The Sun. — London, England, 1809-01-03 00:00:00

REPORT OF 7:11E, BO /.RD OF INQUIRT. MAY IT PLEASB YOUR t4A.IRSTy, We the underwritten General Officers of the Army, in obedience' to your Majesty's warrant, 'which bears 'dote the Ist day of ,November, 180$, commanding us strictly tb ingnire into the condi tions of a suspension of arms concluded on the 22d of August, 1808, between your Majesty's army in Pdrtugal, and the Vrench force in that country-- and also into a definitive Convention, concluded with the French General commanding on the 31st t),ugust follow ing—;also into all the causes and circumstances whet her arising from the previous operatiens,of the British Army, or otherwise, which led to ihem)— , itud into the `condita,behavietereand proceedings of Lientenaeti,General Sir Hew Dalrymple, and such ether Commander or Centniandere of your Majes tis forces in Portugal 7 eand of any other person or persoes, as far as the same were connected with the 4 0aid Armistice, Suspension of Arms, and Colwell ,ton—and to report to your Majesty a statemeot sheteof, as it shall appear, together with our opie pion thereon, and also our opinion, whether any, anti : further proceedings should be had there upon. '''Nte live, at several meetings, perused and con , lidered your Majesty's orders and instru6tions, as teenstnitted to us by the Right Ilon. Lord Castle -410.; your Majesty's Principal Secretary of State, together with sundry letters, and other papers, there with transmittedeeeAnd have beard and examined J..ieutenant-General Sir Hew Dalrymple, Sir Harry Burrard, and Sir Arthur Wellesley, and other prin cipal Qfficers employed on the said Expedition, with such witneasee3 as any of them desired.—And also such other persons as seemed to us most likely to give any material information.—And in order that yetSr Majesty may be fully possessed of every circumstance which has 'appeared in the course of this Inquiry, we beg leave to, lay before your Ma jesty the whole, of our Examinations and Proceed ings to &it our Report annexed.—And upon the must diligent and careful review of the whole mat ,ter, we do, in further obedieoce to your. Royal Com- Oland, most humbly report to your IVlajeasYs that it • , .appears, 84e. Sec. [Here follows a statement of fat% relative to the. arrival in Perlugal of Sir Arthur Wellesley's F;xpe ditioti front, Cork e eto the eppearanee of General Spencer elf the Tagus, his' return to Cadiz, and hie arrival again in Portugal—to the operations of the army up to the battles of the I7th and etst—to the junction of General' Auckland and General Anstru ther's brigades—to' . the arrivarof Sir 'Harry Borrard and Sir Hew Dalrymple—to the arrival and landing ci Sir John Moore ; all of Which have already been given, in the official dispatches . published in the Ga zette, in the narratives of Sir A. Wellesley, Sir FL Burratd, and Sir Hew Dalrymple, and in the evi deuce which we fully detailed during the sitting of the Board of Enquiry.] . • ; After a description of the battle of Vimeira, the report proceeas thus - Bobn atter • twelve, the firing had ceased, and the euteny's ,cavalry were Seen from our left, in bodies • "of 'about eno, by General Vergilson ; and about tire baITIO time General Spetwoi• saw a line formed, about three miles in front el our centre.' About half past twelve, Sir Arthur Wellesley proposed to Sir Harry Burrard to advance from his right, with three brie gades, open Tortes Vedras, and with the. other five pri go divs to follow the eneuit, who had been defeat ed by our left. •-‘ Jt appears .that the situation of the r ArtTly at this ,anement. suns-on the right, Majoe,(yeneral brigade, which had not been engaged, was OU the height behind Vimeira, and at a distance of above three miles from those of Generals Ferguson and I` , !ijltiii)gale on the left. Ins front of Vimeira, and the centre, were the brigades of Anatruther and hue, Which bad been warmly engaged. Brigedier- Generals BeWes's and Acklend'ehrigedes were ad yeeeed on the heights, towards the left, In support ,of Generals Ferguson and Nightingale. Brigadier- Queer - el Cranturd's brigade was detached rather to 41 0 rear Of the left, about belle mile from Major- General Ferguson, to support the Portuguese troops, antking.front in that direotion. It appears, that al though the enemy was completely repulsed, the de tee of expedition with which a pursuit could be - cueunenced, considering the extended position of the ;army' at that these, and the precitetion to be taken agaill‘t the superior cavalry of the enemy, must have *ended. on various local circumstances only to be ealeulated by those en the spot, This very circumstance of a superior cavalryra larding our advance, would allow the enemy's in fatal, without any degree of risk, to continue their retreat in the most rapid manner, till they should Arrive* any given and advantageous point of rallying and formation nor did Sir A. Wellesley, the I 7th August, when 'the enemy had not half the cavalry as on the taut, puma a more inconsi derable and beaten army with any marked advan raete. Were passages are-quoted from Sir A. Wel- Iveiey's dispatches in the Gaeette, in support of this Statement.) It may also be considered, that no the etteck sen our mitre had been repulsed long before that on .our left had, the attacking corps, which, as has beet) observed, was not pursued (hut by the ;arch dragoons, not exceeding tee), hied time' (above 0;1 boor);,t.o re-assemble, and to Occapy . such ground inialti afterwards facilitate the . retreat of, their eight,• and that the enemy were atlually and visibly for ineo in one or more lines, at about three miles in. front of the centre. From these and other fair military grounds, its al low,:31 by Sir A. Wellesley ; ft em thecae t hat occurred in Sir EL liturard's first Interview with Sir A. Wel resley tintn the utmost certainty of the immediate arrival of Sir John Moore's corpi, which; it they had not stopped atMondego Bay, woold have ken at Maceira on the 21st Sir H. Barrard declined 'mak nig any further pursuit that Oh ouerdering the army to March next morning early.—iln Una opi ition Sir H. Ijurrard *totes, lirigadier-Getteral ton sttmci Colonel Murray concurred.] {Pere foiloWs 111 account of the appointment of Sir flew Dalrymple; his assuming', the command; • the negociation of the Armistle4i . : ObjeMions ofßir C. Cotton, fitia ahnis, ; all the particulars of which we have, zilrealy laid before PubliC.l diipedrs that when the propoied treaty (r itiAed by Gencial Junot) of the Out August, %yak brought by Captain Dalrymple on the ?6th to head-tivarters at Ramaihal, all ~tote Lieutettant-.Genetals (Bator& Moore, Hope, Fraser, - Welletiley) were present , ,Lorct, Paget excepted (because not long preViously summoned). The pry posed peaty was, however, discussed, IVinutes of proposed afteraffons were taken by Sir A. Wellesley, as laid before the Board, and the Commander of the Forces has no ,reason to believe that Sir J. Moore, or any of the Lieutenant-Generals that came with him, expressed any disapprobation of. the state a,nd terms of the negociation. The Treaty, with the alterations proposed were re transmitted to Lieutenant-Colonel Murray. It ap pears when the treaty concluded by Lieut.-Colonel Murray on the 3oth was brought by him to Totres Vedras on the 3lst for ratification, the Lieutenant- Generals present were convened, and Sir A. Welles ' Icy was sent for. Lord Paget, who was at a distance, did not come, nor did Sir A. Wellesley, his corps having marched that morning. The other Lieut.- Generals met (Burrard, Moore, Fraser, Hope); the alterations made by Lieut.-Colonel Murray were approved, and the Treaty then ratified by the Coin manderof the Forces (Sir H. Dalrymple), with the approbation of the Lieut.-Generals present. Some of the articles of the Treaty of the teeth, before ob jeded to by the Lieut.-Generals, were altered in that of the auth, and some other good alterations had been inserted, not before suggested. S - comparison of the Treaty of the 28th, and that ratified, will .show the alterations. The meeting of the Lieut.- Generals the Comtnander of the Forces did nut call, or consider as regular Councils of War. • He sought to bene fi t from their talents and experience, by con. suiting them on exigent cases, and by priming the measures be might himself deenrmost for the good of your Majesty's service, after availing himself of the advantage he might thaw from their reasonings, and he does not recoiled there was any dissentient opinion on the 31st, as to the ratification of the Con vention. It appears that Sir J. Moines corps hav ing arrived at Mondego Bay on the 20th of August, began to disembark ; that they re-embarked, and arrived off Maceira Bay on the 24th; that from the 25th to the 29th, they landed tuthr considerable difficulties, and successively joined the army at Torres Vedras. It appears that some of the princi pal advantages to arise from the Convention were in the contemplation of the Generals. That it imme diately liberated the kingdom of Portugal from the dominion of the French, thereby restoring to the inhabitants their capital and 'fortresses, their princi pal Sea-ports; their personal liberty, property, re.i gion, and established government. That it relieved a great extent of Spanish frontier from all apprehen sions of an enemy, and the whole of Spain from that of having an enemy behind them, and allowed •!all parts at' Spain to take more effective measures for Its general defence, as well as permitted Portugal immediately to contribute for their mutual support. That it enabled the British army immediately to en ter Spain,. if' required, by central routes, while it transported the French force to a very.distant part • of their own coast, far removed from the Spanish frontier. That it immediately released 4000 Spanish • Soldiers, and sent them to the defence of Catalonia; it also released from the Portuguese frontier another body, of 2000 Spanish troops. The Portuguese army also became dliposable for Inc common cause, To the men of war and transports, which at thi s season of the year with great difficulty could keep their sta tion near the coast, and on whose presence the sup plies and operations of the army depended, the open ing of the Tagus affinded immediate shelter. It is further urged by the Generals, as inueh more than probable, that it the enemy had been required to lay down their arms, and surrender prisoners of war, they would not have complied ; but it driven to ex tremity, that they would Stave retired upon Lisbon, reinforced by 6000 Russians, who must have been thus compelled to share their'fate ; and in the tem porary attack of this city, much calamity and de ruCtion must have entitled. Also, that masters of the Russian fleet, and of boats and shipping in the Tagus, the passage to the river was ensured to them; that they could have defended for a considerable time its East Bank, and prevented the occupation of the Tagus by our fleet; that with the strong fortresses of Alentejo in their possession, they could have protilieted a de struttive war, to the great detriment of Portugal and the Spanish cause, by finding employment for ibex greater part of the British army, for the remainder Of the year, and whose difficulties and losses in such operation must have been very considerable. It ap pears, that the forts on the Taps were taken posses sion of on the 2d of Septemuer, by the British troops, end the port was then opened to our shipping : That on the sth the army hod its right at St. Jo and its lett on the heights of Hellas : That on the ath or nth, a British corps marched into Lisbon, to ensure the tranquittlty of that city, during the embarkation of the enemy, who were all 'sent off' (except the last division; purposely detained) betbre the end of the month, and part of the British army Was then actually on its route towards the Spaniih liontier..--it appears, then during the discussion, and afterwards during time execution of the Convention, 444414 firm invos was shown In resisting the 'oculists ons and interpolations of the .anenty ; every stipu lation being restrided to its tall`, hottouroble, and • grammatical meaning, and the French not .allowed to carry off,- but obliged to disgorge plumktrs which they affeCted to consider as private property. It ap pears, that phis were taken to misrepresent and raise a clamour in Portugal against this Convention ; but when it was generally known, and its cads felt, the, people of LiSbon, and of the country, stem to have expressed their gratitude and thanks for the benefits attending it. It has been urged by Sir Hew Dalrymple, and -allowed by Major General. Spencer s that in Egypt, in taut -(:otter the victory of the Gist of March, the French having' thrown their whole force into Alexandria and Grand Cairo, about 10,000 men in each plate), that at the siege of Aleaaudria, in August, the country %eosin the full possession of the lititisit and Turks. The garrison, cut off from every possibility of relief, and could only have held out some derv, when - a capitulation was granted to it, September tbe ad, as favourable es the Conven tion of antra - to the army , of Junot (of 94,00 u French, and 000 Russians) and perfeetly similar in an the Chief articiiro of mill, baggage, artillery s eons. veyance, ace. also, that the same terms had been previously granted to the Garrison of Cairo, under' much the same, eirpUrnatintea. By thew two Con yentions, er capitulations, above 204100 Freed": eva coated Egypt, and the British nifty was left dispolo» able for other purrses, Ou the whole it appeara; .that the .operations of the army under Sir Arthur Wellesley, from hip landing in Nlondego -)jay the st of August, until the conclusion of the aaion at Vireelra, the 21st of August, were highly Atonour• able and successful, and suq(i as Wight be expetted from a distinguished General at the head of a British , army of 13,000 men, augmented on the 20th and 21st to 17,000, derieing only some small Ad from a Portnguiise corps (i,OOO men) and against whom an enemy nor exceeding 14,000 men in the held was opposed ; and this before the arrival of a very con siderable reinforcement from England, under Lieutenant-General' Sir John Meere, which, how ever, did arrive and join the army, from the 25th to the 30th of August. It appears a point on which no evidence adduced can enable the Board to pronounce, with confidence, whether or not , a pursuit after the battle of the 21st, could have been efficacious ; nor can the Board feel confi dent to determine on the expedience of a forward movement to Torres Vedras, when Sir Harry Btir rard has stated weighty, considerations against such a measure. Further, it is to be observed, that so many collateral circumstances could not be known in the moment of the enemy's repulse, as afterwards be came clear to the army, and have been represented to the Board. And considering the extraordinary circumstances-under which two new Commanding Generals arrived from the ocean,'and joined the army (the one during, and the other immediately after, a battle, and those successively superseding eath other, and WI the original Commander within the space of 24 hours), it is not surprising that the army was net carried torward, 'until the second . day after the ael.ion, from the necessity of the Generals being ac. quainted with the aaual state of things, and of their army, and proceeding accordingly. It appears that the Convention of Cintra in all its progress and conclusion, or at least all : the principal articles of it, were not objeeted to,by the five distin guished Lieutenant-Generals of that army; and other General Officers who were on that service, whom we have had an opportunity to examine, have also concurred in the great advantages that were imme diately gained, to the country of Portugal, to the army and navy, and to the general service, by the conclusion of the - Convention at that , time.---On a consideration of all circumstances, as set forth in this Report, we most humbly submit our opinion, that no further military pro ceeding Is necessary on the subje&. Bedew, howsoever some of us nmy differ in our sentiments respetting the fitness of the Convention in the rela tive situation of the two armies, it is our unanimous declaration,. that unquestionable zeal 'and firmbess appear throughout to have been exhibited by Lieu tenant-Generals Sir Hew Dalryrriple, Sir Harry Burrard, and Sir Arthur Wellesley, as well-as that of the ardour and gallantry of the rest of the Officers and soldiers, on every occasion during expedi• Lion, have done honour to the troops, and refleaed lustre on your Majesty's arms. All which is most dutifully aubmitted. (Signed) U. Dumons. General. Mins RA ' GellCr.d. PETP.It CRAIG, General. 111E4 I 111-IELD, General. itmaitoxs, Licut—Gen. G. Nualiter, Lieut.-Licit, UL. Zit cuel.s, Licut..Gen. 2ICi Dee. ,24. judge-Advocate General's Office,- Dec. 27, 18: 8. In consequence of the following letter from his Royal Highness the Commander in Chief to Gene ral Sir David Dundas, as President, viz. SLR, Hone Cuaids, Dec. 25, agog. The Judge-Advocate-General having delivered to me, to be laid before his Majesty, the several Papers and Moments, containing all the examinations and proceedings taken before the Board of Enquiry, of which you are the President, together with your re- Tort and opinion upon the whole of the late opera tions of his Majesty's Forces in Portugal, as con netted with the Armistice and subsequent Convention cf eintra,l think it incurnbenton me to state to you, that although the report is fully detailed, and perfeCtly.ex., planetary of all the transactions as they appeared in evidence before you 4 yet upon a due consideration of ' the whole matter, it certainly appears that your opi nion upon the conditions of the Armistice and'Con vention,' which the words of his Majesty's warrant expressly enjoin should be strittly examined, en quired into, and reported upon, has been stltogther omitted. I feel it my duty therefore, to call your attention to these two principal features.of Oil -t ine. " ' portant 'case, the Armistice and - • Convention, and to desire that you may be pleased to take the same again into your most serious consideration ' and to subjoin to th e opinion which you ha ve already given 'upon the other points submitted to your examination and inquiry, whether un der all the circumstances which appear in evidence before you on the relative situation of the two ar mies, on the 22d of August, tBOB, it is your opinion that an Armktice was advisable, and if so, whether the terms of that Armistice were such as ought to have been agreed upon; and whether upon a like con sideration ut the relative situation of the two armies subsequent.to theArmisiiee, and ivhen *li the hritish forces were landed, it is youropinion that a Conven tion was advisable, and if so, whether the terms of that COnvention were such as ought to have been agreed upon. I' am the more desirous that you should'resume the consideration of these two points, the Armistice and Convention, as it appears upon the face of your Report, that a difference of opinion MOOS among the Members of the Board, which may probably produce a dissent from the majority upon these very questions: You will be pleased, there. fore, to desire such of the Members as may be ola clamant opinion from the majority, upon these two questions, to record upon the face of the proceed. hiss their reasons for such dissent. I era, 81r, your's, (Signed) Ft: Veneta Sir P. 1.)1411t.t.ti, X., 13. Coratnander avehief. The 4(40 met this day at the Judge-Advocate- General's Office, when the said fetter having been read, they agreell that the following questions should be put to each of the Members of the Board : ,-, Approve. r Do xou, or do yowl Disvprove.- Lt, Gen. tkiicatla I notiltpprove of the ' Earl of MOita J.t.Cett.Sitt; , .Nugent ) Attntsttse as COll. liar} of Pembroke clutleu on the sad Lord tlearhfieid of August, illog, in Genera Craig I the relative sttua. Gen. Sit D. Dundas. 1 tion of the tw o I N. arm* 2 :14ppreve. t n.) you, or do you r Ilisapprove. Lit'Cen.sirG.Nuwilt f not approve of the 1... Ge 1. N icui Is Gen.' Lorcictleatitheiti 1 Convention aacon- I Earl Pembrokr G erteca I Craig j r eluded upon the %.liarl of Sloita Gen. 'Sir D. Dundas.N ;tat of Aug. *S in the teleive si. 1 tuation of the two] 1 / 4 , armies ? . 4:1 fsisned) 1) vin Du N OAS- Presidept . My Tenon for considering the 4rmistice as Pi visible on the :ad of August was, because the enemy had been able to retire atter the battle of the 9- t st, and take op a strong defensive position. OL. Nmou.s, I think, considering the great increase of our farce from the first sospenoonot hostility to the definitive signing of the Convention, added to the defeat the enemy itad suffered. Sir H. 'Dalrymple was fully entitled to have insisted upon more favourable terms. Qt,. N, scoLLs, L. G. r I approve of the Armistice, after a due ,considera tion of the relative situations of the Iwo armies on the evening of the fit d of August, but I cannot fully approve of the whole of the Convention, after a due consideration of the rwlative situation of the two armies at that time ; because it does not appear tO me that, in the progress of the ne technic*, sufficient stress was 'aid upon the great ad vantages which had resulted, or Were likely to re sult, ;froth the former succeisful operations of the British army in the field—from the considerable re., inforcemeuts which had joined it, subsequent to the commenceMent of the negotiationfrom the cause in which the British army was engaged, being the cause of Portugal, which gave good reason to reckatt upon the good will, if not upon the active assistance, of the majority of the inhabitants; and also, from the unusual readiness which, as it appears to Mc, was manifested by General Jonot to enter into ne gotiation, and by . •the French negotiator to accede to terms as they were proposed, and to such construc tion as Lieut.-General Sir H. Dalrymple put upon them in some instances, where they might have borne'a difference of interpretation.' I therefore thinkit'probable, for the above reasons, that if less lavodrable terms to the French army had been in sistedi upon, they would have been 'acceded to. - PcamltOKE, Lieut.-Gen. • 1 feel less awkwardness in obeying the order to detail my sentiments on the nature of the cenveu tion, because that I have already joined in the tri bute of applause due in other respects to the Officers concerned. My opinion, therefore, is only opposed to theirs on a question orjudgment, where their te lentleare likely to have so much more weight, as to eendtle the profession of my difference, even on that point„ somewhat painful. The duty is, however, imperipus on me not to disguise or quality the de. duttiees which ! have made during this investigation, Au Armistice simply might not have been objettione able, because Sir Hew DArymple expeefing hourly the arrival of Sir John Moore's d ivision, alight sin. more advantage for himself in a short sespension of hostilities, and what the French co . * draw from it; but as the Armistice involved, 'and, in fael, established, the whole principly of the Convention, I cannot separate it from the latter. Sir A. 'Wellesley hes stated, that haven idered his force, et the commencement of the mar e) (rem the Mondego River, as'sullicient to drive t e French from their positions on the Taps. That force is sub 1, sequently joined Lisbon's 4QOO British troops, under Generals Anstruther and Ackland. The French make an attack with theft whole disposable etrengh, and arc repulaed with heavy loss, though but a part of the British army is brought into 060. It is ditfigelt to conceive that the pruspetts which Sir A. Wellesley eutertained could be untiveturably altered by theist events, even had riot file certainly of speedy rein. foreements to the British army teisted. It is urged, that had the Preach been pushed to extremity, they would have crossed the Tagus, and have protraated the eirnpaign in such a manner ae to have frustrated the,apore important view of the British (knee ralsreenainely, sending succours into *in.'5...4214 measure must h ave b een equa ll y teas ib te for tees 41 krencis if no victory had beet) obtained over them ,i but I contess that the chance of such an attempt seems to me RSSIIIIIII%I against probability. Sir Hew Dalrymple notices what he calk " the critical anti embarrassed state of Juno!, before that General has been pressed ny the British army; mid, in expetna tion of that expression, observes, that the surrender of'Duputit, the existenc e o f 'he v iet ut i ous S pan i s h 'Rimy in Andalusia, which cut off the retreat of 010 ' French in that direction, mid the universal hostility . of the Portuvese, made the situ a t ion o f Junta one . lof 4reat distress. No temptation tot the transla. lionn - of the war into Mouse° presents eselt from this picture ; nor dues any other repressenatien give ground to suppose that lime (Ailed have contem plated the measure at hording forth any prospect but ultimate ruin, after much pi .itintuary distress and disgrace. The strongest of all proofs as to Junot's . opinion, arises from his meting the very inurnlng atter the battle of Vinseira, to propose the estacua lieu of Portugal; a step which suiticiently iodi- ' cated that he Wai satisfied be could not only soles, no efe,...lusa tlviitutri but could not even prolong the contest to take the chance of aLci dents. He. seems, indeed, to have been wit rout any real resource. It appears in evidence, that .. of the troops left by him in Lisbon and the kniS,s, a considerable portion were of very doubtful qua lity. Those troops on whose fidelity he could con fide, had been dismayed by a signal defeat r and they were sensible that they had no succour to look to from abroad. To the British Generals it was known, Whim the armistice was granted, that 10,000 Men undo, Sir J. Moore, as well as the ;d anti elid It , gi» ment, of Foot, with the tath Dragoons, might be irnmethately reckoned upon; and although much' aidvititage had nut been drawn from the Portuguese troops, their support and the general violence of the country against the French, cannot be , laid: out of this bitctilatiort. The disparity of force and of circurnstances then, such as- eutthi leave no doubt that the issue must be favourable to use Ido not omit Itch's/rimiest to the difficulties urged as possible to ucxar its fur taishing the British army whit Mead. But, putting slde the obvious solution, that such a tentianary trifttlop is not ruinuth to an army where amtle con Ilre,pr4fured in the country, tins dittictalty comfit be dellprxfitted, it admission is to be given to *itts enbitibil', that the henvy cannon necessiinj ~sr water , . Jill-arts St. Juhen and Ganes were' tu be 40 ashore in (tie ut Lt 4.M Lisoun. The 4iat'SioVlien coma to this: whether the coatru*. AI