The Sun. — London, England, 1810-03-12 00:00:00

of hi:3 e- that otlitr naval tnea trost ht to cruet io►;at artpf, ence have o the . de- , any con r wa§ love y all com• vitb. , This AO' Ludes A nc 4 be .: 11-I! gr , r • • 70 6 ' 7er • -linatnent should be at once transported up the Scheldt," in having`adopted a-measure whit h though• ' of great advantage as applied to the division inteng- . ed for the - attack of Walcheren, was not a littleiat variance with' the leading .purpose of the eXpecliticin i: namely'', the running- with the right Wing; edVance of t h e army at once up,the Scheldt. These observations 'are accompanied by a denial - that even this ; change, in de•tination of part of the fleet from the West to the Last 'Scheldt "would • have delayed the advance Mare than three or four • days, a.vet-nark in which I entirely concur with Lord • ehatharn„.though oil grounds very - ditterent from • those assumed ,in t,ll-Btatement. .Upon, this part of .the case I must recur shortly to the'origidal disCnsSion, and - plans,, - rrelating-tothe Expedition, a n d the c.irctutistances under Wiildhltt§, arrived at ."' . - It . had 'been at' . one time 'proposed befotey we , quitted Londua to land the whole - army in,ThOledl • and Southteveland, as presenting fewer difficulties ; than the navigation of the Scheldt, which undeii the . most favourable .circuintances Must always be liable -to various contingencies. This proposal was, I under= . stand, a good deal discussed, and on this point it is • only necessary la refer to - my instruction to Sir 11. , Keats, when he-was direded.to give every assistance . in - the transporting the 'troops to South Bevelaud and Tholen. . , . - Another plans bad been been-proposed of disein ' barking in the Slough, marching across South Beve l . _ land, - embarking-'again • at' Bathe, 'and landing at Evy py-1.07.) This.plan appeared - to be approVed by:many good '• ", judges of military operations, for ore prof of which . • I may refer to the Minutes of Evidence, p. 197. • • The third tolan which was suggested as preferable to either of the fortner, provided we met with no obstacles, was to proceed directly up the_ West - Scheldt, and . ,this (see INlem.•Min. Ev.) was ulti .. i • • ftnately adopted, because, by keepng the' troops • - . the transports, it promised la' preserve 11)4 in an • 'efficient state until their immediate serviceshauld-be called for.. To /cilia arrangement the 'danritnatii-of the Wieling,pnssage.was thought 'to be netiessary,, for •whichreason a repectable force was destined to occupy Cadsand. • Speakiog of the failure of the attack on Cadsand, . Lord . Chatham says, ‘e in' the' first - place the b ea ch was. to'' exposed," that in 'blowing - weather it was found impoSsible to land." -Secondly, " from•what • _ '• cause I know not, the Marquis - offluntly's division leonld not be taken up in The first- instance high ,_enough to attack the 131*skens battery, the oply one from its situation of much importance." "IsAtly, his Lordship says, " Commodore Owen appeamitq. have experienced great - disappointment ; in not hav ing the support 'of -Lord Gardner's fleet :and Alis boats." • I trust that I shall.' be able to answer, in a very • . • few words, 'the preceding insinuations. - I confess' that I: was aware of the importance of Cadsand be , fore 'we sailed groin England ;' Lord Ch4tham, from being irtipressed with .the same idea, was induced ta, • send over an engineer (Capt. Paisleyl to report on the praaieability of effecting a !Aiding on the beach. - - The same engineer, - , in his evidence (page 87. Mm. • iv.), and speaking of the time to - which Lord -•:•• Chathani alludes, when - he says, ‘.` (the bead) was so exposed, &c.") answers, "it appears to-rue there was, no, difficulty in landing, unless what might arise from - the enemt - haviog'a greater force than we could oppose to.theen in the first instance; of the enemy's force I am not a judge." 'I do not believe, that the Breskens battery had occurred to any persou.until I stated in the - printed Secret circular memorandum, " that the first thing, the enemy would do would be to ere6.'t a mortar and furnate battery at Breskens, &c." I never heard a wish on tile subject of passing the Breskens battery : and'l do think - if it had been represented to Teas so extremely strong, I should have urged the propriety of landing below it, and : taking it in reverse, in preference to the risk - Willa the troops in transports would be subjeeled ,to by passing it. The engineer, in Mintitesof Evidence, page 85; says; ". the batteries - appeared , to me fo 'have ;very litter strength :—the batteries appeared to me to be open batteries." I refer to these Minutes of Evidence,, merely as __proofs of the inaccuracy of the sta!ernent. • .- lseleCted Commodore Owen; an Officer of great - intelligence and , professional Nem,- fsr_thepurposeof, co-operating with.the Marquis Of fluntly-; I gave.. him every I.ititude Of discretion ; , the Quarter-Mas ter-General sent . Lord Huntly a Opp of the Conn modore's instruaions, "and:l appreben&thertsisiaci position or part of .the beach between SliuysAneLttn, Ghent canal, on. which he.would not have attempted to effect a landing, irany propOsition er been made by Lord Hunfly.to that effeei. I only require on. this poinctliat a.dispassionateat tention should-be paid to my orders,. that my letter of the 2d • July.,to Lord Gardner, coupled with that ,of the WO, should be read with a tt ent i on , an d t h at ' a reference. should, he rade t o .the evidence of Com modore Owen-and the- Marquis of HUntly, Which, I think Amequivocally prove that no.apElication was ever made to me fora proportion boats - beyond wharwas carried by C,emmedore Owent.skivadron. - Our original .cleternimition :of landing in Limi land' Bay 'was . laidOside, in consequence of intrlii .gence Jeceived at . Deal of . .the preparation of the - enemy, on that part of the coast, and a memoir Was - draWn up on tbis subjelit, 'which- Was subinitted to Lord Chatham arid. Lord _Castlereagh, avid approved - Of by Ipth ; 'and it was consequently' Intended to land on_pornliargh Beach; but on our arrival at Walcheren„ the surf was found to be very - heavy on • Domburgh Beach, in consequence :of a strong • westerly wind, the landing ther e was impo ssible • • it became , therefore absolutely necessary to take shelter in the Roompot and Veergat, end the con-' %taut succession of gales _for 'many days after - our ar rival, made it, impossible,. indepen dently of other obstacles, to recur to the - original intention of epter ing the western mouth of the Scheldt. • Upon the change in our measures, which - was, thus- forced upon us by the untoward state of the - weather, I must' here beg leave to 'offer a very few . remarks. It ,is admitted by Lord Chatham to have: been in some respeas advantageous, by placing the transports and small craft in a place of security, and - by-facilitating the disembarkation of the troops on 1 the Bree Sand. . (~ His Lordship further states, that by this.ehabge of the destination of the feet - the occupation of Cad land beorne unnece s sary, and that if it could . have . , been accomplishedit would have occasioned a very inconvenient separation ` of our force. 09 the other hand, this change-of destination necessarily tended . to produce some delay in th e naval - operations, by forcing us' to proceed 'far, a Circuitous in,stead of, - a. dire& na.igation ; - but the. tnain - question is, _how far it trecessaricy tended - to retard the attainment of the ulteriorobjeas of the Expedition. I have alreacly stated, that for the parpoSe of ob-.. taining those objee.s, three places had - been - propos : ed;* the *last of w ,hicla, as I conceived, had been seleeted: s as the most aclvanZagepus, only upon the supposition of-our. encountering no obstacles to Vie navigation of whole fleet -. up - West 'Scheldt. Now the Wieling - Channel lt3d been rader - ed inac cessible to us by our failure at Cadsand, - and conse queotly our expectations, in this repe4, had been , wholly overthrown, and the ground . of Breieretice on which the third plan had . been adopted. was ire 'course removed ;. but it is evident, that . the ituprac ticability of the first plan wkich proposed . to carry the army through the - East 'Scheldt Tholen, ors that of the second, according to-which, the troops,. were to have heed landed on South Beveland and to hare proceeded to .Batliz, could not be materially_ adefited by the eneniy'S possessionaCadsand; or at all by the circumstance of our fleet being compelled, by stress Of weather, to take shelter in the Veer Gat ; - on thst contrary:it will appear by the _military -in strudions to Sir John Hope (Min. Eve page 165), " that the navigation of the East Scheldt being In tie - understood; and - whether 'there was sufficient depth of water for the transp o rt s and iietuallers. which must necessarily attend this service, it is now judged most advisable that the operation should take place by the Veer Passage."' - Now the only imaginable impediMents to the further Ili - ogress of our, army must have ,beeti . ap prehended, either from a Military force of the ene- Any occupying South Beveland, or - from the French 'fleet in the West Scheldt, Or. from the eneMy's flo tilla ; but the corps, of Sir John Hope became pos :::-sessed, of the whole of .South BeVeland on the 2d of August, the French fleet had retired beyond the boom of Lillo on the Ist orAugust, from the eue. My'S flotilla, which was unable to prevent ,the corps under Sir 'JOIM•I-lope from taking possession :of Bathz, or to regain_possession of it before the greater :part of the guns, whiCh had been previously spiked; were rendered serviceable, and which, on the first appearance of -the-British flotilla, retired.in contu.: ston, and never. afterwards repassed the booni of ~Lillo, no oppositiOn to the moveMents of the army could at any time have 'been reasonably appre hended, , • With respe& to the immediate difficulties which may have operated as a'n objection to the disem barkation of the troops on .SOuth Beveland, and to their subsequent march across that Island, he need _ only refer to the opinions of the Naval Officers who were' employed. in the Slough, by which I think it will • appear that 20,000 men,. and 4000 horses, might, have been landed .from the - Slough in 48 sours (pa., 173 M. E.); thatcavalry and ordeanCe horses might easily perform this march from,,the Sough to Bathz in thirty-six hours, the - distance be ing from thirty to thirty-five miles. With regard to artillery, it•wasstated by Sir. John Hope, in answer to a question (Min. - Ey. pa. 173), 'as to the number of pus foUnd in Bathz and. Waer;len, which tniht . have been•used for ulterior objeds, that there wdie t welve'24-:pounders'in the battery at Waerden;:arid foUrieen or- fifteen at Bathz, all of :which,. as the General believed, were on -travelling carriages. might add, that the quantity or ordnance and, Ord.; trance stores taken -on the island, as appears , by - the return in Journal Artily Proceedings,' page 15,, was such as .I should suppose to - be sufficient for atl the possii,le warns of the army. When, theiefore, Lord Chatham contends in his" statement that the second point, namely,, " why the army was not brought up sooner to the destipa tion from .whence all operations were fo'cornmence is purely a naval consideration," his position is cer tainly true in words,- but as certainly incorre& in its implied meaning. It is obi/was that the army Might have marched to. Bathz in the Course of a few' days,. . but it is also obvious that it could not be conveyed on board 'a -fleet of 400 transports, besides • frigates, sloops, and flotilla; through a very intricate channel, without some delay. The difficulty of condnding .such a fleet At all through the mazes of such a navi. 7 gation, can only be ,appreciated by professional men .; -ways very greatly increased by an adverse wind, blowing for some time .with; such violence, as to tender the - expedient of warping (the only means-of proceeding.) totally impraaicable ; such obstacles to, our progress, were only to. be overcome by great exertions, and perseverance, by a consider able,' but not, as I trust, an unnecessary expenditure of labour and time.. , - • • I can onty.say, .that I made every arrangement, by appointing the most a6live Officers to every sepa rate part of each ,sers ice, and that I had every reason' to be satisfied .with-their zeal, adivity, and exertion. Having anticipated many of these difficulties, I attempted, in, a conversation with Lord Chatham on the Ist August, to impress them on his Lordship's mind r and I. inferred trotn his answers, that he in tended to mollify his plans in consequence, and to proceed by South Beveland igs►ead of the West Scheldt. ljnder this persuasion I direEted Admiral Otw,ay to take the command of the fleet employed before. Walcheren, that. I might be at liberty to em ploy my whole attention in forwarding the difterent preparations necessary to facilitate the progress of the army to the destination from whence its ulterior operations were to commence. I immediately dirated Sir Home Popham to pro ceed through the Sough with several sloops of war,. all the bombs, gun-brigs, and gun.boats, and use every exertion in getting the flotilla into the West Scheldt, that it might in the first instance 'co-ope rate with Commodore Owen in completing the naval blockade of Flushing, and to be ready to pro ceed to Bathz at the shortest notice, whenever its , services should be required there, for the ,pur pose of prosecuting the ulterior objects of the Ex pedition. I also instrueted him to hasten as much as pos sible the progress 'of the transporta through the Slough. The subsequent news of the rapid oCcupation of South Beveland and of the fort of Bathz, with a quantity of artillery and ammunition in the other forts (v. Jouinal Army . Proceedings, pa: i 5., Sir John Hope) adapted to 'our future operations, and \~__ \ r also of the ,fadify-whiffll •n3ight he afforded to our arrangements for erWstug fo Santfliet, by.a-.fardlre ported capable of being passed by some part of 'the army, fdrther strugthenecl my Opinion - that the 4.anclinz in South &veland with all the cavalry and 14ntry would t,e !he dril y memo ot rap ply prr cuing tuivards the ultimate objet of. the - E , pQdition. - Accordingly, in my interview with Lord Chatham, mA,l!ke Gth,. I stated fully the diffi cu l t ie s I had to en counter from the untoward state of the weather,,.and from the int ripcy of the channel in .passing the - ves ••sels Slotigh,as also from the difficulties •ntade by the pilots,- Who refused •toTtake'ckirge of the vessels, ..or .even . to. carry the line-of-battle ships into the \Ve t - Scheldt. (Vide Lord Gardner's letter.. The strong impression I tiAt upon this subject in duced me-to deviat e ,from, the line of conduCtl have always,-adopted, in . relation to military matters, of not k interp.o4i4 any opinion.; and I venthrecl to pro pose to his . Lordship to. commence the disembark ation: by landing the cavalry immediately on South Beveland; and marchitlg. thein• to Bathz, which might be followed by all the infantry not occupied in the siege - of Flushing; stating that much delay and difficulty woilld arise in getting our numerous vessels and transports through the Slough ;. that in addition to the frigates' which were,already under orders to, proceed into the West Scheidt, I shoUld be able in a day or two to get,a suffbient portion of sloops and flotilla, including the transports I or dered to be armed, and tLe launches of the fleet to be fitted with carronades, to :increase the flotilla through - the Slough to - send up to ea-operate with the army at Baliz, arid'-such a .limited number of transports assmight contain articles essential to the first advance of the army, I Also informed ,his Lordship that every poSsiflle exertion was making to ,accomplish the • passage through the Slough, on the nature of which exertions, being wholly tech nical/ such buoying and anchoring small trans, ports on the side of the sh als, and making arrange . - ments for-warping (the 'wind being still adverse), it cannot be necessary for Me to,dwell. ' That Lord Chatham fully Understood the nature . and extent of the obstacles to our getting haw the West .Scheldt, which I described, is obvious, flora his letter of-the 7th of August (No. 3. Militaiy Pa pers:- B.) written after the interview, in which I had explained them, and ventured to propose the remedy of landipg the cavalry, Bcc. on South Beve. laud. To this letter I beg to call the most particular at:- tention, as it is very difficult to reconcile the state ment.in that letter with the insinuations Which it is my painfig duty to answer. It is no Jess difficult -to reconcile the admission, that " the active enter prize of the enetnY,. and the "reinforcement thrown into Flifshnig, rendered' it necessary Co land Get:eral Grosvenor's.ditriion, with the assertion in the state ment, that." it is to be reim:Ttitiered that this, was only done because.hisianrdship' saw no intivetnent making_ to push fora and a. single vessel up the West Scheldt.- Upon, the justice of the last observation, after - the conversation which lad pas'ssd I)etWeen.• us on tile: bill, I dare not trust myself Wray makirig ariy corn -11)ell t§. • I then tho.pglit, and Isstill think, that if the plan which I had presumed to suggest had been adopt, (I; Lad the - cavribtren landcedo;f: - Soutbßeyeland, and a limited nenther of Cranspors been seletted, that ti dehiy cii.:only a few drys - would Imie- resulted horn the' adyelse accident • which had unavoidably given a'ditTerent course diredion: ofoUr operaticns. Loid 's , ..etned to think it-neee,sary chat alt the' nwn- of war and .transports should as , ietnble in the'Ppper Selelcit'at Emi& ' lily opinions on this subject I have already stated. It is to be remembered that the Freud) facet had retroted'aboie Lillo, so that the presence of our line-Of-battle_ ships • in . .the West -Scheldt Could. not be necessary until the army should have - been as senal• bled at , Bathz, and even then, unless it. should have been deemed inexpedient for ,the army, to Imve vaneed upon Antwerp, until we shotild have broken the boom of Lillo; Z still think that not chore. than four Shipijcoald have been tequired-forthat purpose. In the mean, rime our flotilla would have been amply sufficient to have protected the passage of the army from Bathz to Santvliet, as I should not have agreed to lay proposition for crossing. the arniy un less had been quite certain that I had the most ample means' of giving it the ftallest krictection. Be- ing, however; particularly anxious to pursue the line of con.luct mo,st congenial to' his Lordship's wishes, and consequently best adapted, to pr om o te a cordial - co-operation, I promised every exertion in carrying his intentions into execution. 4ccordip g ly; oninay. return from. Lord Chatham, tcontinued rely arrangements for' accelerating. the various complicated objects which were to be at tended to.. • , Thefirst part Of the flotilla which got ilrough the Sloogh, were applied to the cutting off the con l inu• nication between Cadsand and FluShing, because his Lordship.had regretted (though without urging it as a Subjed of complaint), that - supplies had been so often thrown into Flushing. Id tact;. until after the 7 - th of August,.' the weather continued so bad, all the wind at S. W. and S. S. W. that we were unable to interrupt the communication of Ahe ene my, as the only . vOssels by which we could effect it ,were constantly driven in -by the gales, and could not keep the sea. •.The wind, which was most ad verse to, us, was. roost favourable to the ene m y, who — c ,- Juld, from Cadsand run before it- into Flush ing, without the possibility -of interruption: • On'the 7th. we were able, by the weather mode rating,. to establith the sea blockade of Flushing, and'on the 9th a considerable body 'of the flotillas under the command of ir Home Popham,, was car ried, throUgb the Swatch,way ofthe - Caloot Sand; at the entrance of the Slough Passage;-: propeeded to Baths, . where they2arti.ved, on the Lath. At the same time a squadron of frigltespassed Flushing to join- this flotilla, and 'proceeded on : the following day up the -Seheldt. , , • With respell to tho lineOf battle ships,,gieat difficulty_ had occurred from the obje6lipns Of the pilots, but I regretted ihis,less becawe I had consi dered, these, ships, if in cowegizenee ,of; thy offer they should be called for by Lord Chatham; as ap plicable to the `co-operation. in the attack upOtt the ; and having, placed. thei4illerent divisions o f the fleet employed in the vatious services in the'Eas t Scheldt; at &Oa ? . its the Stough, audit) the Wes tr - Scheldt, ntider the command of Officers of reF. ; on sibility, 'with . clire&ions to press the passage, n “ the , trans`pOrZ;.llii-citighl the Syaugh, I r4...mairted in th t . ,vicinity of Walcbereu,- for the purpose of corntnu-ideating, with Lord Chatham, as Lc' nceived it to my duty- to, do; - until he should think it right to proceed to South Bevelatid. The ships. of thK: therefdre, whose immediate presence. at Brithz did not, for the reasons which I have just mentjonk appear to :am. at all necessary, did not pass'Fiush jog. untie. the attack of the 14th, The Couragcux, which ship was intended to go: up the river, when the frig.ttes did, proceeded early in the .motnttig the 1.5 th.• I detained the - others, as the anchotaxe at Bathz Itru,,iwry confined, and at that tit}-e rx trem4y eFi3i.vded, but they were only a - few lower do'on, and within reach of -going:up in ,o, c tide, whenever - it,should be rewired of the..n proceed up _the river. The traniiio — rts,proceeded up the river in • diffe4 . t ;1 divisions as fast as the difficulties I have stated C.,-,;; be overcome, ; and in consequence rot the arrai:g,- ments tnade, andthe.'exertionp of the OffiCt , rs cli pl..oyed, with fewer:. accidents than I believe h.tv. ever yet occurred to so large a fleet in such a n 4.1• gation. ' ' • . . I trust I have now succeeded in proving the pir! 'With which I set .Out, nainely., that ii.ithe.ar . 'in . y Was not sooner . ; assemi*d at Batkz, the -depiy, in no shape 'imputable to - my .raiscontitta; the pr- , titular line of operationi which had beensuggested to the Commander in - chief of the' For'es au,: to myself, as most likely to jutur e e the attaintnelit 'oi the ultimate objEts'of the Expedition, 'vas depi!i ed from, is notorious ; but 1 have etidt.avontcd spew that that the failure of the attack.on,Ciich,and - \ s not owing to any'd e f e d in the. orde2s .iiistnL;- tions issued by me', andlt Was . evidently that while Cadsand and Flushing,remairiej'iu hands of the enemy,, I could carry %uch a pa: ai 'ar— mament as was assembled tlnder my orders . to t point of general rendezvous. No precaut:ons of mine could secures the Beet and army ag4inst 'Le 'fury of the elaments; or enable us, in spite of the, adverse .gales, to reach - by the shortest coins,: oar proper destination. .4 conveying the fleet to a secure place o f reflagc, and one' Where the disembarkation of tie took place with little loss of time; and without any loss of lives, I trust I shall not be accused either of a derelielion of my duty; or of any ittattenti,,n to . the interests of the army - . From this period I considered myself- bound - plicitly to accede to the wishes of the Comma7q..e: , 'in Chief: With him alone was there an 9, tiJA - between;-a. march .of 34 hours and a voyage of it:de finite length. I trust that it was owing to . tt of zeal on my part, and I am str.e" it was to no want of exertion on - the part of the, many t•K:' oellent Naval Officers whom I 'have the. hollow - contmand, that the progress of a fleet s.vhichit w.'s necessary to warp, or iti less icitu4;al - haul by hbman labour, through the windinv.s. of. a 'moat intricve -channel,, and _often &reel) ill O.:. ,teeth- .Of the \ wind, appeared so• tardy that 1.,. 7 d '` movement making. to forviprd a single . Vessf.l to the West Scheldt." , T;'.e " e,ertions of the Naval 01ficers.and men wt. I:clattered less irksome by the peistttisida titar - lahourAhic'n, though incesant,of.vn provti..l availing, ;night 'hive been - spared to therit at the x. Ashort acr6 , ,s the:isianB of BeVeigq.. to me or to the.N.tvy, the nape Ordelriv,*the loss of titne which, tea, ed by m in - constant solleii tide, and by • .tthr,,itting toil, is not what I should lia , o froM Lord Chatham.‘ it tvould have been more ageeable to have. offered. to their Lordships a simple *jon,ii (-t• 1116 duly transactions of the flee -et, as' that c - ot;,wie wuuhl have afforded me that of paying ajUst of gratitude to •the numerous, able, and Officers by whom I was aided - - in the differ, iit -- brauches.of the service, under my direpions - wlif.l may possibly consider'themsei'ves as 0113 St iy suhje& together with myself, - to some it:Tilt:J : lo:i, • from tili - 6 - tnarked, and perhaps invidious., accuracy 'with- which the - particular days of air4r,il .of dit:. • ... ferent divisions are specified in Lord ,Cliath!...l - 3'fi- - Statement. But I ain : convinced that it was not the of his Lordship, in colleaing such -a of dates, to attribute any 'blame to those 0:1 . 1-. He has closed his Report by pointing cue out as only obje6t of his aniinadversions.' 'He leAves -the !c' 'to account fot the ditli-nhies whichprevented the investment of Vlushi.ug, as astoshew the .obstacles which pr esen t e d t ',ern - , :res to the early progress of the armament up the West., Scheldt." He was not aware, it seems, that the first ,poin: was rendered impossible by the state of the ‘viiitlsy he Was not even aware that the circurnsLnecs being blown into the East Scheldt . hed early progress up the West Scheldt. . . _Cohcerning Lord .Chatham's opinion's f have 't ceased to' be solicitous, but I .am, and ever sh. , l! he, sincefely anxious that yo - ur Lordships st,mulo not krC catise to re g ret the confidence with which been pleased to honour me with upon tliis (Signed) -R. ..I.'.;TRACHANT, Rear-AC.ni::.; I. • ShIII'HFIELD MARKBT,' M ....A.RCIA ' • This clay's" Market was amply snpfrlied wit Ir'priolc Be3sts, and the show of Cattle in other tolerably good; Mutton, Yea!, and lat prices-; - .Beel is dearer ; and the tra:Se was pretty -,brisk:—The sales in the- ILly ".1-I.+: t; were somewhat lively ; . Hay and Straw fetched last: prices; CloVer has got up in price. ---We atm k art : accurate statement of the prices and - numbers , To slnlcihe Offal per stone of 81/3. •• , Beef 4s. 41. to 6s. od."4lfuttott4s. 4d. to 68. ott. Vl;d 4s 4 'od. to is. od. Pork.ss."od. to 7s. od. Beazts 2,260. Sheep 14,5oo.—Calves azo.—Pigs 360. i. ' jSKITHPIELLI. HAYMARKJIi. Hay 41. 45..0 4 . t 0,61,65. od. straw 21. as. od. 3;, c OA Clover .61. los. od. to 71: los. od: _ ' , i . CORN-EXC II AiTGR, MARCH I e..--There. s'a ,! t, lerable fresh supply of Wheat_arrived,' t big d4y, t 1,61' simples :.it a kmall increase in price, other q9 4 !':. :i,s'l heavy sale"at somewhat less • Rye is ci.e:,.;4o :.r "; f. ;.; r 7 , f ley at the late:advance ; less; doll sale ; W 3,f.. Pease rather higher ; %Grey,. aid. Beans ot t!, , t voi kindlilte - wige-;.oats are in short SupPly,an,l de. ri.ir - Flour without, alteration.. - . '~f ~~ r ~ j _~ \th: \ . t,