The Sun. — London, England, 1847-06-16 00:00:00

tit Q ittle ; d 0,., Was precisely an internal quarrel, arieing- Ittn e _u_esti• O causes, and could not, therefore, justify Neeee,r_terence on the part of any other country. tee eo , 4 ,nnilY at a loss to understand what poesible dan t° eee s". 4 lave come over the minds of the Government Oot - nce them that what was wrong on the 6th of e s .d7 W S S right on the 6th of April; or how the Noble tlea s ,i f t t the head of th e F o reign Department, had suc b e l o ln Convincing himself that the arguments which p e a of r rsed were entirely fallacious. Up to the pe ti e s th of April, the interference was only that mediator ; but, after that period, it became ar leeticilPtervention; up to that period there was no L " oomplaiuin of the want of impartiality on Part of this g but that "E N country, after the matter took 1 4 Zuerent turn • it was no longer a mediation, but eftetel l.ti on accompanied by an armed intervention. firmsn,_ were tendered to the Crown, upon the ac tteek 1 7 of which the Government were ready to pro t° til l . l , t _N 3 ole the refusal, on the part of the Queen, We ep - retn those terms, the Government could with- Si f rom its ineffectual attempt at interference. The the s e7f by the Government to the Junta was this : tot s Zu the terms presented ; accept them ; if y o u do tlte rt ii9t the ter ms w ithout limitation, and without otnr we will come down upon you with the forces IltaZ a ce and Spain , and c o m p el y ou to accept them. p ftrti all equitable interference between two conte nd- Sti e ea, struggling together ou an affair purely do ,and internal internal ?—(Hear, hear.) The state of the 4 104 ar tily was described by Sir H. Seymo ur and the Wylde as miserable in the last extreme ; flecitsver the Queen's troops went they carried off the the Junta the crops of the country, while the troops of tite se ''",te were well fed and well clothed. It was under toje t : r cnrastances that the Government thought proper in conjunction with the forces of France and ha ki 130 der these circumstances it was that the Go ttgst e nt had sanctioned an invasion of the soil of Por ?he ; !mad could their Lordships tell him upon what i tt Was that the Government vindicat ed by eelt Tressive interference with this country— kote: country which had hitherto been t he hy. :elm of liberty. He had heard some reasons stat ed they s country should interfere, but he thought tha t twer e he er e based upon such low grounds that no states t 7Ould venture to interfere. It had been sa id that feti4l c ountry did net interfere other nation s would. kfe r f e°ll ntries? France or Spain? Would they have tt Itoekreti without the sanction of England? If so, ere lt not be the duty of Eegland to prohibit such in. itte ke „ nne ? But he did not believe that any such inter h would have taken place on the part of France, otte r , felt confirmed in this opinion by the statement to p Guizot, who expected the return of Don Miguel i thkr a gel, and, in the event of such a n occurrence the Place, the Government of France would apply t o %%ries to the Quaduple Alliance upon the subject, nth s a t that Government was ready to concert measures 1 4 _4 e tt Paitl, Portugal, and England. In a dispatch dated 1.L.a„. 0 f August, from M. Guizot to Lord Pa lmerston, lake ee ' lz ot admitted that the treaty of the Q uadru p le Al "IS not at all applicable to the affairs of Por 'Me Sir H. Seymour, when he got credit for i.npar the " though he appeared to lean towards I llpp e a r alls e of the Queen of Portugal, and to 'ta t the intentions of the British Government, that the French Minister at Lisbon had o ffered the aid of France, and that it had been declined. On th e new sreaching England, Lord Palmerston called upon he et. :eneh Ambassador for an explanation, and in reply lauk t c re that it was a mistake to say that the support -`Kae of France had been offered to the Queen of eor- Rear.) So much for France. The interference tvele„ ; 4l The interference of Spain, in her present thj e i,, s "cn, in the affairs of Portugal ! That Spain should Wh v ''', ll ,. to interfere at all was altogether impossible. bldi"the Government had said, " the first Spanish ttithei that crosses the frontier will he the signal of war Ilef eee ngland," did they think that Spain would have so ls, e "fgetten herself, and her lamentable condition, as to liobl aell t a single soldier across the frontier ? (The k ite e Lord here read a dispatch from the Spanish Mi lieselare stating that the Queen of Spain would adopt no (14: 8 Course without the consent of England. — that and cheers.) Everything, therefore, showed 4 .ve lain would not act independenlty o f En g land, t i ti the cause of the Queen of Portugal was unaided 4 01,1 a rms of England, and Spain had marched an the i nto Portugal, such an act would hav e p rotracted Its p P e ' e sent state of the country, and wou ld have caused eit t °pie t o r i se up against such an invasion , a nd a war /it 0h e most disastrous and bloody character would have 14, 1, n 1 ee broken out between the two countries. They tioe.; s ° wever, undoubtedly succeeded in their interven kee'e .4 had they advanced any nearer the final settle- Wh;, of the question in which they had interfered? had they gained for Portugal? what had they for themselves?—(Hear, hear.) Had they gained Pe 114ra°nal gratitude of the sovereign of Portugal? 14 0 , er a Ps they might; they had saved hr throne, which ke llt __was in danger except from her own misg overn- Il ls (Hear, hear) —they had saved her throne, which kii nl ight have saved herself by a proper cours e of 'I; but w hil st t h ey had save d the throne, they had 1 4 ,411, witted the sovereign--(Hear, hear)—she bad been atuj 7 of a long course of unconstitutional ac t s , te ed had exasperated her people.—(Flear, hear.) Poo °I V, then, gained the affections of the % i t of Portugal ?—(f leer.) Did they think they had which had the old feeling of attachment and friendship an t i - , - had heretofore subsisted between this country of lit-ortugal ? Had they not rather given to the people ev er nagal henceforth reason to say, " Tyranny may , tse its way in Portugal, secure that at the last mo• imn t itwill be protected from the just consequences of the l i gnation of the people by the interfere nee of forces moil by England.—(Cheers.) henceforth the liberty P e e !reedom of Portugal are but shadows—but a name. b e..... ' .l ;hwever unanimous the feelings of the nation may h es. c owever determined their struggle fur liberty, and li p rsuccessful the result—at the last moment p r tY will be snatched from them by the interference of ll ra nee and Spain, aided by Councils, and by the arm s of g a , n d•—(Cheers.) England is no longer ou r power ful"il% under whom we were said to rest, and of whose timeecthll " were sure when oppressed." From this enee e i et :Y would look upon England as leagued with her e evheth Inquire .—(Hear, hear.) He did not stop to were fair and whether d by Eneland the terms propose faith fully carried out, equitable, whether they would be faith hether the national lovers of freedom might . , be satisfied, whether the Junta would have acted Otherwise than they had expressed themselves, but he could not forbear inquiring when they anticipated that w hether could withdraw their forces from Portugal, and t w o nether, when they bad done so, those of France might t enter the country, whether it was not probable that 4' the voice of the nations of the continent they might called upon to continue that intervention to a greater t " ) :•tent than they could now anticipate? By the treaty h afi eY were pledged to afford aid to the Queen until she dTh a e,complished the pacification of her dominions, but hat stipulation mean the total suppression of the po wer 710 w arrayed against the Queen —the suppression n civil rebellion - ; or did it mean the removal of the eau sh e -S es which had led to this outbreak ; or did it mean e sr , Pacification of the people, not . . physical . but tn.:Cat!. o n a s n mental, and the conciliation of the of the people of Portugal ? Did they the to frame the laws of the country, to interfere in t e elections, to interfere in the internal affairs of For . - e ti P l —that the tribunals of justice should not be prosta t etCl to power —that the voters should not be overborne Of 1 , 13 , 1- ce, or prostituted by the bribery or undue influence ) Government? but if they did not do this, they 11 - I; e e no guarantee to the people of Portugal that their onf . e t Y would be protected. Then with re s p ect to the r encesuppose it should consist of Costa Cabral •;:r e a nd others of the extreme party, how would they act? they prepared to see another revolution commence, i wi l ie by the exerc i se o f th e i r au th o rity to protect public To hi e a nd to make themselves rulers and arbitrators? ch er . i nL it appeared an intervention of an intolerable fa r ; but it seemed to him that it would become more intolerable if they were going to do all this, 1 0 . He saw nothing but embarrassment and jea "„szea, which they would find it difficult to t e niave. He hoped that the faith of the Crown might Maintained—that the electoral law might be passed ▪ that the Cortes might be summoned—and that they might respect the feelings of the peop le ; he ho p ed that t hose feelings would not carry them b e y ond p atience, and. h , lead them to the adoption of ex treme measures. what had been done was irredeemable, and must be execrated ; and if, on the contrary to his apprehensions, it led to a restoration of tranquillity and the establish ment of constitutional liberty in Portugal, he should be Clad. He, however, felt confident in his own mind, that the course they were now pursuing was impolitic, and he could not think it consistent with his own duty to shrink from bringing the subject forward, and he trusted their Lordships would not consider it consistent with their duty to abstain from vindicating themselves I in the eyes of the world and in the eyes of posterity against a participation in the course which aer Majesty's Government were pursuing, and that they Would express their sense of the reckless injustice of the course which the Government had pursued, and that t►et th ewould vote against that which appeared to him a n ofgreat injustice, and at variance with the fundamen tal principles of the laws of nations. (The Noble Lord resumed his seat amidst loud cheers after submitting his motion to the House.) The Marquis of LANSDOWNE thought it his duty t o offer his most decided protest against the motion of the Noble Lord. When the Noble Lord, in adverting to t he cruelties which had been committed, stated that Mr. IS outheron had been most active in alleviating them , he f orgot to state that his conduct had been directed and Pai Llted out by her Majesty's Government. He f elt, in entering upon this subject, he was not called upon by ti uY observations made by the Noble Lord to vindicate the expediency, under certain circumstances, of interfer g in the affairs of other nations. Altho u g h the opi nion that n o i nter f erence in the quarrels and discords of Othe r nations should take place had been always held by a Be e man minority in this country, yet all those who de fervenl the n ame of good and sound politic ians, were in Of the contrary principle, and thought that sosn'etention in the affairs of other nations was Iu e4 ,, l nes not only expedient but necessary. call me first instance, he felt it necessary to whiche attention of their Lordships to the relation in 1)e this country stood with respect to Portugal. That s llliar connexion was founded upon the geographical tie o l We ns of the two countries, and upon the system of ti e ranle rce which was carried on, and for ages that rela ierre. They , ; _n had remained nearly the same down to the present e 3, practically knew that in the more distant coun a _r, such as Japan or China, the consequence of wars r p . r evolutions could not affect this country, but expe rience b ee tau ght them that in no ono instance had Po rtu g al thetouched with ou t i mme di a tely and strongly affecting :te e Interests of this country. The Noble Lord had, in course of his observations, inferred that this country was not only a consenting party, but gave that approba-_ was implied by silence to that course of n til _ _ th e ',. , ,tan_ces which had been described as leaditrg ;0 disturbances which had taken place. . They were h i;, to refrain from giving any indications . whic "" " Matrkted into a support of the proceedings of consider also what course it was fitting to pursue with reference to the . general interests of humanity, and the r estoration of aomcstic peace in a country in the internal peace of which we were entitled to take a deep interest. Was there a prospect of an early termination of these quarrels ? Were not parties so equally balanced, that this conflict having continued from the 7th of October, there was every probability that, if we and other powers also stood aloof,—if we had said to the Portuguese, " You shall fight it out," we must have been witnesses of a terrible struggle, impeding industry, engendering per manent discord between members of the same nation, almost members of the same family, without a prospect of any termination, through the superiority of one party or the other.—(Cheers). I wish to take nothing what ever for granted. I wish to state to the House what is the evidence which has brought me to the conclusion that, had I been a member of the Government, having to act in the latter days of March, lam by no means pre pared to say that I would not have taken the course which, under great difficulties, her Majesty's Govern ment finally determined to take.—(Cheers). After the free and unrestricted communication of every letter writ ten at an early period, it were easy, from the pens of those who wrote dispatches and the mouths of those who uttered opinions, to convict Government apparently on their own evidence. Up to the sth of April you de precated intervention. You thought it unwise ; you wished to prevent France and Spain from intervention ; of course you used every argument against it; but when necessity forced on you intervention, then, no doubt, the I arguments you used against intervention appeared ap plicable to your own course; and it would be easy in this way to convict you of inconsistency and condemn you on that account. But, admitting the policy of ab staining from intervention ourselves, and discouraging intervention on the part of France and Spain, the simple question is, whether, towards the latter end of March, a change of policy was not rendered necessary by the state of the case?—(Cheers.) I look to the question, first, as far as the general interests of humanity are concerned. You cannot doubt that, with respect to this country, with which you have had treaties for 400 years, you might abstain from all interference on the most rigid principle of non-intervention. You might say, "We have misery enough on our own hands; we have distress enough in the west of Scotland; we will not encumber ourselves with the responsibility of interfering in Portugal; we will not interfere." A Government might take that course; but I venture to say, if you had taken that course other countries would have interfered, and in their interference they would have carried with them the sympathies of half of Europe.—(Cheers.) Portugal has special claims on us. She stood on our side in the greatest conflict that ever threatened the repose and liberties of Europe; she gave us the advantage of mili tary positions from which, as at Torres Vedras, that il lustrious commander did so much to achieve ultimately the liberties of Europe.—(Cheers.) It is impossible you can view with indifference or disregard the position of Por tugal. I admit it is not enough that the motive is good; I must show that the acts were calculated to promote tranquillity. What, then, was the position of Portugal, its internal position, towards the latter end of March? I take the accounts which reached the Government at the moment when the necessity for decision had arrived. Here is a dispatch from Sir Hamilton Seymour, and dates are very important. It is dated the 14th of March —received by the Government on the 22d. lam now justifying a conclusion to which I come from a reference to the condition of that country, and its imperative claims upon some interference on our part in the general interests of humanity, apart from all obligations of treaty. Sir Hamilton Seymour, writing on the 14th of March, in a dispatch received on the 22d, sa y s, " Every day serves to aggravate the miseries of the country. To present want and distress future famine will be added if those who ought to be employed in cultivating are to be en gaged in laying waste the land."—(Cheers.) But this state of things had continued from October to March. There was no sufficient superiority in either party, ap parently, to terminate the state of things. We were suffering from famine at home; and here was a country, our immediate neighbour—for in such a case the sea constitutes neighbourhood—were we to permit Portugal, on account of intestine feuds, to be laid waste, and an additional strain to be lai d o n her more happily circum stanced neighbours?—(Cheers.) Then again, on the 19th of March, Sir H. Seymour writes, in a dispatch received on the 28th, " The financial condition of the country is daily becoming wo rse ; before this reaches your Lordship the discount of notes will probably be 50 per cent. Extensive importations of corn have been lately made, the most considerable from Liverpool." Well, just consider what was the demand in the Liver pool market; what was the price of corn there; the ne cessity we had ourselves for preserving as much of Liverpool corn as we could for the maintenance of our own people.—(Hear, hear.) What must have been the condition of that people when it is said, "Of the scar city and dearness of bread you will form some idea by the fact, that the last cargoes from Liverpool were sold at a profit to the importer of 30 per cent?"—(Cheers.) That cora was sold at a profit of 30 per cent. The people who ought to have been cultivating the soil, were engaged in cutting each other's throats , wit hout the prospect of bringing that to a conclusion.—(Hear, hear.) What was to be the prospect of that country, with reference to the sustenance of the people, if that state of things was to go on; and we, relying on the principle of rigid non intervention, had refused to interfere by any act by which that state of affairs might be put an end to? — (Cheers.) The English Consul, Mr. Johnson, in a letter received by the Government on the 15th of March, states, "In Viana the authorities have seized corn; they broke open the stores of Mr. Russell, an English man. The state of affairs on the Douro is very vexa tious to our merchants; the merchants can neither bring down their wines nor send pipes or staves to Regos." Here there was a proof that the continuance of these civil commotions materially interfered with the security of British property, and by interrupting commerce di rectly affected the interests of British subjects. Now the testimony lam about to quote is very important. It is written at a subsequent date, but such was the disposi tion of the people in the very neighbourhood of Lisbon that Sir H. Seymour thus describes the plans of what he calls " the anarchists ": " The plan of the anarchists was to set fire to some old houses in various parts of the town, to force the pri son doors, and let loose some 1,200 or 1,400 prisoners. When a populous town is to be fired at various points, and when the confusion which ensues is to be increased by the presence of all the vilest malefactors in the hands of justice, it is idle to inquire what precise political ob jects are sought for, or at what exact points conflagration and excesses are to cease." Well, you had the British fleet in the Tagus ; you heard from your Minister that the plan of the anarchists was to set fire to Lisbon in different parts of the town, to discharge the vilest malefactors to the number of 1,400. I ask you if, having that fleet in the Tagus, we could remain perfectly passive, and permit Lisbon to be destroyed by the malefactors turned out of the gaols? — (Cheers.) I say nothing of the manifest intention of F ra nce and Spain to interfere. I think that the of France and Spain manifested a confidence in this country. I think that the Government cannot found their vindication on any assurance that France or Spain would interfere separately. But then I say the force of circumstances would have caused their interference. If the Queen of Portugal had said, "I will give guarantees for future good governm ent ; I will give an amnesty ; I will recal obnoxious edicts ; I intend to govern consti tutionally ;" if the British Admiral having received these guarantees, had permitted Lisbon to be fired, and malefactors to be turned out and destroy property in the streets, Spain and France would have inter fered. They would have rescued the Queen ; they would have rescued property from such depredation. I again say, the assent and sympat h y of Euro p e would have been with them, and you would have been blamed for permitting such outrages in that country which, to a certain extent, you have virtually taken under your protection. You might have been able in such a case to make out a good defence on the rigid principle of non intervention; but the blood of the British House of Com mons would have risen —(Cheers) —and you would have had no credit for your rigid adherence to the principle of non-intervention.—(Loud c h e ers.) But then again I ask, what security had you that the cause of liberty would have triumphed—what security had you tat t he that the insurgents would triump h? I say, none w. I say that the probability was that the Queen's cause would have triumphed rather than the insurgents had . Onot b serve what has taken place. Although Spain directly interfered, she had a force on the frontier. She was lending the moral authority of Spain to the Queen and her Government. She had not only marched her forces to the frontier; she had facilitated the passage of the Queen's troops through part of her dominions. Her forces on the frontier were thus ready to act. Had events taken a sudden turn, had the fortunate moment for the entrance of Don Miguel within Portugal arisen, Spain would not only have interfered, but she had a right to in terfere, and then she was prepared for that act of interference.—(Cheers.) :that she was lending the coun• tenance of the Spanish Government to the Queen of Portugal, by having her army on the frontier. A pro position was made for the enlistment of a Spanish army, to be officered by Portuguese, and employed in the cause of the Queen. You say Spain will not interfere; but Colonel Wylde . writes on the:2lst of March a dispatch received on the 28th of that month, in which he says, " Saldanha's demand to be allowed to raise a legion in Spain has been acceded to by the Government here. That was direct Spanish intervention. The Spanish Government, acting in concert with the Portuguese Go vernment, had permitted Saldanha to raise a legion to act in Portugal,—that was a direct Spanish intervention. If the authority of the Portuguese Government had been upheld, the upholding of that Govern Government as would en and ve been due to Spain. Spanish interf giv how was this to be resisted? Colonel Wyldo went on to say, " I have no doubt, if this measure is carried into effect, that none but ready-made soldiers will be enlisted, and that every facility will be afforded him by the Spa nish Government for obtaining them by allowing men to volunteer from the regular army." That was the in formation which, on the 22d of March, the Govern ment were in possession of.—(Cheers.) I take for granted that the official accounts are correct. I have no information except that which I derive from the official papers. Mr. HUME—Saldanha only demanded to be allowed to raise a legion. Sir R. PEEL —Colonel Wyldo says, " Saldanho:s has de- been man d to be allowe d to raise a legion in Spain acceded to by the Government here."—(Cheers.) Why, Government has to act on probabilities, and come to a sudden decision on information like this; and, if you found that there had been a legion of Spaniards engaged inn Portugal you would have found it too late to remon strate, and most difficult to carry any remonstrance into effect ; and, unless you chose to send a military force to Portugal, and identified yourself w ith the insurgent force a gainst that of the monarchy, you would have no means of effectual resistance against the invasion of Spain.—(Cheers.) Now, what are the indications that the insurgent cause was likely to triumph ? Sir H. Seymour, in a dispatch dated th, itith of March, re egyed the lith of Marob, says— • " Events of such nature are taking place here as to 1 And what language will you hold to the other make it evident that a crisis of s o me so r t must be at ' parties to the convention ? You declared to them hand. Marshal Saldanha writes to the Queen announcing that the necessity for interference had occurred. You his intention of resigning his seat in the Council, in the knew that no separate interference was desired, and, event either of the Queen's refusal to sanction an appli- although you denied the obligations of the quadruple cation for the assistance of Spain, or of any attempt treaty, and although you did not think a cases fcederis being made to come to terms with the insurgents." had arisen, yet, in deference to the principle of that Consider: what was the position of the Portuguese Go- treaty, by the advice of her Ministers, the Queen of Eng yernment at that time? The Queen, it is admitted, was land invited France and Spain to be parties to the inter menaced with dangers. The Commander-in- Chief and vention. When, then, you have told them that the Queen the Prime Minister had threatened to send in their re- of England can no longer fulfil her engagements, you d signations if she did not early make application to Spain not intend to prohibit them from pursuing the for assistance. How great, then, was her motive to seek policy which with you they commenced ?—(Hear, hear.) from Spain direct military assistance, when such was the After having crept out of your obligations, you do not counsel of her Ministers, and when this was the threat expect that France and Spain who entered into the agree they had made to her!—(Hear, hear.) On the 19th of ment at your suggestion, will now withdraw? You do not March, in a letter received on the 28th of March, Sir H. think that the French Government will say to the Chem- Seymour says; " I cannot doubt that an application to bers, "We interfered at the solicitation of the Queen of Spain for assistance will be made." Well, supposing the England; we were willing to give our aid; but she says Queen had been victorious, what was your guarantee in she can't fulfil her part in the convention, and she tells that case for cons titutional liberty?—(flear, hear.) us also, that it is not possible we can fulfil ours?"— There was some doubts about the result, and you will (Hear, hear.) Is it at all probable that the French find strong evidence in looking over these letters, al- Government will be guided by your resolution? No; though the Junta at Oporto was very firm, that yet the consequence will be, that Spain and France will alone there were intestine divi,eons in the Junta, that the carry out the intervention. How is the Queen of Eng people were undecided, and that in the province of Beira land to remonstrate? The very danger, therefore, that there was no wish to encourage the insurgents. With you have apprehended, viz., the exclusion of your own the Portuguese forces under the command of Saldanha, influence, and the establishment of the authority of backed by the countenance of Spain, I say that the pro- France and Spain in Portugal, will inevitably take place bability was, on the 28th of March, that the Queen under your eyes; and I defy you, in accordance with the would have been victorious.—(Hear, hear.) And when principle of any international law, to make any remon the Government was exulting in unexpected victory, what strance.—(Efear, hear.) I say it is infinitely better we security would you have had for moderation and for- should continue to act in concurrence with the other bearance or constitutional order? Observe—who would Governments, bringing to bear upon the question the have been the Government? The Government would moral influence of the three great powers who established have been composed of those who had advised the trans- the throne of Donna Maria and of the Queen of Spain. portation of the prisoners taken at Torres Vedras—of —(Hear, hear.) In deference to motives of public those who had counselled the issuing of decrees by which policy it is infinitely better we should not attempt to men taken in arms should be instantly shot. If these control the Executive Government, acting under consi things had been done in the green tree, what would have derable difficulties, by any resolution which would in been done in the dry?—(Hear, hear.) If you had re- solve a course undignified and impracticable.—(Cheers.) fused all intervention—if you had said to the Queen of It is infinitely better that we should leave the Govern- Portugal, "We stand aloof, we leave you to settle the meat to decide unencumbered and unembarrassed by our question;" and supposing she had t r i u mphed, what right advice.—(Hear.) An amendment has been moved; I would you then have had to interpose to prevent her am ready to vote against the motion without any amend reaping the fruits of the victory? My conviction is that, ment. I will deal with the subject on its abstract if you had held aloof and the Queen had triumphed, the merits. If I were a member of the Government, same motives which led to those decrees with respect to I would not take an amendment which, after arresting persons taken in arms and the transportation all, will be passing by this censure.—(Hear, hear.) To of prisoners would have again operated, and would have the principle of the motion of the Hon. Gentleman the given you no security whatever, either for the return of Member for Finsbury I have no objection; the question constitutional liberty, or even for the exhibition of decent of affirming it by the House of Commons is another forbearance or generosity towards the vanquished.— matter.—(Hear, hear.) The Government said to the (Hear, hear.) There were, too, many motives that in- Queen of Portugal, "The conditions which we must have tluenced your decision. You saw all the objections to trom you are, complete and entire amnesty and exemp intervention. You feared all the dangers of having to tion from penal consequences for every person engaged make use of a Spanish force; and , on t he other hand, in this insurrection; we ma ke no exce p tion ; we will tr y you calculated the danger of a victory of one cause over to prevent, as far as we can, any future cause for dissen the other, and all the consequences which, as we know sion, arising from the absence of a complete act of from experience, generally follow such triumphs; and I oblivion; we require you to withdraw every decree cannot, in justice, join in the condemnation of a Govern- since the 6th of October at variance with the established ment which, balancing these conflicting considerations, constitution; we also require you to constitute a Go came to the conclusion that it was, on the whole, better vernment which shall inspire general confidence, and I to make proposals which, as I admit, if rejected, led to from which we desire there shat populal be distru exclud st; ed e and, very tlone 1 the necessity of a further intervention.—(Hear.) There liable to public suspicion or r lasy. was every probability that the proposals you made would we earnestly implore you to remove that person who has have been accepted, and that no after-intervention occupied a prominent place in the palace, and whose ai would have arisen. You took that chance, and it tuation in Portugal exposes him to suspicion." These was impossible for any one or any Government to pro- were the terms on which the intervention was based; teed otherwise than on probabilities. Having prevailed and having received an assurance from the Government on the Queen's Government to offer those conditions, you of Portugal that these conditions should be fulfilled, hay had no alternative, if they were rejected, but to assist ing, moreover, invited the insurgent party to lay down her in enforcing obedience from her revolted subjects. their arms upon the assurance that those conditions There was again another danger to be guarded against; should be respected, Ido say, in concurrence with the there was the danger of France and Spain interfering if principle of the resolution, that the honour of England you remained neutral. I have already said that I think is involved in their strict observance.—(Cheers.) I the conduct, both of France and Spain, i n these negotia- think it would be a breach of faith towards the insurgent tions, proves a disposition to show every confidence in party (I regret the necessity) if you did not commit the this Government.—(Hear, hear.) They have through- ons= of England to the maintenance of the condi out evinced no inclination to obtain any adva n tage to tions which you yourselves proffered.—(Hear , hear.) t h e mselves by an interference separate from t his coun- That portion of the dispatches which gives me the best affairsassurance testimon}pp, e a s t i hay eie p e p ),, t t e h r e m n i n n s a o t termination i t t e o d these m u o n n f y o , r twu which try ; and I am glad t h a t the Noble Lord withdrew the Trench Government, in respect to a supposed desire to I find to be borne to the personal dispositions of the So have an independent intervent ion. I saw it with the verei g ns of Portu g al. I, myself, attribute the misfor greatest satisfaction, and Ido believe that, even after tunes that have occurred to the p er ni c ious advice they those unfortunate differences which had prevailed be- have rece i v ed. It is usual, :on all occasions, in eonsti tvveen this country and Fran ce, in respect to which I tutional and loyal states, to presume justice and hu think France in the wrong, there was yet every wish on man ity on the part of crowned heads; but Ido find in the part of France to take an early opportunity of ex- these papers conclusive proof that you may fairly attri pressing a desire to act in unison with us in any inter- bute the acts that Queen of have been d rtone, l not to her Coe pe sort, but to rsonal dis ferenco in the affairs of Portu g al. Ido not think positions of the Pouga or that M. Guizot ever wished, or that he ever con- the bad counsel they received from the Government of y Cabral and those who were leagued with it.—(Hear.) t e mplated, a separate inter vention, and I can hardly believe that the Minister of Louis Philippe, considering I find that Sir H. Seymour, in a dispatch of March 21, what is the foundatien of his throne—(Hear, hear)— affords an unsuspicious testimony to the good faith of would have advised a wanton or unnecessary inter- the queen and the character of the King. He says-- ference in the internal affairs of another nation.—(Hear, e The King has given a fresh proof of the wise and con hear.) Remember, however, that the Minister of France, ciliatory disposition by which he has been distinguished disposed to show confidence in this Government, did, in the Council, by addressing yesterday a letter to Mar nevertheless, declare his opinion to be that the Porte- steal Saldanha, calling upon him to make peaceful over guese Government was entitled to receive aid from the t u res to the Oporto Junta. That was the act of the Spanish Government. M. Guizot entertained an opi- King in council. His suggestion was, not an'appeal to nion, and I think a sincere one, that under the quadruple arms , but that conciliatory overtures should be made to treaty, the three Govern ments mi g ht have justified in- the insurgents.—(Hear, hear.) Those overtures were t er f er ence. Even if a cases faderis had not arisen, M. not made; but whose was the fault? That of the men Guizot said that the principle which had dictated the who threatened to resign should the course advised by signatures to that treaty still remained, and I recollect the King be taken.—(Hear.) With this evidence before particularly that he dwells on this fact—that General them, they were bound to make every allowance for the Povoas, the Miguelite General, had been admitted to conduct of their Majesties, having, as it was shown, been great influence at Oporto, and he considered that circum- placed in so critical a position. Mr. Southern says, in stance most material in justifying the Portuguese Go- againsthis disp vernment in asking aid from Spain. Therefore I gived t d h r e e s i s 3r e i d s o a n noteers takenpro a thetch terse, entire credit to the Governments of France and Spain at Torres Vedras, and that the subject had been re forone t estingo ft ransportation t h a e ti h o a n d o a t the confidence they displayed. I believe that the peatedly under deliberation in the Cabinet, and his corn object of M. Pacheco was to act cordially with us, and ment is, "I am happy to think that the benevolent I acquit M. Guizot and the French Government of any f ee lings of their Majesties induces them to support my intention to obtain particular ad vanta g es for themselves. views; but the opinion of the Cabinet , to whic h some But, in the state of things which would have ensued, if extraneous persons were admitted, finally prevailed, on such acts as those to which I have referred had been being backed by a threat of immediate resignation on the perpetrated—if Lisbon had been fired, if the malefactors part of the Ministry." Thus it was clear the Sovereign had been turned loose, then France and Spain would had interfered on behalf of the prisoners, but. those who have been fully justified in interfering, even had you directed their counsels having threatened re siguation, they refused; and I again say, that if these events had oc- were unable to effect their own charitable wishes.— a th cur red, I doubt if France an d Sp ain would not have found (Hear, hear.) Again, Sir H. S e y mour sa y s. on the support and approval in the p ublic o p inion of Europe.— o f May, speaking of the action of th e Ist of May, when (Hear, hear.) It may be to us and to our interests a the insurgents sustained a loss of 500 killed and matter of indifference what takes place in Pcrtugal ; wounded—" Many of the wounded insurgents, in cora but, consider Spain. T he d y nast y of Spain holds its piny with the wounde d of the Q ueen's forces, have been authority by nearly the same tenure with the dynasty of removed to the hospital at Lisbon. On the 3d inst. the Portugal. Spain could not depart from all consideration hospital was visited by the Queen and King, who spoke of the quadruple treaty. Placing ourselves, however, to many of the wounded, and gave special orders that in the position of Spain, seeing the identity of interests every attention should be paid to all alike:' Such evi which prevailed between the dynasty in the possession dente of justice and moderation on the part of these of the throne of Spain, and the dynasty in the possession Royal personages inspires me with the hope of the throne of Portugal, apart from the quadruple that if they are surrounded by more honest treaty, and every other consideration, I think a common , advisers there is a p ros p ect of re tur n i n g p eace interest and the necessity of p reventing anarchy in I or- and tranquillity to Portugal.—(Cheers.) Now, I trust tugal constitute a case which, itself, would justify, on that nothing I have said will lay me open to the all grounds, Spanish interference, if such a calamity as suspicion that I approve of the measures which were that of which I have made mention had occurred.— adopted by the Government of Portugal since the 7th of (Hear, hear.) And, turning to the other alternative, October.—(Hear, hear.) h6h I of tohointokbothratlBt4h6e ,the of supposing, instead of the Queen's force!, the insurgent Government on the 6th e sudden troops had been successful, I see no evidence whateverme a, and the mode in removal of the Duke de t ral 11 ' which that a greater degree o f moderation would have been t h a t r emoval was effected , wer e calculated to lessen the exe rcised in that case. I see nothing in the pro respect of the people for . the throne.—(Hear, hear.) of the Junta forces, nothing in the course e e. have come to the conclusion that on the whole e it i portion desirable that the . power of England should be exerted theyhave prevailed had they been victorious. Why, the took, to assure me that justice or generosity would for the purpose of quelling these troubles ; but I do not proposal that there should be no Commander-in- think it should be lent to giving countenance and sup. Chief, that there should be different corps acting port to arbitrary proceedings.—(Hear.) I have seen, I under different generals, and, considering that the had almost said with shame and regret, that illustrious Queen's army was in possession of Lisbon, the proposi- man, the Duke of Palmella, an exile from his own coun tion that the Government should be handed over to the try and in banishment.—(Hear, hear.) I see with regret insurgents, for them to accept any terms of accommo- that wisest politician of all the Portuguese—the man dation, convince me that in the hour of victory little who was a political ornament to his country—the man. reliance could be placed on either their moderation or who in 1814-15 was associated with the leading diplo their sense of right.— (Hear, hear.) And, therefore, I matists of Europe for the purpose of laying the founds.- leave you to choose either alternative, the triumph of dons of that general peace which has endured 27 years the Queen's cause, or the triumph of the insurgents; it —I do see with deep pain that that man, the most emi is possible you might have gained an advantage in the nent of the subjects of the Queen of Portugal, is an. termination of a harassing civil conflict; but you would exile from his native country. And for what? Because have found in either case no guarantee for the restora- he wished to govern on constitutional principles— tion of constitutional liberty—that accommodation, that oblivion of past crimes, that mu t u al g enerosit y , on which (Hear)—because, in his int ercourse with public men, with the statesmen of E uro p e, he had learned, perhaps, alone can the hopes of future peace be founded.—(Hear, better principles for the conduct of constitutional go hear.) Then upon these three considerations, seeing vernment than those who have been the ordinary coun the probability that this strife would have long continued cillors of the Portuguese S ove reign.—(Che.er wrotweg s.).cili Lord not suppressed by your means —remembering that it to the advice he gave, and to the lan g uage was speaks of the progress he e made hi ar —dlssee the was for the interests of humanit y that you should inter- I h r a ead d mad his law of eleo fere, looking to t he g reat likelihood that, if you had not restoration of peace. — ( Hear.) the co t . interposed, Fran ce and S p ain would not only have de - tions—l see his resolut ion to summon a ired, but have be en com p elled to interfere —knowing his advice not to resor t to acts of severity—l see these the further probability that in either issue, whether the things, and I think it a reflection on public men that he resu lt were a triumph to t he Q ueen or to the insurgents, should be an exile from his native countr y .—(Cheers.) moderation and justice would not have been maintained Sir, I think that the Portuguese Government, on the —in the midst of these conflicting considerations, all of 6th of October, committed the greatest mistake that a which had to be weighed by the Government, again I Government can commit, when, in anticipation of some say I will not consent to visit with condemnation those fancied dangers, they resorted to what is called a coup who, under such circumstances, deemed it expedient to &lot, that is, attempted to avert threatened danger by decide upon offering British intervention.—(Cheers.) the assumption of unconstitutional power.—(Hear, hear.) And it is upon these grounds that I shall give my vote That was the mistake that was made by the Government against the motion of the Hon. Gentleman. I think it of Charles X., and it is the mistake that has been made inconsistent with justice to visit the Government with by those councillors who advised the dismissal of that censure. I think they have done nothing in the conelu- faithful subject of the Queen and attached friend of peace, sion to which they came which disentitles them to the the ',Duke of Palmella.—(Hear, hear.) It would have confidence of this House so far as their conduct in these been the true policy of the Government, even if these dan affairs is concerned.—(Cheers). Well, now, as to the gers were real, to have met them, and not attempted to question of public policy, which is a far more im- avert them by the assumption of unconstitutional powers. portant subject for our deliberation,—is it wise, while —(Hear, hear.) These advisers of coups (fetal have taken all these transactions are pending, and while the plans credit to themselves for firmness and decision ; they are being carried into execution, to control, by a deci- refer to the case of Louis XVI., and say that the cause sion of the House of Commons, the executive Govern ment, and to say that this policy must be abandoned decision. They pride th e m,eelves on their decision of monarchy was then lost by a want of firmness and Perhaps it must not be abandoned, perhaps it must be and energy, but they do not see the danger of resorting continued. By whom ? I say the hand is palsied that the House which they may lead to.—(Hear, hear.) They pointed to these extreme acts of violence, or the consequences has to execute it if struck by a resolution of at the programme of the Septembrists, but I believe au a proposed change in regard of Commons adverse to it. What do after having adopted this resolution ?---(He .._ . t .g . you Inea a li r r do hat was nothin more th seems to me to be unwarrantable in principle, and likely to electoral districts; and I contend that any apprehen to lead to serious and most mischievous consequences. sions entertained in regard to that programme were not What would be the consequence to the public policy of sufficient to set aside the constitutional liberty of Por the country if you pass such a declaration ? Witl you tugal.—(llear, hear.) That was a grievous mistake; will y°9 and what is the consequence of resorting to such acts of release Das Antes and the insurgent forces, or continue them prisoners of war ? What is the practical power? You alienate from yourselves the sympathies will, meet and resort to unconstitutional acts, be you force of that you propose to do ? You surely ill of Europe.—(2lear, hear.) Let your enemies, if they Will you replac say went, ' andWe are e e c w o i n ll te le n a t v w e i t t h h e h m av to in g g e c t as best they may ?" Das Antas an 3 d eonusetu of the d‘G‘'iffioveeurlnt content to apply the powers which the constitution gives you, and then the good feeling of other countries, aye, been in we have t h e and of your own subjects, will rally around you if the to Oporto, and say, " Gentleme n, his 2,500 men in the British steamers, take them back attack upon you be an unjust one; but if the friends of and will violate the law in ant m ic e i e p t ati a o n n g wrong ; the monarchy will attempt to d and so we return you exactly to the position which it is right we should mak e you compensation, originally you occupied ; . any damage we have done to e o r f le c T en c o g u e p r s s angers, then, •wethere you or your cause we are willing to repair ; them—(Cheers)—that is the mode by whic h thrones are fore bring you bac k to O p orto, and will let you fight more endangercd than by disloyalty and disaffection oe it out !" Is that the course you would now take ? If fulfilled that which. I you thepart of thepeople. I have now have done wrong and you do not wish to inflict in- I have spoken my justice, you have no means of repairing the mischief ; • • said I would do, openly and frankly , individual; after a perusal of those it will not be enough merely to release Das Antis.— opinions as a priv ate_ I cannot assent to a vet© of censure on (Hear, hear.) Will you then retain him in custody, will papers before m t e, I cannot consent to interfere with that you still hold him and his followers as prisoners of war ? the which Government , ensrnnmowin, cours e of action ; but while I take that 1 know not, indeed , what course the Executive is to take course, while I would not interfere to put a stop to that in the midst of these proceedings, when so soon as to - intervention which has taken place, I must at the sane morrow night it may be necessary to give instructions t i me say that of the acts of the Portuguese Government or answer some dispatch they may receive, if there is I cannot speak without condemnation.—(Cheers.) And not a distinct explanation on the part of the House of I say, in conclusion, that unless those evil councillors Commons of the motive by which it is guided in coming who have been placed around the Portuguese throne are to this conclusion.—(Cheers.) Is it to be left to the Mi- ban i s hed — 'Aster of the Crown to say, " I have entered i nto this en- An HoN. MEMBER—They will be banished. Tan • I must fir R. PEEL-4 belie! e that if that faction that calls gagement,l must creep out of it as well as e c , t d?" avoid the fulfilment of the conditions I 19evP e THE SUW LONDON, WED either side as long as actual intervention of the Govern ment and the nation was uncalled for. There were three stages in the policy which the Go vernment had adopted. There was a time when they toot only the part of spectators—but interested spectators—of the internal discords of Portugal, and they could see that no one of the conflicting parties came free from blame into the tribunal of public opinion ; but there were times in which all of them had committed acts which more or less required the disapprobation of those who were interested in the affairs of Portugal. The state of the country had been described by Sir 11. Seymour, in page 221 of the report upon this subject. He stated that the most alarming disturbances had been the consequence of the indulgence of all those evil passions which had been called forth by the disputes between the Crown and the people. The whole of the attempt of the Govern ment had not been an attempt to overthrow the dynasty of Portugal—it was not an attempt to introduce any new laws into Portugal, but merely an attempt to bring the Crown of that country into more close communication with the people, so as to obviate many, or all of those, disturbances which had taken place in that country. The Government laid between three chances —namely, despotism with Donna Maria, a republic with the Junta, and despotism with Don Miguel. So that between all those chances, it was hard if one of them would not eventually become the ascendant, unless some interfer ence took place upon the part of the Government of this country. From the dispatches of Mr. Bulwer, it would be seen that there could not be a more anxious wish to co-operate with this country, than that which was shown to ex:'t on the part of Spain. It was said, however, that Spain should act under the command of the English Go vernment. Now, was that language to be used to a free and independent Government? Ile thought Spain was quite as interested in the affairs of Portugal as this country could possibly be, and he could not con ceive how Spain could possibly be more indifferent with a view to their interests, than this country. The Noble Lord said that they ha d an opportunity of carrying war into Spain. Now, an interference on the part of Spain with the affairs of Portugal, would have had the effect of embroiling France and England; but even that inter ference on the part of Spain would have been less absurd than the course pointed out by the Noble Lord. The Noble Lord (Stanley) had taken advantage of M. Guizot to draw a conclusion in favour of his views. They ought not to let it be sup posed that in the course of events, that if they I had come down with a war on Spain, that France would have remained perfectly neutral ; and he thought, there fore, that the Government had pursued a wise course on this question. They had "not," as Mr. Canning said, somewhere in that speech to which the Noble Lord (Stanley) had referred, " waited for war, but gone be fore war." And the policy the Government had pursued would have been that adopted by Mr. Canning.—(Hear, hear.) They (the Government) had endeavoured to reconcile the Queen of Portugal to the feelings of her people. They had endeavoured to give her subjects hope that they might be able to induce the Queen to revoke those unjustifiable measures which excited the indignation of her subjects.—(Hear, hear.) He thought that the Noble Lord (Stanley) was most unreasonable in his condemnation of the appoint ments of the Government. They could not have made a more judicious selection than that of Colonel Wylde. That Gentleman had been engaged for many years in the Peninsular war, and had become acquainted with the habits and feelings of the people of Spain and Portugal, and that knowledge could not fail to be a most valuable acquisition in the situation to which be had been ap pointed. He believed that no more eligible person could be chosen than that gentleman, and unless the Noble Lord told him (the Marquis of Lansdowne) some speciecircuinstance of disqualification, he should still ad here to his opinion. Sir H. Seymour also was a most eligible person, possessing , as he did, knowledge and abil He must say that the Noble Lord had totally failed to make out this part of his case ; and in the correspond ence that had taken place between Colonel Wylde and Marshal Saldanha , th e latter said :—" I give you my word and honour that not hin g coull be more painful to me than to think that I have given cause of complaint." And what was the conduct of these gentlemen ? Was it not in conformity with their character ? Both Colo nel Wylde and Sir Hamilton Seymour naturally ad dressed themselves first to the leaders of the Queen's party. But the Noble Lord said that when they went Portugal understood that they were to favour the interests of the Queen, and that their views were to be directed to establish a Government totally different to that then existing in Portugal. Now, these gentlemen went out to Portugal upon the distinct impression that their measures were to be directed to the restoration of the Legislature of the country in its fullest efficiency. They were told also that the insurgents were to be in cluded in the amnesty. A better provision could not be procured for the insurgents, though the Noble Lord said that they had derived no advantages from the inter ference of this Government. He contended that the Government throughout had acted in a manner calculated for the security of the peace of Europe, and had succeeded in securing a constitution for Portugal. In effecting that they had achieved more than if they had gained a victory at Torres Vedras. With respect to the argument as to non-interference he did not think the arguments of the Noble Lord were satisfactory. Abstinence from interference might be carried too far in public as well as in private life. Then might arise a state in which interference became a duty. It was the same way in public life. The views of the Noble Lord reminded him of what took place at a trial. A person was murdered and in the course of the evidence one of the witnesses called was a looker-on and cognizant of all the circum stances connected with the crime that had been coin witted. He had even heard the knife with which the murder was committed sharpened. The judge inter rupted him, observing, " Do you mean to say that you did nothing all the time?" The answer was that he " never interfered in matrimonial disputes." Now that resembled what the Noble Lord sugg sted. By inter fering, he believed that they had done something towards preventing bloodshed. He thought that the Government had, as he had already asserted, acted with the wisest policy in this interference in the affairs of Portugal. If they hsd abstained altogether from interference, they would be acting most disgrace fully, because it would show incapacity, while by their present interference they had succeeded in restoring the constitution to Portugal. He therefore would sup port the policy which her Majesty's Government had adopted.—(Hear, hear.) The Duke of WELLINGTON, who was almost in audible at the cotnmencement of his address, said, it was most essential to the interests of this country to preserve peace in all the countries of the world. Agreeing, as he did, in the propriety of this Govern. ment refraining from an interference with the affairs of any other Government, he still expressed a hope, and as far as his knowledge went, his belief was, that a British Ambassador or a British Minister, in every part of the world, would exercise a most important influence in maintaining the peace of the particular country in which such Minister should reside, and so far as was necessary for the maintenance of the tranquillity of that country, and of the policy pursued by the Government existing in it. Ho had the conviction, from other reasons besides those be had mentioned, that there should be a strict abstinence from interference with the internal Govern ment of another country ; but he still held that the pre sence of a British Ambassador, cognisant of everything that was going on in that country, had a most powerful influence in maintaining tranquillity in that country, and in maintaining the form of Government existing within it. His Noble Friend (Lord Stanley) had made a most eloquent speech, and throughout the course of it had more than once expressed his disapprobation of the in terference of this country with the affairs of Portugal, and said, that in no case could an interference be justi fled. The Noble Lord complained of Cabral, and all that he said of the Cabral Administration was true. The Noble Lord, the Minister in that country, had la boured to the utmost of his power, and as far as he hi his could,N honourableoin b order le Fri e principles.n t Friend complained, have the Government conducted on Th e a hadcts, however,beebeen the of c n a w h m i c o h n acts of the Government ever since it had been esta blished. The couatry, then, was in a state consi derable disturbance. This country was under of er oblige Lions, by treaty, to aid Portugal—under dobligations, by the old existing relations ; and it was the in terest of this country, by her commercial and by her political relations to maintain the tranquillity of Portugal. This country had an interest in the political existence, and the independence of the Government, as well as in the tranquillity of the country. Her Majesty's Ministers were under the necessity of sending to that country an armed force in order to give protection to her Majesty's subjects, whose interest it was to reside there, and whose property was all in that country. Here there was a British force in that country in a state of disturbance; this country had an interest in her political independence, and a British force was there for the pro tection of the British subjects exposed as they were to the misfortunes of war. It must be recollected that parties in that country were nearly equally divided, at least there was no gre at military event. This equality existed, not only in Oporto, but somewhat in com- nearly so in Lisbon, and it was fou nd that the genera mand of the troops at Oporto, to the amount of from 4,000 to 5,',.)00 men, embarked from Oporto with the off ec in t tention to take them down to Lisbon, and there to by them what no o e would f or a moment defend — the dethror.etnent of the Queen —who would thereby be under the necessity of leaving Lisbon, or possibly putting herseelf on board the British fleet. Was it desirable that that should be effected—that which this country had had power at hand to prevent? The officer at Oporto already commenced a blockade of the river, and duly sent in a notice, that in case the Portuguese fleet should attempt to sail out, they wou ld be seized by the k ading force. But now he would shortly call the atten tion of their Lordships to the mediation. It was te that the natural mediator w ith Portugal was the British Government. But it was unnecessary for him to remind them that a mediation, in order to consult the interests in question sufficiently, must be pos sessed of some military power ; and this country had, on the present occasion, a British fleet near the seat of disturbance. It might be said that Britain had great reputation for power ; and they did have great power, and great wisdom in their counsels and great energy, but they had been resting to much and too long on their reputation. It was necessary to show sometimes that they could accompany their opinion with power to make it good. On the application, then, of the Queen of Per tugal, this country had at length thought proper to interfere for the support of the Queen, and he hoped that they would take care to make proper arrangements for the good government of the country as far as was possible within the limited powers of the mediation. Anxious as Br i h t e a i w n a w s a for t t h h e e n i n a de t ur pndn a e lm e ed er of a Portugal, toron the affairsand althoughthat country, he yet was glad that that mediation had been taken up, and established by three independent coun tries. It was not in this instance the influence of France alone, or of Spain alone, or of England, but of all those conjointly. He, therefore, thought the British Govern ment was justified in interfering, at the request of the Queen of Portugal, in the affairs of that country. The Noble Duke, who spoke from the cross benches, with his back to the gallery, was very indistinct in his enun- Aation, and was very imperfectly heard. Lord WINCHILSEA said their Lordships were not called upon to say whether the intention of her Majesty's Government was good, but whether the procedure which they had adopted was right? He thought that the in terference which had taken place was most unjustifiable, and therefore he felt it to be his duty to give the most cordial support to the motion. Earl St. G ERMANS said that in the first instance he was very much opposed to the interference of the Go vernment in the affairs of Portugal, as being likely to involve a most complicated question with reference to the affairs of other countries ; but, upon a careful perusal of all the documents connected with the case, he had come to the conclusion that the course adopted by the Government was the one least likely to lead to trouble and inconvenience in the end, and most calculated to meet the justice of the case. He thought that the rela tion which had always existed between Portugal and England was a full justification of these measures which had been adopted by her Majesty's Government under the existing circumstances, and therefore he should not feel it his duty to support the motion of the Noble Lord. —(The Noble Earl was during the whole of his speech nearly inaudible in the gallery.) Lord BEAUMONT said that the great question of neutrality was involved in the question which was then before the House, and their decision would in future re gulate how far that passive conduct which one nation should preserve with regard to the internal af fairs of another was to be departed from. He thought that if this motion were negatived, so as to affirm the principle of her Majesty's Government, that that principle might be in future car ried out by other countries to the detriment of this nation, whilst from a feeling of consistency they would be compelled to look on without any effort to take any part in that which might possibly very much concern them. What could have been said to induce the Govern ment to suppose that France or Spain was about to in terfere, but even supposing either country had contem plated an interference, it was evidently not for the pur pose of an invasion; and he, therefore, attached no im portance to that plea, that had her Majesty's Government not have interfered France or Spain would. From all the proceedings of Spain and France, it was quite clear that if they ever did entertain the expediency of inter fering, it was only in conjunction with England. He thought instead of interfering in this instance, the Government ought to have left it to be settled by the quadruple alliance. The Government, however, seemed to contend that the quadruple alliance performed all its functions in relation to Portugal, when it placed the present Queen upon the throne. Had the move ments of either the Queen's party or that of the people been calculated to injure British interests theremight have been some reason for their directly interfering in the decided manner they had done, but so far from that being the case the two parties had, throughout the whole of the insurrection, scrupulously respected the rights and liberties, and interests of the British mer chants and residents of Portugal. He regretted the preser' interference the more because it imposed upon this country the performance of a difficult task,and might probably induce the world to imagine that it was a party to the civil and unconstitutional proceedings which had been adopted in the name of the Queen of Portugal. But if this interference was justified, as he understood Government contended that it was, upon the grounds of humanity, why was it delayed so long, and why did it not take place before so much blood had been spilt in the Peninsula?—(Hear, hear.) Again, it was exceed ingly difficult to decide which party had violated the constitution, so complicated were the charters, but in his opinion both parties had been guilty of infringement of the constitution. No doubt, however, could be entertained as to the impolicy, not to say injustice and tyranny of the measures pur sued by Costa Cabral. Up to the night of the 6th of October even that party did nothing which could be considered a violation of the constitution. It was said that they were obliged to interfere because it was supposed that some intrigue had been going on at Madrid to induce Spain to interfere separately. Why was the petty intrigue of a foreign nation, however pow erful she might be, to induce England to depart from the long-established principles of equity and justice?— (Hear, hear.) There was but one topic more upon which he wished to touch. It had been said by the Noble Marquis that there was some degree of partiality displayed towards the Queen in the terms and conditions offered to the Junta of Oporto. To some extent he agreed with the Noble Marquis, and he regretted that such should have been the case, because there was every reason to suppose that it bad led to many of the diffi culties and disturbances which had subsequently arisen. He thought that the motion showed a want of confidence in a Government which bad acted with the very best in tention, and therefore lie felt it to be his duty to vote against it. Lord GRANVILLE said that it appeared to him that the question before the House was not so much as to the manner of the armed intervention of the Government as whether the Government could have adopted any other course less open to objection. That intervention was, in his opinion, the only line which the Government could have adopted, considering the course which had been taken by the Government of Portugal and the Govern ments of other countries which were also interested in the question. The measures which had been adopted were of a humane nature, as they were calculated to prevent war of a destructive nature; and he hoped their Lordships would, by their vote to-night, hasten the happy conclusion of that which had been so well coita -1 menced by her Majesty's Gove rnment.—(Hear, hear.) Strangers were then ordered to withdraw, and their Lordships divided, when there appeared— Content Non-content Majority against Lord Stanley's resolution —l9 The Bills on the table were forwarded a stage, and their Lordships adjourned at Half-past Ten o'clock. HOUSE OF COMMONS. June 15. PORTUGAL—ADJOURNED DEBATE. On the order of the day for the adjourned debate being read, Sir DE LACY EVANS said that he would not detain the House at any length, but he would state his opinions briefly and precisely upon the subject. He begged leave to say, in reply to the statement of an Hon. Member, that it was a mistake to suppose that the civil war in Portugal was provoked by her Majesty's Government. The fact was that the war in Portugal had not been caused by the Government of the Right Honourable Gentleman or by the pre sent Government, but when the present Government came into office a civil war existed in that Country. He believed that there was no doubt that a civil war was raging in Portngal for the last two years. The Hon. Gentleman to whom he here alluded inquired if the people of this country had added anything to their military reputation, or obtained any advantage from their interference in this war. He did not mean to say that any commercial treaty had been obtained by the course adopted by her Majesty's Go vernment in their interference in the civil war of Portu gal ; but that interference had led to the important results that had taken place. As to adding to their military renown, it could not be supposed that the trans cendant military reputation of this country could derive any additional lustre from an engagement in this contest Various statements had been made by Hon. Members of. the superiority of the British troops, and the higher abilities of British officers, but he (Sir De Lacy Evans) could refer to the victories achieved by General Espartero as being unsurpassed by anything effected by British arms upon the continent. The Noble Lord the Member for Lynn and oth er Hon. Members spoke in a florid and exaggerated strain of the evils to which these civil contests had expo sed the countries of Spain and Portugal. They described these countries as degraded in their population and a lmost ruined in their agricul tural wealth, as destitute of trade and of commerce, and they traced these evils to the effects of the civil warfare that had prevailed there. It was impossible to deny that the interference of the Government was required, and even in the case of the great French nation, it had been found impossible to restore the legitimate monarchs of the country without the armed intervention of foreign interference I t Hoef had (Sir foreign De been aLr r m e a p cs resented by the House that Lacy must Evans) denied be attended this ; mischief. consequences were not always mischievous. But, said they, this country had no right to interfere. That cer tainly was contradicted by the position sof international laws. The rule of non-interference extending to a cer tain crisis was illustrated by as many exceptions as ob servances. He needed only to refer to the French revolution, and the subsequent war, the civil, and the American war with this country, when the interference of the French was solicited. The proclamation that was issued declared that all that was required was a free government. T he four proposi tions that were contained in that declaration went, i how ever. further than that. The principles con tended for n teat proclamation, however they might abstractedly be deserving of approval, were, under the circumstances, impracticable. His Hon. Friends who too k a part in this debate had all expressed themselves satisfied with the dis patches that had been laid before the House, but they con tended that Government had not adhered to their word. A Spanish party was formed, and there was no knowing what the consequences might have been. Several pro vinces of Portugal, which had formerly been under the influence of Spain, would have, no doubt, reverted to that country on the first appearance of an uncontrolled Spanish army. Having said so much, he would not trespass longer upon the House ; he would rather apolo gise indeed, for having already obtruded himself so long upon them. He had every confidence in the liberal Government of Spain. It might not appear fitting for him to revert to these matters, but having had ex perience in those countries, having been asked by the liberal and by the opposite parties of that country to return to the command of their armies, not because of his professional merits, but because of his acquaintance with their national constitutions ; having this experience be might be allowed to pretend to some little knowledge, and he was sure that the course pursued by the Govern ment, was that which would tend to the beet results. Sir R. PEEL rose with several Hon. Members on dif ferent sides of the House, but the other Hon. Gentlemen giving way, the Right Hon. Baronet proceeded to ad dress the House; he said,—Sir, as this debate has lasted two nights, and as I think the practice that has grown up of confining the more important part of the debate to two or three hours at the close of the evening —(Hear, hear)—is prejudicial to the public service, because it leads to an unnecessary consumption of the public time —(Hear, hear)—l intend, as far as my humble au thority will go, to enter a practical protest against it, by delivering the few observations I have to make at this, to a speaker, unpopular hour of the evening...— (Heir, heir.) sir, I perfectly mar in an °blew tion made in the course of this debate, that the deci sion to which the House should come ought to be a decision on the abstract merits of the question. I agree that no consideration of the position of her Majesty's Government, or of the pendency of a general election, or of the embarrassment that might arise from a sudden change of a Ministry, ought to induce the House to give its sanction to the policy of the Govern ment, or withhold its assent from the motion that has been made, if this House does really believe that the object of the recent intervention has been to support ab solute power in Portugal, or that the consequence of persevering in that intervention will be to endanger the public tranquillity in Portugal, or involve this country in imminent peril of war. There are many motions of light importance in respect to which the decision may, I think, be fairly influenced by extrinsic considerations; but this is not one of them. This question is of too much importance to be treated or decided upon any other grounds than its own intrinsic merits; upon that prin ciple alone I shall give my vote upon it. Sir, we are called on by the motion to affirm that, in the opinion of this House, an armed interference between political par- , ties in Portugal is unwarrantable in principle, and likely to be attended with serious and mischievous consequences. That vote will be a vote of censure, if not direct, yet implied, upon the Government ; and the con sequence of it will be practically, in my opinion, the re versal of the policy on which the Government has en tered. An adverse expression of opinion on the part of this House will completely paralyze the hands which direct it. And the question is, whether I am justified, on considerations of justice and public policy, in affirm ing a proposition which implies not only a censure on the Government, but an abandonment of the policy which is at this moment in the course of execution ? Sir, I am about to exercise a privilege which is most agreeable to me; I am about to give my opinion without any of that circumspection and reserve which necesarily fetter the members of an administration and the leaders of a party. I am going to state the opinion which, after an attentive perusal of these papers, and after lis tening to this debate, I individually hold. I speak no other man's opinion ; I know not what may be the opinion or the vote of any other man ; I undertake only to give my own honest and conscientious judgment on this matter, without reference to any extrinsic circum stance or consideration. I first ask what was the motive of her Majesty's Government in interfering in the domestic concerns of Portugal? I separate the motives and objects of the Government from their acts and proceedings. I have read these papers ; and if I believed, with the Hon. Gentleman who makes this motion, that there had been a wanton departure from the principle of non-interference —if I believed that the object of the Government had been to range itself on the side of despotic power—and to crush the struggling liberties of Portugal, I would have most cordially concurred in a vote of censure. But, after reading these papers—and speaking now of the mo tives of the Government as distinguished from its acts — I acquit it of any other intention than to support an an cient monarchy, and at the same time to combine with the support of that anoiont monarchy guaranteeefor the constitutional liberties of the people. With respect to many painful, transactions the Government had given advice to the Government of Portugal before it com mitted itself to any active interference ; was it wise to give that advice or not ? It would certainly be a plain and simple course to decline giving any advice even to a friend].) Government, to have said, " We have enough to do to manage our own affairs, without concerning our selves with yours ;" it was possible to take that course, and it would have relieved the Government of a great responsibility. But that has not been the course taken in former times with respect either to the Go vernments of Portugal or of Spain. I speak without prejudice on this subject, for I was no party to the quadruple treaty; I objected to the obli gations you incurred by that treaty; I thought it unwise to enter into them; better at that time to permit the people of Spain and Portugal to decide for themselves between the rival branches of the houses of Bourbon and Braganza; I am, therefore, free from any prejudice on this subject. But I cannot enter into the consideration of what has been recently done without remembering that the quadruple treaty has been entered into. You have contracted these special obligations to which the four powers are parties; you have guaranteed the thrones of Spain and Portugal to the present possessors against the other two brances, and if Don Miguel were to reappear in Portugal, or a descendant of Don Carlos in Spain, then you would be bound by the obligations of that treaty to interfere, not certainly for the purpose of establising a particular party in the domestic govern ment of either country, but to take part in a civil war for the maintenance of one branch of the family on the throne against another. In deciding, therefore, on the recent policy of the Government, either in giving advice to Portugal or interfering actively with its affairs, we must bear in mind, not only our ancient relations with that country, the importance of Portugal from its [geo graphical position, and the long connexion between us, but also the special obligations by which we are bound in certain cases to a joint action with other countries. It has not been usual to abstain from friendly inter vention, either with respect to Spain or Portugal. When Mr. Canning was Secretary for Foreign Affairs, the Duke of Wellington being a member of the Cabinet, Lord Fitzroy Somerset was expressly dispatched in 1823 to give advice to the Spanish Government, and dispatched too to advise it to modify the too liberal constitution, to give increased power to the sovereign, and to alter the terms of the constitution, that were supposed to be too favourable to the democratic power. Lord Fitzroy So merset was the bearer of a letter addressed by the Duke of Wellington to the leading men in Spain; the object of that letter came under discussion in 1823, and when Parliament, at the instance of Mr. Canning, rejected the motion made by Sir James Macdonald, and affirmed the policy of Mr. Canning, the tact was before the House of Commons that we had attempted, no doubt from the most friendly feelings, to avert from Spain the danger of threatened invasion from France, by advising the mo dification of her constitution. Therefore, I say the prac tice of advising the Governments both of Spain and Por tugal has not met, in former times, with the censure of this House. Then, Sir, if I look at the nature of the ad vice given to Portugal as in,the dispatches of the Noble Lord the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, I see not a word in that advice of which a British Minister has reason to be ashamed. lam speaking now of the ad vice given before we had committed ourselves to forcible intervention. What was that advice ? When it was in tended to commit that act which we cannot hear without shame at this period of civilisation—(Cheers) —when it was intended to transport men who had engaged in a civil contest, but who had capitulated on the assurance that they should be treated as prisoners of war— kCheers)—when it was attempted to transport these men, gallant soldiers, though they may have been mis taken in the construction of their duty—when it was attempted, in violation of good faith, to transport these men to an unhealthy climate, I find the British Govern ment remonstrating against that act, and earnestly ad vising that, both with reference to the interests of huma nity, and an enlarged and comprehensive view of the in terests of the Portuguese monarchy, such an atrocity should not be perpetrated.—(Cheers.) Sir, I think that the Government was justified in making that remon strance and giving that advice.—(Cheers.) Then, again I find the British Government remonstrating against the shameful decree that all prisoners taken in arms should be instantly shot—(Cheers) —wisely and properly leaving the Portuguese Government to draw the inference that it was impossible for us to countenance or support them, or show them any sympathy, if acts of that kind were committed, endangering the throne in the estima tion of its own subjects, and bringing upon the Go vernment the indignation of every civilised country. In every instance in which advice was given I find it to be in favour of forbearance—in favour of lenity and mo deration—(Cheers)—and, inferring the motives from the advice, I cannot think it consistent with justice to visit the Government with the condemnation which this motion implies.—(Cheers.) Then, Sir, I come to the acts of the Government, and I am perectly willing to admit that it is not sufficient that the motives and inten tions should have been good if the acts were in them selves unwise. You may acquit the Government of intentional misconduct, but if their acts be at variance with justice or sound policy you are perfectly at liberty, if not to censure the Government, at least to compel the revocation of the acts. In reviewing the acts of the Government, the sth of April is a day of the utmost importance.—(Hear, hear.) Up to the sth of April we had limited ourselves to friendly advice, to warnings. and to remonstrances, and up to the sth of April I think there can be few persons disposed to censure Govern ment on account of any stop they had then taken, or any advice they had given. In viewing the subsequent acts of the Government, I certainly should attach consider able weight to the motives and intentions by which they were dictated—not that good motives and intentions would justify acts which are impolitic, but in consider ing the acts I should have material regard to the motives and intentions which influenced them. The question is, whether en the sth of April, when it is clear that the Government departed from its former course and under took not merely to give advice, but to make proposals c a gainst h e er . ver y which in certain contingencies involved the necessity of armed intervention, oli yc are there is wh a ,e firstsufficoief all , sufficient iintdiiscatotiobne ob served, this e r v e c d h , a. position of judges after ep w ho?t That p o stha t nge of w the event have a great advantage over those who had to fo n a d e ci si o n , contingencies. —( Cheer s.) o t complicated nw hailclhh wet an as d e uncertains a ): d d o a u y b . tful, the light of ng providing encies. combinations which had then to be consid ere d, an d o f r twhheinehobstchuereisissuenoawppaes gharleidvter history has been shed. It is now easy to see the mis takes that may have been committed. The judge, being in possession of all the facts, having a knowledge of all the events which have taken place, is in a very diff e r e nt s ituation from those who had to decide under uncertain and doubtful circumstances.—(Cheers.) Sir, I place myself in the position of a Government which, on receiv ing the representations of the Portuguese Government, had to decide what course they would pursue; and, to do justice to their case, it is absolutely necessary to at tempt to forget all we now know, and consider what we would have done with the information before us which they had in the early part of April.—(Cheers.) Sir, I cannot conceive a decision more difficult to be arrived at. On the one hand there was a Government which had done acts that merited disapprobation—(Cheers)—there was every argument against forcible intervention in the domestic concerns of Portugal; there was the danger, also, that, by intervention, we might set the precedent for other and future interventions, from which very serious embarrassments might arise; and no doubt these were considerations that ought to be maturely weighed. —(Cheers.) There is no man in this House who feels more strongly than I do the grave objections that apply to a wanton and unnecessary intervention in the affairs of other countries. The danger is, that by that inter vention you are not propping up the throne in favour of which you interfere—you may be sowing tke seeds of weakness, instead of strengthening the cause you espouse. But, on the other hand, it becomes a Government responsible for tb,* administration of public affairs to