The Sun. — London, England, 1810-03-27 00:00:00

whole of the North of Europe was in movement, and the e_ffeet .of withdrawing the French - troops trie;lll. have been, that the whole would, have ex pkaled.. So far from having inclined to British ob all thedispositions that had been made by his Governmetit leaned to general and not to selfiOt.intetests. He was yet - , howeser, to learn, that it was - a reproach to a Government that it allov- ed the interests of its own country to mingle with _•liose of other nations. He was yet - to learn, that fer the-purpose of disclaiming any selfish v.ew,.-a verntnt.nt ought to prefer, a less advantageous to a -more advantageous operation. . He was justified, therefore, in considering the destrutiion of the naval means of the enemy in the Scheldt as a principal fea ture, thoug,hnotthe sole feature, of that enterprise. Commodore Oren, than whom a more gallant and well-.informed Officer did. not exi=t, had distinctly declared that he always considered Flushing ai a. most formidable post, and had - saicl . .that -to 'watch the enemy's.force - there, it would be necessary to have ati,equal fleet at two_different stations. It was tattier too much to contend that a Govern:rient were not atiluated by a national policy in <-ny mea sure, i! that - measure .was .not accomplished fullest extent. The Governor of Bathz had evacu-- ated that place. Why was there nut as great aprO bahility- that the Governor of Antwerp might have evacuated' Antwerp Of :those,. contingencies", mil connected with Military affairs ; military - men were not competent to judge. When . det;eral Crawford was asked a question involving a contemporary, he replied very justly,:f‘ that-it was a political consider ation." - If 'a sman - sent the title-deedsof an estate which he was offered to legal men .to examine, they would send them back; say they. were, bad, and purchase the estate the next . morning. When a . question was put ,to a military man, a military answer was expeaed ; when put:. to a legal mnr, a legal answer was expeEted; but - in neither of these cases could a,nything rational be -expeEted. There were manyinterniediate degrees of success. which were strong enough to induce the G9vernment to_ undertake a service, leaVing it to the chapter of mili tary, contingencies - to determinethe degree. Taking it however at the lowest, looking at the-conquest of Walcheren, and attributing to that conquest all those drawbacks and dis - advantages which-had been attri buted to.it in argument, he denied •that.it .was so contemptible as it had been represented.' The con quest ofWalcheren involved the destruEtiOn of the port of Flushing, and .as it has been' observed by Commodore Owen, the destru&ion of -Flushing w Ould -make - t wo years difference in the naval equip ment of France. The facilities for coppering, ca vernment, bad such : nrospee,l of success before them be hoped he should .be able to convince - the House. '• Certainly the niffirmatien upon which Government acted -in this undertaking was fully .sufficient to justify the risks which it appeared to involve. In the first piece, they had most satisfactory informa tion respecting the amount of - Abe enemy's force.: - Such inforMation, as was Observed by General . .HZ.)pe, must always in its nature be very loose, utiles.; it be official infortnatiim. But. Government had official ietormation on this head, at a period. not 'very remote from the time of determining on the Expedition. Thele official doccments showed not onlithe•force of the enemy, at _the beginnieg of September, 1808, but the position of the ditle rent regiments. From "these it also appeared, that . in'order to increase the French force oo the Danube, the Low Countries were nearly swept of all the -] troops they contained. Indeed. ail these documents • tended to, prove that the Netherlands and the ad- ; jacent countries were completely drained of almost every thing in the shape _of regular troops. This the general information - received at the period ho had,stated, antl the, subsequent infOrmation received at various times, concurred in ascertaining. If such was the state of the enemy's means of defence, then we ,should look -at the relative - Means of the two parties. According to the evidence of Gen. BrOWn riga, :the enemy's force doWn to the' last moment did not exceed 30,000 men, including the trews of their-ships. Now we_had- a force Of '35,000 Men,. and the numerous crews-of our navy also to support -them ; and with such a superiority, had we not the fairest prospect 'of citccess ? He looked at the . ..enemy's force at the latest period, and taking that at end of AuguSt, if the enemy had but 30,000 . rneti Of every description and quality, he -Would again ask, bad we not 'every rational , expectation of success, against such a force so composed ? He courd not intend to depreciate the character of any . French army; but still if they came out of their, fortresses - , we should be able to beat the . whole, force they could have brought into .the field. We had forty-three thousand men.; the ' eneniyOnly, thirty thousand. It was not, therefore,.: on account of our relative situation that the further objecta of the Expedition' were abandoned. It were to degrade the - character of British troops not to suppose them equal to the attainment of the whole; at least Of the greater vart of the objects which the Expedition had in view. But the Noble,„ Lord seemed to insinuate that he bad no plan.. Was Ott io be expeaect that a General must have a plan ready cut and dry , adapted for every emergency ?-,-- ,Must he not first examine the ground on which he is to a&, and the nature of the operations which the aspect .of circumstances admonishes him to adopt? AU' these be must coiled from his own knowledge, and not depend merely upon what the Government could furnish him with. , He had also an opportu , 'pity of . having the c..lroperation of vur naval force in the higher parts of the Scheldt, at least the co .operation of the lighter part 'of it: The matter therefore should not be argued on the ground_of a sin - tele military .opetatiort, but there was also room . for. the co-operation of the navy in the higher parts of 'the Scheldt, while the enemy was not able to avail 'himself of his naval Means. Where then was the - ittipradicability of the operations against Ant . iverp,, or the .imp'rehabiliiy of the success of these operations ? He had, repeatedly heard it said how extreniely'Absurd .it. was to snppose Antwerp could be -taken by . a 'coup-de-main. 11.1111 s supposition was so absurd, it was however one into which 'Go vernment had-fallen in •corintion with very great , litary, authorities. But previous information should have been had -on that head.' To this he would re ply, by asking what knowledge had Sit- S. Auch.: runty of-Monte Video, before he - undertook to re . - duce-it in that manner?. Upon points of this' tia ture,.an Officer is not to decide merely from the in, formation he receives from Government, bui rather from what he acquires himself upon the spot. GO vern trent had not embarked in the'Expedition with-, out the:best information from Officers who bad seen the place.- • .• It was. a most singular circumstance that during the whole course of this examination the Noble. Lord had not-thought: it necessary to call the Quarter-Master-Geoeral of the Expedition toWalch eren, an Officer, who, from his- peculiar -situation must, Of course, be able to give the most competent evidence.=[Lord Porcheste'r said he had - called-him.) -- , -The Noble LorrFcertainly. did call- him,' 'hut. he had not put' to him a single -question upon the sub . ject to.which he was now alluding. :The evidence, hoWever, which the Quarter-Master-General (Ge neral Brownrigg) bad given, refletled the highest_ honour upon hint as an Officer, and he would yen 'tore to assert, that if the House had not the evidence . Of that Officer 7before them, they would bave &very. imperfect view of the subjed. General. Brownrigg :knew the nature of the fortifications of Antwerp from personal observation in 1794. Antwerp eer lainly was not considered as a -strung fortification, the best proof of which was, . that for between two and three hundred years it had never been defended, Sir William Erskine certainly did think it a great fortification, though there was reason to believe that it had not been repaired since the Duke of Parma's time. Sir W: ErSkine's opinion upon .this subject. was in opposition to the op'nion of all. otherMili tary Officers, and the correctness of their opiniert Was supported .by the fact, that no attempt had ever-. been made, for the period he alluded to, to 'defend it. General Brownrigg knew the woks well ; he was Deputy. Qgarter-master General when he was there in 1794. Sir W. Erskine was at that time a very young man, Aid-de-Camp to his father. Ge neral Brownrigg having this knowledge of the for tifications of Antwerp, and knowing, front the in formation which, Government possessed, that they had not undergone any repair since he had been there, he was - capable of forming a correct judgment respecting them. Government had taken pains. to ascertain the state of the works t at Antwerp—a person had been sent expressly for the purpose, of ,exatnining them, He had submit ted tbat person to an exannnation before the Secret Committee, and certainly no reason had appeared to excite any doubt either as to his ability to turm. a judgment, or his accuracy in giving it. A 'petion sent to ascertain the military strength of a (..'ountry,' might be deceived, . but with regard to the state of works, a man could not be mistaken as to what was before his eyes, provided he-was, _com'peten(te form a judgment. But Gentlemen on the other side of 'the House had ,asked what evidence. there was to she* that Antwerp _could , betaken by a coup-de main ? In answer to this :question, he must beg to refer to the - evidence•of General Brownrigg. The Noble Lord theri read an extra& from - the evi- 1 dence of that •. Gallant Officer, to shew the _practicability of Such,. ail event. But without • referring to . evidence, common sense must tell every - man that there was' great probability that a place, the - works of which were near four - miles' in.circumference, and which had not been,re paired for. 250 years, might be taken by assault. , He Wished very much that Gentlemen, had read the ' trial of Sir John Mordaunt, for the failure at Roche fort, in t 758; the circuMsiances of - the case were, so. remarkably similar, . that .the perusal of that trial would enable them to, form a more correct judgment' upon the - circumstances of the present case. [Lord C. thee read some extracts fronYthattrial, 'particularly the evidence of Sir John Ligonier,l upon • the probability of carrying Rochefort by a crizip-de.'. main, and upon the nature.of that species of attack]: - His Lordship then adverted to the evidence of Sir ..David bundas—upon the probability of reducing Antwerp, ,Without the operations of a regular • siege. . Sir David Dundas had stated that many places stronger than Antwerp had been reduced - by a bombardment. He 'admitted also -that . Co- • penhagen, :w hich . had been reduced in that man :net-, was much stronger than Antwerp; because ''it had a very strong water d.efence.; there was there fore fair ground for supposing that Antwerp might have been taken by bombardment. Many officers had been examined upon that point. It was not to be expected that any officer would declare that there was a certaiqty of success frocyan operation, of that kind, but they had all, with the, exceeption of Sir Wm. Erskine, admitted the probability of takirg Antwerp by bombardment. He had again to.re- . mark, that it was most singular that the Noble Lord had'not thought it necessary•uport this point to examine the -Quarter-Master-General, the .Chief' Officer of Artillery, or the Chief' Officer of Epgi- . neers, whose opinions upon such a subject must be most important. He begged that the House would bear in wird the whole evidence which they had before them upon this- point, 'and he .was convinced that they would• be of opinion that Geyernment had ' fair and rational ground to. hope ,for success from an operation of the kind alluded to ; and it would be recollected that even those Officers who doubted . .that Antwerp would surrender upon a bombardment were of opinion that it Would'be destroyed. But that was not all; , these officers hid stated in evidence, that there was very great probability that from a bombardment the arsenal and the ships in the docks would have been destroyed, even' if the place had not been 'taken. Those Officers were also of . opi nion, that if the town had been taken, even though the citadel bad not fallen into our hands, that the.at-., senal and ships might have'been destroyed.. Gen , - ~ tlemen on . the other side seemed to entertain doubts'! upon that point, because they said th,.., town was commanded by the Citadel.' Certainly it was the ci tadel was built fortliat purpose; but still it appeared from the evidence, that with `the possession of the town Clare was e,ery fair probability of destroying the docks 'apd the ships. It bad been contended that there_ was no 'probability that the ships could have been destroyed in -the lower . part- of. the Scheldt, ""because;" said the- Hon; Gentlemen ff the enemy had it always in their power to go up the. river, out of our reach." Upon that point, how ever, the opinions of the Gentlemen opposite. to him were quite at-variance with the evidence given by all the Officers. Even the evidence of -Sir William. Erskine does not/go' to disprove that point. Upon .this pars of the case, his Lordship read the evidence of. Sir William Erskine, General Hope, and others. In commenting upon the evidence of ,Sir William , 'Erskine, his Lordship said, that however he was . disposed. to feeLevety possible respect for that Offi cer, yet he could not' help observing, that that Officer, seemed in many instances to form his epi- . nion collected upon the spot, which was not entitled .to any credit. In some instances the information .. he had received was even ludicrously absurd. It ap ,peared that some persons had told that Officer, and he 'appeared to have given credit to the informatiOn, • that the enemy had put all the waggons in the Low Countries in requisition, and that the whole West phalian army of 40;000 men would be down in the neighbourhood of Antwerp in ten days from that time. A piece. of information-se absurd, that it was not entitled to-the • slightest credit. But it appeared from the most'indisputable evidence, - that the ships were tote long time below the town, with all their ' guns in, and indeed there was no positiVeevidence that theydid go above the citadel. Under all these circumstances then, would any man say, that the'ob , je6ts of the Expedition were not worth the risque, or that if the army had been in health on the 23d: of August, .tliete existed any danger that ought to have deterred us troartnaking the attack ? Would any man say,..that we should have risqued our army by attacking such a force as was assembled near Ant - - - werp at that time ? A-very considerable portiorf of the French 'force in Holland had. marched under General Gratien to the North 'of Germany,. be.;.' sides the people .of Holland_ were at. Oat" tirrie in sucha.state. as would have given full employ ment to all the troops that were there. . With re speel to the Garrison of Antwerp, General BroWn rigg had stated, that it was not until the '23d of August that it was reinforced to any considetabie ex tent. - He begged that in considering this part' of - the subjea, the House would always 'bear in mind that the 23,000 British troops assembled at Bathz were to be reinforced 'by a great portion of the force that had been employed against Flushing. With respect to the state of preparations at Antis/et?, it appeared that the French did-not' begin-their prepa ration for defence till we had actually arrived off Waleheren. •Notwithstanding ail that had been said . about the superior and activity, diligence, and infer= mation of the French; they were actually surprized. It had been stated that the enemy knew 01 the expedition in April. It certainly did appear, troth Monet's trial, that they were under some alarm in April, and 'did take some steps of. defence ; but ,the fad was; ' that they wt re alarmed at the embarkation -of General Crauturd's division in the Downs,' which was deb t - reening, mending broken-backed ships; &c. were destroyed. This was ..a considerable objea. With iespeL•t to the medical part of the question, be t-bought that it ought to-be kept separately, and that it ought not to be mingled with the present discus sion. Although he allowed thati-the Expedition had been;embarked with \ the knowledge that Wale h eten was an unhealthy place, yet be✓ .confessed* that he never understood it to be 'a fixed principle, tb it .no consideration of policy or justice should. induce Go vernment to commit the British army.to Walcheren. , Our ancestors had.. garrisons in . Flushing, and in bell I r above thirty , years, during the remit- of Elizabeth. The question ;of the reduaion'ot°Wal cheren had been in the contemplation of feveral stieces;..ne administrations, and had bvir abandon ed on grourtds__of., military,' not medical expedi-; diet - cy. Besides, he was not chargeable with the speculative unhealthiness.of a whole army, twelVe thou•and only of -whom Were .to have remained at ;Walelteren ; the remainder _were to' have 'ad vanced to Anheerp, which place, according to Gen. Brownrigg's evidence,. vas one of the healthiest spots in Europe: There was another prospeet which Governinent had in. view when the operations 'were undertaken. It was- hoped .that a blow,might be struck at-.the ships in the Scheldt before they 'could ht , gut no to Antwerpt. Had the British got pos of the batteries on the L6tyer Scheldt, and inter'poSed a three- between the fleet of the enemy their retreat, they would hive been captured ; pt all which there was a rational;prospett'at the cemmencement of the- business. If would their have been one of those contingencies on the consi deration of -which, the service was undertaken. As it happened, it was . one of those chances, the failure of which implied no-error. The Noble Lord then proceeded to discuss (he great queition, viz. whe'7 ther tfre advantages which might. result-from:the Expedition did not justilyhazaroing the risks which might incur ? and theSe'advantages.were to be con sidered both as they affected the fate of the Conti nent\ and as they. tended to our own security by the destruction of the French fleet in 'the Scheldt. Tt , e. risks that might arise to the army were, ealcu late& to be greater than might reasonably he seen for the probable attainment of these advantag6s. Nor were the risks greater / that might be feared from disease, or any want. of medicines, or of medi-,. cal aid. These points the evidence. before the House had placedina satisfaaory point of view.- As -to the expencei 'attending the Expedition, if they were duly weighed, there certainly would be no room for declamation upon that point.. It would be natural, however,' to suppose that. it must be most expensive, as it undoubtedly. was the,mOst exten, sive that had been undertaken.by this country. The city of London, in t'.'e ebullitions of its indignation at the issue of.it, swelled the amount of theexpen. diture it occasioned at no less than fifteen Millions. The Gentlemen on the other side of the House sunk indeed below that estimate, and carried it only five or six millions. What ! they exclaimed, in the present state of our finances, prodigally and pro " fiigately , squander away five millions !' They . would not take the eipences ata lower rate. Yet, Upon a tat , and accurate calculation, the whole expenditure a tending this mighty effort, this most - numerous and extensive armament, did not amount to one mil 1-on--not to_ more than about 800,0001. On the 'solle of expenditure, therefore, the enterprize was alb be condeenned: Three-fourths of the troops cre conveyed over by our Navy. however, ilie tiansiortS could not he paid off and dismissed itliout exposing the army to 'some risk. Upon the whole, notwithstanding, the Expedition might be considered as comparatively cheap. Now, as,to ' th' military risks, be would readily. admit, they he great indeed, if they were not , counteract •. 6 !.; a rational presped of success. That the Go- Ltni DON : Prtntedny RICHARD ITARRIS, ol No. 4, Ma'ttlen-cour:, Bow-street; and i'vblisbed by WILLIAM AItMIUE It SCRIPPS, South Molhm.street, Gror_vonar m u n e . At the SUN-Otrica,'No. 112 0 Strand where Advertisements, Orders for the raper, Let i ters for the Editor, .ticc.,(l)oft-phia), must be addressed tined for Portugal. He really believed that the French thought the Expedition was going to the North of Germany, and that they did not know its . real destination till its arrival in the . Roompot. It • was said that the French War Minister had given. orders for the defence of Antwerp as early as the Ist of August ; 'that was very., possible, beciuse.our force arrived on the 2gth.ot - T Waicheren, and it must be known almost. immediately, by. telegraph, 'at ,Paris. It therefore chewed no great diligence or information, that, on the first of August he gave or- - .ders.for half a dozen broken regiments to march to Aptwerp. But the strongest evidence - upon this subject was that given by Buonaparte himself, for he had shewn the apprehension be entertained for Ant werp, by the pains which he had since taken to improve 'its fortifications. He bee'ged to remind the- House that they were • not now trying Ministers upon. an Expedition that had been tried add failed; but upon the speculative • question of what' might have been the issue of the Expedition'• if it had been tried.. The House. was • now called upon to censure Ministers upon. the liti- - gated opinions of several Military Officers upon tt spectila'fivepoint. His Lordship proceeded tocorn- . • ment upon 'the opinion given by Sir William Erskine, which he admitted' was unfavourable from the beginning of the Expedition to 'the end, but he . 'contended that the information possessed by. that Officer was not . such as 'to justify the House in giv ing . his evidence a prefetence over that of other Officers. Lord Rosslyn also stated himself to be of . opinion, that Antwerp could not. have been taken without bringing up . the heavy artillery ; but that opinion ,was founded upon the belief that the works of AntWerp hid' been improved; which :watt • not the case. Against the opinions of theie Officers he begged leave to quote the opinions of Lord Chat.," 'barn and General Brownrigg, who both thought there was rational ground to hope for success. The 'House - was therefore- to deekdd upon this litigated. ..• speculative point. , For him Self he declared, that if it was the last act of his, life, he should think he . had done-aduty of the most paramount nature in. • . reCommending. this Expedition. If Ministers had • 'Shrunk from that duty,--if they had lost an hour in 'executing; it,,-- if they had suffered that great naval power : remain undisturbed, if they had the power to assail it, 1. the task of defending Mini, sters would have been difficult indeed. It never had been, and he trusted , never would be; the practice of this country to re4uire mathematie cal proof respecting.. the practicability of 'Ex peditions before they were sent out. He war: . -„ sure it ivai"ript by adppting such principles as these • that our nayaland military greatness had been raisedio their ckesent height ; it was not such cold reasoning, such. frigid precaution that induced Nelson. to attack Copenhagen ; it was not that cold principle of pre l . _ caution that enabled him to achieve his glorious vice- , tory,of r AbOukit, by sailing between the enemy and the.sho're, on an unknown coast; it was not:upon, , cold .principleS of precaution that, he attacked the, enemy at Trafalgar, 'where he' sailed down. in two. columns, and I;vhere'some men would have supposed,. that his fleet Must have been,desiroyed before they could bring their 'broadsides. to bear. No; they were, achieved upon a principle of enterprise which he 'trusted would ever Mirk our councils and our, . operations. Was it upon a principle of .cold.precau-.. tion that' Wolfe forced the heights of Quebec--that.' Lord Melville sem a force to. Egypt . to expel the French-• 7 4hat Sir Stewart landed at Calabria, and obtained the victory of Maida, or that, the. attempt ; was successfully and ;gloriously made to expel the French from Portugal ? Gentlemen might find fault . Wit II the ConVention of Cintra, but the enterprise it sel/waS gloriotis and advatitageons'to this country. If. the House were now to determine that no enterprize should be undertaken Without . . a' 'mathematical cer tainty of success; they would lay the band of death on all the, ftiture exertions of this Country, and ex tinguzsh . the glory , of.: the Empire for ever. He Would not commit the force of the country wittout a rational 'Chance of success; Ministers were. bound to compare the chances of success or failure, and to answer fartheir. decisicin. The Expedition in ques tion, he contended, was one which was calcdtated .to promote the beit interests of our Allies; but, leaving the Continent out of the question, there was a great British interest concerned in it upon either ground the Expedition was defensible ;. nut when . they were both combined, •if Ministers had shrunk from the attempt, they Would indeed have deserved the censure of the House and of the Country—they would have shewe that they • would sacrifice the best interests of their country, rather thin 'incurre sponsibility, and that they might with justice 'have been accused of preferring the retention of li:eir places to the execution of their duty. He would not detain the House longer, except to sayohat, ' upon all- the grounds . he had stated; he should or 7.l)l:lse:the motion of the Noble Lord.'Vora casife reaLti-sa; dawn amidst loud and rcpeateit dieers.j Mr. PoNsoxim - rose, amidst cries to adjciurn•-; he • proceeded, however, to mane some observations upon. Lord. Castlereagh's speech, but at l en gth - he gave way to the wish of Lite House, 'Odd the de- • bate was adjourned till this day . ' ,L; • SOLEM QUIS DICSItt FALSUM A.UDIAT LU'NDOI'V; • TUESDAY, MARCH 27, 1810.. The length and the importance of the Del#ates in the House of Conimons. prevents -us from doing mpre than merely noticing aa.,article•in.the4forning Chronicle or yesterday.. In•.that article 4 . is stated, I hat in the course of the' tart u:eek negotiations were carrying on to extend or• to alter the. basis •i€,ine Ad 'ministration. On our part; we declare that that &fate ment is wholly and alrogrther, unfounded in tac► ; and we du assert, that 'except by departure frorn truth,. this our declaration cannot be contradicted. While political' warfare is rallied on by- Jar and no- ..- nourable means we never stialltorriplain of. our.oe ponents ; but - the having recourse to-talsehood for the pnrpose of endeavouring to throw diScie‘fit on parties or on individuals, is an unworthy trick, which is equally di►spicable raid unmanly. - - The .American frigate John Adams sailed y.ester day from Cowes. I I tf t ; ti t i Rest, ti Ai nig Or is P. ~441