The Sun. — London, England, 1857-12-05 00:00:00

IHE SUN, LONDON, SATURDAY EVENUN:G DECEMBER 5 2 lBx7. Lela., and the relations between the Government and the skink; for if that was done, in the first place you would P e etPose every attempt at that usef legislation for arhieh the country was now ripe, a , a', the same time, in n, quiry into the commercial cat set of the present r i lls, which leas a worthy and a n ecess ary subject of ~.'l l „eirY by a comm i ttee . (Hear.) Th a t was th e represen .l"mo he wish e d t o ma k e t o hi s r i g ht h on . f r i en d an d uhe house; and he hoped that he had not made it in any other spirit than that of a desire that they should seize th e opportunity of converting a public difficulty and dis aster into aP üblic advantegeand a permanent settlement of this ~ q uestion. (Hear.) Would it not be an immense "' v antage to a government desirous of settling a great . P l bl ie question to be able to take it, up at a moment ° inert the mind of th e c o u n try was alive to its import; u,n ae e, and wa s rea dy t o give' its assistance in the task . " 4 8 it not often found to be a hopeless task by a public 14311 to stir up and animate the public mind on a quee n of whi c h h e k new t h e i mpor t ance ? A. s an ins anee 1, 141,1 an illustration of that tendency, let it lea remembered to Inany gentlemen it was found possible a year ago 7lng together to listen to an Indian debate. (Hear.) end„ now, because we were smarting from the eff...cts of -cc°lnelereial crisis, should we postpone the et modera "l of a question connected with it until the public kind had relapsed into apathy and lassitude' On the itontrary, this was the time when we ought to deal with tha t Part of the q uestion which related to issue, and Parliantenthad. given a defioite 'judgment with r egard to the laws of issue, then they woul I be in a voction to deal with the laws of banking, for it was by ; °l ziag up those two questions that you constituted a th e difficulty in the way of finding ao entrance into 'he minds of men for that common sense principle ley I / °,_hich they should be guided in dealing with a subject '", this. they If he nd mae one observation more, he hoped "hould not offend d any of those gentlemen from Scot- ] B IL ' Whom he saw around him. So far as regarded the el3-velied question of a check to the circulation of notes in Scotland and even in Ireland, be ( w Mr. ‘-'ladetone) never expected to live to see the dav hen ra rliament would be in such a position as to have such advantage in the dealing with that question as it now of , °lB ,. ea ied. He saw his right hon. friend the First Lord ''"a Admiralty looking at him, and he was confident th at his hon. friend agreed with him, whet it had oc curred that two millions of gold had been sent to Soot. la nd t oftheir enable the banks to meet their securities instead giving gold for them out of their coffers. This t i ght be v ery sat i s f actory to t h em, b ut h e h ope l that e intellect of England was not so far in the background a s not to be able to understand at whose expense it was do (" Hear , hear," and sheers .) No doubt lit was a "oheaP rap system of circulation for Scotland, as it was a system of living for a private individual if he could g e t hi s f r i ends to pay his de b ts. (" H ear, h ear , 413,1 laughter ) But he could net assume that in 1859 i t t ,. Public Mind would be in a f . avourabls condition for the consideration of this ques . ren. We had coming i o ntP us and i n prospec ti ve a qu e stion of the moat gigar. character, and one which was, owing to the unpre- Psrednese of our minds with regard to it, perhaps the al ° B t appalling which, as a public man, he could rea:in kn% It was a question of the manner in which we were to deal with 200,000,000 of men of another race aed re ligion —an ancient nation, which we seemed to think we could treat as so many figures of wax, but a nation whichhad got its own ha bits and manners, its own h .2 to ry, its own civilisation, but with regard to which we seemed to think that we had only to walk into the country and leave it to the exhibition Only of the propert i es and qualities of the Anglo-Saxon tI S mettle all difficulties. (Hear, hear.) He thought that et eo in 1859 w e m i g ht not base settled that question. (sea r ll7„ , heat.) G rea t changes were to be looked for in the e moagement of East Indian affair., and let us not be I° sure that when we were in the midst of the conside ron of that gigantic queetion, it would be easy to turn P l ahlin mind to the question whether Scotch banks flirei t o support th e i r c i rcu l a ti on b y means o bt a i ne d f rom Fo re (Hear, hear.) There cou'd net be much thubt that P ar li ament was now competent to entertain cc) q u estion, but if it was r e fe rre d t o exam i na t ion by a l i n pisgion that it would only cause the letting slip a h " ° uv o opportunity for the consideration of, at 1-ast, one it of the su bj ect, and he was sure that by re'erring * l 7,° questions wan overburdened committee, the result t Vid be th e postponement of the completion of the act . 1 e , ' 0 84 4 by le g i s l a ti on on the laws relating to i s: us, and an i t ha postponing, the perplexing, and the confusion ot aluiry which was essential to he instituted into the "Inmercial causes of the recent panic, and lie grieved to y the present embarrassment. (Loud cheers ) I Mr. SPOONER sa id that he eeuld a*ure his right cll . friend that if he was a memb e r of th e p resen t Icom mittee he would not go into it with a view to propound it own plans, but solely with a d es i re th a t th e commit s ' se should first inquire into the causes of the present dia. the tre ss. agreed that if they west into an inquiry into 1 1 ,'" e Subject in the old way there would be no end of it. tritlt reference to the existing state of things he would mention that a witness, who was admitted by every one b a of a high authority (lie meant Lord 0 verstone) was 0 7toined before the c omm itt ee this year, and at the end C a° essay which hedelivered in answer to a question,the oble lord stated, in reference to the act of 1844, " that d' the strict and prompt adherence to the principles of : o _4 act everything had p , issed off with regularity and itevmonetary system was unshaken, the prosperity of . ` the wisdom was undisputed, and such was the ccnfidence wisdom of th e act o f 1844 t h a t it -was d a il y ga i n i ng. i t - gth ; that if a practical illustration of the scundness of IttPtineipleri and its ben e fi c i a l resu lt s was wan t e d it wason l e y of teilssary to look around at the present state of the trade again country, the prosperity of the revenue, the con. .lade n' of the people, the wEalth that pervaded every. • t "' end having done so, the committee might be called • k - ,, 4 ' 4 3r If they would interfere with the continuance B on . '" act which had produced such reults." He (Mr. lold ° + ° ") would reverse the question, and ask the noble 'whi te s° l ook now at the exactly contrary state of things eatsted,and then to say whether Parliament ought 41)0 • , I. to be ready, net merely to interfere with, but to had a° act which had proved to be a delusion, which h ad 140 t carried out the expectations of its framers, and de n 11 " received the confidence of the pubic. The wh a l ii t e r had not yet passed, it bad hardly begun, and thr oi : v ° lll d be done when numbers of persons were hee t ,, -U °ut of employment I The Act of 1844 could ?tactic' on amended ; it was wrong; in principle and in rev° a nd must be aboli s h e d. Th e A c t of 1819 h a d be et ; u t,..• en fully carried out, and it never could have fo lio , Iv linev er it was put i n full operat i on i t was el istr ' „ " ; " "arY to relax it o n accoun t o f th e commerc i a l th, 't Produced. Any p ros p er ity which ex i s t e d in Put - o °lltlt rY Would be hollow until the currency was th e luProper f oo ti ng. L oo k to t h e year 1825. In Stat e e 8 speech in F e b ruary o f t h at year , an d i n a great-floot of th e then Chancellor of the E-echequer, and ho aat was m a d e o f th e prosper it y o f th e country, th e that ataternent was repeated in July at the time of telel3r°rogation, arid the Chancellor of the Exchequer 1. 0 Mr. Brougham, who hail given notice of a motion been ~ dispensed through the portals of our ancient insti holucs to a just and generous people. In January, 1836, I,,: e ver, he cams down to the house and deplored the 6_ tolled state of every interest in the country, and was able to account for it by the imprudence of some :irtntry bankers. Panic had succeeded panic, but almost .7413, one had bee n prece d ed by a declaration of great !ild complete prosperity. The act of 1319 had never b een carried out ; and Mr. Horner, in 1310, warned p arliament that if they went on in the way iii which t hey were proceeding, and as they afterwards did, they n ever would be able to return to a sound Nt , :tO Cif cur. re tley in thi s coun t r y . I n 181 0-11 a resolution was tend which had the support of th e no bl e l or d now at e head o f th e G overnment, declaring that a one-p )und t lau°t° and a s hilli ng were f or a ll legal purposes the earn s :° guinea, and that resolution was passed in opposition II tnotion, the effect of which wasthat the depreciation that to bo marked and arrested, Mr. orner declaring to a u t if it was not then arrested, it wo ul d be impossible t ind r e rev t it What was done The national debt was per ,r 400,000,0001., and there was a depreciation of 15 .. . e "t• The debt went on increa-ing to 800,000,000/ , I,l;4othe d epreciation reached 30 per cent. Mr. Henry q e , y rbt °n, who differed both from Mr. Horner and the ibLerament, expressed a doebt whether it would bepos. ttlt ° to return to the national standard of value. The ney r e ituc Y had never been restored to that standerd, and tte-r.would be restored to it. The attempts which had ee„,, llll ' 4 de to grant relief Lad only been suocessfutforthe th 4 ;" ft • They had eventually aggravated the evil, and Ivo - i a ' ai rs would go on until a panics would arise which „ 4 : 1 d break p the whole social system. It was necee ea4 t o recon e i,i er the whole sub j ect for the purpose o f s i ng the mis c hi e f c aused b y t h e not o f 1819 . Th e is Y had never had a practical cerrency redeemable et i rd, and never would have one sufficient to carry on 20~ uu0 enterprise of the cou n try. Out o f the the ,0001 issued by the flank of England in notes, all in on their face payable in gold, 14,500,000/. were a " gr : 0 :1 11 ° ,. 11 lleteurities but still they were said to be payable might ' be said that it would never be de. :uttrreaelni.ir:aua, B ut that was the principle laid down. It t'Pon the very face of it, and a system of righ t W hich could not justly be maintained. The that the gentleman (Hr. G:ailtene) as of opinion rate of act of 1844 had worked s well in w regulating the t ailed not be e'zchange' but a discount tif 13 per cent. could payment in 11 I t go.L. practical point ° Inquire i nto how f ar th e a ct 1841 hail assi , ted c Wa.B I:arrYing out the act of 1819. (Hear, hear.) What 5;5 cause of the present distract; It had been " a ce it aroma from over-igeme and over-trading seen, 1 " rtain joint-stock banks had entered into 4 e l :,, h gernente of t ee large a nature—and that the confid e of the pple had been thus shaken. No one Z e tild justify the conduct of some of these banks, but qatern must be bad if a want of prudence in the ~,anageroont of a few such institutions could lead to a Th r e 't °I con fi dence throughout the while commueity. g o i d a ct of 1844 compe ll e d t h e B an k o f England to buy „ th . t Wbethe r i t was wanted or not, and to issue notes s pit h4 r they were wanted or not, T he e ff ec t of that eat had been to reduce the rate of interest to 2 per c : 1 11 10 s and consequently to force capital into all sorts whie'ign investments and wild speculations, many of rion turned out to be worthless, and the result was thing but distress and misery. He believed all our Present evils were attributable to the state of our mone app'ui" yr, and that g rea t b ene fit would arise from the of r „ ritru e 4 t of a committe e t o co ns id er th e b es t mo d e n 4 d °le dYing those evils. With regard to the bill now eorierll conei deration, he gave it his full an d comp l e t e de n ., t r , e ne, and he believed that the Governm en t h a d diefioul"irc duty in arisen.n endeavour But he ipo• to pwarnedut a stoth p em that to the f aced not done enough' z and that if they left matters diffiu„T ties to !low etood they wo uld hereaft e r hav e s till greater sui jPct ! encounter. They ought to look into th e 'P P edily, with ou t a d es i re t o su pp or t any pre- ILZd• ed notions or to pres forward any special theory. al eocatd e;'en accused of be s longing to that ecchool which he h m an Ever unlimited inconvertible currency. Now, was f " giu hisort to any such . He our t a ve limit, s and would :ix that limit views at the v amount of debt owing by the Government to the Bank, instead of having the securities locked up and paying but a quantity of notes professing to be convertible into gold, but which they were unable to pay. Hs would leave the administration of the national paper in the hands of the Bank, and would let them issue those notes, instead of their own, on such terms as would be fair and just for substituting that currency for their own. By doing this, a double currency would be formed. It might be objected that there would be a di'. ference in the value of the two. But would it not be bet ter to allow parties to purchase the gold notes at a pre mium than to compel them to pay 13 per cent. I He con tende.l that such a plan would be more consonant with the Lest interests of the country. By this means there would be a reglar circulation of 20,000,000/ , and those fluctuations whicn were so destructive to business would ba av,.ided. Although he was prepared to sup.tort the Bi 1 of Indemnity, there was one provision to which he entertained an of jection, en I that eras the p >w,r given to the Bank and the Government of breaking the law. as was quite sure the country would not consent to leave such a power in the hands of the Rink, and still less to place such an unconstitutional power in the hands of the Government. (Hear.) Mr. GLYN said he did not understand the Chancellor of the Exchequer to have proposed the insertion of any clause conferring the power to which the hon. member had just alluded, but that he had suggested it for the conside ration of the house. Mr. SPOONER obsorved that it had been proposed by the right hon. gentleman. The CHANCELLOR of the EXCHEQUER remarked that what he had said was that he would insert a clause in the bill authorising tho Bank to exceed the legal limit for twenty-eight days after the meeting of parliament after the reces4. Mr. GLYN—The hoc. member for Warwickshire ba referred to the effect of the act of 1844 on the existing state of things. In doing so the hon. gentleman was mixing up two questions which were entirely distinct. He was mixing up the question of capital with the question of currency. This crisis which occurred in 1847 and that which now ex isted primarily arose from the same causes. In 1847, the commercial crisis was brought about by the overtrading of this country with India, and large speculations for the promotion of the corn trade on the continent of Europe. Thetis things, added to the internal pressure and panic, were the primary causes of the crisis of 1847. The causes which had produced the present crisis were iden tically the same, and had produced the same effects. The country was now suffering par i tly from the terrible over thow of its commercial relatips with the United States. It was also affected by a new ; feature which hitherto had not been felt in its commercial relations —the total destruc tion of commercial houses connected with the North of Europe. That trade had for a few years been carried on very much like that of the United States —on an entire system of credit. Another immediate cause of the crisis, and a new one, was the extraordinary over-banking in Scotland. (Hear, hear.) That, added to the over-banking in some parts dEngland, be I caused the internal pres sure which had led to the disastrous effects under which the commerce of the country was now suffering. But he could not trace these effects up to the Act of 1814 in any way consistent with justice. The provisions of the act may be summed up under three heads—first, the separation of the two departments, banking and issue—secondly, the restriction of the amount of paper circulation upon securities; and, thirdly, that which regulated the coun try banks. With regard to the first point it turned out that the Bank directors themselves, some time before the introduction of the bill of 1844, had instituted that division as a departmental arrangement—a wholesome pro vision when kept in their own circle, but attended with disastrous effects when made a necessary part of the act. With regard to the restriction of the country bank circula tion, he did not think any difference of opinion existed. The great difficulty of the question was in the limit of the circulation to 14,000,000/. He did not think any indivi dual who had watched the operations of the crises of 1817 and that of 1857, could fail in arriving at this conviction, that although the pressure was not caused by the act, yet the limiting of the power of issue upon securities became in itself the primary cause of the evil. It simply acted in this way. The operation of the pressure reduced the reserves at the Bank. The man who was ready to sacrifice anything to meet his engagements, who was ready to pay even 20 per cent, for that purpose, was anxious to buy the currency —would purchase it at any cost—aad that depressed the reserve still further. (Hoar, hear.) He would venture to assert that a person had no right to demand the purchase of a portion of the currency to meet his engagements. That loin; so, the issue of the Government letter became inevi teem both in 1847 and 1857. In the year 1847 especially there was a moral courage in the issue of a letter which the country oeght to appreciate and value; and nothing could exceed the promptitude with which the present letter had been issued, for it was issued without any pressure from the commercial body on the Government. (Hear.) A. de putation was ready to start from Lives pool on the day the letter was written, but they waited for a telegraphic mes sage to know whether they should come up or not, and found their wishes had been anticipated by the noble lord at the head of the Government. (Hear.) It was an inevi table consequence that whenever a pressure arose a letter must be sent down to relieve the act of 1844. He believed that no individual or Government would ever have the hardihood to carry out the primary principle of that act. If any Government did so they would be burled from power, not by a vote of the house but by the physical force of the coustry. (Hear.) The country would not allow its commercial operations to be interfered with in any such manner. Did any one suppose that the large machinery connected with the mill power of the country and the mining interests of the country would be content to go a ithout their wages merely because a principle was to be upheld? (Hear.) That being so, the question arose whether the power which had been exercised should remain in the bands of the government, without any positive knowledge of the manner in which it might be exercised ? He thought the proper Om for lodging such a power was in the hands of a responsible body like the Bank directors, under suffi cient parliamentary control. Unless something of that kind should be done, a pure metallic circulation must be resorted to ; and he did not think the country was prepard for such a proceeding. Mat tees could not be allowed to remain in their present position much longer, for it was constitutionally wrong to allow such a power to exist without any certain rule for its proper exercise. (Hear, hear.) He could not sit down without bearing his testi mony to the conduct of the Bank directors, which was beyond all praise, and he must be permitted to say that they had shown a degree of firmness, vigour, anl discre tion which entitled them to the warmest thanks of the country. (Cheers.) Mr. HENLEY agreed in the general opinion that the government were entitled to a bill of indemnity. Bat if they had acted otherwise, and had not been torn to pieces by the people, they would have to defend themselves against a bill of impeachment. (" Hear," and laughter.) There would not only have been the risk, but the certainty of a popular commotion. So far, therefore, as regarded the bill of indemnity, he should give it a very cheerful support. The next question was, why should there be a need of these indemnities? (Hear, hear.) What was the state of the law ? Twice within the last fifteen years a corporation, possessed of an enormous capital, showing a rest of 3,000,0)01. or 4,000,0001. above their engagements, would not have been able to pay anybody a shilling without an indemnity. (Hear, hear.) In 1847 the directors stated that the measure had been forced down their throats, and that they could have done without it, b u t th a t was clearly a matter of opinion. The hon. member for Kendal had given credit to the government for their spontaneous action in the matter, but ho had made one statement which threw a shade of doubt upon their conduct, for it appeared that a Liverpool deputation were only stopped from coming up by the telegraphic announcement that something bad happened. (A. laugh.) He differed entirely from his honourable friend behind him. He was one of those who wished to see the bank note convertible at overy man's will who held it. (Hear, hear.) He could not conceive that a monetary system could be safe without that. Then the next question was what was being converti ble ? His notion of convertibility was that a men could go to the counter when he pleased and be sure to have gold for his note at the time. Then the next question came: how far did the act of 1814 secure that ? The Chancellor of the Exchequer sail that the distinguished individual who brought that bill forward said ho had three objects. One another to maint a i n conver tibility, was to prevent panics ; and the third object was to prevent speculation by the issue of paper. Now let them see how far these objects had been attained. Sir R, Peel himself said it had failed in the first object. It had failed to prevent panics. Well, failing to pro ince panics—[A. MEMBER : " It has succeeded in that "]-- (laughter) failing to prevent panics had it pro duced convertibility. What had the bank got to pay its notes with ? Jo ordinary times it had twenty millions of bank notee, fourteen millions of which were issued upon ' security, and the residue upon gold. It should be observed that that gold was not in coin. Now if they had not bad a letter to suspend the operations of the bank, if the bank had been unable to pay its deposits over the counter, how long would it have been before parties would have gone to have their notes paid in gold ? They said people would not be so foolish as to go, but why did they not go ? Because confidence prevented their going. They must rely on that confidence because all banking operations were founded on it. Nobauker could keep every shilling that was confided to him in his counter ready to be repaid ; but he must trust to keeping a certain proportion of it. So it was in what was called this mixed circulation. If they chose to issue on security that was nothing but depending on the confidence of the country. If it carried with it a limit they laid the foundation of a want of confidence, and that want of confidence, if they tried to maintain the lair would necessarily prevent bank notes being paid in gold. A good deal had been said on the subject of panics. Sir R. Peel was reported to have said that provision could not be made against panics. But he should like the Chancellor of the Exchequer to state what ground there was for the difficulty they were in now and that they were in in 1817, whether in point of fact it was a real alarm, or whether it was an idle panic ? The hon, member who moved the address quoted an opinion of one of the directors, Mr. Hub bard, upon this subject, They had also in the blue book the opinion of the Governor of the Bank of Eng land. One of these gentlemen said the country was grossly ignorant, and the other said they were not well acquainted with the true principles of the act of 1844, and they went on to explain that the panic arose from not understanding what they called " the normal state of the decrease or the reserve at a particular time." This decrease in the reserve in 1847 took place in the month of October, when there was a nice chance of building up a little his tory to show that the public were unreasonable, and it figures.would perfectlyha m ve r. do H n u e bbard said well,, ,T The ef chiefthey difficulty h . ad kept clear ih o e t o e ! ber, 1817, was occasioned by th e e • public generally." Now that was x a cesstvl ignorance of the (Laughter.) "Excessive ignorance cl o the i with regard to the action of the Bank, jolly accusation. an p d u io especially enera its action periodically, and when the publication o re f ei th e e ne r e ese e rv e e t of the Bank showed a declined state at the commencement of October, the public mind was alarmed, and the alarm became what was called a panic." Now, the difference be tween alarm and panic was when there was any reason for alarm. This alarm, Mr. Hubbard said, caused people to look up what money they bad got. .Mr. Hubbard did not stop there ; but went into the region of prophecy. He said, " I believe therefore that the experience of 1817, so far from showing that the Bank Charter Act is untenable in terms of difficulty, shows that it operated with perfect success—a success teat will be greater under future trials by reason of the Bank feeling more confidence in its own operations, b u t what is more important still, the bankers and mercantile community will know that they must exercise a little indie vidual prudence, an I. nut consider the Bank of England a dry-nurse in the hour of need." T hat evidence was g iven it -July, 1857, and now let them see wh at Mr. We g uelin said, because he went more into detail. This question was put to him—" Suppose that in 1847, in the month of October, the Banks accounts and the various domestic causes regulating the supply of bullion had been as correctly understood as they are in the summer of this yet r , , do you thi n k th a t th e same p an i c would have accrued ? ' ' And he said—and this was very curious—" The lowest I : amount of reserve in 1817, and consequently the highest amount of actual circulation corresponded exactly with the period at which you might expect the lowest amount of issue and the highest active citculation. Con sequently, if the public had been aware that it was nothing more than a mere normal action of the reserve and the active circulation, they would have concluded that from that period the active circulation would begin to de cline." He wont on to put in figures, and what were those figures ? It seemed that at the commencement of October, 1847, the amount of reserved notes was 3.85!,0001., and on the 231 of October it had sunk to 1,191,000/.. a diminution of 63 per cent. Then Mr. Weo b uelin contrasted that with the period of .85G. In September, 1856, the amount was 6,218,0301., while on th e 18th o f October there had boon a diminution of 3,700,0001., and therefore he wanted it to be assumed that because in 1847 the reserve at the Bank had only dropped 2,600,0001., and in 1855 had dropped 3,703,0001., the public were alarmed in 1817, and were not at all alarmed in 1855. But it seemed very odd to him (\lr. Henley) that a man should suppose it was the same thing, with only 3,850,0001. to take 2,658,0001. away from it, that it would be to take the same amount from a much larg r paroel, because prudent people did not look at what w a taken away—they looked at what was left. And, therefore, so far from that statement of the two Bank directors showing that what took place in 1817 was a panic, they gave it resistible evidence, upon figures, to show that reasoning men, who had their engagements to must, had good ground for the alai m that they felt, and, there fore, that ground was cut from under the feet of those who said that the provisions of the bill of 18;4 were always good except in case of panics. He denied that in that case it was panic; it was reasonable alarm. There was another qrtesti m connected with the act of 1844 oa which ho knew ho held an opinion which was not•shared by many, but he was glad to find thatfopinion supported by no less an au thority than the late governor of the Bank. He hail never been able to understand why, when the Bank of England was issuing such aR amount of bank notes as it saw fit, they were to pass a law to say to that corporation, you may if you please, in addition to these notes that you have out, issue 14 millions of notes more. He never could understand the reason of that. .Ele believed the immediate effect was to inflate the currenoy of the country, and that it indaced to a certain degree excess of trading, and the governor of the Bank of England expressed the same opinion, not in evi deuce, but in answer to a communication from the Chancel lor of the Exchequer. After stating certain advantages, he said, "On the other hand, the act encourages the dangerous theory that the Bank of Eoglatul mayin its bankingdepart ment act in all respects as a private bank in the arrange ments with its customers, and that the force of competi tion with large money lenders, and the produce of large deposits, is apt to induce an unwarrantable inflation of credit." That was a strong assertion to come from such an authority. He would now inquire what was the ope ration of the law when it first passed. In 1848 the notes issued were 19 millions, and the private securities were 5,500,0001. On the let of August, 1841, the notes issued were 21 millions, and the private securities 6 millions. That was the state of things antecedent to the bill of 1814. The Bank of rate of discount had then for two years been 4 per cent., but Mr. Chapman said Messrs. Gurney were charging only 21. 3s. 4d. in 1843, and 21. 2s. 6d. in 1814. In 1845 the notes issued, instead of being 21,316,0001., were 28,250,0)0/. ; the bullion was 15,f;00,000/. instead of 1 6,000,000/., and the private securities instead of being 6,851,0a01., jumped up to 11,760,00)/ In 1846 things wore about the same. The notes were 28.400,0001., but the pri vate securities had jumped up to 17,600,000/. That was some little evidence of inflation of credithe thought. But what was the discount? ila 1845 the Bank rate of dis count was 21. 13s. 4d., and Gurneys were charging 2/. 19e. 2d. These facts seemed to give some weight to the opinion of Mr. Wegnelin, that this act had a tendency to an unwarrantable inflation of credit. Now let them take the other end of the stick. By the operation of this act they had had to come twice to the house in ten years to ask for an indemnity. The question was what they were to do under these circumstances. No one had yet got up in that house and said the operation of this bill ought to be maintained in its entirety. (Hear.) The next point was, was it safe or desirable to leave it in the discretion of Government, or ought they to relax the law by repealing it, or by some other mode. In speaking of the repeal of the law he was only speaking of that part which related to the issue of notes by the Bank of England. That which related to the issue of notes by the country banks he thought a sound provision. In July Mr. Weguolin said in no case had the reserve gone below three millic.ns, and there had been no anxiety in the pubic mind with regard to the state of that reserve, but Mr. Chapman said the state of the reserve ha I caused a very great anxiety, and that in 1856 they were under great alarm, and that they carried on their business only on an understanding that they should be relieved by Government. What sort of a state of things was that? The CHA.NCELLOR of the EXCHEQUER—The statement was contradicted. Mr. HENLEY—The right hon. gentleman said it was contradicted ; but where ? It was endeavoured no doubt to be explained away. It was said that the promise was not given by a member of the Government, or e member of Par liament, or a member of the Bank ; but Mr. Chapman said they had it from an individual in such a position that he believed it. With regard to the question where the dis- - pausing power ought to be lodged, he (Mr. Henley) could not see any quarter in which it could be placed with safety. He believed there ought not to be a limit; and that had been proved to demonstration by what ha I fallen from the Chancellor of the Exchequer himself. (Cheers) The right hon. gentleman had argued the question as if he was g )ins• to be hanged unless ho could make out a strong case for his indemnity. He said, "Don't think that the law has been infringe I to the extent of 2,000,0901. or anything like it," and then he went through a long list of figures to show that the infraction really never amounted to more than about 900,000/. Well, but would any one pretend to say that the convertibility of the Bank note had been in any way endangered by that excess of 900,0001.? He (Mr. Hen ley) agreed with the right hon. gentleman (Hr. Gladstone) that to fix the limit at 16 or 17 millions would do no good whatever; and that, while it would not lessen the mischief, it might perhaps give a worse chance of meeting a crisis when it occurred. The directors of the Bank had said throughout that they should have acted in precisely the same manner, and would have taken precisely the same steps, if the act had nit been in existence. They would have raised the rate of discountjust tho same ; and here he (air. Henley) must confess that lie was not one of those who believed they could keep the rate of discount at a uni form point. But if the conduct of the Bank would have been the same, act or no act, why create all this alarm for the sake of keeping up a limit ? It was like greasing a car rizlge wheel ; if' they put the grease on before it got hot, it never would get, hot ; but if it once bee ime heated no amount of grease would save it from coming to ad:a 1 lock. As to leaving the dispensing power in the hands of Government, he (Mr. Henley) was of the same opinion as the member for Oxford and the member for Southampton. When the point was raisedin the committee the member for Oxford said, " If the Government was a weak one it would yield, but if it was a strong one it would resist, and then it would incur,a groat deal of unpopularity." By-t ho-bye, did the hon. gentlemen opposite consider that Oath Govern ment was a weak one for having on this occasion yielded ? However that might be, it was clear that if this power was once conceded to Government, the whole matter would be • virtually placed in their hands ; and now that a double precedent ha I been established, they might rest certain saidthatthattorelaxtheactsimplyto they woul d never tufy it, n pressure. Mr. ai h Hubbard e (Mr. Henley) believed that that was quite true. Mr. Hub bard further said that the effect of extending the provisions of the act in times of difficulty would be to force the bank ing community into a complete dependency upon the Bank have r ° actually e taken P was ppe a r not e d a l o s v a h y a s of lac E s n4 o l3 f n c a o ; ur a s n e d po t s h t a i t toc a g a s ct ha t l hey be n c a o t m u rally asked what good it had done te largely developed since th e p assin g o oh f fe t m h o i: e r A very import ant Carlisle, viz. :—" Are your primary the solvencyof the question was put in the c ommitte c e on b s y ia t e h r e at m io e n m s be w r h f e o n r paper is presented to you for discount, parties governor and deputy-governor —the are said, "These are not our primary considerationsy and the state of your b sp u o ll k io e n ourtnurkeessvean.?" They our only ones." Their principle was, rent, quocunque mode, rent. Not so Messrs. Gurneys. The same question was them, and they seemed not to be so slack - waiste d ; for the Old Lady of Threadneedle-street seemed to have latterly got into some queer habits. ( Laughter.) The representative 0 of Messrs. Gurneys said, "There is a certain description paper that we won't touch—we won't touch any re-dis counted paper." Hon• gentlemen threw up their hands. He andse. He (Mr. Henley) did not say whether it was so or no was not there to answer for the truth of the statements ho quoted ; nor did he care whether they were true or false. They only show what sort of paper was in the market — whether Messrs. Gurneys dealt in it or not. . hey heard a great deal now-a-days about "increased banking facilities" "increased commercial facilities," and the like. H 3 did not care what they called these things ; but it was obvious that since the passing of the act there had been a great development in the trading world of all kinds of queer systems. (Hear, hear, hear.) Formerly, when the Bank felt itself obliged to exercise its own discretion there was not the sort of thing that now went on. Twenty years ago he doubted whether the governor and deputy-governor would have given an answer to the effect that in carryin g on th e i r business they had no regard to the character of the paper offered to them. (Hear.) For merly the Bank held a salutary check over speculative transactions, and that had no doubt a good effect upon trading morality ; but now there wore what they called " slaugltor-houses ; " there were unlicensed pawnbrokers, dealers in warrants, and buyers and sellers of cargoes "on the run "—things which were never heard of a few years ago, and by which small traders were completely "chewed up." (Laughter and cheers.) Small traders died away, and people shrugged their shoulders, and said, "Oh, they cannot keep pace with the times." (Hear., And yet, by means of this wonderful act of 1814, they had, for sooth, rreveuted an undue inflation of credit and specula ti in paper. (Cheers) Certainly, the act had restricted the issue of one particular kind of paper, that called Bank notes; but it had only encouraged the creation of other kinds of paper which were ten thousand times more mis chievous. (Mar.) There was one other point on which ho would make a remark —namely, the proposal of the Chancellor of the Exchequer that the Scotch notes might be paid in Bank of England notes. That proposition he regarded as merely tending to aggravate a prejudicialstate of things which now prevailed in England. By the act they had given to a number of existing private bankers a monopoly is the creation of notes, without their having a single farthing to set against them that the legislature knew of. At present these notes, amounting to 8,000,0001., formed, with the 20,000,000/. of Bank of England notes, the currency of the country. Now, by the wonderful ma chinery of the act, the instant they came to have a pres sure upon gold, they had on the one hand the reserve of notes lessening in exactly the same proportion as the bul , lion diminished, and on the otherhand, they had the coun try bankers compelled to run to the Bank of England for notes amounting to at least 2,000,0001., to enable them to meet the demands of their own customers. To make the Scotch notes likewise payahlein --- Bank of England notes would obviously increaso the evil. At the same time he should be glad to see the circulation of the whole kingdom put on the samo footing ; for at the present moment Soot land and Ireland stood on the footing of foreign states, so far as their currency was concerned. Lord J. RUSSELL--Whatever variety of opinions may exist in this house upon this difficult question, I think all will agree that the committee are very much indebted to my right hon. friend the Chancellor of the Exchequer for the able manner in which be has laid before us the propo sitions of the Government. I am in the singular—l will not say the unfortunate—position of being very wall satis fied with what has been done—tolerably satisfied with the act of 1844, and entirely satisfied with the proposal of the committee which is to follow after the present proposition. I will say but one word with regard to the immediate question before us, because I think that all sides of the house are agreed that the measures takcn by her Majesty's ministers was a right use of their discretion, and that it contributed to save th e commerc i a l cre dit o f this country. (Hear.) Every party in this house will therefore admit that an indemnity ought to be given to the Government for the policy they have pursued, (Hear.) That question i being disposed of, the further question naturally arises, if the act of 1844 was rightly suspended in 1847, and if it has been again rightly suspended in 1857, is it an act which ought to be maintained ? Or, supposing that it is to be maintained, will it not require some extensive alterations • in its provisions ? Or, lastly, is it not necessary to give some dispensing power either to the crown or to the Bank, in order from time to time to suspend its operation? But I think that, gentlemen, in discussing this question in this house—still more in discussing it out of !doors—fall into the error, against which they were warned by the Chan cellor of the Exchequer and by Mr. Glyn, of confounding the two questions of national currency and commercial credit. (Hear.) I say that the act of 1811 was intended to secure our national currency from depreciation and from debasement. I believe that it has contributed to that en I—indeed, that it has secured that end. (Hear.) But commercial credit, which some of the more extravagant supporters of the act of 1844 seem to think was to be saved from all danger and all panic by that act--commercial credit runs its own course ; and all that any act of Parliament can do is to endeavour, as far as possible, that the national currency may not be endangered by it; that it may help from time to time—but that it should net be swept away in the hurricanes that occa sionally desolate the fields of commerce. (Hear, hoar.) To go back 'ots this clistincti, a —withregard tonational currency I think that everyone that willconsider a momentwill be satis fied with the act of 1844 as a supplement to the act of l) , 19. I remember perfectly well coming from the Low Countries in 1815 with a number of 20-franc pieces; sad for every one of these 20-franc pieces I got a one-pound Bank of England note. The Bank of England note was then worth Icifr. (Hear, hear.) But any one now would get 25fr. or more, either in London or Paris, for that same note. Well, then, there is an end of the depreciation ; that depreciation had been cared by the act of 1819 and the act of 1841. And I - do not think that in either of these times of panic or commercial distress, either in 1847 or 1857, there has been the least doubt or question of the convertibility of the bank-note. I believe that every merchant and every individual iu the country felt satisfied that his five-pound note would obtain its equivalent in gold ; and therefore there has been no depreciation of the currency; upon that question there has not been any fail ure. But when we came to that other question of coin naercial credit, I think that any one who looks at the his tory of the country only from the commencement of the present century will see that there have been always these changes— first, of rising and improving trade—next of prosperity—next of inflation—and next of disasters and distrust ; and, finally, the bubble burst, and we had to begin again. (Hear, hear.) That was the case before the act of 184 E was passed. (Hear.) I lament to have heard from so high an authority as Mr. Glyn so much blame thrown ou the act of 1814. Does he recollect what occurred in 1825? (Hear, hear.) In 1825, if I remember right, 23 years before this act was passed, 700 priiate banks in the c )untry broke; there was the greatest distress through out the country, the greatest distrust of country bank paper, and a period of distress ensued. In 1447, again, there were peculiar causes at work; there was a great de mand for corn, a very natural and necessary demand, but which occasioned a great export of specie. Thera wore other speculations which occasioned distrust, an other period of distress occurred. The same has occurred in 1857 ; an I when the right hon. gentleman opposite reads a number of passages from the evidence of merchants and bank directors stating that trade is in a wholesome condi tion, it should be remembered that that only applies to the time when the answers were given. Because every on e , whether engaged in trade or otherwise, must know that there are changes—that there are revolutions, and very often very sudden revolutions—which take place in com merce; that, owing to some particular cause—it may be a very sudden cause—or owing to a great inflation of some particular speculation, the country a'l at once finds itself in a state of doubt and distrust with regard to even the most healthy portions of trading operations. Now, let us look what has been done with regard to the currency at these separate periods ; because, while I would wish to support the act 1844, I think that as it has been very much over-blame:l on the other. I believe that it is an additional security, that it is an improvement on our former laws ; but I do not think, with regard to the action of trade upon currency and currency upon trade, that the course of things has v. ry much varied since the passing of that act. In 1825 we had the testimony of :Lord Ashburton in this house. He stated that-the governor and deputy-governor of the Bank, Mr. Huskiseon, and himself met to consider what should be done. There was then a very small amount of gold in the B ink—perhaps some hundred thousand so vereigns, I don't remember the amount- -and there was a very great alarm. Whether there was a panic or not, and whether alarm is a very just feeling, and panic a very un just one, I will not dispute—that seems rath er a ques ti on of philology than of finance. (Hear.) But there was very groat alarm, and these very able men met to consider what should be done. After some hours of consultation Lard Ashburbon stated they were all agreed that, whatever might be the cause, relaxation and the expansion of credit, net farther restriction, was the remedy required. They advised the governor of the Bulk to issue more paper. This was on the Saturday or Sunday. On Monday morning the Beek declared that they were ready to discount. Confi dence wee restored, an I, so far from the Bank being drained of its last sovereign, its coffers were speedily replenished. That happened before the act of 1844. In 1817, also, from causes which I will not enumerate, there was a return of difficulty and alarm. The case was represented to my right hon. friend the pros nt First Lord of the Admiralty and myself ; and several days we sat in anxi ins consultation on the state of affairs, advising with Mr. Cotton, the governor of the Bank, the directors, and other persons very competent to enlighten us on what occurred from day to clay ; and then, on our own responsibility—not at the requtst of the Bank any more than now—not for the purpose of s tying the national currency, which was not in any danger, but for the sake of the commercial credit of the nation—for the sake of many large firms which, though perfectly solvent thernselve., were threatened by others -and for the great interests of the country, we resolved to recommend the Bank to issue bank notes, if necessary, beyond the limit imposed by law. I believe we were justified in that course; and, if I remember rightly, Mr. Herries, then a member of this house, moved a resolution approving the conduct of the Government in that instance. Well, in 1857 the state of things described to us by the Chancellor of the Exchequer occurs. The Government meets, and the First Lord of the Treasury and the Chan cellor of the Exchequer issue a similar letter. I a m sorr y to say the effect is nut so immediate as was that of our letter in 1817. It may have been that the disease had /plead its routs deeper; it may have been owing to some other cause, existing, perhaps, in foreign countries; but, a,cc.e. ling to the highest authority, we have not yet re cevered our former state of healthy tra'le and sound com mercial credit. As far, however, as it has gone that letter has been effective ; it has saved many parties from ruin, it has saved the general interests of the country from great disaster. And, for my part, I hope, with my hon. friend the member for Kendal, that we shall never see a Minister of this country so infatuated in favour of an abstract prin ciple, sound enough in itself, as to refuse in these cases of emergency to incur th e respons ib ility of relax i ng t h e A c t of 1814 and thereby p revent i ng what may b e a f ear f u l convulsion. (Hoar, h ear. ) But is it true that th i s A c t , having been t• vice suspend e d , is altogether worthless, and ought to be replaced by some other system ? I t hi n k t h at n r a e t a i d o n oaflhacurrency as far as the national currency is concerned it i s an Act which does not requir e a lt erat i on. And with regar d to thath h e a a v r e d a or commercial crelit I ventu re t o say that no one aut h or i ty all times of commercial dist ress and ri panic— scheme which shall preserve convertibilit y proposed fi t a t e schemedh for whha itelh h you ave shall ever by and yet be of sufficient force to prevent the effects—the mostnatural and inevitable effects—be it of over speculation, of excessive trade, or of the misfortune of the particular time. In order to show that I do not wish to cast blame upon those who, in some instances at least, have been unfortunate in these transactions. I cannot but call to mind a remark of Mr. Tierney, who, in allusion to one of these periods of com mercial distress said, " You may talk of wild speculation and rash trading, but the men accused of this rashness and wild speculation would, if they had succeeded, have been enter prising British merchants." (Hear.) It is very often the case that a have pushed their credit too far, that circumstances have turned against them, that their failure loads to others, and thus greet discredit is thrown upon the country, when perhaps but a few—a very few, persons are to blame. But, sir, if there are any persons to blamefor giving too great facilities to individual traders, whether connected with the Bank of England, the Western Bank of Scotland, or any other banking or commercial company, it seems to me that the appointment of a committee is exactly the manner in which the Government ought to deal with this case If such has been the case it cannot but be useful to the country to learn what errors have be n covnitted, and to obtain some warn ing not to repeat them in the future. My right hon. friend the member for the University of Oxford protests against the e c-sppointment of the committee to iuquire into banking and issues, but ho says that he should quite approve the appoint ment of a c mmittee to inquire into the c ruses of the corn. morel a distress. I, sir, am not very particular about the title of this committee, or the exact form in which it is ap. pointed. 1 am quite sure that if appointed as a committee to inquire into banking it would inquire into all the causes of commercial distress, and into the conduct of those who are c arrying on the trade of the country. I am eqcally sure that if appointed to consider the causes of commercial distress is would inquire into banking and the operation of the Act of 1544. It is impossible to bind down a committee not to con sitter these two subjects together, and, therefore, I think it is quite right that it should be appointed in such terms as the Ghaneellor of the Exchequer shall think fit. Well, then, sir, with what view is the committee to be appointed 7 The right hon. gentleman the member for Buckinghamshire asked a question last night, which I think was quite right inspirit, bat which he made rather more stringent than was necessary He asked--'` Is the Act of 1844 to be maintai ne d ? If it is to be maintained why should you have the Act of Indemnity ? If it is not to be maintained let the Act of Indemnity be passed, and let the measures of her Majesty's Government be pro duced." Now, I understand—l do not know that I correAly understand, the intentions ofthe Government, but, as far as I understand them, it seems to me that they are prepared to stand by the 2eneral principles of the Act of 1844 If they were not prepare d to stand by those general principles, if they intended to throw the whole question o f the currency loose before the committee —if we were to have the plan of the hon. number for North Warwickshire (Mr. Spooner) which seems to me, if not so dangerous as I have apprehended vet—l will not use an unusual phrase —more unreaoonable that I bad expected—if we were to have our currency di vided into two parts, one of which is to rest on the security of the Three per Cents., and the other upon gold, and if we were to have other projects of that kind coming out of the committee, then I should say that its appointment by the Government would be a very unadvisable stop. But if we are to have a committee, keeping in view the Act of 1844 and seeing whether that act should be either amended or in any way expanded, I think that is a very fair question to be laid before a committee, and that it woul I be more prudent on the part of the Government to say that whoa the evidence is before us, and not till then, will they tell the house at what conclusions they have arrived with regard to amendments its harmony with the spirit ' of the act, but making its • • provisions still more effeetivo. Various ways are suggested in which that act might be altered. There is one to which the Chan cellor of the Exchequer alluded, and with regard to which I w ith him, although do not quite agree in what he says concerning it. Ho says that if you give to the Government or to the Bank a discretionary power of re • laxing this act from time to time, you will net make much practical alter tion, • but you will raise a constitutional ques tion' whether or not it is right to give sick a power by Act of Parliament. Now, I beg pardon of my right hon. friend, but I think you raise not only a great constitutional but a great practical question besides : because, while I should be very unwilling to give to Ministers this power ; of dispensing with an Act of Parliament on constitutional grounds, I think theatthere are moral reasons, and reasons of practical utility which are still more forcible against the adoption of such a course. I feel convinced that if the Minister and the Bank, or the Bank alone, had this power it would give great el couragement to wild and unsou nd speculation. (Hear, hear.) Every ono would then say, "We eau go to the Gov lenient and tell them that they have got the power, and that this is the v,ry case in which it was intended that they should exercise it ;" whereas it is now a great inconvenience and a great responsibility for a Minister to say, " I think this Act is at present so obnoxious to the community that I will undertake to suspend it awl will immediately call Par liament together to lay my conduct before it." I think that that is a considerable check upon the conduct of the Minister, and therefore upon those speculator] who would wish for the frequent suspension of this Act. (Hear.) -Let us see what has happened with regard to the Act. In 1844 it was enacted ; in 1847 it was suspended for a time. That occurred on'y three years after it was passed, and I think men might then reasonably say that an Act which within three years was found to be unavailing and had broken down ought not to re main upon the statute-book. But since 1847 we have for 10 years had a sound state of the currency—(hear, hear)—we have had no corn laints of the working of the Act ; and it may be five years, or it may be 20 before there is another occurrence similar to that which we are now considering. I would leave the future to the future. I would allow it to be decided by experience wh ther or not another 10 years may not elapse without the ad ption of such a course, and, if the inconvenience is then no greater than has been sustain d in 1847 and 1857, I should think that there would be reason not for repealing, but for maintaining the Act. (Freer, hear.) For, considering that your primary object is to maintain a currency convertible into gold, and that yoar next object is as far as possible, without endangering that cur) ency, to give help in times of commor.ial distress and disaster, I think that an Act which performs those functions as they have been performed by the Act of 1844 in 1847 and in the present year, is one which deserves to be supported. My hon. friend the rwmber for Kendal (Mr. Glyn) says that when distress begins the sight of the Bank returns aggravates the alarm. That may be so, but is that the working of the Act of 1844 ? I remember before the passing of that Act asking a friend of mine who was very well conversant with those subjects, the Late Lord Sydenham, what ought to be done if we had a com mercial crisis and a state of discredit. He said, " Let the Bank go on and p►y to its last guinea." But would not that be a time of distrust and distress Suppose that you had the Act of 1819 aloee, without that of 1844, and there came a time at which the reserve of bullion in the Bank was reduced to 1,000,0001. —to 500,0001.—t0 100,0001.—would not that pro duce great alarm. Would there net be a people as anxious to obtain gold as they now are to obtain bank notes? Would there not be the same discredit and distrust as now exist ? Therefore, as I believe, it is not the Act of 1844, it is the very nature of a currency convertible into gold, operating with a diminution of commercial credit and the spread of alarm, which produces that state of things to which my hon. friend referred. (Hear.) If that be , o, let us see what is the actual working of this Act. It is, I confess, not that which you would expect upon the face of the measure. The Act says that there are 14 millions an 1 a half which the Bank may always issue, but that any notes issued beyond that amount must be the representatives of gold and silver bullion in its cellars. If that were literally carried into effect when the Bank had 16 millions of balm it would issue 3J millions of bank-notes ; when it had 7 millions it would issue 21 mil lions. But that is not the operation of the Act, because we all know that there is no such demand for notes as to induce the Bank to go beyond some 22 , 000,0001. or 23/ 1 00,000/ , , . and we know also that it is quite impossible for them to go on issuing notes with safety to the extent of 7,000,0001., when there is only that amount of bullion in reserve. Immediately that tlio reserve of bank-notes is reduced to 1,000,0001., or 1,500,0001., still more when it is reduced to less, then comes that desire to obtain notes which the Chancellor of the Ex chequer has described. Every one sees that the reserve of notes will soon be Exhausted and makes a rush to obtain what proportion he wants, and thus the Bank becomes en dangered long before the notes represautin; 7.00 9 ,0001. of gold are really issued. The Act of 1844, therefore, is more restrictive than appears on the faoe of it. It hardly allows the issue of 14i millions and the whole stock of bullion to be represented ; there must bo a reserve of notes in order that the Bank may be at all secure. The question may fairly be discussed, whether any change should be mail in that re- spect. Idoubt the utility of change ; but of this I am quite sure; that if it should appear to a select committee that a change might safely and beneficially be made it ought to be made by Act of Parliament, and not by giving auy discretion either to the Minister of the day or to the Bank of England. (Hear, hear.) It should be plainly laid down in your Act what further relaxation might be slowed. (Mar, hear, hear.) I believe myself that the Act of 1841 has tended to secure the currency and has not tended to aggravate commercial distress. (Hear, hear, hear.) We have heard with coins apprehension the views entertained by the right hon. gentleman the member for Oxfordshire. Ho com plains that the Act of 1844 has encourae•ed the great evil of over speculation, and has led to the circulation of a great deal of worthless commercial paper in the country. (A laugh.) That is a somewhat inconsistent complaint, and the right hon. gentleman proposes accordingly a somewhat inconsistent re medy, because he says there should be no limit to tho issue of paper by the Bank. (Hear, hear) Ho complains of the limit ; but I wish to kn ow from him and from tho other gentlemen who denounce the Act of 1844 what is tho real extent of their demands. Are they satisfied or are they not with the Act of 1819 ? Are they satisfied or are they not that notes should always be conwr ible into gold ! Aro they satisfied with the standard of the currency as lei 1 down in ancient times, and as affirmed soon after the Revolution, and again by Lord Althorp when he was Chancellor of the Ex chequer (Hear.) When thdy complain of the spec•al pro visions of the Act of 1844 do they not, in fact, mean a great deal more ? Do they n o t rea lly mean th a t th ere s h a ll b% an issue which shall not be founded upon bullion, but which shall be so extensive, so expansive that it must necessarily become greatly depreciated in value, requiring for the safety of its credit the application of a Bank Restriction Act. (Hear, hear.) If that be their intenti let them plaiuly declare it. Do not let them complain of the special [revi sions of the Act of 1844, but lot them tell us whether they mean to maintain the currency in its integrity. We shall then know how to meet such a proposition. Such views aro not openly avowed in this house, but they have been avowed in some recent meetings; and in ono meeting especially which took place in Glasgow, it was stated without disg,uiso that your paper currency should be commensurate with the demands of trade. (A laugh.) Is it intended, I ask, that there should be any base for this currency, or is it mere worthless paper, producing periodical convulsions worse than any we have heretofore witnessed ? (Hear.) In defending the Act of 1844, in admitting that there may be s me alteration in its principles, but maintaining that there ought to be no re in its provisions, I think I am in fact standing upon the Act of 1819 and the laws which regulate our currency. I believe that th >se evils from which 'we have lately suffered, from which we are still suffering, aro incickital to a very great and ex tended commerce. We all kndlirthat the laws passed of late y ars, beginning in 1842 and ending with the repeal of the Navigation Act in 1848, have tended greatly to increase the trade of the country ; and we know also that while inereas ng legitimate trade, while making many men wealthy and giving general prosperity to the country; they have produced at the same time the concomitant evils of unsound speculation, cash adventures , by men without capital, and bubble companies eager to share i i the riches of the world. We are a great commercial. country, prosperous beyond any that over existed on t'e face Of the globe. But we must not expect too much. We mu't occasimally be visited by misfortune. I believe, however, that the general principles upon which we are acting aro mound ones. I believe that the Government have on this occasion pursued a course which will entitle them to the gratitude of the country. I see nothing to be altered in our general laws, and I hope that this house, at all events, will not tamper with the great principles of a sound currency. (Cheers.) • Mr. DISRAELI—I trust that in discussing this question we shall abstain from that vague declamation which has occa sionally been indulged in upon both sides of the house, and among others by the noble lord who has just spoken, though I admit that many of his observations, like much that falls from his lips, were worthy of. our most serious attoation. What are we asked to do to-night ? It is no ordinary demand that is made upon the House of Commons, We are asked to consent to a Bill of Indemnity for an infraction of the law, authorised by;the Government in consequence of the commer cial distress and distrust that have prevailed, and that unfor tunately still prevail. We have heard a great deal of com mittees upon commercial distress being advisable. Permit me, though very briefly, to lay before you some suggestions as to what may be the causes of the present commercial dis tress and distrust. The distress is general. It is not confined to this country, where it is extensive. All know that it pre vails in the United States. It is • not peculiar to the United States, as some gentlemen who have have addressed you would seem to infer. It is European. It prevails in Ger many, in Aue.ria, in Denmark, in Sweden, and what is occur ring in Hamburg at this moment must be fresh in the recol lection and the fears of many members of this house. Again, it is to be recollected that the commercial trans actions of Europe are carried on by au amount of capital that is not to be counted by millions, but by hundreds of millions. It is, therofore, a very great error—and hero I entirely agree with the noble lord the member for the city— to suppose that the management of a limited portion of the currency of England could have occasioned this immense dis. aster and these wide consequences, which really have origi nated, not from the mismanagement of the currency of this country, but from the mismanagement of the capital of Eu rope. (Hear.) Now, there is one important point which we must bear in mind in considering the Act of 1844. That Act is an Act to'regulate the currency of this country. The pur port of it is in my mind irreproachable. Its object is one er easy ae r e n dnt dks the b o which every man ought to wish to secure, and the means by il which that object is sought to bo obt tined are in many re spects worthy of public admiration. But is it or is it not the fact that this Act, which really is intended only to regulate the currency of this country, to establish and maintain the convertibility of the notes of the Lank of England, has never theless the effect—as I believe, the unintended effect—of greatly aggravator; commercial distr , ss and distrust when they are occasioned by the misapplication and mismanage ment, not of the currency of England, but of the capital of Europe ? (Hear, hear.) Now, I apprehend that that poi..t has never been met throughout all these observations, which I have listened to,.and I apprehend that it is a position which can be established. I say it can be shown that it is in conse quence of the machinery of the Act of 1841, though intended merely as a currency Act, and to h ,ve a limited application to objects, no doubt, of paramount importance, that the managers of the currency of this country h,.ve been forced to treat in an identical manner and by the same means two cir cumstances totally opposite in their character, and both exgr cising a most powerful and injurious influence on the commerce and capital of this country—that is, a foreign drain and a domestic drain. I say that the Act of 1844, from the man ner in which it is framed, forces those who regulate the cur rency of this country to apply to a domestic drain exactly the same treatment which is applied to a foreign drain ; while, if there is anything which can be established by argument andan abpeptre7alatteodfainctasnit exactly a t e h t a ly t tchoenttrwnorysenitsaonfnecirr,cuamndstabnoceosnsehoonulnd tered by means exactly opposite. If that point be esta blished, and if that be the sound position, then surety we accused fairly sed by c o t r e id n e o r bl a e q l u or e d stio o n f w of is th in a g t k to ind tam w p it e h r ou w t it b h e t in h g e standard of value, to inundate the country with paper money, or of desiring to recur to obselete modes of practice, and to what took place in this country , with respect to the circula tion, when, in fact, the same circumstances did not exist, and when there were not the same means of regulating tho curt ency. The noble lord has made a very great appeal to night to the disastrous year of 1825, when he informed us that 700 banks were broken in tho same morning, I believe. (A laugh.) The noble lord was not then the Primo Minister of this country, and though no man is letter acquain'ed with its history than the noble lord, yet I think, that on this occa sion he has trusted too carelessly to his memory ; for at that disastrous period, not 700 country banks, but 73 banks alto gether, in London and in the country, broke, and by no means were the majority of these banks of issue. Therefore I do not think that that illustrative warning bears very much on the question we ought to consider this evening. (A laugh.) But this year of 1825—this phantom of ancient distress con stantly raised in our debates—has really very little to do with the modern principles of banking, and the means by which the currency of this country is now carried on. It is abuse b to ntwe ni t u h n e t B re a ni nk oni d n ir o e r e t t n oi n •s t of in that day for what 1825 it was quite impossible for the directors of the Bank of England to themselves of those resources which yon now are always ready to remind them are at their disposal to guard their raising the rate of discounts. In 1825 you by raising laws to prevail, and it was impossible for aav;Pa th l:cel have a higher rate of discount than 5 per cent. Therefore the year 1825 refers to circumstances which no longer prevail in our laws and manners, and I protest against the quotation of the year 1825 for the future in any currency debate. (Hear.) Now, let us refer to the point before us. We are in a state of great commercial distress and distrust. I entirely agree with the noble lord on this point, that to suppose that the great commercial distress which now pre vails could have been occasioned by the mismanagement of the currency of this or any oth er coun t ry i s lik e suppos i ng , • that a greatnobleman coull be ruined by the mismanagement of his pocket money. (Hear, hear.) The fact is, we are mis taking and have for a long time too easily mistaken, in all these discussions capital for currency. But though the com mercial distress and distrust are entirely occasioned by the management and application in this country, in America, and in the European nations, of the great mass of floatin g capital which prevails, still, at the sam3 time, we cannot con ceal from ourselves that we have a law in this country intended only to act on oar currency, and which, so far as the principle it asserts is concerned, I hope the vast majority of this house willmaintain, but which, whenever commercial distress an I distrust occur, is found entirely u-iendurable, oppressive, and ha ,racticable, and on every occasion of emergency we aro obliged to suspend it. (Hear.) The noble lord who has just addresse 1 the house, and who has addressed it with peculiar authority on this subject, since he was the vel , first Minister who recommended the violation of the statute, has referred to the two occasions in a brief space of time when this Act was suspended ; but, if he would refresh his recollection from the evidence taken before the committee of last year, to which c ,nstant reference has been made during this debate, he will find that practically, or virtually at least, the suspension of this Act is not to be confined to those ts o instances, memo rable as they are ; because in the autumn of 1853 there was a a very great pressure, and the precious metals were leaving this country —one of the causes, by-the-bye, of our present embarrassment, and consequent on the expenditure for he Russian war. The pressure on the money-market was ex treme ; the rate of discount was raised—and wisely raised— by the directors of the Bank of England, and by the prudent and courageous manner in which in that instance, as subse quently, they managed their affairs, the danger for the moment was averted. But we have the evidence of Mr. Chapman, and that is no inconsiderable testimony, as all acquainted with the subject will admit. Well, he by whom the force of a money pressure is al ways felt, who represents the greatest discount house in Lombard-street, says that had it not been for some private information which reached him to the effect that in case of extreme pressure there would be an inference on the part of the Go vernment he should at that moment have given up the idea of struggling any further, and it was only on that tacit understanding that he went on with his business. (Hear, hear.) Remember who gave that evidence. He is the very individual whose representations, if I am rightly informed, iu 1857 as well as in 1847, induced the Minister of this county to recommend the suspension of this Act. (Hear, hear.) The question naturally arises what is the effect of allowing the currency of this country to be regulated by an A.,t which we are in a continual stat ) of being prepared to' suspend ? So entirely do I admire the object of that Act, so anxious am I myself to hope that a largo majority of this House is pre pared to uphold the practicable and virtual convertibi:ity of the note, that I should be most anxious to interpret the ma chinery of the Act in a manner the most favourable to its co , ,tinuance, and to the non-necessity of alteration. I would pass over one crisis, in which its provisions had been sus pended, with what I should consider a wise indulgence, but it becomes the committee deeply to consider whether it will sanction a chronic state of suspension—whether we arc to have an Act of such a character as always either to be sus pended, or to be in that state in which those who are acting unsler it knew that when an emergency arises it will not be put in practice. Is tint wise ? (Hear.) " But," says the noble lord, "on the whole that is the course I recom r.end." The noble lord loves a precedent. He sets a precedent in this instance himself, and I can easily understand the tender :egret with which the nob'e lord would, at the same time, witness that we had turned from that precedented, and as it were passed some censure, mild, I am sure, on the sagacity of his conduct in 1817. But the noble lord says that this Act is a consider. able cheek on what he calls over-speculation and an inflated currency, which in times of prosperity abound. I am sorry to hear from the noble lord that our periods of prosperity aro always necessarily to be accompanied by such distress, but when the noble lord so fairly tells us what are the con sequences of increased circulation—when ho tells es tha%. unless we have these consider tble checks, the currency will be greatly increased—there will be no thee': on the issues of the Bank—a crisis will ariie, the circulation will be inflated, and there will, in fact, be no standard of value, I may he permitted to say to the noble lord with all respect, that though these were opinions once held by persons of consider. able reputation, and for aught I know m ty bo still adhered to by persons of considerable repute, yet they are con clusions the authenticity of which is entirely impugned by authorities of a more novel nature than perhaps the noble lord may t -, e aware of, and of no less high a character than any to which the noble lord could appeal. Many high authorities have held that the depreciation of a bank-note convertible at par is a simple impossibility, and they have also held that it is quite out of the power of any bank to issue beyond the requirements of the country, and what is still more important, is that it is not in the power of any one to prove that any i sue at any tiose has ever affected the price of articles. Nay, mOro, we have con clusive evidence in our possession that the reverse is the fact. Now really, Sir, under these circumstances I must protest against the n•,ble lord so freely, and in that style of declamation w:iich he can command even upon a curren y . question, lending his authority to a principle which I believe to be quite fallacious, and to conclusions whi h I believe to be untenable, and to cict tits which I think he will find him self totally unable to substantiate. But, says the noblelord, " this Act is a check upon the over-speculation of the day, and although there may be sortie objection to the mode in which that check is exercised, still the benefit which results from it is indubitable." But when the noble lord talks of this Act operating as a beneficial check, while the Govern- • ment may interfere with the period of is bells carried out, let me asz the house to consider one point which I think has not been fairly taken into considerat on daring the course of this debate. If the house be prepared to sanction and coun tenance this dispensing power so be exerted at the arbitrary will of the Minister of the day, how don it propose to recog nise the difference of position between those firms who fall victims before the dispensing power is exercised ? Are those ' who hold on a favoured 24 hours struck upon the clock of the Royal Exchange of London to dominate over those with whom they ought to be fellow-victims? (Hear, hear.) Let me remind the house that when we discuss this question and perhaps discuss it too easily as regards those whohave it might perhaps be as well to go a little into detail, for it is onl , through detail that the house can realise some idea of the consequences of this fear and distrust in London and the other great marts of commercial enterprise. Now, sir, here is a document with which I have been furnished, and I will ans-ver for its being correct and accu rate, although I cannot answer for its being complete, be cause there are names of many victims with rega d to whom the amounts for whi h they have fallen h ,ve nut yet been ascertained ; but here is a docement of desolation in my hand, the contents of which I thick will surprise even those gentlemen connected with the commerce and monetary tran actions of the country who have addressed us to-night. It is a return of the number of firms which have fallen be tween the 7th of September and the 12th of N ,v. mber, a period of little more than two months, and among those firms there are some of no inconsiderable import oleo, and some which ranked, as far its capital c in be a test of position, in the highest class in mercantile repu' e. In that brief period I find that no 1- ss than 85 firms fell which represented a capi al of 42,000,000/. sterling, and, with the exception of firms representing 8,000,000 of money, those mercantile esta blislim nts fell before the letter of November, some of them a few days, even holm, before that lette r . (Hear, hear.) Now if.we are to leave the I tw in this st tte, I really thaik that it becomes us calmly, but earnestly and seriously, to consider whatis the operation of the policy, what the state of the ad ministration in-this country which thus conducts and controls its commerce. i t have heard statesmen to-night, and among them the noble lord the member for London, who do not shrink from the responsibility of exercising this dispensing power. I must eay that the right hon. gentleman. the .Chancellor of the Exchequer, showed moromod sty, and display d his reluctance to exercise such a responsibility, by intimating the possibility .upon his ~art of making some suggestion which would avoid a re ponsibility so terrible. A man must have great confi dence in himself, in his position, and in his character who, under err urnstances such as I have described, when 85 firms .representing a capital of 40,000,0011., had fallen within so short a period, would, as a Minister of the Crown, have no re uczance in deciding when to interfere. (Hear, hear.) I am deeply conscious that every English statesman is sin cerely anxious to do his duty to his country, and I can readily 'Conceive the terrible anxiety with which a Minister under such circumstanc s might consult some eminent capitalist, perhaps one of his principal supporters, and ono whose mer cantile knowledge and intelligence had been of groat assist ance, I won't say is preparing a budget, but iu famishing details for the assistance of a Minister in framing his financial scheme. I am not making any personal allusion, but I am only supposing the general position in which a Minister may be placed. Well, then, suppose the Minister to consult such an individual. It may be of the utmost importance to a man engaged in commercial pursuits ,that the suspending power should be delayed for 24 hours, or precipitated by that period, in order to destroy a rival or to save himself. The con sequences of such a course I need not dwell upon. I know that such a case may no:, happen, but would it be wise in us to sanction a law which might, under any circumstances, lead to . consequences of such a character ? I am sure that the House will r fleet deeply upon the difficulty which now surrounds us, that they will recollect the contents of the startling document to which I have alluded, and that they will feel that it is no child's play to bear responsibility oa such a sub ject—a subject which I say is the last with regard to which the responsibility of a Minister of the Crown ought to be exercised, It is a responsibility almost beyond the endur ance of any individual, and one which is totally alien to the character of the constitution of this country. (Hear, hear.) You have thought a dispensing power with regard to civil and political rights unbearable, and you have changed a dy nasty rather than submit to it, and are you prepared now to extend to a Minister such a power with regard to a subject which in this country touches you. perhaps, more nearly than either civil or political rights? Where commercial and mono tary.interests aro concerned, aro you prepared to submit quietly to a dispensing power, exercised arbitrarily at the discretion of the Minister, the exorcise of which even when most virtuously employed may be unjust in its application and ruinous in its results (Cheers.) I think, therefore, that it is most desirable that we should take some course to prevent a repetition of the transactions of 1847 and 1857. I think the time has arrived in which we ought to exert ourselves to solve a difficulty which may be great, but ono which we ought not to evade but which we ought to endeavour to surmount, and I regret that I Pee no disposition on the part of Govern ment to undertake the task. That such appears the case I re gret the more because I think that all that has been said upon the subject during the present session might have tended to prove to her Majesty's Ministers there woe no desire in any quarter to throw any obstacle in the way of the full excercise of their discretion, but that, on the contr ar y , there was ever y wish to assist them to a solution of the difficulty which would redound to their honour, We are to-night asked to agree to a Bill of Indemnity ; now, I said yesterday, perhaps rather inadvertently, that my consent to that bill would depend upon upon the line taken by the Gov ernment with respect vspect toact Bill itself. I forgot that the bill was not a of Indemnity f or Ministers alone, but also an indemnity for the Bank directors. Now, I don't think that any one can impugn the conduct of the Bank directors. There is no evidence before us that the Bank directors required this interference; and in 1847, not only did they not only solicit the Government for a suspen sion of the act, on the contrary, they did not avail them selves of i s suspension, but disapproved the course which had been adopted, and maintained the convertibility of the note I have reason to believe that in the present instance the j directors of the Bank have acted in the same lataguanimous spirit ; and if, at the suggestion of. the Government, they have consented to take an illegal step, I think, whatever may be our differences of opinion on the general subject, it would be cowardly and vindictive to throw any obstacle in the way of their indemnity. So far, therefore, as the Bill o f I ndemnity is asked, I am prepared to accede to the request of the Go vernment, but further than that I cannot afford my consent. I think the Government have taken an erroneous step, not withstand ng the high authority just expressed in their favour by the noble lord in recommending that the house should again appoint the committee to consider this question. I must repeat my belief that there is no subject which can solicit the attention and consideration of public men on iwhick there exists even such a owning() of- knowledge and information as upon the principles on which the currency of this country should be established, and on which it has of late years been carried on, and that any attempt to postpone the solution of the grave difficulties which surround' t by farther inquiry will lead to great public inconvenience, pos- sibly to great public disaster. I think we Ought to show no hesitation in meeting those difficulties that we ought to give our best consideration not only to the passing, but the ihitne diate passing of some measure which will prevent the future necessity 'of appealing to this house for bills of indemnity to' her Majesty's Ministers for such acts as that in respect of which thOy now deem it necessary to ask us to support them. I h iveendeavoured to call the attention of the house to what I thi,k the vital point in this bill which requ , reS our con sideration. lam for supporting the spirit of the bill as far as it maintains the convertibility of the notes which the Bank issues. I would do that completely, sincerely, and in no spirit Of equivocation, but believing as I do that the law by its enactments forcing the Bank to treat a foreign and a doniestic drain by the same means, not only occasions but as ;ravates distress and distrust among the commercial classes of this country, I think wa ought to meet that difficulty by re me :IYi ng the law in that respect. Let the house realise to it sel f onegreat differenc 3 between a domestic and a foreign drain. With a foreign drain we have learnt by experience efficiently ' to cope. We have never had a greater strain on our resources in that respect than we have had of late years, 'but by that powerful arm which the usury laws now place on the Bank of England we have been enabled to cope with that efficiently; and I therefore think there is no man in this country who has now ahy fear of ultimately disastrous consequences of a , foreign drain. A foreign drain is a very unimpassioned, cal culating transaction. It is founded on a knowledge of our resources, and upon the necessities of those wlio in foreign countries require our aid, and, however inexorable the de mand, it is one which is acted on almost In an instant by the results of reason and calculation. But the moment you come to a domestic drain you have to encounter elements of a very different character. The moral quality, as well as the mate rial ele nent, enters into the calculation of the domestic drain. The passions of fear and hope govern mankind ; the mart and the ex3hange are not free from the influence of those pas sions, and when you have circumstances in which a whole nation is panic Struck you cannot hope by the aid of economic science successfully to encounter them. It is therefore the duty of Parliament to remedy the deficiencies of the law in that respect. But I cannot believe we have any 'chance of obtaining that remedy if we c nisent to the course suggested by her Majesty's Ministers. In 1840 the whole question of a - bank of issue was gone into by a committee which, whether we look to the reputation of the members who formed it, or, the high character of the witnesses called before it, produced a volume inferior in interest to none in this house. In 1847, after the panic, you had a committee to inquire into the same subject and into the influence of this very Act of 1844. At the beginning of last year a third committee was appoint ed, and its transactions are before you. What more can you want ? An the more distinguished writers of the day on pub. lie and political economy have favoured the country with their speculations on this subject. There is no new writer before us, and I think therefore the time has came when wo ought to settle this question. What is the use of a govern ment if it cannot settle this question? (A laugh) What is the use of a House of Commons if it cannot animate and - inspire a governments? (Laughter, and an ironical cheer.) There are some men who think that members of Parliament arc -only made to form Parliamentary committees ; but it is only a preparatory, though a very useful, training to accumulate in telligence in that way, to sift evidence and draw conclusions. There is something higher and more necessary ; that is, to re commend a policy ; and I think the time has come when wo ought to recommend a policy. (Cheers.) Now, the right hon. gentleman the Chancellor of the Exchequer has no wish that there should be any great de ay iu passing this Bill of Indem nity. I wish to meet him in that respect frankly and in the most friendly spirit ; but I hope the right hon. gentleman • will not really and practically hold if we g ive him this bill of Indemnity that Parliament was only called together for th it object. The right hen. gentleman has a motion on the paper for a committee, If he would only settle the night on whichto tako that motion for a committee I would move to that motion an amendment the purport of which would be, Without, of course, pledging myself at this moment to its exact phraseoe logy, to express the opinion of the house that it is expedient to legislate on the subject, and not to refer it to a select com: mittee. If the right hon. gentleman will say this clay week for his committee, I will assist him to the best of my power in carryinghis bill; and on this day week, if he will move the committee, I will endeavour in a manner befitting the im portance of the subject to ask the house to consider whether, under all the circumstances of the ease, it is expedient that this question should be referred to a select committee, and whether it is not wiser to proceed at once to legislate on the subject. (Hoar, hear.) The CHANCELLOR of the EXCHEQUER could not but acknowledge the fairness with which the right hon. gentle. man had treated the subject, and the disposition he had shown to facilitate the business before the house. Endoubt edly, the passing of the Indemnity Bill was the mein °Weet for which Parliament had been assembled at this time, and formed tho principal business which the Government wished to forward. If the house consented to allow the bill to be introduced that evening, he would propose the second read ing for Monday, and would brin g f orwa rd hi, motion for a committee ou Friday. Ho hoped that arrangement would suit the convenience of the house. (Hear, hear) Per haps he would be permitted to refer for a moment to a question of fact which had been adverted to by the right lion. gentleman the member for Oxfordshire, and also by the right hon. gentleman opposite (Mr. Disraeli). He alluded to the statement made before the committee of last session by Mr. Chapman, the managing member of the house of Overend and G u rney. At the present moment lie had not the report of the committee before him, and therefore he quoted from memory; but his recollection of the evidence given by Mr. Chapman was, that on some oceasi in he had received as as surance from a gentleman on whom he placed reliance that in the event of their house discounting to a large amount they might rely on the suppo tof the Government. A ques- • tura was put as to the authority on which that statement was made, and he did not assert that lie had received any direct communication from the Government. It was possible that his (the Chancellor of the Exchequer's) recollection might not be very precise as to the words used ; but, be that as it might, he thought it right to stat,l that no such communica ti u). as Mr. Chapman mentioned was ever wade by the present Government either to the house of Overend and Gurney or to any other similar discounting-house whatever. (Hear.) Ho wished to assure the house in the broadeSt terms that could. be used that the statement of Mr. Chapman, and the impression of the person to whom lie referred, had no autho rity from the Government, and must have originated in an entire misapprehension. (Hear, hear ) Mr. CARDWELL said tho arrangement proposed by tho Chancellor of the Exchequer led to the inference that the discussion of the great question before them would be t deen rather on the motion for a coearnittee than on the bill whieli was about to be introduced. He acquiesced in the wisdom of that arrang , ment and would reserve any observa tions he bad to make till Friday next. The resolution was then agreed. The house resumed ; leave was given to bring In the bill, and it was brought in accord ingly by the Chancellor of ►ho Exchequer, read a first time, and ordered to be road a second time on Monday. ACCIDENTS ON RAILWAYS. On tho motion of Mr. BENTINCK, a committee was wood to to inquire into the macs of accidents on railways, awl into the possibility of removing auy such causes by further leg's latio a. NEW WRIT. On the motion of Mr, CIIBETHAM, a new writ was ordered to issue for Ashton•under-Line for the election of a member in the room of Mr. Hindley, deceased. The house adjourned at a quarter to 12 o'clock. PARLIAMENTARY PROCEEDINGS. NOTICES OF rioN—MONDAY, DEC. 7. Mr. WARREN, —To ask the First Lord of the Admiralty, whether his attention has been called to a recent NavalCJurt Martial held on an officer of her Majesty's ship Juno; and whether any stop are contemplated by the Government in respect thereto ? Mr. SCOTT —The 69:11 Regiment being quartered at Ply mouth, to 3,-k her Majesty's Government, what was the ad vantage and also the expense of moving it from Plymouth to Portsmouth by rail, to embark there, in order to return i 7 sea to Piymouth before departing for the East Indies, audby whose authority it was dono ? TUESDAY, DEC. S. Mr. YOUNG—To ask the Secretary of the Treasury, what steps have Leen taken to prevent the interruption of the steam mail service with Australia which is like:y to be occa sioned by the accident to the ship Emeu ; and what provision will be made in future to prevent de ay in this service, iu case of accidents to ono of the steam-ships engaged in the transmis sion of the Mails between Australia and Suez. Mr. W. VANSITTART,—TJ ask the President of the Board of Control, whether, during the tenure of the Governor-pene ralship of India by the Marquis of Dalhousie any recommen dation was made by, or dtsp itch sent from the Supreme Go vernment or the Commander-in-Chief in India to the Court of Directors or to the President of the Board of Control for an increase of European troops, in consequence of the exten sion of the British territories in the E ist, by the acquisition of the Punjaub, Pegu, Nagpore, Conde, &atom, Jhausi, Berar, and other districts, assigned to the East India Company by his Highness the Nizam of Hyderabad; if so, what was the date of such recommendation or despatch. and what was the date and tenor of any reply that may have been sent ; was ally additional force of Europeans despatched to India in con sequence, during tho period referred to; and, if so, what number of men were sent. DEATH OF CHARLES TRAIN, THE DETEOTIVE•OFFICER Yesterday morning Mr. Pearson, the City Solicitor, re ceived information that this active city detective-of f icer expired in Guy's liotpitel, at 1 o'clock from tho wounds rtcrAved on being shot by Christian Settley, en board the Caledonian steamer, while bringing him a prisoner from Hamburg. ITALIAN OPEILL.—The talented corps of operatic Per formers on wuom we last week had occasion to comment, concluded their engagement in Bath on Saturday night, with Verdi's opera, "II TrovatOre. ' no favourableo impression produced on the public d their previous appearances here was amply confirmed by the artistic skill which was manifested throughout the representation of this fine work. Mr. Sims Reeves, as Manrica, was all that could bo wished. Impassioned or tender, defiant or pathetic, as the exigencies of the drains required, be demonstrated that his genius is net confined to the science which has more particularly been the object of his study, but that he also pos sesses considerable histrionic powers. His vocalisa tion was on this occasion singularly happy, and we have seldom heard him in better voice, or seen him' mmedeoden. energy — da t in hr e nw G i a n s g sie n r il too, her fo sa re n e g , i w n it a h m h o or re ac g c e u n s i t a h l both of singing and acting, into the scene, and, succeeding in placing before the audience a most vivid representation of Leonora, the heroine of the drama. Of course, the chie n f tri umph . was . the cele brated " Miserere" o sc o e e ne o T t i ho por tu t de of t o e r ff i e w e n ts a i l w f treatment decidedly iti th o e whole range of operatic music . g g ra nde s t. effects left by it, as interpreted by these artistes, aided by the accessories of an exce ll ent b an d an d c h oru s, is indelible. It was rapturously demanded a second time, and the request of the audience was complied with. Madame Borchardt, as Azueena, ably supported the character, •and Mons. Borchardt threw great energy into the representation of the Count de Luna. How is that the operatic " villain " is invariably devolved on the basso I Is there analogy between the depth of a Man's tones and the degradation of his morality efficient, The subordinate parts of the opera were very respectably a P n i d e r i h n a i h a d a d w M e r a e r i f a u n l i i , o a tko n eci d . , showed Madame sGuesses.ustaine d bTheyShifonrorsi evidently e scenic the effect, and a , o soldiers, and the gron pi grouping grea: attention y been carefully studied. • At the conclusion of the opera, the principal members of the company received the plaudits of the audience in testimony of entire satisfaction *ith this intellectual rendering of Verdi's masterpiece.---Batie and Cheltenham, Qazette.