The Sun. — London, England, 1864-02-05 00:00:00

........ ~~~+~ ~ ~ n'Llll~l'~. 11, °111 SE OF LORDS—This Evening. to tlazi, be Parliament of the United Kingdom was opened having her 11L3'4 C ommission. The Lord Chancellor .s tat:ibajesry's most gracious speech, their lordship The L o afterwards adjourned during pleasure. atfi v °111) CRANCELLOR took his seat on the woolsack " e o'clock. TheLl iA NEW PEERS. 'lent Tr ' tr ing new peers took the oaths and their . seats f : OlotteeBr)llßhton, the Earl of Chesharn, the Bishop o taa c t„,. e l* , Lord Charlemont, Lord Normanby, Lord I ° i o atal the Bishop of Armagh. ti t f Yal Highness the Prince of Wales entered the t lleet his 'oinutes after five, and took his usual seat on Itet ere . ll 'etches. The galleries on both sides of the house kit h , attended by ladies, and the space in front of the was also crowded with strangers. The THE ADDRESS. letieb,LCßAlecnia.ou having read her Majesty's Th e i ltelab e ar gnis of SLIGO rose to move that an humble ad -Bpippresented to h er M ajesty, in answer to her most gra /le 11 ) on the occasion of the opening of Parliament.. the % It "was confident the feeling of gratitude expressed in Ir 9 te e era g r aPh of her Majesty's speech would be shared . Ne t the... Whole of their lordships, and the address that it ?Ist, au his pleasing duty of moving could not commence bit Darl:Propriately than by re-echoing that joy the open bretePh set forth. He regretted the strife that thong ti ° llt in a part of the world with which they had a thici d es, but it was very assuring that the Government 4t o „ A, ° e ll in their power to preserve the peace of %r em and at the same time he was rejoiced to hear that ttltleilett,eaNtr would be made to bring about a peaceful Nay and of the differences that had arisen between Ger ,l4lglitfet"ieriwaotnark, and thus ward off the dangers that ~e tt aitia a war in the north of Europe. With respect Nth ti of affairs, in America, he felt satisfied that the nt had pursued the most prudent course, and ti ßlli B „ t he result of that policy had been productive of kat but abuse from both parties, yet time only showed ~f 4)4l( lbB e tA r° , 4r se Pursued by England was the wisest that takes when the whole of the difficulties of the po- S lik tam eti ere t aken into consideration. The noble lord then ay t ° touch upon the other topics alluded to in her :4111 eels ch t and concluded by moving the Address, lott e ;w a tone of voice as to be quite inaudible in the 448 gallery. ltvilttilaolittea4l3:tH_CßOMßlE rose to second the Address, ti a „ t 'gli r ue inti, a mere echo of the Speech.. He said, t, , ) , at r lament assembled this year with a sons_what .4heittelphere abroad, yet, with one or two trifling tB ltt' b right sunshine prevailed over her Majesty's t oth e e hoped their lordships would unanimously dress moved by his noble friend. Noli e h t it l y e f e ii)LRBY rose and said—My lords, I should 10 '4 % lee, . Preferred it if some other noble lord had ia a ttit k„ th e t o the notice of the house before I proceeded. 4 'la g the- euservations that have been suggested to me by aet l l B bi e glooious Speech which was read to us. But as s i te N e ertl aPPears inclined to rise, it is incumbent on me t a4 oftb e 4e r in silence a Speech which touches upon elli c h l.traost importance and the deepest interest,. t tab l 'idtt e b t 1‘ impossible to regard otherwise than with tia ti le ratir e h ,tili etY• I must begin by apologising to the ifille'lB.w.ho moved the Address, ir, from my irnper t:edetabiser'ng, I was unable to follow him through a 00„ fe ° Portion of what seemed to me, if he will for- O l t) h r B qing it, his somewhat discursive speech. (A "tli t it Cert • •ke ainly, from those of his remarks which did k )4l ltitb e ) ee nid not help entertaining the suspicion that ve se e 4lt at % eh t , an earlier and fuller copy of the Royal 1,0 ve rei ,, ' l e one before us, and that he had not seen the l at iq to thi vni from which are omitted so many of the h he has just adverted. (Laughter.) My t7olott of pa satiafaction at the commencement of another ititherliareent again to be enabled to address the 1 41 niti tt t e language of congratulation on a subject deeply ' bett i f ) L t he nation at large, and which serves, per (ift,kreve, a `,", e h ally other to cast a ray of happiness on ttafre,,:,"" Metering which her Majesty has endured. tf; k yhi etia ) At this time last year we offered our humble 4 4 ,7 hei r to ' 1 t he o her Majesty on the auspicious marriage lipolotBlutt Throne with a Princess every way qua e th e high destiny reserved for him, and whose 1 4 4 ' 4 tli ar e na allt Y and attractions and the natural and unsf kart N et °f Whose manner secured for her from the first (tt ia it tlay er entrance into this kingdom the admiration, Ittb,r.) hie the affection of her adopted country. t hit,. 4l 4 t)0 o ccasion we have to congratulate her Ma -444.1,114 of nation on th e happy issue of that marriage in ttliktltatt..,7ll heir to the throne in the second generation ; k,. °ll tit h Z ray lords, happily for this country, monarchi 14a`kaa If J l_4l are so firmly established in the hearts and 144 8 4 4 1 e People, and their attachment to them has 1 10 . of 'tigthened by the private virtues and personal 4."1800, illustrioua lady who occupies the throne, Otot e( i w . ith us, as it might be with other countries, a qylta:.tatatildvi,tienal congratulation that we thereby obtain 4ei . Z, yet I v ?' for the throne or greater security for the At 0 t N eb tfe b e f ore May be permitted to rejoice at the prospect ke,,"natti ou t tul of a direct line of succession from the pre -41-.411-, it 'wear att,, e er of the Crown and her immediate de 'Sovereign who has done so much to cast (elleareb;°4„,elLt o wn and also to strengthen the hold L . ' 14 1 . 0 e i nstitutions have upon this nation. With ,""' it appears to me that as we advance in klltatdB ntng th t°B Peeta: 4ll her and kindlier sympathy upon the 117 an te the cl ose ; t hose who are entering upon that career y r 7 r tv'tic, r °4l h°„',.)irhich many of us are hurrying. But I tioithf des ° lle of your lordships who does not ]r t d tt ag he r ottiCet.interest the happy career before that 11; snips %,, er birth of whose heir we are now emigre ttilke et as d ee t e it t:l : lam sure there is not one of your at,, ac e that tha t o offer up a fervent prayer . to the 140 40 th ett 1 _ bright prospect may remain un qt„, e ' avpy eong after the youngest of your lordships ce Pied b )11 t his scene, the throne of these realms fills he, Y the de s (11 "kdescendants of the illustrious Prince u rn Ta rt; -11), et qui nascentur ab illis." rgtto her env 'I rejoice ' l3 g to the other portions of the Speech, 18 0 0 , t 4aj eety oilicart cordially concur in congratula t it i 8 sat- theta enerally prosperous condition a f. tie tit ,eorehler.. .B.ary that,notwithstanding heavy thellto twee filedeel" Increasing and our revenue amply Ci he bteeza, enlnds upon it; indeed, I may say toep t , i , '0 ineet those demads, because I trust tp lee ch rs to dash our prospects, the country ItZ further alleviation of these burdens which yiitt ai rtal proem gs.resources. It is true there is exception t 4i ll i kt W I! fro ha P t e j . i tY in the state of those districts which ii i il l Tl tt lte l . eh (tetra"; effe cts of that unhappy and desolat ' o rtb A 8 the whole or the greater part of the \ I N 4, l e ke ofhe t rerica. But even there I concur in ItptNitNtit beenPeeeh, that this distress has to a con *lajiltitha n 4litigated ; for although it is still N, 14,4 wi th a !' eat pressure on the population—who 111,401,(°1111 the 4 sore of courage and patience which t a e t litu re t nnivernal approbation of the country 14,elotiath_tilat p, elltertain the hope that the worst and s ee We is at an end, and that from a very l t , e ll etea eh it" at date the rospect of a very con- Yqth r taitt eci the industry of the cotton districts. I pt,e_Arobmit° soy that the anticipations formed last ki t : B / 1 74 y ear , s e Ply of cotton for our consumption l !kti a Zt . her efe ' f ! r ee been with almost to the letter ; yet!As eased u look With greater confidence to the it t : /1 14 pr il 0 on fact W e • t i 14 It t th e be I which promise us from the end ateriat ginning of May a sufficient supply SklOt eropi o Vi 4 it top t ac. . Y the whole of the mills for five a tqa ntri he is satisfactory to see from how many 1 11 , b +iitL i lopt * 4 4 : bet:: may expect to derive a supply; and eel )) , el l the Federal and the Conefderate "a 'Nit a ''tk ' e ugt t o • • I 4 k di le 4 14 , th an earlier conclusion thanfear s gat e , a t i ; at th e growth of cotton has been so , at ) , ) "a oth er ie 4 , l s at quarters of the world that we shall th i hip,l tt tlp 80 1 _ 11 tho position of depending almost en- N,)„, d Cabo et ( 4,. "tree of supply. (Hear, hear.) I must its Z a l p a s to believ e that there may not be se ilik:ma " 8 )4 even an occasional increase in the Nlipee,ttaiiiitt.i_a.not so much the high price of cot t44 i e 4 ' In the Price which creates the evil. tA " i ti l e t , e t il % a c t , I :esent, it is an important fact that i al / it 4 Pk, wi,insureption of cotton goods has by 4 4 , 4 4,., t o b e the increase of price ; and more i.tql(le kite Of the 17:narked that those countries which are "laitBgeta the 3 „ hw material have been so enriched by 1 01 4 not th eir ev e obtained for their produce, that ° l l g ?aeri Consumption of the manufactured ta • it • ''' . °Part Pht n 4 4 „ 'mute to the increase of price. 11‘)L41) R g aeth et ; er tain how Prices will rule, as long as th e fr ona high t o l ow an d f rom l ow to 'Nlslroatufacturers, for their own self -11,9443' rt aktt l d e eAfr°ro doing more than manufacture ~e to ek th e hour, so long they will not yen eilave en uhich they may suffer a heavy rBtlhGnt diat re cillet lrlY ) there will be great variation Nuc i lt t l l 'tqour t o a . naong tho operative classes. Still " th e r 1-11 P") in proof of the hopeful spirit 06,y ei , e 're th,e roanufacturing districts, that to my , ° ll t B tee h at Present eithe r in course of erection ‘tpt t ilt (a the fewer than 110 new cotton mills which tiglearevival of the trade, and that some of Ntl;44t,,loiaee makingeeale hitherto unknown, one este h Provision for the enormous number ile„_lr) There is one other point con `4l tt ~ a W ith reZtal condition of the country which was h ey r iy by the noble marquis, viz. t, It 4 th at ei falle n upon certain districts in ' Ire ' ;ttleeito.shibie for deserves to be mentioned here 1 . ' 8 ri °r your lordships to supply a remedy, e to... t 't that Yon) who have so liberally, so r), A ) t b c ia Of Sea "u Patience with which the mann witnl p,;tet. north of England have borne their "111'tilte Nvi t t e , 4 . e game tribut e to the patience and ' lt A t 4 k ivitv g tho south and went of Ireland hitt° l ament s l have be Nt 14 three bbe borno. (Hear.) lre , 1 „.e ad harvests, and there can be chef th,„ " Ellett) S mall farmers esp ec i a ll y a n PosNible difficulty. The de 'at,' tOleh a l ie _°°t be better proved than by re ale th e that although the increase has • of ' Math 41 4 4 6 l a of land devotedhastobepeanstnuroatgaec,oyne-t ease but years I..eyr Years there considerable diminution in the riiE SUN, LOI\DON, FRIDAY EVENING, FEERUARY 5, 1864. amount of stock maintained in tho agricultural districts. The cause of that diminution I take to be this—the necessi ties of the small farmers have been so great that they have been compelled to sell off their stock at an earlier age than usual, and the stock has consequently been reduced, the farmers not retaining a sufficient breed to keep up the quan tity. (Hear, hear,) But, my lords, there is another circum stance connected with Irish distress which must not be overlooked on the present occasion, viz., that enormous and unparalleled emigration which has recently taken place from Ireland—an emigration so extensive that nothing has ever approached it--an emigration, too, the more to bo regretted because I am afraid a large proportion of those who emigrate will really servo to feed the unhappy and desolating war in North America. (Hear, hear.) lam afraid that many who are going away in the hope of finding peaceful employment will find those hopes disappointed, and will entail upon themselves and their families great misery, while they are entering into an atmosphere which is not likely to improve their love and affection for the land of their birth. (Hear hear.) With respect, my lords, to the prospects of legisla tion for the present session, I cannot say that the Speech is very encouraging. (A laugh) We are told that various measures will bo submitted for our consideration, That is all, and therefore I think I may say that in this case the performances of her Majesty's Government cannot possibly fall short of their promises. (A laugh,) The only action which the Government announce themselves to have taken is the appointment of commissioners to inquire into the various forms of subscription and declaration required to be made by the clerical members of the Church. A copy of the commission is to be laid before us, and therefore I shall not now presume to comment upon what its scope and object may be; but from what I have heard, I am afraid that the object of it is so extremely minute, as compared with the magnitude of the machinery put into operation, that it will do but little to settle any of those questions to which public attention has recently been attracted. I am sure it is not suf ficient to satisfy my noble friend who has so frequently brought the subject of subscription under our notice, while, on the other hand, I am afraid it may lead to the renewal of a critical agitation without producing any but trifling results. (Hear.) So much, my lords, for the prospects of domestic lrgislation, and for the present internal condition of the count y. I proceed now to a much more serious and much more anxious question—viz., the position in which we stand with regard to foreign countries, and the perilous position in which the peace of Europe is at this moment placed. (Hear, hear.) My lords, foreign policy has been for the last two or three years that upon which her Majesty's Govern ment have mainly rested their claims to public confidence. (Hoar, hear.) As coon as that very ingenious, if I cannot say very ingenuous, stratagem by which the noble earl opposite obtained office had served its purpose—as soon as he had obtained office by the declaration that Parliament was dissatisfied with the modicum of Parliamentary reform offered by his predecessors, and that the country could never be satisfied, and ought never to be satisfied, until a much more extensive measure were carried by the Government— from the moment at which that pretext had served its pur pose, I need not remind your lordships how feebly, how faintly, the noble earl and his colleagues attempted to realize their programme. Nor need I remind your lordships that the great expectations held out by the noble earl were defeated, not by the opposition of his predecessors, but by the voluntary abandonment of himself and of hts supporters in the House of Commons ; and that a very short time ago, when the noble earl, after retiring from his labours in the Lower House to the serener atmosphere of your lordships' benches, pronounced the funeral oration of his defeated bill, he sang its requiescat in pace, and while congratulating himself on having attained the summit of his wishes de clared that he was now disposed and advised his friends to "rest and be thankful." (Cheers and laughter.) From that time foreign policy has been the main groundwork of the confidence which the country was called on to place in hor Majesty's Government. I trust that in the position in which we stand it will not be thought that I am wandering from the subject if, in order to enable your lordships to judge of the full gravity of that position. I examine somewhat at length what has been the course of policy pursued by her Majesty's Government; and what is the degree of consideration which they have obtained for us in foreign countries, (Hear.) My lords, I think that at the commencement the foreign policy of the noble earl opposite might be summed up in the affir mation of the principle of non. intervention in the internal affairs of other countries, the extension of Liberal principles by the exercise of our moral interference, and above all, the maintenance of uninterrupted and cordial relations with the Emperor of the French. We were told more than once that the present. Ministry was the only one ;to maintain a good understanding with the French Emperor, or, at least, that its predecessor could not possibly have done so, and that if the country desired to preserve cordial relations between itself and France, her Majesty's present advisers, and espe cially the noble earl opposite, were the only persons qualified to secure that most desirable object. (Hear, and a laugh.) Now, my lords, as to non• intervention in the internal affairs of other countries, when I look around me I fail to see what country there is in the internal affairs of which the noble earl has not interfered. (Cheers and laughter) Katl in tactumreliquit nihil tetiget quod, I cannot say non ornavit) but non conturbavit. (Laughter.) Or the foreign policy of the noble earl, as far as the principle of non-intervention is concerned, may be summed up in two homely but ex pressive words—" meddle and muddle." (Great cheering and laughter.) During the whole course of his diplomatic correspondence, wherever ho has interfered—and he has in terfered everywhere—he has been lecturing, scolding, blus tering, and retreating. (A laugh) In fact, I cannot think of the foreign policy pursued by the noble earl and his col leagues without being reminded of another very distin guished body of actors commemorated, as your lordships are aware, in "A Midsummer Night's Dream." Of that cele brated troupe the two chief ornaments were Bottom, the weaver, and Snug, the joiner. It appears to me the noble earl opposite combines the qualities which are attributed to both those distinguished personages. (A laugh.) Like Bottom, the weaver, he is ready to play every part, not even excepting that which he has alt early played most satis factorily—via., "Moonshine." (Great laughter.) But his favourite part is the part of the lion. " Oh," says the noble earl, let me play the Lion. I will roar so that it will do any man's heart good to hear me; I will roar so that I will make the Duke say, Let him roar again; let him roar again.'" (Continued laughter.) The noble earl, too, knows as well as anyone, how, like Bottom, to "aggravate his voice," so that he will "roar you as gently as any sucking dove ;" and, moreover, he has had recourse more than once to the ingenious and somewhat original device of letting half his face be seen through the lion's neck, as if to say, " For all my roaring I am no lion at all, but only Snug the joiner. (Renewed laughter.) There is, however, one point of diffe rence which I would have you observe, because it is rather important. Bottom, the weaver, and Snug, the joiner, were possessed of an earnest desire not to alarm the ladies too much, and consequently they gave due warning at the out set. On the other hand, the noble earl's disclosure that though the roar was like that of a lion, the face was only that of the noble lord himself—(a laugh)—was not made betimes in order that the audience might not be frightened but only because he found that all the roaring in the world would not frighten them. (Hear, hear, and laughter.) Se riously, for though there may be something ludicrous about it, the matter is of too great importance to be treated only in a light and jocular manner—seriously, then, I cannot hut feel as an Englishman that I am lowered and humi liated in my own estimation and in that of other nations by the result of the noble earl's administration of foreign affairs. Thanks to the noble earl and the present Govern ment we have at this moment not one single friend in Europe—(hear, hear)—and more than that, this country, the chief fault of which was that it went too direct and straightforward at what it aimed, which never gave a pro mise without the intention of performing, which never threatened without a ful: determination of striking, which never made a demand without being prepared to enforce it, this country is now in such a position that its menaces are disregarded, its magniloquent language ridiculed, and its remonstrances are treated with contemptuous indifference by the small as well as by the great Powers of the Conti nent. (Hear, hear.) We have heard a great deal of har mony and good understanding with France. If we really are on a footing of cordial understanding with France, all I can say is that the Emperor must be the most forgiving and forbearing of all devoted friends, because there is scarcely a question of recent times on which we have not, I will not say purposely, but at least uniformly, opposed his policy and placed him in a situation which must have been pain ful to his feelings and very humiliating to his pride. (Hear hear.) I find no fault with the noble earl for withdrawing from co-operation in regard to the affairs of Mexico as soon as a considerable change was apparent in the project. At the same time, when this question was first under discussion I took the liberty of expressing regret that we should have exposed ourselves to possible inconvenience and embarrass ments by the course we took,and that we did not on our own part make demands and enforce our claims. And, although I do not blame then oble earl for withdrawing from the enter prise, still that was an act which exposed our conduct to un favourable consideration on the part, at all events, of the people of France, and added to the difficulties of the Em peror of the French in carrying out the scheme. (Hear, hear.) Then, my lords, it is notorious that the Emperor was very desirous of taking steps, at any rate, towards the recognition of the Confederate States. Rightly or wrongly, the noble earl opposed that idea, and the Emperor, with an earnest wish to co-operate as far as possible with this country, shaped his policy in accordance with ours, and accommo dated his views to it. I roust now, my lords, call your atten tion to a matter which has had some grave consequences. What was the next quest ion into which we were brought into intimate combination with the Emperor of the French. ? It was the painful, embarrassing and difficult question of last year—the condition of Poland, and the representations to be made on the subject to Russia. There is no doubt that in this country and in France also there was a very serious and cordial sympathy with Poland. (Hear.) There was a very earnest respect for the gallantry, bravery, and patience with which the Poles had fought the battles of their country, and there was a general conviction that they were euffering from an amount of oppression that was sufficient to rouse the feelings and excite the indignation of Europe. It was determined that the Emperor of the French, the Emperor of Austria, and her Majesty should engage in a joint representation to the Emperor of Russia in favour of Poland. The terms of that representation were not identi cal, and I cannot but think, as I ventured to say last year, that the noble earl considerably increased the differences and embarrassments of the situation by founding the de• mends of England on a right which we have derived from a treaty, the non-fulfilment of which must place UR in an awkward relation to Russia. The representations of France and Austria were made in a very different sense, hut with the same object and intention as ours, I ventured also to ask the noble earl at the time whether France, Austria, and England were entirely in accord as to the steps which should be taken in the event of the joint representations to the Emperor of Russia being disregarded; and I pointed out the extreme inconvenience which must result from such a combination if the parties were not agreed as to the manner in which they would give effect to the recommen dations. Well, to add to the difficulties of the case, at the very moment when we were waiting with anxiety for the account of the Emperor of Russia's receipt of our represen tations, couched in that persuasive style, and containing those conciliatory arguments to which I have adverted, the noble earl took the opportunity of stating in this house that deeply as he sympathised with Poland, and I although he had demanded from Russia concessions under a treaty which he had the right to enforce, yet whatever might be the reply of Russia, he would not go to war with her on account of Poland, and the Poles must not expect any armed assistance from us under any circumstances. This conduct on the part of the noble earl was ruin to Poland —more than that, it was an aggravation of her inju ries. (Hear.) He must have known that when we said we would not lend a helping hand, Fran i° and Austria would equally refrain, and that as far as their means went the Poles were absolutely powerless to make effectual resistance. At the same time, however, the noble lord gave the Poles an amount of encouragement which protracted the struggle, aggravated their sufferings, and brought on that unhappy country even greater calamities than it was then enduring. (Hear, hear.) But what, my lords, was the result to Eng land ? The demands of England, calling for the fulfilment of a treaty, were met by a rejoinder in that tone of stinging courtesy for which Russian diplomacy is so eminently cele• brated. The noble earl received a decided rebuff. (Hear, hear.) He was told that England had better mind its own business, that the Emperor of Russia knew best how to de a l with his oc n subjects, and that he would not submit to any foreign interference in that respect. And then, forgettingall his magniloquent threats, and not carrying his high words into action, the noble earl told this house that the Emperor of Russia had done a beneficent act towards his subjects. But the noble earl's pacific declaration was not made until France and Austria had been committed to participation in that policy, and they wore consequently placed in the pain ful situation of having to follow our steps, and to share the humiliation which attended them. (Hear, hear.) That is the third instance in which we have assumed an atti tude not calculated to add to the cordiality of our rela tions with Franco. At the same time I doubt whether these circumstances would be likely to put you on much better terms with the Power to whom you addressed such an insulting demand. Very recently, in the presence of increasing differences and embarrassments occurring in so many parts of Europe, the Emperor of the French made a proposition for a general Congress, in which these various questions might be considered and an attempt made to bring about a common understanding in regard to them. I concur with the noble earl in thinking that there would have been great difficulty in accomplishing that aim. The objections which would be raised had not, per haps, been sufficiently contemplated by the Emperor of the French when to first made his proposal. If, however, there was a country in all Europe which had less reason than another for giving a positive refusal to have anything to do with the Congress it was England, because there was no question which could by any possibility be decided by it which directly affected our interests. The course which should have been pursued by the Government was to recog nise the laudable and beneficent intention of the Emperor of the French in making such a proposal ; to point out that England had no interest to salve by opposing it, if there was any prospect of success ; to declare that we should be only too happy to co-operate in so excellent and well-mean ing a design as the settlement by arbitration of the difficulties which disturbed Europe if the other countries whose affairs would be brought before the Congress would submit to its authority and abide by its decision. If after that, the scheme of a Congress had failed, it could not have been attributed to the hostility of England, but to the inherent difficulties of the case. (Hear, hear.) But as it was, in the face of Europe, when every other Power expressed more or less a readiness to concur in carrying out the ob jects in view, the noble earl opposite met the proposition by a blank refusal to have anything to do with it, and by pointing out in the strongest possible terms all the objec tions that could possibly be entertained to the meeting of such a Congress. Moreover, to add to the discourtesy— T say nothing now of the impolicy—to add to the pain ful feelings with which the Emperor of the French and the French people were likely to be impressed, by the course pursued by the noble earl in giving an al'so lute refusal, the first intimation—and I am sure that I shall not be contradicted by the noble earl when I make this statement—the first intimation which the Emperor of the French received of the decision of the English Cabinet was by reading the despatch in the Times newspaper. (Hear.) Now, if you treat great Powers with this utter disregard of their feelings and wishes, if you bluntly refuse to lend them a helping hand in order that they may at any rate tide over possible difficulties, supposing that there was no other in tention in the Congress but that, how can you expect when you are in a position:of difficulty,and when you call on them that they will give you mutual assistance and advice in cases not affecting their personal or national interests? (Hear, hear.) But there is another great and grave reason why the noble earl should have considered deeply before re fusing to entertain the proposition of a Congress. He must have known that there was one question impending of the greatest gravity and the most urgent interest. He must have known that a question long maintained between the Danish monarch and the people of Germany was coming to a point of the greatest, most critical, and deepest interest ; and if the Congress, or the proposition to hold a Congress, had only postponed for three or four months the active struggle which has since taken place, there would in.that case have been a better prospect than I fear there now is of preserving, or I should rather say of restoring—for it is too late to speak of preserving —the peace which is already broken. (Hear.) With respect to this grave question which is the subject of all engrossing interest at the present mo meat, ',do not think that any one reading the Speech from the Throne, and who is not very familiar with the case be forehand, would have been able to collect from the Speech what really is the question of pressing difficulty at the ex isting moment, and threatening the interruption of friendly relations. Her Majesty's Speech recites, with very great and very unusual minuteness, the names of all those who were parties to the Treaty of 1852 for securing the suc cession to the throne of Denmark. The recital is somewhat unusual; but Ido not complain of that. I presume that the object was to show how many parties have pledged them selves to the arranged succession to the throne of Denmark. I would, however, in passing, make one observation in refer ence to the statement that the treaty was acceded to by the King of Saxony. Though Ido not lay much stress on the argument, yet it is stated on the part of that Sovereign that he never acceded to the treaty, but gave his assent to it. But that very fact made it the more binding than accession to the treaty with reservations, for the assent was pur et simple, recognising the wisdom of the treaty, and makes no reservation, at the same time, with respect to some possible contingent claim on the part of the King of Saxony's own House to a portion of the small duchy of Lanenburg. It could not be said that when the assent was given that any possible reservation was made, and the King of Saxony, therefore, precluded himself from using that argument in the subsequent discussion. I cannot help thinking, in so solemn a document as the Speech from the Throne, which recites the object of the treaty, and also with so much minuteness the names of the parties to it, that it would have been as well if the very words of the treaty had been given, and the more especially because the omission of the words had afforded the opportunity of inserting in one of the paragraphs such language as does not often appear en en in a Speech from the Throne. (Laughter.) The Queen's Speech states :—" That treaty declared that it is conducive to the preservation of the balance of power and of the peace of Europe that the integrity of the Danish monarchy should be maintained, and that the several territories which have hitherto been under the sway of the King of Denmark should continue so to remain." That is the substance of the treaty certainly, but it would have been better to quote the precise words. The treaty goes on to declare the arrangements according to which it was thought that the succession to the whole of the dominions then united under the Crown of Denmark, in the male line to the exclusion of the female, would be the best means of securing the integrity of that monarchy. The object was to secure the Integrity of the Danish monarchy, and the making a change in the course of succession was supposed to be the best means of carrying out that intention. I cer tainly think that, instead of using that elegant phrase in the Queen's Speech, that " the several territories which have hitherto been under the sway of the King of Denmark should continue to remain so," it would have been much better to him given the terms of the treaty, though I do not question that the actual meaning is expressed, and make no quibble en that point. The Queen's Speech goes on to say that " Her Majesty, actuated by the same desire to preserve the peace of Europe, which was ono of the declared objects of all the Powers who were parties to that treaty, has been unremitting in her endeavours to bring about a peaceful settlement of the differences which on this matter have arisen between Germany and Denmark." Now, the diffi culties which have arisen between Germany and Denmark have nothing to do with this treaty. They have nothing to do with the succession, but with a cause totally and en tirely different, and it was not until the death of the late King of Denmark that the question of the succession was introduced to complicate the original grounds of the discussion. (Hear, hear.) It is very important to draw a distinction between these two questions, which are entirely different. The question so long at issue was the fulfilment or non-fulfilment by Denmark of engage ments entered into in 1851, to which the Treaty of 1852 made no reference. I do not deny that so far as Austria and Prussia aro concerned, those engagements were in ducements to lead them to concur in the treaty; but, at the Ramo time the treaty is not conditional on those arrange ments, Her Majesty's Speech is, therefore, made to state on this point that which is not the fact. Now, this is a matter of very considerablo importance, because the case is con- siderably complicated by the different positions which, since the death of the late King of Denmark, have been taken up by the greater Powers and the smaller Powers in Germany. At the present moment there are two interventions ; if I may call them so, in Denmark, and these two interventions aro being carried on by different parties, and for evidently diffe rent objects. The engagements had reference to rights claimed on behalf of the Duchies of Holstein and Schleswig, and the question remains, how far has Denmark contravened the engagements as to the rights, liberties, and privileges she was to give to those Duchies,and under no circumstances to incorporate Schleswig with the Danish Monarchy, or to take any step tending to that result? These were the whole of the questions which, up to the present year, were in dis pute between the Powers of Germany and Denmark. Since the death of the late King of Denmark a Federal occupa tion of Holstein has taken place, and that occupation is ad. witted to be legal for the purpose of securing the fulfilment of the engagements of 1851 in reference to the rights of the Duchies ; but under the cover of that occupation or execu tion claims, with respect to which I would say nothing, to the throne of the Duchies have been put forward, claims which had been actually rejected and repudiated, and never until this moment brought forward since the Treaty of 1852. The parties now proceeding against Denmark do not rest their claim on any opposition to the treaty. On the con trary, they proclaim that they are proceeding in the spirit of the treaty. They have been outvoted by the Diet, and they proceeded to take the matter into their own hands. Professing an open and undisguised respect for the treaty, they are acting entirely without the consent of the Diet. We have the King of Prussia taking up arms in strenuous defence of constitutional rights---(a laugh)—and we have the Emperor of Austria joining in a crusade for the pro tection of oppressed nationalities. (Renewed laughter and cheers.) And these two Powers, recognising a treaty which the minor Powers wish to set aside, are undertaking, as the mandatories of these minor Powers, to attack and carry on war against Denmark for cor siderations and objects totally different from those contemplated by the Diet. (Hear) This isthe state of the question at the present moment; but I cannot avoid thinking that with a little good judgment, a little good management, and a little good temper, it ought to have been settled without a frightful appeal to anus. (Cheers.) Surely it could have been no difficult fact to as certain—if the parties were willing to listen to reason— (hear, hear)—as the case was one in which. the intervention of a friendly Power might be applied—whether a certain engagement entered into by Denmark had or had not been fulfilled, or whether one of the parties was not demanding more than it was entitled to. Ido not question the right of Prussia to ask for a fulfilment of those engagements to the utmost; I do not question the duty cf Denmark to fulfil them as far as actually possible—to fulfil them as far as that is not rendered impossible by one of the parties opposed to Denmark; but I say that if when this question arose this country had occupied the position she ought, she would have been in a position to play the part of mediator, and that the circumstances might have been adjusted by a little good management on the part of the Foreign -office of England. (Hear, hear.) But how could you have ex pected that Germany would yield to your interference in this ease ? In this quarrel there is a people who believe they are struggling for their liberty and independence. That fact will gain them great sympathy in Europe, more especially because they are carrying on the struggle with a force disproportionate to the necessities Of the case ; but how could you have expected that your inter ference would be effectual when you had alienated France, offended Russia, and more or less.quarreled with every Power in Europe ?—when you had not a Power you could call your friend, and, moreover, when the danger which threatened you in this complication was a dangerous and destructive war between England and the united powers of Germany ? (Hear,) What could be more threatening to the peace of Europe than England being committed to a sanguinary quarrel with the whole of Germany in a case in which, whether rightly or wrongly, the teelings of the people of Germany are enlisted on one side ? (Hear.) For my part I certainly should shrink from such a war as one of the greatest disasters that could happen to this country. (Cheers.) I do hope that the noble earl, who must this night give us a clear indication of the course which her Majesty's Go vernment propose to take in respect of their foreign policy, more especially on this question—will be able to assure us that we are not committed by the Government, on the one hand, to a disastrous quarrel with Germany, or, on the other, to a betrayal and abandonment of an ally who has trusted to our support. (Hear.) I have not seen it argued, and in deed I think it could hardly be alleged, that Parliament should indicate the policy which the Government should adopt. There is a sound and constitutional doctrine that it is for the Government —for the responsible Ministers of the Crown—to take a decided course, and then to announce that course and submit it for the consideration of Parlia ment. Ido not pretend to know the position of affairs we stand in ; but, as far as I can see, we are between the horns of a dilemma of a most formidable character—namely, the sacrifice of the honour of the country on the one side, and engagement in a most perilous and san guinary war on the other. (Hear, hear.) My lords, while I regard this as a subject of the most painful interest to England, I would implore Germany to consider what con sequences such a war must entail on her, not only in break ing up of old relations, the severing of friendships—the severing of ties between countries in which there exist almost ties of consanguinity,—but also in giving en oppor tunity to all those opposed to the stability of her institutions —all those who are desirous to profit by anything that may tend to disorder and confusion,—to all who envy that grow ing prosperity of Austria which is owing to the constitu tional course she has so wisely entered upon. A war with England would stop Austria in that course, and England would be in the unhappy position of being an unwilling and unconscious participator in pouring forth that torrent of evil which certainly would be set flowing. And without cast ing the slightest imputation upon the present intentions or possible designs of France, Germany must see that a war with England would leave her in such a position as that France would be master of the situation. If France does entertain ambitious designs, the moment would be one to Germany of the greatest peril, and to France of the greatest temptation. My lords, I brought thi s su bject forward with all the grave, earnest, and deep importance that attaches to it. I will not comment on other portions of the Speech. There will be other opportunities for discussing the subjects to which they relate. I will not allude to what has taken place in China, nor what has taken place in Japan, further than to say, with regard to the former empire, that I think this country was saved by an act of the Emperor of China from the most serious embarrassment. I rejoice that his imperial Majesty rejused to accept the assist ance of a British squadron under such circumstances as only it could have been given to him. Ido not blame Captain Sherard Osborn ; on the contrary. I commend him for the judgment and prudence which he exhibited in refusing to place himself under the orders of a mandarin, and becoming responsible for the acts of such an official ; but it seems incredible to me how the idea could ever have en tered the minds of politicians that the emperor of an inde pendent country would accept the offer of a force on the understanding that his orders to that force were only to be obeyed when forwarded through a civil commissioner, who was to have the power of .y i s ending or withholding them. incompatible with that of Ga T u ha free out it would t would Sovereign; b create a anddifficul ty.ifsueen h t entirely (Hear, hear.) I am only arrangement were carried afraid, from accounts which have bee n rece i ve d w i t hi n t h e last given in ivell by this country in the civil few war in Chinadays, that at has assistance an unpleasant and a painful position. I will not comment on that extraor di nary dat piece of diplomacy—namely, the sur ren d er o f t h e l on i an Islands to the kingdom of Greece. I say noth i ng to t h e sur render itself, but only as to the mod e i n which it has taken placed place. The whole proceeding seems to have been involved in Inextricable confusion. The promise s w hi c h th e no bl e earl made and the expectations which he held out have been set at nought ; and an agreement has been come to with the other Powers to hand over the islands without any condition whatever to the kingdom of Greece, that kingdom being in a state of anarchy, and in a state which renders it quite in capable of conducting its own affairs without assistance and being under the government of an i llustrious Prince, a young man, who, I am afraid, on the advice of the noble adiscretion, undertook a task which,r , with I h more i k n, he w couragell P.nd extremely difficult, We find, too, that in this particular case, as well as i n every case in earl, t which thenoble earl has meddled,he h - asoffe nded not only one side, but both sides. (A laugh.) Again, it appears that, not withstanding the concessions which the nobl e earl has made to the Federal States of America in carr ying out wh a t h e calls neutrality, but what I am afraid I must call one-sided neutrality, he has received from these St ates not thanks, because I believe that papers which have been before the Senate of the United States show we were met by demands and menaces, which I should be much astonished if any one calling himself a British Minister must not have felt a diffi culty in receiving when the despatches containing them were placed in his hands. Since then we are not only told that the American Government will hold us responsible for any damage which their commerce may have su stained by the acts of the Alabama ; but if I have not mis read the pap ers laid before Co., Congress they state that if we do n o t put a stop to the sale of vess e l s of this kind in this country, the r esu l t ' must be that the F e de ra l Government wilt tak e th e law into their own hands, that th e ir cruisers will follow th ese vessels into British po r t s , and will, in British wat ers, maintain their own interests. My lords, I hope the noble earl will be able to show that he answered that despatch in a manner which will put an end to such monstrous demands for the future. (Hear, hear.) But, if lam not mist a k en, the last despatch from Washington was written about August, and was received here towards the latter end of August, and early in September the noble earl took the strong step of seizing the so-called Confederate rams in the Mersey upon that very suspicion as to which, a year before, the Attorney- General informed Parliament that the Government would not be warranted in interfering. (Hear, hear.) Well, then, my lords, if you have not satisfies the Federals, neither have you satisfied the Confederate States. (Hear.) You have not satisfied the Poles and you have offended Russia. You have not very well pleased Denmark, and you have quarrelled with Prussia and Austria. You have not satisfied the lonian Islands or Greece, although you have given t both of them all and more than they have asked ; but you have contrived to couple it with conditions very proper in themselves, and which are mutually unpalatable, and which up to a very late moment led to the refusal by the Greek Government, such as it is, to accept your gift of the lonian islands burdened with those conditions. (Hear, hear.) I cannot say that in looking hack at the general line of policy adopter] by the noble earl, and the degree of success which has attended his efforts as the head of the Foreign-office, such a retrospect is calculated to diminish my apprehen sions of the present, or to inspire much confidence for the future. I hope and pray that the Government may be able to satisfy this house and the country that they have neither taken any course likely to involve us in a war the issue of which no man can foresee, nor, on the other hand, have led on and then deserted a weak Power, which, confiding in our protection, and acting up on our advice, now finds itself abandoned in the hour of its utmost need. (Hear.) This is my earnest hope ; yet I cannot but see that the vessel of our State is in a most perilous position, that it is surrounded by breakers and dangers on every side; and for my own part I have not---I wish I had—the consolation of being able to repose any confidence in the competence of the hands in which its navigation is now placed. (Cheers.) Earl RUSSELL—The noble earl commenced his speech by some remarks, in which he compared wit and facts; but I may, I think, on the present occasion say, with Sheridan, when retorting on his opponent, that the noble earl drew on his imagination for the facts and upon his memory for the wit—(laughter) —for I think the house will agree with me that the wit with which the noble earl regaled the house was not his, but Shakspere's. (Renewed laughter.) With regard, to her Majesty's Government having lost the con fidence, and friendship of other sovereign powers, so far from that being the case, we are in most friendly relations with them, and communications of the most amicable cha racter are being daily carried on with Governments who place their trust and confidence in us. The noble earl ;stated that our policy consisted in non-intervention in the internal affairs of other countries, and in an alliance with France. I must confess that with regard to the prin.. ciple of non-intervention, the practice of intervening in the internal affairs of other countries is not only objec tionable in itself, but always fails in its object, and aggra vates the evils it was intended to cure. The experience which we have had of late only tends to confirm me in that view. (Hear.) The noble lord goes on to say that se far from carrying out our line of policy we have diverged from and offended France. If the noble lord wishes us to adopt the policy which is attributed to the leader of his party in the House of Commons, we should indeed accept whatever France chose to suggest —we should have no opinion but French opinion —no will but French will—no policy but French policy—but I say that that is a policy which we cannot accept. (Cheers.) With regard to the expedition to Mexico, we stated from the beginning that we did not go there to interfere with the internal affairs of that country. It same to be a question with the French what should be the future government of that 'country, but we said that that was not the question which we had come to settle, that upon that point we should separate from France, because we simply went there to obtain redress for our grievances and reparation for the injuries we had suffered. We did not go there to set up an emperor, or any other potentate, to rule over the people. (Hear.) The Earl of DERBY—I beg the noble earl's pardon. I said distinctly that when the objects of the expedition were extended, I did not blame her Majesty's Government for withdrawing from that expedition. Earl RUSSELL—If the noble earl does not blame us, why did he mention that topic? If it was an offence to France how could we help differing from them on that sub ject ? My opinion on that question is vary different from that of the noble earl, and I think that the Emperor of the French, though his policy might be different from ours, gave full weight to the considerations and the policy of the British Government. I believe that he is too just to attri bute the adoption of the polies , which we thought right to adopt to differences we had with him. The noble earl says that we differed with France about the recognition of the Southern States—but no proposal was ever made by us on that subject. There was a proposal, indeed, made for mediation, in order to reconcile the Southern States with the Northern States, and if it had been deemed proper to propose such a mediation it might have led ultimately to a proposal for the recognition of the Southern States. It was not, however, considered advisable to make such a proposal, it being thought that if France made the proposal alone there would be a much better chance of reconciliation than if it were a joint pro posal. (Hear, hear.) I believed that the whole country ap proved of the resolution to which her Majesty's Government came upon that question. The noble earl referred to a par ticularly painful subject—l mean Poland —and he said that her Majesty's Government had disappointed Austria and France in its policy with respect to that country, and more than that, that we had by the encouragement we had given to the Poles aggravated the horrors of their position. That is only one among the many incorrect statements which have been made on this subject. It was not the fact that we were acting entirely by ourselves, and differing from Aus tria on this subject. On the contrary, there were constant communications between Vienna and London, and we be came aware that Austria would be most unwilling, on Aus trian considerations alone, on questions which had reference to Austrian finance, and others which had reference to the rights of Polish subjects of Austria, to put their differences with Russia to the arbitrament of war. (Hear, hear.) And what was the general aspect of the question ? My belief is that you would have had not to recognise Poland, not to fight for the Poles, but to make a Poland, and in making a Poland you would have had to make it as the insurgents of the country wished it to be made, not only to constitute a new kingdom of Poland, but so toconstitute it as to include those western provinces of Prussia which were formerly , Polish. (Hear, hear.) But that would have been a ques tion so enormous, involving as it did the dismemberment of the Russian empire, that it was not to be undertaken with. out the clearest view that the object aimed at could be obtained, and without the full consideration of the great sacrifices that would have to be made. The Government were of opinion that it was not advisable to enter into that war, and therefore I confess that, in concert with Austria, we declined to take any step which might involve us in the further step of hostilities against Russia. When it was proposed to us to write an identical note, we declined to join in it. When it was proposed to consider what further measures should ba adopted in case Russia should refuse our proposal, her Majesty's Government, in concert with Austria, declined to join in it. Were we wrong in not me ditating or intending war for the sake of this Poland, in confining ourselves to sympathy with these brave people and refusing to commit ourselves to hostilities ? I believe the opinion of this country was at that time—and it is still more strong at this moment—against going to war for Po land. (Hear.) The noble earl said that the course the Government took in this respect was calculated to aggravate the evils of the Polish insurgents. I thought differently. I thought the telling the Poles that it was our determina tion not to go to war for them was the way to induce them not to expect an exercise of our arms in their favour, and I think it is one of the most cruel things in the world to lead people to take up arms in the expectation of your support, when you do not intend to give it them, Entertaining that opinion 1 declared plainly in this house last session that it was not our intention to go to war for the Poles. This de cision may have disappointed the Government of France at the moment, but I believe that the Government of France is now persuaded that the French people were by no means willing to enter into that war, that the inclination of the French people—and lam happy to dee that such is the case —is in favour of peace with foreign nations, and they would not have approved of a costly and burdensome war. Then the noble earl taunted us with not having agreed with the Emperor of the French on the subject of the con gress. I confess I considered the proposal was made to us as an invitation. I did not consider there was an obliga tion upon us to accept it—l considered that it was free to us to accept or decline it. If that was the case, and I con sider that such was the intention of the Emperor of the French, we had to consider what was intended to be done at that congress. We asked, therefore, in the first place, what were the topics to be brought forward, and how it was expected that the difficulties were to be solved P When we received an answer to that despatch we considered the matter again; we considered it most carefully and most se riously, and we came to the conclusion that the solution was not likely to be pacific, and that if it were not to be pacific it would be a great disappointment to the powers of Europe that the works of the congress should be entirely null and void. (Hear, hear.) The two main topics to be brought forward were the topics of Poland and Venetia. With regard to Poland, it would have had reference to the course pursued lay Russia. I put a question to the Russian ambassador on the subject, and I found that the Emperor would not maintain that which he had already maintained in his correspondence with France, Great Britain,and Aus tria. I asked the Austrian ambassador what would be the course of his Government with reference to a proposal in respect to Venetia. He said the Austrian Government were determined not to listen to a proposal for the cession or exchange of Venetia. Then upon these two great topics had we made proposals to Russia on the subject of Poland, the answer would have been a refusal, and if we had made proposals to Austria on the subject of Venetia, the answer would also have been a refusal. What then was to be the end of the congress ? Were we to be brought into a war in consequence of those refusals, or were we to be satisfied with nothing being done ? Those were our objections to the congress— those were our honest opinions. The noble lord seems to think that our answer was very rude and curt. But we had expressed our opinion, and had given our rea sons in long despatches, and in our first despatch we gave credit to the Emperor of the French for the motives by which he was actuated—for his desire to put an end to discord, and to establish the general peace of Europe upon a more solid foundation. But with regard to the reasons put forth for such a congress, is not the British Govern ment entitled to form its own opinion or to use its own arguments when a great plan like this is proposed, which is published to Europe without any notice to or concert with her Majesty's Government ? Was this Government entitled to consider for itself whether such a plan was likely to promote the peace of Europe or to have a contrary effect? Upon this question, and also upon the questions with regard to Mexico and the United States of America, I claim that which is not a great deal to claim for a power like England, that she should have the right of framing her own policy, and of being governed by her own views of the interests of Europe, not borrowing them from any other power, how ever great that power may be. (Cheers.) The noble earl has made many comments, but not altogether correct as to facts, with respect to the great subject on which every one must be anxious—namely, the question of the differences between Germany and Denmark. (Hear.) Upon that subject I can only give your lordships a bare outline of the course which has been taken, of the views taken by the German powers, and of the views which her Majesty's Government have taken. In the first place, during the reign of the late King of Denmark the Diet of Frankfort came to a resolution upon the subject. But before Igo into the details - I must state that there were two in fact separate questions, although they have been very much mixed up with each other. In the year 1850, in the month of July, there was a meeting at the Foreign-office, at which Austria, France, Great Britain, and Russia were represented, at which it was agreed —at least by Great Britain, France, and Russia—that the main tenance of the integrity of the Danish monarchy was an object connected with the balance of power and conducive to the peace of Europe. On the 2d of August of the same year that proposition was reduced to a protocol, consisting of several articles, one of which was specially directed to the desirability of maintaining the i n t egr i ty o f t h e D an i s h monarchy, and another commended the wisdom of the King of Denmark in endeavouring to provide and arrange such a succession to the crown of Denmark as might enable his successor to fulfil his federal obligations. On the 23d of August Austria acceded to that. The war in Holstein, and the negotiations which took place afterwards, all ended in the treaty of May, 1852, which proceeded upon the state ments made in 1850—the treaty signed by the noble earl opposite (the Earl of Malmesbury)—and which recognised the succession to the crown of Denmark, and all the terri tories then under the sceptre of Denmark, in the person of Prince Christian, now Christian IX, of Denmark. It is true, the Government of Saxony did not use the term "accede," but used the term "assent," and they used it with an appli cation of terms of eulogy upon the framers of the treaty which would:havelnduced:any Government —either the pre sent Government or that of the noble earl opposite—to ex pect that this power would have been one of the first to main tain and recognise the benefits of the treaty of 1852, With the despatch of the minister of the King of Saxony of Dec. 9, 1852, before them, the least that any Government of Europe could expect would have been that the first to ris t in favour of the treaty would have been the King of Saxony. Yet one of the main movers and agitators against the treaty of 1852 has been this very Saxon minister that signed the letter to which I have alluded. I hope this will be taken as an instance of the difficulties which any Government must experience in dealing with a question under these circura • stances—of the difficulty which must be found in maintain ing a treaty, when the very persons who acknowledged its powers and obligations are among the first to destroy its provisions and to denounce its tendency. (Hear, hear.) There are other engagements with which her Majesty's Go vernment have nothing directly to do, which were a conse quence of the war carried on in Schleswig, and engagements taken by the King with regard to certain portions of his do minions. The King engaged to fulfil all his federal obliga tions, and Austria and Prussia engaged, on their part, to respect the decision of the King of Denmark that Holstein and Schleswig should be entirely separated and not reunited. I quite agree with the noble earl in his expression of regret that these engagements did not form part of any treaty or convention, but were contained only in the notes of the Austrian and Prussian ministers on the one side and of the Danish minister on the other, They were followed up by a proclamation of the King of Denmark, which is considered by the Germans to be in accordance with and in pursuance of the treaty. There has been ever since 1851 a controversy going on between Germany and Denmark, Germany re proaches Denmark with not having fulfilled her part of the obligations, with not having governed Holstein according to the federal ties. The Danes on their side say that the demands made by Germany and their interpretation of the engagements of the treaty were such that it would be im possible for Denmark to comply with them. I believe there is a great deal of truth in both these accusations. Lord Wodehouse, who spoke last year on the subject, said the King of Denmark was bound in honour to fulfil his engage ments, but that Germany was bound not to make it impos sible for him to fulfil them. such being the state of the case, with this constant and bitter controversy going on, the German Diet came to the conclusion on the Ist of October to order the federal execution to take place. But they did not observe the rule which they ought to have observed, that the only territory of Holstein, and that they ought not therefore to go beyond its limits. They, on the contrary, put into the decree various other decrees which had since 1858 been passed by the Federal Diet, one of which was that there should be a common constitution in which each of the four parts of the Danish dominion should have a separate government and constitution, not dependent upon the rest. The interpretation which the Germans had given to this was that the Danes being the majority, and the Ger mans the minority in the proportion of 10 to 16, the minority should have the power in the general parliament of Copen hagen of becoming a majority and governing the whole kingdom. Her Majesty's Government represented to the Diet that it was impossible that part of the decree could stand, and that it was destructive to the interests of the Danish monarchy. That proposition has been with drawn and is no longer, as I understand insisted upon, That decree was in course of execution when on the 15th Nov. the King of Denmark died. From that moment there has been increased agitation in Germany, and the subject of that agitation has not been the federal rights which from 1851 have formed the matter in dispute, not the fulfilment by Denmark of her en gagements with respect to Sleswig and Holstein, but the question of the succession to the crown, a question most hap pily and wisely settled by the treaty of 1852. The German Diet had taken a very extraordinary course in the question, and when I say so I do not except the great powers of Aus tria and Prussia, because I really think their course has been most unintelligible. It is obvious that there were two courses to be taken. Germany might have said, we entirely repel the treaty of 1852, we acknowledge the Prince of Augustenburg as Duke of Holstein, and we will send our armies to ensure to him the succession of the duchy of Schleswig which he claims as well. That would have been a course which would have been inconsistent with the treaties that have been signed, it would have been a course involv ing the destruction of Denmark—it would have destroyed the integrity of the Danish monarchy, and it would have establish the supremacy of Germany in Denmark, but at the same time it would have been a clear and decided course There is another course which everybody expected, that at least Austria and Prussia would have followed, which was to say, "We have already decided to recognize Prince Christian as the successor to the Danish monarchy and to the Duchies of Schleswig and Holstein, we will not depart from our engagements in that respect, we knew perfectly well the right of the Diet when we signed these treaties, and we did not regard them as at all controlling our power or diminishing our rights, We hold to the succession as established, and while we agree in the federal obligations we cannot for a moment listen to these pretensions." They did not take that course—Austria and Prussia were left almost alone, but they concurred that the question of the succession should be suspended. Now the fact is that this impression was at the bottom of the whole dispute. What, then, became the character of the federal execution? On the one side it was execution against the King of Denmark as rightful Duke of Holstein, and it was justly said that, as he had inherited the rights he also inherited the wrongs of his predecessor, and that if the late king had not governed Hol stein according to federal rights, federal execution was neces sary. But, unhappily, Saxony and some other powers who were to take part in that execution did not recognize Prince Christian, and Prussia herself did not receive him in Berlin. When the foreign troops arrived in Holstein all the royal insignia of the King of Denmark were torn down, and the Duko of Augustenburg was allowed to canvass the whole country. Nothing could be more inconvenient than this double course of the two powers—Austria and Prussia ; but on the 13th January they made another proposition, and that was that they should hold Schleswig as a material guarantee in order to enable the German Diet to enforce the obligations of nil. The other Powers said that that would be inconsistent with their declaration that the Duke of Augustenburg was Duke of Schleswig, because if you go into Schleswig on these grounds you acknowledge the right of Denmark, Austria, and Prussia to go into Schleswig to maintain the material guarantee; but, at the same time, there is obviously some disposition to promote the cause of the Duke of Augustenburg. On the Ist October I pointed out in what way the federal execution went beyond the powers of the Diet, and we afterwards proposed a conference, at which all the Powers that had signed the treaty of Lon don should be represented, and on the 31st December fol lowing a despatch was communicated, in which we recom mended the Diet rather to submit the question in dispute to friendly Powers than to force on a war of which no one could foresee the issue. (Hear.) That proposition was referred to a committee, but that committee has, I believe, never re ported. Several persons have t o ld us th a t it wou ld be quite impossible to send representatives to any conference, because they differed so much amongst themselves that it would be quite impossible for any individual properly to represent them. (Hear, hear.) At the same time, however, the pro ceedings of Austria and Prussia went on, and I cannot won der that Austria and P russ i a s h ou ld take the matter into their own hands, and refuse to submit to the Diet ; for when you consider what these Powers are, and the extent of their resources, it would be ridiculous to suppose that they would leave the decision of such questions io the Duke of Coburg or other small potentates. It would have been really too much to expect. (Hear, hear.) But the conduct of Austria and Prussia themselves has been almost as unintelligible es that of the smaller Powers, and, I must add, nearly as re prehensible, because, having determined upon goi ng i nto Holstein they sent to Denmark a . requisition to rev o k e the constitution of November last i n 48 hours. We were of opinion that this constitution was inconsi s t ent with the engagem ents of 1851, and in November or December we discovered that other persons were of otfhensuasnosiae opinion, for the Government of the Emperor then communicated to us a prop osa l t h at a person should be sent from the Russian corn t t o congratulate Kin.. Chris tian on his accession, and at th e same time to advise° the re vocation of the constitution of 1863, as being inconsistent with the constitution of 1851, The French Government re commended the same course, and accordingly my noble friend (Lord .Wodehouse) proceeded to Copenhagen and ad vised the revocation of the constitution, whilst the French and Swedish envoy s , w i thout making any particular recom mendation as t o th at constitution, urged upon the King of Denmark to do everything to conciliate the German Gover nments, and to fulfil all his engagements. The mission was not at first successful. Most unfortunately, the Minister who had then for some time ruled in Denmark under the late King, being no doubt moat patriotic in his views, was ene . most extreme and violent in his views in favour of th Danish people, which views were hardly consistent with justice to the King's German subjects. On the advice of this Minister the King refused the proposition, and dis solved the Parliament; but a few days after he changed his Minister and appointed M. Monrad, who was able to find a colleague in the person who had formerly been envoy at Berlin. Frum that time the whole course of Danish polies was changes', and the Danish Ministers showed their readi ness to make any concession that wa,g compatible with the integrity of the Danish monarchy. -Um'ertunatelynhowever, this was not to be done very quickly. The King of Den mark was bound by the obligations of a constitutional King and could not take any course which sva.y inconsistent with the constitution of the country. He could only ask for a revocation of the constitution in a constin alone: manner— namely, by summoning the Rigsdag, and thus postponing the question for some weeks. At the seine time the new Minister told the Rigsdag that if they expected the integrity of the Danish monarchy to be maintained they must ob serve all the engagements which the late King had left unsatisfied. But the more willing the Danes were to give way, the less Austria and Prussia were disposed to give time; and I may say that when we proposed that six weeks should be given to the Danish Government the proposition was peremptorily rejected both at Berlin and Vienna. We then, in order to give security to Austria and Prussia, pro posed that a protocol should be prepared in the names of France. Great Britain, Russia, and Swed en, recording the intention of the Danish Governm, ant with re spect to the revocation of the constitution, s.) that if that constitution was not immediately revoked Denmark would no longer have any excuse. Both these steps had the con currence of France, Russia, and Sweden as to time time to be given, although not as to the revocation of the constitution. The first proposal, to grant six weeks, was made byFrance, the next was made by Great Britain, and the third by Russia and each and every one was met by a peremptory refusal on the part of Austria and Prussia. Now, I must say, con sidering what has followed —considering especially how Austria has hitherto valued the peace of Europe—consider ing that she has always been the conservative power in the centre of Europe, I am surprised that she did not hesitate before rejecting the propositions made by France and Rus sia, and that her readiness to rush into this war hassome thing in it as unintelligible as it is melancholy. (Hear, lean) Austria and Prussia now declare that is too late to-main tain peace, and their excuses aro, I confess, such as to give me extreme pain. But there is a point in all the despatches upon which both Austria and Prussia emphatically dwell, and that is their own position in Germany. They represent that if,having prepared o invadeSchleswig, they had stopped in their course,there would have been such a commotion in Germany, such a marching of volunteer armies in Holstein as would have exposed them to the risk of civil war. This may be true, but one cannot help thinking it hard that Denmark, not for refusing conciliatory propositions, not for any misconduct on her own part, not because there was any reason to suppose that in six weeks or in three months she would not give satisfaction to all the German dens rods, but because there were fears of German disaffection, Imust be invaded, and must bear the brunt of an assault - which was intended to prevent commotion elsewhere. (hear, hear.) The statements made by the Germans are than they are for Germany becoming one great empire; but surely, if that be their object, why, in God's name, cannot :lorty millions of people effect that object without attac king Denmark andinvading Schleswig ? (Hear, hear.) I say that the fate of Denmark is an unhappy one, between thee( two parties. One parry says, "We wish to be a united .Ger• many, therefore, let us attack Denmark;" the other E ay's. "We wish to stop democratic agitation in Germany,, a d therefore let us go and attack Denmark." (Hear.) WI ether by democrats or conservatives, the destruction of Den mark seems to be equally determined on. I certainly cann, )t ad mire those feelings, and when it was at last proposed that there should be an invasion of Schleswig, I thought it; ne cessary to ask whether those two powers —more espeoTally the more conservative of the two—whether they ack n ow ledged the Treaty of London of 1852, or whether they 'were about to march into Schleswig for some purpose inconsis tent with it. I had a right to ask this question, for those two great Powers had in no way repudiated the Treaty of Lon don, and, on the other hand, they had consented that the question of the succession in Denmark should be kept in abeyance. I have received to-day the answer to that ques tion, and I shall take the liberty of reading both the ques tion we asked and the answer we received, leaving it to your lordships and to future events to decipher and inter pret the fair meaning of that answer. The question put by Sir A. Buchanan was as follows:—" The undersigned CAn hassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary of her Britannic Majesty has the honour to acquaint his excellency M. de Bismarck Schonhausen, the minister resident and Minister for Foreign Affairs of his Majesty the King of Prussia, that the Government of the Queen his august sovereign, havin g been informed that the Governments of Austria and Prussia , have addressed a threatening summons to Denmark, he has been instructed to ask for a formal declaration on the part of the Prussian Government that it adheres to the principle of the integrity of the Danish monarchy." And to it we received the following answer " Be-lin, January 31, 1864.. " 111. Le Comte,—The government of the King, by basing on the stipulations of 1851-2 the rights which, in concert wit Ii Austria, it is proceeding to enforce upon Denmark, has 1):,v this very aet recognised the principle of the integrity of the. Danish monarchy as established by the transactions of 1851-52. The Government of the King, in proceeding to the ! occupation of Schleswig., does not intend to depart from this principle. If, however, in consequence of complications which may be brought about by the persistence of the Danish Government in its refusal to accomplish its promines of 1852, or by the armed intervention of other Powers in the Dano-German conflict, the King's Government was to find itself compelled to renounce combinations which would no longer offer a result proportionate to the sacrifices which events might impose upon the German Powers, no definitive arrangements could be made without the concurrence of the Powers who signed the treaty of London. T.ho British Government would then find the King's Govern ment ready to come to an agreement with them as to the definitive arrangement of the Dano-German questic n. Your Excellency is requested to read and give a covey of this despatch to Earl Russell.—(Signed) BISMARCK." I have already said it would depend on events to give an interpretation to that answer. It may be that, hay.ing occupied Schleswig, or only part of Schleswig, Austria amid Prussia would be ready to consider with other Powers what may be fairly demanded of Denmark consistently with the integrity of the Danish monarchy. If they should be mode rate in their propssals, and if the other powers of Europe be anxious for peace, as I believe them to be, it may be Bible to arrive at a permanent and advantageous arrange ment of this difficult affair ; and her Majesty's Governmei rt would greatly rejoice at such an issue. We have made man y —some will say too many—efforts towards the preservation of peace in the way of advising the various parties to make concessions, whilst at the same time we have not advised anything which does not put Denmark in a better position by putting her in the right. " Thrice is he armed who hath his quarrel just." We advised no concession to Den mark which it was not right for her to yield, and at no time have we given any assistance, nor even hopes of ma, terial assistance. The Danish minister has repeatedly said to me, " We expect no material assistance from this coun try, all we expect is sympathy." That is the state of our engagements as regards Denmark, but what the future ;nay bring forth it would be rash for me to predict. It would' be rash even to attempt an outline of what may happen with the troops actually fighting in the di s p u t e d territory. Ido ask to-night, having stated in as far as I could what has e taken place, and intending as soon as possible to givelrth ac tual papers that have passed, Ido ask that your dshi for the peace of Europe, for the welfare of Denmark r r m e of G y , e a r n m cl ani cr . shallosan I may agree to decide, as events may arise, whatbest a be i :s.yin dependentth ngd i n 1 uk' there°m alsoforthe great dang real erfor we o ro lf e a Germany Europe in the present transactions which are taki ng p l ace in those different countries, It is obvious that for some years—perhaps not for many years—but for some 30 or 40 years—the people of Europe has not chosen to sit down with despotism and not wished to adopt republican forms of go.. vernment. They have fallen back upon that which, if wisely framed and conducted with moderation, is the best form of government, and is the most consistent with true liberty, and the best interests of man --the form of constitutional government. But at the same time it is a difficult form of government, and especially so if not conducted with modera tion, for it is apt to break out with violent acts of authorili upon one side, and violent acts of rebellion upon the otker. Happily for the interests of this country, for the past t svo centuries moderation has been the distinguishing char: ec teristic of our conflicts, and the issue to these realms has been a constitutional and peaceful solution. But to speak of other countries, let Us turn to Greece. There it was thought necessary to change the monarch, because the people wevn not satisfied he was following a constitutional course. Then, again, look at Spain, there the friends of liberty have taken a course which they think favourable to liberty, but it is not consistent with our ideas, for they have adopted the course of not presenting the budget to the Cortes, There is evi dently the greatest confusion in that country upon the sub ject. Then, again, turn to Prussia. It is said that if the budget be adopted by two out of the bodies which comp - 5.9 the state, it is complete. But that is not quite con sistent with the power allowed in England to the House of Commons. But in Prussia the House of Commons is as extravagant on the other side. It is the constitutiomil right of the monarch to make treaties, ; but the House of Commons of Prussia think they ought to throw aside rho treaty made by the King and thus deprive him of his con stitutional powers. I mention these t hings as being incon sistencies existing in reference to conssatutional government solution or in Germany, and they may lead tea a happy of last —and these are questions which are. now being discussed . lead to a bloody and a long conflict. In the course g, an d the the Emperor of Austria propose A some refo i r a the King of Prussia declared for c,onstitutio r n n a ment, and govern ment, and also proposed another fer al of Tee suggestions your lordships may depend upon it that will r before long made will not fall to the ground. great plague to be seen whether Germany is to become These are the pies herself, or a great terror to all E ur°l9 of Europe. The Ent arise a great demand for German praareleira:ments, ques tions which really affect the: fut;rhe sagacity and wis dom, of the French, I belie ye, wtor greathispeople, and it will but he is like has aiven greater p the philosopher who had power to of truth, and could only