The Sun. — London, England, 1840-11-30 00:00:00

EVENING- .ED►I rioN. FRANCE. CHAMBER OF DEPUTIES. (Continuation of the sitting of Nov. 26.) M. Guizot then rose and spoke as follows:—Gentlemen, the• Honourable M. Passy has just stated to the Chamber with as much I sincerity as clearness, the progress of the negotiations carried on by the Cabinet of which he was a member. He has trade known to the Chamber the instructions given to me when I was entrusted with the embassy to London, instructions which were his last act in the important affair of the East. The Chamber observes, either from these instructions or from the statements of M. Passy, that the situation of the Cabinet was perfectly free; that there was no forced line of policy, no irrevocable engagement on the part of the Cabinet ; that the only point on which the Cabinet had positively declared itself *at that relating to Constantinople, and the necessity of abo • lishing any exclusive protectorate. It was under the auspices of these instructions that mymissioneommeneed.They were mmetia ey confirmed by the Cabinet which succeeded that of the 12th of May. No change of hny importance was made in the policy which it was my m•ssion to uphold. I accepted, unhesitatingly, the task of seconding tide policy under the Cabinet of the Ist of Marc'), as I did under that of the 12th of May. In the relations that I had on the first formation of the Cabinet of the Ist of March with its President and some of its members, the sole reservations that I thought it my duty to make, as regarded my entire co•operation, were on points of internal policy. I was told v erbally. —I was written to, that the Cabinet of the Ist of March was formed upon this basis—" No electoral reform—no dissolution."—( Movement.) I approved of this internal policy, and ranged myself under this etensterd, as the only one that I could approve of. As regarded foreign policy, I repeat it, the instructions given to me by the pre ceding Cabinet wore confirmed. I was far from having any ohjez lion to that policy ; I thought it good and just in its principle : greet for Europe, good for the Ottoman empire, and good fur Egypt itself. As you have observed, the fundamental idea of this Po iicy was the maintenance of peace in the East and in Eu rope, by means of the abolition of all exclusive protectorate at Constantinople, aid of a pacific negotiation between the and the I'acha This policy was evidently good for . . the whole of Europe, and saved it from the risk of all strife u; on a special q':estion. I had the honour of saying from another trit.une, that the grand interest of Eurupe at the present day was to avoid ail struggles upon particular questions, and with this view the wisdom of Europe had been displayed fer the last ten years. A great number of special questions had arisen —in Spain, in Adgitnn, and in Italy, which might have brought on the most aerioas confl Vs. Europe, like France, understood that in our day titbit-0 was e general qoestion— the question of peace and eiriiiza lation of Europe, which preponderated over all particular questions. The policy of which I had -the honour to be the organ, applied the same principle to the Eastern question. It was gond ass for the Ot toman empire; it preserved that empire from all internal column tinn, from all civil war, frOm all fore'ign intervention—and main tained the unity of tke•Massitlinans: Under this triple point of Flew it was of great inapnrtance. for the Ottoman crinplie that no tonditt should take place, that the question should not give rlse to elny employment of material force, and that it should be en tirely brought to a conclusion by influence and negotiation. gyi.t herself had as great an interest U _th!s pclicy as the o:retnan empire. Tt w•as not so much the extent of his pos. 0119 that a:Pcted the Pacha ; it was the certainty o thcir duration. 'lO gain the sanction -a-Europe for the do. ration of his ttt!c was the Ibtxlanicrttal intereq vf the Egypt.at, rstabtishrnent—ar•. interest a"hich I deplore bas not bccn sufficiently understood by Egypt bersel4—(Sensation.) Gentlemen, you will t;nu► ,erceivt; that 1 had tio.objection to make to theforeignpolicy of the Cabinet of the Ist of March. I found that poncy goon, just, and u,eful for ttic hoe word, and the Minister, M.Thitrs, was right in siying, 3 esterday Mat I had adhered toit,and that 1 hat' promised to supirrt it cord!ally. I did so, and I fulfilled my pro. mi-e. I will E.ow state to you the idea which I forin.2,l to myscl Or the duties I had end •rtakcn in this situation. I thought that the first was to use all my efforts to carry out my instructions, to tost.. the success of the policy of the Cabinet, in putting aside the t , artt4l or 'accidental' discardances which might ari*e in the course v,4' negotiations, and in pursuing sincerely and cordially the ()Neel that we had in view, The scentsit duty wa4 to inform the Cab.nci exactly of all the cane of the success or failure of its. policy ; to Mace clear:y before it at every moment the true siate of r.ft Ts, in order that it should be able to make its de ciions in conformity with the vatious turns of the ; that it tniglit modify its resolutions, and exercise a discretion ae. cording to the necessities imposed by the course of events. The litinetirable M. Thiers y. sterday cited the desp Itches and the letters in which I inferined him of my hoses for the success of ths policy with which I was charged. He was right; I had hop se Several times in the course of that negotiation I had E;fe. seenshe-possibility of attaining our object—that is to say, a peace ful negotiation between the Sultan and the Pacha of Egypt, which shoule accomplish, in a great measure, the project of arrangement proposet in September by the Cabinet of the 1 eth of May, and which was adopted by the Cabinet of the Ist of 31 irch. Seice the hopes that I had formed have been brought under the notice of the Chamber, I am compelled to place my doubts in like manner before it. On the I tith of March I wrote the following letter to the Pre tests nt of the Council. (H. Guizot here read this tette:. It expresses in it his hope that the Powers would make c is. esseions, but at the same time expresses Lie fear lest Eng. !Isis interests should become the ground of serious ne tt:tete or long delay. He also read a letter of the 17411 of March, in which he directs the attention of his Govern ment to the observations contained in his letter of the 16th, and adds, that France shout t endeavour to come to an un ties...deeding with Englanil on the Syrian question by means ef a compromise, as, if this was not done, France would expose herself to the chance of being isolated on the E (stern question, and seeing An arrangement concluded between the Four Powers without her.) It was on the 17th of March that I thus pointed out as a very pre. bable chairce, and as a contingency for which it was right the Ca lettet should be prepared, and on which it should not deceive itself —the tour-fold arrangement, if we did not succeed in an ameement nit the Syrian question. I did not the less persevere in my efforts Mr the success of the scheme of arrangement which the Cabinet 01 the Ist of March had adopted, and which consisted, as the Chamber knows, in securing to the Paella the hereditary possession of Egyet and Syria, and only asking of him the restitution of the island of Candia, cf Astoria, and the Holy Cities. As I saie a few minutes ego, Iliad at onetime the hope that the plan would succeed. I made a statement to that effect to the President of the Council. In the beginning of April, in ene of those moments—in the mo. meat perhaps when I had most hope—and in the letter dated Zel April, which expressed the most, and thus concluded : " I went out, leaving Lord Palmerston very much impressed, I think, wits. the subject of cur discourse. Ile said nothing to IT, which anthorises me to imagine that his intentions are really changed, or on the point of changing ; but if I do not deceive my. self, it is the first time that the possibility of an arrangement, which should give to 31ehenaet Ali the hereditary possession of Syria as well as Egypt, and the restitution of Candia, Adana, and the Holy Cities, to the P. rte, presented itself to his mind without revolting his amour propre, and without his peremptorily repelling it. 1 beg your Excellency not to give to my words any greater scope than they have in my mind. I make you fully aware of all the oscillations, good or evil, of a difficult and complex situation, in which time danger is always imminent, and in which, up to the present period, we have rather succeeded in shaking our adversaties on their own grounds, than in drawing them to ours."--( Move. ment.) The Chamber will perceive from this that the expression of the doubt 4s linked very closely with the expression of the hope, for the reason that I considered it my duty to make the whole truth known.—(Very well.) I could lay before the Chamber two or three other despatches of the same nature, hut this will suffice, as there is no other in contradiction to it. In the course of this negotiation, and amidst the oscillations of hope and fear through which I was obliged to pass, several train sactions were proposed- I must say for the sake of truth, and that it should be known by my country, that it is my firm con viction that England, as well as the other Powers, but England, above all, was Sincerely desirous of an amicable arrangement with France. lam convinced that not only. the English people, but the English Goreennaent and Lord Palmerston himself, have the French alliance at heart,—(Hear.) A voice from the Left—lsievertheless, facts have spoken clearly. el. Guizot continued—l stand in this tribune to speak what Believe to be the truth, and never was it of more importance to my country to know it. What, gentlemen !—the Government of the King firmly adhered to its first proposition, of arrangement ; it would not depart from them, and yet it would not have it said that it had not the English alliance at heart. The Hon. 111 Thiers knows better than anybody else what importance is attached to it, and it was right. Nevertheless, it held firm as regards the East, to its ideas, and to its first propositions. This is what England herself did. Why should you conclude from this that England ha. not the French alliance at heart? England might retort upon you the reproach.—(Exclamations from the Left.) From what I have here said, Gentlemen, I only intend to draw this con. elusion, that on both sides the desire of an approximation was sin- Pere ; that c u both sides, if there has not been an approximation, it *as because to the point of difference there was attached on both eillea an titteetne, and in my °Onion exaggerated, importance :(Exelathations from the Left, while from the other side many vele:es exclaimed, " But it is evident.") 31. Guizot continued : the first serious effert at an arrangement was the offer to add to the hereditary possession of Egypt the Pachalic of St. Jean d' Acre and its fortress for the life of Mehemet Ali. Every one had at. (ached an extreme importance to the fortress of St. Jean d'Acre; everybody had said from the commencement of this affair that St. Jean d'Acre was the key ofS, ria, and that he who possessed it could at any (hue easily retake Syria. I heard this said in every discussion which took place on this great question ; and when the Cabinet of the loth of May had separated the propositem of the hereditary concession from the life-poe. session of the Pachalic of St. Joan d'Acre, it was because the fortress of St. Jean d'Acre was not comprised in it, and that without the fortress the Pachalic appeared insignificant. I must now make the Chamber acquainted with the disposition in which I found Lord Palmerston when he made this proposal of a transaction. I stated it in these terms to the Cabinet on the Sth of May: —" It evidently cost Much to Lord Palmerston to give up the fortress of St. Jean d'Acre. Ile made-up for it to himself by tell ing me what I knew, that for this arrangement, and if the Pacha refused to accede to it, Austria consented to have recourse to co ercive measures, by joining her flag to those of England and Rus sia. He then developed his plan of coercion, which consists in a triple blockade of Alexandria, of the coasts of Syria, and of the Red sea I saw Lord Palmerston not only annoyed at the idea of Abandoning $C Jean d'Acre, but at the same time rendered con li. dent by the adhesion of Austria to the employment of coercive tnea. sures." I only cite this passage to the Chamber to show the importance which the English Cabinet, either right or 'Smug, placed upon the concession which it then made, and the sincerit y of t h e h ope o f arrangem ent w hi c h animated i These details were known to the Cabinet. The pro isositnin see, set aside a month afterwards. The Cabinet ales illit think it its duty to accept it. On the part of Lord Pahn erston there was tio other direct and formal proposition. But Overtures were made to me in conversation by the Ministers of Prussia and Austria. Their reelect was to add a life possession of Syria to the hereditary possession of Egypt. The Honoureb:e it. Thiess stated yesterday that there was even a time when these Ministers, and especially one of them, had looked on the hereditary possession of Syria as a possible thing. It is true that this appeared onc e or twice in conversation, and I made it known in : n m es Y m m o. ms nts of hope ; but I owe it to tr uth to say that thi s M e in my eyes assumed any consistency in the minds of these pleniP oten tiaries. I confess that when I was enabled t o perceive ata lance, in a very doubtf ul wa y , that our p ro j e cts of arran gemen t accept might be adopte d, it was always on one condition —on the condition that we should p led g e ourselves directly towards the four other Powers to employ force agaiinvistatisitenPvearclattiatiitilakieo hurt eep acc ept that them: if he refused to do so. I insisted on the ado • we Meld this arrang e ment c on dition, and every time that "If the Pach a of our rangement, and that it was ask ed of u 's, T'' do yeti i ns t an tly pledge yourselves ?— if force against will you engage with u s to emi " to say. The ov ht er. orcler to constrain !inn to it ?" I had n othing tete oi the I fe.possession of S t ela was made to ire then as an idea to which the two Cabinets of A ustria and Prussia would employ themselves actively to decide Lord Palmers to n, if the adhesion of preliminary condition—the France could be reckoned upon. T he mild adhere to necessary condition ef this plan was , that France 5 h 0. him to it, and that it could be said to Lord Pa lmerston, in pressine decide, " this finishes the question — Franc e adheres —the arrange mete is terminated in a firm solid form " It was with this engage ment tin 4 Austria and Prtessia gave reason to hope t hat they would Pre " Lord Palmerston to decide. In communicating to the Ca hinet this overture, I Weimer . ' it at the same time in very distinct " re in I believe, what appearee to me to be the consequenc e of its rejectio n I bee , the Chamber to observe that an Ambassador is not a Minist er f or Foreign Affairs, that he has no part to t a k e , that t is not he wlio resolves questions or adopts resolutions, not having the power. The following are the terms on which, on the 24th of June, I gave an account to et. Thiers on the state of theater " We are perhaps upon the point of the crisis. Thi s step in advance of which I spoke to you rn a form er letter, andwhicll consists, on the part of A us tria and Plusse s in casing to Lora Palmerston that 1-e inust con t en t himself with leaving s e n a to the Pacha fo r life, and . making this great concession to France —this s t ep, I say, i s b e i ng taken, if I am not Misi nformed, at this mom ent. Colleagues of Lord -Pal merston on one side, the Austrian and Prussian Ministers on the other, are going to press upon him to induce him to agree to it. If th e y do so they -would believe, both one and the other, that they THE SUN, LONDON, MONDAY, NOVEMBER 30. 18'0. had gained a great victory, and arrived at very reasonable decided. There are a great disagreement and agitation in the 1 propositions of arrangement. It is important, then, that I should Cabinet: some Ministers insist strongly that they should await the I be well acquainted with your intentions upon this subject, for, on I news from Constantinople; those whose opinion is floating show my language, however reserved it may be, may depend, either the I themselves inclined for this delay. There are still, therefore, prompt adoption of an arrangement upon these foundations, or a 1 many chances that effective and definitive resolutions will not be backsliding by w hich Lord Palmerston, p rofitin g b y th e disa pp oint. I immediately arrived at." This is the phrase that M. Thicrs ale ment and ill.hinnour of his colleagues and the other Plenipoten. 1 hided to a short time ago. tiaries, might engage them suddenly in his system, and make them M. Thicrs—There arc others. • adopt as a four.fold agreement his project of withdrawing Syria M. Guizot—Ycs, to the same purpose. from the Pacha, and the employment, if necessary, of means of M. Thiers—No; more precize. coercion. A great deal will be done in the Cabinet; and among M. Guizot— I take them as you will. the Plenipotentiaries, in order only to act in a five-fold arrange- M. Thiers—You wrote me, I think on the 6th, 9th, and 14th mcnt in concert with us, and without coercion. I n o not answer of July, always laying before me such facts as these t —The Eng for it that everything will be done, nor that a sudde fourfold cone liele Cabinet deliberates—there is great agitation—there is a crisis, elusion is impossible.—(Strong sensation )We may be all at once but nothing is yet decided—two plans have been prepared; one placed in this alternative; Egypt given hereditarily and Syria for five-fold which contains the maximum of the concessions to be life to the Pacha, under the condition of the cession of the Holy made to France to attach her to it ; and one feuhold, on the r up. Cities, of Candia, and Adana, by a fivefold arrangement; or, Syria position that France will not consent to the propositions to he withdrawn from the Pacha by a fourfold arrangement, and by means made to her. All the letters which you have written Yo mg—all of coercion if necessary." You see, Gentlemen, that without al- the official despatches which you have•addressed to me contained lowing myself to give any counsel, I clearly pointed out the con- the supposition that, before signing the treaty, a previous proposi sequences of the rejection of this overture. 1 added, that it was lion would be made to Fiance, and I, counting upon this step being t necessary for this overture to have a chance of success to be ac- taken, waited to elicit in the Cabinet a definitive re solution. 1 cepted and vigorously carried out. The certainty of the adhesion will add that you produce here as a determining m ot i ve, havin g of France was necessary. Withrtut that certainl the author of acted upon the English Cabinet, only the false interpretation irieen , y to the retreat of the Paella of Egypt. I will prove again, by quota.the overture could not make that serious and persevering cil lirt lions not merely front official despatches, but from private letters , upon the British Cabinet which was indispensable to bring it to a decision. The followin is the answer which I received from H. that the true motive in your opinion was the news of the insurrec g tiers in Syria, and the discovery, not yet made, of an efficacious Thiers, dated the 30th of June :—" When I spoke to you o f a great conquest which should change our attitude, I meant the here - method, which was neither the sending of an English n or of a Rue sian ermy. (Mary possession of Egypt and the hereditary possession of Syria. M. de Lamar tine—What method ? However, I have consulted the Cabinet upon the overture of which M. Guizot—l have just read to the Chamber, without any emir.. you have spoken tome of late ; Egypt hereditarily and Syria for life. sirens, the despatches, in which I insist equally on the two motives They are deliberating, but with small leaning towards a'conces s io n . which brought on that conclusion—the attempt at direct arrange. However, we shall see. Defer explaining yourself. We shall see what I" / ment, anti the insurrectien in Syria. I have just read the details will happen; nothing is deelded."—(Various interruptions.) Lord Palmerston received of the insurrection in Syria, the hopes he remained, and it was my duty to remain, in the situation pre conceived of it, and the reasons which urged him to conclude an ar cribed to me. I did not abandon the chance which had opened pursued both by the Ministers . rangement, lam about also to ley before the Chamber the m otives before me. It continued to be of Austria and Prussia, and by some Members of the Cabinet, of indecision which still acted upon the English Cabinet ; the chances I yet believed to exist of gaining thee, in order that nothi n g but very feebly, and without any display of his energy or eager ness, which, in my firm conviction were wirh to were indispensable to its sue. should be immediately and definitively settle& I have not the ems ; when I say to its success, slighteA intention to dissimilate ina word that I soy upon t his sub ject. Itecal, if you please, what had occurred in the affair at this tinctly. The lion. M. Thiers asked me yesterday if I believed, or if I had believed, that it was ever pmsible to obtain from Lord epoch ; the Chamber knows perfectly well in the last days of the negotiation something was concealed from Fra nce. I wrote it : I Paltnerston the CClleeiSioll of Syria for life? As I stand here to said so before another tribunal ; I said every W here that something speak the truth, I shall say that I do not believe it.—(Prothund sensation. I doubt that Lord Palmerston could heve been p er- was concealed from France. It turned out tha t I Was not exactly and , completely informed of what passed in the interi o r of the Cabinet—l assailed tn ) the concession of all Syria, even for life, to the Peelle. What I believe is, that if that course had teen entered upon, if the men who had made the overture had been strongly engaged in it, they woel4 trace obtained for the Pacha a slice of cyria better than that of the treaty or the lath of Jigy.—(Renewed movement.) My slicers conviction is that we rniAht have succeeded in forcing a share of Syria more favourable to the Pacha than Mato( the lath °fluty, and I shall tell you how. Englried has always regarded in thiaqueetion of Syria the particular situation of Bagdad, at the same time that she was strongly preoccupied with Constantinople, I could not give certainties when I had them not. I coul.l not i knew it nearly, and I sent exact ly what I knew, neither more nor less. speak with precision when it was not in my thoughts. Something was concealed. Here I concealed that Slits was its my opinion ill treatment? , No; I spoke loudly-of it elsewhere. I believed like M. Thicrs ; liked*, I hied a right tse believe that before a defini live signature, when the project of an arrangement was to he li.- lofted to four, it would have been communicated to France—that it would have been delayed—anti that she would, for the last time, i have had an opportunity to explain. Undoubtedly, I believed it. and with the fear that the mated) of the Pacha into Asia Minor should call the Russians to Constantinople. She was particularly N. Thiers—And you made me believe it. afraid of the Pacha on account of Bagdad; and the conquests of M. Gtezot—lf I had net believed it, if M. Thiers had not - be. tile Pacha in the East, in D:arbekir, toward; Mesopotamia, and on 1 hewed it, we shoulthnot have had to regret ill treatment. • the borders of the Diphrates, disgoieted her much. There was A voice on the Lefl—Say an injury. that divisien of Syria which g :re satistaetioa to England upon this M. Guizot—l will adeert by and by to the question of the nature point, and which took away completely frorn the Pacha rhe course of that course. At present I only speak of the fart. Un-' doubtedly I believed that the treaty would have been comment. of the Euphrates. 1 f the Porte had recovered the Pachalics of I vatted to us heforg it was signed, and this was a ground of very lee Aleppo and Dernescus, or at least the •greater part of the Pachalic r gitimate complaint, anti the reasons why I was the interpreter, the of Damascus, it would hays remained mistress of the Euphrates, 'active organ of your comolaints. I think with you upon this point,. 'fine Pacha on this side had no communication. The Porte in that direction corn:ramie:tett freely with its dominions of Arabia, but you have nothing to complain of against me. I could not tell There was security for it, and security for England, and i' was then you what I did not know. I could oat express an opinion possible to contemplate fir the Peelle the concession of the Paehelic to you contrary to my own and yours. Like you, I waited till the last moment before the signature, exacting it to be corn erfripoli added to the Pachalic of St. Jean d'Acre and a portion of i municated to us, and that the signature of it would beateleyed; time Pactalic of Damascus. While thr affair was thus in suspense 1 believe that they did u.; wets: g. I believe that this is ilt- treat.' the news arrived in London that the Pacha, learning the deposition metal of which we have a right to complain; bu" you cannot be sur of Kliosrew Pacha, had sent Samy Bey to Constantinople, offered I prised that I did not announce what I did not know and what I the restoration of the fleet, and attempted a direct arrangement with the Porte. This fact was announced to me by M. Tigers in did not suppose. With the evil course to which I have adverted, the Treaty was signed, and it was communicated to me on the 17 th. the terms which I will communicate. M. Thicrs wrote me on the 30th of June, " I have just received from Egypt the accompanying A Atomiser on the Left—You are mistaken. dispatch, of which I send you a copy (it is the despatch which ass. ' M. Guizot—l am rnistakeu in strictness ;it was not the Treaty, ' but the fact of the - arrangement width was communicated t o me . noundeJ the demand of the Peelle). It is of importance not to 1 . t ; it he known in London, in order that the English may not ' , event I The Treaty was not communicated to me for six weeks or two after the ratification. a direct arrangement.—(lronical laughter on the extreme left.) The months after, a news will speedily be known, but not for eight days. In the inter- A Member—Say, after the execution. - vat the English will be able to de nothing, and we are sure that they N. Guizot— I wish to open a portfolio which is in ray place, and will be too late if they wieh to write to Constantinople. You will which contains' an account of the conversation I had with Lord make use, however, of this news to prevent a resolution, if there Palmerston, u lien he communicated to me the fact the 'Fr 'sty. is any wish to take one, relative to the plan on which you have I wish to pace before the eyes of the Chamber, with What view consulted me of late—Egypt hereditarily and Syria for life." and in what language I expressed the opinions . of the King's Go ' Abotrt the same time when the arrival of the news of the Paella's vernment at this difficult moment.—(Au usher carried the port attempt at a direct arrangement, arrived the news of the itteureece folio to the Minister.) lion in Syria. I have nothing to add to what has been said on the subject of this insurrection by M. Thiers. I hove more than once complained strongly to the English Cabinet of the efforts which I believe it was making underhand to excite this insurrection. The following is the despatch in which I gave an account of the effect which these two pieces of intelligence produced in London. I beg the Chamber to listen attentively to this despatch--(llear, hear) —'S Since the proposition of dividing Syr:a in two, in giving to Mehemet Ali the fortress and a part of the Pachalic of St. Jean d' Acre, has been set aside, Lord Palmerston has appeared to shun conversation on the affairs of the East. I have engaged him in it once or twice, rather to establish the policy of the King than to attempt to make by discussion one advance in the question. Lord Palmerston answered me like a maze who persists in his ideas, but who does not think the moment propitious for action, and wishes to gaits time. When we wished to gain time Lord Palmerston was pressing. When Lord Palmerston wished to gain time I think that our interest was to be pressing. We never were so at any period. " ". The 17th July, half past eleven at night. .. _ " Lord Palmerston wrote to me, at one o'clock, that he wished 1 ' to speak to me before the end of the morning, I went to the Po. reign Office. He told me that the Cabinet, pressed by events, had just alopted aresolution'touching the affairs of . the East ; that he had a communication to make to me on the subject, and in order to make sure that ho expressed exactly and completely his thoughts, he bad put them in writing. He then read me the paper -of: which I here insert a copy. (It was the memorandum of the 17th July,. which has been publiShed, and which it is none. • cessary to read.) I listened to Lord Palmerston without • interruption, and at length taking the pap^r from his hands,' My Lord (said I), on the foundation of the resolution you have brought , to my knowledge, I shall add nothing to what I have often had the' honour of sa3inz, , . I do not wish un the first reading, to discuss all the paper I have just heard contains; but some Points strike me on which I hasten to express my sentiments. They arc these.' I objected particularly to this passage :—' Notwithstanding latterly the Four Cturts have proposod to France ally herselwith them to effect an arrangement between the Sultan and Mehemet Ali, founded upon ideas which were uttered towards the. close of the last 3 , ,..5r by the French Ambassador in London ; nevertheless the French Government did not believe she could tale part in such ar re. yv h had f, an t ge m h i e c nt .' . No rs basis i t doubt you the her abd e allude, ano n m m my Lord, to h t to ep thea cia of arrange_ , m the Pachalic of St. Jean d'A-re, comprehending the fortress, and it will result from this ;,aragraph that the French Go. vcrnment after making this proposition, did not believe it could be accepted. I cannot admit, on the part of the Govern ment of the K ng, such a reproach of inconsistency. The ideas re. (erred to were never officially uttered by the Ambassador of France in London on the part of the Government of the King—neither by ITIC, nor my in edecenr . ,r. They might have becn broachc4 in conversation like ninny other hypotheses : they were never pre sented under a form nor in a character which authorised the :Is ' section or the belief that the Government of the King first put them forward, and afterwards repudiated them.' The following is my second observation. 'You say that the French Government has many times declared that it has nothing to object to the arrange. M. Thiers—You should have said so. M. Guixot—The Honourable M. Thiers, " You should have said so." I think that I slid say so. M. Thiers—Since you acknowledge my interruption, I hes to make an observation. I shall prove by documents, since lam forced to justify myself before the Ambassador who read my orders, and ought to have given me his advices. I shall prove, I say, by documents, that you said to me on the very 14th of July that we still had time, and that nothing was precipitated. M. Guizot—l shall say so myself presently.—(A voice from the Left--" Why not now ?") I cannot accept the words of M. Thiers. He has not to justify himself hese before me. I ail here as a Deputy, obliged to give my opinion, and to give the Chamber in formation as to the part I have acted its the great affair in question. None of us arejustifying ourselves; we are all explaining ourselves before the Chamber and before the country.—(Approbation.) The matter does not concern me. I was under the orders of the Ho. nourable M. Thiers. I have received his Instructions—l have executed them. I have given him all the information which I could possibly collect. M. Thiers—Never your opinion. . M. Guizot—The Hon. M. Thiers says I have never given him any opinion. Ido not understand his objection. Ihave just read to the Chamber a despatch, in which I said, "If this overture is not accepted, such and such things will happen. It is probable that there will be a fourfold arrangement which will perhaps be suddenly concluded."—(Movement.) If I am not deceived, this was an opinion as much as it was consistent with propriety for me to give. —(From the Centre, " Very well.") If I had been more explicit, I might, I think, have failed in propriety, and invoiced my personal responsibility more than I ought. I should have tailed in prudence as well as in propriety, if I had done more.— (Expressions of assent.) I resume the reading of the despatch which I had the honour to communicate to the Chamber :—" Lord Palmerston has not, indeed, for several weeks, as I have already told your Excellency, either discussed in the Cabinet the affairs of the East, nor even communicated to his colleagues the last note of Chekib-Effendi. Nevertheless, the efforts of several Members of the Cabinet and corps diplomatique in favour of an arrangement which should have for its basis the hereditary concession of Egypt, and the life concession of Syria to the Pacha, were still continued. I followed their progress without mixing itself up with them, conformably to the instructions of your Excellency. I never received this idea, nor discouraged, by any absolute declara. tion on my part, those who sought the success of it. It was in this state of the affair, and of men's minds, that the news arrived here of the dismissal of Kosrew Pacha, and the direct steps taken by Mehe met Ali at the Court of the Sultan. This news did not surprise me. Your Excellency had communicated to me a despatch from M. Cochelet, of 26th May, announcing this intention on the part of the Pacha. I kept this despatch entirely secret , but I since learned that a letter of M. le Comte d'Appony, dated 16th June, if I am rightly informed had announced to the Baron de Nicumann the prediction of H Cochelet. The despatch by which the last men. tioned gentleman informed your Excellency of the step taken by Mehemet Ali was also dated on the 16th of June, so that by a sin g,ilai coincidence, the same day that M. Cochelet wrote from Alex andria, as a fact which had taken place that which the Ambassador of Austria wrote of from Paris as a fact probable and near at hand. When certain intelligence of the fact arrived at Lon. don Lord Palmerston and the three other Plenipotentiaries were scarcely more surprised at it than I was myself. They saw in it, or at least they thought they had no right to see any more in it, than an act long cemented between the Pacha and France, which at Constantinople, as well as at Alexandria, had la boured to prepare it. The effect of the act experienced from it a remarkable alteration. Not only did it lose some of the importance which its spontaneity and its novelty ought to have assured it, but the dispositions of Lord Palmerston and the three other Plenipo tentiaries were •isibly modified by it. They considered the step taken by Mehemet Ali and its success as the ruin of the note of .he 07th of July, 1839, and of the joint action of the Five Powers. and also as the complete and personal triumph of France at Alex andria and at Constantinople. From that time those who prose cuted with the hope of obtaining the joint action of the Five Powers, the arrangement that was based on the hereditary conces sion of Egypt and the life c ncession of Syria, stopped in their endeavours without altogether renouncing them. On his part Lord Palmerston suddenly showed himself disposed for action, and in two successive Councils, held on the 4th and Bth of this month, presented to the Cabinet with a most perse vering ardour his ideas and his plan of proceeding in case of a four-fold arrangement by the Powers. Nothing was resolved upon, the Cabinet was divided. The adversaries of the plan of Lord Palmerston insisted on the necessity of waiting for news from Constantinople, and the question was adjourned until a new Coun / cit. But Lord Palmerston is pressing. The Powers, says he, are engaged in honour to regulate the affairs of the East by their inter vention in the manlier most favourable to the Porte. They pro mised to the Sultan and to each other to do so. The step taker. by Mehemet Ali cannot turn them from it. It is an act which at bottom signifies very little, which does not promise on the part of the Pacha any important concessions, which will not change either the situation or the policy of the Porte, which will not, therefore, `lead to the pacificatim which is hoped from it, and will have no other effect than to fetter, if care be not taken, negotiations be tween the Powers, and to hinder them from ,proceeding them selves to the object which they proposed. Nevertheless the oppar. tunity of acting is favourable ; the insurrection in Syria is se rious, Lord Palmerston avails himself much of the information that the insurgents are numerous and vigorous, and that the administration of Ibrahim is violent, vexatious, and detested, in order to finish the affair promptly." There are some details a hich I will suppress containing, in form ation received by Lord:Palmerston from Syria in private letters. " Every time that an opportunity presents itself, whenever I can enter into conversation with any men ofintluence on the question, I warmly combat these ideas. I repeat all the arguments that I ' have advanced f.r four months, but with which I will not again fatigue your Excellency. II am surprised at the interpretation which is attempted to be given to the step just taken by Mehemet Ali. What was more natural, more easy to foresee, and more in evitable than that step ? For nearly a year the Powers have been trein e to regulate the affairs of the East, but without success. The Paella on his side had declared thai the presence of Khosrew in P , wer he considered the principal obstacle to his own confiding and decisive re'..urn to his al , eeiance Khosrew wes set aside. Was I i there c any occasion to suppose . a long preparation or any diplo , out to him to do. I ; , " , "': ,i Y . to explain what the Pacha had done ? lie did what i advice at AtexandriaF,rbanutceadviticeis '1 _ • a he would do, and what the plainest good sense pointed oft moderation ohraastiigniven, and anodoosotoislsligooiv—es 1 advice which has no other object than to re-establish peace II in the E as t, and in, t;hde beso:n of the Ottoman empire a good understanding a, strength as well a s of pmuctetion, It sole securities of I would be . very, sinent of strange to see the Powers oppose themselves tothe re-estatiliss peace, not wish her return unless. she is brought own bends, and throw themselves a second tiine i, et „. b ecn a c k the suet. their Irain, and his vassal, to separate them a t t h e moment when they were coming together. It is a year since :his intervention -rts imagined. 1 It might have bee ts feared that the P orte, worn out and cast cast down would have delivered I • , by its recent defeat, i I foot to the Pacha, and accepted conditions dangerous to her future what took place a e repose; but now, after t when the Pacha ar- ago' when the Porte i has again found suppor , . a himself with an eager •tiative cf reconciliation,wh a t 1 moderation takes the int motive, what to oppose it, to retard it Dar a single day pretext can be alleged i th • ? makes an impression o i those to whom I language generally . This can n ot hold it as loudly as I could wish, for address myself, but I affording Ile an opportunity. Th e ef ... people endeavour to avoid _ . . staW of CMS; nothing, I repeat, fair is thus at this momcnt in a mentF which the Four Powers desire should be accepted by Me. hernet Ali, if ,Mehemet Ali consents to them, and that in no case will France oppose the measures which the Four Powers, in concert with the Sultan, may judge necessary to obtain the adhesion of the Pacha of Egypt. I cannot, my Lord, - accept this expression `in no case,' and. I am. certain that. I neier said any , thing to nu. tho. ise it. The Government of the King assuredly does not make me the armed champion of any one, and will never compromise, for the single interest of the Pacha of Egypt, the peace and the interests of France; but if the measures adopted against the Paella by the Four. Powers had, in the eyes of his Majesty's Go vernment, that character or that consequence that the actual balance of the European States should be altered by them, it could not consent to them. It would see then what was fitting to do, and it will always preserve in this 'respect its full liberty.'— (Very well.) I made further comments upon some expressions in the Memorandum, several remarks of little importance; and with out entering deeply into the discussion, I added, ' My Lord, the King's Government has always thought that the question whether two or three I'achalics of Syria should appertain to the Sultan o: to the Pacha was by no means worth the risk which the employ ment of force and the return of war in the East might produce both to the East and to Europe. You have judged differently. If you are mistaken we shall not partake of the responsi bility ; we shall use all our endeavours to maintain peace and our general alliances, and to overcome for the benefit of all the difficulties, the dangers, perhaps, which may be pro duced by the new situation into which you will enter.' " In an swer to this memorandum, I received from , the Honourable Presi dent of the Council the French counter memorandum of the 24th of July, with orders to give a perusal of it to Lord Palmerston, and to leave a copy with him. The Chamber knows it, and I shall ,only read from it one passage which interests me as characterising the opinion which the President of the Council had, and doubtless still has, of the proceeding of which we justly complain. After having repeated the language which the French Government had held, either directly or through me (NI. Guizot) as its organ, and as to what he thought on the general principle of the affair, he said, " The opinion that France had held on this subject she still ad tiered to, and she had some reason to believe that that opinion was not exclusively her own. She had had addressed to her in the lat ter state of things no positive proposition on which she was called upon to explain herself. It is not proper, then, to impute to her a refusal whi:lt she was not in a comlition to make as to the determination which England communicated to her in the name of the Four Powers. But, moreover, without insisting upon the question that might arise as to this manner of proceeding to wards her, France declared herself anew, that she considered it as unreflecting and imprudent to take a line of proceeding which con. sisted in adopting resolutions without the means of executing them, or to execute them by insufficient and dangerous means." If Ido not deceive myself, we have a right to infer from this language that the President of the Council thought as I did, that there was in the last act of the conduct of the Four Powers towards France an un handsome procedure, a procedure of which France had a right to complain, and to feel wounded ; but that he had riot seen in it, any more than myself, an insult, an affront, one of those grave out rages which have between people and states, as between individuals, essentially different results than complaint, coolness, or isolation. I do not wish, I rtneat, to draw from this psssage any other Consequence, but that which I have stated 1 believe myself justified in drawing. The treaty signed, the dissatisfaction mani fested by France was, I have no hesitation in affirming it, as great as the President of tlfe Council could desire; I have approved of it and I have seconded it as far as it became me to do so—in the attitude, the preparations, and the armaments which have been adopted by the Government of the King. I thought as I yet think that in the state of coolness and isolation in which France had been placed, and with the chances before her as to the result to which the proceedings adopted in the Eass might lead, that it was indispensable that France should be placed in the most complete and perfect state of an armed peace. I use designedly the word peace, for I have not thought, nor do I at present think, that in what has passed in this epoch, there has been any just, legitimate, or a sufficient motive ; I do not say to break immediately peace, but to prepare ourselves to break it on a future day.—(Numerous marks of assent, laughter, and murmurs on the Left.) I consider that in remaining in this attitude of coolness, isolation, and armed peace, France would be, to a certain extent, sufficiently prepared to meet the chances of the events that might arise; but if, on the contrary, she went before those events by the attitude she took by her armaments and by the display of her forces, she might lead them on.—(Murmurs on the L .ft.) lam convinced that the Powers that signed the Treaty of the 15th of July had not in that Treaty any hostile intention, or any menacing after-thought Corriere pcnscc) towards France and her Government.—(Renewed exclamations.) I am satisfied that there has been between the Allied Powers and France upon the question of the East, with respect to the relations existing between the Sultan and the Pacha of Egypt, and as to the best manner of regulating them, a difference which I deplore; nothing more.— (Laughter from the Left.) I find merely that others think differ ently from myself; but if my opinion has any value, and only from the position in which I am placed, the Chamber has some interest in knowing it.—(Very wall, very well ) Whenever there happens to occur in France a movement a little lively, a little beyond ordi. nary, Europe sees init a revolution ; whenever the Powers unite together and agree together for some determined object, France sees . pa it a coalition. This is very plain, very natural, on one side as well as the other, and no one has a right to complain, but men of sense—men who are called upon to influence the affairs of their country, ought to judge these facts coolly as well as other matters. —(Marks ofas , ent.) Yes, the treaty of the 15th of July has placed France in a difficult situation ; the treaty of the 15th of July has placed France upon an important question in a state of isola tion in Europe, and of coolness towards her best and her surest ally. —(murmurs on the left.) such is the fact in its truth and its ex. tent ; such is the fact for which it is necessary to make provision, and for which it is necessary to take a certain attitude, and to adopt certain preparations. But if you adopt an attitude, if you make preparations which correspond with it, not with regard to this state of things, but to other circumstances ; to circumstances much more grave, much more menacing, much more pressing—then, gentle men, you place France yourselves in the perilous situation in which you state that she is ; you are yourselves the authors of the danger ; you prepare yourselves the coalition of which you speak.—(Loud applause from the ranks of the majority.) . . M. Arago—That is not true. M Guizot—lt is necessary that I should state to you what I have seen; it is necessary I should repeat to you what I have heard. I spoke to you just 110 w of those very false and exaggerated terrors which seize Europe when France is agitated; I have mu thew, I have heard theta. What could I hive said, Oen. themen, if, instead of a peaceful arm amen t; if, instead of adopt i ng l should not be partitioned, and that it should remain eltire i n a firm attitude; if, instead of this, we had seen a warlike a n,. i the hands of the Paella]. There was only (continued the lion. ment, if we had seen levied in France 630 , 000 regular to , eps, 1 Member) one mall In this Assembly who maintained that France and 300,000 National Guards, wha t ans wer could I have made to • cou'et have no interest in Egypt and Syria; he alone main tained it, men who woutd have said to me, "It is revolution—it is a revolti- I anal it was necessary to have his immense talent and great repute. tionary menace, it is a return to the time of the empire end the re-1 lion for any one to take upon A i i mself to make such an assertion. public ?—(Murmurs on the Left.) Whitcou 11111111 ld I have said ? That ' T he Chamber was lITIGUS . this point ; there was unanimity those who believe that it is essentia l to the security, and to the he. I from the press of the Left, whose support the Cabinet of the Ist nour of France, to avenge, or, as it has been expressed, to wash March did not disavow. I a.n neither embarrassed with, ner out in some great enterprise, in soots great adventure, what they i ashamed of, the sepport of the Left.—(Ali, ah, from the Centre.) call the weakness—and I believe that word has also been uttered I 1 lie Left supported me ; the press, which was in its interest, sup -the dishonour of the last few years ; that those who enter- Ported me; it supported me in writing, and I bete the imputation of its support, and accepted it, upon the points on which we taut this opinion should wish for an ar mament of 9001100, I can comprehend this is consistent with reason ; but that those who do I a g reed, namely, sYmnalhY for my cottony, for our revolu not believe this—that those wko believe that France has nothing to tion ; for I am a revolutionist, an honest revolutionist.—(Ex. arrange—that she has nothing to demand reparation for, but hat clamation.) None but an ill-educated parvenu is as hamed what she has to do is to develteee her institutions, .t SCcurAler lof h is 'Nigh); I am not ashamed of mine.—(Approbation.) government, to increase her prOarieraty and jittery:at 's-tr"-.cltila;fii„,l I The Chamber, the press, and the country, have felt . that to give an example to Europe n,n goodlie ve ne m e e ene en ee,f4 ea t 1 we were greatly interested in preventing the separation of Egypt prosperity—those who thus thitilartannonisenv e . te s et 4 e . :ere , ..., et . and Syria. It was a sentiment felt by all, and on which there was of 900,000 is necessary to give ttfraneene.e - a, t f i d e „ f ::,: v it tia . no doubt felt by any one.—(Yes, yes.) Thir opinion I maintained. meat of peace. Those who cntotain . thle opincoWwith mAsh The Cal,inet of the 12th of May had three times demanded, in the face of all the world, the hereditary government of Egypt and to be matted to answer when' ter ere e spokers to as thhe aggressive spirit of France. 0 _l've, trance his done ring 1 Syria for the Neha. Three times it had been refused. I was, I but what she was called ul nto die Tor _liar own sec ty . I therefore, pledged; nevertheless, on entering office, I did not adopt France has only provided for, he chainees that may arise cut I an y irrevocable p lan. You know the p olic y I ado p ted.—(M. Thiess of the solution which you have*lopten for th e E astern ques P on , I here alluded to the instructions which he ga v e to his Ambassador, A as she did not wish to be teen - A unprepared. When Freince IM. Guizot, on his accession to office on the Ist of March. Exa is united to England 300,00Ve sufficient for her as a ieace 1 mining the conduct of N. Guizot, he complained that he had n ot establishment, but when she stands alene it is necessary;that I furnished him with ample particulars—that he had not kept him she should have 400,000 or 5000 men for her attitude o f f an i au courant of events—that he had not made him sufficiently ac. armament of pence. I have, then, gen tl emen, so fir adhere:4 Iqu tinted with men and things.) N. Guizot, added AL TOiers, w ithout limiting the expression ttetlic attitude, an d t o the arena_ observed yesterday, that, as an Ambassador, he had no opinio n to ment combined within the limits - which I'have itelicated..' But. express. I think he is mistaken, and there are several exampl es in when I believed I saw another itetpuls& sot of the G overnmen t it- support of my view. Under the Cabinet of the Path of May, e l . de self, but from without, tending to tarry my country' and its Go- Saint Atilaire, the Fiend] Ambassador, wrote to his Government: v eminent along with it; When hasp thatein ifentitation in which, " Tile policy which has been a,lopted is false and dangerous, and in my opinion, the maintenance of peace %ant 'etisentialen that ~people will turn everybody against you." N. de Iteyneval, the French were rushing to war, to inevitable war, I stopped short. My ad- Ambassador in Spain, also gave his opinion openly upon the effects hesion to and my acting with the Cabinet was thus stopped, arid a produced by the policy of the Cabinet. He wrote that Spain would man, whom 111. .Thiers named yesterday from this tribunal, and be sooner or later lost to Fiance, if the line of conduct which had who is my friend, as he is his (I mean AL le Dec de Broglie) was been followed were te 'be persisted in. Gentle:Fen, I think these made acquainted with the state of my nend, and whet I representatives acted properly. This Is the way in Which I under thought of the situation and of tile dangers which roe- stand the duty of an Ambassador. Ile is on the spot, he sees what naced us. lie was made acquainted with it, an d if I * en , is passing, he is acquainted with the actors in the scenes which he not mistaken nfor I requested him, and authorised him so witnesses, and must be better able to judge of effects than the Ti to do), he informed the President of the Council and some of his Meer who issues orders at a distance. Ile is able, Gentle colleegues on t h e ~,,h jeet. • e - s Oi s lied at the end of the month of Men, to judge and to form an opinion, and he is _bound to September, andiat the ceinmencernent of October, that the Cabinet state that opinion frankly, and to blame or approve of the con should know that I felt uncesy as to the direction in which I be- duct of his Government. This was not what was done towards never' myself drawii.a—(Niiisen I wrote this letter that this might me. It is possible that 1 may have been mistaken in my views, be knewn.—(_Marl.;, of approbation, ant cries of " Read, wail.") but , if I was mistaken, it is. because I was not sufficientl y in " I ;:m rendered uneasy, very uneasy, more by what is occuring at hound of what war p ,ssing. If, continued M. Thiess, M. Guizot home. than by whit is going on abroad."—N:3vement, and cries of had written to me, " Make haste, time press, s ; if you do not "The date, the date.") 'There are twd letters, the first dated the make haste you are lost," I should not have temporised a; I did : 23d aeptember, the other the 13th of October. "We are evi- but I felt persuaded, from what the Ambassador wrote to me, that dently returning to 1831eand to a state of things when the revo:it_ a preposition would be made, and that it would be left to me to tionary spirit takes advantage of the national enthusiasm,—(Cries accept or refuse the li te.governm ent of Syria for the Pane offgypt. from the Centre of " Bravo," " Very good, very good,")--ond urg_ M. Guizot wrote to me, during the hew days which immediately in; it to war." I beg the Chamber to permit me to pause a nto- proceeded the Treaty' of Jun* 13, that nothing pressed, that we had ment on these two words, " the revolutionary spirit and the national time. What was Ito doe for I believed him ?—(At this pat of the enthusiasm."- I respect, I honour the national enthusiasm ever, speech M. Thiere real letters from N. Gu . zot of the tith, Bth, 10th, when it goes astray, But thin is no( a reaciii for giving ourselves and II th July, in which the Ambassador announces that the Cabinet blindly up to rational enthusiasm. Alter great political shocks there had still time; and having read these letters, M. Thiers added) reisiainnin so.cielysennethingrehichis not at all national enthusiasm, . But M. Guizet, tree myself, was deceived. The Powers had rc ' which hes nothing in common with it, something which Ido net .1 solved on keeping the intention of enteting into this Tree's , a hourcor, which Ido not love, which I dread deeply—a revolutionary secret from the French (lovernment. Let us, however, lay aside spirit.—(Appleuse.) 'What has happenel not only to-day, but at the s e w retched p ersonal discussions, and return to lac's. It was, I before said, the determination of the Powers to conceal the Treaty so mane other. periods, and which occasions the difficulty ofnur situation, is that contact of the revolutionary spirit with the Da; 'trent France. But why was this Treaty concluded ? It is im portant that the country should know. It was founded on two them' entliudasm. It , is,the revolutionary spirit that has free c onsiderations—the insurrection in Syria, and the conviction that quently endeavoured to - lay hold, to overrule, and to turn to its France would not act agairSt the Allies. Yes, Gentlemen, those owu purposes the sincere • and generous ustional enthusiasm. Front the motives which led to the Treaty. But forthe itisurree (Freslt marks of approbation.) This is the great danger against trait iti Syria it never would have taken place, because, without which. we' have several times had to defend ourselves, and of the revival of which I entertained a' sincere and firm conviction I that it would have been nezessary to summon the Russians to sa C o nstantinople, and to this England never would have con with the reading the letter—" The revolutionary spirit turnw the symptoms. I halm no; explained, end wiil proceed • sea ted. The Treaty was signed because foreign Powers ha m , to a notion of the weakness of France—because it was affrays without own purposee the national enthusiasm, and draws on a war thought that France would not act with vigour on th i s cc witliout legitimate motives, aid it Mink reasonable chances or casion, and would leave the Four Powers to arrange affairs success, with the sole abject and sole hope of revolution. I say according to their own pleasure. This appears even from a letter without legitimate motives; :the question of Syria is not a logiti. mate case of war. I consider this to be evident. from M. Guizot, written on the 23d of July, after the signature did not make war to free Poland from Iltissia Franc —(Move- e of the treaty. These were the true motives which actuated the meat on the Left)—or Italy from Austria, and she . Four Powers. Yes, Gentlemen, the true cause is the weakness of _ cannot reasonably go to war, in order that Syi is may be the policy of the last ten years. I will speak the truth. De you in the hands or the Pacha instead of those of the Sultan.—("That know what your enemies say ? " You are weak at home — you can. is very true.," from several voices.) The policy hitherto expressed not go to war—you are torn by factions." You give your mimic; reason to say so ; you adopt their opinion, and you say, we are not and suaportea by France with respect to the East does not promote it. We nave loudly and constantly said that the dist ributionof ter- strong enough to go to war.--(Cries of " Oh, oh !" from the `• ritories between the Sultan and thee Paella Was of little importance Yes, yes," from the Left.") I have always be to us ; that if the Pectin wished to give up Syria we should not Centre, and of lieved that it was necessary to display great vigour, that we should assume an imposing attitude towards Foreign Fowers. This is why object to it ; . that the foreseeing his refusal, his resis'ance and the I proposed the armaments, and the conduct of the Allies has fully danger which would result from them to the Ottoman empire and proved they were perfectly justifiable. You have secti them day alter the peace of Europe, (vas the sol e motive' of our opposition to the Means of coercion, . Iu nI day proceeding in their course with increased brutality*. I wished to ncing e etar to : preserve Syria to the Pacha, we should check them by placing France in an imposing attitude. I wished have been - in , open - contradiction to ourselves ; one of those : enntradiettione...whicho by being exposed, weakens to arm in order to obtain a modification of the treaty; 1 resolved the pasty seekimgethep. No ,other iptestion has hitherto been on obtaining it, and I should have oleained it; and if I had not I declare now that I would have gone to war, for the honour and r a ised with regard to princiPle by thenConventiMi of the 15th interest of my country commanded it. When I saw that the tre at y July—in tatets e tiy, itrioexecution. No great interest of Francehas was being betas:ly executed, I wrote as fo:lows to N. Guizot : been attacked., neither her independence, ior her •Government, nor her instittitienkPntii` her Waits, nor her free activity, nor her nWe arc arming, constantly arming; and when Franc. shall lee wealth, - Wltat e if attenapted in the East may - lead to other things ready, if an arrangement does not take place, we shall have war.— (Great sensation ) Ido not hesitate in adopting an extreme course than what, are Ineaot. Questions t eat,' arise then events may when I see that the honour of my country is about to be coin eprieg up ton whieloFraticecannot remain a stranger. - Thi. is it ' reener .... for arming and . being i n rea di ness. It i s not a reason for promised "—(Great approbation.) Yes, Gentlemen, I would our rasing' On 'in . the West events and questions still more grave, have demanded the modification of the treaty. I would have Rod which ovpoltli nit rise natorall Y. Small account has been held . demanded it when France was ready for action; and if it had of the friendship of France. She is hurt, and very justly so. cum , been then refused, although, as a statesman, I know perfectly well , is a reason fir 1 tirLIAWA. i separation' for a perfectly independent and how terrible the word war is for a country, I would have aputelY I l e t ni? r q!OtFl)o s , 1,4 is not a case for sear. The offence is cried, " War, war!" and I should have found an echo in France. not one of those which c omman d and j ust i fy war. They wished —("Bravo, bravo," from the Lett, and great agita tion in th e neither to insult, nor - ten defy e Chamber.) Let me be kept from power, let me banished for ever, eor to deceive France. TlieO de. but let it not be said that, as a French Minister, I would have mended ghee concurrence; she r e f use d it on th e t erms p ropose d, ever permitted language insulting to the honour of France. Yes, They proceeded Icy themsel v es w ith littl e cour t es y . Thi s was a d say to mauvais precede, but not. an affront. F or these ten years wo ,h ave Gen us, " tle:nen, whenever Europe, the whole of You do not choose such or such a thing, we wil Europe,l do shoul it without been saying it is to the honour of our Government th a t you, and in spite of you," I would cry " War." Let us be what iininediately titter a resolution we were able to maintain our rights without anywhere appealing to the 'cessions , our fathers were, and let us never descend from the rank to which that we created our Government by resistance, and yet ma_ they raised us. The applause from. the partisans of M. Tillers at the close of his lured it by order and peace. Shall we cease to hold this tau- ' speech was veryanti vehement. A tong agitation succeeded gunge ? Shall we change our conduct ? That is not possible. 1 loud in the Chamber, and the Sitting was suspended fo r a q uarter of an see from a distance the movement, and can do nothing to reslA it. lam determined not to mire myself up in it. I wrote to you three I ..u r • At a quarter past four the Sitting was resumed, when the Presi. weeks ago. I cannot j.alge of the state oh' feelii.g in Frat.ce, nor appreciate what it prescribes or permits to the Gore nment. It dent announced that M. Villemain, Minister of 'Public Instruction, would next address the Chamber. may be that war, which does , not appear to inc demanded by the state of things, may be rendered inevitable by the state of public N. Villemain, Minister of Public Instruction, spoke as opinion and sentiment. If that were the case I should no longer follows : — ln addresnng t he Chamber u p on the occasion of so solemn a debate, I avail myself of the Woo emitte d by N. connect myself with a policy which I should consider full of errors . „ and dangerin "I should keel , myself aloof from it. I have coetis Thiers, when he said that this debate should not be lowered deneein the,Charnbers.. I hare always seen, in very critical mo. . to a mere question of persons, but sh o u ld rise to the hei g ht of the public interest. Persoaalities ! Who is there here mentOthe sentiment of danger, of dutv, andof responsibility, take that wishes to indulge !n them ? For my own part I attach too possession 'of the Chamber, arid give them* an intelligence, a courage, much importance to the duty of preserving for each man of ability and an energy, which in trangoi , ltimes ,would h ave f a il e d th em, as and Courage all the estimation that is due to him. F or all that, they do the rest of the world. This is ' ailiathappenened in 1831. We have often said, to, ourselves, without. the Chambers,"l • wi .1. • however, I tio not intend to avoid combating M. Thiers. I will out their piesence, without, their co-operation, without that le- notindulge in any personelities against him,but I will endeavour gel explosion ; that organised Strife of the public passions and rea. to draw him out of an error which may become dangerous to the son, the GoOerninent never count . have resisted this warlike and country; I will put him in presence of himself, and I will remind revolutionary tendency, then so strong and so natural. The emu- 'him of his antecedent actions. T h e Honourable AL Passy has try never could have found within Itself so much wisdom and worthily justified the Cabinet of the 12th May ; his noble and cou energy to maintain its , goverriment. Are we on the eve of a se.. rageous language has raised the Ministry from the unjust accusations cond ' trial ? May we hope a second success ?—(Many voices, that were heaped upon it. It is now made a reproach to us, that " Yes, yes.") . I do not know emy anxiety i s greet, but my con- we are come here to do a thing before which others would have Silence is the same.—(sensation.) lt ; 4,4 the Chambers alone hesitated and.given way; we are4however, under the influence of by their support—by the Complete and sincere discussion which events already accomplished; and M. Thiers said so himself at a takes place in their bosono—that the country can be enlightened tune, w he n he had not, in a fit of g affe de cccur, marred the tor and danger averted.—(" Very well," " Bravo," prolonged marks of tune of France —(Explosion of murmurs from the Left; Yes, yes, assent. The Minister, in descending from the tribune, was sue- from the Centre, Order, order ) rounded by a great number of Deputies, w e h e made him their con. M. Thiers rose, and endeavoured to reply to the Minister of gratulations.) Public Instruction, but could not obtain a hearing, mid sat down. The debate was then adjourned. —(The cries of " Order" were redoubled.) The Minister of Putlic Instruction—Thera is nobody in France who has wished that the country should lose in consideration; no. body has wished it to be said that France was weak, that the Powers would do what she might( protest against, and that they would in all questions act without and in spite of her. M. Thiers has said—" France for ten years has not interfered in great events abroad." The fault of that partly lies with himself. At the moment when the revonition of July seas again fermenting, It was he, it was his eloquence, which laboured to check this movement, which from having been a regenerating one threatened to inundate all Europe; it was he who in his explanations said, that in order to maintain an army of a million of men, the whole revolt'_ tionary power must be brought into play. Who in that case could say to u-hat an extent this great revolution might err —who would not think it necessary to guard against the possibility of such errors ? These dangers we admit are now no hunger possible, and we ask M. Thiers if this is a proper occasion to give way to that national excitement which lie formerly attempted to suppress ? [The Minister here went through the different phases of the Eastern qu.stcrn, and, in concluding this part of his address, demanded if, • When M. Thiers had advanced so much and realised so little, he had any right to make an acccusation against others ? Addressing himself to the President of the Cabinet of the Ist March, M. Vile man] reproached him with having come to no decision, with having made no preparations at his debut, when a great commercial and territorial interest wos threatened. He then blamed the Cabinet of the Ist alerch for having entertained the idea of an armament of 935,000 meu when everything was at an end ; he also blamed it for having the intention of waiting until the spring before it should act. Do you think, gentlemen, that it would have been reasonable in the approaching spring with his innumerable army, Syria being lost to the Pacha, a loss which was inevitable, to have said, " We are resolved on re-establishing the power of the Pacha ?" No—, such an idea is inadmissible; there is something in it revolting to sensible minds. A grave fault has been committed; that of menacing much and doing nothing—of being unprepared for ac. tion, and yet speaking in the language of dictation, There wits a better course to have been adopted ; it was that of not being satin. tied with permitting the existence de jure of the power of the Pacha, and at the same time allowing it to be destroyed de fact o It was felt in the whole of the East that nothing was done as to the present, and that a question pregnant with peril was left ex posed to the future. This was said and written to M. Thiess by an agent of Fiance, an honourable man, who has not the quality of Ambassador, but whose councils arc wise and prudent, and ought to be listened to. (N. Vilicmain here read a letter, dated the 12th of October, written by this agent, in Which he says that the French squadron ought to show itself on the coast of Egypt, that the mountaineers would receive the French cordiaty, and that they reploached France for leaving her ships on the coast of Greece. 31. Villemain then passed in review the conduct of the Cabinet of the Ist of March, and continued as follows) :—The C.-1. ',met of the Ist of March placed itself in the eventuality of a war which it did not wish for ; and not having the merit of a prudent policy, it was without even the merit of the imprudence upon which it was rushing.—(lnteruption.) If there had been a defi nitive resolution in the Cabinet,and more foresight, it would have been prepared before the period when it commenced its armaments, The Cabinet of the Ist of March never had the resolution which it pretends to have have had, and, not having had that resolution, it cannot make a ground of accusation against us for our not being williug to complete what it says it was preparing for. At what period of civilisation, I would ask, have we ever heard or read of an armament of 900,000 men as a prelude to negotions i 'a w e have heard a great deal of the effect which this armament . was to produce. We will say what effect we think it would have produced., It' would have led to a - conviction that France, while pretending to be negociating, was in reality preparing for war, and the necessary consequence of such an attitude would have been a general coalition against us. What did the C of the Ist of March do ? Did it not remain inactive until tabinet too late to assume an air of boldness ? and when it did dare wase to assume a menacing altitude, was it not too late to h assume it with effect ? We have now been told, gentlemen , at the plan s of this Cabinet were. T t hey consisted in an - effort greater than the greatest efforts of the Empire. This effort was an armament of 935,000 men, and what was the obj ect of it ? The object'of it, gentlemen, we are told, was for the purpose the spring for the cession of Sy r i a to thPtof negotiating g°ti —( ating in o clia Egypt A laugh.) This plan, good or bad-in itself , had about mo t•t one.great de fect—it came too late. The. Cabinet ought t o have inquired whe ther in the spring Syria would be in a state of independence to ren der a negotiation of the kind possible. I now ask the late Cabinet if it really intended to go to war, how it would have commenced It ? We wish to know in what quarter M. Tillers would have Opened a campaign in order to indemnify , himself for that 1 Syria which he had allowed to be lost ?—(Applause from the Centre.) Are we to be told, is this great nation of 33,000,000 of souls to be told that they were, for such a cause as (hit which has been laid down as a motive for war to be subjected to a military , dictation ? You (the Cabinet of the Ist of March) have left this question in a much worse situation than when it came into your hands. You are not to attempt to extricate yourselves from a diffi. culty by saying, " After us, govern who can."—(A laugh.) y ou have wantonly excited that national enthusiasm which &honkd only be excited for great events. We shall not imitate your conduct —we shall not appeal to national enthusiasm, unless we shall be required to do so in a struggle against a power which is Loth guropean and Asiatic. • Europe will then turn with • SITTING OF NOVEMBER 27. The President took the ch air at one o', the adjou rned discussion on the ad dress. M. Th • ice opened the debate ,he said the Chamber - will d nibt less appreciate the motives which have i nduced me again to ad dress clock -. The Order of the Day . it. Y es terday you heard from th e li on. M. Passy his exp'ana. tions of the policy of the Cabinet of the 12th May. .1 feel it neces sary in the first instance to make some observations or, his state meet. I have never wi s h e d to throw the responsibility of my acts u; on my predecessors. Such conduct on my part would have been unworthy, and I think every person must h ave observed the care I took not to att ac k them in my memo randum. I h av e a tt ac k e d a Policy, not my predecessors. ,I shall, therefore, say only a few words i in reply to the speech of M. Passy ; we are agreed, generally, as to the facts which he has stated, but there are some points on which we diff.r. I thought I had seen by the anterior docu ments that the offer to force the Dardanelles had been made; M. must h ave b een in error when Posy thinks th e con t rar y, an d, theref ore, that M. de Bourquency he put f or th this assertion. Ido not think s o , f or I cannot b e li eve th a t an agent of the Government could have made a mistake on so grave and important a proposition—to have supposed it possible for him so •to have acted, is to suppose that he is without intelligence. What did Lord Palmerston propose? Two things —an intimate union with France, and an immediate solution ; he desired, that in the event of the Russi ans approaching Constantinople, they should be called on to withdraw, and be apprised of t h e consequences of their refusal. Now this, f or me, is even a graver po i nt than the offer to force the Dardanelles (M. Thiele here read a lette r f rom t h e F renc h Charge d'Aff a i res, in which he states, that in the opi n ion of Lord Pahnersto n, t h e French and the British sqnadrons ought, in the event of the Russians approaching Censtantinopte, to appear off t tat capital a s f r i ends, lithe Sultan accepted their assistance, and in the event of hi s not doing so, that they should force the Dardanelles.) The proof, a dd ed M. 'niers, thatM. deßeurqueney did not make any mistake a s t o this proposition is, that in a communication from Lord Granville, th e t ext of the instructions given to the Admirals contains the hypothe s i s of the forcing the Dardanelles; the case, therefore, had evidently been provided for, and the intention of the Eng lish Cabinet was clearly such as it was stated- to be by our represen. the friendly entraneeanodf tative, and as I stated it upon his authority. The Cabinet of the Dardanelles should be forced in the event of the Russians enter. lug the BosphorusPerfectly that England was of opinion that the permission for The Cabinet of the leth Ma • substituted for terruption.) '1 he Cabinet of the 12th M a y Englandjand the instructions)knew it; but it pre ferred to adopt a difthrent course. Ido not blame it. It thought o t f he th l e .re S t u ic l h tall a 's nd re E fu t s ,g it l i i g sh h s is quadro,,,.— c hi. that it would be more advisable to request an entrance from the Sultan, or to negotiate so as to prevent the march of the Russians. the proposition of the object of which was to obtain from the Sultan the facility of entering the Dardanelles, and this negotiation was successful (11e- c M. Titers read several letters of Adurral Roussin, and several despatches, i •n support of this assertion, and then added.) But let us lay aside this miserable discussion sufllce it to say that the given to its Admirals, a negotiation, French Cabinet rejecte 1 the proposition of England. England proposed to force the Dardanelles and that was one of the most rash and decisive acts which could be proposed. M. Villemain, Minister -of Public la:truc tion—Do not thus distort the nature of acts. M.Cabinet of the 12th M 0 M Thicrs—The propo sition. lam not expressi ng a n 1 .,• • on as to its conduct, and shall now abandon the point and opinion to' the anterior nego tiations. (M. Thiers now passed the neg otiations in review, and endeavoured to show th at the Cabinet of t he 12th May had com pletely realised the obje c t of England, viz., that o f rendering the protectorship over Turkey generai, which he said was much more in the interest of England th an of F rance. ) The abolitio n of the exclusive protectorship of R ussia,-added M. Thiers was not the question of moat importan ce to France.- - -( M ur murs.) I do not say that we have no inter es t i n Constantinople. —(N°, n o.) But I do say that all the Powers b a d as much if no t more interest th a n we in t his question ; and th e proof of it is, t h a t at Constantinopler, --, Z every body was on our side. —(Yes, yes.) But the mo st im p ortant question for us Was Egypt.—(Marks of approbatio n. ) We were Morcott that ground. It was th ere that our interest stood alone; t het shore, when we came to that quest i on, the Powers abandoned US, we found ourselves isolated. Whe n we h a d brought the P owers to c o n cur with Us on the question o f C onstant inople, instead o f unit. ing with us on the question of Egypt, they withdre w themselves from us. These are the facts ju st as t h e y transPired ; these are the facts set forth in their true ch arac t e r. 1 Fay, th en, that the C a binet of May 12 served England in generalis in g the protector ship over Turkey, as from that moment she showed herself very exacting with regard to us, and towards the Paella. She proposed to remove by force the two fleets in the port of Alexandria —you refused—l approve of that refusal, and honour you for it. You and: 1, although partisans of alliancewith England, h ave resisted her. We have b ot h opposed her, and we have d one ri g ht; we had better have gone on to an open rupture, than have made con cessions to her which would have been disastrous to our country.— (Appro b a tion.) When the questio n as to territorial limits came to be discussed, we no longer found any one to support us, and that may be readily accounted for•-•:•we alone felt much interest In that question. (M. Thiers here entered into some dctails tend. ing to prove that it was highly important to France ( bat 51114 EVE ,`ANC/ P RT UG AL. anxiety towards France, and seek for our alliance, for then, again I will Europe owe to us its liberty, M. Thicrs, in speaking of an I ess , FAL MOUTH, Nov. 28. eg , anarchical press, declares that he felt honoured by its support ; we , en-the contrary, would boldly reject all support o f such a nature. Cadiz 1.-;.0/ Instead of appealing to an anarchical press, we appeal f or so pp The Vivid steamer arrived last night with the Spanish and P o ert t ug uese mails. The dates are—Gibraltar, Nov. ; is the powers of the State, that is to say, to the Chambers as repie• set ; Lisbon, Nov. 23; Oporto, Nov. 24 ; Vigo, Nov. 25. --- tented by the majority, for this, in fact, Is the true representation I of the country. It is on the majority of this Chamber flee depends LISBON, Nov. 23.—The opposition to the regulatie n n: 2l3 : d s e p - I t the destiny of the country.— against them, both by (Great approbation from the car iyiug into effect the Douro Navigation Conentio • ha, been so violent, and the clamour raised vial benches.) a .; that it It being now a quarter past six, the Chamber adjOurned till to- the Septembristas and some of the Ultra Chartists, so grew: the 1 is believed the Government here will not Attempt to p. ' atu subject further this year, but that t he most urgent which . SITTING OF NOVEMBER 28. I I still unsettled will tie got through the Chambers this wet: t, M. Sauzet, President, took the Chair at half-past one o'clock. that the Legislature will then be prorogued till January ties t. The minutes of the last sitting having been read, the Order of ILaws for recruiting the army, and for authorising the (' lute the Day was read for the adjourned debate on the Address. esets t,to ex p end 50 contos of reis in the purchase of cavalry h M. Guizot, Minister of Foreign Affrirs, having been called to the ha 1 , assed the Chamber of Deputies this weds. e re e istrr Tribune, said that he was determined on putting an end to personal i t is . g enerally expected that some modification of the st questions. He had no taste for recriminations. M. Tillers had w i l l ta k e peace. when he Cortes are prorogued. The Courtis. quoted, on Friday, the passage of one of his letters, in which he ap- said, in honees of seeing the Queen Regent yet restored in _ n ocii i _ prized him of the dispositions of Lord Palmerston, and of the per_ in which case the Court will patronise:t at o . suasion in which his Lordship was, that France would not resist the French inters 'elits l " , fication in an al:ea-Chartist sense; just as, on the otil ; Th e ,eie execution of the treaty. It. should not be inferred from that extract should the present s'o l - 11 "a llt Party ltit;on here will lead them to rut that ors ey that he had not held a becoming language while he was Ambassador fears of a similar revo in Spain continue to r. al in England. .No, nn, from the Centre.) M. Guizot then read the in the hands of the leat3lll7, Septembristas, and parch up son c • w et, whole of this letter, dated July 2.3, to M.Thiers, in which he positively of a coalition Governmer.'t The present 'Ministry Is, of sc ul 7, e . stated that Lerd Palmerston was certain that no opposition would he I hampered by knowing that it' offered by France to the execution of the treaty, and that as soon as the at the first moment it might s 't:it the Die'z policy to recomm a would be sacrificed without affirirs of the East should be settled, England and France would be as change either one way or the ofhe. here from PI mouth eee for co al gold friends as ever. 31. Guizot, in the same letter, described that Llf The Hecate steam frigaSe arn een e would be the course pursued by the Allies on the coast of Syria on Thursday, and left on Saturday r;er the Mediterrane an. e and Egypt, and gave his opinion as to the possible results of an in- Trinculo brig of war and the . eB tervention on the part of Prance on behalf of the Pacha, of the weather is now line : twenteaesee vessels of different natio,e, Oulu march of Ibrohirreon Constantinople, esc. ; and he then asked if French cervette remain here... yesterday, and twenty-two the clay besfore. They could not ( 1.. , there was a word in that despatch calculated to justify the impres. previously for a long time ; some which did were oblige,e Mon made on the Chamber on Friday, by the reading of the same back, and one, a French schooner, lea Belle P0111101..0, _ or. 5_ document. On th s 25th July NI. Guizot had an interview with wrecked on Friday, on the rocks to th. , fiSsu el) of the I3u i g t ! g l ier ` o t Lord Palmerston, at which he presented the memorandum of the crew and passengers were saved. An A:8 trial boat I Friday morninSe M. Thiers. On that day his Lordship gave him the most posi- carpenters, which was crossing from Cacelhas e l iv e eetbo tive assurances of his good will towards France. He said to was s truck. by a squall of wind and instantly tipsy% and tt; ith. him that he was very sorry any difference should have arisen men drowned. It b l e w a p erfect hurricane at the tit r e ; bia aye between the two countries on a que.tion, even though it was a rairr, thunder, an I lightning. We havehad, till with . n' erhe special and limited question. Ile added, that a similar diffe r- two, continued g ales from S.W., with abundance of rat ence had manifested itself in the Belgian affair between Eng- wind is now E. and N.E. land and the three Northern Powers. England then concurred with France as to the necessity of coercing the King of Holland. She had accordingly separate.: from the Three Powers, and sided with France, but without falling out with them, and the peace of Europe was not disturbed. He trusted that such would also be the case in the present ineance, and that the alliance between the two countries would not suffer by this transitory difference. The rest of the despatch referred to a conversation that ensued between M. Guizot and Lord Palmerston, iii which the foriner held to his Lordship a firm and dignified !anguage. M. Guizot next read the already known despatches of the 14th and 17th July, to prove that he had not only given M. Thicrs his opinion on what was going on, but nearly dictated the terms in which the reply to the communication of the 17th should be drawn up. On the 27th he had advised M. Thiers. He told hint that the Ministerial press in London was fearful end uneasy; and that it was necessary the French Government Journals should be firm and tranquil, but not offensive. M. Guizot afterwards maintained that, as Ambas sadsr, he had loyally served his country, that his cambia hod been throughout sincere anti consistent, and that the only points on which he had differed with the Cabinet were, the expediency of electoral ramp, and dissolving the Chambers. DI Guizot after wards examinee the question at' the East in itself, and said that the situation of afLirs had been greatly altered since the conclusion of the Treaty. The latter had been executed to the letter ; all the coast of Syria was in the hands of the Four Allies ; St. Jean d'Acre had been carried by storm, and Ibrahim re called by his Krth..„_ All these occurrences had taken place under the Ministry of the fit of March, in presence of its influence and action, and without its doing anything to oppose the execu tion of the Treaty. In the West it had contented itself with making some armaments, and presenting a casus ball. When in. vested with the direction of affairs by the King, M. Guizot and his colleagues had explained its intentioneto the country in the Speech • from the Throne; giving prudent advice to the Pachs of Egypt, tellerg him frankly, without flattery or weaknees, their opinion on his position ; they had continued their armaments ; they had made Europe no concession or propositiori e The note of the 2d of No. ember, which, he knew not how, had gut into the journals, had ex cited the surprise of the French Cabinet, and the latter had felt it his duty to notify its diseleasure to Lord Pal mersten. His Lordship's reply was couched in the most be coming terms ; he declared that neither the British Cabinet nor the other Powers, had any of the intention supposed by the French Cabinet ; that the uneasiness felt by the latter was un founded ; that the intentions of the signers of the Treaty respect ing Egypt were unchanged ; and, to prove their sincerity, Lord Palmerston not only spoke but acted ; for he transmitted orders to Admiral Stop ford, to send an officer to. Mehemet Ali, and inform him, that if he ceased the hostilities, and surrendered -the fleet, the Four Powers would use their best exertions to obtain from the Sultan the cession to him of the hereditary Government of Egypt, which was exactly what M. Thiers had stipulated for him in the note of the Sth of October.—(M. Thiers here rose, and ob served that, in that note, he did not give up the Pachalic of Syria.) M. Guizot contended that no other construction could be put upon the note, and the Cabinet, iti adopting it as the rule of its conduct, had continued the policy of its predecessors, and that Egypt being now secured to Mehemet Ali, and Syria de facto lost for the Pacha, the Cabinet was bound to accept les fait accoolp lis, and recommend the Pacha to submit. Odillon Barrot, who succeeded M. Guizot, extolled the feeling which the news of the conclusion of the treaty of the 15th of July had roused in thecountry, and he complimented, in similarterms, the neighbours of France, who had renounced their divisions, in presence cf the foreign question, and united in one common senti ment to support their Government. He proposed their example for imitation to the Chamber, and called upon it Ito brand,'by its votes, the doctrine of the faits accomplis proclaimed by M. Guizot from the tribune.. France, he maintained, was in honour bound to befriend the Pacha. She had taken him under her protection. His successes or reverses ought not to change his situation. The Cham bers had intrusted to the Ministry the mission of. protecting the interest of France in the East. This had not been done, and was not likely fo be achieved by the present Cabinet. M. Odillon Barrot strongly blamed the Administration of the 12th of May for not accepting the proposition of England to unite the French and British fleets, for the purpose of forcing the passage of the Dardanelles, (NI. Dufaure, interrupting the speaker, declared that it was Lord Palmerston who had refused to adopt that bold measure,) and thought that England was justified in seeking else. where a less pusillanimous ally. H. Odillon Barrot then took a review of the policy of the French Government, throughout the negotiation, and condemned it for subscribing to the new pub lic law, introduced in the East—the submission of the vassal to his Sovereign—when the Chambers had declared that the rights acquired by the Viceroy of Egypt should be respected, since they were placed under the safeguard of France. An energetic protest should have been entered into against all armed intervention, because such, a measure contained the seeds of an inevitable European war, and actually destroyed the balance of power in Europe. TLe influence. of France in the East was now at an end ; Syria had become an English province ; Egypt would be suffered to exist only on the most humiliating eon'. ditions, and the secular protection exercised by France over that country was for ever destroyed. M. Odillon Barrot then' made a glowing apology of the conduct of thg former Cabinet, who, he said, had not been afraid to look Europe in the face, end run the chances of a war against the Four Powers; it had eat evinced its devotedness to the cause of its country by mere - words : it was likewise determined to act. The stipulations of the note of the Sth October, had it remained in office would have been backed by the .presents of the French fleet at Alexandria. We might have armed, but a war undertaken under legitimate circumstances, and for the real interests of the country, so far from.weakcning the Government, would have contributed to strengthen it. To main tain that an alliance between England and France was not impaired by a treaty concluded between the former and Powers inimical to France, was truly inconceivable. To speak of peace when the cannon of St. Jean d'Acre was still ringing in the ears, and embody pacific protestations in a Par:iamentary address, was humiliating for the country, who, conscious of its strength, had a right to ex pect that its representatives should at least observe a dignified silence.—(Left speaking.) TURKEY. EGYPT. The Count de Tercy, Envoy Ectraoidinary of France to the Court of Persia, has arrived at Paris. The object of the mission of N. Mounicr, the old confidante of the Duke de Richelieu, is to come to an understanding with England on the Spanish question, and a negotiation for the marriage of Isa. bella II and the eldest son of Don Carlos. The letters which we receive from Monte Video, dated the 12th of September, confirm the accounts which we have given of the progress of Lavalle in the cuntry of Buenos Ayres. At that date he was :till fifteen or twenty leagues from Buenos Ayres. The troops under his command amounted to 6,000, or, as others say, to 7,000 men. A demonstration made by our fleet would suffice to put an end to the contest; but Admiral Dupotet will not do any thing, and remains an idle spectator, notwithstanding the indig. nation of all our countrymen in that province. Will Admiral Ilackait manifest more care of the national honour ? We dare not entertain this hope. The small number of troops that he has with him will not enable him to make any great and decisive attempt. Success depends almost entirely on Lavelle. If he should succeed all will be well, bid what will happen should he unfortunately fail ? We fear to predict it. We have received letters from Constantinople of the 7th of No vember One of them gives the following account of the present views of the English Cabinet:— " It seems certain that England consents to leave Egypt to Mehemet A;i ; but on con litionl that he shall give up the fleet, reduce his army, and demolish the fortifications of Alexandria. England will require as the recompense of its intervention permis. sion to establish factories at Bushire, Bagdad, Bassorah, Bir, and A lex andretta." It will :top then for the present,: contented with the commercial occupation of the bank of the Euphrates and its mouth ; but in the sequel, when it shall be able to prove that the plundering hordes on the banks endanger the ports which it has established, it will demand and obtain the power to protect its factories with troops as it has don sin India. We may trust to the clearsighted prudence of England. In fifty years it wi❑ monopolise the whole internal commerce of Asia from Alexandretta to Bushire. It remains to be seen whether the taking of St. Jean d'Aere will not change the disposition of the Porte and its Allies, and whether England will not desire to proceed more rapidly.—Le Coutinerce. We have juit received a communication from our Havre corm spondent, fgoin which the following is an extract : " Havar., Nov. 27. "On Saturday last the English brig William, of Sunderland, laden with coals, for Caen, was lost to the eastward of Dieppe. She had sprung a leak in the gale, and her captain wishing to make Dieppe harbour, which he knew, ran fur the port before the light house was lit up, which is not generally before eight o'clock. It is said he was deceived in the haziness of the weather by the blaze of a lime kiln, which was burning at the foot of the rock on which the light-house stands. The vessel and cargo are lost, together with the mate; the captain and rest of the crew were got off at low tide. " They write from Cape La Hogue that a British lugger from England, laden with coals, was on shore on the reef of rocks off the Hogue, and as the wind blew strong from N. E., it was feared she wouli be lost--the cargo saved, but much injured.—Morning Post BO URSE.—PARis, SATURDAY, NOV. 28. ----- - -- . first Highest Lowest Last Price Price. Plitt: Price French 5 per Cents lll 65 ... 112. 10 .., 11165 ... 11/ 10 4 per Cents. ...... 3 per Cents 79 8) . 80 20 ... 79 B'l ... SO 90 Sank of trance Laflitte [lank 1,0001. Sh 1055 ...1055 ... 1035 ... , 05 5 5(;04. Shares 5151) ...WO ... 5 , 50 ...5150 Etelgian Bank 5 :ier Cents,. 3 rcr Cents New Loan ... ..... ... v ....:h ,a ctive t4 ... 24 ... 23 9 q ... 24 PasgiTe 5% ... 5.X ... 5% ... 5'4 Cortnetiese 3 rer Cents 2. 2 ,4 ... 22.% ... 223 j ... 22% eip.,0).1.1) Roman itri, ... 100 ... 99% ...99% RAILWAY SHARES. i'crsailics, It. I LIL 305 ... 3'7 50 ... 34:5 ... 307 L 0 Oilcans . S rasburg to Bale 247 f.O ... t - . 48 75 ... •,,e7 50 ... 248"75 MESSRS. WRIGHT'S BANK AND THE PARIS AND ROUEN RAILWAY.-The Council of Administration of the Paris and Rotten Railway Company has published a letter, stating that, through the active surveillance of the administrators of the Company resident in London, the amount of the second payment of the share helders in Eng land, which the house of Messrs. Wright and Co. had been commissioned to receive, and convert into Exchequer bills, was actually so converted before tbo house stopped pay ment, and that therefore the Company will not sustain any loss. _....._ • Constantinople, November. ,•;,..7' On the Ist instant, the Turkish Govern ment Sieftller Tair. l3o , 1 0 left this for Syria with 500 soldiers on board, all fine men, and if. excellent condition. The same morning upon which the If is . rahry siled firma this, the Austrian steamer Ferdinando.rtirn°,, is,s, rived fro a m the matt of Syria, having touched on her way to S i r', for cows. She brings no news of later date than what I ga'p's l .,,,,." C. last letter ; but came loaded with passengers, pa ews part of th '''°,,Aga, tiara prisoners, and the rest poor miserable women and chik/Ia ft 'isl.;t l had thrown themselves upon the protection of the allied ferG:001;:>1 a whose presence at this time. in that country could afford us r`o ' - ; they were, therelore,sent up here to enable darn to be put IL,' place of safe ty. None of them died on the voyage, and slit(' „ women were confined. while at sea; only two.. of. the, new. . 4 , ‘ ,.." • infants survived the effects of the great change of temperature.t,. ;I, tequent on the rapid passage of the vessel from a hot to a .-- climate. n , 4 On the night of the 3d inst. was announced th p birth of al , - --th u / Tf t I girl ; the Sultan has now, thereftire, three daughters an d one so !. The rejoicings arc to last three days and three nights. __,,,,,,4 • Since writing my last letter, further particulars have reecho.. 4r ,... about the Egyptian army of the Taurus. From these I learn W . __ the sudden retreat of the Egyptians from Kulek Bogliaz (a mountain-pass, fortified and guarded on one side by the Tork s !1„0 on the other by the Egyptians) to Adana, and thence to 1 1 '• , , i ,,,, and Hems (two important places in the vicinity of AlcPP o )t od, consequence of a peremptory order of Ibrahim Pacha to that.. an - dit ,ot , Before quitting the pass, the Egyptians spiked • all their fl , " ° _,,,er ,it . mortars, which, from the rapidity of their rmavernents, Mey e r ,. ,it , i, • obliged to leave behind. As soon as the news of th i ', r , (4 00 Jr. readied the Turkish General, Hadg Ali Pacha, he orderat A. or.. ,41, the Turkish forces to march forward into Syria, w..:c re t , i i ' A an . posed that he wt!l be j. , incd by the troops stationed at iND° 3 " d " er Diarbekir, who no doubt have by this time recetved the ol: ni stroes-. own ° advance, and cross the Euphrates at Bilcjik, eatuttionly k our maps by the name of Bir. , '62 014. Soon after the retreat of Ibrahim Pacha's army; the io' labl f r e ;Mt: of Tarsus and Adana sent petitions to Hadg-Ali-Pacha, ° h : b r: their allegiance to the Sultan, and requesting the r ach ,!,l;od et— would send them new governors in the places of thole t." - ~:i. present. - BIA,' Nov. Afore a Since the 28th uIt ALEXAND is ~ there nothing new 6 t o notice. -- ar n of more troops are every day leaving Cairo for Syria. ea c r a i rn for camels, variously estimated from 5,000 to 12,0001esve.4bioin4 Syria every fortnight, with provisions and other stores 00 ' or osis army, and the French steamers of war politely' alibld couri er°. tance in conveying by sea the Pacha's despat...eh V o f the officers for the army, and specie for the paYlL l e ° '• pear. troops. Here the "on dit "of the day is all for o ace ie' and tranquillity. A panic almost inconceivable , by the precipitate departure of nearly fifteen hundi, :woo ropeans, of all ranks and calling, has now been as abruptlY ' e by a calm and general confidence that hostil ities will in no -f ha ~ had brougt t to Egypt, that the " decheance" of th e Pacha has no ar the approval of the Four Allied Powers. Here. incredible pi' v io ri p t. Lions for resistance are making. Cannon arc p lanted on OW 1 • French and native engineers are in constant occu p ation repairm ` or constructing fortifications, anti long strings of camels, carryiuS lb d and shell to the different batteries, are met with at every turn_ jou .; Paella is sending to Syria three- Sheiks of the Druses, of Bre a ' belu 4 enee among them, who were exiled by the Ernie Beschir concerned in the first insurrection. They are now recalln _frfoxvi. Sennaar or Nubia. the place of their exile, to effect a reactio sw.:ar their countrymen, whom the English h ave armed and assist finned 1 not very loyally disposed towards the Su ltan, but rather Plc get up a rebellion cn their own account. dt.-a,thr The Euphrates French steamer of war , now running eon' between this and Syria, on her last retu rn here from thence scvot on the rocks on entering the harb our, and ver y narrowly es destruction. She was assisted and towe d oil' by the Nile steal:oss repaired at the Arsenal, and forthwith despatched back agai n " Syria. She brought here Koseuf Effendi, second Dragoman of Om Pasha, and M. Roux, a French officer in the Paella's service-o v a* * had left Acre with importa nt des p atches to Ibrahim, under charges: of a sufficient escort, drawn from the garrison of Acre. They' found, however, the communication cut off, and in one of the re• volted villages were first attacked by the country people, whoa strange to say, were joined by their own escort, who, boring beater:. and maltreated them, left then severely wounded, and ,robbef ,P ‘ everything they had with them. From this it would Appear that the communication between Acre and the Egyptian army is cffec- ...,, ...„ ..... tually cut off; and if so, the former cannot long hold out. o f On the 31st ultimo a French frigate from Bre st, and a beir' --. war fiom the fleet at Athens, arrived here with a report.th.stit_b".--7' French flt had ordrs to reurn to Tuln. r'''' The A e si e a, Captain e Fisher, t has gone to o Malta to refit; an d Ca .. t . ' tain Harvey, of the Implacable, is now senior officer of this P c ' r eo. . The Herald and the Boyne, two English merchant h .ll o'_. o e tered thc harbour on the 31st ultinio, without any moles lc attempt at intimidation by the British fleet, and 'are now l aad'" cotton cargoes. ra ted b! Messrs., Briggs and Co.;of this place, having be en deP _._, H ig. .: •- Captain Johnson on his departure, to fulfil the d uties of forWaL';re„ the Indian mail, in reply to their application to BeEht* ~113_Trbsc' ceived today the following letter, expressive of his satisfacant t7itie,. they were charged with this duty in the absence of the " a ,.... ; and placing at their disposal every facility the country affi" -- : • - • (The original is in French) : ..., WO , ' .' • " Alexandria, Nei. ~.--„ 4,,,5er" " Messieurs--His Highness the Viceroy, to whoin . 1 " le i.: ' . submitted your letter of yesterday's date, has seen I ' lltb u r ateto l : .. • sure that you are charged with the. expedition of 111° „,i - Cir . ' • ' • mails, in the absence of Messieurs Captain Lyori , a" - s hoe', . • tain Johnson ; and as his Highness has always Pa nted for he-h ° mails, every facility which has been requested at his bands , ta -- r d ig.. , ;. given orders that a cavass of his divan shall be placed at Y a , WS 6 , i i . ' 17 t posal, to afford the necessary escort to Mr. Hill, who °U fass' l "' ,:' t ,; es , e O/ 4 .' stated should proceed to Suez to convey them hither. . --- j b , sm" -- 0/7 , is even now charged with the safe-conduct iof these n'' 'rior.o -,,, will place himself under your direction for whatever tirne-,12.-s-!ad think necessary. - Pefit is4 lo 4l4 ,f " 1 have the honour to be, Messrs , with the greatest re l .oirf; 4 1if , •• " BOGHOS JO CS° . u,-' ' • r '' - , ::' , 9 t,, ,,4 ' :' Messrs. Briggs and Co., en ville." .................,............m...........r.......... PAR S. ` ' ) BELGIAN AND GERMAN PA ' <9.- .„, (Voi ' 811[15511.5, Nov. 28.—We learn from Frankfort on .- - ( ; vi i 0 0- i that the lair which has just ceded has been a tired , ' g, ‘ , e tlist; • There were 72,000 cwt. of goods—that is, 10,000 ewt,.,m;c t. °.'. last year. Woollen clothes sold well. There were 8,6',Z dolls wool, chiefly of middling quality, which sold at 50 to 6 .. - . .. A great part remained in the hands of the owners. ~,,i; • ac.. -. BERLIN, Nov. 20.—We expect with some anxiety ftirt".,,-',l.eni. counts of the stipulations of the Treaty of Commerce betw - tniS,, .'' - „ n learn ois n' „• Government and the Porte. According to what we Treaty includes all the States that are Members of th e e G u e s toill, Commercial League (or, as it is sometimes ealle n d, th t c he so - u 'th i c;; ::.. ' • Union), and may become of great importance t States of Germany, when the junction of the Rhine and the . an , I'' is gtic...,i nube, by means of the new canal, shall be complete. tic undertaking the Bavarian Government confers an thencef WI: ' nefit on the commerce and manufactures of German!, a n- , I A LO . add the remit treaties between Austria and Russia, r elat , :; oo if.i ,. the navigation of the Danube we must confess that the O t ...rdr• : • Governments have done a great doia . l in the course of they cq,nroci.gr the piosperity of those dornin,ions! .e. 0..1 • - ~ - 1 9 1 1 I I.li 9 ' 4 , in.:LULA?. I. U NDs—Battssece , Nov. -- - ." ',9- 4 , 1" -Actual Debt, ahi per Cent. . ......... -,, ...Jr. , - - , 0 1 1 ' ' Rothschild's Loan, 5 per Cer4 .... ..... ......... 1',, , ' ~10, 7 ell Loan of` Thirty Millions, 4 per : ..... ... t.. ............ Fe , ' ;,,,05 1 , 0 44 -------.(t.) .................. if 7 ..tni; - i A --- 3 per Cent....... --- ''' b eP ' ) .- Thirty.sQven---. ---.. ..... fiLli .41' ,OW Loan of City, 1832, 4 per Cent. .. . . ......... 9 ,!! ' • , '" g •' - SnrietYnt Commerce, 4 , ,iperCen - t ............. 1 .,",, - ~4 , Bank of Belgium, 5 per Cent ................ .... ....... "7. li National Society . - ,•rjg ''' Exchange on London (short) —Brussels Papers, Nov. 28. DUTCH. FUNDS.—AMSTERDAM, Nov. A. ~,,,,,! L„ ,t,34 per Cent ;tato, ditio D :'er crla. A „,,,, t syn die;,;'' per cent...... ............ 11 4 7 , ;* 3::". ''''' :, lx . ",.'. 71 72% ii..io' Ditto, ditto, 3'c; o e :cent Commercial Company, - 4!:, ;:er cent ma% 16 91 ‘ i,l'i'' .....' -- -- 4E" 'l O Ditto (i. 8.15 and 1837) O per cen:. Loan 1937, 5 per cent. . 'll --- rt b"t lf Exchange on London, One month 12 ` ,3 ' ;.1 1.•...•. ...... , „..s. , ji Two months - 0)1 7 7,;€1 Dutch rapers, Nov. 28. • AUSTRIAN EUNDS.—irtertwa, Nov. 20 1 06 11 . . A° 2, - , M five per Cents. etallimies lose per Cents. .................... .. .. -, , h4f 0- • Three per Cents. ... ...... ... ........ .... Bank Shares "•.„it , i% c ji? —Aligemeine Zeilung, Nov. 25 ' - I ~•-• I PRUSSIAN FUNDS.-Banast Nov 2$ ..,.,'- - ..9 , St. Schuld. Sch., 41, per cent. Prussian English Loan, 1830, 4 per cent Nov .s lif°l i .3 7 .lni ti r ' '' ::s l4l 4e g Exchange on London, three months -..-. u •"" -,, ato" —Prussian Slats Gazelle, 5. —__ Nov.. The . ri tl EXTERNAL COMMERCE OF BENGAGe" 0t.,0',.- Annual Tabular statement of the External ComlO r .. ce i, e g :' It Bengal for 1818-39, and 1839-40 shows a most groat: . ii. t h e year e , " 9, advance in the prosperity of Bengal, during :jog 30th April, 1840, as compared with the year "f a h The imports from Great Britain bad increased 71d 8;. ; and although the Import from China had decrease,. 566 8891. 83.; the aggregate increase for the year amounted' to 925,339/. 2s. The results of the Exports arc aho vent grstifying during the same period, as compared with those ~ of the commercial year ending 30th April, w hile, tO to Great Britain had increased 1,050,427/. s ake i.., China they had decreased 1,115,1441. 'Ss., . aggro gate export to all eountrics shows an increase of 589,5 ' . t , ,i'' Be. The increase of Revenue in the Sea departnicP , 9 4, British Ein-?0,00, Customs, amounted to .105,8261. 103. 3(1. port Tonnage had increased 29,286 tons, and Foreigallfri,;,,oll, I 839. --Those .... 28,563 tons, BritiAli Import tonnage had increased 4,0131 J,, go t' tons, and Foreign 6,540 tons.—East India Tekgrtiph.:•if9";ls 40 In recognition of the eminent services of AdniiFoliali ci l Sir R. Stopford in the recent achit-vertients`by the--,00: di . 3 1 8 ' .60 arms in Syria, we hear that the Governers 111 1 ) : 01:61 ir:jale svich Hospital is to be tendered for his acceptance--ad's!d 4,:0 in wi:ich On spontareous approbation of all partlll", so concur. Commodore Napier will also receive senta,hlol.olbT.,,,,c; - honourable testimonial of the approbation_of.thelfAteraltt';.„"rov for his bravery in the same service.._ i: --_"., .:].: ....... ..,. - .~ '; .} 4 ;I `~. ~i .y". k ? R Chr• The latt oas B ' r esent, i s 00K f t •!Qiih of b ,inr, and 1 . '' e 'O ' let v t " cll th e L 3 of Or co Lond on; I 110 NI Is th: \ Ve hay pi,o,it cl , ti ne fed 1: Pen s 1 4The ! sti r . ...t eoL >al I, l , ea qn s tly r' farce 00 it %t Cl° t '" 4 A An 4E ti ~.; / 1 1 Wi'l7Y's tAZ" 1 1 / 4 „ .. klit i;, tit 0, 41 11 111 ' 41 Ott ktl