The Sun. — London, England, 1857-02-07 00:00:00

the .attention of fhe house to what seem to me the most important questelons involved in the act of 1844, and which will require consideration fro country that itsm the commit tee. It is of the utmost moment tothe currency she mid rest upon a sound basis. On the sound ness of its te arrency the trade, the industry, and the credit of thenatio n depend. ; and no effort should be spared to maintain in their integrity such provisions of the law as . secure so valuable a blessing, and so great a source of wealth and prosperity. But there are other questions connected with this subject which, although subordinate in their im portance. -yest deserve, and I hope will receive, theattentive der.stion of the committee. I allude to the arrange mentci3nsi s u'esisting between the Bank of England, in its rela tion of a banker, and the Government—that is to say, with regard to the deposit of the public money in the custody of th e Bank of England, and also with regard to tho manage ment of the _national debt. The pecuniary relations sub sisting between the Bank and the Government do not, like the subject of the currency, affect the interests and for tunes of trade and production. Nevertheless, within their limited eph ere they aro of undoubted importance. Under the late ace; the Bank of England now pays about 188,000/. annually t o the Government for the privilege of issuing notes. I think 120,0001. is the sum fixed by the act, in addition 'so which the Bank pays 60,0001. a-year for stamp duty, and another trifling item of 8,0001 ., making the total amount which it pays i the Government in connection with the paper currency 188,003/. The profit derived by the Bank of England from the currency is calculated upon different principles, and it is perhaps not very easy to de cide its precise amount ; but the highest estimate that I have heard places it at about 170,0001., and the lowest at about 80,0001. The Government, therefore, receives from the Bank a larger sum than that made by the Bank in the shape of profits. In addition to the contribution in re spect of the issue of notes, the Bank also makes a payment for the management of the national debt. The scale of that payment is prescribed by act of Parliament. They pay at the rate of 4501. per 1,000,0001. for every part of the national debt not exceeding 40 0,000,000/. ; 3401. per 1,000,000/. for every portion between 400,000,0001. and 600,000, 0001 - ; and 3004 per 1,000,0001. for all above 600,000,0001. This is the scale fixed by act of Parliament, but it will be open to the committee, in connection with the general question of renewing the charter, to revise the terms upon which the privileges of the Bank shall be continued. I may also state that lam now in communication with the Governor of the Bank of England on the subject of the pecuniary arrangements sub sisting between the Government and that corporation. Upon the result of that communication it may depend whe ther or not the Government will deem it advisable to pro pose any modification in the terms of the present arrange ment. If such a modification should be thought expedient, and it is likely to receive the assent of the Bank, the Go vernment will of course bring the matter under the con sideration either of the house or of the committee. I have been compelled to trouble the house at, I fear, a wearisome length on this question ; but the matter is one of so much importance to the wholecommunity that I have preferred to appear to be unnecessarily tedious rather than to withhold anything which might be essential for the information of hon. members. Before I sit down I have only to add that the subject of joint-stock banks has, from circumstances well known to every hon. gentleman, attracted a great degree of public attention during the last twelvemonths or more. Some of those establishments have failed in the most alarm ing manner, producing the most disastrous consequences to their unfortunate shareholders. It therefore appeared to me that the subject was one well worthy of investigation before a committee of this house. The procedure by which the affairs of insolvent joint-stock banks sire wound up is anything but satisfactory. Suggestions have been made— although I confess that I am no; one of those who approve them—for the substitution of an inspection of the state of their affairs by a Government officer for the vigilance and control of their own iirectors. I, for one, greatly deprecate any attempt to improve the management of joint-stock banks or any other mercantile undertakings, by weakening the motives for duo care and caution on the part of those directly interested in such enterprises by holding oufthe shadowy safeguard—for, after all, it never can be any real protection—of Government control. However, this is one of those matters which may fairly receive the attention of the committee. I freely admit that there is a great dis similarity between the question of joint-stock banks and the all important subject of the currency, which will con stitute the main topic fur investigation by the committee. Still, it appeared to me that it would be difficult to form two committees, to sit both at the same time, on subjects as closely related to each other as the affairs of the Bank of England and the currency generally, and the law of joint stock banks. On the other hand, I think it would not be expedient altogether to emit to consider the question of joint-stock banks, and I therefore propose that it be sub mitted to the same committee. The righ hon. baronet (who had spoken throughout in a tone too low to he dis tinctly heard) then concluded by moving for the appoint ment of the committee. Mr. DISRAELI (whose remarks were at times inaudible from the same cause) said—lf it be desirable that both of the subjects brought under our notice by the right hon . gentleman should undergo the investigation of a select cons.. mittee, I think it would be very unwise that they should both go before one and the same committee. Between the currency and joint-stock banks I see no necessary connec tion; and, moreover, the question of joint-stock banks has by itself attracted the greatest amount of public attention, and is likewise one of sufficient difficulty and importance to demand the undivided labours of a committee. (Hear.) But, after listening to the statement - given by the right hon. gentleman of the intentions of the. Government re_ specting the currency and their relations to the Bank, I am really at a loss to understand what are to be the duties of the proposed committee on that important subject. (Hear.) The Government appear to have entirely male up their minds on every point of moment connected with the ques tion before us ; and surely, therefore, it would have been preferable for the right hon. gentleman at once to intro duce a bill embedying his views, and thus to afford the hones an opportunity of expressing its approval or disap proval of them. With the exception of one solitary point, of no very great moment—viz., whether the 11,.nk of Ire land should have permission to lend money on mortgage, the Government, according to the speech of the right hon. gent!. man, nave clearly made up their minds on the whole question which they now wish to refer to a committee; and therefore the course he proposes to us - is equally unsatis factory and futile. Where the auestions are of such a nature as those on which the right hon. gentleman has touched, and on which the Government also entertain a very decided opinion, the proper arena' or investigation is the whole house. (Hear.) The Ministers have a policy which they are no doubt prepared to support. Then, why do they not at once b o ldly su b m it it t o th e ver di c t of this house. I question very much the propriety of referring the Bank Act to a select committee, and I should much prefer that the Government should lay before us their matured views in the shape of a bill, which would be discussed and criti cised by all those hon. members who take an interest in the subject, and the Government would then be able to defend the point which they recommend. Of coarse, on such a subject I shaq not attempt to divide the House should there appear to bo a predominant feeling in favour of adopting the proposed course, but I beg the house to con sider weather it. would not be more advisable, as I have suggested, that the committee on joint-stock banks should be confined to that topic, and that the renewal of the Bank Act should be breughtbsf mre us iu the shape of a Govern ment bill, which could be discussed in this house. Mr. TITE said that the speech of the Chancellor of the Exchequer bad confirmed the impression produced on his mind by the Royal speech, that the Government were about to lay this question bsfore the House with a fore gone conclusion upon it. On no subject was there such an extraordinary difference of opinion among men of the greatest ability and most extensive information. The reports of the select committee of the two Houses el . Parliament were completely opposed to each other, though the report of the select committee of that House was carried by a small majority only, and many members of it agreed entirely with the report of the House of Lords' committee that the panic of 1847 was materially aggravated by the operation of the act of 1314. Mr. Tooke also was of tbat opinion,and he was completely opposed to the character and the arrangements of that act. The venters and speakers on this subject did not appear suffi ciently to have taken into c nsideretion the enormous inone tary circtilatien of the country, amounting, in all, including foreign bills of exchange, to wreathing not much nosier 200,000,0001. The mashinery which was to move this great mass ought to be adjusted with the greatest nicety, and so enabled to work without any jerks, such as were occasioned by changes in the rate of interest. 01 these there heal been nine during the last year, and the chances of them had been greatly increased by the act of 1844, which cut the capital of tho Bank into two parts—the ordinary banking capital, anti the capital for the issue de partment. The circulation of the Bank was almost a fixed quantity, about 2 0,000,000/., but the banking department, owing to this division of capital, fluctuated very much. Neither had the enormous amount of gold brought in' o this country since 1843 been•talten into consideration. Since that year gold to the amount of 1 7 5 ,000,000/. had been discovered, of which no less than 135 ,000,0001. had been imported into this country. The disturbing force of that element had naturally been very great, for the impor tations had varied considerably in amount, having only been 1,000,1.004 in some quarters of the int erven i ng years, and 3,000,b0J4 in others. A material effect hat been pro duced by these importations upon the discount of the Bank, and the subject was one which ho thought deserved the careful attention of thecommittee. In 1847 the Bank sud denly reduced the rate of interest to 2A per cent.,and in some instances the rate of discount was only 1 per cent. The con sequence was that enormous building speculations were un dertaken, and when the Bulk found it necessary to raise the rate of interest the speculators became bankrupts. The large number of workmen now out of employment was at tributable to this state of things. He conceived that a change was required in the constitution of the Court of Directors. Under the present system eight of the directors retired every year, and were replaced by eight other gentlemen who were on the list, so that financial Plans which had been sanctioned by a majority in one W 5 Sk might be entirely changed the next week, in conse-. queu e of the ad mission of eight new directors. He hoped t re h i a t t tee ful orlertunity would be afforded, either in the can to which be ti ll a e q house, of discussing the important poi.its Mr. BAlLugalled a tt en ti on . Exchequer t o sa ti lTid understood the Chancellor of the . at he wonld abstain, on the part of the Government, fr Y one indicati ng th th e the details of a measure on this subject, until after bees presented, and h report of the committee had e Mr. Baillie) therefore conceived that the constitution of t f li c, committee was a matter of very e m th erione iportance, °opinions ent er t a i ne d b y advocates of unrestricted and of restricted b an ki ng w e re as much opposed as were foruTiciirelY4aie view s o f t h e Protectioeists and f Exchequer hal referred to th e opinions e r f 'c tt l e or l o e f t s he ir the discussions Peel on th ; s question ; but those wh o recolleeZt eal de discussions ell the present Bank Charter Act would retire R. Peel never regarded it as a final mneiteurniT her that Sir . (Hear.) On the ce ritrer y , the right hon. b aronet distinctly steted, when he introduced the , t bill, that lie int en d ed to t carry it nmuch further , and that his ultimate object was 0110 bulk of issue. Indeed Sir that there S hould be only t . ighout the country --b " no)tender- Peel gave private bankers till.° etand that the privilege of issuing paper would o and . ho . in y vitec e l 'o ali ceded to them for a pei iod of 10 yea rs,the p ri vilege of paper bankers who were disposed to give up issue to do so, and to receive In compensat i on an annual payment of 1 pe r cen t, upon time amount they were actually issuing at th e t i me. A number of private bankers accept that prol"rition ' upon the cl_ear un derstanding, that the issues of all private banks should cease at the termination of the charter ; and these bankers were now placed in a very disadvantageous Petition, as compared with the bank ers who had not entered into the arrangement, for they were without the power of issuing paper. He thought the committee ought to consider whether, if the banking SYS" tern of the country was to remain in its present state, all private bankers should not be placed in the position in ' ,which they were previously to the act of 1844. Mr. GLYN thought thesuggestion of the right hon. mem ber for Buckingbawshire, that tae committees should be appointed to inquire into this important subject, well de served the consideration of the Chancellor of the Exchequer. Whey they considered the nature of the inquiry which was to be submitted to the committee, including the embarrass ing question of the whole currency of the United Kingdom, and involving the nicest points of law, and when they re flected that the committee would be called upon to lay before the houses new commercial code affecting the whole banking business of the country, he thought it would be evident that an investigation ofsnch conducted magnitude would two db o e much more satisfactorily and Speedily committees than by one. (Hear, hear.) The Chancellor of the Exchequer had referred at some length to the question of convertibility. He (Mr. Glyn) had always considered that. the question of the currency and of the Bank privi leges was most unnecessarily mixed up with the question of convertibility, with the intention, as he thought, of throwing a slur upon those who did not assent to the act of 1844, but whose object was, if possible, to improve the p r inciple laid down in that act by extending rather than diminishing its operation. He would not enter at length ito a consideration of the act of 1844, for no doubt the house would assent to the motion of the Chancellor of the Exche quer, and the subject itself WWI very dry one. He might observe, however, that he had alw a ys r e gar ded the act of 1844 as dividing itself into three parts, distinct from each other, and operating very differently with regard to the public welfare. The first important portion of the act pro vided for the separation of the issue and banking depart ments; the second for the limitation of the amount of cir culation advanced upon securities • and the third laid down regulations affecting country banks. With regard to the first of these provisions he did not hesitate to say, although he knew it was rather an unpopular doctrine, that, though he had always been an advocate for the separation - of the two departments, he regretted that the machinery for regulating those departments had not been left in the hands of the Bank of England. If there had been no statutory enactment giving to them the management of the circulation of the country the duty might have been still in their hands. Their power was great, and having the command of the Government ba lances they would have been in circumstances to carry on all the necessary operations. Bat the Bank of England themselves rejected that view of the matter, and by ac cepting the act of 1844 they had prevented all chance of a return to that state of things. The question could no longer be argued as it was in 1844, for there were now other bodies who might step forward and say, " Why not entrust the duty to us as well as to the Bank of England ?" As to the third point (which he would notice before the second), viz., the regulation of the country bank issues, he was not aware there was any such compact entered into with them as the hon. member opposite (Mr. Baillie) alluded to. But, whatever the case might be, the renewal of the Bank Act could not alter the position of the country bankers ; nor did he see that they had any claim whatever. He had always thought the arrangement with the country bankers one of the best provisions of the bill. It provided a ma chinery by which, in point of fact, they might substitute other paper for their own at a great advantage, and many of the country banks availed themselves of the option thus afforded them. Bat, after all, the most important point was the second, which referred to the limitation of the amount of notes. It was impossible to advert to this without bear ing in mind what took place in 1847, and it was remarkable how very anxious the advocates of the bill were to get over the events that occurred in that year. The right hon. gen tleman the First Lord of the Admiralty told them last year that what had occurred in 1847 was entirely to be at tributed to the state of the commercial body ; but he found that another advocate of the bill, in some remarkably lucid letters which had lately appeared, took another view of the matter. He attributed the events of 1817 not to the com mercial body, but, in a great extent, to the prejudice and want of prudence of the Bank directors, who ought to have raised instead of reducing the interest. But the writer made a mistake in the matter of fact. The Bank directors did not reduce the rate of interest in 1817. They reduced it in 1846, acting upon the doctrine laid down by their friends, that they should look to their own reserve merely as bankers, and not to the amount of bullion. Accord ingly, when they found their own till full in 1846 they re duced the interest. At the same time they were entitled to do so, for the bullion was increasing in the Bank. The fault of the Bank directors in 1847 was, that they did not in time raise the rate of interest, and when they did so they did it in a gradual way. With respect to the limi tation of the issue of notes to 14,000,0001., the rest of the issue being based on bullion, he had never heard any rea son assigned for that limitation. The Chancellor of the Exchequer had told them that, under this system, the bullion at one time in the Bank amounted to 20,000,0001. The effect of such an accumulation was to raise great ex pectations in the country, to inflate prices, give encourage ment to speculation and the creation of new companies, all which was sure to be followed by a commercial crisis, and thus drive the country from one extreme to another. This was the result of having a fixed sum of 14,000,0001. as the limitation of the issue of notes. They had been told that, as a certain consequence of having this fixed amount of circulation, whenever the bullion began to give way the notes in circulation would be diminished; but nothing of the kind had occurred. Take last year. There was a dimi nution in the amount of bullion of 3,900,000 z., but the notes in circulation continued the same as before. There was no corrective for this in the existence of the limit. The truth was that in framing the bill the fact was totally forgotten, that the moment money became more valuable that instant the Bank reserves were acted upon. He could not conceive how such a system should be thought necessary, or how the idea bad been lost sight of that the rate of interest should be determined by the amount of bullion, and not by the state of the Bank reserve. He did not wish to go into de tails which would hardly be understood, but the general principle on which we should proceed was something like the following : Don't allow the amount of notes issued ou securities to be a fixed amount. Let a certain amount be fixed, but all above that issued at given ates of interest, and let these rates ofinterest be determined by the amount of bullion in the Bank, making the amount of notes in cir culation always to bear a necessary proportion to the amount of bullion in the Bank coffers ; if, for expample, there should be one million of bullion, let there be two thirds of notes, or some proportion of that kind. He hoped his right hon. friend would not give up the committee, as perhaps something might transpire there which would lead him to change his mind on this question. He thought it was possible to improve the machinery of 1811 very materially. He had great doubts whether the time had not come when all this machinery show(' be place( in other hands—whether the day had not come when we should have not Bank of England notes, or notes of Go vernment circulation, but what might be called Mint notes, or something of that sort. Let it be an issue founded on the receipt of bullion by the Mint, and they should then have a currency free from all chance of risk, and establish a system which would assist most materially the commercial interests of the country. Mr. HENLEY hoped that the Chancellor of the Exche quer would divide the inquiry into two, dealing separately with the question of the Bank charter and that relating to joint-stock banks. The country took a great interest in both questions, but especially in the latter. It was highly desirable, as the Chancellor of the Exchequer had truly said, to reconsider the mode of winding up joint-stock banks ; but that was a matter different from banking, and one which ought to be investigated by different members. On the committee charged with the inquiry into joint stock banks they ought to have members of the legal pro fession. It was a very intricate subject, upon which great difference of opinion existed, and it was desirable that legislation should follow the report of a competent commit tee. Now, nothing could be more general than the terms of the reference to the committee. The Chancellor of the Ex chequer seemed to wish that they should not go into the operation of the act in 1847 ; but the terms of the reference would not exclude that year from the inquiry, and that right hon. gentlemen might depend upon it that when the committee came together they would examine into the whole operation of the act from the beginning to the present time. Well, that would open up no inconsiderable field of inquiry ; the investigation would necessarily be a length ened one ; and in these circumstances he would ask, was it fair or prudent to postpone the consideration of the joint stock-bank question till the fag-end of the session, when everybody would be wearied out and legislation hopeless ? At present the interest in the question of joint-stock banks sod their insolvency was immease—m uch greater than that in t he general subject of banking. Joint-stock banks when prosperous were closely allied to banking, but directly they came to deal with insolvency the question then as sumed a very different aspect from that of the Bank of Englaed. He thought that, upon reflection, the Chan cellor of the Exchequer would say that each of the com mittees would'have quite enough to do—probably as much as would permit them to report in time for legislation to follow during the present session. (Hear.) He would not at that moment offer an opinion on the act of 1844, but he did not think that the labours of the committee would be of a very agreeable nature if they were to commence their investigation under the notion that the Government had come to a conclusion—as might be inferred from the speech of the Chancellor of the Exchequer—with respect to the most material parts of the subject. (Hear, hear.) Mr. MALINS concurred with the last speaker in wishing the Chancellor cf the Exchequer to divide the inquiry into two. Considering the disasters which had taken place during the last few years, involving points of the highest importance, nobody could doubt that the whole question of joint-stock banks should undergo the most rigid investi gation in regard both to management and mode of wind ing -up. The house was aware of the decisions which bail recently been given in the case of the Royal British Bank, and of the misfortunes to which the shareholders in that concern were exposed. He hoped that the present session would not come to an end without an enactment being passed providing that after the winding-up of a joint-stock bank, or any joint-stock company, whether in the Court of Chancery or the Court of Bankruptcy, creditors should not be at liberty to sue individual shareholders to any extent they pleased. The proceedings in the case of the Royal - British Bank were a disgrace to a civilised country. Debts had been bought up by litigious persons for the sole pur pose of suing the shareholders. Now, if after the winding -up, the privilege of suing individual shareholders were abolished, and contributions to pay the debts of the bank or company obtained by means of calls, he had no doubt that the shareholders in every joint-stock concern would ho found abundantly competent to meet all the demands made upon them. There was thus no necessity for suing individual :shareholders. H e b e li eved it had been ascor tained that the shareholders in the Royal British Bank were able to pay the debt three times over by the system of calls ; but as long as they allowed shareholders to be sued by any creditor who chose to raise an action, the consequent litigation would cost more than the entire liabilities of the concern; and the shareholders, instead of meeting their responsibilities at home, would fly to escape the monstrous cost of legal proceedings. With regard to the main subject of debate—the Bank Charter, he agreed with much that had been said by the last speaker but one. He had been disappointed with the speech of the Chan cellor of the Exchequer, because, when he saw the notice on the paper, be did trust that the members of the Go vernment would enter upon the inquiry with a mind open to coaviction. But the Chancellor of the Exchequer had expressed his satisfaction with the act of 1841, as being a piece of absolute wisdom ; and, therefore, if the Govern ment were to have a preponderance in the committee, it would be vela to proceed with the investigation. He trusted, however, that when the Chancellor of the Exche eller went into the committee ho would be joined by men who had not so made up their minds ; and, if that wore eras sot r ight hon. gentleman would find that the question tlensan the nal er a e s . of made by the so B 1 1 discount had very little , Ile appeared to imagine. One of the many surprising statementsl d nriug the whole of llttholB"s"ech that the was rate with the act of 1844. Now, a s n , ( s t e t ir i t i te r , we had what might be called a money panic; August had been as high as 7 e rate of discount, which since gen of moment 6 per cent. at the BanT r cent" was at the present of England. According to the Gazette of last week the a gold now up p n the th e ed to the imagi amountßank was 10,000,000 e whichnVert of t nary 14,000,0001. mentioned! in th ' e g on which notes could be issuelacctlio believed that the public had in their hands2ra' tnhoetr7sleasi.othtlahine° 20,000,0001., leaving reserved or anew 1 p.oye 4 amount had stated that in 1842 the gold in the Bank of England rose rose to 20,0ii0,000/., which, added to the 14,000,s0iitnodS the act, made a total of 34,00.4000/. At that time the ac- tual circulation was 21,000,0001., leaving unemployed notes to the amount of 13,000,0001. The rate of discount was 3 per cent. Everything rose in price ; great facilities were given to trade; many new undertakings were launched upon the world ; but the inevitable crisis soon arrived, and traders suddenly fouls(' themselves over whelmed with interest at the rate of 6,7, and 8 per cent. That was the rate of discount at the Bank of England ; the amount actually paid by traders was much higher. When spending his Christmas vacation in the country he met a banker, doing considerable business, and asked him what his rate of discount was. His reply was, " I charge three per cent. more than the Bank of England," indicat ing a state of things fraught with ruin to the trading com munity. (Hear, hear.) The readers of the "city articles" of the journals must have observed the panting anxiety with which this country waited the arrival of a vessel with 300,0001. in gold, as if the nation actually depended upon it to save it from bankruptcy. What was the meaning of that anxiety, and how was it to be accounted for ? The answer was that it was not gold that the country wanted, but bank notes. He would endeavour to make this clear. There was in the coffers of the Bank of England 10,000,000/. in gold, and the notes in circulation were 20,000,000/. Now, the minimum circulation of notes for the 10 years previous to 1841 was 15,000,000/. ; during the 10 years between 1844 and 1851 it had never gone so low for any duration as 18,000,000/. ; and he ventured to say that it would be impossible by any process now to reduce the circulation below that amount. In order to take the 10,000,000/.of gold from the Bank, however, the circulation must be reduced, not to 18,000,0001., but to 10,000,0001. The public had in hand fat the present moment—say. 20,000,000/. of notes ; and if the whole British community were to present those notes at once the Bank of England must necessarily stop payment, because the much vaunted systetn which, according to the Chancellor of Exchequer, it was impossible to improve, permitted 20,000,000/. of notes to be in circulation when there was only 10,600,000/. of gold to meet them. Sir R. Peel, however, knew that the circulation never would fall so low, and he assumed that it would never be reduced to less than 14,000,0001.; and therefore he allowed that number of notes to be issued upon imaginary security, every note being payable in gold, although there was no gold to meet it. (Hear.) It was impossible at this time to reduce the notes in circulation to below 18,000,0001. ; but, as the Bank was possessed of 10,000,000/. of gold, the Bank could never be inconvenienced, unless the circulation were reduced to 10,000,000/. ; and therefore it was not gold but bank notes that the country wanted. Then, as the Bank of England was compelled to buy geld at the rate of 31. 17s. 9d. an ounce, people were anxious for the arrival of ships with gold, in order that they might take it to the Bank, and thus com pel the issue of additional notes. His assertion that it was the deficiency of bank notes which led to commercial dis aster was borne out by what occurred in 1847, when we were upon the eve of a national bankruptcy. On the 25th Octeber in that year, when the celebrated letter was writ ten, the gold in the Bank was 8,000,0001., and the circula tion was 21,000,000/. It was impossible that there could have been any stoppage of the Bank, therefore, unless the circulation had been reduced to 13,000,000/. Thera was no fear of that ; but this difficulty might have arisen—that while there was 8,000,000/. of gold in the Bank, the direc tors might not have a single note to issue. The unem ployed notes were then reduced to 1,500,000/., and repre sentations were made to the then Chancellor of the Exche quer (Sir C. Wood) that unless something were done there would be a national bankruptcy. Something was done ; the Bank was authorised to issue notes beyond the 14,000,000/. to the additional extent of the quantity of gold in the Bank, and by that means the difficulty was sur mounted. A relaxation took place, and the rate of discount rapidly fell. He was surprised that the Chancellor of the Exchequer, with that example before him, should say that there should he no relaxation now, but that it would be better to leave these cases always to the extraordinary intervention of Government, preferring, as it seemed to him (Mr. Malins), the transgression of the law to leaving the remedying power within the law itself. It was said of those who did not approve the act of 1814 that they were in favour of an inconvertible issue. Now he for one could not be included in that list, for he did not see any occasion for the inconvertibility of the bank-note, for during the year 1847, and during the past year, the gold iu the Bank had never been exhausted. The effect of creating two departments, as the act of 1844 had done, had been to lock up the gold, and to make the rate of dis count to depend on the quantity of reserve notes, and the result had been that the commercial transactions of this country had never been in a satisfactory state when the reserve notes fell below 5,030,000/. ; for if they fell below that amount up went the rate of discount, for the increase in the rate of discount was not occasioned by any scarcity of gold, but by the diminution of the reserve notes. The effect of those changes in the rate of discount, and the un certainty with regard to them, was highly injurious to commercial transactions, for transactions commenced when the rate of discount was 3 per cont. might not be concluded before it had risen nominally to 7, but in reality to 10 per cent., and so commercial men were deprived of the power of making accurate calculations before embarking in any enterprise. It was of the greatest importance to commer cial men that the rate of discount should be well known, and that there should net be much fluctuation. Before the act of 1841 it appeared from the evidence of Mr. Pal mer, given before the committee, that the maximum rate of discount seldom exceeded 5, and never was below 4 per cent., whereas in the 10 years ending at Christmas, 1855, there had been no less than 40 variations in the rate of discount, and in the year 1856 alone there had been 9 or 10 variations from a minimum of 3 to a maximum of 7 per cent.—a circumstance highly injurious to commercial transactions. The subject was one of the greatest import ance to a commercial community, and he trusted that the committee would not enter into the inquiry with fore gone conclusions, but that they would remember that even Sir R. Peel himself did not consider the act of 1841 a perfect measure, and that they would not, like " Merca tor"—the language of whose letters was most clear, but whose ideas appeared to be as confused as they possibly could upon the subject—start by looking upon all those who did not view the act of 1344 as a perfect act as mere idealists. (Hear, hear.) Mr. HEADLAM considered that if an investigation did take place it ought to be a most careful and complete one, and, judging from the strong and discordant views which had been expressed, it must necessarily occupy a consider able period of time. He wished to press upon the Govern ment the propriety of not mixing up with the investigation any inquiry with regard to joint-stock , banks for if they did speedy legislation up )n that subject woulri be impos• Bible. As regarded joint-stock banks there were two q nes tions to be considered. The one was as to the application of the principle of limited liability to those banks, and he confessed that he did not see why they should be made an exception to the general rule ; and the other related to the legislative machinery for winding them up in case of fai lure. For his own part, he did not see the slightest neces sity for referring either of these questions to a select com mittee, and he believed that Government would best deal with the subject by, on their own responsibility, bringing in a clear and definite measure relating to it, which would put a speedy end to the inconveniences which, as had been shown in the case of the Royal British Bank, at present existed. (Hear, hoar.) Mr. LAING said that when the hon. and learned mem ber for Wallingford advocated an unlimited issue of bank notes. [Mr. Malins—" I did not."] The argament of the hon. and learned gentleman was that the pressure In the money market arose from the small circulation of bank notes, and yet he was in favour of their convertibility. Now, he could not understand how both those propositions could hold. If there had been a continually increasing drain upon the bullion, and more bank notes were issued, how could that drain be resisted if the notes were conver tible? This was no theoretical question ; for had they not seen only recently in the neighbouring country no less than 2,000,000/. of bullion disappear from its coffers in a single month ? If that process had gone on for a short time in this country it would have brought us completely to the end of tourh labouringe aggregatetether, iloanfnd the et:a note? oeun deficiencyn o i f t f b at onoukf waslb, n i havenotes truetke s n come otwthst, thnh now ww f c 0 the wu an st irtythat incon vertibilitypositively was greater than at several former periods when money was a drugin the market at '2 per cent ? The total amount of the circulation in the hands of the public towards the close of last year was 40,000,000/ and the circulation o f th e B an k of England a l one was 21,000,000/. Let the house look back towards the close of 1846, when speculation was rampant, and the rata of interest was unprecedently low. What, then was the circulation of Bank of England, notes ? Why, in Sept. of that year it amounted to 21,465,000/ , or within a mere fraction of what it was now. The hon. and learned gentleman had been led into error by his interpre tation of the term " money." In one sense money meant capital. It meant that portion of the capital of the country which was available for commercial purposes ; but that was a very different thing from the total capital of the country the great bulk of which was invested in the funds or on mortgage, and the owners of which would never lend it in Lombard -street at 6/. per cent., knowing, as they did, that in 12 month s th a t m i g ht mean 2?. per cent. Tarn it as they would, there was no way of dealing with the subject except upon the principle of adjusting the supply to the demand. If the demand for money exceeded the supply, money world be scarce in spite of any expedient they might adopt to make it otherwise. When the money market was dear there was no way in which they could restore the equili brium except by diminishing the demand or increasing the supply. How could they do that? Why, manifestly by increasing their rate of interest. That, he believed, wes the whole art and mystery of banking—(hear) —namely, to regulate the supply according to the demand. Although he agreed with the Chancellor of the Exchequer in the main in the soundness both of his principles and his con clusion, he thought the right hon. gentleman had hardly shown a sufficient case for going into committee in one re pect. The right hon. gentleman described the act of 1844 as having been passed simply and solely for the purpose of insuring the convertibility of the paper money issued by the Bank. That might be tree if they looked merely at the letter of the Act of Parliament, but it was not true if they looked at the circumstances under which the act was introduced. It was introduced on the theory that if they regulated their circulation by a self-acting process the sim ple effect of the regulation of the circulation would be to keep them right on all other points. Of that theory Lord Overstone was the most distinguished advocate, and every one wished it to be true, but unfortunately it was not true ("Hear, hear!" from Mr. Malins) ; it was contradicted by fact. If they looked to any of the returns of the circulation in periods of great pressure on the money market they would find there was absolutely no connexion between them. The period of 1817 was a remarkable one. It was proved in evi dence before the committee that between Oct. 1846, and Sept. 1817, upwards of 7,00,000/. had been drained away while the amount of notes in the han,is of the public remained almost exactly the same. He contended therefore that the theory wascontraelicted by fact, and the reason was, that it overlooked the operation of the reserve of gold existingin the Bank. The effect of the act of 144 undoubtedly was, that it provided for the convertibility of the circulatiou, bat it this r moment,adenoi other provision f or th e b an ki ng rese rve. That, at depended upon the sound discretion of the Directors of the Bank of England as much as it did before the act of 1814 was passed. In 1,447 it had a inischievoes effect, in that it induced a false confidence on the part both of the Directors of the Bank of England and of the public, which prevented recourse being ha , l to restrictive Immures; but he thought that error had been completely exploded by subsequent experience, for latterly the Directorsof the Bank had exercised a sound discretion, and had carried the country through a period of great difficulty and trial. That error, he thought, was now so perfectly well known and understood by all men of business that, in looking now at the act of 1844, the house might, leave out of view the erroneous theory on which it was founded, lie had said that the whole question resolved itself into one of the banking reserve. It was desirable that the bank note should be always convertible, and that, he thought, was effectually done by the act of 1844. One point to be observed was to secure the solvency of the Bank, and insure its power to meet its notes. It was also desirable that while maintaining its reserve to secure its solvency the Bank should also have the power of sup porting the credit of the country in times of emergency. By that expression he did not mean to convey that the Bank should be bound to step in to support every large house which had traded imprudently, or had locked up its capital iu unavailable resources ; but he meant that the Bank of England, possessing privileges which no other bank had, and being the hankers of the Government, it had a peculiar power which made it the last resort and founda tion of that large superstructure of commercial credit in this country. All the operations of the private banks were based in a great measure upon the conviction that in times of difficulty or pressure they could obtain assistance from the Bank of England by the deposit of securities. If the Bank permitted its reserve to run too low it created panic, be cause persons in trade perceive the risk, not of an exces sively high rate of interest, which they could hear and which cannot be prevented, but they fear an absolute stoppage, and that a period may arrive when the Bank of England will not be able to make advances upon the best private or Government securities. That was the state of things in 1847, when the Bank of England, having suffered its reserve to run too low, it was compelled in self-defence, to avoid a complete stoppage, to curtail the accom modation which it usually afforded to trade. The great problem was how to prevent a recurrence of that state of things. A suggestion had been made that there should be an increase in the issue of notes beyond the fixed limit of 14,000,000 1 ., but he could not see how the mere creation of paper would increase the amount of avail able capital to be employed in the business of the country It would simply displace so much bullion, which would then find its way abroad. Some allusion had been made to the limit of 14,000,0001. to which the Bank was restricted, and some hon. members could not see why that amount had been chosen in preference to any other; and the reason was that in practice that amount had been found to be suffi ciently below the minimum point to which the circulation could be contracted to give valid security without risking inconvertibility. It had been said that 14,000,0001. was too little at one time and too much at another, and if there were 20,000,0001. of hellion in the Bank and notes were issued to the full extent, there would then be 31,000,000'. in notes ; but, in fact, that was not so, as the Bank could not keep out more than 20,000,0001., and the practical result would be a smaller reserve. Such a state of things might affect the rate of interest, but, practically, there could be no over issue of notes—a circulation bona fide convertible could not be in excess. The whole question hinged upon being able to keep up the reserve to the highest point possible. In 1817 the difficulty really arose from that cause—that, in a period of pressure when the reserve had fallen inconveniently low, n c i portion there for of the act of 1-41 prevented recourse being had t o th e i ss u e t e department, bullion, and wh takingioh was,fr oam. it t were, h e e c pawnede rtan specie purposes. The true remedy appeared to him to be to accumulate, in times of prosperity, a larger reserve, and when pressure came, to adopt measures of contraction earlier and more energetically, so as not to allow the re serve to fall too low. The real difficulty was that the in terests of the public and of the Bank of England were not always identical. (Hear, hear.) It was the interest of the Bank, with a view to ehe dividend for its shareholders, to work with the minimum reserve compatible with its own security, while the interests of the public was that a large reserve should be accumulated in prosperous times, and not suffered to fall too low in times of pressure. The object to be desired could not be obtained without some understanding between the Bank and the Government, as it would not be reasonable to ask the shareholders of the Bank, without compensation, to make the sacrifice which would be entailed by keeping up a larger reserve for the national benefit. If some plan could be devised to meet that difficulty it would be most valuable. Something had been said about a discretionary power to relax the rule affecting the reserve, but he feared the knowledge of that p _weer would afford a temptati on to allow the reserve to sink too low, and thus diminish the security of the Bank. If anything was to be done in the way of creating an extraordinary reserve, it must be by accumulating a bona fide reserve upon securities or bullion, to be brought out in times of pressure by a temporary arrangement between the Bank and the Government. It was important to go into committee, if only to see whether some arrangement could not be made by which the Bank might consent to the sacri fice of keeping up a larger reserve for the benefit of trade ani commerce. There were other questions—such as the management of the Bank—which could be well considered ie committee. At present, if there was a good governor or deputy-governor, there was no certainty that he would remain in office above two years. It was desirable that a committee should be appointed, and if it did nothing but adopt some resolution upon that point it would not be valueless. Mr. JAMES MACGREGOR said he did not understand how the Bank should have a large reserve except by having a larger amount of bullion or of securities. He trusted that some means would be adopted to avert the horrible state of things which existed in 1847. It was a domestic panic, and the moment it was known that notes could be had at the Bank of England the panic ceased. He was of opinion that limited liability would be better both for the joint-stock banks and the public. He hoped the Chancellor of the Exchequer would agree to appoint a separate committee on the joint-stock back question. Mr. POLLARD URQUHART remarked that there were two separate questions to consider with regard to the act of 1 -44, namely, was the act sufficient to maintain the convertibility of the notes; and next, did the act contain provisions embarrassing to commerce. Lord Ashburton, in a pamphlet published in 1343, said no act of Parliament could give perfect convertibility to the bank note. He believed, however, that the act had made the converti bility of the note morally certain. The crisis of 1817 af forded some experience as to what the present act enabled the Bank to do. The convertibility of the note would have been in some danger of the Bank had not put on the screw as early as April, 1837. In 1839 he believed the Bank would have been in danger of suspending payments if it ha I not received assistance from the Bank o France. An other crisis occurred in 1825, which was caused mainly by an internal demand for gold. If a similar crisis had occurred in 1847 he believed the convertibility of the note would have been in danger. It appeared to him that the act of 1344 had no more to do with the panic of 1847 than Tenter den steeple had to do with the Goodwin Sands. That panic c h o a o r l v d e s o t . more be said to have caused the panic of 184 7 than a , potato f g c o r l o d p . a T u ti s e e act cd by e f a 1 1 8 )1 14 d andv ras canedtho failure b o y r e thein t d h r e a drain o moon light shadow at which a horse might start could be said to make the way impassable. The act of 1841 might in fact be said to put the horse on the back, and to make it feel that there was nothing to fear. lie was aware that many people objected to the act of 1841, because they thought it had created a great number of minor panics in 1817 ; but it was in reality no small merit of that act that it wade the public sensitive on the subject of their credit. It instantly informed them when a screw was loose in their transactions or in the state of the ex changes. On the other hand a system of credit which would enable them to tide over periods of crisis without taking any steps to put their affairs on a sounder footing might last for a time, but it must in the long run bring about disaster and ruin. While he thus approved of the principle of the Bank Act, he did not pledge himself to the support of all its details. If, for instance, the minimum of the circulation had increased since 1811, he thought the limit of 14,08 ),0001. might also be enlarged. Nor was the observation of the Chancellor of the Exchequer, namely, that such a step would only enable the Bank to keep a smaller amount of gold in their coffers, any answer to such a proposal; because if, while they secured the perfect con vertibility of the note, they could add a couple of millions to the circulation of the country, they would be conferring a benefit upon the mercantile community. At the same time he trusted that the Government would never consent to any material alteration in a measure which had been found in practice to answer the purpose for which it was designed remarkably well. (Hear.) Mr. NEWDEG,..ITE said it was generally admitted that the operation of the act of 1844 had been to deprive the Bank of England in a great measure of its power of acting as a bank of support. That fact had been strikingly illus tratedinterference of the Government , the Bank would have been operations, by the experienc e of 1847 ; when , but fur the obliged to cease although it had 8,000,0001. of gold in its coffers. (Hear, hear.) If they gave the Government the great and important privilege of infringing the Bank Act, some provision ought to be made for calling Parliament together with i n a reasonable time, to pass an act of indemnity. (Hear-) It would also be highly advi sable to assign some limit to the issue of notes on securities. When, for instance, the issue reached a certain point, the rate of interest ought to advance paid passu with the dimi nution of gold. (Hear) The great vice of the act of 18x4, however, was,that inste a d o f ma ki ng a payment to the Bank for conducting the financial business of the country, they placed the reserve in their hands, and told them to go and trade with it. (Hear, hear.) By that means they gave the Bank enormous power in the market, and enabled it practically to regulate the rate of interest. They took no moans to prevent it from making use of its reserves, when they were very large, to depress the rate of interest as to create an undue tendency to speculation. Thera lay the great vice of the present system. (Hear, hear.) The Bank was, in fact, expected to create various rates of interest—first, when the amount of bullion in its possession was large it was expected to stimulate that spe culation, and then when the reaction took place it was re quired to revenge it upon the public. (Hear, hear.) Sir C. WOOD lam anxious to set the house right upon one or two points of fact which have not been accu rately stated by hon. gentlemen who have preceded me. It seems to me that while hon. gentlemen opposite protest that they are advocates for the convertibility of the bank note, yet that the doctrine they put forward is inconsistent with the contain maintenance of that convertibility. (Hear.) I am not quite certain as to the precise plan of the hon. gentlemen (Mr. Newdegate), but I have little doubt that if the course he advocates had been adopted the security for the convertibility of the note would have been very seriously diminished. Let the house remember how the question of the "little shilling" arose. After the suspen sion of cash payments, when the question arose of restoring the convertibility of the note, the question also arose as to the standard. Any course that renders paper inconvertible may lead to a state of things in which that question must be again urged, of not restoring the standard to the point at which it had before been, and of paying a less amount of gold than had been promised to be paid. That was the doctrine of the "little shilling." The hon. member for the Wick burghs told us what was the purpose of the act of 1814. Now, this is not the first time that gentlemen have undertaken to describe the objects of this act, but I do not think it fair to say what the objects of the bill were, except in the words of its authors. The hon. gentleman says that this bill was to be the remedy for all possible evils, and that it was to prevent not only an over issue of paper, but also any excess of speculation. I say that no tsl.o3l:ghaendpyoacbrttirlilinnettowhedasedaei deal with : p hi o r nor rash professed ne speculation,dt h b t those bill, a the bill of 1844, who n a dl i advocateddisitti with c t t h l distinctly (Hear, hear.) 1 happened to take a remember what every one said was, that it was impossible mismanagement of banking concerns ; but that there had been superadded to those evils the mismanagement of the circulation, and for that the bill would be an adequate remedy. The evils of • exceseive credit and mismanagement of banking concerns haveoccurned iu all countries—in Hol land, where every note was represented by silver or gold in the bank ; in —is cgiutn, and even in countries where no paper circulation existed. It is not necessary in order that banking mismanagement should exist that there should be any notes in circulation. The bill of 1844 regu lated the circulation of the country, and its object was to put a proper limitand check to thepossible mismanagement of the circulation. We are apt in discussing measures of this kind to forget the evils that were complained of when they were past. Iu old times many complaints were made that the management of the hank was left to the dis cretion of the Bank directors. It was thought essential by almost every one that there should be some limit or check or rule by which the circulation should be managed. The hon. member for Kendal has laid down a rule which I will not now discuss, bat that some rule should be laid down has been the opinion of almost all persons who held the con vertibility of the note. It was necessary to take care, in order to secure the convertibility of the note, that the note eircula.tion should vary exactly as the metallic circulation should vary. Tho Mode of attaining this object was by issuing a certain numb er of notes ou secur ity, and taking care that the rest shall be represented by an amount of gold in the hands of the issuing parties. iron. member s have asked why the Bum o f 14,00,00 W, was fixed upon. I be- lieve that the minimum amount of notes that bad ever been in the hands of the public had been somewhere about 15,000m0i., and the sum of 14,000,0001. was taken as an amount below which it was improbable, if not impossible, that the notes in the hands of the public should si n k. The primary object of the bill was to secure that the amount of circulation of silver and gold should vary pre cisely as the circulation of the notes of the Bank should vary. I agree with my right hon. friend the Chancellor of the Exchequer and other hon. members in thinking that not much benefit would be derived from raising the sum of 14,000,0001. Any other sum of about that amount would equally attain the object. The sole advantage would be that an increased amount would set loose so much gold, which might be used in other ways. Whatever advantage and economy there are in issuing notes instead of gold will be attained by fixing the amount a little higher, but I do not think that hon. gentlemen opposite would find that any greater laxity of circulation would be attained. Hon. gen tlemen having entered upon the question of the rate of in terest, I must beg leave to say that the rate of interest does not depend upon the amount of notes in circulation. That was shown when we went into committee by numerous witnesses, and it was stated repeatedly in the discussions which afterwards took place. The floating capital of the country is sent up to London to be used as discount. If there is an abundance of such floating capital, the rate of interest is low ; if, on the contrary, it is scarce, the rate of interest rises ? The rate of interest therefore must depend upon the abundance or scarcity of available capital. (Hear, hear.) I am almost ashamed to state what, in my opinion, is such a truism, but I am obliged to do so, because, when ever there is a discussion in this house, the proposition is denied by some hon. gentleman. lam rather astonished at the argument of my hon. friend the member for Kendal (llr. Glyn) upon thie point, for he altogether excludes from his consideration the reserves of the Bank. Hon. gen tlemen, on the other hand, take a contrary view, and look at nothing but the reserves; but I do not know what dis tinction can be drawn between the notes in circulation and those reserves. The banking department of the Bank, acting like a banker, keeps a reserve of notes in its till, just as a country banker keeps a reserve of gold or silver. That reserve is a portion of the circulation quite as much as the sovereigns of the hanker. A good deal has been said about the effects of the act of 1844, which, it has been contended, produced the crisis of 1847. It was, however, shown before the committee that a baseless system of credit had sprung up previous to that crises, by which bills were drawn and discounted and re-discounted, until after a time, as they could not be met, several failures took place. But what was the case with regard to the notes of the public? At the beginning of October, when the crisis began to be severe, the notes of the public were not diminished by more than 200,C00/. from the amount at which they stood in July, when there was no pressure. How, then, can it be said that the act of 1844 produced the crisis of 1847/ Again, in the three months preceding Oct., 1847, the amount of accommodation afforded to the public in the shape of discount to pi ivate persons was between 6,000,000/. and 7,000,0001. The act of 1844 could not therefore have produced the crisis of 1847, either by diminishing the amount of notes held by the public, or by diminishing the power of the Bank of England to assist private trade. The hon. member for Wick (Ur. Laing) said that the word " money" was used in two senses, and half the discussions which took place respecting the currency would be avoided if those two senses could be properly distinguished. `Money used as floating capital available for discount is a different thing from money used for circulation. It is true that gold is money in both senses, and it is equally true that the gold sent to the Bank of England in the shape of deposits is a portion of the fund available for discount. When, there fore, gold is exported from this country, when there is a drain of gold, the amount of capital available for discount is diminished. People accordingly look, as an hon. gentle man has observed, at the reserves of the Bank as an index of the amount of floating capital available at a particular time (although they do not contain the whole of that capi tal), because it is the practice of merchants to deposit their gold in the Bank, and the amount withdrawn from the re serves is used for circulation in the country. The rate of interest of the Bank is also an index of the rate of interest elsewhere, but the Bank cannot raise or lower it at plea sure. In ordinary times, as the rate of interest required by the Bank is high, people in want of accommodation go where they can obtain it at a lower rate, but at periods when accom modation is limited they have recourse to the Bank. I be lieve that the act of 1844 is the best and the least stringent of rules that can he laid down, but I do not wish to enter into the discussion of that topic now. The variety of opinions which have been expressed is in my mind a suffi cient reason for the appointment of the committee, where the subject would be far better sifted than by a discussion in this house. A select committee, composed of gentlemen of conflicting opinions who examined the witnesses brought before them, is a fitter engine for the extraction of the truth in this matter than this house, and therefore my right hon. friend has done wisely in proposing the appoint ment of a committee. With respect to the last part of the motion, relating to joint-stock banks I think there is great force in the objection to referring that to the same com mittee as the one which would have to consider the Bank Acts, especially as joint-stock banks are not banks of issue, and I do not believe that my right hon. friend would be disposed to insist on that part of the motion, if it should be the wish of the house that it should be omitted from the present motion. (Hear, hear.) Mr. MALINS in explanation, said he had not recom mended an extra issue of six millions, but argued that the circulation should not be brought down. Mr. SPOONER was happy to hear that these questions were to be referred to separate committees. The discussion must be in committee, where there could be an interchange of opinion. (Hear.) Reference had been made to 1819; and he contended that the contract then made was an un- just one ; it had never been carried out, and never would be. The evidence of what had happened since proved it to have been an unjust contract. He remembered Mr. Liorner proposing his resolutions in 1810, declaring that there was a largo depreciation in the currency. This was denied by Mr. Vansittart and the Chancellor of the Ex chequer, who maintained that the one pound bank note and the sovereign were, for all practical purposes, the same. The effect of this on the country was to induce persons of property to deal with it, and to make engagements o❑ the faith of there never being a return to cash payments. But we had done more : we had returned to a far more strin gent system than existed before 1819. Previous to that time there were restrictions on the melting and exporting of coin. Now, gold was made both an article of commerge and an article of currency; and thus its fixed character as a real currency was destroyed, and it was thrown into the markets of the world. He repeated that the contract of 1819 was an unjust one, which never could be acted up to; and the bill of 1841 was an abortive attempt to bolster up the former measure. Immediately after 1819 great distress ensued, which continued till 1822. Lord Castlereagh then brought in three bills, whose object was to increase the currency. The result was a period of prosperity, which was afterwards checked by restriction; and this had been going on ever since— alternate depression and elevation. He believed it was possible to establish a currency which should do justice to every one, and not be subject to the fluctuations which had occurred of late years. As to the rate of discount, he contended that it depended on the supply of notes in the market, including those held by the Bank i❑ reserve. Immediately the public saw that the re serve was getting low there was an increased demand for discounts. This was proved by what occurred in 1847. The moment it wasknown that the restriction had been removed from the Bank the demand suddenly ceased. He remem bered what passed between the late Sir It. Peel and his father on occasion of the bill of 1819 being introduced, and he (Mr. Spooner) was convinced, despite Sir Robert's elo quence, that his father's arguments were the most cogent. He was convinced that no real relief would be obtained until the bill of 1844 was remodelled. Since then 157 millions of gold had been imported into this country. Where would the currency have been without it? Under the present arrangement, he defied any man to say what a pound was, or what it would be a month hence. What was wanted was something which would secure equability, which was the foundation of all trade. His wonder was, that the Bank of England managed so well under the pre sent law. He hoped the right hon. gentleman would not go into the committee with his mind made up, but with a mind open to conviction. If the committee was impartially formed, he had no doubt as to the conclusion they would come to. The report of the committee on the bill of 1844 was only carried by twelve to ten, and, to his knowledge, the two members of that committee who were unavoidably absent on the division would have voted with the minority. The House of Lords' committee was a,gaiust the act of 1844. The balance of opinion, therefore, could not be said to be in favour of that act. The right hon. gentleman (Sir C. Wood) assigned this as the reason for ordering the suspension of the act in 1847—" Considering the enormous amount of the deposits of the Scotch banks, the shortness of the notice, and that the gia titer part of the securities could not be realised, their application for assistance be came a very alarming one." Sir C. WOOD—It was not an application to the Govern. ment. Mr. SPOONER—It was an application to the Bank of England, but no set of bankers had such large autos of money in the public funds, and they were at that period unsaleable without such a loss that insolvency must have been the rose] t of converting them into money. And what was the state of things now? The reserve in the Bank was 4,000,000 C. ; the deposits 9,000,0001 If only half of them came and asked the Bank forthuir money, what became of its solvency? (Hear, hear.) Not that the Bank was insolvent because the Government owed it 14,000,0001. The Bank would say, let the Government find the gold fur me. But where could the Government find it ? The appointment of a committee was, iu his opinion, the only way of properly investigating the question. Mr. WILKINSON, in reply to the question where they should be if the gold of Australia and California hat not been discovered, said they should be a great deal better without it. It added nothing to the real wealth of the world. (Hear, hear.) On the contrary, it would be in jurious for a lung time to the labouring classes, because the price of commodities in reference to gold would rise. There were two points necessary to be clearly known in discussing this subject. One was that nothing was to be gained by a paper currency but the economy and conve nience ; and the other, that interest was paid for capital, and not for the circulating medium. The hon. member ' (Mr. Spooner) said that the rate of interest rose when the reserve was low, and fell when the reserve was high. In saying that, the hon. gentleman put the cart before the horse, for the reserve depended on the rate of interest, and not the rate of interest on the reserve. If interest was paid for capital and not for the circulating medium, there was an end of the whole question. The complaint was that the operation of the act of 184 t was to raise the rate of inte rest, but if the rate of interest was not affected by the circulating medium at all, how could the act of 1814 have that effect ? The right hon. gentleman truly observed that the rate of interest rosa in countries where the act of 1841 did not exist. It was the system of credit which led to panics, and, th a ,t, being so, lie did not believe that pe riodical panics could be prevented. If gentlemen could be only persuaded that the circulating medium had nothing to do with the rate of interest, it would put an end to a great deal of confusion. (Hear, hear.) Mr. MUNTZ said that if a stranger were to come into the house, and listen to the remarks of hon. gentlemen, ho would conclude that in the midst of such various creeds this ques tion could not be solved. The object of his rising was to know what the committee was for? What were they to do or inquire into ? He believed it was sue of the greatest shams ever palmed on the house. (Hear.) What was the use of a committee to inquire into the act of 1844 when they were told by the mover of the committee that it did not require alteration or consideration? The only object of the committee could be to shift the resp ons ibili ty from the Government and throw it upon the house. Unless it was determined to go into the w h o l e question, with a bona fide intention, it was an insult to the house and Whatever country to appoint this com m itt ee, might be the effect of the act of 1844, no one could deny that there never wet() such variations in the cost and value of money as since 1844. ( He ar, h ear. ) And frequent or injuri ous t o t h e never were they so inquired d utry of England. Th a t was the great thi ng t o b e i nr Mr. lIILDYA tt D said there was in a t g o r . eat deal of truth iu the obseevations of the hon. member (Mr. Muntz). B u t as y it was agre e d th at they were a committ ee , an d as the right h,n. gentleman the Chancellor of the Exchequer expressed an opinion in favour of the act of 1844, it was 1 incumbent on him to appoint a fair committee, because the house would otherwise look with suspicion on the con clusions to which it might come. The fact that the act of 1844 was passed for only ten years showed that it was to he adapted to the changed circumstances of the country. f The act of 1844 might be well adapted to the circumstances of 1814, and yet very ill adapted to the circumstances of the present time, when the exports of the country were nearly double the amount of what they were ten years ago. His right hon. friend (Sir C. Wood) said that the active circulation had not diminished in 1847. But was the right hon. gentleman ignorant that, though it might appear on paper that the active circulation was what it purported to be, it was practically locked up by the apprehension that existed ? Arid iu proof of that, he begged to mention that in 1847 a wealthy man in London went to his broker'when he thought the pressure was over, and handed him 10,000/. in cut notes to invest, and when the broker asked him why they were cut in halves, he said, " To tell you the truth. I did not like to trust the whole notes to the Bank." That showed the general distrust which prevailed. Hon. gentlemen said it was now a recognised doctrine that the best mode of checking a drain was to raise the rate o f discount, and talked of the effect of this step since the bill of 1e,44 ; but they forgot that before 1844 the Bank catild not make use of this engine, for the usury laws prevented it. Although he was not prepared to say that it was not a most legitimate mode of action, yet the Bank had con trived to keep things steadier when it had no such power. He hoped the Chancellor of the Exchequer would take care that the committee was fairly constituted, and comprised intelligent men of all interests ; if that was done, whatever might be the result, it would give sa , isfaction out of doors, but if not, whatever might be the report, it would not be satisfactory. Mr. INGRAM expressed & hope that if a committee were appointed the present management of the public debt by the Bank of England would be taken into.sconsidera tion. The allowance in that account for the last year was 247,0001., being on an average a charge of nearly 11. to each person holding stock in the public funds, as, accord ing to the returns for the year 1850, being the last in his possession, it appeared that the number was only 269,736, the debt itself being under 800,000,000% It was true that iu those returns the Bank of England did not appear to receive so much for their management of the public debt ; inasmuch as they refunded 180,000/. for the privilege of issuing bank notes. He however, had no doubt that there were plenty of banks in England who would be glad to pay even four times that amount for the enjoyment of a simi lar privilege. The trouble and expense attendant upon the system pursued in that establishment were enormous, and it even led to considerable frauds. A person holding stock must attend personally at the Bank of England, or in cur a large expense in giving a power of attorney to his banker or agent to receive the dividend. Now, let them but compare that system to the one adopted in respect to similar monetary transactions. He would take, for ex ample, the payment of the dividends on railway stock. He received from Mr. Watkin, the manager of the Manchester, Sheffield, and Lincolnshire Railway Company, a statement of thecoet of the payment of their dividends for the last year, It amounted to 1251. 13e. 2d. The capital was about 9,000,0001., the number of shareholders 4,900. The expense thereforelof the payment of the dividend averaged only 6d. per shareholder ; and the mode of payment was much more satisfactory to the shareholders. That expense, however, did not include any of the charges attendant upon trans fer, which he calculated would be, on an average, ls. ad ditional ; therefore the whole charge to each person might be put down at ls. 6d. He had also aiother return from the Midland Railway which gave precisely similar results. If any new arrangement were wade with the Bank of Eng land, he hoped that these facts . would be taken into consi deration, and a different system adopted for the payment of dividends. He might observe, in conclusion, that he ob jected to the granting of a new charter to the Bank of England. It was quite time, he thought, that the State should take into its own management the issuing of its notes, and the payment of its own debts. (Hear, hear.) Mr. A. HASTIE said that the Chancellor of the Exche quer had referred to the operation of the Scotch and Irish act of 1845, and stated that he had written five or six let ters to Scotland, and, as he received no answer, he con cluded the banks there approved of the act. The CHANCELLOR of the EXCHEQUER had stated that he had received replies to the effect that the operation of the act was considered favourable. Mr. HASTIE in that case could easily understand what parties were applied to. The right hon. gentleman must have commuicated with the five chartered banks only, for he (Mr. Hastie) was well aware that the other banks were not at all satisfied a ith the act, and in 1853 they had pre sented a memorial against it. The act had confers ed several privileges on the chartered banks, which he thought ought to be extended to the others, for they were equally respec table and equally well managed. The people of Scotland were not at all satisfied with the act—it had prevented the establishment of any new banks, although from the great increase of trade there was ample room for them. He hoped that in the committee the Scotch and Irish banks would be fairly represented. Mr. CROSSLE Y was glad to find that the,Chancellor of the Exchequer had consented to the appointment of two committees instead of one : that on joint-stock banks would require the legal members ; but for the Bank Charter they would want commercial men. There were two reasons why the charter ought to be investigated—first, the enormous increase of trade since 1841 ; and next, that from this in crease the prices of all raw materals had risen immensely, so that th e same amoun t of business now required a much larger capital. Some gentlemen seemed to think that an alteration in the charter would be a panacea for all the evils cetnpla.ined of, but as long as the Bank was bound to pay sovereigns on demand, it would be obliged to raise the rate of discount whenever the gold was going out of the country. There was one remark of the hon. member for Kendal which he thought worthy of consideration—viz., w . hether it would not b e d es i ra bl e t o t a k e away th e power issueot . from all banks. Th e Ch ance ll or o f th e E xc h equer said that the Bank of E ng l an d pa id f or th e pr i v il ege ; b u t on an issue of 14,300,0001., there was a profit of 840,0001. per annum, which he considered ought to go to the reduc tion of the taxation of the country. (Hear, hear.) Mr. CAY LEY expressed his satisfaction at the candour which bad characterised the discussion ; for, formerly, only one side was allowed to be heard. There were two parties to this question ; the public were principally concerned, and it was for them they ought to legislate. Money was made for commerce, and not commerce fur money. The Chancellor of the Exchequer said that the committee of 1848 had reported in favour of the act of 1844; but of the seventeen witnesses examined before the committee, only four, including Lord Overatone and the governor and de puty-governor of the Bank, were in favour of the act as it stood. It was important to ascertain the reason why the commercial world was so much embarrassed by these con stant changes in the value of money. The great desidera tum in a medium of exchange was to have it of an uniform value, but that was impossible under the present system. When a large amount of bullion accumulateti in the Bank, it was compelled to go into the discount market and com pete with the brokers, in order to find employment for its capital. The result was that in one instance since 1841, money had fallen to 1 per coot. The necessary consequence of this low value of money was that parties were driven to speculate, in order to get sortie interest. This led to the additional labour and increase of consumption. The im ports then increased, but as the exports were stationary the balance of trade turned against us, and it became neces sary to send gold out of the country, and the rate of die count gradually increased. At five or six different periods prosperity ha I driven the gold out of the country, and dis aster had brought it back. When the basks ceased to accommodate their customers they became, in fact, the chief holders of notes, and thus in times of difficulty the banks, instead of aiding, increased the pressure felt by com mercial men. He thought at all events that sufficient had been said to show that some inquiry ought to take place, and that some remedy was needed. As to the nature of that remedy, he would not venture at that time to ex press an opinion. The CHANCELLOR , of the EXCHEQUER said that •he would confine himself to meeting the objections which had been made to the proposal to have a committee. The house would boar in mind that the act of 1844 expired iu August, 1855, and that it had been extended on terms which rendered the Bank liable to lose its privileges upon notice given by motion in the House of Commons. During last session a motion was made before Easter fora committee to inquire into the subject of the Bank Act. He had opposed that motion, feeling that a time when the nati on was at war was not the time when an inquiry upon s uc h a su bj ect could be most ' satisfactorily considered. At the latter end of the session, I after the conclusion of th e t rea t y of peace, he was asked r whether he should obj ec t t o th e appointment f a committee. I He then replied that he had no objection to such a course, but ho suggested that at so late a period but little practical good would come of the app o i n t ment. s o committee was appointed, but on the last day of the session an lion. member gave notice of his intention to move for a committee early in the present session. Under these circumstances he had thought:that it was a proper course to move for a committee, instead of bringing in a bill, which would no doubt have been referreclsto a select committee. lie would remind the house that since 1810 there had been once in every ten years a committee appointed to inquire into this subject. In 1810 the well known bullion committee sat with Mr. Horner for chairman ; in 1819 the committee sat, of which Sir B. Peel was chairman ; in 1830 and 1840 other committees sat, and in 1848 the committee en Irish distress entered somewhat upon the consideration of this question. He was, however, willing to accede to the suggestion which had been made for limiting the duties of the select committee to an inquiry into the operation of the Bank Acts of 1844 and 1845. He there fore moved for a 44 select committee to inquire into the ope ration of the Bank Act of 1844 (7 and 8 Vic., c. 32). and of the Bank Acts for Ireland and Scotland of 1845 (8 and 9 Vic., c. 37 and 38)." The motion was agreed to. PASSING TOLLS ABOLITION. Mr. LOWE obtained leave t• bring in a bill for the aboli tion of passing tolls. GENERAL COMMITTEE OF ELECTIONS. The general committee on elections was re -appointed. The house adjourned at twelve o'clock. [ADVERTISEMENT.) -.- SIGLIT AND REARING -- SPECTACLEA, POWERFUL TELESCOPES, OPERA, RACE, AND PERSPECTIVE GLASSES. —Messrs. S. and E. Solomons, opticians, 39, Albe marle-street, Piccadilly. Obsezve—opposite the York Hotel (W.) Ily 14er Majesty's Royal Letters Patent for valuable and extraordinary improvements in the most powerful and brilliant Telescopes, Camp, Racecourse, Opera, and Per. s pew s e en to know the distances. These telescopes posse h extraordinary powers that some three and a-half inches, with an extra eye-piece, %rill show distinctly Jupiter's moons, Saturn's ring, and the double stars. With the same telescope can be seen a person's countenance three miles and a half distant, and an object from 16 to 20 miles. They are of larger and all sizes, with increasing powers accordingly.—Til° Royal Exhibition, 1851, Valuable, newly-invented, very emal 0 powerful waistcoat-pocket glass, the size of a walnut, by whici. a person can be seen and known 1l miles distant ; they answ. , r every purpose on the race-course, and at the opera houses, country scenery, an d s hi ps are clearly seen at S to 10 miles. Phey are inval ua bl e for shooting, deer-stalking, yachting, to sportsmen, gentl emen, gamekeepers, and tourists. o wond pe erf r,d ri :ace-cot.rse, ca mp, and perspective glasses, with p ,wer. N ew l y-constru3ted Spectacle Lenses ?t the great est transparent power. no valuable adv.antaigmepadierieidveidi from this invention is, that vision becomin i g person , : are preserved and strengthened, and very aced minute °ern:. enabled to employ their sight at the m m il e cii less man i t - 3 . 1 pation—can see with these lenses of toil'g power — n and ou t s he further part of the world, Persons can be suited at the most remote..their spectacles in a . 5 , ff d e o . t g n not of require the frequent Powerful assistance.e hng e 3 by sending one of the glasses out i letter, and stating the distance and those who have not made use small newspaper print with by s t a ti ng their age. D ea f. from it the eyes they can read of spectaclesame Organic Vibrator, an ex ness. New Discovery. _. deafness, entirely different from all others, to surpaas any. been, or probably ever can b e, traordinary powerful, small, newly -invented instrument f or thing of the kind that produced. Being of the s ame colour as tie skin, is n o t per ceptible ; it enables is deaf persons;t unpleasant sensation of s i ng i ng to hear distinctly at c h urch and at publio assemblies entirely removed; and it affords all th e ould be desired.-39, All'etaarle noises in the ears t"at assistance - possibly c Observe—opposite the York Hotel. (IVO street, Piccadilly= Country Markets . LTVETZTOuI,-FEB. 6. Our corn exchange this morning had oily a slender at tendance of buyers, and the general business was of limited extent. In the few transactions passing the prices of Tuesday were obtained for good fresh wheat, oats, and oatmeal. Second ar y w h ea t neglected, and nominally id to 24 per bushel lower. Flour moved very slowly at the prices of Tuesday. Indian corn was in less demand, and late rates barely supported. WAKEFIELD—Fes. 6. Fine wheat sold at Is to 2s per qr. lower, and other sorts wore difficult to quit at a decline of 2s. Fine barley was steady, but other kinds dull. Oats and shelling rather cheaper. Beans fully as dear. EXETER-FEB. 6. CORN.—Wheat, 7s to 7s 9d ; barley, 5s Od to be Od; grinding do., Op Od to Os Od. Oats, 38 Od to 38 2a. Beans, Os Oil to 0 Od. Peas, 00s Od to 00s Od. FLOUR. —Fine, 428 Od to 41s Od; seconds, 40s Od to 42e Od per sack. CATTLE. —There was a small supply of bullocks. Best beef, from 103 64 to lls per score ; inferior, 9s &I to 10 8 Pe r score ; fat calves, —d to 01 per lb ; barrenners, Os Od to 01 Od. per score ; cows and calves, 121. to 161. t.s ; butchers calves, Oct to 7d per lb., rearin calves —s to s each,' sheep, ewes and lambs, 0/. O s to 01. O s per coupl e; e wes, to 7d ; wethers, 7d 7641; lambs, —to Od per lb. Pigs, large size, —s to —s ; second size, —s to —s ; slips, - 7 8 to —3 ; suckers, —s to —s. Rough fat, 5a per lb. Pork carcases from 9s 9d to 10s 941 per score. BRISTOL SUGAR—FEE. 6. This week's transactions on the spot are limited to 54 0 mats crystallised Mauritius, for which about 55s has been paid ; and to arrive 15,000 mats Mauritius have been sold, floating, at again rather stiffer prices. Some further trans actions in Manillas are also spoken of, but the particulars havo not transpired. Refiners' produce is in very short supply, and large sales, both in stove dried and wet goods, for delivery a month to six weeks hence, have been made at a further advance of is per cwt. In rum there is no thing doing. COAL MASH Prices of Coal per ton at :M.—FEB. 6. the close of the martet. Wellsend, kc. e. d. Bell's Primrose l4 0 Bebside's Hartley l5 0 Davison's West Hartley 15 3 North Percy Hartley l4 6 Victoria 14 3 Stanley Main 15 6 • • Hatton ls 6 Russell's Hatton 17 6 Hartlepool Hetten lB 0 South Hatton 18 3 real lB 6 Eden Main l7 9 Haswell 18 6 Wallaend, Riddell l7 0 3hlpe at market... 51 I Sold COURSE OF EXCHANGE.--YXSTERDAY. kmsterdam ............ I 1 14% Gibraltar .... .......... Ditto, three months .. 11 17 aotterdam ............ 11 17 Yi Antwerp .............. 95 30 Flrussets 25 30 Elamburgh ............ 13 6% Altona ..•• ............ 25 22% Ditto, three months 25 6254 Marseilles ............. 25 6254 Bourdeaux . ..•• Frankfort-on-5f aine .... 119% Berlin •• •• •• •••• .• •• •• Vienna•••••••••••• •••• 10 83 rrie5te.........••• . 10 35 Petersburg ............ 37% gadrid ........... 49% Jadiz .........•••••,.. 49% 'Weelona .......... ~....... Leghorn • • •• • • lo• •• .• • 29 45 Genoa ..... - 45 70 Milan •••• •••• •• •• ..•• Naples ... ......• .. 433(1 Palermo .... ...... •... 1293¢ Messina ..•.......•... 120 Lisbon .. Oporto •• •••••••••••••• 51% Rio Janeiro •—• Buenos Ayres.... •• • Now York,6o days'sight Philadelphia PISCES OF SIILLIFOR, PIZ 05. Foreign Gold in Bars .£3 17 9 Portugal Gold Coin .. 0 0 0 Mexican Dollars .... 0 3 0 % New Dollars 0 0 0 Silver in bars .. 0 0 SEABORNE MAILS. [When the date for making up a mail falls on a Sunday the mail remains open until the day following ; except in th• case of the India mail, via Southampton, which, on Plat occasions, is made up the previous evening.] Lisbon Spain Gibraltar Gibraltar 1 Malta Egypt .. • • Ceylon • • India • . Mauritius I via Ceylon) China Penang Singapore Australla(via} ll the Cape) Cape of Good Hope Mauritius Ceylon India .• Lisbon...• 1 Madeira Capedc Verde Brazil. 34 linenosAyres Falkland Is lands Wes. Indies (except Ha vana and Honduras). Venezuela Grey Town New Granada Chili Peru California Ilonduras .Nassaa Mexico .... Ilav ilia .. Madeira .. .. Teneriffe .. W.C.of Africa British North America .. United States United States British North America .. United States British North America .. Canada .... Made up at the Post Office. lth,l7th, & 27th of the month. 4th & 20th of the month. 4th of 1 . the month. ..... ••••1 Feb. 5.. .. Ireb. 9.... Ed and 17th of the month. IFeb. 17 .. 'Feb. 2.... IFeb. 23 .. Every Fri. Feb. 3 and te T a i l iemci rnt aee. W hence des patched. South ampton South ampton South ampton South ampton Dart mouth South ampton I Feb. 25 South ampton South ampton South ampton Feb. 24 .. By what Vessel. Alham bra Ripon Ripon Harbin ger ffedway l Parana Parana Ply. mouth Liver pool Europa Liver pool South ampton Liver pool When expected Jan. 24 4th and 20th of the month. Feb. 4.. ran. 31 Jan. 25 Feb. 12 lit and 16th of the By whit Vessel. month. 16th •f the month. Feb. 1 A WA- oloult 0 Feb 6 Feb. 2 Niornini Llgi lEnsto Avon Ericsson Feb. 191 Herman Indian Atr*te ....... . Atrate swop Asia !Erie WO 3 1—Morning. E—Evening. Feb. 191 Feb. 4 Arse Arne' ricnn. WAR TROPHIES.—The distribution of the war trophies is under consideration, and Lord Panmure has premised that the inhabitants of Edinburgh will be gratified by a gun from Hango, if they prefer it, but certainly by moms suitable acknowledgment in this form of the heroic part played by the Scotch regiments in the late struggle. [AigivEnTistnoNTl—Holloway's Pills an extraordi nary remedy for Liver and Stomach Complaints.—Mark Drewell, of Mtloom-street, Bath, was afflicted for seven years with a disorder of the liver and stomach, indiges tion, lose of appetite, and extreme debility ; consequently quite unable to follow his occupation. He bad consulted the most eminent medical men in town and country without any beneficial result. At last he had recourse to this valuable remedy, which, in a short time, effected th wonderful change for the better, and in three months big health was re-established.—Sold by all medicine vendors throughout the world ; at Professor Holloway's Maw. blishments 244, Strand, London, and 80, M a id en -lane, New York; by A. Stamna, Constantinople ; A. GuidiCit Smyrna ; and E. Muir, Malta. [Anvitarissmzsr.]—Drs Barry's delicious Revalenta Arable* Food invariably restores health, without medicine, inconve nience, or expense, as it saves fifty times its cost io other remedies, and removes indigestion (dyspepsia), flatulency, constipation, nervous, bilious, and liver cons plaints, cough, asthma, consumption, and debility. We extract a few out of 50,000 testimonials of cure', which had resisted all medicines. Cure No. 4,208, —Eight years' dyspepsia, nervousness, debility, with cramps, spasms► and nausea, have been effectually removed by Du Barry's delicious food in a very short time.—Rev. John W. Flavell, Ridlington Rectory, Norfolk. From the Dowager Count°. of Castlestuart.—Cure 52 , 612 .—Rosstrevor, County of Down, Ireland, 9th December, 1854.—The Dowager Countess of Castlestuart feels induced, in the interest of suffering huma nity, to•state that Du Barry's excellent Revalenta Arabica Food has cured, her, after all medicines had failed, of indigestion, bile, great nervousnessand irritability of many years' standing- This food deserves tho confidence of all sufferers, and may b• considered a blessing. Inquiries will be cheerfully answered. Supported by testimonials from the celebrated Professors of Chemistry Dr. Andrew Ure ; Dr. Shorland ; Dr. Harvey ; Dr. Campbell ; Dr. Gattikor ; Dr. Wurzer ; Dr. Ingram; Lord Stuart do Decies ; the Dowager Countess of Castle stuart ; Major-Gen. Thomas King, and many other respectable persons, whose health has been restored by it, after all other means of cnro had failed. For further particulars respect' ing this invaluable food our readers are referred toDu advertisement in another part of this paper. BIRTHS. 07 • 007/1. On the sth inst., at 58, Westbourne-grove, Bayswater, the wife of Wm. Champain Hall, Esq., solicitor. On tho sth inst., at Morditord Rectory, near Hereford, . the wife of the Rev. John Garland. OP A DAUGHTER. On the sth inst., at 17, Percy-place, Clapham-road, th• wife of Mr. T. H. Mandalay, jun. On the 6th inst., Mrs. Henry L. Hammack, of Claren• don-terrace, Bow. MARRIE D. On the sth inst. a Christch urc h , S urrey, R. Bianc hi, Esq., of 43, Stamford -street, to Catharine, only daughter of the late John Doubleday, of Long Clawson, Leicester shire, and niece of Edward Doubleday, Esq. of London. On the sth inst., at St. James's Church, ' Bermondsey. Captain John Mackintosh, to Louisa, widow of John Cho. Axtell, Esq., of B ermondsey, and Bexley, Kent. DIED. On the sth inst., at 39, Sackville-street, John Burn, of the firm of Harrison and Burn, aged 56. On the sth inst., at Trafalgar -place, Peckham, Mr. G° ° ' Pearce, late of Billeter-square, city, aged 68. E s( 0 q) 1. 1 1 : ottfliieeAsrat4ltpihthi n ian a l t s : st , q: M aa a rt z t , ahge t e li (L e 4. 7 d.g i f e e , of vir K i th e a n hMe risen, hev. F. G. Luard, 8.A., aged 27. On the 4th inat John Wilk s, s, aged 71. On the 4th inst., from disease of the b o ra f in S , P b itEg r a o l u -ss g e: 1: : : tr o lle : by his arduous services in the Crimea, where he servo , ' during the whole campaign, Lieut.-Colonel Geo. Steven s ' late of the 20th Rest. aged 37. Killed o o n n ei t C h e e ch 9 G th re D nv ec il . le la m st a , le i t n , c a o e m ti m on a , n n d e in a g r 3 B d u la sh i i s r ni. . 6 t : Cavalry, f our th son of the late bir Chas. W. Malet, Ba rt . l n LONDON • Printed and Pnblighod by MIIRDO YOUNG of No. 112, Strand, Printer, at 27e Sun Office, NO. 112, Strand, in the Precinct of the Savoy, in the cowl II of Aliddleeex, Saturday, February 7, 115157. THE SUN, LONDON, SATURDAY EVENING, FEBRUARY 7, 1857.