The Liverpool Standard and General Commercial Advertiser. — Liverpool, Merseyside, England, 1855-09-18 00:00:00

SUPPLEMENT TO 4ibtrpooli tantarbf. AND GENERAL COMMERCIAL ADVERTISER. 1855. [GRATIS. seeks to close the hostile undertaking in such a way as will neither humiliate nor weaken Russia. Having settled in his own mind that the inva sion of the Crimea was a blunder, he proceeds, with a degree of coolness similar to that required in demonstrating a geometrical problem, to criti cise, and, in many points, condemn the disposi tions of the Allies at the battle of Alma. He ad mits that the celebrated " flank march' after that battle was well made, but thinks itwas, ina military sense, a mistake. General Klapka, in common with many other military authorities, censures the impropriety of attempting the siege of Se bastopol without a full investment of the place, and expresses a conviction that, had the fortifica tions been boldly assaulted when the Allies first came before it, it must have yielded to the blow. As his observations on such a subject are entitled to considerable weight, we submit the annexed remarks on the 1. --- O r i ! It)ill vof iv lik ; rattle cottage gate, „AM over it a maiden leant ; ulloti her ( tee and ivitio ' race &lover's tartest eya,,a,„e bent. good night, 4 Goodnight," site slid, ic once more , The evening star is rising high ; Rut early with tile mornin g light tie sure yea cm 4, you Pass by. " The Skil)/ had as su er leapt, CPflt Atitinn's h and her treasures /-44„,f°1111 a terry Party swept, 1..4 7'41 tartuents, two and two. ~,, It Wee the %aid that blessed threw, F -ue "eaing Star that rose so high, akt he, is 11 suppose you've guessed, "4 °Nil called as he passed by. . litnki lot h all's forgo t flowers ; ph i ove, that ,sr ere . with Oh, what's a throne to that dear cot Wreathes the heart Whose only wealth is happy hours ? 1 Woos to leave their home they're Althongh the evening star be nigh tat if you wish to see them both, loth, Perchance they% call as they pass by. LIVE Atrite you CALL Xl l4 tt, V ' i rt ..., sw . 11 47 . 18 111 th e z aB - '----.. t i , elat ed ' 3 ' B S i: " the Year 1853 till f r Y urelleral George Klapka: 4 0 4 ° 4 l the • • dl4 ed °riguial MS. by Lieut.- 'Lttil • IlYall°z kY Chapman , c, ttiltr.e • London : . t att i „.... clas s o p _ 044 1 44 8 of readers this volume will pre- Itte tttil xi 'el? high order. The fame 48 8411 a Pka a • War kilita ,ac as an able and all leet etll, ind u r 3 leader in the last Hunga t bet his opi n i ee m any to look with great ; pb, Weee tl. _ las relative to the contest now etk t the four allied powers and Rus lit 140 4 • Pee aliar • 1, 11 44 4 nth 410 views entertained by him,. a thih atid 40, views of his countrymen, relative 114 '°eielit's‘rian despotism, will be with kik t Vith ea reason for receiving his animad !4 . ai th e o l f lti m, if not with distrust and 4 tted t. „ t tt xt these views is less or more justi 'tthe :the A ° f the book which he has sub hii "(14 4 "kion, and in some degree also Lte t,, et, t ic l / 41 7 th e 11,-itiof the British people. .His re p nit4 o larger imp ort r iS a reference to its being of 4 iti e tnalotie itace thari a mere settlement of kle tatiblo.Position of the Turkish empire. 14to jit a l ! k itrop sl ea ° t , the question is . of the '''. the'kite ° lle, and in this view _ _ in the widest 4 i lk kli ovi % s at the conclusion of his specula I . , kst et 4 1 as 6 -4„ 14 .1 4,1 4cTl3 v"--cacii OUGHT TO REGITLATE THE I kh t illt tll e 3r 'recall of • expedition, and the 10 4:. 1,14i 4 , i the Crimean li t i e - -41, th e ..t 1,.21 seat of war in in th th e e E ß a a s l t ti t c o p t r h o e . 44,4 a ki.i t i tea t i i rng of an army Id i ll tY 4, 1 )3 , 0 ty p o f an alliance with Sweden.-3. The tr ee) the e 8 14% 0 1 3.(1,—The repudiation of Austrian i ll 0 3 - ) , ) Pea t °f lung her to declare for or against. t i b ie r : ti tr b e h er joining the enemy—which can doubted —The formation of a Dant - , :pe, i ,,,e iii, t ...to include all the provinces, not Ger 'ot.,lll44,:tver, with Hungary as their centre.- 2.N1 th e , 1.4 liberation of Italy.-6. The employ kg th e .e A tirkislt forces in Asia. Itkedokijojead.er, now familiar with the splendid 14: siege of Sebastopol, the first reeom.- 4 of our author is more likely to beget a !kid. Against his opinions than any practical , Nlie e • • • lii his views. This, together with the ~ RPOOL, TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 18, fact that in the great struggle still pending he sees only the one and as yet unrecognised political virtue, " the liberation of the oppressed nationali ties," will lead to a suspicion that much of his reasoning is the result of an overheated imagina tion. Those who so conjecture, however, would be betrayed into an unjust estimate of the book and of the man. A soldier, and a good one himself, General Klapka looks on the whole arrangements of the war with the eye of a military critic, and passes his remarks in a spirit of calm and dispassionate observation. He estimates the military operations. of the Allies as not entitled to much commenda tion, and curtly, yet smartly condemns their diplomacy as short-sighted and weak. He strongly maintains that " the conquest of the Crimea " can only be accomplished by successful operations on the continent, and confidently forte's the failure of the siege operations carried on before Sebas topol. Under present circumstances, of course, this prediction must sound like nonsense ; but when it is borne in mind that the prediction referred to the state of matters, during the spring and early part of the summer, when the opinion so expressed was entertained by many men who are looked on as good authorities, much of the seeming absurdity is removed. How little soever the gallant general may be entitled to reputation as a seer, his observations on the military opera tions which have been carried on by the Allies since their landing in the Crimea, are entitled, from his own comparative successes, to no small amount of attention and regard. As already intimated, he regards the Crimean invasion as a blunder in military strategy, and maintains that the war should have been directed against the Caucasian provinces, as the only vulnerable por tions of the Russian Empire in the south-east. In respect to the brave inhabitants of these regions, our author makes some sensible obser vations, and thus concludes his remarks on THE CIRCASSIAN RESISTANCE TO THE MUSCOVITE. All the efforts and sacrifices of Russia to subjugate the heroic races of the Caucasus have met with only partial and unsatisfactory results. Though the circle of their attack gradually draws closer and closer, and the defenders are driven farther and farther into the interior of their mountain fastnesses, yet their resistance and courage con tinue as determined as ever ; and the smaller portion of them in the exposed valleys alone bend their proud necks beneath the Russian yoke. The rest are still free and independent, replying both to the promises and the assaults of their aggressors with bullet and yategan. But whether oppressed or free, all races entertain a deadly and unconquerable hatred to everything that bears the name of Russian. In a supplement to these observations, General Klapka insists on the policy of enrolling, subsi dizing, and supporting an army, 50,000 strong, of those hardy mountaineers, who would, he says, be admirably qualified for thwarting the despotic views of Russia. This may be, and in all proba bility is true, so far as it goes. There are, how ever grave reasons for doubting the likelihood of such a combination being efficacious in defeating the aggressive objects of Russia. That the effect of such an organization would materially hamper the military operations of the Czar cannot be doubted, and it will readily suggest itself to all thinking men to question the impropriety of ab staining from it, few such being inclined to coun tenance the drawing-room style of warfare which CONDUCT OF TEE ALLIED GENERALS. On the 23rd the army advanced to the Katcha, and not encountering the enemy there pushed forward on the fol lowing day to the Belbeck, where they only found a few detachments occupying the entrenchments at the mouth of that river. It was now evident that Menschikoff was de termined not to wage a second battle in open field, and thus the opportunity of retrieving the mistake on the Alma upon the banks of one or other of the neighbouring rivers slipped from the grasp of the Allied commanders. Now that they stood in close proximity to the works of Sebastopol as well as to the army of Menschikoff, the Allies, amounting to 50,000, all at once discovered how much they had under rated the difficulties of the expedition, and in what dispro portion their means were to the magnitude of the under taking. At the same time considerations as to their own safety began to press heavily upon them. The Rus sian reinforcements from Odessa were rapidly moving down by way of Perekop : thus if they persisted in their plan of operations against the northern fortifications, they ran the risk of losing their land communication with Eupatoria, and of being taken in the rear by a relieving army, while vainly sacrificing time and forces upon those works. These motives, and not the sinking of a few vessels at the entrance to the harbour of Sebastopol, induced St. Arnaud and Lord Raglan to abandon their design upon the north fort, and to execute their memorable flank manoeuvre to Balaklava. The possession of both the harbours of Ka miesh and Balaklava secured them in the rear, and offered a tolerably firm basis of operations. No wonder that both the leaders felt greatly relieved, when they found them selves sheltered ; the French in their enthusiasm going so far as to call the Bay of Kamiesh the Bay of Providence. The flank march of the Allies succeeded marvellously. Had they but taken advantage of the surprise of the enemy, and attempted an immediate assault upon the city, which at that moment was weakly garrisoned, they might possibly have succeeded in carrying both the town and the arsenal ere the Russians had time to erect regular works of defence. But, instead of this, they took to pro tracted reconnoiterings, in this case overdoing what had been utterly disregarded on the Alma, where a more accu rate reconnaisance would have assisted them in a better arrangement of the plan of battle. Here, on the contrary, protracted reconnoiterings led to perpetual indecision and preparation, and finally to a formal siege, which had never entered the calculation of the Allies in the original plan of the expedition. One daring and rapid blow, even at a heavy sacrifice, might still in the present state of affairs have led to a favourable issue ; and if the Allies had not had determination enough at once to have recourse to such an extreme expedient, they ought immediately to have returned to their vessels. Pelissier, the present French commander-in-chief, would in all probability have been the very man for such a contingency; both Canrobert and Lord Raglan were wanting in energy. They thought such an act of daring did not tally with their conscience and the responsibility devolving upon them. How incomparably more victims has the winter campaign cost the Allies than a bold assault under the protection of some easily-con structed batteries at the end of September ! Like all military authorities at home and abroad; i.