The Sun. — London, England, 1803-06-07 00:00:00

measure it would be nzeewtry to have recourse to at last, arid in his opinion it would be better to adopt • it, at fiiSt ; at the, same time he would' adopt every means of recruiting the Army, because we must not only have a . large 'Army now, but 'always,' at least. : until some very material change • took place: - upon the Continent. For, the purposes, of mere defence, therefore, thiS was .a bad force ;. but lie trusted that one objet was not confined merely to defence. The cause which drew us into, the present War was the <slestrut ion of the balance of power in Europe, and in consequence thereof the great ac quisition of power by one State. Now when the balance was destroyed, he knew but two ways of replacing it, either to take some weight out of one Scale, or to prat some into the othei ; or indeed you might forcibly hold both scales, even by means' of eorernal force, such as a powerful Mediator or Guatontee. But generally speaking, the only means we had to adopt was either td strengthen ourselves, or to .weaken the Enemy, or we could tut exist as an independent Nation. This being the case, it teitained to consider the order in which these objects were to be taken, and their relative importance. In order to consider , thii point iaitly, he w ish e d t o r efer for a. Moment - to the events of last War. In that War it appeared to him that theplan of weakening the Enemy was not only the most proper and the most effedualo but the shortest, and most praCtieuble mode of proceeding. He thought it would be more easy to kill the revo: lutionary tiger, than it would he to chain Or to cage . him, To tllat ol)jfqt, therefore, almost the whole force of this Country oaotlt to have been directed, though certainty the other objeCt should not have been lost sight of. The same objetts • that - existed at that time, exi it at present, but certainly the pro gress of time might have changed die relations of ,these objeds, and altered their relative value. That which before was praeticable might no'w be hopeless; if that was the case our situation would tertainlybe deplorable ; but even that would not be so bad as a system of defensive War; He did not mean to say that the mode he had .suggested of conduaing the War, would inevitably be the most successful, but ; under all the circumstances, he thought they would be the best to adopt. • He, recolleded that in one of Foott's Farces, Mrs. Cole gave as a reason for being of the Roman Catholic religion, that it was so coin, fortable to persons of her profession. Now the • -plan which he had suggeated of offering some means of shorteoing.the duration of the contest, certainly must be very comfortable to persons in our situation. If some means of this kind were not adopted, the ,presped before us would be gloomy indeed, in spite even of that Mediation of which Gentlemen had " talked to much, but from which he hoped, no good, • but foresaw most dangerous consequences, and at "which he felt great shame. We had, indeed, much to ,doo r we had for a. long time been falling,te lee_ ward, and we hail now the difficult task of beating to:windward against a head sea, before we could regain out fowler situation. If he were asked, Whether he looked for any prospect of doing any thing in France itself, or on the Continent, though indeed he hardly knew where to look for the Powers of the Continent—llia answer would be, that he saw no great hope at present, thanks to the Treaty. of Amiens, which had given away the Powers and the inied of the Continent from us, .and had' made the whole Coast of Europe an iron.buund Coast to us, slot alfortliog an inlet or a creek, into which we -could run a • Cutter. It might be said, that the Powers of the 'Continent detested France ; lte ad_ trained they did, but it was a 111.1XiM with Tyrants, thrist duo natuant. It was perfedly true that the -Powers of the Continent hated I+ ranee, but then they had another feeling With respell roller, which Gentlemen seemed to • fe'rget, and that was, that they •leated her. I.le however could not abArolOo the hope 'which he had placed. in the exertions which the Continent would make for itself, and .therefore he was the more host de against the scheme Of policy which was now proposed, because if it • was adopted, it would render us incapable of taking advantage of any favourable disposition that might shew 'itself on the Continent. He was not only dissatlsfied with the policy which Ministers seemed- inclined to adopt, but with the language sahiCh they held. It was with peculiar regret, that he, read the language at the end Of His Ma. jesty's Declaration, which was calculated JO prove to the Continent, that we looked merely objefte, and that we should be ready, if those ohjeds were attained, to &ire them-t0:1...as we had done before. He knew very well what a kind of general clamour would be raised against the prin. costes for which he was contending. It would he said, " you are fighting for the Bourbons, • for the 'Royalists,' for Monarchy, &c." Stilt however he retained his opinion ; if he was wrong, it could not be said that he was an obstinate sinner, because his . pian, had never been fairly tried ; his opinions had never beets contratlided he experience.. The Right Han. Gentleman had however made an expe riment in the Treaty of Amiens, but his predic tions upon that subject had bean pretty well con, tradided. ,did not expel that the Right Hon. Gentleman would acknowledge that he Wiis guilty ttf •a gross error in making- the ".1" teary of Amiens ; ;that perhaps would be too much to exped even from lilt candour, bk he ~ might very fairly admit that she event had not exactly answered his expectations. When M r . Wlit5TON pieditited, that on a certain (lay a Cornet would appear which would destroy, all mankind, and when the day came, and no Comet appeared, Jie believed • that though ,Mr. WittSTON did not acknowledge that big prediction Was foUtided, in folly, he had 7 ito •objection • When the day was . over, and all mankind perfedly safe from the Comet, to own that he had been mistaken in his calculations.. ao he thought that whatever wisdom the Right lions - Gentleman-might think he had displayed in making the Treaty of Amiens', he could now have no great lie. citation in admitting that it had not answered his est o Pettations. He did not know what might be the Italic Of the experiments. he recommended, abut he 'retested against a declaration that thershbuld not be tried at a dl ; It was his opinion that if England • • would make an'epen, grand declaration, in the face of Europa; other views and objeds; he did not mean aannatitie,' chivalrous declaration, tuft .one that would draw with et the sympathy and leCling of Europe, it would have the best effd.t. Much was -4t.l.ways avid of the. great power of the Freach Kt. public, but it, was by no Megng right to Confound the strength and duration of France-together. Her power was unquestioned at present, but how long that power would exist was 'a different question. That we wished and hoped to see an end to that power, it was impossible form to deny, notwith. standing all the mean, base, couching language we had held. That prospeft was at . the bottom of all -our i hopea. Every thing which he saw was only calculated to throw him into despair, but he begged not to be misunderstood, he had great confidence in the strength and resources of the Country, provided they were in proper hands and judiciously applied. He was one of those who had never-treated the idea of Invasion with contempt. , We had to deal with an enemy who would not do things by halves. The storm with which we were threatened might burst suddenly upon us—we might then , be 'thrown into, consternation, .and put in danger of losing every thing that,was valuable taus,: we werefike a Ship in a Storm, if the Vessel was a good one, is the Crew were brave and obedient, if the Officers were skil ful and experienced, . they had little to fear from the elements, but if the Crew was disunited, if the Officers were incapable olditeCting them either from drunkenness or incapacity, then, indeed, their dan. • ger would be inevitable. He confessed the did look upon an inVasion with dread, and could never con cur with those who thought lightly of it. In con. versing upon this subjea with men the most likely to form a corral judgment upon it, Officers who had' seen much service, and were really tic:. quainted with War, he found, that not one of them treated it lightly. But who were those who treated the idea of Invasion with ridicule ? Why, men who had no means of knowing any thing upon the sub. , men who In the division of a Battle, Knew no more than a spinster — men who would be. of no service in a con. test, but who . would add to the confusion of .a rout—men who .never saw a gon ,fired in anger, . but yet talked with great ease of de stroying whole Armies of Frenchmen. Such were ate kind of men who' talked with contempt of an invasion, and to the weight of . such authorities he was not disposed to how with great reverence. lint while lie was not disposed 'to 'treat an Invasion lightly, lie did not look at it with apprehension, be. cause lie..had the most unbounded, confidence in the strength and resources of the Cauntry, if properly applied and skilfully direted; Mr. PITT said, he should say only a very few words upon this stsbjt.d, he merely wished -to ask whether the Force which it was now proposed to vote, ioeluded the whole of the regular Force that was to'he proposed, or whether they were to,expc6l in the present Session, any more substantial aug.: meotation to that which certainly was an unusually large Peace Establishment? He was averse to discus sing in that Hotise any questioo respeting the aimiunt of the Force necessary for the . public safety. That ought certainly.to rest iii the first Instance. with Mini. steri, under the responsibility of their situation. It was a . confidence that Parliatnentought. to place- in them, and if they did not possess that confidence they ought not to. retain their situation. But he really did not apprehend that it was. proper to discuss in ,that House the distribution of the Public Force, lie therefore would not. enter into any detail upon the sobjca. If however he heard from Mini. sters, that this was all the- Force- they meant to . provide, it, Would- give him real uneasiness ; how ever, he would not say a word more upon that sub. jei, until he knent.whether that was the case or not. The SECRETARY at WAR observed, that al. though what the Right Hon. , Gentleman had stated was very able in itself, and, in a political point of view, yet there were many of the topics into the detail' of which he should not at present enter, be. taitse this did-not appear to 'lila to be. the, season for so doing; he should rather apply himself to the answer which he had'. to give to the question of his Right HMS: Friend Mr. Pitt, and he had the saris. loan:4 of saying,. that the attention of Ministers had been applied in order to prepare a plan which appeared to them . to be essential for securing, not only the domestic defence of the country, but also to enable us to put forth our arms in a'maisner that might be, efredual for other objets ; and here he could non help thinking that the Right Hon. Gen. tleman opposite to hitu had in some- measure raised a phantom which he was afterwards 'to, combat, for he had said that ail-our force waslo be purely a de. lensive war. , Where he found that out, and hOw he came to that conclusion, he did not know. He had also stated, that every effort should he nruic for.'our defence at this important crisis ; this was an assertion the truth of which. nobody doubted ; nor .was this all, for it was proper that . we should rut ourselves in a situation . that may become offensive as opportunity may occur abroad ; he did not think that we should confine ourselves to strid MONCLI, but that we shoUld look at this war in a diErent 'vieW, to consider its nature and its charader, and that we' were not to he content' with dere 'stli.de, fence or domestic safety, but that the rather we should consider hoW, and - to hold ourselves in Ceadi. ness to avail ourselves of the best opportunity which mightoccur to strike on the enemy •the severest and - the most effedual blow we may be able ; these were the feelings 'of His Majesty's Ministers , upon this most important Matter ;, but when vigour was talk. ed of, he would observe, that vigotix did not ,con. sist in the use of high.sounding words, hitt on What may adually be done,. and much had 30uolly been done. He spoke of arrangements subsevent to the Treaty of Amiens ;• we had been in that short ipe. riod of peace Rain in many reipeds; we had been put on a much stronger footing than we had been in any former period of peace. Our regular army was much more considerable now titan it had been at the commencement of any :war.; our Militia in like manner was in a much better state for military pUr« poses than it had been at any former period of the commencement of a war ; we had in every respeo a much greater force than we , ever had before at ,the beginning of hostilities ; but was 'he saying that this was therefore sufficient ? No, he was not ; but the energy of the Country: must be called forth, and there must be Orli a disposal of that fade as,:to shew - oar enemies, ignor a nt -as tiwy lire of this Country, of the disposition of.iti' Peolde, of its ternal. vigour, 4,)1 its resources, ,and almost cvery thing, about it, for very ignOratst indeed were our enemies of all these things; but, he said, them must be such a disposal, of our force :led strength as may shew them how much they have been mis taken of this Country; but it was not a vote' for a large sum of money that would raise a large dis. posable force, that would depend much more on . the nature of the measures to' be adopted for raising such force, than upon the vote for paying them; and he flattered himself that the measures abaut to be pro- ' posed for that purpose would be efficacious . ; that the Men ,would be furnished as they should be found to be necessary, and they should be proposed to be. under the command of Officers of the regular, Troops, and aMilitia force was intended to be as a supplement to the regular Army ; and after this plan was completed, then there would remain to be done that which it would he in this country more easy perhaps to do than the rest of it, namely, to find the money. The first and the main objea was to, have an effectual control of the men, and then it would not be difficult to raise the money. Voting a number of men however great, and voting a Sum of money,' however large, to.pey them, did not ap pear to him to' be, witte,• until the plan for raising- the men shall have been matured, because until that was done it was only raising men upon paper, which was not what we wanted ;,, neither did large votes, without method of carrying them into eficat a prove very useful, Having' said thus much gene. he would now take on a few of the, points brought forward byt the Right lion. Gentleman opposite to him, but not all of them, for atf some he could not help saying, that althaugh they were like every, thing delivered by that Right Honour. able Gentleman, very sensible, yet in ahis case, they did not' appear to him to have an immediate reference to the question now before the Commit tee. Such, therefore, he should take site liberty, Of passing over for the present, professing a readiness. to enter. ,on their discussion when occasion might require. 'He could not help thioking that the Right'Hon. Gentleman had given way a little too much to a tone of despondency, as applicable either to the manner in which we were, now preparing for War, or to the manner in which we concluded Peace. He agreed however with the Right Ho nottrable Gentleman, it was right to state the situation of this Country flirty, to state .even the chance of an Invasion, but he ,thought be might , be permitted to say that the Right Honourable Gentleman had considered that suljeet, a little too broadly. No man would say that the great wry Foice and ninaterous Troops of FrAtiee had not great power.; that was a matter of which we must be all aware, and the ineasut es wh i ch we adopt mtist be with refe'rence not only to this idea, or for the defence:and security of the Realm, but also to aa against the koierrtY occattion. may occur. He thought that the tietistion between the two• Go. vernments was now broOght to this point, arid it was high time that we should shew, riot-by words, but aCtiorts, we'are not to be insulted by France— that we" are • not to 'be 'intimidated by any menace they may tlii - oW oute—that it is riot their shoeing themselvei in large' numbers opposite : to our roasts - , is to throw us into a panice,-(i That they may throw a body of men into our Country is praalea. ble," said he, , --" may be done certainly under favourable circumatances, that is,' if they be not sunk in the attempt ;. but really I think it would no t be long before they would be made prisoners ; neither do I think that any of them would return. I think it is time to shew that we are not to be taunted in this way with Invasion, or intimidated with the threat of it." There was another part of the Speech of the Right Hon. Gentleman, which he shOuld now shortly notice : he seemed to. suppose that by the Treaty of Amiens, we,had relimeaished for - ever all right to consider of the a ff a i rs o f t h e ,1 Contioept ; and. he said, that for the' last ten years we had gone very much to leeward : that was not so. As to•the Treaty of Amiens, he approVed of it at the time, under all the circumstance; in which it was concluded. He was setisfied, even now, of the propriety , of this Country having entered into that Treaty ; but it was mit Correa to say, that by that Treaty we had giVen op the Continent ; we had done no such thing ; nor was it our incline-. tion to do. any thing like it.' If there had been any chance of any Continental co.operation with us---if 'we had had the continuance of any Continental Alli ance, then, the Peace of Amiens wits a Peace which he should not have aeiproaed ; but as we had Cominental Alliance lett fur carrying' on the War, he - thought that no advantage was to liave . , been gained by the prosecution of the War ; .nor did he ace how any one, however sanguine, Could expect any advantage to us by that continuance, un der such circumstances. We therefore had agreed to the Pe'ace, anti, in hit opinion, we ti ltd wisely by so doing. But the Right Honourable Gentle. man hartasked, whether the. last Peaav w a s hot merely an experiment ? Yes, it was ; and whe ther it lord•not Ctiled ? Why, yes it had failed, as was evinced -by our being now• at War; brit we closed a discussion, the continuance of which would. only ' have 'fomented the People' ,of - this 'Country-the publication of which had - roused their indignation to a pitch which he con. ceived to have decided the charaaer of the cause in which we are engaged, for that it has united the People ci this Coutitay, and made thetn,aas it were,' one mare against France, and a full determination •of'the People of this Country upon tliat subje4), a stedfast deterthination to regard France- as - the oppressor of 'Europe in general, and ore :who wished to be' the oppreasor of this CoCntry . . have this.sentiment thoroughly rooted . in the hearts of EugliShMent was, to speak in the language of another 'Gentleman . on. another occasion, thing worth I ten or twenty West India Islands : this was an expression which he hail no hesitation in deliver. ing. But.the Right tinn. Gentletnan had said, that the hopes of this Country were gone. He did not think so. He did , not think that. we were a People likely to give up our hopes. He found nothing in the .History of this Country to' justify that idea; nor'did he think there was any thing in the conduct -of this Country to warrant the expression that we had given up all ciaticern • in the .units of the Conti nent., On the contrary, the History of this Coun. try proved that o ur objed had always, since the . Revolution, m os t.rernarkAily beim to preserve the i• Balance of Power. on the Contineut ; syg had made. a glorious effort to de S 3 in the last War—we had continued in the crates; Cir that purpose long , after every British ohjed had been attairted, and as long .as it was possible with any hopes of . rnAting ,an pression favourable to the general interests of Eu. rope; we had Continued in the contest until we were left without alliance for perseverance in it; and then we did what, under auch circumstances, it was wise in us to do; ,but there was not, what the Right Hon. Gentleman ha said, any thing shabby on our part. The Right Hon. Gentleman, after having charged us with negleCting cur true interests, by adopting a system — purely defensive, which he denied, had proceeded to state that the force we had hitherto proposed to adopt is not ap. plicable to our case, and alluded to the Militia. Now upon this subjeCt he must be allowed to lament a little that the Right I lon. Gentleman had not brought forward his objeCtion to this system at the rime it was first brought before the House, because abundant opportunities had been afforded to hear the reasoning of the Right Hon. Gentleman upon the subject, and indeed upon the system of the Mi. litia altogether. He should have been happy to have heard the 'opinion of the Right Hon. Gentle.. in.►n upon that as well as upon any other subjea.— lie was perfectly open at the time to eonvielion, and so he wished to be still, but . he only wanted to know what the Systerntof this Country had always been, and whether : the mea,ure now proposed w.ts not an improvement upon that plan ' and whether the observations of the Right HotL Gentleman, if they had been twat. last year, would have induced Parliament to'vote too,oo6'meti on the establish. :nen% pc' thought not, our nteaures lasi year, however, enabled us to stet a stronger force on foot than was ever knoWn at the' coirnnenetnent of a War, and we had at this moment a coitsideralle body of the best TrottPs on font we ever had ; for reasons he ih inght that Govermtient was m , t liable to reprimch for negligence. He shoUld not follow :the Right Hon, G.:utletnan through his ob. serVatiooi tin the Militia, as he had stated already. He lamented that the s Hou,c had not been favoured with the opinion of the Rightflon. Genticat in fully on this occasion formerly, but the question now was, whether the Committee would not votr a foice which on consiticrAnn la it Session %vas thought necessary ? Thc Right Honourable Gentle, man said that a regular army 111 V act ing a %gm try could be opposed only by 4 regularly that was tru:, but it admitted of tcrusin cations ; it was trtie with regard to an engagement noc to a prottadcd W.ll. Amcrica Was a proof of this—the regiiht army indeed bear the An-tet r i. cans in evorycugAgerat:nt, but at last they harr;iss_ ed, and finally overpewered the regal army. This was also the case of France ht rsclf against Prussia—the Prussian army was composed of the bo.q regular Trops„ and he believed that the. FrenQh who tare op,' used ,to them consisted of the National Guard froops of that description, lie must say, that v.hatever eharancr . the French • Troops had whatever thy' , ' may now he, they had gone thronizh a great deal of hard fighting, but they did not saf e r t hemseive i d e _ viand or to be alarmed on account of their nut be ing regular Trcops althOugh they were to be op_ pmcd by regulacs, they exerted thernselves,by a re. solution which enabled theta to get the better Of . their difficulties—and if, this Country hid the same resolution, of which there could be no doubt, be.: cause we 411 felt the. propriety; of it, we should not only get over. our, diifienftieS, but We should teaelt this our •iniplent Enemy wel are nor to be insulted With impunity, and if they attempt us, to on their own words, on our own dunghill, woe be to the as. •Nr. PITT said, he was in a great degree S 3 tiS. fled by what he had just heard froth his Right Hon. Friend: He was happy to understand horn him, that Ministers did not think, that the piesent litia was all the additional force which the Public Service, at .this interesting moment requires, and if they (tiro not t teen r uit n the subjea at present,' it 07,1:1 Only I;ecause they hail measures of augm2niat inn in view which were not mature; that they had not laid before the Committee. the moans of knowim t h e pl a n now for that reason, hot that Hwy at r .L a conSiderable augmentatiOn most , being of that ..Opinion himself, he shoo :d bardlk have occasion to make more than one. re. [nark, which was, that in his vietv of the sulj on the priecipie tvhich Ministers had adopted, that of more vigtr,ius measures than tad been hi , "herto Cron tried, to obtain th:► t for CC W hich seas , o f t h e best sort, that of S'appl,:mental force to the, arMY., main. under (..:ommissioned and Non.comvai'sSi n ned Officers in the regular Army. It did apt):ear that tvalitltl h.ive heen lumina-tc it they had ea ther, begun by establishing in of Parliament and of the Country the necessity the thing t o be'done,, by preparing the rok mind by an, ath•quate vote for thin tir 'woe, course and pursuing the means, may be now desirabl e t w u nivia. , - the public mind to the a do pt i o n of w h at may be , thought essential either for the, safety of the Island, or , what we should couple with it, the vigorous prosecution- of the War. with France,' that of calryingten Witr with a f'otce which may he at once adapted either for Offence or defetic., the bt!t effeAs inay be expeled, but we are not in a stato. tit for War "tvith'France until we are in a situation to avail ourselves of every opportunity hich tiny QCC:IIt . for Offensive as %yell as defensive operations. He wottld go for.. thee, and say, that tye,.wallto the means of offon, M sive we should have the ore, of defensive V3r."•• tk _applauded every' desire which Ministers could' manifest, to labour with perseverance IQ consider of the best means for the safety of the State; but," said Ite, "c 1 it- 7 -do it effeaually I and to do it ,el.. you must dO it soon— Doing it soon Will be better, though you do it with difficultyi than if you do it some time hence, and after muchOelibera, tion: easily, I think it is bitter that.. the thing should be done at once, or os 5000 as possible, 'than that you should delay it—that is, I think it better that it should be yolod without delay, and t h e 4 that you should consider about the nte4tis: first vote the measure, and then come forq%trd With the vote for defraying the.expence, becatise by bunging the mat. ter forward immediately, you will call the spirit of the P eo pl e b it ° aaion. The quiestion now is, will you save your Country ? Save rt in the best and most