U.S. Department of State Seal 
美中双边关系：历史的教训
2019年12月12日 美国东部标准时间 下午03:42
东亚和太平洋事务局助理国务卿史达伟
战略和国际研究中心
我讲话的题目是“美中双边关系：历史的教训”。有个广为人知的中文成语叫“实事求是”。今天我想将这个原则用于美国与中国的关系史。很遗憾，这个话题并不总是实事求是地被讨论。
特别是，我想检视一下极为重要而又经常被忽略的一段美中历史：即持续数十年，美国政府为赋能中华人民共和国及援助其发展做出的极其广泛的贡献。
中国不仅曾是美国为维持世界自由秩序所做的整体努力的间接受益者。美国对中国发展的支持曾是有意、直接和具体的，采取了多种形式。我们提供了军事和情报协助。我们进行了慷慨的技术转让。我们确保了优惠的贸易和投资准入。我们赞助并安排了广泛的教育交流。我们提供了发展融资，并组织了政府对政府的能力建设。还有更多。
在我们开始详述细节之前，我要指出中国变强的最主要动力是中国人民自己。中国在最近几十年最伟大的成就反映了中国人民的聪明、才干、勇敢和开创精神。当中国共产党最终放松了在中华人民共和国最初的几十年加给中国人民的灾难性压制时，这些特点驱动了中国的发展。
当共产党领导人认识到“大跃进”“文化大革命”和毛泽东之后的混乱继任之争的失败，并采取行动放宽中国的体制之时，中国人民就能够投入工作——而美国和其他各方也热情地提供帮助。但是承认中国人民是这个故事的中心不应该让我们无视其他方的重要贡献，尤其是美国的贡献。
但是，中国政府近些年来对美国、我们的利益和我们的原则表现出越来越强的敌意。这促使美国人民和本届政府重新评估我们的一些政策。如蓬佩奥国务卿所说，“几十年来我们接纳并鼓励中国的崛起，即便这种崛起的代价是美国的价值观、西方的民主、安全和良好常识。”
北京的敌对行为并非不可避免。它不合理，它是中国领导人的选择。四十年前美国官员开启美国多方面的政策大力支持北京的现代化和自由化时，这绝不是他们想要或者期望的。
历史记录
美国愿意帮助中国实现其雄心，中华人民共和国领导人邓小平对此十分清楚，即便是在1978年12月共产党的一次工作会议上他开启“改革开放”之前。确实，在他提出 “改革开放”理念的同一天，他还接受了来自美国政府的邀请，成为中华人民共和国第一位访问美国的领导人。
接下来的一个月，美国和中国宣布了关系正常化，邓小平坐上了飞往华盛顿的飞机。我在本月早些时候在另一场演讲中提到了这个故事，但值得再说一遍：根据历史学者潘文（John Pomfret）记述，在飞机上，邓小平的外交部长问他为什么将美国作为上任后的第一个出访国家。邓小平回答，因为美国的盟友都富有和强大，如果中国想富强，就需要美国。
……在两国关系正常化的前夕，当邓小平接待白宫科学顾问弗兰克·普雷斯时，他坚持让普雷斯立即给卡特总统打电话，要求美国接收5000名学生。凌晨三点被电话吵醒的卡特回答道：“告诉他派10万名过来。”邓小平就这样做了。……截至1987年，不到十年之后，真有10万名中国学生在美国学习——这成为签证、奖学金和其他教育交流大增的一部分，这改变了中华人民共和国的科学和技术，且仍在继续。
技术是邓小平1979年第一次访美的一个重要主题。他访问了福特汽车公司、波音和NASA，在一项美国对中国的科学援助协议上签了字，还与白宫达成一致，在中国西北地区建立一个名为“栗子行动”（Operation Chestnut）的联合情报站，从而促成了更深层次的军事和情报合作。
……
天安门事件之后的确出现了一个变化，那就是中华人民共和国的领导人在学校和文化中引入了严苛的“爱国主义教育运动”。此举的目的是通过加强民族主义并将外国人——尤其是美国人和日本人——丑化为遏制中国并阻碍其崛起的所谓“敌对势力”，来强化对共产党的支持。制造关于美国敌意的不实之说这件事本身就是针对美国的敌对行为，但美国官员几乎没有注意到。
相反，我们将精力集中在了制定我们对中华人民共和国的支持政策的下一篇章上。其中力度最大、最具影响力的可能要算中华人民共和国加入世界贸易组织。
……
即便在人权上未见改善，克林顿还是开始赞成给予中华人民共和国“永久正常贸易关系”，并支持其加入世贸组织。他信奉一个理念， 是美国在对中华人民共和国贸易中长久以来所秉持的，后来也成了信条，那就是：如果我们扩大与中国的国际贸易联系，中国必然会在政治上自由化，有利于 中国人民、人权事业和整个世界。
这种观点在 美国发挥不可或缺的作用、使得中国加入世贸组织的过程中主导着美国的思维。加入世贸组织对于中华人民共和国的雄心来说如同火箭燃料，让中国获得国际市场准入，将其变为世界制造业和出口大国。没有什么政策措施比这更能让中华人民共和国变强。
同时，像其他许多方面一样，帮助中国加入世贸组织时，我们刻意忽略了中华人民共和国不恰当的贸易做法和空头承诺。正如蓬佩奥国务卿所说：“我们鼓励中国加入世界贸易组织和其他国际组织，前提是中国承诺进行市场改革并遵守这些组织的规则。而很多时候，中国从未履行承诺。”
……慷慨的技术援助是几十年来美国政策的优先事项。甚至在关系正常化之前，卡特总统就发布了第43号总统令，指示联邦机构支持中华人民共和国在教育、能源、农业、太空、地球科学、商业和公共卫生方面的能力建设。很快，在华盛顿DC ，几乎所有的机构和办公室都有项目提供培训和专门的知识，从而加强中国政府的能力，扩大贸易，并从总体上帮助中华人民共和国融入全球事务。这些项目持续了数十年，直到今天。没有其他国家像中华人民共和国这样获得了如此大规模的美国能力建设援助。
同样，美国政府还协助美国企业来帮助北京。20世纪90年代，美国的投资银行与中华人民共和国领导人一道工作，创立中国移动等大型国有公司，而后通过在纽约和伦敦等地上市来集资。同时，尽管这些公司尚未达到基本监管要求，美国的政策仍允许其从美国投资者那里筹集资金。数百亿美元流入中国政府国库。
20世纪90年代，美国还为中国的公民社会提供了援助——我应强调的是，这是应中华人民共和国政府的要求。亚洲基金会和福特基金会与中国政府官员在经济改革、国际关系和北京自身的海外援助项目上合作。1998年，卡特中心与中国民政部签署了谅解备忘录，帮助开展实验性的农村选举。美国律师协会花了二十年与中华人民共和国的法官、官员和律师一道努力，开展刑事司法改革和法律培训，并打击家庭暴力。国际小母牛组织帮助成千上万的中国农民以更加可持续的方式饲养牲畜。这些努力往往得到了美国政府的资助——以透明的方式，并且符合北京自己的政策。
遗憾的是，中华人民共和国对外国公民社会团体已经变得不友好。如今，北京将外国非政府组织描绘成阴险的颠覆者，而非中国发展的伙伴。并不是非政府组织改变了，而是北京变了。它失去了过去对增加开放度、透明度和对外联系曾有的热情。中国共产党也不愿与外界分享中国发展的任何功劳，以免其主要角色遭到削弱。因此，当前北京宣称，美国公民社会团体是破坏中国的“黑手”。北京还在2016年实施了一项旨在从中国驱逐外国非政府组织的法律，而这项法律恰恰做到了这点——非政府组织的数量从2016年的7000个减少到如今的数百个。
……乔治·W·布什总统和巴拉克·欧巴马总统如他们的前任们一样，都对北京行为的有些方面有所关切，他们两人都采取了措施防范北京带来的风险。但是，他们都确保了美国从根本上作为伙伴和支持者与中华人民共和国打交道。
即使在北京舞弊以及美国对中国的累计贸易逆差激增至4万亿美元以上时，他们两人都扩大了与中华人民共和国的贸易和技术关系。尽管北京经常破坏重要国际组织的使命和精神，两人都支持提升北京在这些国际组织的地位。两人都相信了北京的说辞：双边关系里的麻烦问题可以通过更多的外交盛会和高级别对话来解决。并且两人都欢迎了越来越多的中国学生，到2015年，美国有大约27万名中国学生。在此郑重指出，现在在美国的中国大学生人数已达到37万人之多，与北京的宣称恰恰相反。
美国有着追求与中国和中国人民友谊的长期历史，我们为此感到自豪。在美国和中华人民共和国关系正常化的第40个年头，值得一提的是，对中国和中国人民，美国所展现的乐观与友谊可以追溯到几个世纪以前。19世纪，美国传教士在中国设立了医院和大学。在19世纪后期，美国外交官支持“门户开放”政策，然后在1909年设立了“庚子赔款奖学金”，种下了清华大学的种子。第二次世界大战期间，上千名美国士兵牺牲生命保卫中国，以支持我们的盟友承诺，并抵抗了一股扩张主义的侵略势力。战后，美国坚持中国得到联合国创始成员国中的一席，在安理会中拥有否决权。
结论
因此很自然地，四十年前当中华人民共和国一转向改革开放，美国就伸出我们的友谊之手。而北京现在宣称，美国面向中华人民共和国所展示的新竞争姿态暴露出要打压中国这个国家的愿望，这是彻底虚假的。相反地，我们当前的姿态是基于对中国共产党领导人的失望，因为他们决定以这种具有攻击性的、一贯的恶意回应我们的善意。
我想要我们的关系是良好、丰富和互利的。任何想要美中关系友好的人都应该揭露和反对旨在激发敌意的宣传。对这种虚假信息予以反击有利于具有建设性的关系。孔子强调“正名”的美德。同样，我们想要澄清记录——有信心如果澄清了，这将化解，而不是助长敌意。
几年前，我在北京担任美国驻华武官。由于我的姓氏，我遇到了一群中国爱国者，他们组织了一个激动人心的项目，名为“国家记忆”。他们的工作开始于1999年，当时其中一位创建人偶然碰到了一张老照片，这张照片很显然是在中国拍摄的，是美国陆军的牧师在为麦克默里少校举行葬礼，有美中两国军事人员参加。我的朋友不相信，尝试查阅自己国家档案中第二次世界大战的记录，但没有成功。但是他可以查阅美国国家档案馆，因此他找到了第二次世界大战期间美中作为盟友合作的6万张数字化照片。 ……然而，一直以来，北京官方的说法仍然是美国一直对中国怀有敌意。
未来，美国将继续寻求与中国的良好关系，我们期望北京能够做出对等的回应。我们仍然认为，这是中国人民想要和寻求的。为了事实和友好关系起见，北京应该承认我在这里概述的美国提供的帮助和支持的历史。这是基于这样一种信念，即美中合作并加强现有的全球秩序让中国和世界得以改善。无论如何，美国人将努力对我们的历史和未来保持清醒的认识。

Introduction
Good afternoon. Thank you to CSIS for inviting me – and for rescheduling this speech after I had to miss our initial date last week.
The title of my remarks is “U.S.-China Bilateral Relations: The Lessons of History.” There is a well-known Chinese idiom, “Seek truth from facts.” Today I’d like to apply this principle to the history of America’s relations with China. This is a subject that unfortunately isn’t always discussed truthfully or factually.
In particular, I’d like to examine a part of U.S.-China history that is hugely important and yet often overlooked: Namely, the vast range of official U.S. contributions, sustained over decades, to empowering the People’s Republic of China and aiding its development.
U.S. Support for China’s Development
Why recount this history? First of all, if we don’t acknowledge it, we can’t claim to understand the current state of U.S.-Chinese relations. Second, the history is colorful and dramatic, involving secret presidential directives, sensitive diplomacy, and some of the most consequential economic and technological shifts the world has ever seen.
Third and most important: Recounting this history refutes the false claims of propagandists who claim that the Trump Administration’s competitive posture toward Beijing is motivated by longstanding American animus, or a desire to keep China down. The fact is that for decades, American policymakers have extended the hand of friendship to the PRC—yet Beijing has not reciprocated. The historical record shows this clearly.
When commentators occasionally discuss how American policy has contributed to China’s empowerment, they often focus on America’s general role in sustaining a free and open international order, including open sea lanes for international trade. Their point is that, in sustaining this international order, America provided China with a peaceful and stable external environment in which to grow. This is indeed a big part of the story, and to create and preserve that international order required enormous U.S. investments in blood, treasure, and ideas. But there is far more to the story than that.
China was not just the indirect beneficiary of general American efforts to sustain a liberal world order. S. support for China’s development was deliberate, direct and specific. It took many forms. We provided military and intelligence assistance. We made generous technology transfers. We ensured preferential trade and investment access. We sponsored and arranged for vast educational exchanges. We provided development financing and organized government-to-government capacity building. And more.
Now before we get into details, I want to note that the primary drivers of China’s strengthening were the Chinese people themselves. China’s greatest achievements in recent decades reflect the intelligence, talents, and courageous and entrepreneurial spirit of the Chinese. Those traits fueled China’s growth when the Chinese Communist Party finally loosened the disastrous stranglehold that it had placed on the people during the PRC’s first decades.
Once Communist Party leaders recognized the failures of the Great Leap Forward, the Cultural Revolution, and the chaotic fight for succession after Mao, and moved to liberalize China’s system, China’s people were able to get to work – and the United States and others were enthusiastic to help. But acknowledging the centrality of the Chinese people in this story shouldn’t blind us to the important contributions of others, especially the contributions of the United States.
Yet the PRC has acted in recent years with increasing hostility toward the United States, our interests, and our principles. This has prompted the American people and the current administration to reevaluate some of our policies. As Secretary Pompeo has said, “We accommodated and encouraged China’s rise for decades, even when that rise was at the expense of American values, Western democracy, security, and good common sense.”
Beijing’s hostile behavior was not inevitable. It is not justified. It is a choice by Chinese leaders. It is by no means what American officials desired or expected forty years ago, when they initiated the multifaceted U.S. policy of intense support for Beijing’s modernization and liberalization.
The Historical Record
America’s willingness to help China achieve its ambitions was clear to PRC leader Deng Xiaoping even before he inaugurated the era of “reform and opening” at a Communist Party work conference in December 1978. Indeed, on the very day he presented the “reform and opening” idea, he also accepted an invitation from the U.S. government to become the first PRC leader to visit America.
By the next month, the U.S. and China had announced normalization of their relations and Deng was on an airplane to Washington. I mentioned this story in another speech earlier this month, but it bears repeating: On the airplane, as historian John Pomfret records, Deng’s foreign minister asked him why he picked the United States for his first trip as leader. Because, answered Deng, America’s allies are all rich and strong, and if China wanted to be rich and strong, it needed America.
For Deng, the engineer of China’s modernization and prosperity, it was clear that America could be relied on to help. Deng was pushing longstanding PRC plans for “four modernizations.” These addressed science and technology, industry, agriculture and defense. The U.S. would help in all four areas, and then some.
And it produced results. After the horrific privations caused by the Cultural Revolution, Deng Xiaoping intensely desired that Chinese students would study in the United States. When Deng received a visit from White House science advisor Frank Press in the run-up to normalization, he insisted that Press call President Carter immediately with a request to accept 5,000 students. Awakened by the call at 3 a.m., Carter replied, “Tell him to send a hundred thousand.” So he did.
By 1987, less than 10 years later, there were indeed 100,000 Chinese students studying in America – part of a boom in visas, scholarships, and other educational exchange that transformed science and technology in the PRC. It is still booming.
Technology was a key theme of Deng’s 1979 first trip to America, as he visited Ford Motor Company, Boeing, and NASA. He signed an agreement for U.S. aid to science in China. And he agreed with the White House to establish a joint intelligence station in northwest China known as Operation Chestnut. It led to deeper military and intelligence cooperation.
Several months after Deng’s trip, Vice President Mondale visited China and told Deng, “We have insisted repeatedly, and I will state it again: We strongly believe in the importance of a strong China.” Mondale showed it by previewing a major accommodation on trade policy and human rights: The United States would grant the PRC most-favored-nation trading status, cutting tariffs on Chinese goods to the preferential level offered to friends and allies, even though Beijing did not meet the political and civil rights standards required for that status under U.S. law. Creating this kind of exception for the PRC would become a common U.S. practice.
The Carter administration also used America’s leading position at the World Bank to clear the path for China’s membership in 1980. Beijing began receiving World Bank loans the following year. It has since received some $62 billion, making it the world’s second-largest beneficiary of World Bank support.
After Carter left office many U.S. foreign policies changed, but the approach to aiding China’s modernization endured. It even intensified. The Reagan Administration helped the PRC especially in the military and technology domains.
In 1981, President Reagan issued National Security Decision Directive (NSDD) 11, opening the path to sell the PRC air, ground, naval and missile technology. This built on Carter’s 1980 authorization of the sale to the PRC of nonlethal military equipment. In 1983, Reagan’s NSDD 76 authorized “peaceful” nuclear cooperation to boost Beijing’s civilian nuclear program. By the mid-1980s, the U.S. had agreed to sell the PRC hundreds of millions of dollars’ worth of torpedoes, anti-artillery radar and other military systems and equipment.
In 1986, the U.S. and China announced the “Peace Pearl” program to modernize China’s F-8 jet fighters with sophisticated navigation, radar and other electronics. Peace Pearl, the Pentagon said, would “improve the security of a friendly country which has been an important force for political stability and economic progress in Asia and the world.”
The Reagan Administration loosened controls on the export of technology to the PRC in 1983, again furthering work that began in the Carter years. Before a 1984 visit by PRC Premier Zhao Ziyang, Reagan signed NSDD 120, directing the Administration “to lend support to China’s ambitious modernization effort, especially through our liberalized technology transfer policy.” That classified policy document stated that the U.S. seeks “a strong, secure, and stable China” that “can be an increasing force for peace, both in Asia and the world.”
In 1986 the Reagan administration even helped the PRC establish research efforts in genetic engineering, automation, biotech, lasers, space technology, manned spaceflight, intelligent robotics, and supercomputers. That year the U.S. also worked with Japan and others to usher Beijing into the Asian Development Bank, which later extended the PRC $40 billion in loans for transport, energy, water, agriculture, finance and other projects.
Now let’s recall that, in this first decade after normalization in 1979, as in the years immediately before 1979, a key consideration in America’s China policy was the Cold War, in which the PRC was a counterweight to the Soviet Union. But even when the Cold War ended, the U.S. policy toward the PRC remained highly favorable.
As the Cold War was ending, U.S. leaders went out of their way to show their intention to remain committed to China. Recall the George H.W. Bush Administration’s response to the Tiananmen massacre of 1989. Here was a brutally violent refutation of the optimistic notion that modernization by the Chinese Communist Party would also mean political liberalization. Nevertheless, President Bush decided not to fundamentally reassess U.S. relations with the PRC.
The senior President Bush suspended new arms sales but decided to follow through on many existing programs (including Peace Pearl, which was terminated later by the Chinese side, not the U.S.). President Bush also opposed economic sanctions favored by a majority of members of Congress. “Now is the time,” he told the public, “to look beyond the moment to important and enduring aspects of this vital relationship for the United States.” Though the Administration announced it had suspended high-level contacts with the PRC, Bush dispatched his National Security Advisor on a secret mission to Beijing carrying letters that stressed the importance of getting “our relationship back on track.”
And so the two sides did. That measured U.S. response to the massacre reflected a hopeful and accommodationist frame of mind that continued to shape U.S. policy toward the PRC for years to come.
Across decades, we accommodated the PRC’s human rights abuses without significant protest. We mostly shrugged at the PRC’s proliferation of nuclear and missile technology to Pakistan, Iran, North Korea and others. We largely overlooked the PRC’s diversion of U.S.-origin dual-use technology into its military. We offered little opposition to the PRC’s theft of intellectual property, piracy of trademarked goods, and countless other unfair trade practices. Policymaking requires balancing interests, and we often had reasons to let this or that PRC offense go unanswered, but the consequences mounted.
Following Tiananmen, one change that did come was that PRC leaders introduced a harsh “patriotic education campaign” into the schools and culture. The aim was to shore up support for the Communist Party by playing to nationalism and vilifying foreigners—especially Americans and Japanese—as so-called “hostile forces” seeking to contain China and block its rise. Stoking this mythology of U.S. hostility was itself a hostile act against the United States. But U.S. officials barely took notice.
Instead, we concentrated on producing the next chapter in our policy of support for the PRC. This was probably the most favorable and consequential of all: PRC accession to the World Trade Organization.
President Bill Clinton entered office highly critical of Beijing’s human-rights record. He promised to reestablish the link between the PRC’s trade privileges and human rights, as the Jackson-Vanik Amendment concerning “most-favored-nation” status had intended. By mid-1994, though, Clinton dropped that insistence.
Clinton began to favor bestowing on the PRC “permanent normal trade relations” and backing its membership in the WTO, even if there weren’t improvements in human rights. He embraced an idea, long part of U.S. thinking about trade with the PRC, that became dogma: If we expanded international trade links with it, China would inevitably liberalize politically, benefiting the Chinese people, the cause of human rights and the world in general.
This view dominated thinking as the U.S. played an indispensable role in bringing about Beijing’s WTO accession. And WTO accession was rocket fuel for the PRC’s ambitions, giving it the global market access that turned China into the world’s manufacturing and export powerhouse. No policy measure has strengthened the PRC more.
And, like so much else, helping China enter the WTO involved our purposefully ignoring PRC improper trade practices and empty promises. As Secretary Pompeo has said, “We encouraged China’s membership in the World Trade Organization and other international organizations, premised on their commitment to adopt market reforms and abide by the rules of those organizations. And all too often, China never followed through.”
The friendly U.S. approach to China in the 1990s was evident when Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan visited Beijing in October 1994. “It is very important to the United States as well as to the whole world that China succeed,” Greenspan told PRC Premier Zhu Rongji. “Therefore, we’re willing to provide as much assistance as we can to your central bank in those technical areas in which we have many years of experience.”
Generous technical assistance was a U.S. policy priority for decades. Even before normalization, President Carter issued Presidential Directive 43 instructing federal agencies to support PRC capacity-building in education, energy, agriculture, space, geosciences, commerce, and public health. Soon there was hardly an agency or office in Washington, D.C. without a program to provide training and know-how to strengthen PRC government capacity, expand trade, and generally aid PRC integration into global affairs. These programs lasted for decades, into the current day. No other country has received such an outpouring of U.S. capacity-building aid as the PRC has.
The U.S. government similarly helped American business help Beijing. In the 1990s, American investment banks worked with PRC leaders to create state-owned megafirms such as China Mobile and then raise money via stock listings in places like New York and London. U.S. policy meanwhile allowed them to raise money from U.S. investors despite not meeting basic regulatory requirements. Tens of billions of dollars flowed into PRC state coffers.
The 1990s also saw U.S. aid to Chinese civil society—at the request, I should stress, of the PRC government. The Asia Foundation and Ford Foundation partnered with PRC officials on economic reform, international relations, and Beijing’s own overseas assistance programs. The Carter Center signed an MOU with Beijing’s Ministry of Civil Affairs in 1998 to help with experimental village elections. The American Bar Association spent two decades working with PRC judges, officials, and lawyers on criminal justice reform, legal training, and combating domestic violence. Heifer International helped thousands of Chinese farmers raise livestock more sustainably. Such efforts often received funding from the U.S. government—transparently, and in alignment with Beijing’s own policies.
Unfortunately, the PRC has grown inhospitable to foreign civil-society groups. Beijing today paints foreign NGOs as insidious subversives, not partners in Chinese development. It’s not that the NGOs have changed. Beijing has. It has lost its former enthusiasm for more openness, transparency, and foreign links. Nor is the CCP keen to share any credit with outsiders for China’s development, lest the starring role of the Party be diminished. So, Beijing today claims that U.S. civil-society groups are a “black hand” undermining China. Beijing also enforces a 2016 law designed to drive foreign NGOs from China, and which has done just that—reducing the number of NGOs from 7,000 in 2016 to a few hundred today.
These weren’t the outcomes sought by U.S. leaders before the 1990s or since. Presidents George W. Bush and Barack Obama both had concerns about aspects of Beijing’s behavior, as their predecessors had, and both took measures to hedge against risks posed by Beijing. But both ensured that the United States engaged the PRC fundamentally as a partner and supporter.
Both expanded trade and technology ties with the PRC, even as Beijing cheated and the U.S. trade deficit with China soared above a cumulative $4 trillion. Both supported elevating’s Beijing status in important international organizations, even as Beijing often subverted the mission and spirit of these organizations. Both believed the Beijing line that irritants in the bilateral relationship could be worked out via ever more diplomatic pageantry and high-level dialogues. And both welcomed more and more PRC students, with some 270,000 in America by 2015. And for the record, the number of PRC university students in the United States is now a whopping 370,000, contrary to Beijing’s allegations.
We are proud of America’s long record of pursuing friendship with China and the Chinese people. In this 40th year since U.S.-PRC normalization, it’s worth recalling that U.S. optimism and friendship toward China and the Chinese people dates back centuries. American missionaries established hospitals and universities in China in the 1800s. American diplomats backed the Open Door policy in the late 1800s, then set up the Boxer Indemnity Scholarship in 1909 that seeded Tsinghua University. American soldiers defended China during World War II, sacrificing thousands of lives to support our alliance commitments and resist an expansionist and aggressive force. After the war, America insisted that China receive a seat among the founding members of the United Nations with a veto on the Security Council.
Conclusion
So it was natural that, once the PRC turned to reform and opening forty years ago, America would extend our hand in friendship. And it is altogether bogus that Beijing today claims that America’s new competitive posture toward the PRC betrays a desire to keep China down as a nation. On the contrary, our posture today is based on disappointment that Chinese Communist Party leaders decided to respond to our good faith with such aggressive and consistent bad faith.
I have reviewed this history not as an opponent of good U.S.-Chinese relations. On the contrary, I want our relations to be good, rich and mutually beneficial. Anyone who wants friendly U.S.-China relations should expose and oppose propaganda designed to stimulate hostility. Pushing back on such misinformation is in the interest of constructive ties. Confucius highlighted the virtue of the “rectification of names.” Likewise, we want the record to be clear –confident that if it is, it will defuse, not foster, hostility.
A personal story illustrates the point. Some years ago, I was the U.S. Defense Attaché in Beijing. Because of my last name, I met a group of Chinese patriots who put together a stirring project called “National Memories.” Their work began in 1999, when one of the founders came across an old photo, clearly taken in China, of a U.S. Army chaplain conducting a funeral for a Major McMurray, with a mix of U.S. and Chinese military personnel in attendance. In disbelief, my friend tried to access World War II records in his own national archives, without success. But he could access the U.S. National Archives, so he found 60,000 digitized photos of U.S.-China cooperation as allies in World War II. He has since published these photos in multiple books and venues, including here in Washington. And yet, all along, the official narrative out of Beijing remains that the U.S. has always been hostile to China.
Going forward, the United States will continue to seek good relations with China, and we expect Beijing to reciprocate. We continue to believe that this is what the Chinese people want and seek. In the interests of truth and of friendly ties, Beijing should acknowledge the history of American helpfulness and support that I have outlined here. It was the result of the belief that China and the world are improved when China and America cooperate and strengthen the existing global order. In all events, Americans will strive to remain clear-eyed about our history and our future.
Thank you.