The Sun. — London, England, 1810-03-27 00:00:00

, • • . sponstbility. .The tad , Was, ti - ;at notwithstanding these palpable errors of Ministers, the country stilt owed some of its glory to the gallant Cirlitklanchett, 61 the Raven, who gallantly 'forced his way idto the passage, and although expGAed to the fire of the bat teries, or, in his own wOids, - " though the shells caMeaboard.rue and the'rontid shot flew through me, - yet I strceeded 'in - protetling our vessel's from the enemy's fire.". - The sending of . the t se transports was the most, frantic, inconsiderate, precipitate, .and cul lable part of the conduct (31' Ministers. .The Noble Lord obseived, .that (mina' accompanied Ministers in their expedition to Santvliet, he should now go into that part of it which appeared romance, viz, the attack or siege of Antwerp a. sort of Don Quixotte condu3, attacking windmills; and here he must notice the alitaryprojed of Sir H. 1 1 'ciplim for the . attack of Poi t .which he con- sidered as practiCable in the event of the inhabitants being friendly ; but then we must be satisfied that 'we could ensure that friendship, ,and also that the Citadel would be udde r the coniroul .of the inhabi- tants. The next' past of the evidenee which be sh,,nld examine, itvaS the vigorous attack of General: S'onta6 ,- ,, an Officer of abilities, who had been em ployed t oth On the British and on foreign service. This officer, in eommon with General Don, con ceived that the terror, inspired by the appearance-of the British fleet, would strike such alarm into the . inhabitants of Antwerp that great hopes of success from that.circurnstani:e must be expected. Gene- . ral Sontag stated. that, success was to_bel expected, from " a vigorous attack union the enemy's weak' points;`' that success was to be pbtained' by erect.' Mg a battery of, twenty-f Our pieces of cannon, but' on being asked this poser of a. question, where the batteries should be erected, replied, " that he con.' cei'ved the erer.tion of batteries to be a difficillt un dertaking." General Brownrigg entertained a san guine expectation of success from the attack on Ant- . well). The General, was of opinion that fifteen guns and fifteen bornbarding.artillery, would, well directed, to intimidate the inhabitants that they v'ould speedili surrender. , The House, hovtrever, would do well to look at the subsequent answer of Gen. Broworigiz on the subject of bombardment. Re, in answer to one or two questions, says, " My opinion never w'as certain as that Antwerp, could be tnl:cti by bombardment."' Lord Porchester next •,utn.: . etot in the expedition. .It .was the opinion of :hit intelligent Orticer, that if Bathz was defended, the ene.tly would be enabled to increase in such ntt:t.bers as to threaten us with dan4erous con , e quenees that it was impossible. a.powerful-tlotilla co., go en the Setif-Idt on account of the gun4orts. fir the described the iffit.ol ties which the armament must naturally .encounter horn . the .eircumstances of being iknorant of he true.state of the enemy's tt rc ...The.No))le.l,ord having commented. on this dvidence, next averted to the intelligence given be fore (fie Sebrvt (one. - nittee by a person conversant viit!r.the- navinionof the Scholdt, in whom two i inistet . s placed great confidence. This i.erson; a pit.., vatecl that th,.. passag,e to Bathz, might beef, f.ctel in 48 hones, but that to effect it there should .b , : a pilot in each sine of • battle ship and •in every frigate. It zartie out in evidence that •there was only , one oilotto the w hole fleet.. The same person al.f ) towed that it was. impossible to proceed to Bathz _ . without a change .of wind ; there were only r Cella:la points tit .he wind in "L high the ships could sailtio, ant ii , se were two points : bet ixt the West a ti ‘i South ; that unless Ntuisters coeld proviie relays . - of witids at every, turnip(' and w iodise ,- e' of the river, it was impossible to reach the desired object. • With respect te, the occupancy of 13athz, Sir John Hope . had, declared, that it would hold, out several clays, if . defended, In this opinion be was confirmed by bed Resslyn, ; yet these necessary preliminary con , siderttions •were left out 01 the calculation of Mi nisters. The Calculations of the Noble Lott] and General Browprigg. were founded on the probability of landing on the 3d of August, when they conceiv-; that a gool chance 'of success. The Nobl' Lord then commented on thee‘idence as applicable to the defence o• Bathe, and the f:stimoni"of Lord 'CaStle:- reagh, who, could not, on being ouestioned4resume to. judge the precise - day of the -occupation, nor to calculate on the movements of the . eremy. " He therefore Was justified in' contending that -- the'Nuble• Lord 'Stood coolertmei leyhis own testimony, for' he had not' formed any caleillapon's as•to the proba ble hopes of the armament - picleeeding, nor had be any pound on v hie!) to judge offthe pro'etbility of the r safe retoni. It was, - preeliely the point on wh.ch *Minist-rs ought to have Obtained' informa: COD, because it was not only decisive of the fate'of the army, but of tin- kiticoom. In •.stahl,clirrg the evidence of another N:ble Lorii (Chatham), it was desirable to listen with attention, for although nothing to the shape o: opinion - could be gathered from his test! liony, y 0 it Was - given in 'Such . S wan - • ner as to convey a pointed sarcasm on his colleagire§-:: H well.knew that the business - was involved in•-a bthi ninth. Lot.d'Porchester here contrasted the evi dence of ,Lord 'Chatham with the eYiclence of oilier military characters, as to the praai ability of landing 'hree or four The Noble Lord attetebeing• pressed hard,, at last ccinf' . .-e:d, that„,pos., , ibly it yught be ette6,ted in that lute, -bit that, it was 'not' • very. probable. Generals McLeod and Brownrigg stated that the artillery and ho ; es were landed oe the 4th Augest ,Laird, Chatham. stated they were not landed on.the.6tb ; here was a" great variance iv the testimony of titese ofticers havipg endeavoured tq shew that the probabilities of suecess'.Nvere against the enterprise, in conseehence•of th'iniscalculations of IV..listers, wliO, reckoned upon the rapidity of Movements, fbigetting - Tte. estiorate - thedangers trig attending, the execution of their iti-c: = gested . plaus. The . Noule Lord recerted.back to the ,„., ►,le•-. e r the fallacy of • their conduct in sending out so huge an armament without any. settled:plan. It vas like, he observi:d, the ArchiteCt; who built his Chamber 'floors with out considei mg the necessity . of constructing a 'stair case to ascend to them. There seemed to be but one concurrent opinion among ail the Geiierals as to the precise -tune ,at which Czdsand would be oc cupied, yet this prehminary measure was not con sidered until the •Expeclit.on had sailed. It 'was a subject worthy of t consideration, Whether the de fences of the tiyet were such as could. be surnount- ed by our army. tiren-ral BrOw.nrigg lamented greatly that the right wing of the army was not dis posed on the banl Of the river. If that waw a subject of regret to Geo. Brownrigg, it must be a subject cf • regret to Minis•ers and attached on them great re commented On the evidence of General M'Leod, Sir W. Ersltihe, and General: Fyers, 'who, in con tra:Es-110e to the military opinion of - Lord Castle reagh, that it was pratlicable to carry the place by a coup-de-r,ain, stand their reasons for not agriSeitig with the Noble Lord, and the impossibility of so' carrying it. The Noble Lord, however, bad talked of the bombardment of the place, and recommended that it should be battered in breach, yet so little had he considered the subjed,.that he forgot there were. no battering guns to etre& .hiS favourite objet, .the coUp-de-ntain ; every thing - Was to be done by a coup-de-main.. Su far from Ant - seri) being in - a ,statepl surprise, he • could 'prove by 11 French dos cument, that every means were taken to put It in a' state of complete deleoce three days prior to the ar rival 'the -expedition.! The .-condua of Lord, Chatham was equally inconsistent and absurd., He arrived at Baths without having-contemplated in what manner to proceed. -No plan was formed for the progress of the campaign until the council was :summoned. It would be seen with whaisesiseet be 'treated the project of his colleagues, ,The expedi 'non- was fitted out, relying-on the Noble Lord and on the truth of the information heyeceived respects ing the state of Antwerp; yet, cat being questioned, the Noble Lord declared, that" he knew not:ring of •thetrtith of the intelligence he had no ground ,for 'eithetsbelieving or disbelieving it, for he could not know the 'state of-Antwerp." The - opinion of the Commander-in-Chief on this subject was, " that the possession - of Antwerp depended much on cOotin `genciess--that the works had -been - repaired, and that it could not be taken' by a coup-de-main." —The Noble Lord then made some observa tions on the testimony of Sir Joho Hope. The ,opinion of Lord Resslyn was, that had the Expedi tion reached Santvliet on the 3d or 4th, A.eitwerp could not save been taken - . From the testimony of Sir W. Erskine, who was at Antwerp in 1794, it appeared the situation of Antwerp was such, that the enemy could, within the space of one - week, put it in a state to sustain a siege, and that the north end of the town, against which he did not know but our operations • were intended to be Principally directed, could not be approached.. It had been said ftliat AntWerp had no guns mounted for its defence. Ide thider,tood in such townsit was not a customary thing to keep the guns always mounted, and con stantly exposed -to the effects of the weather.; it t:lierefiSre did. not follow that Antwerp, becausesit. had 'no guns mounted, was in a defenceless state. Wheri it :-yes; considered that at Antwerp 'a great - nsval 'arsenal had- _been _established, which. was growing one stif the most formidable in Europe, it could • not • for a moment be supposed they were without ordnance. The force toady to de fend it was more formidable than might be appre hensled. Buonaparte and . Sir Sideey Smith could tell t hem-what might be expected from such a force. Sir W. Erskine had tar- her stated, that neither Ant- Werp, Lillo, nor Liefkenshoek could be taken by a coup-de-main, as the arrival of a British armament in the Scheldt must be known almost before they had. fairly cast their anchors. The events which shad occurred were not such as could not be for seen. Sir.,W. Erskine in a correspondence ,vieth Sir Richard Strachan had partly anticipated what, before the expedition sailed, would• take place, and all liis predictions had been verified. Sn Eyre Conte bad stated it to be ,his opinion' ) that success was doubtful. The Marquis -of • Huntly thosignt it impossible to take Ant wisp by a coul-sk,main ;. and Geo. Calvert, -though tie mu not trunk i t i mrs , ss iee , considered the successful*complishinent of the , b ject Of the expedition as very impronahles Did the Marquis of Huntly think when he. knew. that but 700 men could at once be disetisbalked at Cadsand that success' was certain ? No, be rather apprettetid ed that once landed he shouk have much difficulty 'in "maintaining his position. They knew not where they were going, and having no pilot able to conduct them, they could- pet get up the _Wieling channel. 'General Brownrigg had given it as. los opinion , that the means employed were adequate to the obje& in view. He had stated that he }Amino roe ' son to believe that Antwerp was defended, and the French had found an army to defend it by acci dent. It appeared - that Antwerp was thus saved by a fortuitous circumstauce. That an army of French soldiers who were going somewhere or • other, hap- . petting - to be in the neighbourhood of Antwerp at the time the English Expedition reactied the Scheldt, and understanding how things were going on, thought it would be as well to enter Antwerp and. see `, 4 fair play." 'This circumstance, which bad been described as fortuitous, was an accident which, he - was sorry to say, bad often befallen the enemy, but which had very -rarely happened to us. It commonly occurred that a French army happened to be where it was wanted, but lie could remember very few instances of our sending One where it could do any good. The information Mi nisters had of the enemy's force Was far from being accurate. They had been infornied that there were very, ,few troops at 'Antwerp, and that it would take five or six days to assemble a considerable force in that neighbourhood. In. June or duly they had , been informed 'by a confistenthl servant that the force of the enemy in that quarter amounted to 26 or 23,009 men. 'From a-report however made to the ' Emperor of the French, dated. August Ist, the day On which we entered Aoorrlpotlwhicb he here pro duced and read); giving an account of the appear an& of the English, and of the means resorted to to repulse them, it appeared that such dispositions had been previously-made by the enemy that a very consi derable force could easily be assembled in three days. They plated their fiorce at stich a distance from Ant werp as not to leave Bolougne open to our attacks, yet sufficiently near to defend Antwerp, when it was known to what point our operation§ were intended to be direeed,, and that arrangements accounted for the arrival of a French army at the point of attack just in time. Having now shewn that .the Ex -- pedition against Antwerp, according to, the theo ries of all those who were consulted by Minis stets on,the subject, was morally, if not physically impossible, he would proceed . to stew that - if those theories were not precisely coffee, if it was not ori , I ginally impossible for the enterprise against Ant i werp to succeed, : it was. made so by the arrangements Of Ministers. , One division of the expeditien was ,• to be assembled atßathz, on the 31st of Julys He, ,wished to know what. General could take the force Under his command there without disobeying or der's ? Was it Sir E. come ? Sir J. Hope ? ror the Marquis of Huntly ? all of whom were employed on setwic--!s teliich - rendcred-it impraEticeble,ns-Were Lord Rosslyn at* Geti. Grosvenor. Gen. Brownrigg had stated, that when W.alcheren' was takeet 'the 2d division of the armament it was intended should'pro-' ceed to the accomplishment. of the ulterior objects of the expedition. It however .appeared, that the ord.. nStrce; &c. was not sent ofl - from this country till the". very day- on whith the' landing at Satitvliet: was intended. A corps Of• Lord Huntl's divi sion; as soon as th e investment .of Flushing was complete, and the 'lsland of S. Beveland taken, was to proceed .to Bathz, where a conjunct operation: was to. be attempted, .with instructions how -to act should theenemy proceed to Lillo ,or L;elkenshoek. There appeared to be no particular hurty to get to Antwerp.. A change in the plan had been madelin consequence of the want of boats. Sir T. Hope's corps had been- kept .two days in the boats,.apd or dered to taken position to observe Cohen and Bathz. *Gen. Brewei igg .remembered that Lord .Chatham had resolved to keep the corps of .Lord.Rosslynas a body of reserve. Sir Home Popham had ground,. , ed his:hop:s of success on the embarkation of the troops in ships.. of the. line, which mode of em harkation was ordered:to insure ,greater eltpedi tithe That mete expeditions mode of :embarking troops was peculiarly applied to Flushing.: The Admiralty would not sutler ships of the line. -to enter -the narrow atid intricate passages of . the Scheldt. They had given - orders tor collecting any .ships but those of the line to convey the troops tsp to Ant Nerp. The troops destined to act agoint Wet cheretr were ernharked in h hips .of the line; but in the ulterior operations of the armament that mode of e.olbaekation was to be discontinued. from the diffi culties n tending the navigation Of the Scheldt. In h letter from ,Sir. . Richard Strachan to the Score,. hay ,of State, no mention• whatever had been made of the ulterior objects of the Expedition.. .He had merely said ". he • would lose no. time,! : ' Tlie in, structions of Sir .R.,StraChall to Captain Owen set forth, that. there were tw9 services., to be accom plished—the first against Cadsand e ahe. second to cut off the communication with Boulogne. These per formed, Ire was to plat himself under the , cOmmaed of Commodore Owen. • Could it possibly be thought that any division of .the army would proceed to - Saet,. vliet, when the instritaionsgiven . did not, in. the re motest •degree, .connienance'sueh, a procedure, as all the officers, without e;(ception, were told either to keep behind the rest, or to attempt one or two, things,. and then wait for further orders.. Thus it appealed that no one could proceed to Bantrliet,. without disobeying orders. The ships of.the line which had been used. for greater expedition to eM, nark the.troops were not soused in ; the Scheldt,. though so meet) at that period depended upon. expedition, while. the battering, train had not been sent Steen the Downs, till.the period at .which it ought to have arrived at SantVliet.. 'He ,would say Dealing, farther on,•the plan pr policy, of..the expedition. He would not even:matte comment, bot leave the House to judge . .from all the 'eir, cutest:glees, whether, or nut it way possible tor the Expedition to. reach Antwerp,, whether or not with. sucti instructi , insii Was possible to succeed, and wh e ,. tiler or not the.prop.cl did not deseve to be cpnsi-. dered as a wi;d romantic t istott. :He. woull no NV proceed to rtheci.lidnct of, tlie.Expeclition..- He im puted the. blame to neither service ; he telt as oared that .each had deserved well of the country, and that the failure e<s to be ascribed not to them, out tu.the. circumstance 01 their valour hay:rig:been opposed to -Lich wYrY I' urn aunrah i e_Hith-rtohehad taken but a..military view of the difficulties they had . to encountyi from-the situation- of place, the forte tuey had to encounter, tic. but iie had now' to tice evils of a nitre formidable . nature; which p,sed their exertions. They had t o cont e n d w i t h adverse elements; and still more wit It the 'horrors of disease. It wag k nown that the climate was un healthy. • Lord Mulgrave well knew ire and he .might have remembered that when he was there his men were not only unhealthy, but that many lost their liwes. yet this armament has been sent' to a paitilential place at the Most pestilential season, without one medical inan.i.being preViocsly don stilted, and. without any suitable provision beiiig _made. If it were alleged that secresy, which was considered necessary to the success of the enter prize, wouldliave-sidered by 'such a precautionary step, why, he would ask, when the destination of the army was notorious, did they not consult medi cal men on the subjea, before they were told tliSit • 3900 men were sick, and in a :most dreadful sitd3. tion, On the 31 st August, Sir E. Cpote wr o t e h ome i on the sohjea, nclosing, a letter from. Dr. Webb ; st tting forth the deplorable state of the army, and' pressinghiost urgently for immedipte assistance. He • (Sir E. Coote) blamed navigation as tardy on an occa sion so important, and that the swiftest vessel sailed too slow when relict wits necessary forthe sickening soldiery. at the 2d Sept. the Noble Lord wrotretO• Sir David Dundas, inclosing the note received from Dr. Webb, yet through a something that did not reach the War Office till December. - Subsequent applieations were made, but it was not till disease had made the most alarming progress in thinning our tanks that any medical men were sent to investigate , the nature of that disease and that climate, which ought to have been thoroughly known, and fully as-.• 'certained, before a man was sent from our own shores. This policy was of a piece'with. that which , sent Lord Chatham, with an immense force, to a place in ot.der to ascertain whether or not that place : was assailable.; a mode of proceeding never considered as convenient or eligible before. He now came to the last but not the least import ant- charge, the retention of Walchoreh. He had now to -ask what possible motive 114inisters could have tor so doing. After what had been said' by' Sir Eyre, Come and others on: the subj. - et • of the distress of the troops; after they homer , . • ous representations that had been made of"' their wants, and of the afflicting hardships to which they were exposed from the want of : clothing, of bag gage, and from being in hospitals %teaming roofs,, exposed to the inclemency of- the season. This was not all, their stock of Medicine had 'been 'so 19w, that had it not been for the succour atibrded them by a. smuggler, the army must actually have pd . .rislied' for want of bark: The protratled delays 101103 occurred, he impt4ed, to that, Miserable subordination which : had been, 'established, itar4. which rendered a autyber of orders necessary from one person in office to another, before any ef ficient measures could be taken to remedy the evil - . deplored. Three or four orders were' thus' ren- . . . , •dered necessary 'to the attainment of one . objeb. i The Medical Board, had it been whit a Medical Board ought ttt be, instead of what it was, with such a - system:could not htit be backward in;atTording the assistance required. -The health of the army ought not to have been entrusted tot such a Board as the last, which itATA§ intended to abolish probably , evea befetrethe sailing of the Expedition . Wh at e xc u se . 'Cottld they make . fer . reposing - s'ich :a trust in such persOnS ?.. None, but than private ' - discord had': obliterated - from their bosoms 'all feeling for the ' public : interest. With what view could_ they have kept our langnishing'soldierx in the unhealthy, filthy' marshes of Walcheren for so long'a period? Were they to be told that it was considered Rx be a good military position, and as r..-tiCh , worth retaining. Had they not .been told by a high milttary otlictr that it could not be kept without maintaining.a force of 22 or 23,000 men,,nor even with such a force _With; • out - erecting .fortifi , :ations.. liatUthey not also been told that ,there was no relying , on naval assistance. That during-three months in the y , ..ar the shipping would be under the necessity of going into Flushing: thus affording the enemy an opportunity of -armo' -tine us. Gen. Don had said, that at no time the - . shipping could be sure of keeping their positions.- - '7 Other testimonies to a similar etfeet could be ad• duced. Now, putting feeling and :humanity out of the : question, could it be policy to retain it under 8 (ICI' circumstances !—CoUld we supply from otir.pontl.'. Lition the annual . exhaustion by diw a s e 3, Could they think. of retaining. it with such enormous sa-.. ~ : cruces ? W.rethey not ,teld too by General pony. •that the island was in a defence'ess state,, and that he was apprehensive, if _the enemy could break . . their. line of stltt sifety:e, the hoSpital Must . be,.. ' taken ? What, could Mike Ministers callous to their retlealions ? WliaCcould induce thern 'to cortLr. our brave army to remain there to perish ?.. Why, after the representations .on and before:. 2d September, m was the order forvs . cuat nig the island t not given tilt • .November f it was not becant-e Ministers were , ;' anxious for the 'retetnion of Walcitaren, but Ile - cause they could think of little but the reten' .tien, of, their own offices. The intelligence _front ,Wilcheren ought to have made a deep impressiod .. ,on.those who.serit:ant an expedition so fruhless, 0r.., gather so fruitful of evils,, WhiCh the country, would f'' long have to deplore. But at , that 'period 11 ( lillir.. tern were too busy 'at ..home ,hoe :to thick of our pool ~ poldiers„ engaged- as ~they were ;in a' disgracg.d. " scramble for -.pla - Ls and for po.ver.—The 6017.: ..incinications. from. Austria prove] that nothing ( 4-: theAtind had been - done .in eonsequence42l theit wishei, When such an offer- was made. last ‘clir , their 9 ,, iy reply was, ^ " where is "this Lland of N i t r al - ; cheren r Austria could derive tno be.rieLt from the retention of • Waicheren. - When it was kliow , n °‘ Buda that Lord,Chatharnhad retreoted, leaving a gar' bison at Walcheren, theYexpressed'disappoiOtmert, and declared they bard no hopes, of mfr . .doing i- 11)' gobd there, and only, wished 'some eruct to -I/. ° , : . made in the North . of Germany. As early as rite • 6 : b4 .of . Odober; Sir Eyre Coate • had -p reused 1 ?" know • what were the intentiens.of Government re:: speaiOg• - -Walcheren ; yet • nothm; docitiive s w 3: done ; onr remaining - tlLere could d., no g ood ; t-4-I.i Ministers chose to nornoiate the . remains of 00 c ., 'gardson to tile manes of Austrian greetnes.:. 00 own veterans had been thUS sent to sw.cour the Alas' triad cause t 3 dayS-ufier peace had been coocluded• - ; When_ our brave , soldiers :were . tiro s waste d, it !Na „ not too much to ask if. the ,advantages gained WC' equa to the saeritices 'fllAde ? That ' great ca d 'i paigner" Gen ral Brownrigg . had said that some c ', the. troops Frapce had been called from the 4 3111. ' 0 ' . 01 the Danube by our disersion t bra; if a tew we' actually so . ;called off from our ally, was that cOokY,ll for such an Expedition ? . The Expedition, he C OL : .., tended, Ita . d been begun in ignorance,. Oondyc t ` a in impotence, and terminated in the loss ot 11 1:1 finest army that, ever lett our sh ores, in nalinllie disgrace,. arid almost in national despondency, -lie :Noble Lord concluded moving the following rt , ' iwions, .which i from his bein g muc h exhausted king, by 4 speaking so g, Lord Temple read-t o th e goo- ~ . , 1.. That on the Agth. of J uly and followingdays an I V i e r ' ' , s, tion of zg,ono soldiers, 37 ships o f th e li ne, three of 4-I,,g;',.esr to frigates, :31 sloops, &c. &c. &c. sailed from our O' or. , having for its rallied the capture of the enemy's ships P', a 1 Scheldt, 'the destruction of those building; the reductl' l de s , the I,slatid of Walcheren, the capture 01 Antwerp, o f - truction . of its dricklards am! 'arsenals, and the mutat" the Scheldt no lougernavigable, . • ~ , ol d • 2., That Flushing . surrendered on'the tsth. of Augusti e or on the 29111, it was judged advisable to abandm the alt 'obje4s of the Expedition. . to o 13 , :.:Tliit alter accomplishing. the destructi on A; the ~ , ,,1 .and works of-• Flushing on the lath t)eecmber,' the l ' was ev4cuaredoa the 23d. . . . tit' . 4. That. Fl hat. this,ouse is of opinion that no blame is / 1 " , able either to the military or naval part of the arinatilell:t'n..it e.„ Illat i on or about .tife !VII or September a tria.qii:ci disorder made its.appearance in the army, and on the Oct. the number 'of the sick amounted to t 0,9,^1. „,-,.. 6. That it appears from the - r e p orts o f t h e I'lly'sic ‘ i' lls i o cl' pointed. to investigate. the 'subject, that that disease. Pe f coo t-ally-breaks Out in W a l c h eren w i t h great v i olence, Dr ," , ,0 of tinues to rage throughout the Autumn till the latter rar e; ; October,'That. recoveries from the eile c t s.o t i t are ver.Y . ,' in* and that it is the cause of 'complaints which reiukr nit.'" efficient tOr military purposes: St f 7. That of. that army th ere di e d , O n o r 14 Seforc-the !". r ,,,, 5 1: February ate, 6a ttficers -and. 39ao men, exc l u Si v e of r,,,.. killed:in attion, and the number vf sick ,out the first of b . rtiary, amounted to 267 officers, and t 1,996 then. rf t o' d 8: That the Expedition wa s undertaken at zi pctio• t soc• under circumstances precluding every rational . hope ? o , s re cess i . and that, the'adviiers of thiS illjacige. Ex p ,..ditio .i .. ' 00 deeply t.ottponsible_ for the h e avy calamities thus brood ' the counny " fi second string of Resolutio ns was here producech in substance as follows ' - * • " ' • J. That Sir E. Coote, being lelt'in Walcheren with 'oco men, dirt represviit to his M..testy's M nisters that.the could not be retaified without git immense sacrifice of b g s • and treasinc. - • ,-" • r _2: That on theie3d of September he stated titc atil9ilgflie ()ups to- have nt;ide such an - alariningtr y,— ;', ' 6 ir it S.) to ilicr:itsc tt r rho following ' 1 weeks our poN,e,si.;it of the Island Lvili ! id be plecalion• o ul • ' 3,, That • on. the ot-h of October, Sir E. Ccore star"a• b e possession of the I ;land to he pra..aii,us, a:ld dos.rca t () ititbrmecl. of the ii . licutions of Goveram:nt.as to the 'conduct thiey'llaellit in'contemplation tv pursue, wittt tcsP .to Its reteritton, zzo. • 4. That notwillts:ant(lng these and similar representaN bee , his A•Lij..•;tv's Nl:nisterS`ll4s4leted till the 4th of 1\10", t " o ill to inter W - atelieren to be evacuated , and it was not 1 ` , .cr;:ctimed rt.!) the - z3tt'of December: 5. .ThatsubNequeGtly to the . t o th of September, 6 93 3 . 1 0 t wereei?):U iced for which by the time " W:ig't , ..;4,ll.ned; woe Augmented to i i tc,9. „ atter tzwatiallialeil ~ of the ,reso obj-:tts 0- f t arre pedi ! irin bad ccaszo to be con s id : r e d as pr , eticable , o u r, ob . was . 'kept his Miti,: s t ) ' s : - ,ll:Usters, without any , cit jed'in view, in.' in the greatest - danger, apd r Y posed for more .titaii time months to a disease whIC 1 aS" . 0 .• as the,j ist, of August had assumed a m us t a larming all ) ance. Is 141 • 7. That the corAuel of his Majesty's Ministol.cal ihe s,iverest . ce,Qtue of this ilouse,