证词
史达伟，东亚和太平洋事务局助理国务卿
参议院外交关系委员会
华盛顿DC
2020年9月17日
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国务卿蓬佩奥（Pompeo）一再指出，中国是他每天一早就考虑的首要外交政策挑战。我们国务院的每一个人都以完成这项重要的工作为要务。我的证词将重点介绍我们对华政策的概况、中国共产党的全球行动和国家的对策，然后具体介绍我们在东亚和太平洋地区正在采取的措施。
事态的缘起 
多年来，我们和国际社会的运作历来以促进中国融入有章可循的国际秩序并日益推进国内的改革开放为前提。我们一度认为，中国在中国共产党统治下会履行对世界贸易组织（WTO）和其他方面的国际承诺。持续蔑视这些承诺的行为，尤其在主席习近平统治下愈益严重，说明已无法兑现上述种种期待。现在的情况明确地告诉我们和世界各地越来越越多的国家，在总书记习近平统治下的中国共产党并不想加入我们和我国盟友及伙伴几代人为之奋斗和牺牲的自由和开放的国际秩序。与此相反，中华人民共和国的对外政策和安全政策以狭隘的自我利益和专制主义价值观为中心，仅为中国共产党一个受益方服务，目的在于破坏和重塑国际环境。
今天，我们以敦本务实的态度与中国共产党进行接触，不再一厢情愿，也不再听信其巧言令色的自我标榜。国务卿蓬佩奥在2019年10月30日的讲话中对此做了总结：“无视我们两种体制间的根本差异及影响——这两种体制带来的影响，它们的差异对美国国家安全的影响——不再是现实的……今天，我们终于认识到中国共产党真正敌视美国和我们的价值观的程度 。”这就需要对中国共产党的动机和在世界各地采取的行动有一个明确的认识，不仅要求美国政府，而且包括我们的公司、我们的制度以及我们的公民。为了真正保障这方面的努力取得成功，需要我们与我们在世界各地的盟国和伙伴共同努力，认识并应对中国共产党构成的挑战。
我们还必须明确指出其中的利害关系：几代人以来美国维持在全球的领导地位，因为我们的行动惠及世界无数的国家，同时加强了国际体系。现在，中国共产党为了破坏有章可循的国际秩序无所不用其极，在世界各地耀武扬威，特别是在印度-太平洋地区。所有的国家都应该考虑到，其结果必将对全球共同体和我们共同的价值观造成不利影响。
中国共产党的侵略日益加剧
几个月前，正当全世界开始面对全球爆发疫情的现实之际，中国一名著名的病毒学家曾发出警告，冠状病毒“只是冰山的一角”。当时她作为流行病学家发表意见，要求全球采取行动应对今后爆发的疫情。以此作为对照，可以有效地说明中国共产党在全球的侵略和恶意行为。
中国共产党在全世界采取恶意行为的每一个显而易见的事例都在表层下隐藏着暗礁险滩。我们在国务院的工作之一，特别是东亚和太平洋事务局，是努力向其他国家更多地揭示这座冰山的面目，看清中国共产党的本质——一个侵略性的、专制的、野心勃勃的、偏执的、敌对的势力，对各自由和开放的社会及自由和开放的国际秩序造成了威胁。
北京的侵略行为采取各种形式，包括攻击外国公司和政府；操纵国际组织；压制海外批评的声音；为推进其军事和经济野心购买、盗窃或强制转移技术；并散布谎言。北京对COVID-19冠状病毒疫情的隐瞒已使国际社会及时认识到，中国共产党缺乏透明度，且以弥天大谎对待全球健康和安全问题，导致险象环生。这并非偏颇之词，而是中国共产党所作所为的真实反映。
仅是过去几个月就可以看到北京行为的一些格外令人震惊的例子：与印度的边界暴力；在南中国海（South China Sea）海域和台湾及尖阁诸岛（Senkakus）周围咄咄逼人的举动；在中国推动消灭蒙古和藏族文化和语言；以及在新疆持续进行压制和强劳运动。澳大利亚记者因受到安全部门的骚扰而逃离中国。北京单方面在香港实施严酷的国家安全法，包括一些条款允许中华人民共和国对一些人在其他国家里批评政府颁布对他们的域外逮捕令。这些不是负责任的国际行为体的行为，而是不法之徒的霸道行为。
我们政策如何发生改变
在国务院，我们每天非常努力地对抗中共在全球的恶意活动。通过实施总统的2017年国家安全战略（2017 National Security Strategy），我们在抵制像中华人民共和国这样的修正主义大国，它在利用技术、宣传和高压手段形成一个与我们的利益和价值观相对立的世界。我们要求中国共产党兑现它的承诺——既对我们也对国际规则、规范和机构作出的承诺。我们将在他们未兑现诺言时予以公开指出。我们将在我们的利益和我们盟友的利益受到威胁时给予有力保护。自冷战以来我们不曾把我们的精力如此专注地对准单一一个外交政策挑战，我可以向各位保证，我们正在开足马力应对来自中国的全部挑战。
让我明确一点：美国人民和中国人民有着数代之久的密切关系，我们继续欢迎中国的学生、访问者、投资者和移民。我们与中国有着重要关系，如同世界大多数国家一样。我们没有要求其他国家选择站在哪一边，而是要求他们站起来保护自己的国家主权、安全、价值观和经济福祉。我们也在要求国际社会与我们一道，站出来维护为我们一代又一代人带来共同和平、安全与繁荣的国际规则、规范和组织机构。
对中国采取清醒的方针意味着我们坚持在我们关系的所有方面对等，从贸易到投资，从签证到外交活动渠道。我们将继续维护美国一贯捍卫的权利和自由，无论是揭露在新疆和西藏对人权的践踏，为新闻自由而斗争，还是支持香港的个人自由和民主程序。
我们与中华人民共和国的竞争无需导致冲突。实际上，通过竞争，我们是在美国和世界过去让北京引发的对我们大家都有害的不平衡和不稳定方面，恢复平衡与稳定。我们还将寻求与中国在那些我们有共同利益的领域进行合作，并继续致力于在广泛的议题上取得进展，包括解决贸易不公，实现北韩去核化，以及切断致命和不可允许的芬太尼向美国的流入，无论是中国制造的，还是用中国的化学成分在其他地方所生产。
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国务院总体中国政策领域
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经济行动
在全球，中国共产党暗中作害和影响的最强大因素之一是其经济力量，它被用来在其他战略领域施加影响。中华人民共和国国家主导的借贷和投资往往扭曲市场，助长腐败，回避透明，给美国公司和地方竞争者造成不平等的游戏场。中华人民共和国的倡议计划，如“一带一路”，谋求融合北京的经济和战略目标，然而有损于东道国的主权、安全和可持续性经济增长。美国一马当先，一直致力于提高世界对中华人民共和国这种借贷投资方式的危险性的认识。
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军方-民用融合及敏感技术
中华人民共和国通过军民融合发展战略，致力于将经济和社会发展战略与其安全战略相“融合”，建立一体化的国家战略系统和能力，支持北京的目标。为此，北京在国际经济和学术合作以及在关键的先进、敏感和新兴技术的投资中玩弄花招。中华人民共和国的意图是把通过民间贸易和/或交流——既包括合法也包括非法途径——所获得的技术转用于军事。中华人民共和国力图让保护我国经济的美国传统工具失效，如出口限制、签证审理以及针对扩散风险的投资审理。
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同恶性影响作斗争
中共的恶性影响通过多种机构得到展示，从中华人民共和国的外交使团，到宣传媒体、孔子学院、统战组织，以及国营企业等等。
在媒体方面，自2月以来，我们将设在美国的9个中华人民共和国宣传媒体定为外国使团——包括新华社、人民日报以及中国环球电视网。3月，我们对可在这些被定性的国营新闻媒体工作的中华人民共和国国民的人数设置了上限，使之与北京允许在中华人民共和国工作的独立美国记者的人数更相符。
我们同样也将孔子学院美国中心（Confucius Institutes U.S. Center）定为外国使团。孔子学院虽然宣称它的唯一目的是向美国人教授中国语言和文化，但它鼓吹中国共产党的行事计划，并且破坏学术自由。
我们必须认识到这些实体的本质——它们是受北京控制的组织，是中共宣传影响的媒介。美国人应该知道它们不是独立的媒体或单纯的教育机构。我们也鼓励社交媒体公司将中华人民共和国的官方媒体账户明确标出，从而让所有人认识到它们是中共的宣传工具。7月，我们关闭了中华人民共和国在休斯顿（Houston）的领事馆，原因是其外交人员的不恰当活动令人严重担忧。我们现在要求中华人民共和国的高级外交人员在举行许多会议、大型活动和到学术机构进行访问时必须申请得到许可。当然，北京对在中国的美国外交人员长期实施的障碍仍然是严重得多。
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香港
我们领导世界对中华人民共和国在香港的镇压作出反应，包括带头与志同道合的国家发表联合声明，对在北京和香港的中华人民共和国官员，包括行政长官林郑月娥，实施金融制裁和签证限制，取消了我们的引渡条约和交流项目，并建立出口限制。我们的努力为许多其他国家声讨中华人民共和国的行动并采取它们各自的类似举措，铺平了道路。
新疆
针对新疆的人权危机，美国比任何政府都采取了更多具体行动。2019年10月，国务院对践踏人权负有责任或共谋的官员宣布实行签证限制。这与商务部在实体名单上添加了中华人民共和国的48个实体相辅相成，其中包括涉及践踏人权的公安局成分和商业公司。
美国海关与边境保护局（U.S. Customs and Border Protection）颁布了暂扣令（Withhold Release Orders），禁止在新疆经营的数家公司制作的具体商品进入美国，根据有关信息，有理由认为这些公司的经营涉及使用强迫劳工。我们颁布了商务告示，提醒工商企业注意供应链可能与践踏人权有关联的风险，包括在新疆和中国其他地方使用强迫劳工。财政部对与在新疆严重践踏少数民族权利的两个中华人民共和国实体和六名现任或过去政府官员，包括政治局委员陈全国，实施了制裁。
印度-太平洋
我们全球联盟和伙伴关系的韧性和力量对处理同中国的战略竞争至关重要，这点在印度-太平洋地区比在其他任何地区都更是如此——这个地区占世界人口和国内生产总值的一半以上。我们在考虑中国的全球举动时，必须继续不忘印度-太平洋地区是我们同中国战略竞争的第一线。
鉴于认识到印度-太平洋地区的地缘政治重要性，特朗普总统三年前在越南岘港（Da Nang）宣布了美国对印度-太平洋地区的战略框架（U.S. Strategic Framework for the Indo-Pacific），促进印-太地区所有国家作为主权、独立国家繁荣并存的愿景。印度-太平洋战略的根本在于，为面对着中华人民共和国企图主宰这一地区的印度-太平洋国家提供自治支持。它有赖于同盟国和伙伴的合作，以及东盟（ASEAN）、亚太经合组织（APEC）和其他机构在地区构架中的中心地位。
印度-太平洋战略确定的地区共同愿景是开放贸易和投资，不受胁迫，享有安全。美国和各方盟友及伙伴如今在清晰地谈论“印度-太平洋”。这是一个在语义和战略上都很重要的词。日本、印度、澳大利亚、韩国和台湾以及“东盟印度-太平洋展望”（ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific）都提出了类似的概念，显示出我们伙伴之间的高度一致。这些努力提出了指导地区走向未来的连贯原则，抗拒中华人民共和国专制主义的、国家主导的发展模式。
我们与盟国和伙伴步调一致地推进了我们的经济行动计划。我已经提到了蓝点网络（Blue Dot Network）——在澳大利亚和日本启动——作为一个例子。在印度-太平洋地区，我们正在实地一道作出努力，例如，通过一项与日本、澳大利亚和新西兰的五国伙伴合作，为巴布亚新几内亚人民送去电力。
为促进良好的执政管理——它对美国外交政策和国家安全利益不可或缺，并且符合美国的价值观——我们在两年前启动了印度-太平洋透明度倡议（Indo-Pacific Transparency Initiative）。通过它，我们最大程度地优化一些长期以来的项目，并启动新项目，专门针对中华人民共和国的影响因素，包括腐败、假信息和信息控制以及金融高压。这些项目倡导公民社会、法治、尊重人权和基本自由，以及地区各国的政府透明和负责。
我们也在加强我们的安全承诺。我们对南中国海申索国家的安全协助有助于伙伴国家保护他们的自治和海洋资源。
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南中国海
7月13日，国务卿蓬佩奥宣布美国有关南中国海海事索求问题的政策有所改变，明确表示北京对南中国海大多数地区离岸资源的索求是不合法的，与其为控制它们而采取的胁迫行动一样。我们同东南亚国家站在一起，维护他们根据国际法所享有的主权权利。里施（Risch）主席和资深委员梅南德兹（Menendez），我们欢迎你们有关南中国海的联合声明，体现出我们决意澄清美国政府认为中华人民共和国在南中国海的海事索求不合法的立场。我们看到东南亚国家由于我们的政策改变而更加大声地直言。
8月26日，国务卿宣布针对中华人民共和国国营企业参与南中国海军事化以及填海活动的特定雇员实施签证限制，包括中国交通建设公司在内，这是与商务部（Department of Commerce）将之增列入其实体名单（Entity List）协同进行的。而且我们已看到成效。在菲律宾，在马来西亚，以及在远方的巴拿马和哥斯达黎加，媒体、智库乃至政府官员都对中国交通建设公司的活动及其对他们的经济造成的影响提出了质疑。我们能够预期他们会对今后同中国交通建设公司的交易进行更严格的审核，并在未来对中国人民共和国的基建援助可能造成的负面影响进行一些更加深入的思考。
台湾
尽管中国在该地区的行为咄咄逼人，但我们同台湾的关系自成一体，而且我们同台湾的关系不是美中关系的一个分支。我们已经阐明，美国将继续推进我们同台湾的接触。阿扎尔部长（Secretary Azar）最近对台湾的访问显示出美国将同台湾就国际事务进行合作，例如全球健康事务，而且接下来的经济接触将进一步深化我们强劲的纽带。
我们还将继续大力支持台湾在国际组织中的有意义的参与，特别是在关系到公共健康、安全和保障的领域。台湾值得称赞的应对COVID-19冠状病毒的行动显示出它能为全球社区做出大量贡献，而且它对民主、人权和自由市场的承诺也是如此。
7月9日，本届政府正式通知国会向台湾出售防卫武器一事，这仅仅是我们将如何继续根据《台湾关系法》（Taiwan Relations Act）向台湾提供防卫物资和服务，以使台湾保持一种足够的自卫能力的一个近期的实例。美国实施《台湾关系法》及六项保证（Six Assurances）的承诺是坚定的，正如我们对美国的一个中国的政策的承诺，其中包括我们坚持以和平的、没有胁迫或恫吓的方式来解决海峡两岸的问题。
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结束语
美国同中华人民共和国有着一种重要的关系，正如全世界大多数国家一样。我们不是要让各国选边，而只是要让北京为其恶意行为负责，并在这个过程中保护他们自己的国家主权、安全以及长期的经济福祉。我们还请求国际社会同我们一起捍卫普世人权以及保障着全世界世世代代的共同和平、安全和繁荣的基于规则的国际体制。我们正在向这一目标大步迈进，而且我们深深地感谢贵委员会对我们的持续努力的支持。
点击这里查看英文版讲话全文：https://china.usembassy-china.org.cn/advancing-u-s-engagement-and-countering-china-in-the-indo-pacific-and-beyond/

TESTIMONY
DAVID R. STILWELL, ASSISTANT SECRETARY
BUREAU OF EAST ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS
SENATE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
WASHINGTON, DC
SEPTEMBER 17, 2020
Chairman Risch, Ranking Member Menendez, and Members of the Committee:
Thank you for the opportunity to testify before the Committee to discuss the threat posed by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) to the United States and the global order, and what we are doing about it.  I am joined by my Department colleagues, PDAS Julie Chung from our Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs, and A/S Philip Reeker from our Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs.  The fact that the three of us are testifying on CCP malign influence, representing three different geographic regions, is a testament to the global challenge we face and how the Department is adjusting to meet this challenge.
As Secretary Pompeo has repeatedly said, China is the first foreign policy challenge he thinks about each morning.  Every one of us at the Department of State is focused on succeeding in this critical effort.  I will center my testimony on an overview of our China policy, the CCP’s actions globally and how State is responding, and then focus specifically on what we are doing in the East Asia and Pacific region.
For years, we and the international community operated under the assumption that facilitating China’s entry into the rules-based international order would lead to increasing domestic reform and opening.  We agreed that China, under the CCP, would abide by its international commitments at the WTO and elsewhere.  The persistent flouting of these commitments, increasing under President Xi Jinping, demonstrated that it has failed to meet those expectations.   It is now clear to us, and to more and more countries around the world, that the CCP under General Secretary Xi Jinping is not seeking to join the free and open international order we and our allies and partners have fought and died to defend for generations.  Instead, PRC foreign and security policy seeks to disrupt and reshape the international environment around the narrow self-centered interests and authoritarian values of a single beneficiary, the Chinese Communist Party.
Today we are engaging with the Chinese Communist Party as it is, not as we wish it to be, or as it seeks to present itself rhetorically.  Secretary Pompeo summed up this strategic shift in his October 30, 2019 speech: “It is no longer realistic to ignore the fundamental differences between our two systems and the impact that…the differences in those systems have on American national security…Today, we are finally realizing the degree to which the Communist Party is truly hostile to the United States and our values.”  This requires a clear-eyed view of the CCP’s motives and actions around the world, not only by the U.S. government, but by our companies, our institutions, and by our citizens.  And to be truly successful in this effort, it requires that we work together with our allies and partners around the world to recognize and meet the CCP challenge.
We must also be clear what is at stake:  The United States has maintained a position of global leadership for generations because our actions have benefited countless nations around the world and strengthened the international system.  The CCP is now using any and all means to undermine the international rules-based order and project power across the world, especially in the Indo-Pacific region.  All nations should worry how this outcome would negatively affect the global community and the values we share.
A few months ago, as the world was coming to grips with the reality of the global pandemic, one of China’s leading virologists warned that the coronavirus was “just the tip of the iceberg.”  She was speaking as an epidemiologist and urging a global response to prevent future outbreaks, but that analogy is a useful way to think about CCP aggression and malign activities globally.
For each visible example of CCP malign activity worldwide, there are many more lurking beneath the surface.  Part of our job in the Department, and especially in the EAP Bureau, is to help bring more of that iceberg into the open for other nations to see the CCP for what it truly is – an aggressive, autocratic, ambitious, paranoid, hostile threat to free and open societies and the free and open international order.
Beijing’s aggressive behavior takes many forms, including assaults on foreign companies and governments; manipulation of international organizations; silencing of critics abroad; buying, stealing, or forcing the transfer of technology to further its military and economic ambitions; and spreading disinformation.  Beijing’s cover-up of the outbreak of COVID-19 has made urgently clear to the international community the dangers of the CCP’s lack of transparency and use of disinformation to global health and security.  This is not an aberration; this is a reflection of how the CCP operates.
The past several months alone have seen particularly egregious examples of Beijing’s conduct: violence on the border with India; aggressive moves in the South China Sea and around Taiwan and the Senkakus; a push to wipe out Mongolian and Tibetan culture and language in China; and a continued campaign of repression and forced labor in Xinjiang.  Australian journalists have fled China due to harassment by security services.  Beijing unilaterally imposed a draconian National Security Law in Hong Kong, including clauses that allow the PRC to issue extraterritorial arrest warrants for those criticizing the government while in other countries.  These are not the actions of a responsible global actor but a lawless bully.
At the Department of State, we are working hard every day to counter the CCP’s malign activities around the world.  In implementing the President’s 2017 National Security Strategy, we are pushing back on revisionist powers, such as the PRC, who use technology, propaganda, and coercion to shape a world antithetical to our interests and values.  We are holding the CCP to its commitments, both to us and to global rules, norms, and organizations.  We will call them out publicly when they fall short. And we will vigorously defend our interests and those of our friends and allies when they are threatened.  Not since the Cold War have we focused our efforts so intently on a single foreign policy challenge, and I can assure you we are firing on all cylinders across the full spectrum of the China challenge.
Let me be clear:  The American and Chinese people have close ties going back generations, and we continue to welcome Chinese students, visitors, investors, and immigrants.  We have an important relationship with China, as do most countries in the world.  We are not asking countries to choose sides, but rather to stand up to protect their own national sovereignty, security, values, and economic well-being.  We are also asking the international community to join us in standing up for the international rules, norms, and organizations that have provided for our collective peace, security, and prosperity for generations.
This clear-eyed approach to China means we are insisting on reciprocity across the entirety of our relationship, from trade and investment to visas and diplomatic access.  We will continue to uphold the rights and freedoms the United States has always stood for, whether exposing human rights abuses in Xinjiang and Tibet, fighting for press freedom, or supporting individual freedoms and democratic processes in Hong Kong.
Our competition with the People’s Republic of China need not lead to conflict.  In fact, by competing, we are restoring balance and stability in areas where the United States and the world previously allowed Beijing to foment imbalance and instability, to the detriment of us all.  We will also seek to cooperate with China in those areas where our interests align, and remain committed to achieving progress on a broad range of topics, including resolving trade inequities, achieving DPRK denuclearization, and stemming the deadly, unacceptable flow into the United States of fentanyl, whether manufactured in China or made elsewhere with Chinese precursors.
Our China policy efforts at the Department of State are guided by the 2017 National Security Strategy (NSS) and grouped around the four pillars laid out in that strategy: 1) protect the American people, homeland, and way of life; 2) promote American prosperity; 3) preserve peace through strength; and 4) advance American influence.  On May 20, the White House published a report on the United States Strategic Approach to the People’s Republic of China detailing efforts across the government.
Within the State Department, we have organized to ensure that all of our bureaus, offices, and posts around the world have sufficient policy clarity, training, resources, data, and messaging direction to successfully tackle the China challenge in their areas of operation.  This has meant breaking down bureaucratic barriers, shifting resources, and developing new coordination mechanisms.
I co-chair a new coordination body with all of our regional and functional bureaus to coordinate our lines of effort on China policy across the Department. Other agencies also coordinate on these lines of effort.  The mechanism has a special focus on bringing together the policy and messaging sides of the house to ensure the two are working hand in glove.  We’ve also asked all of our posts around the world to designate reporting and public diplomacy officers to focus specifically on the China policy portfolio in their host country, and to ensure posts’ interagency leadership teams are sufficiently focused and coordinated on our number one foreign policy challenge.
On the analytical side, we’ve developed new data-driven diplomacy tools to give our officers the information and analysis they require.  Our posts have also drastically increased their diplomatic reporting on CCP activities and influence in every country, providing a trove of additional information to inform our understanding of the China challenge.  We’re also tripling our cadre of forward-deployed, regionally focused China experts, who play a critical role in supporting our posts and identifying regional trends in CCP behavior.
The battle against CCP malign activities requires messaging that is well-informed, well-crafted, and well-executed all around the world.  Accordingly, our public diplomacy teams are working in partnership with the Bureau of Global Public Affairs and the Global Engagement Center (GEC) to promote a positive vision of U.S. leadership, expose malign conduct, and counter propaganda and disinformation.
From the Secretary on down, all of our leaders and public diplomacy practitioners are empowered to convey these messages.  Our Ambassadors in the field across all geographic regions have been particularly effective in taking this challenge on.  The Bureau of Global Public Affairs (GPA) supports our team in the field by regularly disseminating topline messages and senior leader statements.  GPA also publishes original content that describes American values and contrasts CCP behavior with global norms.
The GEC has significantly expanded its work on the China challenge over the last year.  GEC works in partnership across the Department, our posts overseas, the NSC, and relevant departments and agencies to coordinate strategies and tactics.  GEC’s efforts to counter CCP propaganda include increasing awareness of the problematic aspects of the One Belt One Road initiative, human rights abuses in Xinjiang, Tibet, and elsewhere in China, and Beijing’s abuse of open research and academic environments to achieve its military objectives.  GEC programs build global resilience to PRC disinformation through media training and other support to investigative journalists and to map PRC influence in the information environment to guide current and future approaches.
The GEC also supports efforts to provide accurate information about U.S. policies and contributions of U.S. businesses to local communities to restrict the space where CCP propaganda can take root.  Across the Department, we leverage GEC’s analytical tools and networks of credible partners and local voices overseas.
Globally, one of the CCP’s most insidious and powerful influence vectors is its economic clout, which it uses as leverage in other strategic areas.  PRC state-led lending and investment often distort markets, encourage corruption, avoid transparency, and create an uneven playing field for American companies and local competitors.  PRC initiatives like “One Belt One Road” seek to fuse Beijing’s economic and strategic goals to the detriment of host country sovereignty, security, and sustainable economic growth.  The United States has been on the forefront of raising global awareness about the dangers of this type of PRC lending and investment.
The United States levels the playing field for American companies by promoting free enterprise and transparent, private sector investment through improved market access and competitiveness and increased business-to-business ties.  With bipartisan congressional support, the United States Government is deploying new and innovative mechanisms in key areas:
We also seek to equip states to resist coercive economic practices, unsustainable debt burdens, and other dangers:
Through its Military-Civil Fusion development strategy the PRC is working to “fuse” its economic and social development strategies with its security strategies to build an integrated national strategic system and capabilities in support of Beijing’s goals.  In doing so the PRC exercises subterfuge in its international economic and academic collaboration, as well as in its investments in key advanced, sensitive, and emerging technologies.  The PRC’s intent is to divert technology acquired through civilian trade and/or exchanges – including through both licit and illicit means – to military end uses.  The PRC seeks to render ineffective traditional U.S. tools to protect our economy, such as export controls, visa screening, and investment screening for proliferation risk.
The Department has taken important measures to safeguard our critical infrastructure and technology and deny the PRC the ability to target and acquire sensitive technologies in the United States to further its military and commercial capabilities.  These included the suspension of entry of certain PRC students and researchers seeking J and F visas for work in fields relevant to military modernization.
For over two years, the United States has called on countries around the world to secure their 5G networks from untrusted vendors, such as the PRC’s Huawei and ZTE.  On April 29, Secretary Pompeo announced the 5G Clean Path initiative to protect the voice and data traversing 5G standalone digital cellular telecommunications systems and networks that service U.S. diplomatic communications at home and abroad.  More and more countries and companies around the world are putting in place strong measures to secure their 5G networks.
But 5G infrastructure is only one part of a broader telecommunications and emerging technology landscape and these same risks of untrusted vendors subject to the unchecked powers of compulsion of authoritarian states like the PRC apply across this ecosystem.  To address this broader threat, on August 5 Secretary Pompeo announced the Clean Network initiative, a comprehensive approach to safeguarding citizens’ privacy and companies’ most sensitive information from manipulation or disruption by foreign adversaries.  This Department and interagency effort addresses important and previously overlooked technology areas including apps and app stores, cloud services providers, and undersea cables.
Malign CCP influence manifests itself through a diversity of organizations, from PRC diplomatic missions to propaganda outlets, Confucius Institutes, United Front organizations, state-owned enterprises and more.
On the media front, since February we have designated the U.S.-based operations of nine PRC propaganda outlets—including Xinhua, People’s Daily, and China Global Television Network – as foreign missions.  In March, we capped the number of PRC nationals allowed to work at these designated state media outlets to more closely match the number of independent American journalists Beijing allows to operate in the PRC.
We have likewise designated the Confucius Institutes U.S. Center (CIUS) as a foreign mission. While claiming no other aim than to teach Americans about Chinese language and culture, the Confucius Institutes also promote the Chinese Communist Party’s agenda and subvert academic freedom.
We must recognize these entities for what they are – organizations under Beijing’s control and vectors for CCP propaganda and influence.  Americans should know that they are not independent media or simple educational institutions.  We are also encouraging social media companies to label PRC official media accounts clearly so that everyone recognizes them as propaganda tools of the CCP.  In July, we closed the PRC Consulate in Houston due to serious concerns about the inappropriate activities of its diplomats.  We now require senior PRC diplomats to seek permission for many meetings, large events, and visits to academic institutions.  Of course, the longstanding barriers that Beijing imposes on U.S. diplomats in China remain far more severe.
We appreciate Congressional leadership in establishing the new Counter Chinese Influence Fund (CCIF) in the FY 2020 appropriations bill.  This very important provision provides the U.S. interagency with a flexible mechanism that will bolster our efforts to strengthen our partners’ resiliency to China’s malign influence worldwide.
The Director of Foreign Assistance at the State Department is currently leading the effort to review proposals from Washington and posts around the world.  The Department and USAID are prioritizing proposals in four areas:  Commercial Engagement, Good Governance, Promoting Security and Resilience, and Winning the Technology Competition.  There is strong demand from the field.  The initial round of CCIF funding solicitation resulted in over 400 project submissions from around the globe, with demand far outstripping the appropriated funding.  Initial allocation decisions are planned by early October.
We have led the global response to the PRC’s crackdown in Hong Kong, including by spearheading joint statements with like-minded countries, imposing financial sanctions and visa restrictions on PRC officials in both Beijing and Hong Kong, including Chief Executive Carrie Lam, cancelling our extradition treaty and exchange programs, and instituting export restrictions.  Our efforts paved the way for many other countries to speak out against PRC actions, and to take similar measures of their own.
More than any other government, the United States has taken concrete action to respond to the human rights crisis in Xinjiang.  In October 2019, the Department announced visa restrictions on officials responsible for, or complicit in, human rights abuses.  This complements the Department of Commerce’s addition to its Entity List of 48 entities in the PRC, including elements of the Public Security Bureau and commercial companies, implicated in human rights abuses.
U.S. Customs and Border Protection has issued Withhold Release Orders (WROs) prohibiting imports of specified merchandise produced by several companies who operate in Xinjiang based on information that reasonably indicated the use of forced labor in their operations.  We issued a business advisory to caution businesses about the risks of supply chain links to human rights abuses, including forced labor, in Xinjiang and elsewhere in China.  The Treasury Department sanctioned two PRC government entities and six current or former government officials in connection with serious rights abuse against ethnic minorities in Xinjiang, including Politburo member Chen Quanguo.
The resilience and strength of our global alliances and partnerships is paramount to addressing strategic competition with China, and in no region is this more true than the Indo-Pacific – a region that accounts for more than half the world’s population and GDP.  As we take account of China’s efforts globally, we must continue to remember that the Indo-Pacific is the frontline in our strategic competition with China.
In recognition of the geopolitical importance of the Indo-Pacific, President Trump announced the U.S. Strategic Framework for the Indo-Pacific  three years ago in Da Nang, Vietnam, to advance a vision for the Indo-Pacific region in which all countries prosper side by side as sovereign, independent states.  The Indo-Pacific Strategy is fundamentally about supporting the autonomy of Indo-Pacific states facing PRC attempts to dominate the region.  It rests on cooperation with allies and partners, as well as the centrality of ASEAN, APEC, and other institutions in the regional architecture.
The Indo-Pacific Strategy has defined a shared vision for a region that is open to trade and investment, free from coercion, and secure.  The United States and a diverse cohort of allies and partners now speak clearly in terms of the “Indo-Pacific.”  This is significant in semantic and strategic terms.  Similar concepts have been put forward by Japan, India, Australia, South Korea, and Taiwan, as well as the “ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific,” showing remarkable alignment across our partners.  These efforts set forth consistent principles to guide the region’s future that push back on the PRC’s authoritarian, state-led development model.
We have advanced our economic initiatives in lockstep with our allies and partners.  I have already mentioned the Blue Dot Network—launched with Australia and Japan—as one example.  In the Indo-Pacific region, we are working together on the ground, for example through a five-country partnership with Japan, Australia, and New Zealand, to bring electricity to the people of Papua New Guinea.
To promote good governance, which is integral to U.S. foreign policy and national security interests and in line with U.S. values, we launched the Indo-Pacific Transparency Initiative two years ago.  With it, we are optimizing longstanding programs and launching new ones focused on particular vectors of PRC influence, including corruption, disinformation and information control, and coercive financing.   These programs promote civil society, rule of law, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and transparent and accountable governments across the region.
We are also reinforcing our security commitments.  Our security assistance to South China Sea claimant states helps partners protect their autonomy and maritime resources.
State and USAID have doubled development assistance to our Pacific Island partners through the Pacific Pledge.  Never before have we had so many people on the ground, in so many Pacific Island countries.
We are developing new arrangements to coordinate with like-minded partners.  In September 2019, the first ministerial-level meeting of the United States, Australia, India, and Japan at the Quadrilateral Consultations marked a new milestone in Indo-Pacific diplomatic engagement.
Building on the successes of the Lower Mekong Initiative, the five Mekong partner countries and the United States launched the Mekong-U.S. Partnership on September 11 as a strategic forum for cooperation.
The Partnership will continue existing work and expand our areas of cooperation, including economic connectivity, energy security, human capital development, and transboundary water and natural resources management.  This includes supporting these countries in holding the CCP accountable for sharing water data from China’s massive upstream dams in Tibet and elsewhere.
We will also cooperate on emerging threats such as health security capacity building and pandemic response, countering transnational crime, cyber security, and countering trafficking in persons, illicit drugs, and wildlife. 
On July 13, Secretary Pompeo announced a change in U.S. policy on maritime claims in the South China Sea, making clear that Beijing’s claims to offshore resources across most of the South China Sea are unlawful, as is its campaign of coercion to control them.  We are standing with Southeast Asian states to uphold their sovereign rights under international law.  We welcomed your joint statement on the South China Sea, Chairman Risch and Ranking Member Menendez, reflecting our resolve in clarifying the United States’ position that the PRC’s maritime claims in the South China Sea are unlawful.  We have seen Southeast Asian countries speak out more vocally as a result of our policy change.
On August 26, the Secretary announced visa restrictions for certain employees of PRC SOEs involved in South China Sea militarization and land reclamation activity, including the China Communications Construction Co. (CCCC), which was coordinated with Department of Commerce additions to its Entity List.  And we’ve seen results.  In the Philippines, in Malaysia, and as far afield as Panama and Costa Rica, media, think tanks, and even government officials have raised questions about CCCC activity and its impact on their economies.  We can expect them to subject future dealings with CCCC to greater scrutiny, and to think a bit more deeply about the potential downsides of PRC infrastructure assistance in the future.
Notwithstanding China’s aggressive behavior in the region, our relationship with Taiwan stands on its own and our relationship with Taiwan is not a subset of U.S.-China relations.  We have made clear that the United States will continue to advance our engagement with Taiwan.  The recent visit by Secretary Azar to Taiwan demonstrates that the United States will work with Taiwan on international issues, such as global health, and upcoming economic engagements will further deepen our robust ties.
We also will continue to vigorously support Taiwan’s meaningful participation in international organizations, especially where public health, safety, and security are concerned.  Taiwan’s commendable COVID-19 response demonstrates it has much to offer to the global community, as does its commitment to democracy, human rights, and free markets.
On July 9, the Administration formally notified Congress of a defense arms sale to Taiwan, just one recent example of how, consistent with the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA), we will continue to provide Taiwan defense articles and services to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability.  The U.S. commitment to implementing the Taiwan Relations Act and the Six Assurances is firm, as is our commitment to the U.S. one-China policy, including our insistence that cross-Strait issues be resolved peacefully and without coercion or intimidation.
We also engage closely with the private sector in advancing our policies and values.  The Indo-Pacific Business Forum has emerged as a premier annual event bringing together leaders from the private and public sectors from economies across the Indo-Pacific region, including the United States, to share knowledge, build relationships, and explore opportunities.  This year we are co-sponsoring the IPBF together with the government of Vietnam and with leading business organizations as a virtual conference in late October.
The IPBF supports and extends our Indo-Pacific strategy, as one important tool to make our economic case to the region for the transparent, private sector-driven model we promote, and its proven track record for delivering sustainable growth, reducing poverty, and fostering technological innovation.  This model provides a clear and compelling alternative to the PRC’s state-led approach to development that all too often leaves countries in the Indo-Pacific region saddled with unsustainable debt and vulnerable to political and economic pressure.  American businesses also find significant value in new markets in this dynamic region.
In all of our policy efforts, outreach to other countries is critical.  We have been vigorously engaging our allies and partners on the full scope of CCP malign activities, including 5G, military-civil fusion, human rights abuses, environmental degradation, propaganda and disinformation, and international organizations, among many other issues.
In the technology realm, dozens of countries have now taken action to restrict untrusted Beijing-linked vendors from their 5G networks.  We’ve also seen stricter investment screening mechanisms instituted in the EU and more than a dozen other countries to help protect critical technology or infrastructure, including from CCP control.  On international organizations, some 54 countries came together to deny the PRC candidate the top leadership position of the World Intellectual Property Organization.  Twenty-three countries joined us in co-signing a joint statement on Xinjiang at the UN Third Committee.  Allies and partners have also joined together to oppose Beijing’s efforts to insert language promoting CCP ideology and unilateral policy initiatives in United Nations documents.
Regarding CCP influence and interference, more and more countries are taking action against Confucius Institutes, United Front organizations, and other vectors of CCP malign influence and disinformation, including CCP influence efforts on university campuses.  On Hong Kong, we have released several joint statements with allies and partners, many of which have also suspended extradition treaties with Hong Kong and imposed export controls.  In line with what we have done in these areas, we encourage all countries to push for transparency and reciprocity in their relations with the PRC, and to expose and counter CCP vectors of influence and interference, including by PRC state media and PRC diplomats.
The United States has an important relationship with the PRC, as do most countries in the world. We are not asking countries to choose sides but simply to hold Beijing accountable for its malign behavior, and in the process to protect their own national sovereignty, security, and long-term economic well-being.  We are also asking the international community to join us in standing up for universal rights and the rules-based international system that have provided for the world’s collective peace, security, and prosperity for generations.  We are making great strides toward this goal, and we deeply appreciate the Committee’s support of our continued efforts.