美国司法部
公共事务办公室
2021年9月24日
 
华为首席财务官孟晩舟承认误导全球金融机构
孟晚舟签署延期起诉协议以解决欺诈指控
 
华盛顿——华为技术有限公司首席财务官孟晚舟，49 岁，来自中华人民共和国，今天在布鲁克林（Brooklyn）的联邦地区法院出庭，签署了一项延期起诉协议（DPA），并因被指控共谋实施银行欺诈、共谋实施电信欺诈、银行欺诈和电信欺诈而被传讯。
纽约东区（Eastern District of New York）代理联邦检察官（Acting U.S. Attorney）妮可·博克曼（Nicole Boeckmann）表示：“孟在签署延期起诉协议时已对她在实施一项欺诈一个全球金融机构的图谋中的主要作用承担责任。她在事实陈述中所承认的，证实在担任华为首席财务官期间，孟就华为在伊朗的业务运营向一家金融机构的高级主管多次做出了严重的不实陈述，以试图维护华为与这家金融机构的银行业务关系。孟所隐瞒的华为在伊朗的业务的真相，本来会对该金融机构继续其与华为的银行业务关系的决定产生重要影响。孟所承认的证实了政府在起诉这起金融欺诈案中的有关指控的核心——孟及其他华为雇员共同从事了就华为在伊朗的活动欺骗全球金融机构、美国政府和公众的行为。”
主管司法部（Justice Department）国家安全局（National Security Division）的代理助理司法部长（Acting Assistant Attorney General）马克·莱斯科（Mark J. Lesko）说：“这项延期起诉协议将使在加拿大正在进行的引渡程序结束，否则该程序可能会持续许多个月，甚至数年。我们非常感谢加拿大司法部在这次引渡中兢兢业业，及其对法治的坚定遵循。”
主管司法部刑事局（Criminal Division）的助理司法部长小肯尼思·A·利奇（Kenneth A. Polite Jr.）表示：“金融机构是我们维护美国金融体系的安全和保障的第一道防线。因此，有关法律要求使用美国金融体系的公司向金融机构提供有关其业务运营的真实信息。华为技术公司首席财务官孟晚舟今天承认，她没有说明关于华为在伊朗的业务的真相，结果导致有关金融机构继续与华为开展业务，违反了美国法律。我们的检控团队继续准备针对华为的审理，而且我们期待着在法庭上证实我们针对该公司的诉案。”
主管联邦调查局（FBI）反情报处（Counterintelligence Division）的助理局长小艾伦·E·科勒（Alan E. Kohler Jr.）表示：“孟所承认的是以一贯的欺骗手段违反美国法律的证据。当有迹象表明在美国开展业务的公司做出藐视我们的法律的行为时，联邦调查局将继续展开积极调查。”
欺诈金融机构的图谋
 
根据法庭文件，以及孟在延期起诉协议事实陈述中所认同的，星通技术有限公司（简称星通）是一家主要在伊朗运营的香港公司。截至2007年2月，星通由华为技术有限公司（简称华为）的子公司华盈管理（简称华盈）全资所有。2007年11月，华盈将其在星通的股份转让给华为控制的另一个实体Canicula控股公司（简称Canicula）。在华盈将其星通股份转让给Canicula时，孟在华盈担任秘书。
2008年2月，在华为将星通的所有权从华盈转让给Canicula后，孟加入了星通董事会，该董事会由华为员工组成。她在董事会任职至2009年4月。孟离开星通董事会后，星通董事会成员仍是华为员工，Canicula继续持有星通，而且Canicula继续受华为掌控。截至2012年8月，在用英文所写的公司文件中，华为将星通列入一份“华为其他子公司”的名单。
在2010年至2014年期间，华为控制了星通在伊朗的业务运营，而且星通由华为控制的一个实体所有。星通所有的重大业务决策都由华为做出。此外，星通的国家经理——业务主管——是一名华为员工。被星通雇佣的员工都认为他们是为华为工作的。
在同一时期，华为员工与一家英国人力公司接触，在伊朗提供工程师以支持星通与伊朗电信服务提供商的合作。代表星通进行谈判及合同事宜的是华为的员工。为支付这些承包商的费用，华为从星通在亚洲的银行账户，其中包括从一家跨国金融机构（金融机构1），向该英国人力公司在英国的账户发送了至少750万美元的大约80笔系列付款。这些交易以美元计价，并通过美国结算。
在2012年12月和2013年1月，据包括路透社（Reuters）在内的多家新闻机构报道，星通提出在伊朗销售来自一家美国计算机设备制造商的“禁运”设备，有可能违反美国出口管制法，而且华为与星通有密切关系。在2012年12月的一篇文章中刊发的致路透社的一份声明中，华为称星通是其在伊朗的“主要当地合作伙伴”之一。据路透社报道，华为进一步声明：“华为在伊朗的业务完全符合所有适用的法律和法规，其中包括联合国、美国和欧盟的法律法规。我们公司一贯履行并严格遵守这一承诺。此外，我们也要求我们的合作伙伴遵循同样的承诺并严格遵守相关的法律和法规。”
2013年1月，路透社的一篇后续文章报道，孟在2008年2月至2009年4月曾担任星通董事会成员，并指明了星通董事成员们与华为之间的其他联系。文章还引用了华为的声明如下：“华为和星通之间的关系是一种正常的商务伙伴关系。华为已经建立了一个符合产业最佳实践的贸易合规体系，而且我们在伊朗的业务完全符合所有适用的法律和法规，其中包括联合国的法律法规。我们也要求我们的合作伙伴，例如星通，做出同样的承诺。”这一陈述是不正确的，因为华为曾运营并掌控星通；因此星通不是华为的商务“伙伴”。
在这些文章发表后，“金融机构1”和其他向华为提供过包括美元结算在内的国际银行服务的其他全球金融机构（统称“金融机构”），针对上述媒体报道向华为查询。2013年年初，华为员工向“金融机构”表明，星通只是华为在伊朗的一个当地商务伙伴，而且星通没有利用其在“金融机构”的账户进行与伊朗有关的交易。
为了回应新闻报道中的指称，华为要求与“金融机构1”的一名高级雇员进行面谈。该会面于2013年8月22日在香港进行，当时孟会见了“金融机构1”负责亚太地区业务的一名高管。在会面中，孟进行了一次以中文为文稿的PowerPoint演示，并由一名口译员翻译成英文。孟表示，她使用口译员是为了使自己的语言精准。
孟在她的陈述中所谈内容之一是，华为与星通的关系是“正常商务合作”和“正常与可控的商务合作”，她形容星通是一个“伙伴”，“华为的商务伙伴”，以及在伊朗“与华为共事的第三方”。这些陈述不属实，因为正如孟所知，星通不是华为的商务伙伴或与之共事的第三方；华为掌控星通，星通的雇员其实是华为的雇员。如果“金融机构1”知道华为掌控星通，这会对它具有实质意义。
此外，孟称华为“曾一度是星通的股东”，但已经“出售了在星通的全部股份”。这些陈述不属实，因为，正如孟所知，华为将它的股份“售给了”一个华为控制的实体。具体而言，华为将星通的股份从华为一个子公司（华盈）转到了另一个由华为控制的实体（Canicula）。如果“金融机构1”知道星通是被从一个华为控制的实体转到另一个实体，这会对它具有实质意义。
最后，孟称华为“在伊朗的运营严格遵守相关法律、规章和制裁规定”，并且“华为或华为与之共事的任何第三方”“没有违背出口控制规定”。这些陈述不属实，因为华为运营星通致使“金融机构”为华为设在伊朗的商务提供违禁服务，包括银行业务，而华为掩盖了星通与华为的联系，故违反了美国财政部（U.S. Department of the Treasury）外国资产管制办公室（ Office of Foreign Assets Control）的 《伊朗交易和制裁条例》（Iranian Transactions and Sanctions Regulations，31 C.F.R. Part 560）。此外，在2010年至2014年期间，华为使星通通过“金融机构1”从事了经美国准许的价值大约一亿美元的交易，其中至少有一些支持了违反美国法律的它在伊朗的业务，包括有750万美元用于英国人事公司提供的在伊朗工作的合同人员。
在会议期间或结束后的任何时候，孟——她知道路透社报道了华为有关星通发布的公开声明——没有撤销或者修改其中任何一项声明。而且，也出席了8月会议的华为财务官没有更正或修改孟作出的任何声明。
在孟与“金融机构1”的会议后不久，华为在“金融机构1”的要求下，准备了一份英文版演示文稿说明（PowerPoint presentation）。孟后来安排于2013年9月将演示文稿说明的纸质拷贝送交给她曾会晤过的“金融机构1”的高管。英文版演示文稿说明中的陈述紧密跟随孟在会议中的陈述。
在会议后和接到孟的演示文稿说明后，“金融机构1”决定继续它与华为的关系。其他“金融机构”也同样将各自与华为的关系继续下去。
延期起诉协议
根据延期起诉协议的条件，孟同意，关于她有意对“金融机构1”作不实之词的一项四页事实陈述准确。孟还同意不犯其他联邦、州或地方罪。如果孟违背协议，她将可受到此案第三份替代起诉书对她的所有指控。政府还同意撤回向加拿大司法部提出的将孟引渡美国的要求。
纽约东区助理联邦检察官亚历山大·所罗门（Alexander A. Solomon）、茱莉亚·内斯特（Julia Nestor）、戴维·凯斯勒（David K. Kessler）、萨拉·埃文斯（Sarah M. Evans）和梅雷迪斯·阿尔法（Meredith A. Arfa）；刑事局防洗钱和追回资产处（Money Laundering and Asset Recovery Section）出庭律师劳拉·比林斯（Laura Billings）和克里斯蒂安·瑙维尔（Christian Nauvel）；国家安全局反情报和出口管制处（Counterintelligence and Export Control Section）出庭律师西娅·肯德勒（Thea D. R. Kendler）、戴维·利姆（David Lim）和伊丽莎白·亚伯拉罕（R. Elizabeth Abraham）正在起诉此案。纽约东区民事处（Civil Division）助理联邦检察官布赖恩·莫里斯（Brian Morris）和布伦丹·金（Brendan King）以及司法部国际事务办公室（Office of International Affairs）出庭律师安德鲁·芬克尔曼（Andrew Finkelman）、玛格丽特·奥马利（Margaret O’Malley）和约翰·赖森伯格（John Reisenberg）提供了宝贵协助。
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Huawei CFO Wanzhou Meng Admits to Misleading Global Financial Institution
Meng Enters into Deferred Prosecution Agreement to Resolve Fraud Charges
The Chief Financial Officer of Huawei Technologies Co. Ltd., Wanzhou Meng, 49, of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), appeared today in federal district court in Brooklyn, entered into a deferred prosecution agreement (DPA) and was arraigned on charges of conspiracy to commit bank fraud and conspiracy to commit wire fraud, bank fraud and wire fraud.
“In entering into the deferred prosecution agreement, Meng has taken responsibility for her principal role in perpetrating a scheme to defraud a global financial institution,” said Acting U.S. Attorney Nicole Boeckmann for the Eastern District of New York. “Her admissions in the statement of facts confirm that, while acting as the Chief Financial Officer for Huawei, Meng made multiple material misrepresentations to a senior executive of a financial institution regarding Huawei’s business operations in Iran in an effort to preserve Huawei’s banking relationship with the financial institution. The truth about Huawei’s business in Iran, which Meng concealed, would have been important to the financial institution’s decision to continue its banking relationship with Huawei. Meng’s admissions confirm the crux of the government’s allegations in the prosecution of this financial fraud — that Meng and her fellow Huawei employees engaged in a concerted effort to deceive global financial institutions, the U.S. government and the public about Huawei’s activities in Iran.”
“This Deferred Prosecution Agreement will lead to the end of the ongoing extradition proceedings in Canada, which otherwise could have continued for many months, if not years,” said Acting Assistant Attorney General Mark J. Lesko for the Justice Department’s National Security Division. “We are enormously grateful to Canada’s Department of Justice for its dedicated work on this extradition and for its steadfast adherence to the rule of law.”
“Financial institutions are our first line of defense in maintaining the safety and security of the U.S. financial system,” said Assistant Attorney General Kenneth A. Polite Jr. of the Justice Department’s Criminal Division. “That is why the law requires that companies who avail themselves of the U.S. financial system provide financial institutions with truthful information about their business operations. Meng Wanzhou, CFO of Huawei Technologies, admitted today that she failed to tell the truth about Huawei’s operations in Iran, and as a result the financial institution continued to do business with Huawei in violation of U.S. law. Our prosecution team continues to prepare for trial against Huawei, and we look forward to proving our case against the company in court.”
“Meng’s admissions are evidence of a consistent pattern of deception to violate U.S. law,” said Assistant Director Alan E. Kohler Jr. of the FBI’s Counterintelligence Division. “The FBI will continue to aggressively investigate companies doing business in the United States when there are signs they behave with contempt for our laws.”
The Scheme to Defraud Financial Institutions
According to court documents, and as agreed to by Meng in the DPA’s statement of facts, Skycom Tech. Co. Ltd. (Skycom) was a Hong Kong company that primarily operated in Iran. As of February 2007, Skycom was wholly owned by a subsidiary of Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd. (Huawei), Hua Ying Management (Hua Ying). In November 2007, Hua Ying transferred its shares of Skycom to another entity that Huawei controlled, Canicula Holdings (Canicula). At the time Hua Ying transferred its Skycom shares to Canicula, Meng was the Secretary of Hua Ying.
In February 2008, after Huawei transferred ownership of Skycom from Hua Ying to Canicula, Meng joined Skycom’s Board of Directors, which was comprised of Huawei employees. She served on the Board until April 2009. After Meng departed from Skycom’s Board, Skycom’s Board members continued to be Huawei employees, Canicula continued to own Skycom, and Canicula continued to be controlled by Huawei. As of August 2012, Huawei included Skycom among a list of “other Huawei subsidiaries” in Huawei corporate documents written in English.
Between 2010 and 2014, Huawei controlled Skycom’s business operations in Iran, and Skycom was owned by an entity controlled by Huawei. All significant Skycom business decisions were made by Huawei. Moreover, Skycom’s countrymanager – the head of the business – was a Huawei employee. Individuals employed by Skycom believed they worked for Huawei.
During the same time period, Huawei employees engaged with a U.K. staffing company to provide engineers in Iran to support Skycom’s work with Iranian telecommunications service providers. Negotiations and contracting on behalf of Skycom were conducted by Huawei employees. To pay for these contractors, Huawei sent at least $7.5 million to the U.K. staffing company in a series of approximately 80 payments from Skycom’s bank accounts in Asia, including at a multinational financial institution (Financial Institution 1), to the U.K. staffing company’s account in the United Kingdom. The transactions were denominated in U.S. dollars and cleared through the United States.
In December 2012 and January 2013, various news organizations, including Reuters, reported that Skycom offered to sell “embargoed” equipment from a U.S. computer equipment manufacturer in Iran in potential violation of U.S. export controls law, and that Huawei had close ties with Skycom. In a statement to Reuters published in a December 2012 article, Huawei claimed that Skycom was one of its “major local partners” in Iran. Reuters reported that Huawei had further stated that “Huawei’s business in Iran is in full compliance with all applicable laws and regulations including those of the U.N., U.S. and E.U. This commitment has been carried out and followed strictly by our company. Further, we also require our partners to follow the same commitment and strictly abide by the relevant laws and regulations.”
In January 2013, a subsequent Reuters article reported that Meng served on the Board of Directors of Skycom between February 2008 and April 2009 and identified other connections between Skycom directors and Huawei. The article also quoted the following statement from Huawei: “The relationship between Huawei and Skycom is a normal business partnership. Huawei has established a trade compliance system which is in line with industry best practices and our business in Iran is in full compliance with all applicable laws and regulations including those of the UN. We also require our partners, such as Skycom, to make the same commitments.” This statement was incorrect, as Huawei operated and controlled Skycom; Skycom was therefore not Huawei’s business “partner.”
After these articles were published, Financial Institution 1 and other global financial institutions that provided international banking services to Huawei (collectively, the “Financial Institutions”), including U.S. dollar-clearing, made inquiries to Huawei in response to the above-described press reports. In early 2013, Huawei employees represented to the Financial Institutions that Skycom was just a local business partner of Huawei in Iran and that Skycom had not conducted Iran-related transactions using its accounts at the Financial Institutions.
To address the allegations in the news reports, Huawei requested an in-person meeting with a senior Financial Institution 1 employee. That meeting occurred on Aug. 22, 2013 in Hong Kong, at which time Meng met with an executive of Financial Institution 1 responsible for operations in the Asia Pacific region. During the meeting, Meng delivered a PowerPoint presentation written in Chinese, which was translated by an interpreter into English. Meng stated that she was using an interpreter to be precise in her language.
In her presentation, Meng stated, among other things, that Huawei’s relationship with Skycom was “normal business cooperation” and “normal and controllable business cooperation,” and she described Skycom as a “partner,” a “business partner of Huawei,” and a “third party Huawei works with” in Iran. Those statements were untrue because, as Meng knew, Skycom was not a business partner of, or a third party working with, Huawei; instead, Huawei controlled Skycom, and Skycom employees were really Huawei employees. It would have been material to Financial Institution 1 to know that Huawei controlled Skycom.
In addition, Meng stated that Huawei “was once a shareholder of Skycom” but had “sold all its shares in Skycom.” Those statements were untrue, because, as Meng knew, Huawei had “sold” its shares to an entity that Huawei controlled. Specifically, Huawei transferred Skycom shares from a Huawei subsidiary (Hua Ying) to another entity that was controlled by Huawei (Canicula). It would have been material to Financial Institution 1 to know that Skycom was transferred from one Huawei-controlled entity to another.
Finally, Meng stated that Huawei “operates in Iran in strict compliance with applicable laws, regulations and sanctions” and that “there has been no violation of export control regulations” by “Huawei or any third party Huawei works with.” These statements were untrue because Huawei’s operation of Skycom, which caused the Financial Institutions to provide prohibited services, including banking services, for Huawei’s Iran-based business while Huawei concealed Skycom’s link to Huawei, was in violation of the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control’s Iranian Transactions and Sanctions Regulations, 31 C.F.R. Part 560. Moreover, between 2010 and 2014, Huawei caused Skycom to conduct approximately $100 million worth of U.S.-dollar transactions through Financial Institution 1 that cleared through the United States, at least some of which supported its work in Iran in violation of U.S. law, including $7.5 million for Iran-based contractors from the U.K. staffing company to do work in Iran.
At no point during or after the meeting did Meng, who was aware of Huawei’s public statements about Skycom in Reuters, retract or amend any of those statements. Moreover, Huawei’s Treasurer, who also attended the August meeting, did not correct or amend any of the statements made by Meng.
Shortly after the meeting between Meng and Financial Institution 1, Huawei prepared an English version of the PowerPoint presentation at Financial Institution 1’s request. Meng later arranged for a paper copy of that PowerPoint presentation to be delivered to the Financial Institution 1 executive she had met with in September 2013. The representations in the English version of the PowerPoint presentation closely tracked the ones Meng had made during the meeting.
After the meeting and subsequent to receipt of Meng’s PowerPoint presentation, Financial Institution 1 decided to continue its relationship with Huawei. The other Financial Institutions similarly continued their respective relationships with Huawei.
The DPA
Under the terms of the DPA, Meng has agreed to the accuracy of a four-page statement of facts that details the knowingly false statements she made to Financial Institution 1. Meng also has agreed not to commit other federal, state or local crimes. If Meng breaches the agreement, she will be subject to prosecution of all the charges against her in the third superseding indictment filed in this case. The government also agreed to withdraw its request to the Ministry of Justice of Canada that Meng be extradited to the United States.
Assistant U.S. Attorneys Alexander A. Solomon, Julia Nestor, David K. Kessler, Sarah M. Evans and Meredith A. Arfa for the Eastern District of New York; Trial Attorneys Laura Billings and Christian Nauvel for the Criminal Division’s Money Laundering and Asset Recovery Section; and Trial Attorneys Thea D. R. Kendler, David Lim and R. Elizabeth Abraham of the National Security Division’s Counterintelligence and Export Control Section are prosecuting the case. Valuable assistance was provided by Assistant U.S. Attorneys Brian Morris and Brendan King of the Eastern District of New York’s Civil Division and Associate Director John Riesenberg, Attaché Andrew Finkelman of U.S. Embassy Paris and former Trial Attorney Margaret O’Malley of the Justice Department’s Office of International Affairs.