The Sun. — London, England, 1847-12-01 00:00:00

IMPERIAL PARMA:VIEW HOUSE OF LORDS, N0v4130. The Earl of SaA ESBI:RY, in the absence of the Lord Chancellor, took his seat upon the Woolsack at Five o'clock. COSTS—ECCLESIASTICAL COURTS. Lord BROUGHAM presented a petition com plaining of the excessive costs of suits in Doctor's Commons, and stated that he should one day draw the attention of their Lordship to this subject. INDIA. The Earl of ELLENBOROUGH moved for an account of all sums advanced by the Government of India on the hypothecation of goods in each year from 1839 to 1846, both inclusive, with the rate or rates of exchange at which in each year such sums have been advanced, and the credit given for the repayment of such advances ; also, An account of all bills drawn upon the several Pre sidencies in India respectively, by the Court of Directors of the East India Company, in each of the years from 18319 to 1846, both inclusive, with the rate or rates at which bills were drawn in each year, and the number of days after date or sight at which such bills were payable ; also copy of the notifieation issued by the Govern ment of India on the sth August, 1843, with respect to the proposed discontinuance of advances on the hypothecation of goods, and of any official report which led to the issue of such notification, and of all correspondence between the Government of India and the Board of Directors, relative to such proposed discontinuance of such advances ; also, copies of all memorials or representations addressed to the Commissioners for the affairs of India, or the Court of Directors, by merchants in England, with re spect to such advances, together with the replies thereto, from 1839 to 1846 inclusive ' • and also, copies of any agreement entered into by any com pany or companies for constructing railways in India with the Government of India, or the Court of Di rectors of the East India Company, whereby any amount of interest is guaranteed to such railway company. He considered that if these returns were made they would in a great measure explain the cause of the recent railway failures. At that time he was Governor-General of India, he had endeavoured to discourage these advances on the hypothecation of r._, odc and he wished to call the attention of her Ma jesty's Government to this subject, which was most important. It appeared that the Court of Directors had ordered large remittances of bullion to be made to them from India. Now, to show the effect of this measure upon the well-being of the people of India, he would refer to a letter written by Mr. Trevelyan, now one of the Secretaries of the Treasury, but at the time whe'n that letter was written employed in India, viz., in 1832. In that year the directors had ordered a quantity of silver to be remitted from India, and in. consequence, as Mr. Tre velyan stated, ,Bengal .was almost drained of silver. The natives, in • consequence, suffered the greatest distress ; and - the land tax, which had been previouely cheerfully paid, was with diffi culty collected. No doubt it would be more con venient for the Court of Directors to drain India of its bullion, than to go into the Money market here for the supplies which they muat doubt they' would be forced to pay a higher rate.; of interest for rai s ing money in this,country - .dUring the present state a necessity in the money market, but that would affect only the proprietors of East India stock and the holders of East India securities, and would not at all affect the great bulk of the po• pulation of India, and he held that it was the duty of her Majesty's Government to take care of the in terests of the millions of India who had been en trusted by Providence to their care, and he thought that this was a case in which the Government was called on to exercise the most careful consideration, and not to lightly sanction the course proposed to be pursued by the Court of Directors. The Noble Earl concluded by moving for the returns. The Earl of AUCKLAND, on the part of the Government, had no objection to grant the returns. With regard to what had fallen from the Noble Earl on the subject of advances on the hypothecation of goods, he (Lord Auckland) was inclined, in a great measure, to agree with him with regard to the second point, and also with regard to the advances made by the direc tors to railway companies ; he must at present decline giving any opinion. The returns were then agreed to. RAILWAYS. Lord WHARN6LIFTE --- aWed whether the mea sure for granting additional time to those railway companies who had obtained their Bills for completing their works, was intended to apply to Railway Ex tension Bills also? Earl GREY said that, until the subject had been considered in the House of Commons, he could not give an answer. Their Lordships then adjourned. HOUSE OF COMMONS, N0v.:30. The SPEAKER took the Chair at Four o'clock. Several Hon. Members took the oaths and their Beats. TURNPIKE TRUSTS. Mr. FREWEN proposed the following resolution with respect to these trusts :—" That, in order to facilitate the passing of Acts for the purpose of amal gamating turnpike trusts, this House will generally consent to suspend the standing orders during the present session of Parliament in cases of private Bills, the object of which is to unite two or more turnpike trusts_ That, on or before the last day of February, 1848, and one month before leave be given to bring in any Bill for the purpose of uniting turnpike trusts, the promoters of any such Bill shall be required to give notice, in the form prescribed by the standing orders, once in some newspaper published in the county, or, if there is none published in the county, then in a newspaper generally circulating in the county where the said turnpike roads are situated, of their intention to make such application to Parliament : and shall also serve, or cause to be served, on the clerk of each of the said turnpike trusts, a copy of the said notice ; and there shall be a schedule attached to each Bill, stating whether the trustees of each trust assent to or dis sent from (orotherwise as the case may be) such Bill." The Hon. Gentleman said the object which he had in view in proposing them was to facilitate in every way the amalgamation of small turnpike trusts. Wher ever this was done the best results had accrued to the amalgamated bodies. For instance, since the whole of the metropolitan trusts were combined in one commission, they had been enabled to pay 168,0001. of their debts. The subject had been for some time un,ler the consideration of local magistrates, and they were generally of opinion that the resolutions he now submitted should be carried out. Mr. STRI_, T TT said that the House had laid down certain standing orders, prescribing the course to be adopted by persons applying for Bills affecting turn pike trusts. The House had carefully considered the subject, and the courses recommended had been invariably adhered to. The Hon. Member now pro posed that all the standing orders should be suspended. He did not see any reason why the present mode should be altered. It appeared to him a somewhat extraordinary mode of proceeding, that now before • the month of November had expired, and with the one case of hardship which the Hon. Member had re ferred to, the House should be called upon to lay aside its standing orders without any recommenda tions from a Committee on the subject. lie therefore felt bound to give his opposition to the motion of the Hon. Member. Sir W. JOLLIFFE said that there was no doubt the proposed resolutions would not effectually remedy the existing difficulties of the case. Some of the trusts in the south of England were in so utterly a a hopeless state, that it was impossible for them to amalgamate. He felt bound to give his Opposition also to the motion of the Hon. Member. Mr. FREWEN said that the trusts were in the sam e difficulties all over the country. In one parish in Sussex there were no less than sixteen trusts, all of which were in the hands of the creditors, and the inhabitants h a d thr e atened to pull down the gates, as had been d one some ti me s i nce i n S o uth Wales. After the statement of the Right Hon Gentleman (Mr. Strutt) he to d th n d ot press his motion. He begged, therefo re , Motion withdrawn. it. RAJA OF SATTARA. Mr. G. TtlompSON presented a petition from the Tower Hamlets, an inquiry into the claim s the House to institute been made the Raj a o f S a tt ara , an d the charges which had made against hi m . Mr. J. WILLIAMS pre by 750 of the electors of sNtlaetreyd a petition, signed lebone, to the same effect ; and a petition from also to the same effect. borough of Finsbury Mr. BROTIIERTON presented a petiti on from Salford praying an inquiry into the case of th e R a j a of Sattars. COERCIVE MEASURES FOR IRELAND. Colonel THOMPSON presented a petition, nume rant 1V s igned by the inh abitants of B radford, praying the J-louse not to sanction any coercive measures for Ireland. POOR -LAWS (IRELAND). Mr. GRANGER presented a petition from Cork in favour of an assimilation of the poor-laws of Eng. land and Ireland. PUNISHMENT OF DEATH. Mr. BERKELE Y p resented a petition, signed by 2,500 of the inhabit ants of Bristol, f death. i n favour of the abolition of the CURRENCY o RRENCY ACT. Mr. G. CRAIG presented a petition praying the Rouse to repeal the existing Currency Act. SCOTCH BANKING. Mr. J. B. SMITH presented a petition from Stir ling praying for an alteration of the law relating to St° tell banking. _ NATIONAL DEFENCES. Mr. AOSBORNE gave notice of his intention on T U an early clay to call the attention of the House to the state of the national defences of Great Britain and Ireland. MEXICO. Colonel THOMPSON gave notice of his intention on this day fortnight to call the attention of the House to the facts and the effects of the invasion of Mexico by the Americans. TENANT RIGHT. Mr. S. CRAWFORD gave notice of his intention on Tuesday, the 14th of next month, to bring .1 a 13111 with respect to tenant right in Ulster and other parts of Ireland. QUARANTINE LAWS. On the motion of Dr. BOWRING, all such papers as had been issued from the public departments since the last returns relative to the quarantine laws were ordered to be laid upon the table of the House. COUNTY COURTS. - - - On the motion of Mr. GRANGER, the following returns relative to the County Courts were agreed to— " 1. The total number of plaints entered in each Court, from the time when the Act came into operation to the Ist of December, 1847, specifying the number of plaints above 101.; above 5L and not exceeding lu/.; above 11. and not exceeding 5/.; and at and under 1/. " 2. The total number of days that each Court has sat within the above period, and the average number of hours comprised in each sitting. " 3. The total number of causes tried by each Court during the above period. "4. The gross total amount of moneys received in each Court, from the Ist day of April to the let day of December, 1847, distinguishing the amount received for fees from the amount received to the credit of suitors. "5. The total number of causes tried in each Court with the assistance of a jury ; specifying the number of such causes in which a verdict has been recorded in favour of the party requiring a jury to be summoned." IRELAND. Mr. J. O'CONNELL put several questions to the Government relative to the measures they intended to bring forward to meet the distress of the present winter in Ireland ; and was also desirous of knowing when those measures would be laid on the table. He also wished to know when the contemplated Bill for the amendment of the law regarding landlord and tenant in Ireland was to be introduced? Sir G. GREY was sorry that the Hcn. Member had not thought it right to give notice of the ques tions he had just asked. He had but that minute received the list of the questions, and was, therefore, not prepared to answer them satisfactorily. With respect to the Tenant Right Bill, he could not pledge himself to the precise time when it wouli ba intro duced, but he could assure the Hon. Member the subject was under the consideration of the Govern ment. Mr. JOHN O'CONNELL would give notice of his intention to move an amendment on that subject on the question of the House going into a Committee of Supply. RAJA OF SATTARA. Mr. GEORGE THOMPSON postponed his mo tion relative to the documents connected with the case of the Raja of Sattars. SWITZERLAND. Mr. URQUHART wished to know from the Noble Lord the Secretary fur Foreign Affairs whether it is the intention of her Majesty's Government to interfere in the civil dissensions of Switzerland, except as a mediator invited by both parties to act ? Lord PALMERSTON said that the answer to the questions of the Hon. Member might be given by referring to the Speech of her Majesty on the subject, delivered on the first day of the session. The first intention of her Majesty's Government was to refrain from interfering at all in the affairs of Switzerland, but, at the earnest request of the Government of France, her Majesty's Government had consented, in connexion with the other four Great Powers of Europe, to offer their mediation to Switzerland, with a view to bring about an amicable settlement of hostilities. Her Majesty's Government, however, made it a condition of joining with the other Powers, that it should be left entirely optional with both or either of the parties in Switzerland to accept or refuse that offer, and the refusal of that offer by either party should not be made the ground of hostile mea sures.—(Hear, hear.) He should, however, state on the other hand, that there was a distinct understanding requested by the other Powers, that that condition should not be considered as fettering the other Powers as to the exercise of their own rights. He thought it useful to remind the House that by the declaration signed by the five Powers in Nov., 1815, at Paris, the five Powers declared that they guaranteed the neutrality and independence of the territory of Switzerland, such as it was defined by the Congress of Vienna and the Treaty of Paris. Mr. B. OSBORNE wished to ask the Noble Lord if he had any objection to lay upon the table of the House the papers which her Majesty's Government had received relating to Switzerland? Lord PALMERSTON said he had no objection whatever, and they should be laid before the House in due course. Mr. URQUHART wished to know if Government would be prepared to prevent any other power inter fering with the aid of force in the affairs of Switzer land. Lord PALMERSTON said he was sure the House would excuse his not answering that ques tion.—(Hear, hear.) THE LAW OF MARRIAGE. Mr. RICE, seeing the Hon. Member for Buteshire in his place, wished to ask him when the Commission sitting upon the Law of Marriage was likely to make its report ? Mr. S. WORTLEY replied that the Commission, since the Ist of November, hart met regularly, and collected a considerable body of valuable evidence, and they were now daily pursuing their inquiries. He was in hopes that the Commission would be in a po sition to make its report early next spring. SMALL DEBTS COURTS. Mr. 'WALPOLE cal:ed the attention of the House to the system that at present prevailed of multiplying fees under the County Courts Act, and asked the Chancellor of the Exchequer whether, as it was con templated paying the judges of these courts by sala ries instead of fees, it was intended to pass a law to prevent the continuance of the abuses he com plained of. Sir GEORGE GREY said the practice had been adopted in some county courts, but not all. The practice was contrary to the intentions of the Act, and he had been collecting information on the subject, with the view of applying a remedy. He believed it would be necessary to have a new table of fees. THE COMMERCIAL DEPRESSION. The CHANCELLOR of the EXCHEQUER said he rose for the purpose of moving the motion which stood first on the paper of to-day, namely, that a Select Committee be appointed to inquire into the causes of the recent commercial distress, and how far it has been affected by the laws for regulating the issue of bank notes payable on demand ; and, in pursuance of the promise which he made on the first night of the session, he should avail himself of the opportunity, not only of stating the reasons which induced Government to give that recom mendation to the Bank of England, which was con tained in the letter of the 25th of October, signed by himself and his Noble Friend the First Lord of the Treasury, but also to state the views which Govern ment entertained of the causes which had given rise to the commercial distress. He need hardly say that it was from no unwillingness on the part of Government that this statement was not made at an earlier period of the session, because so much mis apprehension had prevailed as to many things which had taken place as to make it no less the in terest of Government than it was their duty to lay that statement before the House and the country at the earliest possible period. That duty, however, now devolved upon him, and he need hardly say that he felt very sensibly the, responsibility which attached to him, in the perform ance of that duty. It was no light matter for a Government to be under the necessity of con• templating a revolution of the statute law, though he was happy to say none had taken place, and it was not, therefore, necessary for him to apply to the House for a Bill of in demnity. But still her Majesty's Government stood there to be judged by Parliament upon this important question, and it was for that purpose that Parliament had been called together at an earlier period than was usual. It was impossible not to feel that as their feelings had been ex cited, and some of their interests affected by the recent occurrences, that all the members of the House could act in this matter as impartial judges, and as this circumstance placed him in a situation of peculiar difficulty, he hoped he might be allowed to ask of the House more than an ordinary share of that indulgence which he had so often experienced at their hands. In taking the course they had pursued, Government had been prepared to meet with blame, w hi c h attac h e d to a ll part i es w h o took a middle course, but the view which would be taken of their conduct would no doubt be influenced in a considerable degree by the opinions entertained of th e A ct of 1844 Those who disap proved o f it were likely to blame them for not having more completely bdeparted from it, an d accor di ng l y ought hadnoatlretado y have met t by parties who said they whomoerdfered—by others, who said they had done their interference Now, wnydet(illothat they ought —and by others, goooNnt mus s wt e o V eu ll lg o re sa p l a d re t d he t y o to have interfered sooner. ought to have interfered sooner prove that an earlier interference prov ed mischievous, instead of b ene fi c i al. i not have n t o those who said they ought t o have departed f u rther from the Bi ll of 1844, he must tell the had they done so Government would have acted con trary to their first eon WI because the principle WI continued they COO . upon which that 1 LONDON, , sidered was the only sound principle that could regulate the issue and circulation of notes. When he stated that he had the utmost confidence in the Act of 1844, he did not wish it to be imagined that he was one of those who contended that the prin ciple of that or any other measure arising from human wisdom was, in all circumstances, at all times, and at all hazards, to be carried into effect.—(Hear, hear.) Nothing that arose out of human wisdom could be considered inviolable. He spoke thus of the Act of 1844; but his remarks applied with equal truth and sincerity to other Acts embodying more sacred principles still. He might make the same remark with respect to trial by jury—with respect to the still more sacred palladium of liberty, the Habeas Corpus Act ; it was no torious that at various times these and other Acts had been suspended with temporary ad vantage to the country. It was so in other sciences as well as in that of legislation. In that of medicine, it was notorious that a certain treatment must be applied to some diseases, whilst it was equally notorious that for others a diametrically opposite course must be pur sued, and with the same success. 'What he said of these laws he said also of the Act of 1844 ; it was a measure which, like those to which he had referred, could not, under altered circumstances be carried into strict execution. It was first brought into opera tion under a combination of circumstances of ti peculiar nature, because the state of things that prevailed was unprecedented for years ; and he trusted it would be unparalleled for years to come.—(Hear.) There had been a heavy drain on the capital of the country for the purchase of corn, and much alarm prevailed amongst those engaged in the cotton and other extensive manufacturing operations that they should be unable to meet their engagements. And they had not even met, during that period, with that general mistrust—such an univesal alarm and panic which they had witnessed six weeks ago. What system, what legislation, could have provided against the alarm and panic which prevailed at the period of which he was speaking ? Legislation, and in fact every system, proceeded upon the principle that men were at times acted upon from various causes, by the principles in herent in human action. That they adopted stops and indulged in fears and distrust against which the wisdom of legislation could not provide. If the standard was depressed in 1819, and was even now of much less value, that would be no argument against what took place in the interim. Debts were contracted in money of the same value at the two periods, and if the depres sion had depreciated the value of gold, debtors would have thereby been enabled to cheat their creditors. Some entertained the opinion that there should be free trade in gold, and that notes should be issued in propor tion as the transactions of the country—the demands for cotton, for instance, increased—that they should rise and fall in number and amount. In the autumn the price of agriculture was low, and commerce was stagnant, and, consequently, according to this theory, a smaller amount of bank notes would have been required than the Act of 1844 allowed. It was, however, no condemnation of that Act to say that it was made to meet the contingency which had occurred. The pressure could not have been foreseen. Mr. Jones Loyd, one of the most distin guished supporters of the Act, wrote in 1840, in a work which he published in 1844, that a change in the commerce of the country might render a relaxation of the Act necessary, and Mr. Hus kisson also stated that if such a period should occur during a depressed currency, that measures of relief must be left to the wisdom of those in power at the time. " These remarks," continued Mr. Huskisson, " form a true answer to the memorial of the London bankers, in which they urged the introduction of a special clause the operations of the Bill in times of peculiar pressure of the money market. To accede to such a proposition would be virtually to destroy the efficacy of the measure.—(Hear, hear.) The commencement of a drain or pressure upon the money market is the time in which the provision of the Bill became the most important, and, except strictly adhered to, the whole measure becomes a nullity. For all contingencies which can reasonably be anticipated, and which are susceptible of being previously defined by law, the strict application of the provisions of the Bill is essential.—(Hear, hear.) Against the occurrence of those contingencies which are not capable of being fore seen or defined by law, but which are not altogether impossible, the Bill itself affords the best protection which can be obtained. Should occurrences ever arise beyond all ordinary calculation, and not amenable to the application of any ordinary principles, the remedy must be sought, not in the opera tions of the Bill, but in the discretion of those who may then be at the head of affairs, subject to their own responsibility, and to the judgment of Parliament." Believing in the truth of the principles contained la the foregoing extracts, her Ma jesty's Government felt it to be their duty to act in the manner in which they had done.—(Hear, hear.) He would now proceed to show the House that the time when they took the step to which he had alluded was such a severe period has had not existed in the country for a quarter of a century. The step was taken for the pur pose of allaying the panic in the market more than with a view of relieving the monetary pressure upon the country. The end which they had in view had been effected. The causes of the pressure he thought lay far deeper than was supposed by those persons who imagined it to be owing solely to the issue of one or two million of bank-notes.—(Hear, hear.) He thought that those who attributed what took place to so inadequate a cause as that had but little apprehension of the gravity of the circumstances.—(Hear.) There was no doubt but that the pressure had been exagerated by that circumstance. In the summer of 1846 there was a most unexampled drain of capital for the purchase of corn and for invest ments in Government works. He had no doubt but that the country might have borne up under the pressure of the vast purchases of corn and the permanent invest neat of large sums of money, but sooner or later such abstractions of capital would effect the whole superstructure of the credit of the country—(Hear, hear.) In the year 1837 there was &great commercial pressure; in the year 1838 there was a severe drain for the purchase of corn; but those two circumstances came separated not, as in the present year, together.—(Hear.) Although the pressure for money had been very great, sill the amount of accommodation afforded by the Bank of England was considerably less in the autumn of 1839 than in the corresponding time of the autumn of the present year. He found that on the Ist of October, 1839, the Bank notes in circulation, including Bank post bills, was 16,800,0001., whereas on the 2d of Oct., 1847, the amount was 19,577,0001., being an increase of about 3,000,0001. The private securities held by the Bank of England amounted on the let of October, 1839, to 13,290,0001., but upon the 2d of October, 1847, the amount was 21,260,0001., being an increase of no less than 8,000,000/. in the amount of accommodation afforded by the Bank of England to the mercantile and commercial interests of the country during the year 1847 as compared with the year 1839. From that time the state of things changed. The har vest of 1846 failed, and it became necessary to import largely for the relief of the people ; and it was also in 1846 that the increased demand of railroads took place; and then it was for the:first time that a drain of gold was felt. This was the state of things prevailing through the autumn of that year. The drain on the Bank of England was great in the extreme, but the Bank was enabled to meet the demand out of their own coffers. In the course of the next year, however, the Bank was obliged to raise their rate of discount ; the importation of corn became greater than in the last year, and the result was a rise in the rate of interest to 5 per cent. Then came the panic. He had stated before, and he saw no reason to-change his opinion, that it was caused by the imprudence of the Bank of England in letting out money with the freedom they did—(Hear, hear) — and then pulling up as suddenly as it let out its money before, and the result was the alarm that had taken place. The Bank kept increasing their discount, and on the sth of August last they raised it to 51. per cent. The first of the great failures took place on the 10th of August, in this state of things—Leslie and Alexander failed on that day ; and it was a remarkable fact that almost all the houses that had failed in the first instance were largely engaged in transactions in corn. Between May and September the price of corn fell no less than 50 per cent. ; in fact, the average price of corn in May was 1025., and in September 48s. The im portations that were made in Msy were most extrava gant, and although it was no part of his duty to warn people against the consequences of their over- specula tion, be omitted no opportunity last session to state to the House the extraordinary amount of speculation that wes going on. He came to town early in September, and he found the general impression was that the failures, that were taking- place, were almost entirely confined to houses in the corn-trade.—(Bear, hear.) That, too, was his own impression and as Honourable Friend had assured him that it was the impression of some of the large brokers of Liverpool. Early, how ever, in September—on the 6th, in fact—the Bank of England announced that they would make advances, up to the 14th of October, at five per cent., which was exceedingly unfortunate, because dealers did not so much attend t.) the published accounts as they did to the acts of the Bank and the rates of interest they charged in making advances. Now, what was the eget of those acts of the Bank authorities upon the notes in circulation ? He had already stated that in the be ginning of June the notes in circulation amounted to 18,000,0001. odd, while on the 30th of July they amounted to 18,892,0001. On the 17th of September the amount of notes had gone down to 17,840,0001. ; but on the 2d of October, when the advances had increased, the amounts had in creased to 18,712,0001. ; therefore, the difference was quite immaterial. During the whole time of the pres sure they were 200,0001. more than at the time of which he was speaking. The other securities on the 24th of July were 15,300,000/. The amount of accommodation given to the pnblic at this time of extraordinary pressure had increased to 21,265,0001. In fact, in August and September the increase was considerable. If they took the amount of securities in former years, with the corres ponding period of last year, they would find that the amount in— October 1844 was £10,500,000 1845 ... 15,000,000 - 1846 ... 15,000,000 - 1847 ... 21,250,000 He did not think that any inference detrimental to the Bank could be drawn, because it appeared that they had given a ccommo d at i on, as at any former ti me, and their not es were a b out 1,000,0001 . below their limit. In Scotland there had been little or no difference be tween August and September, in 1846 and 1847; in Ire land less than in the former year, and the failures there. Lwere comparatively small. Now the Bank never refused to discount bills which they had taken at former times. 1 1 They charged, however, a higher rate of interest. They WEDNENDAY_ EVENING, ; took all those bills which at any period they bad re ceived, and they had continued to do so up to the present time. Up to October there was no great inadequacy of notes. The Government believed that the pressure was caused by a drain upon the avail able capital of the country. The first great drain to which he would refer was corn. The net cost of the corn imported as corrected by Mr. Porter was—from June, 1846, to January, 1847, 5,139,0001.—fr0m January to July, 14,184,000/., and in the three months from July to . October the cost for corn had been greater than during the preceding six months, namely, 14,240,000/.—(Hear.) He had stated the other night that the capital expended in railways had been 4,500,000/. a year on the average from 1841 to 1843, making in 1841 and 1842 from 1,500,000/. to 2,090,0001. This was incorrect ; it should stand thus : In 1841, 1842, and 1843, 4,500,000/. each year; in 1844, 6,000,000/. ; and in 1845, 14,000,000/. The first half of 1846, 9,800,080/. ; the last half, 26,600,000/. ; the first of 1847, 25,770,000/. ; and if the works had pro ceeded at the same time, the expenditure in the last half of 1847 would have been 38,000,000/. He was not indisposed to agree with his Right Hon. Friend the Lord Mayor of York (Mr. Hudson) that per haps it would have been as well if a little check had been placed upon the amount of the bill transactions of the year, but still he thought that the detention of about 50,000,000/ of floating capital and conversion of the same into fixed capital. It was painful to allude to the cases of insolvency which had recently takenplace ; but he thought it was clear that a large number of those houses which had failed had for a number of years been destitute of the requisite capital to carry on their business. And in other cases business was forced not so much with a view to the profits to be made as with a view of promoting the extension of bill transactions. There was no doubt but that credit was essential to car rying on the extended business of this great country, but still there were some bounds to the syst em o f cre dit, there ought to be some proportion maintained between the money and the credit.—(hear, hear.) The failure of a number of houses was attributable to the ci r cumst a n ce of the produce-brokers not being able to discount their bills, in consequence of the large number of acceptances which they had in hand.—(Hear,) When he found that more than one-half of the means of carrying on the business of some parties bad failed through this cause, he was not at a loss to account for the various failures which had recently taken place. The conduct of the Royal Bank of Liverpool was such as fully to justify him in the view he had taken. In that case nearly the whole of their capital was advanced upon discounts. The party obtaining this large advance was not able to get his bills discounted; hence the difficulties of that concern. He had conversed with many of his friends who were practically acquainted with the mode of con ducting business, and they expressed themselves per fectly appalled at the reckless manner in which the business of some of the larger houses was conducted. It would be improper in him to do more than allude to this in general words, and he hoped the House would believe that he did not state it without a knowledge which justified him in doing so. He thought after this statement, the House would be in a condition to judge to which of the two causes the failures of September and October were to be attributed. It bad been said, on one hand, that it was owing to the stringent operation of the Act of 1844 which prevented the issue of notes by the Bank; while, on the other hand, he maintained it was caused principally by the undue extension of credit, and the want of adequate capital. He had shown that there had been no want of circulation, and also what amount of capital had been withdrawn from trade, and he would appeal to every impartial and reflecting man to say to which of those causes the failures were attributable? In October an occurrence took place . which changed the feeling of persons in the City. Early in September the Bank had been accustomed to make advances for a limited time out of the Government balances in their hands—of course it could only be for a limited time, for the advances were made out Of the public money which had accumulated for the payment of the dividends. (Hear, hear.) The Bank gave a notice that they would grant loans till the 14th October. They soon ad vanced such a sum as they thought they could with safety, and the demand for advances had nearly ceased. But on the two last days of September there was an extraordinary increase of demand for these loans, and instead of a sum of about 70,0001. on 29th September it amounted to 150,0004 and on 30th to 360,000/. The sum from which they could make these advances was limited, and on the 2d of October they issued a notice that it was found impossible to increase the amount of advancea, and that they should expect by the time the dividends were due that the loans would be repaid. The whole commercial world was in a state of surprise at this, as if it was as unusual and as un justifiable a step as was ever taken. Gentle men in the City would, he hoped, forgive him if he said that he was astonished how any man could be surprised at it. The loans were advanced from the Government money accumulated for the payment of the dividends, and last spring he had stated that the Government balances would be high. It was said that if there was any deficiency cf accommodation, it would be caused by his deficiency bills. He stated that it would not be so, for whether he borrowed or not there would be a large amount there, and the effect wows' be the same, for the accommodation must be withdrawn at a given time. He said also that if the Bank had large Government balances on their hands they would lend to parties, and the loans would be pay able when the dividends were due, and at that time, and whether there were deficiency bills or not, the eft/et would be the same. Precisely what he said in April came to pass in October, and it ought to have taken no , one by surprise. There was a general impression that the amount of the loan would be rapidly withdrawn. On Sept. 25, the aggregate was 4,928,0001., and on Oct. 9, it was 4,544,0001., and the only thing the Bank was bound to do was to see the loan repaid. When he (the Chan cellor of the Exchequer) came to town on October 22, he found the City in a state of panic. He saw persons of all classes and descriptions, from the time he was up until he went to bed, and he never passed so painful a week. The interest of money rose to an exorbitant rate, and sixty per cent. per annum was charged for what were called continuations for one day. It was thought impossible that the loans could be repaid, and if reliance for the payment of the dividends was placed on the return of those loans, that there would be a disap pointment, and that it would be impossible for the public creditors to be paid. The next week came, and the dividends being due the loans were repaid. The Go vernor and Deputy-Governor of the Bank acted with ex treme prudence and discretion, and received the payment of the loans, and, on the whole, they were punctually paid. The notes which were paid in were issued in pay ment of the dividends, and the result was, that in this extraordinary period of demand for notes there was taken out of the Bank in the four days for payment but 300,0001. more than in the corresponding days of last year. When the parties had a right to demand 7,000,000/, extra, they only drew 300,0001. more than in 1846. The gloomy anticipations of the week before the payment of the dividends were not realised, and in spite of the failure of the Royal Bank of Liverpool on the Monday following there was in London a better feel ing in the early part of the w ee k, an d one of the papers, in its money article, stated that matters were steadier, although they had been affected by the failure of the Newcastle Joint Stock Bank. There was a de cided change in the accounts on Thur s d a y, F r id ay, an d Saturday. The payment of the dividend s did not indi cate . any eiv improved ed o f the feeling. state By the country, and f rom various parts they were very alarming. this time, too, a ccoun t s were of On Monday th e Royal Bank of Liverpool failed —a failure which was only caused by gross neglect, for, with a paid-up capital of only 600,0001., 500,040/. had been advanced to one house. At the same time apprehensions were enter tained with regard to a broker whose name he had mentioned. He applied to the Bank for assistance, and they gave it. Another bank stopped at Li verpoo l , an d apprehensions were entertained for the safety o f ot h er country banks, especially in the commercial districts, for in the agricultural parts of the country they had been comparatively at ease. There was an alarm as to the banks in the west of England, one of which had since failed, and was reported to be likely to pay a very small dividend. News came of the stoppage of the Newcastle Union Batik on Thursday, and later in the day there were accounts of severe runs on several district banks. Allusion had been made to the assist ance given to that bank. The fact was that Mr. Richardson, the manager, Caine to London to get assist ance from the Bank of England, and left without obtain ing it. So far was it from being true that there was any ' recommendation from the Government on the subject. It was true that that bank was saved by the interference of the branch bank of the Bank of England, and Mr. Grote took on himself a fearful responsibility, for seeing the danger that would arise even to the peace of the country, unless that bank was saved, he furnished it with the means of standing the run which was made on it on Friday and h a lf of Saturday ; and part i es w h o had withdrawn gold and notes in the morning tendered them as re-deposits in the evening. It did not appear that there was a run for bank notes, but a steady run for deposits on t h e b anks of Liverpool and M anc h ester in the course of a few days preceding the Thursday and Friday. Then came a fearful aggravation of the supposed danger. It was a matter o f notoriety now that application for assistance had been made by the banks of Scotlaud. It was generally considered that those banks were on so safe a footing that they were able to take care of themselves, and that they would not find it necessary to apply to the Bank of Eng land ; but applications were made, and occasioned much alarm. For when it was considered how enormous the deposits are—(gear, hear) —in the Scotch banks which may be readily withdrawn—(Hear) —and most of which aro made on security which, though solid, is not easily realised, there was just cause for alarm.—(Hear.) The demands on the Bank of England for assistance, and on the London banks, to assist these correspondents, were extensive. Two bill brokers stopped, and others were paralysed, and the whole discount business was thrown on the Bank of England, and they refused to discount no bills which came within their rules, but a large mass of paper, which was usually done by bill brokers, were refused. The Right Honourable Gentleman, the Lord Mayor of York, had referred to the price of Exchequer bills, but in 1845 they were at a lower discount than in October last. Compare them with what they were in 1847. In Mr. Tooke's History of Prices it was stated that in June, 1847, the period of the panic, they were at 335. discount (as we understood), while in October last they were at 30s. discount. This was the state of things which was represented to the Government from all parts of the country, and a feeling arose in commercial quarters, the least likely to be biassed, who came to them, and whose opinions they took, that mat ters were growing serious unless some measure was adopted by the Government to restore confidence. He did not deny that the statements which had been laid before him were alarming. He took pains to examine their accuracy, and he could not deny that most unwil lingly and most reluctantly he came to the conclusion that it was necessary to interfere, and having come to DECEMBER 1, 1041. Ithought he had shown they had acted successfully.--- (Hear, hear.) But it had been urged that they ought to have acted much more largely, and that it was the duty of the Bank of England to have discounted every bill that came to them. They did so ; but then parties said it was usury to charge more than four-and-a-half or five per cent. If such demands were conceded, it was useless to talk of the convertibility of paper. There would be a time, early or late, when the Bank would have been compelled to take some stringent step ; but it was said that such a step was unnecessary when the Bank had 8,000,0001. of gold in its coffers. Why, it was the pos sesssion of that sum of 8,000,000/ that gave safety to the step which was taken.—(Hear, hear.) The Govern ment had felt assured that with exchanges in favour ' of this country, with 8,000,0001. of gold in the Bank, that there would be an influx of bullion into this coun try before any drain could be made on the gold in the Bank. And to what were they indebted to the posses sion of that 8,000,000/. but to the operation of the Act of 1844?—(Hear.) If the Bank had gone on during the summer discounting at tour and a-halt or five per cent., what check could have been given to over-trading and over-speculating ? If railroads could have gone on borrowing at four and five per cent. by an unlimited issue of notes, they alone would have swept away more than the whole circulation.—(Hear, hear.) If by a drain of bullion the amount had been diminished to 2,000,000/. or 3,000,0001., could anybody doubt but that, under the alarm and want of confidence which existed at the time, there would have been a run upon the Bank for gold ? Former experience had shown that such would have been the case, and, instead of taking the measures they had, the Government would have been in imminent danger of being compelled to suspend cash payments, and to have asked Parliament for a Bill of Indemnity. If they had avoided that danger, it was to the operation of the Act of 1844 that they were indebted.—(llear, hear.) He was not prepared to say that he thought all the difficulties and all the pressure was over. He had said last year, that, from the changes which had taken place, this country had a hard time to go through. He was of the same opinion still. He did not, like some, attribute the present pressure entirely to the adoption of free-trade principles. There had been the pressure of a panic in 1825 and 1837, under a protective system. Now there was a pressure and a panic in the state of change from protection to free trade, through which the country was now going. His belief was, that when the s) stem of free trade was fairly established, the prospects of the country would be fixed on a firmer basis than ever, but at the same time he never had expected that the change would take place without being accompanied by some evil. Neither ought the present state of things to be attributed exclusively to the Act of 1844. Why, after the passing of the Act of 1819 there was hardly a cala mity which affected the agricultural, the commercial, or the manufacturing interests, which had not in like man ner been attributed to that measure. But now the ma jority of the world considered that the Act of 1819 had operated most beneficially to this country ; and in like manner he anticipated that when the pressure of the present time had passed over, and people looked back at the events of the last few months, they would be inclined to entertain similar opinions of the Act of 1844. A complaint had been made that the operation of that measure had nut saved this country from com mercial revulsions and distress. He fur one had cer tainly never held out any expectations that it would do so. All he had said was that it would prevent over-spe culation, by the absence of an ill-regulated currency. Mr. Jones Loyd, in the pamphlet he had already quoted said that to guard against commercial revulsions was not the object of the Bill. That was so: the object was to combine a paper with a metallic currency. There were objections to a metallic currency, inasmuch as it was not the cheapest or most convenient, but it was the , safest. It was the currency of the two greatest com mercial communities in Europe—Holland and Hamburgh, and yet those countries had not been free from commer ; cial revulsions. To say that, under such a system, expansion of the currency was prevented, was contra ' dieted by the events of the summer of 1846, when a larger amount of notes was issued. He had never prophesied or thought that the operation of this system would be other than it would be under a metallic currency. Whatever evils might happen under a metal lic currency might happen under this; whatever advan , tages might be attained by a metallic currency might be attained by this, with the certain addition of economy and convenience. It was perfectly clear that the amount of reserve in the Bank of England, in the summer of 1846, had prevented any action on the notes in the hands of the public for some considerable time.—(Hear, hear.) It was perfectly consistent, he admitted, with the provisions of the Act that no such action on the public should take place; and there was, therefore, no legal obligation upon the direction of the Bank to act otherwise than they had done. He thought it would have been wiser and better if they had given timely warning, and had taken longer precaution.—(Hear.) But the obligation to do so rested simply upon the dis cretion of the directors of the Bank; and he was far from saying that that discretion had not been wisely exercised. It was utterly impossible that an establish ment which possessed so large a capital should not be most powerful, either for good or evil, upon the commercial interests of this country ; and it was a matter of vital im portance, that the management of that banking establishment should be conducted soundly and dis creetly.—(Hear, hear.) He feared that recent events had somewhat shaken the confidence of the public in the direction of that establishment.—(Hear, hear.) It might beilifficult to suggest a mode of improving that direction ; but he was certain that this was a subject well worthy consideration, and might be a fit subject for I inquiry in the Committee he was about to move. Though the Bank Charter did not expire for some years, he believed the Bank parlour would be fully disposed to I concur in any measure which the wisdom of Parliament might suggest.—(Hear, hear.) He believed they found some difficulty in inducing persons to undertake the heavy responsibility of the office of Governor of the Bank of England—(Hear, hear)—and he was assured that it was a subject to which the Bank parlour would most willingly direct their attention, and that they would gladly co-operate with Parliament in anything that might be considered an improvement in its manage ment.—(Hear.) He was anxious not to go further at present into those controverted subjects connected with the currency ; he had referred to them, as he promised and intended, no further than was necessary to illus trate the view which the Government took of the pre sent state of affairs, and the view which had induced them to pursue the course they had pursued. He was not ignorant that many men of great authority, great experience, and great practical acquaintance with busi ness, differed from the view* be had ventured to state. He believed they differed also in no inconsiderable man ner among themselves as to the course that ought to be pursued.—(Hear, hear.) In the opinion of Government it was most desirable that all these views, differing as they did from each other upon a subject of vital import ance to the country, should be well and carefully weighed.—(Hear, hear.) They had thought it unad visable that, so soon after events which had excited so strong a feeling, any attempt at legislation should be made, because on no subject was the exercise of calm deliberation and impartial judgment more urgently re quired.—(Hear, hear.) But the Government did think it expedient that an inquiry should take place when all these events were fresh in men's minds, as they were at present.—(Hear, hear.) He thought no one would deny that, in the course of the last year and a half, phenomena had occurred well calculated to throw light on the subject, and to illustrate any opinion which ger tlemen might have entertained on the question. Fow of us could say we had not learnt some thing by the experience of the last 18 months (Hear, hear, and a laugh.) And, for his own part, he thought it most desirable that a Committee, composed of persons of various opinions, taking different views of the subject, should inquire into the matter, and that, by the collision of their opinions, and the result of the evi dence that might be laid before them, they might be able to throw additional light upon this complicated and difficult subject. Many of those gentlemen who had taken a most decided part against the Act of 1844 in the course of the last session, had voted for that Act three years ago. Amongst those, were one of the Hon. Isi y hers for Lincoln s hi re , hi s H o n. Friend the Member for Oxfordshire (Mr. Henley), and one of the Hon. Mem , bers for the City of London. Mr. HENLEY said he had not voted for the Bill of 1844, but for Mr. Muntt's amendment. The CHANCELLOR of the EXCHEQUER said there were several Hon. Members who had voted for that Bill at the time, but who had since seen reason, and doubtless good reason, as it appeared to them, to change their opinions. All he wished to say was, he trusted this inquiry would not be considered in any party spirit. —(Hear, hear.) He did not deny that he should go into Committee with an opinion certainly biassed one way by the result of the inquiry made in a former Com mittee, of which he had had the honour to be chairman; and he certainly should go into that Committee, as he trusted and believed every other H on. Gentleman would e do, with the fullest determination t o wei g h impartially the whole of the evidence that m i g ht be presented, the whole of the considerations that might be laid before them. He believed that such an investigation, conducted before a Committee fairly and impartially constituted, would, in the end, tend to promote the bests interests of the country. He would now conclud e b y movin g the resolution of which he had given notice, for the appoint ment of a Committee. The SPEAKER having read the resolution from the Chair, The CHANCELLOR of the EXCHEQUER again rose, and said, an Hon. Friend had reminded him that he had omitted to state that, as to taking any course immediately, it was not the intention of the Government to propose any measure at present. They believed that there was not the slightest probability of any such mea sure being required. The state of the Bank was such that no person could entertain the slightest apprehen sion as to its power of meeting any demands that might be made upon it. The amount of the Bank's reserve, last night, was 5,800,0001., and of bullion 10,600,0001. — (Hear, hear.) The mere statement of these sums was a sufficient warrant to the House that there was little probability of any occasion for alarm. The bullion in reserve amounted to six millions and a half in reu n d numbers. It should also be remembered that Parlia ment was assembled ; and if a n y emergency, the shoulde possi bility of which he certainly cou ld not contemplate, • arise, Government would h ave the power of imea m su m re ed w ia h t i e e ly h applying to Parliament to sanc tion any in ei jo.piNnvithon—e o ( r gear. ia ly ) wGaesntleman who bad just SO mightN s d, agreed with the Right Hon. appeari t o be h e n e e a c u e s s e s a r h y e . the amendment he in spoken, in the appoin tment of a Committee, that ho thought it necessary to move - thought that o thete in tended de Right to m H o o v n e . G e before ntl e m h a e nf sat ha down. d h H i s e m the t er ms of it tion as it incon then ven i en tly extensive; for , stood, the time of the Committeer might be occupied by a variety of topics; and the object he had in moving his theof the House amen d me nt was, to obtain sanction that the inquiries of the Committee should be tnore con fined. As the motion then stood it would allow to the consideration of the Committee any subject which any Honourable Member might conceive to have been the cause of the reck nt commercial crisis. —(Hear, hear.) Now, if he understood aright the object of the Go vernment and the desire of the country, the object they had in this inquiry should be con fined to the one question of banking and currency. Perhaps there never was a period when the question of banking and the currency commanded such anxious attention as at present. The variety of opinions held by those gentle men interested in the commerce and banking of the country had been materially shaken within the last month, and by no event more than by the necessity under which the Government had found itself of inter fering with the Act of 1844. The step which had been taken had induced in the public mind a want of confi dence in the existing law, and that impression would not be removed until Parliament had thoroughly sifted the subject, and definitively pronounced its decision. The question which every man having commercial obligations to undertake, and future transactions depending on those obligations, was now asking himself was—ls the law of 1844 to be maintained in all its integrity? or, if not, is it to be subjected to such modifications as the pressure of circumstances may call for? or, in the the third place. is that Act to be abandoned altogether, and a new prin ciple set up? He believed that if these three questions were not fully answered, Parliament would endeavour in vain to restore that public confidence which existed but three months ago. There were, however, other good reasons why the attention of the Committee proposed to be appointed should be confined strictly to the subject of banking. Some Hon. Members might not be aware of the position in which this question had been left in 1841 by the last Committee which had entered upon a similar inquiry. A Committee was appointed in 1840, to inquire into banking and currency, in reference to the operation of the Bank Charter Act, and the investi gation was without result, in consequence of the dissolu tion of Parliament in 1841, Of that Committee the Right Honourable Baronet the Chancellor of the Exchequer was the efficient chairman, and the Right Honourable Baronet (Sir Robert Peel) an effi cient member The Committee said it would be for the House in the next session to determine whether tins other Committee should be appointed, to whom all the evidence should be referred for the purpose of framing report; but under the then existing circumstances they considered they had only one course to pursue, to report upon the evidence they had so far heard without any observation. Such was the conclusion of that long in vestigation of 1840, and from that day to this no further inquiry had been instituted. Parliament proceeded to legislate without seeking for any more information, and, looking to the striking difference of opinion in evidence taken before that Committee, and given on their respec tive sides by men of equal experience and intelligence on the subject, he could not but conclude that Parliament had not done-all that was necessary, before the Act of 1644 was passed, in oreer to ascertain precisely those principles upon which it would have been safe for them to decide.—(Hear, hear.) The question haying been left in that unfinished state was one of the best reasons why it should be taken up now by a Com mittee, which should be a Committee on banking only. The principle of convertibility was not now more gene rally granted than when the last inquiry was suspended, and there was another question which had been since started and become popular, supported as it was by many Members of that House. There were many/gentlemen who would now concede the necessity of a fitted standard of value, and the necessity of the convertibility of notes into that standard, yet there were others still uncon vinced, who asked why there should be a fixed price of gold. This question had been very generally taken up through the country, and the attention which was now paid to commercial topics caused it to be frequently discussed. If it were really attempted by that House to fix the price of gold, or of any other commodity, he would stigmatise it as a foolish and futile endeavour, and he thought that it had been sufficiently shown of late years how ineffectual it was for Parliament to seek to regulate the price of corn or any other commercial article.--(Hear.) When, therefore, it was inquired why we fixed the price of gold at 31. 173. 100. per ounce• his simple reply would be, that in the ordinary meaning of the term " price" we did not fix the price at all.--(Hear, hear.) He would answer that we only de fined the division of certain amounts of solid gold tntO pieces, made into coins—that we merely determined that one ounce of gold should represent 31. 17s. 104 d. towards the fourth sovereign in coin. We no more attempted t° fix the price el gold by saying that an ounce shall coin into so much, than we sought to fix the price of wheat in enacting that invariably a quarter shall represent eight bushels.—(Hear, hear.) Gentlemen might turn round and say, " You do fix the price of gold; it is not altogether a measurement, for you have two prices— . the Mint price, 31. 17s. IQ4d., and the Bank price. which is 31. 175.9 d." This was true, but the word " price" nas again improperly applied. If a quantity of gold was taken to the Bank, 31. 17s. 9d. would be obtained for it per ounce, the remaining three halfpence being charged tor the time and trouble which would be expended in converting the mass into coin. If taken to the Mint the full price of 31. 17s. lOid. wou ld be received, but if a man, for his own convenience, pre ferred going to the Bank, then he would have to submit to pay those three halfpence on each ounce as being fully equivalent to the time which otherwise would have to be sacrificed.—(Hear, hear.) The next question to which the public mind was becoming alive related to the usury. laws. It was not uncommon even in this day to hear gentlemen of some intelligence advocating a re currenceto the usury-laws ; but ho was convinced that, if the Committee which had been moved for was ap pointed, it would have to report upon the extreme incon venience of any portion of those laws being left in exist• ence.—(Hear, hear.) He believed that there were many Hon. Gentlemen opposite (on the Opposition side) who would now bear witness to the inconvenience which land lords had recently experienced in having retained what they deemed a privilege to themselves, when they per mitted merchants to pay more than five per cent. for their accommodation. Recently, too, inconvenience had been felt in Scotland from the impossibility, or rather, illegality, of borrowing money on heritable sem• rities at the current market price of money. There were, it was true, modes of evading this law ; landlords might carry a bill of exchange to a banker, and procure discount at ten per cent, gheelodgin e ritable bonds as collateral secu rit y .--(Hear, But was this the way in which the Legislature should proceed ? Was this the position in which the great landed and commercial interests of the country should be placed ?—(Hear, hear.) Nothing had more contri! r b e u p t e ed al t o o f the the a u l s le u v ry iat l i a o w n s o ; f laantde so dis tressfar the a n the recommend ing part ial enm advice of the Committee would be, that Parliament ing their re-enactment, he believed:that sbondrepeal whatever remnants remained .—( Bear , hear.) Another t r ec question which had engaged attention, and which boasted of the support of a Noble Lord whose authority w as v w i e se ig d h t t o y. be was es with tabli s reference . to n N c eo Nothing n t g h e astonishedd ouble sta n b d i rid ( w ad ! Wilson) more than to find man of soun d knowledge, a nd o t transactions, c e t i a o c t propose te dis did not know in what way they would aaidnvtoeanacteinwgitahuceohmamn eerxcpiaeldliiefnetaanad tmhoien.etaHrya inst the would at this momen t have been so popular aga t 3 in c in h i a t r t e g d e . t i a f n d a a d r o d u be existed, s s t t e a d n , d a n r o d w n n e .m r ep Ipaein - Bank as that they h elbtofwopualydinhgavneobeeen • either of theid m a o n rd s ep just silver u ng notes. an d to redeem those notes at another period in the cheapest it then happened to possess .--( Hear , nrn a h n a d se w g i o de co mplaint that the Bank had the power _ p metal scionsato )1: D e r p vt e ai es i g o . d y iss i thing, then, could be more conclusive and sth hear. ) o, he felt N mus t maintain their sing le standard ; (iiea thanat the 0 y. g e h a d been loud in repre. the precious meta ls from abroad a ssured, would the Committee nrteipemoretntowbtoheimHpnorutseed. During the last season many enabled, at particular perm s p , o conver subsequentlylowed to be is o s b u l e ige n d ote t : I! silver r) ti e into h notes , e n js andy i h t i pas becoming.w nd a o s w d o o t ne r teheseumrsei popular b ing t redeem pro position that the e g oßankldi be o It a u p l p d ear e dalt o h im, unreasonable to ask the Bank of England to issue notes however, very on silver, although it might on any commodity whatever excepting that in which it was bound to redeem them ; it was equivalent to asking that they should issue notes on any other article the price of which might be subject to variation. He did not think that the Legislature had acted discreetly in allowing the Bank to hold any part of their notes on silver at the passing of the last Act. No convenience was secured which was not likely afterwards to prove an inconvenience ; and it was clear that it would always be in the power of the Bank to purchase gold with the silver they poi seised with as much facility as they had procured the silver itself. When the Bank had sixtenn millions of gold in its possession it was no convenience whatever to hold silver, and when its bullion was being drawn out for the purpose of correcting the foreign exchanges, it was ss little convenience to retain any portion of that silver l; the whole amount might just as well have been in gold. There was, therefore, no reason why the Bank should hold any more silver than was required in the ordinary silver coinage. It was clear that whatever bullion the Bank had in its possession was so much abstraction of the capital of the Bank for that purpose, and that capital might just as well, in the first instance, be invested in gold as in silver. And there was another reason why the recommendation of these gentlemen was unnecessary. The silver bullion which came into the country was more useful in the hands of privar merchants for the purpose of regulatiil e,xchang, than it would be if at the disposal of the Bank. If • quantity of silver was imported from South Almeria► the importer, whether Rothschild or 'any other cap; talist, made more use o f the metal in correcting th e talist, it continent were than placedw o would dt the p ee e l s f s a i r b e l e o ffo the r i to b e exchangesturn ed o ned f Bank. It was also a dvised, in order that the Minx t t h o e should have a greater power of correcting these foreign exchanges, that it should hold a portion of the securitleel of foreign states, the expectation being that in the event of an adverse exchange they would be able to transfer them, and so restore the exchange to par. But theorise argument as he had applied to the first proposition would demonstrate the inutility of this. These foreign se curities were held by capitalists here t o a huge amount, and the first things that went out of the count'', when the exchanges were against us, long before the bullion in the Bank was run upon, were these very on curities, exported to meet the obligations of indindunt merchants, because the prices fell here to a lower 1%4 than at Paris or Amsterdam. The less, indeed. thought, they made the Bank of England a cc:oo 34l ,r'; establishment, the more they confined it to the singed objects of banking, and the more strictly they d e u n , those objects as of a purely internal and ho ra character, the morn simple would the raanagen c i er erLt of that institution become, and the m ore tain would it eventually prove to be in its, ci „P i e ) : rations.—(flear, hear.) But beyond these genera' s' jects of inquiry it appeared to hire that what eir that conclusion, he should have thought himself un worthy of the place he held if he had hesitated, owing to any former opini o n s o f hi s own , t o d o what he thought his duty.—(Hear, hear.) Not only did he think the exercise of this discretion was required by Other circumstances, but it was evident that notes had been hoarded to a great ext.- nt, and a circulation which, under other circumstances, would have been adequate to its purposes, and when the pressure or panic was removed—(Hear)—would have proved abundant for its objects, was prevented by this hoarding from perform ing its functions. As a proof of this, tens of thousands of notes which had been hoarded in the boxes had been brought into circulation ; and when the House remem bered that under 400,0001. was the amount of notes taken out of the Bank of England after the 25th of October, it furnished a proof that there was an adequate amount of circulation in the hands of the public, but that from tear and alarm it had been hoarded up, and thereby rendered incapable of being brought into use. —(Hear, hear.) His Noble Friend (Lord J. Russell) and he had seen parties of all descriptions, and the uni versal application which had been made to his Noble Friend and himself was to this effect—they said " We do not want notes—what we desire is that you should give us confidence ; it is only for you to say you will stand by us, and nothing in the world else will give us confidence. We do not want notes, but only to know where we can get them."—(Hear.) They added, "Charge any rate of interest you please, ask what you like."— (" No, no," from Mr. Spooner.) The Hon. Gentleman sail " No, no," but he (the Chancellor of the Exchequer) must be permitted to know what had been stated to him, and he would say distinctly such was the constant tenor of the applications which had been made. He repeated that they said " Charge ten or twelve per cent. interest if you like, we do not mean to take notes, but let us know that at some rate of interest we can get them, and that will amply suffice." An Hon. Member had asked the other day what had been the change of circumstances which had induced the Government to act on Saturday in a manner different from the course they had declined but a short time before. In reply to that question, he could now state that the accounts received on the Thurs day, Friday, and Saturday, had been of a totally different description from those which had preceded them, and they then had believed that according to the passage he had already quoted from Mr. Huskisson, they had come to this—that a stagnant cirettlation wanted life—it every day became more embarrassed, whilst these new calamities contributed to increase the general apprehension of the country. It was on that Saturday, and not before that, he and his Noble Friend thought it right and proper to act, because then they were in possession of information which afforded them a justification for the violation of the statute.—(Hear, hear.) Having determined to act in the emergency, of course the next question which had arisen was the mode in which it should be done. He and his Noble Friend had long before considered the matter, and had made up their minds as to the best mode of action in case action should become necessary, and he should have been glad if there had been any mode of action that would have been effectual, other than that which they had taken. It had been suggested that they ought to have advanced Exchequer-bills on goods and produce, but he was not quite clear whether at the time goods and produce were just as saleable as Exchequer-bills—(Hear, hear)—and, therefore, that mode of action would have failed. Others invited an advance of Consols, and a third suggestion was, that the issue of some description of a Government note would have answered the purpose. Now, in his judgment, it would clearly have been absurd and foolish to act at all, unless in a way which they were pretty sure would be effectual; and therefore having determined to act, they had acted in that manner which, approved by practised and practical authorities, they believed would be certain to ensure its purpose.—(llear, hear.) He must also state that to nine-tenths of the parties who had applied to the Government to sanction the issue of notes in this way, it was stated it would be essentially necessary that some limit should be put upon it, and the first sugges tion was that a limited amount of notes should be issued with an increasing rate of interest. To this plan there was, he thought, a decided and fatal objection—namely, there would have been a scramble for the first and second million, and that as soon as that was over the same state of things would have occurred again. But if they were not to limit the amount of notes, the other, and he thought the wiser, suggestion was, that a limit should be put on the rate of interest. That course had been adopted, and in the recommendation made to the Bank of England was a high rate of interest, because if a high rate of interest had not been adopted they would have done that which would have been most mischievous —namely, to check the importation of capital and bullion into this country.—(Cries of " Hear, hear.") At the same time, he (the Chancellor of the Exchequer) had been as anxious as anybody not to impose a rate of interest higher than was necessary, and therefore instead of adopting a minimum rate of 10 per cent., they had adopted 8 per cent., the lowest amount suggested to the Government by the applicants being 7 per cent. The rate of 7 per cent. clearly would not have answered the object which was in view, for when the rate had been fixed by the Bank of England on the direction of the Government at 8 per cent., what was the rate of interest out of doors ? At that time the rate of interest at Hamburgh was 7 per cent. He held in his Arland a letter from the Consul at Hamburgh, dated the 2id of October, which stated that then the discounts there were at the rate of 6 and 7 per cent, per annum, and it was not less in any part of Europe. At New Y. , r 1 .. on the 30th of October, before the intelligence of what had happened here had reached that country, money was in active demand there ist the rate of 7 per cent., and in some cases higher rates had been paid. Again, though the Bank of England had discounted a small amount of bills at 5f per cent., yet at the time the letter of his Noble Friend and himself had been addressed to the Bank, the average rate charged by the Bank was 7i per cent., so that the real extent to which that letter raised the rate was not more than half per cent. upon the rate then charged at the Bank of England, and one per cent, upon the rates on the continent and in America. It was desirable that capital and bullion should be attracted to this country, and it was only by the attraction of a high rate of inte rest that this desideratum could be accomplished.— (Hear, hear.) He conceived, therefore, that the mode in which the Government had acted was the one best calculated to attain the end they hail in view—namely, the influx of capital and the importation of bullion, and thereby the removal of the panic. But it had been said that the Government ought to have left it to the Bank of England to fix the rate of interest; but he thought it was much fairer, both to the public and to the Bank, that they (the Government) should take that responsibi lity from which neither he nor his Noble Friend were disposed to shrink. It had also been remarked that the Government ought to have made the increased rate to apply only to such portions of the advances as were made by the Bank in consequence of the letter. He, however, contended that it would have been utterly impossible for the Bank to have acted in a dif ferent spirit after the receipt of that letter, and to have drawn a distinction between the advances made in con sequence of the Government letter and those which without the letter would have been made. Again an exception had been taken to that paragraph in the letter which referred to the extra profit being carried to the account of the public, but that was inserted far the pur pose of protecting th e Bank, in conformity with the 6th clause of the Act of 1844—a clause inserted at the in stance of the Bank itself. He thought that the purpose for which the letter had been issued—not to create ca pital —snot to support credit, which had no security to offer, but to release the circulation which had been closed by fear and alarm, had been answered, and he believed that those engaged in the commerce and trade of the country would admit that the effect intended had been completely realised.—(Hear, hear.) He did not mean to say that parties may not have been disappointed that they were not released from the position in which they had placed themselves, or that others might not have expected that something would have been done that would enable them to put money in their pockets and to carry on concerns which they had not the means to sup port, but he believed that the great bulk of the commer cial world, by means of the confidence created by the letter in question, had been enabled to use those means which, when alarm had been allayed, had been found to be perfectly adequate. No doubt the pressure had re• mained, because it had been caused by the circumstan ces to which he had alluded at the commencement of his observations. No doubt failures had taken place, and might still take place (for, after the assurances given in the summer of the sound state of trade had been so signally falsified by results, he could not say he had any great confidence in any particular house), yet the Government had succeeded in preventing a general failure, which at once would have been fatal to the country. lie was happy to be enabled to state that orders from abroad were coming in, and, from a circular sent to him by an eminent cotton broker in Liverpool, he learned that a decided improvement had taken place in the demand for cotton; that the state of the manufac turing districts was improved; that an increased number of mills were now working full time; that others would more or less follow the example; that the number of operatives employed had increased, and there was, consequently, good reason to hope that distress in the approaching winter would be averted. This circular was dated the 26th November, and from it it was most satis factory to find that exports to the United States were considerably on the increase, and he observed that to day a considerable amount of bullion had been returned from the United States, and he hoped that goods would be taken in exchange. He trusted that this showed a state of things very different from that state of shame, bank ruptcy, and disgrace which had been:pictured to the House a few evenings ago. He believed that the trader was now enabled to meet the demands upon him, for an enor mous amount of bills had been punctually paid in the course of the last month, and he believed that the general trade of the country was at the present moment healthy and sound, and that they might hope it would steadily and slowly, but surely improve, and survive, and that supremacy of British commerce would again be , maintained.—(Hear.) His belief was that an earlier in terference on the part of the Government would not have attained the end they wanted. It would be con ceded to the Government that it was no light matter for them to overstep the law which had been sanctioned by an overwhelming majority is Parliament—that it was not a light matter that they should be firmly convinced of the necessity of the step, and they should have good reason to believe that the representations made to them were based upon a solid foundation. In April last a panic had prevailed, and the Government had then been told that from 2,000,0001. to 3,000,000/. must be sent to Liverpool in order to save the commerce of that town. However, no advances had beeu made, no failures had then taken place, the alarm passed off, and it was clear that if the Government had then yielded, they would have s hided without reason. The main cause of the pressure was the want of capital, which the Government could not undertake to supply; but when they had been convinced 1 that the pressure was beyond all human calculation, I they had felt themselves justified in acting; and he ki ~- ,