资料照片：2019年11月7日，助理国务卿史迪威在北京历史悠久的钟楼前。 
美国国务院
东亚和太平洋事务局
助理国务卿史达伟（David R. Stilwell）的讲话
布鲁金斯学会
2019年12月2日
美国、中国以及国际事务中的多元主义（The U.S., China, and Pluralism in International Affairs）
 
[讲话预备稿]
下午好。感谢布鲁金斯学会（Brookings Institution）对我的邀请。
我今天应邀讲话的主题是中华人民共和国，及其塑造全球秩序的意图。
我将很快地回顾一下我们的政策，然后引出一个我们在思考这一挑战时不断在头脑中出现的主题。这个主题就是多元主义。
首先，让我们谈一谈政策。显而易见的是，特朗普政府（Trump Administration）对美国在印度-太平洋（Indo-Pacific）地区的政策作出了早应有的改变。中国是一个重大考量，但我们和多种多样的志同道合的盟友和伙伴的关系也同样重要。
40年前，中华人民共和国从其在意识形态上自我实行的孤立和经济贫弱中开始实现发展。“改革开放”——重点在“开放”——要求中国共产党必须针对更广泛的地区及世界作出调整，以便从多边主义中获益。我们都知道这需要时间，但我们都为1980年代的重大进展感到鼓舞。
当时有许多充满希望的迹象：我在1988年首次访问北京时，看到了私营企业的起步，以及它所释放出的人的能量和创造力，这从天安门广场往南一点的一个小饺子馆中体现出来。你知道它与众不同，因为这个试验性的餐馆不把顾客当成麻烦，而是主动吸引顾客。那里的饺子是热腾腾的，啤酒是凉丝丝的，服务非常周到，特别是与旁边一家国营餐馆相比。
基于这些最初的有希望的迹象，美国的政策多年来都基本是根据一种黄金准则（Golden Rule）设定。美国官员希望，通过显示开放的益处能促使北京走上一条更加自由化的道路，进一步走向经济和政治开放。
但事实表明，我们的很多乐观假设都是错误的。“中国将继续向进一步开放而努力”的承诺在加入世贸组织（WTO）20年后仍是空话，引发了对有关中华人民共和国、其野心以及我们的反响的早就应有的重新思考。本届政府现在正在根据其现状，而不是长期以来我们希望出现的情况，来应对中国。
我们在过去20年中看到的情况是，自由化改革有所减缓甚至出现倒退。随着中华人民共和国获得更大的财富和实力，并与世界更加融合，它并没有像预期的那样与自由、开放的全球秩序接轨。反之，中国共产党想要重塑国际体制，使其变得与它自己的专制做法更为兼容。
特朗普政府一贯明确表示，尽管我们同中国的关系是竞争性的，但我们仍在利益一致的领域欢迎合作。竞争不必造成对抗或冲突。我们对中国人民深怀尊重，而且还有作为贸易伙伴甚至盟友的长期合作史——这种历史是最早让我对中国产生兴趣的原因。
因此，我们的目标是捍卫美国的主权，增进我们的地区利益，并在亚洲和全世界提倡自由、开放、基于规则的秩序。
美国最近在看法和政策上的转变引发了一些疑问。如果“负责任的利益相关方”的说法已被现实淘汰，那么取代它的是什么？我们知道华盛顿（Washington）反对北京的挑衅性或威胁性行为，但华盛顿支持的是什么？在同中国的竞争中，华盛顿是否在迫使各国作出选择？
“多元主义”一词当然不是对所有这些问题的完整答案。但它有助于我们应对所有问题，因为在谈论对世界秩序的不同构想时，它抓住了我们所说的某种精髓。
根据词典释义，多元主义是指多种事物共存——不论是国家、团体、原则、意见，还是生活方式。简而言之，就是多样性和开放性。
我的观点是，在外交方面，美国的对外政策理念根植于国内的民主多元，在海外也支持相应的多元——在印度-太平洋地区以及整个世界。在国内和国外，我们都支持以自由、法治以及尊重邻人的权利为原则的多元体制。而且，正如我们在国内的多元理念植根于个人的主权，我们在海外的多元理念也同样植根于各国的主权。
这世世代代一直都是美国的理念。我们今天面临挑战，与过去一样，是因为对多元的认识欣赏并不是普世存在，因此我们必须予以捍卫。
我们都听说过一种全球治理的“新型”构想。它贬低多元主义，尽管现行体制在第二次世界大战（World War II）以来的70年中一直极好地服务于世界——包括中国在内。
让我们来看看具体内容。
美国支持一个多元的亚洲。
在一个多元的亚洲，该地区的不同国家都能按照自己的意愿不断繁荣发展。他们在各自的主权自治中都有安全保障。他们都能自由地按自己的方式发展，正如新加坡的李光耀（Lee Kwan Yew）所言。任何一个霸权国家都不能对他们称霸或胁迫。
在一个多元的亚洲，各国都有对全球公共资源的开放共享使用。国际水域和空域属于所有人。任何一个国家都不能将其变成一个独自占有的或者排斥他方的特区。
多元主义对于我们有关自由、开放的印度-太平洋的理念至关重要，正如特朗普总统两年前在岘港（Da Nang）所言：该地区的国家应当一直是一组多种多样的星座，每一个都闪闪发光，任何一个都不是其他人的卫星。
必须认识到，该地区国家自身都很珍视这一理念。
我们了解这一点，例如，最近的《东盟对印太地区的展望》（ASEAN Outlook on Indo-Pacific）强调了“包容性”，敦促对该地区所有国家，不论大小，都予以尊重。我们从《东盟宪章》（ASEAN Charter）中了解到这一点，宪章呼吁信守“多元一体”的原则。
我们还从日本的自由及开放的印度-太平洋（Free and Open Indo-Pacific）愿景、韩国的新南政策（New Southern Policy）、印度的东进（Act East）政策以及澳大利亚的印度-太平洋概念中了解到这一点：大家都着重于在所有国家间拓展关系，基于法治以及对主权的尊重，共享公共资源以及共同繁荣。
美国支持多元主义，不仅在印度-太平洋地区，而且在全球各地。
在二战之后，美国领导建立了一种战后国际秩序，其多元和自由程度都是空前的。在一战有缺陷的和平之后，二战后的制度旨在让战胜者和战败者都能受益，让所有人都在国际论坛上有平等的发言权。这些措施的目的是通过确保和平和繁荣能够共享，来制止世界大战再度发生。与人类的一切努力一样，它并不完美，但整体而言取得了惊人的成功。
正如特朗普总统在对联合国（United Nations）的讲话中所说，“美国精神的一种永恒信誉体现在，即使我们和我们的盟国从历史上最血腥的战争中获胜，我们也没有寻求领土扩张，也不试图将我们的生活方式强加于人。相反，我们帮助建立了像这个机构这样的机制，捍卫所有人的主权、安全与繁荣。”
这种真正的双赢方针带动了世界前所未有的最突飞猛进的繁荣。这种繁荣自然地扩展到全球各地愿意加入世界经济的国家。人们抓住了机会。大国并没有作宗主般的慷慨施予。
我们的方针反映了美国深信的观念，即公平行事意味着要有真正的双赢机制。遵守规则能使各方受益。生活并非一定是零和博弈。我的强大繁荣不是要求你弱小贫穷。
这也是我们处理国际关系的方式。我们不认为只是因为世界上其他人在赚钱或者有实力，我们就变衰弱或贫穷。相反，我们认为，其他人的见地可以让我们受益，其他人的强大可以让世界更安全，其他人的财富意味着，他们将造出我们想购买的东西和购买我们想出售的东西。这种正和，即相互增益式的思维方式，在本质上就具有多元性。
这就是为什么美国从未谋求成为亚洲或世界的唯一强权。1991年苏联共产主义的垮台，使美国成为（至少在一个时期内）世界上唯一一个所谓超级大国，但是我们没有利用这种地位压低其他国家。相反，我们对其他国家的发展给予重大投资——其中包括中国、日本、印度等等，以便其他地方，而不仅仅是在国内，更加繁荣富强。
这就是多元主义——或者用政治学的术语说“多极化”。我们不畏惧也不反对这种多极化。相反，我们培养它。我们希望其他国家在国际事务中扮演重要角色，尊重共同的国际规则体系，分担维护保障世界安全的责任。
美国不反对其他国家的实力增长和繁荣。我们不视它为一种零和问题或威胁。问问邓小平就行！
正像历史学家潘文（John Pomfret）所记述的，在1979年关系正常化后邓小平飞往美国进行首次历史性访问时，他的外交部长问，为什么他将美国作为上任后的第一个出访国家。邓小平说，因为美国的盟国都富有和强大，如果中国想富强，需要美国。
这里也有可以汲取的中国自身的多元经历。
当中国朝着政治和政策更加多元发展时，它走在改革开放时代的更好轨道上。
我在前门附近简陋的饺子馆里亲眼看到了这点。当时许多人都喜欢引用邓小平非常务实的说法，不管黑猫白猫，抓住老鼠就是好猫。“百花齐放！”
扩大多元和减少专制会对中国人民更有利，对世界更有利。较少专制的中国很可能有较少的海外野心。
但是 ，新型治理观念中反映出专制在加强，在该地区以至更远的地方。
中华人民共和国官员自己解释了北京的“新型”治理观念。我认为，2010年，时任外交部长杨洁篪在东盟会议上的一个讲话中，概括出北京对地区秩序的看法。他说，“中国是一个大国，其他国家是小国，而这就是事实。”对北京来说，国际关系意味着等级制，谁大谁就正确。这不尊重多元，也不尊重主权自治。
在中国国内，共产党越来越强化在政治、种族、文化、数字和意识形态上的一统化。就像在新疆和香港以及其他地方正在日益显明的，北京的治理观念是一统化。
在全球层面，北京如何看待多元？考虑一下它对NBA单独一名主管发推文发表了它不欢迎的对香港的看法所作的反应吧。显然，北京推动的意识形态一统化不以中国边界为限。
在结束前，我想谈谈多元与选择的密切关系。
如果多元世界让各个国家可以自由地做他们自己，那就意味他们有作选择的自由。多元与选择相辅相成。
现在让我们来考虑一下经常听到的一种担忧，即许多国家要被迫在美国和中国之间作出选择。我希望各位知道，美国不会强迫他们作这种选择。当我们说美国的理念是多元和包容时，我们是认真的，我们的历史说明了这点。我们希望与北京有友好关系，而且如果其他国家同样致力于以合作友好的方式与北京打交道，我们不反对。
然而，在我们的对外关系中，各国都不断就事关自身利益和福祉的政策问题——经济、贸易、技术、安全等等——作出选择。我们鼓励盟国和伙伴谨慎选择，保护各自的主权国家利益。
主权国家意味着生活不受外部主宰，根据自身法律行事，决策自主。我们不寻求指使他人，我们希望盟国和友邦不受制于其他任何人的指使。
选择主权意义重大，因为没有它，就可能完全失去选择的自由。选择保护主权就是选择保护未来的选择自由，这是我们所有人都珍视的。一个各国保持自身选择自由的地区，就是多元的地区，并且将成为一个更繁荣和安全的地区。
我将重新回到我们的政策上，以此结束讲话。美国长期以来的观点是，战后国际体系具有足够的承受力和适应力——有足够的多元——来接纳并高兴地吸收一个按规则行事的强大和繁荣的中国；这些规则为全球有效服务了70年。这个体系有能力改变，实际上已经针对几十年前不可想象的许多主张和压力作了调整。
我们今天仍然希望，北京将回到改革与聚合的道路上来。在国内外更加尊重多元将是一个令人欢迎的迹象。
谢谢各位。现在我期待接受提问。

REMARKS
DAVID R. STILWELL, ASSISTANT SECRETARYBUREAU OF EAST ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS
BROOKINGS INSTITUTION
DECEMBER 2, 2019
As Prepared
Good afternoon. Thank you to the Brookings Institution for inviting me.
I’ve been asked to speak today about the People’s Republic of China, and its intentions for shaping the global order.
I will do so by quickly reviewing our policy, and then drawing out a theme that keeps coming to mind as we consider the challenge. That theme is pluralism.
First off, let’s talk policy. It’s obvious that the Trump Administration has made long-overdue changes to U.S. policy in the Indo-Pacific region. China is a major consideration, but so is our relationship with a diverse set of like-minded allies and partners.
Forty years ago, the PRC began to grow from its ideologically self-imposed isolation and economic weakness. “Reform and opening”—emphasis on “opening”—required the Chinese Communist Party to adapt to the larger region and world in order to benefit from multilateralism. We all understood that it would take time, but we were encouraged by significant progress in the 1980s.
There were many hopeful signs: My first trip to Beijing, in 1988, saw the beginnings of private enterprise, and the human energy and creativity it unleashed, in the form of a small dumpling restaurant just south of Tiananmen Square. You knew it was different because instead of regarding customers as a bother, this experimental shop actively sought out customers.  The dumplings were hot, the beer was cold and the service was excellent, especially when compared with the state-owned restaurant next door.
Given these initial hopeful signs, U.S. policy for many years was largely premised on a version of the Golden Rule. American officials hoped that demonstrating the benefits of openness would move Beijing onto a more liberal path that led to greater economic and political openness.
But it has become clear that many of our hopeful assumptions were wrong. Twenty years of empty post-WTO assurances that “China will continue to work toward greater openness” have triggered an overdue rethink of the PRC, its ambitions, and our response. This administration now is addressing the PRC as it is, not as we long wished it would be.
What we have seen over the past two decades is that liberal reform has slowed and even reversed. As the PRC gained greater wealth and power, and grew more integrated with the world, it did not converge with the free and open global order as expected. Instead the Chinese Communist Party hopes to reshape the international system to become more compatible with its own authoritarian practices.
The Trump Administration has been clear that, even as our relationship with the PRC is competitive, we welcome cooperation where our interests align. Competition need not lead to confrontation or conflict.  We have a deep respect for the Chinese people and there is a long history of cooperation as trading partners and even as allies—a legacy that got me interested in China in the first place.
And so our aim is to defend U.S. sovereignty, advance our regional interests, and promote the free, open, and rules-based order in Asia and worldwide.
Now the recent shift in U.S. perceptions and policy has triggered questions. If the “responsible stakeholder” notion has been overtaken by reality, what replaces it? We know Washington is against aggressive or threatening conduct by Beijing, but what is Washington for? In competing with the PRC, is Washington forcing countries to choose?
The word “pluralism” is not the complete answer to all such questions, of course. But it helps us address all of them because it captures something essential about what we mean when we talk about divergent visions of world order.
In dictionary terms, pluralism is about the coexistence of multiple things—whether states, groups, principles, opinions, or ways of life. In short: diversity, openness.
My point, in diplomatic terms, is that America’s foreign-policy vision, which is rooted in democratic pluralism at home, supports a corresponding pluralism abroad, too – in the Indo-Pacific region and across the world. Both at home and abroad, we support pluralistic systems governed by freedom, rule of law, and respect for the rights of one’s neighbors. And just as our vision of pluralism at home is rooted in the sovereign rights of individuals, so our vision of pluralism abroad is rooted in the sovereign rights of states.
This has been America’s vision for generations. Our challenge today, as in the past, is that the appreciation of pluralism is not universal, so we must come to its defense.
We have all heard about a “new type” vision of global governance. It denigrates pluralism, even though the existing system has served the world—China included—very well in the seven decades since World War II.
Let’s examine the details.
The United States supports a pluralistic Asia.
A pluralistic Asia is one in which the region’s diverse countries can continue to thrive as they wish. They are secure in their sovereign autonomy. They are free to be themselves, as Singapore’s Lee Kwan Yew put it. No hegemonic power dominates or coerces them.
In a pluralistic Asia, countries enjoy open and shared use of the global commons. International waters and airspace belong to all. No one country can convert them into a sole possession or a zone of exclusion.
Pluralism is essential to our vision of a free and open Indo-Pacific, as President Trump said in Da Nang two years ago: Countries in the region should remain a diverse constellation of stars, each shining brightly, and none a satellite to any other.
It is important to recognize that the region’s countries cherish that vision for themselves.
We know this, for example, from the recent ASEAN Outlook on Indo-Pacific, which emphasizes “inclusivity” to urge respect for all the region’s nations, large and small. We know it from the ASEAN Charter, which calls for upholding the principle of “unity in diversity.”
And we know it from Japan’s Free and Open Indo-Pacific vision, South Korea’s New Southern Policy, India’s Act East policy, and Australia’s Indo-Pacific concept: All focus on broadening ties among all nations, based on rule of law and respect for sovereignty, with shared access to the commons and shared prosperity.
The United States supports pluralism not just in the Indo-Pacific, but around the globe.
After World War II, the United States led in the creation of a postwar international order that was pluralistic and free to an unprecedented degree. Following the flawed peace of World War I, the post-World War II system was designed to benefit victors and vanquished alike, giving all an equal voice in an international forum. Those arrangements aimed to prevent a new world war by ensuring that peace and prosperity could be shared. As with all human endeavors, it falls short of perfection, but overall it has been a stunning success.
As President Trump has said in addressing the United Nations: “It is an eternal credit to the American character that even after we and our allies emerged victorious from the bloodiest war in history, we did not seek territorial expansion, or attempt to oppose and impose our way of life on others.  Instead, we helped build institutions such as this one to defend the sovereignty, security, and prosperity for all.”
This genuine win-win approach fueled the greatest explosion in prosperity the world has ever seen. This prosperity spread naturally around the globe to countries that opted to join the world economy. The opportunity was seized. Great powers did not dole it out as some kind of imperial largesse.
Our approach reflects a view deeply ingrained in American thinking that fair play is about genuine win-win arrangements. Everyone can benefit if the rules are obeyed. Life is not necessarily zero-sum. My being strong or prosperous does not require you to be weak or poor.
This is also how we conduct international relations. We don’t think we’re weaker or poorer just because someone else in the world simply makes money or has power. On the contrary, we think the insights of others can benefit us, that the power of others can make the world a safer place, and that the wealth of others means they’ll make things we want to buy and buy things we want to sell. Such positive-sum, synergistic thinking is inherently pluralistic.
This is why the U.S. never sought exclusive power in Asia or the world. With the collapse of Soviet Communism in 1991 the United States became (at least for a time) the world’s only so-called superpower, but we didn’t use our position to keep other countries down. On the contrary, we have invested substantially in the growth of other countries – including China, Japan, India and others – to bring about greater wealth and prosperity elsewhere, not only at home.
This is pluralism – or, in political science terms, “multipolarity.” We don’t fear or oppose such multipolarity. On the contrary, we’ve cultivated it. We want other countries to play important roles in world affairs, to respect a shared set of international rules, and to share the burdens of keeping the world safe and secure.
The U.S. does not oppose the growth in power and prosperity of other countries. We don’t view it as a zero-sum matter or a threat. Just ask Deng Xiaoping!
As the historian John Pomfret records, when Deng was flying to the U.S. for his historic first visit after normalization in 1979, his foreign minister asked him why he picked the U.S. for his first trip as leader. Because, Deng said, America’s allies are all rich and strong, and if China wanted to be rich and strong, it needed America.
There’s a lesson here, too, about China’s own experiences with pluralism.
China was on a better trajectory in its era of reform and opening, when it moved toward greater pluralism in politics and policy.
This I witnessed firsthand in that scratchy dumpling shop near Qian Men. At that time many were fond of quoting Deng Xiaoping’s very practical idea that it doesn’t matter if a cat is black or white so long as it catches mice. “Let 100 Flowers Bloom!”
More pluralism and less authoritarianism would be better for the Chinese people and better for the world. A less authoritarian China would likely be less aggressive overseas.
But the increasing authoritarianism is reflected in this New Type governance idea, in the region and beyond.
On Beijing’s “new type” governance idea, PRC officials have spoken for themselves. I think then-foreign minister Yang Jiechi summed up Beijing’s view of regional order in 2010, when he declared to an ASEAN meeting: “China is a big country and other countries are small countries, and that’s just a fact.” For Beijing, international relations is about hierarchy and big-makes-right. It is not respectful of pluralism or sovereign autonomy.
Inside China, the Communist Party increasingly enforces political, racial, cultural, digital and ideological homogeneity. As is increasingly apparent in Xinjiang, Hong Kong and beyond, Beijing’s idea of governance is enforcement of uniformity.
And at the global level, what is Beijing’s view of pluralism? Consider how it responded when a single NBA executive tweeted an unwelcome opinion about Hong Kong. Clearly Beijing’s campaign to compel ideological conformity doesn’t stop at China’s borders.
Before closing, I’d like to address the close relationship between pluralism and choice.
If a pluralistic world is one in which countries have the freedom to be themselves, that means they have the freedom to make choices. Pluralism and choice go hand-in-hand.
Now let’s consider the commonly heard concern that countries will be forced to choose between the United States and China. I want you to know, they won’t be forced to make such a choice by the United States. When we say that America’s vision is pluralistic and inclusive, we mean it, and our record shows it. We aspire to friendly relations with Beijing and have no objection if other countries similarly strive to deal with Beijing in cooperative, cordial ways.
In our foreign relations, though, all countries constantly make many choices about policy issues—economics, trade, technology, security, etc.—that affect their interests and well-being. We encourage our allies and partners to choose prudently, in ways that protect their sovereign national interests.
Sovereignty means the ability to live free of foreign domination, to live according to one’s own laws and make one’s own decisions. We’re not looking to dictate to others, and we want our allies and friends not to be subject to anyone else’s dictates.
Choosing for sovereignty is important because without it, the freedom to choose at all could be lost. Choices that preserve sovereignty are choices that preserve the future freedom of choice, which we all cherish. A region in which countries maintain their freedom of choice is a pluralistic region, and will be a more prosperous and secure one.
I’ll close by returning to our policy. It has long been America’s view that the postwar international system is sufficiently resilient and adaptable—sufficiently pluralistic—to accommodate and gladly incorporate a strong and prosperous China that plays by the rules that have served the world well for 70 years. This system is capable of change, and has in fact adapted to many ideas and pressures not imagined decades ago.
It remains our hope today that Beijing will return to the path of reform and convergence. More respect for pluralism, at home and abroad, would be a welcome sign.
Thank you. I look forward now to taking questions.