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中国（第三类）
中华人民共和国政府没有完全达到消除人口贩运问题的最低标准，也没有在这个方面做出显著努力，因此，中国继续归为第三类。尽管中国政府缺少显著努力，但还是采取了一些应对人口贩运活动的措施，包括继续与国际有关当局合作，处理在中国的强迫结婚和假结婚的情况，这是外国妇女和女孩被贩运的一个主要薄弱环节，以及继续寻求对可能参与合谋包括性贩运在内的卖淫犯罪行为的官员追究刑事责任。然而，在政府对新疆穆斯林少数民族的大规模拘留和政治改造运动中，国家支持的强迫劳动加剧。据报道，当局对藏人和其他少数民族宗教群体也采取了类似的做法。政府连续第二年没有报告发现任何贩运受害者或将其转介给保护服务机构。当局拘留因涉嫌卖淫而被捕的妇女，有时持续数月，而不进行人口贩运筛查，并且在外籍受害者逃离并报告受到虐待以后，经常将其强行送回给贩运她们的人贩子。
优先建议：
结束在政府设施、改建为政府拘留中心的非政府设施，以及刑事程序以外政府官员主使的强迫劳动。·废除新疆拘留营中人员的任意拘留和强迫劳动，并立即释放被拘留在那里的人。·停止歧视性雇用和有针对性的流离失所政策，因为这些使穆斯林和其他少数民族面临人口贩运风险。·尊重正当程序，针对强迫劳动和性贩运的肇事者，包括同谋政府官员，积极调查、起诉和判刑。·更新法律框架，将所有形式的人口贩运都确定为犯罪，包括组织未满18岁少年卖淫。·建立积极、正式的机制和程序并使之系统化，以便在全国范围识别人口贩运受害者，包括劳工贩运受害者、从海外返回的中国受害者、以及弱势群体中的受害者，例如流动工人以及因卖淫指控而被捕的外籍和中国妇女儿童；对第一线官员进行落实执行的培训。·停止由于人贩子强迫受害者犯下的非法行为而惩罚贩运受害者。·立即对涉嫌卖淫犯罪的人进行性贩运指标筛查，并将确认的受害者转介给保护服务部门。·确保有关部门不再长期拘押、惩罚和遣返人口贩运受害者。·扩大受害者保护服务，包括全面的咨询、医疗、重新融入社会和对性贩运和劳工贩运的男女受害者提供的其它康复协助。·对那些如果被驱逐就可能在一些国家，尤其是朝鲜，面临苦难或者遭到报复的外籍受害人提供其它合法出路。·增加政府打击人口贩运行动的透明度，并提供关于调查和起诉，受害者识别和服务提供等方面的详细分类数据，包括继续与国际合作伙伴共享相关数据。
起诉
政府减少了执法工作。刑法将某些形式的性贩运和劳工贩运定为犯罪。刑法的各项条款可用来起诉性贩运罪。刑法第240条将“绑架和贩卖妇女或儿童”定为刑事犯罪，其中包括以贩卖为目的的拐卖、绑架、购买、运送、接收和转运。但是，与国际法的贩运人口定义不同，刑法第240条没有明确将这些行为与剥削目的联系起来。刑法第240条规定对绑架和买卖妇女儿童处以5至10年的有期徒刑和罚款。如果被绑架的妇女被迫卖淫，则处罚增加到10年有期徒刑到无期徒刑、罚款和没收财产。这些处罚措施十分严厉，与强奸等其他严重犯罪的处罚相称。刑法第241条将购买被绑架妇女或儿童定为犯罪，并规定最高处以3年有期徒刑、短期拘留或者缓刑。与刑法第240条一样，它并不要求购买是为了剥削目的。根据这个条款进行的处罚本身并不够严厉。但是，刑法第241条规定，如果一个人购买了被绑架的妇女或儿童，然后使其遭受“强迫性关系”，根据刑法的强奸条款，他们将面临额外的处罚。刑法第358条将强迫卖淫定为刑事犯罪，并处以5至10年有期徒刑。如果犯罪涉及14岁以下的儿童，除罚款或没收财产外，处罚还增加至10年有期徒刑。这些处罚措施十分严厉，与强奸等其他严重犯罪的处罚相称。刑法第359条将组织卖淫或引诱或介绍她人卖淫定为刑事犯罪，并规定最高5年有期徒刑和罚款。如果犯罪涉及14岁以下的女孩，则规定至少5年有期徒刑和罚款。这些处罚足够严厉；但是，对涉及14至17岁女孩的犯罪规定的处罚与对强奸等其他严重犯罪规定的处罚不相称。可以根据刑法第244条起诉劳工贩运犯罪。该条款将“以暴力、威胁或限制人身自由强迫工作”以及招募、运送或以其它方式协助强迫他人劳动确定为犯罪，并规定处以3至10年有期徒刑和罚款。这些处罚足够严厉。
中央政府没有收集或报告全面的执法数据，并继续根据国际法（包括偷运移民，绑架儿童，强迫婚姻和虚假收养）报告贩运定义以外的犯罪统计数据，因此难以评估进展。公安部连续第二年没有报告针对可能的贩运案件启动的调查数量（2016年为1004起），尽管媒体报道称当局继续调查一些案件。最高人民法院发布的数据显示，起诉和结案了至少634起贩运案件（2017年为1146起），最终导致1252人被定罪（2017年定罪1556人定罪，2016年为1756人），包括1252人因贩运妇女和儿童而定罪，833人因强迫卖淫被定罪，以及35人因强迫劳动被定罪。当局没有按照相关的刑法条款对定罪
数据进行分类。与往年一样，法庭根据刑法第358条起诉和审判绝大多数这些案件，特别是涉及卖淫盘剥的案件，而不是根据刑法第240条起诉和审判。政府没有提供判刑数据，但媒体报道显示，至少有一桩强迫劳动的案子的刑罚是从1年到6年有期徒刑。在过去几年中，媒体报道的处罚为5个月有期徒刑加上罚款7万4000元人民币（1万零760美元）至无期徒刑。
政府通过司法部将大多数带有强迫劳动指标的案件作为行政案件处理，很少使用反人口贩运法律起诉这种案件。像前几年从事的努力一样，当局与外国政府合作执法，调查在缅甸、柬埔寨、塞浦路斯、澳门和新加坡的中国公民受到人口贩运的案件。中国有关当局试图引渡和刑事起诉在欧洲涉嫌强迫劳动的中国人和台湾人。在本报告所述期间，政府增加了与老挝、蒙古和越南执法当局的协商伙伴关系，联合处理这几个国家的公民由于被强迫与中国人假结婚的贩运问题。中国邻国的一些执法人员报告说，他们的中国同行对跨境人口贩运案件双边合作请求没有反应，而另一些人则报告说，中国繁琐的执法官僚机构阻碍了联合行动。
与前几年不同，政府没有提供具体执法培训的数据。然而，一个国际组织说，政府拨出更多资金，共同主持执法和司法官员在调查和起诉贩运案件方面的能力建设培训。在本报告所述期间，中国发起了一场全国运动，调查腐败的地方官员和警察，据说他们利用其影响力保护从事卖淫活动的犯罪组织或者从中渔利；这包括打击性贩运的工作。据报道，在这个过程中被判有罪的官员被开除中共党籍，开除公职，罚款和移交给司法机构处理。但是当局没有提供有关此次活动导致的调查、起诉或定罪数量的统计数据。尽管继续有报道称执法官员允许或者直接组织性贩运和强迫劳动，并且从中渔利，但政府并未报告对据称涉嫌犯罪的执法官员的任何调查、起诉或定罪。据报道，中央、省和地方政府官员也参与组织强迫劳动，而且可以逍遥法外，这是中国对穆斯林少数民族群体的大规模拘留和政治改造运动的一部分，据报道，当局对藏人和其他少数民族宗教团体成员也进行了类似的虐待。
保护
政府减少了保护受害者的努力。连续第二年，政府没有报告确认了多少受害者，尽管媒体报道显示有关当局把一些受害者从受盘剥的境遇中解救出来。当局与一个国际组织合作，共同赞助并参加了关于受害者身份识别和领事官员和执法协助、救助站行为规范、婚姻移民监管、以及全国转介机制在各部门之间实施的培训。公安部继续保持2016年向全国各地的执法人员发布的书面指示，目的是澄清在卖淫者和可能通过强迫或假结婚的人员当中识别贩运受害者的程序。据报道，公安部官员实施了一个程序，筛查因涉嫌卖淫被捕的人的人口贩运指标。2016年的一项政策仍然有效，规定对这类人的拘留时间不得超过72小时。尽管存在这些程序，但是与上述政策相反，执法人员继续逮捕和拘留涉嫌卖淫犯罪的外籍妇女，不筛查她们的性贩运指标，有时拘留长达4个月，然后以违反入境法律的理由将她们驱逐出境。在一些案子里，乡村边境官员接到涉及缅甸和蒙古妇女和女孩被强迫和中国男子假结婚的性贩运和强迫劳动的报告，然后为她们提供临时救助站，并帮助资助和护送她们遣返。然而，观察人士指出，这种援助是临时性的，在更远的内陆工作的前线官员提供的援助较少。一些外国受害者逃到内地，向当局报告了受虐待的情况，但是却立即被逮捕，强行送回给她们的中国“丈夫”，有时是接受了男方家的贿赂而进行的交换。由于有关当局没有在执法工作中普遍实施全国转介机制，警察很可能因人贩子强迫身份不明的中国人口贩运受害者从事的非法行动而逮捕贩运受害者。
在过去这些年里，政府报告说，至少有10个专门照顾中国人口贩运受害者的救助站，还有8个为外籍人口贩运受害者准备的救助站和全国各地2300多个可以照顾人口贩运受害者的多用途救助站。政府没有提供2018年这些救助站的情况。民政部、一个全国妇女组织和基层非政府组织向受害者提供住所、医疗照顾、辅导和社会服务，在某些情况下可以提供康复服务。获得专门护理在很大程度上取决于受害者的地点和性别。男性受害者受到照顾的可能性要少得多。政府没有报告有多少受害者受益于这些服务，而且关系人士指出，对性贩运受害者存在普遍的成见，很可能继续阻碍了许多人接受保护服务。有一项将中国大陆境内的外国非政府组织置于公安部监管之下的政策，执行这项政策继续对民间团体的活动造成繁重的规定和限制，包括能够为容易遭受贩运的受害者和容易遭受犯罪的社区提供服务的组织。据报道，外国驻华使馆向受害者提供救助站或其他保护服务。当局没有规定把与执法部门合作作为获得受害者照顾的条件，但他们确实要求受害者向警方提供信息。法律规定受害者有权要求对人贩子提起刑事起诉，并通过向人贩子提起民事诉讼要求财务赔偿。中国政府没有报告是否有任何受害者受益于这一法律条款。中国司法制度并不要求受害人在法庭上为审判人贩子作证，并允许检察官提交事先记录的陈述作为证据。
政府此前报告的海外受害者援助的效力目前尚不清楚，包括其与缅甸、老挝和越南的8个边境联络处，以及受害者资金、热线和政府与政府间的协议以协助受害者。当局报告称，2018年遣返了一些受害者，但没有提供进一步信息，包括他们是中国人还是外国人。国际民间社会团体报告称，中国的外交使团往往对中国海外强迫劳动受害者提出的投诉没有反应，特别是在日本。政府没有努力在其高度易受贩运的朝鲜流动人口中识别贩运受害者，也没有为可能是朝鲜贩运活动受害者提供遣返以外的合法选择。中国当局继续拘留寻求庇护的朝鲜人，并强行将一些人送回朝鲜。这些人在朝鲜遭受严厉的处罚或者死亡，包括被送进朝鲜的劳改营。政府没有报告是否对这些人进行了人口贩运指标的筛查。据报道，根据联合国安理会一个决议，政府遣返了一些朝鲜劳工移民。中国当局并没有对他们进行人口贩运指标筛查或者提供合法留在中国的选择。
预防
政府防止贩运的努力微乎其微，并实施延续广泛的强迫劳动的政策。当局召开了第六次年度跨部委会议，协调打击贩运工作。公安部继续协调反贩运跨机构工作，并且领导跨机构努力执行“全国打击人口贩运行动计划”，包括正在进行的关于全国打击犯罪工作效力的研究。政府连续第二年没有报告在推动行动计划方面为打击贩运活动提供资金的程度（2016年的资金超过5500万人民币（800万美元））。政府利用传统和社交媒体，并在交通和社区中心分发海报和其它材料，增加公众对这个问题的了解，包括在薄弱的乡村地区。至少有一个主要城市的市政府资助了反贩运电影。学者和专家指出，以前的独生子女政策造成的性别失衡可能继续导致中国的人口贩运犯罪。据报道，政府开始实施一系列试点计划，使柬埔寨和越南公民能够合法进入中国南方工作，希望借此阻止通过边界，尤其是多边边界地区进行的非法劳务移民。这种人口贩运薄弱环节减少的规模，或者实施的程度尚不清楚。
中国政府的户口制度（户籍制度）继续限制人们的就业机会，减少人们获得社会服务的机会，对于从海外拐卖返回的中国受害者来说尤为如此，这继续造成内部移动人口受到贩运的风险。政府继续通过要求地方政府为移民工人
提供获得居留许可的机制来杜绝其中一些薄弱环节。然而，这些居住许可证对中国的少数民族来说少得不成比例，加剧了对他们就业和获得社会服务的限制。政府为减少对卖淫的需求做出了一些努力。中国政府报告说，进行了一些减少强迫劳动的工作，在与外国企业和国家的书面合同中加入了明确禁止人口贩运的文字，但是有关当局对于发生强迫劳动的指控往往无动于衷。中国政府并没有报告对任何在海外从事儿童性旅游的中国公民进行调查或者起诉，尽管存在关于此类犯罪的广泛报道。
人口贩运概况
过去五年来的报告显示，人贩子在中国境内贩运中国人和外籍人，并且在国外贩运中国人。人贩子还将中国作为转运点，将外籍人贩运到整个亚洲和国际海运业所及的其他国家。组织严密的犯罪集团和地方帮派在中国境内用中国妇女和女孩进行性贩运。人贩子通常从农村地区招募她们，把她们带到城市中心，以虚假的工作机会诱惑受害者，加上通过征收大笔旅费、没收护照、限制受害者人身自由进行胁迫，或者对受害者进行暴力或财务威胁，迫使她们卖淫。中国的国家户籍登记系统（户口）继续限制农村居民合法改变工作场所或居住地的自由，使中国内部的流动人口（估计超过1.8亿男女和儿童）处于在砖窑、煤矿和工厂中遭受强迫劳动的高风险之中。其中一些企业利用政府执法不严而非法经营。据报告，非洲和亚洲男子在大西洋上悬挂中国国旗的渔船上遭受带有强迫劳动特征的境遇。来自其他地区的男子也可能在这些船上被强迫劳动。来自南亚、东南亚和非洲几个国家的妇女和女孩遭受家庭奴役，被强迫纳妾，强迫生育，以及通过被迫与中国男子假结婚进行性贩运。人贩子专门寻找有发育残障的成人和儿童以及因家长流动到城市而被留给亲戚的留守儿童下手（估计有6000多万），强迫他们劳动和乞讨。国家机构强迫穆斯林少数群体劳动，这是任意大规模拘留和政治改造计划的一部分。
在中国，政府支持的强迫劳动越来越普遍。2013年，全国人民代表大会通过了一项废除“劳改”的决议，这是一种惩罚制度，通过司法程序以外的涉及强迫劳动的拘留来处罚人，据报中国政府从这种强迫劳动中获利。到2015年10月，中国政府关闭了大部分劳改设施。不过，据民间组织和媒体报告，政府将一些劳改设施改为政府主办的戒毒所或者行政拘留中心，强迫劳动仍在继续。
在新疆维吾尔自治区，政府对穆斯林少数民族的大规模拘留和政治改造运动中，国家支持的强迫劳动正在加剧。当局在多达1200个“职业培训中心”中任意拘留了100多万穆斯林，包括维吾尔族人、哈萨克族人和吉尔吉斯族人，设立这些中心的目的旨在消除民族宗教身份特征。根据民间组织对当前被拘留者的幸存者和家属的访谈得出的报告显示，政府强迫这些人中的许多人劳动，在现场或邻近的工厂生产服装、地毯、清洁用品和其他在国内以及可能在国际上销售的商品。当局提供补贴，鼓励中国公司在拘留营附近开设工厂，地方政府由于每个被迫在这些地点工作的被关押者而获得额外的资金，同时只需支付最低工资或者根本不提供任何补偿。这个系统内也可能关押了少数汉族人。有报告显示，政府已开始将数以千计在新疆被任意拘留的人送到其他省份强迫劳动。
一些地方的有关当局还强迫在新疆被任意拘留的男子的家属在男人不在家的情况下劳动。当局把越来越多在新疆被关押的穆斯林的小孩安置在国营寄宿学校、孤儿院和“儿童福利指导中心”，迫使他们参与政治改造活动，并且报告自己家庭的宗教活动。据报道，当局将年龄较大的孩子安置在职业学校，有些人可能是强迫劳动的受害者。一些哈萨克斯坦和吉尔吉斯斯坦公民在新疆探亲时被任意拘留。他们的孩子现在在国外无人陪伴，也有较高的被贩运的风险。
新疆当局2017年发布通知，废除了“哈萨尔”制度下的农村义务劳动，据报道，在这种制度下，每年有数以千计的维吾尔族成人和儿童在政府基础设施项目和农业中被强迫劳动。尽管政策发生了这种变化，但在新疆类似形式的国家支持的强迫劳动还在继续，包括在新疆生产建设兵团中的强迫劳动。兵团是一个经济和准军事组织，对新疆的几个地区实施行政控制。兵团的各个团在新疆各地至少管理36个监狱农场。与上述大规模拘留运动不同，这个体系主要是强迫汉族被关押者劳动，其中许多人可能是任意拘留的受害者。兵团当局还强迫囚犯在新疆几个地区建造新的监狱设施，并可能强迫被关押者在采煤和石棉开采领域劳动。还有报道说，在兵团的指导下，有儿童被迫采摘棉花。据报道，正式的歧视性就业政策阻碍维吾尔人在许多部门就业，包括每年一度的棉花采摘，导致数以千计维吾尔族农民离开本地去寻找别的工作，使他们面临更高的被强迫劳动风险。政府有针对性的强行迁移计划也是如此，包括兵团为汉族内部移民建设的新定居点，据报道，这些定居点将维吾尔族社区打散，扰乱了他们的生活。
据报道，政府在西藏自治区和邻近省份任意拘留一些藏人，进行类似的政治改造和强迫监狱劳动。据报道，当局还对一些佛教神职人员进行政治改造活动，并将寺院改成工厂，强迫他们劳动。在其他地方，被关在司法管教设施的宗教和政治活动人士继续报告说，在审前拘留期间和刑事判决之外存在强迫劳动。政府强迫基督徒和其他宗教团体的成员劳动，作为拘留中意识形态灌输的一部分。幸存者报告说，他们被迫在砖窑、食品加工中心以及制造服装和家庭用品的工厂工作。执法人员未经正当程序，以卖淫罪将一些中国和外籍妇女拘留在“管教”中心。她们在那里被强迫劳动。国际媒体报道，地方当局强迫儿童参加一些政府支持的勤工俭学计划，在工厂工作。
人贩子在至少60个其他国家里将中国男女和儿童置于强迫劳动和性贩运之中。他们迫使中国男女和女孩在海外华人社区的餐馆、商店、农业企业和工厂中工作。一些人得到保证，会向他们提供国外工作，但一抵达海外就被限制在私人家中，在带有强迫劳动性质的条件下被迫从事电话诈骗。在非洲和南美洲的中国男子在建筑工地、煤矿、铜矿和其它采矿产业中受到虐待，受到带有强迫劳动性质的对待，比如拖欠工资、限制行动、扣押护照和身体虐待等。在刚果民主共和国的中国人拥有的采矿企业中，刚果男子和男孩经历了带有强迫劳动性质的情况。人贩子在世界各地将中国妇女和女孩置于性贩运之中，包括在主要城市、建筑工地、偏远的采矿场和伐木场，以及中国流动工人高度集中的地区。在国外活动的中国人贩子也强迫当地居民在非洲、地中海地区和南美洲的几个国家卖淫。据报道，中国男子在柬埔寨和蒙古从事儿童性旅游。
中国人贩子强迫来自邻近亚洲国家、非洲和美洲的妇女和儿童在中国境内劳动，以及置于性贩运之中。人贩子向非洲和南美洲妇女保证在中国有合法工作，但是在她们抵达时强迫她们卖淫。中国政府的计划生育政策和在文化上对儿子的偏好造成中国117名男孩与100名女孩的性别比例失衡。观察人士认为这种情况继续推动对卖淫的需求，以及中国男性对外国新娘的需求，这两者都可能通过强力或者胁迫手段获得。人贩子通过婚姻中介绑架或招募妇女和女孩，将她们运到中国，在那里一些人遭遇性贩运或强迫劳动。非法中介越来越多地提供方便，促进南亚、东南亚、东北亚和非洲妇女和女孩与中
国男子的强迫婚姻和假结婚，费用高达3万美元。这些男子（有时与他们的父母合伙）往往会承担巨额债务以支付这些费用，他们试图通过强迫“新娘”劳动或者卖淫来偿还。据报道，一些中国男子绕过这种中介制度，直接前往东南亚各国首都，与当地妇女和女孩合法结婚，然后返回中国，强迫她们卖淫。还有报道说，中国男子和他们的父母在中国欺骗东南亚妇女和女孩假结婚，然后禁锢她们，强迫纳妾，包括强奸导致被迫怀孕。如果强迫纳妾导致分娩，男子及其父母有时会以孩子为要挟来保持该妇女的强迫劳动或性奴役，或者利用该妇女的移民身份作为胁迫，劝阻她们向当局报告虐待行为。
许多在中国非法居住的朝鲜难民和寻求庇护者特别容易遭受贩运。人贩子在一些朝鲜妇女抵达中国后引诱，提供毒品，拘押或者绑架她们，迫使她们在妓院、互联网性爱网站或者强迫婚姻中卖淫。人贩子还迫使这些妇女干农活，在夜总会和卡拉OK酒吧当女招待，受到家庭奴役和在工厂里被迫劳动。据媒体和2018年的一份非政府组织报告，朝鲜政府让朝鲜公民在中国从事强迫劳动，作为其核扩散融资系统的一部分，中国官员对此可能知情，这包括在酒店、餐馆和远程网络运营中的强迫劳动。

China (TIER 3)
The Government of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) does not fully meet the minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking and is not making significant efforts to do so; therefore China remained on Tier 3. Despite the lack of significant efforts, the government took some steps to address trafficking, including by continuing to cooperate with international authorities to address forced and fraudulent marriages in China, a key trafficking vulnerability for foreign women and girls, and by continuing to seek accountability for officials complicit in commercial sex crimes that may have included sex trafficking. However, state-sponsored forced labor intensified under the government’s mass detention and political indoctrination campaign against members of Muslim ethnic minority groups in Xinjiang, and authorities reportedly subjected Tibetans and other ethno-religious groups to similar conditions. For the second consecutive year, the government did not report identifying any trafficking victims or referring them to protective services. Authorities detained women arrested on suspicion of prostitution, sometimes for months and without screening for trafficking, and often forcibly returned foreign victims to their traffickers after they escaped and reported their abuses.
PRIORITIZED RECOMMENDATIONS:End forced labor in government facilities, in nongovernmental facilities converted to government detention centers, and by government officials outside of the penal process. • Abolish the arbitrary detention and forced labor of persons in internment camps in Xinjiang and immediately release the individuals detained therein. • Cease discriminatory hiring and targete displacement policies putting Muslim and other minority communities at risk of trafficking. • Respecting due process, vigorously investigate, prosecute, and impose prison sentences on perpetrators of forced labor and sex trafficking, including complicit government officials. • Update the legal framework to fully criminalize all forms of trafficking, including the facilitation of “prostitution” involving children younger than the age of 18. • Institute and systematize proactive, formal procedures to identify trafficking victims throughout the country—including labor trafficking victims, Chinese victims returning from abroad, and victims among vulnerable groups, such as migrant workers, foreign women, and Chinese women and children arrested on “prostitution” charges—and train front-line officers on their implementation. • Cease penalization of victims for unlawful acts their traffickers compelled them to commit. • Immediately screen individuals suspected of prostitution offenses for sex trafficking indicators and refer identified victims to protection services. • Ensure authorities do not subject trafficking victims to extended detention, punishment, or deportation. • Expand victim protection services, including comprehensive counseling and medical, reintegration, and other rehabilitative assistance for male and female victims of sex and labor trafficking. •Provide legal alternatives to foreign victims’ removal to countries where they would face hardship or retribution, particularly North Korea. • Increase the transparency of government efforts to combat trafficking and provide disaggregated data on investigations and prosecutions, victim identification, and service provision, including by continuing to share relevant data with international partners.
PROSECUTIONThe government decreased law enforcement efforts. The criminal code criminalized some forms of sex trafficking and labor trafficking. Various provisions of the criminal code could be used to prosecute sex trafficking offenses. Article 240 criminalized “the abduction and sale of women or children,” which included abduction by deceit, kidnapping, purchasing, selling, sending, receiving, and transferring for the purpose of sale; however, unlike the definition of trafficking in persons under international law, Article 240 did not explicitly link these acts to a purpose of exploitation. Article 240 prescribed penalties of five to 10 years’ imprisonment and fines for the abduction and sale of women and children. If an abducted woman was then forced into prostitution, the penalties increased to 10 years to life imprisonment, fines, and confiscation of property. These penalties were sufficiently stringent and commensurate with the penalties prescribed for other serious crimes, such as rape. Article 241 criminalized the purchase of abducted women or children and prescribed a maximum penalty of three years’ imprisonment, short-term detention, or controlled release; like Article 240, it did not require the purchase be for the purpose of exploitation. Penalties under this provision were not alone sufficiently stringent; however, Article 241 stipulated that if an individual purchased an abducted woman or child and then subjected them to “forcible sexual relations,” they would face additional penalties under the criminal code’s rape provisions. Article 358 criminalized forced prostitution and prescribed penalties of five to 10 years’ imprisonment; if the offense involved a child under the age of 14, the penalties increased to 10 years to life in addition to fines or confiscation of property. These penalties were sufficiently stringent and commensurate with the penalties prescribed for other serious crimes, such as rape. Article 359 criminalized harboring prostitution or luring or introducing others into prostitution, and it prescribed a maximum of five years’ imprisonment and a fine; if the offense involved a girl under the age of 14, it prescribed a minimum of five years’ imprisonment and a fine. These penalties were sufficiently stringent; however, the penalties prescribed for offenses involving girls 14 to 17 years of age were not commensurate with the penalties prescribed for other serious crimes, such as rape. Labor trafficking offenses could be prosecuted under Article 244, which criminalized forcing a person “to work by violence, threat, or restriction of personal freedom” and recruiting, transporting, or otherwise assisting in forcing others to labor, and prescribed three to 10 years’ imprisonment and a fine. These penalties were sufficiently stringent.
The central government did not capture or report comprehensive law enforcement data, and it continued to report statistics for crimes outside the definition of trafficking according to international law (including migrant smuggling, child abduction, forced marriage, and fraudulent adoption), making it difficult to assess progress. For the second consecutive year, the Ministry of Public Security (MPS) did not report the number of investigations initiated into possible trafficking cases (1,004 in 2016), although media reports suggested authorities continued to investigate some cases. Data published by the Supreme People’s Court (SPC) indicated it prosecuted and concluded at least 634 trafficking cases (1,146 in 2017), culminating in 1,252 individuals convicted (1,556 in 2017 and 1,756 in 2016); this included 1,252 convictions for the trafficking of women and children, 833 convictions for forced prostitution, and 35 convictions for forced labor. Authorities did not disaggregate conviction data by the relevant criminal code statutes. As in prior years, courts prosecuted the vast majority of these cases under Article 358—especially for those involving commercial sexual exploitation—rather than under Article 240. The government did not provide sentencing data, but media reports indicated penalties imposed in at least one forced labor case ranged from one to six years’ imprisonment. In previous years, media reported penalties ranging from five months’ imprisonment with fines of 74,000 renminbi ($10,760) to life imprisonment.
The government handled most cases with indicators of forced labor as administrative issues through the Ministry of Justice and seldom initiated prosecutions of such cases under anti- trafficking statutes. Authorities engaged in law enforcement cooperation with foreign governments, investigating cases of Chinese citizens subjected to trafficking in Burma, Cambodia, Cyprus, Macau, and Singapore; as part of similar efforts in previous years, Chinese authorities attempted to extradite—and criminally charge—Chinese and Taiwanese individuals subjected to forced labor in Europe. During the reporting period, the government increased its consultative partnerships with Lao, Mongolian, and Vietnamese law enforcement authorities to jointly address trafficking via the forced and fraudulent marriage of their citizens to Chinese individuals. Some law enforcement personnel in neighboring countries reported their Chinese counterparts were unresponsive to requests for bilateral cooperation on cross-border trafficking cases, while others reported China’s cumbersome law enforcement bureaucracy hindered joint operations.
The government did not provide data on specific law enforcement trainings, unlike in prior years. However, according to an international organization, the government allocated increased funding to co-host capacity-building training for law enforcement and judicial officials on investigating and prosecuting trafficking cases. During the reporting period, China launched a nationwide campaign to investigate corrupt local officials and police officers allegedly using their influence to shield or profit from criminal organizations engaged in prostitution rings; this included efforts to address sex trafficking. Officials found guilty through this process reportedly faced expulsion from the Chinese Communist Party, termination of their official positions, fines, and referral to the judicial system. However, authorities did not provide statistics on the number of investigations, prosecutions, or convictions resulting from this campaign. Despite continued reports of law enforcement officials benefiting from, permitting, or directly facilitating sex trafficking and forced labor, the government did not report any investigations, prosecutions, or convictions of law enforcement officials allegedly involved in the crime. Central, provincial, and local government officials were also reportedly complicit—with impunity—in forced labor as part of China’s mass detention and political indoctrination campaign against members of Muslim ethnic minority groups, and authorities reportedly subjected Tibetans and members of other ethno-religious groups to similar abuses.
PROTECTIONThe government decreased efforts to protect victims. For the second consecutive year, the government did not report how many victims it identified, although media reports indicated authorities continued to remove some victims from their exploitative situations. In conjunction with an international organization, authorities co-sponsored and participated in trainings on victim identification and assistance for consular officials and law enforcement, shelter best practices, regulation of marriage migration, and interagency implementation of the national referral mechanism. MPS maintained written instructions promulgated in 2016 for law enforcement officers throughout the country aiming to clarify procedures for identifying trafficking victims among individuals in prostitution and forced or fraudulent marriage. MPS officials reportedly maintained a procedure to screen for trafficking indicators among individuals arrested for alleged prostitution. A 2016 policy limiting the detention of such individuals to 72 hours remained in place. Despite the existence of these procedures, and contrary to the aforementioned policy, law enforcement officials continued to arrest and detain foreign women on suspicion of prostitution crimes without screening them for indicators of sex trafficking—sometimes for as long as four months—before deporting them for immigration violations. In some cases, rural border officials received reports involving the sex trafficking and forced labor of Burmese and Mongolian women and girls via forced and fraudulent marriage to Chinese men, then provided them with temporary shelter and helped to fund and escort their repatriation. However, observers noted this assistance was ad hoc and less prevalent among front-line officers working farther inland, where some foreign victims escaped, reported these abusive circumstances to the authorities, and were summarily arrested and forcibly returned to their Chinese “husbands”—sometimes in exchange for bribes from the men’s families. Because authorities did not universally implement the national referral mechanism across law enforcement efforts, it was likely police arrested and detained unidentified Chinese trafficking victims for unlawful acts their traffickers compelled them to commit.
In prior years, the government reported maintaining at least 10 shelters specifically dedicated to care for Chinese trafficking victims, as well as eight shelters for foreign trafficking victims and more than 2,300 multi-purpose shelters nationwide that could accommodate trafficking victims; it did not provide information on these shelters in 2018. The Ministry of Civil Affairs, a nationwide women’s organization, and grassroots NGOs could provide victims with shelter, medical care, counseling, social services, and—in some cases—rehabilitation services. Access to specialized care depended heavily on victims’ location and gender; male victims were far less likely to receive care. The government did not report how many victims benefited from these services, and contacts noted widespread stigma against victims of sex trafficking likely continued to discourage many from accessing protection services. Implementation of a law placing foreign NGOs in mainland China under MPS supervision continued to impose burdensome requirements and restrictions on the activities of civil society organizations— including those able to provide services for trafficking victims and communities vulnerable to the crime. Foreign embassies in China reportedly provided shelter or other protective services to victims. Authorities did not condition access to victim care on cooperation with law enforcement, but they did require victims to provide information to police. The law entitled victims to request criminal prosecution and claim compensation through civil lawsuits against their traffickers; the government did not report whether any victims benefited from this provision. The judicial system did not require victims to testify against their traffickers in court and allowed prosecutors to submit previously recorded statements as evidence.
The efficacy of the government’s previously reported victim assistance abroad—including its eight border liaison offices with Burma, Laos, and Vietnam, along with victim funds, hotlines, and government-to-government agreements to assist victims—was unclear. Authorities reported repatriating a number of victims in 2018 but did not provide further information, including whether they were Chinese or foreign. International civil society groups reported China’s diplomatic missions were often unresponsive to complaints filed by Chinese victims of forced labor overseas, particularly in Japan. The government did not undertake efforts to identify trafficking victims within its highly vulnerable North Korean migrant population, nor did it provide suspected North Korean trafficking victims with legal alternatives to repatriation. Authorities continued to detain North Korean asylum-seekers and forcibly returned some to North Korea, where they faced severe punishment or death, including in North Korean forced labor camps; the government did not report screening these individuals for indicators of trafficking. In compliance with an UN Security Council Resolution, the government reportedly repatriated some North Korean labor migrants; Chinese authorities did not screen them for trafficking indicators or offer options to legally remain in the country.
PREVENTIONThe government maintained minimal efforts to prevent trafficking and carried out policies that perpetuated widespread forced labor. Authorities held a sixth annual inter-ministerial meeting to coordinate anti-trafficking efforts. MPS continued to coordinate the anti-trafficking interagency process and led interagency efforts to implement the National Action Plan on Combatting Human Trafficking, including ongoing research into the efficacy of national efforts to combat the crime. For the second consecutive year, the government did not report the extent to which it funded anti-trafficking activities in furtherance of the action plan (more than 55 million renminbi ($8 million) in 2016). It used traditional and social media and distributed posters and other materials at transportation and community centers to increase general understanding of the issue, including among vulnerable rural communities. The municipal government of at least one major city funded anti-trafficking films. Academics and experts noted the gender imbalance created by the previous One-Child Policy likely continued to contribute to trafficking crimes in China. The government reportedly began a series of pilot programs to enable Cambodian and Vietnamese citizens to enter legally into southern China for work in hopes of stemming illicit labor migration through especially porous sections of the border; the extent to which this mitigated trafficking vulnerabilities—or to which it was implemented—was unknown.
The government hukou (household registration) system continued to contribute to the vulnerability of internal migrants by limiting employment opportunities and reducing access to social services, particularly for Chinese victims returning from exploitation abroad. The government continued to address some of these vulnerabilities by requiring local governments to provide a mechanism for migrant workers to obtain residency permits. However, these residency permits were disproportionately unavailable to China’s minorities, exacerbating their constrained access to employment and social services. The government made some efforts to reduce the demand for commercial sex. The government reported efforts to reduce forced labor by including language in written agreements with foreign businesses and countries explicitly prohibiting trafficking, but authorities were generally unresponsive to allegations of ensuing forced labor. The government did not report investigating or prosecuting any Chinese citizens for child sex tourism, despite widespread reports of the crime.
TRAFFICKING PROFILEAs reported over the past five years, human traffickers subject domestic and foreign individuals to trafficking in China, and they subject Chinese individuals to trafficking abroad. Traffickers also use China as a transit point to subject foreign individuals to trafficking in other countries throughout Asia and in international maritime industries. Well-organized criminal syndicates and local gangs subject Chinese women and girls to sex trafficking within China. Traffickers typically recruit them from rural areas and take them to urban centers, using a combination of fraudulent job offers and coercion by imposing large travel fees, confiscating passports, confining victims, or physically and financially threatening victims to compel their engagement in commercial sex. China’s national household registry system (hukou) continues to restrict rural inhabitants’ freedom to legally change their workplace or residence, placing China’s internal migrant population—estimated to exceed 180 million men, women, and children—at high risk of forced labor in brick kilns, coal mines, and factories. Some of these businesses operate illegally and take advantage of lax government enforcement. African and Asian men reportedly experience conditions indicative of forced labor aboard Chinese- flagged fishing vessels operating in the Atlantic Ocean; men from other regions may be in forced labor aboard these vessels as well. Women and girls from South Asia, Southeast Asia, and several countries in Africa experience domestic servitude, forced concubinism leading to forced childbearing, and sex trafficking via forced and fraudulent marriage to Chinese men. Traffickers target adults and children with developmental disabilities and children whose parents have left them with relatives to migrate to the cities—estimated at more than 60 million—and subject them to forced labor and forced begging. State bodies subject members of Muslim minority groups to forced labor as part of arbitrary mass detention and political indoctrination schemes.
State-sponsored forced labor is increasingly prevalent in China. In 2013, the National People’s Congress ratified a decision to abolish “Re-education through labor” (RTL), a punitive system that subjected individuals to extra-judicial detention involving forced labor, from which the government reportedly profited. The government closed most RTL facilities by October 2015; however, the government reportedly converted some RTL facilities into state-sponsored drug rehabilitation facilities or administrative detention centers where, according to civil society and media reports, forced labor continues.
State-sponsored forced labor is intensifying under the government’s mass detention and political indoctrination campaign against Muslim minorities in the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region (Xinjiang). Authorities have arbitrarily detained more than one million ethnic Muslims, including Uighurs, ethnic Kazakhs, and Kyrgyz, in as many as 1,200 “vocational training centers”—internment camps designed to erase ethno-religious identities. According to civil society reports derived from interviews with survivors and family members of current detainees, the government subjects many of these individuals to forced labor in on-site or adjacent factories producing garments, carpets, cleaning supplies, and other goods for domestic and possibly international distribution. Authorities offer subsidies incentivizing Chinese companies to open factories in close proximity to the internment camps, and local governments receive additional funds for each inmate forced to work in these sites at a fraction of minimum wage or without any compensation. A small number of Han Chinese individuals may also be in detention within this system. Reports indicate the government has begun transporting thousands of people arbitrarily detained in Xinjiang to other provinces for forced labor.
Authorities in some localities also subject the families of men arbitrarily detained in Xinjiang to forced labor in their absence. Authorities are increasingly placing the young children of interned Muslims in Xinjiang in state-run boarding schools, orphanages, and “child welfare guidance centers,” and forcing them to participate in political indoctrination activities and report on their families’ religious activities. Authorities reportedly place older children among these groups in vocational schools, where some may be victims of forced labor. Some Kazakhstani and Kyrgyzstani citizens are arbitrarily detained while visiting family in Xinjiang; their children, now unaccompanied abroad, are also at elevated risk of trafficking.
Xinjiang authorities issued a notice in 2017 abolishing rural obligatory labor under the hashar system, in which thousands of Uighur adults and children were reportedly subjected to forced labor in government infrastructure projects and agriculture each year. Despite this policy change, similar forms of state- sponsored forced labor continue in Xinjiang, including under the auspices of the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps (Bingtuan)—an economic and paramilitary organization with administrative control over several areas in the province. Bingtuan regiments manage at least 36 agricultural prison farms throughout Xinjiang; unlike the aforementioned mass detention campaign, this system primarily subjects Han Chinese inmates— many of whom may be victims of arbitrary detention—to forced labor. Bingtuan authorities also force inmates to build new prison facilities in several areas of the province and may subject inmates to forced labor in coal and asbestos mining. There are also reports of children in forced cotton picking under direction of the Bingtuan. The impact of formal discriminatory employment policies barring Uighurs from jobs in many sectors—including in the annual cotton harvest—reportedly drives thousands of Uighur farmers out of their communities in search of alternative work, placing them at higher risk of forced labor. The same is true of the government’s targeted forced- displacement programs, including the Bingtuan’s construction of new settlements designated for ethnic Han internal migrants, which reportedly disperses Uighur communities and disrupts their livelihoods.
The government reportedly subjects some Tibetans to arbitrary detention featuring similar political indoctrination and forced prison labor practices in the Tibet Autonomous Region (Tibet) and in neighboring provinces. Authorities also reportedly subject some Buddhist clerics to political indoctrination activities and forced labor in monasteries repurposed as factories. Elsewhere, religious and political activists held in legal education facilities continue to report forced labor occurring in pretrial detention and outside of penal sentences. The government subjects Christians and members of other religious groups to forced labor as part of detention for the purpose of ideological indoctrination; survivors report having been forced to work in brick kilns, food processing centers, and factories manufacturing clothing and housewares. Law enforcement officials detain some Chinese and foreign women on prostitution charges without due process in “custody and education” centers, where they are subjected to forced labor. International media report local authorities force children in some government-supported work-study programs to work in factories.
Traffickers subject Chinese men, women, and children to forced labor and sex trafficking in at least 60 other countries. They force Chinese men, women, and girls to work in restaurants, shops, agricultural operations, and factories in overseas Chinese communities. Some are promised jobs abroad and confined to private homes upon arrival overseas, held in conditions indicative of forced labor, and compelled to conduct telephone scams. Chinese men in Africa and South America experience abuse at construction sites, in coal and copper mines, and in other extractive industries, where they face conditions indicative of forced labor, such as non-payment of wages, restrictions on movement, withholding of passports, and physical abuse. Congolese men and boys experience conditions indicative of forced labor in Chinese-owned mining operations in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Traffickers subject Chinese women and girls to sex trafficking throughout the world, including in major cities, construction sites, remote mining and logging camps, and areas with high concentrations of Chinese migrant workers. Chinese traffickers operating abroad also subject local populations to forced prostitution in several countries in Africa, the Mediterranean region, and South America. Chinese men reportedly engage in child sex tourism in Cambodia and Mongolia.
Chinese traffickers subject women and children from neighboring Asian countries, Africa, and the Americas to forced labor and sex trafficking within China. Traffickers promise African and South American women legitimate jobs in China and force them into prostitution upon arrival. The Chinese government’s birth-limitation policy and a cultural preference for sons created a skewed sex ratio of 117 boys to 100 girls in China, which observers assert continues to drive the demand for prostitution and for foreign women as brides for Chinese men—both of which may be procured by force or coercion. Traffickers kidnap or recruit women and girls through marriage brokers and transport them to China, where some are subjected to sex trafficking or forced labor. Illicit brokers increasingly facilitate the forced and fraudulent marriage of South Asian, Southeast Asian, Northeast Asian, and African women and girls to Chinese men for fees of up $30,000. The men—sometimes in partnership with their parents—often incur large debts to cover these fees, which they attempt to recover by subjecting the “brides” to forced labor or prostitution. Some Chinese men are reportedly circumventing this brokerage system by traveling to Southeast Asian capitals and entering into legal marriages with local women and girls, then returning to China and compelling them into prostitution. There are also reports of Chinese men and their parents deceiving Southeast Asian women and girls into fraudulent marriages in China, then confining them in forced concubinism involving rape leading to forced pregnancy. In cases where this forced concubinism leads to childbirth, the men and their parents sometimes use the children as collateral to retain the women’s forced labor or sexual slavery, or use the women’s immigration status as coercion to dissuade them from reporting their abuses to the authorities.
Many North Korean refugees and asylum-seekers living illegally in China are particularly vulnerable to trafficking. Traffickers lure, drug, detain, or kidnap some North Korean women upon their arrival in China and compel them into prostitution in brothels, through internet sex sites, or in relation to forced marriage. Traffickers also subject these women to forced labor in agriculture, as hostesses in nightclubs and karaoke bars, in domestic servitude, and at factories. According to media and a 2018 NGO report, the North Korean government subjects North Korean citizens to forced labor in China as part of its proliferation finance system, possibly with the knowledge of Chinese officials; this includes forced labor in hotels, restaurants, and in remote cyber operations.