The Sun. — London, England, 1810-03-30 00:00:00

import dgoby 6re ;ISt cirCVnl~ the %vat such a L:tobeci Itlctneti .have iti home, ona ,ep Ind in 3 fated, tO , nce.. tbo, kdow,lli, jet] i ota ; uudep7. )editiOa pr°; i nbineu execu -it 0 0 hen 111 latfect" 3 It sfacm riature. bserva7 tlefoa i ter Int ° .ar with Brea r t° ‘ tiorl Lion () ega l 7 t : woula ate& 3 LII Wi ti z!.. - .lt ccoia' wg!it it light it Awaris ispbse" to do of it, bLen id: a °I .Thit 0, 304 nilitopt .1 . be: p(r3i:ls; J. Sy greaC b' , a I na y Kcal d- Ulcers,' n)ere r btea ;ers On 1-loq• natioh which nt 1)A Jf tbj !fl at. C3o' )nd to stale dwelt bjecr, ified, Kircd glerat id no o r of ,to evils , coh- fe r to de everY nenti they se fur of the Over Y ne t any erSC' cor ts of. ;vox s [aver ,•bole 1 Y O f .cdel . . .. .. . •.-- es tles cont shoull he vi Sited on thelteadt Irian- GOVer.hreent; ' that fife idea ;of our Lend pg bY An (*der for the Gens-d'Armes ana Guard Ara-, - . . . _ -. , nit ‘. V .l's planned, He reap I t only troops .. . tos e Trieste nevea ►einered Theis: cestleine ; tiasszak to - March thitheriminerliately, atlas , 'pct. it in a ~ . :: juS'ificatibn brit to . prove- that Mi- ; platieri.,, Bute it was . ' roe vise, to ,us that. we : preperestaie of defence. ' Frees t this it was most eb .: ,,,' i n a ; wing ir e at ere aeitiated liy., motives i should' make an attempt in 'ltaly that weshould vjoo=sthiu Antwerp had no.ealseeiously 'been put in a ka HT free. a just sense of public duty --such as, _ continue 'our 'operations in the Peoinsula; and , proper state of aiefetice, and thns a sort .r.f.-reiro le ~ Huit f 3.1 y if he were not a party concerned, that we "should . attempt, a d .io , the ' sp`edive acknowledgmen was inada that the plan,of en te .ed ah s en to the approbation of the country-- North of Germany. \Vela regard. Loft on aly, the itt-1 The Expedition was softar Wise,' 'ft has been con, such e aseni a hr well be -recOmmended to their suc- , tempt, as he had already stated, had been made, S terafed, 'that Ministers did foresee the ditfiettities of eesors—e-i et i stiel i as no Administration would blush and - in the Peninsula, we certainly lad. carried .'on i his E kpeditit;n",' roid yet aheys.'aSlopted it. -- Most fo; ,::,,:. -;s..i;-. H e woeld nor consider it as an in- : our operations' u ith undiminished . vieseur. The, re- , Aindootnectly the nefioisteTS ;lid foresee ditricullies„hM Su: :, : e.-,L;.o:!, but ;is part Of that systeM wh cli maiteng.paiut . of operation was the North Ger- . theydid not -t.ppear to be such as tb - rprecluile aational hae , e si pursued. i tire-upon( site present war, is many. Much had lieen "said upon 'the 'adisaittafeet • prospect of bl 3 c c (.'• ss . 'Gentlemen seemed, to think it, The pros es ' eiio n of which _we had a double interest; likely rot e derived ,iioM aii attack in that quartet was- nycessary, that 'be.far .anasapedition.sail e d, Mi 6ast to ereserva other nations from the doniination from the insurrections which oer ..presenc . e •would, would , - pistets slioiSid i d " o at bave.an .abschate certainty . of .01 •Franc ,,; .---,o , ,iseeon t lly, , to preserve ou r own in- have encouraged ; but he would contend, and- haf . -I sncer,s , hot that they shonla have :raced:out to the legrity.- l' o pr o , e the great interest we had in the - always conteptled, that to. excite insurrections week Corneeindera every s'ep s‘hieli. they mere to take ~ lit - • i • (.l c.;se nee ute n e argument ; but he contended 'we ha..l not the weans of arroralieg eifeettail protee- Wiih Inalacioatical•pre;isiO n . •To this:. arvunint he it was t - qually our duL' to do the former. Standing ii,ei afterwards, Vras an ad not a on.) , of the greatest tilii . s t ;.i , , , e a decided negative:* it w - aS absburd au s ' . .. ay, • • , high as w e d o among the ti4tions,of Europe, it was . cruelty, but of the most obviatis- impoliey. ' Theses that fie attempt should he wade titlle ' ss With an ab- - ineurnbe ti t ups t ri &island to assist weaker nations who contenaed that we .ought to have sent 'th a n ex- . snitite Certainty . of success, b'ecan'ae. in that .Case against oppressie n , not oily as far as we could do pedition to the North of Germatiy. rather th to. - 'no expedition could ever be undertaken nor did ,so consistently with our ow n interests ; but as tar as . the Scheldt, .because the - sbipping and arsenals yve lie . . think :it was jteCk.-ssary Jo .point, out fyith colts s our doing so was not absolutely inconsistent with our li3d a view to in the• Scheldt E4peclitioi' . g.tv e ; precision: tO Cornmanders the whole. detail Of Own security. Throughout the war it had beti our ' our exertioes the appearance of eemanatieg trout Abe eperat ions they were to piarsue,..becaUs e much practice to avail' ourselves of ad spirit of ' a selfish- principle, (.arrie . si a ood - principle ton ' .mte:t alWaya depend Upon contingencies'.much ;resistanc e 41ahitested by other nations agaimSt the en- . far. collateral edv.intaiges in such a. case '.uight npon obeCevatioe - colleete.d 'upon th e spot. l ii his' aeroacements of Fret-tee, and cenatstratly ttk_fiy 'to o n e be lei:Areal tel withoet either the - apPearance or .opieieneallahat etitild'be required of Miniiters was ,succoir of those who were assailea .by her:ambition s : the reality of fe sordid motive. . When ~a tern- - that. tlie'y . should . seleel al ..objea. Of sufficient t was much to be lamented that the course of war e pinery interest of oars was put in competition Impoilalice .tO , justify file nttenipc, and where end been such, th a t w e ini . gtot short( have to-con-. : with • the . vital • itnerest..'ef an Atli, our• • tern- there waS a fair and ...rational 'prosped of -suc send singl e ,hande , ,i, not oil y aaaiiist the ambitious :' porary ioterest ought - dertaSnly to gite Way ; but 'to cess ; illak they shauldconsmunicate that object to Rut. 4. 'of France, .but also ,against teoae 'sowers . put ..out:interests out cans olview e woui4 be absurd in Ilie totniaaanders, and that they, furniifi them with tla Whom 'our exist e o ee tad h een extended, who . the extreme,' Along period-had not elapsed sineo .. adetitialo means of carrying the plateinto execution, We had- scot an army into the Northof Gertnany-- 2.linistei s .. dia not_ 'flaitik of takin:g Antwerp by A :'.l)gvcl op his "side in cOnsenuence Of his successes, , While their nearts,were for us, might be compeded tat ,an army which . arrived just' in time to learn't he i , soo , rogialar . sit' se'; they eXpeCted tia . taka 'it by surprise', raise th er hands againse us. Wg ought -never to i of the fatal _battle Of 2 Acsterlitz.- . But he 'begged . and by ; assault ;• brit Gentlemen hatfcensUred them lime sight s of th e t•,,;tiey of making all -the' Powers !, Cientletneet to'compare the State of the Continent at , for .uodertakingeit in opposition "tO the opinion - of ... el the Continent feelltheir interest sepatated frons : that time with What it was when we- undertook ' the Commander ire phief and Colonel Gordon and those of France ; and he . Uesired • that :the ; Ex- _the. Expedition to the Scheldt., - There was at that . ah expression of the latter had been partici:Aar! ) , Peditio n to the. Scheldt Might be considered as time a Russian Artny advancing to the aSsistanee relied upon, viz. that• it was.- a- deiperatp enter.; into t o May. the foundation' of such a separae of the Allies ; there - was a body of 15,060 Men prise ; but that expteisiOn was -sused in a 'col tissue. . It did not originate in the . Austaian war, . ready . to co-operate with 45; ; Denmaelt was 'in a dequial Sense, and did not meat) . that 'the enter her did the Expedition to the Scheldt originat e with state of neutrality, the 'power of Prussia . was unbroe pri'ae was so- difficalt, as to 'be devOid of • all. the prekeot Gaivernment ;it had been'contemplaied ken ; she'prOP.9sld neutrality, and her tatritories 1)- - pc.... Great endeaOura liml been . : inade, so isi,;:i.z . by sev . eral successive Adniimstrations, and neyer.. ; were, ', to a certain - extent, respeated. - Look at lite rage . the ()pillion . of General Brow nrigge and it wa Was ther e so• urgent au. occasion for such 'tn . 4pe- state of ; the North of Germany When we were in- said tiaatelie tied not stated. his. ffilthoriti t saa teat tie ditiOn 'a s at that period 'at which the lite - at - ma' vited . there last year. Russia the a6live .Ally of o b.sereed.that Gentlemen did uot - cal) 'for the antho-' raelit was fitted out. He hoped Gent lethen opposite : Fraace, penmark hostile, and Alie power of Prtiasia rities - of those otficers„ whOac opinona Were hestile 'Would n o t tbinklie wished to recriminate any censure: completely ,broken. ' The situation of • the minor" to Ministera. : But even if Gen. BroWnrigg had Stated' they , Mi g ht. have bestow e d on the enterprize,iiihen Powers of the Continent was not More favourable the authorities'tipOn whiCh he founded his opinion", he stated that such a o ne h a d nom alw a y s been disap- to our enterprize.. This was the State of ding's in Geotlernen would have ass :for the .aistlioritie; of ProVea o ft on that side of' the House. It was tar which we ,were invited to the North of Geritiany, those athorities, and -'so ori lift they i t to . sotne from him „ 0 to recriminate, as he thought the ahead Without friendship to receive, or neutrality to Pr, n'ect paint 00 which they could express their \valet of - bes ztudable, and the policy wise., which dictated such Lis s ' If, hoWever, Sve bail sent an army thither, it lier.: Titey put hitn,in ind the,lndian proverb, an effort. Ttie Noble Lord he had succeeded -in must have been under an eagagemeritithat it saeuld which says, that the asiorld 'stands . On - an elephants the the • Offi ce he had lately the honour to hot* reams - in the *inter,. for surely it would not be elephant stands on etortoia,e'but whaethe.tortoise , . hose ability and zeal could. not' be 'doubted by contended that any Minister would be justified in . , t3lai- upon they do not' .Istiow.,- .4, was said they 6 , 0 Y one, had, .on his leaving that House (itsi de- risking a British arrity there during.'Wliner, cOnsi- ought to have taken Lpril citai ham's o 'triton before , i, tate which, through some. circumstance, he be- dering the present situation of the , continent.— the .Exrdition- was undertaken : they had Lord . : 11 eved, bait never been erode public), strong!y re- What Caett ,wovild•haye been the i:onsequence, if by ! Chatitarn's opiiiiee'i they had the strongest proof t ernmended such an E our appearance we had elicited the brave s population .: of Ins seotimenta respealing the - EX . : a-edition by his xpedition to the successors ,f 'hit Administration of watch. he formed- a:part. of the North to insurrection ? Why we nanst, hsve laoing so . cotintihnd . it. , r 1,10 p„ ! e Gelltien ) . .04 the ,f, l1- e - Nbble Lord,. in giving this advice, in leavioa a. left Vae - i - s eaposed tOatill gre . at'cr . tytantry and cruel- other 'side 'of the, noose - tretltieh Ouded to ; the , . Niis lepc ) , , .to his *successors, did wisely 's, he had ty. But thii . was not air; Prussia, humbled c)se ot two Fretich .Ctilonela„, one of ;ybotn i e •.i.id to 10 0 1 Ced al th e growing naval force of the enemyeaad and broken as she is, has silli art artn t y, cite,! with ' ;liis soldiers -" 411 e x. iz,ze,s . c;utti'n's." I'l l ,: ,otler said, 11 t . tradocoosidereic of the mogt etfeetuel means of 'that .3i...by we must have.ccine ideont:ict.. .Would ' ,*(‘ .1t11(r)is ?nes . eVarrs." .. tte lattYr lay hi; eapreasioe c hecking it. 'That Noble Lord, from el ears it have beeri righ.t, would it have been politic, Atha - , aluswed liis - exeeeta:i o n Of sileces-i by hiS williogness t. which h e had preaiously held as first Lord ()Idle der such circiani.staitces, •to Ove 'fbreed one se • , share the dang - er of „Ilia- atte:mpt. 40 anSwer to whi p ' .- Aalmiralty-,: had had his attenton particularly callesd, ina) an active War with 'Prussia ? , On ' the other had been said of theinteratticabiltr Of tak . N;;AnttVerp '. 1 9- the subject, : and therefere his authority was of hand, if was had not conae in cobalt svith PaoSsie ;. '• 'by surerize, the Mahle Lord -behied inin had hi great w . eigot upon this point, leath in that character if any thug like an understanding had'appeitred 'be- seaweed the ease at . Cepent,a g en e . but this cane. ,dia and in that of a genera! tate_iillill). But what vsaa twee(.( us, Would it not Irti.e furnished Bonnaparte not siu;t * Gehletnett„:.becuse, • fop t p o i (1 ) .4 had bet): ti le . State of Antwerp—l,vhat 'ails its irnpartanc at with a' pretext to wrest - from the Mon=dell . - Of that taken too much by:surpaze,. •• - Another curious mode - t he time the Noble Lord left 'that legacy, with its . Country the bauble of a Scttptre wh!ch he holda, to et adconining for the surrender ot Copenhage n was, L i liporian e e when this Expedition was undertaken ? ; Like away even the mockery of the Cr . *l.l which he , the the. indignation a iht. inriabitants against us what had been the. increased means of the enemy •. still wears . ? This Must •hare been th.:_i _ 7 :ionstoiltaeriCe ,was so . great, . that - they surreadered. This cer slPee that time? . ••Itny st be unnecessary to recall. of the Expediticiti to the North of Gerstrihy; and tins tandy waS he believed, the oddest effect that , a to the attention of.the House the attention which . alone ought have . nrade the British 'Government , ever • was 'prialesaed by indignation. 'He then • a ny $u the had - paid to his Navy, aria to e boasts pause befare dal . . undertook such an Eatiedi , len:— s ‘stanced. the fell ot Brala„ Bergeti-op-Zoocn, apti .;14v'llich he had held forth to Europeof his growing 'But besides 'this, what was the aanal st , te of the 'other places before 'Dtithourree, in the infancy of al power-S-hoasts which, it was perfectly well .• ansureation in the North ? A gallant, solclie-r, on- . the French Revolittion. ' Those though he thought . I.town werenoe empty ones. It was this impor- iuthorised by his Sovereign, had eolleeted - a few V'saould be ascribed to the effed Of 'revolutionary prin ant consideration which led tee attention of Minis- followers—the Print:e'er Hesse, who had- beet) de_' 'ciples. was it necessary, then, to go back to that ters' to - this object . ; but there were other strong ins- prived of his dominions, was in arms , vith a small 'of Prague, or to that of the generally accounted im -tiancements which led to the adoption of that pl3p. number-3nd the g - allant Doke of Brek had pregnable fortress'bf weiellitz in Silesia ? lino- Ilorn'lt WaS' strongly recommended by a prine!ple of eco- , traver4ed with a . body of . troops, the whOle of the thee, „instance he might bring forwlrd Was Les y, because, the success of the enterpriz e would North of Germany uninialested—it pioof, certatile, , ilia, . b . efore Whieh the great Conde failed; yet fl enabledGoaertimnet to hive dispensed with the of the diaposition of the vetaale-stant that d'spei - ion afterFarda, when the Duke of Orleans sat ileets which it had been found necessary to maintain was quiescent. Thi was theextent of thetemptation : down . befbre 'it; it Was carried in a fortnight. t Yarmouth amid the Downs. • Therefore, if the and the aleans, and this the extent of good. That a : Prom these . instancese, he 'only wished to infer, Austrian War bad never broken out, the Expedition laudingthere would have detaehed'some 'troops f - rom that. what cos sonietimes .deemed impracticable 4 gainst Antairer . wOula have been a wise meaahre, the Danube was very probable'. But you had to cotisi- • alight he 'accomplished. He did not mean to say a sleading to tie attainment of a great British ob- der. theexpence to yourselv.es,aua the sufferings you ~ they 'should place a• dependence on improbabilities, Jed. It was upon these grounds that the- Eipetli, would bringe On the North . of Gerni:thy Austria but who in war - would never run a chance ? Who, ti $. was first resolved upon, and the preparations could not in justice call upon us to relieve her at the like the Austrian General at Ulm, would resign hope oracle : then came the Austrian Ware then came expence of such sufferings. The part we did 1 .becanse. success was improbable, and calculating th - -- - 6 Pplications from Austria fur assistance—applif a- ; teke had this- great and important advantara ti°ns ' which were unnecessar lo:-.- a ralle 'y, „feause we -were d upon by the , - most obvious policy, and the 3‘tongest self-interest, to give her e ve ry succour i n , (111 . 1 ' power. The quest i on t h en naturally arose, 'czqv could we afford her the most effectual as listance ? There were but two modes of afl - ording a !kcou r to Aultr:a, the one was. by .dirtict co-oper.l - ; the ott er was b y making a diversion, fur the Zpos.of drawin g - o ff t h e attent i on of the ene my.U a ltit respect to direct co - operat i on, he should not ; ve thought it necess ar y to h ave arg u ed upon the ~, ` E np racticability of it i n t h e t h en situation of the i;.'ohtinent, if he had not heard Gentlemen in that i t3 '. l se talk of. he propri e ty o f sen di ng an expedition t ° the bottom of t h e Adriatic, to Trieste, i n or d er c o-operate with the Austrians in that quarter; idea sso ahsurd, so excessively absurd, that he 43 amazed when he head, it suggested. Did the. t ntlemen who proposed suc h au experiment think or, the difficul t i es an d d angers " of sending a fleet of itC:v transports, crowded with troop s' uo su Ai a Yage, through the Streights of Gibra p lta n r, along tl Airdit erra i lean, and through the, re Ili ahno+t Jriktiowo, Adriatic ? S uc h a noun a would never ve- entered into the head of a Statesman ; no man , practical inforfnation would ever have thought of v i "ding such an expedition, which might arrive t . r ee months after it sailed, and two months after A t l : 4 object for which it was"sent had ceased to exist. 1 ;v ith respect to the other plan which had been pro 4ed, ;viz. that of lat.ding lit Italy, it had been it to a" certain degree, and desisted, from whence Has found that our effbris in that quarter could no p ° nger be attencLd with any a d vantage to our Allies, C9nSeqtletoCe of the retreat of the Archduke John. I:i,vltat-would have been the consequence if we (1 attemp:ed the Tonstrol)s plan of sending a , ) , ree e • to Triet ? „WV, .w.twn we a:rived there wed , ha‘e 1..1:nd ;t p , ssesciOn z ot- - the French, 1:!lnout an. Austrian tri solitier 300 ruile;-ot us. . kuought it proper to xtctie, mjnStice to the riOs gc,_ that it combi n ed t h e two objects which ta we hid most io view to accomplish—it tended 'ef fectually , to assist our Allies, ..and . at the same f' time to promote our own interest's. It bad been said, upon a foimer occa4:on, he understood, that when the Expedition sailed -from- the Scheldt, he had de clared.that he expetted co-operation from the people of Flanders and of Holland. He begged to State most distindly, that he had zuver used such an ex - prthision ; that he never et tent tined such an expecta tion ; nay, he could fairly s ~e, that that which most recommended' this pl..n to his approbation was, that the attempt was to be made at a part where there was no probabilty of any such co-operation as had been alluded to.—lf Gentlemen we,re required to by their fingers upon that spot of subjugated Europe which has suffered least from French domination, they mast point out Antwerp. Before the Rem ?tit ion, Antwerp was in a state of tion ; her greatness had fled, her commerce was an nihilated, her once crowded streets, were covered with grass. To this state s he was red uce d b y a re- • stritaion imp o s e d, not by nature, but by tre Ity, and-I from this she was relieved by her a nnexation to Franc - 4. From tlie population of Ant werp no co operation could be looked for, because they alone of all the people of the Continent would suffer by being in the situation its which they were before the Re- olution. The only object ot the expedition was to prosecu - e an open legitimate war. His-objet was to take - Apt werp unprepare.l. That Antwerp w.,s not in a proper state of preparation was molt unequivo• cally proved by the - Moni?eur itself ie a ceriespon-, denee bet weenthe Mini s t er of War and I3uo na p arte, which was evidently publithed with a view to make the people believe that Antwerp had not been - neglected. The correspondence sct forth, that °lir Expedition was originally intended tor Spain, but that in consequence of the conclusion ot the armistice between France and Au•Lia .deativation hal been changed. This was-fulic-.Fed I - ' chances again s t hi m as i f he were .engaged at chess,. give up the, contest because the moves 'were ag a i nst him ? Such a p erson might I3e a good tactiCi an , but nothing more could be said in his praise.— They all remembered a book :that came Out some years ago in France on the subject of a carriage, or something of the kind; 'in England, which was to go a certain distance in a certain time. ;The author of the book undertook to prove; learn edly,. that the plan could not succeed was to ,represent the carriage -B, the horses-,-C, the dri • ver—D„ the resistance of the air—E, the friction of the earth—and - F, the impo§sibility of success. There, said the author-•-•A, phis B, plus-C, plus D, plus E, is equal to F; but nevertheless the plan succeeded. He felt that he was labouring under considerable difficulty ,in arguing this case before Some of the Gentlemen of that House, because by them Ministers. had not only been called upon• to. defend themselves for failure, but t o excu l pate themselves . for vi6tory, and to atone for triumphs from these Gentlemen he certainly was not san gnine enough to look.-for a very favourable decisidn. He trusted, hoWever, that the House would net make Ministers resnonsiblefor misfortunes which theycould not. preven t, aud 'Censure. them. because the weather Was unfavourable. But there were many Gentle, men, he observed,, who looked- at the Government of this country in one point of view, and, at r Mona,. parte', in another. He never heard the French Ruler Cermared for want of skill, or for failure ; he was not blamed for his attack upon Acre; nor was lie censured . Wliert he placed himself last year. in dud most p•ecarious situation in the Island .of Bit those Gentlemen had another mode of deciding upon the condutt of the British Goverinent. With them success was the result of accident, but failure was a proof of incapacity. What would have been said, - had Ministers, instead' of defending theirhaVingcaptured Waicheren, had to vindicate their havin g sutfered the Isle of Wight to be taken; rtha.cmravn- rii ,t, as ii l o .might appear, a fair c011313R• riFon eir.lsted - '6etween the.-trio cis: 3, Carinin having pi:essed these points with hi s usual ekquence; a:lvertect to th e resolution, respectin g the retention of WalCheren : Much had been .said again,st Mit.isters for sending an expedition to a phce I,vliere the climate was known to be uowliolesorne. If thd authority of the book that had beenmen tinned to guide the condhel of Ministers, no expedition should be scot to Flanders, .as the same objecti , ,n could lie made to them °which the policy of two pentode, lia(r been so frequently sending. They onght not . to be to - severe on those vVito had planned the Expedition on account : of because it Migut suit c.ulat purposes. They , must not .think by visiting on the heads of thOse who . had sent out. the Expedition the calamities occasiond by the pes tilential - climate, to conceal the tenure by which we hold the 'West -India Islandi. They .ought not, by di re ai r i g all their resentment agai Ministers on bynst the present oc cas i on, and be. stowing all their compassion on the sufferers •at WaicherFn, to think they could purchase ahso 7 lutiontother cases , Walche ren h a d b een before an obj o d of 'poltey. of attack, aye, and of possessien to the sChish . It, was riot more pestiferouS now, I):!cause':it tvas> more important.than formerly. .14e ,did not know that there was a clause in the capitu-, lation that had been spoken, of, stipulating . that the Swiss . soldiers should not serve in Walcheren, but he knew .that,witklin the last twenty years it had been twice garrisoned by - Swiss soldiers. If, hew :ever there were such a clanse, w h at did. it 'prove ? hag we not similar clauseS respecting some c.i . our 'preseta possessions ? .Walcheren was a place of 'such .military • importance, that he th oug h t no M:nister eot4d at. once determine on evacuating it. But if MiniSters had resolved to abandon ,tt, he was not prepared_ to admit the propriety of -rc.tain:n; 'it, while the .works :of Flushing were or in compliance, with the,' wishes 'of If in, the then sittiatioti OfAustrianaffairS our army was.p)spokidto ten . days unnecessary siekness to- aid them; theke'was no proportion between, the good we aid and,:thetsacritices we made. It had been said.by the Anstaian. , dovernment, that if we retained our conquest, some of. the dependencies Of France might encouraged for throw. off the yoke; but this he did not wish, for the lemons he had air, ady, giren- ; and - besides be did , not thizk that the time, when - an instirreLition was likely to break-out. favour of • the Emperor of Austria, was just after he had aban doned the ill-fatedTyrolese. When - the importance of ..Walelteren was ponsidefecl,hecciuld not thi n k tors were liabl e . to any b'arne for pausing before they gave it up, and he trusted the House would join tith bun in thinking that', as tovertiment had been 'engaged receiving reports, some of. which en- courted- the hope •of retaining Walt:bereft, if could' not -be • imputed to them , as mattcr of Oame, •that they had not tome to ..an lin -mediate:decision.- He' would rote far- the con ciusiob, therefore, that ho blame al-ladled to the. Gove.rnmeht; but lie must change the premises. could not believe that .theljoase, con-idering the enemy. we had ti) de:al with, wouht be dispoieu. t o render respotisibi ity so heavy as to . 'crush ad ea- • tt4l)llZe. • • We regret that the great length of the debate comp t l s L i s t o compress the latter part of ti.is Gen tleman's spec.cll,' which Was. - marked - with all -that usn:d eloqu-,.act.', and, ap.)-ared to produc e a sgr - teat cfrea Upop the Housa,..• by the hid and re'rwated cheers with ,whickit was received. He concluded with expressing hiS detertnittation to vote against all the Resolutions. Mr. WIIITBREAD commenced by observing, that much as he had attended to the many topics urged by the Right Honourable Gentleman who had just sat down, .there was one circurnstnrce attached to his public conclud for which he could not account. He thought' the Right Honourable Gentleman, above all others, responsible for the failure of the Expedition, -- -for more inconsistency. ofcondua than charaderised that Right 'Honourable Gentlethan was rarely t o b e f oun d i n the history of the world. It was remarkable, that ou the 6th day of April the Right Honourable Gentleman should deliver to the Duke of Portland a declaration, that the Minister who was to plan the Expedition then in Contempla tion was a 'man. incapable, in - his opinion, to 'con dna the. affairs of his office. The Right Honour., able Gentleman had outraged his private"feelings, by communicating t o his Majesty - that the L' rd Lord was incapable of executing the dnties of lt;s situation, and at the same trine he suffered hiM to moceedin the planning and fitting out of the pedition. The Noble "lord . biMself had forma: ly used a 'signior expression. He had said that the, AdminiStration. was put on Ei.rock';' but little-did- he know at the tirtie - that the rock was Undermined, and that he should be blown in the air. He would- ". not apply to th e Right honourable Gentleman im proper motives; but he would contend that the Right Honourable Gentleman - was bound as a States; man not to expose his charader to public-obloquy. If it should be proved that servants of the Crown had advised: their Sovereign . to go to' war, from their own -private interests, and history afforded "many lamentable examples of .guch,rniscOndud, it would become persons who possessed such iotuntioni to proceed with caut i on. The Right Hon. Gentleman had done nothing. but from principle, but with re gard to the public, how did he answer for his Con-, duct? He had had ,orol communication with hi s Sovereign respelling :one of his Colleagues., in offs . e. The' vote which had recently -passed in that Hop s had declared it unconstitutional fo r a Minister to convey privately to the. Sovereign written comniti - pleat:ton respeEting official transactions, and he could not see any difference .bet Ween. oral and writen communications ma d e i n this inanoer. The Right Hongurable Gentleman supported the -conitu:a of those who had concluded the Expedition, and he had .old the House -that it was not inclined to fiod fault with Buonaparte tailing in 'his expedition to Aere ; but what had the House 10 do with Buo-na parte ?. they could not bring him to their,B:ir. - The Im;iliess was with the Right Honourable Gentleman, end .the Ministers of England. The great cause of complaint against the Right Ranourable Gen; lemati was for - having suffered the &Ole Lord to conduct the Expedition, with the kirovvledge thit he would ultimately fail. •He had talked much about rte balance of power in Europe, and he had stated that an .army was`not sent to the North of Germany, be cause the people, ready to'sink under their Co t querory, should not be distressed; so that these Cr , ° - )`- I ~