The Sun. — London, England, 1801-11-06 00:00:00

In the re• :he forao been ir: cur Bosses , instruEle 4 oints con- Self now al would be shy be an a Projer lad against that then c form, to that it Wag larquis, tO Ed rendered .s wrong in a quarter of of tierivea .alents ,w about la' putting tho : ve Peadetq 3 so large a' Igers whicW F our Poe was tieres.! ions. By Dt nocv re, cance the° to sec a° Cprnpletelt zoded for was entire) his dome' f infinitely hen his do' I . not wish 2 ; what ha d not hell , direaly tok into th e :otland was .n. stria al' 7wick urol s por tance [y it cOtil‘ i now, wile° c:C 40 have claimed' Piedmont for its Sovereign, but r r ) nicl we have obtiib&lStf? ',Could we have pro. - ured its restoration unless- we could have disposed the King.roft Errnria, unless weLeonid have the ,14 1 pine and.Ligprian Republich, and„ driven the : - 'ri-etich from the Mountains cdSwitzerland.?-41n.. igsg . we cotild„have done - all; this, it would have, been, • vain e ,to re s t ore th e King of Saainia to his ' , III, surrounded as he would t have beep by the F'rench t " by;their dependent at affiliated kepulilics.— As to Portugal; eve'ry . body j fh r uSr - iarnent er mis- t:ortunct. But irit Was rightirt - ,h'er - ro - ask to be re. .eased from her engagements to- Us, and 'if it was: tight in us to consent to it, then: clearly: we were iihsolved from any Obligation 'because an ob _ ligation w hi c h i s put au en d to on t h e dne side, Can,- upon no fair reasoning, - be said to Continue on the other. As to the Cession of OliVenza, it Certainly was not of any great importance-; bear much had been said abou t t h e 'Territory which France had obtained. f c qn Portugal in South America,'and.a considerable degree of geographical knowlecigeliad been displayed in tracing the coarse of river but Gen t me n ;should l ecolleki;that a South American antil aref: uropein 'river Were materially different, tfn.r When yoltrwere talk; 2ng of the Banks of ii river in South Arterici f it Vria• . Veillaterl lit tie less thanthe c6asts , of an ocean. It had been said, " You atfed to guarantee theln, ttarity of Portugal, but it is 1y 'after France and Spain have taken every thing they wished , for.q But this again was not corred. The Treaty of , 13 "dajoz certainly did not give to• France all she desired, because France, 'by a subsequent Treaty, extorts another Cession of still greater importake /0 her. What 114 , pens then ? Portugal has given up this second portion of her territory by force,. when you interfere and cancel the Second Treaty, and bring them back to the Stipulations in the first. To you, then, Portugal owes this dilference in the limits of her South American Empire, and to her You have acted not only with good Faith, but .with dignified liberality. The only remaining Ally was !ue Prince of Orange ; from our antient conne cti ons , irom our gratitude for, the services.of the House of Orang e at the period of the RevolutiOn, from his onnexion with our Sovereign, we could not but take a lively interest in his fate, and we had shewn i t by our conduCt ; he was not to be told of the guarantee of the Constitution of Holland, without re -calling to the recolleetion of the House, the efforts we had made to defend, the unparalleled exertions W had made to restore him to his dominions. tven 41 1. : the present occasion his interests had not been t leglefted; we did interfere fbr him,' and we were . ;old that'his interests were at that time the subjed . tit s Negotiation, and dim he. would receive an ' 'indemnity., Even if we were to take that upon ourselves; it ought 'not to stand in - die way of a , catPnatio n i t i arrangement. Thus stood the case With regard to our acquisitions and to our Allies. ILit it has been said, that we ought 'to have ob tained more; 'that we ought to have obtained some ding to'balance the great increase of power tVhicli Yrance had obtairie&--that we. have 'given France means of increasing her maritime strength, and, short, 'thfit we have signed the death-warrant df tile Country. 'Now, in the first place, if we had 'retained all'our conquests; it would not have 'made difierence to us in point of security. He did not mean to say, he would not have retained them 4 , 1 i if he could, but they were no note' important Than they would give us a little more or a little less : 41 f colonial power, and only tended to promote our 6 ecority by. increasing our finance. But would the ',:acquisition of all these Islands have enabled us 'to ounterbalance - the power which France -has ac- I ' lotted on the Continent, they would only give you a little more wealth ; .brit a littore wealth 11 ',_ eolit he badly purchased by a little more-war ; should think SO, even if we could be sure. that one year's more war would give it , to us ; i - l * lrtieularly 'when i fr .t was recolleCted how tnany . tears we had now been engaged in this contest. n speaking however about our resources, he would' 'U ke. upon himself to state (and he hoped the House Gould give him - Credit for some knowledge upon the 414 .ie61), that if any case of necessity should arise, c : if our honour should, require another contest, we ate far, v ery far indeed, from the end of our pe t 41 11ary resources, Which, he ,was happy to say, were greater than the Enemy, or' even the People '..°.! this Country theMselves had an idea of. For the' P ui l'' 6 se atili-feilee, or foi the Se - Cu ritY of Our honor, , .. e h oe still resources in abundance, but they ought t : .° be Kep t for these purposesiand-not lavished away' 24 vsaNinuing a contest, with the certainty of enor i ' 14 " 3 expellee. 'iou might sit down in a worse relative situation than yen are at present, your ob. 2 IL":t not obtained, your 'security not effeeted.—As .*-I ,_' 4 be general point, we could..not now think of ualanci ng the - Powers on the Continent ;• it was un ! dGubtedly . ri g ht, _that if the French had conqaered - much, We Ought also to endeavour to retain-much ; out in treating with France, -we were not to con --sider, what France, had. got from other Countries, but what was the relative situation between us and -'ranee. Gentlemen had talked of - the - iiti pssidetis, but F ran ce had not insisted upon that principle. in " Met' Treaties with the Powers 'on the Continent ; the had 'not retained the possession of all she had otlqueretl, and consequently we , could be justified ik-insisting upon that principle. HeAdmitted, that if a Country had increased in power and territory,fas ter t han its natural rival; for, without 'speaking hasti iY, he must consider France in that charatter, that Light justify. 'the engaging in a Confederacy to bri ng him hack to his ancient strength; but if he had been able to dissolve that Confederacy,, that W hy', perhaps, he the worst reason in the world wny, when we came to make Peace with him, we were to expect the more favourable terms. It would be but bad reasoning if one Power was to say to • another, you are much too powerful for us; we - have not the means of reducing that power by force, and therefore you must cede to us a portion of your territories in order to 'make us equal in point of strength. Gentlemen might undoubtedly wish this, but that which regulated wishes would not regulate • z ,_ -- 'tierly - many things might be prayed for, but were "tdly to be expeCled. • ,BUt he did not see that we lvere giving to the Enemy all this Colonial wealth "n l Maritime Power which had.been represented. '''''' a t You give back is not only smaller .than what * )-otr-reiain, but much of it-is in-a -ruined state-. . .fie .- ' " 3 therefore inclined to . think, that fur many years at least, we should have the Colonial trade, and that too isacaeaAng - ioaexten4 and value.— That we should not have been justified in ask.: ing for more . he. did noa,rneara to assert, but that we should hav i e -got more, or ; that. i we ; ought to have continued a the a War to, increase our Posses sions, was a proposition to which he, coati' not give his assent. Allusions had been made to former diiihaidnS and l(dgeage a upon this aubjeCt he should oAly e sly, ',that .;peace having laCen'res`tored be tween England aiod France, forbearance of lan guage, and terms of respe&, were proper, but it would be - ,affedation and hypocrisy in him to say he had-or could change his opinion of the cha rader of the peeson presiding in France, until he saw a train of condud which would justify that change'. He would not now oceupy the attention of the House by entering into adiscussion of the ori gin of the Ware the unjust aggression which was Made upon:ais, was established by recent evidence, but it was unnecessary to enter into it now, because upon .that. subjett the opinion of the House and of the Country was fixed. The great object of the War on our .part was defence for . ourselves and for. the: rest of the world, irea war waged against most. Of ,thenations of Europe, but against us with par. ticulatethalignity. Security was our great object ; there were different means of accomplishing it with better or worse prospects Of success, and according to the different variations of policy, occasioned *by aechange of circumstances, we still pursued our great object,' security. In order to obtain it, we cer tiaoly didlook for the subversion of that Govern ment whiclfWas fotitided upon revolutionary prin. tiples.. We never at any one period said, that as a sine qua non we insisted upon the ,restoration of the old Government of France a a—we,only said, there was no Government with which We could treat : this was our language up to 1796 ; but in no one instance did we ever insist upon restoring the Monarchy, though, he did not hesitate to acknow ledge. that it would have been more consistent with the wishes of Ministers, and with the interest and security of this Country. He, was equally ready to confess, that he had given up his hopes with the greatest reludance, and he should, to his dying day, lament that there were not, on the part of the Other Powers of Europe, efforts corresponding to Our own for the accomplishment of that great work. There were periods during the continuance of the War in which they had hopes of being able to put to gether the scattered fragments of that great and vene rable Edifice ; to have restored the exiled Nobility of France, to 'have restored a Government, cer tainly not free from defects, but built upon sober and regular foundations, instead of that mad system of innovation which threatened, and nearly accoin. plished the destruCtion of Europe. When this became unattainable he gave up his hopes, but wehad the satisfafflon of knowing, that we had survived the violence of the Revolutionary fever ) that we had seen the extent of its principles abated :—We had seen jacobinism deprived of its fascination *;' we-had seen it stripped of the name and pretext of Liberty ; it had shewn itself to he ca pable only of destroying, not of building, and that it . must necessarily end in a Military Despotism ; he trusted this important 'lesson would not be 'thrown away upon' the world.—There were times , doting the War in which Government hoped to be able • to drive France within her ancient limits, and even to make barriers against her fur ther incursions ; but in this they'were disappointed; it became then necessary, with the change of cir 'conistancea, to change our objects, for he did not know a more fatal error, than to look only at one objet`}, and obstinately to pursue it, when the hope of accomplishing it no longer remained. If it be came impossible for us to attain the full a s hjea of oar wishes, wisdom and policy both required that we should' endeavour to obtain that which was next hest. In sayinethis, he was not sensible of incon sisteney, either in his former langUage or condud, in refusing to treat with the person who now holds the destinies of France, because, when he formerly declined Treating with him, he then said, that if events took the turn they had since done ) he had no objealon to treat with him. He would now add, but very little more to what he had said—He could not agree with those Gentlemen who seemed to think that France had grown so much stronger in proportion to what' we had, and these gloomy apprehensions seemed to him to be almost wholly without • foundation. This Country al ways was, and he trusted always would be, able to check the ambitious projezis of France, and to give that degree of assistance to the rest of Europe which they had done upon this occasion, and he' wished it-had been done with more effect. But when the immense acquisitions which France had made were taken into consideration on the one hand, it was hut fair on the other, to consider what she had lost in population, in commerce, in capital, and in habits of industry ; the desolation produced by con vulsions such as France had ',undergone, could not be repaired even by large acquisitions of territory. Comparing therefore what France has gained with what she has lost, this enormous increase of power was nor quite so apparent as some Gentlemen on the other side seemed to apprehend. When he.took into consideration the immense: wealth of this Country, and the naturaland legitimate growth of that wealth, so much superior to the produce, of rapacity and plun der, he could ..not but entertain the hope, founded in ,justice and -in nature, of its solidity. This hope was strengthened by collateral considerations, when he looked to the great increase of our maritime power, when he contemplated the additional naval triumphs we had obtained, when he looked to the brilliant victories of our .Armies obtained over the flower of the Troops of France, Troops which, in the. opinion of many, were invincible—when lie regaled upon these glorious ataievements, though he could not but lament our disappointment in some objeds, .he had the satisfaetioo ,of; thinking that we had added ,strength to our security, and lustre to our National Character. Since the Treaty which had taken place at. Lisle, we had' increased in wealth and commerce. But there were two important events which had givon the greatest conaolidation to our strength, he alluded destruction of the power of. Tippoo Sultana in India, who had fallen a vidim 0 his attachment to prance find his perfidy to us had_frequently..been observed„.that greaadangers , frequently produced in Nations of a wanly cast of mind, great and nobli exertions. So when the ,most unparalleled -danger threatened the Sister ;Kin g dom, the feelings of a common cause between `.lhe Peoole of both Colin Trie s -had enabled them to overcome prejudices, some. of .tbetil. perhaps lauda ble, at.d all of them deep-rooted, and led to that happy Union, which adds more to the _power and strength of the British Empire, than all the Con quests of One and Indiiisible France.. These 'were consolations which he wished to recall to the recol_ legion of those who entertained gloomy apprehen sions about the Strength and Resources of Great Britain. If any additional proofs were wanting to prove her ability, to protea her honour, and main tain her .interest, let Gentlemen .look to the last Campaign, and they would see Great Britain con tending against a powerful ConlederaCy in the North ; they would see her fighting .for those objets at once, in Egypt .and in the Baltic, and they would see her saccessfUl in both. We had ,shewn, that we' were ready to meet the . threatened Invasion at Home, and could send Troops to triumph over the French in, the barren sands.. of Egypt, before a man could escape from Tou lon to reinforce their blocked up Army. We had met the menaced invasion by attacking France on her own coasts ; and we had seen these ships Which were destined-for the invasion of this Country, moored and chained to their ,coasts, and finding proteaion only in their batteries. These were not only sources of justifiable pride,' but grounds of solid security. Whatever might be the future objea of the Chief Consul of France, he knew not, but if it was to: exercise a . military despotism, he would venture to prediae. that. he would not selea this Country for the first objet of his attack ; and if we were true to ourselves, we had little to fear from that attack, let it come when it would. Bat though he did not entertain appre hensions, yet he could not concur with those who thought we ought to lay aside all caution ; if such policy were adopted, there would indeed be ground fbr most serious apprehenSions ; he hoped every measure would be adopted which prudence could suggest to do away animosity between the two Countries, and. to avoid every ground of irri tation by sincerity on our part. This, however, on the other hand was not to be done by paying abjea court to France. We must depend for our security only upon ourselves ; but if the views of France corresponded with our own, we had every prosper of enjoying a long Peace. lie saw some symptoms that they were, but upon this he had no certain knowledge ; but he would never rely upon personal character for tile security of his Country, He was inclined to hope every thing that was good, but he was bcund to at as if he feared otherwise. He concluded by giving assent to the Motion. Mr. FOX began by saying, that he never gave his vote with more heart-felt pleasure than he should give it to-night. He adv i erted shortly to the man ner in which the 'Mover and the M:nisters had spoken of the Peace, and confessed, that if the word Honourable had. been introduced, he should not have declined assenting to the Motion on that ac count. He conceived that the question had been fairly divided into two parts, Ist, Whether this Peace was preferable to a continuance of the War ? and, - 2d, Whether a better. Peace could - have been obtained ? The last point was not easy to be . ascer tained. Undoubtedty, if we could have had a better Peace. without the risk of Continuing . the War, we should have been very blameable in not doing it. In speaking of the terms, he considered Ceylon as a valuable possession. Some persons had regretted that we had not kept the Cape.. 'He was not one of those ; it would be better that it should be a free port, than that we should beat the expence of keeping did not, however ~agree with Lord HAWKESBURY, that the Mediterranean was a secondary point to Ceylon and Trinidad. He thought Malta and Minorca of considerable 'importance, particularly Malta, which, in any future war might be rendered almost impregnable. Yet why, he would ask, were we to suppose, that better terms might have been obtained ? What pressure upon France could have made her consent to better terms ? The Noble Lord had said, wish great ac curacy, and it was that part of his speech which he admired the most, that with respen to the unsatis factory state of the Continent, nothing gave him much hope of mending it. It might be true :hat France could not hurt this Country. Not hurt it ! The invasion of Great Britain he had always treated as chimerical, but there were - many ()titer points which he should not now discuss. Yet was any man so fond of the Union, so wildly satisfied with the measures that had been adopted, that he would say the danger arising from the French being in Ireland would not ,be greater, than would be the danger arising from the.Eeglish being in France ? The only question then was, whether• by pressure of War, we could prevail upon France to cede Malta and the Cape ? Could we prevail upon her by pres sure upon her Colonies ? that had been already done. By pressure upon the territory of ? that was ab surd. By pressure upon her finances' Here he could not help admiring Minis ters'foe not introducing into the discussion that jargon of the ruin of the French Finances; of their being in the jaws and gulph of bankruptcy. They had too much good sense to do it. He came now to the question, whether the War should be continued, or whether these Terms should be accepted ? A Noble Lord, who sat on the same .side with him, had talked of the Peace as a capitu lation of our safety, but yet he discovered that - that Noble Lord begged to be understood as not prefer. big' another year of War to this complete surrender. These expressions, therefore, lie could' not help considering as little more than oraorical ex egge_ ration. For 'his own part he .had believed himself to be the last person who coul,i bear the drought of Moodier year of war ; yet he found • now that was really warlike, compared with that Noble , Lord. Though he could not, however, - go so. far as he did; yet, still, he could not concern., plate another year of war-without dread and horror.. He would ask Gentlemen, what had been the state, of the poor for two years ? . What had been seen. in every parish ? Each poor man forced- to depend upon alms and churity.. charity did he call it ? One of the, worst parts of the present times was, that charity leosa its nature ; that the necessity was irresistible ; .the industrious and the dissolute were forced t 9 be relieved in the same manner. Should he be told that this wat not conneael with the `Vat Have not the events of this year proved that c.on— neaion"? Thfte had been an abundant 'harVesi,iViiiCif he knew had produced a reduaion in the 'price of grain, and also, but not in so great a degree, in the price of other provisions, But before the ?eace they had begun to 'rise again, probably be6use the fall had been too great. But as soon Peace came, the - fell had been greater than it had been before.—' Could any man doubt, under such circumstances,' that it was better for the people to cat than that we should possess the Cape, or even Malta ? He would now task Gentlemen,' whether they ever remembered an event that had occaskined such general and un. feigned joy ? But, perhaps, he should be told, that that joy was greater .among the lower classes. — Be it so. It then proves,. that- plenty in their minds was 'conneaed with peace. Mr. Fox now' alluded to the 'Preliminaries as they related te, France ; he said that if the objea of the War was to restore the ancient, accurseddespot?sm of France,• it would be an additional recommendation Of the Peace that the War had failed of attaining that ob. jest. He took a tie v of the comiequences that would have been produced upon Europe, had the coalition for the restoration of the Bourbon FAmily succeeded.' The consequences would have been, 'a perpetual guarantee amongst all Kings, against all people who might be oppressed iw them in any part of the world. He entered next into an historical view of the effeds that such a guarantee would have produced in the time of Charles - the. First, and at the period of the Revolution ; he expressed a clif; ferenee of opinion will Lord Hawkesbury upon the earlier periods of the War, and upon the causes of it. He contended that such-terms as had been ob_ tained might have been obtained at a much earlier period; he took a view of the different Negotiations that had been entered into with France, in each of which Negotiations we might have obtained as good, if not better terms. 'When ze last offer to treat was made by Bonaparte, in Son, we, were old to rause. We had 'pxrsed from 1300 to Oa, f Sol, and this Pause had cost us 70 millions, five times as much as all the Dike of .Marlivnough's campaigns. Mr. Fox proceeded now to charge the old Administration With - b:7ing the cause of the ag grandisement of France. He expressed a belief that the present Government of France would be less hostile to this Country than the old, and he argued against the idea of our Commerce being injured by the rivalship of the French. As to the Union with Ireland, he did not wish now to enter into the merits of it ; time would best chew ' whe ther it was likely to strengthen the conne6tion tween both Countries. He had heard of a mixture of delicacy and firmness in the Government of Ire land. He would be glad to know what delicacy. there was in the burnings and massacres I The Noble Lord had been incautious in the seleflion of his words; he had spoken of indulgencies :o be granted to the People in consequence of the Peace. Was the substitution of Common Law for-iVlartiai Law, or the Constitution of the Hab•las C- rim. to be considered as an indulgence ? He 1 .,r one not receive these much wished-for measures as in_ dulgencies, but as rights. He-concluded with say ing, that he could, not help lamenting that the Peace had not been made earlier. A better Peace might certainly have been had seven years since. Mr. WINDHAM - and Lord .FOLKSTONE said a few words against the Motion. Dr. LAWRENCE having, in the course of a short speech, expressed his surprise that the Mini ster of the• Country should not have delivered his opinion on so momentous a subjea, The CHANCELLOR' of .the EXCHEQUER rose. He observed, that after the able arguments that had been advanced in favour of the question, it was difficult to find any topics that had not before been alluded to. It had alWays appeared to him, as well as to many others, that the duty of Negotiation commenced when all hopes of continental a idin cher.' r , ing the power of France .were at an end. His prede cessors had been of this opinion, and had twice sought a Negotiation, though their efforts had been unsuc cessful. As soon, therefore, as His Majesty had been graciously pleased to deliver the authority of the Country, into the hands of the present Ministers, they had thoUght it necessary to follow the same example. —They had commenced a Negotiation, and their efforts had been crowned with success. A compa_ rison had been made between the Terms which were proposed at Lisle, and those which had now been agreed upon ; but it should be recolleaed, that since the Negotiation at Lisle, the National Debt of this Country had increased no less than an Hundred and Fifty Millions. At that . Ne, gotiation it was proposed to restore to France and her Allies all that had been taken from them, a measure that mast have been more dan. gerous to us at that time than it could be at pre sent, because Tippoo Sultaun was then in force, and in connexion with France. In the Mediterra_ nean, we did not then stipulate for the establish ment of the Republic of the Seven Islands, whielt now form a barrier to Turkey on the Eastern side. In the West Indies we were in possession of Cape Nicola Mole and Jeremie, in addition to cur other conquests ; them we agreed to give up, keeping only the Cape. and Trihidad. Upon the whole, he was decidedly of opinion, that the terms now obtained, were more favourable for the Country than those proposed at - Lisle. He then entered into an exa mination of the present Articles, which he con.. tended were calculated very much to effeCt the se. curity of our Eastern and Western Possessions. To those who wished to continue the War for the purpose of reducing the Power of France, he wished to state, that another Campaign could not be made at a. less expence than Forty. Mil lions, and a perpetual Annuity (except for the. operation of the Sinking Fund) of Two Millions per annum, in addition to their other burthens. Even certain success would not have been worth such a price. He perfealy concurred with his Noble Friend in thinking that we ought to watch with care any tendency to increase the Colonial sys tem of this Country. He was by no means satisfied *of the wisdom of those whose object seemed, to be to prevent France from beeoming'. a Commercial Power ; he wished to see France possessed of commerce, he wished to see her possessed of in.. terests which would make her conscious of