The Sun. — London, England, 1808-12-15 00:00:00

~; las caused the Bachi Aga;Commandant °r ale Ma rine, and the fanatical ene:ny of every thing that Was Turkish, to be beheaded. This event has caused a great sensation, in this capital. We have equally aston i shed at learning of the deposition "liag_gs.Pactia, COmmandant of the Castles of. the D ardanelles, who has been sent into exile. He has ,been replaced by Rahill Paeha , who, is considered lias as a zealous i,artizau of the Porte. M: Bosgovicli Presented his credentials as Charge d'Affaires from Prussia. • NU,REMBURGIT, Nov. 20.—The Archduke Ferdi nand of Austria, brother of the Empress, has been appointed Commander .in Chief of the Austrian troops in. Bohemia, Moravia,,and Austrian. Silesia. We are still without any positive intelligence of ate e : , erations oldie EngliSh squadron, which has reap- Peared in the Adriatic Gulph, and which menaced to attack the Russian ships in the port of Trieste, as the last letters from the latter place make no men lion.of host lie operations. PEON! THE MO NITEUR•OF THE 4TH OF DECEMBER: An English Brig, 'which sailed. from Portsmouth on the loth of Noverribetto St. Andero, was taken t il the 20d, i n t h at port.. We have taken some ex esrli froni the JournalS found on board. H E • which have rst.sort.A.Pa, of:Nov. 5.---'.' Otir troops hvi bee n lifi - I t anded at Corunna are to march upon Burgos by t . - _ s 151. 37.00... men. '- There they will joitLthe:troops from i I s cq, under the command of General Moore. The re for in( lef of our troops in Portugal will embark in the Tagus cep tne mouth of the Ebro, and from thence march for Bar.. n a , . ~ ! Note of the Ilioniteur.,--Admirable planned cam paign ! The. Ettli4ll reckon without their host. They will not go to-the mouth of the Ebro,.but *ill remain at the mouth of the Tagus. They are no doubt sufficiently. prudent to have prepared an en trenched ramp to protea their embarkation on the approaching day when the Continent will be freed fr°M their presence. , . , .'Rom THE SUN of 6.—" We are convinced that ''°,parte has t ~ t'2, -•- Nov. disposable men, and if he had, he na's trot the n '- eans ° ol ? -m ° aint.aining them' during a winter campaign in a CHUM I'V like &pain." . :.:-/Yofe of the Monitezir.—This article deserves no attent ion, except a, .it affbrds us , an opportunity to at , ir r em.ark ho w easy it is-to dupe ilie English people._ re c , ;l i, 4 , 1 eszreat effrontery or great ign orance to assert that 14'rante has rot . 200,000 disposable men, when she has 800,000 at her disposal ; and that she cannot maintain them during a winter campaign, in a coun try like Spain, when it is well known, that in Castile` al one, a n d at t hiS season, there is a superabundance of .. Co rn, wine, sheep, barley, and straw. Is it not evident; that with the 4 or 5000 ammunition carriages which comprise the equipage of the French armv,'six Mil lions .of rations may be conveyed, on which it may subsist for a long time. The English always em ploy the same means. •At the ume of the - tion:to Egypt, they pretended that an army expedi could zot li ve in that fertile country. They thought their People so iimoratit as not to know that corn, rice, e, S ugar, and coffee, abound in Egypt. THE suN.—" According to accounts from Lisbon, a part of the English Army will embark for the Mediterranean and. oft anded in Catalonia. The .Peopl e of Lisbon continue to rejoice at the departure of the French troops ; and on the al tfi, the English Officers gave a very spindid entertain ment to the Nobility and principal Merchants of that City." Note of the Moniteur.—The English will not land in Catalonia. As to Lisbon, if the people of that City rejoiced arthe departure' of the French, they Will. rejoice much more sincerely at the departure of the English; and'if the French give splendid repasts, :, I will be to t h an k t h e l a di es . of Lisbon for the bril • "ant balls they have received from them. 1 Can any thing be more ridiculous than the emu tinijc,l manifested by the English' to, contend with , . eq`land forces against the French ? France has in 5 00 N134 a formidable army, and, at the same time, G I° ° o men forming the army cf the Rhine, in ' Naples y' 11 - ` l 3' ; 10 0,000 are, at Boulogne; 40,000 at ii s - ; 40 ,000 in p‘ilmatia ; and 80,000 in Italy. got have war taken plsce in Germany, that would fugal.lave,Prevetned the conquest of Spain and Ppr s sehnt Franc e . W , ish io consider pre as the same with France of former times. e can h ave goo,ooo men., under arms without :9- exhausting, herself; she can have, and she has, 0,0 00 Cavalry. This number way be' increased, ~ ,41, ivTessary, till England shall have made peace.— .., 11-Uhe English merchandize which has . been found at il boa, at St. Andero, and in the ports Of Asturias, •-, a re sufficient to pay,the eXpences of the war. ;11itom TiliTYtiaLic ADVERIASER, Nov. zo.—" We larn N i ,, a !,70 . 10 English have rec..ived orders, to go from Malta and t o 9' into Spain, ,We much wish that this maybe true; ‘1 : it is i n S pain that the fate of Sicily and Italy will be j.te 'ided, s and it is thither that our un i ted forces ought to be dir e . . t hole of the Moniteir.--The fate of Italy is fixed : s i !, a Sicily will not. be decided . i n S pa i n, but in c ,'Y, as that o f Cap ri has ' been at Capri. t i i s t 's to the power of France in Spain, eight days after , ,' f r , t , . ° .t ) lling of the campaign it extended to the ! C atle rs of Portugal, and when this shall be read in oution lit Will the E i extend 'much beyond Madrid, and . ) will see froth the top of the Rock of Gib raltar , t he French standard flying, in the same t nanne r • as from the tops of their masts, and out at sea, to Will From Y see it flying on the forts of Lisbon. bea ten . the same Paper.—" Christophe continues to be l i on. .Itiall the engagement.; he has had with It's rival Pc. ?eh anciedwby should not b e surprisal if the Squadron coin- Goodall, winch s.ilect some time shmild • ~,4 ' been ;:ent to bring to this Country the since, utiturtunitte t.hristope." Aole.—Christophe will have the fate reserved for the friends of England. The laud will always fly torn under their feet. The flifiniteur of the sth contains a statement of p apers numbers o f t h e S panish armies from the Spanish raper_s, making the total a mount to 194,000. The afonzteur adds the following note : , Vastly we ll ! But after ten days campaign, and ±,cit)iy three detions, th ose o f B urgos, Espinosa, and 4 dela, let us see how many remain. There are no t 4000 men collected together. Their arm i es na ve existed." __,___—_ , A shocking accident occurred yesterday afternoon. %Int! of the lads. belonging to the two-penny post "ice, in driving his horse between a cart and. a l ''''ll.gon in Newgate;-street, just opposite Newgale, \v as thrown down, and one of the wheels going . .._‘er his legs, actually severed them from his body. ". was instantly taken to Sr. Bat tholomew's Hos- PU, but there is little hope entertained of 1 1 6 re 9ver.ing. COURT OF. INQUIRY. TENTH DAY. -CHELSEA HO3PITAL, Dec. /4. EXAMINATION OF SIR A. WELLESLEY, `BY SIR - BUR RA RO, CONTINUED FROM YESTERDA Y. Q. What distance was it from the British yto Torres Vedras It was nine mii s from Vimiera to Torres Vedras, and the British army was always . on its march an hour before day-light. Q. Is Torres Vedras less distant from. Vimiera than Mafra is, and how much ?—A. I imaaine Torres Vedras is 1 2 miles distant, from Malra-2Vi miera is tom 17 to 19 Q. If the French at Terras Vedras had known of the march of the BritiSh army, could nut they, have reached Mafra first, and have gained reinforcements from St. Julien and Cascayes ?—A. I conceive not. The British would have been at Mafia first, as they would have marched an hour before day-fight. , The enemy's line of retreat would probably have been by CabeSa and Montelavar. I always estimated the French force in Lisbon, St. Julien, Cascayes, and the, batteries, to be about 3000. They were troops in whom much confidence could not be placed for operations in the field, being principally Hano verians, Italians, and.people from Dilmatia ; and as the British Admiral was anchored off Cascayes with the fleet, and had 7 with him the Royal Veteran Bat talion for the purpose of alarming the enemy up o n those points, and as it w as se ttl e d with him, that as we advanced, he should disembark that battalion, and the marines of the fleet, in the.neighbourhood of the Rock of Lisbon, I conceive the French' would not have ventured to weaken the garrisons and the forts . on the Tagus to reinforce thesarmy in the field. Q. If it had been necessary to attack Cascayes and Fort St. Julien, how did you propose to get heavy cannon ?—A. From the ships. It had been so settled before I left England, and a store-ship lay off for that purpose. • - Q. After the aiStion of the 17th, and before Sir J. Moore „landed, could not you have received supplies had you so wished ?—A. After the action of the 17th, I was nearer Santarem than Sir J. Moore's division was when it was in the Montego, and could cer tainly have arrived there before Sir J. Moore could have arrived, in a state of equipment, from the Mon tego. I conceive that there were two distinCt lines of operation in Portugal, and two Modes of support- . ing these operatio ns . O ne by th e S ea - coast, an d de pending on the communication with the coast for. - supplies of all kinds;' the other by Saniarem, and de pending for its ,support on its communication with the Montego. There was a shelter in that river for the small vessels and transports, which would then . in faCt have become a depot; and the country, on the Banks of the Montego, which was settled and 'organized under the Government of Oporto, would, have afforded means, even after the-army under my, 'command was equipped, of keeping up the co i n, munication'hetween the Montego and Lyria, which, place would have furnished the means of communi cating with the army at Santarem. As there was no shelter for the troops at St. Martin's and Nazara, and - as those places. had not been settled under the Government of Oporto, and Nazara had be b en . hurnt by the FrenCh; the depit could not have been form ed at those places) and if _it ,11ad been possibl e t o no form it, there would have been Means of com municating with it. Therefore, conceive, that after the adion of the 17th of Aug4st, it, was not expedient that I s h ou ld c h ange my nue ,of opera tions with a view to the reasons only and that it was best that the corps Which 'should take the line at Santarem, should communicate with the Mon tego. ' Q. Do you not think that qie viauallers which vialuallod Sir J. Moore at Santarem, might also have vianalled_you ?—A. If „I had been at Santa= rem, and all the previous arrangements had been made for supporting the corps under ,my command at that place, as detailed in my letters of the Bth, loth, and i2th of Augtist, to Sir H. Burrard, I conceive . the corps under my command might have been so victualled. Q. What distance. do you suppose it to be from Cascayes to Santarem, and why would you not have availed yourself of the 'arrival of General Anstru ther's brigade I should think it 40 'miles, if not more, from 'Carcayes to Santarem. I was not informed of :the arrival of General Anstruther's bri gade, until the morning of the 18th of August,— They were then off the Berlinnes to the Southward of Cascayes ; and I could not have• landed them nearer .to Cascayes than where 'they did land, without sending them back to the Northward . against- the wind ; and either altering my position, or falling back to Cascayes again, after the action of the 17th of August, to facilitate a junction. Q. How far was the place where General Anstru ther's brigade landed from Cascayes From 15 to 20 miles. Q. How far was it from Monternorno ?—A. About sixty miles. Q. Might not the stores and provisions have been there landed with safety ?—A. I conceive that the formation of the depot of provisions and stores at any'point • of the coast was very - precarious; and that at the end of August and the beginning of Sep tember it became daily more-so. It might have been effe6ted during a long course of fair weather, but it was an operation which could not be calcu lated upon. Q. Had the artilleryborses been landed, could not those of your army have been given to the Coin missariat, or a' portion of the Worst of each corps ?- -A, They might have been disposed of in that or any other manner ; but it would have been useless to have given them to the Commissatiat, as there were no carts with the - Commissariat or in the country which could be drawn by horses. (in answer to a question from 'Lord 'Moira; Sir A. Wellesley ob served, that the only carts in the country were little two-wheeled carts drawn by bulloeks.) • Q. If the artillery horses could have been landed could not waggons also have been landed, and have, : been made use of by the Commissariat ?—A. I con ceive that there were not more waggons with the artillery than were •required tOr carrying the stores; but those waggons might have . been employed in carrying the provisions, - had the, Commander in Chief of the Army thought proper so to employ them. • Q.. Was, there no good ground at or near Matra or Lisbon, for cavalry to act upon ?—A.. Iu any opi nloo cdt•;ilry can ,be used with advawave, nearly in i -. . . all parts of Portugal ; not i , n large bodies any where; to lirerent ,the Feeesch from, Crossing the rieer e ant c, • l but every where in small; and' theie ' - Waa ground -he fart herastared, i he was. deSirous of this con between Mafia and Liaboo, on winch cavalry could 'test *sakitiga - place near' "tosl.,isbone'having an rideal' _have sited with , advantage. - the country= , - in the s winity of that Q.- Did not the 18th, light dragoons embark in town. Sir A. Wellesley added, that if Sir John,; the Thames on the 25th and 26th july ?e , --A. Ido • Moore's torps-shoul,f be brought down to Macseire, not iecollet that I ever heard at what- time•the 18th Sir H. Burrard must relinquish all_ be advanntges r lig - hedragooos embarked. As well as I can • remem- which might have been expeeted from .his- hare.:- i bey, I imagi n e th ey were to come from England. g that bodyw ith, 'upon Santa r e m , with t h e view Of Sir J. Moore's corps. 'cutting off the retreat of she French army, by i Close of the examin a ti on o f Si r A. Wellesley b ' Sir H. Burrard. y .the northward: Sir HarrY: Burrard repe'ated, that ' i' he thoright it advisable to bring-d moo'soWn•-Sir John ' LLord•MotRA,---Sir H. Dalrymple and Sir 4.wei- 're . mrps, t o render, certain those opera- Lesley have declared, that if the Conveption by which tions. which appeared- to him to be doubtful. Sir the French were allowed to evacuate Portugal' bad Arthbr *then asked Sir Harry Burrard whether he not been entered into, the French army might have had received his letters•of the Bth and loth of Au= passed the Tagus with full fOrce, and have involved. : gust, which recomniended s the march of this rein the British army in a tedious course of operations, at forcemeat on Saotarem ? ....Sir Harry replied that he , a time when the-presence of the latter in Spain was " had received those letters, but he did not e in reyeeva peculiarly desirable. I wish to know from Sir H. sense, make any' comment:or observation on that' : Burrard, whether he thinks there was a possibility of, I proposed operatioti, Sir H. Burrard then wrote a ; the French ceossiog- the Tagus ; could General Ju- ,' letter. to• Sir J. Moore, which I did not see, but I una • not have so transported them after the 224 of, Au- i derstood it to be an order to come down the-coast' gust ? i with his divlsion. I beg leave to state, that, to the . Sir 11. BURRARD.—Yt*S, in my opinion he might. : best of My recollesaione this is the substance of- the [ ' Lord Mot • ea.—Q. How does Sir H. •Burrard :'conversation that 'passed, 'though I -cannot pledge thin' that this coat luSion is to be resisted:from the .' mysel! to the exaa words. • coecurrence •of Gen. Junot - in the Conventioe, ' vie. Sir A. ,WeeeasenY.----Doea 'Colonel Torrens re f that he thoUght the cildilions of th e Co:e'en:ibis cancer my stating to Sir H. Burrard, the probability, more favourable to France, than protratting the if we did not move. to attack, the French, that they _..._ campaign in the runnier in which it has been repre- would attack us ?—Ai I do recoiled Sir Arthur's ' seeted it was in his pewee to protrad it ?—A. I con I making that observation. to Sir H. Burrard, and adds. ceive that General Junot had his motives which we ina at the same time, that a i' , teat expenditure of „. 0 b were reselv'ed to - Counteraa. The COnvention would provisions would be occaaioned• by waiting on A iik certainly.net have b e en Con e led e d e t all, h a d not the grolltld for Sir J. Moore, who could not be expected French General °dicers laid' their h ands on their i f ee some d ays , Ij hearts, and said that no private 'prepare' or money , • Sir A. \V.—Does Colonel Torrens recoiled my should be carried off by there army. • - 'stating to Sir H. Burrard the' probability of an ;A , Lord Moita's two question§ W ere s proposed to Sie creased difficulty in supplying the army with pre. A, Wellesley. visions when its numbers should be incr e a se d with , . • Sir A. WELLESLEY.—. I readily answer the last of out any proportionate increase of means'--Col. T.---'-- the 'Noble Lord's ()oestrous; for with respect to the Ido put - fealty recoiled his making that observation. first I have already given it as my opinion, that at ter Sir A. W.—Does Col one l' T orrens r eco ll e e t my the : . 2 c 2d of August the French had it in -their power stating to' Sir H. Burrard the probability that if the to cross the 'rages. When I considered the expedi- enemy did not attack us they would fortify their po ency of allowing the French to evacuate Portugal by I sitions between our army and Lisbon, during the dee I. sea, I took into my contemplation British interests lay of our march ; and my stating , the .difficulty at and British objets only, with the objects of our j turning fortified positions with cannon in that coon- Allies as connected with those of Great Britain. . I ' try, on account of th e narrowness o f t h e roa d s ? • . considered that the French army, f rom t h e relative l Col. T.—l do perfedly ; adding, , that the badness situation of the two armies i n P or t uga l, an d f rom its as well as the narrowness of the roads would render .• having the military possession of the country, had a I the operation of turning the enemy's flank, in any fair military right to withd r a w by sea wit h t h e i r arms position he might tak e u p, extremely diffi , cult. and baggage.; and Ido not think it necessary for . Sir A. WELLESLEY.—Does Col. Torrens recellerl .me to account for the motives which induced Gen. my sending hiM with orders to Gen..Fatre e and'Gen. Junot to prefer the evacuation by sea to another f Anstruther's brigadei, before or immediarele at the' line of operations, which,- without wishing to - say commencement of the battle of the 21 - o CiT .-:.!.11!-7? any thing disrespectful to him, might have been bad . Col. T.--I do recollect Sir•A. Wellesley's eepeing • or unworthy, as well as against the feelings of the me with orders both to Gen. Kane and to Gen. Au country. It certainly •sloes not rest on me to ac- struther, on the commencement of thebattle of the count ter Gen. Junot's conduet. 2lst August. • Sir Hew Dalrymple was then requested to reply 1 Sir A. Weeeaseev.—What were they ?--Col. 'l', to the two , questions by the Noble Lord. Sir A. Wellesley desired me to ride'as fast as could Sir H. DA LH YAlPLE.—Criainly after the ?st of l to. General Anstate!ler and 'General Fale, and to August the French were enabled to cross the ' Tagus. i convey to them his orders that they should not move . As to the Convention, I have already stated to the froth the'position which they, occupied in the froee, Court the nelsons wliich induced •rnes to think it ad-. of the village of Viiniere, without further diredions vantageous to Great ! Britain and her allies. It must from him. On my arrival at that position 1 found that Geneeal Fans: leer advanced elitde way in front, also be recollected th a t I reed particular inst ru eti oos in e expellieg the French ti- ill lishon, to ~ to say prc.t-ett- and was engaged With some French light troops. .1. their, retreat to Spain. Without prdtending • followed pinta nd delivered these orders, and he cent. ' hossefat thatSmight haves beeii.their intention, Leer.. sequently retired. I thi n k thi s was a b out h a lf past tainly had no other means of preventing - such' a nine in the. morning, I cannot speak with accuracy. movement: I cannot be aware of the motives that Sir'A. WELLESLEY.—Did I state generally to Col. e induced General junot to cbticer in :the same ma- Torrens the reasons for giving those orders ?—Col. T. Yes, partly.. I u n d erstoo d from Sir A. Welle s . Rife; he'doubtless thought he saw some advantages' in it to the French interest which I could not discern, ley that. those Orders originated from the nature of exeltisively of the greatenotive that must influence f• the ground in front of that position, which would on all such occasions—to spare the useless effusion render it ineligible to remove from it ; •particularly as of:blood. General Junot roust have seen in the ii he had observed a large French column 'forming in measure his own advantage or that of the country, I the Wood in front, and evidently preparing to Make one or the other. a vigorous attack on the centre. Question from the Court to Sir H. Dalrymple.— Sir A. WELLESLEV.—Was t 01, Torrens present On the change of circumstances in which the British when I recoMmended to Sir H. Burrard on the field army was placed by the latter end of August, could of. battle, .on the 2 tst of August, to pursue our ad not you have resisted any conclusion of th e pending vantages ?—col. T.. I was. negociation , ?—A. I suppose that, from the change Sir A. WELLESLEY.—WiIIshe state what passed ? of cirCumstances, met particularly, from the events Colt T.-e-lonnediately after we had defeated the • of the enth and 31st August, when the landing of right column of the French army, which had made, Sir J. Moore's corps 'was completed, I might have so its attack on our left, and . was then retreating i n a resisted; 'but I did not then think that oth e r circum- , precipitate manner, Sir A. Wellesley rode to Sir H. stances permitted of the negociat ion being protraeled ; Burrard, and said, " Sir Harry, DOW is your time to and the four Lieutenatit-Geberals with whOm'l con- advance, the enemy are• completely beaten, ande.ve suited on the occasion, seemed to •Me to concur in shall be in Lisbon in three days. 'We have a large the same opinion —those Lieutenant-Geeerals were, body of troops which hate not'been in action ; let Sir H. Bairrard, Sir J. Moore, Lieut. General Hope, • s ua move themfrom the right on the road to Tolies ' and Lieut. General Frazer. • ' Vedras, and I'll follow the enany with the lett."— ' Lord Mote e.—The release of a large portion of Sir H e ßurrard replied, that he thought a gre at deal ' the British army to ad in Spain having been assigned . had been done, very mach to' the credit of the as a principal m o ti ve f or a ece krati r i' the conclusion troops ; but • that he did not think it advisable to of the Convention in Portugal, how happened it that mote oft the ground in pursuit of the enemy. Sir the march of Sir John Moore aveasso tardy ? . A.:Wellesley remarked at the time, that the troops Sir H. flues? ssear: —I do not exaelly know in were perfectly prepared to advance, having provi point of fact when the British army commenced its sians ready cooked in their haversacks, accorchog to , March into Spain. When I left Portugal the opera the'orders of the clay before.. tion s •wai•ed tor nothing but notice from Madrid of Sir A. `V•,.—Does Col. "Torrens tecoileel my men the ,neeesskyrrangetnents for the movement of the ironing That the troops had plenty of ,ammunition ; ' that there were twelve clays bread Melte camp for troops having been made in Spain, .which I h a d reason daily to exped. ' - - the original numbers of the army ; and _a st.nii , Lord Mmea.—lt is. then to be understood by the ciency of every kind of store in the reserve e: iio Court, that no arrangements had been made for the briades ? - arrival of that reinfo; . ceinent in Spain, previous to the Col. T.—l'recolie'a Sir Arthur' s men ti on i ng tin . Convention of Cintra ? • ,' , - was plenty of airimunition ; that the mules o f. re- Sir H, Daretymeee.'s--None that I know of. served musket ammunition were in the rear of the Colonel Toatt EN s was culled in and re-ere:rained. - brigades ; and that we leid abondence of ordnance Sir. A. WELLEsLE),;.—Wvie . you present in the stores and •provistene; but I cannot call to my re- Brazen, when I had a c o nver sa ti on w ith Si r H. Bur- collection, whether he specified fit that moment the e rard, on the eveping of the 20th, o f A ugus t. number of days prevision we h a d in c am p., Col. Toitnees.---I was.. I was p r e s e n t i n th e Sir A. W. Did lon the 20th, order th e - an : try to. • 2 Brazen when Sir A. Wellesley m a d e hi s re p or t t o march on the kst ?—He did. Sir H. Burrard, upon the arrival of that officer in Sir A. W..*--Did I countermand those orders when Maceira Roads. 'Sir A. Wellesley represented tp 1 returned from , the Brazen or, the evening' of the him the state of the army under his comma n d, th e 20th ?—C o l. T. Sir A. Wellesley., countermanded situation of that. of the enemy, and the principles these orders inneiectiately on bis arrival in camp on ou which he had cOndoe,ted the operations from the tae evening of the loth; in consequence of the di landing in Montego ; and further stated, he. had is- .redions he had received from Sir H. Burrard to that sued orders for the march of the eerily next morning. effeel. . . . . , • . Sir H. Burrard replied, that he did not consider it . . Sir A. WELLESLEY oaered•to the Court some act- advisable to advance from that poiition, lentil the. clitional observazions to thoSe Contained . in the nar arMy should be reinforced by the division under the ratives he had already given : in. , They were to the C ,IlDMilld .of Sii J. rvlo v re: Sir A. Wellesley ob- following etfeel.—To gain pdssessioa of Lisbon? and served, that he thought it of the utmost impoe- of the Tagus, had always appeared to him the seeat twee to push forwards .by the nay of Matra, with ohjed•of the campaign. If the Court would rest:; a %iew of turning the enemy's left flank, and to . .to the plan of the Freoch Engineers, that h a d bee.) endeavour to bring die Fr enc h army t o t h e i ssue of submitted to them they would perceive that the e a battle in the field, as near to Lisbon as possible, enemy had two, lines of retreat opeteto them.. Noe: that we nil: , lit twail ourselves of a short distance it appeared to him that had'Sie j. Moore occupied born the Tagus, by following tip the victory, so as : Sauterern, their retreat would have been cut oil; at i 1