The Sun. — London, England, 1810-02-15 00:00:00

ways knew that it was snbje& to agues in the •Au ta ~n : in 1794, I had an ague there ,myself in Au- . • gn u(,‘ hut I do notfFeolleat that many of the inha bitants were , tben titillated with that ague, nor do I think4 - Ahough that, may easily be seen by matting a tetetit of the regiments that were there in 1794, that they were in any .degree . atilided-so much as the reg rue,ts laSt year. Any military. operations-upon the subje& of tle 4xpfdition submitted to your consideration - by Lord Castlereagh. or. Lord Chatham'?- . --I think, a Iviemoir was given me to read by. Lord Chatham upon t' , e subject of passing to Antwerp by 'the AaSt •F-clieldt, and Tole!) and Bergen op Zoom By whom was that Memoir written ?—When• I .receive) it ~from Lord Chatham, to read, it . xas in his own house, and it was a 'confidential paper: liitie4ndent of th;s . Memoir, which you have tamed a confidential paper, were arty other opinions. ..of military men or others submitted to your consi deration, by .Lord .Mulgrave, Lord Castlereagh, - or Lord Chathani ?—1 do not recoiled any ethers. were. • By the term !`.cunfidentially,"' do you mean to . imply that. this Memoir was in the nature of secret intelligence given by .some person, who might have been employed to Collea thestate of the enemy's de fFnce„ or so forth, on, the other side of. thewater.; or Wr4s the Memoir delivered in by a military person or other in this country ?—The .Memoir was cer tainly by a person in this country; Lord Chatham Kitt it into my hands to read ;I received it froM him. m the most coefidential manner,' and therefore thought .it my duty to state distivaly to the Corn 'Mace my einba:assment in giving up the name of the person who was confidentially put, in my' possession. Was the Memoir put into' your hands for the purpose of your making any comment; or forming any opin:on upon it? I rather' think that the Me , xnoir was- put into 'My hand to . shew how far a military opinion went with repel to the pt atticabi• lity pf -going to Antwerp by the route of the Eastern Scheldt., . . Were you.yOurself employed in the expeditipn ? I was. . • • • • In ; what capacity ?—I was Captain of the Ve 'peraPle. ' . , Were you, in any other situation than Captain - of a Fi:ieate.sltip in the fleet?-1 was going to state that was employed upon detac!ied services by Sir 4i chard*St rilchan.: in the first 'instance,.l - carried the first dtvision of the fleet into the-Rompoot,,add re turned and carried. the second division into the ,Rompoot, and' then Sir 'Richard Strachan dire6ted me to land. : with Lord Chatham, and remain with .him till he shpuld.give me further -orders. You have stated, that it - was intended to land ihe : army near Santvliet, will you state whether you re connoitred the lauding place in the neighbourhood .of Santcliet believe I stated, that I was de .sired to .give my -opinion upon the practicability of landing at. Saptvlier ; but I have -no hisitation in . saying, -tfrit..as far as I was a judge,.l thought it an . iexcelient plate. . , W.as not the first objet. of ,entering the Scheldt the occuOti-m of -Willeheren, and particularly •of Flushing ?-1, rather think that it was always intend ed drat the first ohjed should be Cadpnd, to give -us the cormnand Of the Wheeling Channel. When you had the command of the Wheeling • Channel, what was the next objet, according to the plan submitted to you of the expedition ?-1 - o . pass _ the shipi and the that were not employed -,in carrying troops for the irnmtdiate, objeet. of mak ing a -descent upon Waicheren into the Western Scheldt by that channel; •As I trust drepaper that I laid before the Adinv alty may be laid• be ore the .—House, if I should - at-all vary in . the, opinicin. that gave then, and .what I - Statt:new, , I trust - it %ill be ent.rtly attribUted to my not exaCtly recolleaing the precise detail;' proposed for those arrange ments. ' - • From the printed papers laid before diet-Rinse,. I recollect that the first objet of the. expedition was the occupation of Walcheren, and that I ,s;o6Q.men Which the - ships al war carried rartieularlywere iii • tended exclusively. for that destination; , did you un— • derstand; at the time of the communication of the plan to you, that the r c ecupition of Walcheren vas intended, a'nd by•such means as 'the 'paper laid: be s . fore the douse - imports it - was ?—The first obje6t. of permanent possession was certainly Walcherien ; Catisstid:vtas never intended to be keptlonzer than sufficient to dcstroy• the batteries, and to enable our Ships to pass' through the; Wheeling Channel into the Western Scheidt, at least so I understood it ; and I believe it will be found in the paper I men-,. tioned, that I ventured to submit thpt idea to.. G overnment. • As the plan was communicated to you, you knew that after Waleheten was occupied and Fltisbing was reduced, the ulterior objeas of the expedition were the:destruCtion of the 'French Fleet 'and the "Arse nals and Naval Works' at Antwerp ?-4 certainly knew that the ulterior objet of the expedition4ere the destruetion of the French fleet and the Naval Ar's:etrals. at Antwerp. t' you consider at the time that the plan: Was thus C.ommunicated to you, that it would probably be necessary, tor the accomplishment of those ulte. rilr objects, to remove from Walcheren the farce employed in the wank:Lion of Flushing, before these ulterior . objetts could be accomplisheu ?—No, I did . riot. . Then you consider the other -path of the force not eMployed in Walcheren as sufficient to acCom. 7 Plish those ulterior objals considered the re maiotog t. part of the force, so "far as I . was able to itscige; sufficient to proceed to the execution of the ulterior objeets, thptigh I always thLinght it poisi ble, - upon Flushirig being closely invested, lutt part of the force originally" destined for that sert ice might be spared to reinforce that part of the army which was originallrintended - to proceed to 'the Ulterior objeEts of the expedition. Did you understandat the time this communica tion was made.to you that that part of the force now intended to occupv Walcheren or invest Flushing, was to proce ed to the ulterior objeCfs of the expe-. dition, before the surrender of the town of -Flush ing ?-1 so understood it. At the time of th 6 cotnmunication of the plan to you, was any distip&account given you of the state of the fortifications, particularly of Lillo and. Leif-, kenshoeik, and . the other forti fi cations that Must .command, or a flea in different places the ..passage of the . SCheldl, or, the stiit' of he defences of Ant werl)'.—l have in some . prcviOus answers regretted, that Iconic! not obtAin i!,fotination with reiped to Lill6, and I have ,anl all I know - with respect to the fortifications of Ant wet-p. How, 'without .yout' bent able 'to obtain any knowledge of the ;Cate of Itiilo, or Lief kenshotik, and knowing nothing - of the state - of Antwerp, be yond what you kneW.of it in the year ,1794, are yon able to come to a conclusion that it was sate to advance the. remainder of the force, not in% esting Flushing or gccupying W,Acheren, to proceed to the . ulterior obje& of the nyedition, natnely;to wroy the French fleet, and the liaval at sepal at Ant werp ?--Great pall of that is a' military question ; I naturally concluded that. his Majesty's Minist&s would have been in possession of any new - works that had been, raised at Antwerp, and .if they had decided before I was sent for, that they, were to-go from Santvliet, then the fleet would hase.had no— thing to do . with Lillo till after the army was in pos session of that fortress.. • Then ,your opinion of the propriety oftnaking this attempt, with the part of the lace not engaged in Walcheren, was ,founded on .the copfi_dence.you placed in the information obtained by his. Majesty's Ministers ) —I clo :not think I .have exaCtly_stated that that was the only 'ground on which I did tin* that - the . remaining part of. the force, for instance 20,000 men, might have proceeded.:..losvainly.did bear that it was supposed that there were no regular troops at that time in Antwerp, and Alia the , LoW Countries were never, so bare :of troop; 3 this was the information I think I' received from th9se of his Majesty's Ministers with whom I talked, and it was on that- presumption . tthoUght it would 'be quite safe for an army of 20,000 exclusive of the aid Alley naturally 'would have derived `from the fleet, to have proceeded towards Antwerp ; be cause they must have had intelligenCe time enough _for them to have eff4.cted their retreat: to The fleet, it any extraordinary number of troops had cone down from the interior part of count*, OT was On its march down; this is" merely matter of opi nion, which .I have stated to his,l\lo,-!siy" nisters, and the several superior Officers, and wl.ic;i opinitth was founded on the best judgment I posseised.• Are there any other reasons' that-, induced you to think .it WAS a proper measure ?—I trust that the Committee will never check an anxiety in a Naval Officer to_ &stray any part of the enerny's' fleet it is ptaCtitable”tado so; I thought With that - force it was possible to erfeCt that object. Had. you any reason to believe that his Majesty's Ministers had received any eicad or "accurate *tutor- Mation of the state of the works of Antwerp that time ?-4 really do ni,rt recollect that I had - any po ,sitive,teason to know that they had ; . but the gene ral impression upon my mind, after talking - with them; 'was that 'Antwerp-was in a' defenceless state, and that there were very few troops in' the lots countries., •• Were . you of opinion that that part ofthe force _Which was not required for the occupation of Wal cheren, or the attack upon Fllishino, might pass up *to', Satitvlitg, having one bank of the Scheldt in our posse-:sion ?--i kii - ow of noihing to prevent it. You have stated that you' are not aware that the alteration 'which - took place in the plan of attack at Deal made any difference 'as to the ultimate objects - of the Expedition ; did • that chthige make any alteration in the pradicability of obtaining the ultimate objeds of the expedition is necessary for nie, in stating the groundS Upon Which the alteration *as made, and.the'eX. tent to which that alteration would'have gone uri. ,dei• ordinary circuthitances, to state that if there 'was any difference in the pi-atiicability of the - ulterior objects, that the difference did. tot an i se from Op . alteration-of the plan, but that it arose frOM the .circumstances of the weather. The plan was changed from a landing i.l Zoutland' Bay to a land ing - :bout Dumberg, by which 'means the whole of thefleet would have been at anchor in the Stone Deeps, and. would-have made 'an open sea tohae gone . into, the..Scheldi after-the debarkation had taken. place upon. Dinuherk; - but when - Dutnberg beach . was examined; there was so' great' a surf that it was - quite impoSSible to land a man there, and it blew so extremely hard that there was great appre hension many- of thelransports might part their cahles and get on Shore., and that 'in all , probability most - of the gun-boats would have foOndered at theif anchors; that on that account it was proposed, as originally mentioned as the alternative in the original plait, incase such a circumstance of Wind and Wea-' ther should arise, that the whole fleet should go into the 'Rompoot, where a landing was efleded without any diffictilty, _And without 'the toss' of h. 'single man. ••' • • I You have stated, that in .yoUr opinion the . mate objects of the expedition might have been at tained by the proceeding of Such of. the 'troops 'ass_ were not employed in the investiture of -Flushing up the -Scheldt to .Slintvliet, from - whence they might_have gone to Antwerp; and that. there were Very troops ip Antwerp ; are you aware that in. thlitias well .ai other parts of the French donii nions, theje is a very strong National Guard for tbe, defence of the country am aware that there . is a National Guard, but I did' not know.that it ikas so strong in the Low Countries as it is in France ; at the same time .1 never made any particular itt quiriei about it; -and the opirtiOn which I gave upon the .praElicability, as -far as it struck me, of proceeding with so ,large a force, was merely the opinion of a naval offic er up o n a military question; and therefore if! that opinion was erroneous, it will not, I hope be an impeachment of, any professional opinion I may give. Did you Conceive that that corps of troops could have - advanced for the purpose of obtaining the ul timate objeEt of the expedition, without investing wr disposing the forts or fortifications upon the Scheldt, -betyVeon Santvliet and Antwerp ?—.l think it Might only have been necessity for a midi corps to have masked Lillo, if it should have been deemed inexpe dient to pass it. AFi you conceive that a small corps, .out of the original 'corps landed at- Santvliet, must have been left to have masked Fort Lillo, do you conceive the - .ultimate object of the expedition, namely, the i destru6tion of the French 'fleet,- and of the baSin and orsenali at Antwerp, could have been obtained ,N,Fithottkoiir,,troops tavitig.prvitiuslyobtahrd pos session of the tortikations at Antwerp ?"-..4 think. it would iLive;treen - necessary for us to have obtained . _ •posse!ision of the fortifications at-Antwerp, unless it should have appeared,' - when the. river was, opened, _that it was. possible 'to haVe stormed the town on the sea lace during the mght. Does that opinion extend .toihe.occuation of the Cit Adel, or only the works of the town ?—Were - it possible to move a fleet two 'or three miles, :the movement. of ..thf.4• fl?et might change any -Opinion that could he previously given. If the fleet, was .lying-at the lower part' of the town of Antwerp, - I think it would' have been possible to have destroyed ;the fleet without possession of the c.itadel,•if we'vvere. in possession of the river ; but if the fleet lay above the Citadel, I. do not apprehend the fleet could have. been destroyed. .without the.. Genera- commanding` tile, troops conceiving that the force in Antwerp was; so small as -to justify his masking it or passing it, and - going round with_ his army to ere& batteries to des troi• that fleet. • . , Do . you know whether, our expedition sailed' on the. supposition that t he enemy's fleet could or could' not runup above the town of Antwerp ?4,-L believe, ,when the expedition siiled, every body was aware that, the fleet' might run up to Antwerp, and ; it is .possible that many people might , be aware that it could run higher up, but I do not believe that the circumstance was much- agitated about its running up above Antwerp'; it. will be -seen by the papers, = as far as I know. myself I believe many, people have thought that they might go above, Anfwerp;. and if any body had.,askd me whether they could go much above Ani rp, : .l should :have said- , be lieved not much,. but it is now found. that they can run above it. • • . • In point of • faa; did not the enemy's fleet runup above Antwerp ?—Part of the fleet went: up above A ntwerp.w Rile I was laying at talc?; I think five sail of the line ; I could bring accurate information of the number,. if required. You have stati:d that you did not kutoiv . whether the fleet might noi•be carried above - the. - citadel of Antwerp : do you. recoiled what is the depth of the water marked upon that .chartwith which the Navy was furnished upon. the sailing of the ESpedi.o tiop ?—I do not 'immediately= recoilect it, but I could refer to it if it i 5 desired:- Is it not marked immediately above the, Citadel of Antwerp as twenty-six ,feet deeN—lt is very possible it may. - _ _ . Is not the depth of the river marked upon•the chart, the depth of the•river at low water ?..—The depth of the river upon all. charts is marked at low water, unless otherwise expreSsed. • • DO you know how many • feet the•tide rises at Ant. well) ?—I should suppose in ordinary .spring tides 18 feet, [The Cliairman was dire&ed to report progress, and ask leave to sit again.] • FIFTH DAY, Fss. 9. Major-General Brownrigg, in a letter to the Cotn mander in .Chief, did not,thint it would be advise.: able to laud at Ostend and proceed by the Bruges Ca nal to Ghent and Antwerp, asohey might be inter capted on their return ; but he thought that by going up the Scheldt with the capture oh Waicheten, the object might be accomplished. _ln Meinoranda (as they are called ) ,by Major- Genpral.Alexander Hope, the sane train nfreason it% is porsued—ad a priority. given to operations on the eldt, t Scheldt, operations from the coast of Flan aers..' . . .. . Captain Owen, of, the _Clyde,. said, that he. had received _ a second instruction ,from- Sir Richard Strachan, intiowing, that the enemy might detach his flotilla towardS.Cadsand, and therefore instruct , ing him to use his.own discretion about landing, but always keeping it in his recollection that it was of the_greatest importance . to obtain possession of Cad , sand. s Lord Huntley's - instructions , supposed_ that Captain Owen had the means of landing 2000 Men at one operation. HiS, provided boats could only carry 61.5, but he foundmeansto.extendiho number to 700. The transporthoats, if the weather had per initted.thern to act,would have doubled that nninber.- When the moment of landing came, ,it blew too hard for the transport boats to :ad. -It then be came a question with Lord Huntley whether, it ought to be tried. Capt. Owen could only Lind 700 . at,a .time, and could not return fdr an hoyr or more. On the mokning of the 31st July, a disposition was made for running the transports with two regi _ipenti in shore, to facilitate the ..operation, but the enemy 'were th4ti in considerable force, and it was judged .better to wait for. Lord Gardner's boats. Captain Owen. sent letter. to Lord _Gard _ ner, who, in return sent an extract of his instruc tions; by which it appeared, that .his-Lord.hip was ordered to remain where:he ,was. On the 3d of: August, Captain Owen took a 'position-uprin the end of the Ellhogg, which divides the channeiS of the Weelin and the.llderloo,_ which he cohsidered good 'Position forasisting in the blockade of Flush ing, and held t h a t statton , d ur i ng , t h e rest o f t h e siege. From the 7th he considered the. blockade to have been complete. Troops might have 'been landed, on the 30th of July, from men of war's boats ; but to Lind 2000 men there must have been a much greater tbrce of men of war. ;According to report, the reinfOrc:ments drawn , from 'Cadsand : to Walcheren_ consisted of three regiments. Captain Qwen was of opinion, that it would certainly have been - desirable to chsarrn the.batteries at Cadsand ; and that if the island of Cadsand fiad been in..our pos se?sion, ici.vould have been possible for the trans ports to to have ,'-proceeded up the Scheldt without molestation from the guns.ot Flushing. i-le doubted whether thewhole number of troops that could have been landed at Cadsand by his, boats-and Lord Gard-•; ner's, would have exceeded 1000 men. There was no appearance of. force at -Cadsandson the morning= ,of the 30th of July. He thought that the landing would . have beer etleaed in that morning, had it not been for the , violent state of the wind. Lord iluntley's instru -lions expressed an expectation that . Captain . Owen would haile had the means of landing 2000 men. Captain Owen could not state. the rea son why the frigates and line -of battle'ships did not 'pass up the Scheldt, between - the 2cl and Bth of Au gust. If a landing had been.attempti2d Cadsand; i on the 30th of July, of 700 men, it might have been made good between nine-and ten in the morn ing, 2400 men Might have been landed before font o'clock. Captain Gwen - W,Tis of opini,.,n, that the prerious‘calitare Flrishirig .13. as not m-cessary to the intended attack upon Ant Aerp. The state, t , f the Wind on the morning, of the 30th Was such to enable the boats- of the men of wa r an d the flat boats to effeat a . landing; 13tig4tdier-Getteral Montressor stated, that Lord Huntley's instreetions were communicated to him, ty,,hiCh stated, -that the landing iw Cadsand Wo.s' in trusted to him, the- Brigadier-General, with 2000 Men,to he under bis command.. With respect ;qtr the force of the enemy upon Cadsand, the NOophen frigate telegraphed - 2000 tried atlt wo o'clock oil the •n4ernocir of the tst ; there 'Were 400 men seen froni . n frigate on shore on the '3O! h. From the ap. , ( pearance of tile enemy's force, he , did not think it would nave been safe to have landed roe-force rr de. tachtnents of from 6 to 700 'men.. He did not iris** Moe the i aiding could. hive - been -effeetually-covered by the ships of war; and there . was a want of guii , boats. Lord "Huntley's 'division'.received Orders the 3d of, August riot to make any-furtheratremdt upon Cadsaird. He did not' think, if a iandii of 0000 'men could have been effected" on' tad sand;:on the morning Of the of. -Lilly, that such a corps could have maintained its position. againSt the • enemy. Leta Huntley could have landed ah - out 5000 men if necessary. Supposing 't hal bec9 •Poisible to hare landed 2000 men-on CadOnci on tite day Of the 3ti, he did not think it Is' , oUld have 1)*; pOlible to have landed so many - more men to hare.ennbldd thos6 2080 to maintain their post tiOn, and in that case,,:fre• had iio doubt, th..t the; .000 . men musthave fallen. He did not think Cad satid,a necessary point to have taken, In - orcio - to navigate the mouth' of the Sch e ld t . Be Co!ceived 'an 'attempt to land the tropp4 in detachments of 70CP Men on the. morning Of-the 34/h would have beet' 111-ad Vised. Lord Huntley. expre , ised great ilisart p6intment at there ndt being boats to enable hira.,4o /arid 2000 men - at one 'time, -as h e - expected, , anti afterwards- fepeated his surpri.,e. • 'Capt. Paisley; of the Royal - Engineers, CliiefEngi neer rn Lord Huntley 's division, \k ith re , peet to tue praelicability,Or prudence of attacking-the hattedeff at Cadsand on the 30th July, by finding deiachmetits of riot mare thati'7oo Men at a time, stated th it the batteries appeared to' him to havevery little strength in themselves ; hut the propriety of at'acking ther m with 700 men, would depe n d enti re ly o n thln e , emY' . s force, which he could not vouch tot; lie did not know What force the eneiny . liad thete, the batteries appeared to hirn to be open batteries. f - Ic did not kut.mv the . reason 'vv,hy the debarkation did not Oke . pkok-e; —On the morning of • the 31st, the soldiers were ready to step into the:boats with two days' prow' sions, cooked according to orders : he did not know the reason why the orders were countdrmaoded , , It'appeaitd:to him there was no difficulty in land ing, : unless what might arise trOm the eneiny,having a greater force than we could oppOse to (tient in the tirSl instance ; of the enemy's force ho was not ..a .11dge. 1500.1 - nen "Were, he believed, telegraphed to, be in Cadsand on the 30th, in the afternoon, and some field-pitces on the 51st. • Bow- , STREET.--Yesterday 'three well,known 01 1 ' ra6ters, Hart, White, and Martin, were:charged by Lack, one of the' patrole, with picking several gO - and attempting to pick others, when . the company were corning out of Covens": garden Theatre, on Monday n;g4xt. Lack st3tc4f that, learning that a-. number of persons . had -been robbe4 as they wer e .coming out of Covent-garden Theatre, for several bights 'past, he ci,sguised hira self aS a Coachman, and watchedthern, and saw' tt3oll l pick. several- . gentlemen's pockets,. and hand the stolen property frotn one the anothex, to avoid 4 P e property being . found upon them. He also saw them attempt to . rob several. On searching *the al several handkerchiefs were found upOn There was also found upon them some foreign coi n ,; two pocket-books, a curious tobacco stopper, 3°" various other articles supposed to have been siOlen• - The prisoners, were committed for further exbal l " nation next Monday. ' SHIP NEWS. I.OIWON : Printed by RICrUARII HARRIS, of Nu. 4, Martiett.cipirt, Bow -street ; And Pvblisbed by WILLIAM . ARMIGBR SCI4I PPS, South Molton.street, Gru. yea° ,Atitht3 SIdN-OPFIGE, No. 412, Strands where daverasemenis, Order's tor a the Paper, Letters for .. the Editor, &c. (post-paia), must be addressed " - 'GRAVESEND, FXSRUA R V 1 3 , Arrived—the Betsey, Sin:Meld, tr m Gibraltar. S'ailed —the Ferret, 'Kennedy, for With and the Me* Richarda, for - Newfoundland. „ • • BIRTHS, • On Thursday lhst,-at his mother's house, in • Queen street West, the Lady of Edward Anson, Esq. of a Sou. On Friday last, in Bedford-row, ;Mri. Murray, ofa Scu, On the Loth inst. the Lady of , Mich. • Furlong, Esq. 0- G uildford- of a'Son. Oh Saturday last, at Tattingstone-place, Sutfblk, the Lidi of Captain Western, of the Royal-Navy, o f a D aug h ter. , The same day, at tht. Grove, item' Dorking, . the.. Lady 04 ' lohn,Louis Goldsmid, Esq. of a Daughter. • • • - . AMRRIED. • • On Thu's(lay -last; at Newcastle-upon-Tyne, stir. joht/ Graham, of London, Merchant, to Miss Margaret Niclaul, of G a tesl;ead . Robert Bechy, Esq. Merchant, of St. Mar 's-hill, T'="ve- - Stieet, to Miss H arri e t 13. a k er, l ate of Newport, in 15i4 Wight. - On Monday, -by special` license, at Si. George' ( s flanlvet-squate, Walter Long Esq. of P.reshaw, - the Lady Mary Carneee, eldest (hi - lighter or the bal. Northesk. Dad), On Friday the2d inst. at Oxford, on his return home, the , Rev. George •Watts, Vicar of ' Utfington Beiks, and Pre —. bendary of the Cathedrals of Salisb u ry a n d ! St. A silph. On Thursday last, at Chelsea, aged tit, 'Mr:. Auguatirr Faisch, formerly of Basil, in Switzerland. , On the gth inst. at LynapstOti,' •in Devonshire, Lad! Charles Fitzroy, eldest danghter-of the Earl of LondondefrY'!" in.the 3 ist year of her age. ,On' Friday last, at Kensington, in the gth year of his alter' after a short illness, the second son of tie Rev. 'l'. F. lib. din. On Saturday last, at his house in St. Paul's Churclt-yard, Mr. Benjamin Chandler, aged fio. On the ioth inst. at Hadley, near Barnet, Mrs. - Hannah King. On Monday last, at his house at Milbank, .Westrnirt4terp . John Yidler, Esq. aft& a severe illness. On the 3d o 1 December last, of a typhus lever, on board, His. Majesty's ship Cle,optura, on his pabAgc: trot:. the Wcs: Indies to Halifax, Lieutenant, Ellis, iii the zeth.yar of hit . age, youngest son of the late Major:General Li!is; of Kew?' sey,,in the County of Worcester, OP .1, • YESTERDAY. , Rank Stock, • In,tra stock, tSS.I Navy 5 per Cent. 99i 99 India Bonds, I,s. 65,75. pr. Itisk s per Cet2r. Exci)equer lis. pr. 2s- - 4 per Ctnt. per Cent. iced. 68 67 j 'imperial 3 per Cent. 666 3 per ,:ent. Con. 67 6 g• Ditto A 7 g3-i6tlis* Pam, . 18'7-16 5.16 C f, r t)lllitV. 137 t arc. NUM] -'"'~,-- w • 4Perseciv I n Ad 1 After , poxes Place, hew box' till P,,ui , Th e b dt fiagneT°-rn, erth (;r4litt 'Ti Ncfkra eagiic foxes Gallery". P r i, rat . e t o r e l nl s he apc e ne w glat e i r .1) LOS la ' ti, 6t 4 /..'e ON b. ck Were ,o 1 x , h e c •r un .it it ' S t? F ir ? t ' Sand 4 %ve, A rt— !he s , }l ead trotind ve Ill tiSt overy u)tubil