The Sun. — London, England, 1857-02-07 00:00:00

THE SUN, LONDON, SATURDAY EVENING, FEBRUARY 7, 1857. es. • . the attention of the house to what seem to me the moat served the consideration of the Chancellor of the Exchequer. important questions involved in the act of 1844, and Whey they considered the nature of the inquiry which was which will require consideration from the commit- to be submitted to the committee, including the embarrass tee. It is of the utmost moment to the country that its ' ing question of the whole currency of the United Kingdom, currency should rest upon a sound basis. On the sound- and involving the nicest pellets of law, and when they re noes of its currency the trade , the industry , and the credit flected that the committ ee would be called u p on to l ay of the nation depend ; and no effort should be spared to before the house a new commercial code affecting the whole maintain in their integrity such provisions of the law as I banking business of the country, he thought it would be secure so valuable a blessing, and so great a source of wealth i evident that an investigation of such magnitude would be much more satisfactorily and speedily conducted by two an d prosperity. But there are other questions connected w ith this subject which, although subordinate in their im- co mmittees than by one. (Hear, hear.) The Chancellor of p o rtance, yet deserve, and I h o p e w ill r eceive, theattentive th e Exchequer had referred at some length to the question consideration of the committ ee . I allude to the arrange- o f c onvertibility. He (Mr. Glyn) had always considered ment subsisting between th e B an k o f England, in its rein- that the question of the currency and of the Bank privy tion of a banker, and th e G overnm ent—that is to say, with loges was most unnecessarily mixed up with the question of convertibility, with the intention, as he thought, of regard to the deposit of the public money in the custody of throwing a slur upon those who did not assent to the act the Bank of England, and also with regard to the manage of . 1844, but whose object was, if possible, to improve the ment of the national debt. The pecuniary relations sub principle laid down in that act by extending rather than slating between the Bank and the Government do not, like diminishing its operation. He would not enter at length the subject of the currency, affect the interests ito a consideration of the act of 1844, for no doubt the house and for tunes of trade and production. Nevertheless, within their would assent to the motion of the Chancellor of the Exche limited sphere they are of undoubted importance. Under 000 s, quer, and the subject itself was a very dry one. He might the late act the Bank of England now pays about 188, observe, however that he had always regarded the act of annually to the Government for the privilege of issuing notes. I think 120,000/. is the sum fixed by the act, in 1844 as dividing itself into three parts, distinct from each other, and operating very differently with regard to the addition to which the Bank pays 60,0001. a-year for stamp duty, and another trifling item of 8,000/., making the total Public welfare. The first important portion of the act pro vided for the separation of the issue and banking depart amount which it. pays to the Government in connection n with the paper currency 188,00 e e The profit derived by ; the second for the limitation of the amount of cir the Bank of England from the currency is calculated upon culation advanced upon securities; and the third laid different principles, and it is perhaps not very easy to de - down regulations affecting country ba nks . With re g ard tide its precise amount ; but the hi g hest est imate that I to the first of these provisions h e did not hesitate to sa y , have heard places it at about 170,0001., a nd the lowest at although he knew it was rathe r an un p o p ular doctrine, about 80,0001. The Gover nment, theref ore , receives from that, though he had alway s been an advocate for the the Bank a larger sum than that made by the Bank in the separation of the two departments , he regretted that shape of p r ofits. In addition to the contribution in re- the machinery for regulating those departments had not set. of the issue of notes, the Bank also makes a payment been left in the hands of the Bank of England. If f there had been no statutory enactment giving to them or the management of the national debt. The scale of the management of the circulation of the country tha duty that payment is prescribed by act of Parliament. They might have been still in their hands. Their power was pay at the rate of 4501. per 1,C00,000/. for every part of great, and having the command of the Government ba the national debt not exceeding 400,000,0001. ; 3401. per lances they would have been in circumstances to carry on 1,000,000/. for every portion between 400,000,0001. and 600,600,0001. ; and 3001. per 1,000,0001. for all the necessary operations. Bat the Bank of England themselves rejected that view of the matter, and by m all above 600,000,000/. This is the scale fixed bY act cepting the act of 1814 they had prevented all chance of a of Parliament, but it will be open to the committee, return to that state of things. The question could no longer in connection with the general question of renewing the be argued as it was in 1844, for there were now other bodies charter, to revise the terms upon which the privileges of who might step forward and say, " Why not entrest the the Bank shall bo continued. I may also state that lam duty to us as well as to the Bank of England ?" As to the now in communication with the Governor of the Bank of third point (which he would notice before the second), viz., England on the subject of the pecuniary arrangements sub the regulation of the country bank iseues,he was not aware aiming between the Government and that corporation. theta was any such compact entered into with them as the Upon the result of that communication it may depend whe ther or not the Government will deem it advisable to pro- hon. member opposite (Mr. Bernie) alluded to. But, whatever the case might be, the renewal of the Bank Act pose any modification in the terms of the present arrange could not alter the position of the country bankers ; nor ment. If such a modification should be thought expedient did he see that they had any claim whatever. He had and it is likely to receive the assent of the Bank, the Go always thought the arrangement with the country bankers vernment will of course bring the matter under the con one of the best provisions of the bill. It provided a ma si deration either of the house or of the committee. I have chinery by which, in point of fact, they might substitute been compelled to trouble the house at, I fear, a wearisome other paper for their own at a great advantage, and many length on this question ; but the matter is one of so much importance to the whole community that I have preferred to of the country banks availed themselves of the option thus a appear to be unnecessarily tedious rather than to withhold afforded them. Bat, after all, the most important point was anything which might be essential for the information of the second, which referred to the limitation of the amount of notes. It was impossible to advert to this without bear hon. members. Before I sit down I have only to add that ing in mind what took place in 1847, and it was remarkable the subject of joinnstock banks hae, from circumstances well how very anxious the advocates of the bill were to get over known to every hon. gentleman, attracted a great degree the events that occurred in that year. The right hon. gen of public attention during the last twelvemonths or more. tleman the First Lord of the Admiralty told them last Sotue of those establishments have failed in the most alarm tleman that what had occurred in 1847 was entirely to be st ing manner, producing the moat disastrous consequences to tributed to the state of the commercial body; but he found their unfortunate shareholders. It therefore appeared to that another advocate of the bill, in some remarkably lucid me that the subject was one well worthy of investigation letters which had lately appeared, took another view of the before a committee of this house. The procedure by which the affairs of insolvent joint-stock banks are wound up is matter. He attributed the events of 1817 not to the com anything but satisfactory. Suggestions have been made— mcrcial body, but, in a great extent, to the prejudice and although I confess that lam not one of those who approve want of prudence of the Bank directors, who ought to have them—for the substitution of an inspection of the state of raised instead of reducing the interest. But the writer their affairs by a Government officer for the vigilance and made a mistake in the matter of fact. The Bank directors control of their own directors. I, for one, greatly deprecate did not reduce the rate of interest in 1847. They reduced it any attempt to improve the management of joint-stock in 1846, acting upon the doctrine laid down by their banks or any other mercantile undertakings, by weakening friends, that they should look to their own reserve merely the motives for due care and caution on the part of those as bankers, and not to the amount of bullion. Accord directly interested in such enterprises by holding out the ingly, when they found their own till full in 1846 they re shadowy safeguard—for, after all, it never can be any real dared the interest. At the same timo they were entitled to protection—of Government control. However, this is one do so, for the bullion was increasing in the Bank. The of those matters which may fairly receive the attention of fault of the Bank directors in 1847 was, that they did the committee. I freely admit that there is a great die- not in time raise the rate of interest, and when they did similarity between the question of joint-stock banks and so they did it in a gradual way. With respect to the limi the all important subject of the currency, which will con- tation of the issue of notes to 14,000,0001., the rest of the stitute the mein topic for investigation by the committee. issue being based on bullion, he had never heard any rea- Still, it appeared to me that it would be difficult to form son assigned for that limitation. The Chancellor of the two committees, to sit both at the same time, on subjects bullion Exchequer had told in t them that, under this system, the at one time he Bank amounted to 20,000,000/. , as closely related to each other as the affairs of the Bank of The effect of such an accumulation was to raise great ex- England and the currency generally, and the law. of joint pectations in the country, to inflate prices, give encourage stock banks. On the other hand, I think it would not be ment to speculation and the creation of new companies, all expAient altogether to omit to consider the question of which was sure to be followed by a commercial crisis, and joint-stock bank., and I therefore propose that it be sub mitted to the same committee. The rich hon. baronet thus drive the country from one extreme to another. This (who had spoken throughout in a tone too low to be die- was the result of having a fixed sum of 14,000,000/. as the fleetly heard) then concluded by moving for the appoint- limitation of the issue of notes. They had been told that, meat of the committee. as a certain consequence of having this fixed amount of circulation, whenever the bullion began to give way the Mr. DISRAELI (whose remarks were at times inaudible there:inind circulation would be diminished ; but nothing of from the same cause) said—lf it be desirable that both ofha( I occurred. Take last year. There was a dimi the subjects brought under our notice by the right lion nation in the amount of bullion of 3,900,0001., but the notes gentleman should undergo the investigation of a select com: in circulati on continued the same as before. There was no mitten, I think it would be very unwise that they should corrective for this in the existence of the limit. The truth was that in framing the bill the fact was totally forgotten, both go before ono and the same committee. Between the that the moment money becauie more valuable that instant currency and joint-stock banks I see no necessary cermet:- the Bank reserves were acted upon-. He could not conceive tion ; and, moreover, the question of joint-stock banks has how such a system should be thought necessary, or how the by itself attracted the greatest amount of public attention, idea had been lost sight of that the rate of interest should be determined by the amount of bullion, and not by the and is likewise one of sufficient difficulty and importance to state of the Bank reserve. He did not wish to go into de demand the undivided labours of a committee. (Hear.) tails which would hardly be understood, but the general Bat, after listening to the statement liven by the right principle on which we should proceed was something like hon. gentleman of the intentions of the Government re_ the following : Don't allow the amount of notes issued on sporting the currency and their relations to the Bank, lam securities to be a fixed amount. Let a certain amount be fixed, but all above that issued at given sates of interest, really at a loss to understand what are to bo the duties of and let these rates of interest be determined by the amount the proposed committee on that important subject. (Hear.) of bullion in the Bank, making the amount of notes in cir- Tho Government appear to have entirely made up their ex:dation always to bear a necessary proportion to the minds on every point of moment connected with the ques- amount l of bullion in the Bank cotr,rs ; if, for expample, tion before us ; and surely, therefore, it would have been a should be one million of bullion, let there be two preferable for the right hon. gentleman at once to intro - thirds r of notes, or some proportion of that kind. He hoped dace a bill embodying his views, and thus to afford the his right hon. friend would not give up the committee, as house an opportunity of expressing its approval or disep- per h aps somet hi ng m i g ht t ransp i re th ere w hi c h would lead proval of them. With the exception of one solitary point, him to change his mind on this question. Ho thought of no very great moment—viz., whether the Bank of Ire- i t was poss ibl e to i mprove the machinery o f 181 1 very I end should have permission to lend money on mortgage, materially. He had great doubts whether the time the Government, according to the speech of the right hon. had not come when all this machinery should be placed gentleman, have clearly made up their minds on the whole in other hands—whether - the day ha t not come when we question which they now wish to ruler to a committee; and s h ou ld h ave not Ban k o f England notes, or notes of an therefore the course he proposes to us is equally unsatis- vernment circulation, but what might be called Mint notes, factory and futile. Where the questions are of such a or something of that sort. Let it be an issue founded on nature as those on which the right hon. gentleman has the receipt of bullion by the Mint, and they should thee touched, and on which tho Government also entertain a very b are a currency free from all chance of risk, and establish a decided opinion, the proper merle far investigation is the system which would assist most materially the commercial whole house. (Hear.) The Ministers have a policy which interests of the country. they are no doubt prepared to support. Then, why do they not at once boldly submit it to the verdict f this house. Mr. HENLEY hoped that the Chancellor of the Excho- I question very much the propriety of referring the Bank quer would divide the inquiry into two, dealing separately Act to a select committee, and I should much prefer that with the question of the Bank charter and that relating to the Government should lay before us their matured views joint-stock banks. The country took a great interest in in the shape of a bill, which would be discussed and criti- beth questions, but especially in the latter. It was highly cised by all those hen. members who take an interest in the desirable, as the Chancellor of the Exchequer had truly subject, aid the Government would then be able to defend said, to reconsider the mode of windin g up joint-stock 3 the point which they recommend. Of coarse, c n such a banks ; but that was a DOW ter different from banking, nd subject I shall not attempt to divide the House should one which ought to be investigated by different members. there appear to be a predominant feeling in favour of On the committee charged with the inquiry into joint adopting the proposed course, but I beg the house to con- stock banks they ought to have members of the legal pre sider weather it would not be more advisable, as I have fession. It was a very intricate subject, upon which great suggested, that the committee on joint-stock banks should difference of opinion existed, and it was desirable that be confined to that topic, and that the renewal 2f the Bank legislation should follow the report of a competent commit- Act should be br t mght before us is the shape of a Govern- tee. Now, nothing could ho more general than the terms of meet bill, which could be discussed in this house. the reference to the committee. The Chancellor of the Ex 111r. TITE said that the speech of the Chancellor of the chequer seemed to wish that they should not go into the Exchequer bad confirmed the impression produced on hie operation of the act in 1817 ; but the terms of the reference mind by the Royal speech, that the Government. wore would not exclude that year from the inquiry, and that about to lay this question before the House with a fore- right hon. gentlemen might depend upon it that when the gone conclusion upon it. On no subject was there such committee came together they wouli examine into the an extraordinary difference of opinion among men of the whole operation of the act from the beginning to the present greatest ability and most extensive information. The time. Well, that would open up no inconsiderable field of reports of the select committee of the two Houses of inquiry; the investigation would necessarily be a length- Parliament were completely opposed to each other, ened one ; and in these circumstances he would ask, was it though the report of the select committee of that House fair or prudent to postpone the consideration of the joint was carried by a small majority only, and many members stoek-bank question till the fag-end of the session,- when of it agreed entirely with the report of the House of everybody would be wearied out and legislation hopeless ? Lords' committee that the panic of 1847 was materially At present the interest in the question of joint-stock banks aggravated by the operation ef the act of 1814. Mr. Tooke and their insolvency was irameaeo—much greater than that also was of that opinion, and he was completely opposed to in the general subject of banking. Joint-stock banks when prosperous ware closely a llied to banking, but directly the character and the arrangements of that act. The writers and speakers on this subject did not appear suM- they came to deal with insolvency the question then as ciently to have taken into c essideretion the enormous moue- awned a very different aspect from that of the Bank of tery circulation of the country, amounting, in all, including England. He thought that, upon reflection, the Chan foreign bill s o f exc h ange , t o something not much under celior of the Exchequer would say that each of tho corn -200,000,0001. The machinery which was to move this mittees would have quite enough to do—probably as much great mass ought to be adjusted with the greatest as would permit them to report in time for legislation to nicety, and so enabled to wor k w ith ou t an y j er k s , such as follow during the present session. (Hear.) He would not were occasioned by changes i n th e ra t e o f i n t er est. Of at that moment offer an opinion on th e ac t o f 1844, but he these there had been nine durin g th e l as t year, and th e did' not think that the labours of the committee would be chances of them had been greatly increased by the of r e f v a e vary agreeable nature if they were to commence their 1844, which cut the capital of the Bank into two pa t net parts—the the notion that the Government had ordinary banking capital, and the capital for the issue come s to ' . a i c o o n tec n l n u • might be inferred from the speech partrnent. The circulation of the Bank was almost a E' fixed - of the Chaneellor sm o n f — th se eExchequer—with respect to the quantity, about 20,000,0001., but the banking department, most material parts of the subject. (Hear, hear.) _ owing to this division of capital, fluctuated very much. th Mr. MALINS concurred with the last speaker in wishing Neither had the enormous amount of gold brought into er e Chncellor cf the Exchequer to divide the inquiry into this country since 1813 been taken into consideration. tw the disasters which had taken place Since that year gold to the amount of 175,000,0001. had during t o h n e ei l e as ie t rin fe g w years, involving points of the highest been discovered, of which no leas than 135,000,0001. had importance, nobody could doubt that the whole question been imported into this country. The disturbing force of of joint-stock banks should undergo the most rigid investi that element had naturally been very great, for the impor- gation in regard both to management and mod e o f wind tatious had varied considerably in amount, having only ing-up. The house was aware of the decisions which hail been 1,000,0001. in some quarters of the intervening years, recently been • ven in the case of the Royal British Bank, and 3,000,00 a. in others. A material effect had been pro- and of the g misfortunes to which the shareholders in that duced by these importations upon the discount of the Bank, concern were exposed . ea He hoped that the present session and the subject was one which he thought deserved the would not come without an enactment being careful attention of the committee. In 1847 the Bank sud- passed providing that after the winding-up of a joint-stock denly reduced the rate of interest to 23 per cent.,and in some bank, or any joint-stock company, whether in the Court of instances the rate of discount was only I per cent. The con- Chancery or the Court of Bankruptcy, mny , creditors should not sequence was that enormous building speculations were un - be at liberty to ane individual shareholders to any extent dertaken, and when the Bank found it necessary to raise they pleased. The proceedings in the case of the Royal the rate of interest the speculators became bankrupts. The British Bank were a disgrace to a civilised country. Debts large 4 __„_ number of workmen now out of employment was at- had been bought up by litigious Demons for the sole le pnr eett table to this state of things. He conceived that a pose of suing the shareholders. gow, if after the winding change was required in - the constitution of the Court of up, the privilege of suing individual shareholders Direct ors . means of calls, he had no doubt were Under the present system eight of the abolished, and contributions to pay the debts of the bank directors mired every year, and were reraced by eight or company obtained by other gentlemen plans which wh e o e were on the list, so that financial that the shareholders in every joint-stock concern would wee k might had beent b ire n sanctioned by a majority in one be found abundantly competent to meets all the demand quence of the admissiolync e langed the next week, in cense- made upon them. There was thus no necessity for Being s that full opportunity woul f d now directors. He hoped individual shareholders. He believed it had been ascer mines or in the house, of be afforded, either in the corn- tamed that the shareholders in the Royal British Bank . to which he had called' attention.discussing the important poieta were able to pay the debt three times over by the system of calls; but as long as they allowed shareholders to be Mr. BAILLIE had understoocblattahie Chancellor of the sued by any creditor who chose to raise an action, the Exchequer to say that he would deta n ila on f the part of the consequent litigation would cost more than the entire Government, from indicating the this subject, until after the report of thee a measure on liabilities of the concern; and the shareholders, instead of been presented, and he (Mr. Beillie) e()remitteo had meeting their responsibilities at home, would fly to escape constitution of the.fer the eatirie was thereforea conceived the monstrous cost of legal proceedings. With regard to that thematter of the main subject of debate—the Bank Charter, he agreed opinions entertained by with much that had been said by the last speaker but one. very eurious importance, views of the the advocates of unrestricted and of restricted banking He had been disappointed with the speech of the Chan were as much opposed as were form h er e ly ci t i llateve i l e l c e e n ner of the Exchequer, because, when he saw the notice Protectioniets and Freetraders. of the Exchequer had referred to the opinions of the late' Sir the paper, he did trust that the members of the Go vernment would enter upon the inquiry with a mind open expressis But the Chancellor of R. Peel on this question ; but those . who recollected' the to conviction.th e Exchequer had piece zt of e t b ei sol satisfaction with the act of 1841, as being a discussions on the present Bank Charter Act would remem ber that Sir R. Peel never regarded it as a final ineasnrr, were to have wisdom ; and, therefore, if the Govern (Hear.) On the contrary, the right hon. baronet distinctly stated, when he introduced the bill, that ho intended to , however, oproceed with the investigation. ° He would q er w b e a n t v i t n i :o tt i i. a preponderance in the committee, it that when the Chancellor of the Exche carry it much further, and that his ultimate object was trusted male e mmittee he would be joined by men that there should be only one bank of issue. Indeed, Sir R. was not so simple as he Peel gave private bankers throughout the country to under- who had not so stand that the privilege of issuingso, the right hon. gentleman their minds - and, if that were aleared to imagine. One of the ceded to them for aand would b e only invited man would find that the question Period of 10 - y p ea ap rs e , r bankers who were dispo se d to give up the privilege of paper many surprising statements issue to do so, and to receive in compensation an annual tleman in the course of his made by the right hon. gon payhient of 1 per cent. upon the amount they were actually discount had very little to do speech that the rate of issuing at the time. A number of private bankers accepted during the whole of last winter, w e enact of 1844. Now, that proposition, upon the clear understanding that the called a money panic, and the rate of clsml what might be issues of all private banks should cease at the termination August had been as high as 7 per cent iseounnwhich stare of the charter; and these bankers were now placed in a m oment 6 per cont. at the Bank of England.w at the present very disadvantageous position, as compared with the bank- the Gazette of last week the amount of gold According to era who had not entered into the arrangement, for they Bank was 10,000,000 e, which being added to nowi i in the were without the power of issuing paper, He thought the nary 14,000,000/e mentioned in the act brought up inaagi committee ought to consider whether, if the banking sys- amount on which notes could be issued to 21,00%00 0 u l p the tern of the coun try wa s to remain in its present state, all believed that the public bad in their hands rather less th ie private bankers should not be placed in the position in 20,000,0001., leaving reserved or unemployed notes to the which they were previously to the act of 1844. amount of 4,800,000/. The Chancellor of tho Exchequer Mr. GLYN thought the suggestion of the right hen - . memo had stated that in 1842 the goldin the Bank of England ber for Buckinghamshire, that two committees should be rose to 20,000,000/n which, added to the 14,000,0001. o f appointed to inquire into this important subject, well de- ' the act, made a total of 31,00),0004 At that time the ac, teal circnlation was 21,000,0001., leaving unemployed notes to the amount of 13,000,000/. The rate of discount was 3 per cant. Everything rose in price ; great facilities were given to trade; many new undertakings were launched upon the world ; but the inevitable crisis soon arrived, and traders suddenly found themselves over whelmed with interest at the rate of 6,7, and. 8 per cent. That was the rate of discount at the Bank of England ; the amount actually paid by traders was much higher. When spending his Christmas vacation in the country he met a banker, doing considerable business, and asked him what his rate of discount was. His reply was, " I charge three per cent. more than the Bank of England," indicat ing a state of things fraught with ruin to the traling com munity. (Hear, hoar.) The readers of the " city articles" of the journals must have observed the panting anxiety with which this country waited the arrival of a vessel with 300,0001. in gold, as if the nation actually depended upon it to save it from bankruptcy. What was the meaning of that anxiety, and how was it to be accounted for ? The answer was that it was not gold that the country wanted, but bank notes. He would endeavour to make this clear. Thera was in the coffers of the Bank of England 10,000,0001. in gold, and the notes in circulation were 20,000,0001. Now, the minimum circulation of notes for the 10 years previous to 1341 was 15,000,000/. ; during the 10 years between 1844 and 1851 it had never gone so low for any duration as 18,000,0001. ; and he ventured to say that it would be impossible by any process now to reduce the circulation below that amount. In order to take the 10,000,0001.0 f gold from the Bank, however, the circulation must be reduced, not to 18,000,0001., but to 10,000,0001. The public had in hand ]at the present moment—say. 20,000,0001. of notes ; and if the whole British community were to present those notes at once the Bank of England must necessarily stop payment, because the much vaunted £ysteln which, according to the Chancellor of Exchequer, it was impossible to improve, permitted 20,000,09 e/. of notes to be in circulation when there was only 10,100,0001. of gold to meet them. Sir R. Peel, however, knew that the circulation never would fall so low, and he assumed that it would never be reduced to less than 14,000,0901.; and therefore he allowed that number of notes to be issued upon imaginary security, every note being payable in gold, although there was no gold to meet (Hear.) It was impossible at this time to reduce the notes in circulation to below 18,000,000/. ; but, as the Bank was possessed of 10,000,0001. of gold, the Bank could never be inconvenienced, unless the circulation were reduced to 10,000,000/. ; and therefore it was not gold but bank notes that the country wanted. Then, asthe Bank of England was compelled to buy gold at the rate of 31. 17s. 9d. an ounce, people were anxious for the arrival of ships with gold, in order that they might take it to the Bank, and thus com pel the issue of additional notes. His assertion that it was the deficiency of bank notes which led to commercial dis aster was borne out, by what occurred in 1847, when we were upon the eve of a national bankruptcy. On the 25th October in that year, when the celebrated letter was writ ten, the gold in the Bank was 8,000,0001., and the circula tion was 21,00,000/. It was impossible that there could have been any stoppage of the Bank, therefore, unless the circulation had been reduced to 13,000,0301. Thera was no fear of that; but this difficulty might have arisen—that while there was 8,000,0001. of gold in the Bank! the direc tors might not have a single note to issue. The unem ployed notes were then reduced to 1,500,001., and repre sentations were made to the then Chancellor of the Exche quer (Sir C. Wood) that unless something wore done there would be a national bankruptcy. Something was done ; the Bank was authorised to issue notes beyond the 14,000,0001. to the additional extent of the quantity of gold in the Bank, and by that means the difficulty was sur mounted. A relaxation took place, and the rate of discount rapidly fell. He was surprised that the Chancellor of the Exchequer, with that example before hiss, should say that there should be no relaxation now, but that it would be better to leave these cases always to the extraordinary intervention of Government, preferring, as it seemed to him (Mr. Mathis), the transgression of the law to -leaving the remedying power within the law itself. It was said of those who did not approve the act of 1314 that they were in favour of an inconvertible issue. Now he for one could not be included in that list, for he did not see any occasion for the inconvertibility of the bank-note, for during the year 1817, and during the past year, the gold in the Bank had never been exhausted. The effect of creating two departments, as the act of 1844 had done, had been to lock up the gold, and to make the rate of dis count to depend on the quantity of reeervo notes, and the result had been that the commercial transactions of this country had never been in a satisfactory state when the reserve notes fell below 5,0)0,000/. ; for if they fell below that amount up went the rate of discount, for the increase iu the rate of discount was not occasioned by any scarcity of gold, bat by the diminution of the reserve notes. The effect of those changes in the rate of discount, and the un certainty with regard to them, was highly injurious to commercial transactions, for transactions commenced when the rate of discount was 3 per cent. might not be concluded before it had risen nominally to 7, but in reality to 10 per cent., and so commercial men were deprived of the power of making accurate calculations before embarking in any enterprise. It was of the greatest importance to commer cial men that the rate of discount should be well known, and that there should not be much fluctuation. Before the act of 1811 it appeared from the evidenco of Mr. Pal mer, given before the committee, that the maximum rate of discount seldom exceeded 3, and never was below 4 per cent., whereas in the 10 years ending at Christmas, 1835, there had been no less than 40 variations in the rate of discount, and in the year 1856 alone there had been 9 or 10 variations from a minimum of 3 to a maximum of 7 per cent.—a circumstance highly injurious to commercial transactions. The subject was one of the greatest import ance to a commercial community, and ho trusted that the committee would not enter into tho inquiry with fore gone conclusions, but that they would remember that even Sir R. Peel himself did not consider the act of 1811 a perfect measure, and that they would not, like " Mkrca ter"—the language of whose letters was most clear, but whose ideas appeared to be as confused as they possibly could upon tho subject—stoat by looking upon all those who did not vie T the act of 1'44 as a perfect act as mere idealists. (Hear, hear.) Mr. HEIDLAI considered that if an investigation did take place it ought to be a most careful and complete one, and, judging from the strong and discordant views which had been expressed, it must necessarily occupy a consider able period of time. He wished to press upon the Govern ment the propriety of not mixing up with the investigation any inquiry with regard to joint-stock banks, for if they did speedy legislation upon that subject would be impos sible. As regarded joint-stock banks there were two ques tions to be considered. The ono was as to the application of the principle of limited liability to those baulee, and he confessed that he did not soo why they should be made an exception to the general rule ; and the other related to the legislative machinery for winding them up in case of fai lure. For his own part, he did not see the slightest neces sity for referring either of these questions to a select com mittee, and he believed that Government would best deal with the subject by, on their own responsibility, bringing in a clear and definite measure relating to it, which would put a speedy end to the inconveniences which, as had been shown in the case of the Royal British Bank, at present existed. ((Tear, hear.) Mr. LAING said that when the hon. and learned mem ber for Wallingford advocated an unlimited issue of bank notes. Dir. Malins—" I did not."] The argument of the hon. and learned gentleman was that the pressure in the money market arose from the small circulation of bank notes, and yet he was in favour of their convertibility. Now, he could not understand how both those propositions could hold. If there had been a continually increasing drain upon the bullion, and more bank notes were issued, how could that drain be resisted if the notes were conver tible? This was no theoretical question ; for had they not seen only recently in the neighbouring country no less than 2,000,0001. of bullion disappear from its coffers in a single month ? If that process had gon e on f or a s h or t ti me in this' country it would have brought us completely to the end of our tether, and then what would have come of the incon vertibility of the note? If it w as true that the country was labouring under a deficiency of bank notes, how was it that the aggregate amount of bank notes was now positively greater than at several former periods when money was a drugin the market at 2 per cent? The total amount of the circulation in the hands of the public towards the close of last year was 40,000,0001, and the circulation of the Bank of England alone was 21,03 1 000/. Lot the house look back towards the close of 1846, when speculation was rampant, and the rate of interest was unprecedently low. What, then was the circulation of Bank of England notes ? Why, in Sept. of that year it amountel to 21,465,0001 , or within a mere fraction of what it was now. The hon. and learned gentleman had been led into error by, his interpre tation of the term " money." In one sense money meant capital. It meant that portion of the capital of the country which wasavailable for commercial purposes ; but that was a very different thing from the total capital of the country the great bulk of which was invested in the funds or on mortgage, and the owners of which would never lend it in Lombard-street at 61. per cent., knowing, as they did, that in 12 months that might mean 2/. per cent. Turn it as they would, there was no way of dealing with the subject except - upon the principle of adjusting the supply to the demand. If the demand for money exceeded the supply, money would be scarce in spite of any expedient they might adopt to make it otherwise. When the money market was dear there was no way in which they could restore the equili brium except by diminishing the demand or increasing the supply. How could they do that? Why, manifestly by increasing their rate of interest. That, he believed, was the whole art and mystery of banking—(hear)—namely, to regulate the supply according to the demand. Although he agreed with the Chancellor of the Exchequer in the main in the soundness both of his principles and his con clusion, he thought the right hon. gentleman had hardly shown a velcient case for going into committee in one re pect. The right hon. gentleman described tho act of 1814 as having been passed simply and solely for the purpose of insuring the convertibility of the paper money issued by the Bank. That might be true if they looked merely at the letter of the Act of Parliament, but it was not true if they looked at the circumstances under which the act was introduced. It was introduced on the theory that if they regulated their circulation by a self-acting process the sim ple effect of the regulation of the circulation would be to keep them right on all other points. Of that theory Lord Overstone was the most distinguished advocate, and every one wished it to bo true, but unfortunately it was not true ("Hear, hear!" from Mr. Malins) ; it was contradicted by fact. If they looked to any of the returns of the circulation in periode of ereat pressure ea the money market they would find there was absolutely no connexion between them. The period of 1817 was a remarkable one. It was proved in evi dence before the committee that between Oct. 1846, and Sept. 1817, upwards of 7,000,0001. had been drained away while the amount of notes in the hands of the public remained almost exactly the same. He contended therefore that the theory was contradicted by fact, and the reason was, that it overlooked the operation of the reserve of gold existing in the Bank. The effect of the act of 1614 undoubtedly was, that it provided for the convertibility of the circulation, but it made no other provision for the banking reserve. That, at this moment, depended upon the sound discretion of the Directors of the Bank of England as much as it did before the act of 1814 was passed. In 1847 it had a mischievous effect, in that it induced a false confidence on the part both of the Directors of the Bank of England and of the public, which prevented recourse being had to restrictive measures; but he thought that error had been completely exploded by subsequent experience, for latterlythe Directoraof the Bank had exercised a sound discretion, and had carried the country through a period of great difficulty and trial. That error, he thought, was now so perfectly well known and understood by all men of business that, in looking now at the act of 1844, the house might leave out of view the erroneous theory on which it was founded. He had said that the whole question resolved itself into one of the banking reserve. It was desirable that the bank note should be always convertible, and that, ho thought, was effectually done by the act of 1844. One point to be observed was to secure the solvency of the Back, and insure its power to meet its notes. It was also desirable e s.3h4 soo.eshouse acawhy tthohtet tit the hedpac expression bßeea w esddas ttook i r i noua e fndsh r maintaining d utdei d t d a po s i trna n eulop i scntio countryeg r ahi i ena t asv Itoreservemtheese oopn fov t o weeyme securertehrogafetn sup portingteihyt the i n n tl t y o , o s r up h p a o d rt loc e k v e e d ry u l p ar i g t e s L capi tal in unavailable resources ; but he meant that the Bank of England, possessing privileges which no other bank ha 1, and being the bankers of the Government, it had a peculiar power which made it the last resort and founda tion of that large supersiructure of commercial credit in this country. All _the operations of the private banks were based in a great measure upon the conviction that in times of difficulty or pressure they could obtain assistance from the Bank of England by the deposit of securities. If the Bank permitted its reserve to run too low it created panic, be cause persons in trade perceive the risk, not of an exces sively high rate of interest, which they could bear and which cannot be prevented, but they fear an absolute stoppage, and that a period may arrive when the Bank of England will not be able to make advances upon the best was compelled private or Government securities. That was the state of t i h ts ing suffered reserve sn \ S O ! to avoid a complete stoppage, to curtail the accom nwthoeon low, , B i a t n w k accom modation which it usually afforded to trade. The great problem was how to prevent a recurrence of that state of things. A suggestion had been made that there should be an increase in the issue of notes beyond the fixed limit of 14, 000,000/. , but he could not see how the mere creation of paper would increase the amount of avail able capital to be employed in the business of the country. It would simply displace so much bullion, which would then find its way abroad. Some allusion had been made to the limit of 14,000,001. to which the Bank was restricted, and some hon. members could not see why that amount had been chosen in preference to any other; and the reason was that in practice that amount had been found to be suffi ciently below the minimum point to which the circulation could be contracted to give valid security without risking inconvertibility. It had been said that 14,000,0001. was too little at one time and too much at another, and if there were 20,000,0001. of bullion in the Bank and notes were issued to the full extent, there would then be 34,000,000'. in notes ; but, in fact, that was not so, as the Bank could not keep out more than 20,000,003/., and the practical result would be a smaller reserve. Such a state of things might affect the rate of interest, but, practically, there could be no over issue of notes—a circulation bona fide convertible could not be in excess. The whole question hinged upon being able to keep up the reserve to the highest point possible. In 1817 the difficulty really arose from that cause—that, in a period of pressure when the reserve had fallen inconveniently low, the act of 141 prevented recourse being had to the issue department, and taking from thence a certain portion of the bullion, w hi c h was, as it were, pawned there for specie purposes. The true remedy appeared to him to be to accuanulate, in times of prosperity, a larger reserve, and when pressure came, to adopt measures of contraction earlier and more energetically, so as not to allow the re serve to fall too low. The real difficulty was that the in terests of the public and of the Bank of England were not always identical. (Hear, hear.) It was the interest of the Bank, with a view to the dividend for its shareholders, to work with the minimum reserve compatible with its own security, while the interests of the public was that a large reserve should be accumulated in prosperous times, and not suffered to fall too low in times of pressure. The object to be desired could not be obtained without some understanding between the Bank and the Government, as it would not be reasonable to ask the shareholders of the ' Bank, without compensation, to make the sacrifice which would be entailed by keeping up a larger reserve for the national benefit.. If some plan could be devised to meet that difficulty it would be most valuable. Something had been said about a discretionary power to relax the rule affecting the reserve, but he feared the knowledge of that power would afford a temptati on to allow the reserve to sink too low, and thus diminish the security of the Bank. If anything was to be done in the way of creating an extraurdinaryreserve, it must be by accumulating a bona fide reserve upon securities or bullion, to bo brought out in times of pressure by a temporary arrangement between the Bank and the Government. It was important to go into committee, if only to see whether some arrangement could not be made by which the Bank might consent to the sacri fice of keeping up a larger reserve for the benefit of trade and commerce. There were other questions—such as the management of the Bank—which could be well considered is committee. At present, if there was a good governor or deputy-governor, there was no certainty that he would remain in office above two years. It was desirable that a committee should be appointed, and if it did nothing but adopt some resolution upon that point it would not be valueless. Mr. JAMES MACGREGOR said he did not understand how the Bank should have a large reserve except by having a larger amount of bullion or of securities. He trusted that some means would be adopted to avert the horrible state of things which existed in 1847. It was a domestic panic, and the moment it was known that notes could be had at the Bank of England the panic ceased. He was of opinion that limited liability would be better both for the joint-stock bankiand the public. He hoped the Chancellor of the Exchequer would agree to appoint a separate committee on the joint-stock bank question. Mr. POLLARD URQUHART remarked that there were two separate questions to consider with regard to the act of 1144, namely, was the act sufficient to maintain the convertibility of the notes ; and next, did the act contain provisions embarrassing to commerce. Lord Ashburton, in a pamphlet published in 1343, said no act of Parliament could give perfect convertibility to the bank note. He believed, however, that the act had made the converti bility of the note morally certain. The crisis of 1817 af forded some expos lance as to what the present act enabled the Back to do. The convertibility of the note would have been in some danger of the Bank had not put on the screw as early as April, 1337. In 1339 he believed the Bank would have been in danger of suspending payments if it hat not received assistance from the Bank of France. An other crisis occurred in 1825, which was caused mainly by an internal demand for gold. If a similar crisis had occurred in 1817 he behoved the convertibility of the note would have been in danger. It appeared to him that the act of 1844 had no more to do with the panic of 1817 than Teeter den steeple had t) d ) with the Goodwin Sands. That panic was casual by the drain of gold caused by a bid harvest, and the failure in the potato crop. The act of 1814 could no more be said to have caused the panic of 1847 than a moon light shadow at which a horse might start could be said to make the way impassable. The act of 1841 might in fact be said to put the horse on the back, and to mike it feel that there was nothing to fear. He was aware that many people objected to the act of 1841, because they thought it had created a great number of minor panics in 1817 ; but it was in reality no small merit of that act that it made the public sensitive on the subject of their credit. It instantly informed them when a screw was loose in their transactions or in the state of the ex changes. On the other hand a system of credit which would enable them to tido over periods of crisis without taking any steps to put their affairs on a sounder footing might last for a time, but it must in the long run bring about disaster and ruin.' While he thus approved of the principle of the Bank Act, he did not pledge himself to the support of all its details. If, for instance, the minimum of the circulation had increased since 1844, he thought the limit of 14,000,0001. might also be enlarged. Nor was the observation of the Chancellor of the Exchequer, namely, that such a step would only enable the Bank to keep a smaller amouut of gold in their coffers, any answer to such a proposal; because if, while they secured the perfect con vertibility of the note, they could add a couple of millions to the circulation of the country, they would bo conferring a benefit upon the mercantile community. At the same time he trusted that the Government would never consent to any material alteration in a measure which had been found in practice to answer the purpose for which it was d es i gne d r emarkably well. (Hear.) Mr. NEWDEGATE said it was generally admitted that the operation of the act of 1844 had been to deprive the Bank of England i n a great measure of its power of acting as a bank of su pport. That fact had been strikingly illus trated by the experience of 1847 ; when, but for the interference of the Government, the Bank would have been obliged to cease operations, although it had 8,000,0001. of gold in its coffers. (Hear, hear.) If they gave the Government the great and important privilege of infringing the Bank Act, som e provision ought to be made for calling Parliament together within a reaso na bl e ti me , t o pass an act of indemnity. (Hear.) It would also be highly advi sable to assign some limit to the issue of notes on securities. When, for iustanee, the issue reached a certain point, the rate of interest ought to advance pari passu with the dimi nution of gold. (Hear.) The great vice of the act of 1814, however, was, that instead of making a payment to the Bank for conducting the financial business of the country, they placed the reserve in their hands, and told them to go and. trade with it. (Hear, hear.) By that means they gave the Bank enor mous power i n the market, and enabled it practically to regulate the rate of interest. They took no means to prevent it from making use of its reserves, when they were very large, to depress the rate of interest as to create an undue tendency to speculation. Thera lay the great vice of the present system. (Hear, hear.) The Bank was, in fact, expected to create various rates of interest—first, when the amount of bullion in its possession was large it was expected to stimulate that spe culation, and then when the reaction took place it was re quired to revenge it upon the public. (Hear, hear.) Sir C. WOOD— I sin anxious to set the house right upon one or two points of fact which have not been accu rately stated by hon. gentlemen who have preceded me. It seems to me that while hon. gentlemen opposite protest that they are advocates for the convertibility of the bank note, yet that the doctrine they put forward is inconsistent with the certain maintenance of that convertibility. (Hear.) I am not quite certain as to the precise plan of the hon. gentleman (Hr. Newdegate), but I have little doubt that if the course he advocates had been adopted the security for the convertibility of the note would have been very seriously diminished. Let the house remember how the question of the "little shilling" arose. After the suspen sion of cash payments, when the question arose of restoring the convertibility of the note, the question also arose as to the standard. Any course that renders paper inconvertible may lead to a state of things in which that question must be again urged, of not restoring the standard to the point at which it had before been, and of paying a less amount of gold than had been promised to be paid. That was the doctrine of the "little shilling." The hon. member for the Wick burghs told us what was the purpose of the act of 1811. Now, this is not the first tinie that gentlemen have undertaken to describe the objects of this act, but I do not think it fair to say what the objects of the bill were, except in the words of its authors. The hon. gentleman says that this bill was to be the remedy for all possible evils, and that it was to prevent not only an over issue of paper, but also any excess of speculation. I say that no such doctrine was ever professed by those who advocated the bill of 1844. (Hoar, hear.) 1 happened to take a large part in the discussions on that bill, and I distinctly remember what every one said was, that it was impossible for any bill to deal with rash speculation, and with the mismanagement of banking concerns ; but that there had been superadded to those evils the mismanagement of the circulation, and for that the bill would be d tan a Nue e remedy. The evils of excessive credit and mismanagement of banking concerns have occurred in all countries—in Hol land, where every note was represented by silver or gold in the bank; in Belgium, and even in countries where no paper circulation existed. It is not necessary in order that banking mismanagement should exist that there should be any notes in circulation. The bill of 1841 regu lated the circulation of the country, and its object was to put a proper limit and check to thepossible mismanagement of the circulation. We are apt in discussing measures of this kind to forget the evils that were complained of when they were past. In old times many complaints were made that the management of the Bank was left to the dis cretion of the Bank directors. It was thought essential by almost every one that there should bo some limit or check or rule by which the circulation should be managed. The hon. member for Kend a l h as l a id down a rule which I will not now discuss, bat that some rule should be laid down has n been the opinion of a l mos t a ll persons who hold the • con vertibility of the n o t e . It was necessary to take care, I order to secure the convertibility of the note, that the note circulation should vary exactly as the metallic circulation should vary. The mo de of attaining this objectwas by issuing a certain number of notes on security, and taking care that the rest shall be represented by an amount of gold in the hands of the issuing parties. Hon. members have asked why the sum of 14,000,e00e. WAS fixed upon, I be. hove that the minimum amount of notes that bad over been in the hands of the public had been somewhere about 15,000,0007., and the sum of 14,000,000/. was taken as sn amount below which it was improbable, if not impoesible ' that the notes in the hands of tbo public should sink. The primary object of the bill was to secure that the amount of circulation of silver and gold should vary pre cisely as the circulation of the notes of the Bank should vary. I agree with my right hon, friend the Chancellor of the Exchequer and other hon. members in thinking that not mulch benefit would be derived from raising the sum of 14,C00,0001. Any other sum of about that amount would equally attain the object. The sole advantage would be that an increased amount would set loose so much gold, which might be used in other ways. Whatever advantage and economy there are in issuing notes instead of gold will be attained by fixing the amount a little higher, but I do not think that hon. gentlemen opposite would find that any greater laxity of circulation would be attained. Hen. gen tlemen baring entered upon the question of the rate of in terest, I must beg leave to say that the rate of interest does not depend upon the amount of notes in circulation. That was shown when we went into committee by numerous witnesses, and it was stated repeatedly in the discussions which aft erwards took place. The floating capital of the country is sent up to London to be used as discount. If there is an abundance of such floating capital, the rate of interest is low ; if, on the contrary, it is scarce, the rate of interest rises ? The rate of interest therefore must depend upon the abundance or scarcity of available capital. (Hear, hear.) I am almost ashamed to state what, in my opinion, is such a truism, but I am obliged to do so, because, when ever there is a discussion in this house, the proposition is denied by some hon. gentleman. lam rather astonished at the argument of my hon. friend the member for Kendal (Mr. Glyn) upon thie point, for he altogether excludes from his consideration the reserves of the Bank. Hon. gen tlemen, on the other hand, take a contrary view, and look at nothing but the reserves; but I do not know shat dis tinction can be drawn between the notes in circulation and those reserves. The banking department of the Bank, ' acting like a banker, keeps a reserve of notes in its till, just as a country banker keeps a reserve of gold or silver. That reserve is a portion of the circulation quite as much as the sovereigns of the banker. A good deal has been said about the effects of the act of 1814, which, it has been contended, produced the crisis of 1847. It was, however, shown before the committee that a baseless system of credit had sprung up previous to that crises, by which bills were drawn and discounted and re-discounted, until after a time,- as they could not be met, several failures took place. But what was the case with regard to the notes of the public? At the beginning of October, when the crisis began to be severe, the notes of the public were not diminished by more than 203,0001. from the amount at which they stood in July, when there was no pressure. How, then, can it be said that the act of 1844 produced the crisis of 1817? Again, in the three months preceding Oct., 1847, the amount of accommodation afforded to the public in the shape of discount to ps ivate persons was between 6,00,000/. and 7,000,0001. The act of 1844 could not therefore have produced the crisis of 1847, either by diminishirig the amount of notes held by the public, or by diminishing the power of the Bank of England to assist private trade. The hon. member for Wick (Mr. Laing) said that the word " money" was used in two senses, and half the discussions which took place respecting the currency would be avoided if those two senses could be properly distinguished. Money used as floating capital available for discount is a different thing from money need for circulation. It is true that gold is money in both senses, and it is equally true that the gold sent to the Bank of England in the shape of deposits is a portion of the fund available for discount. When, there fore, gold is exported from this country, when there is a drain of gold, the amount of capital available for discount is diminished. People accordingly look, as an hon. gentle man has observed, at the reserves of the Bank as an index of the amount of floating capital available at a particular time (although they do not contain the whole of that capi tal), because it is the practice of merchants to deposit their gold in the Bank, and the amount withdrawn from the re serves is used for circulation in the country. Tho rate of interest of the Bank is also an index of the rate of interest elsewhere, but the Bank cannot raise or lower it at plea sure. In ordinary times, as the rate of interest required by the Bank is high, people in want of accommodation go where they can obtain it at a lower rate, but at periods when accom modation is limited they have recourse to the Bank. I be lieve that the act of 1844 is the best and the least stringent of rules that can be laid down, but I do not wish to enter into the discussion of that topic now. The variety of opinions which have been expressed is in my mind a suffi cient reason for the appointment of the committee, where the subject would be far better sifted than by a discussion in this house. A select committee, composed of gentlemen of conflicting opinions who examined the witnesses brought before them is a fitter eng i ne f or th e ex t ract i on of the truth in this matter than this house, and therefore my right hon. friend has done wisely in proposing the appoint ment of a committee. With respect to the last part of the motion, relating to joint-stock banks, I think there is great force in the objection to referring that to the same com mittee us tho one which would have to consider the Bank Acts, especially as joint-stock banks are not banks of issue, and Ido not believe that my right hon. friend would be disposed to insist on that part of the motion, if it should be the wish of the house that it should be omitted from the present motion. (Hear, hear.) Mr. MALINS in explanation, said be had not recom mended an extra issue of six millions, but argued that the circulation should not be brought down. Mr. SPOONER was happy to hear that these questions were to be referred to separate committees. The discussion must be in committee, where there could be an interchange of opinion. (Hear.) Reference had been made to 1819 ; and ho contended that the contract then made was an un just one; it had never been carried out, and never would be. The evidence of what had happened since proved it to have bean an unjust contract. Ho remembered Mr. Horner proposing his resolutions in 1810, declaring that there was a largo depreciation in the currency. This wall denied by Mr. Vansittart and the Chancellor of the Ex chequer, who maintained that the one pound bank note and the sovereign were, for all practical purposes, the same. The effect of this on the country was to induce persons of property to deal with it, and to make engagements on the faith of there never being a return to cash payments. But we had done more : we had returned to a far more strin gent system than existed before 1819. Previous to that time there were restrictions on the melting and exporting of coin. Now, gold was made both an article of commerce and au article of currency; and thus its fixed character as a real currency was destroyed, and it was thrown into the markets of the world. He repeated that the contract of 1819 was an unjust one, which never could be acted up to; and the bill of 1841 was an abortive attempt to bolster up the former measure. Immediately after 1819 great distress ensued, which continued till 1822. Lord Castleskagh then brought in three bills, whose object was to increase the currency. The result was a period of prosperity, which was afterwards checked by restriction; and this had been going on ever since— alternate depression and elevation. He believed it was possible to establish a currency which should do justice to every one, and not be subject to the fluctuations whioh had occurred of late years. As to the rate of discount, he contended that it depended on the supply of notes in the market, including those held by the Bank in reserve. Immediately the public saw that the re serve was getting low there was an increased demand for discounts. This was proved by what occurred in 1847. The moment it wasknown that the restriction had been removed from the Bank the demand suddenly ceased. Ho remem bered what passed between the late Sir R. Peel and his father on occasion of the bill of 1819 being introduced, and he (Mr. Spooner) was convinced, despite Sir Robert's elo quence, that his father's arguments were the most cogent. He was convinced that no real relief would be obtained until the bill of 1844 was remodelled. Since then 157 millions of gold had been imported into this country. Where would the currency have boon without it? Under the present arrangement, he defied any man to say what a pound was, or what it would be a month hence. What was wanted was something which would secure equability, which was the foundation of all trade. His wonder was, that the Bank of England managed so well under the pre , sent law. He hoped the right hon. gentleman would not go into the committee with his mind made up, but with a mind open to conviction. If the committee was impartially formed, he had no doubt as to the conclusion they would come to. The report of the committee on the bill of 1811 was only carried by twelve to ten, and, to his knowledge, the two members of that committee who were unavoidably absent on the division would have voted with the minority. The House of Loris' committee was against the act of 1841. The balance of opinion, therefore, could slot be said to be in favour of that act. The right hon. gentleman (Sir C. Wood) assigned this as the reason for ordering the suspension of the act in 1817—" Considering the enormous amount of the deposits of the Scotch banks, the shortness of the notice, and that the gse ater part cf the securities could not be realised, their application for assistance be came a very alarming one." Sir C. WOOD—It was not an application to the Govern ment. Mr. SPOONER—It was an application to the Bank of England, hut no set of bankers had such large sums of money in the public funds, and they were at that p er i o d unsa l ea bl e without such a lossthatinsolvency must have been the result of converting them into money. And what was the state of things now? The reserve in the Bank was 4,000,0001. ; the deposits 9,030,0001. If only half of them came and asked the Bank fortheir money, what became of its solvency? (Hear, hear.) Not that the Bank was insolvent because the Government owed it 11,000,000/. The Bank would say, lot the Government find the gold for me. But where could the Government find it ? The appointment of a committee was, in his opinion, the only way of properly investigating the question. Mr. WILKINSON, in reply to the question where they should be if the gold of Australia and California had not been discovered, said they should be a great deal better without it. It added nothing to the real wealth of the world. (Hear, hear.) On the contrary, it would be in jurious for a long time to the labouring classes, because the price of commodities in reference to gold would rise. There were two points necessary to be clearly known in discussing this subject. One was that nothing was to be gained by a paper currency but the economy and conve nience ; •and the other, that interest was paid for capital, and not for the circulating medium. The hon. member (Mr. Spooner) said that the rate of interest rose when the reserve was low, and fell when the reserve was high. In saying that, the hon. gentleman put the cart before the horse, for the reserve depended on the rato of interest, and not the rate of interest on the reserve. If interest was paid for capital and not for the circulating medium, there was an end of the whole question. The complaint was that the operation of the act of 1811 was to raise the rato of inte rest, but if the rate of interest was not affected by the circulating medium at all, how could the act of 1814 have that effect ? The right hon. gentleman truly observed that the rate o f interest rose in countries whore the act of 1841 did not exist. It was the system of credit which led to panics, and, that being so, he did not believe that pe riodical panics could be prevented. If gentlemen could be only persuaded that the circulating mediuM had nothing to do with the rate of interest , it would put an and to a groat deal of confusion. (Hear, hear.) Mr. MUNTZ said that if a stranger were to come into the house, and listou to the remarks of hon. gentlemen, he would conclude that in the midst of such various croeda this ques tion conic! not be solved. The object of his rising was to know what the committee was for ? What wore they to do or inquire into ? He believed it was one of the greatest palmed on the hou se . shams ever (Hear.) What was the use of a committee to inquire into the act of 1814 when they were told by the mover of the committee that it did not require alteration or consideration ? The only object of the committee could be to shift the responsibility e from the Government and th row i t upon the house. was determined t o go i n t o the whole question, with wistsh ite bona fide intention, it was an insult to the house and country to appoint this committee. Whatever might be y the effect of th e ac t of 1811, no ono could deny that never were such var i a ti ons in the cost and value of money as since 1844. (Hear, hear.) And never wore they so frequent or injurious to the industry of England. That was the great thing to be inquired into. Mr. HILDYA RD said there was a great deal of truth in the obseevations of the hon. member (Mr. Mentz). But as it was agreed that theynvere to have a committee, and as the right ken. gentleman the Chancellor of the Exchequer expressed en opinion in favour of the act of 1844, it was incumbent on him to appoint a fair committee, because the house woad othcrwi.e flie elusions to which it might come. The fact that the act of 1844 was passed for only ten years showed that it was to be adapted to the chang ed circumstances of the country. The act of 1844 might b e well adapted to the circumstances of 1844, and yet very ill adapted to the circumstances of the present time, when the tr.:ports of the country were nearly double the amount of what they were ten years ago. His right hon. friend (Sir C. 'Wood) said that the active circulation had not diminished in 1847. But was the right hon. gentleman ignorant that, though it might appear on paper that the active circulation was what it purported to be, it was practically locked up by the apprehension that existed ? And in proof of that, he begged to mention that in 1847 a wealthy man in London went to his broker'when ho thought the pressure was over, and handed him 10,0001. in cut notes to invest, and when the broker asked him why they were cut in halves, he said, "To tell you the truth, I did not like to trust the whole notes to the Bank." That showed the general distrust which prevailed. Hon. gentlemen said it was now a recognised doctrine that the best mode of checking a drain was to raise the rate o f discount, and talked of the effect of this step since the bill of 1844 ; but they forgot that before 1844 the Bank could not make use of this engine, for the usury laws prevented it. Although he was not prepared to say that it was not a most legitimate mode of action, yet the Bank had con trived to keep things steadier when it had no such power. He hoped the Chancellor of the Exchequer would take care that the committee was fairly constituted, and comprised intelligent men of all interests ; if that was done, whatever might be the result, it would give sa ti s f ac ti on ou t of doors, but if not, whatever might be the report, it would not be satisfactory. Mr. IN - GRIM expressed a hope that if a committee were appointed the present management of the public debt by the Bank of England would be taken into considera tion. The allowance in that account for the last year was 247,000/., being on an average a charge of nearly H. to each person holding stock in the public funds, as, accord ing to the returns for the year 1850, being the last in his possession, it appeared that the number was only 269,736, the debt itself being under 800,000,000'. It was true that in those returns the Bank of England did not appear to receive so much for their management of the public debt; inasmuch as they refunded 180,0001. for the privilege of issuing bank notes. lie however, had no doubt that there were plenty of banks in England who would be glad to pay even four times that amount for the enjoyment of a simi lar privilege. The trouble and expense attendant upon the system pursued in that establishment were enormous, and it even led to considerable frauds. A person holding stock must attend personally at the Bank of England, or in cur a large expense in giving a power or attorney to his banker or agent to receive the dividend. Now, let them but compare that system to the ono adopted in respect to similar monetary transactions. He would take, for ex ample, the payment of the dividends on railway stock. He received from Mr. Watkin, the manager of the Manchester, Sheffield, and Lincolnshire Railway Company, a statement of the cost of the payment of their dividends for the last year, It amounted to 1251. 13s. 2d. The capital was about 9,000,0001., the number of shareholders 4,900. The expense thereforelof the payment of the dividend averaged only Gd. per shareholder ; and the mode of payment was much more satisfactory to the shareholders. ' That expense, however, did not include any of the charges attendant upon trans fer, which he calculated would be, on an average, ls. ad ditional ; therefore the whole charge to each person might be put down at ls. Gd. Ho had also another return from the Midland Railway which gave precisely similar results. If any new arrangement were made with the Bank of Eng land, he hoped that these facts, would be taken into consi deration, and a different system adopted for the payment of dividends. He might observe, in conclusion, that he ob jected to the granting of a now charter to the Bank of Eogland. It was quite time, he thought, that the State should take into its own management the issuing of its notes, and the payment of its own debts. (Hear, hear.) Mr. A. HASTIE sail that the Chancellor of the Exche quer had referred to the operation of the Scotch and Irish act of 1845, and stated that he had written five or six let ters to Scotland, and, as he received ,no answer, he con cluded the banks there approved of the act. The CHANCELLOR of the EXCHEQUER had stated that he had received replies to the effect that the operation of the act was considered favourable. Mr. HASTIE in that case could easily understand what parties were applied ,to. The right hon. gentleman must have commuicated with the five chartered banks only, for he (Mr. Hestia) was well aware that the other banks were not at all satisfied with the act, and iti 1853 they had pre sented a memorial against it. The act had conferred several privileges on the chartered banks, which ho thought ought to bo extended to the others, for they were equally, respec table and equally well managed. The people of Scotland were not at all satisfied with the act—it had prevented the establishment of any new banks, although from the great increase of trade there was ample room for them. Re hoped that in the committee the Scotch and Irish banks would be fairly represented. Mr. CROSSLE Y was glad to find that the Chancellor of the Exchequer had consented to the appointment of two committees instead of one : that on joint-stock banks would require the legal members ; but for the Bank Charter they would want commercial men. There wero two reasons why the charter ought to be investigated—first, the enormous increase of trade since 1841; and next, that from this in crease the prices of all raw materals had risen immensely, so that the same amount of business now required a much larger capital. Some gentlemen seemed to think that an alteration in the charter would be a panacea for all the ' evils cempleiued of, but as long as the Bank was bound to pay sovereigns ou demand, it would be obliged to raise the rate of discount whenever the gold was going out of the country. There was one remark of the hon. member for Kendal which he thought worthy of consideration—viz., whether it would not be desirable to take away the power of issue from all banks. The Chancellor of the Exchequer said that the Bank of England paid for the privilege . but on an issue of 14,300,0001., there wa s a p ro fit o f 840,000/. per annum, which he considered ought to go to the reduc tion of the taxation of the country. (Hoar, hear.) Mr. CAYLEY expressed his satisfaction at the candour which had characterised the discussion ; for, formerly, only one side was allowed to be heard. There were two parties to this question ; the public were principally concerned, and it was for them they plight to legislate. Money was made for commerce, and not commerce for money. The Chancellor of the Exchequer said that the committee of 1848 had reported in favour of the act of 1814; but of the seventeen witnesses examined before the committee, only four, including Lord Overstone and the governor and de puty-governor of the Bank, were in favour of the act as it stood. It was important to ascertain the reason why the commercial world was so much embarrassed by these con stant changes in the value of money. The great desidera tum in a medium of exchange was to have it of an uniform value, but that was impossible under the present system, When a large amount of bullion accumulated in the Bank, it was compelled to go into the discount market and coat pate with the brokers, in order to find employment for its capital. The result was that in one instance since 1841, money had fallen to 1 per cent. The necessary consequence of this low value of money was that parties were driven to speculate, in order to get some interest. This led t o th e additional labour and increase of consumption. The im ports then increased, but as the exports were statienar the balance of trade turned against us, and it b ecame neces saryY to send gold out of the country, and the rate of dis count gradually increased. At five or six different periods prosperity bal driven the gold out of the country, and dis aster had brought it back. When the baales ceased to acco mmodate their customers they became, in fact, the chief holders of notes, and thus in times of difficulty the I banks, instead of aiding, increased the pressure felt by corn ' mercial men. He thought at all events that sufficient hal been said to show that some inquiry ought to take p lace, a nd that some remedy wa s nee d ed. As to the nature of that remedy, he would not venture at that time to ex press an opinion. The CHANCELLOR of the EXCHEQUER said that he t w e o e u d in c a o d n e fi t n o e t 1 : e h ims e lf proposal t o to havemeeting a t h e committee. objections the Bank a n a k n and liabletlia t ittohal loco e been Thwheiehhouse would bear in mind th at the act of 1844 expired in August, its extended privileges en upon terms i w i o h t i i e c h e g r e i v n e d n e r b e y d motion in the House of Commons. During last session a motion was made before Easter for a committee to inquire into the subject of the Lank Act. He had opposed that motion, feeling that a time when the nation was at war was not the time when an inquiry upon such a subject could be most satisfactorily considered. At the latter end of the session, I after the conclusion of the treaty of peace, he was asked / whether h e s h ou ld o b ject to the appointment of a committee. I He then replied that he had no objection to such a course, but he suggested that at so late a period but little practical good would come of th e a pp o i n t men t, o committee was appointed, but on the last day of the session au hon. member gave notice of his intention to move for a committee early in the present session, Under these circumstances he had thought:that it was a proper course to move for a committee, instead of bringing in a bill, which would no doubt have been referred to a select committee. Ile would remind the house that since 1810 there had been once in every ten years a committee appointed to inquire into this subject. Iu 1810 the well-known bullion committee sat with Mr. Horner for chairman; in 1819 the committee sat, of which Sir R. Peel was chairman ; in 1830 and 1840 other committees sat, and in 1848 the committee on Irish distress entered somewhat upon the consideration of this question. Ho was, however, willing to accede to the suggestion which had been made for limiting the duties of the select committee to an inquiry into the operation of the Bank Acts of 1844 and 1845. He there fore moved for a " select committee to inquire into the ope ration of the Bank Act of 1844 (7 and 8 Vic., c. 32), a n d o f . the Bank Acts for Ireland and Scotland of 1845 (8 and 9 Vic., c. 37 and 38)." PASSING edIe T a TO LLS b A r n B g O L i n I T a l O b iNI for the The motion was agreed to. l Mr. LOWE obtain aboli tion of passing tolls. GENERAL COMMITTEE OP ELECTIONS. The general committee on elections was • 8. as re -appointed. Tho house adjourned at twelve o'clock. • [ADVERTISEMENT. 1-- Sioux AND HEARING -- SPECTACLRF, POWERFUL TELESCOPES, OPERA, RACE, AN Passe - sem - a GLASIIOS. S. and B. Solomens, opticians, 39, Attic ' marle-street, Piccadilly. Obsce ve—opposite the York Hotel (W.) By lser Majesty's Royal Letters Patent for valuable and extraordinary improvements iu the most powerful and brilliant Telescopes, Camp, Racecourse, Opera, and Per spective Classes, to know the distances. These telescopes possess such extraordinary powers that some three and a-half inches, with an extra eye-piece Trill show distinctly Jupiter's moons, Saturn's ri ng, and the double stars. With the same telescope ca n b e soon a person's countenance three miles and a half distant , an d an object from 16 to 20 miles. They are of e larger and all s i zes, with increasing powers accordingl fi y- q Royal Exhibition, 1851. Valuable, newly-invented,very", powerful waistcoat-po c k e t glass, the size of a walnut, a person ca n h e Been a n d knoWnli miles dis t ta e nt ; they answer every purpose ou th e race-course, and at the opera houses, country scenery, an d s hi ps aro clear l y seen l at 8 to 10 miles. ing, yachting, to sm and with wonderful They are inv a l ua bl e for shooting, deer-st , _ak tourists. open, sportsmen, gentle men, game k eepers , la : ace - course, e•smp, and perspective g power, N ewly - constrzzte d Spectacle Lenses of the groat ses, est transparent power. The siou valuable becoming impaired is advantage derived from this invention is, that vision preserved and strengthened, and very aged persons are r sight at the most minute oce t . enabled to employ their o lenses of a much less magnify. ins power—and they do ps.tion—can see with tho u s not require the frequent ch anges to the dangerous effects of further powerful assistan ce. Persons can be suited ea at the most remote part of the w or ld , by sending oneof the glasses out of their specta c l es i n a letter, and statingthe distance from the eyes they can read print with it; and those who have small newspaper of spectacles by stating their age. Deaf not made use. gery. The Organic Vib:ater, an ex ""*— New Discovery. small, newly-invented instrament fcr ' .y . powerful, , traordinar . lothers, to l different from ail deafness, ent k ir i o a( y fiat hasbeen, or probably ever ears be, thing of the :_ ein i g 1 of the same colour as tee skin, is not per produced. 1-3 it enables deaf persons to hear distinctly at church per ceptible ; . , n nblies • the unpleasant sensation of singing noises at public esser 1. . ~ g .the cars is entirely removed; am it affords all the n°iBe- in that possibly could be desire.l.-39, Aniemarle ,ssistance " i'ieeadilly. Obiorvo- - opposite the York Hotel, (W.) street, Country Markets. LIVERPOOL-EEB. 6. Our corn exchange this morning had only a slender at tendance of buyers, and the general business was of limited extent. In the few transactions passing the prices of Tuesday were obtained for good fresh wheat, oats, and oatmeal. Secondary wheat ne g l ec ted, and nominally 1( 1 to 2d per bushel lower. Flour moved very slowly at the prices of Tuesday. Indian corn was in less demand, and late rates barely supported. WAKEFIELD-FIB. 6. Fine wheat sold at is to 2s per qr. lower, and other Norte were difficult to quit at a decline of 2s. Fine barley was steady, but other kinds dull. Oats and shelling rather cheaper. Beans fully as dear. EXETER-F 1 L 6. CORN.—Wheat, 7s to 7s 9d ; barley, 5s Od to bs Od; grinding do., Or Od. to Os Od. Oats, 3s Od to 3s 2d. Beans, Os Oto 0 Od. Peas, OOs Od to OOs Od. FLOUR.—Fine, 42s Od to 41s Od ; seconds, 40s Od to 42s Od per sack. CATTLR. —There was a small supply of bullocks. Best beef, from 103 Gd to lls per score ; inferior, 9s 6d to 108 per score ; fat calves, —d to Od per lb ; barrenners, Os Od to Os Od. per score ; cows and calves, 121. to 161. t s ; butchers' calves, Od to 7d per lb., rearing calves —s to • s each. sheep, ewes and lambs, 0/. Os to 01. Os per couple; ewes, 63d to 7d ; wethers, 7d 74d ; lambs, —to Od per b. Pigs, large size, —s to —s; second size, —s to —s; slips, —0 to —s ; suckers, —s to —s. Rough fat, 5d per lb. Pork carcases from 9s 9d to lOs 9d per score. BRISTOL SUGAR-FEB. 6. This week's transactions on the spot are limited to 500 mats crystallised Mauritius, for which about 55s has been paid ; and to arrive 15,000 mats Mauritius have been sold, floating, at again rather stiffer prices. Some further trans actions in Manillas are also spoken of, but the particulars have not transpired. Refiners' produce is in very short supply, and large sales, both in stove dried and wet goods, for deliver) a month to six weeks hence, have been made at a further advance of is per cwt. In rum there is no• thing doing. 00AL MARE Moss of Coil per ton at %-FEB. 6. the close of the market. Ws.llserid, &o. O. a. Bell's Primrose • l4 0 Bobside's Hartley 15 0 Davison's West Hartley 15 3 1 North Percy Hartley ~ 14 6 Victoria 14 3 Stanley Main 15 6 a " • Hetton ls 6 Russell's Hetton 17 6 Hartlepool Hetton 18 0 South Hotton 18 3 Tees lB 6 Eden Main l7 9 Haswell 18 6 Wallsend, &c. Riddell l7 0 Eihips at market... 5' ISold ........... 40 COURSE OF FICA , Amsterdam 11 14% Ditto, three months .. 11 17% Rotterdam •• •• •• •• •• •• 11 17% Antwerp •• •• •• •• •• •• •• 25 30 Brussels • • •• •• •• •• •• •• 25 30 Ramburgh •• •• •• •• •••• 13 6% Altona •• •• •• •• •• •• •• •• Paris. ••• •• •••••••• •• .• 25 2214 Ditto, three months .. 25 62% Marseilles 25 62% gourdeaux •• • •• •• •• •• Frankfort-on-Maine •... 119% Berlin •• •• •• •• •• •• ••• •• Vienna •• •• •• •• •• •• •r• •• 10 83 rrieste•• •• •• •• •• •fn 10 35 Petersburg •• •• •• •• •• • • 37% liladrid ••• .• •• •• 494 i Cadiz • ...• •• •• 49% qarcelona •• • • •• .• •• • fANGE.--YESTZEDAL Gibraltar .. .• •• •• •• •• Leghorn .• .• •• •• 29 45 Genoa .......... 25 70 I Milan •• •• •• •• •• •• •• •• Naples •• •• •••• •••••• 43 1 Palermo •••• .... 129 Messina •• • ... 130 Lisbon ... ••• 51% Oporto ........... ..... Rio Janeiro..... .. Buenos Ayres •••• New York,6o dayesight •—• Philadelphia ...... OP BULLION, PBX OS. Foreign Gold in Bars £3 17 9 Portugal Gold Coin .. 0 0 0 Mexican Dollars .... 0 5 0% New Dollars 0 0 0 Silver in bars •••• # 0 SEABORNE MAILS. [When the date for making up a mail falls on a Sunda/ the mail remains open until the day following ; except in the case of the India mail, via Southampton, which, on seal occasions, is m Lisbon Spain Gibraltar Gibraltar Malta Egypt ...... Ceylon .... India Mauritius (via Ceylon) China Penang .. •• Singapore .. Auitialta(via the Cape).. i . . Cape of Good Hope ~ • • ➢lauritius E Ceylon . • India Lisbon...... Madeira .... Caped eVercls Brazil BuenosAyres Falkland Is lands Wes.; Indies' (except Ha vana and _l(oliduras). Venezuela .. Grey Town.. New Granada Chili ...... Peru • • .... California ... Ironduraa .. Nassau ... ~ Mexico .. Havana .... Madeira .. .. Tenerife .. 1 W.C.ofAirica British North America .. I United States United States British North America .. United States British North 131 America .. Canada .... 1 E Ith,l7th, & 27th of tke month. South ampton South ampton South ampton South ampton Dart mouth South ampton South ampton South ampton South ampton When expected By t Vessel. Alham bra IJan. 24 A.lhaul' bra- Jolonge Ply mouth I colombd VornMg Mb IEIIO O e up the previous evening.] Made up at the Post Office. W hence des- By what Vessel. patched 4th & 20th of the month. 4th of the month. Feb. 5.... (Feb. 9.... 2d and 17th of the month. Feb. 17 .. [?eb. 2... IFeb. 23 .. ETery Fri. I Feb. 3 and alternate Tuesdays. Feb. 25 .. i Feb. 24 .. } Liver pool Liver pool South ampton Liver pool Ripon Ripon Harbin ger 1 Medway 1 Parana Parana 4th and 20th of the month. Feb. 4.. fan. 31 Jan. 25 Feb. 12 i at and Nth of the month. 16th of the month. Ivso AtatO I. ...... Feb. 1 Europa Ericsson Herman, Indian M—Morning. E—Evening. Avg° Feb 6 Feb. 2 Feb. 191 Igthioo Iltaciee Feb. 191 Feb. 4 A.a2r rican. WAR TROPHIES.—Tha distribution of the war trelb iig is under consideration, and Lord Panmure has prou1 $ that the inhabitants of Edinburgh will be gratified bf gun from Hango, if they prefer it, but certainly by sae: suitable acknowledgment in this form of the heroic par played by the Scotch regiments in the late struggle. [A DVERTISEUENT.] —Holloway's Pills an, exttaoroi; nary rem e dy f or Li vor an d S tomach Compl aints. —:-Mar Drcwell, of Milsom-street, Bath, was afflicted for see , years with a disorder of th., liver and stomach, indiger tion, loss of app e tit e , an d ex t rame d e bil ity ; conse q u ent /) quite unable to f o ll ow hi s occupa ti on . H e h a d cons ulted the most eminent medical men in town and cOuel% without any b ene fi c i a l resu l t. A t l ast h e h a d recours e to this valu a bl e reme d y, w hi c h , i n a short time, effecte d; wonderful ch ange f or th e b etter, an d i n three months 1)1 health was re- es t a bli s h e d . —S o ld b y all medicine vendor , throughout the world ; at Professor Holloway's Est' blishments, 244, Strand, Lond on , an d 80, M ai d en -10" New York; by A. Stampa, Constantinople; A. Guidi o l o Smyrna, ; and E. Muir, Malta. ; [Aevswrisamsxx.]—Du Barry's d e li c i ous Revalenta Ara bia I Food invariably restores health, without medicine, lucosvf : nience, or expense, as it saves fifty time s it s cost 7 other remedies, and removes indigestion (dyspels i " flatulency, constipation, nervous, bilious, and liver cots. plaints, cough, asthma, consumption, and debility' We extract a few out of 50,000 testimonials of c,u re „ h l years' dyspepsia, which had resisted all medicines. Cure No. 4,208. — J e1 ,„e - 0 , nervousness, debility, with cramps, s_ Bad delicious and nausea, have been effectually removed by Da kis i "o, delicious food in a very short time.—Rev. John W. F1 0 . e .0 Ireland Ridlington Rectory, Norfolk. From the Dowager Cous"_% I f Castlestuart.—Cure 52,612. —Rosstrevor, County of Dovl ; 9th December, 1854.—The Dowager Counted Cas tlestuart feels induced, in the interest of suff er ing iluT nity, to st a t e th at Du Barry's emcellent RevalentaArabica Fo od ' has oured her, after all medicines had failed, of i n digestie2 . bile, gre a t nervousnessand ir.itability of many years' standing" This food deserves the confidence of all sufferers, and may considered a blessing. Inquiries will be cheerfully answered Supported by te s ti mon i a l s f rom the cele b rated Professors , Chemistry Dr. Andrew Ure ; Dr. Shorland ; Dr. Hari' Dr. Campbell ; Dr. Gattiker ; Dr. Wurzer ; Dr. IngraT: Lord Stuart de Decies; the Dowager Countess of CisiT 4 . stuart; Major-Gen. Thomas King, and many other revolt er persons, whose health has b een res t ore d b y it , a f tera ll o means of cure had failed. For further particulars re_ ing this invaluable food our readers are referred toDu Fair" advertisement in another part of this paper. BIRTHS. OP ♦ 8011. On the sth inst., at sg, Westbourne-grove, Eayssrate r ' the wife of Wm. Champain Hall, Esq., solicitor. On the sth inst., at Morditord Rectory, near Herefolat the wife of the Rev. John Garland. 0? A DAUGHTER. On the sth inat., at 17, Percy -place, Clapham-road, the wife ct Mr. T. H. Mandalay, jun. On don-terr theace, 6th inst., Mrs. H enry L. Hammack, of Clar ee• Bow. MARRIED. • olais On the sth that., at Christchurch, Surrey, R. Bo in k ier Esq., of 43, Stamford•street to Catharine, only clang,. of the late John Doubleday, of Long Clawson, Leios7: shire, and niece of Edward Doubleday Esq., of Lont o f, On the sth inst., at St. James's ChUrch, Bermon7. o , o o Captain John Mackintosh, to Louisa, widow of John Axton, Es q ., of Bermondsey, and Bexley, Kent. • DIED. On the sth inst., at 39, Sackville-street, Pic& fir. John Burn, o f the Srm of Harrison and Burn, aged 7:00; On the sth inst., at Trafalgar-place, Peckham, Mr' Pearce, late of Billeter-square, city, aged 68. On the sth inst , Mary, the wife of Kenneth aorb otif Esq., of Ampthill;quare, aged 42. O. On the 4th inst.,at the Lodge, Witham, Foot Rev. F. G. Luard, 8.A., aged 27. On the 4th inst., John Wilks, Esq., of Spital-squ arer aged 71. IA W l ' On the 4th inst., from disease of the brain, broug l y his arduous services in the Crimea, where he uring the whole campaign, Lieut.-Colonel Geo. Sie late of the 20th Regt., aged 37. .fl us hiter Killed, on th e 9 t h Dec. last, in action, il ear ~ Lieut.-Colon e l G eo . G renv ill e M a l e t, commanding 3d .t.yt, t ,„ Cavalry, fou r th son o f th e l a t e lair Chas. W. Malet, B s"' 010 LONDON : Printed and Published by MURDO YOUN G of No. 112, St ra nd, Print er , a t Th e S un Of fi ce r • r " • 112, Strand, in the Precinct of the Savoy, in the ono of Middlesex, Saturday, February 7, 1657.