们希望领先全球的核心关键和新兴技术领域并加大投资力度，比如先进计算、生物技术、生物制造以及清洁能源技术等。
美国政府还努力振兴国内制造业，特别是先进制造业。过去几十年间，随着美国向中国和亚洲其他地区输出就业机会和制造能力，并减少了对人力资源和基础设施（这些对于维持美国的长期竞争力至关重要）的投资，全国各地都出现了制造业停摆、企业倒闭、地方创新引擎停止运转的局面。
我对这些转变有着切身感受。我父亲大半辈子都在普罗维登斯的宝路华手表公司工作，但干了28年后，公司为追逐廉价劳动力而迁至中国，他与其他工友只能提前退休。发生在我父亲身上的这种事并不鲜见，过去40年来数百万美国人都有过类似遭遇。 
中国正在成为全球制造业领军者，并从制造业驱动创新中获得了巨大利益，而美国经济竞争力日渐衰弱，在越来越多的关键技术和商品方面过度依赖中国。值得注意的是，中国之所以获得成功，源自于国家对产业发展的大规模扶持。新冠疫情凸显了美国私营部门和民众对中国过度依赖的长期风险，以及重振国内制造业和创新的必要性。
半导体是这场技术竞争的起点，美国新投资战略的核心，几乎所有新兴技术创新的驱动力，也是国家重要安全应用的支撑力。美国是半导体工业的开拓者，在最先进芯片制造领域曾处于世界领先地位。而如今，全球最先进半导体并非出自美国企业，美国芯片产能仅占全球10%。另一方面，自2020年以来全球某些成熟芯片的新增产能中近75%来自中国。
《芯片与科学法案》标志着美国创新掀开新篇章，我们将扭转这一衰落趋势，确保美国的技术和工业在21世纪处于领先地位。未来几年，美国商务部将在半导体制造业投资520亿美元，用于加强人力资源培训和技术研发等，以打造充满活力的产业体系。
但这种公共投资只是一个起点，其目的在于鼓励工商界吸引私人资本，与政府合作进行投资，在为企业创造长期回报的同时提升美国竞争力。我们的目标是为美国企业的发展奠定基础，促使其发挥在创新、规模化运营和竞争等方面的固有优势。 
借助激励性研发生产方案，我们努力构建新的公私合作伙伴关系，推动实现最先进芯片在美国国内的生产，同时进一步提升成熟芯片产能，以捍卫经济安全、国家安全。劳工组织和教育机构应提供必要的人力资源培训和学徒计划，满足建设和运营新生产设施的需要。
我们在《通胀削减法案》中对公共投资采取了类似举措。目前，美国政府拨款3690亿美元用于向清洁能源转型和应对气候危机，这是有史以来美国联邦政府对清洁能源拨出的最大一笔款项。据估计，这笔资金将能在未来十年带动1.7万亿美元的公共和私人投资。
最近，美国政府还启动了“国家生物技术和生物制造计划”，确保不会在生物技术领域重蹈半导体和电信行业的覆辙，同时借助我们在生物技术研发方面的领先地位，打造生物技术制造高地、增加就业机会。
我可以自豪地说这些战略已初见成效。美光科技和英特尔等公司已宣布对锡拉丘兹和哥伦布的半导体制造业进行大幅投资，它们还携手当地高校和社区学院共同开发课程和培训项目，为数以万计的高薪制造业工作岗位培养人才。目前，美国制造业工作岗位已增加70万个，达到近30年最高水平。
展望未来，我们不仅要在本土发明未来技术，还要将其用于生产。
我们还在面向美国庞大人才储备投资。美国高等教育非常发达，为我们培养了世界一流的科学家、创新者和企业家。就麻省理工学院来说，150多年来历届毕业生和教授为科学技术进步做出了突出贡献。
此外，我们希望这个令人振奋的创新生态系统能吸引来更多美国人，这也是美国的需要。除了主要研究中心，美国政府增加了向高校提供的研发资金，尽可能多地培养人才。对于有色人种、女生和低收入青年等代表性不足的学生，我们也加大了对STEM教育的投资力度。我们正在建设通往高技能、高薪酬制造业工作岗位的新渠道，这些岗位很多不需要高等学历就能胜任。
我们还必须继续吸引全世界最优秀人才，美国的复兴和繁荣历来依靠的是移民。我要明确指出，种族主义或仇外心理在提升美国竞争力的道路上没有立足之地。美籍华人一直是——并将继续是——美国重振国威的重要力量。目前，中国在美留学生约为30万，我们对中国学生和移民仍持欢迎态度，并会坚决地与反华裔种族主义作斗争。
吸引和留住全世界最优秀的STEM人才，是美国不愿失去的一个优势。我们不会让这种情发生。今年年初，我们宣布了一系列措施来简化移民申请程序，并为国际STEM学生和研究人员开辟了新通道。但我们仍然任重而道远。我们准备在两党合作的基础上携手产业界和国会，充分挖掘美国作为超级大国的真正潜力。
美国的另一大竞争优势是多样性。多样性是创新之源，但为了做到人尽其才，我们必须为所有美国人提供参与21世纪经济建设的机会。在《两党基础设施建设法案》的支持下，商务部帮助数千万美国人登录廉价、高速互联网。我们的经济将会是允许任何地方的美国人都能参与，且可以在任何地方都能参与竞争。
我们的变革性国内投资议程是美国经济的长期竞争力和核心竞争力。但是，要在竞争中超过中国、塑造和引领21世纪全球经济发展，还需要我们快速灵活地采取行动，并加强我们的防御，以应对一系列正在出现的、不利于美国工人和企业，甚至在某些情况下威胁我们国家安全的做法。
今天，中国对美国的国家安全构成了一系列威胁，而且日益严峻。它的军队部署方式影响到了我们盟友和伙伴的安全，破坏了全球贸易的自由流动。它主导着许多关键材料商品的制造，并利用其他经济体对其市场的依赖施以政治胁迫。它还寻求在某些先进技术领域占据主导，利用这些技术来推进军事现代化、在国内外践踏基本人权。
我们认为，未来十年三类技术特别重要：第一类是计算相关技术，包括微电子、量子信息系统和人工智能；第二类是生物技术和生物制造；第三类是清洁能源技术。我们将进一步采取措施来捍卫美国的优势，并在这些基础技术方面保持尽可能大的领先优势。
为实现这一目标，我们积极升级现有能力、建设新能力。美国政府将与私营部门一道完善出口管制机制、加强投资审查制度、提高供应链弹性、制定创新解决方案，来对抗中国的经济胁迫和侵犯人权行为。
首先，我们正在加倍努力，从战略上不断完善出口管制机制和投资审查框架，保护美国核心技术。
十月，美国政府公布了一系列针对特定技术的系统性出口管制措施，来限制中国购买和制造某些非常先进计算芯片的能力。此类芯片可被用于制造大规模人工智能模型，助力先进军事和监视系统，以及用在这些尖端芯片的制造设备上。
此外，美国政府还限制了美国公民为这些先进技术项目提供支持。
长期以来，美国的出口管制战略总显得被动——只注重在中国获取美国知识产权后阻止其技术能力进一步扩大；而这些新规则具有战略性和针对性，旨在保护国家安全。 
根据《芯片与科学法案》的规定，我们携手参议员科宁、凯西以及众议员麦考尔、卢卡斯和德劳罗，以两党合作的方式设置了具有历史意义的防护栏，确保我们在研究和创新方面的投资永远不会被中国用于发展军事力量。
我们还在以新的眼光审视外资。几个月前，拜登政府发布了一份总统行政令，要求美国外国投资委员会在评估潜在外来投资时，要把重点放在某些关键的新风险因素上，比如技术领先地位、供应链依赖以及外国公司对于美国个人数据的访问等——这也是该委员会自几十年前成立以来接到的第一份正式指示。
对于关键技术领域的对外资本投资，我们与国会和私营部门一道识别和减轻其对国家安全构成的风险。比如，我们要求接受《芯片与科学法案》资助的公司，十年内不得到中国进行尖端或先进技术设施投资。 
我们的战略还包括加强对关键供应链的保护。
新冠疫情期间，我们见证了个人防护装备制造业在中国的过度集聚，给美国人造成了怎样的风险。
这段记忆让我刻骨铭心。新冠疫情来袭时我担任罗德岛州州长，与其他许多州一样，我们迫切需要呼吸机和个人防护装备。我不分昼夜地全球打电话、寻找防护物资，而这些生产厂商几乎都集中在亚洲。
现在，作为商务部长，我下定决心永远不能依赖另一个国家来提供商品、保障美国民众的安全。
我们已动员政府力量，研判可能对美国安全造成巨大损害却无法在国内采购、加工或制造的商品和技术。
对于这些领域我们与私营部门加紧合作，把供应链的核心部分迁回本土或转至“友好国家”。我们为关键行业开发一个近乎实时更新的全球供应链“通用运营态势图”，以便尽快填补漏洞。
此外，我们还在探索新途径来保护美国和其他国家，以免受到中国的经济胁迫。减轻美国企业在关键供应链核心部分对中国的依赖只是一种办法，而非全部解决方案。
比如，在中国与立陶宛断绝贸易关系时，我们向立陶宛农产品开放了市场，并提供6亿美元出口信贷来重点扶持制造业、商业服务和可再生能源。
对这种经济胁迫形成有效威慑，是拜登政府以及美国合作伙伴和盟友的首要任务。
我还想强调的是，我们要重点确保美国企业不参与中国严重侵犯人权的活动。美国的对华贸易和投资应能体现美国核心民主价值观，这就是拜登总统签署《维吾尔强迫劳动预防法案》的原因所在——企业应证明在生产过程中没有采购强迫劳动产品。
最后，我经常听美国商界领袖抱怨，这种政策环境的快速变化对他们做出明智决策、进行长期投资构成了挑战。对于这种挑战我当然理解，但国家政策不可能一成不变。他们需要不断适应技术变革和国家安全之间的动态交互。不过，在如此复杂的环境下，政府有责任为工商界提供一致而明确的指导，尽可能保持透明和加强协商，尽量减少破坏性变革，以及采取多边化措施。我们的目的是与私营部门建立强有力和充满活力的伙伴关系。
与此同时，私营部门必须要认识到今天的战略环境与十年前截然不同，企业应该与政府积极合作，以实现国家经济与安全目标。高校和企业今天决定在何处以及如何开展研究、从事贸易活动、做出投资决策，都会对美国未来几十年的经济发展和国家安全产生深刻影响。我要指出的是，麻省理工学院最近有关科研诚信和与中国伙伴合作的中国战略报告就是一个例子，说明我们需要主动行动来完善政策，规划一条明智的发展道路。 
无论是出口管制、新的投资准则还是供应链，我提到的所有措施不仅需要美国政府与私营部门携手合作，也需要与我们的盟友和合作伙伴并肩作战。
在与中国竞争打造21世纪全球经济的过程中，美国不能单打独斗。正如国务卿布林肯今年早些时候所指出，拜登政府的对华政策不仅体现在国内投资上，还体现在与美国盟友及伙伴的结盟关系上。当与其他国家官员会面时，他们对中国所作所为表达了类似担忧，并希望围绕规则、标准和价值观与美国加强合作和政策协调，增强我们共同的国家安全和经济福祉。他们也注意到中国的发展路线已发生变化，并相应调整了自身战略。
比如，美国与日本、澳大利亚和印度在四方安全对话机制下建立了关键和新兴技术工作组，并与欧盟合作成立了贸易和技术委员会，该委员会将于下周在华盛顿举行会议，进一步协调和确保供应链安全，推进出口管制、数据治理和投资审查。
目前，我们在针对俄罗斯入侵乌克兰实施制裁方面取得了步调一致，见证了这种伙伴关系的力量。
美国也在重塑在全球最具经济活力地区的领导地位和伙伴关系。去年五月，拜登总统与13个伙伴国在东京正式启动“印太经济框架”，这些国家与美国的GDP之和占全球40%以上。
这一创新性经济框架代表着一种积极的经济战略，目的在于发展具有连通性和弹性、清洁而公平的区域经济，同时为美国出口和投资开辟充满竞争力和吸引力的新市场。
它还将成为一种“供应链多元化加速器”，为美国企业提供更具竞争力的生产源和供应商。
美国工人也将从中受益。比如去年夏天，新冠疫情导致亚洲芯片生产放缓，最终引发底特律汽车公司裁员，而“印太经济框架”的供应链危机应对机制将有助于避免未来出现类似情况。
美国的长期竞争力还取决于能否持续加入国际机构，制定数据和技术标准。
近年来，中国在多个重要的国际标准制定机构中担任了领导职务。我们从美国及国外企业获知，中国经常在这些组织中安插政府和企业代表，极力推行自己的专制标准和价值观。
这些“投机取巧”的行为破坏了良好治理，不仅让美国企业在全球技术竞争中处于劣势，也给我们的许多基本价值观带来了风险，比如信息流动自由和数据隐私等。美国正在采取措施，提升在这些机构中的领导地位和影响力，加强与合作伙伴的协调。 
不过，仅依靠我们的传统盟友和伙伴合作还不足以为21世纪全球经济制定标准。我们还要与南半球充满活力的新兴经济体进一步接触，满足他们对可持续性、广泛性、包容性和透明化增长的需求。
作为最先迈出的重要一步，拜登总统与七国集团共同启动“全球基础设施和投资伙伴关系”计划，将筹集6000亿美元来建设具有气候适应能力的基础设施、提供更好的医疗保健和可持续能源。比如，商务部与美国进出口银行、美国企业和安哥拉政府合作，开发一个价值20亿美元的太阳能项目。这项投资不仅将帮助安哥拉利用清洁能源推动经济发展，还能拉动高达13亿美元的美国出口。
总而言之，这些新的多边合作机制反映了美国及其合作伙伴和盟友的共同价值观，它们在壮大美国实力的同时，也为未来全球可持续和包容性增长奠定了基础。
现在，我们的大部分对华经济战略集中在如何采取措施以及如何与盟友合作、保护美国自身竞争力，但在保护和积极促进美国经济利益的同时，与中国建立适当的双边经济关系。
中国政府采用一系列经济手段，导致希望参与中国市场竞争的外国公司处在不利地位。中国政府将美国及其盟友和合作伙伴的工人和企业挤出全球市场，从而为本国产业攫取了更多优势。对于中国可造成不公平竞争环境的非市场经济行为——比如在金融、监管等领域对国有及私营企业提供大力支持、强制性技术转让以及卑劣的知识产权侵权行为，我们将继续敦促其加以纠正。我们正在与七国集团合作，共同解决这些问题。
与此同时，我们并不寻求美国经济与中国脱钩。我们希望在不威胁美国核心经济利益、国家安全或人权价值观的领域，进一步加强贸易和投资。当前，中美两国年贸易额已从1972年的470万美元增长至7500亿美元以上，这种贸易往来为美国企业提供了利润，为美国工人创造了工作岗位，同时也加强了两国民众的联系。
中国现在是美国第三大出口市场，直接创造就业机会75万个。从这些出口中获益的不仅有大型跨国企业，而且包括2.5万多家中小企业——2020年其对华出口额达330亿美元。为扶持这些中小企业，商务部最近就个人护理产品发起了一项出口促进计划，目的是帮助中小企业开拓市场和促进出口，同时进一步加强知识产权保护。中国也是美国最大的农产品市场，美国农民今年向中国出口的农产品价值有望达到360亿美元。
美国企业和品牌在中国消费文化中享有很高知名度，美国软实力也由此受益。星巴克在中国开设的门店超过5000家；苹果iPhone13上市时中国消费者蜂拥而至，在商场大排长龙。美国产品不仅代表着高品质，还充分展示了我们开放、创新和创造力的价值观。
我们希望在不损害美国利益或价值观的领域继续促进贸易投资，同时也会使用一切手段来保护美国企业、打击不公平经济行为。比如，我们在中国拥有一支知识产权专家团队，他们在为美国企业提供帮助的同时，也在寻求持续推动中国知识产权法做出重大变革。
如果所有国家都遵循同样的比赛规则，则没有人能超过美国。
拜登总统本月早些时候与中国国家主席习近平会晤时已明确表示，美国希望与中国在具有全球经济重要性的议题上开展合作，比如气候变化、粮食安全、卫生安全和债务减免等。出于这个原因，我与中国生态环境部部长进行了会晤，为美国企业发声，并建议中美共同努力，减少海洋污染和海洋塑料垃圾。
当然，我们希望美国工人能从出口中受益，希望美国企业能在包括中国在内的全球市场蓬勃发展，但也必须对中国当前的发展方针保持清醒认识。
近四十年来，美国一直倡导与中国建立稳健的贸易投资关系并从中受益，却经常为了短期利益而忽视长期成本。最重要的是，我们必须记住要长期维持这种利益关系，就必须首先捍卫美国的国家安全和价值观。
结束语
近年来，中国领导人一直秉承这样的观点，即东方在崛起、西方在衰落。
见仁见智，我希望发表一些不同看法。
我认为美国是全球最大经济体，人口在全球最具多样性，而这种多样性正是我们非凡创造力和影响力的源泉。美国企业在世界上最具创新力和盈利能力，美国高等教育水平令所有国家羡慕，美国拥有强大的盟友和合作伙伴网络，而且这个网络还在不断壮大。
然而，尽管拥有这么多优势，在与中国有效竞争时，我们仍需付出更多努力。
目前，我们采取必要措施来应对中国带来的种种挑战，加倍努力扩大国内投资，与盟友围绕自由、隐私、法治和公平竞争的价值观确保政策一致，通过加强公私合作伙伴关系和重新思考经济治国工具来提升竞争力。
所有这一切让我相信，美国能够在明确目标指引下，落实各项举措，履行我们的长期承诺——这对于确保美国在全球创新领域长期处于领先地位、捍卫经济和国家安全至关重要。

Introduction
This year marks the 50th anniversary of the opening of relations between China and the United States. For most of this period, the United States was committed to the idea that economic engagement with China would serve our mutual interests: first, as a counterweight to the Soviet Union, and later as a gateway to a deeper political and economic partnership. Engagement also provided U.S. companies with greater access to China’s market and helped open China’s economic system. And some even thought that over time China would take its place alongside the U.S. and other advanced economies to become a pillar of the post-war liberal international order.
But now it is clear that China took a different path—and with that has come profound impacts on our bilateral relationship and on China’s behavior on the global stage.
Over the past decade, China’s leaders have made clear that they do not plan to pursue political and economic reform and are instead pursuing an alternative vision of their country’s future. They are committed to increasing the role of the state in society and the economy, constraining the free flow of capital and information, and decoupling economically in a number of areas, including many technology sectors of the future. They have firewalled their data economy from the rest of the world. And they are accelerating their efforts to fuse their economic and technology policies with their military ambitions.
As China’s economy has grown in size and influence, so too has its commitment to using non-market trade and investment practices in ways that are forcing us to defend our businesses and workers – and those of our allies and partners. China’s reprioritization away from economic growth toward national security and its assertive military behavior means that we have to rethink how we protect our national security interests while also promoting our interests in trade and investment.
In the face of this dramatically transformed strategic environment, our economic priorities are clear: ensuring that the U.S. builds the talent, technologies, and manufacturing capabilities necessary to lead the global economy in the 21st century—to be at the forefront of global innovation in an era of unprecedented technological change and competition; to provide our workforce with the education and training necessary to compete for the jobs of the future; to safeguard our national security and democratic values; and grow in ways that reflect our values of sustainable and inclusive growth, as well as openness, transparency, and the rule of law.
Our strategy to realize these priorities has four components—
But U.S. government policies are only part of the answer. We need the private sector, including business, labor, and universities, to work with us to ensure America’s long-term prosperity and security. We are pushing on all fronts, all at once. And we need to do it all together.
Our competition with China is global, but our economic strategy begins at home. Our economic competitiveness and national security depend on a bold domestic investment agenda in strategic and critical sectors.
In just the first twenty months of the administration, we worked with Congress to enact the Bipartisan Infrastructure Act, the CHIPS and Science Act, and the Inflation Reduction Act. Taken together, it represents over $1 trillion of investment in America. A once-in-a-generation commitment to innovation, technology, manufacturing, workforce training, and the infrastructure, including broadband, we need to ensure our future competitiveness and national security. It is what President Biden has termed a “modern industrial strategy” – an approach rooted deeply in America’s history—from Alexander Hamilton’s Report on Manufacturers to President Lincoln’s intercontinental railroad—but calibrated to the new, forward-looking challenges and opportunities of the 21st century.
With these transformational investments, we are also reimagining our national innovation ecosystem well beyond Silicon Valley and Silicon Alley to create new technology innovation and manufacturing hubs throughout the country. These hubs will take advantage of our nation’s diversity, foster new collaborations among businesses, universities, labor, and local communities, and position the United States to lead in the 21st-century global economy.
In R&D, we are working across the government and with leading university and industry experts to identify and invest in core critical and emerging fields of technology where we want to attain global leadership, such as advanced computing, biotechnologies and biomanufacturing, and clean energy technologies.
We are also revitalizing U.S. domestic manufacturing, particularly advanced manufacturing. Over the past decades, communities across the country have seen manufacturing shut down, businesses shutter, and the local engines of innovation grind to a halt, as we exported jobs and manufacturing capacity to China and the rest of Asia and reduced investment in the workforce development and infrastructure necessary to maintain our long-term competitiveness.
I felt the effects of this shift firsthand. My father worked his whole career in the Bulova Watch Factory in Providence. But after 28 years, his job moved to China as the company chased cheap labor. And just like all his friends, my father was forced into early retirement. What happened to my father is hardly unique. It happened to millions of Americans over the last 40 years.
While we watched China become a world leader in manufacturing and reap the massive benefits of manufacturing-driven innovation, the U.S. economy became LESS competitive and overly dependent on China for an increasing number of critical technologies and goods. It is worth noting, by the way, that China achieved its success through massive state support of its industries. COVID opened our eyes to the long-term risk for both the private sector and the American people of this over-dependence on China and the need to rebuild domestic manufacturing and innovation.
Semiconductors are ground-zero in this technological competition and central to our new investment strategy. They drive innovation in nearly every emerging technology and support critical national security applications. The U.S. invented the semiconductor industry and once led the world in producing the most advanced chips.  Today, we no longer manufacture the world’s most advanced semiconductors and produce only 10 percent of global chip capacity. Meanwhile, since 2020, nearly 75 percent of the new global capacity for certain mature chips has been added in China.
The CHIPS and Science Act marks the beginning of a new chapter in U.S. innovation where we reverse that decline and ensure that the United States retains its leadership in the technologies and industries of the 21st century. In the coming years, the Commerce Department will invest $52 billion in domestic semiconductor manufacturing, including workforce training and R&D, to create a vibrant domestic industry.
But this public investment is only a starting point. It is designed to spur the business community to crowd in private capital and be our partner in making the kinds of investments that generate long-term returns for business and advance American competitiveness. Our goal is to lay a foundation for American business to do what American business does best – innovate, scale, and compete.
Through R&D and manufacturing incentives, we are facilitating new public-private partnerships to enable domestic production of the most advanced chips and expand the production of mature chips essential to national and economic security. And we are looking to labor and educational institutions to provide the workforce training and apprenticeship programs necessary to build and operate new manufacturing facilities.
We have adopted a similar approach to public investment in the Inflation Reduction Act—the IRA. We are investing $369 billion, which is the largest federal investment ever made to transition the United States to a clean energy future and combat the climate crisis. By one estimate, that $369 billion will catalyze another $1.7 trillion in public and private investment over the next ten years.
The administration also recently launched a National Biotechnology and Biomanufacturing Initiative to ensure that what happened to the United States in semiconductors and telecommunications does not happen in biotech—ensuring we translate our leadership in biotech R&D into leadership in biotech manufacturing and jobs.
I am proud to say that we are already seeing our strategy pay off. Companies such as Micron Technology and Intel have announced significant new investments in semiconductor manufacturing in Syracuse and Columbus. And they are partnering with local universities and community colleges to develop the courses and training programs necessary to support tens of thousands of new, well-paying manufacturing jobs. Already we have added more than 700,000 manufacturing jobs to the U.S. economy—the most in almost three decades.
Going forward, we are not only going to invent the technologies of the future in America but we are going to manufacture them here too.
We are also investing in America’s massive talent pipeline. The United States is blessed with universities that consistently produce world-class scientists, innovators, and entrepreneurs. Here at MIT, your graduates and professors have contributed to pathbreaking scientific and technological advancements for more than 150 years.
But we want—and need—more Americans to be part of this exciting innovation ecosystem. We are increasing the amount of R&D funding we make available to universities OUTSIDE our major research centers to ensure that we access the broadest possible range of talent. We are also making significant investments in STEM education for underrepresented students, such as people of color, girls, and low-income youth. And we are building new onramps to high-skilled, well-paying manufacturing jobs – many of which don’t require a college degree.
We must also continue to attract the most talented people from around the world. Our history of renewal and reinvention has been powered by immigrants. And let me be clear: there is no room in our path to competitiveness for racism or xenophobia. Chinese Americans have been – and will continue to be – an essential part of this American story of renewal. Right now, there are roughly 300, 000 students from China studying in the United States. We will continue to welcome Chinese students and immigrants, and we won’t hesitate to stand up to racism against people of Chinese heritage.
Attracting and retaining the world’s best STEM talent is an advantage that is America’s to lose. And we are not going to let that happen. Early this year, we announced a series of measures to streamline the immigration process and open new pathways for international STEM students and researchers. But there is so much more to do. We are ready to work with industry and Congress on a bipartisan basis to capitalize on what is truly America’s superpower.
Our other great competitive advantage is our diversity. Diversity fuels innovation. But to unleash all of our talents, we must give all Americans the opportunity to participate in the economy of the 21st century. With support from the Bipartisan Infrastructure Law, the Department of Commerce is connecting tens of millions of Americans to affordable, high-speed internet. We will have an economy where Americans can participate from anywhere and compete everywhere.
Our transformative domestic investment agenda is at the heart of our long-term economic competitiveness. But outcompeting China to shape and lead the global economy of the 21st century also demands that we move nimbly and quickly to harden our defenses against an array of emerging and ongoing practices that tilt the playing field against American workers and businesses and in some cases, threaten our national security.
China today poses a set of growing challenges to our national security. It is deploying its military in ways that undermine the security of our allies and partners and the free flow of global trade. It dominates the manufacturing of many critical materials and goods and has exploited other economies’ dependence on its market for political coercion. It also seeks to dominate certain advanced technology sectors, while using many of those technologies to advance its military modernization and undermine fundamental human rights at home and abroad.
We believe there are three families of technologies that will be of particular importance over the coming decade: first, computing-related technologies, including microelectronics, quantum information systems, and artificial intelligence; second, biotechnologies and biomanufacturing; and third, clean energy technologies. We will continue to take action to protect our advantage and maintain as large a lead as possible in these foundational technologies.
We are moving aggressively to reform our current capabilities and create new ones to accomplish this goal. Together with the private sector, we are going to bolster our system of export controls, enhance our investment screening regimes, strengthen our supply chain resiliency, and develop innovative solutions to counter China’s economic coercion and human rights abuses.
To begin with, we are redoubling our efforts to safeguard our core technologies by strategically and continuously updating our export control policies and investment screening frameworks.
In October, we released a set of rules that impose systematic and technology-specific export controls to limit China’s ability to purchase and manufacture certain very advanced computing chips that are used to train large-scale artificial intelligence models, and which power the country’s advanced military and surveillance systems, as well as the manufacturing equipment used to make these cutting-edge chips.
In addition, we restricted American citizens from supporting these advanced technology programs.
For too long, America’s export control strategy was reactive—focused on preventing China from expanding its technological capabilities after it accessed American intellectual property. But these new rules are strategic, targeted, and designed to protect our national security.
And as part of the CHIPS and Science Act, we worked in a bipartisan way with Senators Cornyn and Casey and Representatives McCaul, Lucas, and DeLauro to implement historically strict guardrails to ensure the investments we make in research and innovation are never used to benefit China’s military efforts.
We are also modernizing our review of inbound investment. A few months ago, we issued Presidential guidance—the first of its kind since the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States was established decades ago—to direct a focus on certain critical new risk factors when evaluating potential inbound investment, such as technological leadership, supply chain dependency, and foreign company access to our personal data.
And together with Congress and the private sector, we are working to identify and mitigate the risks to our national security from outbound capital investments in critical technology sectors.  As one example, we have prohibited companies receiving CHIPS funding from investing in leading-edge or advanced technology facilities in China for ten years.
Our strategy also includes the protection of our critical supply chains.
During the COVID pandemic, we witnessed how the concentration of personal protective equipment manufacturing in China put Americans at risk.
I remember this time vividly. I was Governor when the pandemic hit. Like so many other states, Rhode Island desperately needed ventilators and PPE. I spent night after night calling countries around the world, nearly always in Asia, asking them to help us get the supplies we needed.
Now, as Commerce Secretary, I am determined that we will never let ourselves become dependent on one country for the goods we need to keep our people safe.
We have mounted a whole-of-government effort to identify the commodities and technologies where our inability to source, process, or manufacture domestically could cause great damage to our security.
In these areas, we are working with the private sector to re-shore or friend-shore core parts of our supply chains. And we are developing a near real-time “common operating picture” of global supply chains for critical industries so that we can address vulnerabilities as quickly as possible.
Related to this, we are exploring new avenues to defend ourselves and others from China’s economic coercion. Reducing our companies’ dependence on China for core parts of our critical supply chains is one part of the answer, but not the entire answer.
For example, when China cut off trade with Lithuania, we opened our markets to Lithuanian agricultural products and provided a $600 million export credit agreement focused on manufacturing, business services, and renewable energy.
Developing an effective deterrent against this kind of economic coercion is a priority for the Biden Administration, as well as for our partners and allies.
I also want to underscore the priority that we are placing on ensuring that our companies are not complicit in China’s gross human rights abuses. Our trade and investment with China should reflect our core democratic values. That is why, President Biden signed the bipartisan Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act into law – requiring companies to certify that they are not sourcing goods that relied upon forced labor in their production.
Finally, I hear often from U.S. business leaders about the challenges this rapidly changing policy environment poses to their ability to make smart, long-term investment decisions. And while I certainly understand this challenge, our policies cannot be static.  They need to adapt continuously to the dynamic interaction between technological change and national security. But in such a complex environment, it’s on us in the government to provide clear and consistent guidance that the business community needs to succeed; to be as consultative and transparent as possible, to minimize disruptive change, and to adopt measures multilaterally. We are committed to a strong and vibrant partnership with our private sector.
At the same time, it’s on the private sector to recognize that we’re operating in a fundamentally different strategic environment from a decade ago and to work with us to realize our economic and national security objectives. The decisions our universities and companies make today on where and how they undertake research, engage in trade, and make investment decisions will profoundly shape our economic and national security for decades to come. And I would note that MIT’s recently released China strategy report on research integrity and collaboration with PRC partners is an example of the type of initiative we need to help inform our policy and chart a sensible path forward.
Now, all of the measures I have outlined—from export controls to new investment parameters to supply chains—require not an only partnership between the U.S. government and private sector but also between the U.S. and our allies and partners.
In our competition with China to shape the 21st-century global economy, we cannot go at it alone. As Secretary Blinken articulated earlier this year, the Biden administration’s approach to China is centered not only on investment at home but also on alignment with our allies and partners abroad. When I meet with my counterparts from other countries, they voice similar concerns about China’s behavior and a shared desire to cooperate and coordinate our policies around the rules, standards, and values that advance our collective national security and economic well-being. They, too, see how China’s direction has changed and are adjusting their strategies accordingly.
For example, we have established the Quad Critical and Emerging Technologies working group with Japan, Australia, and India, as well as the U.S.-EU Trade and Technology Council, or TTC, which will be meeting next week in DC, to align our approaches secure supply chains, export controls, data governance, and investment screening.
We are witnessing the strength of this partnership right now in the extraordinary degree of coordination we have achieved around the implementation of sanctions against Russia in response to its invasion of Ukraine.
We are also reasserting U.S. economic leadership and partnership in the most economically dynamic region of the world. Last May, in Tokyo, President Biden launched the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework or IPEF, with thirteen partner countries that together with the U.S. represent over 40 percent of global GDP.
This innovative economic framework represents a proactive economic strategy, designed to support a regional economy that is connected, resilient, clean, and fair and will provide a competitive and attractive new market for U.S. exports and investment.
It will also be a kind-of-a “supply chain diversity accelerator” by facilitating U.S. companies with more competitive sources of production and suppliers.
And American workers will benefit too. For example, last summer we saw how COVID-related chip manufacturing slowdowns in Asia contributed to layoffs for auto workers in Detroit. IPEF’s supply chain crisis response mechanism will help us avoid a similar situation in the future.
Long-term U.S. competitiveness also depends on our continued and active participation in international institutions that set data and technology standards.
In recent years, China has assumed leadership positions in several important international standard setting bodies. We have heard from our companies, as well as those from other countries, that China often packs these organizations with government and business representatives who work together to push the country’s authoritarian standards and values.
These efforts “to game the system” undermine good governance, place our companies at a disadvantage in the global technology competition, and put at risk many of our fundamental values, such as the free flow of information and data privacy. We are taking steps to elevate U.S. leadership and presence in these bodies and to coordinate our efforts with our partners.
It is not enough, however, to work with our traditional allies and partners to set the standards for the global economy of the 21st century. We are also engaging more deeply with the vibrant emerging economies of the global south to meet their desire for growth that is sustainable, broad-based, inclusive, and transparent.
As an important first step, President Biden, together with our G7 partners, launched the $600 billion Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment, or PGII, to support climate-resilient infrastructure, better healthcare, and sustainable energy. At the Department of Commerce, for example, we are partnering with U.S. Exim-Bank, U.S. businesses, and the government of Angola to develop a $2 billion solar project. This investment will not only help Angola power its economy with clean energy but also support up to $1.3 billion in U.S. exports.
Taken together, these new multilateral arrangements reflect the shared values of the U.S. and its partners and allies. They amplify the power of U.S. and they provide the basis for future global growth that is sustainable and inclusive.
Now, while much of our China economic strategy is necessarily focused on what we can do at home and with our allies to ensure our own competitiveness, we also need to get the bilateral economic relationship with China right by protecting and also actively promoting our economic interests.
China’s government employs a range of economic practices that disadvantage foreign companies trying to compete in the PRC market. China’s government also gives unfair advantages to its own industries in ways that displace American workers and businesses – and those of our allies and partners – from the global market. We will continue to press China to address its non-market economic practices that result in an uneven playing field, such as such as its massive support – financial, regulatory, or otherwise – to its state-owned and private firms, forced technology transfer, and egregious intellectual property theft.  And we are working with our G7 allies on a shared approach to these issues.
At the same time, we are not seeking the decoupling of our economy from that of China’s. We want to promote trade and investment in areas that do not threaten our core economic and national security interests or human rights values. Annual trade between our two countries has grown exponentially from $4.7 million in 1972 to more than $750 billion today. This trade provides revenues for American companies, jobs for American workers, and connectivity with the Chinese people.
China is now our third largest export market, and those exports directly support 750,000 American jobs. The benefits from these exports go not only to our large multinationals but also to more than 25,000 small and medium-sized enterprises that exported $33 billion to China in 2020. To support these smaller businesses, the Commerce Department recently launched an export promotion initiative around personal care products. We aim to boost exports by helping SMEs navigate the market, while ensuring that their IP is protected. China is also the U.S.’s largest agricultural market, and our farmers are on track to export $36 billion in agricultural goods this year to China.
U.S. soft power also benefits from the popularity of our companies and brands in China’s consumer culture. Starbucks has built more than 5,000 stores in China. When Apple launched its iPhone 13, shoppers in China stampeded through a mall to be first in line. Our products signify not only high-quality but also our values of openness, innovation, and creativity.
We want to continue to promote trade and investment in those areas that do not undermine our interests or values, while using all the tools at our disposal to protect our companies and counter unfair economic practices. For example, we maintain a team of intellectual property experts in China that helps address our companies’ needs while seeking to drive important changes to China’s IP laws over the longer term.
No-one can outcompete the U.S. if we are playing by the same rules.
And as President Biden made clear during his recent meeting with China’s President Xi Jinping earlier this month, we want to work with China on issues of global economic importance, such as climate change, food security, health security, and debt relief. For that reason, I met with China’s Minister of Ecology and Environment to advocate for our companies and to propose that we work together to reduce ocean pollution and marine plastic debris.
Of course, we want American workers to benefit from exporting and American companies to thrive in global markets, including China. But we also have to be sober about China’s current direction of travel.
For almost forty years, we championed the benefits of a robust trade and investment relationship with China, often overlooking the long-term costs for the near-term benefits. And above all, we must remember that sustaining these benefits over the long term requires that we defend our security and values in the near term.
Conclusion
In recent years, China’s leaders have promoted a narrative that the East is rising, and the West is declining.
I hope you see something different. I see something different.
I see that the U.S. is the world’s largest economy, that it is blessed with one of the most diverse populations in the world—and that this diversity is a source of unparalleled creativity and strength—that our companies are among the world’s most innovative and profitable, that our universities are the envy of all countries, and that we have a strong and growing network of powerful allies and partners.
Yet, despite all of our strengths, competing effectively with China will take hard work.
We are taking the steps necessary to address the full range of challenges that China now presents. We are redoubling our commitment to invest at home. We are aligning our policies with our allies around our values of freedom, privacy, the rule of law, and fair competition. And we are competing by investing in robust public-private partnership and rethinking our tools of economic statecraft.
All of this leaves me confident that we can deliver on the clarity of purpose, consistency in execution, and long-term commitment that will be necessary to ensure our continued leadership in global innovation and protect our economic and national security.