The Sun. — London, England, 1851-04-11 00:00:00

tt aced directly or indirectly to encreachmente by Euro- Pear ls on the lauds of the natives. Those et:crotch- Inenta drove away the game of the hunter tribes, and curtailed the pastures of the pastoral races. Thus d pe rived of th e i r means of subsistence, the native races aces Must either starve or encroach upon the lands of other tribes and war with them, or they must rob and attack their European foes. The timid, the week, and the gentle races lay down and died; the fiere and energetic resisted. ; Among the savages few excelled the Kafirs in vigour courage, and audacity ; and they had often declared that they preferred death by our swords an bullets to death by starvation. Now, we had exiended °‘ l ! empire in South Africa, not slowly, not gradually, as oar . ,teireehat;ed slate— repheation had increased, and the natives hed.cte by our liquors, disease, and civiliz but Sir Harry Smith had, within the last five gars, extended that empire by huge, gigantic, and extrae a e. ,aent strides. To explain Sir Harry Smith's t r e G t e dZ i t li h g e e he must ask permission to describe, in a few form and character of our South African em p i re. South Africa was an elevated table land—it Projected from the equator towards the southern poie in so k n S tb " a pe of a hu ge promontory, b at h e d b y t h e A t l ant i c, "ern, oceans and Indian Oc e ans ; from the shores of tho sto e the and h mounted up by flights of mountain steps sod the table laud of the interior. Betwee flea mountaies tt . th e Southero and Indian Oceans ther n e was a narrow " te rl P of fe rt il e land. There, in former times, bed d.velt T t t ot etr ibes of th e Hottentots'. Just two centuries ago the te ntots had b een assailed simultaaeousa w y by to most formidable foes, From the north-east cane the Kafirs, 1310olro race, probably with a large mixture of Arab hthaeclr Increasing nurnhere, or a want of pasture for cattle, or the attack of hostile and kindred tribes, tropi c e°ll3 pelled them to abandon their homes under the o r ri , and, like the Hun and Scendinavien swan ms of ' to teek swarms,ut ew lands whereon to subsist. great of these called the Amakotae, under their for chi ef 'rep', wrested from the Hottentots the terra , Y 'Yin knowbetween the Kei and Keiskatnma rivers, now tim e ti ,"Y the name of British Kafraria. About the sane " the year 1650, the Dutch had landed at the was extreMity of Africa, where Cepe Town aid kove situated. Tee Hetteutots, assailed en the one bad b ee 1.3' the Dutch, and on the other side by the Kafirs, eeen exterminated or enslaved. Finally, Kefirs end th tl e teh ' lIEI /Incing from opposite directions. Lad tact in litte laroya teo of Albany; then a petty warfere had en seouti eheilar to the border warfare of Etignuid and 1):a". The Kafir, like the Scot, lied deemed it an toit r e i ble act to steal cattle from his foe, and the The Dutch' l ke the Enelish, hat! not been slow to retaliate. e_zuzatblenotat errs, encamped in military villages, had only to deteed themselves, but, us their la tt fi be re had inmensed, they had gradually pushed the the rs ba ck. In 1806, we had taken final possession of with Cate €f . Good Hope, and soon began to interfere . %ti t( tee herder system of the Dutch, and to establish rear) ! Posts on the frontiers, with garrisions of er tre aps. The Imperial expenditure on account xar the se onr , - garrisons had attracted very many tre oo rsa k ee to the frontier. The presence of the el ler ': 4 , ati encouraged, facilitated, and hastened the XaCeonments of the Europeans on the lands of the sessionr 41)(1 on various pleas we had taken .po!d eetan,a of their territory, and had claim:. si tto a"" k bY aver their chiefs. The Kafirs had red a:4th'; lied stolen the cattle of the colonists, and had retaliate'Etl numerous depredations. The culoniste had We e d, the troops had been called out, and a Kafir lidded „With exist " thetermination of each war we had f anothert° our territories, and thus had sowed the seeds o the it , War. But the Kitfirs had acquired something of ke ro 8 :" 1 of their opponents, and had learnt the u-c of war l; ean weapo ns , and therefore every suc c e ss i ve K a fi r kn.. , ad beconae more formidable than the preceding one, In more troops and costing a larger sum of money. keth' 2 A ' t ee he had already said, our military force . in . tary at t"'"tiee, amounted only to 2,000 men, and our mill itkePenditure to about 100,0001. In 1835 th ere was amo unt w „er, and our military expenditure far that year k t an to 2 40,0004 Iu 1846-7 there was another bee o r n , W ar, and the number of troops in South Africa had Ott t — h 6,1 96 men, and our military expenditure , 685,0001. aid, H 7 conclusion of that war, in 1b47, Sir H. Smith, etbiotue sanction of the Colonial-office, added to the sides Y of „ the Cape of Good Hope, on its north-eastern . je t it,rie provinces of Victoria and Albert, coutatn vine abbe 3,600 square miles. Beyond these pro s° es, still to the north-cast, Sir Harry Smith added cel e nt tr South African dominions, but not to . the of 1 1 1 1 Y of the Cape of Good Hope, the territory ritish Rafraria, in which the present war corn leered, and which contained about 3,900 square miles. ti ttle , content with these acquititions, Sir H. Smith had fr anca crossed the mountains which guarded the northern o er of the Cape of Good Hope, and took possession Cti,„_the whole tract of country between them and the j f . '"e t , fie River —an area of the size of England, contain tielabout 50,000 square miles of as barren a desert as Ito ; t on the face of t h e eart h. Th at d esert had made our gating flank secure aga i nst the attacks of barbarians. g'Lng uncovered that flank, Sir H. Smith, still travel lb! I,orthwards, crossed the Orange River in pursuit of ofe to Te hel Boers. These Boers had fled from Colonial tb,„2 o Ppression to Natal. There we fi rs t p erm it- e d to u 4 to establish a Government—then sent our troops t oo lsl thdue . them, and thus added to o u r d om i n i ons 1 0,000 op:re miles, situated on an harb our l ess ocean , w i t h fi rs t , ' on one side, and the equally warl i k e Z eo l a h s t t" e toe other side. In cons quence of our ha v i ng Is e la possession of that worthless territory, the t e " fled again and crossed the mountains the plains of the i n t er i or . Si r H arry Smith 4 e sued them, defeated th em , an d proc l a i med the save 4tntv of Gr ea t B r i ta i n over all the plains between the % t re at Orange Riv e r an d t h e V aa l or Yellow River, an tit lit or about 48,000 square miles, with a froutier of 600 trig —exposed to the incursions of Zoolahs and other the et , of the saute eeig in as it Kafirs. Assin. some o f ft:iners fled nort h wards and crossed the Yellow River, a le if we persevered in our policy of pursuing them we kolild have to fellow th em to t h e mountains of the th e n °, and to add t o our d om i n i ons all Africa south of of th e Pies, Thus Sir Harry Smith, with the senction Colo n i a l- off i ce, had, since 1847, added 105,000 eitaP) miles to ou r S ou th Af r i can possess i ons, an area S ta r t ? equal t o t h at of the United Kingdoms, and our egri Africa n emp i re now covered the vast space of 4, 1 ,;;" square m il es, an area eaua l to t h e whole of the tee4;zian empire, i nc l u di ng Lombardy an d a dd ing Pied- Of ;I, to it. He cal cu l a t e d th a t on th e f ront i er te:4 a t empire th ere was a li ne o f 1 ,000 m i les tl4`,,ed to th e attacks of savages of the same blood as d er afire, and as fierce, warlike, and energetic. He defe4.not attempt to calculate what it would . cost us to e tti c tlt , 1 that frontier with regular troops in the same . of er —_ c „ we had defended the north-eastern frontier Ito ls e nt El pe of Good Hope. To defend those 200 miles tatielf ' , Pent of late years not less than 600,0001. an- C 1.04. To show some of the consequences of the en ,oteo4t.ing policy of Sir Harry Smith and of the Colonial 4st h " would now refer to the blue book which had sob' eti delivered to them. He opened it, and the first betjefeet he saw in it was entitled " Boundary , Disputes ttib e el L t i, butch Farmers and Tambookiee, ' a Kafir ra t i, twuohad generally been on good terms with us. the w . ° Sir Harry Smith's arrival on the frontier, in e ° l oe irlte r of 1847, this land was situated without the Sir 12 c , The Boers on the frontier memorialised th eft. Smith to annex it to the colony and give it to ti 41 . A sir tt• Smith granted the prayer of the memo teeffsuee portion of the land in question was forthwith thl t r ad out for some of the Boers, and it so happened the land tIc11),„so measured out belonged to a chief who t 3 tol te V i Our ally in the last war. This, said Sir A. Ise sfmtrotta rendered the governor prodigiously popu- Rive u p, t ime. The Tambookies, however, refused to %ee l, r t , the land. The Boer's threatened to compel csie s e k nd bitterly complained that they had been de- Re tro (.1 the fine words of the governor. Sir A. Stok en -I,oinitilzrlais letter of Ist July last, addressed to the Co te tot etar y,described these proceedings as calculated e kid to „the Boers and Tambookies at mutual slaughter, mes e -,Onvert her Majesty's most devoted servants into S i .""-e re h r a a ti e rebels," Unfortunately his gloomy . forebea r this b eo n n i _lne to pass. The next subject of importance N' ll tl b t& was entitled " Excitement throughout Kafir aiteh the Prophecies of a witch doctor." Sir Harry 111'4011841 assured Lord Grey that he was pulling down ought,()th • Sir Harry Smith was not so successful as 1 4) ag a i n Last autumn the belief in witchcraft sprung t itle s-u'lleußafirland in consequence of the want of rain. de coct a n , rin gs of the Kafirs became intense, and pro -mesite ;—°ngst them feelings of desperation and ani vtaeethrards 118 ; for before we came amongst them, Zsir effo e was a want of rain, the KAI - 3 used to lead ;rate r "a from the plains to the mountain sides, where W tte gene 11 g their ra yto be found, or they used, by change t_ elr pastures, to follow the rain, ~.f or frequently tt'2en there Was WCs a drought in one part o, their territory et- as fallin g in another. In consequence, of our en- Ps tor ems, the power of the Kafirs to change their greatly diminished, and consequently their Stad te from drought greatly increased. He be o:lt in former times the Kafirs had been per ege pr,alled vi a ti t certain times, to pasture their cattle within edl%.. e° of Victoria and Albert, which wise men ged eutrea Ground; but since Sir Harry Smith got, illere to the colonof the Cape of Good r e thit, Provinces y . , I teee tt Pormistion had been refused. Under the in stets „"" more suffering, the feelings of the Kafirs te -44ia;45170re (as the well. int irmed author of an into 111a ' E lie of the Kafir wars justly observed) the same 'ee ve rso of the Gael towards the Saxon, as described in .46 of Sir Walter Scott. The Kafir chief would et a , ~, I Ti t "lite Rhoderick Mau:— p it :Be fertile plains, that soften'd vale, there once the birthright of the Gael. dwells he now? . N eat thou we w ill not sa lly f o rth 411C111., Spoil t h e spoiler as we may, Wi l `! f rom the r o bb er ren d hi s p re y, li uf 4 ° of ten thousand herds there strays 11 One along yon river's maze, Sh a s l i G a,c l of ns and river heir fL with strong hand redeem his share."—(Cheers) chi was a belief in Kafirland that witches, and core t ets art b g! called bewitching things, e r .rai nt l e e,.ge and to cattle, and could prevent the falling could cause injury to o Tttqae itt btafirs also believed that there were certain at 'elvettlled witch doctors, who could discover witches a tcl ught n i e te ,biog things. The Kafirs attributed the Itl'ear e e. 'let year to witches, and a great witch doctor eF ‘rry s British Kafraria. He pretended, like Sir 4 k trac trth, t o put down witchcraft; and, as two e never agree, Sir Harry ordered Colonel xt te, kv. , 01 1 to secure this Mehemet, as he termed ;ttei t i tin 't to transport him to Robben Island. Colonel i o 'lter e owever, told Sir Harry that the tbaoteld endanger the tranquillity of the co -11.4414 . 1 '; there had been nothing mischievous or th a oth er , ln iaa the conduct of the witch doctor. On the t th e hand it was generally believed in the colony Cpl the was had attributed to the Europeans ai e !:' 3 of the Rears. Sir Harry Smith and to 4E44 4 'e i ' lL e'n, nn Lt) eenerary, attributed the t:S..- 6,.oerthr_ hafirltnd to the efforts of Sir Harry Spuith Itet iltu r the authority of the native chiefs. That Produced much alarm among the frontier _. r - ~ ___ T.11;,' SUN, farmers, which was increased by finding their Kafir ser vants suddenly leave them. They began, therefore, to take precautions, which alarmed the Kafiri. In the midst of this alarm and excitement Sir H. Smith wrote to Lord Grey, on the 14th of October last, that though " he attached no importance to this excitement," he would proceed at once to the frontier, and on his arrival he would report without delay. Oa the 21st October he wrote that "his Lordship need be under no apprehen sion of an outbreak," and that a meeting of Kafir chiefs had been summoned for the 26th October, when he (Sir Harry) would explain to them their true position. That meeting had very important consequences. The great Galka Kafir chief Sandilii did not attend it, fearing lest he should be put in prison, for that once before when he had attended a meeting he had been put into prison. Sir Harry inamsdiately issued a pro clamation deposing Sandilli from the rank of chief. On the 31st of October Sir Harry an nounced this event to Lord Grey. and assured the Noble Earl that Sandilli possessed " neither influence nor respect among his people." Never did Sir Harry Satinet make a more incoherent statement. The attempt to capture Sandilli had twice caused an outbreak of the Kafirs. They rose one and all to defend him last winter, and there was not a man among them who would net gladly rush between a bullet and the person of Sandilli. In the same dispatch Sir Harry stated, with reference to the deposition of Sandilli, that "a crisis had arrived which would test his system;" that "be had no appre henrien of the result;" that " every Kafir who possessed anything was a supporter of the present Government;" and that, " if the chiefs had endeavoured to excite the people, they had signally tailed." In the next dispatch, dated 6th November, he assured Lord Grey, that the isis had passed most happily, and that therefote he should leave the frontier and return to Cape Town. On his arrival there he wrote again to Lord Grey, on the 26th Nov., assuring the Noble Lord " that he had left British Kafraria in a state of perfect tranquillity—the Kafir people fully satisfied, and the chiefs expressing similar feelings." In the seine dispatch he informed Lord Grey that he was going to organize in the colony cf the Cape of Good Hope a rural police, analogous to the Kafir police, which had been so " remarkably efficient in British Kafraria." According to our last accounts, almost every one of the Kafir police had deserted to the enemy, with their horses, arms, and ammunition. Sir Harry Smith proceeded forthwith to order the governor of Natal to arm and lead into the field against the Amagaikas 3,000 warriors of the hostile population of the Ausazeothabs. The perfect tranquillity which Sir Harry described in his dispatch lot the 26th November did not continue long. On the sth of December he wrote to Lord Grey that the quiet which lie had such just grounds to anticipate was not realized. :On the 12th December he wrote again and assured Lord Grey that " he perceived little.or no difficulty in restoring tranqui lity." Lord Grey was delighted et receiving this dis patch, for in reply he wrote how " glad he was to learn that all immediate danger of an outbreak was at an end." Unhappy Lord Grey! This letter was witten on the sth March; the next day he received intelligence that the outbreak had commenced with fearful violence. It was evid , nt, therefore, that the two persons who ought to Lava been preeminently well informed in these mat ters, were pre-eminently ignorant on them. The next end last dispatch to which he should refer displayed in the highest degree the blindness of Sir Harry Smith. It was dated the 20th December last, four days before the commencement of the war:—lt began with an account of a meeting of the Lambie tribes, who dwelt in the neighbourhood of King William's Town, with Sir H. Smith. He stated that "the conduct of the chiefs and the feelings of the assembled people were all that he could possibly desire. The chiefs expressed their deter mination to adhere faithfully to the present order of things avid to obey her Majesty." According to the last accounts they had fought against our troops, and interrupted the communications with King William's Town. In the same dispatch Sir Harry stated that he " had received accounts of a very improved character as regards the conduct of the Tambookie chiefs;" and ho looked for ward with every confidence to being able to restore ge neral harmony and tranquillity." These were the chiefs about whom Sir Andreas Stockenstroem had entertained such gloomy forebodings. According to the last ac counts they had, as he had already said, attacked our frontier, carried off a quantity of cattle, and committed a long list of murders. Next Sir Harry was sorry to " inform Lord Grey that the majority of the farmers on the frontier had abandoned their homes, and moved far into the interior. His advice and influence had been ex erted to induce them to remain," but " unfortunately they had disregarded his counsel." Most fortunate it was for them that they did disregard his counsel; that his advice had no weight nor influence with them; that they did abandon their homes and move far into the in terior; for if they had believed in Sir Harry Smith most of them would have been slaughtered. In the same dispatch Sir Harry stated that " he was happy to bring under Lord Grey's notice the good and loyal feelings which prevailed among the colonists." In the same dis patch :Sir H. Smith stated " that they were tranquil, contented, and happy; that he anticipated that his system would be perpetuated," and he de clared that he " had every confidence in the prospect before him." Four days after this dispatch was written the r G ten a pe i u lt nl a s e s sdn r rose lnodn i e n edl a s r i m r sH— sdefeatedthn ColonelFo Fort Cox, a n c n k d i n Somer set,tnboenn— when he attempted to open communications with Sir Harry. Now, what had made the Gaikas rise in arms? He had said it already. It was the attempt to capture Sandilii. The Kafir war, which began in 1846, was re kindled in 1847 inconsequen ce o f a di spute b etween hi m and Sir. Henry Pottinger. That dispute had arisen about 13 or 14 goats, which had strayed or had been stolen from the colony. Sir H. Pottinger had ordered Sandilli to restore them, and to give up the thief. San dilli had restered 12 goats, but had declared he knew nothing about the remainder, nor ahnut the thief, if there were one. Sir Henry Pottinger was not satisfied; he sent a secret expedition to capture Sandilli. The Kafirs rose in his defence, and the expedition failed. Accord ing to Sir Harry Smith in this "bit of a brush with Sandilli," 56,0001. were spent on waggon hire alone. This fact would give the House some faint idea of the probable expense of a contest with Sandilli.—(Hear. hear.) Sir Harry Smith, soon after his arrival in the colony, assembled the Kafirs at King William's Town. At those meetings, which took place in December, 1847, and January, 1848, Sir Harry Smith pretended to de pose Sandilli from the rank of great chief, and to appoint himself the Inkoli Inkulu of the Kafirs. He did se with the strangest ceremonies. He described to Lord Grey his proceedings on one occasion in the following words: —" The Kafirs being arranged in a circle, I rode into the midst of them, bearing in my right hand a sergeant's halberd, well sharpened, the emblem of war, in my left hand a magic wand, my baton of peace and authority, surmounted with a brass knob.—(A laugh.) I directed each chief to come forward and touch which ever he pleased, it was immaterial to me; they all touched the symbol of peace; then each chief kissed my foot—(Great laughter)—exclaiming, " Inkoli Inkulu." I then shook hands with each, never having done so before. Three cheers were given, and thus I commenced the foundation of the improvement of their social condi tion.—(Great laughter.) At another meeting he made the Kafir chiefs swear " to obey his commands," " to disbelieve in witchcraft," " not to buy wire," and " every year to give a fat ox to her Majesty." He also harangued them in speeches full of bombast and rhodomontade, with a mixture of religion, or rather of blasphemy, be ginning with a curse and ending with a prayer, much after the fashion of a mock oration of a trooper of Crom well. Thus, by alternately courting and threatening the Kafirs, by alternately: praising and reviling them, by playing all manner of fantastic and mountebank tricks, by aping the manners of the savage, Sir Harry thought to civilize Kafirs and to impose upon them;, but the Kafirs laughed at him, turned him into ridicule, and im posed upon him. At the great meeting of the 19th of December last, Sir Harry acted a somewhat similar farce. According to the reports of the colonial news papers he denounced Sandilli as a rebel and an outlaw, and offered a reward of 5001. for his capture. The Gaika chiefs remonstrated, and entreated him to show mercy to Sandilli. Sir Harry declared that he could not do so, for if he were to show mercy to Sandilli the great Queen of England would cut off his (Sir Harry's) head, and that he would not lose his head for such a rebel as Sandilli.—(Laughter.) The next day Sir Harry pro claimed a successor to Sandilli, and wrote to Lord Grey that he bad every confidence in the prospect before us. Two days afterwards, in the postscript to the same dis patch, he assured Lord Grey that the best feeling per vaded the Kafirs, and that the Gaikas were much pleased with his conduct. Finally, on the 24th, finding that no Kafir would betray his chief, even for the enormous re ward of 5001.. Sir Harry sent Colonel Mackinnon, with a force of 587 men, to capture Sandilli. That expedi tion failed, as a similar one had failed in 1847. The Gaikas rose in defence of their chief, they attacked our troops in a narrow defile, from which our troops were with difficulty extricated with serious loss. Then the Kafirs destroyed the military villages on the frontier, slaughtering the inhabitants; next, they surrounded Sir Harry Smitll in Fort Cox, owing to which "accidental circumstance" (to use the strange language of the Hon. Gentleman the Under Secretary of State for the Colo nies), Sir Harry Smith was for several days pre vented from communicating with the colony. Next, the Kafirs repulsed General Somerset in his attempt to open communications with Fort Cox. Finally, Sir Harry Smith escaped, and on the 31st of December rescL,ed King William's Town. IM roediravly he issued a proclamation, calling upon the co lonists to rise en masse, destroy and exterminate the barbarous savages, and promising them unlimited license to plunder. Now, the Tambookies had assailed us on the north—the Kafir police had deserted—the Rat River Hottentots had rebelled—the Boers were doggedly in active, and disaffection prevailed amongst the coloured classes on the frontier, who had been in the last war our allies. lie was afraid, therefore, that a serious war had commenced, and that it would be a costly one.—(Hear, 0 1 79 had seen in the colonial newspapers that an tat aal notica had been issued, promising all able-bodied men who should enrol a bounty of 21. for six months' families, and with arm , w a s service, 6d. a day pay, liltahetchroaiuttiorenras accoutrements themselv_e e s and families, and clothing. He had no doubt that alarmed, however, when he read a_wthis necessa ry.notice, what the country would have to for without doubt we should have to and thought liwas paayfit,ans war; for this war Sir H. Smith and Lord Grr y ey or were responsible; it it had broken out in their own peculiar province of Bri tish Kaffaria,which was no part nor portion of the colony of the Caps of Good Hope. The last question was, what steps ought to be taken to relieve this country from any expense on account of future wars with the Kafirs. It was clisar that first we must defeat the Kafirs and reduce them to subjection, and pay for so doing; what should we then do? Adhere to the present system of defending the frontier by troops at the ex pense of this country? In 1848 he ban presumed to warn the House that under that system there would be a Kafir war every three or four years, with a large bill to pay for it; that there was only one way to save our purses, and that was to give the inhabitants of the Cape of Good Hope free institutions—complete control over ' their own expenditure, and the management of their re lations with the frontier tribes—(Hear, hear)—that the same time the colonists should be made to distinctly understand that they must defend themselves against the Kafirs, and pay for their own defence; and that, finally, our troops should be withdrawn from the fron tier, and only an Imperial garrison maintained in the naval station of Cape Town. If these measures were not adopted the House might feel certain that on the average of years the people of the United Kingdom would have to pay from 600,0001. to 700,0001. a year for the Cape of Good Hope—a sum which considerably ex ceeded the exports of -British produce and manufactures to that colony. The Cape of Good Hope was not worth that price.—(Hear, near.) With free institutions the inhabitants of the Cape of Good Hope would be fully capable of defending themselves against savages. They had bid defiance to the might of Great Britain, and threatened by force of arms to resist any attempt to transport convicts to their shores. Let them display a similar energy end self-reliance in a war with Kafirs, and they would be more than a match for Sandilii and all his followers.—(Hear, hear.) Ho had concluded his observations with regard to the military expenditure of the United Kingdom ou account of those colonies which were neither military stations nor convict settlements. He had endeavoured to show that if those colonies were governed as they ought to be governed, no troops should be maintained in them at the expense of the United Kingdom, except for strictly Im perial purposes, and that it was neither just nor fair to call upon the inhabitants of the United Kingdom to de fray out of their taxes the expenses of the troops which were required for merely local purposes. He had also attempted to show, with regard to the Cape of Good Hope and New Zealand, that if free institutions, with self-novernment, were given to those colonies, a very considerable redaction might ultimately be made in the military force maintained by the United Kingdom in those colonies, and that by that reduction a further saving might be made in the effective military expendi ture of the United Kingdom—to the amount of at least 550,0001. a year. Therefore the saving which he con sidered could be made in the effective military expendi ture of the colonies to which his resolutions applied would amount to at least 1,200,0001. a year. If to that sum were added a proportionate amount of the dead weight, then the ultimate saving in the military cost of those colonies would be at least 1,600,000/. a year.—(" Hear, hear" from Mr. Williams.) If his views on the subject of military Stations were adopted and acted upon, the military force maintained in the colony at t,e expense of the United Kingdom might be still further reduced. The principles which he had laid down with regard to military expenditure were equally applicable to civil expenditure. For 1846-7 the civil expenditure of Great Britain in the colonies had been returned at about 500,000/. Of this sum about 300,000/. was for the clothing, maintenance, superinten dence, and transport of convicts; 70,000/. was expended in the military stations. These two sums being re quired for Imperial purposes, had very properly come Out of the Imperial purse. He thought that by adopt• ing the principles which he had laid down the whole of that sum of 130,000/. might ultimately be saved, with the exception of the sum paid for the salaries of go vernors. For, in his opinion, if the goveruor of a colony were appointed by the Imperial Government, he should be considered as an Imperial officer, and be paid out of the Imperial treasury. In concluding his observa tions on our colonial expenditure he must remark that in every colony there were many persons who had a strong sinister interest in the amount of Imperial expen diture. These persons had made, or expected to make, large gains, by contracts, jobs, and by the innumer able other modes of robbing the mother country. They rejoiced in every increase of Imperial expenditure. To them a Kafir or a Maori war, or a rebellion, was a godsend. He had heard it, on good authority, that in the Canadian rebellion the enormous gains of these persons had . been equal to the losses of the rest of the community, and that they had been heard to boast, " The good old times of that rebellion, and the speedy commencement of the next." Sir H. Smith had stated in one of his dispatches, that during the last Kafir war many persons had amassed large sums of money, and that the consequences were a redundancy of money at the Cape of Good Hope, with general prosperity, and a tendency to over speculation. H e had heard similar statements with regard to New Zealand, and it was self evident that with au Imperial expenditure many times greater than the local revenue of a colony, there must be a fine harvest for the jobbing and peculating tribe, and that noxious date must flourish and multiply. — (Hear, hear.) To this class, and it was not an uninflu ential one in our modern colonies, any proposal for a re duction of Imperial expenditure was in the highest de gree distasteful. Corrupted by that expenditure, they had not the feelings of self• reliance and self-respect, which, according to the just remark . of Lord Grey, our old colonists displayed in their conflicts with the Indians, and even with the might of France. Many of these un worthy Anglo-Saxons would , in their hearts, prefer Colo nial-office despotism, with huge Imperial expenditure, to the freest institutions with imperial economy. We were to blame for this degeneracy, which every high-minded and every right-minded colonist deplored. We were to blame fur having departed from our old colonial policy and demoralised our colonial children by our waste and extravagance. The sooner we returned to the old policy the better for them morally, for us pecuniarily; their characters would be elevated and ennobled by becoming sell-reliant and obtaining self-government; and our money would be saved by bestowing upon them the freest institutions, and strictly enforcing the; maxim, "No Imperial expenditure for local purposes." That maxim was the sum and substance of his first resolution; those resolutions expressed his idea of the true colonial policy of Great Britain, which was self-government for these colonies, and no Imperial expenditure except for military stations ; with that polioy, the more of these co lonies we had, and the fewer military stations we had need of, the richer and more powerful the British em pire would be. He moved those resolutions in no hos tile spirit to the Government, but, on the contrary, to encourage them to pursue boldly and vigorously the po licy which they had commenced on the continent of Australia. He asked them to assent to this motion—he asked all Hon. Members to support it who wished to reduce the national expenditure; for if there were any portion of that expenditure in which a considerable re duction could be made without injury to the empire, that portion was our colonial expenditure; and that ex penditure could only be reduced by acting in conformity with the principles contained in the resolution which he now begged leave to move. (The Hon. Gentleman re sumed his seat amidst general cheering.) Mr. URQUHART, in seconding the motion, said, that if adopted it would not only effect the important objects which the Hon. Baronet had in view, but would like wise open a door to an object to which he (Mr. Urqu hart) attached great importance—viz., the destruction of the present power of departmental government. The Hon. Baronet had stated near the beginning of his speech that the strength of this country abroad depended upon the judicious selection of our military and naval estab lishments, and at the same time he had laid down cer tain wise and prudent maxims for the selection of those establishments. He (Mr. Urquhart) thought that Gib raltar afforded a remarkable instance of the injudicious ness of our whole colonial arrangements. During the 150 years for which that colony had been in our posses sion it had cost us scarcely less than 250,0001. a year, and, including the additional sums which we had spent upon fortifications and otherwise, he believed that the whole of our expenditure upon that colony alone would represent a capital sum of no less than 100,000,0001., which he maintained was entirely thrown away, for the colony neither furnished a place for the defence, repara tion, or provisioning of our fleet, nor the means of at tacking an enemy. Instead of its giving us a security over Spain, it rendered that nation the necessary and inevitable enemy of England, unless when it found itself obliged to fall back upon us in conse quence of a greater hostility elsewhere; and it no more commanded the Mediterranean because it was placed at its entrance than it commanded the Atlantic because it was placed on its side. To use the words of Napoleon, " Gibraltar opened nothing, and shut nothing; while it secured to France the undying hatred of Spain against England."—(Hear, hear.) And yet upon this unimportant place we were squandering a sum equal to the eighth part of the national debt; in stead of placing it immediately in schedule A.—(Hear.) Gibraltar also afforded an apt illustration of the internal liberties of those colonies called military, the privilege of participating in the government of their own inter nal affairs being entirely denied to the colonists, on the plea that military colonies required to be treated like vessels, which were ruled entirely by the captain on the quarter-deck. The Hon. Member then proceeded to argue that Gibraltar, Malta, and the lonian Islands suf fered at once under the maleficent influence of the Fo reign and the Colonial Departments. The adoption of the present motion, therefore, by depriving those de partments of their control over the army would go far to neutralise their evil influence, With respect to the Colonial-office in particular, he begged to say that if it did not soon resign itself to the task of correcting its own abuses, the unanimous voice of England would soon be raised to put it down; and ho wondered that the Noble Lord at the head of the Government, whose poli tical position had been acquired by the correction of abuses, had not ere now applied himself to the correc tion of that greatest of all abuses, the Colonial-office; for he felt assured of this, that if the good sense of the country did not put down the Colonial Department as at present constituted, the Colonial Department would put down the colonial empire of Great Britain. The SPEAKER having put the question, Mr. HA WES asked the indulgence of the House while he endeavoured to offer 130020 reply to the able and eloquent speech of the Hon. Member for Southwark. That Hon. Gentleman had made a speech showing his usual industry and great learning, and replete with de tails of great interest and importance. It was one that deserved the best attention of the House, and he had lis tened to it with deep interest. It was impossible for him altogether to dissent from many of the observations of the Hon. Baronet in reference to our colonial empire. But on the other hand he was bound to say, looking at the speech as indicating the policy ho would press us to adopt, that such a policy would be deeply injurious to this country, would injure its best interests, and impair one of the noblest empires that any power had ever pea. sensed. The Hon. Baronet had based nearly the whole of his arguments upon pecuniary considerations. Having ascertained what the convict stations and military sta tions were, which he altogether excluded from his ob servations now, the Hon. Gentleman advised the House deliberately neither more nor less than to abandon those colonies which we now possessed, in which we had any military establishments.—(Hear, hear.) Was the House prepared for such a step? And on what grounds did he rest the policy. which he recommended? Ho (Mr. Hawes) again said he could not discover any beyond those of a pecuniary character. It might be that we were too poor to hold our own—that we have fallen from our high estate; but - .: alt;'. r </ 14 0 N' . l) 0 N, ~,~, ) , APRIL 1 1) 1851. _ ~_ ~: „ people than the recognized body. That expenditure, moreover, had the effect of demoralizing the population politically and morally. Why could not the colonies produce sufficient statesmen to govern them? It was owing to our corrupt and debasing system. The gover nor governed by corruption, and as his power proceeded from an alien source, he was unchecked by the people about him. This expenditure injured the colonies by creating a fictitious system of expenditure. There re venues were nothing more than an item of British expenditure.—(Hear.) This was the normal state of our colonies. How could countries that had no com merce whatever have a revenue? The main and the last observation he would make was that this very mi litary expenditure created wars. A large military force led to its own use, and to the occasion of its own em ployment.—(Hear, hear.) The Noble Lord was wrong when he interrupted the Hon. Baronet (Sir W. Moles worth) and said that the policy of Sir Harry Smith was not to destroy the chiefs.—(lnterruption.) The House was not interested in this question.--(Renew c d cries of " Hear.") He would not enter further upon the que s ti on , hut would wind up the observations he had to make, as he saw the House impatient, by pressing upon them to take immediate steps for the reduction of colonial ex penditure. Mr. STANLEY said ho should not follow the Hon. Baronet through the vast variety of subjects he had at tempted to handle. He would confine himself to the, question of colonial economy. The Hon. Baronet con tended that at the earliest possible period this country ought to be relieved from military and other kinds of expenditure on behalf of the colonies. The Honeturable Baronet said that there were some colonies which could not have any value as military stations. He had in atenced Jamaica, but from the testimony of a foreign power, the American Government, it was asserted that that would soon become one of the highways of the world. Its contiguity to the Isthmus of Panama gave it some value as a military sta tion.—(llesr.) The second part of his resolution was to give the colonies sufficient powers of internal self-go vernment, and to free them from Imperial interference. (Hear, hear.) If the Hon. Baronet characterised our military establishments as created for the purpose of putting down public opinion and establisning despotism, he could only say that he knew more of the theory than the practice of government.—(Hear.) Over the vast ex tent of our colonies there was only about 9,000 men. When that was considered, our colonial system could not be so despotic as represented. It was a common thing to charge the Imperial Parliament with indifference to colonial affairs, but he could appeal to the records of their debates, and to the personal experience of Members for incontestiblo evidence of the interest taken in colonial affairs.—(Hear, and cheers.) In the case of colonial af fairs the only power which that House exercised was that of a court of the last resource. It was a kind of court of appellate jurisdiction for the colonies. Do what they would, Colonial Assemblies must be more or less democratic assemblies. In speaking of a con stitution for the colonies, they were to take into account, first, the fluctuating character of that population—not being of oue colour, but of a hetero gen ous kind. On that point, he would remind the House, of the report made by Lord Durham, in 1834, and in which he said, that he expected to find in Canada a party struggle, but he found instead a war of races.— (lear.) He thought it was quite clear that Parliament should keep the power of interfering in extraordinary cases. He would have been glad to have had -an oppor tunity of laying before the House the degree of pros perity enjoyed by those colonies which the Honourable Baronet had said were all but crushed and ruined.— (Hear, hear.) He would take a single case, that of the colony of New South Wales. He would show to ;he House by official statements its rapid prosperity. In the exports the increase had been as twenty to one—taking the period of twenty years from 1828 to 1848, and in the imports the increase had been nearly as great, in 1828 amounting to 57,0001., and in 1850, 1,500,000/. Then as to pcpulation—in 1828 the population of New South Wales was 36,000, and in 1848 it had increased to 200,000.—(Hear.) Nearly similar statements could be made with reference to the other colonies of Australia, —and it might with truth be said that they were more prosperous, and the increase might be called more marvellous than in the Western States of America.—(Hear, hear.) He did not deny the distress that was stated to exist in the West Indies; and one thing was certain, that if ho wont back to 1834, and that there had been then in existence an independent colonial legislature, it would have been the means of perpetuating evils far more serious than any that now existed.—(Hear, hear.) Did any man think that the Act of slavery abolition would ever have been passed by an independent colonial Legislature?—(Hear, hoar.) The set of constitutions which the Hon. Baronet proposed seemed to be something in the nature of a con federation—a military confederation it could not be, and ho (Mr. Stanley) confessed he could not understand what such a confederation could be; for it would of necessity be—" each for himself and Heaven for us all." As to one point of the case of war, if this country declared that in any war the colonies must pay, they must give to the colonies the power to determine the war.—(Hear, hear.) They could not do so, for in that case they must allow the colonies to contract any alliances they chose, and if they allowed that this country could not retain any vestige of supremacy. He (Mr. Stanley) believed that what would follow from the adoption of the resolu tion would be the abandonment of their colonies. — (Hear, hear.) To that he could never consent. It would be an act of the most suicidal character, and he should therefore give to the resolution of the Hon. Baronet the most strenuous and determined opposi tion.—(Loud cheers.) Mr. COBDEN said the speech of the Hon. Baronet remained to answer, notwithstanding all that had been said on the subject. The Hon. Gentleman who had just sat down had narrowed the question indeed, though ho certainly professed not to understand the comprehensive view of the Hon. Baronet. He had not said a single word about English commercial interests in the colonies in the course of his speech; and had solely referred to the colonies as means of fuinishing military posts and military garrisons. The Hon. Gentleman had called the attention of the House to the advantage of having 1,500 miles of military frontier in Canada; but he (Mr. Cob den) hoped England would never have to defend that line against 24,000,000 of the bravest people in the world. The Hon. Gentleman had prided himself on the idea of Jamaica being made a military station; but was that the fact? Even the Hon. Gentleman himself admitted thatthe Americans were avoiding the route to Chagres and creating another route by the way of Nicaragua to avoid that mili tary station. The trade of New York to Panama was di verted because of that circumstance. The Hon. Gentle man informed the House of the great prosperity of the colonists in Australia. He might have gone farther, and told how the labouring man in these colonies got 4s. or ss. a day, while if ho only turned his eyes at home he would find agricultural labourers getting only ls. a day; and then he might ask whether it was not time the people of England should have justice done to them, taxed as they were for the support of colonial prospe rity. The Hon. Gentleman, however, could not be charged with making the question a mercenary one—a mere pecuniary question, as the Hon. Under-Secretary for the Colonies had taunted the Hon. Baronet the Member for Southwark with making it. The Hon. Under-Secretary, however, should show that there never was a period in the history of tho country when pounds, shillings, and pence formed such an important items in politics as the present. On Monday there was a great debate on the apportionment of 1,500,000/. sur plus; on Friday there would be another debate on the same subject. The Hon. Member for Bucks would hardly sneer at the pecuniary view of the question, nor would the last messenger from the agricultural interest, the Hon. Member for South Notts. The Hon. Under- Secretary of State could, therefore, have but a very im perfect perception of what was passing in the minds of his countrymen, when he sneered at the Hon. Baronet making the subject of the colonies a pecuniary ques tion. The Honourable Baronet, however, had taken a more generous view of the character of the colonists than the Hon. Secretary for the Colonies; because he gave them, on the one hand, the rights of citizens, while, on the other, ho abolished the expenditure on civil and military matters—a choice which he (Mr. Cobden) had no doubt would be accepted by the colonists. His Hon. Friend had incurred much odium for his efforts in respect e ma d e which the colonies; but the only reduction that cou ld b d e which would sensibly affect the expenses of this connatry was the one he proposed—namely , to cut down the civil and military expenses of the colonies. F ree -tradora and Protectionists would be soon brought to t he sam e view of the case. The present surplus could not be depended on in fact it was, as had been stated, half consumed already on Kafirland. He (Mr. Cobden) did not con sider, as a Free-trader, that because the corn-law wa s repealed there would be no deficiency in the revenue; on the contrary, a convulsion on the Continent, or an explosion in America, would, in his opinion, produce a collapse in the revenue. The onl y way to l oo k f or a permanent surplus was in the reduction of expenses, and the expenses that first claimed attention were the naval and military expenses of the colonies. The Honourable Gentleman (Mr. Stanley) spoke as if money was to be had without trouble or expense, but he was mistaken. As a Free-trader he (Mr. Cobden) considered the relations of the mother country with the colonies had changed since free trade was established. He was surprised to see the Right Hon. Baronet the Member for Ripon had left the House, for that Right Hon. Gentleman had taken a course on the question of the commercial policy of the country which involved as logical consequences the reduction of expenditure in the colonies. When the exclusive trade of this country with the colonies was put an end to the plea of uphold. ing civil and military establishments was got rid of. The Hon. Member for Lynn seemed to think there was a dif ferential duty in favour of England still kept up in the colonies. He was mistaken. The colonies, by the Act of 1846, had a right to regulate their own tariff, and they regulated them accordingly. England had, therefore, no favour in that respect. Canada had been alluded to, but England had given up all sovereignty over the land in that colony. lie could not, therefore, conceive why she kept soldiers there. If, then, she could not give away an acre of land, or regulate the tariff, or levy taxes in her colonies—in Canada in particular—?,_b_t" was the use of 9,000 troops?—(Hear, hear , ) could not hold the country against 2,000,000 people he the people were so minded. The real fact Wa knew it to be one unpalatable to the House, there was an immense deal of jobbing in the both there Canada, and there were consequently pa rties as they and at home who had an interest in thingskeeping were. The people of England, however,o ld. no longer ng n eor sileh interest in the matter, and they n e c d t e d w o ifth sel f-interest, England expenditure by tole rate it. The colonies were eon a stronger tie than a few troops the by nd th othertipaltryeas considerations - of interest, —they were connected through lines of packets, a connec e by blood, by that nature; they were also H reli gion, by laws, and by feeling. e ( r. Cobden), there tore, regarded the question in its pecuniary aspect as one of the most important that h ad b een brought before the House in the present session; and he considered is Hon. EVENI‘if, IN tar he must say the voluntary abandonment of such an empire as this--consisting of such vast possessions— containing a friendly port in every quarter of the globe— that this was a sacrifice which no country had ever been known to make at any former period.—(Hear, hear.) The Hon. Baronet had gone at considerable length into an estimate of our colonial expenditure. He (Mr. Hawes) did net think that the items were quite the same as those he hod used on a former occasion. Per haps the Hon. Baronet had seen from further inquiry that the items of the expenditure which he formerly quoted required to be materially modified. It was almost impossible to make a reply to details of this de scription, which required the greatest consideration, and the most careful examination, in order to arrive at any thing like an eccuraie estimate. He thought that the Right Hon. Baronet had materially over-estimated our colonial expenditure. The Hon. Gentleman altogether excluded on :the present occasion all military stations and convict stations, but he had not decided what the military stations of the empire were. For instance, the Cape he did not include amongst the military stations, and he would find other cases in which it would be equally difficult to distinguish the colony proper from a military station. The Mauritius was a case in point. It was a colony which, in point cf posi tion, was of the highest military importance for the defence of our trade. And yet it was a colony which produced about 60,000 or 70.000 tons of sugar yearly to this country. He clid not think it was an easy task to decide what were military stations and what were colonies proper. By a return ordered on the mo tion of the Hon. Member for Northampton, the House would find in detail the military expenditure of this country in reference to our colonies, giving the gross expenditure for five years. Now ho found that the gross annual expenditure, according to that return, which, he admitted, might not include the whole expenditure — but a small addition might be made to it—by this return he found that the gross estimate of the colonial expen diture for all our colonies was only 1,9 , 18,4711. yearly. —([rear, hear.) They were, according to the position laid down by his Lion. Friend, entitled to deduct from the general sum the cost of their military stations, be cause his Hon. Friend did not propose to reduce the ex penditure at these stations.—(Hear.) Nov, he did not mean to say that their establishments were what they ought to be; true, he might assume that a military ex penditure was necessary for the maintenance of the em pire at large—and, even so assuming, yet declare that it wan capable of reduction, and even of expressing the hope that it might be reduced.—(Hear, hear, and cheers.) He did not mean to say that as far as these colonies were concerned they were incapable of having the military expenditure upon them reduced. The fact was otherwise—for a paper that bad been laid on the table of the House the previous day, showed that a reduction was contemplated.—(Bear, hear.) Taking the figures, however, as they had been stated, these mili tary stations cost 552;000/.; their convict stations 71,0001.—making a total of 623,0001., which might be deducted from the 1,948,0001., and it was over the re maining balance that the Hon. Baronet would exercise control.—(hear.) He wished now to call the attention of the House for a moment or two to those colonies which, not being military or convict stations, they were, according to the propositions of the Hon. Baronet, to abandon altogether, because, they wero to remember, these were the words of the Hon. Baronet's resolutions:— " I. That it is the opinion of this House that steps should be taken to relieve this country, as speedily as possible, from its present civil and military expenditure on account of the colonies, with the exception of its ex penditure on account of military stations or convict set- Clements. 2. That it is expedient, et the same time, to give to the inhabitants of the colonies which are neither mili tary stations nor convict settlements ample powers for their local self-government, and to free teem from that Imperial interference with their affairs which is insepa reble from their present militery occupation." It followed, from these propositions of the Hon. Baronet, that all their colonies, not being convict or military , stations, and having a military force within their boun daries, were to be abandoned.--(Hear.) He thought that tho speech of his Hon. Friend, so full as it was of details, served to show that he dwelt too much oa those details as an economist, and that his doing so . had pre vented his giving a duo appreciation to that polls}' which it became a great monarchy to maintain ands great empire to pursue. The consequences of the policy of his Hon. Friend, he believed, would be found very fatal, and such as the people of this country would not approve of. The colonies would have to be abandoned—it would be declaring them independent of this country—it would lead to their separation from the mother country; there would be no longer any tie between the eoloaies and the mother country but their reciprocal interests, and it would be free for any other country to bid against England with the colony for that interest. The re sult, then, of the policy of the Hon. Baronet would be this—and in saying so, he did not at all exaggarate the consequences—it would be the abandonment of the far greater portion of their colonial empire.—(Llear.) Now he believed that neither their merchants nor their traders were prepared to take that stop.—(Hear.) Wfy, it was but that very day that his Noble Friend had presented a petition from almost every merchant at the Cape, pray ing for the assistance of this country in the war in which they were engaged. Let them but adopt the proposition of his Hon. Friend, and they must part with their West Indian colonies—Jamaica, Trinidad, Guiana must be alike lost to them, with Australia and New Zealand; they must float away on the world for any strange power that chose to take them; and he believed that it would not be long, once they had been abandoned by this country, before they would fall under the dominion of some other power.—(Hear.) His lion. Friend had said that if they left to those colonies local selt-government—that if they freed them from Imperial control, the colonies would undertake their own defence, and to that defence they might be safely left. He (Mr. Hawes) dissented altogether from that proposition. He knew that his Hon. Friend connected together as if they were inse parable from eech other local self-government and the distribution of their military force; as if there were, no self-government where there was military force, and that there was self-government where there was an ab sence of military force. Such was not the true state of things. In point of fact ho could show that in a colony where there was the largest power of self-government there was a large military force, and he mid point to another colony—a Crown colony—a colony governed, as it was said, by the Colonial-office, whore there was a very small military force. Let them take, for instance, the case of Jamaica. There was the fullest power of self-government, and yet there were 1,400 of their mi litary ; and, on the other hand, there was Trinidad that had not self-government with only 300 mer. Let them run through their colonies, and they would find there was no connexion between local self-government and the maintenance of a military.—(Hear, hear.) Take two colonies adjoining each other—Nova Scotia and New Brunswick. They had at Nova Scctit a military station, and New Brunswick was not so. Let them take the case of New Zealand and compare it with South Australia. New Zealand had from fifteen to sixteen hundred men, and Australia had but sixty-fivo men. Whether a force were paid out of Imperial resources or the colonial funds, still, in case of necessity. the colony would look to relief and protection from the Imperial Government. Thus in New Zealand they had a largo native population, end there, therefore, thee must have a large military force. From that expens; they could not escape; and he doubted much whether the mother country would save much by adopting the Hoe. Baronet's proposition. Let them take the case of tie Cape. If they granted it local self-government, and dd not inter fere with the administration of its affairs, Ind yet, if a war broke out with the Kafirs, his ,Hon. Iriend would give them a large sum of money to maintain the ex penses of the war. Sir W. MOLESWORTII—No, no. Mr. HAWES—He understood from the lon. Baronet that in such a case he would not abandon ,he colony to its own resources. He gathered, from abet his lion. Friend had said, that he saw the contingency before him, and that he discerned this fact, that they could not separate the commercial interest! of British subjects here from those of British subjects in their colonies. The time, then, would come, when they would have to answer this question—would they assist the colony when it was placed in dtfieulties? And he was sure the country would readily give its assent to do so, and thus the policy of the Hon. Saronet would involve them in a heavier expense thant what was in curred under the present system.—(Hear, hear.) But sunposing the recommendations of the Ern. Baronet to be . adopted, he assumed that the intercourse between the mother country and the colony would be as beneficial as it was at present. Experience served to show that assertion was not sustainable in fact. Letthem take the case of the United States of America, wiich had once been colonies of the British empire. ;low that the United States were separated from this country, the British merchant, before he could bring hs goods into one of their ports, had to pass through protecting duties of 25 per cent.—(Hear, hear)—whilst in very colony that belonged to the British empire he hal a friendly port open to him. The vote, he said, was ai important coasideration for them, because many of hese colonies were trying to impose a protecting tariff,and if they were independent of this country they woud have their trade interfered with. It might be sad that these duties would be paid by the consuners in the colonies. There could be no doubt tha such would be the case, but in proportion as thee protective duties wore high their power to purchase vould be im paired; and thus they would have an incretse of taxation in another shape, even though they mightget rid of the cost of an immediate expenditure, whichthe Hon. Ba ronet desired.—(Hear, hear.) It was notsn mere com mercial and pecuniary grounds alone that le opposed the motion of the Hon. Baronet; and taking ip these other grounds led him to refer to the Cape of Good Hope.— (Hear, hear.) When they took possessio a of the Cape of Good Hope they found that it was a Prssession that extended 400 miles inland, and they took it with the obligation to protect the white populetten sere, and also to protect the coloured population. Now, ;hey could not withdraw Imperial control from that celery without en dangering the safety of the colony. They hid not, he said, the power to throw away the oblighttonsthey had con tracted. His Hon. Friend had mentioned ;hat he had on this occasion made the observations he intended to have offered to the House on an amendment of which he had given notice, on the motion of the Noble Lord (Lord J. Russell); and this induced him ( 41. 4 1 1 e-es) to refer more particularly to what bad been saicl on the subject by the Hon. Bsronet.—(ilear, bear.) 'Fie Hon , Baro net had spoken of their " frontier policy" at the Cape of Good Hope. His Hon. Friend bad bean eicreetly silent as to his significations of a "frontier p s t oy h , b ut h e threw ridicule upon their extending their enpire. Now, he (lir. Hawes) did net know of a singlt governor of eminence who had not recommended exestly the same policy which Sir Hurry Smith had follower, It was the policy recommended by Sir B. IYthoan. But th e n, it it was said that pokey had failed; bit he denied that it had failed. Ia 1820 that House pled a large sum of money for the purpose of sending )ut emigrants to plant on their frontier; and one of the most promi nent in recommending that measure was the Honour able Member for Montrose, who urged them to in crease the number of their emigrants. That, then, was their policy, and they had thus incurred en obligation to protect these emigrants. When the Dutch had that colony their system was to allow the Dutch settlers to raise a military force themselves, to proclaim war against the natives when they chose, and to carry it on with all those blood-stained incidents with which such a war was sure to be accompanied. That system England indignantly rejected. They determined that a regular military force should take the place of such a volunteer force ; but they soon found that the frontier chosen by Lord Charles Somerset in 1820 was badly chosen as a defensive frontier. Part of the ar rangement then made was to extend the frontier from the Fish River to Keiskamna. Sir B. D'Urban, Sir H. Pottinger (a most valuable governor), and Sir H. Smith all concurred in this policy, and its value was proved by what had recently occurred, for the Kafirs, alarmed at the idea of having forts behind them, had not in their incursions caused anything like the mischief or loss of life that had occurred on similar occasions hitherto. It was said that Sir H. Smith had been taken by surprise, but he referred to a paragraph in a letter of Sir Harry Smith to which the Hon. Baronet had not alluded, and in that letter, da'ed 20th December, p. 64, and paragraph 6, showed that Sir H. Smith, though he conceived that peace had been established, had yet resolved not upon disbanding the troops until he was convinced that general tranquillity had been established. In reference to Sir H. Smith, he could not avoid saying, that as en absent man, as an officer, and as a governor, he thought this was not the fitting time to cast ridicule upon him.— (Cheers.) He did assure the Hon. Baronet that what was said in that House had a considerable effect out of it, and that Hon. Members ought sometimes to feel more responsibility then was generally evinced by them, when they passed their censulea upon absent individuals. —(Cheers.) But the Hon. Baronet passed to Natal, and said that there they came in contact with a naval force that was bold and terrible. Ho admitted that they were a very brave people, and he had to add that they were now marching to the aid of Sir Harry Smith. In that colony they had nearly 100,000 natives under British dominion, and they were very civilised, for they paid taxes very weil—(Laughter)—and they preferred direct taxes, for they paid a house tax.—(Laughter.) That colony was managed very well, but then they were told a great deal about the Boers. Now the first cause of the alienation of the Boors was, that the British Go vernment would not allow them to proclaim war against the native tribes ; and a great cause of dissatisfaction with them was the abolition of slavery, as they said they could not carry on their agricultural labour with out slaves.—(Hear.) As to the convict question at the Cape, it was sufficient to say of it, that those who agi tated against it well knew that it was never intended to make the Cape a convict settlement, and those who had taught others to despite authority, were now reaping the bitter fruits of their own treachery. The proposition of the Hon. Baronet amounted to this, it was that they should save 1,200,000/. and part with their colonial empire. The simple question then was this—was their colonial empire worth 1,200,0001.? They must not calculate the value of their colonial trade by simple exports and imports from this country with the colonies. In doing that the Hon. Baronet took no notice of their shipping, and the amount of capital and interests involved in their inter-colonial trade—in their trade be tween colony and colony. Of these things the Hon. Baronet took no notice at all. It was as if he were to take the total expenditure of the Great Western and North-Western Railway, and then only look to what goods were sent from Euston-square and Paddington, without taking any notice of what was sent from the other stations along their lines. Such was the Honourable Baronet's mode of giving them the value of their colonies by merely taking into his account their colonial exports.—(Cries of " Hear, hoar.") He was quite sure, then, that the policy of the Honourable Baronet was not one the House was prepared to adopt.—(Hear, hear.) He found by papers which were then before him, that the estimates had been gradually reduced from a sum of about 226,0001. when the present Government came into office, to an annual vote of 180,0001. His Hon. Friend (Sir W. Moiesworth) had alluded to the subject of reducing the number of troops in New South Wales. Might he refer his Hon. Friend to the papers which had been cir culated that morning showing the intentions of his Noble Friend (Earl Grey) as to the further reduction of the military force in the colonies, and he could assure the Hon. Baronet that if there were a reasonable or practicable reduction to be made, no man would ho more anxious to effect it than his Noble Friend. He trusted, then, that the House would not follow the Hon. Baronet's advice, but support him (Mr. Hawes) in the course he felt bound to pursue, by moving the " pre vious question," as the only way in which he could show that the motion was met in a kindly spirit, and that the Government were prepared to reduce the Colonial expenditure to the lowest point that it could be reduced consistently with the honour of the country.—(Hear.) Mr. ADDERLEY complained that the Under-Secre tary for the Colonies had gone out of his way to allude to the convict question, and to throw the blame of the irritation at the Cape, not on those who attempted to make the Cape a convict station, but on those who re sisted the attempt. As the subject of the Kafir war should be fully gone into by the Noble Lord at the head of the Government, he thought the most advisable course to adopt would be to divide at once on the question be fore the House, and discuss the subject of the Kafir war separately. The motion of the Hon. Baronet was, in point of fact, to reduce the military expenditure of the colonies, and to give them the powers and advantages of local self• government. This proposition was charac terised by the Under-Secretary fur the Colonies as neither more nor less than abandonment of the colonies. In a recent dispatch from the Noble Lord at the head of the Colonial Department to Lord Elgin—a dispatch bearing date ,March 11—the withdrawal of a largo number of troops from Canada was directed, and the handing over of the civil estimates to the considera tion of the local Legislature suggested. Why should the principle be carried out with regard to the largest and most powerful colonies, and yet be denied in the case of smaller colonies? The policy proposed by the Hon. Baronet the Member for Southwark was one in its very nature calculated to avoid an abandonment of the colonies. That policy was based on broad, sound principles. The entire subject presented itself' under a double aspect; first, as a qestion of retrenchment, and, secondly, as a general colonial question. When the question of protection occurred to him, he felt he con fessed mortified that so few of its professors had mani fested any sympathy in the cause of retrenchment, which they had undertaken to support. Protectionist Members, though they had told the farmers that protection was a lost battle, and had taught them not to look forward to a return to it, still they had promised to do their utmost in procuring a retrenchment. There was a noble oppor tunity for them. But whether this expenditure was to be discountenanced or not, by the effect of the divi sion on this motion, the country had long since decided against, and would not much longer tolerate it. Though it had borne it long and patiently, the time had come when, in a moment of irritation, it would throw it off, and repudiate along with it the whole of their colonial system. The only way in which such a calamity was to be avoided was, by at once establishing a colonial sys tem of government on sound principles, while it was still in their power to deal with the subject calmly, and upon a full knowledge of facts. They must, before long, come to an understanding with the colonies, and lay down a definite policy respecting them. He (Mr. Adderley) maintained that they could not deal with this important subject by agreeing to the previous question. At the very moment when the surplus was to be handed over to the commissaries to defray the expenses of the war had they not constituencies at home that might be glad to share it? But the fact was, that there would always be a Kafir war to swallow up any surplus that might occur. It was, in fact, a mere mockery of the coun try to be talking of the surplus at its disposal, when, in fact, its application was anticipated. Far better would be to have ship-money, or benevolences, or any the contrivances of former times, • than to bo thus deluded with the pretence of a consti tutional taxation and expenditure. We had all the practical tyranny of a despotism, and all the trouble of a democracy, united at present in our existing system of Government. lie did not hesitate to say that they might use the words which were used in that House in the reign of Henry the Eighth, when he sent Cardinal Wol soy to demand a benevolence. The words which were used on that occasion by a Member were worthy of be ing remembered. They were these—" If our money is to be taken by a commission, we shall be taxed like France, our taxes will be farmed, and this country will be bound, and no longer free."—(Hear, hear.) He had no sympathy with those who looked on the colonies merely as a pecuniary question. He might refer in sup port of his own view of the subject, to some remarkable words which occurred in a letter, written by Mr. Godley to Mr. Bagster, while expressing his opinion that we should feel the loss of a colony less than that constant loss which a colony was made to produce by extravagance and migovernment. His words were—" When the Roman legions drew within the line of the Danube, it was not the loss of the province of Dacia, but the satisfcction of the Roman people at the loss, which was so ominous of the spirit of the times." And in speaking of the loss of our American colonies, he said disastrous as it was We suffered less loss of prestige and of strength , than er should have done had we retained them. H e never looked upon this subject as a pecuniary question; but could not avoid seeing that this expenditure of 3,000,0001. or 4,000,0001. a year was not only of our arepr o ach to our selves, but that it actually crippled the c ommerce colonies, and paralysed the enterp rise of spoke here,colon colonists. It was not the voice of economy t hat that of patriotism. The Hon. ißoaroofneeotlognrioaulnmdeidlitahriys observations on the principal nt t e h d e out Ca to e expenditure, and he proved that tpo t his caseofr o e f ductionof military expenditure applied to five groups colonies, viz., the North American, th the Australian, and New zeealalnVde.st Ho pointed those cases the House that in every one of those the military ex penditure of England alone was equal in to the whole revenue of the colon y —exce p t in one c ase , where, in the north part of New Zealand, it was six times the amount, and the military forces exce e d e d the adult male population. The Under Secretary for the Colonies made, for an only answer to this, expendi ture abandon th e colonies, w as ornecessary, maintain it. The co lonies, and that thatl,,we must o t s h t aba lonies, he said, we re taken p osses sion of by us on that f a ith, and in good faith we should adhere to it. In ° n contradiction to this statement he had this to urge, that t hi s expenditure, burdensome as it was to this country, and hateful as it was to us, was even more deeply hated by and injurious to our colonists. In New Zealand there was a new association formed of all the householders, which called itself the Constitutional Assembly, and which sat side by side with that of the local Government. That body seemed to have a greater command of infor mation, and had certainly more of the sympathy of the - 7; - ---, 4",jk Fill DAY r.. „ Members on the other side refused to support it under that aspect, they were not entitled to any remission of taxation. If the military and civil expenditure of the colonies were reduced, he (Mr. Cobden) could see his way to a repeal of the malt-tax, for instance—(Laughter) —but otherwise he could not.—(Great laughter.) H e held that Hon. Gentlemen opposite would be on their trial on that occasion; and it they wished for a reduo tion of taxation they would join his Hon. Friend, wh o was one of themselves—a person who had agricultural interests at heart, who had come forward as an inde pendent gentleman, and not from the Manchester School —(Laughter)—and, indeed, if ever there was en 00011-. sion upon which to show themselves sincere, the present was one.—(Hear.) Lord J. RUSSELL said, I quite agree with the Hop e Gentleman who has just sat down, that this is a most important question.—(Hear, hear.) It is not a question of :the saving of 1,200,0001., or 1,500,0001., or even 2,000,000/. a year. It is not a question of the repeal of the malt-tax, which the Hon. Gentleman thinks is the most captivating form in which to place it before Hon. Gentlemen opposite—(Laughter)—but it is a question whether the tendency of your policy shall be towards the maintenance or the dissolution of this great empires --(Hoar.) This is the nature of the motion which the Hon. Gentleman has made. The motion of the Hon. Gentleman is, as the Hon. Member for Lynn has argued most justly, in that very able speech which he has de livered--(Hear)—this: it is a question, not of diminish ing a part of your military establishments—of reducirg that which may be excessive in some of our colonies— but to tako away the whole of your military expendi ture from those colonies which cannot be considered as military or convict stations.—(Hear, hear.) Now, Sir, it is impossibl e to consider such a question as this without endeavouring to trace what might be the consequences of such a policy being adopted—effecting, in the words of the resolution, this policy as soon as possible. The Hon. Member for the West Riding says that these colonies will remain attached to you, from the attachment which naturally and particularly belongs to them as persons of the same race. But this is not a consideration to make us abandon all those colo nies. Nor is it the question which af fects some of our principal colonies to which he has adverted. Wi th re gard to Canada, you say you will not ha ve any military expenditure; but if you show a disposition not to defend Canada in time of war—they are of the same race, they may require our protection—but, not receiving it, they may look for the protection of some other country, B ut it may Ito said that Canada can form a separate and in dependent state of her own. This, however, is not the case with many other colonies. Jamaica, for instance, could never exist as a separate state. There was a publication issued the other day by an American gentleman who oad visited Jamaica, and he said that within twenty years Jamaica must belong to the United States; but if you adopt this policy which the Hon. Gen tleman recommends, this change will take place within two years instead of twenty.—(Bear, hear.) It is im possible not to believe that the people of Jamaica, if they saw the whole of their garrisons removed, and all the duty of protection discarded, would not refer I to some strong state which would give them pro tection, and that state must be the United States of America. It is the same thing with regard to our other colonies which in former wars we have taken from other powers. The Cape, for instance, which is in a great part inhabited by Dutch, if you say you will leave them to any danger which may threaten them or their possessions, what would be easier for them than to come to the kingdom of the Netherlands and ask for that protection which a colony has a right :to ask, as long as you demand allegiance from them?—(Hear.) In the same way, if you abandon Trinidad, she may apply to Spain, and the Mauritius to France. So in the, course of some two or three years you would have dis solved that great colonial empire which it cost the wis dom, design, and valour of our greatest statesmen, our best soldiers, and our most gallant sailors to build up in the course of former wars.—(Cheers.) But then my Hon. Friend who makes this motion, and those who vote with him, think and speak as if another war was an improbable thing, and there was to be a perpetual peace. As we have been so long without the calamity of war, they think there is no danger of peace being interrupted. But we must never lose sight of the fact that by some sudden turn of events, often by en unforeseen oc currence springing up, we might be engaged in war with some of the other powers of Europe. What then would be the case with your trade?—(Hear.) It would not be in times of war as in times of peace. Your colonies would be the depots of privateers, would be filled with hostile ships, your trade and commerce would be destroyed, and those your now loyal and attached colonies would be the resort of your most implacable enemies.—(Hear, bear.) I confess I am sometimes disheartened by the language held by various parties out of doors as much as in this House. It really seems to me that after the career through which we have gone in the course of centuries, from the time that Oliver Cromwell first took Jamaica down to the end of the last war, there were persons who, seeing that we were in possession of a great and suffi cient empire, can merely consider in what way that em pire may be diminished and lessened.—(Hear, hear.) It is quite evident that if this policy were carried into effect in the manner proposed, it would not be many years that you could maintain your present place and reputation in the world. No sooner was it kiown that you had given up your colonies, than foreign powers who had little cause of quarrel would consider the best mode of attacking a country less able to resist them. But you must not conceive that that great place which we keep in the world, and which we have secured with many battles and ecars, is not an object of envy to many other states, and that immediately they saw you were disposed to shrink from your empire —not that its limits were nar rowed, but yet that the spirit which maintained it was narrowed, and that the same determination which ani mated this mighty monarchy had departed—then this envy would spring up into wars of aggression against vou.—(Hear.) In what state would you be left then? You would have none of the material power which these colonies have given you—you would have parted with these colonies, to obtain which you have contracted such a heavy debt, and yet the obligation of that debt would still remain. You would have an undiminished debt. with a diminished empire and possessions.—(Hear.) Now, Sir, I must say, I think the loss would be more than the loss of possessions, there would be also the loss of that reputation—of that high honour we have hitherto enjoyed, which, if you are prepared for a very short time to suffer, the people of this country will not be prepared to suffer also.—(Hear.) We can recollect in former times when colonies were founded in the United _ ___..... States, obtaining little support from the mother country, there were incursions made by the savage tribes into the infant settlements, and villages were destroyed, and the inhabitants massacred. At this time the news of this calamity did not arrive in this eountry before ono or two years, and the calamity did not produce any great sensation then. Bat if you were to hear now that a number of English settlers, who in 1819 had gone out under the sanction and protection of the Government of this country to the Cape of Good Hope, had been at tacked, and the greater portion of them murdered by sa vages—that the land they cultivated was seized, and the villages they inhabited burned by the barbarians who had slaughtered them—if you had heard from New Zea land that a hostile tribe had destroyed another:fill: that, having abandon ed and if you heard, mor eove r, Hon.ndon d th coast of Africa (for that too was part of the i Gen tleman's savings) the slave trade was flourishn g in that latitude with all its former vigour, I thi n k the people of u it may be and would nay, whatever would turn with indignation , whatever the saving may 1,000,000/. or 2,000,000 L by t h is , be, .st i l s th altho ugh economical pro jeot, let us bear the burden, and put eves twi ce as much on us, sooner than :have our countrymen de• stroyed in the colonies which you have made, and where they went under your protect ion .—( gear , hear.) 1 Putting aside the question of empire and power, the honour and reputation of this country would so greatly suffer we s hould be unable to maintain such a polio as this.—(Bear.) With regard to the motion of the Hon. Baronet, that in return for the loss of this military protect i o n we should give representative in s tit u ti ons t o our colonies, I must say I think the argument of the Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies on that sub ject is quite unanswerable. In Jamaica you have free representative institutions, and an Assembly which takes more power upon itself than the House of Commons. You might take away the 1,500 men from Jamaica, but you cannot g i ve h er a more powerful Assembly or freer institutions than she now has.—(Hear, hear.) In Trinidad you have 400 men; but if you were to give them representative institutions it is the opinion of Lord Harris that the number of races ther e is snob that there would be a continuous war of races, and instead of 400 men being sufficient the numbs' would require to be augmented, instead of haying an taken away.—(Hear, hear.) This question of the °T,' 1 ference of races in the colonies is one . 0 L:E! utmost consequence, and should never be lost sig ht of to the consideration of the military garrisons nec essa ry French, be kept in those countries. We have Germa n o , ribes of Spaniards, Portuguese, Dutch—savage t ribes in ever y description—aborigines of New Zealand , " a eart .e a fact,'orother there is scarcely a race of mankind °I2 I me on some of gmivielittoaroynperooi whom are not under our dominion in s° of our colonies. But in taking a wiyoutlhde tection which they now have, y those races the sole military 1311 " wr. t a uthority, those and you would introduce endless dissensions is _ cases. Take Alleayvell°tllhe e Friend oloni e a s t tho case of Canada, for Mea that in all such cases be would tranquillity. provide for their own intern a l Any one who of. Canada must have has observed the historych ob served the danger which arisen to Canada from its having been dieided l . inhabited solely by Britis h settlers, and the other by French. The Frenc h race, having the majority by two thirds or three-four ths, were bent upon separating from this co u ntry altogether, and establishing a d canaian French republic in Lower Canada. Such a dangerous attempt the English race resisted; and when the insurrection took place it was put down by them, and through the moans of the mili tary forces in the country under the able direction of Sir John Colborne. But if this insurrection, instead of having been put down as it had been, had been put d o wn by an English militia in the same province, you cruelty have a much longer enmity and much greater rarc) Sir, y than had occurred or was desirable. —(lie rt ' he speech of I cannot assent to this motion. I admire and one whisk my lion. Friend, as a very able speech , reat subject, and showed that he had studied thantogu t nworthy of that brought it forward in a manner ag ree with him, if subject.—(Hear, hear.) hear.) I cou ld withdraw from those co stead of saying that we shoul d to define; if he had said lonies—which it was impos sib le ionie which the military that there were some and in wh ich the people them , garrisons are too greats ucient m ilit ar y. The House selves might furnish Ii m of late dispatches of Lord must have seen a coup l ei•ence to New South Wales Grey's, in which, with .. 1 proved that these colonies and Canada, it ";:terielly to their own military de ought to contribute _, woe kept up ter 45 yeas ' , few); that the trib ut e " isOMP I