中华人民共和国（PRC）是一个集权国家，中国共产党（CCP）拥有至高无上的权威。政府及安全机构的所有最高层职务几乎都由共产党员担任。最高权力掌握在由25人组成的中共中央政治局以及由7名成员组成的政治局常务委员会手中。习近平仍然身居三个最重要的职位，即中国共产党总书记、国家主席以及中央军委主席。
文职政府保持对安全部队的控制。
在该年度，政府明显加强了大规模拘捕新疆维吾尔自治区（新疆）穆斯林少数民族人员的行动。据报道，当局任意拘押了大约80万至200多万维吾尔、哈萨克以及其他穆斯林人士，将他们关押在旨在消除宗教和种族身份特征的再教育营内。政府官员声称，这些再教育营对于打击恐怖主义、分裂主义和极端主义是必要的。国际媒体、人权组织和曾被拘押过的人士报告说，这些再教育营内的保安官员虐待、拷打并杀害了一些被拘押者。
人权问题包括政府任意或非法剥夺生命；被政府强迫失踪；被政府实施酷刑；被政府任意拘押；残酷和危及生命的监狱和拘留所条件；政治犯；任意侵犯个人隐私；对记者、律师、作家、博客作家、异议人士、上访人员和其他人士及其家人进行暴力攻击和刑事起诉；审查和屏蔽网站；干扰和平集会和结社自由的权利，包括用于外国和国内非政府组织（NGO）的过度限制性法律；对宗教自由的严厉限制；对自由迁徙（包括在国内和国际旅行）的严重限制；向朝鲜遣返有充分理由担心在那里遭受迫害而寻求庇护的人员；公民无法选择自己的政府；腐败；有时会导致绝育或流产的强制性的计划生育政策；人口贩运；严格限制劳工权益，包括禁止工人组织或参加他们自己选择的工会。官方对西藏自治区（TAR）和其他藏族区域以及新疆维吾尔自治区（XUAR）的维吾尔族和其他少数民族的言论、宗教、迁徙、结社和集会自由的压制更加恶化，并且比国内其他地区更为严厉。
当局通过司法系统处理了一批滥用职权的案件，尤其是腐败案件；但是大多数情况下是由共产党先行调查，并通过不透明的党内纪律检查程序对官员进行处罚。共产党继续主宰司法系统，控制着对所有法官的任命权，并对某些案件的判决直接作出指示。当局骚扰、关押并逮捕独立倡导打击滥用职权的公民。
 
第一节  尊重人格的完整，包括不受以下行为的侵犯：
 
 
有很多政府或其机构任意或非法杀人的报道。在许多情况下，这些案子极少或没有任何细节可循。
有报告说，上海警察于4月13日开枪打死抗议强拆自己家的鞠海良。据说警方还打伤了鞠的姐姐和外甥。当局以“危害公共安全”的罪名指控鞠的姐姐、姐夫和儿子；其姐姐姐夫还因为对警察投掷砖石而受到“妨碍治安行为”罪的指控。
有来自新疆的一些关于在扩大的再教育营中发生的死亡事件的报告。有些死亡发生在2018年之前，只是在被拘押者逃到外国以后才透露出来。
维吾尔族商人阿布都热西提·塞列伊·哈基姆于5月或6月在被拘押在再教育营期间死亡。据接受自由亚洲电台采访的一些人说，他因头部遭钝器击打而亡。
尽管近年来的法律改革减少了对死刑的使用并改善了复审程序，当局仍然在未经过正当程序和无合理上诉渠道的情况下在定罪后处决了一些被告。
 
 
有多起报道称当局拘押了一些人并将他们长期关押在不明地点。
政府在新疆对维吾尔人、哈萨克人和其它穆斯林人士进行大规模的任意拘押。“中国人权捍卫者”报告说，这些拘押相当于强制失踪，因为家庭成员得不到关于拘押时限或者地点的信息。
人权律师高智晟于2017年失踪，2018年仍然下落不明。自由亚洲电台2017年9月报道，高的家人说，警方说他被关押在一个秘密地点，但当局没有透露任何相关细节。
11月，多次获奖的中国纪实摄影家卢广在去新疆主持摄影讲座后失踪。当局不理会卢广妻子以及国际组织提出的了解其状态和下落的请求。
据7月的报道，被隔离监禁三年的王全璋律师仍然活着，被关押在天津拘留中心。12月26日，王有过一次不对外的法庭庭审。2015年7月的“709”大抓捕期间，当局拘押了300多名人权律师和法律助理，其中包括王全璋。
政府仍然未就1989年对天安门示威游行进行暴力镇压时被杀害、失踪或被拘捕的人员提供全面、可信的说法。许多参与1989年示威游行的活动人士及其家属继续遭受官方骚扰。
政府在防止、调查和惩戒这样的行为方面未做出任何努力。
 
 
法律禁止从肉体上伤害或虐待囚犯，并且禁止监狱看守酷刑逼供、侮辱囚犯的尊严、殴打或教唆其他人殴打囚犯。针对部分类别的刑事案件，修订后的刑事诉讼法规定，通过酷刑及其他非法手段取得的包括口供在内的证据不得用于某些类型刑事案件的庭审，但这些法律保护措施仍未得到有力的执行。不计其数的前囚犯或被拘押者报告说，他们遭到殴打、强奸、电击、强制数小时坐板凳边、绑手腕吊起、剥夺睡眠、强制灌食、违背本人意愿强迫服药以及其他形式的身心虐待。尽管狱管当局也会虐待普通犯人，但据报道，他们尤其会给政治与宗教异议人士更为恶劣的对待。在“709”大抓捕中被拘押的律师、法律助理和活动人士继续遭受不同形式的酷刑、虐待或有辱人格的对待，与2017年人权报告中提到的对吴淦、李春富、谢阳和江天勇的待遇相似。许多人权倡导人士都对此表示关注。
据自由亚洲电台9月报道，64天网人权中心的创始人黄琦因多次受审而受伤。黄于2016年在四川省绵阳市被捕，罪名是“非法向海外提供国家机密”。多个知情人都报告说，当局剥夺黄的睡眠和及时得到医疗照顾的权利，试图以此来强迫黄认罪。10月，当局又给黄琦增加了多个罪名，其中包括“泄漏国家机密”。绵阳中级人民法院在突然取消6月的庭审之后，至今尚未给黄确定新的庭审日期。黄琦的母亲蒲文清于10月向中央当局请愿，要求释放她儿子，因为她认为黄受到了虐待。她已经两年没有见到黄琦。蒲于12月7日在北京火车站遭到便衣安全人员抓捕，随后失踪。
少数民族维吾尔族的一些人报告说，司法和再教育营中的执法人员和管教人员有系统地经常对他们施加酷刑和其他有辱人格的对待。幸存者说，当局对被拘押人员实施的刑罚包括电击、水刑、殴打、体位折磨、注射未知物质以及低温监号（另见第6节，少数族裔）。被取缔的法轮功的成员和全能神教会成员也报告在被关押期间受到系统化的酷刑。
据媒体报道和非政府组织8月发布的一份报告（见第4节）称，在对待和虐待被拘押者方面，司法体系之外的用于调查腐败的新的“留置”制度保留了以前“双规”制度的许多特点，诸如长期单独监禁、剥夺睡眠、殴打、强制以令人难受的姿态连续站立或者坐数小时，有时是数日等手段。
法律规定精神治疗与入院应当遵从“自愿原则”，但法律又允许当局和家庭成员违背当事人意愿把他们送入精神病院，而且没有为被收容入院人员提供有意义的法律保护。法律不提供聘请律师的权利，并且限制当事人与精神病院以外的人员沟通的权利。
据《法制日报》（一份报道法律事务的官方报纸）报道，公安部直接管辖着23所用来关押精神病罪犯的保安严密的精神病院。尽管被关进精神病院的人中有很多人被判有谋杀和其他暴力犯罪，但也有报告说有不少活动人士、宗教和信仰信徒以及上访人员因政治原因被迫接受精神病治疗。公安人员可以将人送进精神病院，强迫他们接受治疗，尽管他们的“病情”与精神病无关。
据关注人权的网站“民权与民生观察”2月报道，重庆地方安全官员第七次将异议人士刘刚送入精神病院。从2004年起刘经常批评中共，当局经常以“扰乱公共秩序”的罪名拘押他。
一些活动人士和组织继续指控政府强制摘除政治犯的器官，尤其是法轮功成员的器官。政府否认有这种情况，已经从2015年开始正式停止长期以来实行的强制摘取死刑犯器官用于移植的做法。
 
监狱和拘押中心的条件
 
关押政治犯和刑事犯的惩戒设施通常条件恶劣，而且威胁生命安全或有辱人格。
居住条件：当局经常将囚犯与在押人员关在拥挤不堪、卫生条件恶劣的环境中。食物往往量少质次，很多在押人员在被允许的情况下都要依赖亲属提供额外的食品、药品和保暖衣物。经常有报道说囚犯因没有床铺或被褥而不得不睡在地上。在很多情况下，卫生、通风、取暖、照明和饮用水等条件都不合要求。
尽管官方保证囚犯有权得到及时治疗，但是，不能为囚犯提供及时、适当的医疗护理仍然是一个严重的问题。监狱当局有时拒绝为政治犯提供治疗。
5月，广东政府官员将徐琳送往广州武警医院急诊。徐是作曲家，于2017年9月因演唱有关诺贝尔和平奖得主、政治犯刘晓波的歌曲而被拘押。拘留所当局告诉徐的妻子，他的病是因为在拘留所吃的食物造成的。6月，徐琳被诊断为患有“乳腺增生”，即乳房组织增大，这经常发生在癌症早期。当局拒绝了徐的妻子和律师提出的让徐保外就医的请求。徐的妻子坚持说，徐琳在被拘押前没有任何健康问题。
政治犯和普通犯人关在一起，据报狱警会教唆其他犯人殴打政治犯。有些人据说被与一些死刑犯关押在一起。当局不准一些异议人士从亲属处获得补充食物、药品以及保暖的衣物。
行政拘留所的条件与监狱的条件相似。在行政拘留所发生过殴打致死的事件。被关押的人报告说曾遭到殴打、性侵、缺乏适当的食物以及只有有限的医疗服务或根本没有。
新疆当局为维吾尔、哈萨克和其它穆斯林人士建造了新的再教育营。在有些情况下，当局用原来的学校、工厂和监狱改建。根据人权观察报道，这些再教育营注重“对被收容者进行军事化纪律约束和全面的政治灌输”。能够获得的信息很有限，但有些报道说，那些学不会汉语词汇和歌曲的人遭到克扣食物的惩罚。
10月，来自新疆的维吾尔妇女米娜•图尔松对媒体回忆了中国当局在她2015年回新疆之后数次任意拘押她的经历。图尔松报告说，在2018年她被拘押期间，有9名与她同监室的人死亡。那是一个地下监室，没有窗户，共关押了68名妇女。
管理：法律规定囚犯写给监狱上级机关或司法机构的信件不需受到检查，但该法律在何种程度上得以执行尚不清楚。尽管当局偶尔会调查具有可信度的非人道待遇指控，但并不对外公布调查结果。许多囚犯和在押人员都得不到合理的探视，不能与家人联络。有些家庭成员不知道他们被监禁的亲属的下落。当局还禁止许多囚犯和被拘留人员从事宗教活动或获得宗教读物。
独立监督：有关当局将与监狱以及其他各类行政和法外拘押设施有关的信息视为国家机密，政府一般不允许对这些设施进行独立监督。
 
 
任意逮捕或关押的问题仍然非常严重。法律赋予警方广泛的行政拘留权以及在没有正式逮捕或刑事起诉的情况下延期拘留的权利。本年度内，律师、人权活动人士、记者、宗教领袖及其支持者、前政治犯及其家属等群体继续成为任意拘留或逮捕的对象。
法律规定任何人都有权在法庭上质疑其被捕或羁押的合法性，但政府一般不履行这种规定。
 
 
国内主要的安全机构包括国家安全部、公安部和人民武装警察。人民武装警察接受中国共产党中央委员会和中央军事委员会的双重领导。人民解放军主要负责对外安全，但也承担了部分国内安全责任。此外，地方政府还经常动用被称为“城管”的城市平民保安人员执行行政任务。对这些人员的监督责任主要是在地方上，并没有统一的做法。法律规定滥用职权的官员可受到刑事起诉，但除了腐败案件以外，很少追究这种案子。
公安部负责协调民警部队，其行政组织划分成特别的部门以及地方、县级和省级警察机关。检察院对公安力量的监督有限。各级部门的腐败现象普遍。警察和城管人员曾参与法外拘留、勒索和袭击事件。
根据法规，如果监狱管教人员被发现有殴打、体罚、虐待囚犯或挑起这种行为就会被开除，但是没有关于这些法规得到实施的报道。
尽管文职当局保持对安全部队的有效控制，在缺乏可靠数据的情况下很难确认国内安全机构逍遥法外的确切程度。社交媒体上甚至在国家媒体报道中常会见到滥权的实例。通常在有关警察杀人的报道之后当局会宣布进行调查。但是并不清楚这些调查是否发现了警察渎职或采取了纪律处罚措施。很少见到政府采取行动以促使保安部队尊重人权的有关报道。
4月28日，广东汕尾的警察以实行法外惩戒、非法拘押和违法使用警用设备的罪名逮捕了一个安全官员。4月24日，该安全官员抓住了一名企图在附近道观偷钱的十几岁的少年，该官员用手铐将其铐在旗杆上，殴打并用警用电棍对他施暴，还将过程录像，然后上传到社交媒体。
 
 
警方拘押若超过37天就必须由检察机关正式批捕，但对于涉及“国家安全、恐怖主义以及重大受贿”的案件，法律允许最高6个月的隔离拘押而无须正式逮捕。在正式逮捕嫌疑人之后，警方还有权在案件调查期间将嫌疑人再拘押7个月。
在调查结束后，检察院在决定是否对其作出刑事指控时可将嫌疑人再拘押45天。一旦提出刑事指控，当局可以在司法程序开始之前再将嫌疑人拘押45天。有时候警方拘留嫌疑人的时间会超过法律允许的期限，在案件开审前嫌疑人被拘押一年甚至更久是很常见的现象。
法律规定，在押人员在受到刑事起诉之前可以会见自己的辩护律师。《刑事诉讼法》规定，法院要为没有委托律师的、有盲、聋、哑或精神病等情况的、未成年的以及面临无期徒刑或死刑的被告指派一名律师。无论被告是否有经济能力，该法律都适用。法院也可以为其他无力支付律师费用的刑事被告人指派律师，但是法院往往不会这样做。一些律师报告说，他们很难会见被关押在拘留所里的委托人，尤其是被认为是政治敏感案件的委托人。
刑事被告人在等候审理期间有权申请保释（也被称为“取保候审”），但该系统运作效率似乎不佳，当局很少让嫌疑人取保候审。
法律要求在拘留后24小时内通知被拘留者的家属；然而，当局常常在将一些人关押了远超出此规定的时间后也不发出通知，尤其是在涉及政治敏感案件的时候。有些案件没有送过通知。根据一项笼统的例外规定，如果通知家属会“阻碍案件调查”，则警方不需要通知。修改后的《刑事诉讼法》将该例外情况局限于涉及国家安全或恐怖主义的案件，但公安人员对这些条款有着广泛的解释权。
在某些情况下，法律允许监视居住，而不是拘押在正式的设施中。假如警方怀疑有危害国家安全、恐怖活动或情节严重的受贿等罪行，而且认为在家监视居住有可能妨碍调查，经由上一级部门批准后，警方可以对嫌疑人在指定地点（即嫌疑人住宅以外的其他地点）执行长达6个月的“监视居住”。在这一类案件中，当局也可能不准辩护律师与嫌疑人见面。人权组织和被拘押过的人士报告说，这样的做法使被拘押人面临遭受酷刑的高风险，因为被关在一个既不是自己家又不是正式拘押设施的地方减少了对被拘押人士待遇以及上诉机制的监管。
当局使用行政拘留手段来恐吓政治与宗教维权人士并阻止公开示威。行政拘留的方式包括强制戒毒治疗（针对吸毒者）、 “拘留教养”（针对未成年罪犯），以及用于拘留政治活动人士和宗教信徒尤其是法轮功学员的“法制教育”中心。在强制戒毒康复中心停留的最长时间是两年，其中有6个月通常是在解毒中心。
任意逮捕:  当局以泄漏国家机密罪、颠覆罪和其他罪名实施拘留和逮捕，以此镇压持不同政见者、压制公众诉求。但这些指控，包括何谓国家机密，都定义不清，而且任何信息都可以通过追溯方式被认定为国家机密。当局还广为使用语意不清的“寻衅滋事”罪名来对付许多维权人士。这个词至今语义不清。基于广义且模糊不清的国家机密法，公民和外国人士还会因泄露刑事审判、商业活动和政府活动信息等行为被拘留。反间谍法授权当局可要求个人和团体停止任何被视为威胁国家安全的活动。不遵守该要求可能会导致财产和资产被没收。
有多起报告说，有些律师、宗教领袖或者信徒、上访人员和其他维权人士在被逮捕或拘押很长一段时间以后，其指控却因为证据不足而被驳回。当局将许多公民非法软禁、剥夺旅行权、或者送进包括“黑监狱”在内的各种非法拘留设施实施行政拘留。在有些案例中，公安人员会给学校施加压力，不准接收知名政治犯的孩子入学。受软禁人士的情况各有不同，但有人在警察的监视下在家中与世隔绝。安全官员经常会驻守在这些人家里。在外国高层官员来访、一年一度的全国人民代表大会、天安门广场屠杀纪念日，以及在藏区和新疆的敏感纪念日等敏感时期，当局都会软禁许多公民。公安当局还会将一些没有被软禁的人士送到很远的地方去“强制度假”。
2015年在泰国失踪的瑞典籍书商、香港居民桂敏海于2017年10月被中国当局释放，又于1月底乘火车旅行时被中国当局再次拘押。中国政府2月12日发表声明，称桂违反了中国法律，其案件将按照中国的法律来处理。媒体报道说桂仍在被拘押中，但他的下落不明。
7月当局释放了诺贝尔和平奖得主刘晓波的遗孀刘霞；刘霞曾被软禁在家达8年之久。当局扣押刘霞并没有经过任何刑事起诉或法律程序。据能够与刘霞联络的人士说，她的身心健康一直在恶化。刘霞的弟弟刘晖仍在中国保外就医，2013年他因欺诈罪被判11年徒刑。人权维权人士认为政府是将刘晖作为人质扣押，以防止刘霞公开批评当局。
据媒体报道，自从浙江温州地下教会的“彼得”邵祝敏2016年被任命为主教以来，政府官员已经拘押了他五次。从2017年5月到2018年1月，邵被拘押了7个多月。在以前的拘押中，当局几次将邵送往青海接受“改造”，罪名是邵拒绝加入国家认可的中国天主教爱国会。
审前拘押：审前拘押可能持续超过一年。据称，涉及“敏感案件”的被告在案件开审之前被拘押的时间更长。许多在“709”大抓捕中被当局拘留的人士遭到超过一年时间的审前拘押，无法接触他们的家人或律师。具体统计数字未见公布，公众也无法获得，但在政治犯的案件中，审前拘押尤为常见。
6月29日，沈阳铁西地区法院在经过两年的审前拘押之后给维护人权人士林明杰判刑，其罪名是2016年在北京公安部门前组织示威者抗议沈阳公安局长许文有滥用职权。林被判两年零6个月徒刑，刑期包括他已被拘押的时间。
 
 
尽管法律规定法院应当独立行使司法权，不受行政机关、社会团体以及个人的干涉，但司法并不独立。法官常常就如何裁决待审案件，特别是政治敏感案件，接到来自政府和中共的政治指导。中共政法委员会有权审查和指导各级法院的审理活动。法院与检察院的所有任命都必须得到中共组织部的批准。
由于防范司法腐败的措施模糊不清且执行不力，腐败常常会影响司法裁决。地方政府负责任命地方法官并支付他们的工资，从而经常对其辖区内法官的裁决施加影响。
一个由中共控制的委员会在大多数重大案件中作出决定，而一审法院和上诉法院法官的任务只是为该委员会的决定撰写一份法理依据。
法院无权裁决某项立法是否符合宪法。虽然法律允许团体和个人对法律法规是否符合宪法提出质疑，但是这些质疑只能向立法机构提出。因此，律师几乎没有机会在诉讼中就法律是否违宪进行辩护。3月，律师及其他人得到中央政府的指示，要避免讨论宪法修正案中有关取消国家主席和副主席任期限制的做法是否符合宪法。
据媒体报道，公安部门通过电视播放律师、国外和国内博客作者、记者和企业高管认罪的镜头，以便在刑事审理开始之前将他们定罪。在有些案件中，这种认罪可能是释放的前提条件。非政府组织认为，这样的电视认罪很有可能是逼供甚至是使用酷刑的结果，而且一些曾经认罪的受押人在被释放之后撤回了自己的供词，并证实他们的认罪是被强迫的。法律并没有允许在审判前让犯罪嫌疑人通过电视认罪的规定。
江天勇2017年在湖南长沙被判犯有煽动颠覆国家罪之后，现仍在狱中。一个法院判处他入狱两年。他的罪名源自他接受外国记者采访，以及在互联网上发布的文章，这些在海外广泛被认为是正常的专业行为。当局不准江自主选择辩护律师，很多分析家都认为对他的审判既不公平，也不公正。
据报道，“司法独立”仍然是中共命令大学教授回避的课题之一（见第二节a.“学术自由和文化活动”）。
 
审判程序
 
尽管修订后的刑事诉讼法重申了无罪推定，但刑事司法系统依然倾向于有罪推定，那些受到高度关注或政治敏感的案件更是如此。
不认罪的被告往往会受到法院的惩罚，得到比认罪的人更为严厉的判决。上诉程序极少推翻原判，也不能提供足够的复审途径；对侵犯被告权利的补偿不合理。
最高人民法院规定，除了涉及国家机密、隐私、未成年人或由当事人请求保护商业机密的案件之外，所有的审判都应向公众公开。当局利用涉及国家机密案件的例外规定向公众甚至有时对家属都封锁政治敏感案件的进展情况，并且剥夺被告寻求辩护律师的权利。法院条例规定，持有有效证件的外籍人士同中国公民一样拥有获准旁听审判的权利，但事实上只有获得邀请的外籍人士才能旁听庭审。如同往年一样，在多个案件中，当局禁止驻中国的外交官和记者旁听庭审。有些案件被重新归类为“国家机密”，或者以其他理由不对公众公开。
由政府经营的庭审公开网在互联网上播放庭审；其中大部分都是民事审判。
法规要求，除了涉及国家机密和未成年嫌疑人的案件外，法院官员要在判决生效后的7天之内公布判决结果。法院并没有公布所有的判决。他们有广泛的决定权，如果认为公布判决书“不适当”就不公布。许多政治案件的判决都没有公布。对话基金会观察到，互联网上公布的判决书数量有所减少。
受到行政拘留的人没有寻求法律咨询的权利。刑事被告有权接受法律援助，但绝大多数刑事被告在受审时没有律师为其辩护。
律师按规定都必须是中共控制下的全国律师协会成员，而且司法部要求所有的律师在取得或每年更新其从业执照时都要宣誓效忠中共的领导。中共继续要求有3名或以上中共党员的律师事务所在所内成立党支部。
尽管政府声言尽力改进让律师会见其委托人的做法，但是2017年全国律师协会的主席告诉《北京青年报》，辩护律师只参与了不到百分之三十的刑事案件。尤其是一些人权律师报告说，当局不允许他们为某些委托人做有效辩护，或者威胁他们如果选择做辩护就会受到惩罚。有些律师拒绝为政治敏感的案件辩护，而这类案件的当事人往往很难找到辩护律师。在有些情况下，当局不准当事人自选的律师接受委托，却用法院指定的律师取而代之。
1月18日，在广州著名人权律师付爱玲到江门市新会看守所会见她的委托人詹会东之后，广东省司法厅约谈了她。司法厅官员反复追问江，是什么人联系她寻求法律代理，是什么人聘用她做詹的辩护律师。詹会东是名民运活动人士，曾参加过纪念刘晓波的活动。
政府暂停或吊销一些接受敏感案件的律师的营业执照或律师执照；敏感案件的当事人包括民主异议人士、家庭教会活动人士、法轮功学员或批评政府者。当局利用全国律师协会的年度执照审查程序来拒绝或延迟给专业律师颁发执照。政府用来恐吓或对人权律师施压的其他手段包括非法拘押、对法律办公室做不明不白的“调查”、取消律师资格、骚扰以及人身恐吓，还有阻挠律师取得证据或接触委托人。2月，一批中国律师写了一封公开信，抗议政府对接受人权案件律师的骚扰。
1月，广东省司法厅吊销了备受瞩目的人权律师隋木青的法律执照。4月，他要求对司法厅吊销其执照的决定进行行政复议，但直到8月也没有得到回复。
接受政治敏感案件的律师们自己往往会成为被骚扰甚至拘押的对象。为“709”大抓捕中的人权律师辩护的北京律师李昱函仍然被关在沈阳，未经任何正式的审判程序；他只在7月和10月有过两次审前会议。当局于2017年10月拘押了他。
2015年，全国人大常务委员会修订了关于法律从业人员的立法。修订过的法律将律师“侮辱、诽谤或威胁司法官员”、“不服从法庭警告”或“严重扰乱法庭秩序”的行为确定为违法。该修订法案还把向媒体披露委托人或案件信息或者以抗议、媒体报道或其他方式影响法庭裁决的行为也确定为违法。违反者会面临罚款和3年以下有期徒刑。
2015年制定的法规还规定，拘留中心的官员应当允许辩护律师会见嫌疑人或被告，或者要说明为什么此时不能安排会面。按照规定，这样的会面应当在48小时内即行安排。检察院和法院应当允许辩护律师在三个工作日内取得并阅读案情文件。根据该法规，辩护律师阅卷的时间和次数不应当受到限制。有些敏感案件的律师在庭审前无法见到他们的委托人，查看证据的时间有限，在审判中被告和律师也不能相互交流。与这个法律相悖，在案件提交法庭之前刑事被告往往没有被指定律师。法律规定刑事诉讼使用的书面语及口语都应该是当地常用的语言，政府翻译员要为不熟悉当地语言的被告提供语言服务。消息来源称大部分审判都使用汉语普通话，即使是在少数民族地区也是如此，在被告不会讲普通话时提供翻译员。
被告与原告当庭对质的机制不足。据报道只有一小部分案件有目击证人。在是否需要甚至是否允许证人当庭作证方面法官享有很大的自由裁量权。在大部分刑事审判中，证词都是由检察官宣读，被告及律师没有通过交叉询问进行反驳的机会。虽然法律规定预审期间的证人陈述不能作为定罪的唯一依据，但检察官高度依赖此类陈述。尽管辩护律师可以申请查看政府掌握的涉案证据，但无权强迫证人作证或要求进行证据开示。
广东省珠海市当局以“国家安全”为由拒绝允许著名反审查活动人士甄江华与其律师任全牛见面。2017年，当局以“煽动颠覆国家政权”的罪名逮捕了甄，将其软禁在指定地点监视居住。甄，网名“GuestsZhen”，是一个名为“翻墙网”的反审查网站的执行编辑。这个网站在国外注册，提供有关审查的信息和进入中国边界以外的互联网的翻墙工具。
依照法律，对于那些被判处死刑、在等候复核期间无经济能力聘请律师的囚犯要指派律师。执行死刑的官方数字被归类为国家机密。对话基金会称，自2007年死刑系统开始改革，执行死刑的人数连续数年持续下降，现在已经趋于稳定。对话基金会认为，对犯罪团伙头目和新疆地区被判为恐怖分子的处决人数可能抵消了其它死刑人数的减少。
 
政治犯与被拘押者
 
政府官员继续否认关押了任何政治犯，声称拘押那些人不是由于他们的政治或宗教观点，而是因为他们触犯了法律。但是，当局继续因政治和宗教原因将公民投入监狱。人权组织估计有成千上万名政治犯仍然被关押，大多数被关在监狱，有的被关在行政拘留设施。政府不准国际人道主义组织探望政治犯。
政治犯获得提前释放的比例比其他犯人低。据对话基金会估计，仍有100多名犯人在因反革命罪和流氓罪服刑；这两项罪名已于1997年从刑法中废除。另有数千人因“危害国家安全”和“从事邪教活动”等政治和宗教罪服刑。政府并未复核所有在1997年前因反革命罪和流氓罪被起诉的案例，也没有释放那些因刑法己经撤销的非暴力罪名入狱的人士。
直至本年底，许多政治犯仍然在狱中服刑或在其他形式的拘押中，其中包括作家杨茂东（郭飞雄）、维吾尔学者伊力哈木·土赫提和热依拉·达吾提、活动人士王炳章、活动人士刘贤斌、台湾民主活动人士李明哲、牧师张少杰、法轮功学员卞丽潮和马振宇、上海教区辅理主教马达钦、人权律师王全璋、夏霖、高智晟、唐荆陵、余文生和江天勇、博客作者吴淦、佛教僧侣徐志强（又名圣光法师），以及上海工运活动人士蒋存德。
刑事处罚包括在获释后的一段固定时间内“剥夺政治权利”，在此期间获释者被剥夺言论、结社和出版自由。据前服刑人员说，其就业、出行、获得居住许可和护照、租房以及获得社会服务的能力受到严重限制。
前政治犯及其家属常常受到当局的监视、电话窃听、搜查以及其他形式的骚扰或威胁。例如，公安人员跟踪去会见外国记者或外交人员的被拘留或囚禁的维权人士的家人，要求他们禁言，不许谈论案情。某些维权组织的成员被禁止会见来访的外宾。
 
民事司法程序和赔偿
 
法院审理民事案件时在司法独立方面面临与刑事案件相同的限制。《国家赔偿法》规定，给予权益受到政府机构或官员侵犯的原告行政与司法赔偿。该法律还允许对遭受错误拘押、精神创伤或由拘留所或狱管人员造成的身体伤害的人给予赔偿。
过去很少有公民申请国家赔偿，原因是诉讼费用高、法院信誉低下以及很少有人意识到《国家赔偿法》的存在，但仍有法院推翻错误判罪的情况。7月，辽宁省的李金莲申请达4140万元人民币（610万美元）的国家赔偿；她因1998年被控用有毒糖果杀害两名儿童而被判死刑缓期执行。6月，江西省高级人民法院认定以前的判罪事实不清、证据不足，将李无罪释放。9月江西高级人民法院决定因错判赔偿李将近293万元人民币（43万1千美元）。10月最高人民法院接受了李关于重新考虑江西法院决定的要求，于11月19日就李申诉原始赔偿不足举行了听证，最终裁决到年底仍未决定。
法律给予个人到政府部门上访以解决其不满的权利。大部分的不满都源于土地、住房、权益、环境或腐败，大部分上访者都试图将其问题投送到当地“信访”办公室。政府报告说每年收到大约600万份上访信；但是，上访者的集会和表达不满的权利继续受到限制。
虽然有改善上访制度的努力，进展仍然不稳定。尽管中央政府重申禁止阻挠或限制“正常上访”，不准非法拘押上访人员，官方对上访人员的打击报复仍在继续。一些规定鼓励所有与诉讼有关的上访都在本地通过地方或省级法院得到解决，使地方官员防止访民到高层上访的鼓励机制得到强化。地方官员派人到北京将上访人员强制带回本省，以防止他们向中央政府投诉地方官员。这样的拘押都没有记录，上访者经常是被短暂关押在非法的“黑监狱”中。
6月3日，广东省广州市的警察拘押了活动人士杨素媛，她为被大型国有银行解雇的员工申请就业遣散福利。警方审问了杨，采集了她的指纹和DNA血样以及面部识别记录，并把她转送到家乡广东清远的派出所做进一步询问。
6月，因2017年6月非法拘押、捆绑和殴打一名来自江西省的上访人员，北京第二中级人民法院审判了12 名嫌疑人。这名来自江西省上犹的上访者叫陈裕咸，在北京被嫌疑人抓走8小时后死亡。据报道，该12名嫌疑人来自一个打着租车公司名义的非法犯罪团伙，该团伙与要求他们截访的地方政府官员有非常密切的联系。直至年底北京法院尚未公布判决。
 
 
尽管法律规定“公民的通信自由和隐私受到法律保护”，但当局经常不尊重公民的隐私。法律要求执法人员在搜查房屋之前要获得搜查令，但执法人员往往对这一条款置若罔闻。公安局和检察官有权不经司法审查自行颁发搜查令。仍然不断有关于警察强行闯入的报道。
当局监控私人之间的电话、短信、传真、电子邮件、即时通讯和其他数码通信。当局还拆开并审查国内和国际邮件。安全部门经常监视并进入民宅和办公室搜查电脑、电话和传真机。外国记者在离开中国的时候发现他们的一些个人物品被搜查。在有些情况下，如果发现了被认为是政治敏感的材料，记者要被迫签署文件说明他们是“自愿”将这些文件留在中国的。
据媒体报道，公安部在全国设置了数以千万计的摄像头来监控一般民众。一些人权组织称，当局越来越依赖摄像头及其他一些手段来监视和恐吓政治异议人士、宗教领袖及其支持者、藏人以及维吾尔人。这其中包括面部特征识别和“步态识别”视频监控，使警察不但得以监控事态而且能够快速识别人群中的个体。对电话和互联网通讯的监控与干扰在新疆和西藏地区尤为普遍。政府在西藏自治区和自治区以外的藏区的寺庙中设置了监控摄像头（见“西藏”特别部分）。法律允许安全人员在发生“重大安全事件”时中断通讯联络。
“人权观察”称，国家安全部与信息技术公司合作创建一个“大规模自动化语音识别与监控系统”，这个系统与已经在新疆和安徽使用的系统相类似，用以帮助破解刑事案件。根据一个参与制造这个系统的公司所言，该系统的程序可以解读普通话以及包括藏语和维吾尔语在内的某些少数民族语言。在很多情况下其他与生物特征有关的数据，比如指纹和DNA，也都被储存起来。这个数据库中的信息不仅取自罪犯和犯罪嫌疑人，也包括全部的移民工以及所有申请护照的维吾尔人。
因城市开发而强制搬迁的事件在一些地区继续发生。对搬迁条件或补偿不满而举行抗议的现象很普遍，当局起诉了一些组织抗议的领导者。农村地区的基础建设和商业开发项目导致了成千上万的村民被迫搬迁。
公民与政府之间的房地产纠纷有时演变成暴力事件。造成这些纠纷的原因常常是当地官员与房地产开发商勾结，对拆迁居民赔偿很少甚至不予赔偿，而且对当地官员从事房地产交易又缺乏有效的政府或媒体监督，对被拆迁居民也没有提供法律救济或其他解决纠纷的机制。虽然中央政府声称已进一步加强了控制非法征地行为并制定赔偿标准，但问题仍然存在。
政府继续推行“社会信用系统”，该系统收集大量信息用来为个体和公司评分，以解决“社会信任”缺失的问题，加强金融信贷工具，减少公共腐败。与西方的金融信用评分记录不同的是，社会信用系统还收集学术记录、交通违规、社交媒体使用、交友质量、遵守计划生育规定程度、工作表现、购物习惯以及其他方面的内容。这个系统意在促进自我审查，因为网民要为自己的言论、人际关系甚至在亲密社交圈中别人与自己分享的信息负责。
通过监视公民的网上活动和人际关系，个人的“社会信用分”是可以用来量化其对政府忠诚度的标准之一。有迹象表明，该系统根据个人到访网站的“忠诚度”和与其互动网民的“忠诚度”来加减分数。该系统还建立了让公民互相监督的奖励机制。各种应用程序上组创聊天组的人要监督和报告任何违规内容，他们要对违规行为承担责任。
尽管政府意在创建一个统一的社会信用系统，有数个中国技术公司创建了几个完全不同的系统，而且这些系统的具体应用在不同省或城市各不相同。在杭州，评分系统应用于18岁以上的居民，包括了个人的教育、就业、遵纪守法（比如纳税）、缴纳医疗费用、偿还贷款、信守合同、参加义务活动以及自愿献血等信息。
个人的信用分数对其活动造成了具体的限制的案例有数起。社会信用分数低的用户面临不断增加的一系列后果，包括失去在国内社交平台交流的能力、旅行以及购置房产。有国家媒体4月报道说，社会信用系统“阻止”了一些人的1100万次飞机出行和400万次火车出行。
据人权活动人士报告说，另外一种使用社交媒体审查的情况是，当局就有关他们参与和人权有关的聊天组事宜进行问询；这包括了微信和WhatsApp。当局通过监视这些聊天组来识别活动人士，致使微信用户越来越多进行自我审查，甚至导致多起聊天组组织人被逮捕的事件。
政府在新疆施行了“双联户”制度，该制度从已在西藏实行了多年的制度发展而来。这个制度将居民每10户分为一组，互相监视并向政府报告“安全问题”和贫困问题，从而将普通公民变成了举报人。在新疆，政府还要求维吾尔族家庭接受“寄宿”者，由官员或志愿者强行入住维吾尔人家，以监控这些家庭，发现“极端主义”的线索。祷告、拥有宗教书籍、或戒用烟酒等，都被政府视为有“极端主义”迹象的行为，有这些行为的人都可能会被拘押在再教育营里。
政府限制夫妇生育子女（见第六节，妇女）
 
第二节 尊重公民自由，包括：
 
 
宪法阐明公民“享有言论、出版、集会、结社、游行和示威的自由”，但当局并不尊重这些权利，当它们不符合中共利益的时候尤为如此。当局继续严密控制所有平面、广播、电子和社交媒体，并经常利用它们宣传政府的观点和中共意识形态。当局审查和操控新闻媒体和互联网，在敏感的周年纪念日期间和议题上尤为如此。
言论和表达自由：公民可以在私下小范围地讨论许多政治话题而不会受到官方惩罚。但是，当局经常对那些质疑中共合法性的公民采取严厉的行动。一些独立的智库、研究小组或研讨会报告称，曾被迫取消某些涉及敏感议题的会议。在公开演讲、学术讨论和媒体评论或在网上发表政治敏感言论的人仍会遭到惩罚。
7月，在全国都在强烈抗议儿童假疫苗事件时，警方到访了相关家长们的家，试图制止他们在网上讨论这个话题。他们向一些家长出示了一个文件，上面说警方会以“勾结外国媒体”的罪名起诉参加计划中的媒体见面会的家长。这些家长随后取消了记者会。
4月，回族诗人崔浩新在新疆的再教育营被关押了一周，他认为这是因为自己在诗歌和其它作品中表达的政治观点。8月16日，新疆警察威胁崔，试图阻止他在推特上发布关于这些再教育营的信息。
出版和媒体自由：中共和政府继续对所有的出版物、网上及广播材料保持绝对控制权。只有官方媒体机构才能得到政府批准报道中共领导人的新闻或其他被认为是“敏感”的话题。尽管中共及政府没有对所有出版和广播的内容作出详尽指导，但却保有不受制约的权力来决定是否、何时以及如何报道某个问题，或者干脆下令禁止报道。
在本年度中，官方媒体报道报道说，高层当局发布了共产党内部规定，详细列出对没有坚守意识形态规定的人的惩罚，命令进一步打击非法的互联网账号和平台，并指示媒体从事“以马克思主义为基础的新闻事业”。这些规定还计划针对大学生做更进一步的政治和意识形态的灌输。
政府通过重新构建监管制度来收紧对媒体和公共话语空间的管控。中共宣传部直接控制国家新闻出版广播电影电视总局。当局于3月重组了国家新闻出版广播电影电视总局，重新安排部分职责，并将其改名为国家广播电视局。新的结构极大地扩大了中共对电影、新闻媒体、报纸、书籍和杂志的管控。直接管理互联网内容包括网上新闻媒体的中国网络空间管理局也为中共的宣传服务。
11月14日，中国网络空间管理局发布了一个说明，称作为正在进行的活动的一部分，已有9800多个互联网账号被“清除”。11月15日，中国网络空间管理局发布了一个通知，对在网上能够发表什么样的意见作进一步的限制，称中国网络空间管理局将开始要求互联网和媒体公司提供详细的用户记录；这是中国网络空间管理局针对网上异议意见和社会运动而采取的新政策的一部分。11月30日，中国网络空间管理局说，将要求那些可能被用于“社会动员”或导致“公众舆论重大变化”的互联网平台提交有关其活动的报告。
政府进一步采取行动来构建其宣传工具。3月，它将中国中央电视台、中国国际广播电台和中国国家广播电台合并成一个被称为“中国之声”的新的超级媒体集团。国家媒体解释说，这一重组意在“加强党对重要舆论立场的集中建设与管理”。
出版所有的图书和杂志仍旧需要国家颁发的出版号；出版号收费高昂，而且往往难以获得。与过去一样，几乎所有的平面媒体、广播媒体和图书出版商都隶属于党政机构。有为数不多的印刷出版企业有一些私人股权，但是没有民营性质的电视台或广播电台。中共指示国内媒体不要对某些议题进行报道，传统的广播电视节目都必须经过政府的批准。
记者在被政府严格管控的环境中运作。尽管中国不断增长的互联网用户要求用最新技术来讲述有趣的故事，政府当局对那些新技术（例如网上直播）实施管控，压制新的数字媒体和社交媒体平台。
由于中共不认为互联网新闻公司是“官方”媒体，这些公司都受制于会削弱其运行的法规，并且被禁止报道潜在的“敏感”消息。据全国记者协会2017年在国家新闻媒体上的最新报道，中国有23万1564名具有正式资格的记者。只有1406名从事网络新闻工作，其中大部分都任职于诸如新华网或中国日报网等国有媒体。这并不意味着网络媒体没有报道重要消息。事实上很多网络媒体都通过创造性手段来分享信息，但是他们必须限制自己的方式和话题，因为他们未获得官方批准。
 
暴力与骚扰：政府经常妨碍媒体工作，包括阻挠公民记者。一些记者报告说，在报道敏感话题时会受到人身攻击、骚扰、监视和恐吓。政府官员使用刑事起诉、民事诉讼和包括暴力、拘押和其他形式的骚扰在内的其他惩罚手段来恐吓作者和记者，以阻止他们就广泛的话题发布未经批准的信息。
海外记者的家人也面临骚扰，时有拘押发生，藉此来报复他们海外亲属所做的报道。2017年当局拘押了至少6名自由亚洲电台维吾尔语记者的几十名亲属。这些记者都是中国少数民族维吾尔族人，他们报道了新疆再教育营的情况（见第一节）。
记者如果发表质疑政府的观点可能会面临降职或失业。在很多情况下可能的信息源会因为实际存在的政府压力或对政府压力的恐惧而拒绝与记者会面。尤其原本一向是信息来源的学术界人士越来越不愿意会见记者。
该年度中，当局监禁了许多传统媒体和新媒体的记者。
6月26日，四川省的一个法院以“煽动颠覆国家政权”和“非法出境”的罪名判处政治漫画家姜野飞六年半徒刑。姜2008年画的批评2008四川地震和讽刺中国政府官员的漫画引起政府注意后，于同年逃往泰国。2015年他被迫返回中国，随即被隔离监禁，直到2018年6月被秘密审判。
8月1日，山东省济南的退休教授孙文广正在接受美国之音（VOA）采访的时候，当局进入他的家。听众听到孙教授抗议他们的入侵，警察随即终止了采访。政府将孙拘押了大约两个星期，然后将其释放，对其采取“严密监视”。孙被释放后，8月13日，两名美国之音记者叶兵和艾伦到访他家，随即被警方扣押了6个小时，毁坏了他们的手机，查看了他们的设备。
9月，新疆当局逮捕了国家允许出版的几份新疆报纸的4名工作人员，称他们在这些报纸的维文版发表了不适当的内容。新疆日报集团的代表确认了他们被逮捕的消息，称这4个人被指责为“两面人”；这个词用来描述那些公开支持中共统治，私下却不同意对少数民族文化、语言和宗教加以限制的人。
中央和地方的中共宣传部门对外国记者仍然施加严格的限制，尤其是在敏感时期和周年纪念日。外国记者站报告称，外国新闻机构在当地聘用的员工也受到官方的骚扰和恐吓，这仍然是外国记者站一个主要的关注点。
到新疆去的记者报告说，他们的工作受到非常严格的监视、监控、骚扰和干涉。
外交部官员再次把特别约见用来作为大多数记者更新记者证手续的一部分。在这些约见中，官员对记者施加压力，要求他们少报道人权问题，提醒记者不得逾越的报道“红线”，在有些情况下还威胁他们不予更新签证。由于难以获得签证，许多外国新闻机构在中国国内扩大或保持其业务范围时继续遭遇麻烦。一些外国媒体越来越不愿公布这些问题，担心会引发政府进一步的反弹。
当局继续对在外国媒体机构中供职的中国公民实行严格限制。外国媒体机构中国籍员工行为准则用开除或取消资格来威胁那些进行“独立报道”的中国员工。该准则还指示中国员工向其雇主提供有助于树立“中国良好形象”的信息。
报道商业问题的传媒机构相对受到较少限制，但是宣传官员的事后审查体制鼓励编辑们做自我审查，以避免无意中刊登未经授权的内容而受到处罚带来的损失。
中国境外的中文媒体机构报告说受到中国政府的恫吓与财务威胁。例如，位于澳大利亚的《看中国》的拥有者在2月的一个年会上谈到中国官员向在该报纸上刊登广告的客户施加压力，试图压制该媒体的观点。有些客户遭到中国驻澳大利亚领事馆官员的“盘问”，其它人在去中国时被到访，强迫他们停止与《看中国》做生意。
审查或内容限制：中国国务院的《出版管理条例》授予各级政府宽泛的权力来根据内容限制出版，包括规定是否、何时以及如何报道特定问题。尽管外交部每日的例行新闻发布会基本上是对外开放的，国务院信息办公室也安排了其他政府机构的发布会，但记者不能自由地参加其他新闻活动。国防部继续有选择地允许外国媒体偶尔参加新闻发布会。
供本国记者使用的官方指南通常语焉不详，宣传官员可随意修改，并可追溯执行。宣传部门强迫报社和网上媒体开除发表与官方政策不一致的文章的编辑和记者，并暂停或取缔出版物。记者、作者和编辑进行广泛的自我审查，尤其是因为宣传官员进行出版后审查并实施不同程度的责罚。
2月8日，广东省宣传部免除了《南方周末》主编段功伟的职务和官方头衔；段主持了两个关于海航集团的财务调查报道。这些报道显示，据称与中国高层领导有关的海南航空尽管已有大量债务，仍然在“疯狂采购”。
中共中央宣传部命令媒体严格按照权威部门提供的信息报道，尤其是对敏感事件或重大事件的报道。这类指示往往还警告媒体不准报道与党和官员的声誉、健康和安全以及外交事务相关的内容。
对公众对习主席描述的控制有所增加，审查员会迅速关闭任何与官方媒体表述不同的内容。社交媒体仍然继续阻止发布维尼熊卡通形象，因为互联网用户用维尼熊来代表习近平主席。HBO在6月里播放的一段《上周今夜》节目中，主持人约翰·奥利弗批评了习近平，导致当局一度对HBO网上内容实施封锁。
外国记者要进入西藏自治区、其他藏区或者新疆从事报道而不受到严重的干扰极为困难。试图在其他敏感地区做报道的外国记者也遇到限制进入或受到干扰的问题；此类敏感地区包括朝鲜边境、与共产党成立有关的各历史重地、 近期发生自然灾害的地区，以及包括北京在内的发生了社会动荡的地方。
主要限于宾馆和外国人聚居区播放的外国电视新闻也会受到审查。外国报纸和杂志发表的文章如果被当局认为过于敏感，有关期目也会被禁。国际杂志中与敏感话题有关的文章被删除。电视广播中与敏感事件有关的部分被黑屏。
就政治敏感事件的报道而言，对中文的审查最严格，其次是英文，然后才是其他语言。政府禁止一些被认为过于敏感的国内外电影在中国上映，或者会将有关部分删除才允许上映。根据政府规定，当局必须对在中国放映的每一部外国电影授权，每年放映总数不得超过50部。
当局继续禁止出版他们认为内容与官方观点不同的图书。法律仅允许获得政府批准的出版社出版图书。未经国家新闻出版广播电影电视总局和有关省级出版机构批准的报纸、期刊、图书、音像制品或电子出版物不得出版发行。未经政府批准试图出版的个人面临监禁、罚款、没收图书和其他形式的处罚。中共控制出版行业的手段还包括事先将某些议题列为国家机密。
政府颁布禁令禁止销售未获得进口许可的外国出版物。这包括网上销售平台也禁止销售未经政府批准的“海外出版物”，包括图书、电影和游戏。该禁令也适用于与出版物有关的服务。
诺贝尔和平奖得主刘晓波于7月去世一年以后，政府仍继续审查公共媒体和社交媒体平台上大量的相关词汇和图像。除了刘的名字和形象以外，诸如“安息”、“灰色”、引用他文章的片段、蜡烛的图像、甚至蜡烛表情符号，无论是在网上还是在社交媒体上发布的私人信息，都被屏蔽。试图取得被审查内容的结果是得到一条信息，“根据相关法律、法规和政策”，该内容无法显示。政府的审查员还屏蔽了网上有关刘晓波遗孀刘霞的消息。
 
 
政府严格控制并高度审查国内的互联网使用情况。根据中国互联网信息中心8月发布的正式报告，中国的互联网用户已达8亿零200万，占全国总人口的57.7%。国际电信联盟的数据显示，2017年占总人口54%的人使用了互联网。据主要媒体公司估计，有6亿2500万人通过社交媒体和网上媒体获取新闻。
尽管互联网非常普及，其内容却受到当局严格的审查。政府在全国、各省和地方继续雇用成千上万的人来监督电子通讯和网上内容。据报政府雇用人员在各种网站上推广官方观点、反击网上出现的不同观点。互联网公司也自行雇用数以千计的审查员来执行中共和政府的禁令。一旦政府官员因其内容而批评或暂时屏蔽了一个网上平台，该平台的上级公司就必须雇用更多的内部审查员，致使每个公司要为此雇用成千上万以至数万人，极大地增加了员工需求量。
4月，审查员暂时关闭了著名新闻应用《头条》。在该应用的所有者为没有推广“社会主义核心价值观”道歉并承诺会雇用4000名新的内部审查员之后，得以重新开放，从而使内部审查员总数提高到了1万人。当局永久性地关闭了该公司的另外一个应用程序《内涵段子》。有2亿人使用这个应用程序分享笑话和网红事务。
3月19日，与政府有关联的中国生物多样性保护与绿色发展基金会向信宜市警方提交了信件之后，广东当局释放了被信宜警方拘押的环保人士雷萍；雷是在网上发布了揭发一个非法经营的采石场对当地水源影响的报告之后被捕的。
政府继续发布一系列规定，用于实施2017年生效的《网络安全法》。该法允许政府“监督、保护和处理源自国内或国外的网络安全风险及威胁”。该法第12条将使用互联网“制造或传播虚假信息以干扰经济或社会秩序”确定为犯罪。例如，在广州麻醉师谭秦东对一个传统中医药酒的批评开始在微信中广泛传播之后，他被以“诋毁公司名誉”的罪名被关押了三个月。中国的新闻报道推测他的被捕是应药酒生产商的要求而发生的。当局在谭写了道歉书说自己“考虑不周”之后释放了他。该法还立法允许安全机构在“重大安全事件”发生时中断某个地理区域全部的通讯网络，尽管在该法通过之前当局已经采取过这种措施。
中国网络空间管理局关于互联网新闻信息服务的规定要求网站、移动应用、论坛、博客、即时通讯服务和搜索引擎都要保证，对政治、经济、外交的新闻报道或评论都服从官方对“事实”的认定。这些规定将对传统媒体早已有之的控制扩展到了包括网络及社交媒体在内的新媒体，以保证这些新闻来源也服从共产党的指示。
据国家媒体1月报道，2017年度当局关闭了12万8000个网站。这些网站因其不当内容而被认定是“有害”的，其中包括政治敏感材料以及色情和赌博内容。2018年当局保持着同样的步调，仅在第二和第三季度中，中国网络空间管理局就报告说关闭了3673个网站和120万个社交媒体账户。7月，中国网络空间管理局称仅在当月内便接到了672万个“有效的”关于网上“非法及有害”信息的报告。
中国网络空间管理局还规定所有的直播平台、视频平台、商业网站、门户网站以及应用都向中国网络空间管理局登记。有执照的中央媒体及其附属机构的网上内容平台不需登记。4月，国家媒体宣布在短视频网站发布的违反社会主义核心价值的内容会被删除，而且中国网络空间管理局还宣布，已经与多个短视频网站“谈话”。随后不久，著名平台“抖音”的直播和评论部分停止了运作。去年一年，还有其它不少平台也因“不正当”或“非法”内容而面临被关闭。
法规规定在诸如微博和微信等博客或即时通信平台上传送视听材料必须具备特别许可。平台管理者直接负责保证用户发布的内容符合其许可范围。这包括电视节目、电影、新闻节目以及纪录片，很多网民仅仅通过社交媒体渠道来消费这些内容。规定禁止上传任何业余人士制作的、符合新闻节目定义或关于“敏感”话题的内容。
中国网络空间管理局2017年对网络安全法的修改还加强了在网站和社交媒体实行实名登记的规定。百度和新浪微博宣布，那些没有用实名登记的账户在使用一些网站功能（如对网贴的评论）方面会受到限制。邢台和上海的网吧也开始使用人脸识别来与用户身份证上的照片做比对。
政府继续致力于限制使用虚拟专用网络（VPN）服务。对“未经授权”的VPN的禁令于3月31日生效。尽管包括国际公司在内的一些用户可以使用虚拟专用网络，小公司、学术界以及公民都无法使用经授权的VPN。不过新闻报道显示当局并未严格执行这个禁令。当局在诸如11月的商业与互联网展销会在内的重大事件前加强对VPN服务供应商的屏蔽。据政府主管的《人民法院报》报道，上海的一名软件工程师被判3年徒刑，因为自2016年以来他为数百名用户提供了非法的VPN。该戴姓男子还被判缓刑三年、罚款1万元人民币（$1400美元）。
除了国际大赦和人权观察等人权组织的网站被屏蔽，许多国际媒体的网站，包括《纽约时报》、《华尔街日报》和彭博社等，仍然常年被屏蔽。8月，审查人员屏蔽了澳大利亚广播公司（ABC）的网站和手机应用程序。澳广于2017年启动了一个中文网站，2018年澳广关于中国在澳大利亚的影响的报道引起了中国官方媒体强烈的批评。
政府审查人员继续屏蔽与敏感话题有关的网站或网上内容，诸如台湾、达赖喇嘛、西藏和1989天安门屠杀有关的内容。
数千个社交媒体和其它网站仍然被屏蔽，包括脸书、推特、Instagram、谷歌和油管。尽管无数的新闻和社交媒体网站仍然被屏蔽，被审查的网站中有很大比例是赌博和色情网站。
政府于年初对航空公司发布警告，不准在它们的网站上将台湾、香港和澳门列为不同的国家，并列出了违反此规定的航空公司。官方责成万豪酒店将其网站关闭一周并就将西藏、香港和澳门列为不同国家而公开道歉。梅赛德斯-奔驰公司同样被迫向政府道歉，原因是它在自己的官方Instagram账户发布了达赖喇嘛的这段语录：“从所有的角度来看情势，你会变得更加开放。”官方对此的反应包括在国有《人民日报》上将梅赛德斯-奔驰称为“人民的敌人”。
在国家新闻出版广播电影电视总局2017年宣布同性行为/关系是“非正常的性关系”并禁止描述这些行为，在此之后，仍然禁止提及同性恋行为/同性关系和使用准确的科学术语描述生殖器。1月，国内的媒体报道称，一个北京法院同意就一位争取同性权利的人士就同性恋问题起诉国家新闻出版广播电影电视总局举行听证，但是直到12月仍然没有宣布任何裁定。与此同时，5月，一个全国知名的湖南的电视台将播出的欧洲电视网的部分内容黑屏，因为这个欧洲音乐演出中展现了同性关系，并遮蔽了一面同性恋骄傲彩虹旗的画面。
在3月8日国际妇女节当天，审查人员关闭了一个知名的女权主义微博账号。该微博账号有18万粉丝，是中国最知名的争取女权的网上平台之一。在2017年的国际妇女节官员也关闭了这个账号，然后又让它重新运行，但这一次当局永久性地关闭了这个账号。
本年度，当局开始操控个人推特账户的内容。有报告说当局强迫一些人让当局进入他们的推特账户，然后当局借此删除他们的推文。10月，人权维权人士吴淦的成千上万推文被删除。
当局继续因和平表达政治观点而关押大量互联网写手。6月27日，当局将异议作家彭佩玉拘押两周。彭的批评文章包括一篇题为《讨习檄文》的文章，他被捕前不久将此文发布在网上。据彭的律师说，他以前就已经被拘押了“很多次”。
此外，仍有针对外国网站、记者以及政府禁止互联网用户访问其信息的新闻机构进行网络攻击的报道。和过去一样，政府有选择地屏蔽由外国政府运营的网站，其中包括卫生组织、教育机构、非政府组织、社交网站以及搜索引擎等。
尽管这种审查能够有效地使普通用户远离有敏感内容的网站，但许多用户通过各种技术手段绕过了审查。在中国国内能够获取境外代理服务器的信息和规避审查的软件，但很多时候会受到防火墙的限制。诸如Telegram和WhatsApp之类的加密通讯应用程序经常被中断，尤其是在一年中的那些“敏感”时期。
《国家保密法》要求互联网公司全面配合对涉嫌泄露国家机密案件的调查，一经发现立即停止传输此类信息并向当局举报此类犯罪行为。此规定定义不清而且没有明确的限制。此外，这些公司还必须按照当局的指令从其网站上删除此类信息，否则将会受到警方和国家安全部等有关部门的惩罚。
 
 
学术自由和文化活动
 
政府继续限制学术自由和艺术自由，并在大专院校和研究机构限制讨论政治和社会课题。中宣部发布的限制规定和决定约束了人员和思想的交流。
许多知识分子和学者都做自我审查，他们知道与政治话题有关的书籍和文章会被认为内容过于敏感而不得发行。对艺术作品的审查与自我审查也很常见，尤其是那些被认为含有政治敏感内容的艺术作品。当局常常拒绝西方音乐家在中国举办音乐会的申请，严查文化活动的内容，并施加压力促进讨论中的自我审查。
政府和中共组织部继续控制着大学里大多数领导职位的任命，包括系主任。尽管是否共产党员并不总是取得终身教职的必要条件，但没有党籍的学者能够得到的晋升机会往往很少。被认为是政治敏感的学术领域（例如，民权、高层裙带关系、公民社会等等）继续被禁止。一些学者要对自己发表的内容做自我审查，面临要得出预设的研究结果的压力，或者在政治敏感时期无法召开有国际人士参加的会议。外国学者声称，政府用拒签签证、阻止查阅档案、不让做实地调查或访谈等方式来迫使他们对自己的工作做自我审查。在课堂上使用外国教科书仍然受到限制，而国内出版的教科书的编辑继续受到中共的控制。
所有专业的本科生都要修习有关马克思、毛主义以及邓小平思想等政治意识形态课。7月，教育部宣布将要在所有级别的私立教育机构加强党的领导，包括从幼儿园到高中。
多个媒体报道指出，大学校园里加强了对意识形态的控制，一些大学教授因表达与共产党思想不一致的观点而被辞退。8月，贵州大学的一位经济学教授在网上发布了批评共产党的文章，随后被大学开除。9月，厦门大学解聘了一位历史系助理教授，据该大学说，原因是他的网上评论“有损于党和国家的形象”。类似的控制也被用于学生。例如，重庆有一个项目，要求所有的高中生必须通过对他们的政治意识形态的审查才能参加大学高考。
6月，外国和国内的媒体都报道说，被学生举报的大学教授被停职或开除的事件有所增加，举报原因是他们的评论在政治上敏感或不当。在有些情况下，大学安排学生做线人。
11月，媒体机构报道，北京大学和人民大学校园里出现了针对学生中的劳工权利活动人士的打击。一些学生和最近的毕业生被抓并被隔离关押，其中有一人是在北京大学校园被绑架走的。现场的学生被殴打、被按倒在地，并被禁止拍照或对保安部队讲话。据说人民大学官员骚扰、威吓、使用监视手段针对学生活动人士，并阻挠他们的自由行动（见第7a节）。
8月，《金融时报》报道称，与中国国内的大学联合办学的外国大学必须在校内建立共产党的党委，赋予共产党官员更大的决策权，并收回了早前有关保证学术自由的承诺。7月，据《金融时报》报道，在中国第一个联合办学的大学里，一位外国学者因为批评共产党所支持的倡议而被逐出校管会。
在若干情况下，当局阻止了被认为政治敏感的一些人入境，同时拒绝给一些应邀参加国际交流项目的中国公民发放护照，原因是当局认为他们“政治上不可靠”，尤其是藏人、维吾尔人以及其他一些少数民族地区的居民。另有多名应邀参加外国政府资助的交流活动并且已经有护照的人——包括一些学者——在申请出国参加项目时遭遇困难。一些学者报告说，他们必须经过批准才能够出国旅行；有些人说他们每年可以出国的次数受到限制。
共产党的影响范围越来越广，超出了中国的国土边境。一个对海外500多名研究中国的学者的调查发现，在过去10年中有9%的学者曾经被中国政府有关当局“请喝茶”，被面谈并因其研究项目而受到警告；26%的从事档案研究的学者报告称被拒绝查阅资料；5%报告说难以取得签证。该调查发现，68%的外国学者说，在中国研究领域，自我审查是一个问题。
中共积极推动对海外留学生的审查制度，媒体报道了一些自我审查以及利用金钱奖励来遏制外国校园里的反华言论的例子。
和成千上万的新疆居民一样，新疆的学者学人失踪或死亡，而且极有可能发生在再教育营里。有些官员和学者被控为“两面人”，这是一种隐喻的说法，指的是那些在国家和党的工作岗位上工作，但具有“分裂主义”或“反对官方”倾向的少数民族人士，包括不同意官方限制少数民族的文化、语言和宗教。那些失踪了而且据信是被关在再教育营的人包括国际知名的民俗学者热依拉·达吾提、文学教授阿卜杜克里木·热合曼、新疆大学教授阿扎提·苏里坦、文学教授盖热提·奥斯曼、语言教授阿尔斯兰·阿卜杜拉、诗人阿卜杜拉迪尔·贾拉拉丁，以及作家亚力坤·茹孜。当局拘押了新疆教育督导局前局长沙塔尔·沙吾提，将喀什大学校长艾尔肯·乌买尔和副校长姆赫提· 阿布杜吾普尔撤职，他们在年底均已失踪。法院以“分裂主义”罪名判处前新疆医科大学医院院长哈木拉提·乌普尔和前新疆大学校长塔西普拉提·特依拜死刑，缓期执行。根据该年度的国际组织报道，宗教学者穆罕默德·萨利赫·阿吉和阿卜杜勒赫德·买合苏力在再教育营中死亡。
 
 
政府限制和平集会和结社的自由。
 
 
尽管宪法规定和平集会自由，但政府严格限制这一权利。法律规定这种活动不得挑战“党的领导”或侵犯“国家利益”。对政治体制或国家领导人的抗议遭到禁止。对于表达不同政治观点的示威，当局不予批准，并且迅速压制。
全国各地的公民继续公开集结以抗议驱赶、强迫搬迁和不当补偿，经常会导致与当局的冲突或正式起诉。媒体报道，本年度在全国各地发生了数千起请愿。尽管和平请愿是合法的，公安官员却极少发放许可。尽管有限制，仍有很多示威发生，但当局会迅速驱散那些因各种政治不满或社会不满而起的示威，有时甚至过度使用武力。
3月20至30日，来自福建省龙岩市长汀县的一千多居民在地方政府办公室外抗议政府在距离居民区一公里（0.6英里）的地方建造垃圾焚烧炉的计划。3月30日，地方当局召集防暴警察来恢复秩序。当天晚些时候政府官员宣布取消了垃圾焚烧炉项目计划。
所有超过200人参加的音乐会、健身班或其他集会都需要经过公安部门的批准。在北京和其他地方有大量的公众集会被临时取消，或政府拒绝为之发放许可，名义上是要确保公共安全。
 
结社自由
 
宪法规定有结社自由，但政府限制这项权利。中共的政策和政府法规要求所有的专业、社会和经济团体在政府正式注册并获得批准。这些法规阻止了成立自治的政治、人权、宗教、精神、劳工和其他政府认为有可能在任何领域挑战其权威的团体。政府依旧严密控制民间组织，有时会拘押或骚扰非政府组织的工作人员。
对非政府组织的监管系统非常严格，但是具体的规定会因外国或国内的组织而不同。国内的非政府组织受到《慈善法》以及其他许多相关规定的管理。国内非政府组织可以注册为以下三个类别之一：社会团体、社会组织或者基金会。国内的非政府组织都要在民政部注册，而且要挂靠一个得到正式认可的、作为其“专业监督单位”的机构。寻找一个挂靠单位并非易事，因为挂靠单位要为挂靠的非政府组织的活动承担民事或法律责任。所有的团体组织都必须报告其资金来源，包括来自外国的资金。国内非政府组织在继续调整以适应这个新的监管框架。
2016年，中共中央委员会发布了一项指示，要求到2020年在所有非政府组织里建立党组织。当局称，这些在非政府组织内部运作的中共党组织能够对非政府组织在“为重要的项目、重要的专业活动、主要的开支和资金、接受大额捐款以及有外国人参与的活动等方面做决策时”“加强指导”。该指示还要求当局进行年度抽查以确认“意识形态政治工作、党建、财务和人员管理、研究学习、对外交流、接受外国捐助和帮助、以及按照该组织的章程运作”等方面是否合规。
2017年1月，《中华人民共和国境外非政府组织境内活动管理法》（简称《外国非政府组织管理法》）生效。该法要求外国非政府组织在公安部注册，而且要为其运作找到一个被国家认可的挂靠单位。未能符合该规定的非政府组织可能会面临民事或刑事处罚。该法不给没有得到批准注册的非政府组织申诉的机会，并且申明，被发现违反某些规定的非政府组织可以被禁止在中国运作。该法还称，与没有注册的外国非政府组织合作的国内团体会受到惩罚，并可能被取缔。
一些国际非政府组织报告说，他们与大学、政府机关、国内非政府组织及其他机构的合作越来越困难，因为该法律反映了中共的观点，即认为外国非政府组织是对“国家安全”的一种威胁。对大多数外国非政府组织来说，寻找一个官方挂靠单位很困难，因为挂靠的单位要为非政府组织的行为负责，并且要按规定承担繁琐的报告工作。在公安部公布可挂靠机构的名单之后，非政府组织报告说，大多数政府机构仍然没有负责外国非政府组织挂靠事宜的部门。专业监督单位报告说，他们不理解应如何实施该法以及当局希望他们做些什么。什么是非政府组织以及哪些活动被视为“政治”活动因此属于非法，都定义模糊，从而让许多商业机构和校友团体都难以界定自己是否处于该法的管辖之下。政府缺少清晰的沟通，加上安全部门的骚扰，造成一些外国非政府组织暂停或终止了他们在中国的运作。截止到12月31日，官方估算的曾经在运行中的大约7000个外国非政府组织中，大约有439个已经按照《外国非政府组织管理法》的规定注册，其中大部分从事的都是贸易和商业活动。
据民政部统计，截止于2017年底，有80多万个合法注册的社会团体、公共机构和基金会。许多专家认为，国内非政府组织的实际数目要多得多。国内非政府组织报告说，来自国外的资金继续减少，因为很多国内非政府组织都力图避免这样的资助，因为面对新法带来的越来越多的限制，他们担心会被贴上“颠覆”的标签。非政府组织以各种正式和非正式的名义存在着，包括由中国共产党创建并资助的全国性群众团体，即官办非政府组织。这样的组织被禁止拥有任何独立性。
如果外国非政府组织要向国内团体捐款，《外国非政府组织管理法》要求外国非政府组织在中国必须拥有办公室或者使用本国非政府组织的银行账户才能为举办临时活动汇款。根据法律，禁止外国非政府组织用任何其他方式来汇出或接收资金，而且这样的资金必须向公安部报告。该法还禁止外国非政府组织募捐或进行“营利活动”。
尽管所有的注册团体都在政府一定程度的控制之下，有些非政府组织，主要是以服务为目的的官办非营利组织，在运作中能够少一些例行检查。当局支持一些针对扶贫救灾等社会问题的非政府组织发展。法律法规明确禁止团体从事政治或宗教活动，拒绝服从的团体会面临刑事处罚。
当局继续限制和取缔接受外国资助的本国非政府组织以及为西藏自治区和其他藏区的藏民社区提供帮助的国际非政府组织。由于旅行限制、官方对其工作人员的恐吓以及无法与当地的合作伙伴续签项目协议，几乎所有的团体都被迫减少其活动。
 
 
请参见美国国务院发布的《国际宗教自由报告》：
www.state.gov/religiousfreedomreport/。
 
 
法律规定公民享有境内出行、出国旅行、移居国外和返国的自由，但政府有时不尊重这些权利。
政府在严格限制其运作范围的情况下偶尔会与联合国难民事务高级专员公署（UNHCR）驻北京办事处合作。
政府越来越多地通过不给与国际和国内出行许可或非正式软禁的形式来禁止活动人士发声。
在有些情况下，政府对其他国家施加压力，要求强制遣返寻求庇护的人或者受到联合国难民事务署承认的难民。7月13日，自由亚洲电台报道，重庆一个法院于2017年7月以“煽动颠覆国家政权”和“非法偷越国境”的罪名秘密给人权活动人士姜野飞和董广平判刑。姜与董举家逃往泰国并取得了联合国难民事务署的难民身份，但2015年泰国被迫将他们从曼谷送还给中国。他们在电视上“认罪”的时候，可以看出在拘押期间曾受到酷刑。两人的家人没有得到官方关于审判的通知。据联络人称，在董的前律师2017年7月到访重庆第二监狱拘留所的时候，当局驳回了他要求会见委托人的请求。
对移民、难民和无国籍人士的虐待：有报道说，朝鲜政府派出的人员在中国境内秘密运作，强行遣返朝鲜公民。此外，有些被中国当局拘押的朝鲜人面临遣返，除非他们能够通过贿赂来得到释放。朝鲜难民不是被关押在拘押设施中，就是被软禁在不明地点。想避免亲属被强制返回朝鲜的家人必须向中国当局付费，据称是支付在拘押期间的费用。被拘押的朝鲜人偶尔会被释放，但他们极少有人得到安全前往第三国所必需的许可。
境内出行：当局继续严格限制出行自由，特别是在重要纪念日、外国政要来访或重大政治事件之前限制政治敏感人士的出行，并防范游行示威。在西藏自治区和其他藏区，藏人的出行自由仍受到严重限制（见西藏附件）。维吾尔人在新疆和新疆之外的地区也面临新的出行限制。尽管在前往其它地方旅行前要得到地方官员批准的“国内护照”已经于2016年停止使用，在进入或者离开城市时以及在公路上仍然还有证件检查站。在新疆，保安官员在诸如市场和清真寺等公共区域的入口设立检查站，要求维吾尔人扫描身份证，接受面部识别检查，并将所有的包袋放入机场式的安全检查机器。当地的汉人不受这些限制。9月26日，《乌鲁木齐晚报》宣布，新疆铁路管理局将于10月22日开始停止向所有的旅客出售离开新疆的车票。与此同时有报道称，当局将再教育营中200到500名一组的维吾尔和其他突厥穆斯林人士集体判刑，并送到中国的其它地区的监狱，如黑龙江省。
虽然政府仍然限制更换工作地或居住地的自由，但是全国户籍登记制度（户口）继续发生变化，大部分公民去往全国各地工作和居住的能力继续提高。尽管许多农村居民继续迁入城市，城市人均可支配收入约为农村人均收入的三倍，但是他们不能更改他们在国内正式的居住地或工作地。大多数城市对每年可签发的新的暂住证实行配额管理制度，因此，所有的就业者，包括大学毕业生，都必须努力争取数目有限的暂住证。农村居民尤其难以在经济较发达的城市地区获得户口。
户籍登记制度增加了农村居民在城市面临的困难，即使他们在那里安家并找到了工作。根据国家统计局2月发布的《中国人民共和国2017年国民经济和社会发展统计公报》，居住在其户口所在地以外的人口为2.91亿。农民工及其家人在工作条件和劳工权利方面面临重重阻碍。由于农民工不是合法登记的城市居民，许多人在其工作与生活的城市无法享受公共服务，如子女接受公共教育或社会保障服务。
从4月到6月，非北京籍居民可以根据市政府新发布的积分系统来申请北京户口。根据这个新政策，未超过法定退休年龄、有北京暂住许可、在京连续七年缴纳社会保险、没有刑事犯罪的非京籍居民可以通过积分取得户口。据报道，那些“有稳定工作、稳定住所、良好教育背景、在京成功创新创业”的人更可能在积分竞争中取得高分。市政府在每年的第四季度宣布取得户口的新名单。
“留场就业”制度适用于被行政拘留的惯犯，当局据此不准某些服满刑期者回乡。一些获释人员或假释人员回家后不得自由出行。
出国旅行：政府准许大多数公民合法移居海外和出国旅行。政府部门——尤其是军队——的雇员和退休人员的出国旅行继续受到限制。政府在机场及其他边境口岸扩大了对离境乘客实施的出境管制，籍此禁止持不同政见者和在政府任职的人出国旅行。一年来，许多律师、艺术家、作家及其他活动人士被禁止出境的情况时有发生。当局还阻止一些维权人士以及贪腐官员和商人的家属，包括外籍家庭成员的旅行。
边境检查人员和警方以威胁“国家安全”作为不准离境的理由。此类人员中大部分人都是在出国旅行时被当局拦截在机场的。
绝大多数公民都能获得护照，但是那些被政府视为有潜在政治威胁的人说，他们经常被拒发护照或被禁止出国旅行，这些人包括宗教领袖、持不同政见者、上访者和少数民族人士。
维吾尔人——尤其是居住在新疆的维吾尔人——报告称，他们的护照申请很难获得地方当局批准。他们经常被拒发护照，无法去海外旅行，尤其是无法去沙特阿拉伯朝觐或去其他穆斯林国家，也无法因学术目的前往西方国家。2016年以来，当局命令新疆的居民交还护照，或者告诉居民没有新的护照。但是，召回护照的做法并不仅仅限于维吾尔地区。海外维吾尔活动人士的家人也被拒发签证，无法进入中国。本年度中，政府继续统一行动，迫使在海外学习的维吾人返回中国，常常是向他们在新疆的亲属施加压力，要求他们在海外的亲属回国。当局还拒绝给住在海外的维吾尔人续发护照，致使他们或者回中国，或者寻求在所在国保持合法身份的途径。一旦回去，很多维吾尔人或者与新疆居民有联系的人就被拘留或者失踪了。
藏人申请护照面临重重困难，而对佛教僧尼来说则几乎是不可能的。当局不愿意给藏人发放或续发护照的做法对藏人而言等于是出国旅行禁令。藏区的汉族居民没有这样的困难。
政府继续试图禁止许多藏人和维吾尔人离开中国，很多试图离开的人被拘押（见西藏附件）。有些维权活动人士的家属无法移民。
流亡：法律没有规定公民的归国权，也没有涉及流亡问题。政府继续拒绝众多被视为持不同政见者、法轮功活动人士或“捣乱分子”的公民重新入境。尽管当局允许一些移居海外的持不同政见者回国，但因保外就医而获准出国的异议人士往往相当于被流放。
 
难民保护
 
遣返: 中国政府强制遣返弱势的难民和寻求庇护者，特别是来自朝鲜的难民。中国政府仍然认为朝鲜人都是“非法经济移民”而非难民或寻求庇护者，并将很多人强制送回朝鲜。
人权组织报告说，相当多的被关押在辽宁省和吉林省、来自朝鲜的寻求庇护者有即将被遣返的危险。
寻求庇护：没有授予难民或寻求庇护者身份的法律。政府没有制定难民保护制度，但是通常认可被联合国难民署记录在册的难民和寻求庇护者。这些人没有被政府正式承认为难民，他们在中国仍然是非法移民，不能工作，不能上学，并且随时都可能被政府递解出境。
朝鲜难民和寻求庇护者，尤其是生活在中国社会边缘的年轻妇女，由于他们的地位不被承认，很容易遭受人口贩运和强迫婚姻的伤害。当局继续强行遣返朝鲜难民，包括人口贩运受害者，视他们为非法经济移民。政府拘押他们，并遣返回朝鲜，在朝鲜他们面临严厉的惩罚或死刑，包括被关入劳改营。政府没有为朝鲜人口贩运受害者提供除被遣返之外的合法途径。
大量非政府组织报告称，中国政府仍然不允许联合国难民署在中国接触朝鲜难民和寻求庇护者。当局有时会拘留和起诉帮助朝鲜难民的中国公民以及那些协助非法越境的人。
 
获得基本服务：在中国寻求经济机会的朝鲜寻求庇护者通常由于没有合法身份而无法享受卫生保健、公费教育或其他社会服务。
 
持久解决办法：自越战时期以来，中国政府在重新安置来自越南和老挝的汉族及少数民族人员定居中国境内方面基本上与联合国难民署进行了合作。中国政府与联合国难民署继续就允许这些长期居民及其子女（许多人在中国出生）入籍的问题进行讨论。
无国籍人士：国际媒体报道称，朝鲜妇女在中国生了3万名儿童，这些妇女大多与中国配偶结婚，但由于她们没有合法身份，生的孩子无法登记户口，从而事实上成为的无国籍人。这些孩子无法获得包括教育和医疗在内的公共服务，尽管有法律条文称，只要有一名家长是中国公民，孩子就可以成为公民。
 
第三节 自由参政的权利
 
宪法声明“中华人民共和国的所有权力属于人民”，人民行使国家权力的机构是全国人民代表大会（NPC）以及省、地区和地方人民代表大会。事实上，中共决定人大的立法议程。尽管法律规定对县级或县级以下的人大代表进行选举，但公民并不能自由地选择统治他们的官员。中共控制了所有的选举，并继续掌控着政府官员的任命权。中共使用包括软禁在内的各种恐吓手段阻止独立候选人进入地方选举名单。
3月的全国人大取消了国家主席和副主席任期不得超过两届的限制，为习近平继续留任扫清了障碍。
 
选举与参政
 
近期的选举：3月4日，全国人大的2980位代表选出了主席和副主席、总理和副总理以及中央军委主席。由175名成员组成的全国人大常务委员会监督这些选举并决定全国人大的议程和议事规则。全国人大代表每5年选举一次，其过程由中共控制。
 
全国人大常务委员会仍然在中共的直接管辖之下，所有重要的立法决定需要经中共的七人政治局常委会同意。虽然依照国家宪法全国人大拥有广泛的权力，但它未曾在不经中共批准的情况下独立制定政策或罢免政治领导人。
根据民政部于2016年所做的统计，在中国60多万个村庄中，几乎所有的村庄都实行了对地方政府下属机构即村委会成员的直接选举。由普通公民直接选举官员仍然在很小的范围内进行，并被严格限制在最低的地方级别。仍然存在腐败、贿选以及乡镇官员和中共干部干涉选举问题。法律允许每位选民最多为其他三位选民代理投票。
选举法管辖各级立法机关，然而对其遵守和执行的情况在全国各地各不相同。根据此法律，公民有机会每五年选举一次县级或县级以下的人大代表，但在大多数情况下，上级政府官员或中共干部在这些选举中控制了候选人的提名。在更高的级别，立法者在他们的同级别官员中选出人大代表。例如，省级人代会选出全国人大的代表。地方的中共书记一般同时在地方人代会的领导团队中担任职务，从而增强了中共对立法机构的控制。
 
政党与参政：官方声称中国采取的政党体系是在中国共产党领导下的“多党合作与政治协商”。然而，中共保持了对政治权力的垄断，而且政府禁止成立新的政党。政府正式承认1949年之前成立的九个党派，中共之外的党派在全国人大中占有百分之30的席位。这些非中共代表并不构成政治反对派。他们在立法或决策中的没有什么影响力，而且只能在中共统一战线工作部的指导下运作。
关于成立政党并没有具体的法律法规。中国民主党（CDP）仍然被取缔，政府继续监视、拘押和监禁现在以及前民主党党员。民主党创始人秦永敏和他的妻子赵素丽于2015年被拘押，秦仍在武汉第二拘留所等候审判，罪名是“颠覆国家政权”。
妇女和少数民族的参与：法律对妇女和少数民族参与政治活动没有特别的限制，他们也确实有所参与。妇女在政府或中共部门中极少担任有重要影响的职位。该年度参加十三届全国人大的 2987 位代表中有742位（25%）是妇女。在第十九届党代会之后，25名成员的中共政治局中有1名女性。政治局常委中没有女性。
选举法对妇女和少数民族代表的配额有一般性规定，但要达到这个配额，负责选举的机构经常不得不违反选举法。
第十三届全国人大中有438名来自55个少数民族的代表，占代表总数的16%。所有被官方承认的少数民族都有代表。第十九届中共党代会上选出了15名少数民族人士进入有202名成员的中央委员会。在政治局中没有少数民族委员，只有一名省级党委书记是少数民族，但是有数名少数民族人士在省政府中担任领导职务。3月，蒙古族妇女布小林就任内蒙古自治区主席，相当于省长职务。回族妇女咸辉担任宁夏回族自治区主席。
 
第四节 政府腐败及缺乏透明度
 
尽管官员腐败会受到刑事处罚，但政府和共产党执法并不一致，也不透明。腐败行为依然很普遍，许多腐败案件都出现在受政府高度监管的领域，比如土地使用权、房地产、矿产以及基础设施建设等，这些领域都容易发生欺诈、贿赂和回扣。法院的判决常常无法对特权部门执行，这些部门包括政府机关、国有企业、军方人员以及一些中共党员。
“透明国际”的分析显示，在中国腐败仍然是一个严重问题。该年度有大量的关于政府腐败以及相关审判和判决的报道。
3月20日，全国人大通过了《国家监察法》，立法规定国家监察委员会和中央纪律检查委员会（NSC-CCDI）合署办公。该委员会的职责是将腐败连根拔掉。国家监委-中纪委的调查可以针对任何公职人员，包括警察、法官和检察官，也可以调查和拘押与被调查公职人员有关联的人。建立国家监察委员会实际上赋予了中纪委这个中共内部的违纪调查单位以国家权力。对国家监委-中纪委调查、运作和拘押的管理规则不清。
过去，作为党（而非国家）组织机构的中纪委在调查期间依靠非正式的“双规”制度来扣押被怀疑违反了党纪的党员。国家监委-中纪委的拘押被称为“留置”，被拘押人员指责说遭到虐待和酷刑。被留置人员遭到隔离监禁，没有就其拘押申诉的途径。尽管《国家监察法》禁止虐待在押人员，但在押人员向上报告受到虐待的机制不清。不过，根据赔偿法，被错误指控腐败的人员可以因其留置的时间获得赔偿。
尽管留置是在司法系统之外运作，在留置期间所做的坦白交代在司法程序中一直被用作证据。根据媒体报道和非政府组织8月发布的一份报告，留置保留了“双规”的许多特点，诸如长期单独关押、剥夺睡眠、殴打以及被迫以不适的姿势站、坐数小时甚至数日。
据报道，第一起留置期间在羁押设施死亡的事件发生在《国家监察法》生效几个星期以后。4月9日，福建省的国家监委-中纪委将原任建阳区政府司机的陈勇留置，以便当局采集有关副区长林强的信息；林被怀疑有腐败问题。5月5日，国家监委-中纪委官员告知陈的家人他被羁押，但家人到达时发现陈已死亡，被保存在太平间的冰箱里。陈的姐姐告诉《财新传媒》，陈的面部变形，胸部塌陷，腰部有淤青。有关官员阻止她查验陈的下半身。
腐败：在许多案件中，政府的检察官就腐败问题调查了公务员和国企领导，这些人通常还兼任党内高级职务。
虽然受到严密控制的国家媒体公布了一些值得关注的腐败案调查，但总体而言，对于党政官员因腐败接受调查的程序很少有细节披露。9月，中国第一位在法国里昂担任国际刑警组织主席并保留中国公安部副部长职务的孟宏伟在乘9月25日的航班到达北京之后失踪。媒体报道说孟因涉嫌贪腐在到达中国以后被“纪检部门”拘留。政府宣布，在国家监委-中纪委对孟及其同事们就有关受贿指控进行调查期间他受到监视；直到年底此案仍然没有结论。
8月，在廊坊城南骨科医院院长张毅高调自杀之后，河北廊坊的反腐机构惩罚了31个官员。在张的自杀遗书中，他指控前安次区人代会副主席杨玉忠参与贪腐活动，干涉医院的管理并挪用医院资金。河北纪检当局透露，政府和中共官员掩盖杨玉忠和他的犯罪团伙故意伤害、强迫交易、暴力拆迁和为犯罪利益假造公章等行为。在被惩罚的官员中有一名是前安次区政协主席，一名现任派出所长，几名村支部书记，还有区基建局的副局长。该调查是中央政府打击犯罪团伙及对其进行保护的官员行动的一部分。从2月至年底，河北共有427人受到与此行动相关的调查。
财产公开：有规定要求县级或县级以上政府部门或国有企业中的官员申报个人财产，包括他们的配偶和子女名下的财产及其家庭的金融资产投资和企业投资。规定未要求公开申报，而是呈报上级和人事部门。对拒绝申报者有不同的处罚，包括接受法规培训、警示谈话、调动工作直至免职。规定还要求官员申报他们的所有收入，包括各类津贴、补助、奖金以及其他工作收入如演讲、写作、咨询、审稿、绘画及书法等。官员和配偶及与其共同居住的子女还要申报房产和金融投资状况，但这些申报也不对外公开。还规定他们报告他们的子女是否在国外居住以及子女和第三代的工作状况和职务（包括在国外居住者）。规定官员每年报告一次，个人身份发生改变后必须在30天以内报告。
 
第五节 政府对国际和非政府组织调查侵犯人权指控的态度
 
政府试图继续保持对公民社会团体的控制，遏止独立非政府组织的出现，并阻挠公民社会团体及维权活动团体的活动。政府经常对国内非政府组织进行骚扰，在很多情况下不允许他们公开监督或评论人权状况。政府明确表示对独立组织持怀疑态度，对在经济或其他方面与海外有关联的非政府组织严加审查。本年度里政府采取明显的步骤，将国内所有的非政府组织置于其法规的直接管控之下，从而缩小了独立非政府组织的生存空间。大多数大的非政府组织都是半官方性质，所有正式的非政府组织都必须挂靠政府机构。
联合国或其他国际组织：政府仍然不愿接受其他国家或国际组织对其人权状况提出的批评。政府严格限制联合国专家到访中国，而且很少就联合国人权机构的质询提供实质性回应。联合国专家提交的十多个访问中国的请求仍未得到回应。
中国政府还利用它在联合国经济及社会理事会非政府组织委员会成员的身份来阻挠批评中国的团体取得联合国的认证，并阻挠有认证的活动人士参与联合国的活动。政府还报复与联合国合作的人权团体的行动，引起了联合国秘书长安东尼奥·古特雷斯的批评。5月，中国政府要求联合国非政府组织委员会取消德国非政府组织“为了受威胁的人民协会”的认证；该组织协助世界维吾尔人代表大会主席多里昆·艾沙参加了联合国原住民问题常设论坛。
政府的人权机构：中国政府坚持认为每个国家对待人权的方式都受到其经济、社会、文化和历史条件的制约。政府声称，它对待嫌疑人的方式是符合国家法律的，而那些嫌疑人却被国际社会认为是政府侵犯人权的受害者。中国政府没有设置人权专员或人权委员会。
 
第六节 歧视、社会虐待和人口贩卖
 
妇女
 
强奸和家庭暴力：强奸妇女是非法的，可被判三年有期徒刑至死刑。法律不保护同性伴侣或婚内强奸受害人。另一个有关性侵犯的法律包括了男性受害人，但最高刑期只有5年徒刑。在被报道的案件中，大多数有关强奸的指控都通过私下和解而不是起诉来结案。有些被判强奸罪的人被处决。
 
家庭暴力仍然是一个严重的问题。有些学者说，受害者往往被鼓励通过调解来解决家庭暴力问题。社会上往往将家庭暴力看作是家庭和个人的私事，从而造成妇女面对家庭暴力时不报告、当局不采取行动的情况。《反家庭暴力法》将家庭暴力归入民事而非刑事犯罪。网络出版物《第六声》报告称，25%的家庭中出现过家庭暴力。
政府支持为家庭暴力受害者建立的收容所，有些法庭对受害者提供了保护，包括通过法院保护令来禁止家庭暴力施暴者接近受害者。但是，政府的帮助并不总是能够送达受害者，公安部门通常对家庭暴力视而不见。为家庭暴力受害者提供咨询和辩护的法律协助机构经常受到压力，要他们中断公共活动，停止任何形式的政策呼吁，因为那些都是只有政府资助的组织才能从事的活动。
据妇女维权人士称，在起诉家暴案件的过程中反复出现的一个问题是当局采证不足，包括照片、医院病历、警察笔录或孩子的证词。目击者很少在法庭上作证。
3月18日，在《反家庭暴力法》两周年之际，广州市妇女联合会、广州律师协会和越秀区法院主办了一个街头演出，目的是提高民众对家庭暴力的认知。律师协会的法律顾问和法院在现场提供了免费咨询，指出保留关键证据在法律程序中的重要作用，这些证据包括就医记录和通讯记录。
法院对家庭暴力的认识有所改善，使配偶虐待成为出于自卫而犯罪的辩护中的一个减罪因素。
 
性骚扰：法律禁止对妇女进行性骚扰；但是，法律对性骚扰的定义不清。据北京公安局规定，对违法者可实施最多15天拘留。受害人仍然难以就性骚扰提出控告，法官对此类案件也难以作出判决。官方媒体称，很多妇女仍然不愿意投诉性骚扰事件，认为司法系统对此无能为力。有几起关于性骚扰的重大新闻报道在社交媒体上广为传播，有助于增强对这个问题的认识，尤其是在工作场所。
6月20日，甘肃省庆阳市一位19岁的李姓女子跳楼自杀，她曾指控遭到其吴姓教师的性骚扰。李的父亲称，庆阳人民法院5月18日驳回了她对吴姓教师性骚扰的指控，致使她自杀。6月25日，当地教育局宣布已经给吴以10天禁闭的行政处罚。据报道李的父亲拒绝了学校提出的以35万元（5万3200美元）来换取撤诉的建议，要求学校做出公开道歉，并要吴承担责任。吴后来被撤职并禁止再从事教学工作。
尽管很多女性在工作场所遭到性骚扰，极少有人会提出报告。人权观察援引一个统计数字显示，有将近40%的妇女说她们在工作场所受到过性骚扰。一个广州记者发现，在她调查过的400个记者中，有80%说她们在工作场所遭受过性骚扰。
《保护妇女权益法》使受害人能够向自己的雇主和当局投诉性骚扰问题。如果雇主不能采取有效措施防止性骚扰，可以被罚款。7月1日，江苏省颁布了一个新的法律，详细列出了雇主必须采取的具体措施，以保护雇员在工作场所不会受到性骚扰。根据这个新法，雇主必须制定反性骚扰的内部规定，对雇员们进行防止骚扰培训，为提出性骚扰指控的雇员建立投诉渠道，并及时解决投诉的问题。观察家注意到，该法并未规定合规时限，也没有说明不合规会受到的惩罚。
一些寻求提高公众对性骚扰认识的妇女非政府组织报告说，曾受到公安的骚扰，在执行其项目时遭遇困难。
7月25日，一名前女实习生说，她向警方报告著名电视主持人朱军曾经强吻和抚摸她以后，警方强迫她撤诉。警方声称，在国家媒体主持年度春节晚会的朱“对社会有巨大的积极影响”。朱随后要求该女性及其在网上分享了此案信息的朋友在网上和国家级报纸上道歉，并赔偿65万5000元人民币（9万5260美元）以及支付此案的诉讼费用。作为回应，这位前实习生的朋友提出了她自己的针对朱的民事诉讼，理由是“侵犯人格权”。
8月，国家宗教事务管理局在其网上发布声明称，一项调查作出结论，北京郊区著名的龙泉寺方丈学诚通过短信对一些女弟子实施性骚扰。学诚是中国知名的和尚和作者之一，是中央政府一个有影响的政治顾问，负责中国佛教协会的工作。
强迫计划生育：该年度中有强迫流产和绝育的报告，但没有强迫流产的官方统计数字与百分比。共产党限制父母选择生育子女数的权利，利用从省级到村级的计划生育单位来推行人口限制及分布。《人口与计划生育法》允许已婚夫妇生育两个孩子，并允许符合本地或本省相应规定条件的夫妇申请生育第三个孩子。国家媒体声称，近年来在宽松的法规之下，包括推行的二孩政策，强迫流产的数量已经有所减少。但是，违反法律的夫妇会受到巨额罚款，而只生一个孩子的夫妇则会获得一个证书，使他们每月得以获取奖励金及其他优惠；每个省的奖励额度从每月6到12元人民币（1-2美元）到3000元人民币（450美元）不等，给予贫困地区的农民或牧民。有些省份的夫妇需要得到批准并注册才能怀孕。
据国际媒体报道，一名哈萨克妇女说，政府强迫她和其它新疆人将她们的第三个孩子堕胎。她说，警察于2017年12月进入她家，强迫她接受医疗检查，认定她已经怀孕6个星期。第二天当局命令她去堕胎。尽管她开始拒绝这样做，但是在他们威胁要将她弟弟送到再教育营之后，她服从了，可是当局在她堕胎后还是把她弟弟送去了再教育营。她的丈夫要求当局为失去的孩子作出补偿。
在法律规定以及实际操作中，超出生育限制或违反规定的生育仍然会受到经济和行政处罚。实施的法律要求每个未经批准的孕妇做人工流产或者交付最高可达个人年度可支配收入10倍的社会抚养费。具体的罚金数量因省而异，大不相同。那些有经济能力的人往往会交付罚款，这样他们违规出生的孩子便可以得到广泛的社会服务和权利。有些家长为逃避罚款将违规出生的孩子藏在朋友或亲戚家中。在有大量流动工的地区，有关官员尤其注意流动妇女人口，以确保他们不会超过生育限制。但是一些省份的少数民族家庭可以生育更多孩子
法律依旧表明，“公民有依照法律计划生育的义务”，还说“育龄夫妇自愿选择计划生育和避孕方法以避免和减少意外怀孕”。
由于国家计划生育法只提到了已婚夫妇的权利，地方上对法规的实施并不一致，未婚人员避孕必须缴费。尽管《民事法》和《婚姻法》都规定，单身妇女的孩子与已婚夫妇的孩子们享有同样的权利，但事实上单身母亲和未婚同居者生的孩子被看作是“政策之外”的产物，需缴付社会抚养费，而且无法获得出生证和“户口”等法律文件。在孩子出生60天之内结婚的单身妇女可以避免这些惩罚。
与往年一样，人口控制政策仍然依靠社会压力、教育、宣传和经济惩罚，也依靠诸如强制性孕检以及时有发生的强迫堕胎以及强迫结扎等手段。根据是否能够达到其行政区域规定的人口目标，各级官员会获得奖励或受到惩处。生育上限的提高，加上大部分人不希望有两个以上的孩子，要达到人口目标相对容易了，因而地方官员的压力也比以前大大减轻了。被发现违反计划生育政策而超生或帮助他人逃避国家控制的人会受到处罚，例如高额罚款或被开除。
要求违反计划生育政策怀孕的妇女终止妊娠的规定在一些省份仍然存在并且在执行中，其中包括湖北、湖南和辽宁。其他的省份，例如贵州和云南，保留了要求采取“补救措施”（官方对于堕胎的委婉说法）的文字，以应对违规妊娠。
尽管很多地方政府鼓励夫妇生育二胎，有三个或更多孩子的家庭仍然需要交付“社会抚养费”。在福建省福州市，一个区将拒绝交付社会抚养费的人放到一个“个人信用黑名单”上。这个黑名单会影响一个人申请贷款、乘坐公共交通、购物、孩子的教育以及参加旅游团的能力。
法律要求计划生育委员会对已婚育龄妇女进行孕检，并向他们提供有关计划生育的基本知识和孕期服务。有些省份对没有定期按照国家规定做孕检的妇女罚款。
在推行计划生育政策的过程中，如果负责计划生育的官员被发现侵犯了公民的人权或财产权、滥用权利、接受贿赂、挪用或侵占计划生育经费或者虚报计划生育统计数字，就会面临刑事指控或行政处分。强制堕胎并没有被专门列为被禁止的活动。法律还禁止医务人员提供非法手术、对胎儿做医学上不必要的超声波性别探查、性别选择性堕胎、虚假医学鉴定以及虚假的生育证明。根据法律，公民可以正式投诉越权实施计划生育政策的官员，其投诉会受到调查并得到及时的处理。
歧视：宪法规定“妇女在所有方面享有与男子平等的权利”。法律赋予妇女平等的财产所有权、继承权、受教育机会以及同工同酬权利。但是，妇女们报告说，存在歧视、不公平解雇、降职和工资差别等严重问题。
从事同样工作的妇女收入平均比男性少35%。在乡村地区这种工资差距更大。尽管女性参加工作的比例很高，但在领导岗位上任职的女性仍然很少。
当局通常不能切实执行保护妇女权利的法律。法律专家认为，由于模糊的法律定义，提出性别歧视诉讼的难度很大。一些观察人士注意到，负责妇女权利保护的机构倾向于注重与产期有关的福利以及产假期间的不正当解雇问题，而不是性别歧视、对妇女的暴力侵害和性骚扰问题。有其他人士指出，全国妇联在新的反家庭暴力立法中扮演了积极的角色。
妇女维权人士指出，在农村的离婚诉讼中，妇女往往会丧失土地和财产权利。农村土地承包法和其他保护妇女权益的法律规定，在土地管理方面妇女享有同等权利，但专家认为由于法律的复杂性和执行上的难度，实际情况很少如此。
10月，河北省唐山市的地方政府官员告知一名离婚妇女，她的土地所有权归入其前夫的户口。官员敦促她与前夫商讨如何分割土地，或者诉请地方法院分割这对离婚夫妇尚未划分的资产。
 
 
出生登记：公民身份来自父母。父母必须在孩子出生后一个月内遵照全国户籍登记制度为其登记户口。没有户口的儿童无法获得公共服务，包括教育。教育：尽管法律规定儿童必须接受九年义务教育，但在经济落后的农村，许多儿童没有完成规定的教育年限，有些甚至从未上过学。虽然公立学校不准收学费，但由于地方与中央政府提供的经费不足，很多学校仍然收取各种杂费。这些费用以及上学需要的其他费用使贫困家庭和一些流动工人难以送子女上学。城乡青少年受教育的城乡差别仍然巨大，大多数外来务工人员的孩子只能在未获官方许可、设备条件差的学校就读。
虐待儿童：对儿童进行身体虐待者可受到刑事起诉。《反家庭暴力法》也保护儿童。对儿童尤其是乡村儿童的性虐待是一个严重的问题。
10月，互联网上流传一个视频，据称是在中国东南地区的火车上有一名父亲在猥亵他的5岁女儿。视频显示，该男子让女孩坐在他的大腿上，不断掀开她的裙子，抚摸她的后背，并多次试图亲吻她的嘴。江西省南昌铁路警察作出结论，该父亲的行为不构成猥亵，因为这是父女关系，所以并不违法。这个发布在这个南昌的派出所微博上的说法引起了广泛的公众批评。
童婚及强迫婚姻：法定最低结婚年龄为男性22周岁、女性20周岁。就所知信息而言，童婚不是一个问题。
对儿童的性剥削：法律规定自愿性行为的最低年龄为14岁。强迫14岁以下幼女卖淫的人可被判处10年有期徒刑直至无期徒刑，并处以罚款或没收财产。对情节特别严重者，除没收财产外可判处无期徒刑或死刑。嫖宿14岁以下被迫卖淫的幼女者可被判处5年或以上有期徒刑，并处以罚款。
包括儿童色情制品在内的所有色情制品都是非法的。《刑法》规定，以牟利为目的制作、复制、出版、贩卖、传播淫秽制品者，可处三年以下有期徒刑、刑事拘留或者管制，并处以罚款。情节严重者判处三到十年有期徒刑，并处以罚款。
法律规定，向18岁以下未成年人播放或展示淫秽制品者会受到“严厉惩罚”。
杀婴或杀害残疾婴儿：法律禁止杀害婴儿，不清楚这种做法是否仍在继续。残疾婴儿的父母通常会将孩子留在医院，主要原因是无法支付将来的医疗费用。基于性别而进行的堕胎以及遗弃或忽视女婴的情况据信在减少，但是在一些情况下仍然是个问题，主要原因是传统上对男孩的偏好以及计划生育政策。
流浪儿童：在新疆，有大约80万到200万或更多的维吾尔人、哈萨克人及其他穆斯林人员被关押，导致很多儿童失去照管人。尽管很多这样的孩子有其他家庭愿意照看他们，政府开始将被拘押人士的孩子们送入孤儿院、寄宿学校，或“儿童福利指导中心”，在那里他们被迫呼喊爱国口号、学习汉语普通话，并回答有关他们父母宗教信仰和实际行动的问题。不清楚这样的儿童有多少，特别是因为很多这样的设施都接收孤儿和普通学生。政府政策的目标是为这些孩子提供由国家支持的照管，直到他们18岁。媒体报道显示，在2017和2018年，新建的孤儿院数量大大增加，用于收留家长被关入再教育营的成千上万的儿童。在和田，有些寄宿学校安装了铁丝网。
福利院收容的儿童：7月，河南省新密市当局关闭了有合法执照的孤儿院“中美义务合作服务社（SANCS）慈善之家”，理由是按照《外国非政府组织参与法》，不再允许外国人参与非政府组织的活动。该孤儿院从1996年开始运行，由天主教会主持，拥有中外员工。被关闭时，该慈善之家收容了50个儿童，只有其中13个被确认有了新的家庭，其余的再次无家可归。
跨国拐骗儿童：中国不是1980年《国际儿童拐骗民事问题海牙公约》的缔约国。请参见美国国务院的《国际父母掳拐儿童年报》，网址为：https://travel.state.gov/content/travel/en/International-Parental-Child-Abduction/for-providers/legal-reports-and-data.html
 
反犹太主义
 
政府不承认犹太人的民族或宗教地位。该年度未见有反犹太主义行为的报告。
 
人口贩运
 
请参见美国国务院发布的《人口贩运问题报告》：
www.state.gov/j/tip/rls/tiprpt/。
 
残疾人
 
法律保护残疾人的权利，禁止歧视。但是，在很多情况下残疾人的现实处境与法律要求相去甚远，政府对残疾人也没有提供获取意在帮助他们的项目的途径。
法律规定，残疾人“在政治、经济、文化和社会领域中，在家庭生活和其他方面都享有与其他公民平等的权利”。禁止歧视、侮辱或侵犯残疾人士。法律禁止歧视有残疾的未成年人，并制定了一系列法律为青少年提供司法保护。
据教育部报告，全国有2000余所专为残疾儿童设立的学校，但非政府组织的报告称，在2000万残疾儿童中，只有2%的孩子能够得到可以满足他们需求的教育。
残疾人士接受高等教育也面临困难。大学常常不录取各方面合格但有残疾的考生。一项法规要求，必须给残疾学生参加高考提供特别照顾。
成年残疾人失业仍然是一个严重问题，部分原因是对残疾人的歧视。法律规定地方政府必须为聘用残疾人的企业设立奖励机制。一些地方法规还规定，如果企业的残疾员工数量没能达到法定的最低比例，雇主要向全国残疾人基金缴款。
《残疾人保障法》规定道路和建筑物应符合适于残疾人通行的标准，并要求“逐步”落实这些标准。但对该法律的执行非常有限。
法律禁止患有某些精神疾病（如精神分裂症）的人结婚。如果医生发现一对夫妻有可能将先天缺陷遗传给孩子，这对夫妻只有在同意使用避孕措施或接受绝育手术的情况下才能结婚。在有些情况下，如果医生在产前检查中发现胎儿可能有残疾，官方仍会要求夫妻终止妊娠。法律规定地方政府必须采取这样的措施来提高非残疾儿童出生的比率。
 
民族/种族/少数民族
 
政府政策要求对获得承认的少数民族在计划生育、大学录取、申请贷款和就业等方面给予优惠待遇。然而少数民族政策的实质性内容及其实施仍然不足，歧视少数民族的现象仍旧普遍存在。政府的“汉化”运动造成了基于种族的行动限制，包括削弱维吾尔人自由旅行或取得旅行文件的能力；新疆当局加强了监控以及武装警察的布署；以及限制文化及宗教活动的法规。
最近的2015年的政府人口普查显示，在新疆的正式居民中有950万（40%）是汉族人。维吾尔族、回族、哈萨克族、吉尔吉斯族和其他少数民族居民总共为1410万，占新疆总人口的60%。官方的统计数字少报了汉族人口，因为居住在准军事地区（兵团）的270多万汉族人和作为长期 “临时工”的汉族人都未被计算在内；按照新疆政府2015年的报告，这类人口比前一年增加了1.2%。
政府鼓励汉人移居到少数民族地区的政策显著增加了新疆的汉族人口。汉族官员继续担任着少数民族自治地区的大部分权力最大的党的职务和许多政府职务，在新疆尤其如此。近几十年来在新疆急剧增长的汉族人口造成了维吾尔人的不满。
据新华社报道，2017年新疆政府还实施了新的“去激进主义法规”，将“遏制和消除极端主义”的做法法律化。自2017年以来，对激进主义的宽泛定义造成了80万甚至可能超过200万的维吾尔人、哈萨克人和其它穆斯林人士被羁押在教育改造中心，或称再教育营。这种再教育营的目的是对被羁押人灌输爱国主义，消除他们的宗教和民族身份。被羁押人包括许多被命令回国的海外留学生或工人。国际媒体报道说，再教育营里的安全官员虐待、拷打并杀害了一些被羁押人。（见第1.a、1.b、1.c、1.d和2.d节。)
新疆官方加强了对政府认定的“三股邪恶势力”（即宗教极端主义、民族分裂主义和暴力恐怖主义）的打击力度，包括继续集中开展再教育运动。现任新疆党委书记陈全国是前西藏自治区的共产党领导人，将在西藏实行的政策照搬到新疆，增加了超过300%的安保预算，招募了9万零800个与安保有关的工作人员；那些措施被认为是在西藏有效地减少了反对共产党统治的情况。当局借口按照2016年新疆《反恐怖主义法》实施准则打一场“反恐怖主义的人民战争”，将监控手段升级，并加强了对旅行和民族以及宗教行为的限制。
在再教育营以外，政府还严格限制表达少数民族文化、语言和宗教身份的行为，其中包括法规禁止诸如“不正常”的蓄须、在公共场所戴面纱以及突然戒除烟酒等，以及其他一些行为；政府认为这些行为是“极端主义”的标志。法规禁止在给孩子起名字的时候使用一些伊斯兰名字，教孩子宗教内容也会受到惩罚。当局实行“住户调查”和“落户”等措施，官员或志愿者强行入住维吾尔家庭并监视这些家庭中可能的“极端主义”迹象。
10月，新疆政府发布了新的“去激进主义法规”实施办法。法规的第17节称，县级政府“可以建立职业技能教育和培训中心以及其他类似的教育和改造机构以及管理系统，以便对受到激进主义影响的人进行教育和改造”。有些观察人员指出，尽管有这个新的地区法律，“再教育中心”仍然违反宪法。
居住在边境地区和其他一些地区的少数民族受教育的机会比汉族人少，在就业方面与汉族移民相比也受到歧视，收入大大低于其他地区的水平。政府的发展项目和工作条款破坏了少数民族的传统生活方式，有时还包括强制性搬迁和强迫游牧民族定居。少数民族地区的汉人从政府项目和经济增长中受益的程度明显超过了少数民族。为了强调建设“和谐社会”、维持社会稳定，政府对种族歧视及针对少数民族的体制性歧视等问题轻描淡写，此类歧视仍然是新疆、内蒙古自治区、西藏自治区和其他藏区严重不满情绪的根源。
法律规定，“以招收少数民族学生为主的学校(班和年级)和其他教育机构，在可能的情况下应当采用少数民族文字的课本，并用少数民族语言讲课”。尽管有保证这些文化和语言权利的条款，据国际媒体报道，在新疆普遍要求从幼儿园起全部使用普通话授课，并禁止在所有的教育活动和管理中使用维吾尔语。
一些警方突袭、任意拘押和司法惩罚显然针对的是一些寻求和平表达其政治或宗教观点的团体或个人。拘押和惩罚扩展到了在互联网和社交媒体上表达意见，包括浏览、下载和传输被禁止的内容。有关官员继续以存在暴力威胁为借口对本地人、记者和来访的外国人采取极端的安全手段。据新华社报道，有关官员使用监视和面部识别软件、生物数据收集以及大数据等技术来建立一个新疆维吾尔人口数据库，目的是“预测、防范和制止社会动荡”。据官方媒体报道，安全部队经常在新疆各地举行有数千名武装警察参加的大规模阅兵。
维吾尔人和其他宗教少数民族继续遭受长期监禁，有些人在未经正当程序的情况下被处决，罪名是分裂主义以及危害国家安全。有可靠消息来源称，政府在新疆建了一些新的监狱，目的是缓解已有设施的过度拥挤现象。国际媒体报道称，2016年和2017年，新疆地方政府公开招募了将近10万名安保人员。经济学家伊力哈木·土赫提仍在狱中；他于2014年因与分裂主义相关的罪名被判处无期徒刑。
法律将在互联网上讨论分裂主义定性为刑事犯罪，并且禁止以任何方式利用互联网破坏民族团结。法律还禁止煽动民族分裂或“危害社会稳定”，要求互联网服务商和网络运营商建立监控系统来发现、报告并删除宗教内容，或强化现有监控系统，报告违法行为。据报道，当局在检查站以及在随机抽查维吾尔人住宅时查看手机内容，那些拥有所谓恐怖主义材料（包括具有一般宗教或文化意义的图像）的人会被逮捕并被控以刑事罪名。国际媒体报道称在警方设置的安全检查站，安全官员使用监控应用软件来下载和观看手机里的内容。
据自由亚洲电台和其它国际媒体报道，中国的哈萨克族人也成为目标。8月，哈萨克族中国公民萨依拉古丽·萨吾提拜在哈萨克斯坦出庭作证，称她曾在一个关押了大约2500名哈萨克人的中心被强制劳动。她告诉法庭，她在再教育营受到“政治灌输”。哈萨克人还被禁止在中国和哈萨克斯坦之间自由来往，一些回到中国的人被关押到再教育营。
中国政府给外国施加压力，要求遣返离开中国的维吾尔人或拒绝给他们发放签证，而被遣返的人回国后面临被监禁或虐待的危险。有些维吾尔人被遣返回中国后失踪。据国外媒体报道，在海外学习的维吾尔人的家人也受到压力，要他们说服学生回到中国，而回国的学生都遭到羁押或被迫参加再教育营。
本年度，集会自由在新疆遭到严重限制。有关在新疆践踏宗教自由的信息，见国务院的《国际宗教自由报告》，网址是：
www.state.gov/religiousfreedomreport/。
关于西藏的具体信息，请见西藏附录。
 
基于性取向和性别认同的暴力、歧视和其他虐待行为
没有法律规定成年人私下发生自愿的同性性行为是犯罪。与其他接受海外资助的团体一样，为男女同性恋、双性恋、变性人和双性人（LGBTI）事务工作的活动人士和团体继续报告说，他们受到来自当局的歧视和骚扰。
LGBTI人士报告了暴力事件，包括家庭暴力；但他们在寻求法律赔偿时遇到困难，因为关于家庭暴力的法规以及《反家庭暴力法》都没有包括对同性关系的承认。赔偿的评估进一步受到社会歧视和传统规范的限制，这造成多数LGBTI人士避免公开讨论他们的性取向和性别认同。
有关LGBTI的非政府组织报告说，尽管由于《外国非政府组织管理法》和《中国慈善法》，公共维权工作愈发困难，但他们仍然通过一些具体的反歧视案件在争取LBGTI权利方面取得了一些进展。
11月，国内和国际媒体报道，安徽省芜湖县法院因一位刘姓作家自己出版和销售一本描述同性性行为的色情小说而将其判处10年半徒刑。刘以笔名“天一”在2017年发表了她的小说《攻占》，在被当局查禁之前，她的书在热门的淘宝网站卖出了7000本。尽管制作和销售色情材料被严厉禁止，官方和社交媒体做出反应，将刘的刑期与对暴力罪犯判处的较短的刑期进行比较。刘对判决提出了上诉。
在5月和6月，西南地区的当局干涉了几次庆祝LGBTI“骄傲月”的相关活动。有一次警方中断了一部电影的上映。在另一个事件中，他们对一个已经被预定的场所施压，让他们取消一个关于LGBTI获得医保的小组讨论。
 
对艾滋病毒携带者和艾滋病患者的社会歧视
 
对艾滋病毒携带者的歧视仍然是一个问题，影响到这些人的就业、教育以及住房机会，妨碍了他们获得医疗保健。在有些情况下，保护艾滋病毒携带者免受歧视的法律与限制他们权利的法律相互矛盾。本年度中，官方媒体报告说，一些艾滋病毒携带者或艾滋病患者因带有艾滋病毒而在住房、教育或就业等方面受到阻碍。
1月3日，海口的一所公立医院拒绝为一位他们确定携带艾滋病毒的患者做手术，并坚持把他转到另一家医院，称他们没有足够的消毒设备进行这种危险的手术。当地的非政府组织“红丝带”帮助这位病人找到了另一家医院。
根据法律，公司不得要求进行艾滋病毒抗体检验，也不得因雇员携带艾滋病毒而将其解雇。4月28日，四川省的一名雇员在与雇主达成法律和解之后恢复了工作并得到赔偿。之前他因查出携带艾滋病毒而被解雇。
 
其他社会暴力或社会歧视
 
法律禁止针对传染病患者的歧视，并且允许这类人担任公职。尽管法律禁止歧视，但是在许多地区，歧视乙肝病毒携带者（包括2000万慢性乙肝病毒携带者）的现象在很多地区仍然非常普遍，地方政府有时也会试图限制他们的活动。尽管2010年的一项全国性规定禁止在招工、招生时强制进行乙肝病毒检测，很多企业仍然将检测乙肝病毒作为上岗前筛查的一部分。
法律没有对就业方面常见的一些歧视类型作出规定，包括基于身高、外貌或民族的歧视。
 
第七节 劳工权利
 
 
法律不保护结社自由，而且工人不能自由组织工会或加入自己选择的工会。独立工会是非法的，罢工权不受法律保护。中华全国总工会（简称“全总”）是仅有的一个得到法律承认的工会。独立的工会是非法的，法律不保护罢工的权利。法律允许各类企业的员工为薪酬进行集体谈判。法律还允许有行业性或地区性集体合同，全国各地的企业集体合同通常是强制性的。有关规章要求政府控制的工会在与管理层协商之前必须征求工人的意见，并将集体合同提交工人或其代表大会审批。雇主没有法律责任进行谈判或本着诚信原则讨价还价，有些雇主拒绝这么做。
法律规定了保护，防止对官方批准的工会进行歧视，并且规定企业管理部门不得在工会代表的任期内将其调走或终止其工作。法律规定，因从事工会活动被解聘的工人必须复职，并且规定了对企业反工会活动的其他处罚。法律不保护在官方承认的工会之外独自向雇主提出要求或进行谈判的工人。在本年度报告的几起案件中，试图这样做的工人遭到报复，包括被迫辞职、解聘和关押。
所有的工会活动必须由全总批准和组织。全总是中共的一个组织，由一名政治局委员任主席。全总及其省级和地方各级分支机构继续积极组建新的下属工会并增加新成员，特别是大型跨国企业里的外来务工人员。法律授予全总对其下属所有工会的财务和行政控制权。全总的下属工会可以代表职工与企业及事业单位进行协商并签订集体合同。法律没有要求全总在劳动争议中代表工人的利益。
全总和中共通过多种机制来影响工会代表的挑选。虽然法律规定各级工会领导人必须通过选举产生，但全总下属的工会任命了大部分工厂层面的工会领导人，而且常常会与雇主协调产生。官方工会的领导人通常来自管理层。工人直接选举工会领导人的情况仍然罕见，仅仅发生于企业层面，并且受到上级工会或中共的监督。在直接选举工会领导人的企业中，全总地区官员和当地中共当局控制了对候选人的挑选和批准。即使在这些情况下，工人和非政府组织也对选举的公信力表示关切。
法律没有明令禁止停工，而且也不禁止工人自发的罢工。尽管当局似乎对抗议拖欠工资和少付工资的罢工有较高的容忍度，在全年继续有警察镇压罢工的报告。例如，在5月27日，警察在安徽省六安镇压了一群要求根据1994年的《教师法》与当地公务员获得同等工资的教师。根据香港劳工权利非政府组织的《中国劳工通讯》记录，2015年到2017年之间的6694起罢工和集体抗议事件，有82%与工资问题有关。
有时地方当局在对这种罢工的镇压中对罢工领袖控以模糊不清的刑事罪名，比如“寻衅滋事”、“聚众扰乱公共秩序”、“破坏生产”，或索性不提出任何指控即拘留他们。在罢工问题上，中华全国总工会的唯一法定角色是参加调查和协助人力资源及社会保障部解决纠纷。
执行劳工法律通常不足以震慑普遍存在的违法行为。劳工检查员没有足够的授权和资源强迫雇主纠正违法行为。虽然法律规定了解决争议的一般性程序，但这些程序冗长且会被拖延。某些地区的地方当局着力限制独立民间团体和法律工作者的活动。有一些地区对调解未果而可以继续进行仲裁或者法庭审理的案件有非正式的限额。一些地方政府当局采取措施，增加调解或者仲裁。例如，3月6日茂名市中级法院和茂名市工会联合建立了劳工仲裁与和解协调办公室来协助更好的沟通并缓解纠纷。当地人大的一位官员称，日益增多的仲裁、冗长的诉讼和昂贵的官司成本无益于建立积极与和谐的劳资关系。
虽然看起来有一个强有力的劳工运动，工会参加率也相对很高，但真正的结社自由和工人代表权并不存在。附属于全总的工会在代表和保护工人权益方面通常作用很小。工人通常不把全总当作自己权益的维权者，尤其是外来务工人员，他们与工会官员的接触微乎其微。
《中国劳工通讯》报道了全国各地有工人举行自发性罢工、停工或其他抗议活动，并称工人们的行动表明全总无力防止违法行为和解决纠纷。媒体报道了一批在中国南方的工厂发生的抗议活动。
政府在本年度逐渐加大了针对劳工活动人士、学生和其他维护工人权利的人士的行动。例如，从7月开始直到年底，政府拘押了数名工人、学生、非政府组织代表、律师和其他响应示威和网上帖子支持工人在佳士科技（Jasic Technology）建立工会的人士。佳士科技是深圳的一家生产工业焊接设备的工厂。据报工厂的工人试图针对低薪和恶劣工作条件建立一个工会。尽管这个工会的组织者据说得到了全总当地分支的一些信息和帮助来建立一个企业级别的工会，公司的管理部门最终选用管理方的代表作为工会的领导，建立了一个企业级别的工会，并解雇了试图建立工会的工人。据报在7月的工人抗议之后，主要组织者被殴打，引发了深圳和其他地方的抗议活动。广东的劳工活动人士、毛派组织乌有之乡、左派大学生和香港工会支持了这些抗议活动。
据报深圳警方关押了大约30名工人和打工者工人中心的代表，他们被控与佳士的抗议有关。数名工人活动人士被指控为“聚众扰乱社会治安”。据报当局还突袭了“时代先锋”网站和设在北京的《红色参考》杂志社的办公室，并刑事拘留了一名《红色参考》的职员。8月24日，当局在广东、北京和国内其他地区拘押了数名工人和北京大学、人民大学和南京大学支持工人的学生。11月初，政府在北京、上海和深圳拘押了9名学生组织者和工厂工人，以及武汉的3名活动人士。政府还在11月拘押了2名深圳的地方“全总”官员。在12月，当局拘押并审问了其他的学生。
尽管有对工人行动的限制，跨省的联合行动在其他几个部门也有发生。例如，5月1日，建筑业的起重机司机举行了一次遍及全国的罢工，组织者在许多城市要求增加工资，包括广西的玉林和崇左，以及福建的厦门。6月，卡车司机为停滞不涨的工资、高油价和任意罚款举行的抗议活动发生在山东、四川、重庆、安徽、贵州、江西、湖北、河南、浙江等省以及直辖市上海的不同地点。
中央、省级和地方政府的联手行动包括骚扰、拘押和监禁劳工维权人士并限制其旅行，还限制非政府组织的资金来源，这些做法都干扰了劳工维权。劳工活动人士及1989年民主运动参与者刘少明仍然在关押中。广州中级人民法院于2017年因涉嫌“煽动颠覆国家政权罪”判处他四年半徒刑。
 
 
法律禁止强迫或强制劳动。虽然国内媒体很少报道强迫劳动的案件和相关处罚，该法律规定了可酌情惩罚的范围，包括监禁、刑事拘留和罚款。这些惩罚是否足以威慑犯罪尚不清楚。当成人和儿童在私营部门被强迫劳动时，据报政府会执行该法律。
尽管全国人大在2013年废除了劳改制度，即一个可不经司法审查任意行政拘留的体系，一些媒体和非政府组织报告说，强迫劳动继续在一些戒毒所中存在，其中有人未经司法程序而被拘押。
有消息称，一些被关押在再教育营（见第6节）的人被强制劳动。12月一家媒体报道说，在一家新疆强制劳动营生产的服装被一家美国运动服装商进口。据报新疆和田地区的地方当局还强迫一些不在营地的维吾尔族妇女和儿童劳动。
数起报道称，在小型作坊和工厂中患有精神残疾的人被强制劳动。
另见美国国务院发布的《人口贩运问题报告》：www.state.gov/j/tip/rls/tiprpt/。
 
 
法律禁止雇用16岁以下的儿童。16岁到18岁的工人称为“未成年工”，他们被禁止从事某些形式的危险工作，如采矿业工作。政府没有有效地执行该法律。
法律具体规定，对于非法雇用童工的企业给予行政审查、罚款和吊销经营执照的处罚，并且规定一旦发现童工必须遣返原籍，交给父母或者监护人。对雇用16岁以下儿童从事危险劳动或过长工时的劳动的惩罚是判刑，但在立法与执法之间依然存在着明显的差距，尽管在全国每年都有地方当局开展的检查活动。尚不清楚惩罚是否足以威慑犯罪。
在1月，两个法国的非政府组织对三星提出了法律诉讼，称该公司在中国的工厂雇用了童工并有其他的虐待行为。之前三星在东莞的供应商曾因雇用技术学校的童工而受到批评。
滥用学生工制度的现象还在继续。如往年一样，有指控说学校和地方官员不适当地为使用学生工提供便利。例如，3月17日，桂林电工技校的学生家长向当局报告，有100多名实习生曾经作为学徒在一家空调机工厂的生产线工作。据报这些学生每天工作12小时，没有中间休息，没有工资，没有假期，也没有病假。3月30日，桂林市教育局对桂林电工技校发出了一份行政警告，责令该校从位于广东江门市的空调机厂召回所有的学生，并指示该校防止类似情况再次发生。
 
 
法律为禁止基于民族、种族、性别、宗教信仰、残疾、年龄和传染病或职业病的就业歧视提供了法律保护的基础。政府没有有效地执行这些法律。执行条款包括通过法院寻求民事赔偿的权利。法院通常不愿受理歧视案件，各级当局强调通过协调解决劳动纠纷。因此，很少有执法行动导致最终法律裁决的案例。就业歧视普遍存在，包括在招募广告中基于性别、年龄、身高、出生地、外貌和健康状况的歧视（见第六节）。
本年度内工作场所普遍存在对妇女的歧视。从事蓝领工作的女性的强制退休年龄为50岁，从事白领工作的女性为55岁，而所有男性的退休年龄是60岁。
全国妇联2015年在高等学校进行的一项调查表明，80%的女毕业生报告在招工过程中遭受了歧视。歧视的案例包括招工广告中征求漂亮女性、优先雇用男性或者对同样的职位要求女性有比男性更高的学历。调查结果显示女性较少有机会接到面试或第二轮面试的邀请。在一些面试中女性被问到她们是否有孩子、有几个孩子以及是否有计划要孩子，如果她们已经有了孩子，是否会要更多的孩子。
在3月5日，广州美赞臣（Mead Johnson）营养品集团的前销售经理袁女士因妊娠歧视对她的前雇主提出了法律诉讼。她在2016年9月的产假期间前往休斯顿生子，之后美赞臣因旷工将她开除。该公司还拒绝承认医院的医疗记录，称雇员仅应利用产假来治疗妊娠过程中发生的病情。
户口制度仍然是最普遍的就业歧视的一种形式。它使外来务工人员不能得到与当地居民同等的全面社会福利，包括医疗保健、养老金和残疾福利等。
 
 
没有全国通行的最低工资标准，但是法律一般要求地方和省级政府依据人力资源和社会保障部设立的标准制定本地区正式或非正式部门中的最低工资。根据法律，限制雇员每天工作8小时，每周工作40小时；超过这个标准的工作属于加班。法律还禁止每天加班超过3小时或每月加班时间超过36小时，并且规定加班必须付超过正常工资的加班费。
在本年度政府建立了一个新的应急管理部，该部纳入了前国家安全生产监督管理总局的一部分，负责制定并执行职业健康和安全规章。法律要求雇主对在危险条件下工作的雇员提供免费健康检查并将结果告知他们。法律还规定，工人有权报告可能危及其健康的违法现象或离开此类工作场所，而不应当有因此被解雇的风险。
法规声明，县级和县以上的劳动和社会保障部门负责劳动法的执法工作。违反职业、安全与卫生法规的公司面临多种处罚，包括停止营业或吊销商业证书和营业执照。
政府没有有效地执行该法律。惩罚措施不足以威慑违规行为而且鲜有执行。监察员的数量不足以监视工作条件，而且其检查范围不涉及非正式经济部门。尽管国内工人的安全记录在过去的7年中有改善，本年度还是有一些工作场所发生事故。媒体和非政府组织将事故的原因归于缺乏安全检查、对法律法规执行不力、低效的监督和应急反应机制不足。
拖欠工资在许多地区仍然是一个问题。各级政府继续努力防止拖欠并追回未付的工资和社保费。
数十年以来，由于普遍雇用分包的低薪流动工人，拖欠工资一直是建筑业的一个严重问题。这种非正式的招工体系使得农民工容易被拖欠工资，促使他们参加讨薪行动。工人们有时采取激烈措施讨薪。在7月，人力资源和社会保障部称他们在上半年帮助100多万工人追回了总共108.8亿元人民币（16.2亿美元）的欠薪。例如，据广州法院报告，该市各个法院从2015年到2017年审理了111起拖欠工资纠纷的刑事案件，涉及4880名受害者和3062万元人民币（440万美元）的薪金。法院报告说，有116人因恶意拒绝支付其雇员的工资而被判罪。
公司仍然会在搬迁或关闭前的很短时间内发出通知，这经常使职工无法追索应得的报酬。
非正式经济部门的工人常常缺乏劳动合同所涵盖的保障；即使有合同，特别是外来务工人员，也比较难以获得福利，尤其是社保福利。非正式经济部门的工人工作时间较长，却比正式经济部门的工人得到更少的工资。在6月，数个城市的卡车司机对停滞不涨的的工资和恶劣的工作条件发起了抗议（见第七.a.节）。
应急管理部在7月通报工伤事故数量有所降低，但没有提供具体的数字。该部还报告称，尽管事故和死亡率在多数部门都降低了，但从2016年以来这个比率在建筑业逐步上升，使它成为过去9年所有工商部门中事故和死亡率最高的部门。在1月、5月和7月，媒体报道了100多名患尘肺病的前建筑工人三次从湖南前往深圳为长期拖欠的工伤补助金请愿。他们是1990年代在该城市工作时染上尘肺病的。
据本年度发表的官方文件，职业病普遍存在。病人来自许多行业，包括煤矿、化学工程和有色金属部门。
尽管在本年度报道的煤矿事故较少，煤矿工业的死亡人数仍然很多。据应急管理部统计，在2017年发生了219起煤矿事故，造成375人死亡，过去两年分别下降了12%和28.7%。在5月9日，有5个人在湖南省中部一座煤矿的瓦斯爆炸中死亡。8月6日，贵州省一座煤矿的瓦斯爆炸造成了13名矿工的死亡。在10月，山东的一座煤矿塌方，导致21人死亡。
工作事故也仍然在其他产业中普遍存在。例如6月5日，在辽宁省一座铁矿的爆炸中，11人丧生，9人受伤。8月12日，四川省的一所化工厂发生爆炸，造成19人丧生和12人受伤。

The People’s Republic of China (PRC) is an authoritarian state in which the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is the paramount authority.  CCP members hold almost all top government and security apparatus positions.  Ultimate authority rests with the CCP Central Committee’s 25-member Political Bureau (Politburo) and its seven-member Standing Committee.  Xi Jinping continued to hold the three most powerful positions as CCP general secretary, state president, and chairman of the Central Military Commission.
Civilian authorities maintained control of security forces.
During the year the government significantly intensified its campaign of mass detention of members of Muslim minority groups in the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region (Xinjiang).  Authorities were reported to have arbitrarily detained 800,000 to possibly more than two million Uighurs, ethnic Kazakhs, and other Muslims in internment camps designed to erase religious and ethnic identities.  Government officials claimed the camps were needed to combat terrorism, separatism, and extremism.  International media, human rights organizations, and former detainees reported security officials in the camps abused, tortured, and killed some detainees.
Human rights issues included arbitrary or unlawful killings by the government; forced disappearances by the government; torture by the government; arbitrary detention by the government; harsh and life-threatening prison and detention conditions; political prisoners; arbitrary interference with privacy; physical attacks on and criminal prosecution of journalists, lawyers, writers, bloggers, dissidents, petitioners, and others as well as their family members; censorship and site blocking; interference with the rights of peaceful assembly and freedom of association, including overly restrictive laws that apply to foreign and domestic nongovernmental organizations (NGOs); severe restrictions of religious freedom; significant restrictions on freedom of movement (for travel within the country and overseas); refoulement of asylum seekers to North Korea, where they have a well-founded fear of persecution; the inability of citizens to choose their government; corruption; a coercive birth-limitation policy that in some cases included sterilization or abortions; trafficking in persons; and severe restrictions on labor rights, including a ban on workers organizing or joining unions of their own choosing.  Official repression of the freedoms of speech, religion, movement, association, and assembly of Tibetans in the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) and other Tibetan areas and of Uighurs and other ethnic and religious minorities in Xinjiang worsened and was more severe than in other areas of the country.
Authorities prosecuted a number of abuses of power through the court system, particularly with regard to corruption, but in most cases the CCP first investigated and punished officials using opaque internal party disciplinary procedures.  The CCP continued to dominate the judiciary and controlled the appointment of all judges and in certain cases directly dictated the court’s ruling.  Authorities harassed, detained, and arrested citizens who promoted independent efforts to combat abuses of power.
 
 
 
There were numerous reports that the government or its agents committed arbitrary or unlawful killings.  In many instances few or no details were available.
There were reports Shanghai police shot and killed Ju Hailiang on April 13, while he was protesting a decision to demolish his home.  Police reportedly also injured Ju’s sister and his nephew.  Authorities charged Ju’s sister, her husband, and their son with “endangering public safety.”  His sister and her husband were also charged with “disorderly behavior” for throwing bricks and rocks at the police.
In Xinjiang there were reports of custodial deaths related to detentions in the expanding internment camps.  Some of these deaths occurred before 2018 and were reported only after detainees escaped to other countries.
Abdulreshit Seley Hajim, a Uighur businessperson, died in May or June while being held in an internment camp.  According to those interviewed by Radio Free Asia, he died from strikes to the head with a blunt object.
Although legal reforms in recent years decreased the use of the death penalty and improved the review process, authorities executed some defendants in criminal proceedings following convictions that lacked due process and adequate channels for appeal.
 
 
There were multiple reports authorities detained individuals and held them at undisclosed locations for extended periods.
The government conducted mass arbitrary detention of Uighurs, ethnic Kazakhs, and other Muslims in Xinjiang.  China Human Rights Defenders reported these detentions amounted to enforced disappearance, as families were not given information about the length or location of the detention.
Human rights lawyer Gao Zhisheng, who went missing in 2017, remained missing throughout 2018.  In September 2017 Radio Free Asia reported Gao’s family said they were told he was in police custody at an undisclosed location, although authorities did not release any details surrounding his detention.
In November award-winning Chinese documentary photographer Lu Guang disappeared after traveling to Xinjiang to lead a photography workshop.  Authorities did not respond to requests by Lu’s wife and international advocacy organizations to account for Lu’s status and whereabouts.
Lawyer Wang Quanzhang was reported alive in the Tianjin Detention Center in July after being held in incommunicado detention for more than three years.  Wang had a closed court hearing on the charges against him on December 26.  Authorities detained Wang in the July 2015 “709” roundup of more than 300 human rights lawyers and legal associates.
The government still had not provided a comprehensive, credible accounting of all those killed, missing, or detained in connection with the violent suppression of the 1989 Tiananmen demonstrations.  Many activists who were involved in the 1989 demonstrations and their family members continued to suffer official harassment.
The government made no efforts to prevent, investigate, or punish such acts.
 
 
The law prohibits the physical abuse and mistreatment of detainees and forbids prison guards from coercing confessions, insulting prisoners’ dignity, and beating or encouraging others to beat prisoners.  Amendments to the criminal procedure law exclude evidence obtained through illegal means, including coerced confessions, in certain categories of criminal cases.  Enforcement of these legal protections continued to be lax.
Numerous former prisoners and detainees reported they were beaten, raped, subjected to electric shock, forced to sit on stools for hours on end, hung by the wrists, deprived of sleep, force fed, forced to take medication against their will, and otherwise subjected to physical and psychological abuse.  Although prison authorities abused ordinary prisoners, they reportedly singled out political and religious dissidents for particularly harsh treatment.
Many human rights advocates expressed concern that lawyers, law associates, and activists detained in the “709” crackdown continued to suffer various forms of torture, abuse, or degrading treatment, similar to the 2017 reports of authorities’ treatment of Wu Gan, Li Chunfu, Xie Yang, and Jiang Tianyong.
In September, according to Radio Free Asia, Huang Qi, founder and director of 64 Tianwang Human Rights Center, sustained injuries from multiple interrogation sessions.  Huang was detained in the city of Mianyang, Sichuan Province, in 2016 for “illegally supplying state secrets overseas.”  Multiple contacts reported detention officials deprived Huang of sleep and timely access to medical treatment in an attempt to force Huang to confess.  In October prosecutors brought more charges against Huang, including “leaking national secrets.”  The Mianyang Intermediate People’s Court had not set a new trial date for Huang since its sudden cancellation of his scheduled trial in June.  Huang’s mother, Pu Wenqing, petitioned central authorities in October to release him because she believed her son was mistreated.  She had not been able to see him in two years.  Pu disappeared on December 7 after plainclothes security personnel detained her at the Beijing train station.
Members of the minority Uighur ethnic group reported systematic torture and other degrading treatment by law enforcement officers and officials working within the penal system and the internment camps.  Survivors stated authorities subjected individuals in custody to electrocution, waterboarding, beatings, stress positions, injection of unknown substances, and cold cells (see section 6, National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities).  Practitioners of the banned Falun Gong spiritual movement and members of the Church of Almighty God also reported systematic torture in custody.
The treatment and abuse of detainees under the new liuzhi detention system, which operates outside the judicial system to investigate corruption, retained many characteristics of the previous shuanggui system, such as extended solitary confinement, sleep deprivation, beatings, and forced standing or sitting in uncomfortable positions for hours and sometimes days, according to press reports and an NGO report released in August (see section 4).
The law states psychiatric treatment and hospitalization should be “on a voluntary basis,” but the law also allows authorities and family members to commit persons to psychiatric facilities against their will and fails to provide meaningful legal protections for persons sent to psychiatric facilities.  The law does not provide for the right to a lawyer and restricts a person’s right to communicate with those outside the psychiatric institution.
According to the Legal Daily (a state-owned newspaper covering legal affairs), the Ministry of Public Security directly administered 23 high-security psychiatric hospitals for the criminally insane.  While many of those committed to mental health facilities were convicted of murder and other violent crimes, there were also reports of activists, religious or spiritual adherents, and petitioners involuntarily subjected to psychiatric treatment for political reasons.  Public security officials may commit individuals to psychiatric facilities and force treatment for “conditions” that have no basis in psychiatry.
In February, according to Civil Rights and Livelihood Watch, a human rights oriented website, local security officers sent Chongqing dissident Liu Gang to a psychiatric hospital for the seventh time.  Since 2004 Liu often criticized the Chinese Communist Party, and authorities regularly detained him on the charge of “disturbing public order.”
Some activists and organizations continue to accuse the government of involuntarily harvesting organs from prisoners of conscience, especially members of Falun Gong.  The government denied the claims, having officially ended the long-standing practice of involuntarily harvesting the organs of executed prisoners for use in transplants in 2015.
 
 
Conditions in penal institutions for both political prisoners and criminal offenders were generally harsh and often life threatening or degrading.
Physical Conditions:  Authorities regularly held prisoners and detainees in overcrowded conditions with poor sanitation.  Food often was inadequate and of poor quality, and many detainees relied on supplemental food, medicines, and warm clothing provided by relatives when allowed to receive them.  Prisoners often reported sleeping on the floor because there were no beds or bedding.  In many cases provisions for sanitation, ventilation, heating, lighting, and access to potable water were inadequate.
Adequate, timely medical care for prisoners remained a serious problem, despite official assurances prisoners have the right to prompt medical treatment.  Prison authorities at times withheld medical treatment from political prisoners.
In May Guangdong government officials sent Xu Lin, a songwriter first detained in September 2017 for singing about the late Nobel Peace Prize Laureate and political prisoner Liu Xiaobo, to Guangzhou Armed Police Hospital with a medical emergency.  Detention center authorities told Xu’s wife he was ill due to food he ate in detention.  In June Xu Lin was diagnosed with “breast hyperplasia,” an enlargement of breast tissue that often occurs in the early stages of cancer.  Authorities denied a request by Xu’s wife and lawyer for his release on medical bail.  Xu’s wife maintained Xu Lin did not have any health problems before being detained.
Political prisoners were sometimes held with the general prison population and reported being beaten by other prisoners at the instigation of guards.  Some reported being held in the same cells as death row inmates.  In some cases authorities did not allow dissidents to receive supplemental food, medicine, and warm clothing from relatives.
Conditions in administrative detention facilities were similar to those in prisons.  Deaths from beatings occurred in administrative detention facilities.  Detainees reported beatings, sexual assaults, lack of proper food, and limited or no access to medical care.
In Xinjiang authorities constructed new internment camps for Uighurs, ethnic Kazakhs, and other Muslims.  In some cases authorities used repurposed schools, factories, and prisons.  According to Human Rights Watch, these camps focused on “military-style discipline and pervasive political indoctrination of the detainees.”  Available information was limited, but some reports described the withholding of food as punishment for those who could not learn Chinese phrases and songs.
Mihrigul Tursun, a Uighur woman from Xinjiang, recounted to media in October how Chinese authorities arbitrarily detained her multiple times after she returned to Xinjiang in 2015.  Tursun reported nine deaths in her cell, an underground, windowless room that held 68 women, occurred during her detention in 2018.
Administration:  The law states letters from a prisoner to higher authorities of the prison or to the judicial organs shall be free from examination; it was unclear to what extent the law was implemented.  While authorities occasionally investigated credible allegations of inhumane conditions, their results were not documented in a publicly accessible manner.  Authorities denied many prisoners and detainees reasonable access to visitors and correspondence with family members.  Some family members did not know the whereabouts of their relatives in custody.  Authorities also prevented many prisoners and detainees from engaging in religious practices or gaining access to religious materials.
Independent Monitoring:  Authorities considered information about prisons and various other types of administrative and extralegal detention facilities to be a state secret, and the government typically did not permit independent monitoring.
 
 
Arbitrary arrest and detention remained serious problems.  The law grants public security officers broad administrative detention powers and the ability to detain individuals for extended periods without formal arrest or criminal charges.  Throughout the year lawyers, human rights activists, journalists, religious leaders and adherents, and former political prisoners and their family members continued to be targeted for arbitrary detention or arrest.
The law provides for the right of any person to challenge the lawfulness of his or her arrest or detention in court, but the government generally did not observe this requirement.
 
 
The main domestic security agencies include the Ministry of State Security, the Ministry of Public Security, and the People’s Armed Police.  The People’s Armed Police is under the dual authority of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party and the Central Military Commission.  The People’s Liberation Army is primarily responsible for external security but also has some domestic security responsibilities.  Local jurisdictions also frequently used civilian municipal security forces, known as “urban management” officials, to enforce administrative measures.  Oversight of these forces was localized and ad hoc.  By law, officials can be criminally prosecuted for abuses of power, but, outside of anticorruption cases, such cases were rarely pursued.
The Ministry of Public Security coordinates the civilian police force, which is organized into specialized agencies and local, county, and provincial jurisdictions.  Procuratorate oversight of the public security forces was limited.  Corruption at every level was widespread.  Public security and urban management officials engaged in extrajudicial detention, extortion, and assault.
By regulation, state officers in prisons face dismissal if found to have beaten, applied corporal punishment to, or abused inmates, or to have instigated such acts, but there were no reports these regulations were enforced.
While civilian authorities maintained effective control of the security forces, in the absence of reliable data, it was difficult to ascertain the full extent of impunity for the domestic security apparatus.  Anecdotal accounts of abuse were common on social media and appeared in state media reports as well.  Authorities often announced investigations following cases of reported killings by police.  It remained unclear, however, whether these investigations resulted in findings of police malfeasance or disciplinary action.  There were few known government actions to increase respect for human rights by the security forces.
On April 28, police in Shanwei, Guangdong, arrested a security official for administering extrajudicial punishment, illegal detention, and illegal use of police equipment.  On April 24, the security official caught a teenager who tried to steal money from a nearby Taoist temple, handcuffed him to a flagpole, beat and tortured him with a police electric shock baton, filmed the process, and uploaded it to social media.
 
 
Criminal detention beyond 37 days requires approval of a formal arrest by the procuratorate, but in cases pertaining to “national security, terrorism, and major bribery,” the law permits up to six months of incommunicado detention without formal arrest.  After formally arresting a suspect, public security authorities are authorized to detain a suspect for up to an additional seven months while the case is investigated.
After the completion of an investigation, the procuratorate can detain a suspect an additional 45 days while determining whether to file criminal charges.  If charges are filed, authorities can detain a suspect for an additional 45 days before beginning judicial proceedings.  Public security officials sometimes detained persons beyond the period allowed by law, and pretrial detention periods of a year or longer were common.
The law stipulates detainees be allowed to meet with defense counsel before criminal charges are filed.  The criminal procedure law requires a court to provide a lawyer to a defendant who has not already retained one; is blind, deaf, mute, or mentally ill; is a minor; or faces a life sentence or the death penalty.  This law applies whether or not the defendant is indigent.  Courts may also provide lawyers to other criminal defendants who cannot afford them, although courts often did not do so.  Lawyers reported significant difficulties meeting their clients in detention centers, especially in cases considered politically sensitive.
Criminal defendants are entitled to apply for bail (also translated as “a guarantor pending trial”) while awaiting trial, but the system did not appear to operate effectively, and authorities released few suspects on bail.
The law requires notification of family members within 24 hours of detention, but authorities often held individuals without providing such notification for significantly longer periods, especially in politically sensitive cases.  In some cases notification did not occur.  Under a sweeping exception, officials are not required to provide notification if doing so would “hinder the investigation” of a case.  The revised criminal procedure law limits this exception to cases involving state security or terrorism, but public security officials have broad discretion to interpret these provisions.
Under certain circumstances the law allows for residential surveillance in the detainee’s home, rather than detention in a formal facility.  With the approval of the next-higher-level authorities, officials also may place a suspect under “residential surveillance at a designated location” (RSDL) for up to six months when they suspect crimes of endangering state security, terrorism, or serious bribery and believe surveillance at the suspect’s home would impede the investigation.  Authorities may also prevent defense lawyers from meeting with suspects in these categories of cases.  Human rights organizations and detainees reported the practice of RSDL left detainees at a high risk for torture since being neither at home nor in a monitored detention facility reduced opportunities for oversight of detainee treatment and mechanisms for appeal.
Authorities used administrative detention to intimidate political and religious advocates and to prevent public demonstrations.  Forms of administrative detention included compulsory drug rehabilitation treatment (for drug users), “custody and training” (for minor criminal offenders), and “legal education” centers for political activists and religious adherents, particularly Falun Gong practitioners.  The maximum stay in compulsory drug rehabilitation centers is two years, including commonly a six-month stay in a detoxification center.
Arbitrary Arrest:  Authorities detained or arrested persons on allegations of revealing state secrets, subversion, and other crimes as a means to suppress political dissent and public advocacy.  These charges–including what constitutes a state secret–remained ill defined, and any piece of information could be retroactively designated a state secret.  Authorities also used the vaguely worded charges of “picking quarrels and provoking trouble” broadly against many civil rights advocates.  It remained unclear what this term means.  Authorities also detained citizens and foreigners under broad and ambiguous state secret laws for, among other actions, disclosing information on criminal trials, commercial activity, and government activity.  A counterespionage law grants authorities the power to require individuals and organizations to cease any activities deemed a threat to national security.  Failure to comply could result in seizure of property and assets.
There were multiple reports authorities arrested or detained lawyers, religious leaders or adherents, petitioners, and other rights advocates for lengthy periods, only to have the charges later dismissed for lack of evidence.  Authorities subjected many of these citizens to extralegal house arrest, denial of travel rights, or administrative detention in different types of extralegal detention facilities, including “black jails.”  In some cases public security officials put pressure on schools not to allow the children of prominent political detainees to enroll.  Conditions faced by those under house arrest varied but sometimes included isolation in their homes under guard by security agents.  Security officials were frequently stationed inside the homes.  Authorities placed many citizens under house arrest during sensitive times, such as during the visits of senior foreign government officials, annual plenary sessions of the National People’s Congress (NPC), the anniversary of the Tiananmen massacre, and sensitive anniversaries in Tibetan areas and Xinjiang.  Security agents took some of those not placed under house arrest to remote areas on so-called forced vacations.
 
Swedish bookseller and Hong Kong resident Gui Minhai, who went missing from Thailand in 2015 and was released by Chinese authorities in October 2017, was detained again by Chinese authorities in late January while traveling on a train.  The Chinese government issued a statement on February 12 stating Gui had violated Chinese law, and his case would be dealt with in accordance with Chinese law.  The press reported Gui remained in detention, although his whereabouts were unclear.
In July authorities released Liu Xia, widow of Nobel Peace Prize Laureate Liu Xiaobo, from eight years of home confinement.  Authorities had held Liu Xia without a criminal charge or a judicial proceeding against her.  Liu Xia suffered deteriorating physical and emotional health, according to those who could communicate with her.  Liu Xia’s brother Liu Hui remained in the country on medical parole related to his 11-year sentence for a 2013 fraud conviction.  Human rights advocates argued the government was holding Liu Hui as a hostage to restrict Liu Xia from publicly criticizing authorities.
 
According to media reports, officials had detained Bishop “Peter” Shao Zhumin, the leader of the underground Catholic Church in Wenzhou, Zhejiang, five times since he was ordained in 2016.  Shao spent more than seven months in custody from May 2017 to January 2018.  Authorities sent Shao to Qinghai for “re-education” during some of his previous detentions for refusing to join the state-sponsored Chinese Catholic Patriotic Association.
Pretrial Detention:  Pretrial detention could last longer than one year.  Defendants in “sensitive cases” reported being subjected to prolonged pretrial detention.  Authorities held many of the “709” detainees in pretrial detention for more than a year without access to their families or their lawyers.  Statistics were not published or made publicly available, but lengthy pretrial detentions were especially common in cases of political prisoners.
On June 29, the Tiexi District Court in Shenyang sentenced human rights advocate Lin Mingjie, after two years of pretrial detention, for assembling a group of demonstrators in front of the Ministry of Public Security in Beijing to protest Shenyang Public Security Bureau Director Xu Wenyou’s abuse of power in 2016.  Lin was sentenced to two years and six months in prison, including time served.
 
 
Although the law states the courts shall exercise judicial power independently, without interference from administrative organs, social organizations, and individuals, the judiciary did not exercise judicial power independently.  Judges regularly received political guidance on pending cases, including instructions on how to rule, from both the government and the CCP, particularly in politically sensitive cases.  The CCP Central Political and Legal Affairs Commission has the authority to review and direct court operations at all levels of the judiciary.  All judicial and procuratorate appointments require approval by the CCP Organization Department.
Corruption often influenced court decisions, since safeguards against judicial corruption were vague and poorly enforced.  Local governments appointed and paid local court judges and, as a result, often exerted influence over the rulings of those judges.
A CCP-controlled committee decided most major cases, and the duty of trial and appellate court judges was to craft a legal justification for the committee’s decision.
Courts are not authorized to rule on the constitutionality of legislation.  The law permits organizations or individuals to question the constitutionality of laws and regulations, but a constitutional challenge may be directed only to the promulgating legislative body.  Lawyers had little or no opportunity to rely on constitutional claims in litigation.  In March lawyers and others received central government instructions to avoid discussion of the constitutionality of the constitutional amendments that removed term limits for the president and vice president.
Media sources indicated public security authorities used televised confessions of lawyers, foreign and domestic bloggers, journalists, and business executives in an attempt to establish guilt before their criminal trial proceedings began.  In some cases, these confessions were likely a precondition for release.  NGOs asserted such statements were likely coerced, perhaps by torture, and some detainees who confessed recanted upon release and confirmed their confessions had been coerced.  No provision in the law allows the pretrial broadcast of confessions by criminal suspects.
Jiang Tianyong remained in prison following his 2017 conviction for inciting state subversion in Changsha, Hunan.  A court sentenced him to two years in prison.  The case against him was based on his interviews with foreign journalists and his publishing of articles on the internet, actions that, outside the country, were widely seen as normal for someone in his profession.  Authorities prevented Jiang from selecting his own attorney to represent him at a trial that multiple analysts viewed as neither impartial nor fair.
“Judicial independence” remained one of the reportedly off-limit subjects the CCP ordered university professors not to discuss (see section 2.a., Academic Freedom and Cultural Events).
 
 
Although the amended criminal procedure law reaffirms the presumption of innocence, the criminal justice system remained biased toward a presumption of guilt, especially in high profile or politically sensitive cases.
Courts often punished defendants who refused to acknowledge guilt with harsher sentences than those who confessed.  The appeals process rarely reversed convictions, and it failed to provide sufficient avenues for review; remedies for violations of defendants’ rights were inadequate.
Regulations of the Supreme People’s Court require trials to be open to the public, with the exception of cases involving state secrets, privacy issues, minors, or, on the application of a party to the proceedings, commercial secrets.  Authorities used the state secrets provision to keep politically sensitive proceedings closed to the public, sometimes even to family members, and to withhold a defendant’s access to defense counsel.  Court regulations state foreigners with valid identification should be allowed to observe trials under the same criteria as citizens, but foreigners were permitted to attend court proceedings only by invitation.  As in past years, authorities barred foreign diplomats and journalists from attending a number of trials.  In some instances authorities reclassified trials as “state secrets” cases or otherwise closed them to the public.
The Open Trial Network (Tingshen Wang), a government-run website, broadcast trials online; the majority were civil trials.
Regulations require the release of court judgments online and stipulate court officials should release judgments, with the exception of those involving state secrets and juvenile suspects, within seven days of their adoption.  Courts did not post all judgments.  They had wide discretion not to post if they found posting the judgment could be considered “inappropriate.”  Many political cases did not have judgments posted.  The Dui Hua Foundation observed a reduction in the number of judgments posted online.
Individuals facing administrative detention do not have the right to seek legal counsel.  Criminal defendants are eligible for legal assistance, although the vast majority of criminal defendants went to trial without a lawyer.
Lawyers are required to be members of the CCP-controlled All China Lawyers Association, and the Ministry of Justice requires all lawyers to pledge their loyalty to the leadership of the CCP upon issuance or annual renewal of their license to practice law.  The CCP continued to require law firms with three or more party members to form a CCP unit within the firm.
Despite the government’s stated efforts to improve lawyers’ access to their clients, in 2017 the head of the All China Lawyers Association told China Youth Daily defense attorneys had taken part in less than 30 percent of criminal cases.  In particular, human rights lawyers reported authorities did not permit them to defend certain clients effectively or threatened them with punishment if they chose to do so.  Some lawyers declined to represent defendants in politically sensitive cases, and such defendants frequently found it difficult to find an attorney.  In some instances authorities prevented attorneys selected by defendants from taking the case and appointed an attorney to the case instead.
On January 18, the Guangdong Provincial Justice Department summoned prominent Guangzhou rights attorney Fu Ailing after visiting her client Zhan Huidong at the Xinhui Detention Center in Jiangmen municipality.  Justice department officials repeatedly questioned her about who contacted her for legal assistance and who employed her as Zhan’s defense attorney.  Zhan Huidong was a prodemocracy activist who attended a memorial event for Liu Xiaobo.
The government suspended or revoked the business licenses or law licenses of some lawyers who took on sensitive cases, such as defending prodemocracy dissidents, house-church activists, Falun Gong practitioners, or government critics.  Authorities used the annual licensing review process administered by the All China Lawyers Association to withhold or delay the renewal of professional lawyers’ licenses.  Other government tactics to intimidate or otherwise pressure human rights lawyers included unlawful detentions, vague “investigations” of legal offices, disbarment, harassment and physical intimidation, and denial of access to evidence and to clients.  In February a number of Chinese lawyers wrote an open letter protesting the government’s harassment of lawyers who took on human rights cases.
In January the Guangdong Provincial Justice Department revoked the law license for high-profile human rights lawyer Sui Muqing.  In April he requested administrative review of the department’s decision to revoke his license, but he had not received a response as of August.
Lawyers who take on politically sensitive cases often become targets of harassment and detention themselves.  Beijing-based lawyer Li Yuhan, who defended human rights lawyers during the “709” crackdown, remained in custody in Shenyang without formal trial proceedings, other than “pretrial meetings” in July and October.  Authorities initially detained Li in October 2017.
In 2015 the National People’s Congress’s Standing Committee amended legislation concerning the legal profession.  The amendments criminalize attorneys’ actions that “insult, defame, or threaten judicial officers,” “do not heed the court’s admonition,” or “severely disrupt courtroom order.”  The changes also criminalize disclosing client or case information to media outlets or using protests, media, or other means to influence court decisions.  Violators face fines and up to three years in prison.
Regulations adopted in 2015 also state detention center officials should either allow defense attorneys to meet suspects or defendants or explain why the meeting cannot be arranged at that time.  The regulations specify that a meeting should be arranged within 48 hours.  Procuratorates and courts should allow defense attorneys to access and read case files within three working days.  The time and frequency of opportunities available for defense attorneys to read case files shall not be limited, according to the guidelines.  In some sensitive cases, lawyers had no pretrial access to their clients and limited time to review evidence, and defendants and lawyers were not allowed to communicate with one another during trials.  In contravention of the law, criminal defendants frequently were not assigned an attorney until a case was brought to court.  The law stipulates the spoken and written language of criminal proceedings shall be conducted in the language common to the specific locality, with government interpreters providing language services for defendants not proficient in the local language.  Sources noted trials were predominantly conducted in Mandarin Chinese, even in minority areas, with interpreters provided for defendants who did not speak the language.
Mechanisms allowing defendants to confront their accusers were inadequate.  Only a small percentage of trials reportedly involved witnesses.  Judges retained significant discretion over whether live witness testimony was required or even allowed.  In most criminal trials, prosecutors read witness statements, which neither the defendants nor their lawyers had an opportunity to rebut through cross-examination.  Although the law states pretrial witness statements cannot serve as the sole basis for conviction, prosecutors relied heavily on such statements.  Defense attorneys had no authority to compel witnesses to testify or to mandate discovery, although they could apply for access to government-held evidence relevant to their case.
Zhuhai city authorities in Guangdong Province denied permission for prominent anticensorship campaigner Zhen Jianghua to meet with his lawyer, Ren Quanniu, on “national security” grounds.  In 2017 authorities arrested Zhen, charged him with “incitement to subvert state power,” and held him in residential surveillance at an RSDL.  Zhen, also known by his online moniker GuestsZhen, was the executive editor of the anticensorship website Across the Great Firewall, an overseas-registered site offering information about censorship and circumvention tools for accessing the internet beyond China’s borders.
Under the law lawyers are assigned to convicted prisoners on death row who cannot afford one during the review of their sentences.  Official figures on executions were classified as a state secret.  According to the Dui Hua Foundation, the number of executions stabilized after years of decline following the reform of the capital punishment system initiated in 2007.  Dui Hua believed an increase in the number of executions for bosses of criminal gangs and individuals convicted of “terrorism” in Xinjiang likely offset the drop in the number of other executions.
 
 
Government officials continued to deny holding any political prisoners, asserting persons were detained not for their political or religious views but because they had violated the law.  Authorities, however, continued to imprison citizens for reasons related to politics and religion.  Human rights organizations estimated tens of thousands of political prisoners remained incarcerated, most in prisons and some in administrative detention.  The government did not grant international humanitarian organizations access to political prisoners.
Authorities granted political prisoners early release at lower rates than other prisoners.  The Dui Hua Foundation estimated more than 100 prisoners were still serving sentences for counterrevolution and hooliganism, two crimes removed from the criminal code in 1997.  Thousands of others were serving sentences for political and religious offenses, including for “endangering state security” and carrying out “cult activities.”  The government neither reviewed the cases of those charged before 1997 with counterrevolution and hooliganism nor released persons jailed for nonviolent offenses under repealed provisions.
Many political prisoners remained in prison or under other forms of detention at year’s end, including writer Yang Maodong (pen name: Guo Feixiong); Uighur scholars Ilham Tohti and Rahile Dawut; activist Wang Bingzhang; activist Liu Xianbin; Taiwan prodemocracy activist Lee Ming-Che; pastor Zhang Shaojie; Falun Gong practitioners Bian Lichao and Ma Zhenyu; Catholic Auxiliary Bishop of Shanghai Thaddeus Ma Daqin; rights lawyers Wang Quanzhang, Xia Lin, Gao Zhisheng, Tang Jingling, Yu Wensheng, and Jiang Tianyong; blogger Wu Gan; Buddhist monk Xu Zhiqiang (who also went by the name Master Shengguang); and Shanghai labor activist Jiang Cunde.
Criminal punishments included “deprivation of political rights” for a fixed period after release from prison, during which an individual could be denied rights of free speech, association, and publication.  Former prisoners reported their ability to find employment, travel, obtain residence permits and passports, rent residences, and access social services was severely restricted.
Authorities frequently subjected former political prisoners and their families to surveillance, telephone wiretaps, searches, and other forms of harassment or threats.  For example, security personnel followed the family members of detained or imprisoned rights activists to meetings with foreign reporters and diplomats and urged the family members to remain silent about the cases of their relatives.  Authorities barred certain members of the rights community from meeting with visiting dignitaries.
 
 
Courts deciding civil matters faced the same limitations on judicial independence as criminal courts.  The State Compensation Law provides administrative and judicial remedies for plaintiffs whose rights or interests government agencies or officials have infringed.  The law also allows compensation for wrongful detention, mental trauma, or physical injuries inflicted by detention center or prison officials.
Although historically citizens seldom applied for state compensation because of the high cost of bringing lawsuits, low credibility of courts, and citizens’ general lack of awareness of the law, there were instances of courts overturning wrongful convictions.  In July Li Jinlian in Jiangxi Province applied for state compensation of 41.4 million yuan ($6.1 million) for her wrongful conviction and subsequent death sentence with reprieve for the 1998 murder of two children with poisoned candy.  In June the Jiangxi Provincial Higher People’s Court acquitted Li, ruling the previous conviction was based on unclear facts and insufficient evidence.  In September the Jiangxi Higher People’s Court decided to award Li approximately 2.93 million yuan ($431,000) for his wrongful conviction.  In October the Supreme People’s Court accepted Li’s request to reconsider the Jiangxi court decision, and on November 19, it heard Li’s claim that the amount of the original award was insufficient, and a final ruling was still pending at year’s end.
The law provides for the right of an individual to petition the government for resolution of grievances.  Most petitions address grievances about land, housing, entitlements, the environment, or corruption, and most petitioners sought to present their complaints at local “letters and visits” offices.  The government reported approximately six million petitions were submitted every year; however, persons petitioning the government continued to face restrictions on their rights to assemble and raise grievances.
Despite attempts at improving the petitioning system, progress was unsteady.  While the central government reiterated prohibitions against blocking or restricting “normal petitioning” and against unlawfully detaining petitioners, official retaliation against petitioners continued.  Regulations encourage all litigation-related petitions be handled at the local level through local or provincial courts, reinforcing a system of incentives for local officials to prevent petitioners from raising complaints to higher levels.  Local officials sent security personnel to Beijing to force petitioners to return to their home provinces to prevent them from filing complaints against local officials with the central government.  Such detentions often went unrecorded and often resulted in brief periods of incarceration in extralegal “black jails.”
On June 3, police in Guangzhou, Guangdong, detained Yang Suyuan, an activist who petitioned for employment severance benefits for staff dismissed from big state-owned banks.  The police interrogated Yang, collected her fingerprints, took a DNA blood sample and facial record, and transferred her to a police station in her hometown in Qingyuan, Guangdong, for further questioning.
In June the Beijing Number 2 Intermediate People’s Court tried 12 suspects accused of illegally detaining, tying up, and beating a petitioner from Jiangxi Province in June 2017.  The petitioner, Chen Yuxian from Shangyou, died in Beijing eight hours after the suspects took him away.  The 12 suspects were reportedly from an illegal crime group under the guise of a car rental company that had close connections to local government officials, who had demanded the petition be intercepted.  The Beijing court had not issued a verdict as of year’s end.
 
 
The law states the “freedom and privacy of correspondence of citizens are protected by law,” but authorities often did not respect the privacy of citizens.  Although the law requires warrants before officers can search premises, officials frequently ignored this requirement.  The Public Security Bureau and prosecutors are authorized to issue search warrants on their own authority without judicial review.  There continued to be reports of cases of forced entry by police officers.
Authorities monitored telephone calls, text messages, faxes, email, instant messaging, and other digital communications intended to remain private.  Authorities also opened and censored domestic and international mail.  Security services routinely monitored and entered residences and offices to gain access to computers, telephones, and fax machines.  Foreign journalists leaving the country found some of their personal belongings searched.  In some cases, when material deemed politically sensitive was uncovered, the journalists had to sign a statement stating they would “voluntarily” leave these documents behind in China.
According to media reports, the Ministry of Public Security used tens of millions of surveillance cameras throughout the country to monitor the general public.  Human rights groups stated authorities increasingly relied on the cameras and other forms of surveillance to monitor and intimidate political dissidents, religious leaders and adherents, Tibetans, and Uighurs.  These included facial recognition and “gait recognition” video surveillance, allowing police not only to monitor a situation but also to quickly identify individuals in crowds.  The monitoring and disruption of telephone and internet communications were particularly widespread in Xinjiang and Tibetan areas.  The government installed surveillance cameras in monasteries in the TAR and Tibetan areas outside the TAR (see Special Annex, Tibet).  The law allows security agencies to cut communication networks during “major security incidents.”
According to Human Rights Watch, the Ministry of State Security partnered with information technology firms to create a “mass automated voice recognition and monitoring system,” similar to ones already in use in Xinjiang and Anhui Province, to help with solving criminal cases.  According to one company involved, the system was programmed to understand Mandarin Chinese and certain minority languages, including Tibetan and Uighur.  In many cases other biometric data such as fingerprints and DNA profiles were being stored as well.  This database included information obtained not just from criminals and criminal suspects but also from entire populations of migrant workers and all Uighurs applying for passports.
Forced relocation because of urban development continued in some locations.  Protests over relocation terms or compensation were common, and authorities prosecuted some protest leaders.  In rural areas infrastructure and commercial development projects resulted in the forced relocation of thousands of persons.
Property-related disputes between citizens and government authorities sometimes turned violent.  These disputes frequently stemmed from local officials’ collusion with property developers to pay little or no compensation to displaced residents, combined with a lack of effective government oversight or media scrutiny of local officials’ involvement in property transactions, as well as a lack of legal remedies or other dispute resolution mechanisms for displaced residents.  The problem persisted despite central government claims it had imposed stronger controls over illegal land seizures and taken steps to standardize compensation.
The government continued implementing a “social credit system,” which collects vast amounts of data to create scores for individuals and companies in an effort to address deficiencies in “social trust,” strengthen access to financial credit instruments, and reduce public corruption.  Unlike Western financial credit-rating systems, the social credit system also collected information on academic records, traffic violations, social media presence, quality of friendships, adherence to birth control regulations, employment performance, consumption habits, and other topics.  This system is intended to promote self-censorship, as netizens would be liable for their statements, relationships, and even information others shared within closed social media groups.
An individual’s “social credit score,” among other things, quantifies a person’s loyalty to the government by monitoring citizens’ online activity and relationships.  There were indications the system awarded and deducted points based on the “loyalty” of sites visited, as well as the “loyalty” of other netizens with whom a person interacted.  The system also created incentives for citizens to police each other.  Organizers of chat groups on messaging apps were responsible for policing and reporting any posts with impermissible content, making them liable for violations.
Although the government’s goal is to create a unified government social credit system, there were several disparate social credit systems under several Chinese technology companies, and the specific implementation of the system varied by province and city.  In Hangzhou the scoring system, which applies to residents 18 years or older, included information on individuals’ education, employment, compliance with laws and regulations (such as tax payments), payment of medical bills, loan repayment, honoring contracts, participating in volunteer activities, and voluntary blood donations.
There were several cases in which an individual’s credit score resulted in concrete limitations on that person’s activities.  Users with low social credit scores faced an increasing series of consequences, including losing the ability to communicate on domestic social media platforms, travel, and buy property.  In April state media reported the social credit system “blocked” individuals from taking 11 million flights and four million train trips.
In a separate use of social media for censorship, human rights activists reported authorities questioned them about their participation in human rights-related chat groups, including WeChat and WhatsApp.  Authorities monitored the groups to identify activists, which led to users’ increased self-censorship on WeChat, as well as several separate arrests of chat group administrators.
The government instituted the “double-linked household” system in Xinjiang developed through many years of use in Tibet.  This system divides towns and neighborhoods into units of 10 households each, with the households in each unit instructed to watch over each other and report on “security issues” and poverty problems to the government, thus turning average citizens into informers.  In Xinjiang the government also required Uighur families to accept government “home stays,” in which officials or volunteers forcibly lived in Uighurs’ homes and monitored families for signs of “extremism.”  Those who exhibited behaviors the government considered to be signs of “extremism,” such as praying, possessing religious texts, or abstaining from alcohol or tobacco, could be detained in re-education camps.
The government restricted the rights of men and women to have children (see section 6, Women).
 
 
 
The constitution states citizens “enjoy freedom of speech, of the press, of assembly, of association, of procession and of demonstration,” although authorities limited and did not respect these rights, especially when they conflicted with CCP interests.  Authorities continued tight control of all print, broadcast, electronic, and social media and regularly used them to propagate government views and CCP ideology.  Authorities censored and manipulated the press and the internet, particularly around sensitive anniversaries and topics.
Freedom of Expression:  Citizens could discuss many political topics privately and in small groups without official punishment.  Authorities, however, routinely took harsh action against citizens who questioned the legitimacy of the CCP.  Some independent think tanks, study groups, and seminars reported pressure to cancel sessions on sensitive topics.  Those who made politically sensitive comments in public speeches, academic discussions, or in remarks to media, or posted sensitive comments online, remained subject to punitive measures.
In July, in the midst of a national outcry over faulty children’s vaccines, police visited the homes of concerned parents to attempt to stop their online discussion of the issue.  Some parents were shown a document that said police intended to charge parents who attended a planned media session with “colluding with foreign media.”  The parents subsequently cancelled the press conference.
In April Cui Haoxin, a Muslim poet, was detained in a Xinjiang internment camp for one week, which he attributed to the political views he expressed in his poetry and other writings.  On August 16, police in Xinjiang threatened Cui in an attempt to stop him from posting information on Twitter about these camps.
Press and Media Freedom:  The CCP and government continued to maintain ultimate authority over all published, online, and broadcast material.  Officially, only state-run media outlets have government approval to cover CCP leaders or other topics deemed “sensitive.”  While it did not dictate all content to be published or broadcast, the CCP and the government had unchecked authority to mandate if, when, and how particular issues were reported or to order they not be reported at all.
During the year state media reported senior authorities issued internal CCP rules detailing punishments for those who failed to hew to ideological regulations, ordering a further crackdown on illegal internet accounts and platforms, and instructing the media to engage in “journalism based on Marxism.”  The rules also planned for greater political and ideological indoctrination efforts targeting at university students.
The government tightened ideological control over media and public discourse by restructuring its regulatory system.  The CCP’s propaganda department has direct control of the State Administration of Press, Publication, Radio, Film, and Television (SAPPRFT).  Authorities also restructured SAPPRFT in March, relocating some of its responsibilities and renaming it the State Administration for Radio and Television Agency (SARFT).  The new structure greatly expands CCP control of film, news media, newspapers, books, and magazines.  The Cyberspace Administration of China (CAC), which directly manages internet content, including online news media, also promotes CCP propaganda.
On November 14, the CAC issued a statement saying more than 9,800 internet accounts had been “cleaned up” as part of an ongoing campaign.  On November 15, the CAC issued a notice that further restricted what opinions could be posted online and said the CAC would start to require detailed logs on users from internet and media firms as part of its new policy targeting dissenting opinion and social movements online.  As of November 30, the CAC said it would require internet platforms that could be used to “socially mobilize” or that could lead to “major changes in public opinion” to submit reports on their activities.
The government took further action to build its propaganda tools.  In March it consolidated China Central Television, China Radio International, and China National Radio into a new super media group known as the “Voice of China.”  State media explained the restructuring was meant to “strengthen the party’s concentrated development and management of important public opinion positions.”
All books and magazines continued to require state-issued publication numbers, which were expensive and often difficult to obtain.  As in the past, nearly all print and broadcast media as well as book publishers were affiliated with the CCP or the government.  There were a small number of print publications with some private ownership interest but no privately owned television or radio stations.  The CCP directed the domestic media to refrain from reporting on certain subjects, and traditional broadcast programming required government approval.
Journalists operated in an environment tightly controlled by the government.  While the country’s increasingly internet-literate population demanded interesting stories told with the latest technologies, government authorities asserted control over those new technologies (such as livestreaming) and clamped down on new digital outlets and social media platforms.
Because the Communist Party does not consider internet news companies “official” media, they are subject to debilitating regulations and barred from reporting on potentially “sensitive” stories.  According to the most recent All China Journalist Association report from 2017 on the nation’s news media, there were 231,564 officially credentialed reporters working in the country.  Only 1,406 worked for news websites, with the majority working at state-run outlets such as XinhuaNet.com and ChinaDaily.com.  This did not mean online outlets did not report on important issues.  Instead, many used creative means to share content, but limited their tactics and topics since they were acting outside official approval.
Violence and Harassment:  The government frequently impeded the work of the press, including citizen journalists.  Journalists reported being subjected to physical attack, harassment, monitoring, and intimidation when reporting on sensitive topics.  Government officials used criminal prosecution, civil lawsuits, and other punishment, including violence, detention, and other forms of harassment, to intimidate authors and journalists and to prevent the dissemination of unsanctioned information on a wide range of topics.
Family members of journalists based overseas also faced harassment, and in some cases detention, as retaliation for the reporting of their relatives abroad.  In 2017 authorities detained dozens of relatives of at least six reporters for Radio Free Asia’s Uighur Service.  The reporters, members of the country’s Uighur minority group, were reporting on the Xinjiang internment camps (see section 1).
A journalist could face demotion or job loss for publishing views that challenged the government.  In many cases potential sources refused to meet with journalists due to actual or feared government pressure.  In particular academics–a traditional source of information–were increasingly unwilling to meet with journalists.
During the year authorities imprisoned numerous journalists working in traditional and new media.
On June 26, a Sichuan province court sentenced political cartoonist Jiang Yefei to six years and six months in prison on charges of “inciting subversion of state power” and “illegally crossing the border.”  Jiang fled to Thailand in 2008 after his cartoons criticizing the 2008 Sichuan earthquakes and lampooning Chinese government officials attracted government attention.  In 2015 he was forcibly returned to China and then held incommunicado until his June 2018 trial, which was held in secret.
On August 1, authorities entered the house of retired professor Sun Wenguang in Jinan, Shandong, during an on-air telephone interview with Voice of America (VOA).  Listeners heard the police stop the interview as the professor protested their incursion.  The government held Sun for approximately two weeks and then released him under “strict supervision.”  A pair of VOA journalists, Yibing Feng and Allen Ai, went to Sun’s home after his release on August 13, at which point the police detained them for six hours, destroyed their cell phones, and scanned their equipment.
Authorities in Xinjiang arrested four employees of state-sanctioned Xinjiang newspapers in September and accused them of publishing inappropriate content in the Uighur-language versions of their papers.  A representative for the Xinjiang Daily group confirmed the arrests and said the four were accused of being “two-faced,” a euphemism for individuals who outwardly support CCP rule while secretly disagreeing with restrictions on minority culture, language, and religion.
Restrictions on foreign journalists by central and local CCP propaganda departments remained strict, especially during sensitive times and anniversaries.  Foreign press outlets reported local employees of foreign news agencies were also subjected to official harassment and intimidation and this remained a major concern for foreign outlets.
Journalists who traveled to Xinjiang reported very high levels of surveillance, monitoring, harassment, and interference in their work.
Foreign ministry officials again subjected a majority of journalists to special interviews as part of their annual visa renewal process.  During these interviews the officials pressured journalists to report less on human rights issues, referencing reporting “red lines” journalists should not cross, and in some cases threatened them with nonrenewal of visas.  Many foreign media organizations continued to have trouble expanding or maintaining their operations in the country due to the difficulty of receiving visas.  Some foreign media companies were increasingly unwilling to publicize such issues due to fear of provoking further backlash by the government.
Authorities continued to enforce tight restrictions on citizens employed by foreign news organizations.  The code of conduct for citizen employees of foreign media organizations threatens dismissal and loss of accreditation for those citizen employees who engage in independent reporting.  It instructs them to provide their employers information that projects “a good image of the country.”
Media outlets that reported on commercial issues enjoyed comparatively fewer restrictions, but the system of postpublication review by propaganda officials encouraged self-censorship by editors seeking to avoid the losses associated with penalties for inadvertently printing unauthorized content.
Chinese-language media outlets outside the country reported intimidation and financial threats from the government.  For example, the manager of Australia’s largest independent Chinese-language newspaper, Vision China Times, spoke at a conference in February about the pressure Chinese officials put on the newspaper’s advertising clients in an attempt to silence the media outlet’s views.  Some clients were “grilled” by Chinese consulate officials in Australia, while others were visited during trips to China and pressured to stop doing business with Vision China Times.
Censorship or Content Restrictions:  The State Council’s Regulations on the Administration of Publishing grant broad authority to the government at all levels to restrict publications based on content, including mandating if, when, and how particular issues are reported.  While the Ministry of Foreign Affairs daily press briefing was generally open, and the State Council Information Office organized some briefings by other government agencies, journalists did not have free access to other media events.  The Ministry of Defense continued allowing select foreign media outlets to attend occasional press briefings.
Official guidelines for domestic journalists were often vague, subject to change at the discretion of propaganda officials, and enforced retroactively.  Propaganda authorities forced newspapers and online media providers to fire editors and journalists responsible for articles deemed inconsistent with official policy and suspended or closed publications.  Self-censorship remained prevalent among journalists, authors, and editors, particularly with post facto government reviews carrying penalties of ranging severity.
On February 8, the Guangdong Provincial Propaganda Department revoked the position and official title of Duan Gongwei, chief editor of the Southern Weekly, who oversaw two investigative financial reports about Hainan Airlines Group.  The reports showed how the airline, which was reportedly linked to senior Chinese leaders, went on “acquisition sprees” despite operating with large debts.
The CCP Central Propaganda Department ordered media outlets to adhere strictly to the information provided by authoritative official departments, especially with respect to sensitive or prominent situations.  Directives often warned against reporting on issues related to party and official reputation, health and safety, and foreign affairs.
Control over public depictions of President Xi increased, with censors aggressively shutting down any depiction that varied from official media storylines.  Censors continued to block images of the Winnie the Pooh cartoon on social media because internet users used the symbol to represent President Xi Jinping.  A June segment of John Oliver’s Last Week Tonight program on HBO criticizing Xi Jinping resulted in authorities temporarily blocking access to HBO’s online content.
It was extremely difficult for foreign journalists to report from the TAR, other Tibetan areas, or Xinjiang without experiencing serious interference.  Foreign reporters also experienced restricted access and interference when trying to report in other sensitive areas, including the North Korean border, at places of historical significance to the founding of the Communist party, sites of recent natural disasters, and areas–including in Beijing–experiencing social unrest.
Overseas television newscasts, largely restricted to hotels and foreign residence compounds, were subject to censorship.  Individual issues of foreign newspapers and magazines were occasionally banned when they contained articles deemed too sensitive.  Articles on sensitive topics were removed from international magazines.  Television newscasts were blacked out during segments on sensitive subjects.
Politically sensitive coverage in Chinese, and to a lesser extent in English, was censored more than coverage in other languages.  The government prohibited some foreign and domestic films deemed too sensitive or selectively censored parts of films before they were released.  Under government regulations, authorities must authorize each foreign film released in the country, with a restriction on the total number that keeps annual distribution below 50 films.
Authorities continued to ban books with content they deemed inconsistent with officially sanctioned views.  The law permits only government-approved publishing houses to print books.  Newspapers, periodicals, books, audio and video recordings, or electronic publications may not be printed or distributed without the approval of central authorities and relevant provincial publishing authorities.  Individuals who attempted to publish without government approval faced imprisonment, fines, confiscation of their books, and other punishment.  The CCP also exerted control over the publishing industry by preemptively classifying certain topics as state secrets.
Government rules ban the sale of foreign publications without an import permit.  This includes sales on online shopping platforms, which are banned from offering “overseas publications,” including books, movies, and games, that do not already have government approval.  The ban also applies to services related to publications.
One year after the death in July of Nobel Peace Prize Laureate Liu Xiaobo, the government continued to censor a broad array of related words and images across public media and on social media platforms.  Besides his name and image, phrases such as “rest in peace,” “grey,” quotes from his writings, images of candles, and even candle emojis were blocked online and from private messages sent on social media.  Attempts to access censored search results resulted in a message saying the result could not be displayed “according to relevant laws, regulations, and policies.”  Government censors also blocked online access to news regarding Liu Xiaobo’s widow, Liu Xia.
 
 
The government tightly controlled and highly censored domestic internet usage.  According to an official report released in August by the China Internet Network Information Center, the country had more than 802 million internet users, accounting for 57.7 percent of its total population.  According to International Telecommunication Union data, 54 percent of the population used the internet in 2017.  Major media companies estimated more than 625 million persons obtained their news from social and online media sources.
Although the internet was widely available, authorities heavily censored content.  The government continued to employ tens of thousands of individuals at the national, provincial, and local levels to monitor electronic communications and online content.  The government reportedly paid personnel to promote official views on various websites and social media and to combat alternative views posted online.  Internet companies also independently employed thousands of censors to carry out CCP and government directives on censorship.  When government officials criticized or temporarily blocked online platforms due to content, the parent corporations were required to hire additional in-house censors, creating substantial staffing demands well into the thousands and even tens of thousands per company.
In April censors temporarily shut down prominent news app Toutiao.  It reopened after its owner apologized for failing to promote “core socialist values” through the app and promised to hire 4,000 new in-house censors, bringing the total number to 10,000.  Authorities permanently shuttered the company’s other app, Neihan Duanzi, which was used by its 200 million users to share jokes and memes.
On March 19, Guangdong province authorities released environmental activist Lei Ping after the government-linked China Biodiversity Conservation and Green Development Foundation submitted a letter to Xinyi police, who had detained Lei after she posted online an investigative report uncovering illegal quarry operations and their effects on local water resources.
The government continued to issue an array of regulations implementing the Cybersecurity Law, which took effect in 2017.  The law allows the government to “monitor, defend, and handle cybersecurity risks and threats originating from within the country or overseas sources.”  Article 12 of the law criminalizes using the internet to “creat[e] or disseminat[e] false information to disrupt the economic or social order.”  For example, Guangzhou anesthesiologist Tan Qindong spent three months in jail for “damaging a company’s reputation” after his criticism of a traditional Chinese medicinal tonic began circulating widely on WeChat.  Chinese news reports speculated the arrest most likely occurred at the behest of the tonic manufacturer.  Authorities released Tan after he wrote an apology admitting he had “not thought clearly.”  The law also codifies the authority of security agencies to cut communication networks across an entire geographic region during “major security incidents,” although the government had previously implemented such measures before the law’s passage.
CAC regulations on Internet News Information Services require websites, mobile apps, forums, blogs, instant communications services, and search engines to ensure news coverage of a political, economic, diplomatic, or commentary nature conforms to official views of “facts.”  These regulations extend longstanding traditional media controls to new media–including online and social media–to ensure these sources also adhere to the Communist Party directive.
According to January state media reports, authorities closed 128,000 websites in 2017.  These were deemed “harmful” due to inappropriate content, which includes politically sensitive materials, as well as pornography and gambling.  The pace continued during the year, with the CAC reporting it shuttered 3,673 websites and 1.2 million social media accounts in just the second and third quarters of the year.  In July the CAC reported receiving 6.72 million “valid” reports of online “illegal and harmful” information in that month alone.
The CAC also required all live-streaming platforms, video platforms, commercial websites, web portals, and apps to register with the CAC.  Online content platforms by licensed central media and their affiliates were not required to register.  In April state media announced content on short video sites that violated core socialist values would be removed, and the CAC announced it had “talked” to several short video sites.  Shortly thereafter, the live streaming and comment section of a prominent platform, Douyin, ceased to function.  Various other platforms faced shutdowns for “illicit” or “illegal” content over the last year.
Regulators required a special permit for transmission of audio and visual materials on blogging platforms such as Weibo and instant messaging platforms such as WeChat.  Platform managers were made directly responsible for ensuring user-posted content complies with their permit’s scope.  This includes television shows, movies, news programs, and documentaries, which many netizens consumed exclusively through social media channels.  The rules prohibit the uploading of any amateur content that would fall under the definition of news programming or “sensitive” topics.
The changes in cybersecurity law put in place by the CAC in 2017 also bolstered real-name registration requirements for websites and social media platforms, with Baidu and Sina Weibo announcing accounts without real name registration would have restricted access to certain website functions (e.g., commenting on posts).  Cybercafes in Xingtai and Shanghai also began using facial recognition to match users with their photographs printed on national identification documents.
The government continued efforts to limit virtual private network (VPN) service use.  A new ban on “unauthorized” VPNs went into effect on March 31.  While some users, including international companies, were permitted to use VPNs, smaller businesses, academics, and citizens did not have access to authorized VPNs.  However, news reports indicated authorities were not strictly enforcing the ban.  Authorities stepped up efforts to block VPN service providers ahead of major events such as November trade and internet shows.  A software engineer in Shanghai was sentenced to three years in prison after providing illegal VPNs to hundreds of customers since 2016, reported the government-owned newspaper People’s Court Daily.  The man, surnamed Dai, was also ordered to serve three years of probation and fined 10,000 yuan ($1,400).
Many other websites for international media outlets, such as the New York Times, the Wall Street Journal, and Bloomberg, in addition to those of human rights organizations, such as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, remained perennially blocked.  In August censors blocked the Australian Broadcast Corporation’s (ABC) website and phone app.  ABC launched a Chinese-language site in 2017, and in 2018 ABC’s stories about Chinese influence in Australia drew strong criticism from official Chinese media.
Government censors continued to block websites or online content related to topics deemed sensitive, such as Taiwan, the Dalai Lama, Tibet, and the 1989 Tiananmen Square Massacre.
Thousands of social media and other websites remained blocked, including Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, Google, and YouTube.  While countless news and social media sites remained blocked, a large percentage of censored websites were gambling or pornographic websites.
Early in the year, the government warned airlines not to list Taiwan, Hong Kong, or Macau as separate countries on their websites, and it published a list of offending airlines.  Officials obligated Marriott hotels to shut down its website for a week and publicly apologize for listing Tibet, Hong Kong, and Macau as separate countries.  Mercedes Benz was similarly forced to apologize to the government after a posting on its official Instagram account included this quotation, “‘Look at the situations from all angles, and you will become more open.’ — Dalai Lama.”  Officials’ response to the posting included the state-run People’s Daily calling Mercedes Benz an “enemy of the people.”
References to same-sex acts/same sex-relations and the scientifically accurate words for genitalia remained banned following SAPPRFT’s 2017 pronouncement listing same-sex acts/relations as an “abnormal sexual relation” and forbidding its depiction.  In January domestic media reported a Beijing court agreed to hear a gay-rights activist’s lawsuit challenging SAPPRFT regarding homosexuality, although by December no ruling had been announced.  Meanwhile, in May a nationally popular Hunan-based television broadcaster blacked out parts of Eurovision, a European music performance, that depicted gay relationships and pixelated an image of the gay-pride flag.
Censors shut down a prominent feminist Weibo account on International Women’s Day, March 8.  With 180,000 followers, the account was one of the country’s most prominent online feminist advocacy platforms.  Officials had similarly shut down the account in 2017 on International Women’s Day, then allowed it to reopen, but this time they shuttered the account permanently.
During the year authorities began manipulating the content of individual Twitter accounts.  There were reports of authorities forcing individuals to give them access to their Twitter accounts, which authorities then used to delete their tweets.  In October tens of thousands of postings from human rights advocate Wu Gan were deleted.
Authorities continued to jail numerous internet writers for their peaceful expression of political views.  On June 27, authorities subjected dissident author Peng Peiyu to a two-week detention.  Peng’s critical writing included an essay entitled “On Xi:  A Call to Arms,” which he posted online shortly before his arrest.  According to his attorney, Peng had been detained “many times before.”
In addition there continued to be reports of cyber operations against foreign websites, journalists, and media organizations carrying information that the government restricted internet users in the country from accessing.  As in the past, the government selectively blocked access to sites operated by foreign governments, including the websites or social media platforms of health organizations, educational institutions, NGOs, social networking sites, and search engines.
While such censorship was effective in keeping casual users away from websites hosting sensitive content, many users circumvented online censorship by using various technologies.  Information on proxy servers outside the country and software for defeating official censorship were available, although frequently limited by the Great Firewall.  Encrypted communication apps such as Telegram and WhatsApp and VPN services were regularly disrupted, especially during “sensitive” times of the year.
The State Secrets Law obliges internet companies to cooperate fully with investigations of suspected leaks of state secrets, stop the transmission of such information once discovered, and report the crime to authorities.  This was defined broadly and without clear limits.  Furthermore, the companies must comply with authorities’ orders to delete such information from their websites; failure to do so is punishable by relevant departments, such as police and the Ministry of Public Security.
 
 
The government continued restrictions on academic and artistic freedom and on political and social discourse at colleges, universities, and research institutes.  Restrictive Central Propaganda Department regulations and decisions constrained the flow of ideas and persons.
Many intellectuals and scholars exercised self-censorship, anticipating books or papers on political topics would be deemed too sensitive to be published.  Censorship and self-censorship of artistic works was also common, particularly artworks deemed to involve politically sensitive subjects.  Authorities frequently denied Western musicians permission to put on concerts, scrutinized the content of cultural events, and applied pressure to encourage self-censorship of discussions.
The government and the CCP Organization Department continued to control appointments to most leadership positions at universities, including department heads.  While CCP membership was not always a requirement to obtain a tenured faculty position, scholars without CCP affiliation often had fewer chances for promotion.  Academic subject areas deemed politically sensitive (e.g., civil rights, elite cronyism, civil society, etc.) continued to be off-limits.  Some academics self-censored their publications, faced pressure to reach predetermined research results, or were unable to hold conferences with international participants during politically sensitive periods.  Foreign academics claimed the government used visa denials, along with blocking access to archives, fieldwork, or interviews, to pressure them to self-censor their work.  The use of foreign textbooks in classrooms remained restricted, and domestically produced textbooks continued to be under the editorial control of the CCP.
Undergraduate students, regardless of academic major, must complete political ideology coursework on subjects such as Marxism, Maoism, and Deng Xiaoping thought.  In July the Ministry of Education announced its intention to strengthen party leadership at all levels of private education, including K-12.
Multiple media reports cited a tightening of ideological controls on university campuses, with professors dismissed for expressing views not in line with party thought.  In August an economics professor at Guizhou University was expelled from his university after posting online an article critical of the party.  In September Xiamen University dismissed an assistant history professor for comments online that the university said “harmed the image of the party and the country.”  Similar controls were applied to students.  For example, a program in Chongqing required high school students to pass a review of their political ideology in order to take the national university entrance examination.
In June both foreign and domestic media reported a growing incidence of university professors being suspended or fired after their students reported them for comments deemed politically sensitive or inappropriate.  In some cases the university assigned the students to act as informants.
In November media outlets reported crackdowns against student labor activists on Peking University and Renmin University campuses.  Students and several recent graduates were detained and held incommunicado, one of whom was kidnapped from Peking University’s campus.  Students on the scene were beaten, forced to the ground, and prevented from taking photographs or speaking by security forces.  Renmin University officials allegedly harassed, threatened, employed surveillance against, and hindered the free movement of student activists (see section 7.a.).
In August the Financial Times reported foreign universities establishing joint venture universities in the country must establish internal CCP committees, granting greater decision-making power to CCP officials and reversing an earlier promise to guarantee academic freedom.  In July the Financial Times reported a foreign academic was removed from the management board of the first joint venture university in the country for being critical of CCP-backed initiatives.
Authorities on some occasions blocked entry into the country of individuals deemed politically sensitive and, in some cases, refused to issue passports to citizens selected for international exchange programs who were considered “politically unreliable,” singling out Tibetans, Uighurs, and individuals from other minority areas.  A number of other foreign government-sponsored exchange selectees who already had passports, including some academics, encountered difficulties gaining approval to travel to participate in their programs.  Academics reported having to request permission to travel overseas and, in some cases, said they were limited in the number of foreign trips they could take per year.
The CCP’s reach increasingly extended beyond the country’s physical borders.  A survey of more than 500 China scholars outside the PRC found 9 percent of scholars reported having been “taken for tea” by Chinese government authorities in the past 10 years to be interviewed or warned about their research; 26 percent of scholars who conducted archival research reported being denied access; and 5 percent reported difficulties obtaining a visa.  According to the survey, 68 percent of foreign scholars said self-censorship was a problem in the field of China studies.
The CCP actively promoted censorship of Chinese students outside the country, with media reporting examples of self-censorship and the use of financial incentives to tamp down anti-Chinese speech on foreign campuses.
Academics and intellectuals in Xinjiang, along with the hundreds of thousands of other Xinjiang residents, disappeared or died, most likely in internment camps.  Some officials and academics were charged with being “two-faced,” a euphemism referring to members of minority groups serving state and party occupations who harbor “separatist” or “antiofficial” tendencies, including disagreeing with official restrictions on minority culture, language, and religion.  Those disappeared and believed to be held in the camps included Rahile Dawut, an internationally known folklorist; Abdukerim Rahman, literature professor; Azat Sultan, Xinjiang University professor; Gheyretjan Osman, literature professor; Arslan Abdulla, language professor; Abdulqadir Jalaleddin, poet; and Yalqun Rozi, writer.  Authorities detained former director of the Xinjiang Education Supervision Bureau Satar Sawut and removed Kashgar University president Erkin Omer and vice president Muhter Abdughopur; all were disappeared at year’s end.  Courts delivered suspended death sentences for “separatism” to Halmurat Ghopur, former president of Xinjiang Medical University Hospital, and Tashpolat Tiyip, former president of Xinjiang University.  Religious scholars Muhammad Salih Hajim and Abdulnehed Mehsum died in the camps, according to reports from international organizations during the year.
 
 
The government restricted freedoms of peaceful assembly and association.
 
 
While the constitution provides for freedom of peaceful assembly, the government severely restricted this right.  The law stipulates such activities may not challenge “party leadership” or infringe upon the “interests of the state.”  Protests against the political system or national leaders were prohibited.  Authorities denied permits and quickly suppressed demonstrations involving expression of dissenting political views.
Citizens throughout the country continued to gather publicly to protest evictions, forced relocations, and inadequate compensation, often resulting in conflict with authorities or formal charges.  Media reported thousands of protests took place during the year across the country.  Although peaceful protests are legal, public security officials rarely granted permits to demonstrate.  Despite restrictions, many demonstrations occurred, but authorities quickly broke up those motivated by broad political or social grievances, sometimes with excessive force.
On March 20-30, more than one thousand residents from Longyan’s Changting County in Fujian province protested outside the local government office against the government’s plan to construct a garbage incinerator one kilometer (0.6 mile) from the town’s residential areas.  On March 30, local authorities called in riot police to restore order.  Later that day government officials announced they were canceling the planned incinerator project.
Concerts, sports events, exercise classes, or other meetings of more than 200 persons require approval from public security authorities.  Large numbers of public gatherings in Beijing and elsewhere were canceled at the last minute or denied government permits, ostensibly to ensure public safety.
 
 
The constitution provides for freedom of association, but the government restricted this right.  CCP policy and government regulations require all professional, social, and economic organizations officially register with and receive approval from the government.  These regulations prevented the formation of autonomous political, human rights, religious, spiritual, labor, and other organizations that the government believed might challenge its authority in any area.  The government maintained tight controls over civil society organizations and in some cases detained or harassed NGO workers.
The regulatory system for NGOs was highly restrictive, but specific requirements varied depending on whether an organization was foreign or domestic.  Domestic NGOs were governed by the Charity Law and a host of related regulations.  Domestic NGOs could register in one of three categories:  a social group, a social organization, or a foundation.  All domestic NGOs are required to register under the Ministry of Civil Affairs and find an officially sanctioned sponsor to serve as their “professional supervisory unit.”  Finding a sponsor was often challenging, since the sponsor could be held civilly or criminally responsible for the NGO’s activities.  All organizations are also required to report their sources of funding, including foreign funding.  Domestic NGOs continued to adjust to this new regulatory framework.
In 2016 the CCP Central Committee issued a directive mandating the establishment of CCP cells within all domestic NGOs by 2020.  According to authorities, these CCP organizations operating inside domestic NGOs would “strengthen guidance” of NGOs in areas such as “decision making for important projects, important professional activities, major expenditures and funds, acceptance of large donations, and activities involving foreigners.”  The directive also mandates authorities conduct annual “spot checks” to ensure compliance on “ideological political work, party building, financial and personnel management, study sessions, foreign exchange, acceptance of foreign donations and assistance, and conducting activities according to their charter.”
In January 2017 the Law on the Management of Foreign NGOs’ Activities in Mainland China (Foreign NGO Management Law) came into effect.  The law requires foreign NGOs to register with the Ministry of Public Security and to find a state-sanctioned sponsor for their operations.  NGOs that fail to comply face possible civil or criminal penalties.  The law provides no appeal process for NGOs denied registration, and it stipulates NGOs found to have violated certain provisions could be banned from operating in the country.  The law also states domestic groups cooperating with unregistered foreign NGOs will be punished and possibly banned.
Some international NGOs reported it was more difficult to work with local partners, including universities, government agencies, and other domestic NGOs, as the law codified the CCP’s perception that foreign NGOs were a “national security” threat.  Finding an official sponsor was difficult for most foreign NGOs, as sponsors could be held responsible for the NGOs’ conduct and had to undertake burdensome reporting requirements.  After the Ministry of Public Security published a list of sponsors, NGOs reported most government agencies still had no unit responsible for sponsoring foreign NGOs.  Professional Supervisory Units reported they had little understanding of how to implement the law and what authorities would expect of them.  The vague definition of an NGO, as well as of what activities constituted “political” and therefore illegal activities, left many business organizations and alumni associations uncertain whether they fell within the purview of the law.  The lack of clear communication from the government, coupled with harassment by security authorities, caused some foreign NGOs to suspend or cease operations in the country.  As of December 31, approximately 439 of the officially estimated 7,000 previously operational foreign NGOs had registered under the Foreign NGO Management Law, with most focusing on trade and commerce activities.
According to the Ministry of Civil Affairs, by the end of 2017, there were more than 800,000 registered social organizations, public institutions, and foundations.  Many experts believed the actual number of domestic NGOs to be much higher.  Domestic NGOs reported foreign funding continued to drop, as many domestic NGOs sought to avoid such funding due to fear of being labeled as “subversive” in the face of growing restrictions imposed by new laws.  NGOs existed under a variety of formal and informal guises, including national mass organizations created and funded by the CCP that are organizationally prohibited from exercising any independence, known as government-operated NGOs or GONGOs.
For donations to a domestic organization from a foreign NGO, the Foreign NGO Management Law requires foreign NGOs to maintain a representative office in the country to send funds or to use the bank account of a domestic NGO when conducting temporary activities.  By law foreign NGOs are prohibited from using any other method to send and receive funds, and such funding must be reported to the Ministry of Public Security.  Foreign NGOs are prohibited from fundraising and “for-profit activities” under the law.
Although all registered organizations came under some degree of government control, some NGOs, primarily service-oriented GONGOs, were able to operate with less day-to-day scrutiny.  Authorities supported the growth of some NGOs that focused on social problems, such as poverty alleviation and disaster relief.  Law and regulations explicitly prohibit organizations from conducting political or religious activities, and organizations that refused to comply faced criminal penalties.
Authorities continued to restrict and evict local NGOs that received foreign funding and international NGOs that provided assistance to Tibetan communities in the TAR and other Tibetan areas.  Almost all were forced to curtail their activities altogether due to travel restrictions, official intimidation of staff members, and the failure of local partners to renew project agreements.
 
 
See the Department of State’s International Religious Freedom Report at www.state.gov/religiousfreedomreport/.
 
 
The law provides for freedom of internal movement, foreign travel, emigration, and repatriation, but the government at times did not respect these rights.
While seriously restricting its scope of operations, the government occasionally cooperated with the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), which maintained an office in Beijing.
The government increasingly silenced activists by denying them permission to travel, both internationally and domestically, or keeping them under unofficial house arrest.
In some instances the government pressured other countries to return asylum seekers or UNHCR-recognized refugees forcibly.  On July 13, Radio Free Asia reported a Chongqing court had secretly sentenced human rights activists Jiang Yefei and Dong Guangping in July 2017 for “inciting subversion of state power” and “illegally crossing a national border.”  Jiang and Dong had fled to Thailand with their families and received refugee status from UNHCR, but Thailand then forcibly returned them from Bangkok in 2015.  During their televised “confessions,” Jiang and Dong appeared to have sustained torture while in detention.  The families received no notification from authorities concerning the trial.  According to contacts, authorities denied Dong’s former lawyer permission to meet with his client when he visited the Chongqing Number 2 Detention Center in July 2017.
Abuse of Migrants, Refugees, and Stateless Persons:  There were reports North Korean agents operated clandestinely within the country to repatriate North Korean citizens against their will.  In addition, North Koreans detained by government authorities faced repatriation unless they could pay bribes to secure their release.  North Korean refugees were either detained in holding facilities or placed under house arrest at undisclosed locations.  Family members wanting to prevent forced returns of their North Korean relatives were required to pay fees to Chinese authorities purportedly to cover expenses incurred while in detention.  While detained North Koreans were occasionally released, they were rarely given the necessary permissions for safe passage to a third country.
In-country Movement:  Authorities continued to maintain tight restrictions on freedom of movement, particularly to curtail the movement of individuals deemed politically sensitive before key anniversaries, visits by foreign dignitaries, or major political events, as well as to forestall demonstrations.  Freedom of movement for Tibetans continued to be very limited in the TAR and other Tibetan areas (see Tibet Addendum).  Uighurs faced new restrictions on movement within Xinjiang and outside the region, as well.  Although the use of “domestic passports” that called for local official approval before traveling to another area was discontinued in 2016, identification checks remained in place when entering or leaving cities and on public roads.  In Xinjiang security officials set up checkpoints managing entry into public places, including markets and mosques, that required Uighurs to scan their national identity card, undergo a facial recognition check, and put any baggage through airport-style security screening.  Such restrictions were not applied to Han Chinese in these areas.  On September 26, the Urumqi Evening News announced Xinjiang railway administrative departments would stop selling tickets on all passenger services leaving Xinjiang starting on October 22.  This occurred around the time reports surfaced about authorities criminally sentencing Uighurs and other Turkic Muslims en masse of groups of 200-500 persons from the internment camps to prisons in other parts of the country, such as Heilongjiang Province.
Although the government maintained restrictions on the freedom to change one’s workplace or residence, the national household registration system (hukou) continued to change, and the ability of most citizens to move within the country to work and live continued to expand.  While many rural residents migrated to the cities, where the per capita disposable income was approximately three times the rural per capita income, they often could not change their official residence or workplace within the country.  Most cities had annual quotas for the number of new temporary residence permits they could issue, and all workers, including university graduates, had to compete for a limited number of such permits.  It was particularly difficult for rural residents to obtain household registration in more economically developed urban areas.
The household registration system added to the difficulties faced by rural residents, even after they relocated to urban areas and found employment.  According to the Statistical Communique of the People’s Republic of China on 2017 National Economic and Social Development published in February by the National Bureau of Statistics of China, 291 million persons lived outside the jurisdiction of their household registration.  Migrant workers and their families faced numerous obstacles with regard to working conditions and labor rights.  Many were unable to access public services, such as public education for their children or social insurance, in the cities where they lived and worked because they were not legally registered urban residents.
From April to June, non-Beijing residents could apply for a Beijing hukou under the special municipality’s new points-based system.  Under the new policy, nonnatives of the city under the legal retirement age who have held a Beijing temporary residence permit with the city’s social insurance records for seven consecutive years and were without a criminal record were eligible to accumulate points for the hukou.  Those with “good employment, stable homes in Beijing, strong educational background, and achievements in innovation and establishing start-ups in Beijing” were reportedly likely to obtain high scores in the point-based competition.  The city was to announce the new hukou winners in the fourth quarter of the year.
Under the “staying at prison employment” system applicable to recidivists incarcerated in administrative detention, authorities denied certain persons permission to return to their homes after serving their sentences.  Some released or paroled prisoners returned home but did not have freedom of movement.
Foreign Travel:  The government permitted legal emigration and foreign travel for most citizens.  Government employees and retirees, especially from the military, continued to face foreign travel restrictions.  The government expanded the use of exit controls for departing passengers at airports and other border crossings to deny foreign travel to some dissidents and persons employed in government posts.  Throughout the year many lawyers, artists, authors, and other activists were at times prevented from exiting the country.  Authorities also blocked the travel of some family members of rights activists and of suspected corrupt officials and businesspersons, including foreign family members.
Border officials and police cited threats to “national security” as the reason for refusing permission to leave the country.  Authorities stopped most such persons at the airport at the time of their attempted travel.
Most citizens could obtain passports, although individuals the government deemed potential political threats, including religious leaders, political dissidents, petitioners, and ethnic minorities, routinely reported being refused passports or otherwise prevented from traveling overseas.
Uighurs, particularly those residing in Xinjiang, reported great difficulty in getting passport applications approved at the local level.  They were frequently denied passports to travel abroad, particularly to Saudi Arabia for the Hajj, to other Muslim countries, or to Western countries for academic purposes.  Since 2016 authorities ordered Xinjiang residents to turn in their passports or told residents no new passports were available.  The passport recall, however, was not limited to Uighur areas.  Foreign national family members of Uighur activists living overseas were also denied visas to enter the country.  During the year the government continued its concerted efforts to compel Uighurs studying abroad to return to China, often pressuring relatives in Xinjiang to ask their overseas relatives to return.  Authorities also refused to renew passports for Uighurs living abroad, leading them to either go home or pursue ways to maintain legal status in those countries.  Upon return, many of these Uighurs, or persons connected with the Xinjiang residents, were detained or disappeared.
Tibetans faced significant hurdles in acquiring passports, and for Buddhist monks and nuns, it was virtually impossible.  Authorities’ unwillingness to issue or even renew old passports for Tibetans created, in effect, a ban on foreign travel for the Tibetan population.  Han Chinese residents of Tibetan areas did not experience the same difficulties.
The government continued to try to prevent many Tibetans and Uighurs from leaving the country and detained many while they attempted to leave (see Tibet Annex).  Some family members of rights activists who tried to emigrate were unable to do so.
Exile:  The law neither provides for a citizen’s right to repatriate nor addresses exile.  The government continued to refuse re-entry to numerous citizens considered dissidents, Falun Gong activists, or “troublemakers.”  Although authorities allowed some dissidents living abroad to return, dissidents released on medical parole and allowed to leave the country often were effectively exiled.
 
Refoulement:  The government forcibly returned vulnerable asylum seekers, especially North Korean asylum seekers.  The government continued to consider North Koreans as “illegal economic migrants” rather than refugees or asylum seekers and forcibly returned many of them to North Korea.
Human rights groups reported a relatively large number of North Korean asylum seekers being held in detention in Liaoning Province and Jilin Province who were in danger of imminent refoulement.
Access to Asylum:  The law does not provide for the granting of refugee or asylee status.  The government did not have a system for providing protection to refugees but generally recognized UNHCR-registered refugees and asylum seekers.  The government did not officially recognize these individuals as refugees; they remained in the country as illegal immigrants unable to work, with no access to education, and subject to deportation at any time.
North Korean refugees and asylum seekers, particularly young women living on the margins of Chinese society, were vulnerable to trafficking and forced marriages as a result of their unrecognized status.  Authorities continued to repatriate North Korean refugees and asylum seekers forcibly, including trafficking victims, generally treating them as illegal economic migrants.  The government detained and deported them to North Korea, where they faced severe punishment or death, including in North Korean forced-labor camps.  The government did not provide North Korean trafficking victims with legal alternatives to repatriation.
Numerous NGOs reported the government continued to deny UNHCR access to North Korean refugees and asylum seekers.  Authorities sometimes detained and prosecuted citizens who assisted North Korean refugees, as well as those who facilitated illegal border crossings.
Access to Basic Services:  North Korean asylum seekers in the country seeking economic opportunities generally did not have access to health care, public education, or other social services due to lack of legal status.
Durable Solutions:  The government largely cooperated with UNHCR when dealing with the local settlement in China of Han Chinese or ethnic minorities from Vietnam and Laos living in the country since the Vietnam War era.  The government and UNHCR continued discussions concerning the granting of citizenship to these long-term residents and their children, many of whom were born in China.
Stateless Persons:  International media reported as many as 30,000 children born to North Korean women in China, most of whom were married to Chinese spouses, had not been registered because their North Korean parent was undocumented, leaving the children de facto stateless.  These children were denied access to public services, including education and health care, despite provisions in the law that provide citizenship to children with at least one PRC citizen parent.
 
 
The constitution states “all power in the People’s Republic of China belongs to the people” and the organs through which citizens exercise state power are the NPC and the people’s congresses at provincial, district, and local levels.  In practice the CCP dictated the legislative agenda to the NPC.  While the law provides for elections of people’s congress delegates at the county level and below, citizens could not freely choose the officials who governed them.  The CCP controlled all elections and continued to control appointments to positions of political power.  The CCP used various intimidation tactics, including house arrest, to block independent candidates from standing for local elections.
In March the National People’s Congress removed the two-term limit for the positions of president and vice president, clearing the way for Xi Jinping to remain in office.
 
 
Recent Elections:  On March 4, the NPC’s 2,980 delegates elected the president and vice president, the premier and vice premiers, and the chairman of the Central Military Commission.  The NPC Standing Committee, which consisted of 175 members, oversaw the elections and determined the agenda and procedures for the NPC.  The selection of NPC members takes place every five years, and the process is controlled by the CCP.
The NPC Standing Committee remained under the direct authority of the CCP, and all important legislative decisions required the concurrence of the CCP’s seven-member Politburo Standing Committee.  Despite its broad authority under the state constitution, the NPC did not set policy independently or remove political leaders without the CCP’s approval.
According to Ministry of Civil Affairs’ 2016 statistics, almost all of the country’s more than 600,000 villages had implemented direct elections for members of local subgovernmental organizations known as village committees.  The direct election of officials by ordinary citizens remained narrow in scope and strictly confined to the lowest rungs of local governance.  Corruption, vote buying, and interference by township-level and CCP officials continued to be problems.  The law permits each voter to cast proxy votes for up to three other voters.
The election law governs legislative bodies at all levels, although compliance and enforcement varied across the country.  Under the law citizens have the opportunity every five years to vote for local people’s congress representatives at the county level and below, although in most cases higher-level government officials or CCP cadres controlled the nomination of candidates.  At higher levels legislators selected people’s congress delegates from among their ranks.  For example, provincial-level people’s congresses selected delegates to the NPC.  Local CCP secretaries generally served concurrently within the leadership team of the local people’s congress, thus strengthening CCP control over legislatures.
Political Parties and Political Participation:  Official statements asserted “the political party system [that] China has adopted is multiparty cooperation and political consultation” under CCP leadership.  The CCP, however, retained a monopoly on political power, and the government forbade the creation of new political parties.  The government officially recognized nine parties founded prior to 1949, and parties other than the CCP held 30 percent of the seats in the NPC.  These non-CCP members did not function as a political opposition.  They exercised very little influence on legislation or policymaking and were allowed to operate only under the direction of the CCP United Front Work Department.
No laws or regulations specifically govern the formation of political parties.  The China Democracy Party (CDP) remained banned, and the government continued to monitor, detain, and imprison current and former CDP members.  CDP founder Qin Yongmin, detained with his wife Zhao Suli in 2015, remained at the Wuhan Number 2 Detention Center awaiting trial for “subversion of state power.”
Participation of Women and Minorities:  No laws limit participation of women or members of minorities in the political process, and they did participate.  Women and members of minority groups held few positions of significant influence in the government or CCP structure.  Among the 2,987 appointed delegates to the 13th NPC in the year, 742 (25 percent) were women.  Following the 19th Party Congress, one member of the CCP Central Committee’s 25-member Politburo was a woman.  There were no women in the Politburo Standing Committee.
The election law provides a general mandate for quotas for female and ethnic minority representatives, but achieving these quotas often required election authorities to violate the election law.
A total of 438 delegates from 55 ethnic minorities were members of the 13th NPC, accounting for 16 percent of the total number of delegates.  All of the country’s officially recognized minority groups were represented.  The 19th Party Congress elected 15 members of ethnic minority groups as members of the 202-person Central Committee.  There was no ethnic minority member of the Politburo, and only one ethnic minority was serving as a party secretary of a provincial-level jurisdiction, although a handful of ethnic minority members were serving as leaders in provincial governments.  An ethnic Mongolian woman, Bu Xiaolin, served as chair of the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region, equivalent to a provincial governor.  An ethnic Hui woman, Xian Hui, also served as chair of the Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region.
 
 
Although officials faced criminal penalties for corruption, the government and the CCP did not implement the law consistently or transparently.  Corruption remained rampant, and many cases of corruption involved areas heavily regulated by the government, such as land-usage rights, real estate, mining, and infrastructure development, which were susceptible to fraud, bribery, and kickbacks.  Court judgments often could not be enforced against powerful special entities, including government departments, state-owned enterprises, military personnel, and some members of the CCP.
Transparency International’s analysis indicated corruption remained a significant problem in the country.  There were numerous reports of government corruption–and subsequent trials and sentences–during the year.
On March 20, the NPC adopted the National Supervision Law, which codifies the joint National Supervisory Commission-Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (NSC-CCDI).  The NSC-CCDI is charged with rooting out corruption.  NSC-CCDI investigations can target any public official, including police, judges, and prosecutors, and can investigate and detain individuals connected to targeted public officials.  The creation of the NSC essentially vested the CCDI, the CCP’s internal discipline investigation unit that sits outside of the judicial system, with powers of the state.  Rules governing NSC-CCDI investigations, operations, and detentions remained unclear.
Formerly, the CCDI, a party (not state) organ, relied on an informal detention system–known as shuanggui–to hold party members suspected of party rule violations while a discipline investigation was underway.  NSC-CCDI detention, known as liuzhi, faced allegations of detainee abuse and torture.  Liuzhi detainees are held incommunicado and have no recourse to appeal their detention.  While detainee abuse is proscribed by the National Supervision Law, the mechanism for detainees to report abuse is unclear.  According to the compensation law, however, suspects wrongly accused of corruption can receive compensation for time spent in liuzhi.
Although liuzhi operates outside the judicial system, confessions given while in liuzhi have been used as evidence in judicial proceedings.  According to press reports and an NGO report released in August, liuzhi retained many characteristics of shuanggui, such as extended solitary confinement, sleep deprivation, beatings, and forced standing or sitting in uncomfortable positions for hours and sometimes days.
The first reported death inside a liuzhi detention facility occurred several weeks after the enactment of the National Supervision Law.  On April 9, the Fujian provincial NSC-CCDI took Chen Yong, a former government driver in Jianyang District, into liuzhi so authorities could gather information into Lin Qiang, a vice director of the district, who was suspected of corruption.  On May 5, NSC-CCDI officials notified Chen’s family he was in detention and when they arrived, they found him deceased in a morgue refrigerator.  His sister told Caixin Media his face was “disfigured” and his chest was caved in with black and blue bruises on his waist.  Officials stopped her from examining his lower body.
Corruption:  In numerous cases, government prosecutors investigated public officials and leaders of state-owned enterprises, who generally held high CCP ranks, for corruption.
While the tightly controlled state media apparatus publicized some notable corruption investigations, as a general matter, very few details were made public regarding the process by which CCP and government officials were investigated for corruption.  In September Meng Hongwei, serving as the country’s first Interpol president in Lyon, France, while retaining his position as a Chinese Ministry of Public Security vice minister, disappeared after arriving in China on a September 25 flight.  Media outlets reported Meng was taken into custody by “discipline authorities” upon his arrival into China for suspected corruption.  The government announced Meng was being monitored while the NSC-CCDI investigated him and his associates for allegedly taking bribes, and at year’s end the case remained unresolved.
In August anticorruption bodies punished 31 officials in Langfang, Hebei, following the high-profile suicide of Zhang Yi, president of the Langfang Chengnan Orthopedic Hospital.  In his suicide note, Zhang alleged Yang Yuzhong, a former deputy at the Anci District People’s Congress, had engaged in corrupt practices and had interfered in the hospital’s management and misappropriated hospital funds.  Hebei investigative authorities revealed government and CCP officials shielded Yang Yuzhong and his criminal organization that used intentional injury, forced transactions, violent demolition, and forged seals for illegal interests.  Among the officials punished were a former chairman of the Anci District Committee of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference, a current police station chief, village party secretaries, and the deputy head of the district’s construction bureau.  The investigation was part of a central government campaign against criminal organizations and officials who protect them.  From February to year’s end, 427 persons throughout Hebei had been investigated in connection with this campaign.
Financial Disclosure:  A regulation requires officials in government agencies or state-owned enterprises at the county level or above to report their ownership of property, including that in their spouses’ or children’s names, as well as their families’ investments in financial assets and enterprises.  The regulations do not require declarations be made public.  Instead, they are submitted to a higher administrative level and a human resource department.  Punishments for not declaring information vary from training on the regulations, warning talks, and adjusting one’s work position to being relieved of one’s position.  Regulations further state officials should report all income, including allowances, subsidies, and bonuses, as well as income from other jobs, such as giving lectures, writing, consulting, reviewing articles, painting, and calligraphy.  Officials, their spouses, and the children who live with them also are required to report their real estate properties and financial investments, although these reports are not made public.  They are required to report whether their children live abroad as well as the work status of their children and grandchildren (including those who live abroad).  Officials are required to file reports annually and are required to report changes of personal status within 30 days.
 
 
The government sought to maintain control over civil society groups, halt the emergence of independent NGOs, and hinder activities of civil society and human rights groups.  The government frequently harassed independent domestic NGOs and in many cases did not permit them to openly monitor or comment on human rights conditions.  The government made statements expressing suspicion of independent organizations and closely scrutinized NGOs with financial and other links overseas.  The government took significant steps during the year to bring all domestic NGOs under its direct regulatory control, thereby curtailing the space for independent NGOs to exist.  Most large NGOs were quasigovernmental, and government agencies had to sponsor all official NGOs.
The United Nations or Other International Bodies:  The government remained reluctant to accept criticism of its human rights record by other nations or international organizations.  The government sharply limited the visits of UN experts to the country and rarely provided substantive answers to queries by UN human rights bodies.  A dozen requests for visits to the country by UN experts remained outstanding.
The government used its membership on the UN Economic and Social Council’s Committee on NGOs to block groups critical of China from obtaining UN accreditation and barring accredited activists from participating in UN events.  The government also retaliated against human rights groups working with the United Nations, eliciting the criticism of UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres.  In May the government requested the UN NGO Committee remove the accreditation of the German NGO the Society for Threatened Peoples after it assisted Dolkun Isa, the president of the World Uyghur Congress, in attending the UN Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues.
Government Human Rights Bodies:  The government maintained each country’s economic, social, cultural, and historical conditions determined its approach to human rights.  The government claimed its treatment of suspects, considered to be victims of human rights abuses by the international community, was in accordance with national law.  The government did not have a human rights ombudsman or commission.
 
 
 
Rape and Domestic Violence:  Rape of women is illegal and carries a sentence of three years in prison to death.  The law does not safeguard same-sex couples or victims of marital rape.  The separate law on sexual assault includes male victims, but it has a maximum penalty of five years in prison.  Of the reported cases, most allegations of rape were closed through private settlement rather than prosecution.  Some persons convicted of rape were executed.
Domestic violence remained a significant problem.  Some scholars said victims were encouraged to attempt to resolve domestic violence through mediation.  Societal sentiment that domestic violence was a personal, private matter contributed to underreporting and inaction by authorities when women faced violence at home.  The Family Violence Law defines domestic violence as a civil, rather than a criminal, offense.  Web publication Sixth Tone reported 25 percent of families had experienced domestic violence.
The government supported shelters for victims of domestic violence, and some courts provided protections to victims, including through court protective orders prohibiting a perpetrator of domestic violence from coming near a victim.  Nonetheless, official assistance did not always reach victims, and public security forces often ignored domestic violence.  Legal aid institutions working to provide counseling and defense to victims of domestic violence were often pressured to suspend public activities and cease all forms of policy advocacy, an area that was reserved only for government-sponsored organizations.
According to women’s rights activists, a recurring problem in the prosecution of domestic violence cases was a failure by authorities to collect evidence–including photographs, hospital records, police records, or children’s testimony.  Witnesses seldom testified in court.
On March 18, the Guangzhou Municipal Women’s Association, the Guangzhou Bar Association, and the Yuexiu District Court hosted a public roadshow aimed at raising awareness about domestic violence on the second anniversary of the Anti-Domestic Violence Law.  Legal advisors from the Bar Association and the court provided free consultations at the event and noted keeping key evidence, such as hospital records or communication history, is crucial in legal proceedings.
Courts’ recognition of domestic violence improved, making spousal abuse a mitigating factor in crimes committed in self-defense.
Sexual Harassment:  The law prohibits sexual harassment against women; however, there is no clear definition of sexual harassment under the law.  Offenders are subject to a penalty of up to 15 days in detention, according to the Beijing Public Security Bureau.  It remained difficult for victims to file a sexual harassment complaint and for judges to reach a ruling on such cases.  Many women remained unwilling to report incidents of sexual harassment, believing the justice system was ineffectual, according to official media.  Several prominent media reports of sexual harassment went viral on social media, helping to raise awareness of the problem, particularly in the workplace.
On June 20 in Qingyang, Gansu Province, a 19-year-old woman surnamed Li jumped to her death after allegedly suffering sexual harassment by her teacher, surnamed Wu.  According to Li’s father, the Qingyang People’s Court May 18 decision to dismiss her sexual harassment case against Wu triggered her suicide.  On June 25, the local bureau of education announced it had administratively punished Wu by giving him 10 days of detention.  Li’s father reportedly refused an offer from the school of 350,000 yuan ($53,200) in exchange for dropping the case, instead demanding a public apology from the school and for Wu to be held accountable.  Wu was later terminated from his post and barred from teaching.
Although many women experienced workplace sexual harassment, very few reported it.  Human Rights Watch cited one statistic showing nearly 40 percent of women said they experienced sexual harassment in the workplace.  A Guangzhou journalist found among 400 journalists she polled, more than 80 percent said they had suffered workplace sexual harassment.
The Law on the Protection of Women’s Rights and Interests empowers victims to file a sexual harassment complaint with their employer, authorities, or both.  Employers who failed to take effective measures to prevent sexual harassment could be fined.  On July 1, Jiangsu Province enacted new legislation that details specific measures employers must take to protect employees against sexual harassment in the workplace.  Under the new law, employers are required to establish internal regulations against harassment, provide training to employees to prevent harassment, create a complaint channel for employees who allege harassment, and address the complaints in a timely manner.  Observers noted the law did not specify a timeline for compliance, nor did it spell out penalties for noncompliance.
Some women’s NGOs that sought to increase public awareness of sexual harassment reported harassment by public security and faced challenges executing their programs.
On July 25, a former female intern said, after she reported to police that prominent television host Zhu Jun had forcibly kissed and groped her, police forced her to withdraw the complaint.  The police claimed Zhu, as host of the annual Spring Festive gala on state media, had “enormous ‘positive influence’ on society.”  Zhu then demanded the woman and her friend who shared the case online apologize online and in a national newspaper, pay compensation of 655,000 yuan ($95,260), and cover the costs of legal fees for the case.  In response the former intern’s friend applied to file her own civil suit against Zhu for “infringement of personality rights.”
In August an investigation concluded Xuecheng, abbot of the well-known Longquan Temple on the outskirts of Beijing, had sexually harassed female disciples via text messages, according to a statement posted on the website of the National Religious Affairs Administration.  One of the country’s best-known monks and authors, Xuecheng was an influential political adviser to the central government while heading the national Buddhist association.
Coercion in Population Control:  There were reports of coerced abortions and sterilizations, although government statistics on the percentage of abortions that were coerced during the year was not available.  The CCP restricts the rights of parents to choose the number of children they have and utilizes family planning units from the provincial to the village level to enforce population limits and distributions.  The Population and Family Planning Law permits married couples to have two children and allows couples to apply for permission to have a third child if they meet conditions stipulated in local and provincial regulations.  State media claimed the number of coerced abortions had declined in recent years in the wake of loosened regulations, including the implementation of the two-child policy.  Nevertheless, citizens were subject to hefty fines for violating the law, while couples who had only one child received a certificate entitling them to collect a monthly incentive payment and other benefits that vary by province–from approximately six to 12 yuan (one to two dollars) per month up to 3,000 yuan ($450) for farmers and herders in poor areas.  Couples in some provinces were required to seek approval and register before a child was conceived.
According to international press reports, an ethnic Kazakh reported the government forced her and others in Xinjiang to abort their third child.  She said in December 2017 police entered her home, forced her to undergo a medical check, and determined she was six weeks’ pregnant.  The next day those authorities ordered her to get an abortion.  Although initially refusing, she consented when they threatened to send her brother to an internment camp, which authorities did anyway after the abortion was completed.  Her husband demanded compensation for their lost child.
Under the law and in practice, there are financial and administrative penalties for births that exceed birth limits or otherwise violate regulations.  The law, as implemented, requires each woman with an unauthorized pregnancy to abort or pay the social compensation fee, which can reach 10 times a person’s annual disposable income.  The exact amount of the fee varied widely from province to province.  Those with financial means often paid the fee so that their children born in violation of the birth restrictions would have access to a wide array of government-provided social services and rights.  Some parents avoided the fee by hiding children born in violation of the law with friends or relatives.  In localities with large populations of migrant workers, officials specifically targeted migrant women to ensure they did not exceed birth limitations.  Minorities in some provinces, however, were entitled to higher limits on their family size.
 
The law maintains “citizens have an obligation to practice birth planning in accordance with the law” and also states “couples of child-bearing age shall voluntarily choose birth planning contraceptive and birth control measures to prevent and reduce unwanted pregnancies.”
Since the national family planning law mentions only the rights of married couples, local implementation was inconsistent, and unmarried persons must pay for contraception.  Although under both the Civil Law and Marriage Law the children of single women are entitled to the same rights as those born to married parents, in practice children born to single mothers or unmarried couples are considered “outside of the policy” and subject to the social compensation fee and the denial of legal documents, such as birth documents and the hukou residence permit.  Single women could avoid those penalties by marrying within 60 days of the baby’s birth.
As in prior years, population control policy continued to rely on social pressure, education, propaganda, and economic penalties, as well as on measures such as mandatory pregnancy examinations and, less frequently, coerced abortions and sterilizations.  Officials at all levels could receive rewards or penalties based on whether or not they met the population targets set by their administrative region.  With the higher birth limit, and since most persons wanted to have no more than two children, it was easier to achieve population targets, and the pressure on local officials was considerably less than before.  Those found to have a pregnancy in violation of the law or those who helped another to evade state controls could face punitive measures, such as onerous fines or job loss.
Regulations requiring women who violate the family planning policy to terminate their pregnancies still exist and were enforced in some provinces, such as Hubei, Hunan, and Liaoning.  Other provinces, such as Guizhou and Yunnan, maintained provisions that require “remedial measures,” an official euphemism for abortion, to deal with pregnancies that violate the policy.
Although many local governments encouraged couples to have a second child, families with three or more children still must pay a “social compensation fee.”  In Fuzhou City, Fujian Province, one local district added the names of those who refused to pay social compensation fees to a “personal credit black list.”  This listing affects one’s ability to request loans, take public transportation, purchase items, educating their children, and joining tours.
The law mandates family planning bureaus administer pregnancy tests to married women of childbearing age and provide them with basic knowledge of family planning and prenatal services.  Some provinces fined women who did not undergo periodic state-mandated pregnancy tests.
Family-planning officials face criminal charges and administrative sanction if they are found to violate citizens’ human or property rights, abuse their power, accept bribes, misappropriate or embezzle family planning funds, or falsely report family planning statistics in the enforcement of birth limitation policy.  Forced abortion is not specifically listed as a prohibited activity.  The law also prohibits health-care providers from providing illegal surgeries, ultrasounds to determine the sex of the fetus that are not medically necessary, sex-selective abortions, fake medical identification, and fake birth certificates.  By law, citizens could submit formal complaints about officials who exceed their authority in implementing birth-planning policy, and complaints are to be investigated and dealt with in a timely manner.
 
Discrimination:  The constitution states “women enjoy equal rights with men in all spheres of life.”  The law provides for equality in ownership of property, inheritance rights, access to education, and equal pay for equal work.  Nonetheless, women reported discrimination, unfair dismissal, demotion, and wage discrepancies were significant problems.
On average, women earned 35 percent less than men who did similar work.  This wage gap was greater in rural areas.  Women also continued to be underrepresented in leadership positions, despite their high rate of participation in the labor force.
Authorities often did not enforce laws protecting the rights of women; according to legal experts, it was difficult to litigate sex discrimination suits because of vague legal definitions.  Some observers noted the agencies tasked with protecting women’s rights tended to focus on maternity-related benefits and wrongful termination during maternity leave rather than on sex discrimination, violence against women, and sexual harassment; others pointed to the active role played by the All China Women’s Federation in passing the new domestic violence legislation.
Women’s rights advocates indicated in rural areas women often forfeited land and property rights to their husbands in divorce proceedings.  Rural contract law and laws protecting women’s rights stipulate women enjoy equal rights in cases of land management, but experts asserted this was rarely the case due to the complexity of the law and difficulties in its implementation.
In October local government officials in Tangshan, Hebei Province, informed a woman that her land rights had been conferred to her ex-husband’s hukou after their divorce.  Officials urged her to negotiate with her ex-husband to divide the land interests or petition the local court to divide up the former couple’s unsettled assets.
 
 
Birth Registration:  Citizenship is derived from parents.  Parents must register their children in compliance with the national household registration system within one month of birth.  Unregistered children could not access public services, including education.
Education:  Although the law provides for nine years of compulsory education for children, many children did not attend school for the required period in economically disadvantaged rural areas, and some never attended.  Public schools were not allowed to charge tuition, but many schools continued to charge miscellaneous fees because they received insufficient local and central government funding.  Such fees and other school-related expenses made it difficult for poorer families and some migrant workers to send their children to school.  The gap in education quality for rural and urban youth remained extensive, with many children of migrant workers attending unlicensed and poorly equipped schools.
Child Abuse:  The physical abuse of children is ground for criminal prosecution.  The Domestic Violence Law also protects children.  Sexual abuse of minors, particularly of rural children, was a significant problem.
In October video circulated online of a father allegedly molesting his five-year-old daughter on a train in southeastern China.  The video showed a man with the child on his lap, repeatedly lifting her shirt, caressing her back, and trying to kiss her several times on the mouth.  Nanchang Railway Police, Jiangxi Province, concluded the father’s actions did not constitute molestation, as it was a father-daughter relationship, and thus could not be deemed illegal.  The incident incited widespread public criticism on the Nanchang police station’s Weibo post of its statement.
 
Early and Forced Marriage:  The legal minimum age for marriage is 22 for men and 20 for women.  Child marriage was not known to be a problem.
Sexual Exploitation of Children:  The minimum legal age for consensual sex is 14.  Persons who forced girls younger than 14 into prostitution could be sentenced to 10 years to life in prison in addition to a fine or confiscation of property.  In especially serious cases, violators could receive a life sentence or death sentence, in addition to having their property confiscated.  Those who visited girls forced into prostitution younger than 14 were subject to five years or more in prison in addition to paying a fine.
Pornography of any kind, including child pornography, is illegal.  Under the criminal code, those producing, reproducing, publishing, selling, or disseminating obscene materials with the purpose of making a profit could be sentenced to up to three years in prison or put under criminal detention or surveillance in addition to paying a fine.  Offenders in serious cases could receive prison sentences of three to 10 years in addition to paying a fine.
The law provides persons broadcasting or showing obscene materials to minors younger than 18 are to be “severely punished.”
Infanticide or Infanticide of Children with Disabilities:  The law forbids infanticide; it was unknown if the practice continued.  Parents of children with disabilities frequently left infants at hospitals, primarily because of the anticipated cost of medical care.  Gender-biased abortions and the abandonment and neglect of baby girls were believed to be in decline but continued to be a problem in some circumstances, due to the traditional preference for sons and the birth-limitation policy.
Displaced Children:  The detention of an estimated 800,000 to two million or more Uighurs, ethnic Kazakhs, and other Muslims in Xinjiang left many children without caregivers.  While many of these children had other family willing to care for them, the government began placing the children of detainees in orphanages, boarding schools, or “child welfare guidance centers,” where they were forced to shout patriotic slogans, learn Mandarin Chinese, and answer questions about their parents’ religious beliefs and practices.  The total number of such children was unknown, especially as many of these facilities were also used for orphans and regular students.  Government policy aims to provide such children with state-sponsored care until they reach age 18.  Media reports showed new construction for orphanages in Xinjiang greatly escalated in 2017 and 2018 to house thousands of children of parents being held in internment camps.  In Hotan some boarding schools were topped with barbed wire.
Institutionalized Children:  In July authorities in Henan Province’s Xinmi City shuttered legally licensed orphanage Sino-American Nonprofit Cooperative Services (SANCS) House of Mercy under the Law on Foreign Involvement in Nongovernment Organizations on the grounds that foreigners were no longer allowed to be involved in the NGO space.  The orphanage, which had been operating since 1996, was run by both foreign and Chinese staff and sponsored by the Catholic Church.  At the time of closing, SANCS housed more than 50 children, only 13 of whom had been confirmed to have a new home; others previously housed at the facility once again became homeless.
International Child Abductions:  The country is not a party to the 1980 Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction.  See the Department of State’s Annual Report on International Parental Child Abduction at https://travel.state.gov/content/travel/en/International-Parental-Child-Abduction/for-providers/legal-reports-and-data.html.
 
 
The government does not recognize Judaism as an ethnicity or religion.  There were no reports of anti-Semitic acts during the year.
 
 
See the Department of State’s Trafficking in Persons Report at www.state.gov/j/tip/rls/tiprpt/.
 
 
The law protects the rights of persons with disabilities and prohibits discrimination, but in many instances conditions for such persons lagged behind legal requirements, and the government failed to provide persons with disabilities access to programs intended to assist them.
According to the law, persons with disabilities “are entitled to enjoyment of equal rights as other citizens in political, economic, cultural, and social fields, in family life, and in other aspects.”  Discrimination against, insult of, and infringement upon persons with disabilities is prohibited.  The law prohibits discrimination against minors with disabilities and codifies a variety of judicial protections for juveniles.
The Ministry of Education reported there were more than 2,000 separate education schools for children with disabilities, but NGOs reported only 2 percent of the 20 million children with disabilities had access to education that met their needs.
Individuals with disabilities faced difficulties accessing higher education.  Universities often excluded candidates with disabilities who would otherwise be qualified.  A regulation mandates accommodations for students with disabilities when taking the national university entrance exam.
Unemployment among adults with disabilities, in part due to discrimination, remained a serious problem.  The law requires local governments to offer incentives to enterprises that hire persons with disabilities.  Regulations in some parts of the country also require employers to pay into a national fund for persons with disabilities when employees with disabilities do not make up a statutory minimum percentage of the total workforce.
Standards adopted for making roads and buildings accessible to persons with disabilities are subject to the Law on the Handicapped, which calls for their “gradual” implementation; compliance was limited.
The law forbids the marriage of persons with certain mental disabilities, such as schizophrenia.  If doctors find a couple is at risk of transmitting congenital disabilities to their children, the couple may marry only if they agree to use birth control or undergo sterilization.  In some instances officials continued to require couples to abort pregnancies when doctors discovered possible disabilities during prenatal examinations.  The law stipulates local governments are to employ such practices to raise the percentage of births of children without disabilities.
 
 
Government policy called for members of recognized minorities to receive preferential treatment in birth planning, university admission, access to loans, and employment.  The substance and implementation of ethnic minority policies nonetheless remained poor, and discrimination against minorities remained widespread.  The government “sinicization” campaign resulted in ethnically based restrictions on movement, including curtailed ability of ethnic Uighurs to travel freely or obtain travel documents; greater surveillance and presence of armed police in Xinjiang; and legislative restrictions on cultural and religious practices.
According to a 2015 government census, the most recent, 9.5 million, or 40 percent, of the Xinjiang’s official residents were Han Chinese.  Uighur, Hui, ethnic Kazakh, Kyrgyz, and other ethnic minorities constituted 14.1 million Xinjiang residents, or 60 percent of the total population.  Official statistics understated the Han Chinese population because they did not count the more than 2.7 million Han residents on paramilitary compounds (bingtuan) and those who were long-term “temporary workers,” an increase of 1.2 percent over the previous year, according to a 2015 government of Xinjiang report.
The government’s policy to encourage Han Chinese migration into minority areas significantly increased the population of Han in Xinjiang.  Han Chinese officials continued to hold the majority of the most powerful CCP and many government positions in minority autonomous regions, particularly Xinjiang.  The rapid influx of Han Chinese into Xinjiang in recent decades has provoked Uighur resentment.
In 2017 the Xinjiang government also implemented new “Deradicalization Regulations,” codifying efforts to “contain and eradicate extremism,” according to Xinhua.  The broad definition of extremism resulted in the reported detention since 2017 of 800,000 to possibly more than two million Uighurs, ethnic Kazakhs, and other Muslims in “transformation through education” centers, or internment camps, designed to instill patriotism and erase their religious and ethnic identities.  This included many of those ordered to return to China from studying or working abroad.  International media reported security officials in the centers abused, tortured, and killed some detainees (see sections 1.a, 1.b, 1.c, 1.d, and 2.d.).
Officials in Xinjiang intensified efforts to crack down on the government-designated “three evil forces” of religious extremism, ethnic separatism, and violent terrorism, including by continuing the concentrated re-education campaign.  Xinjiang Communist Party Secretary Chen Quanguo, former Communist leader in the TAR, replicated in Xinjiang policies similar to those credited with reducing opposition to CCP rule in Tibet, increasing the security budget by more than 300 percent and advertising more than 90,800 security-related jobs.  Authorities cited the 2016 Xinjiang guidelines for the implementation of the national Counterterrorism Law and a “people’s war on terrorism” in its increased surveillance efforts and enhanced restrictions on movement and ethnic and religious practices.
Outside of the internment camps, the government implemented severe restrictions on expressions of minorities’ culture, language, and religious identity, including regulations prohibiting behaviors the government considered signs of “extremism” such as growing “abnormal” beards, wearing of veils in public places, and suddenly stopping smoking and drinking alcohol, among other behaviors.  The regulations banned the use of some Islamic names when naming children and set punishments for the teaching of religion to children.  Authorities conducted “household surveys” and “home stays” in which officials or volunteers forcibly lived in Uighurs’ homes and monitored families for signs of “extremism.”
In October the Xinjiang government released new implementing regulations on “de-extremification.”  Article 17 of the regulations states county-level governments “may establish occupational skills education and training centers and other such education and transformation bodies and management departments to conduct education and transformation for persons influenced by extremism.”  Some observers noted, despite this new regional law, the “re-education centers” were still illegal under the constitution.
Minority groups in border and other regions had less access to education than their Han Chinese counterparts, faced job discrimination in favor of Han Chinese migrants, and earned incomes well below those in other parts of the country.  Government development programs and job provisions disrupted traditional living patterns of minority groups and in some cases included the forced relocation of persons and the forced settlement of nomads.  Han Chinese benefited disproportionately from government programs and economic growth in minority areas.  As part of its emphasis on building a “harmonious society” and maintaining social stability, the government downplayed racism and institutional discrimination against minorities, which remained a source of deep resentment in Xinjiang, the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region, the TAR, and other Tibetan areas.
The law states “schools (classes and grades) and other institutions of education where most of the students come from minority nationalities shall, whenever possible, use textbooks in their own languages and use their languages as the medium of instruction.”  Despite provisions to ensure cultural and linguistic rights, measures requiring full instruction in Mandarin beginning in preschool and banning the use of Uighur in all educational activities and management were implemented throughout Xinjiang, according to international media.
Some security raids, arbitrary detentions, and judicial punishments appeared to target groups or individuals peacefully seeking to express their political or religious views.  Detention and punishment extended to expression on the internet and social media, including the browsing, downloading, and transmitting of banned content.  Officials continued to use the threat of violence as justification for extreme security measures directed at the local population, journalists, and visiting foreigners.  According to Xinhua, officials used surveillance and facial recognition software, biodata collection, and big data technology to create a database of Uighurs in Xinjiang for the purpose of conducting “social-instability forecasting, prevention, and containment.”  Security forces frequently staged large-scale parades involving thousands of armed police in cities across Xinjiang, according to state media.
Uighurs and other religious minorities continued to be sentenced to long prison terms and in some cases executed without due process on charges of separatism and endangering state security.  The government constructed new prisons in Xinjiang to alleviate the overcapacity of existing facilities, according to credible sources.  In 2016 and 2017, the Xinjiang regional government posted advertisements to recruit nearly 100,000 security personnel, international media reported.  Economist Ilham Tohti remained in prison, where he was serving a life sentence after his conviction on separatism-related charges in 2014.
The law criminalizes discussion of “separatism” on the internet and prohibits use of the internet in any way that undermines national unity.  It further bans inciting ethnic separatism or “harming social stability” and requires internet service providers and network operators to set up monitoring systems to detect, report, and delete religious content or to strengthen existing systems and report violations of the law.  Authorities searched cell phones at checkpoints and during random inspections of Uighur households, and persons in possession of alleged terrorist material, including pictures of general religious or cultural importance, could be arrested and charged with crimes.  International media reported security officials at police checkpoints used a surveillance application to download and view content on mobile phones.
Ethnic Kazakh Chinese were also targeted, Radio Free Asia and other international media reported.  In August Sayragul Sauytbay, an ethnic Kazakh Chinese citizen, testified in a Kazakhstan court that she was forced to work in a center where an estimated 2,500 ethnic Kazakhs were detained.  She told the court she had to undergo “political indoctrination” at the camp.  Kazakhs were also prevented from moving freely between China and neighboring Kazakhstan, and some were detained in re-education centers when returning to China.
The government pressured foreign countries to repatriate or deny visas to Uighurs who had left the country, and repatriated Uighurs faced the risk of imprisonment and mistreatment upon return.  Some Uighurs who were forcibly repatriated disappeared after arriving in China.  Family members of Uighurs studying overseas were also pressured to convince students to return to China, and returning students were detained or forced to attend re-education camps, according to overseas media.
Freedom of assembly was severely limited during the year in Xinjiang.  For information about abuse of religious freedom in Xinjiang, see the Department of State’s International Religious Freedom Report at www.state.gov/religiousfreedomreport/.
For specific information on Tibet, see the Tibet Annex.
 
 
No laws criminalize private consensual same-sex activities between adults.  Individuals and organizations working on lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and intersex (LGBTI) issues continued to report discrimination and harassment from authorities similar to that experienced by other organizations that accept funding from overseas.
LGBTI individuals reported incidents of violence, including domestic violence; however, they encountered difficulties in seeking legal redress, since regulations on domestic violence, including the Family Violence Law, do not include recognition of same-sex relations.  Accessing redress was further limited by societal discrimination and traditional norms, resulting in most LGBTI persons refraining to publicly discuss their sexual orientation or gender identity.
NGOs working on LGBTI issues reported that although public advocacy work became more difficult for them in light of the Foreign NGO Management Law and the Domestic Charity Law, they made some progress in advocating for LGBTI rights through specific antidiscrimination cases.
In November domestic and international media reported the Wuhu County Court in Anhui Province sentenced a novelist, surnamed Liu, to 10 years and six months’ imprisonment for self-publishing and selling an erotic novel that described same-sex acts.  Liu, who wrote under the alias Tianyi, published her novel Occupy in 2017 and sold 7,000 copies on the popular Taobao platform before authorities banned it.  Although the production and sale of pornography is strictly prohibited, official and social media reaction contrasted this sentence with lesser sentences given to violent offenders.  Liu filed an appeal of the ruling.
In May and June, authorities in the southwest interfered in several public LGBTI-related activities in honor of Pride Month.  In one case police interrupted a film screening.  In another case they pressured a reserved venue to cancel a panel discussion on LGBTI access to health care.
 
 
Discrimination against persons with HIV remained a problem, impacting individuals’ employment, educational, and housing opportunities and impeding access to health care.  In some instances laws protecting persons with HIV from discrimination contradict laws restricting the rights of persons with HIV.  During the year state media outlets reported instances of persons with HIV/AIDS who were barred from housing, education, or employment due to their HIV status.
On January 3, a public hospital in Haikou refused to operate on a patient it determined was HIV positive and insisted on transferring him to another hospital, citing they did not have adequate sterilization equipment for such a risky surgery.  Local NGO Red Ribbon helped the patient find another hospital.
According to the law, companies may not demand HIV antibody tests nor dismiss employees for having HIV.  On April 28, an employee in Sichuan Province was reinstated at work and received additional compensation after he reached a legal settlement with his employer, which had previously terminated his employment after he was diagnosed HIV-positive.
 
 
The law prohibits discrimination against persons carrying infectious diseases and allows such persons to work as civil servants.  Despite provisions in the law, discrimination against hepatitis B carriers (including 20 million chronic carriers) remained widespread in many areas, and local governments sometimes tried to suppress their activities.  Despite a 2010 nationwide rule banning mandatory hepatitis B virus tests in job and school admissions applications, many companies continued to use hepatitis B testing as part of their pre-employment screening.
The law does not address some common types of discrimination in employment, including discrimination based on height, physical appearance, or ethnic identity.
 
 
 
The law does not provide for freedom of association, and workers are not free to organize or join unions of their own choosing.  The All China Federation of Trade Unions (ACFTU) is the only union recognized under the law.  Independent unions are illegal, and the law does not protect the right to strike.  The law allows for collective wage bargaining for workers in all types of enterprises.  The law further provides for industrial sector-wide or regional collective contracts, and enterprise-level collective contracts were generally compulsory throughout the country.  Regulations require the government-controlled union to gather input from workers prior to consultation with management and to submit collective contracts to workers or their congress for approval.  There is no legal obligation for employers to negotiate or to bargain in good faith, and some employers refused to do so.
The law provides for legal protections against discrimination against the officially sanctioned union and specifies union representatives may not be transferred or terminated by enterprise management during their term of office.  The law provides for the reinstatement of workers dismissed for official union activity as well as for other penalties for enterprises that engage in antiunion activities.  The law does not protect workers who request or take part in collective negotiations with their employers independent of the officially recognized union.  In several cases reported during the year, workers attempting to do so faced reprisals including forced resignation, firing, and detention.
All union activity must be approved by and organized under the ACFTU, a CCP organ chaired by a member of the Politburo.  The ACFTU and its provincial and local branches continued to establish new constituent unions and add new members, especially among migrant workers, in large, multinational enterprises.  The law gives the ACFTU financial and administrative control over constituent unions empowered to represent employees in negotiating and signing collective contracts with enterprises and public institutions.  The law does not mandate the ACFTU to represent the interests of workers in disputes.
The ACFTU and the CCP used a variety of mechanisms to influence the selection of trade union representatives.  Although the law states trade union officers at each level should be elected, ACFTU-affiliated unions appointed most factory-level officers, often in coordination with employers.  Official union leaders were often drawn from the ranks of management.  Direct election by workers of union leaders continued to be rare, occurred only at the enterprise level, and was subject to supervision by higher levels of the union or the CCP.  In enterprises where direct election of union officers took place, regional ACFTU officers and local CCP authorities retained control over the selection and approval of candidates.  Even in these cases, workers and NGOs expressed concern about the credibility of elections.
The law does not expressly prohibit work stoppages and does not prohibit workers from striking spontaneously.  Although authorities appeared more tolerant of strikes protesting unpaid or underpaid wages, reports of police crackdowns on strikes continued throughout the year.  For example, on May 27, police in Lu’an, Anhui Province, suppressed a group of teachers calling for wage parity with local civil servants, as mandated in the 1994 Teachers Law.  Wage-related issues constituted 82 percent of the 6,694 strikes and collective protests recorded during 2015-17 by the Hong Kong-based labor rights NGO China Labor Bulletin.
In cases where local authorities cracked down on strikes, they sometimes charged leaders with vague criminal offenses, such as “picking quarrels and provoking trouble,” “gathering a crowd to disturb public order,” or “damaging production operations,” or detained them without any charges.  The only legally specified roles for the ACFTU in strikes are to participate in investigations and to assist the Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security in resolving disputes.
Enforcement was generally insufficient to deter wide-scale violations.  Labor inspectors lacked authority and resources to compel employers to correct violations.  While the law outlines general procedures for resolving disputes, procedures were lengthy and subject to delays.  Local authorities in some areas actively sought to limit efforts by independent civil society organizations and legal practitioners.  Some areas maintained informal quotas on the number of cases allowed to proceed beyond mediation to arbitration or the courts.  Some local government authorities took steps to increase mediation or arbitration.  For example, on March 6, the Maoming Municipal Intermediate Court and Maoming Municipal Trade Union jointly established the Labor Arbitration and Mediation Coordination Office to facilitate better communication and ease tensions in labor disputes.  An official from the local People’s Congress noted the increasing number of arbitrations, lengthy legal proceedings, and high litigation costs were not helpful in constructing positive and harmonious labor-capital relations.
Despite the appearances of a strong labor movement and relatively high levels of union registration, genuine freedom of association and worker representation did not exist.  The ACFTU constituent unions were generally ineffective in representing and protecting the rights and interests of workers.  Workers generally did not view the ACFTU as an advocate, especially migrant workers who had the least interaction with union officials.
China Labor Bulletin reported workers throughout the country engaged in wildcat strikes, work stoppages, and other protest actions and claimed the workers’ actions were indicative of the ACFTU’s inability to prevent violations and resolve disputes.  Media reported a number of protests at factories in the southern part of the country.
The government increasingly targeted labor activists, students, and others advocating for worker rights during the year.  For example, beginning in July and continuing through the end of the year, the government detained multiple workers, students, NGO representatives, lawyers, and others in response to demonstrations and online posts in support of workers attempting to form a union at Jasic Technology, a manufacturer of industrial welding equipment in Shenzhen.  Workers at the factory reportedly tried to establish a trade union in response to complaints of low pay and poor working conditions.  Although the lead organizers of the union reportedly received some information and assistance to set up an enterprise-level union from the local ACFTU branch, company management subsequently set up an enterprise union, selected management representatives to serve as union leaders, and fired the workers who had attempted to organize a union.  Following protests by the workers in July, the lead organizers were reportedly physically attacked, inciting protests in Shenzhen and elsewhere.  Guangdong labor activists, the Maoist organization Wu-You-Zhi-Xiang, leftist university students, and Hong Kong trade unions supported the protests.
Shenzhen police reportedly detained approximately 30 workers and representatives from the Dagongzhe Worker’s Center for their alleged connection with the Jasic protests.  Several of the worker activists were charged with “gathering a crowd to disrupt social order.”  Authorities also reportedly raided the offices of “Pioneers of the Times” and a Beijing-based publisher “Red Reference,” and criminally detained a staff member of “Red Reference.”  On August 24, authorities in Guangdong, Beijing, and other parts of the country detained multiple workers and students from Peking, Renmin, and Nanjing Universities who had been supporting the workers.  In early November the government detained nine student organizers and factory workers in Beijing, Shanghai, and Shenzhen and three activists in Wuhan.  The government also detained two local ACFTU officials in Shenzhen in November.  Authorities detained and questioned additional students in December.
Despite restrictions on worker action, joint action across provinces took place in several other sectors.  For example, on May 1, a strike by crane drivers in the construction industry spread nationwide as operators demanded pay raises in a number of cities, including Yulin and Chongzuo in Guangxi, and Xiamen, Fujian Province.  In June protests by truck drivers over stagnant pay, high fuel costs, and arbitrary fines took place at various locations in Shandong, Sichuan, Chongqing, Anhui, Guizhou, Jiangxi, Hubei, Henan, and Zhejiang Provinces, as well as in the Shanghai Special Municipality.
Coordinated efforts by governments at the central, provincial, and local levels, including harassment, detention, and the imposition of travel restrictions on labor rights defenders and restrictions on funding sources for NGOs, disrupted labor rights advocacy.  Labor activist and 1989 prodemocracy movement veteran Liu Shaoming remained in custody after the Guangzhou Intermediate People’s Court sentenced him to four and one-half years’ imprisonment in 2017 for “inciting subversion of state power.”
 
 
The law prohibits forced and compulsory labor.  Although domestic media rarely reported forced labor cases and the penalties imposed, the law provides a range of penalties depending on the circumstances, including imprisonment, criminal detention, and fines.  It was unclear whether the penalties were sufficient to deter violations.  Where there were reports forced labor of adults and children occurred in the private sector, the government reportedly enforced the law.
Although in 2013 the NPC officially abolished the re-education through labor system, an arbitrary system of administrative detention without judicial review, some media outlets and NGOs reported forced labor continued in some drug rehabilitation facilities where individuals continued to be detained without judicial process.
There were anecdotal reports some persons detained in the internment camps (see section 6) were subjected to forced labor.  In December a press report stated apparel made at a forced labor camp in Xinjiang was imported by a U.S. athletic gear provider.  Local authorities in Hotan prefecture, Xinjiang, also reportedly required some Uighur women and children not in the camps to perform forced labor.
There were several reports small workshops and factories subjected persons with mental disabilities to forced labor.
Also see the Department of State’s Trafficking in Persons Report at www.state.gov/j/tip/rls/tiprpt/.
 
 
The law prohibits the employment of children under the age of 16.  It refers to workers between the ages of 16 and 18 as “juvenile workers” and prohibits them from engaging in certain forms of dangerous work, including in mines.  The government did not effectively enforce the law.
The law specifies administrative review, fines, and revocation of business licenses of enterprises that illegally hire minors and provides underage working children be returned to their parents or other custodians in their original place of residence.  The penalty is imprisonment for employing children younger than age 16 in hazardous labor or for excessively long hours, but a gap remained between legislation and implementation despite annual inspection campaigns launched by local authorities across the country.  It was unclear whether the penalties were sufficient to deter violations.
In January two French NGOs filed legal cases against Samsung for the company’s alleged use of child labor and other abuses at its manufacturing plants in China.  Samsung’s suppliers in Dongguan had previously been criticized for using child labor from vocational schools.
Abuse of the student-worker system continued; as in past years, there were allegations that schools and local officials improperly facilitated the supply of student laborers.  On March 17, for example, parents of students at the Guilin Electronic Vocational School reported to the authorities that more than 100 student interns had been working at an air conditioning manufacturer’s production line as apprentices.  The students reportedly worked 12 hours a day with no breaks, no pay, no holidays, and no sick leave.  On March 30, the Guilin Municipal Education Bureau issued an administrative warning to the Guilin Electronic Vocational School, ordering the school to recall all students from the air conditioning manufacturer, located in Guangdong’s Jiangmen Municipality, and instructed the school to prevent the situation from recurring.
 
 
The law provides some basis for legal protection against employment discrimination on the grounds of ethnicity, race, gender, religious belief, disability, age, and infectious or occupational diseases.  The government did not effectively implement the laws.  Enforcement clauses include the right to pursue civil damages through the courts.  Courts were generally reluctant to accept discrimination cases, and authorities at all levels emphasized negotiated settlements to labor disputes.  As a result there were few examples of enforcement actions that resulted in final legal decisions.  Discrimination in employment was widespread, including in recruitment advertisements that discriminated based on gender, age, height, birthplace, and physical appearance and health status (see section 6).
Workplace discrimination against women was common during the year.  The mandatory retirement age for women was 50 for those in blue-collar jobs and 55 for those in white-collar jobs.  The retirement age for men was 60 across the board.
A 2015 All China Federation of Women survey in institutions for higher education revealed more than 80 percent of women graduates reported they had suffered discrimination in the recruitment process.  Examples of discrimination included job advertisements seeking pretty women, or preferring men, or requiring higher education qualifications from women compared to men for the same job.  Survey results showed women were less likely to be invited for interviews or called back for a second round of interviews.  In interviews some women were asked whether they had children, how many children they had, and whether they planned to have children or more children if they had a child already.
On March 5, Yuan, a former sales manager of Mead Johnson Nutrition Corporation in Guangzhou, filed a lawsuit against her former employer alleging pregnancy discrimination.  Mead Johnson fired Yuan for absenteeism after she traveled and gave birth to a baby in Houston during her maternity leave in September 2016.  The company also refused to recognize the hospital’s medical records, citing employees should use maternity leave only to cover medical situations during pregnancy.
The hukou system remained the most pervasive form of employment-related discrimination, denying migrant workers access to the full range of social benefits, including health care, pensions, and disability programs, on an equal basis with local residents.
 
 
There is no national minimum wage, but the law generally requires local and provincial governments to set their own minimum wage rates for both the formal and informal sectors according to standards promulgated by the Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security.  By law employees are limited to working eight hours a day and 40 hours per week; work beyond this standard is considered overtime.  It also prohibits overtime work in excess of three hours per day or 36 hours per month and mandates premium pay for overtime work.
During the year the government established a new Ministry of Emergency Management that incorporated parts of the former State Administration for Work Safety; the ministry sets and enforces occupational health and safety regulations.  The law requires employers to provide free health checkups for employees working in hazardous conditions and to inform them of the results.  The law also provides workers the right to report violations or remove themselves from workplace situations that could endanger their health without jeopardy to their employment.
Regulations state labor and social security bureaus at or above the county level are responsible for enforcement of labor laws.  Companies that violate occupational, safety, and health regulations face various penalties, including suspension of business operations or rescission of business certificates and licenses.
The government did not effectively enforce the law.  Penalties were not adequate to deter violations and were seldom enforced.  The number of inspectors was insufficient to monitor working conditions and did not operate in the informal sector.  Although the country’s worker safety record improved over the past seven years, there were a number of workplace accidents during the year.  Media and NGO reports attributed them to a lack of safety checks, weak enforcement of laws and regulations, ineffective supervision, and inadequate emergency responses.
Nonpayment of wages remained a problem in many areas.  Governments at various levels continued efforts to prevent arrears and to recover payment of unpaid wages and insurance contributions.
Unpaid wages have been an acute problem in the construction sector for decades due to the prevalence of hiring subcontracted low-wage migrant workers.  This informal hiring scheme made rural laborers susceptible to delayed payment or nonpayment for their work, prompting them to join in collective action.  Workers occasionally took drastic measures to demand payment.  In July the Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security claimed it had helped more than one million workers recover a total of 10.88 billion yuan ($1.62 billion) in unpaid wages owed in the first half of the year.  According to the Guangzhou Court, for example, from 2015 to 2017 the city’s courts tried 111 criminal cases for wage arrears disputes involving 4,880 victims and 30.62 million yuan ($4.4 million) in wages.  The court reported 116 persons were convicted for malintent refusal to pay their employees’ wages.
Companies continued to relocate or close on short notice, often leaving employees without adequate recourse for due compensation.
Workers in the informal sector often lacked coverage under labor contracts, and even with contracts, migrant workers in particular had less access to benefits, especially social insurance.  Workers in the informal sector worked longer hours and earned less than comparable workers in the formal sector.  In June truck drivers in multiple cities protested stagnant pay and poor working conditions (also see section 7.a.).
Without providing exact numbers, the Ministry of Emergency Management announced in July the number of workplace accidents fell.  The ministry also reported while accident and death rates in most sectors were declining, in the construction sector these rates had steadily increased since 2016, making the sector the one with the highest number of accidents and deaths of any industrial and commercial sector for the last nine years.  In January, May, and July, media reported more than 100 former construction workers affected by pneumoconiosis from Hunan made three trips to Shenzhen to petition for long overdue compensation for the occupational illness they contracted while working in the city during the 1990s.
According to several official documents published during the year, occupational diseases were prevalent.  Patients came from many industries, including coal, chemical engineering, and nonferrous metals.
Although there were fewer news reports on coal mine accidents during the year, the coal mining industry remained extremely deadly.  According to the Ministry of Emergency Management, there were 219 coal mine accidents in 2017, causing 375 deaths, which represented a drop of 12 percent and 28.7 percent year-on-year, respectively.  On May 9, five persons died when methane gas exploded in a coal mine in central Hunan Province.  On August 6, a coal mine gas explosion in Guizhou Province killed 13 miners.  In October a coal mine collapse in Shandong Province left 21 dead.
Work accidents also remained widespread in other industries.  On June 5, for example, 11 persons were killed and nine injured in an iron mine blast in Liaoning Province.  On August 12, a chemical plant blast in Sichuan Province killed 19 and injured 12.