The Sun. — London, England, 1806-02-08 00:00:00

. . . . , most gantuine, the issue Or the b. , .t•tle k f the !.1 th had given .some hopes of inttlre success;, but they - . were illusory. GenerA. Ney,,, had -quietly made his retreat upOtr the main of the lirench Arrny.still. l)- tween-tho Tilartu-be and- Aligsl)iat : gli, and the csmniii--, nicatiori btetween the - Ailarilia 3 and lliassiaris wasp. . now completely cut 4 --- . -.. I n . conspquetice, o - f:Abis - movement (whether by - choite.-pr'lly neces.sit.r: 1 f . ;ii,t..:,. not) General' Mack. .divided'his i army ; and :i . e.J).el'ai Jeltachicli, ,vas de tachod with, ~1 relieve, .1,...5 or i.ti battalion l towa . :,ds • • the. Tyrol. Orders were sent at. this tillio to the'g ,, ,1 , ..- rison of Uen49lilYge!•l4:.-,N-11cil-Pttitlfeti of i-t fiatta-' li.q l 3, --toky!iirf, l 4e , .tliatail.:lce, apdEin the above corps, .• wider Oen; 4e,l}achiclr . ..l;:Whet4r . the ( . )der . arriVed* .tgo-iplej,„puilick4ef,it v,git...1ivire4,, ; ..1 am also rtig,h4g , t0 : 444 i b(iy he 2 3 vryion:cztpitulated,.to the Tiskoc.fi i• An4,44sl i ,eneril.i I)a'' ! ?iiu.c.,,. at - ter thejolNfn li . ,,td, been nearly reduced to ashes. It is .i to be observed, that tile_ .41,0407,destine0 for thefortitica'tions:of t2 4 ir:rlg'42'...still withbltfllie town.' tTi;on this 0' q s a l or‘ 'd - ' , . 4 iii, t s f l inbi.-71.pf`trn',TV11r6 ti ' p C..' at tin t 3 W ITO nit jA 1 ;fi.f 'Vrecch,"antj',who -,-Oretaking posses sign i sfill? .Cnie..4.ll:!ilery; . A . Vet t` it to piEteSt;v- the 4.tv4fl .A."l'l l triaT,' listiii!tik,"'qvlio ,carried' 'the' . whole""pr . the st,paii ) tt'oik --, . * --"'. ' '' .-; 2. 'sail fei'AP;: j tliiir a 'general- . consternation and dismay is beginning to prevail here, at ltst - in ttititjWsiki.%lity life!,onCe , -of" the Emperor of .Rus • • 3114 11 Dl+ll§ l4 / 5 etpeAed there on the s th of nest itik)littici:itiaay;4 . iellhapszte , nd to- dispel , tli:i. ,loom, paN4:4olyishobla'arfairsAake:ratherla , rnorq favour -. ors4@ckbatloW4l4.in.terval:':lf4u truth they bear :au in, atiE)icions afipet% they are not .by anv'ineabs , -despe-; 414,01t1I0tUristn-Artu*of 1.3.'t-14egvif.„5 . 6,4ciautan ; • there are as many more Russians on their. marolif iiAn'e-7ftiln:orcettneiria,:-piay....l.ye drawn I froin ltiLly ; *9:4 5 r 4 44 .3 PPQ:rNsn•Akix,r4i,s , to be 4°,1)01. be saved , A l go-i i iii - 41 4, 11,p,,• !?4 appips now in Ger : . Libloyp,j sq l 6lo,m l thp,C i pup,s9,o 2 t-, l * 4rree . ,.•0r..f0 LW_ '.VCO{,,S ;I tkiplV . WitttOEt :44-In,igit.44o4lA, be ai)ff)lytply, and, iiterally annihilated: we shall have' consid e rably .34.1.40vei1ei liVilfir-t0*1 8 7 4 414'.4 1- re 4 dYAV.44MA t iI';A9 I 4: . ‘ ' 4 . , fin host=s ititi,eolllllle n cOjtti Op R"fo.pei.PeKioa.iß IlbYtr,!PVt... ll d, -41 :? , 1 1 TIP b_4.Vtlity.) J4. - F:. ID.qc.A. in possession or tire Iviilanese. .. ::: ~ r .... ,-; -.. ,- L . : Qn tk-At i ll•i•ot n Afl i day : ,,pp wh:qt - # it wasCarcu laic4..!ltl4l-4e A.rOildrit4<futYo4 4 d.CXAsi j l P;,44 l igti :4 <:74111( 4 ,444. % I ;;a 3 9Paie4 tfipto: tie:- French side okt r ql rx. I lst i poalifliq Nvatick.cons4onir,. by the --..A.ustiiatis on their side, and ' . .whicli was, ans,wer_ed hY-, sbegy,...r 7 This is the only ,gel of hostility- which, down to this date, has taken 1112ceinA,I_tatr i y, /.. ...-,. I have the liunaur. to be, &c. „ 4 1 , 0 ; j ' . .1 ') (Bigno,)'.; '.• - 7 '_.4Y , "" t7 - 4447 V r. A • • • )rci . t't ;-i. , - tx tr'a a frorml,i4isiire-illotibid.&;').:' . e., 4- k4 , , , K;: , 11Loid , M*4.gia.ye, daved:sti+etersloa s rgtiv.'2,9th . luni, I bos .- ::.i.i'i°.•..7.621 ; . 1 ,'.''...:' !!..:!3 '.:::: hf.).:iti.-.r15 c .. ' ... : .. -._ i .; My 'Lord—The annmation, of, thel Ligtirian:lte, pnblicltb the_Eve,ncli liiiip.ixe,,.exerutid at, thprsogy, ; - ncirnert - 15.vhcri".;.a _Russian ,il l 4eriipotentiarytiwAs);tio petacciiiitilfraw*cliaegockwitiarßropositiox.4 of i•Arhith Ito protbssath:oliiediciadeber ittiretJgenetal Ailankiio Pie n vott: the uktiti rd of llorcikkl isveentidered- 'as '... so 27. - owerlit sett'fiiibeitli6oyeile@n:si:whose'zietuirrierits. that Aienipotentkari f rowaiteEnpciwerid-to•declare;'that his fiaSpoxiai-I.ll.33l:styhamjixdpat k under)theseTiitaLll4 itani:es,libr :mu t& nor,rictinasisterittigiwwitiv• - ivh4 ,ie ttueiJciiiiicfawn:rtity,.ot.i.oitirtti(sekilansintlVar4 permit M. Novos,ilzof to proceed to fulfil the , ailletik efiehll4llliss44htiii il-htiv4 tlveictiorkitly to be,' , Ngiti othe 40 - 4rAti i ,e4= 7 :l:4,j4:' , LS , , cl:tYr,l?- 1 4'40 411 ).- fP=4:'. o ;clst tioetatent 1111(1 . ,111(4A likeillat4telOf#ikilrg t i:: , vi; .`-: . • kA, , ' , l'3 I'M ill t i . 1 d ''''t , •!'' , GßiAllPVlLbi!.: I_) . .6skitlt(3 l bli'itt. Irk •RigTii'llttal'APAl_Wipiitriye;. l e2ii: fic: c ' -a. i ..,..1 ' 'J.”- ..,...A.1,:n.,..0 ,161. , • ••• 41 i /...:% .7 :.1; , . : r- .-.. ! - .. Extrati of a I)ispatch fr.orn Lord G....1%;:a66vie' t'Aciflilird:Muti /, ea y4,4itect , ••*-- VAlets l 434ool;Egl- e r rs ' --CI.; b. 4>ji. i.. ..d to it:4l, !...3t,.:1. 1.-:naom -•,,-... 1.1 :'; 4Nly.':B . +4' irk bli it I ..i:RfAt } t' ?Epl i i tat hina ~1:. fera4iPtlit!ii'g i' . l . 4 , ,WUnOn_i. W,64XiciieiNT,o wtin)iitationttranpittinceezartioryski.tnta•vinferenee, z . , ~i , ',l wi eq.l l 4,, e i ,jt ci 4-..IP' rPO kn', ..;:OF 9 l.Pl it 'dj il Attqwt..l%, •i 4 i... ~. ..iriliq. e col* . v94,l f 4Rit4gl 4 l 3 :Pgagialaolii pnwiiemet:akeWillariggerodeirtqktt v.these 'it , ttppears pllti,6Tiri . ptrot'-aftft vriev is it Tastr:i'Vi'r c 'e.iiecy,li"O a sehse . of h'iS 1'1'1;6 dign ity ,` n'ct the re ttf ,w4wests' oi kis Empire-c-3an4that,tfOrdSeeinVtb:e.-inev'itaiiilitr of Nc" , tiri'itie , iiletit4ertbitied riot- to-leare' to .33orra-parte the 4 1 9icg....-19. j.t4elnQffieitiin.r,PPlßie,niel l 9stili.t . i..6::. ask + l '...:.-' .l,)ti .I.lol4.4:Ctrek AVV;3l7:vr; ccf ,-.-.. &c.. , ... • • . '7 :. i;i44,4eg a 6,Winilg,:a . 4ii..(t2 . (it.:i ~ o .. Wiiiio 1,0 rd ' iq l .ll, E . 7:ekiY. c 2 4 . . 3 E0'g; ••,Pf4 4 13 1 1 .Lig IC 3a sgpt,-ig.s, ( N 0 • •3g • ) '' y Lord- 7 Thy last„ s dispatohes from the Russian iviiii.ctor,. 4. Vie4l4 . ii - ?fi r - II f? " . terms I , or , .., 41, , J ~ S 1C.% the warlike, tempter-oii.that:teabinet : - :certain tom:- rnupica tioji s had lfee.Q[ro,c.id" frii - ki!yariS; which ifidi- V ated yielillug disp t oii,i.*.on.fti t e-part Of .gonaparte ; but- .to-; these- indirmtiousiCornitCobentael seems to rttrach tottedit,, - ntiel"CtOunt reit-ntriou.Ski reprePz.nts ifi!it-tliel'irtesebt - citiqic.Vit' - 9 r. 4.116:: , ‘A:iistilan MiniStiv is.:a .dircft .contritst to its- - formpr timidity and ivid t :- inion,irnil that a firm - Cenvit:iiiih'ee - rhi'tiov3'tli p r .. :tail ; at Vienna, that it.is through 'war alone that any . 0304Yity can :be obtaintd- npinst: the a:,imiiion add ow.“2l ^ ,,.France. 'Eh ro, 'ikj);:-Akciro:tid.-cpeec 2ng drat his IMlierlal.aiii'.,:_iioyali\lajestv being per s-haded-that x•var is' iclewi' iiAble,•ruity-be, hiduCed not to• Wait the issue of the -. ti - ioi - ps!:!::l,i)4, , otiitions ,NVith the. 'French Govecntuelr'.; taut that --lie will commence %74tilit'ies . at` the time :when the . superiority of the •' l. -A furcA=BPr c. ,lniS.;S 1:11:, best •Progpea of success. • '--frf bwards e_ae beginning , of Oaobcr the Austrian :army. upon the . Vr_netiwn frontiur• will .be competed tto its full establishment,' a).A ).y111: ..s-itliOnt doutit be greatly superior in numbers to the French' forces in Italy ; and the Rwisi-,:in.'afinWillh e Sufficiently' advanced into the hieted.itaty S.tats..to ensure their arrival upon tire frontiers' ?if •Bovaria ' , bcfore -6.6 1:i - ench ,troop f c rbtil tii_6"'•`Past'''. and the interior of . _ii'rance can reach the .C . in r ii ern Elllpife A • .1 jiaEe4 t . tker'efore, in sevel-al Conversations lately....with.Prineof • OzartOrisky anti :Comte Stadion; ingqsl the - experti-1 ency of losing—fro-time in 'beginning war. Th . -PiPnce informs line,* that lie.lias-Afe-4clyirrsti - fiae •64b ti errite'Raztimouski• toliress ,thiS'consideration upon 1 the attention Of . tharCottrt.Of :Vienna, but that.h6 siltivill,Lbt , fail`-to repet thei initruetions to the•Russiaa scArnhalatleit ! .- - ._ • .. ;.',. , I -ham great sati4faCtion in-observing the increas 7 -4iig:ni'gratitt'Ogotail' of this Court. Thelrrilse-: ror, foreseeisiithil pOEsibility of Bonaparte eff64...iir4 t;:ai large. augmentption to the _French Army, in, .con? sequen,qo of thepenaced attack by the„Allied Powt .crs, has,yesolved t i o.be.prepared to meet such art cf eifort by a correspo_rAing !. , „;w: - tiononhis _part ; and. bc has ordered a levy of four men in every 500, viiali I.vill produce above 1.50,,0dt) men. 4 corps. of, about 1.0,000 mein, under tl:e corn : Tana .of his Imperial Highness the Grlind Duke •Constantine, and comped.chieliy of - : the -Garrison of St. PetersbUrf,h, began their march, towards the Prussian ':froatier.on Thursday the 2Ad. The troops destined for — Pcmerania are ready for embarkation i ' ,ancl - *ill probably-sail in alJoat' six or eight days.— 'They amaunt: to 2.0,000 ,nleki. No : dispatches, rlmwever, have been received from M. Alopens,,whu • w.as chargedtonegotiae with tile King ef the netegsaN iratigein6nts 'si'dr - the :la ;title Russians at Strafsmid, and the, augmtntation of the ; Sliredi'sh.QarriOn in that port. f. 1 ~I leave the !konopr to. be„w:ql 11%liest i respe6 : l, :my Lord; yourtarA s' - Obed t• • • I • and most humble Servant, • _ •:• , GRAViYtt.a.vik - 4 1 .1.5 - GN.Goist.E. 119. (A : 1--Ylan of the o.r t atOps-Aktuposeo hy ihti; Conti of Cile p icr. - i ' - France, npon th 6 new organization ,nf her. army; has on foot, ; #7 • • .• • rb.t7 'V. 12 Regiments of the Line , c.4,8z8 Men 3o Rkirtieliss of Light li - 161 , 44 . Ss Cavalry - - - 64,22,6 16 Artillery ' s°) 6 4 This number, with the.ahltittica.:affihe tlifferenE cops iri Corsicasgnil Island ; 4,,i4Arezirp r et3t.bof; Dutch so'diers, regtmet,qs ? 18. iluAniaty troop;; from Italy, and the liiisMAl 9 6- . laßhi'vhi 4 * consist§ of .15;000 , men, m:ikes . a tltotarroila4;964,:. tlie whole . militgry ,force.uow 'These trook are . for the greater..pt qlroaCly on, ,the, , . . , • war establlsilliielit. Any grand desceiffl!frcni rug laild'uflcuisthe clast ofTrance, of decided success, is scarcely tcrbt franci:‘ may therefore-freenture to-draw almost all her troops froth her interior, :anti:' fro:niaer - Conas.n Bet:dW; a well-arranged natif)flf.l guard;~ ipisbitAslilscipl 7 . ffi l would enable her to spare her iroqpi 6f fhe 4 11,4 cave.; franr where 'they had igeli'Zi - iiiped !NV ) esii+ini 1 dothestic .order anditdetriity.: It frill - Ms, .that; Eiin%. - ..e Faightrt'n l Pj°Y. s 9P , °99 ta , F.J.A t iit M4iA: biliith.sv.ltli.,4 and 'Gel mpy. In* ppizsition tcYlt l ll:lt'ittidratlie .4 liB u til;')iiiitli ii 4 and-116,000 Eitssicint,4,titilianteal i'vickl:tirbdoTteacX compose a' toto .lrttlblit.Aitici3.Ls,: bibtoitlii4 . 4s(4h:§9 much -..1!...• lcsi ro bp,Liii?[ . - 4 1 1.0Auxbeciquse ver.v ;.,. littl4-'l - ',-.ai,-e. :is.L',istitice If 4) tc`Z'ltTLl'tt frNAPTfiI SvcoecieV to d- :414:-'pkilghl. l o (T ,, tibiK,titifilf:higtite necessary conclusions frOMlhtioilitt-Vidiiiil;ri L3:1...q . Ist. Coniderin)r., .diii.-,emitiruate, and the : advan- taps. whigti tioi, whether ,for 4,lefece igrui4it niainte,;aliceorpeVp, tu 17. mo,e ra , .-owante • iiiik C h:l a . ris, l SeeA ItorALlWlfifiWtAr-cittaat'Ac; --i - -.e.dc..4f4i0f6..eve.r,,) :wad silyokbiliqminoilaitatilei . ftot, ,?1.11y,,t0...,11,1,41.1re. its sneceA.i, t ti . 4444hii,v( evils rriGxealfinino tliose I;rTg;,7t, saiy, :Court 14'11_40145s ettiie iErtiltstf yigpro4(4fOi3idfkA:lP,gs4=.i"ll- ( ?ift' 4 1 e1 bri9g nt9 etbcien,ey . nieap at 1. 4st r equai to thcir',,, ittibt'sateikuis. lu • •)" trILOVitAEL 7 1 1 -21116 rt ibr ii ysArratqtneiiis . ,:ill6 gej-IrM R0 . 1jc 2 ,1,114: Ali.;es,' 41115 1 - .. ; sypcyllimdmt j tiga forth tliosg epergies„ by which alone . I.yecaulkoug to give success to our efforts. : 11 '1 if.; ' lit tr Itiiantenient4 . . I Th i 4 akofietritithrfil Gif.Yielik.)ljt6e; the Austrian armies should not curne into the field more than 000.,00n ,strong, The tirst of.the',..,iper gnbibiii i'hews;'' -what lA , buid b ii4Zg i cit - Miu To to be.supPlipdin' , the Invperinl and,litipi?ittny,.;• • cruiting, in appoipttuintp t 5 1e4„ii k , r.CtnQutltit: ':he cavalry, besides otirel. twginencationg necessary. to raise it i%oxp,iits pre,sent„vveak,,statfi,:Rpon a .; peace estat)lishment ? to the number above=nleittoned.; aucl, at thetatn`e' hiarnbeiVtif trop re quisite for service in the interior of the monarchy, and for tide observance erfAitelioeverheilta of Prussia. The diffichlties which strike trio n• a first?ppear conside b i:dile atiesittention fEE" istriau , troops ati'rTow distributed,- The line formed to prevent theeintrti, Lion; of i nfec ou se4se s.: Kari indmil c contr i lboted 3"o - p art, - . that disaavzifitage, leavei t e Venetian' doininibris . o± the Empiretio-abnvr ih ger cifiurprise - 7 from the werewEr n,ecp,ssary n to- take measures • to c iopeop a„geat, to that which the Enemy might, bring again:it O us frorri• - titti ; atcrior 'of his donainioll., ttc'af t itol,.?l(l(ll's'- positions st•Protp anctliigraron : to the. seasonable concentration : of troops, which are, in4,,reat...,part s , at a distance from the fro, in. danger to put them • lll . )9 s l:l_, the foot- ; ing War, 'an To bri to - A c jt 7o 'th ts which am the- cKpsi-k1;;C:;T-14*figA %,Meiig-Me would require to. be ~catrittkinto Abe greater, activity, because,,,it ;i CQ*C,l`,.il9l,iq exp4tl. that . the Ito Ops of his Al2iiesty the Emperor of sia iliOuld; from such a diitance,-:arriV6 •of aiiiorr; till after the Austrian trocipsihottli:iliTes sustained the first attacks, of the Enemy, jesty deterred by these great glifiacuttles, if war-should become unavoldpb!p,F,,heeclii n O i rth3t, case; use this most strenuous endear ours', - to ' s~ar sc at :every difficulty, and fulf4lais .emagt - -9eis.L ; ,,Akt, to give effect to this steady resolation, it is necessary_, ! , . 2dly. That there shout,d bA4dPgßlte,flpansfi4l sour :es, and that th6difficultOSwhioli,prpient, then=selves under that tread s'l;ould lirw?Vgd.; perial Court of St. Peteriiburgii i plEcatly .tbrmed of the vast and neFesary,.expcticii,ttimr.i,?.quired to put the infantry, Alie•cavalrk: ) a - rtillery, the objpets_of the Con-mjiss?lies:„lpppailt ment, the magazines and st.o,rF4i.?-;slio,rt . ' IT; cry thing bcipiigingto the ariny, s wyp,ti L ip:fuli war esa blisliment. The sliccour of fifteen millions of .-I:l9r,iFis, wh I iti,s 4p.54 askeii troth 44494171:1-?.4.541,i in ry service, is not . more.llll9 .one-.44)4.8f 4CUNiIy wanted. - ''llie,expence 'eact•icampaign.pl:,the,;lii.st : war r Eas,frogl.one yi . tpioile hundred and-twenty cp . of . co-,RpoditiesHonld rehFlefi„the ; p:ponce :of the same.9l4eCts., :now) considerably 'grater. : But, suppose it even not to exceed thq-jornAet,, yet the .subsicly,of thirty millions of florins,,,,,wilich .agli. - .ed England,.adde4 ; to al e ordinary peace eNpendi hire' of the army, would leave still an enormo s ils de ,ficith whicb theburthened finances Of Austrip-could hardly make good. It follows, that, .uniqs Eng :lan6.grants the subsidy which has been demanded, it must be impossible for the qpurtof. Vienna;, not withstanding its determined inclination)eventp make those preparations for witr, whichare not to be at tempted. without an assurance of being able to follow them up, and maintain them. These consiAerations liehr4 stated, it is next to toe examined; what would be the detail .of the opera- -. . . Lilly; of the armie3 in Italy, the Tvroi, SwitVria.nd,, ,• and tlle 4ontiers of Germany, it t hey ohoult.l make all i their Movements w perfect Mutual - concert. lt' is this concert of operations which must 1116 et ihe.first plans mid march . of.the Eneluy. Its prot4t.qr tit-dy success, its - favourabie or unfavourable ieso.,lt, .)izill determine, iii faCt, the whole lortune'a la :11", and, of course , the .fate of EuroPe. . - ,, , (-onsidering the geographical positien of France 5 1 it. certuan frontier ; §'witzetkind.-which is in sub ;. mr . ation to it,; and the It.dian RePubiic 5 and oli -11 serving, on the otherhand, the positition of the hereditary dominions of Austria ; it is impossible i not to discern, that it woilld be imPrudent. to Make 1 any attempt froul Germany bist France, in Al 7 i sace, or on the Rhine: Such nit attempt could be .! made only by passing the Rhine at Manheim, or by. laying siege to ,:Mentz. i ~ , : [,-- In the first of the, , .e enterprizes there:would be the 1! vast disadvantage of advancing,, from the 'very first step, amidst fortified places of the greatest strength, of I?6ng forced to carry on a.war of sieges, with an enormous con:.,n:oi.i eii of Men and money, and ' liTitliont'a prot .- t 4'. ;my IK4ppicr iii,lle Ot the cam paign, even . 'at: the ticst,,, , than by the reduction of eine of thQse sp - onpi:xes. ,To undert,ke the:siege i of Mentz,,,at 1 'ast; ? i . p,(;k4). men wouin oe necessary tm blockade the plae;.,.,_ a::,1 t , : cover.the operations:of gie f sie i ;e. Tho extent . ancl strougih of Mentz are t..1.c1i., that m.e . slio,tild be detained bgfore that plaCe 4lone tor' half tile,wrppaign 5 and no opdrations sub ',fluent to its sugosiercould lead . t.tr any but very uncertain and s inst?ettre Jesuits; . because the places wouthe .17/lease : op the one side, and in Alsace on. order, the would every where arrest the progresS of opr i arulics. Add 'to these . another consideration of got •lcss weight,.Ahat, since neither of those ope r4lonlicould be carried into eill.:ct bet by great ar l initv,there would be few troops, left. to cover the, Ppper,Rhine: ; ; Ile Enemy might ,avail. him , ,elf of thWwa - zye44nisii might dhea llis,attaek there, iNdilik,Wg Ethpulti, be, occupied in.the siege,of Landau, ot:N4e,ntzl and , tui , r l, t t'..-; advance:; in a line of )-plpati(6 . l6bo,rtc.:4,.iltaii-our%s ; might possess himself of ‘otwtoorpogoivai.lops i ,inid might get 1... , , - . - :en us kinfiAlpur-supp . ls, To : avoid being cot .o:t from gAsg. o we,4hould, in that case, , he obliged to aban- Ortemy thing withotit E triltito.g a blow.. , - hnhogl4lteror througlriSw4rlaiid, against Franche , Cfpt6; W 31.10:, b?, indisp . utablty, the most fortnid .WAtkitorth4 fgrpiny.,,i4,l_, frontiers, are there open. But, as such a plan of 6petation could not be ' cgried! 144 : ege4,7but ; through . Svb.abi.i. by the qtapyg,,i, : ,p, : •, , b4ow the : 4,Al of co,,stance,,on t0:1(44a oft -the,f.impossihility of, hating supplies " co} ayt?dl hfopgli,,the rl' . }. rol , i r t T v. - oul ;1 be necessary, kg.f6Amik-gtenaptivg it, to.imvp made considerable pro- 4 , l , e4s.in..4kwalaiai .anstp,) have an army of observation 9Ppomtel,Stilaßkl4l, , t 9..11 . 40 1 .* e! l ‘. illy. 1: would lawn; bp. flfite . SSw i tix hayp ,obtai pea .sorm advantages ivh i liti6x,;,ho4p, - 647xdkog .ii attack in Switzerland. A rtUC,f . A.he:4snu in Italy towards. isliagenforth„ IV? 1,10.13 43.ge,,4nt ,t,ht; , army in the 7 .l'yyol - from joining . tali to owitti , : 4l)n§-in 5 , .-.' it4eFland, 'I he enemy would ppswoo,ptieingelvgs of the Poster-Thal (the Poster ' 11611 1 ,44 ) ,inthl3agirok.4 between Brixen and. Lientz, IrlthizasinNonic*switlx the Yale of the Adige), on gig : -.gileg tw4 ( kor : pvti e64ntriunications *id convey . ances to and front the 4091,, ~ , - , 1 0 Nik i shonit3i)o r noopelied 'to detach ,troops from 4)i' kiatty ,c,n,- Oafillaby fo'r the interior defence of -.A.ustria t i:•Wtl". noti pnly., 1.. p. relinquish ail-offensive -bperritions, tht •aeli t 9, 4Ct144 tie otirselyes within -th e lihe :of. thea.,,c)3,_or-possjikly-thf , Inn, in Germany, odd there , to take to Aefensive. position, in order not to be at.too.greata distance-from Austria, , and to be rhady to supply with due promptitude the assistance ;! whileb,toight .the-re,begante.d. It follows, , froth all thdst• It oroidemiplas,.• khat .t he war • should begin. with ,vitor6ug :Offensive, operations in Italy.,' /t js:there We should::at% with The superior force of our army.. A • -vidory,gained there .Nvould affbrd u s . the same ad vantage. f 4. for.the,prosetutiou of . otfonsive operations :against . &once:, which . France .WOUld 'acquiro from -our loss. of ~a battle, in , order to; penetrate into the: Austrian Hereditary.. Dominions., If the dirliculties! of• our situati Q n.: Te nder it. : VV I) i ll) 1)0 3Si 1.)1e for . us fo, :.arm and . advance, to atl upon the frontier as . soon as. -the. enemy.. bow much leis is ,it to be-.pxpeefed_that. ;the. troops of the , Emperor•of Russia l Ould arrive in etime td ar:t at the very cornmenuthrlt:of.the L war ? ' /::,It -wouldsbellitt ih-teres.t of France to use every' ititdazts to anticipate their arrival, by an early and: de- . • sxisi,Ve.stiveriority.- .Any..ionceutration of our troops,. or the march of the &isstans, would not fail to af ; fatd - -Bonaparte a. 4.peciOttt-vvretexi- .t0,.-declare war.. The forte ;of thlobservattm is, to prove that, in: I,case..of t wazwitixiFraw;e - , la plan of operations, the -first; dirstributiotiastd disposal-,of the troops, the com mencement and the first,progress of the military pinyvoinents, rriu - st be arranged, 'tin the , supposition' Ltilat:war will )be begunTby..the Austrians alone. • • - ' It would; be requisite that the army in Italy should I..begincits.ozovements with forcing the passage of the L-Adige-, , -disledginglhe Enemy from the Mincio, In . ivestiug, Maritua.ancl:Reschiera, detaching a body of troops to the Po, to observe the South of I taly, and '. , open its ; . way. to the. Adda; in order to cover the blockade - of siege lbf .these' places. . Only the reduc tion of these ewo fortresses, .or some such great and v.:fortunate -events, as ire. not to be reckoned. upon, -could induce the Cornmonder of ihiS army to push .bis.operations fartlier. , . - ' v .:, Thy army in Germany would commence its - opc-• [ -21ra.tiobs;by passing- the Inn,' would enter Bavariii,.'and :Would thereAtwhii on the Lech . the.movements of th. 2 I.: other artnies; and, •-in • particular, the arrival of the troops from. Russia. The army in the Tyrol would 14tecletennined id its movements 'by those of the-ar- - - i),III3iCALAiI dLi iy, and Germany. • . • : lirthe xaSeyof , operations against Switzerland, a }hart; in the Tyrol 'would be employed an.attack orhthe Grisons and the other small:Can, teas; ' and the rest would, in, the cas_ of the sucbesS of the army in Italy, advanCe from its detensiye po sitions,. and join, that army. This is all that, with .our greatest efforts., and upon the supposition of de cide& stvicell, we. can 'exptEt to accomplish, till the whole.of the ,plans and powers O . the Coalition shhll be in full activity If If Italy..be. the grand paint - . of operation at the tointnencenitnt. of ho•tilities, Swit zerland must bee.omesneh,as scion as we wall have obtained succeSs in; that quarter, atui shall have act= vancZyd tl;rough . Swabia. Switzerland oilers to . a conqueror th44a13.74,,tata,gt.: of the shortest communica tion between Italy anti Gerrnany tit gives 'the fact of s'ATding Supplies and reinforcenients -*with promptitude to the one or the other of thee court . .- iiie3 ; :kJ it is only tlE'ough Switzer land that an •* - •en tranee..V.in. - be effeeled'into France on the side of / I . Franche(Apite. -- It would then be necessary to c o . I'ver ourselvcikon the side -of Alsace, by taking Defort . and I:liinningVn, and leac;ing, at the same .timO, a considerable Pidy of troops in Swabia, t o :co ver t h e • tig - ht wing of the; army ha Switzerland from any at-• tempts by the Ere4ll from Stra.thurgh, and t o p ro tect . our -corritntuncationv,, . and . to ensure the con ve y ance •of :supplies., . , • -, The reasons have li s ti explained, on acconntot 'which, in !the '!.; - et - teral .- p.lan of operations, it is not indicated in what manner the troops of the twoitn', ' lie - rial Courts might co-operate ; either in union 'un der "the same 'St - andards;, ors by a concert in th , ..ir Movements. We must look fa - ward' tO theca.e or Austria beiug attacked by France befbre the arrival of the Rds , iians in Germany. The combination of . the operations of the two Courts would then depend upon the resolution of Prussia. And, thanks to. the wise measures of the Ernpqror Alexander ! N'Ke are soon to learn decisively how far we may or may not reckon upon Prussian co-operation, upon the nen . - , trality - of that Power, or its rejeLtion of our proposi tions-,- 'We shall' then he enabled to present to the Imperial Court of Russia, upon the request which it has; communicated; proposals - for its -. co-operatioe towards the common and general objet. - "'IN": may heie previonsl-, submit thecansi,deration, that the line of operation in Italy is.the •most. re more, and that it is there the campaign must be opened With the greatest vigour ; that the C our t o f . Vlenna will therefore send a great army-into Italy, in 'order td art with rapidity upon that-line; and that therefore of the Russian troops, and their strtntion l'or' thote of Austria,'amidSt the move nWitts of the \ War in Italy; - wcitild be impossible. As• . sborvaS we shall . oe - rtainl„\k P'ii6W the reStntf. ) the great anditiiportant step whidh,his Majesty the FAupe-roi of all the-ItuSSiasihas taken, at the Court of serlin, - wc shall' -add, - witheuf 'delay, , whateter-re- . mains to be coMmUnicated farther upon the s-übje6t of the friendly propositions here expiained, and upon the,plan of operations 'for'thetwo courts in Ger many, and shall thrtiv.vith Subnut it to the Court of RuSsia., --• '' '.' . - - - -* . . . No. I) 1.. (B.)—traas from a Paper, int/tuled, Remarks on the Plait Operations pro;)(tbd ui Austria. The Plan which the Cabinet of Vienna has trans mitted to that St. Petersburg - le presents 'a new proof of the intimate confidence meeially subsisting be tween the two Imperial Courts ; and if the War pow. undertaken te check and restrain the ambition of -Bonaparte shit terminate happily, its success must be owieg i eo the continuation of that confidence. Upon. this principle - e. - e shall, without dissembling any dif ficulty, offer our remarks upcn the-Plan, article by article, in order to obviate, as much as possible, the difficulties_ apprehended by the Austrian Cabinet. • The'plan begins with stating as a fa-t, that the real ferceS Of the French emount, upon the new or gani•zatiote, to 598 ) 084 men, and with the addition • of those which are at the disposal of the French Go vernment, to The Cabinet-of St. Pe tersburgh has reason to believe, that the French Ariiiy is -far from being complete on its new orga nization, in eensequence of the difficulty which. the French Government has to surmount, and notwith standing the .violent means it is ebliged to use, to 'muster the fresh Conscripts, who strive, in all pus bible weys, to avoid the service. . nesideS, 'though the English shbuld be unable to effe& any disembarkation on-the French coast, • suf ficient for • the prosecution of - regular war within France, they may, nevertheless, occupy_a consider table nember ef die French troops, by menacing a descent en all the accessible points : on 'the Lower Elbe, on the WeSer, on the coasts of Holland, Flanders, France, and Italy. The French, in short, must be naturally obliged to 'divide their strength, and distribute their forces for the defence of every as sailable point of their possessions. It follows, that the French can never be in a con dition' to oppose so many - as 500000 men to the Opetatioes of the Powereof the coalition, and that a deduction of perhaps one-third of their forces may be confidently reckehed Upon. -- The disproportion of 250,000 Austrians and 115,030 .I.ln.i:4lans to 'the French troops which cap ''be hreugle to a& against them, will therefore be less considerable than it has been supposed. From the unfavourable calculation of the relative forces of France and the Allies, Which is presented iii the pip of the Court. of Vienna, the following •coechfsiems have been drawn :—" 1. That the local adeantag - es . which - France, enjoys by its gedgraphical • position, whether for defence Or for aggression, are such, 'that it is desirable to -remain at peace till a more favourable conjunebare of afiairs." , - This reasoning would be solid and just, if it were probable that- any 'more favourable conjuneture of affairs should hereafter arise ; if the Court of Vieena could, in • the mean While, prepare and augment its forces, and► it: , the state of things should, 'in other respe&s, remain unaltered. while Europe temporises, Bonaparte's Go vernment acquires every day new stability. His power increases by the subjugation and new organi zation of all. Lombardy and. Parma. The relative geographical advantages can undergo no change favourable to Austria, but, in tat, the cent:am-- Besides, there can.be nothing inure dangerous than the policy the' French, (.4overnieeee w ie l d s e els ever gained more by negotiations than by its arms. If we enumerate the battles of the last war, tLe French lost as, many as they' gained. It is always in the intervals between one great period and .anu 1-- thee, in seasons .of insiecere, nominal peace, that they enlarge their domieions. • "We are therefore firmly • persuaded, that the Cotta t of Vienna, if it would consult its own true interest 4., should not hesitate 'to. renew the war as speedily as possible; and ought to make every effort to -prevent Bonaparte. from consolidating his power. Assured of the azsistapee or Russia, and of England, when shall it find a conjunaure more favourable? The s.econdehing assumed as a conclusion in the , Austrian , plan, is, that if War be inevitable, the Allied Coe:ts ought to aet " with thy most vigor ous efforteof whieh,they are capable." In this he Court of Vienna has formed a just opinion. But it errs in supposing fbr a moment that it' would be left alone in the midst of the contest., The good faith and . honour of his Majesty the Enipet - er ,df Russia are to well known to admit a shadow "of distrust upon this bead. Neither woeld the lisle Government be disposed to saceifice such ha