The Sun. — London, England, 1857-12-05 00:00:00

issue, and the relations between the Government and the Lank; for if that was done, in the first place you would Postpone every attempt at that useful legislation for w hich the c oun t ry was now ripe, and, at the same time, stifle inquiry into the commercial causes of the present which was a worthy and a necessary subject of t il : c i ti l iirY by aal committee. ear ) That was the represen tationh e wished to make to his right hon. friend arid the h ouse; and he hoped .hat he had not made it in any the spirit than that of a desire that they should seize oPportunity of converting a public difficulty and dis aster into a pu bli c a d vantage an d a permanent sett l emen t o , f , this question. (Hear.) Would it not be an immense a usantag e to a government desirous of settling a great question to be able to take it up at a moment : , was the mind of the country was alive to its import -Ice) and was rea d y to g i ve i ts ass i s t ance i n the task . as it not often found to he a hopeless task by a public l an to sti r up and animate the pu bli c m i n d on a pros t : It ier' of which he knew the importance ! As an instance o Vci an illustration of that tendency, let it be remembered w alaily gentlemen it was found possible a year aeo to bring together to listen to an Indian debate. (Hear.) . 4 " now, because we were smarting of - i e ftineercial crisis, should we pestpone the c snsidora ttele of a question connected with it until the public - "lilt' had relapsed into apathy and lassitude ? On the C ontrary, this was the time when we ought to deal with that part of the question which related to issue, and -50 Parliament had given a definite judgment with Nerd to the laws of issue, then they would be in a Position to deal with the laws of banking, for it was by nsie fri big up those two questions that you constituted a ftiltful difficulty in the way of finding an entrance into t he minds of men for that common sense principle by Which they should be guided in dealing with a subject ; I ke this. If he made one observation more, he hoped iarl should not offend any of those gent l emen f rom Scot ad whom he saw aroun d hi m . So far as regarded the o e Preaed question of a check to the circulation of Bank notes i n S co tl an d an d e ven in Ireland, he (Mr. Gla dstone) never expected to live to see the day when 4- arliament would be in such a position as to have such an advantage in the dealing with that question as it now P os sessed • He saw his right hon. friend the First Lord ei the Admiralty looking at him, and ho was confident tha t his hon. f r i en d agree d with' him, when it had oc riled that two millions of gold had been sent to Scot and to enable the banks to meet their securities instead ° their fh : t giving gold for them out of their coffers. This b light be very satisfactory to them, but he hoped that t he intellect of England was not so far in the background as not to be able to understand at whose expense it was cione • (" Hear, hear," and cheers.) No doubt lit was a C heap system of ci rcu l a tion for Scotland, as it was a a PsYstem of living for a private individual if he could always get his friends to pay his debts. (" Hear, hear,' a nd L laughte r .) B u t h e cou ld ne t assume th a t i n 1859 Public mind would be in a favourable condition for the consideration of this question. We had coming upon us and i n prospect i ve a ques ti on o f the most gigar e tic character, and one which was, owing to the unpre- Paredness of our minds with regard to it, perhaps the t4 . o at appalling which, as a public man, he could remora err- It wa s a ques tion of the manner in which we were ' 0 deal with 200,000,000 of men of anotaer race and religion —an ancient nation, which we seemed to think We could treat as so many figures of wax, but a nation ,w.hich had got its ow n h a bit s an d manners, i ts own alstory, its own civilisatio n , b u t w ith regar d t o it hieli we seemed to think that we had only to w alk into the c oun t ry an d l eave i t to t h e ex hibi t i on aIY of the p ro p er ti es an d qua li t i es o f t h e A ng l o -S axon .bo Settle all difficulties. (Hear, hear.) He thought that e ven in 1859 we m i g ht not h ave se ttl e d that question. e ar, hear.) Great changes were to be looked for in the t cl _ management of East Indian affairs, and let us not be o sure that wh en we were in the midst of the conside t ron of th a t g i gant i c ques ti on , it wo uld be easy to turn were Public imind to the question whether Scotch banks de to support their circulation by means obtained from ° land (Hear, hear.) There could not be much `4oubt that Parliament was now competent to entertain q ue stion, but if it was referred to examination by a ' ll ie C Tlnissi on t h at it would only cause the lett i ng s li p a 1 4 1°11 opportunity for the consideration of, at least, one "of the subject, and he was sure that by referring ~.."° questions to an overburdened committee, the result o w e ,ld be the postponement of the completion of the act „;_ 1 0 8 44 by legislation on the laws relating to issue, and 711. the postponing, the perplexine, and the confusion of se," 14 la qui w hich re mo was essential to"be instituted into the .rmal causes of the recent panic, and he grieved to the present embarrassment. (Loud cheers.) Mr. SPOONER said that be could assure his right ' l °, l l. fri en d th at i f he was a member of the present com mittee he w ou ld no t go i n t o i t w i t h a v i ew t o p ro p ou nd t ee own plans, b u t solely with a desire that the commit ,'" should fi rs t i n quire into the causes of the present die ese. He agreed that if they went into an inquiry into subject in the old way there would be no end of it. W ith reference to the existing state of things he would mention that a witness, who was admitted by every one ;‘) he of a high authority (he meant Lord 0 terstone) was ~ ' ruined before the committee this year, and at t he end 14 en essay which hedelivered in answer to a question, the nobl e l or d stated, i n re f erence t o th e a ct of 1844, " that the strict a n d prompt adherence to the principles of th at act everything had passed off - with regularity and Z ie ;OUr monetary system was unshaken, the prosperity of i n s country was un di spu t e d, an d suc h was the confidence etrteuhe wisdo m of the act of 1844 that it was dail y g ainin g fts _ r gth . ; that if a practical illustration of the soundness of inerples and its beneficial results was wanted itwas only le of th e , e sary to lo o k aroun d at t h e presen t s t a t e o f the trade tent in Country, the pro s p er ity o f the revenue, the con owe eat of th e peop l e, the wea l t h t h at perva d e d ever y e tt ' and having done so, the committee might be called of ar Say If they would interfere with the continuance Spoon which had produced such results." He (Mr. lo r d . Ql , ) W ould reverse the question, and ask the noble *la' 6 100 k now at the exactly contrary state of things I , et t a n asisted,and thee to say whether Parliament ought ab e ii t l be ready, not merely to interfere with , but to ha 118 h an.act which had proved to be a delusion , which he Not carried ou t the expectations of its framers, and au not received the conf id ence o f the public. The dan ger had not yet passed, it had hardly begun, and :Oat would b e d on e when numbers of persons were thrown out of employment I The Act of 1844 could nev er be amended ; it was wrong in principle and in Prentice and must be abolished. The Act of 1819 had never heen frilly carried out, and it never could have Whenever it was put in full operation it was ounce necessary to relax it on account of the commercial ! d istress it produced. Any prosperity which existed in t he country would be hollow until the currency was Put on a proper footing. Look to the year 1825. In the King' s sp eec h i n F e b ruary o f t h at year, and i n a tatement of the then Chancellor of the Exchequer, great boast was made of the prosperity of the country, tad that statement was repeated in July at the time of 01.1 p r orogation, and the Chancellor of the Exchequer d Mr. Brougham, who had given notice of a motion ra reform in Parliament, that all 'this prosperity had t u e , d ispensed through the portals of our ancient insti ll ' l ens to a j us t an d generous peop l e . I n J anuar y, 1836, Qwe ver, he came down to the house and deplored the **retched s t ate of every interest i n the country, an d was Y able to account' for it by the imprudence of some clu , at rY bankers. P an i c h a d su cceeded panic, but almost and en ° had been preceded by a declaration of great ectroplete prosperity. The act of 1819 had never et,i.carried out ; and Mr. Horner, in 1810, warned tianlameat that if they went on in the way in which 31 7,,Y e _were _proceeding, and as they afterwards did, they L would be able to return to a sound state of cur- P a n a y d in t his country. In 1810-11 a resolution wa s c h h a d the support of the noble lord now at t he o head of the GovernMent; declaring that a one-pound : a te an,d a shilli ng were for a ll l ega l purposes the same to% gains and that resolution was passed in opposition motion, the effect of which wasthat the depreciation th ~Lt ht to be mark e d an d arres ted, Mr. Horner declaring i f it was n o t th en arr ested, it would be impossible arrest it. What was done I The national debt was tinder 400 , 0 00,0001., and there was a depreciation of 15 a l i t r a c , e ,nt. The debt went on increasing to 800,000,000/ , st i ,;" wie depreciation reached 30 per cent. Mr. Henry q a t rnt oil, who differed both from Mr. Horner and the aibefirtntnent, expressed a doubt whether it would be pos -0 return to the national standard of value. The carre o b ey cY had never been restored to that standard, and b ee " would be restored to it. The attempts which had I x : Made to grant relief had only been successful for the th °lent. They had eventually aggravated the evil, and .„„ tl a affairs wou ld go on un til a pan i c wou ld ar i se w hi c h ;ald bre a k up t h e w h o l e soc i a l s y s t em . I t was neces hr, to r econs id er t h e w h o l e su bj ec t f or th e purpose o f 44 °irig the mischief caused by the not of 1819. The iaentry had never had a practical currency redeemable : l l gold, an d never wou ld have one sufficient to carry on i eonamercial enterprise of the country. Out of the a '. ° ,_° o .oool issued by the Bank of England in notes, all the m on their face payable in gold, 14,500,0001. were iW u ed Ott securities, but still they were said to be payable go,ld. It might be said that it would never be de evealaued. But that was the principle laid down. It o ' 4 a fraud upon the very face of it, and a system of le e t h r , e n t cY Which could not justly be maintained. The t i b - e - 57,," °11 . gentleman (Mr. Gladstone) was of opinion the act of 1844 bad worked well in regulating the to Of exa:hange, but a discount of 13 per cent. could tto Lie ealt e d a payment in gold. The practical point •on lnquire into was how far the act of 1844 had assisted Ca e r flirit' out the act of 1819. (Hear, hear.) What R 8 " rause of the present distress 1 It had been Said that it arose from over-issue and over-trading that ordain joint-stock banks bad entered into ar rangements of too large a nature—and that the e ctifidencei of the people had been thus shaken. No one e ?ald juseify the conduct of some of there banks, but th e system must be bad if a want of prudence in the rnae --agein But of a few such institutions could lead to a ,„"ant of co nfidence throughout the whole community. 4" act of 1844 compelled the Bank of England to buy g o ld *bather it was wanted or not, and to issue notes whether they were wanted or not. The effect of that 11Y o st ,eus had been to reduce the rate of interest to 2 per v oi n ''' aud consequently to force capital into all sorts 'which Iforeign investments and wild speculations, ninny ( turned out to be worthless, and the re‘ult was nothing but distress and misery. lie believed all our h Pres ent evils were attributable to the state of our mone fry la• w, and that great benefit would arise from t he o Poirrtme n t of a committee to consider the best mode rauttedying those evils. With regard to the bill now tmcint consideration, he gave it his full and complete peurrenee, and be believed that the Government had ti ne their duty in endeavouring to put a stop to the ts.moulties which had arisen. But he warned them that rh ge.Y had not done enough, and that if they left matters dl l if t a l lcY now stood they would hereafter have still greater 2_, pUltiel to encounter. They ought to look into the o:_°Ject epeedily, without a desire to support any pre lecceived uotions or to press forward any special theory. had been accused of belonging to that scchool which tU v ocated a n un li m i te d i ncon v e rtible cur renc y. N ow , w e had ne ver g i ven his suppor t t o any suc h v i ews. H e it a in favour of a limit s and would fix that limit at the 3 FIE amount of debt owing by the Government to the B instead of having the mecurities locked up and paying out a quantity of notes professing to be convertible into gold, but which they were unable to pay. Re would leave the administration of the national paper in the hands of the Bank, and would let them issue those notes. instead of their own, on Ruch terms as would be fair and just for substituting that currency for their own. By doing this, a double currency woald be formed. It might be objected that there would be a di`- ference in the value of the two. But would it not be bet ter to allow parties to purchase the gold notes at a pre mium than to compel them to pay 13 per cent. 'I Ile con tended that such a plan would be more consonant with the best intere , ts of the country. By this means there would be a reglar circulation of 20,000,0001., and those fluctuations whicn were so destructive to business would be avoided. Although he was prepared to support the Bi 1 of Indemnity, there was one provision to which he entertained an o` jection, sn'l that was the power given to the Bank and the Government of breaking the law. He was quite sure the country would not consent to leave such a power in the hands of the Bank, and still less to place such an unconstitutional power in the hands of the Government. (leer.) Mr. GLYN said he did not understand the Chancellor of the Exchequer to have proposed the insertion of any clause conferring the power to which the hon. member had just alluded, but that he had suggested it for the conside ration of the house. Mr. SPOONER observed that it had been proposed by the right hon. gentleman. The CHANCELLOR of the EXCHEQUER remarked that what ho had said was that he would insert a clause in the bill authorising the Bank to exceed the legal limit for twenty-eight days after the meeting of parliament after the recess. Mr. GLYN—The hon. member for Warwickshire had referred to the effect of the act of 1q44 on the existing state of things. In doing so the hon. gentleman was mixing up two questions which were entirely distinct. Ho was mixing up the question of capital with the question of currency. This crisis which occurred in 1847 and that which now ex- feted primarily arose from the same causes. In 1847, the commercial crisis was brought about by the overtrading of this country with India, and large speculations for the promotion of the corn trade on the continent of Europe. These things, added to the internal pressure and panic, were the primary causes of the crisis of 1847. The causes which had produced the present crisis were iden tically the same, and had produced the same effects. The country was now suffering partly from the terrible over thow of its commercial relations with the United States. It was also affected by a new feature which hitherto had not been felt in its commercial relations—the total destruc tion of commercial houses connected with the North of Europe. That trade had for a few years been carried on very much like that of the United States—on an entire system of credit. Another immediate cause of the crisis, and a new one, was the extraordinary over-banking in Scotland. (Hear, hear.) That, added to the over-banking in some parts ofEngland, hal caused the internal pres sure which had led to the disastrous effects under which the commerce of the country was now suffering. But he could not trace these effects up to the Act of 1811 in any way consistent with justice. The provisions of the act may be summed up under three heads—first, the separation Of the two departments, banking and issue—secondly, the restriction of the amount of paper circulation upon securities; and, thirdly, that which regulated the coun try banks. With regard to the first point it turned out that the Bank directors themselves, some time before the introduction of the bill of 1844, had instituted that division as a departmental arrangement wholesome pro vision when kept in their own circle, but attended with disastrous effects when made a necessary part of the act. With regard to the restriction of the country bank circula tion, he did not think any difference of opinion existed. The great difficulty of the question was in the limit of the circulation to 14,000,000/. He did not think any indivi dual who had watched the operations of the crises of 1847 and that of 1857, could fail in arriving at this conviction, that although the pressure was not caused by the act, yet the limiting of the power of issue upon securities became in itself the primary cause of the evil. It simply acted in this way. The operation of the pressure reduced the reserves at the Bank. The man who was ready to sacrifice anything to meet his engagements, who was ready to pay oven 20 per cent, for that purpose, was anxious to buy the currency —would purchase it at any cost—aad that depressed the reierve still further. (Hear, hear.) He would venture to assert that a person hal no right to demand the purchase of a, portion of the currency to meet his engagements. That tan; so, the issue of the Government letter became inevi tauie both in 1847 and 1857. In the year 1847 especially there was a moral courage in the issue of a letter which the country ought to appreciate and value ; and nothing could exceed the promptitude with which the present letter had been issued, for it was issued without any pressure from the commercial body on the Government. (Hear.) A de putation was ready to start from Liverpool on the day the, letter was written, but they waited for a telegraphic mes sage to know whether they should come up or not, and found their wishes had been anticipated by the noble lord at the head of the Government. (Hear.) It was an inevi table consequence that whenever a pressure arose a letter must be sent down to relieve the act of 1844. He believed that no individual or Government would ever have the hardihood to carry out the primary principle of that act. If any Government did so they would be hurled from power, not by a vote of the house but by the physical force of the con,try. (Hear.) The country would not allow its commercial operations to be interfered with in any such manner. Did any one suppose that the large machinery connected with the mill power of the country and the mining interests of the country would be content to go without their wages merely because a principle was to be upheld? (Hear.) That being so, the question arose whether the power which had been exercised should remain in the hands of the government, without any positive knowledge of the manner in which it might be exercised ? He thought the proper place for lodging such a power was in the hands of a responsible body like the Bank directors, under suffi cient parliamentary control. Unless something of that kind ghoul(' be clone, a pure metallic circulation must be resorted to ; and he did not think the country was proper(' for such a proceeding. Matters could not be allowed to remain in their present position much longer, for it was constitutionally wrong to allow such a power to exist without any certain rule for its proper exercise. (Hear, hear.) He could not sit down without bearing his testi mony to the conduct of the_Bank directors, which was beyond all praise, and he must be permitted to say that they had shown a degree of firmness, vigour, and discre tion which entitled them to the warmest thanks of the country. (Cheers.) Mr. HENLEY agreed in the general opinion that the government were entitled to a bill of indemnity. Bat if they had acted otherwise, and had not been torn to pieces by the people, they would have to defend themselves against a bill of impeachment. (" Hear," and laughter.) There would not only have been the risk, but the certainty of a popular commotion. So far, therefore, as regarded the bill of indemnity, he should give it a very cheerful support. The next question was, why should there be a need of these indemnities? (Hear, hear.) What was the state of the law ? Twice within the last fifteen years a corporation, possessed of an enormous capital, showing a rest of 3,000,000/. or 4,000,0001. above their engagements, would not have been able to pay anybody a shilling without an indemnity. (Hear, hear.) In 1817 the directors stated that the measure had been forced down their throats, and that they could have done without it, but that was early a matter of opinion. The hon. member for Kendal had given credit to the government for their spontaneous action in the matter, but he had made one statement which throw a shade of doubt upon their.conduct, for it appeared that a Liverpool deputation were only stopped from coming up by the telegraphic announcement that something had happened. (A. laugh.) He differed entirely from his honourable friend behind him. He was one of those who wished to see the bank note convertible at every man's will who held it. (Hear, hear.) He could not conceive that a monetary system could be safe without that. Then the next question was what was being converti ble ? His notion of convertibility was that a man could go to the counter when he pleased and be sure to have gold for his note at the time. Then the next question came : how far did the act of 1814 secure that ? The Chancellor of the Exchequer said that the distinguished individual who brought that bill forward said he had three objects. One was to prevent panics ; another to maintain convertibility, and the third object was to prevent speculation by the issue of paper. Now let them see how far these objects had been attained. Sir R e Peel himself said it had failed in the first object. It had failed to prevent panics. Well, failing to proauce panics—{A. MEMBER : "It has succeeded in that "1- (laughter) failing to prevent panics had it pro duced convertibility. What had the bank got to pay its notes with ? In ordinary times it had twenty millions of bank notes, fourteen millions of . which were issued upon _ _ security, and the residue upon gold. It should be obseried that that gold was not in coin. Now if they had not had a letter to suspend the operations of the bank, if the bank had been unable to pay its deposits over the counter, how long would it have been before parties would have gone to havetheir notes paid in gold ? They said people would not be so foolish as to go, but why did they not go ? Because confidence prevented their going. They must rely on that confidence because all banking operations were founded on it. Nobanker could keep every shilling that was confided to him in his counter ready to be repaid ; but he must trust to keeping a certain proportion of it. So it was in what was called this mixed circulation. If they chose to issue on security that was nothing but depending on the confidence of the country. If it carried with it a limit they laid the foundation of a want of confidence, and that want of confidence, if they tried to maintain the law would necessarily prevent bank notes being paid in gold. A good deal had been said on the subject of panics. Sir R. Peel was reported to have said that provision could not be made against panics. But he should like the Chancellor of the Exchequer to state what ground there was for the difficulty they were in now and that they wero in in 1817, whether in point of fact it was a real alarm, or whether it was an idle panic ? The hon. member who moved the address quoted an opinion of one of the directors, Mr. Hub bard, upon this subject. They had also in the blue book the opinion of the Governor of the Bank of Eng land. One of these gentlemen said the country was grossly ignorant, and the other said they were not well acquainted with the true principles of the act of 1814, and they went on to explain that the panic arose from not understanding what they called " the normal state of the decrease of the reserve at a particular time." This decrease in the reserve in 1847 took place in the month of October, when there was a nice chance of building up a little his tory to show that the public were unreasonable, and it would have done perfectly well if they had kept clear of figures. Mr. Hubbard said, "The chief difficulty in Octo ber, 1817, was occasioned by the excessive ignorance of the public generally." Now that was a good jolly accusation. (Laughter.) " Excessive ignorance of the public) generally with regard to the action of the Bank, and especially its action periodically, and when the publication of the reserve of the Bank showed a declined state at the commencement of October, the public mind was alarmed, and the alarm became what was called a panic." Now, the difference be tween alarm and panic was when there was any reason for alarm. This alarm, Mr. Hubbard said, caused people to look up what money they had got. Mr. Hubbard did not stop there ; but went into the region of prophecy. He said, " I believe therefore that the experience of 1847, so far from showing that the Bank Charter-Act is untenable in terms of difficulty, shows that it operated with perfect success—a YUCCOI3B that will be greater under future trials by reason of the Bank feeling more confidence in its own operations, but what is more important still, the bankers and mercantile community will know that they must exorcise a little indi vidual prudence, an I nut consider the Bank of England a dryenurse in the hour of need." That evidence was given see e et w ait at MThri.sWeguelin said, because . he went o question in July, 1857, and now n lot ie th i e i m ao in the month was pi", accounts and the various domestic of October , the Banks ma, to him—" Suppose that in 1817, causes regulating the supply o f bullion had been as correctly understood as they are in the summer of this have yes 'f'' do you think that the same p anic would accrued_ he t And ho said—and this was very curious—" T lowes Amoun t o f mom i n 017, A nd cosequently the highest SUN, LONDON, SATURDA EVENING DE amount of actual circulation corresponded exactly with the period at which you might expect the lowest amount of issue and the highest active circulation. Con sequently, if the public had been aware that it was nothing more than a mere normal action of the reserve and the active circulation, they would hive concluded that feom that period the active circulation would begin to de cline." He went on to put in figures, and what were those figures ? It seemed that at the coramencement of October, 1817, the amount of reserved notes was 3,852,0001., and on the 231 of October it h a d sun k t o 1,194,0001., a diminution of 68 per cent. Then Mr. Weguelin contrasted that with the period of 1856. In September, 1856, the amount was 6,218,000/., while on the 18th of October there had been a diminution of 3,700,0001., and therefore he wanted it to be assumed that because in 1847 the reserve at the Bank had only dropped 2,600,0001., and in 1856 had dropped 3,700,000/., the public were alarmed in 1847, and were not at all alarmed in 1856. But it seemed very odd to him (Mr. Henley) that a man should suppose it was the same thing, with only 3,850,000/. to take 2,658,0001. away from it, that it would be to take the same amount from a much larger parcel, because prudent people did not look at what was taken away—they looked at what was left. And, therefore, so far from that statement of the two Bank directors showing that what took place in 1847 was a panic, they gave ii resistible evidence, upon figures, to show that reasoning men, who had their engagements to meet, had good ground for the alarm that they felt, and, there fore, that ground was cut from under the feet of those who said that the provisions of the bill of 18A were always good except in case of panics. He denied that in that case it was panic; it was reasonable alarm. There was another question connected with the act of 1841 on which he knew he held an opinion which was not shared by many, but he was glad to find thatgopinion supported by no less an au thority than the late governor of the Bank. He had never been able to understand why, when the Bank of England was issuing such an amount of bank notes as it saw fit, they were to pass a law to say to that corporation, you may if you please, in addition to these notes that you have out, issue 14 millions of notes more. He never could understand the reason of that. He believed the immediate effect was to inflate the currency of the country, and that it induced to a certain degree excess of trading, and the governor of the Bank of England expressed the same opinion, not in evi dence, but in answer to a communication from the Chancel lor of the Exchequer. After stating certain advantages, he said, "On the other hand, the act encourages the dangerous theory that the Bank of England maylin its bankingdepart meat act in a,ll respects as a private bank in the arrange ments with its customers, and that the force of competi tion with large money lenders, and the produce of large deposits, is apt to induce an unwarrantable inflation of credit." That was a strong assertion to come from such an authority. He would now inquire what was the ope ration of the law when it first passed. In 1848 the notes issued were 19 millions, and the private securities were 5,500,0001. On the Ist of August, 1841, the notes issued were ,21 millions, and the private securities 6 millions. That was the state of things antecedent to the bill of 1844. The Bank of rate of discount had then for two years been 4 per cent., but Mr. Chapman said Messrs. Gurney were charging only 2/. 3s. 4d. in 1813, and 2/. 2s. 6d. hi 1844. In 1845 the notes issued, instead of being 21,116,000/., were 28,250,090/. ; the bullion was 15,600,000/. instead of 16,000,000/., and the private securities instead of being 6,851,0J0/., jumped up to 11,760,000/ In 1846 things were about the same. The notes were 28.400,0001., but the pri veto securities had jumped up to 17,900,000/. That was some little evidence of inflation of credit he thought. But what was the discount? (In 1845 the Bank rate of dis count was 2/. 13s. 4d., and Gurneys were charging 2/. 19s. 2d. Tlaese facts seemed to give some weight to the opinion of Mr. Wegnolin, that this act had a tendency to an unwarrantable inflation of credit. Now let them take the other end of the stick. By the operation of this act they had had to come twice to the house in ten years to ask for an indemnity. The question was what they were to do under these circumstances. No one had yet got up in that house and said the operation of this bill ought to be maintained in its entirety. (Hear.) The next point wa., was it safe or desirable to leave it in the discretion of Government, or ought they to relax the law by repealing it, or by seine other mode. In speaking of the repeal of the law he was only speaking of that part which related to the issue of notes by the Bank of England. That which related to the issue of notes by the country banks he thought a sound provision. In July Mr. Weguelin said in no case had the reserve gone below three millions, and there had boon no anxiety in the pubic mind with regard to the state, of that reserve, bet Mr. Chapman said the state of the reserve had caused a very great anxiety, and that in 1856 they were under groat alarm, and that they carried on their business only on an understanding that they should be relieved by Government. What sort of a state of things was that? The CHANCELLOR of the- EXCHEQUER—The statement was contradicted. Mr. HENLEY—Tho right hon. gentleman said it was contradicted ; but where ? It was endeavoured no doubt to be explained away. It was said that the promise was not given by a member of the Government, or a member of Par liament, or a member of the Bank ; but Mr. Chapman said they had it from an individual in such a position that he believed it. With regard to the question where the dis pensing power ought to be lodged, he (Mr. Henley) could not see any quarter in which it could be placed with safety. He believed there ought not to be a limit ; and that had been proved to demonstration by what had fallen from the Chancellor of the Exchequer himself. (Cheers) The right hon. gentleman had argued the question as if he was going to be hanged unless he could make out a stropg case for his indemnity. He said, " Don't think that the law has been infringed to the extent:of 2,000,000/. or anything like it," and then he went through a long list of figures to show that the infraction really never amounted to more than about 900,000/. Well, but would any ono pretend to say that the convertibility of the Bank note had , been in any way endangered by that excess of 900,0001.? He (Mr. Hen ley) agreed with the right hon. gentleman (Mr. Gladstone) to fix the limit at 16 or 17 millions wolild do no good whatever ; and that, while it would not lessen the mischief, it might perhaps give a worse chance of meeting a crisis when it occurred. The directors of the Bank had said throughout that they should havo acted hi precisely the same manner, and would have taken precisely the same steps, if the act had not been in existence. They would have raised the rate of discount just the same ; and here he (Ur. Henley) must confess that he was not one of those who believed they could keep the rate of discount at a uni form point. But if the conduct of the Bank would have been the same, act or no act, why create all this alarm for the sake of keeping up a limit ? It was like greasing a car riage wheel ; if they put the grease on before it got hut, it never would get hot; but if it once became heated no amount of grease would save it from coming to a dead lock. As to leaving the dispensing power in the bands of Government, he (Mr. Henley) was of the same opinion as the member for Oxford and the member for Southampton. When the point was raisedin the committee the member for Oxford said, " If the Government was a weak one it would yield, but if it was a strong ono it would resist, and then it would incur a great deal of unpopularity." By-the-bye, did the hon. gentlemen opposite consider that their Govern ment was a weak one for having on this occasion yielded ? However that might be, it was clear that if this power was once conceded to Government, the whole matter would bo virtually placed in their hands ; and now that a double precedent had been established, they might rest certain that they would never - be without pressure. Mr. Hubbard said that to relax the act was simply to stultify it, and he (Mr. Henley) believed that that was quite true. Mr. Hub bard further said that the effect of extending the provisions of the act in times of difficulty would be to force the bank ing community into a complete dependency upon the Bank of England ; and that appeared to have actually taken place. Of course post hoc was not always propter hoc ; but when they sew that such a state of things had become largely developed since the passing of the act, they natu rally asked what good it had done them ? A very import ant question was put in the committee by the member for Carlisle, viz. :—" Are your primary considerations, when paper is presented to you for discount, the solvency of the parties and the state of your bullion in reserve ?" The governor and deputy-governor spoke out like men. They said, " Those are not our primary considerations—they are our only ones." Their principle was, rent, quocunque mode, rem. Not so Messrs. Gurneys. The same question was asked them, and they seemed not to be so slack-waisted ; for the Old Lady of Threadneedle-street seemed to have latterly got of in t s o s r s s o . m G e o q r u n e e e y r s I s r a a i b d i s ( c L h a e u r g e t is er .) T a certain he description representative of paper that we won't touch—we won't touch any re-dis coun'ed paper." Hon gentlemen threw up their hands. was Ho li n o r t e e n r e l tyr a d o i s d w n e o r t f o s a r y t h w e h t o r t a h t e h r i o t f wt the e s s s o t a o t r e m n o e t n . ts lie he quoted ; nor did he care whether they were true or false. They only show what sort of paper was in the market — whether Messrs. Gurneys dealt in it or not. a hey heard a great deal now-a-days about "increased banking facilities" " increased commercial facilities," and the like. He did not care what they called these things ; but it was obvious that since the passing of the act there had been a great development in the trading world of all kinds of queer systems. (Hear, hear, h ea r.) Formerly, u hen the B an k f e lt it se lf o bli ge d to exercise its own discretion there was not the sort of thing that now went on. Twenty years ago he doubted whether the governor and deputy-governor would have given an answer to the effect that in carrying on their business they hail no regard to the character of the paper offered to them. (Hear.) For merly the Bank held a salutary check over speculative transactions, and that had no doubt a good effect upon trading morality ; but now there wore what they called " slaughter-houses ; " there were unlicensed pawnbrokers, dealers in warrants, and buyers and sellers of cargoes " on the run "—things which were never heard of a few years ago, and by whi c h sma ll t ra d ers were co mpletely "chewed up." (Lau g ht er an d c h eers .) S ma ll traders died away, and people sh r u gge d th e i r s h ou ld ers , an d said, "Oh, they cannot keep p ace w ith th e ti mes ." (H ear . ) And yet, by means of this wonderful act of 1844, they had, for sooth, prevented an undue inflation of credit and specula tion in paper. (Cheers ) Certainly, the act had restricted the issue of one particular kind of paper, that called Bank notes ; but it had only encouraged the creation of other kinds of paper which were ten thousand times more mis chievous. (Hear.) There was one other point on which he would make a remark—namely, the proposal of the Chancellor of the Exchequer that the Scotch notes might be paid iu Bank of England notes. That proposition he regarded as merely tending to aggravate a prejudicialstate of things which now prevailed in England. By the act they had given to a number of existing private bankers a monopoly is the creation of notes, without their having a single farthing to set against them that the legislature know of. At present these notes, amounting to 8,000,0001., formed, with the 20,000,0001. of Bank of England notes, the currency of the country. Now, by the wonderful ma chinery of the act, the instant they came to have a pres sure upon gold, they had on the one hand the reserve of notes lessening in exactly tho same proportion as the bul lion diminished, and on the otherhand, they hail the coun try bankers compelled to run to the Bank of England for notes amounting to at least 2,000,0001., to enable theta to meet the demands of their own customers. To make the Scotch notes likewise payable in Bank of England notes would obviously increase the evil. At the same time he should be glad to see the circulation of the whole kingdom put on the same footing ; for at the present moment Scot land and Ireland stood on the footing of foreign states, so far as their currency was concerned. Lord J. RUSSELL—Whatever variety of opinions may exist in this house upon this difficult question, I think all will agree that the committee are very much indebted to my right hon. friend the Chancellor of the Exchequer for the able manner in which he has laid beforri us the propo sitions of the Government. I am in the singular—l will not say the unfortunate—position of being very well satis fied with what has been done—tolerably satisfied with the act of 1844, and entirely satisfied with the proposal of the committee which is to follow after the present proposition. I will say but one word with regard to the immediate question before us, because I think that all sides of the house are agreed that the measures taken by her Majesty's ministers was a right use of their discretion, and that it contributed t o save t h e commerc i a l cre dit of s country. ( Hear.) Every party in this house will therefore admit that an indemnity ought to bo given to the Government for the policy they have pursued. (Rear.) That question being disposed of, the further question naturally arises, if the act of 1844 was rightly suspended in 1847, and if it has been again rightly suspended in 1857, is it an act which ought to be maintained ? Or, supposing that it is to bs maintained, will it not require some extensive alterations in its provisions ? Or, lastly, is it not necessary to give some dispensing power either to the crown or to the Bank, in order from time to time to suspend its operation? But I think that, gentlemen, in discussing this question in this house—still more in discussing it out of tdoors—fall into the error, against which they were warned by the Chan cellor of the Exchequer and by Mr. Glyn, of confounding the two questions of national currency and commercial credit. (Hear.) I say that the act of 1814 was intended to secure our rational currency from depreciation and from debasement. I believe that it has contributed to that end—indeed, that it has secured that end. (Hear.) But commercial credit, which some of the more extravagant supporters of the act of 1844 seem to think was to be saved from all danger and all panic by that act—commercial credit runs its own course ; and all that any act of Parliament can do is to endeavour as far as possible, that the national currency may not be endangered by it; that it may help from time to time—but that it should not be swept away in the hurricanes that occa sionally desolate the fields of commerce. (Hear, hear.) To go b ack t • this distinction —with regard to nationsl currency I think that everyone that will consider a momentwill be galls fled with the act of 1844 as a supplement to the act of 1819. I remember perfectly well coming from the Low Countries in 1815 with a number of 20-franc pieces; and for every one of these 20-franc pieces I got a one-pound Bank of England note. The Bank of England note was then worth 16fr. (Hear, hear.) But any one now would get 25fr. or more, either in London or Paris, for that same note. Well, then, there is an end of the depreciation ; that depreciation had been cured by the act of 1819 and the act of 1841, And I do not think that in either of these times of panic or commercial distress, either in 1847 or 1857, there has been the least doubt or question of the convertibility of the bank-note. I believe that every merchant and every individual in the country felt satisfied that his five-pound note would obtain its equivalent in gold ; and therefore there has been no depreciation of the currency; upon that question there has not been any fail ure. But when we come to that other question of com mercial credit, I think that any one who looks at the his tory of the country only from the commencement of the present century will see that there have been always these changes—first, of rising and improving trade—next of prosperity—next of inflation—and next of disasters and distrust; and, finally, the bubble burst, and we had to begin again. (Hear, hear.) That was the case before the act of 1841 was passed. (Hear.) I lament to have heard from so high an authority as Mr. Glyn so much blame thrown ou the act of 1844. Does he recollect what occurred in 1825? (Hear, hear.) In 1825, if I remember right, 20 years before this act was passed, 700 private banks in the country broke; there was the greatest distress through out the country, the greatest distrust of country bank paper, and a period of distress ensued. In 1847, again, there wore peculiar causes at work ; there was a great de mand for corn, a very natural and necessary demand, but which occasioned a great export of specie. There, wore other speculations which occasioned distrust, an other period of distress occurred. The same has occurred in 1857 ; and when the right hon. gentleman opposite reads a namber of passages from the evidence of merchants and bank directors stating that trade is in a wholesome condi tion,'it should be remembered that that only applies to the time when the answers were given. Because every one, whether engaged in trade or otherwise, must know that there are changes—that there are revolutions, and very often very sudden revolutions — which take place in com merce; that, owing to some particular cause—it may be a very sudden cause—or owing to a great inflation of some particular speculation, the country all at once finds itself in a state of doubt and distrust with regard to even the most healthy portions of trading operations. Now, let us look what has been done with regard to the currency at these separate periods ; because, while I would wish to support the act 1841, I think that as it has been very much over-blamed on the other. I believe that it is an additional security, that it is an improvement on our former laws ; but I do not think, with regard to the action of trade upon currency and currency upon trade, that the course of things has very much varied since the passing of that act. In 1825 we had the testimony of Lord Ashburton in this house. Ho stated that the governor and deputy-governor of the Bank, Mr. Huskisson, and himself met to consider what should be done. There was then a very small amount of gold in the Bank—perhaps some hundred thousand so vereigns, I don't remember the amount—and there was a very great alarm. Whether there was a panio or not, and whether alarm is a very just feeling, and panic a very un just one, I will not dispute — that seems rath er a ques ti on of philology than of finance. (Hear.) But there was very great alarm, and these very able men met to consider what should be done. After some hours of consultation Lard Ashburton stated they were all agreed that, whatever might be tho cause, relaxation and the expansion of credit, not further restriction, was the remedy required. They advised the governor of the Bank to issue more paper. This was on the Saturday or Sunday. Oa Monday morning the Bank declared that they were ready to discount. Confi dence was restored, and, so far from the Bank being drained of its last sovereign, its coffers were speedily replenished. That happened before the act of 1844. In 1817, also, from causes which I will not enumerate, there was a return of difficulty and alarm. The case was represented to my right hon. friend the present First Lord of the Admiralty and myself ; and several days we sat in anxious consultation On the state of affairs,' advising with Mr. Cotton, the governor of the Bank, the directors, and other persons very competent to enlighten ns on what occurred from day to day ; and then, on our own responsibility—not at the request of the Bank any more than now—not for the purpose of saving the national currency, which was not in any danger, but for the sake of the commercial credit of the nation—for the sake of many large firms which, though perfectly solvent themselves, were threatened by others -and for the great interests of the country, we resolved to recommend the Bank to issue bank notes, if necessary, beyond the limit imposed by law. I believe we were justified in that course; and, if I remember rightly, Mr. Herries, then a member of this house, moved a resolution approving the conduct of the Government in that instance. Well, in 1857 the state of things described to us by the Chancellor of the Exchequer occurs. The Government meets, and the First Lord of the Treasury and the Chan cellor of the Exchequer issue a similar letter. I am sorry to say the effect is not so immediate as was that of our letter in 1847. It may have been that the disease had spread its roots deeper; it may have been owing to some other cause, existinz, perhaps, in foreign countries; but, according to the highest authority, we have not yet re covered our former state of healthy trade and sound com mercial credit. As far, however, as it has gone that letter has been effective ; it has saved many parties from ruin, it has saved the general interests of the country from great disaster. And, for my part, I hope, with my hon. friend the member for Kendal, that we shall never see a Minister of this country so infatuated in favour of an abstract prin ciple, sound enough in itself, as to refuse in these oases of emergency to incur the responsibility of relaxing the Act of 1814, and thereby preventing what may be a fearful convulsion. (Hear, hear.) But is it true that this Act, having been twice suspended, is altogether wo_Ft.hklens!i,tahnal ought to be replaced by some other system? .1 t h ink as far as the national currency is concerne d it is an Ateot which does not require alteration. And wi th re g ard commercial credit I venture to say that no one authority that I have ever heard or read of has proposed a &thee by which you shall have a national currency times of commercial distres s a nd fitted f p a nic—a scheme wht m or . . a e ll shall preserve convertibility and yet be of sufficient force to prevent the 'effects —th e mos t n atural and inevi table effects—be it of over spe cu l a ti on , of excessive trade, or of h the misfortune of the p ar ti cu l ar time. In order to show that I do not wish to cast blame upon those who, iu some instances at least, have been unfortunate in these transactions. I cann o t b u t ca ll t o mind a remark of Mr. Tierney, who, in allusion to one of these per iods of com mercial distress said, " Y ou may ta lk o f w ild speculation and rash trading, but the men accuse d o f thi s rashness and wild speculation would, if they had succeeded, have been enter prising British merchants." (H ear. ) It is very often t he case that a few have pushed their credit too far, that circumstances have turned against them, that their failure leads to others, and thus great discredit is thrown upon the country, when perhaps but a few—a very few, p erso ns are to bla me. But, sir, if there are any per sons t o bl ame f or giving too great facilities to individual t ra d ers, whether con nected with the Bank of England, the Western Bank of Scotland, or any other banking or commercial company, it seems to m e that the appointment of a com m it tee is , exactly the manner in which the Government ought t o d eal with th i s ca se If such has been the ease it cannot b u t b e useful to th e country to learn what errors have been committed, and to o btain some warn ing not to repeat them in th e f uture. My right hon. friend the member for the Uni versity of Oxfor d pr otests against the re -appointment of the c omm i ttee to inqu i re into banking and issues, but he says that he should quite approve the appoint. ment of a c )mmittee to inquire into the caus es of the com mercial distress. I, sir, amnot ver y particula r about the title of this committee, o r th e exact f or m iu which it is ap pointed. 1 am quite sur e th at i f appointe d a s a committee te i n quire into banking it would i nqu i r e into all the causes of comme rcial distress, a n d i nto the con duct of those who are carrying on the trade of the country. I am equally sure t h at if appointed to consider the causes .of commercial distress it would inquire into banking and the operation of the Act of 1844. It is impossible to bind down a committee not to con sider these two subjects together , and there fore, I think it is qu ite right that it should be 7 appointed in such term s as the Ghancellor of the Exche quer shall think fit. Well, then, sir, w ith what view is the committ ee t o b e a ppointed ? The right hon. gentleman the member for Buckinghamshire asked a question last night, which I think was quite right inspirit, but which he made rather more stringent than was necessary. He asked--" Is the Act of 1844 to be maintained ? If it is to be maintained why should you have the Act of Indemnity t If it is not to be maintained let the Act of Indemnity be passed, and let the measures of her Majesty's Government be pro duced." Now, I understand—l do not know that I correctly understand, the intentions of the Government, but, as far as I understand them, it seems to me that they are prepared to stand by the general principles of the Act of 1844 If they were not prepared to stand by those general principles, if they intended to throw the whole question of the currency loose before the committee—if we were to have the plan of the hon. member for North Warwickshire (Mr. Spooner) which seems to me, if not so dangerous as I have apprehended vet—l will not use an unusual phase —more unreaoonable that I had expected—if wo were to have our currency di vided into two parts, one of which is to rest on the security upon gold, and if we kind coming out of the appointment by the c o ,so f .ei t ur Is om e tiottbe Threeuev,et then eet other r e shou ts., h i p t or s uo . j , and oldo tssa yo t the t e i It that a h t e i kt r s Government would bo a very unadvisable step. But if wo aro to have a committee, keeping in view the Act of 1844 and seeing whether that act should be either amended or in any way expanded, I think that is a very fair question to be laid before a committee, and that it would be more prudent on the part of the Government to say that when the evidence is before us, and not till then, will they toll the house at what conclusions they have arrived with rega r d to amendments in harmony with the spirit of the act, but making its provisions still more effective. Various ways are suggested in which that act might bo altered. There is one t o w hi c h th e Chan cellor of the Exchequer alluded, and with regard to which I time, you a constitutional do not quite agree wit h him, alth ough there is some reason in what he says concer nin g it. H e says that if you give to the Government or to t he Ban k a discretionar, power of re nwill net make much practical axi buttim time to willtim ques tionraise whether or not it i s ri g ht t o give sick a power by Act of Parliament. Now, I beg p ard on of my right hon. friend, but l alteration, ac " from I think you raise not only a great constitutional but a groat practical question besides : because, while I should be very unwilling to give to Ministers this power ; of dispensing with an Act of Parliame It on constitutional grounds, I think theatthcre are moral reasons, and reasons of practical utility which aro still more forcible against the adoption of such a course. I feel convinced that if the Minister and the Bank, or the Bank alone, had this power it would give great en couragement to wild and unsound speculation. (Hear , hear ) Every one would then say, " We can go to the Gov, rnment and tell them that they have got tho power, and that this is the very ca se in which it was intended that they should exercise it ;" whereas it is now a groat inconvenience and a great responsibility for a Minister to say, " I think this Act is at present so obnoxious to the community that I will undertake to suspend it awl will immediately call Par liament together to lay my conduct before it." I think that that is a considerable check upon the conduct of the Minister, and therefore upon those speculatora who would wish for the frequent suspension of this Act. (Hear.) Let us see what has happened with regard to the Act. In 1844 it was enacted ; in 1847 it was suspended for a time. That occurred only three years after it was passed, and I think men might then reasonably-say that an Act which within three years was found to be unavailing and had broken down ought not to re main upon the statute-book. But since 1847 we have for 10 years had a sound state of the currency—(hear, hear)—we have had no complaints of the working of the Act ; and it may be five years, or it may be 20 before there is another occurrence similar to that which we are now considering. I would leave the future to the future. I would allow it to be decided by experience whither or not another 10 years may not elapse without the adoption of such a course, and, if the inconvenience is then no greater than has been sustain d in 1847 and 1857, I should think that there would be reason not for repealing, but for maintaining the Act. (Hear, hear.) For, considering that your primary object is to maintain a currency convertible into gold, and that your next object is as far as possible, without endangering that currency, to give help in times of commercial distress and disaster, I think that an Act which performs those functions as they have been performed by the Act of 1844 in 1847 and in the present year, is one which deserves to be supported. My hon. friend the member for Kendal (Mr. Glyn) says that when distress begins the sight of the Bank returns aggravates the alarm. That may be so, but is that the working of the Act of 1844 ? I remember before the passing of that Act asking a friend of mine who was very well conversant with those subjects, the late Lord Sydenham, what ought to be done if we had a com mercial crisis and a state of discredit. He said, "Let the Bank go on and pay to its last guinea." But would not that be a. time of distrust and distress ? Suppose that you had the Act of 1819 alone, without that of 1844, and there came a time at which the reserve of bullion in the Bank was reduced to 1,000,0001.—t0 500,0001.—t0 100,00 M—would not that pro duce great alarm. Would there not be a people as anxious to obtain gold as, they now are to obtain bank notes ? Would there not be the same discredit and distrust as now exist ? Therefore, as I believe, it is not the Act of 1844, it is the very nature of a currency convertible into gold, operating with a diminution of commercial credit and the spread of alarm, which produces that state of things to which, my hon. friend referred. (Hear.) If that be so, let us see what is the actual working of this Act. It is, I confess, not that which you would expect upon the face of the measure. The Act says that there aro 14 millions and a half which the Bank may always issue, but that any notes issued beyond that amount must be the representatives of gold and silver bullion in its cellars. If that were literally carried into effect when the Bank had 16 millions of bullion it would issue 30 millions of bank-notes ; when it had 7 millions it would issue 21 mil lions. _ But that is not the operation of the Act, because we all know that there is no such demand for notes as to induce the Bank to go beyond some 22,000,0001. or 23,000,0001., and we know also that it is quite impossible for them to go on issuing notes with safety to the extent of 7,000,0001., when thereris only that amount of bullion in reserve. Immediately that the reserve of bank-notes is reduced to 1,000,0001., or 1,500,0001., still more when it is reduced to less, then comes that desire to obtain notes which the Chancellor of the Ex chequer has described. Every one sees that the reserve 'of notes will soon be exhausted and makes a rush to obtain what proportion he wants, and thus the Bank becomes en dangered long before the notes representing 7,000,0001. of gold are really issued. The Act of 1844, therefore, is more restrictive than appears on the faoo of it. It hardly allows the issue of 14 millions and the whole stock of bullion to be represented ; there must be areserve of notes in order that the Bank may -be at all secure. The question may fairly be discussed, whether any change should be made in that re spect. I doubt the utility of any change ; but of this lam quite sure, that if it should appear to a select committee that a change might safely and beneficially be made it ought to be made by Act of Parliament, and not by giving any discretion either to the Minister of the day or to the Bank of England. (Hear, hear.) It should be plainly laid down in your Act what further relaxation might bo allowed. (Hear, hear, hear.) I believe myself that the Act of 1841 has tended to secure the currency and has not tended to aggravate commercial distress. (Hear, hear, bear.) We have heard with some apprehension the views entertained by the right lion. gentleman the member for Oxfordshire. He com plains that the Act of 1844 has encouraged the great evil of over-speculation, and has led to the circulation of a great deal of worthless commercial paper in the country. (A laugh.) That is a somewhat inconsistent complaint, and theright hon. gentleman proposes accordingly a somewhat inconsistent re medy, because he says there should be nb limit to the issue of paper by the Bank. (Hear, hear.) He complains of the limit ; but I wish to know from him and from the other gentlemen who denounce the Act of 1844 what is the real extent of their demands. Aro they satisfied or are they not with the Act of 1819 ? Are they satisfied or are they not that notes should always be convertible into gold? Are they satisfied with the standard of the currency as laid down in ancient times, and as affirmed soon after the Revolution, and again by Lord Althorp when ho was Chancellor of the Ex chequer? (Hear.) When they complain of the special pro visions of the Act of 1844 de they not, in fact, mean a great deal more ? Do they not really mean that there shall be an issue which shall not be founded upon bullion, but which shall bo so extensive, so expansive that it must necessarily become greatly depreciated in value, requiring for the safety of its credit the application of a Bank Restriction Act. (Hear, hear.) If that be their intention, let them plainly declare it. Do not let them complain of the special provi sions of the Act of 1844, but let them tell us whether they mean to maintain the currency in its integrity. We shall then know how to meet such a proposition. Such views are not openly avowed in this house, but they have been avowed in some recent meetings; and in one meeting especially which took place in Glasgow, it was stated without disguise _ . _ that your paper currency should be commensurate with the demands of trade. (A laugh.) Is it intended, I ask, that there should be any base for this currency, or is it mere worthless paper, producing periodical convulsions worse than any we have heretofore witnessed 7 (Hear.) In defending the Act of 1844, in admitting that there may be smne alteration . . . . . . in its principles, but maintaining that tliere ought to be none in its provisions, I think I am in fact standing upon the Act of 1819 and the laws which regulate our currency. I believe that th3se evils from which we have lately suffered, from which we are still suffering, are incidental to a very great and ex tended commerce, * We all know that the laws passed of late y are, beginning in 1842 and ending with the repeal of the Navigation Act in 1848, have tended greatly to increase the trade of the country ; and we know also that while increasing legitimate trade, while making many men wealthy and giving general prosperity to the country; they have produced at the e same time the concomitant evils Of unsound speculation, cash adventures by• - nithout capital, and bubble companies eager to share in the riches or the world. We are commercial country, prosperous beyond any that ever existed on the face of the globe. But wo must not expect too much. We must occasionally be visited by misfortune. I believe, however, that the general principles upon which we are acting are sound ones. I believe that the Government have on this occasion pursued a course which will entitle them to the gratitude of the country. I see nothing to be altered in our general laws, and I hope that this house, at all events, will not tamper with the great principles of a sound currency. (Cheers.) Mr. DISRAELL—I trust that in discussing this question we shall abstain from that vague declamation which has occa sionally been indulged in upon both sides of the house, and among others by the noble lord who has just spoken, though I admit that many of his observations, liko much that falls from his lips, were worthy of our most' serious attention. What aro we asked to do to-night ? It is no ordinary demand that is made upon the House of Commons. We are asked to consent to a Bill of Indemnity for an infraction of the law, authorised by:the Government in consequence of the commer cial distress and distrust that have prevailed, and that unfor tunately still prevail. We have heard a great deal of com mittees upon commercial distress being advisable. Permit me, though very briefly, to lay before you some suggestions as to what may be the causes of the present commercial dis tress and distrust. The distress is general. It is not confined to this country, where it is extensive. All know that it pre vails in the United States. It is not peculiar to the United States, as some gentlemen who have have addressed you would seem to infer. It is European. It prevails in Ger many, in Austri t, in Denmark, in Sweden, and what is occur ring in Hamburg at this moment must be fresh in the recol. lection and the fears of many members of this house. Again, it is to be recollected that the commercial trans actions of Europe are carried on by an amount of capital that is not to be counted by millions, but by hundreds of millions. It is, therefore, a very great error—and here I entirely agree with the noble lord the member for the city— to suppose that the management of a limited portion of the currency of England could have occasioned this immense dis aster and these wide consequences, which really have origi nated, not from the mismanagement of the currency of this country, but from the mismanagement of th^ capital of Eu rope. (Hear.) Now, there is one important point which we must bear in mind in considering the Act of 1844. That Act is an Act to regulate the currency of this country. The pur port of it is in my mind irreproachable. Its object is one which every man ought to wish to secure, and the means by which that object is sought to be obttinod aro in many re spects worthy of public admiration. But is it or is it not the fact that this Act, which really is intended only to regulate the currency of this country, to establish and maintain the convertibility of the notes of the Bank of England, has never theless the effect—as I believe, the unintended effect—of greatly aggravating , commercial distr, se and distrust when they aro occasioned by the misapplication and mismanage ment, not of the currency of England, but of the capital of Europe ? (Hear, hear.) Now, I apprehend that that point has never been met throughout all these observations, which I have listened to, and I apprehend that it is a position which can be established. I say it can be shown that it is in conse quence of the machinery of the Act of 1844, though intended ' merely as a currency Act, and to h .vo a limited application to objects, no doubt, of paramount importance, that the managers of the currency of this country have been forced to treat in an identical manner and by the same means two cir cumstances totally opposite in their character, and both exor cising amost powerfuland injurious influence on the commerce and capital of this country—th is, a foreign drain and a domestic drain. I say that the Act of 1844, from the man ner in which it is framed, forces those who regulate the cur rency of this country to apply to a domestic drain exactly the same treatment which is applied to a foreign drain ; while, if there is anything which can be established by argument and an app-al to facts it is that the two sets of circumstances should be treated in an exactly contrary manner, and be encoun tered by means exactly opposite. If that point be esta blished, and if that be the sound position, then surely we may fairly consider a question of that kind without being accused by the noble lord o f wishin g to tamper with the standard of value, to inundate the country with paper money, or of desiring to recur to obsolete modes of practice, and to what took place in this country with respect to the circula tion, when, in fact, the same circumstances did not exist, and when there were not the same means of regulating th curren cy. The noble lord has made a very great appeal toe night to the disastrous year of 1525, when ho informed us that 700 banks were broken in the same morning, I believe. (A laugh.) The noble lord was not then the Prime Minister of this country, and though no man is better acquainted with its history than the noble lord, yet I think that on this occa sion he has trusted too carelessly to his memory ; for at that disastrous period, not 700 country banks, but 73 banks alto gether, in London and in the country, broke, and by no means were the majority of these banks of issue. Therefore I do not think that that illustrative warning bears very much on the question we ought to consider this evening. (A laugh.) But this year of 1825—this phantom of ancient distress con stantly raised in our debates—has really very little to do with the modern principles of banking, and the means by which the currency of this country is new carried on. It is v ery easy to abuse the Bank direct ors of that day for what occurred, but wo must remember that in 1825 it was quite impossible for the directors of the Bank of England to avail themselves of those resources witch yon now aro always ready to remind them are at their disposal to guard their accounts by raising the rate of discounts. In 1825 you allowed the usury laws to prevail, and it was impossible for the Bank to have a higher rate of discount than 5 per cent. Tborefere the year 1825 Worn to eircumetancos Which 119 ; 1 8 "ts Ilonger prevail in our laws and manners, and I protest against the quotation of the year 1825 for the future in any currency debate. (Hear.) Now, let us refer to the point before us. We are in a state of great commercial distress and distrust. I entirely agree with the noble lord on this point, that to suppose that the great commercial distress which now pre vails could have been occasioned by the mismanagement of the currency of this or any ether country is like supposing that a greatuobleman could be ruined by the mismanagement of his pocket money, (Hear, hear.) The fact is, we are mis taking and . liave for a long time too easily mistaken, in all these discussions capital for currency. But though the com mercial distress and distrust are entirely occasioned by the management and application in this country, in America, and in the European nations, of the great mass of floating capital which prevails, still, at the same time, we cannot con ceal from ourselves that we have a law in this country intended only to act on our currency, and which, so far as the principle it asserts is concerned, Lhepe the vast majority of this house willmaintain, but which, whenever commercial distress and distrust occur, is found entirely unendurable, oppressive, and imeracticable, and on every occasion' of emergency we are obliged to suspend it. (Hear.) The noble lord who has just addressed the house, and who has addressed it with peculiar authority on this subject, since he was the very first Minister who recommended the violation of the statute, has referred to the two occasions in a brief space of time when this Act was suspended ; but, if he would refresh his recollection from the evidence taken before the committee of last year, to which c instant reference has been made during this debate, he will find that practically, or virtually at least, the suspension of this Act is not to be confined to those two instances, memo rable as they are ; because in the autumn of 1856 there was a a very great pressure, and the precious metals were leaving this country—one of the causes, by-the-bye, of our present embarrassment, and consequent on the expenditure for the Russian war. The pressure on the money-market was ex treme; the rate of discount was raised —and wisely raised— by the directors of the Bauk of England, and by the prudent and courageous manner in which in that instance, as subse quently, they managed their affairs, the danger for the moment was averted. But we have the evidence of Mr. Chapman, and that is no inconsiderable testimony, as all acquainted with the subject will admit. Well, he by whom the force of a money pressure is always felt, who represents the greatest discount house in Lombard-street, says that had it not been for some private information which reached him to the effect that in case of extreme pressure there would be au inference on the part of the Go vernment, he should at that moment have given up the idea of struggling any further, and it was only on that tacit understanding that he went on with his business. (Hear, hear.) Remember who gave that evidence. He is the very individual whose representations, if I am rightly informed, in 1857 as well as in 1847, induced the Minister of this country to recommend the suspension of this Act. (Hear, hear.) The question naturally arises what is the effect of allowing the currency of this country to be regulated by an Act which we are in a continual state of being prepared to suspend ? So entirely do I admire the object of that Act, so anxious am I myself to hope that a large majority of this House is pre pared to uphold the practicable and virtual convertibility of the note, that I should be most anxious to interpret the ma chinery of the Act in a manner the most favourable to its co etinuance, and to the non-necessity of alteration. I would pass over one crisis, in which its provisions had been sus pended, with what I should consider a wise indulgence, but it becomes the committee deeply to consider whether it will sanction a chronic state of suspension —whether we arc to have an Act of such a character as always either to be sus pended, or to be in that state in which those who are acting under it knew that when an emergency arises it will not be put in practice. Is thut wise ? (Hear.) " But," says the noble lord, "on the whole that is the course I recommend." The noble lord loves a precedent. He sets a precedent in this instance himself, and I can easily understand the tender regret with which the noble lord would, at the same time, witness that we had •turned from that precedented, and as it were passed some censure, mild, I am sure, on the sagacity of his conduct in 1847. But the noble lord says that this Act is a consider able cheek on what he calls over-speculation and an inflated currency, which in times of prosperity abound. I am sorry to hear from the noble lord that our periods of prosperity aro always necessarily to be accompanied by such distress, but when the noble lord so fairly tells us what are the con sequences of increased circulation—when he tells us that, unless we have these considerable checks, the currency will be greatly increased—there will be no check on the issues of the Bank—a crisis will arise, the circulation will be inflated, and there will, in fact, be no 'standard of value, I may be permitted to say to the noble lord with all respect, that though these were opinions once held by persons of consider able reputation, and for aught I know may be still adhered to by persons of considerable repute, yet they are con clusions the authenticity of which is entirely impugned by authorities of a more novel nature than perhaps the noble lord may be aware of, and of no less high a character than any to which the noble lord could appeal. Many high authorities have held that the depreciation of a bank-note convertible at par is a simple impossibility, and they have also held that it is quite out of the power of any bank to issue beyond the requirements of the country, and what is still more important, is that it is not in the power of any one to prove that any i‘sue at any tine has ever affected the price of articles. Nay, more, we have con clusive evidence in our possession that the rover.° is the fact. Now really, Sir, under these circumstances I must protest against the noble lord so freely, and in that style of declamation which he can command even upon a curreillY question, lending his authority to a principle which I believe to bo quite fallacious, and to conclusions which I believe to be untenable, and to details which I think he will find him self totally unable to substantiate. But, says the noblelord, " this Act is a check upon the over-speculation of the day, and although there may be some objection to the mode in which that check is exercised, still the benefit which results _ _ from it is indubitable." But when the noble lord talks of this Act operating as a beneficial check, while the Govern- meet may interfere with the period of is being carried out, let me ask the house to consider one point which I think has not been fairly taken into considerat;on during the course of this debate. If the house be prepared to sanction and coun tenance this dispensing power to be exerted at the arbitrary Will of the Minister of the day, how does it propose to recog nise the difference of position between those firms who fall victims before the dispensing power is exercised ? Are those who hold on a favoured 24 hours struck upon the clock of the Royal Exchange of London to dominate over those with _ _ whom they ought to be fellow-victims? (Hear, hear.) Let me remind the house that when we discuss this question and perhaps discuss it too easily as regards those whohavo fallen, it might perhaps be as well to go a little into detail, for it is only through detail that the house can realise some idea of the consequences of this fear and distrust in London and the other great marts of commercial enterprise. Now, hero io w cinernmPnt with which I have been furnished, and I will answer for its being correct and accu rate, although r cannot answer for its being complete, be cause there are names of many victims with rega d to whom the amounts for which they have fallen have nut yet been ascertained ; but here is a document of desolation in my hand, the contents of which I think will surprise even those gentlemen connected with the commerce and monetary transactions of the country who have addressed us to-night. It is a return of the number of firms which have fallen be. tween the 7th of September and the 12th of NJvamber, a period of little more than two months, and among those firms there are some of no inconsiderable import ince, and. some which ranked, as far as capital can be a test of position, in the highest class Xi mercantile repute. In that brief period I find that no lass than 85 firms fell which represented a capi al of 42,000,000/. sterling, and, with the exception of firms representing 8,600,000 of money, those mercantile este,. blishm , nts fell before the letter of November, some of them a few days, even hours, before that letter. (Hear, hex".) Now if we aro to leave the law in this state, I really think that it becomes us calmly, but earnestly and seriously, to consider what is the operation of the policy, what the state of the ad ministration in this country which thus conducts and controls its commerce. I have heard statesmen to-night, and among them the noble lord the member for London, who do not shrink from the responsibility of exercising this dispensing power. I must say that the right hon. gentleman, tho Chancellor of the Exchequer, showed more modesty, and displayed his reluctance to exercise such a responsibility, by intimating the possibility upon his part of making some suggestion which w,,uld avoid a responsibility so terrible. A man must have great confi dence in himself, in his position, and in his character who, under cir _umstances such as I have described, when 85 firms representing a capital of 40,000,000/., had fallen within so short a period, would, as a Minister of the Crown, have no re;uciance in deciding when to interfere. (Hear, hoar.) I am deeply conscious that every English statesman is sin cerely anxious to do his duty to his conntry, and I can readily conceive the terrible anxiety with which a Minister under such circumstances might consult some eminent capitalist, perhaps one of his principal supporters, and ono whose mer cantile knowledge and intelligence had been of great assist ance, I won't say in preparing a budget, but in furnishing details for the assistance of a Minister in framing his financial scheme. I am not making any personal allusion, but I sin only supposing the general position in which a Minister may be placed. Well, then, suppose the Minister to consult such an individual. It may be of the utmost importanca to a man engaged in commercial pursuits that the suspending power should be delayed for 24 hours, or precipitated by that period, in order to destroy a rival or to save himself. The con sequences of such a course I need not dwell upon. I know that such a case may not happen, but would it be wise in us to sanction a law which might, under any circumstances, lead to consequences of such a character ? I am sure that the House will ralect deeply upon the difficulty which now surrounds us, that they will recollect the contents of the startling document to which I have alluded, and that they will feel that it is no child's play to bear responsibility on such a sub ject—a subject which I say is the last with regard to which the responsibility of a Minister of the Crown ought to be exercised, It is a responsibility almost beyond the endur ance of any individual, and one which is totally alien to the character of the constitution of this country. (Hear, hear.) Yon have thought a dispensing power with regard to civil and political rights unbearable, and you have changed a dy nasty rather than submit to it, and are you prepared now to extend to a Minister such a power with regard to a subject which in this country touches you, perhaps, more nearlythan either civil or political rights? Where commercial and mone tary interests are concerned, are you prepared to submit quietly to a dispensing power, exercised arbitrarily at the discretion of the Minister, the exercise of 'which even when most virtuously employed may be unjust in its application and. ruinous in its results ? (Cheers.) I think, therefore, that it is most desirable that we should take some course to prevent a repetition of the transactions of 1847 and 1857. I think the time has arrived in which we ought to exert ourselves to solve a difficulty which may be great, but one which we ought not to evade but which we ought to endeavour t 3 surmount, and I regret that I see no disposition on the part of Govern ment to undertake the task. That such appears the ease I re gret the more because I think that all that has been said upon the subject during the present session might have tended to prove to her Majesty's Ministers there wos no desire in any quarter to throw any obstacle in the way of the full excereise of their discretion, but that, on the contrary, there was every wish to assist them to a solution of the difficulty which would redound to their honour. We are to-night asked to agree to a Bill of Indemnity; now, I said yesterday, perhaps rather inadvertently, that my consent to that bill would depend upon the line taken by the Government with respect to the act itself. I forgot that the bill was not a Bill of Indemnity for Ministers alone, but also an indemnity for the Bank directors. Now, I don't think that any one can im p u g n the conduct of the Bank directors. There is no evidence before us that the Bank directors required this interference; and in 1847, net only did they not only solicit the Government for a suspen sion of the act , on the contrary; they did not avail them selves of its suspension, but disapproved the course which had been adopted, and maintained the convertibiiity of the note. I have reason to believe that in the present instance the directors of the Bank have acted in the same magnanimous spirit ; and if, at the suggestion of the Government, they have consented to take an illegal step, I think, whatever may be our differences of opinion on the general subject,. it would be cowardly and vindictive to throw any obstacle in the way of their indemnity. So far, therefore, as the Bill of Indemnity i s asked, I am prepared to accede to the request of the Go vernment, but further than that I cannot afford my consent. I think the Government have taken an erroneous step, not withstandug the high authority just expressed is their favour by the noble lord in recommending that the house should again appoint the committee to consider this question. I must repeat my belief that there is no subject which can pouch the attention and cousidtiratin 0 public pros on almosto Bwsu egvy tfaoefrth asib in which there exists oven such a surplusage of knowledge and information as upon the principles on which the currency of this country should be established, and on -which it has of late years been carried on;"and that any attempt - , to postpone the solution of the grave difficulties which surround it by further inquiry will lead to great public inconvenien ce , -pos sibly to great public disaster. I think we ought to show no hesitation in meeting those difficulties that we ought to give our best consideration not only to the passing, but the itnree. diate passing of some, measure which will prevent the future necessity of appealing to this house for bills of indemnity to her Majesty's Ministers for such acts as that in respect - of which they now deeM it necessary to ask us to support them. I have endeavoured to call the attention of the house to what I think the vital point in this bill which requires our con sideration. lam for supper:Mg the spirit of the bill as far as it maintains the convertibility of the notes which the, Bank issnes. I would do, that completely, sincerely, and in no spirit of equivocation, but believing as I do that the law by its enactments forcing the Bank to treat a foreign' and a domestic drain by the same means, not only occasions, but agsravates distress and distrust among the commercial classes of this country, I think we ought to meet that difficulty ; by remedying the law in that respect. Let the house realise to it self oue great differene 3 between a domestic and a foreign drain, With a foreign drain we have learnt by experience efficiently to core. We have never had a greater strain on our resources in that respect than we have had of late years, but by that powerful arm which the usury laws now place on the Bank of England we have been enabled to cope with that efficiently; and I therefore think there is no man in this country who has now any fear of ultimately disastrous consequences of a. foreign drain. A foreign drain is avert' unimpassioned, cal culating aeo e ssuuTiOnludttsrr, countries s isr a eeoa n qns d uoeinr i l we p ahon o i unde which haiaseli calculation. t e ta i di e do s 0: n i . culating transaction. It is founded, on a knowledge Of our mankind a s ewe and inexorabledoe ; w lmoil nm l tea i shonset the n tnmyhi toceta f uhbr td o m i yec i v e oaa : tedmitn g hnr / to a domestic drain you have to encounter elements of a' e 7ri di e ff e e e i p • l e a S e c on l u l t a s, r eo a nf e te t fe e rsa r. r annTt into hope hoop morale calculation go v q e u r n ali m t the exchange are not free fy,om the influence of those pas. sions, and when you have circumstances in which a •whole nation, is panic struck you cannot hope by the aid of economic science succe.ssfully_to.encounter them. It is therefore the duty of Parliament to remedy the deficiencies of the law in that respect. But I cannot believe we have any chance of obtaining that remedy if wo consent to the emirs° suggested by her Majesty's Ministers. In 1840 the whole question of a bank of issue was gone into by a committee which, whether we look to the reputation of the members who formed it, 0 r the high character of the witnesses called before it, produced a volume inferior in interest to none in this house:- In 1847, after, the panic, you had a committee to inquire into the same subject and into the influence of this very Act of 1844. At the beginning of last year a third committee was appoint ed, and its transactions are before you. What more canyon want ? All the more distinguished writers of the day on pub lic and political economy have favoured the country with their speculations on this subject. There is no new writer before us, and I think therefore the time has come when we ought to settle this question. What is the -use of a govern ment if it cannot settle this qUestion? (A laugh) What is the use of a House of Commons if it cannot animate and inspire a government? (Laughter, and an ironical cheer.) There aro some men who think that members of Parliament are only made to form Parliamentary committees ; but it is only a prpparatory, though a very useful, training to accumulate in telligence in that way, to sift evidence and draw conclusions. There is something higher and more necessary ; that is, to re commend a policy; and I think the time has come when we ought to recommend a policy. (Cheers.) Now, the right hon. gentleman the Chanceller of the Exchequer has uo wish that there should be any great de'ay in passing this Bill of Indem nity. I wish to meet him in that respect frankly and in the most friendly spirit; but I hope the right hon. gentleman will not really and practically hold if we give him this Bill of ' Indemnity that Parliament was only called together for that object. The right hon. gentleman has a motion on the paper for a committee. If he would only settle the night on whichto take that motion for a committee I would move to that motion an amendment the purport of which would be, without, of course, pledging myself at this moment to its exact phraseo logy, to express the opinion of the house that it is expedient to legislate on the subject, and not to refer it ,to a select com mittee. If the right hon. gentleman will say this day week for his committee, I will assist him to the best of my power in carryinghis bill ; and on this day week, if he will move the committee, I will endeavour in a manner befitting the portance of tho subject to ask the house to consider whether, under all the circumstances of the case, it is expedient that this question should be referred to a select committee, and whether it is not wiser to proceed at once to legislate on the subject. (Hear, hear.) The CHANCELLOR of the EXCHEQUER could not but acknowledge the fairness with which the right hon. gentle man had treated the subject, and the disposition he had shown to facilitate the business before the house. Undoubt edly, the passing of the Indemnity Bill was the main object for which Parliament had been assembled at this time, and formed the principal business which the Government wished to forward. If the house consented to allow the bill to be introduced that evening, he would propose the second read ing for Monday, and would bring forward his motion for a committee on Friday. He hoped that arrangement would suit the convenience of the house. (Hear, hear.) Per. haps he would be permitted to refer for a moment to a question of fact which had been adverted to by the ri g ht hon . gentleman the member for Oxfordshire , and also b y the ri g ht hon. gentleman opposite (Mr. Disraeli). He alluded to the statement made before the committee o f la st session by Mr. Chapman, the managing membe r of the house of Overend and Gurney. At the present moment ho had not the report of the committee before him, and therefore he quoted from memory; but his recollection of the evidence given by Mr. Chapman was, that on some occasion he had received an as surance from a gentleman on whom he placed reliance that in the event of their house discounting to a large amount they might rely on the suppo tof the Government. A ques tion was put as to the authority on which that statement was made, and he did not assert that he had received any direct communication from the Government. It was possible that his (the Chancellor of the Exchequer's) recollection might not be very precise as to the words used ; but, be that as it might, he thought it right to state that no such communica tim as Mr. Chapman mentioned was ever made by the present Government either to the house of Overend and Gurney or to any other similar discounting-house whatever; (Hear.) Ha wished to assure the house in the broadest terms that could be used that the statement of Mr. Chapman, and the impression of the person to whom be referred, had no autho rity from the Government, and must have originated in an entire misapprehension. (Hear, hear.) Mr. CARDWELL said the arrangement proposed by the Chancellor of the Exchequer led to the inference that the discussion of the groat question before them would be taken rather on the motion for a committee than on the bill which was about to be introduced. H e acquiesced in the make till F en ri t da an y d no w x o t u . ld reserve any observa tionsw isd o he h f a t d h t a o t r ak m The resolution was then agreed. The house resumed ; leave l n lo t r h o e f btiblio, .Exchequer,ditwasb r r o o a u d gh a t d in ro a t c t c i o ni rd o, - in was gl y g b i v y e t u h to e Chance bring i and ordered to be read a second time on Monday. ACCIDENTS ON RAILWAYS.' On the motion of Mr. BENTINCR, a committee was agreed to to inquire into the causes of accidents on railways, and into the possibility of removing any such causes by further leg Ts. lation. NEW WRIT. On the motion of Mr, Cnzernam, a new writ was ordered to issue for Ashton-under-Line for the election of a member in the room of Mr. Hindley, deceased. The house adjourned at a quarter to 12 o'clock. PARLI.AMENTARY PROCEEDINGS. NOTICES OF MOTION—Money, DEC. 7. Mr. WAREENT,—To ask the First Lord of the Admiralty, whether his attention has been called to a recent Naval Court Martial held ou an officer of her Majesty's ship Juno; and whether any steps aro contemplated by the Government in respect thereto ? Mr. SCOTT—Tho 69. h Regiment being quartered at Ply mouth, to ask her Majesty's Government, what was the ad vantage and also the expense of moving it from Plymouth to Portsmouth by rail, to embark there, in order to return by sea to Plymouth before departing for the East Indies, andby whose authority it was done ? . ninon', DEC. 8. Mr. YouNa—To ask the Secretary of the Treasury, 'what steps htvo been taken to prevent the interruption of the steam mail service with Australia which is likely to be occa sioned by the accident to the ship Emu ; and what provision will be made in future to prevent de'ay in this service, in case of accidents to ono of the steam-ships engaged in the trausmis ion of the Mails between Australia and Suez. Mr. W. VANSITTART,—To ask the President of the Board of Control, whether, during the tenure of the Governor-Gene ralship of India by the Marquis of Dalhousie any recommen dation was made by, or desp ,tch sent from the Supreme Go vernment or tlio Commander-in-Chief in India to the Court of Directors or to the President of the Board of Control for an increase of European troops, in consequence of the exten sion of the British territories in the East, by the acquisition of the Punjaub, Pegu, Nagporo, Oudo, Sattara, Jhansi, Berm., and other districts, assigned to the East India Company by his Highness the Nizam of Hyderabad ; if so, what was the date of such recommendation or despatch. and what was the date and tenor of any reply that may have been sent ; was aay additional force of Europeans despatched to India in con sequence, during the period refarred to; and, if so, what number of men were sent. DEATH OF CHARLES TRAIN, THE DETECTIVE-OFFICER Yesterday morning Mr, P,aeson, the City Solicitor, re. revved information that this active city detective-officer expire i in Guy's Hotpital, at 1 o'clock from tho wounds received on being shot by Christian Sattley, on board tho Caledonian steamer, while bringing him a prisoner from Hamburg. ITALIAN OPERA..—The talented corps of operatic per. formers on whom wo last week had occasion to comment, concluded their engagement in Bath on Saturday night, with Verdi's opera, "II Trovatore." The favourable impression produced on the public mind by their previous appearances here was amply confirmed by the artistic skill which was manifested throughout the representation of this fine work. Mr. Sims Reeves, as Manrico, was all that could be wished. Impassioned or tender, defiant or pathetic, as the exigencies of the genius particularly not c d o ra n m an a e r d eq t o u i r t e h d e , h e e eie d n e c m e o w ns h t i r c a h ted ha t s h a more His vocalisa. but that he also pos. s b o e s en ees th o e on o s b id j e e r c a t h o le f tion was on this occasion singularly happy , and we histrionic ri o study,nic p owers. have seldom heard him in better voice, or seen him in a more genial mood. Madame Gassier, too, sang with her accustomed energy—throwing all her force, both of singing and acting, into the scene, and, succeeding in placing before the audience a most vivid representation of Leonora, the heroine of the drams. Of course, the chief triumph was t h e eels oscneel point lle ot in be grandest of o e r ff ig ec in ts al i i n ty th o e f M d ecidedly iserere" treatment e n ' t ' whole range of operatic music. The impression left by it, as interpreted by these artistes, aided by the accessories of an excellent band and chorus is indelible. It was raptu rous l y d emluded a secon d time, and the request of the audience was complied with. Madame Borchardt, as Azucena, ably supported the character, and Mons. Borchardt threw grea t energy into the representation of the Count de Luna. How is that the operatic " villain" is invariably the e ev d o e lved th on the basso ? Is there analogy, of a mates tones and the degradation of i The subordinate parts of the ope d ra we r r i e eei sustained by Signori Pierini a d n Chez ici. The chorus and ban . and the grouping of the OVID great attention • to scenic carefully studied. principal members of the audience in testimony this intellectual ren derin g betweenhs tmorady t very respectably nd Madame were full ' and efficient, • soldiers , &0., showed -- - " ' and had evidently been effect, At the cionclusien of the opera, the of the company received the plaudits of entire satisfaction with of Verdes masterpiece.—Bage and Clieltenliffrn OGate.