The Sun. — London, England, 1809-07-28 00:00:00

'die Colin 'would remain ia ignorance of ne tact. . The question was then repeated. f.,7ord Cochrane coinitined.—l ordered' the cables t ) be lowed tort up and down. The Etna bomb .imssed ; I enquired, by hailing, if any attack was in tended to be made on the enemyeand was answered by the Captain that he was directed to bombard the eti env. I think there was a brig coming down after him I desired him to go close, and ,hoved anchor' to o the bows. The impression on my . mind _Was, f-aviog seen no signal made about that -time to indi cate an attack,'tbat no further attack, except that by -throwing shells was intended. The Calcut ta,Varsbvie, and most of the other ships'were pressing sail to force them on towards the Charante,, and out . of our reach. •Theirriperieuse, although_we did not com mence to fire On the enemy Until two 'o'Clock,. was. then wholly in time, by firing on the Calcutta to cut away, or to cause them to' break . (corn :the 'confusion in; & which they were shrown„ The confusion 'of she enemy forced the Varsovie ashore, 'and thereby prevented, the escape of these two ships, whiCh were :tile last, with the exception of the Aquilon, which ..es, - ;e1, although near, was a little - further up, and r they on board the Aquilon were in such confusion, that it was upwards of an hour and a halt' be - fore they Could get one single gun out of the stern ports of that vessel. The whole of the enemy's shipS of war Were, at two ,o'clock, in the position shewn in Chart, No. 3, which I shall present to the Court; and The British fleet are there put down as it ap 'Feared from thy Impericese, from the anchorage . 'o.llteli she took up, and in which anchorage she con tittoed until one o'clock, close to Buoyart shoal, just iethin . the longest drop of shells. , The Eagle, .al though nearest, did not fire at all (produces Atte Charts). The reasons, if there are any, why the - frigates might not, previous to the hour of half past eleven o'clock, have attacked the'enerny, will be found in the.preceding narration, wherein it appears that two sail . of the line continued at:anchor until half past' eleven, which two 'ships, it pearect - to my mind, would haVe bece better to attack . , .by opposing so them two or three sail of the. line, instead of a great number of'fi tes, although it was my opinion that the frigates themselves would Lave been quite, eqnal, to the task. The enemy's two ships . were - employed all the Morning attempt ing to get their topmasts up, whicho.in.the Course Of six hours from daylight in the morning, I do not thinly they had quite effected at the time that they made sail on the approach of the British fleet, and '-rap aground in the middle of the ehannel leading to the Charante ;" I, think in aboUt_ half an hour after the British fleet anchored. This gave rise to my opinion that they were not in.a state to fight. Q. it being statedin the log of the Imperieuse, 'that about four o'clock p m. on the 13th, the signal was made to the inshore squadron to work out at the - ebb tide, that a signal of rebel was also made to you, va hick yod answered by a telegraphic communica tion, and it not appearing 14 the log of the Caledo-'. nia that such signal was made, state whether such signal was made for recalling, and . whether the in snore squadron came out in consequence thereof, -and what was 'the purport of the telegraphic signal you made to the Commander in Chief ? A. On the morning of the 13th April, the ships of the line, one of them bearing the flag of Admiral t Stopford, weighed and worked out of the inner an chorage by order, to the best of My belief, from Admiral Stopford, whose ship shewed some lights; • which I understood was a„signal for that purpose to the line-of-battle ships. ,Most of ,these havincon tintied until low water in situations in which it' was known by the chart that there was not water enough. The signal of recal vas reported to me, about four . or five o'clock in the'afternoon, to hive been made" by the Caledonia, and LanSwered by _telegraphic sig nalithat the enemy could be deStroyed, and I'vvas the further confirmed in this opinion, by an official ietter, directed "oo service,!' Which I hold in my hand, directed to me from his Lordship, ordering . the Itnperieuse, together with the bomb, and dated on the 13th, 'written, to the best of, my belief, in his Lordship's own hand, acid which I beg may be reed to the Court. The setter was then read, in substance nearly follows :-- " MY DEAR LORD 44 Caledmia, April 13 'You Wave done your part so admirably that.l voll not Sutler you, to tarnish it by attempting impos sibilities. You must therefore join me, as soon as youcan with the bomb; &c. as .I wish to have:some illation from you beton I close my dispatches. " I Am &c. P.S. I have „Olered three brigs and two bombs to' join you in the attempt; but I don't think it will suLcetut ,You must come to me in the turn of the tide, as want to send you to, England as soon as possible." T o Ni•hiel) I refilled in the following letter also dated the 13th, and with'which letter I sent a Com miasioned Officer : " Irnperieuse, April 18. " tity LORID,—I have just received your Lord ship's ',Ater :—we can destroy the enemy's ships on shoe, of which I hope you approve. ' 'I am, &c. ' ``•' COCHRANE:" Q. It appears from the log-of the Imperieuse, that at threep. m. the Etna, with brigs in company, was bOmbarditig the enemy's ships in the Channel; when •w ere they recalled, and by whose orders ? • • A. I sent diem in to bombard the enemy: I be ht:i-e they came out•afier the Imperieuse' had weigh ed, and the Eagle had taken' her anchorage. I told thern the day before to come out on the ebb tide,. tot they did so a little slier high water. Q. In your Lordship's letter to Mr. Pole, in answer to his letter,, and- requesting you to state - to the Lords of the Admiralty your grounds for ob • je';::ting to the Vote of Thanks, you referred generally to the log.. You are requested to state: whether "you meant to draw their Lordships'- attention- to more than the documents now stated, on which yoU have given your sentiMents? A. Having been diredted 'by their Lordships to exphain my reasons, I referred their,Lordships to the • logs . and signal : logs of the squadron,. c ons idering' tha't, under every circumstance, the best source from whence their - Lordships could possibly derive infor-, illation. It was Plot my desire, unless I had b ee n • presse-ii, to have 'drawn their Lordships' attention to - pari-' of them, or any other documents. I con .; sidered the affair in Basque Roads in" every resPetVas pissed, and, whatever my opinion might have been, incapable of all remedy. Had it been a matter in which--the future interests of my country were ins volveti, I she old not have hesitated one moment - in pointing/that out to thekLoidships, and calling their attention to every pari.oftliesedocuments b or any Othe. - s I might be possessed of, -I have now also to call the 'attention of the Court, that. had the frigates on the morning, instead olleaxiag the inner aucnorage, and accompanying the ships of the line, remained, there, full opportunitieS offered that day to deStroy several sail of the enemy, which-were not out of reactrat the vesselsharoperly placed,at proper timeS of the tide,or of smaller vessels during every part of the tide, and I see no cause to alter my opinion.---4 The remainder of this answer is notimportant.. )• .Q. When did your Lordship first discover in the inner road of Aix, that there was anchorage suffi ciently capacio6i to contain six sail of the line to ride,without being in range of shot or shell ? A. I have been in possession of the French Charts, which I have riot tumid defective -in any material pdin ts, for - a‘ - period of /years ; .and from -these Charts I have at• all tines drawn conclusions with respect to the depth of the water and' other circumstances xirhiCh relate to navigation Upton theenemr,S coast; and on them, in this case, as . in all others, I placed my• dependance. • I went in ; On many occasions I found them'corred. I knew by the Chart, when in pur suit of the Calcuttai I was to find a bank. We found it, and this I did, knowing what I was abont..-.Upon ruy traa, close by the 'Ruyan Lfound it carr i ed ; and, in fad, I- had' confidence in the Chars, by- which tt has long appeared to.me that - this anchorage might, if ,any object was in view,.be 'taken. Q. In. the chart your Lordshp consulted 'on this occasion, are the soundings so marked in has to at ford a space - sufficient for six sail, not within range of shot and shell • A. That convidion was- upon my - mind ; but on referring to the chart, which' is exactly the same as others which have been in my possession, I find-that , no soundings are wanted; but the Court can, by re ferring thereto, decide the question. Q. When yoU fotincl, by expel ience, on going in to Aix Roads, by The soundings you found in the charts yon made use of were correctly set clown, and from theoce you drew a conclusion that there was ;safe anchorage for - six sail of the line did you intake any communication of that important fact to the Commander in Chief ? • - A. The Commthder in Chief harthe same chart's, I believe, as I was in possession of upon which, as I have already stated, I formed my condo sions with respect to the anchorage above alluded to. He had also French pilots on board, in whose re ports, from previous experience, I knew the Qum mander in Chief to rely above _all other authority. On reconnoitring the fleet the first day, we were so near as to induce 'the enemy to open his fire from almost his whole line. I reported to the Coalman -der in Chief the ruinous state of Aix, its fortifications being completely blown up and desttoyed, which I might easily ascertain from the deck with pet feet pre cision, not only as to the side towards us, but also as to the opposite, from the main-top,ot the Ship." There were only 13 guns mounted upon that side on which I had I had formerlyseen, to the best of my recoiled ion, about 50. In making these observations to,h is Lordship. for his in tO-7, - iat ion, he stated hisperfect reliance upon the c.:1;,,11 of the Pilots, and assure& me that was exceedingly strong, and that I think it had three - tier of guns 'Mounted towaids the i. .shipping. I then observed to his Lordship that the circumstances which.l then related were within my own observation, which did nut alter hi Lordship's opinion. The remainder of this answer is not material to the question. " \ • 'Q. Can the ships of the line arrive at that an chorage at all times of the tide ? A. By following the track which I judged best in taking_ in the Iniperieuie, that being furthest off from the fire of the enemy, I do believe'that ships of the line may pass in at any time of the. tide. I sat on the netting attending to 'the, leads, during-the, time we were going in, it was then high wafer ; and having marked that the rise and fall of the tide'' was stated at to ft. the impression upon tny i minct was that I'should not With a'ship of the line hesitate to go ,in. I think my impression at the 'sairie time was that atlow water it would not be proper to take one of the heaviest ships in, which was - riot neces sary. I don't think we had less than a 40 gun ship. We passed so close to the , Buoprt I could. have thrown a penny piece on it. _ Q. All the intormation your Lordship has of the rising and falling of the water was obtained from the charts only, and without any other intortuati,,ti A. I had remarked, when before on that coast, the rise and fa)! of the tide at a pl,Lce not tar distant to be about 10 or 12 feet at the Jughest tide; and I thought after Wards, when the French ships lay aground, that they stood about '! 12 feet. The Aquilon bad sunk abbot 10 feet, and it must have been at thd dead of low water when I went on board of her. Q. You said that/ ships of the line might have brought to, with.their heads to the N.. E-near the Buoyart Shoaly and might have engaged the two French ships that rdoisined at anchor, without dan ger From shot or shell from the Isle of Aix; would they have been nearer to the Isle of Aix than they would to those ships ? 'A. •I should not have thought of bringing any ships broadside to an enemy when at a distance so great as from the Isle d'AiX. to the Buoyart, but should have continued on the same course that ships would do in going to the inner anchorage; until -the enemy's shot began to tell, and then I should have brooght• the, broadside of the ships to bear in the manner before described, having their heads towards the N. and E. or if their shot did not tell, so as ma terially to injure, I should probably have proceeded to bring the larboard guns to bear. by passing on the side opposite to Isle d'Aix, till I placed my ship, .or ships, in such a situation as not only to capture or destroy these; but 'those also which were laying as in chart No.. 2. The distance was such that I might lie there for a week and not be hit twice. Q.. You said, that after a time they might put their helms up, and run under the stern of the ships at anchor, and'engage both these ships and the ships that were on shore; was that a situation in which any of our ships were at any time placed ? A. I have said, that provided I found it more ex . -. pedient, I would have done so; the Valiant and ships that joined thd' Inmerieuse about three 0 . 410 ck p. m. on the 12th of zwril, placed themselves, or rather passed the oaition alluded to, at4i went' on toviards the end of the stwal, which in the case stated. in the question'weuld not have been - necessary. • Q. Your Lordship having stated, that if two or three sail of the line, it coming in, had borne close on the Buoyari; . had laid their main and foretop-sails aback, and taken the tide under their lee, so as to enable them to bear round and go up to the enemy's two line of battle-ships, then afloat, was there space enough foreither one, two, or three sail of the line to have taken 1. - 1) an anchorage s with even part of their broadsides to bear - on those two ships, without taking the ground.; • A. I did not consider the tide under.the lee as a: point essential w the bearing up. There wassutli 7 cient room. I can speak with positive certainty, for we in the Imperieuse, when working ,out from the position which we. occupied, as .shewn by chart, . No. 3, tacked repeatedly, and traversed all the space between the shoal' of the Buoiart and the buoys of the 'enemy's ships, where they had been anchored in line, and from which they had , cut. - 1 should not have stood so far Edwards these buoys had it not "been that the enemy seemed little inclined to disturb us, which I not only attributed to the ruinous state of their works, but, concluded that they were. in want of powder or other military stores. I should not. have chosen; ,however, any distant station, but should probably have bronght Op alongside of them, and on that side direCtly opposite to Aix. The 3- decker, and oth - er ships on :there, 'two of which after appeared to have their masts" locked together, could . have given no material disturbance : in 'such a position, and these-three ,might have been destroy ed by one 74, had she been sent to attack them; or even by a frigate or two, while the two French line of battle ship's were Occupied at their anchors, as is above supposed. When I arrived' at' the outer n anchorage, I mentioned to Lord Gambier that as 'there could be no jealousy with resped to Admiral Stopford, that it would be a matter essential to the service to send the Admiral in with the frigates aid other vessels, which ever his Lordship thought best, as his zeal for the sere ice would accomplish W.hat I consider yet more, creditable than any thing that bad `been-;done; I apologized for the freedom which I used with his Lordship, and stated that I took that liberty as a friend, for it . would be - impossible, things reinanting as they were, to prevent a noise being , made about it in England. I said, "My Lord, you &sired me to speak candidly .to you, and'l haje used ilia: freedom.; I have no wish or desire but for the service of our country." To vt hich his 'Lordship replied; that if threw/ blaMe, it' would appear as arrogantly claiming all the merit to my self. I assured his Lordship I had no such inten tion, and mentioned at the same time that it was not my design to carry dispatches, or to go.to Lon don with Sir H.irry Neale, 'upon the occasion. .His Lordship. imrn. d lately after delivered to me an eider directing the above. Whet, I weighed, 1, had the satisfaction of hearing that the signal had been made for Admiral Stoil:ini, but whether- to execute the , above parpose by the frigates, or other means,..l do • not know. Lord Gambier declined asking Lord Cochrane any questions at present. :rldMil a/ STOPFORD sworn and examined. 0,71-TaviWg l card ihe order from the Admiralty to tord Gazubier to attack i thelieet it - 1 Basque Roads, state to the_ Court • any \neglect you !chow in the attack of the enemy's ships, tor any detect or unne cessary delay on the part at nis Lordship, between the I Oth March and 17iji Apia, and whether he used every means in his power to' carry ioto effect the abiive mentioned orders • A. Under aathe circumstances of the case, viewed in . 'eveiy point in Which. I am capable, and giving 'to the Commander in Chief the exercise of that dis cretion, which everyC,ornmandet in Chief, in the exe cution of measures for which he alone is responsible, I do not think there, was any delay or defic►ency on the part of the C , Minander in Chief, in executing the service entrusted to his Lordship's care. Q, (By tt,e Court) Was the fleet in .Basque Roads unmoored on the day previous to the going in of the frigates ? A. Yes ; the' shills were unmoored on the lith. (4. Do you know why they were untnoored ? A. From a conversation I had ‘vith the Corn nian.ter in Chief before utimooring, I , unAerstood• it was for the purpose of being ,ready to take advantage of any favourable circtiMstance. L must alsO there was some conversation which bad tin practical effe'A, respetiing the fleet making a spew of getting. under weigh to deceive the enemy, for the purpose of prevent) 'g the enemy's boats coming ow to in tercept the tire ships. Q. Was the fleet moored again in the course of that day ? . .4, Tce signal was made, and the fleet moored again aboUt sunset, except the Cxsar. •Q. Do you know what induced the Commander in Cniertn order the fleet to !nor again, or if you do not knoW his teasoni, did you see or know any sufficient cause for its being . done ?, • A.-The Commander in Chief did,not at the.titne COMMOllicat6 to nie his reason for mooring ; but from the close order in which.sonie part of the fleet was originally moored, and considering the strength of the tide, I think there might have been , some risk of the ships- nearest to each o\\her getting on board of each other, had they) Continued so close. Q. The morning after the fire-ships went in,. some signals and telegraphic commuhications were made from the Imperieuse to the:Commander in Chief: Do you recoiled what they were ? A. I confess,l must speak more from recolletStion, than from' any thing I saw myself. 1 can speak to those which were officially reported to me by the .Captain Of the Caesar. The first signal reported to me to be made by the Imperieuse, was that of ." -seven sai' of the enemy's ships on shore---pthefleet can •destroy them." Soon after signal repeated, that half the flee( could destroy them." Between half past six aod eight o'clock, I do not reâollet any other-signal made•byt he Imperieuse till between half past twelve and one o'clock, same day, and standing in towards the enemy. The Imperieuie made stgnal that the enemy's ships were superior to thechasing ships, but interior to the fleet united ; also that the Imperieuse was in distress, and wanted assistance. • Q. Dicl you see, or I.va3 it officially reported to you in the course of that day, that the Itnperteuse had infornaed the Commander in Chief by telegraph, that two Sail of the line would be sufficient to de , grny the enemy ? 'A. No such signal was repotted to me ever to have been made. Q. Was any official information given to you of .the Commander in -Chief having recalled the Irn- Verieuse on the morning of the Igth ? No such comrpunication was e v er m a d e t o jne. Q. The - Revenge,'Theseui, Valia n t, an d C seqar , are stated eo ltase been sent into the Road of Aix. Did they go in ? • ,A. The} went in at different times of night—the Caesar some hours after the Valiant. - .Q. Were they recalled by signal or otherwise,-by the Corndiander in Chief ? A. They were recalled by no order from the Commander in Chief ; but part of theni, the Caesar, 'Theseus, and Valiant, came out by orders from, me. Q. What were your reasons for calling those ships from the service on which they were ordered Without direaions from the Commander in Chief ? A. The imminent and inevitable danger-the ships were exposed to by continuing that station, also the certainty that they could not ,be employed with in the further. destruetion of the enemy's • , ships.. Q., Did you consider. the danger to which they, would be -exposed from the enemy's batteries, or badness of roads, `or.both-?- :A.. Froth both. The evening preceding it, when the Caesar. was going in, she gat onshore for three ,hours, in range of the enemy's shot, and this con trary to illy, expectations, being told by the pilot there was sufficient .water. The Captains "of the 'Theseus and Valiant also informed me . that their ships had been aground. • Q. On what shoal was the Cmar aground •A. A continuation of the Booiart, or "a . separate bank, in the same line with the Buoyart. At the time - the Cwsar got ashore, it was nearly dark, awl the enemy did not'perceive her situation. It it.had been day-light, I should have despaired of getting her off. Q. Did you know, that within the Wad of Aix, there was an anchorage capable : of containing. siX sail of the line, perfectly out of the reach of shut • and 'shells, from any of the enemy's batteries ? A. Previous to our frigates going in ; I certainly did not know it, although some Pilop were of .opi nion, that there was, others, that there was' not. With resped td the number, I understoOd t.it nevef contained more than four ships• in five fathom; - with.7 out range of shells. Had. I known of that anchor age before I went in, I should have expected to de rive little good tiom any ships going there, as if was quite out of the line of annoying any of the enemy's ships that were on shore. . _ _ _ Q. One of the reasons you have given for with.' drawing the ships two, the road at Aix was, that they could not annoy the enemy's ships. .Wert, you, before it was dark, in a situation from which you could see the enemy's ships so as to feel qu ite . satisfied, ships of the lin e c o uld d o t h em no mor e mischief ? A. Befdre I went in, and in going in, I observed the enemy's ships close under the batteries, and was so little acquainted With that anchorage, that' I was of both with - respea •tcv the naviga , . lion as well as the exposure to the batteri2s, strips could not be employed without imminently _ risking their.sately._ Q. yoL have commanded a squadron for a con siderable time in Basque-roads; have you been able ro nseerrain -- how high the tide rises and falls At spring tides ? A. Generally from 18 to 21 feet, according to the set of the wind; the. N. W. Wind makes a higher tide. Q.. When the Imperieuse made the signal that the enemy's ships wete on shore, and the, IL:et might destroy them, ‘vould you, with the experience you have as a Flag-Officer, have thought it prudent or proper to send or lead in the fleet to destroy them ? A: In my opinion the dislodgment from the ao' chorage of the enehly's ships by fire-ships, remov 4 ed but , a small part of the obstacles. This is not 'only my Opinion, birt that of others who preceded in the command. The'difficulties of the navigatiop, and an imiierk6t acquaintance with the anchorages would, think, have made me unworthy of a corn' viand, where the enemy had all the adirantage, and ours Would have had all the loss. Q. When the signal was made by the Lnpe' rieuse that Waif of the fleet could have destroyed the enemy, would you have conuualed half_the flea for that purpose, with ttio wind and weather as it then was ? A. 'ln this and ale for Mer answer I must take the state of the wind only, IA ith the willd as it then was, , ind the broadside of their ships stilt bammand• t bepassage, we should - 'have been so crippled going in and iu workiit t out, a passage a little rtior. than a mile, I think 1 Should, not .hare risked the ships' had they been under my command. Q. The itnperieuse made the signal of being in distress, 'and wanting immediate assistance—;wero any ships irntnedidtety sent to assist her ? A. I will not pretend to say whether the frigates were ordeted in betore_ or afterwards, by the Coin' rriantfer in Chief, but there were several ships nor at, the time. I do' not teculled any signal being, made irnniediately i 0 answer to the sigma trotn tkS Imperieuse. Adjourned until to-morrow. TO CORRESPONDENTS. *.* It is with great pleasure that we acquaint our R e adefi s that we have received the 'Second Letter from 'tax TAN' NICUS to CoioneI . WARDLE, which shall appear'as soon as possible. We cannot insert anonymous communications of .Bilths„ 'Deaths, and Marriages. THE S t: N. SOLIIM QUIS DICSILI I , ALSVM AUDILAT ? L 0 N D 0 N, ~. FRIDAY, JULY 28, 1809. - -"! We feel great ple3sure in being able t o s tate) that the whole Of tie Expedition has sailed. Yb e , PortsinoUtli division leached the DOwns yesterday' and when our Deal' Correspondent closed his let' ter, the preptaratory , 'signal for sailing had bai l wade. Mr. WAGSTAFF, the Messenger, arrived'