The Sun. — London, England, 1847-06-16 00:00:00

knd in the course of the evidence one of the witnesses hued was a looker-on and cognizant of all the circum igts connected with the crime that had been com e had even heard the knife with which the ;7; le murde r jas committed sharpened. The judge inter dict „ observing, " Do you mean to say that you N n othing all the time?" The answer was that he 2rer interfered in matrimonial disputes." Now that rezbled what the Noble Lord suggested. By inter tesJl he believed that they had done something a T's Preventin g bloodshed. He thought that the aoss erltment had, as he had already asserted, with the wisest policy in this interference in the s t 7. l , of Portugal. If they had abstained altogether irinterference,k they would be acting most disgrace because it would show incapacity, while by their the w ent interference they had succeeded in restoring uti ennstit • p en g on to Portugal. He therefore would sup the poli c y w hi c h h er Majesty's Government had i k ed,—(llear, hear.) Lea ." Duk W e ce the cof ELLINGTON, who was al in rale atcommencement of his addre ss, most said, pea it ase nst essential to the interests of this country to r ye peace in all the countries of the world. mein g, . ble at g, as he did, in the propriety of this Govern ea„ refraining from an interference with the affairs of s k ,f other Government, he still expressed a hope, and as i t l i as his knowledge went, his belief was, that a British w or tassador or a British Minister, in every part of the sp un . .1 would exercise a most important influence in se e i'l l aing the peace of the particular country in which for th Minister should reside, and so far as was necessary ° maintenance of the tranquillity of that count r y , tie it. °f the policy pursued by the Government existing for Ile had the conviction, from other reasons besides elalr he had mentioned, that there should be a strict eas senallee from interference with the internal Govern -01 another country ; but he still held that the pre n„tia7 of a Briti s h A m b ass ador, cognisant of everything lee was going on in that country, had a most powerful h i genes in maintaining tranquillity in that country, and eaityntaining the form of Government existing within el el rs Noble Friend (Lord Stanley) had made a most in er .‘.,nt speech, and throughout the course of it had te st ' than once expressed his disapprobation of the in- Pence of this country with the affairs of Portugal, mod, that in no case could an interference be justi that The Noble Lord complained of Cabral , and all he s a id o f t h e C a b ra l Ad m i n i s tration was true. Thel;4Noble Lord, the Minister in that country, had la te:lad to the utmost of his power, and as far as he be a m' i n order to have the Government conducted on ti a treble principles. The acts, however, of which 1 144 4 ' 4 41e Friend complained, had been the common lAi sh of the Government ever since it had been este tlekeed. The country, then, was in a state of consi tjde disturbance. This country was under oblige anai by treaty, to aid Portugal—under obligations, t ere :,ge old existing relations ; and it was the in " b of this country, by her comm ercial 41 14 e etp her political relations to maintain the tranq u i l l it y e l teci t r tngal. This country had an interest in the po litical fo p *en cet and the independence of the Government, as Itt a • as In the tranquillity of the country. Her Majesty's e sters were under the necessity of sending to that he4r Majesty's an armed force in order to give protec tion to sh op. 4 iajesty' s subjects, whose interest it was to reside and whose property was all in that country. Here dist; t" a British force in that country in a state of ted e -r uance; this country had an interest in her political tewPendence, and a British force was there for the pro- C o On of the British subjects expo , ed as they were to k ti r nisfortunes of war. It must be recollected that i " in that country were nearly equally di vided, "b, e ntt there was no great military event. This :„44Ity existed not only in Oporto, but somewhat nearly zoo : Lisbon, and it was found that the general in com ,oj of the troops at Oporto, to the amount of from f t . 4 - ;:' to 5,000 men , em barked ' from Oporto with the In tl, '4 . °11 to take them down to Lisbon, and there to e ffect tie t C e nl what no ose would for a moment defend —the tu at '° ll enaent of the Queen —who would the reb y be er the necessity of leaving Lisbon, or possibly putting Leff on board the British fleet. Was it desirable that p e ,,.° .,21 0u1c1 be effected—that which this country had tir w .er at hand to prevent? The officer at Oporto had litt lt r commenced a blockade of the river, and duly ast e 41 a notice, that in case the Portuguese fleet should tam to sail out, they w o uld be seized by the block tie n g force. But now hew would shortly call th e atten u o f . their Lordships to the mediation. It was true Itri tia t t be natural mediator with Portugal was the fo r Government. But it was unnecessar y ass h im to remi n d th e m that a mediation, in orde r to urt the i nteres t s i n qu estion sufficiently, must be pos en th e °f some military power ; and this cou ntr y had, d ie 0 present occasion, a British fleet near the seat of teputirtitibance. It m ight be said that Britain had g reat on for power ; and they did have great po wer, bud b ut great wisdom in their counsels and great energy, tep a lb t eY had been resting to much and too long on their the -alien. It was necessary to show sometimes that e 1 t could accompany their opinion with power to make teg, ° d• On the application, then, of the Queen of Por ta, I, this country h a d a t l eng th thought proper to th 7 rfere for the support of the Queen, and he hoped that i ta Lwould take care to makeproper arrangements for the ssOgovernment of the country as far as was possible i t_Lltt the limited powers of the mediation. Anxious li t Letvas for the independence of Portugal, and although gut t y , Was the natural mediator on the affairs of that tek"'rY, he yet was glad that that mediation had been hi e ? 'IN and established by three independent cowl- S.l O It was not in this instance the influence of France e xal t! or of Spain alone, or of England, but of all those tee n 'iv i L n tiY. He, therefore, thought the British Govern ge- was justified in interfering, at the request of the Itl e tr of Portugal, in the affairs of that country. The k ° Duke, who spoke from the cross benches, with ei m: m_ask to the gallery, was very indistinct in his enun -1.4:M1, and was very imperfectly heard. e a r, rd WINCHILSEA said their Lordships were not „,.7 upon to say whether the intention of her Majesty's ei t "' e ernment was good, but whether the procedure which, r r e had adopted was right? He thought that the in . and th erefore which had taken place was most unjustifiable, cordial he felt it to be his duty to give the most Earli to the motion. was St. ve s e g ,..",RMANS said that in the fi rst instance he Vern sue c i Cuc" opposed to the interference of the Go inatioirivse a f .rionostt.he affairs of Portugal, as being likely to complicated question with reference to the °/ all th e other countries ; but, upon a careful perusal to me e documents connected with the case, he had ta _ to the conclusion that the course adopted by the lb len:mem was the one l ea st likely to lead to tr ouble 1 7 1 ._ Inconvenience in th e en d, an d most calculated t o ,:et the justice of the case. He thought that the rela gCWhich had always existed between Portugal and . land was a full justification of these measures which the been adopted by her Majesty's Government under t fso!4Sting circumstances, and therefore he shoul d no it his duty to support the motion of the Noble Lord. a e llbe Noble Earl was during the whole of his speech '"ly inaudible in the gallery.) Lord ae BEAUMONT said that the great question of Aare was involved in the question which was then r tl , r i ore the House, and their decision would in future re elintate, how far that passive conduct which one nation fec i . u 'd preserve with regard to the internal al kof another was to be departed from. He a 0 as that if this motion were negatived . , 0 0 , a s to affirm the principle of her Majesty b ri e ern ment, that that principle might be in future car saw out by o th er coun tries to the detriment of thi s r ° l3 , whilst from a feeling of consistency they would h co mpelled t o l oo k on w i t h ou t any effort to take any et in that which might possibly very much concern r a . Zn e „.. What could have been said to induce the Govern t er F: to suppose that France or Spain was about to in plat!,e, but even supposiug either country had contem pas:u.ul interference, it was evidently not for the pur portaZ an invasion; and he, therefore, attached no im ce to that plea, that had her alajesty's Government bet hav e e l , interfered France or Spain would. From all thn,pPeeedings of Spain and France, it was quite clear fi r ltif they ever did entertain the expediency of inter thsuelg, it was only in conjunction with England. He ea . tight instead of interfering in this instance, the irovernment ought to have left it to be settled d e the quadruple alliance. The Government, however, a ra, ed to contend that the quadruple alliance performed t) : its functions in relation to Portugal, when it placed „,,e present Q ueen upon the throne. Had the move ments of either the Queen's party or that of the peop le been some reason for their directly interfering in the uecided manner they had done, but so far from that bein g the case the two parties had, throughout the Whore of the insurrection, scrupulously respected the eights and liberties, and interests of the British mer chants and residents of Portugal. He regretted the Present interference the more because it imposed upon this country the performance of a difficult task,and might Probably induce the world to imagine that it was a party IC the civil and unconstitutional proceedings which had b een adopted in the name of the Queen of Portugal. Illut if this interference was justified, as he understood 'overnment contended that it was, upon the grounds of h umanity, why was it delayed so long, and why did it sot take place before so much blood had been spilt in hi e Penins u la?—(Hear, hear.) Again, it was exceed glY difficult to decide which party had violated the co nstitutio n , so complicated were the charters, but in e i s °Pinion both parties had been guilty of infringement the constitution. No doubt, however, could al7 entertained as to the impolicy, not to all i ed injustice and tyranny of the measures pur - Gth by Costa Cabral. Up to the night of the t o of October even that party did nothing which could ternairlered a violation of the constitution. It was al : that they were obliged to interfere because it was jed that some intrigue had been going on at w as rl t _d to induce Spain to interfere separately. Why farfulu_ Petty intrigue of a foreign nation, however pow the 1 s h e might be, to induce England to depart from °n g - established principles of equity and justice?— whi a f' h ear.) There was but one topic more upon saide" b y the Noble Marquis that there was th e degree of partiality displayed towards to th' ll l en in the terms and conditions offered With t h ° Ma of Oporto. To some extent he agreed should Nobl e M arqu i s , and he regretted that such reaso n t ua re been the case, because there was ever y ° su ppose that it had led to many of the diffi- U e tb - and disturbances which had subsequently arisen. he a a °ll ght that the motion showed a want of confidence sauti;ovenment which had acted with the very best in tim., Nand therefore he felt it to be his duty to vote ust 'icrd a the -.II ANVILLE said that it appeared to him that xencireestion before the House was not so much as to the vsh ath r of the armed intervention of the Government as co h e r the Government could have adopted any other ins less open to objection. That intervention was, in he v :P e i s r linn, the only line which the Government could tstke2i,tlopted, considering the course which had been reauteu by the Government of Portugal and the Govern . - the q other countries which were also interested in Iferi lle ' ti °n• The O f e measures which had been adopted " ml uxuale nature, as they Were calculated to prevent war of a destructive nature; and he hoped their I Lordships would, by their vote to-night, hasten the happy conclusion of that which had been so well com menced by her Majesty's Government.—(Hear, hear.) Strangers were then ordered to withdraw, and their Lordships divided, when there appeared — Content Non-content Majority against Lord Stanley's resolution —l9 The Bills on the table were forwarded a stage, and their Lordships adjourned at Half-past Ten o'clock. HOUSE OF G'OMMONS. June 15. • The SPEAKER took the Chair shortly before Four o'clock. REPORTS. The following Reports were brought up, and ordered to lie on the table: — Caledonian Railway (Purchase or Lease of Wishaw and Coltness Railway). Leicester Waterworks. London (City) Improvements. York and Newcastle Railway (Hartlepool Dock and Railway, and Great North of England, Clarence, and Hartlepool Junction Railway Lease and Purchase). York and North Midland (East Riding Canals Purchase). The reports on the following Bills were further con sidered and agreed to: — Chester and Holyhead Railway (Extension at Chester and Alteration of Levels). East of Fife Railway (Markinch Deviation). Edinburgh and Northern Railway, Saint Andrew's and Newburgh Harbour Branches and Road Crossings :Newport Railway Extension). Fleetwood, Preston, and West Riding Junction Railway (Burnley and Colliery Branches). Great Northern Railway (Deviations between Gains borough and Doncaster). Guildford Extension and Portsmouth and Farnham Railway. Huddersfield and Manchester Railway (Deviations and Alterations in Oldham Branch, &c.) Leeds, Dewsbury, and Manchester Railway (Ossett Branch and Dewsbury and Morley Stations.) Leeds and Thirsk Railway (Harrogate and Pateley Branch, &c.) Leeds and Thirsk Railway (Branch from Melmerby to Northallerton, &c.) Leeds and Thirsk Railway (Eagleschffe and Stillington Extension.) London and North-Western Railway (Lease and Pur chase of the Huddersfield and Manchester Railway and Canal, and the Leeds, Dewsbury, and Manchester Railway). Manchester, Sheffield, and Lincolnshire Railway (Ash- ton Canal Purchase). Manchester, Sheffield, and Lincolnshire Railway (Branch to Chapeltown and Thurgoland Coal Branch). Manchester, Sheffield, and Lincolnshire Railway (Shef field Canal Purchase). Manchester, Sheffield, and Lincolnshire Railway (Junc tion with the Midland Railway yid Barnsley and Branches therefrom). Manchester, Sheffield, and Lincolnshire Railways (Sta tion at Sheffie'd, and Branch to the Sheffield Canal). Midland Railway (Extension of the Nottingham and Lincoln Branch at Lincoln). Midland Railway (Masbrough and Normanton Stations Enlargement). Tyne Docks. Wear Valley, Bishop Auckland and Weardale, Wear dale Extension, and Wear and Derwent Railways and Shildon Tunnel Amalgamation. Westminster and Part of Middlesex Sewers. York and Newcastle Railway (Wearmouth Dock En largement). York and North Midland Railway (Knottingley Branch). THIRD READINGS. The following Bills were read a third time and passed: Airdrie and Bathgate Junction Railway. Ashton Gas. Edinburgh and Northern Railway (Improvement of the Ferry between Ferry Port on Craig and the North Shore of the River Tay). Edinburgh Waterworks. Glasgow, Airdrie, and Monklands Junction Railway (Cowlairs Branch). Kilmarnock Police and Improvement. London (City) Small Debts. London and North •Western Railway (Birmingham and Lichfield Line, &c.) London and North Western Railway (Kenilworth to Berkswell, Branches and Extensions, &c.) Lynn and Ely, Ely and Huntingdon, and Lynn and Dereham Railways Amalgamation. Strathtay and Breadalbane Extension Railway. York and Newcastle Railway (Pelaw, Tyne Dock, &c., Branches). EASTERN UNION RAILWAY. On the motion of 'Captain GLADSTONE, it was ordered that the report from the Committee on the Eastern Union Railway (Branch from Manningtree to Harwich) Bill be taken into consideration upon Thurs day next, provided prints of the Bill, as amended in Committee, shall have been deposited with the door keepers on or before this day. LIVERPOOL, MANCHESTER, AND NEW CASTLE-UPON TYNE JUNCTION RAILWAY. Mr. ENTWISLE moved, on consideration of the re port from the Committee on the Liverpool, Manchester, and Newcastle-upon- Tyne Junction Railway (Burnley Branch) Bill, that the Bill be read the third time on Thursday.—Motion agreed to. The HoN. MEMBER also moved, on the consideration of the report of the Liverpool, Manchester, and New castle-upon-Tyne Junction Railway (Alteration of Main Line and Hawes Branch) Bill, that the Bill be read the third time on Thursday.—Motion agreed to. MIDLAND RAILWAY. Sir JAMES EAS r moved, on consideration of the report from the Committee on the Midland Railway (Extension from near Leicester via Bedford to Hitchiu, and to Northampton and Huntingdon, and Enlargement of the Leicester Station) Bill, that the Bill be read the third time on Thursday.—Motion agreed to. LONDON BRIDGE RAILWAY TERMINI. • Captain PECHELL moved, on consideration of the report from the Committee on this Bill, that the Bill be read the third time on Thursday.—Motion agreed to. The GALLANT CAPTAIN also moved, on considera tion of the report from the Committee on the South- Eastern Railway (Widening of the Greenwich Railway and Arrangement and Enlargement of the London bridge Station) Bill, that this Bill be read a third time ou Monday next.—Agreed to. BIRMINGHAM AND OXFORD JUNCTION R AILA. On consideration of the report from the Committee on the Birmingham and Oxford Junction Railway (Devia tion of the Line, &c.), Mr. C. RUSSELL moved that the Bill be read a third time on Thursday next.—Agreed to. The reports upon the following Bills were further con sidered, and the third reading ordered to take place on Thursday next : Lancashire Railway (Deviations and Rawtenstall Coal Branch). South Yorkshire, Doncaster, and Goole Railway (Foul stone, &c., and Purchase of Sheffield, Rotherham, Barnsley, Wakefield, Huddersfield, and Goole Railway, Dun Navigation, and Dearne and Dove Canal). Great Northern Railway (Deviations between Gains borough and Doncaster). GuLdford and Reigate Railway. London and Blackwall Railway Improvement, and Branches to the St. Katherine and Londo❑ Docks. York and North Midland Railway (Hull Station and Branches). North British Railway (No. 1). Northern Counties Union Railway Deviation. Oldham Alliance Railway. Midland Railway (Gloucester and Stonehouse Junction). Birmingham, Wolverhampton, and Dudley Railway (Stourhridge and West Bromwich). LONDON AND NORTH-WESTERN RAILWAY (BIRMINGHAM AND LICHFIELD LINE, &c.) This Bill was read a this d time and passed. LONDON AND NOR 111- WESTERN (KENIL WORTH TO BERKSWELL, BRANCHES AND EXTENSION). This Bill was read a third time and passed. EDINBURGH WATERWORKS BILL. This Bill was also read a third time and passed. RAILWAY BILLS. Mr. R. HODGSON moved that the reports from the Committees on Railway Bills brought up on Monday, the 14th June, be further considered on Friday next, pro vided the breviates of the amended Bills be laid on the table and the prints of the Bills be deposited as re quired by the stauding orders. The motion was agreed to ; the particular standing orders to which it referred were ordereci_to be suspended, EDUCATIONAL GRANTS. Mr. CHAPLIN presented a petition from the inha bitants of Salisbury, complaining of the exclusion of the Catholics from participation in the Government grants for education. SMITHFIELD MARKET. Mr. CRIPPS presented a petition from the Butchers' Company, praying to be heard by counsel before the Select Committee on Smithfield Market against its removal. IRISH EMIGRANTS AT LIVERPOOL. Lord SANDON presented a petition from Liverpool, praying the House to allow some provision to be made out of the poor-rates for the wives and families of those parish officers who had died of fever and other con ce on tagiouthe s diseases, which they had caught by attendan Irish emigrants at Liverpool. HEALTH OF TOWNS BILL. Mr. MACKINNON presented a petition from a meeting held at Exeter Hall in favour of the Health of Towns Bill. STATIONERY RETURNS. Mr. IMME said that on the Ist of June he had moved for certain stationery returns, which were ordered, but he since found that the officers were unable to give the returns in the form then specified. He wished, there fore, to change the terms of that motion, and to substi tute a different form in which the returns could be made to the House.—Agreed to. CEYLON. Mr. B. DENISON gave n otice that, on Tuesday, the 29th instant, he should move an address to her Majesty, with respect to the dismissal of Mr. Robert Langdale, one of the judges of the island of Ceylon. CURRENCY. - Mr. TRELAWNY rose to bring on the following motion:—" That one mode of diminishing the present pressure would be to commence a gradual abolition of all restrictions on banking ; that this would relieve a considerable quantity of that part of the capital of the country which consists of gold, unnecessarily locked up in the coffers of banks on account of the arbitrary limitation of issues, and the want of a smaller denomination of paper cur rency suitable to the purposes of retail exchange. That all promises, not fraudulent or otherwise immoral, ought to be allowed by law, whether promises to pay gold or other commodities; and that any State inter ference, devised for the purpose of influencing the terms of promises, with refereAce to the ability of parties to keep them, only weakens the force of the qualities by means of which men protect them selves, whilst such interference is costly, incon venient, and void of real security. That, whilst the issue of inconvertible paper would be no remedy for the present pressure, and would be mis chievous in itself, any hopes of checking speculation in one particular direction would be illusory, because there would still be wanting a power of preventing the diver sion of capital into other foreign and domestic channels." The Hon. Gentleman was proceeding to deal with the subject, when Lord J. RUSSELL interposed, and trusted that the Hon. Gentleman would, as other Hon. Members had done, allow the adjourned debate on Portugal to have precedence of his motion. Mr. HUME intimated that there would no doubt be a discussion on the currency on Thursday, on the motion of an Hon. Member, and that it would be advisable that those interested in the question of the currency should defer the expression of their opinions until that evening. Mr. TRELAWNY said the currency-laws were in a very unsatisfactory state ; and he was, therefore, anxious that no time should be lost in bringing it pro minently before the attention of the House. He should, however, defer to their wishes, and withdraw his motion. The motion was accordingly withdrawn. ECCLESIASTICAL CHARITIES. Mr. E. DENISON rose to move the appointment of a Select Committee to inquire into the composition and management of the English ecclesiastical charities. He believed the Noble Lord was prepared to grant the Committee for which he had moved, and, therefore, it would be unnecessary for him to make any further ob servations. Sir R. INGLIS said that whoever would undertake the conduct of the Committee, would be most self: devoted. His Hon. Friend seemed to conceive that the .ouse would not be adjourned before the 15th of Sep- tember. CUSTODY OF LUNATICS. Mr. DUNCOMBE obtained leave to bring in a Bill relating to the custody of lunatics. Mr. Aglionby and Mr. Cabbell were ordered to take charge of the Bill. On the question that the order of the day be read for the adjourned debate on Portugal, Sir R. INGLIS wished to know from the §ecretary of State for the Home Department, whether some oppor tunity would not be given for discussing the Stock in Trade Exemption Bill. It was an annual Bill, and had been proposed from year to year for the last seven years, without any discussion. Sir. G. GREY said that, in consequence of the ad- journed debate upon Portugal and the press of public business, he was unable to name an early day. HEALTH OF TOWNS: Captain PECHELL wished to know if it was intended_ to go on with the Health of Towns Bill on Thursday next, in preference to the Prisons Bill. POOR-LAW ADMINISTRATION. . _ Sir G. GREY, in answer to the preceding question of the Hon. and Gallant Member, said that it was the in tention of the Government to go on with the Poor•law Administration Bill on Thursday, before the other orders of the day. PORTUGAL. Mr. B. OSBORNE said that he understood that a correspondence had taken place between this Govern ment and those of France and Spain, which, if produced, was likely to give an entirely new complexion to the intervention in the affairs of Portugal. He wished to put a question to the Noble Lord, in order to ascertain whether he was prepared to lay on the table copies of any dispatches, dated May the Ist, authorising Colonel Wylde to threaten Count Das Antas with the armed interposition of the British Government? Lord J. RUSSELL said that he believed all the papers containing instructions to Colonel Wylde had been laid upon the table. Mr. BANKES said that, in the event of the re solutions proposed by the Hon. Member for Montrose being-negatived and the proposition of the Hon. Mem ber for Finsbury being carried, he proposed to move as a resolution, " That this House laments that her Majesty's advisers had taken upon themselves the responsibility to recommend an interference, by force of arms, on behalf of one of the two parties now engaged in a civil war in Portugal, without there having been some communica tion from her Majesty upon the subject to her faithful Commons." Lord J. RUSSELL wished to address a few words to his Hon. Friend the Member for Finsbury, with respect to the amendment he had proposed to the motion of the Hon. Member for Montrose. His (Lord J. Russell's) Right Hon. Friend the Member for Edinburgh had stated, and in that statement he fully concurred, that in the sentiment and language of that amendment the Government were quite ready to agree • but be (Lord J. Russell) was afraid, that if that amendment were put to the House as a substitute for the motion of the Hon. Member for Montrose, it might be interpreted that no decision of the House had been given upon that motion. He should wish, therefore—if his Hon. Friend had no objection—that the motion of the Hon. Member for Montrose, which was a direct censure on the Govern ment, should be put to the House first • and that his Hon. Friend should afterwards move his resolution, which, either in the shape of a resolution or of an ad dress to the Crown, he should be happy to support.— (Hear, hear). Mr. T. S. DUNCOMBE said that he had no objection to the adoption of such a course under the distinct understanding that he should not withdraw his motion. Mr. TRELAWNY wished to ask the Hon. Member for Finsbury, whether by the words of his resolution, " every just means in their power," he contemplated the use of arms in order " to secure to the people of Por tugal the full enjoyment of their constitutional rights and privileges ?" Mr. HUME objected to this. The House was engaged in a discussion on the question, and not upon words. He objected to the question, which entirely turned upon words. Mr. TRELAWNEY again rose amidst general cries of " Order," and began to repeat his question, when, Mr. BERN AL rose to order. Mr. T. S. DUNCOMBE said I am not the Minister of War for the country I—(Loud laughter.) PORTUGAL—ADJOURNED DEBATE. On the order of the day for the adjourned debate being read, Sir DE LACY EVANS said that he would not detain House at any length, but he would state his opinions briefly and precisely upon the subject. He begged leave to say, in reply to the statement of an Hon. Member, that it was a mistake to suppose that the civil war in Portugal was provoked by her Majesty's Government. The fact was that the war in Portugal had not been caused by the Government of the Right Honourable Gentleman or by the pre sent Government, but when the present Government came into office a civil war existed in that country. He believed that there was no doubt that a civil war was raging in Portugal for the last two years. The Hon. Gentleman to whom he here alluded inquired if the people of this country had added anything to their military reputation, or obtained any advantage from their interference in this war. He did not mean to say that any commercial treaty had been obtained by the course adopted by her Majesty's Go vernment in their interference in the civil war of Portu gal ; but that interference had led to the important results that had taken place. As to adding to their military renown, it could not be supposed that the trans cendant military reputation of this country could derive any additional lustre from an engagement in this contest Various statements had been made by Hon. Members of. the superiority of the British troops, and the higher abilities of British officers, but he (Sir De Lacy Evans) could refer to the victories achieved by General Espartero as being unsurpassed by anything effected by British arms upon the continent. The Noble Lord the Member for Lynn and other Hon. Members spoke in a florid and exaggerated strain of the evils to which these civil contests had exposed the countries of Spain and Portugal. They described these countries as degraded in their population and almost ruined in their agricul tural wealth, as destitute of trade and of commerce, and they traced these evils to the effects of the civil warfare that bad prevailed there. It was impossible to deny that the interference of the Government was required, and even in the case of the great French nation, it had been found impossible to restore the legitimate monarchs of the country without the armed intervention of foreign powers. It bad been represented by the House that interference of foreign arms must be attended with gross mischief. He (Sir De Lacy Evans) denied this • the consequences were n o t a l ways mischievous. But: said they, this country had no right to interfere. That cer tainly was contradicted by the position of international laws. The rul* of non-interference extending to a cer tain crisis was illustrated by as many exceptions as ob servances. He needed only to refer to the French revolution, and the subsequent war, the civil, and the American war with this country, when the interference of the French was solicited. The proclamation that was issued declared that all that was required was a free government. The four proposi tions that were contained in that declaration went, how ever, further than that. The principles contended for in that proclamation, however they might abstractedly be deserving of approval, were, under the circumstances, impracticable. His Hon. Friends who took a part in this debate had all expressed themselves satisfied with the dis patches that had been laid before the House, but they con tended that Government had not adhered to their word. A Spanish party was formed, and there was no knowing what the consequences might have been. Several pro vinces of Portugal, which had formerly been under the influence of Spain, would have, no doubt, reverted to that country on the first appearance of an uncontrolled Spanish army. Having said so much, be would not trespass longer upon the House ; he would rather apolo gise indeed, for having already obtruded himself so long upon them. He had every confidence in the liberal Government of Spain. It might not appear fitting for him to revert to these matters, but having had ex perience in those countries, having been asked by the liberal and by the opposite parties of that country to return to the command of their armies, not because of his professional merits, but because of his acquaintance with their national constitutions ; having this experience he might be allowed to pretend to some little knowledge, and he was sure that the course pursued by the Govern ment, was that which would tend to the best results. Sir It. PEEL rose with several Hon. Members on dif ferent sides of the House, but the other Hon. Gentlemen giving way, the Right Hon. Baronet proceeded to ad dress the House; he said,—Sir, as this debate has lasted two nights, and as I think the practice that has grown up of confining the more important part of the debate to two or three hours at the close of the evening —(Hear, hear)--is to )—is prejudicial to the public serv i ce , b ecause i t leads an unnecessary consumption of the public time —(Hear, hear)—l intend, as far as my humble au thority will go, to enter a practical protest against it, by delivering the few observations I have to make at this, to a speaker, unpopular hour of the evening. (Hear, hear.) Sir, I perfectly concur in an observe,- - tion made in the course of this debate, that the deci sion to which the House should come ought to be a decision on the abstract merits of the auestion. I agree that no consideration of the position of her Majesty's Government, or of the pendency of a general election, or of the embarrassment that might arise from a sudden change of a Ilinistry, ought to induce the House to give its sanction to the policy of the Govern ment, or withhold its assent from the motion that has been made, if this House does really believe that the object of the recent intervention has been to support ab solute power in Portugal, or that the consequence of persevering in that intervention will be to endanger the public tranquillity in Portugal, or involve this country in imminent peril of war. There are many motions of light importance in respect to which the decision may, I think, be fairly influenced by extrinsic considerations; but this is not one of them. This question is of too much importance to be treated or decided upon any other grounds than its own intrinsic merits; upon that prin ciple alone I shall give my vote upon it. Sir, we are called on by the motion to affirm that, in the opinion of this House, an armed interference between political par ties in Portugal is unwarrantable in principle, and likely to be attended with serious and mischievous consequences. That vote will be a vote of censure, if not direct, yet implied, upon the Government ; and the con sequence of it will be practically, in my opinion, the re versal of the policy on which the Government has en tered. An adverse expression of opinion on the part of this House will completely paralyze the hands which direct it. And the question is, whether I am justified, on considerations of justice and publid policy, in affirm ing a proposition which implies not only a censure bn the Government, but an abandonment of the policy which is at this moment in the course of execution ? Sir, I am about to exercise a privilege which is most agreeable to me; I am about to give my opinion without any of that circumspection and reserve which necesarily fetter the members of an administration and the leaders of a party. I am going to state the opinion which, after an attentive perusal of these papers, and after lis tening to this debate, I individually hold. I speak no other man's opinion ; I know not what may be t he opinion or the vote o f any ot h er man ; I undertake only to give my own ho nest an d consc i en tious judgment on this matter, without re f erence to any ex trinsiccircum• stance or consideration. I first ask what was the motive of her Majesty's Government in interfering in the domestic concerns of Portugal I I separate the motives and objects of the Government from their acts and proceedings. I have read these papers ; and if I believed, with the Hon. Gentleman who makes this motion, that there had been a wanton departure from the principle of non-interference —if I believed that the object of the Government had been to range itself on the side of despotic power—and to crush the struggling liberties of Portugal, I would have most cordially concurred in a vote of censure. But, after reading these papers—and speaking now of the mo tives of the Government as distinguished from its sets— I acquit it of any other intention than to support an an cient monarchy, and at the same time to combine with the support of that ancient monarchy guarantees for the constitutional liberties of the people. With respect to many painful, transactions the Government had given advice to the Government of Portugal before it com mitted itself to any active interference ; was it wise to give that advice or not ? It would certainly be a plain and simple course to decline giving any advice even to a friendly Government, to have said, " We have enough to do to manago our own affairs, without concerning our selves with yours ;" it was possible to take that course, and it would have relieved the Government of a great responsibility. But that has not been the course taken in former times with respect either to the Go vernments of Portugal or of Spain. I speak without prejudice on this subject, for I was no party to the quadruple treaty; I objected to the obli gations you incurred by that treaty; I thought it unwise to enter into them; better at that time to permit the people of Spain and Portugal to decide for themselves between the rival branches of the houses of Bourbon and Braganca; I am, therefore, free from any prejudice on this subject. But I cannot enter into the consideration of what has been recently done without remembering that the quadruple treaty has been entered into. You have contracted these special obligations to which the four powers are parties; you have guaranteed the thrones of Spain and Portugal to the present possessors against the other two brances, and if Don Miguel were to reappear in Portugal, or a descendant of Don Carlos in Spain, then you would be bound by the obligations of that treaty to interfere, not certainly for the purpose of establising a particular party in the ,domestjc govern ment of either country, but to take part in a civil war for the maintenance of one branch of the family on the throne against another. In deciding, therefore, on the recent policy of the Government, either in giving advice to Portugal or interfering actively with its affairs, we must bear in mind, not only our ancient relations with that country, the importance of Portugal from its !geo graphical position, and the long connexion between us, but also the special obligations by which we are bound in certain cases to a joint action with other countries. It has not been usual to abstain from friendly inter vention, either with respect to Spain or Portugal. When Mr. Canning was Secretary for Foreign Affairs, the Duke of Wellington being a member of the Cabinet, Lord Fitzroy Somerset was expressly dispatched in 1823 to give advice to the Spanish Government, and dispatched too to advise it to modify the too liberal constitution, to give increased power to the sovereign, and to alter the terms of the constitution, that were supposed to be too favourable to the democratic power. Lord Fitzroy So merset was the bearer of a letter addressed by the Duke of Wellington to the leading men in Spain; the object of that letter came under discussion in 1823, and when Parliament, at the instance of Mr. Canning, rejected the motion made by Sir James Macdonald, and affirmed the policy of Mr. Cunning, the tact was before the House of Commons that we had attempted, no doubt from the most friendly feelings, to avert from Spain the danger of threatened invasion from France, by advising the mo dification of her constitution. Therefore, I say the prac tice of advising the Governments both of Spain and Por tugal has not met, in former times, with the censure of this House. Then, Sir, if I look at the nature of the ad vice given to Portugal as in the dispatches of the Noble Lord the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, I see not a word in that advice of which a British Minister has reason to be ashamed. lam speaking now of the ad vice given before we had committed ourselves to forcible intervention. What was that advice ? When it was in tended to commit that act which we cannot hear without shame at this period of civilisation—(Cheers) —when it was intended to transport men who had engaged in a civil contest, but who had capitulated on the assurance that they should be treated as prisoners of war— (Cheers)—when it was attempted to transport these men, gallant soldiers, though they may have been mis taken in the construction of their duty—when it was attempted, in violation of good faith, to transport these men to an unhealthy climate, I find the British Govern ment remonstrating against that act, and earnestly ad vising that, both with reference to the interests of huma nity, and an enlarged and comprehensive view of the in terests of the Portuguese monarchy, such an atrocity should not be perpetrated.—(Cheers.) Sir, I think that the Government was justified in making that remon strance and giving that advice.—(Cheers.) Then, again I find the British Government remonstrating against the shameful decree that all prisoners taken in arms should be instantly shot—(Cheers) —wisely and properly leaving the Portuguese Government to draw the inference that it was impossible for us to countenance or support them, or show them any sympathy, if acts of that kind were committed, endangering the throne in the estima tion of its own subjects, and bringing upon the Go vernment the indignation of every civilised country. In every instance in which advice was given I find it to be in favour of forbearance—in favour of lenity and mo deration—(Cheers)--and, inferring the motives from the advice, I cannot think it consistent with justice to visit the Government with the condemnation which this motion implies.—(Cheers.) Then, Sir, I come to the acts of the Government, and I am perectly willing to admit that it is not sufficient that the motives and inten tions should have been good if the acts were in them selves unwise. You may acquit the Government of intentional misconduct, but if their acts be at variance with justice or sound policy you are perfectly at liberty, if not to censure the Government, at least to compel the revocation of the acts. In reviewing the acts of the Government, the sth of April is a day of the utmost importance.—(Hear, hear.) Up to the sth of April we had limited ourselves to friendly advice, to warnings, and to remonstrances, and up to the sth of April I think there can be few persons disposed to censure Govern ment on account of any stop they had then taken, or any advice they had given. In viewing the subsequent acts of the Government, I certainly should attach consider able weight to the motives and intentions by which they were dictated—not that good motives and intentions would justify acts which are impolitic, but in consider ing the acts I should have material regard to the motives and intentions which influenced them. The question is, whether en the sth of April, when it is clear that the Government departed from its former course and under took not merely to give advice, but to make proposals which in certain contingencies involved the necessity of armed intervention, there is a sufficient vindication for this change of policy? Now, first of all, it is to be ob served, that we who are in the position of judges after the event have a great advantage over those who had to form a decision, providing against very co m pli ca t e d an d u ncertain contingencies.—(Cheers.) That which was then obscure is now as light as day. Upon all those combinations which had then to be considered, and of which the issue appeared very doubtful, the light of history has been shed. It is now easy to see the ig a knowledge of all in a very diff e r e nt mis takes that may have bee n committed. The judge, b e i ng ahllutehetafkaecnts,p.hlacavei, s n situation from those who had to decide under unc er tain and doubtful circumstances. — (Cheers.) Sir, I place myself in the positio n o f a Government which, on receiv itnhe possession events wh o ic f h receiv ing the representations of the Portuguese Government, had to decide what course they would pursue; and, to I do justice to their case, it is absolutely necessary to at tempt to forget all we now know, and consider what we would have done with the information before us which they had in the early part of April.—(Cheers.) Sir, I cannot conceive a decision more difficult to be arrived at. On the one hand there was a Government which had done acts that merited disapprobation—(Cheers)—there was every argument against forcible intervention in the domestic concerns of Portugal; there was the danger, also, that, by intervention, we might set the precedent for other and future interventions, from which very serious embarrassments might arise; and no doubt these were considerations that ought to be maturely weighed. --(Cheers.) Tbere is no man in this House who feels more strongly than I do the grave objections that apply to a wanton and unnecessary intervention in the affairs of other countries. The danger is, that by that inter vention you are not propping up the throne in favour of which you interfere—you may be sowing the seeds of weakness, instead of strengthening the cause you espouse. But, on the other hand, it becomes a Government responsible for the aininistratiou of public sffeirs to consider also what course it was fitting to pursue with reference to the general interests of humanity, and the restoration of domestic peace in a country in the internal peace of which we were entitled to take a deep interest. Was there a prospect of an early termination of these quarrels ? Were not parties so equally balanced, that this conflict having continued from the 7th of October, there was every probability that, if we and other powers also' stood aloof,—if we had said to the Portuguese, " You shall fight it out," we must have been witnesses of a terrible struggle, impeding industry, engendering per manent discord between members of the same nation, almost members of the same family, without a prospect of any termination, through the superiority of one party or the other.—(Cheers). I wish to take nothing what ever for granted. I wish to state to the House what is the evidence which has brought me to the conclusion that, had I been a member of the Government, having to act in the latter days of March, lam by no means pre pared to say that I would not have taken the course which, under great difficulties, her Majesty's Govern ment finally determined to take.—(Cheers). After the free and unrestricted communication of every letter writ ten at an early period, it were easy, from the pens of those who wrote dispatches and the mouths of those who uttered opinions, to convict Government apparently on their own evidence. Up to the sth of April you de precated intervention. You thoughtit unwise ; you wished to prevent France and Spain from intervention ; of course you used every argument against it; but when necessity forced on you intervention, then, no doubt, the arguments you used against intervention appeared ap plicable to your own course; and it would be easy in this way to convict you of inconsistency and condemn you on that account. But, admitting the policy of ab staining from intervention ourselves, and discouraging intervention on the part of France and Spain, the simple question is, whether, towards the latter end of March, a change of policy was not rendered necessary by the state of the case?—(Cheers.) I look to the question, first, as far as the general interests of humanity are concerned. You cannot doubt that, with respect to this country, with which you have had treaties for 400 years, you might abstain from all interference on the most rigid principle of non-intervention. You might say, "We have misery enough on our own hands; we have distress enough in the west of Scotland; we will not encumber ourselves with the responsibility of interfering in Portugal; we will not interfere." A Government might take that course; but I venture to say, if you had taken that course other countries would have interfered, and in their interference they would have carried with them the sympathies of half of Europe.—(Cheers.) Portugal has special claims on us. She stood on our side in the greatest conflict that ever threatened the repose and liberties of Europe; she gave us the advantage of mili tary positions from which, as at Torres Vedras, that il lustrious commander did so much to achieve ultimately the liberties of Europe.—(Cheers.) It is impossible you can view with indifference or disregard the position of Por tugal. I admit it is not enough that the motive is good; I must show that the acts were calculated to promote tranquillity. What, then, was the position of Portugal, its internal position, towards the latter end of March? I take the accounts which reached the Government at the moment when the necessity for decision had arrived. Here is a dispatch from Sir Hamilton Seymour, and dates are very important. It is dated the 14th of March —received by the Government on the 22d. lam now justifying a conclusion to which I come from a reference to the condition of that country, and its imperative claims upon some interference on our part in the general interests of humanity, apart from all obligations of treaty. Sir Hamilton Seymour, writing on the 14th of March, in a dispatch received on the 22d, says, " Every day serves to aggravate the miseries of the country. To present want and distress future famine will be added if those who ought to be employed in cultivating are to be en gaged in laying waste the land."—(Cheers.) But this state of things had continued from October to March. There was no sufficient superiority in either party, ap parently, to terminate the state of things. We were suffering from famine at home; and here was a country, our immediate neighbour—for in such a case the sea constitutes neighbourhood—were we to permit Portugal, on account of intestine feuds, to be laid waste, and an additional strain to be laid on her more happily circum stanced neighbours?—(Cheers.) Then again, on the 19th of March, Sir H. Seymour writes, in a dispatch received on the 28th, " The financial condition of the country is daily becoming worse ; before this reaches your Lordship the discount of notes will probably be 50 per cent. Extensive importations of corn have been lately made, the most considerable from Liverpool." Well, just consider what was the demand in the Liver pool market; what was the price of corn there; the ne cessity we had ourselves for preserving as much of Liverpool corn as we could for the maintenance of our own people.—(Hear, hear.) What must have been the condition of that people when it is said, "Of the scar city and dearness of bread you will form some idea by the fact, that the last cargoes from Liverpool were sold at a profit to the importer of 30 per cent?"—(Cheers.) That cora was sold at a profit of 30 per cent. The people who ought to have been cultivating the soil, were engaged in cutting each other's throats, without the prospect of bringing that to a conclusion.—(Hear, hear.) What was to be the prospect of that country, with reference to the sustenance of the people, if that state of things was to go on; and we, relying on the principle of rigid non intervention, had refused to interfere by any act by which that state of affairs might be put an end to? — (Cheers.) The English Consul, Mr. Johnson, in a letter received by the Government on the 15th of March, states, "In Viena the authorities have seized corn; they broke open the stores of Mr. Russell, an English man. The state of affairs on the Douro is very vexa tious to our merchants; the merchants can neither bring down their wines nor send pipes or staves to Regoa." Here there was a proof that the continuance of these civil commotions materially interfered with the security of British property, and by interrupting commerce di rectly affected the interests of British subjects. Now the testimony I am about to quote is very important. It is written at a subsequent date, but such was the disposi tion of the people in the very neighbourhood of Lisbon that Sir 11. Seymour thus describes the plans of what he calls " the anarchists ": " The plan of the anarchists was to set fire to some old houses in various parts of the town, to force the pri son doors, and let loose some 1,200 or 1,400 prisoners. When a populous town is to be fired at various points, and when the confusion which ensues is to be increased by the presence of all the vilest malefactors in the hands of justice, it is idle to inquire what precise political ob jects are sought for, or at what exact points conflagration and excesses are to cease." Well, you had the British fleet in the Tagus ; you heard from your Minister that the plan of the anarchists was to set fire to Lisbon in different parts of the town, to discharge the vilest malefactors to the number of 1,400. I ask you if, having that fleet in the Tagus, we could remain perfectly passive, and permit Lisbon to be destroyed by the malefactors turned out of the gaols? — (Cheers.) I say nothing of the manifest intention of France and Spain to interfere. I think that the conduct of France and Spain manifested a confidence in this country. I think that the Government cannot found their vindication on any assurance that France or Spain would interfere separately. But then I say the force of circumstances would have caused their interference. If the Queen of Portugal had said, " I will give guarantees for future good government ; I will give an amnesty ; I will recal obnoxious edicts ; I intend to govern consti tutionally ;" if the British Admiral having received these guarantees, had permitted Lisbon to be fired, and malefactors to be turned out and destroy property in the streets, Spain and France would have inter fered. They would have rescued the Queen ; they would have rescued property from such depredation. I again say, the assent and sympathy of Europe would have been with them, and you would have been blamed for permitting such outrages in that country which, to a certain extent, you have virtually taken under your protection. You might have been able in such a case to make out a good defence on the rigid principle of non intervention; but the blood of the British House of Com mons would have risen —(Cheers)—and you would have had no credit for your rigid adherence to the principle of non-intervention.—(Loud cheers.) But then again I ask, what security had you that the cause of liberty would have triumphod—what security had you that the insurgents would triumph? I say, none whatsoever. I say that the probability was that the Queen's cause would have triumphed rather than the insurgents. Ob serve what has taken place. Although Spain had not directly interfered, she had a force on the frontier. She was lending the moral authority of Spain to the Queen and her Government. She had not only marched her forces to the frontier; she had facilitated the passage of the Queen's troops through part of her dominions. Her forces on the frontier were thus ready to act. Had events taken a sudden turn, had the fortunate moment for the entrance of Don Miguel within Portugal arisen, Spain would not only have interfered, but she had a right to in terfere, and then she was "prepared for that act of interference.—(Cheers.) But she was lending the coun tenance of the Spanish Government to the Queen of Portugal, by having her army on the frontier. A pro position was made for the enlistment of a Spanish army, to be officered by Portuguese, and employed in the cause of the Queen. You say Spain will not interfere; but Colonel Wylde . writes on the.2lst of March a dispatch received on the 28th of that month, in which he says, " Saldanha's demand to be allowed to raise a legion in Spain has been acceded to by the Government here." That was direct Spanish intervention. The Spanish Government, acting in concert with the Portuguese Go vernment, had permitted Saldanha to raise a legion to act in Portugal,—that was a direct Spanish intervention. If the authority of the Portuguese Government had been upheld, the upholding of that Government would have been due to Spain. Spanish interference was given, and how was this to be resisted? Colonel Wylde went on to say, " I have no doubt, if this measure is carried into effect, that none but ready-made soldiers will be enlisted, and that every facility will be afforded him by the Spa nish Government for obtaining them by allowing men to volunteer from the regular army." That was the in formation which, on the 22d of March, the Govern ment were in possession of.-.-(Cheers.) I take for g ranted that the official accounts are correct. I have no information except that which I derive from the official papers. Mr. HUME—Saldanha only demanded to be allowed to raise a legion. Sir R. PEEL—Colonel Wylde says, °' Saldanha's de mand to be allowed to raise a legion in Spain has been acceded to by t he Government here."—(Cheers.) Why, Government has to act on probabilities, and come to a sudden decision on information like this; and, if you found that there had been a legion of Spaniards engaged in Portugal you would have found it too late to remon strate, and most difficult to carry any remonstrance into effect ; and, unless you chose to send a military force to Portugal, and identified yourself with the insurgent force against that of the monarchy, you would have had no means of effectual resistance against the invasion of spain.—(Cheers.) Now, w hat are the indications that insurgent cause was likely to triumph ? Sir U. thethe nu rgent cause was likely to triumph P Sir U. Seymour in a dispatch dated the lsth of March, re. eeived the lath of_lAlsrch, says— " Events of such nature are taking place here as to make it evident that a crisis of some sort must be at hand. Marshal Saldanha writes to the Queen announcing his intention of resigning his seat in the Council, in the event either of the Queen's refusal to sanction an appli cation for the assistance of Spain, or of any attempt being made to come to terms with the insurgents." Consider: what was the position of the Portuguese Go vernment at that time? The Queen, it is admitted, was menaced with dangers. The Commander-in. Chief and the Prime Minister had threatened to send in their re signations if she did not early make application to Spain for assistance. How great, then, was her motive to seek from Spain direct military assistance, when such was the counsel of her Ministers, and when this was the threat they had made to her!—(Hear, hear.) On the 19th of March, in a letter received on the 28th of March, Sir H. Seymour says; " I cannot doubt that an application to Spain for assistance will be made." Well, supposing the Queen had been victorious, what was your guarantee in that case for constitutional Liberty?—(hear, hear.) There was some doubts about the result, and you will find strong evidence in looking over these letters, al though the Junta at Oporto was very firm, that yet there were intestine divisions in the Junta, that the people were undecided, and that in the province of Beira there was no wish to encourage the insurgents. With the Portuguese forces under the command of Saldanha, backed by the countenance of Spain, I say that the pro bability was, on the 28th of March, that the Queen would have been victorious.—(Hear, hear.) And when the Government was exulting in unexpected victory, what security would you have had for moderation and for bearance or constitutional order? Observe—who would have been the Government? The Government would have been composed of those who had advised the trans • portation of the prisoners taken at Torres Vedras—of those who had counselled the issuing of decrees by which men taken in arms should be instantly shot. If these things had been done in the green tree, what would have been done in the dry?—(Hear, hear.) If you had re fused all intervention—if you had said to the Queen of Portugal, "We stand aloof, we leave you to settle the question;" and supposing she had triumphed, what right would you then have had to interpose to prevent her reaping the fruits of the victory? My conviction is that, if you had held aloof and the Queen had triumphed, the same motives which led to those decrees with respect to arresting persons taken in arms and the transportation of prisoners would have again operated, and would have given you no security whatever, either for the return of constitutional liberty, or even for the exhibition of decent forbearance or generosity towards the vanquished.— (Hear, hear.) There were, too, many motives that in fluenced your decision. You saw all the objections to intervention. You feared all the dangers of having to make use of a Spanish force; and, on the other hand, you calculated the danger of a victory of one cause over the other, and all the consequences which, as we know from experience, generally follow such triumphs; and I cannot, in justice, join in the condemnation of a Govern ment which, balancing these conflicting considerations, came to the conclusion that it was, on the whole, better to make proposals which, as I admit, if rejected, led to the necessity of a further intervention.—(Hear.) There was every probability that the proposals you made would have been accepted, and that no after-intervention would have arisen. You took that chance, and it was impossible for any one or any Government to pro cheaedtdhnoo no alternative, Government on probabilities. Having prevailed on if they to w e o r ff e e r r t e h j e o c s t e edbut conditions, t oassist y • her in enforcing obedience from her revolted subjects. There was again another danger to be guarded against; there was the danger of France sad Spain interfering if you remained neutral. I have already said that I think the conduct, both of France and Spain, in these negotia tions, proves a disposition to show every confidence in this Government.—(Hear, hear.) They have through out evinced no inclination to obtain any advantage to themselves by an interference separate from this coun try ; and I am glad that the Noble Lord withdrew the imputation which had been cast upon M. Guisot and the French Government, in respect to a supposed desire to have an independent intervention. I saw it with the greatest satisfaction, and I do believe that, even after those unfortunate differences which had prevailed be tween this country and France, in respect to which I think France in the wrong, there was yet every wish on the part of France to take an early opportunity of ex pressing a desire to act in unison with us in any inter ference in the affairs of Portugal. Ido not think that M. Guisot ever wished, or that he ever con templated, a separate intervention, and I can hardly believe that the Minister of Louis Philippe, considering what is the foundation of his throne—(Hear, hear) — would have advised a wanton or unnecessary inter ference in the internal affairs of another nation.—(Hear, hear.) Remember, however, that the Minister of France, disposed to show confidence in this Government, did, nevertheless, declare his opinion to be that the Portu guese Government was entitled to receive aid from the Spanish Government. M. Guisot entertained an opi nion, and I think a sincere one, that under the quadruple treaty, the three Governments might have justified in terference. Even if a cases fcrderis had not arisen, M. ' Guisot said that the principle which had dictated the signatures to that treaty still remained, and I recollect particularly that he dwells on this fact—that General Povoas, the Miguelite General, had been admitted to great influence at Oporto, and he considered that circum stance most material in justifying the Portuguese Go vernment in asking aid from Spain. Therefore I give entire credit to the Governments of France and Spain for the confidence they displayed. I believe that the object of M. Pacheco was to act cordially with us, and I acquit M. Guisot and the French Government of any intention to obtain particular advantages for themselves. But, in the state of things which would have ensued, if such acts as those to which I have referred had been perpetrated—if Lisbon had been fired, if the malefactors had been turned loose, then France and Spain would have been fully justified in interfering, even had you refused; and I again say, that if these events had oc curred, I doubt if France and Spain would not have found support and approval in the public opinion of Europe.— (Hear, hear.) It may be to us and to our interests a matter of indifference what takes place in Portugal ; but, consider Spain. The dynasty of Spain holds its authority by nearly the same tenure with the dynasty of Portugal. Spain could not depart from all consideration of the quadruple treaty. Placing ourselves, however, in the position of Spain, seeing the identity f interests which prevailed between the dynasty in the possession of the throne of Spain, and the dynasty in the possession of the throne of Portugal, apart from the quadruple treaty, and every other consideration, I think a common interest and the necessity of preventing anarchy in Por tugal constitute a case which, itself, would justify, on all grounds, Spanish interference, if such a calamity as that of which I have made mention had occurred. — (Hear, hear.) And, turning to the other alternative, supposing, instead of the Queen's forces, the insurgent troops had been successful, I see no evidence whatever that a greater degree of moderation would have been exercised in that case. I see nothing in the pro portion of the Junta forces, nothing in the course they took, to assure me that justice or generosity would have prevailed bad they been victorious. Why, the proposal that there should be no Commander-in- Chief, that there should be different corps acting under different generals, and, considering that the Queen's army was in possession of Lisbon, the proposi tion that the Government should be handed over to the insurgents, for them to accept any terms of accommo dation, convince me that in the hour of victory little reliance could be placed on either their moderation or their sense of right.— (Hear, hear.) And, therefore, I leave you to choose either alternative, the triumph of the Queen's cause, or the triumph of the insurgents; it is possible you might have gained an advantage in the termination of a harassing civil conflict; but you would have found in either case no guarantee for the restora tion of constitutional liberty—that accommodation, that oblivion of past crimes, that mutual generosity, on which alone can the hopes of future peace be founded.—(Hear, hear.) Then upon these three considerations, seeing the probability that this strife would have long continued if not suppressed by your means —remembering that it was for the interests of humanity that you should inter fere, looking to the great likelihood that, if you had not interposed, France and Spain would not only have de sired, but have been compelled to interfere —knowing the further probability that in either issue, whether the result were a triumph to the Queen or to the insurgents, moderation and justice would not have been maintained —in the midst of these conflicting considerations, all of which had to be weighed by the Government, again I say I will not consent to visit with condemnation those who, under such circumstances, deemed it expedient to decide upon offering British intervention.—(Cheers.) And it is upon these grounds that I shall give my vote against the motion of the Hon. Gentleman. I think it inconsistent with justice to visit the Government with censure. I think they have done nothing in the conclu sion to which they came which disentitles them to the confidence of this House so far as their conduct in these affairs is concerned.—(Cheers). Well, now, as to the question of public policy, which is a far more im portant subject for our deliberation,—is it wise, while all these transactions are pending, and while the plans are being carried into execution, to control, by a deci sion of the House of Commons, the executive Govern ment, and to say that this policy mast be abandoned ? Perhaps it must not be abandoned, perhaps it must be continued. By whose ? I say the hand is palsied that has to execute it if struck by a resolution of the House of Commons adverse to it. What do you mean to do after having adopted this resolution ?—(Rear.) It seems to me to be unwarrantable in principle, and likely to lead to sericus and most mischievous consequences. What would be the consequence to the public policy of the country if you pass such a declaration ? Will you release Das Antos and the insurgent forces, or will you continue them prisoners of war ? What is the practical force of that you propose to do ? You surely will not say.." We are content with having censured the Govern ment, and we will leave them to get out of the difficulty as best they may ?" Will you replace Das Antes and his 2,500 men in the British steamers, take them back to Oporto, and say, " Gentlemen, we have been in the wrong ; it is right we should make you compensation, and so we return you exactly to the position which originally you occupied ; any damage we have done to you or your cause we are willing to repair ; we there • fore bring you back to Oporto, and will let you fight it out 1" Is that the course you would now take 1 If you have done wrong and you do not wish to inflict in justice, you have no means of repairing the mischief ; it will not be enough merely to release Das Antas.— (Hear, hear.) Will you then retain him in custody, will you still hold him and his follower s as p r i soners o f ar ? I know not, indeed, what course the Executive is to take in the midst of these proceedings, when so soon as to morrow night it may be necesrary to give instructions or answer some dispatch they may receive, if there is not a distinct explanation on the part of the House of Commons of the motive by which it is guided in coming to this conclusion.—(Cheers.) Is it to be left to the Mi nister of the Crown to say, " I have entered into th is en gagement,l must creep out of it as well as I can ; I must , avoid the fulfilment of the conditions I accepted? And what language will you bold to the oth et parties to the convention ? You declared to them that the necessity for interference had occurred. You knew that no separate interference was desired, a n d, although you denied the obligations of the quadruple treaty, and although you did not think a cases ficderi s had arisen, yet, in deference to the principle of that treaty, by the advice of her Ministers, the Queen of Eng land invited France and Spain to be parties to the inter vention. When, then, you have told them that the Queen of England can no longer fulfil her engagements, you d not intend to prohibit them from pursuing the policy which with you they commenced ?—(Hear, hear.) After having crept out of your obligations, you do not expect that France and Spain who entered into the agree ment at your suggestion, will now withdraw? You do not think that the French Government will say to the Chem hers, "We interfered at the solicitation of the Queen of England; we were willing to give our aid; but she says she can't fulfil her part in the convention, and she tells us also, that it is not possible we can fulfil ours?"-- (Hear, hear.) Is it at all probable that th e F renc h Government will be guided by your resolution? No; the consequence will be, that Spain and France will alone carry out the intervention. How is the Queen of En land to remonstrate? The very danger, therefore, thgat you have apprehended, viz., the exclusion of your own. influence, and the establishment of the authority al• France and Spain in Portugal, will inevitably take ple a , under your eyes; and I defy you, in accordance with the principle of any international law, to make any rens on strance.—(Hear, hear.) I say it is infinitely better we should continue to act in concurrence with the other Governments, bringing to bear upon the question the moral influence of the three great powers who established the threne of Donna Maria and of the Queen of Spain. —(Hear, hear.) In deference to motives of public policy it is infinitely better we should not attempt to control the Executive Government, acting under consi derable difficulties, by any resolution which would in volve a course undignified and impracticable.—(Cheers.) It is infinitely better that we should leave the Govern ment to decide unencumbered and unembarrassed by our advice.—(Hear.) An amendment has been moved; I am ready to vote against the motion without any amend ment. I will deal with the subject on its abstract merits. If I were a member of the Government, I would not take an amendment which, after all, will be passing by this censure.—(Hear, hear.) To the principle of the motion of the lion. Gentleman the Member for Finsbury I have no objection; the question of affirming it by the House of Commons is another matter.—(Hear, hear.) The Government said to the Queen of Portugal, "The conditions which we must have from you are, complete and entire amnesty and exemp tion from penal consequences for every person engaged in this insurrection; we make no exception; we will try to prevent, as far as we can, any future cause for disten sion, arising from the absence of a complete act of oblivion; we require you to withdraw every decree since the 6th of October at variance with the established constitution; we also require you to constitute a Go vernment which shall inspire general confidence, and from which we desire there shall be excluded every one liable to public suspicion or popular distrust; and, lastly. we earnestly implore you to remove that person who has occupied a prominent place in the palace, and whose si tuation in Portugal exposes him to suspicion." These were the terms on which the intervention was based; and having received an assurance from the Government of Portugal that these conditions should be fulfilled, hav ing, moreover, invited the insurgent party to lay down their arms upon the assurance that those conditions should be respected, I do say, in concurrence with the principle of the resolution, that the honour of England is involved in their strict observance.—(Cheers.) I think it would be a breach of faith towards the insurgent party (I regret the necessity) if you did not commit the honour of England to the maintenance of the condi tions which you yourselves proffered.—(Hear, hear.) That portion of the dispatches which gives me the boat assurance of a happy termination to these unfortunate affairs is the testimony, the unsolicited testimony, which, I find to be borne to the personal dispositions of the So vereigns of Portugal. I, myself, attribute the misfor tunes that have occurred to the pernicious advice they have received. It is usual, :on all occasions, in consti tutional and loyal states, to presume justice and hu manity on the part of crowned heads; but I do find in these papers conclusive proof that you may fairly attri bute the acts that have been done, not to the personal dis positions of the Queen of Portugal or her Consort, but t. the bad counsel they received from the Government of Cabral and those who were leagued with it.—(Hear.;) I find that Sir H. Seymour, in a dispatch of March e t , affords an unsuspicious testimony to the good faith of the queen and the character of the King. He says-- "The King has given a fresh proof of the wise and con ciliatory disposition by which he has been distinguished in the Council, by addressing yesterday a letter to Mar shal Saldanha, calling upon him to make peaceful over tures to the Oporto Junta." That was the act of the King in council. His suggestion was, not an:appeal to arms, but that conciliatory overtures should be made to the insurgents.—(Hear, hear.) Those overtures were not made; but whose was the fault? That of the men, who threatened to resign should the course advised by the King be taken.—(Hear.) With this evidence before them, they were bound to make every allowance for the conduct of their Majesties, having, as it was shown, been placed in so critical a position. Mr. Southern says, in one of his dispatches, that he had addressed a note pro testing against the transportation of the prisoners taken at Torres Vedras, and that the subject had been re peatedly under deliberation in the Cabinet, and his com ment is, "I am happy to think that the benevolent feelings of their Majesties induces them to support my views; but the opinion of the Cabinet, to which some extraneous persons were admitted, finally prevailed, on being backed by a threat of immediate resignation on the part of the Ministry." Thus it was clear the Sovereign , had interfered on behalf of the prisoners, but those who directed their counsels having threateeed resignation, they were unable to effect their own charitable wishes.— (Hear, hear.) Again, Sir H. Seymour says, on the lith of May, speaking of the action of the Ist of May, when o in f su s r r ents k , il i l n ed eoixt an i d . w t o e n n d insurgents cd —I a n s y u s o t a f i t e h e e d w a o u loss d pany with the wounded of the Queen's forces, have been removed to the hospital at Lisbon. On the 3d inst. the hospital was visited by the Queen and King, who spoke to many of the wounded, and gave special orders that every attention should be paid to all alike." Such evi dence of justice and moderation on the part of these Royal personages inspires me with the hope that if they are surrounded by more honest advisers there is a prospect of returning peace and tranquillity to Portugal—(Cheers.) No w , I trust that nothing I have said will lay me open to the& suspicion that I approve of the measures which were adopted by the Government of Portugal since the 7th of October.—(Hear, hear.) I think that the change of Government on the 6th of October, 1846, the sudden removal of the Duke de Palmella, and the mode in which that removal was effected, were calculated to lessen the respect of the people for the throne.--(Hear, hear.) I have come to the conclusion that on the whole it i s desirable that the power of England should be exerted for the purpose of quelling these troubles ; but I do not think it should be lent to giving countenance and sup port to arbitrary proceedings.—(Hear.) I have seen, I had almost said with shame and regret, that illustrious man, the Duke of Palmella, an exile from his own coun try and in banishment.—(Hear, hear.) I see with regret that wisest politician of all the Portuguese—the man who was a political ornament to his country—the man who in 1814-15 was associated with the leading diplo matists of Europe for the purpose of laying the founda tions of that general peace which has endured 27 year, —I do see with deep pain that that man, the most emi nent of the subjects of the Queen of Portugal, is an exile from his native country. And for what? Because he wished to govern on constitutional principles — (Hear)—because, in his intercourse with public men, with the statesmen of Europe, he had learned, perhaps, better principles for the conduct of constitutional go vernment than those who hove been the ordinary coun cillors of the Portuguese Sovereign.—(Cheers.) I look to the advice he gave, and to the language in which Lord Howard speaks of the progress he had made towards the restoration of peace.—(Hear.) I read his law of elec tions—l see his resolution to summon the Cortes—l see his advice not to resort to acts of severity—l see these things, and I think it a reflection on public men that he should be an exile from his native country.—(Cheers.) Sir, I think that the Portuguese Government, on the 6th of October, committed the greatest mistake that a Government can commit, when, in anticipation of some fancied dangers, they resorted to what is called a dlliat, that is, attempted to avert threatened danger by the assumption of unconstitutional power.—(Hear, hear.) That was the mistake that was made by the Government of Charles X., and it is the mistake that has been made by those councillors who advised the dismissal of that, faithful subjectof the Queen and attached friendof peace, the ',Duke of Palmella.—(Hear, hear.) It would have been the true policy of the Government, even if these dan gers were real, to have met them, and not attempted to avert them by the assumption of unconstitutional powers. --(Hear, hear.) These advisers of coups cilia have taken credit to themselves for firmness and decision ; they refer to the case of Louis XVL, and say that the cause decision. They rchy rh w e a y s p t e h i e d n e ltohsetmsbeylvaeswaonnt firmness decision and energy, but they do not see the danger of resorting to these extreme acts of violence, or the consequences which they may lead to.—(Hear, hear.) They pointed at the programme of the Septembrists, but I believe that was nothing more than a proposed change in regard to electoral districts; and I contend that any apprehen eogrnsnr gieaetnlhvt:oem acts,us enemies, sympathies mistake; st a k e ; sions entertained in regard to that programme were not sufficient to set aside the constitutional liberty of Poe e a t opw u nfoi g dy:El a. will, ur . oea ( ept H te s e_ ao a tnu r h(d , rceihear.)eeoa resort as hear.) atoe, T rrno. : en :01,3 yourselves usrt a tre s i ssyt eou a ituvai b p ..,1 11 c fe a t t t l , s a yh t eo o e yu f e n t el then the good feeling to apPlythepowerswhich the constitution gives c y o en t , e n a t n of other countries, aye, and of your own subjects, will rally around you if the attack upon you be an unjust one; but if the friends of the monarchy will attempt to meet danger by coups dada, and will violate the law in anticipation of dangers, then, in that case, the sympathies of Europe will not be with them—(Cheers)—that is the mode by which thrones are more endangered than by disloyalty ainddistaffstownhoinehoal said I would do, openly an d frankly, the part of the people. I have now fulfilled that "dual; after a perusal of those papers before me , I cannot in as sent to a vot • f e o censure on spoken my opinions as a private ch • which is no w in course of action ; but while I take that the Government , I cannot co n sent to interfere with that cou rse, while I would not interfere to put a stop to that intervent i o n which has taken place, I must at the same time say that of the acts of the Portuguese Government I cannot speak without condemnation.—(Cheers.) And I say, in conclusion, that unless those evil councillors who have been placed around the Portuguese throne are banished --A An lioN. MEMBER—They will be banished. Sir R. PEEL—I believe that if that fa,ctizqlthit E SUN, LONDON, WEDNESDAY EV N CT,