The Sun. — London, England, 1801-11-04 00:00:00

}t will ,'s mi. iciai -clemans• fore the very ne• eft on a on of an :xpressly orantee3 E, to- the . t to that. eally did Baciajozo' even had e said c made bf ldcrstoccl be Noble ra of 1.11 ?rl', that 'hied to/ : leatj ,eeri :v1: • yrs Prelirn bet w4zen rreaty of w tier, and y had re- nders tool elimittatY tat ing felt de V' Ll;jca noire LlAetice. 01 Nig tres' to raov e j shatilo at io a 041 an wary ; of .$ CfljVC A War , justice ° P i IC l'.-.(11: 1 1 nexamre" f cohduct t Q(: 1,:5:44.ti0g ~'.? til pi e : the in il l .alO • , , defer4C on the part of Britain. By the Treaty • entered into between Germany and Prussia, agains t Fra i nce, it was evident that the object of the War carried on by them against that Country, a as for the purpose of imrsing a Government upon France. Had England so far forgot its own inter ests as to join this Confederacy; such War could not have - been supported. So far, however, from t his, it was well known that England carefully ab stafned from interfering in the politics of France, and it is e qua lly w ell known that she reduced still farthe r her Peace Establishment in the year 1792, during the whole of which year the number of Sea -I:hlen employed in her Navy was only ts,ooo, and the Army was reduced to 16,000, making in the w,,,h01e a total of only 3i,000 men employed in both " - Navy and Army, whilst the Taxes were at the same Ihne reduced. It was e. ident, therefore, that Eng. ;and had no idea whatever of joining the Coalition, or ihtertering ip the Politics of France. The con. duet of France however towards Great-Britain i early proved it was her intention to forcerovoke hostilities on the part tif the latter, and her to ,a combat she had continually endeavoured to avoid. was i t not well known, that the French Nation towed, throughout all Europe, the seeds of Sedition and Insurrettion ? Could it he forgotten that they received Addresses from various Seditious Societies England, whose avowed objed was to establish The French upon the- ruins of the British Constitu -lido ? But it was the objeCt of France to provoke Brit a i n to hostilities. It could not fora moment be doubted, that the War entered into by Britain was a War of self-defence in:opposition to the aggres ,sions of France. The latter Country, by open force, and by propagating JacObinism in the respedive Countries round her, was enabled to make repeat ed conquests in spite of all ‘pposition. Great Bri. t "in than finding the inutility of opposing France • Upon the Continent, determined to attack her Colo- • r'ies; and render the War entirely Naval. The suc. cess attending her exploits were too -well known to u e repeated, for never before were such a series of brilliant successes gained in any War. This War, thus carried on, with reiterated successes, had at length been terminated by the Treaty now before the House. The territories gained by that Treaty - Would he highly advantageous to the Commerce of Great Britain. Ceylon was of the highest import_ ante to the trade of the East Indies, and was the sour ce of the monopoly of the Cinnamon trade, Whilst Trinidad was equally valUable and advan. tiered in the West Indies. It was to be remem. been that three different efforts at Pacification h a d ueen made "by Great Britain, who therefore could tot any time be charged with an indisposition to • He'now called on those Gentlemen who ad th• or supported the Treaty at Lisle, and opposed e Present, to shew wherein the superiority of the Tr• eaty of Lisle consisted, and why the present reaty was o f entitled to equal support, when the between of bdth was Peace, , and when the difference l'etween them was slight and trivial ? The Cape of Cod Hope was, by the Treaty at Lisle, to be ceded. to Great Britain, and by the present Treaty to . be made: a' F:ee Port, that was the whole differ. once. The question was, had we gained the objet; vie had in view, and preserved our Honour and our Ltegrity ? He saw no end to War, if Parties were not to give up on either side some point of a Treatyb ‘Vere those Gentlemen who opposed the War pre. pared to say that we should have re-kindled the i"nt of War, because we would not consent to I 1 C I .;‘ke the ape of Good Hope a Neutral Port N t . ere they prepared to say that the Terms, as they tvere before the House, ought to have been refused, 44 4 the War continued ? Surely the supporters of lit Treaty at Lisle must approve the present. The securi t y for the permanence of the Treaty had been -Sue)tioned, but he .knew of no better security than t he mutual interests of the Parties. He remem. °ered having heard it related of an Emperor of Mo. I c'eco,,who, when advised he was about to break a reaty by some ad he was about to commit, said, only adhere to Treaties so long as they agree k ith my interest." He was much inclined to think th e . 4 coarse language of the Moorish Chieftain would Ply very forcibly to. the more polished Courts of utope. The mutual interests of the Parties would, h e Conceived, forcibly operate in the present instance . give security to the Provisions of the Treaty.— "Pon the whole he thought it the best Peace that finder all the circumstances could be obtained. Lord GRENFILLE LEVESON said, the Hon. Gentleman had observed, that all those who sup_ Ported the Treaty at Lisle must, approve the pre -11"t• In answer to this he would say, .that the pe riod at which Lord MALMESBURY was sent to was a period of unexampled calamity to this Country. y The Bank had just stopped payment ; the British Navy at home was in a state of Mu tiny, whilst there was reason to fear every British Settlement. was - stained by alts of Mutiny. The Funds were so low, that it was thought almost impossible to raise the Supplies. Ireland, though 11 ,ot in a state of adual Rebellion, was approximat ing nearer and nearer to that state every day—, Mien we had no Fleet adequate to cope with the e nemy in the North Seas, and the French were t r'inpletely masters of the Mediterranean, whilst t t the p er iod of the present Treaty public credit as reinstated, Ireland was secured to us by th e I Union ; commerce was increasing, and the r irish N av y were not only in an excellent state tc discipline, but every where vidorious and sh t ti mphant. Had he not then a right to consider T i m as two completely distina periods ? By the pert at Lisle we were to. retain the Cape, with ot• Places ; and now, at a period of infinitely greater esCo Perity, we had given up Minorca, Malta, the Nteial superiority of Egypt and other places of 'nfeiior note. So far from. guaranteeing the in- Jrity of Portugal before the War, we had only V r "ranteed its integrity after a part of it had been ei blY taken by-conquest. He had no hesitation T r sa Ying e the terms were worse than those of .the Ivii ' t tY of Lisle,-and that from all the circumstances li e ' C h appeared, they might have been - made better. p rr ::_as not prepared however to. vote against the ; be be , lieved better terms might have been . . _ ; but...the. 'treaty gave Peace, and that had 4us e d c o , a general sensation .of joy throughout - the 'MIT I , _ le".tiad,--seen amongst his Constituents, 'vas perfottly 'convinced the Country rejoiced at it. He could not however. consent to: add to it the epithets of gloricius and honourable. Lord HAWKESBURY said, he rose at this early hour to state to the House his reasons why, under all the circumstances of Europe, and of the world, His Majesty's Ministers had been induced to ad vise His Majesty to assent to the Preliminaries of Peace now before the House. His Lordship said, he could not help differing considerably from his Noble Friend, who had just preceded him in this Debate, and who had compared the present Preli minaries with the terms of the Negotiation at Lisle, who had stated the circumstances to be very dif ferent at the two periods, as they certainly were, and of which he should shortly take notice.— What did his Noble Friend 'Compare upon this oc casion ? Why, be compared the Ultimatum of the present Ministers with the Projet of Lord GREN VILLE ; now he would ask his Noble Friend, if he meant to say that the first Projet of any Minister in time of War, endeavouring to negotiate for a Peace, was either the same in reality, or was ever expcled to be the same as the Terms on'which he was really willing to conclude a Peace ? Did that at any time happen to be the case in any Nego tiation for a Peace ? Did his Noble Friend mean to say, that Lord GRENV ILL E would not himself, when he sent this Projet to Lisle, have been glad to assent to Terms of a very different kind, pro- vided he were assured he could have 'obtained Peace ? Most unquestionably he would, and yet his Noble Friend had set that. Negotiation against the present Preliminaries, as if there was no real dif ference between them. Upon the question of Terms, he should advert presently, 'but he should, for the present, proceed to other topics. Upon the question of Peace, generally, he wished to make but a very few observations. After nine years War, and after zoo Millions had been added to our National Debt ; after the loss, of so much blood and treasure ; after such unexampled exertion, in so many arid such various ways, by which the People of this Country had distinguished themselveS ; and after we had been left alone, as it were, in the con test—to say, that under such circumstances, Peace was 'not desirable, he apprehended was an assertion that few persons would be disposed to make, nor did he conceive how it was possible that any one could say so. Having said this, he thotight 'it ne cessary to guard against a possible misapprehension, for which purpose he begged to disclaim the plea of Peace being made under any sentiment, feeling, or apprehension of any over-ruling Necessity. On the contrary, he believed most firmly, that the re sources of this Country are still most consider able, that its power is great, and that its situ ation now is such as its People have reason to be proud of. It was under these circumstances, and with this impression on their minds, that His' Majesty's Ministers had advised His Majesty to agree to the Terms of Peace specified in the Preli minaries now before the House. It was on this ground, and on thiS ground only, that he wished the Preliminaries of Peace to be examined. To say that the Peace was not liable to any objeaion what - - ever, was what he should not hazard ; he knew of nothing that was of that charaCter in this life. It was not a thing to be eispeaed in the present con dition of the World ; but what he alledged was, and that he did with confidence . , that under all the present circumstances of Europe, and of the greater part of the World, it was a Peace which it was wise on the part of this Country to agree to ; and (if better Terms could not be obtained) His Ma - - jesty's Ministers would in his opinion, be highly censurable for rejecting. There might be objeaions started against this Peace perhaps, or there might be a difference of opinion on account, or on the ground of the present Government of France, and on the present state of the Continent of Europe. Others might disapprove of the Peace on its own ground. With respect to the first of these objetiions, he should trouble the House but very shortly indeed. It was hardly necessary for him to remind the House that this question was, properly speaking, discussed last year, and Peace was then stated to be a mere question of Terms : that proposition' was denied by nobody, either in the House of Commons or in any other quarter.—Still, although this was so then stated, and so admitted, he really believed that the objeaions which persons now had to the Peace, were objeaions that rather went to the Go vernrnent of Frarke, than the Terms of the Peace. There were also, perhaps, some who might know how to make a distinaion between negotiating and making Peace—who might think it wise to nego tiate, and not wise to make Peace. He thought it necessary to-say a few words on this part of the sub jee:t, and in considering it, he was led to take no tice of the assertion, that this was a War under taken on our part with a view .of destroying the Republic of France—of establishing the antient Monarchy of France. He protested against that ever having been the °Nett of the War, on the part of this Country. He considered this War as a wise and just one on out part. When' it commenced between France and the other Powers, Austria and Prussia, this Country remained neutral, and pro.' perly so, in his opinion. He always thought that this Country was forced by France into this War, by a determination to propagate certain opinions by the sword, and which opinions had a dire& tendency to the subversion of all order in society, and were particularly hostile to the Constitution under which we have the' happiness to live—by promoting, in an extraordinary degree, Sedition and a spirit of Discontent in this Country,—a practice avow ed even by some of the Constituted Authorities of France, and carried openly into effect by a cor respondence with certain Societies in this Country. Such condua on the part of France forced this Country into the War : it was a war, therefore, which we could not have avoided and 'be true to ourselves. This had always been his opinion,—an opinion but little disputed in reality in this Country, and he believed not at all diSputed now here, and perhaps as little disputed in France. It had been said, that in this War there was a convulsion in human affairs; that men's minds were turned ; that certain principles would for a time flourish and bear every thing before them like a torrent, which it was in the power of no man, or any set of men, to stop. He did not say that this torrent could ,be ,entirely stopped, but he did say that this Country stemmed that torrent, and resisted it until it bad changed its direaion, and even altered its charaaer. We had been able to continue our exertions until the storm had in some degree subsided ; having done this, the objea of the War must be allowed to be in,a great degree answered. No man could look at France at present without being convinced that the opi nions, sentiments, and feelings of the people of that Country were most materially altered from what they were under their furious system of interference with all the Constituted Authorities of the rest of Europe ; we had gained much of our object in this War. Did he therefore say there remained no evil to be apprehended ? Certainly he did not—but the evils of 1801 were not comparable to the evils of 1793. Danger might still exist, but it was a dan ger, taken at the worst, of a- very different nature from that which threatened us at the commence ment of the War. The danger was a danger aris ing from principles ; the danger now, was only a danger of power. He did not, however, mean to estimate our present danger lightly, for he certainly did feel that the modern evils of Peace are not the same as ancient ones ; and this was not an opinion which he had taken up on the sud den, but was one which he had thought of and re_ fleeted on a great deal, and he had not seen any rea son for changing it ; how that Clanger arose, he should hint at presently. There were two ways - in Which to view the question, both of which involved considerations of wisdom and prudence. First, whether it would be expedient for us to continue the War, even if we had the power to commence a third Coalition of the Powers of Europe ? Now upon this point, although it was one on which he believed there was some difference of opinion, he freely confessed, that after all the Treasure spent on two Coalitions, and the efforts of them had failed (from no fault however imputable to this, Country, but from causes he would not stop by the way to inquire), he should not under the present state of affairs in Europe, be for trying the effect of a third. There might be those who entertained a different opinion.—He would ask them what was the chance of forming that Coalition a third time with any hope of success ? But he apprehended there would be an end of this point, if it was clear that the different Powers who had formed the two former Coalitions did not feel disposed to make a third. Now he 'could alledge, that there was not one of these Powers disposed to make that third Coalition.— That Austria, great as her power still was, and it certainly was very great, had no such disposi tion. That the policy of Prussia was still the same as' that which had guided its proceedings for a con siderable time past ; and that Russia was as little disposed to form this Coalition, as she had been for some time to enter into such Coalition. The other way .of viewing this part of the subject, was - that of our continuing the contest, without any such Coalition. He would then ask, what was the prospea of such a course ? What was there to be gained for us ? Nothing valuable at least— then why should . the War be continued ?- - There were two ways in which this last question might be considered—by inquiring what harm France could.do to us, and what harm we could do to France ? With regard to the first, there was no person in that House, he believed, less afraid than himself, of the power of France to hurt us ; none, who had less apprehension than himself of an Invasion of this Country, not meaning to say we should be absolutely careless of such a.threat, nor to undervalue the preparation to meet it, but speaking pf the thing itself, as an event reckoned on by the Enemy. But passing that by as a thing deserving no serious apprehension, he would ask, where was the part of the world (if we must continue to fight) in which we could affect France ? All her possessions, that were of more value than the expence would be of taking them, were in our power . already. Then, he would ask, Why continue the War ?. This was not all the ob jedion to the continuance of the 'War, under the pre sent condition of things. We know it had been for some time the policy of France to attack the diffe rent weak Powers of the Continent, and thereby to force us into , concessions to her, in order to procure to those Powers a restitution of what they had lost. .He would ask, Could we save those weak Powers of the Continent from these incursions ? No, we could not ; it was obvious we could not. Then, he would ask, Was it justice in us to continue the War, when we knew the effea it must have on the different weak States of Europe ? We had made great exertions and great efforts, the objects of which had, in some measure, failed ; from what causes it was un necessary now to consider ; suffice it, for the present, that the fault was not ours. But if we had not been able to accomplish all we wished—if we could not save all, we should_ save some part of Europe, and, in that sense, even with a view to the state of the Continent, the Peace was a wise and a prudent measure to be adopted. So much for two proposi tions, namely, whether there was a chance of a third Coalition ? And if there was not ) what was to be expected by our continuing the contest alone ? He came now to a third proposition, which was that which embraced the question of the Peace it self : its own Terms, he meant, the circumstances 'under which it was agreed to, and the whole of its Conditions,, and every thing which contributed to the formation of its charader. There were in this subjed, as indeed there 'were in every subjed of this nature, three main or leading considerations. First, the Time when. 2d; The Tone in which. 3d. 'The Terms whereon it was concluded ; and however im. portant the last might be, which he could not under value, yet he would say a few words on the pre ceding heads before he came to the latter, and he did this the more readily, from feeling that on our part it was a War in which we had always preferred security to aggrandizement—First, then, he would observe, that the time in which the Peace was made was most favourable to this Country, in a point of view which embraced a large policy.—Peace should, if possible, be made when the Enemy are impressed with your power, and when yoiryourselves are coisfi dent of your strength—when ycu yourselves feel that you have been eminently successful.—lf ever there can be a moment in which a great Nation ought to withhold its demands, and prudence prescribes that they should not be pushed to an extreme point, it is the moment of victory, because nothing can shew magnanimity better than moderation in the hour of triumph. He did not say this with a view of sheltering himself; he admitted that this eliserYatiore of his was liable to an objection, which was, that if the dote was so advantageous, why were not the terms better ? but he owned he saw the tern's in a view that was far from meriting • any. censure on those who had advised the conclusion of them, for. rea sons which he should assign presently. The second Proposition he had premised to discuss, was the tone of the Peace, and this was a point which ap peared to him well worth considering. It was, in his opinion, important that Peace should be made in a tone of dignity and independence ; that nothing humiliating should appear, bat that the true Honour and Character of the Nation should be adequately supported. He need not remind the House of the Tone of the Negotiation at• Lisle he thought also that little need tie said to that Mousse to prOve that the Treaty of Peace was made on our part in the tone of an Independent Nation ; made in every way consistently with the honour and feeling of the Nation. The third - point he pro posed was, that of the Terms ; but. before the House judged of this, he should solicit permission to say a few words by way of ineroduaion to it. There were several disadvantages that Government laboured under in making this Peace. The first was one which he believed every body had oliserved who had paid any attention to the detail of politi_ cal events for some years past : he meant, the tone of many of the Public Prints, which had bccosne distinguished for under- valning the Resources of this Country, and exaggerating those of the Coon try with which we were contending ; setting little, value on our own acquisitions, and estimating ltigh ly every one gained by our opponent ; a situation in which no Government, but that of this Country, ever stood, and in which this Country itself - never stood preVious to this War : but so it was . , and there was a disadvantage arising out of it in conclud ing terms of Peace. Another disadvantage in dlsGn§s ing the terms was, the Negotiation at Lisle that Negotiatiod(withouf intending to say any thing against the propriety of it) he would say, did put His Majesty's present Ministers under extreme dif ficulty, in negotiating the terms of the present Peace. He did not say, that what past there was not matter of necessity, but he did say, that it was a point which must aired any subsequent Negotia tion. He did not mean to say, that if France had been driven n to. its ancient frontier, or within its ancient limits, That the Negotiation at Lisle would have had much eirea on the subsequent Negotia tion, because a different policy would have obtain edofor the objeas and views of France. must have been more moderate ; but he meant to submit to the House, that in the present condition of things,`the Negotiation at Lide must. have given something of a colour to ail subsequeot Negotia tions. Having said this by way of introduEtiOn to the Terms,. he was led to consider the Terms themselves. The first thing to be considered in discussing the Terms was, that of good faith on our part towards our Allies, because our Honour was concerned in that point : Nov, upon this, he certainly was prepared to contend, that there was its this contest, at the conclusion of the Prelithina ries, but one Power whom this Country ,was bound, in strictness of good faith, to stipulate for, and that was the Ottoman Porte ; that although every feeling of generosity made it desirable that we should stipulate for others, yet, in point of real good faith, we were bound to none of them except the Ottoman Porte ; for when Powers had not held themselves bound to us, whatever might.be their engagements, we could not be held- bound to them. Naples desired to be released from her engagement, and to make a separate Peace, to refuse to receive our Men of War, and to receive those of our Enemy—a measure which not only . absolved us from all Good Faith in the continuation of our care for its integrity, but would haiie.justi fied a Declaration of War on our part against that Power. They admitted a French force, for the put pose of attacking ours and that of our Allies in our Expediaion to Egypt ; and yet we did stipulate for that Power. With roped to Portugal, they stood in the same predicament before these Preliminaries were settled : they desired to be allowed to exclude our vessels and to admit our Enemies ; they conclud ed the Treaty of Badajoz, and the Spanish Govern ment ratified that Treaty, but the .. French Govern ment ref - used to do so, and increased their demands, and afterwards we agreed that no further demands should be made. Now, with regard to the Otto.. man Port e, that Power stood to the last, and there.. fore we were bound to them to observe Good Faith in stridoess ; and we did so, for we obtained for them Pcoce without any sacrifice whatever. We had obtained for them that which they .could not have obtained for themselves ; a Declaration for the Maintenance and Integrity of their Domi nions; we had- obtained the renunciation of France to the possession of the seven Ex-Venetian Islands also. -It therefore stood thus, that for the Ottoman Porte, the only Power for which we were bound in good faith, we had obtained, not only all that we were hound to obtain, but also all they ever asked or wished us to obtain. There were two other Powers to be taken notice of irr this part of these :Preliminaries, those of the Prince of Orange and the King. of Sardinia. He knew of no stria obligation that we were under to stipulate 'for the Prince of Orange : it was perlealy true, that in 1787 we made a. Treaty for the joint gua rantee of the Power of the Stadtholder: it was true also, that every effort was made that could with propriety be made by this Country, to prevent the Prince of Orange being driven. from that Country, and, that an effort was made by the Go vernment of this Country, after that Prince was driven away, to restore him to that Country, which, if it bad succeeded, would have been much to our sat islaftion. Prussia, however, did not co-operats with us in that effort, and that it failed of succes was no fault of ours, nor would any one say there .was any obligation on out part to do so much as we did in that respect. It was true also, that this very subjea was in discussion, but His Mioysty'sMi nisters were given to understand, not, only from the French Government, but irons the Prince of Orange hirrnelf, that the discussionof that suhjeti was to be renewed with France and that l'ti,nce. With respell to Sardinia, we were not bound to treat tor him. In 1795 that Monarch, matte Leace