The Sun. — London, England, 1854-02-21 00:00:00

this house, and I only touch upon these circumstances at all that my statement may be complete. He arrives at 'Constantinople. I need say nothing about the despatch of Colonel Rose, one of most able and most ill-used of public men. (Hear, hear, from the Opposition.) What does Colonel Rose tell you ? He tells you of the arrogant bear ing of the Rassian Minister—he tells you of the secret - threats of the Porte—he tells you that a Turkish secretary of state has been ignominiously expelled—he tells you that the Prime Minister threatens to resign, and that the Grand Vizier sends for him (Colonel Rose) , and informs him that the independence of Turkey is at stake. He himself 'expresses in his despatch that the circumstances are most exigent, and that unless some step is taken, he can no longer answer for the independence of Turkey or for the haleness of power. (Hear, hear.) He tells you all this. I hardly stop to criticise these important circumstances ; and if Ido stop at all, it is only to answer an argument which has been urged in this house, and also in the other House of Parliament, viz., that Colonel Rose, when he demanded that our fleet should be sent to the Greek waters, was precipitate in making that request, because he afterwards acknowledged that the arrival of the fleet was unnecessary. But it seems to be forgotten that it was notorious, not only at Constantinople but at Paris, that Colonel Rose had sent for the fleet; and that an alteration in the tone of the Russian envoy was occasioned by this announcement. (Hear, hear.) That was the naturaaldino ference ; and whilst Iwill never quote from a p rity in this house, althoughin this casel posses s ri the highest yet I say that this was the fact. Well, yo u had these des patches of Colonel Rose, and not only t hese des p atches, but you had on the the 19th of March (when Colonel Rose was writing) Sir H. Seymour--not _a m an who . is distinguished by his want of confidence R uss ia -not a man who would be eager to describe the conduct of Count Nesselrode as fraudulent—and I should say as great a dip lomatist as probably ever flourished at a northern court— how does he write? Before I presume to read an extract, I beg the house to believe me that it is not merely for cri tical observation that I for a moment entreat their atten tion to this despatch--I have an object in so doing —I have a result to offer to the house, upon the merits of which the house will decide; but I cannot fairly . put it before the justice in the investigation with house with any regard to out „f urr i n g to this document. Well, how does Sir H. Seymour write ? While Colonel Rose was despatching by every means and every opportunity the most agitated mis sives that were ever sent by a dipl oma ti s t , on th e 19 t h M ar ch Sir H. Seymour says, that he asked Count Nessel rode, "What credit was to be attached t o th e rumours , which reached me from so many quarters, as to military preparations in the course of being made?" Count Nessel rode answers, that he believed he might state that I had not been correctly informed. Sir H. Seymour then in quires, " Does your excellency authorise me to assert that you are not arming, or am I only to report that you be lieve you are not arming?" (L aug ht er .) C ou nt Nessel rode replies, "I will not assert, but I have reason to be lieve—(renewed laughter) —that the tendency is rather to slacken than to urge on military preparation." Sir H. Seymour then says, " I apprehend this relaxation of pie , partition to allude to the order for the purchase of horses, which has been rescinded." Well, after all this—after all the despatches of Colonel Rose—after this despatch from Sir H. Seymour, which I have just read, what is the tone of' the new Secretary of State? What is the tone of the statesman who drew up the instructions to Lord Strat ford? What effect is produced upon him by all that he • read and all that he hoard ?On the 22d (of March) he writes to Lord Cowley, and of course reports to that able man, in nearer contiguity with him, his impression. He says, " I had yesterday a long interview with Count liralewaki upon the events that have recently taken place at Constantinople." Let the house remember what those events were—the Turkish Ministry expelled, and the Grand Vizier announcing that the independence of his country is at stake, secret intimations that treaties would be demanded that would destroy Turkey— the personal explanation of Colonel Rose that even the balance of power was at stake— and the despatch of Sir H. L'eymour, showing how un satisfactory was his communication with Count Nessel rode. Lord Clarendon gave this as his private, but calm and dispassionate summary of all that had occurred to Lord Cowley at Paris " When the intelligence from Con stantinople was analysed, and divested of the colouring imparted to it by local excitement, there was but one fact to deal with." What was that ? Was it the armament of Russia ? No ; that " Prince Menschikoff lied declined to hold official intercourse with Fuad. Eireudi the Turkish Minister. Lord Clarendon says he had informed Count Walewski that Fusel EXereli had resigned, " but Prince Menschikoff had not required this, and he had declared that no disrespect was intended to the Sultan by the omis sion of the customary visit to his minister." This is the summary of Lord Clarendon of all these events. Lord Clarendon not only denounces, I must say, the order of l i Col. RO3O for advancing the British fleet, but he absolutely expresses himself glad that Admiral Dundas had not obeyed him, and even regrets the order given to the French admi ral to proceed to the Greek waters, treating France with this sententious dogma that certainly will not soon be for gotten, or which will last at least as long as the war, viz., that "a policy of suspicion was neither wise nor safe." Lord Clarendon adds, and it is of great importance to notice it, that "her Majesty's Government were disposed to place re hence on the Emperor of Russia's solemn assurances to up hold the Turkish empire ; " and that he was " bound to believe that the mission of Prince Menschikoff was not of a character menacing to the independence and integrity of Turkey." Now, I must again remind the house that we have no evidence, so far as I can recollect, in the state papers on the table, of these personal assurances of the Emperor. I do not say that it may not be most discreet and wise on the part of the Government not to give us the despatches in which these assurances are made, but in the absence of the documents we are bound to speculate on what may be their possible character; and judging from all the antece dents in our position, it is quite possible that the Emperor of Russia may have said to air H. Seymour —as, I believe, he has said to great personages in this country and in other countries—that nothing would induce him to take any step to destroy the independence and integrity of the Ottoman empire ; that he sought no territorial aggrandisements ; and that that was a policy which he wasperfectly ready to maintain. All this is perfectly consistent with everything which has, up to this period, occurred on the part of Rus sia, and respecting which our Government asked no ex planation. Now, I cannot presume to apologise for react ing the language of a Minister of State on a subject of this importance, because, if I make the statement from mere recollection, I shall be told in the debate that I have given a false colour to or have garbled a despatch. I have quoted nothing front these despatches but to illustrate one idea. Now, what does Lord Clarendon write to our ambassador at Constantinople at the same time, " that our Govern ment feels no alarm at the reports of Colonel Rose—that we feel quite secure that the objects of Prince Menschis koff's mission, whatever they may be" (so that therefore, at this period, the Ministry had no description by Russia of what those objects were; but Lord Clarendon says)— "The objects of Prince Menschikoff, whatever they may be, do not expose the authority of the Sultan, or the in , tegrity of his dominions; so far from thinking that Tur key has anything to apprehend" (and he goes out of his way to accuse our only solitary ally in Europe, and says) " oar only grounds for apprehending embarrassment is the position which has been for some time ocdupied by France with respect to the holy places, a question really settled." Well, I am not surprised when I trace the policy of her Majesty's Government as indicated through all their despatches up to this moment, that Count Nes selrode should have told our minister at St. Pe tersburg, that he looked very hopefully to a peaceable solu tion of this question ; and the hon. gentleman who intro duced this discussion—and, I must say, in a speech which did not disappoint the expectations of the house (cheers)-- who was quite entitled to introduce the subject, not only from his former connection with the embassy at Constan tinople, but from the great ability that he has shown on other subjects, and his general knowledge of the East— the hon. member for Aylesbury (Mr. Layard) very properly touched upon that very extraordinary despatch, which, at this time, came from St. Petersburg, in which we are in formed that the Emperor of Russia is grateful for the salu tary impulse given to the policy of this country by the accession of Lord Aberdeen and Lord Clarendon to office. (Hear.) In that despatch the hon. gentleman reminded us that we are told that the Emperor of Russia was grate ful to Lord Aberdeen for that renewed instance of his confidence—(hear, hear)—and the hon. gentleman quoted , a phrase which amused the house, and I believe has some what diverted the country—namely, what was happy irony when Count Nesselrode complimented Lord Aberdeen on the bold Hie ho was playing (Laughter.) But I think that the hon. member for Aylesbury Made a great mistake in that quotation, which was somewhat short if I remember right. The first minister of the country is complimented by Count Nesselrode, not merely on the new and boll rule he is playing, but that bold rdle is defined ; and what is that definition l—namely, that he has left France ieole. (Hear, hear.) Now, sir, I will refer very slightlyto therestofthose despatches ; but it is absolutely necessary, I think, in justice to the Government as well as to the point which I wish to impress upon the house, and at which I am now rapidly ar riving, that I should not leave out several passages,because I do not wish to be told hereafter that I stated the case unfairly. On the Ist of April Colonel Rose informed the country of the secret invention which Prince Menschikoff proposed. Colonel Rose had not been looked upon as an authority ; but there was a timely vindication of the discrimination and sagacity of Colonelßose, because in ten days afterwards, on the 11th of April, Lord Stratford arrives at Constantinople, and confirms everything that Colonel Rose stated, not in that original despatch, but in the des patch of the let of April, in which he gives a minute ac count of the secret convention proposed by Russia. (Hear, bear.) 'should suppose that an incident that was confirmed by Lord Stratford would have opened the eyes of those who talk so much of Russian duplicity, but who seem to have forgotten that there may be an English quality of an op posite character. (Laughter.) Yet after this, the Earl of Clarendon writes thus—after all the information from Colonel Rose is confirmed by the highest authority, Lord Stratford—after Lord Stratford has announced that Rus sia is trying to obtain a secret convention from Turkey which would destroy its independenoe, Lord Clarendon motes to Sir George Seymour, May tint 16th : "That her 4 ▪ Laiesty' Government being compelled either to think th a prince ze Menschikoff had exceeded his instructions, or to doubt t entertai n th assurances they had received, they did not e latter alternative." Now, when Lord Cla s,rlideorlalisi a tr e e s duces the question of an alternative, he says, the frank ja tys Government have felt the advantage of of Rnsmia,,,nd friendly explanations offered by the Emperor 3,7 1 1 , ' 1 icb never h ave b een seen b y th e H ouse o f Commons, prehensions which enabled them to disregard the ap coupled with the the proceedings of Prince Menschikoff, gitary preparations, had not unnatu rally produced. Mensehikoff leaves ear, hear.) Immediately after, Prince C onstantinople ; and on June the Bth Count .Nesselrode, a nd9patch to Baron Brunow, to be delivered to Lord C l ar end on, No V i p, announced the occupation of the principalities. s will not refer to that despatch, because I think that ev a:VI:2 r is familiar with it, and if they look to it they the argument I am about to offer s the bearing of it on de spatch proves—if the view of th e ore I say that that de 'violence and perfidy—violenc e again Go vernment be right— announces that, because Turkey has' Tur key, ne because it to its dictation in a course which Tarke y b : i ll e nsen to yield its independence, Russia had resolved to lisl e es menaces force—(hear); —and perfidy, because, according t o the • to of the Government, Count Nesselrode had, up to that eview mo ment, been , deceiving them. (Hear, hear.) w ith re d to the latter point, what does be say in the despatch ? 9 He says that, from th© very first he had comninnicated to the Government of England his intentions with reg ar d to Turkey. (Hoar, bear.) When the Russian army occ u . pies the provinces, the Russian Minister declares that hi s Sovereign has remained faithful to his d eclarati on t o the English Government, and th at be did not, oe conceal front them that the time might come when would be obliged to have recourse to arm s. He comp l i ments the English Government on the friendly disposition it has shown, blaming France. and t hro wing the bla me all men in the s of Prince Mensehikoff's failure, o f world, on Lord Stratford. (Hear, hear.) We want to have this declaration of the Emperor of Russia ; we want more than the declaration of the Emperor of Russia—we want the despatch. We want the evidence of this ear's , declaration from Count Nesselrode to the English Govern ment, of the whole intentions and policy of his country. THE SUN, LONDON, TUESDAY EVENING, FEBRUARY 21, 1854. (Hear, hear.) I say this aespatch proves violence and per fidy according to the views of the Government. I say, if I it be a fact that the Government were aware of the inten tions of the Russian Government, of course their conduct was not perfidious ; but I say, if the statements in this famous despatch prove violence and perfidy, w' ly is it that Lord Clarendon after all this—after Colonel Rose's decla rations had been confirmed by Lord Stratford—after the occupation of the Principalities—after Count Nesselrode had declared, in his vindication, that from the first the English Government was cognisant of the policy of his country and of the intentions of the Emperor—why is it, after all that occurred, that Lord Clarendon says in his circular, " He does justice to the moderation which has heretofore distinguished the Emperor of Russia's policy, and rests the hope of an amicable conclusion on the Em peror's repeated declaration to respect the integrity of the Turkish empire?' (Hear, hear.) Mind, that is the cir cular of the Secretary o f State after the Chancellor of Russia has publicly declared that the English Government were cognisant from the first of the intentions of the Rus sian Government. (Hear, hear.) I am obliged to curtail, but if I did not refer to the passages, some one would answer me, "It is all very well, but turn to page so and so and you will find a complete answer." I must, there fore, repeat the case fairly and completely as the despatches give it. (Aaar, hear.) But after all this Lord Clarendon writes a despatch on the 4th of July, which, I am bound to say, is a very sensible and spirited performance. (A laugh.) Several pages are expended in proving that he has been taken in. (Laughter.) I will not make any com ment upon it. I would have quoted some passages in his favour, but the impatience of hon. gentlemen opposite will not permit me—(laughter)—and I refer to them for his vindication. (Hear, hear.) Allow me to remind you, sir, that I have now gone over the negotiations from January till the end of July. I have reviewed those negotiations until we approach the Vienna note. There is only another important despatch which I am bound to notice, for it is of the utmost importance. It is a summary of the seven months' negotiations. Lord Clarendon was appealed to by Lord Stratford to take a more decided course, and Lord Stratford said, " that in any case nothing can be worse than a hesitating, uncalculating course." Lord Stratford then tells the English minister "to look an evil in the face, which, if evaded, will return ;" and what is the language of Lord Clarendon in the last despatch which I am going to read ? On the 28th of July he says—" No doubt that France and England, if they set to work in ear nest, may certainly cripple Russia, but Turkey may be wholly and irretrievably ruined, and peaceful negotiation is the only course to pursue." If that were an argument then, it is an argument now. If it were a good argument during the whole course of these negotiations, it is now an argument fatal to the policy of the Ministry who recom mend war. (Cheers.) If the inevitable consequence be the irretrievable destruction of Turkey, why go to war at all? (Hear, hear.) What, then, becomes of this war for the integrity and indegendence of Turkey? (Hear, hear.) Well, sir, Count Wllewski proposes that we then go to the Dardanelles, but Lord Clarendon objects; he says it is a hypothetical arrangement, and he reads to Count Walewski his despatch to Lord Stratford, in which he states that " in case of further aggression or undue delay on the part of Russia, the Government will be pr pared, in conjunc tion with France, to take more active measures." While he objects to hypothetical arrangements, ho advocates a hypothetical policy, and retains the opinion, that if Eng lend and Franco cripple Russia, the destruction of Turkey is irretrievable. (Hear.) I regret that the great apostle oT peace who quoted to-night the instructions of the Secre tary of State to her Majesty's ambassador, to prove that this country has no confidence in the resources or energy of Turkey, omitted to quote that passage also. It would heighten the colouring of his picture, strengthen his case, and enforce his argument, if he could have shown, after seven months of negotiation and official responsibility, that Lord Clarendon, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, writes his soleion opinion, that the active interfer ence of England and France must ensure the irretrievable ruin of Turkey. Now, I shall proceed, if the house will per mit me, to draw what I consider the inevitable conclusion from the despatch to which I have called the particular at tention of the house. (Hear.) Remember that it spreads over a period of seven months—remember that it notices every principal incident—that in January the Russian army was ac on! ilulated upon the Turkish frontier - - remember that the Cabinet of Russia is announcing to her Majesty's minister at the Court of St. Petersburg that his court is about to demand measures of compensation iu favour of the Greek Church—remember that throughout this period we have no formal and pacific demand on Russia to express expli citly what are her intentions—remember that throughout this period of seven months minister after minister sent fruitless warnings to the Secretary of State—they came from St. Petersburg—they came from Constantinople— they are disclaimed and rejected when they come from a charge d'affaires, they are confirmed and authorised by an ambassador—armies are assembling, vague demands are made, haughty, ostentatious missions are sent ; th e P r i me Minister of Turkey tells you that the independence of his country is at stake, your diplomatic agents simult a n eous ly inform you that the balance of power is at issue ; and all this time, in every form—in letters to Constantinople —in despatches to St. Petersburg—in instructions to its own ministers—in conversations with Baron Brunow and with Count Walewski, there is no expression on the part of her Majesty's Government, that there is no cause for alarm. (Hear, hear.) If there be no cause for alarm, why have you diplomatic agents—why should there be any ambas sadors—why should there be any despatches ? (Loud cheers.) Why have you locked up in some secret cabinet the despatch of the Emperor of Russia—why do you not place it under your pillow and sleep in peace, though you may be responsible for the safety of the world ; (Heir.) Let us try to find out then the cause of this war. What I w l% l w t l as i e n er t t h a L firstis this—what ti a n t c i e s e th m a t o the vs Housel a ir lf u C en o e m e Commons (g e l! Government during these seven months, and during their observance of this strange conduct ? (Hear.) Lord Cla rendon talks in one of his letters of an alternative, and I shall offer an alternative also—either the Government was influenced by a degree of confidence which assumed the morbid character of credulity, or they were influenced by connivance. (Cheers, and cries of " hear," from the Opposition benches.) I mean a policy which calculated that it was better that the dissolution, in their opinion— in the opinion of the Secretary of State and of the Prime Minister—should receive the compliments of the Emperor of Russia—a policy that calculated - that it was better, on the whole, that the inevitable dissolution of the Turk ish empire should take place by the indirect means of foreign interference, under those peculiar circumstances, than that England and France should go to war to maintain what are called the integrity and indepen dence of the Porte. Now, sir, that is the alternative which it is most important to decide. Was it cordiality or was it connivance ? And. I beg the house to observe, that on ascertaining that point depends our also ascertain ing what is the object of this war. I believe that the cause of the war has been the conduct in these negotiations, dur ing these seven months, especially of her Majesty's Go vernment. If their conduct has been prompted by credu lity, they may carry on the war with success and spirit. The fact that they are nndevided by the word of an Empe ror is a mournful fact. It is a lamentable circumstance, but it is an incident to which generous minds may be liable; and the very fact that they are undeceived may Animate them to greater exertions, and to efforts which will indicate their conduct to their country and to poste rity. (Cheers.) If this conduct of her Majesty's Govern 'nent during these seven months has been influenced by credulity, it is possible that you may have a war—a long and a severe war -but it will be a war carried out for treat objects. and may end in great public benefit. Russia, by her perfidious conduct—if it have been perfidious —may have postponed a struggle which, perhaps, was inevitable. Russia may be forced at the end of this struggle to a posi tion which may secure the independence of Europe, the safety of England, and the safety of civilisation. You may have a war that may restore Bessarabia to the Porte—you nay have a war that may convert the Crimea into an inde )(indent country, destined to flourish under the guarantee )f the great powers—you may have a war that may make the Danube a free river (cheers)—and you may have a war which will make the Euxine a free sea ; but all this is de pendent upon the somewhat humiliating but pardonable circumstance— the comparatively pardonable circumstance —that her Majesty's Government has seen the consequence of credulity. (Cheers.) But let us for a moment contem plate the results of the alternative. If it has been suggested by connivance, you may have a war; but it will be a war 4uck as will be carried on by connivance—a tyrannous war —a vacillating war—a war with no results, or rather with the exact results which were intended. (Hear, hear.) It is not a war which will place Russia where we think neces sary for the security of Europe and our country, bat it is a war which will end with some transactions similar to Prince Menschikoff's note, or to the arrangements of the Vienna Conference. Now, these are two results-so far opposed—so very different—one, I believe, is welcome to the people of this country, the other is so entirely satisfactory, that I think it does become—it is the duty of this house, even if we " potter over blue-books"— (a laugh), to try to ascertain the truth of these important facts. Sir, I must—late as the hour is I cannot refrain from trespassing a little while on the house—l must do my duty to this subject. (" Oh, oh," from the Ministe rial, answered by vehement counter cheers from the Oppo sition side.) I am not responsible for this debate having been brought forward. On the contrary, I have endea voured to throw no obstacle in the way of the Government obtaining those votes which, whatever may be the opinion of this house, it is 'my conviction it is our duty to grant. But I feel it my duty to complete a fair view of this ques tion ; and I must remind the house that I, along with my noble friend, are almost the only members who have risen on this side of the house to speak on a subject that for twelve months has engaged the interest and for half a year has agitated the passions of this country. I cannot, in spite of the groans of gentlemen on the backest of the benches of the Treasury—(laughter and cheers)—l cannot shrink from fulfilling a painful and a necessary duty. I owe this, not so much to myself, but to those with whom I have the honour and the happiness to act. (Cheers from the Opposition.) I have taken for these seven months important negotiations, ending with a d espatch from a Secretary of State, from which only one inference can be drawn, namely, that under no circumstances ought we to go to war for the integrity and independence of Turkey. I have offered you the only alternative which can explain the strange conduct of the Ministry. I have asked you to decide whether it is credulity or whether it is connivance. But, sir, there is a passage which I must now call the at tention of the noble lord to, b ec ause I think it demands some explanation. You know last year we were not per mitted to touch upon this question. You know last year sometimes a question was asked, and the Military, perhaps not without reason, deprecated discussion. Therefore, I think the noble lord is the last person who ought to com plain of being troubled with enquiries on this question. He must feel that if in 1853 he told the House of Com mons that it was inconvenient to answer questions, in 1854 the creditor would have the right at least to ask that the bargain should be satisfied. (Hear, hear.) It is due to the country and the Government of which the noble lord is a member that he should throw some explanation over the circumstances to which I am going to refer—(hear, hear),—which may assist us to a solu tion of this question, namely, whether the conduct of the Government has been animated by credulity, or whe ther it has been suggested by connivance ? On the 21)th April, 1853, a noble lord who takes a great in foreign affairs in another place addressed some questions to the Secretary of State. The Marquis of Clanricarde adverted —to the alarm recently excited by the announcement of the special mission of Prince Menschikoff from St. Peters burg to Constantinople, and by the French Government having considered this mission to be of such grave import ance as to induce them to send a portion of their fleet to Salamis, circumstances which pointed to the great im portance of a union between England and France. This was the most important inquiry that could then be made, and second only to the interest of the debate which took place at the end of the session, on the motion of Lord Malmesbory. Lord Clarendon expressed a strong opinion with respect to the obligation to maintain the independence and integrity of the Ottoman empire. He stated also, with regard to the mission of Prince Menschikoff, that, the Turkish Government having made to the French Govern. meat certain concessions which appeared to be inconsistent with concessions previously made to the Emperor of Russia, the Emperor of Russia, knowing the great inter. est felt by the Greek population in the holy shrines, de termined upon sending Prince Menschikoff on a special embassy; and that prince was ordered to arrange that mat ter of the holy shrines, and to place it on.a permanent and ! satisfactory footing. Now, at the time when Lord Claren don made that statement, he was fully aware, to put it very briefly—first, that great military preparations were being made by Russia, and secondly, that Prince Menschi koff had spoken of the question of the holy places as a question which he did not understand ; and that, from Colonel Rose's despatches, which he had received more than a month, he was also aware that the real object of the mission of Prince Menschikoff was the securing a treaty with the Porte, which was inconsistent with the interests of England and France, and with the independence of the Porte itself. He was aware that Prince Menschikoff having failed in his object, had left Constantinople. I ask the house was Lord Clarendon justified in making that statement to the House of Lords and to the Par liament of England, when he was in possession of that in formation? What is the condition of the forbearance of the two Houses of Parliament towards Ministers? It is that they should be at least met in a frank and candid spirit ; that if the Minister rises and says it is inconvenient to the public service that an inquiry should be answered, a patrio tic and proper feeling renders every member silent ; but there is a clear understanding that no Minister should rise in his place and mislead the Parliament of this country. And I ask the noble lord, or any of his colleagues that may follow me in this debate, did they, or did they not, think I that Lord Clarendon was justified in the statement he made on the 25th of April in the House of Lords—that statement briefly that Prince Menschikofrs mission was to arrange and dispose of the question of the holy places— when he had information that Prince Menschikoff had ab solutely left Constantinople, and that his object was to obtain a secret convention—secret as respects England and Franco—and inconsistent with the independence of Tur key ? (Cheers.) But we have been told that we have enough of information on this question. We must not " potter over blue books." (A. laugh.) A year ago we made inquiry of the Minister in his place in Parliament — which of all places in the world should animate a man to a noble fulfilment of his duty—and we are met by the usual answer that the inquiry is inconvenient ; but information is given, which information we did not find to be fraudu lent until we had the blue book to " potter over." (A laugh.) I think that the Parliament of England have been treated by a Secretary of State in a harder fashion than they were treated by the Russian Minister. I will give no opinion on the alternative; but what I want hon. gentlemen to do is to apply this alternative to all these documents—to apply this alternative to the representation made by the Secretary of State when he was in possession of Col. Rose's despatches; and I ask you whether that re presentation made by Lord Clarendon was influenced by credulity or connivance ? That is a question which I think should be asked. Well, sir, it is impossible for me not to notice the Vienna note. That is the next phase of these transactions. The noble lord has noticed it, and I shall probably be able to treat it as briefly as any gentleman who ever spoke on so difficult a subject. But the most remark able thing is the language of the noble lord on this remark able document. Here are all the diplomatic wiseacres of Europe—(a laugh)—assembled at Vienna in a conference ; and they draw up a document which Turkey and Russia both agree in ascribing the same meaning to —(hear)—and which meaning is the one not intended • by any of the ministers or diplomatists of Europe. That is the first re markeble circumstance. But the most curious thing is, that the Vienna note, to men of common understanding, in the exact spirit, and almost in the exact shape, if re jecte i by Prince Menschikoff, was at once to be considered as a cants ULU. Is that a species of connivance or not? Is it also a species of connivance when this note is first sent to the Emperor of Russia and accepted by him, that it is then hurried to Constantinople and offered to the Sultan, with hardly a moment's time for consideration, because time is precious, and providentially rejected by him ? How does the noble lord treat• this? Upon the hypothesis of connivance—but I express no opinion, I speak only of facts—it is very easy to understand it. Hav ing intended from the first that there should be no real struggle for the independence and integrity of Turkey— having intended, from the first, that the ultimatum of Prince Menschikoff should have been accepted, they would have been very glad, by means of a Vienna note, to have obtained their, purpose. But the other hypothesis—that of credulity—is very difficult to apply to the case, because I can hardly imagine that any man could be so credulous as to suppose that Turkey having rejected the ultimatum of Prince Menschikoff,'would have accepted the note of the Vienna conference. But what was the language of the noble lord with respect to this note? He said, " I do not know whose note it is--it is none of our children. *(Ex pressicns of dissent from Lord J. Russell.) I understood the noble lord to say that her Majesty's Government did, not draw up the note, but he believed it came from Paris. At all events, the language used by Ministers in another place with reference to it was to the effect that the Govern. ment were formally responsible for it, that it came from Paris, that everybody touched it up a little, and that ulti mately this failure took place. At the end of the last session, when the country began to be somewhat alarmed respecting these transactions in the East, when the noble lord the member for the city of London was pressed in this house upon the subject, he answered, I admit, fairly and frankly enough. But what was the reply to the question by a minister much more peculiarly responsible, and more par ticularly qualified to give an answer to such a question ? Lord Clarendon did not speak of this note at all in a de preciating tone or manner. On the contrary, he was most sanguine, and in reply to the question of Lord Malmesbury, he said that, in point of fact, the Vienna note had brought the negotiations to the point of a satisfactory conclusion. He said also that the note originated with the French Go vernment, that it was slightly modified by us, and it cos tained nothing derogatory to the independence or integrity of the Porte, and could see, therefore, no difficulty to its acceptance by the Porte The note, then, it appears, was drawn up by one of the most able men in Europe,. the French Secretary of State—it was sent to all the other great Ministers of Europe; it came here, and had the ad vantage not only of the full consideration of the Cabinet, but of a Cabinet of all the talents. (Laughter.) What is , to be thought, then, of the termination of the discrimina tion used in this case? This Vienna note was probably one of the most important political documents ever drawn up since the treaty of Vienna. You had the peace of Europe depending upon the question—you had these great statesmen concentrating their energies and intellect upon the question—and they ultimately produce a note which they themselves admit to be the greatest failure on record. (Hear, hear.) But I look upon this matter in another spirit. I give no decided opinion upon it, but IJcannot believe that some of the ablest and most eminent men in England, whom I now look upon, and those most able and eminent men whom I might look upon in another place, could have produced such a failure or such a docu ment. (Hear, hear, and laughter.) But if from the first there was a foregone conclusion—l do not say in the whole Cabinet, but in the majority of the Cabinet— for I think I may be able to adduce evidence hereafter that upon many points the Cabinet were not united—but if, I say, there did exist a foregone conclusion in the minds of the Cabi net, or a majority of it, that the independence and inte grity of Turkey was a farce, and that by a conscientious connivance the affair might be settled by means of this note, then we can account for its production and its failure. (Hear, hear.) I have examined the seven months of nego tiation which elapsed from January to July much more briefly than I could have wished to have done, and now let me ask the house to bear in mind the alternative which I have suggested as a means of explaining the cause and throwing some light on the object of the war. After the failure of the Vienna note, up to the affair at Sinope, there occurs a dreary interval. What was her Majesty's Government doing in this important time? I will not refer, as some one has done, to articles in a jour nal which Emperors read, and to which it is said Prime Ministers contribute, as absolute evidence of the feelings of the Government. I in no way impute its representations to the Government, but certainly (luring that period there never was so depreciating a tone taken with respect to Turkey as in that interval which elapsed between the failure of the Vienna, note-and the crossing of the Danube by Omer Pacha. We were told that we might mediate for Turkey, but we must not do more—that we might de a little, but not too much—that Turkey was in fact "used up "—(a laugh)—and that in fact the thing might be settled in some way or other without England doing any thing like going to war. I do not say that that is evidence ' • but we have the evidence of one of the most distinguished members of this house—of one who forms a part of her Majesty's Government, and who is supposed to be pecu liarly in the confidence of the First Minister of the Crown. The right hon. gentleman made one of those progresses which public men make sometimes through the country. He found himself in a city second only in importance to the metropolis, and while there he found time to give his opi nions to au interesting assembly upon the state of foreign affairs. How did the right hon. the Chancellor of the Ex chequer then view the Turkish question ? The Chancellor of the Exchequer, who will probably have to propose new taxes in due time to carry on the war undertaken for the integrity and independence of Turkey—the Chancellor of the Exchequer said that the integrity and independence of the Turkish empire was a very different thing from the in tegrity and independence of England or France, and they must not in any way confound this sovereignty of Turkey full of anomalies, full of misery, and full of perplexities, with that of the two countries he had named. Now I want to know what that means. If the independence and integ rity of Turkey are different from the independence and in tegrity of England and France, I would advise the house —if that is the opinion of her Majesty's Ministers and of the Finance Minister—to think twice before they eater into this war. What is the case of Russia? Why, the case of Russia is exactly that described by the right hon. gentleman the Chancellor of the Exchequer. Russia says to you, " We are prepared to respect the independence and integrity of the Porte." You have, you tell us, the per sonal assurances of the Emperor to that effect. (A laugh.) But, according to our opinion, the integrity and independ ence of Turkey are very different things from the integrity and independence of England and France. Therefore, let the Sultan be at Constantinople—let him still possess his side of the Danube, but let us govern three-fourths of his subjects. And why not ? It is, you know, a " sove reignty full of anomalies, full of misery, and full of perplexity." Why, Count Nesselrode could not have made a better plea—more fraudulent if you please. (A laugh.) Then the right hon. gentleman the Chancellor of the Exchequer made a speech at Manchester, at a time when Parliament was not sitting, when every man was anxious to receive some cue or some intimation of the opinion of her Majesty's Government. (Hear.) Well, about this time, the end of the autumn, it was thought that the cause of Turkey was hopeless : for myself, however, I be lieved that there were one or two virtuous men who might save this " beleaguered city." They were in the minority; but it was understood that they had done their duty, that their recommendations were right, and had been adopted six months after the proper time. (A laugh) Certainly nothing could be more gloomy than the state of Turkey at the time when the Chancellor of the Exchequer was stating the political views of the Cabinet at Man chester. What was it that oh mged the aspect and fortunes of Turkey ? What was it that gave a new impulse to the public mind ? It was not diplomacy, not the Vienna note, not instructions to ambassadors, de preciating the energy of the land they effected to save— not that accumulated mass of trifling, or worse than trifling which we have upon our table— no, but the energy of the Turks themselves, The valour and patriotic spirit of the people whom the hon. member for the West Riding libels and reviles—it was the energy, the patriotism, and the en thusiastic vigour of a " sovereignty full of anomalies, full of misery, and full of perplexities," which Europe witnessed an , i admired, and which among all classes in England met with a ready and generous sympathy. The Danube was crossed, the battle of Oltenitza was won ; Russia, which had been accumulating her menacing forces, was put back by the very men whom your very minister and ambassa dor had counselled for months to forfeit their independence and to let their country fall to the ground. (Hear.) But no sooner had the first flush of this good fortune passed over, and a little re-action occurred in the public mind, when, little accustomed to the unexpected incidents and changes of the fortunes of war—no sooner had there been a lull in the public mind, than the policy of credulity or of connivance was at its dirty work again, and the Turks were told that since they had shown themselves capable of fighting successfully for their country, "Do not for God's sake disturb the peace of Europe." Give over this fighting. Respect the feelings of the Emperor of Russia. We are going to send you some new propositions almost as goad as the ultimatum of Prince M.enschikoff, and more successful, we trust, than the Vienna note—(laughter)— ant certainly there never was a more disgraceful fraud either for diplomatists or for Ministers than when the Sultan was repeatedly asking us to prove our sincerity by I entering the Black Sea, which we as often declined to do. It is as disgraceful for France as for England. Ono day we are told the admiral quarreled with the ambassador; another day the ambassador quarrelled with the admiral ; then the two admirals disagreed, and then the two ambas salors ; at least we are told so if we " potter over blue books." (Laughter.) Bat my opinion is that all this time there was a great diplomatic conspiracy going on. which wa s to settle this affair in a manner which, if it had suc ceeded, would only, as Lord Stratford de Redcliffe tells us, have postponed the evil day, and forced us to a solution of this imperial difficulty under circumstances of much difficulty under circumstances of much aggravated disad vantage. Well, as the battle of Oltenitza saved the Turks once, the slaughter of Sinope operated again their favour. Then we were obliged to enter the Black Sea ; but when we entered the Black Sea what did we do ? Was that a policy of credulity or a policy of connivance? When I heard of the return of our squadron to Constantinople, I could not help recalling the words of a great orator when he was addressing an assembly not less illustrious than this; when he said, "Oh ! Athenians, the men who ad minister your affairs are men who know not how to make peace or how to make war." (Cheers.) Well now, sir, having expressed my opinion that the cause of this war is the conduct of the ministry, or at least of a powerful ma jority in the ministry, who influenced the negotiations for the past seven months, I have a right to express my fear that if it has been a policy of connivance which has only been baffled by events, it will lead, after perhaps a disas trous war, to an ignominious peace. (Hear.) I come now to the last point, to the preparations which the Govern ment have made for the future. Sir, the First Lord of the Admiralty has given us a catalogue, though an imper fect one, of some of the advantages which we now enjoy— though otherwise we should not have possessed them—to meet the difficulties which we have to encounter. And first of all I was glad to hear from the right hon. gentle man, that they have not done much in the interval ; they have succeeded in cementing a good understanding and alliance with France. The right hon. gentleman ought to be a judge of the importance of such connexions. (Hear.) About a year ago an alliance with France was not in such favour on the Treasury benches. I remember it was im puted as a great fault to a noble friend of mine, who was once Secretary of State, that he was too fond of an alliance with France ; and when I remember the acrimony, the vituperations, the ignorant impertinence with which Lord Itialmeslaury was assailed the first moment of his entering office, and contrast the feeling of public opinion towards that nobleman at -this moment with what it once was, as his colleague then, as his friend still, I rejoice at what has occured. The pull° now recognises that he was a man o: sagacity and a mini ster of unswerving firmness ; but this time last year the French alliance, since happily cemented by her Ma jesty's Ministers, was not so much in vogue as at present. Far be it from me to allude to past debates, nor should I have done so had I not found that so discreet and expo rienced a Minister as the leader of the house thought it expedient that this year our debates should be again en livened by abusing another Emperor. Last year the Em peror of the French was a pirate ; this year the Emperor of Russia is a butcher. (Laughter.) After the trial of Dr. Sacheverel, Sir Robert Walpole said that the Whigs had had quite enough of roasting a parson. I should say that her Majesty's Ministers hair had quite enough of roasting an emperor, and I should not be surprised that, if the war is shorter than some imagine, perhaps by this time next year they may have succeeded in cementing a peace with Russia. (Laughter.) What the character of the Emperor of Russia may be then I cannot say, but I have no doubt that the First Lord of the Admiralty will do justice to it. (Laughter.) But we are told by the noble lord that we have entered into a mutual alliance with France to prose cute this war. That is a most important declaration, and 11 I wish Ihe noble lord had favoured 3 with more details upon the subject. The noble lord was somewhat vague in his description, or rather his reference to the condi tions of this alliance. I think the country and the house have a right to know what are these projected engage ments as to not disturbing the territorial arrangements of Europe ; for that I infer was one of the conditions of this projected alliance. I think if the noble lord awl his col leagues have entered into any engagement of that nature, they have entered into one of the most unwise and most unnecessary engagements possible. We have heard a great deal— Lori J. RUSSELL—I did not say that there was an en gagement, or anything like it. Mr. DISRAELI—The noble lord's tone was somewhat low anal diplomatic when he referred to the treaty. I am, however, glad to find that he has not recommended that arrangement. The hou., member for Surrey and others have referred to the balance of power, and some gentlemen have spoken of it with ridicule in a manner that I will not imi tate. But, sir, I never will confound the maintenance of the balance of power with the maintenance of the present territorial distribution of Europe. They have nothing to do with each other ; and if we confound them, this country will be involved in great danger and difficulty. We all know— at least those who, like the noble lord, believe in the absolute existence of a balance of power—we all, I say, know what it is. It is at Madrid, it is at Belgium, on the Adige, and at Constantinople ; but thou h this is true, it is not true that the distribution of territory sanctioned by the treaties of Vienna has anything to do with the ba lance of power. And we had a proof of that in 1848, when the greatest changes in Italy were sanctioned by the most illustrious statesmen, even by Prince Metternich, as not in any way disturbing the balance of power. I impress this on the house, because the _future of Italy mainly depends on the appreciation of that truth. But we are told by the noble lord that, in order to strengthen our position at this moment, we have entered into an alliance with Turkey. And I may be allowed to say that, admitting that alliance with Turkey to be at this moment not only expodiont,but necessary, my astonishment is that that treaty was not en tered into many months ago. It is a notorious fact that dur ing the last eight weeks there have been repeated attempts to negotiate directly between Russia and Turkey. It is known that In one instance the attempt was nearly success ful, and I should like to know what would have been the position of the noble lord if he had had to come down to Parliament to say that Russia and Turkey had succeeded in settling this affair between themselves on terms fatal to the independence of Turkey and injurious to the interests of Europe, because her Majesty's Ministers had omitted at the proper time to bind Turkey by a convention not to compromise the interests of Europe by such a course ? I should say they would have been in almost as compromis ing a position as they would have been had Turkey signed the Vienna note ; and I believe that would have been a position which for dismay, disgrace, and disaster was never equalled by any statesmen. I am sorry that when the noble lord gave us this information with respect to the treaties with Turkey and France, he did not in any way confirm the flattering statement of the First Lord of the Admiralty with regard to the German powers. The First Lord of the Admiralty, in his catalogue of the great achievements of her Majesty's Ministers, and in his an nouncement of their successive labours for the welfare of the country, told us to congratulate ourselves on having drawn the German powers into union with England and France. But I observed with deep regret—though I believe the statement was perfectly justified - that the noble lord distinctly seated that neither Austria nor Prussia were bound in any way to interfere if war continued. But, sir, I think it was the duty of her Majesty's Ministers to demand from those Govern ments a distinct and categorical answer as to what they intended to clo if war proceeds. I think, ton, that that is a subject on which her Majesty's Ministers are bound to give information to Parliament. On Friday night the noble Lord said that I had made a most important observation because I rose with the concurrence, indeed at the request of the gentlemen on these benches, t o state that we should make no opplition to the vote of men which the noble lord wished immediately to pass. The noble lord was pleased to say that that was an important declaration. I confess myself that I was rather surprised at the somewhat exag gerated view which he took of these simple words. For whatever might be our opinion of the conduct of the Go vernment in the management of those transactions which have led to this terrible conclusion, I cannot suppose that on these benches there could be any difference of opinion as to the duty which we have to fulfil, to support our sove reign and to maintain the honour of our country. I can assure the noble lord that so long as the opposition benches are filled by those who now occupy them, he will at least encounter men who will not despair, under any circum stances, of the resources of their country. The noble lord ha s: great historical information and great experience of this house. I cannot but believe that the noble lord must have drawn his opinion of those who sit opposite him from his recollection of other and preceding oppositions. (Cheers.) I do not know whether, on the part of the noble lord, it was an effort of memory or of remorse. But this I can say—for this I can answer on the part of myself and my friends, that no future Wellesley on the banks of the Danube will have to make a bitter record of the effects of a British opposition that depreciated his efforts, that ridi culed his talents. (Cheers.) We shall remember what we believe to be our duty to our country; and however protracted may be the war, however unfortunate may be your councils, at least we sh all never despair of the republic. (Cheers.) Lord PALMERSTON then rose, and was greeted with cheers from.. the ministerial side. The noble lord said — Late as the hour to which this debate has been protracted, I should feel that I was not discharging my duty which I owe to this house and to the Crown if I were to permit the debate to close without making some observations in reply to, and in consequence of, the speech of the right hon. gentleman. I am ready to admit that we are met here on one of the most important and solemn occasions upon which it can fall to the lot of Parliament to deliberate. The country, by the admission of the responsible advisers of the Crown, is, I am afraid I must say, upon the verge of war. (Hear.) The house and the country have a right to know what has been the conduct of Government, and what has been the course which has led us to this position. We have laid before Parliament the papers, which show what the conduct of Government has been, and we have pro duced these papers for the express purpose that Parliament might have the opportunity of considering and of reviewing that conduct, and of expressingitsopinion thereon. (Hear.) But I mast confess I did not expe ct to hear from any mem ber of this house that which has just fallen from the right hon. member who has just sat down—(hear)—because, I think, that if I were to be of opinion that a Government, in the direction of its public duty, in consideration of great and important negotiations upon matters involving not only the interests of this country, but the peace and wel fare of Europe, had been justly chargeable either with credulity or connivance, I think that if I felt those were the onlyalternatives upon which the housecould be called upon to pronounce its judgment, I certainly think I should feel there could be no other course open to me and to the house than to withhold from them the confidence of Parliament. Yet we are told that the Government in relation to which this house has only the alternative of condemnation for credulity or condemnation for connivance, is to receive the confidence of Parliament by the supplies which may be ne- 1 cessary to carry on the war; and that the gentlemen who sit opposite are ready to entrust to such a Government the I fortune of the war. (Hear, hear.) Well, then, a Govern ment staiding in the position in which we stand has a right to expect that its conduct wi.l be scrutinised to the bottom. There are many charges that might be brought against us. In the first place, we might be accused of hav ing rashly, imprudently, and without due regard to the heavy responsibilities which weighed upon us, brought the country to the condition of being obliged to draw the sword and rush into war. That charge no one has made against us. That charge would indeed have been a heavy charge ; and, if proved against us, would have manifested us as deserving of the severest condemnation of the country. (Hear.) That charge, however, no man bas, as yet, in timated could be alleged against the conduct of the Go vernment. Well, another charge might be, that by delay, by credulity, by absence of sufficient vigour at the proper time, we had allowed matters to come to a pass at' which they would never have arrived had we pursued a different course. Now, I think that neither is this a charge which can be rightly brought against the Government ; and, on the contrary, I am ready to maintain that the model ation and forbearance by which our conduct has been character ised are such as to enable us to stand well in the opinion of the country. (Hear, hear.) If it is said that we have fore borne to the last moment, th .t we have exhausted every means of negotiation, that we have clung to every hope of terminating the disputes which threatened the peace of Europe by amicable adjustment, that we have trusted those who were not deserving of cur trust, that we have believed assurances which events have shown were untrue, that we have postponed to the last moment the deci sion which it may now appear we must come to, these are not, in my opinion, charges against the Govern ment, but rather as a proof that we have done all in our power, and up to the latest hour, to avoid war, will in duce the country to rally, as one man, round the Govern ment, seeing that war, if war comes, is a necessity which could not be avoided; and to make every sacrifice which the war, so forced upon us, despite our utmost endeavours to avert it, must inevitably entail. (Hear, hear.) We are accused of credulity ; I say, that the despatches in these volumes justify us in having for a considerable period reposed confidence in the assertions of the Russian Government. (Hear, hear.) The right hon. gentleman has accused my noble friend, the Secretary for Foreign Affairs, of having misled Parliament, on the 25th of April, by declaring, at that time, that the Russian Government asked for nothing but the settlement of the question of the holy places, whereas, says the right hon. gentleman, at that very time Prince Menschikoff had left Constantinople, and the English Government knew perfectly well that he had been urging a certain treaty on the Porte. What are the facts ? Prince Menschikoff did not leave Coast .nti nople till the 22d of May—(hear, hear)—and, as to the latest declaration which, on the 25th of April, Lord Claren don had received from the Russian authorities, its date was the 28th of March, on which day, in reply to a ques tion from Sir Hamilton Seymour, whether the settlement of the question as to the holy places would arrange every thing between Russia and Turkey, Count Nesselrode with his own lips assured him that it would—(hoar, hear)- - and that nothing thereafter would remain to be settled between the two Powers but some petty points connected with the Chancery, wholly unimportant, and unconsequential. (Hear, hear.) That statement was repeated on the 3:lth of April, when Count Nesselrode declared most positively to Mr. Hamilton Seymour that the arrangement which was negotiating at Constantinople contained nothing beyond that which had been already made known to the British Minister at St. Petersburgh, and by the Russian Minister at the Court of St. James's to the English Government. (Hear, hear, hear.) Sir, when such positive assertions as these are made by the Government of a great country like Russia, I say that the Government to which they are made is enti tled to place confidence in them. (Hear, hear.) It is said, that we heard of military preparations on the part of Rus sia, and we ought to have inferred from this that some other demands were on foot. We were told by the Russian Government itself that such preparations were making but we were also told by the Russian Government that their sole object was to counteract the menacing language which had been used by France, awl that they bore solely and entirely on the question of the Holy Places. (Hear.) We were told also, it is quite true, that Russia required some proof of confidence, as well as some reparation from Turkey, for offences which sue had committed in connexion with the changes that had. been made in the question of the Holy Places, and that the security was to be in the form of a treaty confirming the Sultan's firmans for the settlement of that question. But we had never any in titnation that any such treaty was to apply tu other mat ters. (Hear, bear.) When, therefore, Count Nesselrode assertel, at a later period, that our Government had known from the outset what were the whole demands of Russia upon Turkey, he asserted that—l am bound to say it-- which was utterly at variance with the fact. (Hear.) It is painful to speak of a Government like Russia in terms of censure or reprobation, but I am brand to say, on behalf of the English Government, that the Russian Government, by itself and its agents, has, throughout these transac- Cone exhausted every modification of untruth, coi.ccal inent, and evasion, and ended with assertions of positive falsehood. (Hear, hear.) I ask, however, has anything been lost by the forbearance with which the Government has conducted this question ? I say, that if in the last summer a course had been taken by us which would have brought matters then to the point at which they now are—if we had found ourselves in June or July last on the print of a rapture with Russia—our position would not have been such as it is now. It may be said, indeed, that the present result would never have arisen—that Russia would have given way, if we had shown greater vigour at first. (Hear.) That is a plausible opinion, and one which is person may be jus tified in holding; but, after all, it is but an opinion, and, had matters taken the course I have assumed, and turned out wrong—had Russia, instead of submission, urged us on then to the point at which we now stand—we should have been justly chargeable with a grave political mistake. (Hear.) There were a great many reasons why forbear ance was desirable. It was of the utmost importance, in a matter affecting the great interests of Europe, that, though England and France have been from the outset acting to gether, heartily, entirely, and cordially, they should en deavorir to obtain also the concurrence of Austria and Prussia. (Hear, hear.) We know that these two countries have interests in this matter far more direct than those of England and France. To Prussia and Austria it is a mat ter of vital existence, because, if Russia were either to ap propriate any large portion of Turkish territory, or even to reduce Turkey to the condition of a Sato merely de pendent upon Russia, it is manifest—no man can doubt it who casts a glance at the map of lenrope and looks at the geographical position of those two Powers with regard to Russia and Turkey—that such an immense ap propriation of geographical power on the part of Russia must be fatal to the independent action of Austria and Prussia. (Hear, hear.) Well, it was of great importance to get these two powers with us as far as it wes possible to obtain their counsel and advice ; but neither of them could be expected to risk lightly a rupture with their great and powerful neighbour. The reasons which might load Prus sia not to wish to risk such a rupture—the reasons, I would rather say, why those who wished well to Prussia —her well-meaning allies—would not have wished to press her forward singly, are obvious to any man who looks at the map of Enron?. Austria, we know, was under great obligations to Russia. It was natural that she should be unwillinglo break with Russia as long as it was possible that matters could be arranged by any amicable adjust ment; and if Austria, seeing that England and France were hurrying matters on, and precipitating a war when she (Austria) thought that by more forbearance, by her influence at St. Petersburg, and by diplomacy, negotia tions might have been carried on and war avoided, Eng land and France, under these circumstances, would not have been entitled to expect her active co-operation in the war. (Hear, hear.) It was therefore of great im portance to avail ourselves as much as we could of that influence which Austria possessed, or imagined she pos sessed, at the Court of St. Petersburg, and to convince Austria that we consulted her position as well as our own, and that we were willing to give every possible oppor tunity for an amicable settlement of the difference. if by any means it could be effected. (Hear.) I believe I am not overstating the facts when I say that the conduct of England and of France in this respect has been fully ap preciated by Austria and Prussia, and that whereas, if war had been entered into and carried on in the course of last summer, we might have had no reason and right to expect their co-operation—l cannot per suade myself but .that, if matters go on to the point I fear they are likely to go to—the conduct of Austria and Prussia will be different now to what it would have been under those different circumstances. (Hear, hear.) Well, then, I say that the conduct of her Majes ty's Government is not blameable either upon the ground of precipitation or upon the ground of too much forbear. ance. The house, I think, will agree that the great ob ject of preserving peace was one which justified every possible degree of forbearance short of the sacrifice of those interests which it was our duty to maintain. But it may be said, "Is the object, then, for which you are making the country now to go to war—is the object one of suffi cient magnitude to justify the efforts which you require the country to make ?" I might answer that question by saying that the opinion of the Government that the object is worthy of those efforts, is an opinion sharedtby France, by Austria, and by Prussia—that all these powers have recognised, in the most solemn and dis.inct manner, that the independence and integrity of the Tn.kish Empire is an essential condition for the continuance of the peace of Europe, that it is an essential element in the balance of power, and that it would he a calamity to Europe if any attempt were made to destroy that integrity and inde pendence. Why, even Russia, while she is pursuing a course which is acknowledged by all the Powers except herself to be fatal to that independence, and that integrity —even Russia does not venture to deny the principle that the independence and integrity of the Ottoman empire is an essential element in the condition and welfare of Europe. Why, Sir, it is manifest that if Russia were to appropriate to herself those territories, which now lie under the sway of the Sultan, she would become a power too vast and too gigantic for the safety of the other states of Europe. (Hear, hear.) If she were to bestride the continent from north to south possessing large naval power both in the Baltic and in the Mediterranean, enveloping the whole of Germany, commanding regions full of every natural resource, and a population of enormous extent, she would become dangerous to the liberties of Europe, and her power would be fatal to the independence of other States. (Cheers.) I say, therefore, it is the duty of the other countries of Europe to prevent such an enor mous aggrandisement as that which would result from such a change of possession. I shall be told, very likely, " Yes, but Russia don't want any accession of territory ; she don't pretend or profess to take permanent possession of any ter ritory that belongs to the Sultan • she merely holds these principalities as a mate r n a l pledge for concessions which she requires to be made—concessions which she says are essential to her dignity and honour." What the Turkish Minister replies to that is a true statement of the danger. He says that it would be better that Turkey should have a limb cut off than that poison should be slowly but surely infused into her whole body corporate, which would surely soon destroy her energies and lay her prostrate at the foot of her powerful neighbour. (Hear hear.) That which Russia dem •nded was no thi ng less than the sovereignty over 12,000,000 of Turkish subjects, because the power which was to protect them in all the affairs of life, both religious and civil, would have been the power to which those 12,000,000 persons would have looked, audithe Sultan would have been no longer anything but the nominal ruler of those subjects. (Hear, hear.) I say, therefore, that that concession was one which the Sovereign of Turkey wasjus tified in refusing, and which every other power—which England, France, A us t r i a , an d P rus sia—united to declare could not be granted without an abandonment of the inde pendent sovereignty of the Sultan. (H ea r.) Well, I say, t then, that the object for which we are contending is one which a due regard for the interests of this country, and a due regard to the welfare of Europe and • to the peace of the world, justifies us in contending for. (Cheers.) We are told, however, that, setting aside the abstract I principle of preserving the balance of power—which some ' gentlemen profess to treat with great contempt as a matter wholly undeserving the care and attention of statesmen— we are told that, setting that aside, there is something in ; the condition of the Turkish empire which makes it utterly I unworthy of our support, and that, because it is not in such an advanced state of civilisation as this country, it ought therefore, to be conquered by Russia, and blotted out as an ' independent nation from the face of Europe. I was asked by the hon. member for the West Riding (Mr. Cobden) I whether I still maintained the assertion I made last session that there was hardly any country which bad, in the same period of time, made such material progress in its internal arrangements as Turkey has done. Sir, I abide by that assertion. (Cheers.) I am satisfied that an'y man who looks into the condition of Turkey now, and compares it with 1 ' what it was at the time referred to, will admit the truth a nd justice of my assertion. It is quite true that Turkey now is far behind England and France, but we are not on this account to forget how much further advanced it is now than it was in the time of Sultan Mahmoud. Any man who knows anything of Turkey will know that in re spect to internal navigation, in respect'to her army, her na vy, and justice or political administration, great and im mense progress has been made since that period. But . Turkey, forsooth, is not worth defeldirtg, and does not desire to be defended, because the Christian subjects of the Sultan are not in ail respects placid upon a footing of equality with the Mri ' , tamer:re. I ielieve that, legally speaking, the great distinction now latween the two races is, that the Christians pay the kharaj and are exempt from conscription. There is also an iequality as to their evidence in civil cases; but, I belies, in respect to crimi ► - nal cases they are now placed uporan equality with the Mussulmans. But, sir, if the fact if any race in a coun try being upon a fo..ting of civil andpolitical inequality is any justification for considering thaicountry as undeserv ing of independent political existene, what would have been said by th hon. member for be West Riling, if he had lived not very long ago, when there prevailed that penal code in Ireland, which placer our Catholic fellow subjects on a much worse footing tlan that on which the Christian subjects of the Porte now stand. (Hear, hear.) I fancy that in those days, whent,his country produced many men eminent in all matters ofliterature and science, they would have been very much suprised if they had been told that they were a set of barbariane, and deserved to be conquered by France in order tht the Catholics should be put upon the same footing asthe Protestants in this count. (Cheers.) Well, I say hen, that the condition of the Christians is no reason whtever why, upon great political grounds, this country and France—ay, and Aus tria and Prussia too—should not ombine to maintain the Turkish empire in its present geogaphical position. I be lieve that the internal progress much has commenced in. Turkey will be continued, and thatho Christian and Mus sultnan subjects will be placed a the same footing of equality. I can assure the houo that it has been the anxious object of the Governmen to bring about that re sult, and not only of the present, but also of former Ad ministrations. In the year 1816 when I had the honour of being Secretary for Foreign' Afairs, immediately upon assuming the seals of office I sat for Lord Stratford de Radcliffe, who was then in Englnd, and urged him to re turn to Constantinople, assuring bin that there was no one in whose ability, sagacity, aid knowledge of Turkish affairs tho Government could taco greater confidence. Lord Stratford replied that he \valid go upon one condi tion,—which.was, that he shout be allowed to exert all the influence which his positiot as British ambassador would give him to induce the sltan to proceed with in ternal reform, and to place his ciristian and Mussnlman subjects upon an equal footing. We are now told by some that our interference in the internal affairs of Turkey is similar to that of the Russian Givernineut as explained in the Menschikoff Note; but the treat difference is, that we interfered only by advice, which he Sultan was at liberty to refuse or accept, as he thought ft. We demanded no pro tectorate over his subjects; we oily counselled him to im prove the civil and political coalition of a portion of his subjects, that they might be bond by closer ties to his Government, and so become nore useful citizens. Our interference was very different prom that of Russia, who demanded a protectorate over sine 12,000,000 of the sub jects of the Sultan—so that if ore of them felt himself ag grieved he was to repair to St Petersburgh and trust to the protection of the Emperor of Russia rather than to the justice of the Sultan. (Thar, hear.) The object we have at he'irt is one of great importance, and one deserving that the efforts of the country should be made to attain it. What, let us consider fur a moment, is the nature of the adversary we shall have to cope with ? Th,re are two things equally dangerous in matters of this kind. The one is to overrate our adversary ; the other is to undervalue him. To overrate an enemy is dangerous, but I must say that I think that there never has been a great State whose power for externalaggression has been more overrated than Russia. (Hear.) We have seen that Russia is powerful for defence, and have inferred that she is therefore powerful for aggression, but the very circumstances which render her powerful within render her weak with out. (Hear) The vast distances which invading armies Intuit traverse, and the dangers of the march, all operate against an attacking army; but the same causes operate to prevent Russia being herself powerful in attack. There is also a vast difference between an army on paper and the actual number of men in the field of battle. An army would be much reduced in one of these long marches from its original strength. The accounts of the Russian troops in the principalities estimated them at a very large amount, but it seems that the 'Russians never had any very con siderable force there, and that is proved by the fact that in all the encounters which have taken place they have had the worst ; and the endeavour to force the passage of the Danube never has succeeded. We have seen, on tha other hand, that the Turks have shown is vitality which they were not believed to possess, and what the Russians call their fanaticism we ehoubl call a public spirit of patriot ism which leads them to defend their Sovereign and their country. (Hear.) As an instance of this spirit, I may men tion that in one district, where the contingent required for the army was 1,000 men, on the day of muster 4,000 men appeared, and the 3,000 who were disappointed said that if the Government would accept their services they would ask for nothing in return but rations and arms, and they would supply themselves with clothes. The Turkish forces may be deficient in officers, but is evident that Omnar Pasha has conducted the campaign in a manner which evinces great military talent. (Hear.) My opinion is that any one great Power like England or France, possessing such naval and military resources, could, if it took up the cause of Turkey, bring the quarrel to a success ful issue ; but when those two countries combined take np the cause, I- maintain that the chance of the Emperor of Russia is entirely desperate. (Hear, hear.) We are entitled to expect that, if the war should continue, Austria and Prussia will not remain passive spectators. They will feel it due to themselves to take some part in the contest, for, if they do not, Austria must have indeed for gotten all her established policy, and must be ignorant of all her own interests ; and the same is the case with Prus sia,. I therefore say that, with England and France acting as supporters of Turkey, with the opinion of the whole of Europe opposed to the Emperor of Russia, who will have not a single ally to support him in his career of injustice, I have no doubt as to what may be the result. (Rear.) It is a noble sight to see England and France, two countries which have long been in rivalry with each other, united in a course of action—(cheers)—bound be . a reciprocal engage ment to seek no territorial advantage to themselves, but standing forth in the defence, not of their own interest and welfare alone, but in behalf of the interests of Europe. It is a worthy sight to see those fleets and armies which have hitherto met in downy contest ranged side by side in per fect amity, not armed for the purpose of conquest, but armed in a noble and generous cause to defend right against might. (Hear, hear.) lam willing to lay the case of the Government before the country and before Parliament, convinced that the peer .le of this country will be satisfied that we have not recklessly and without cause involved ' them in a war of which Ido not wish to underrate the con sequences, but which I think will be a very different war from all others in which this country has ever been involved. I feel no hesitation in applying to the country for assistance to enable us to carry on with vigour the contest in which we may be engaged ; aryl I say that if it be the opinion of the people of this country or of Parliament that we have shown weakness and credulity or the infamy of connivance, let them take the conduct of the war from the hands of a Government incompetent to carry it on, and place it in the hands of those in whose ability, judgment, and sagacity they can place greater reliance. (Cheer , .) Col. SIBTHORP declared that he had no confidence in the Government, and placed no reliance on France or Aus tria. He hoped this country would not be humbugged, but would rely on its own resources ; and he, as an humble individual, holding the position of colonel in the militia, would be ready to give the Executive all the assistance in his power in prosecuting the war. (Hear, and laughter.) The house then resolved into Committee of Supply. On the motion of Mr.WILSON, 16,024,100/. wee voted to defray the charge for outstanding Exchequer-bills. NAVY EST LmA'T ES. Sir J. GRAHAM said that, considering the lateness of the hour (2 o'clock) he would defer any statement with re spect to the estimates till the next opportunity. On the present occasion, however, as the discussion on the policy of the course pursued by the Government might now be deemed closed, he would take the votes for the number and pay of the men. (Hear, hear.) The votes were accordingly proposed,—viz., the number of seamen was fixed at 41,000; boys, 2,000; ma , ines afloat, 8 .'(:); and marines ashore, 7,500; total, 5-4;00; 2.192,6711. were voted for the pay, and 87033;1. for the victuals. Col. SIBTHORP expressed his concurrence in the votes, and his readiness to increase the number of the men. The house OLT' resumed. Lord J. RUSSELL—I beg to state that, on Friday next, I propose to take a vote for the number of men in the army before we go into any further votes for the navy. On the motion of - fir, I. BUTT, documents relative to the construction of Ballycotton harbour and pier were or dered to be laid before the house. The house adjourned at about about five minutes past two o'clock. SHIPPING INTELLIGENCE. CUSTOM HOUSE, FEB. 20. ENTERED INWARDS.—Tho Marie , from Gravelines ; Nordstjernan, Dram ; Comet, Marsala ; Rosilia, Bilboa ; Zephyr, Messina and Catania ; James Scott, Shanghai ; Speedwell, Rouen ; Alcides, Alexandria; Julia, Dunkirk; Waterwitch, Megadore; &mann, Havannah and Matanzas; Lockwood, Callao ; Lady Valiant, Mauritius; Gwalia, Calcutta ; Faaborg, Faaborg ; Amadora, Manzanilla ; Guillelmo, Marseilles ; Monteiro Primeiro, Oporto ; J. J. Cobb, Baltimore ; Investigator, Mauritius and the Cape of Good Hope; Abberton, ENTERED OUTWARDS FOR LOADING.—The Atalanta, for Port Philip; Joseph Wheeler, Barbadoes ; Lady Valiant, Mauritius ; Monteiro Primeiro, Oporto ; Wilsons, Algoa Bay ; Norman Morrison, New Zealand ; Mary, Valencia ; Abberton, Hobart Town. CLEARED OUTWARDS WITH CARGO.— The Isabella Blyth, for the Mauritius ; Forerunner, Africa ; Trafalgar, Ade laide ; Premier, Demerara ; Hendnka Jantina, Amster d a m ; Gertrudes, Bilboa Camerton, Dominica; Admiral de Ruyter, Port Philip ; Wiltshiie, Palermo and Messina. SPORTING INTELLIGENCE. TA TTERSALL'S.-YE 3TERDAY. Speculation took a somewhat extensive range, and two or three movements of interest and importance marked its progress. The transactions, however,. on most of the handicaps specified below were only on a small scale. LIVERPOOL GRAND NATIONAL.-6 to 1 was taken to various sums about Miss Mowbray, and 7 to 1 to up wards of 1001. about Bourton ; La Gazza Ladra had an advancing tendency ; Cockcrow had two or three friends apparently full of confidence ' - and 25 to 1 was t aken to 751. about Oscar, after a couple of bets of 300 to. 10 each had been booked. Tan TWO TEEM:MANZ-700 to 200 was taker about Ruby, the taker offerireto go on. Very little do in e about Phaeton. The DERBY.-500 to 100 was betted against Autocrat, and although something was whispered about "hedging money," yet it was quite clear that his positioan was a little shaken ; 7 to 1 would have been taken to .a consi derable amount about King Tom, but scarcely; 13 to 2 was obtainable; 5 to 2. to fully 1601. in the agirregate, was taken about the couple. A strong dispositions to lay against Dervish was manifested, paiticularly I °wards the close, when 16 to 1 was betted, and aftorwards offered. 2,000 to 90, 1,100 to 50, and finally MO to 25 taken about Ruby ; 625 to 25 about Acrobat ; axed 1,500 to 30 about Bessus. Closing prices : LIVERPOOL STEEPLECHASE. 6to 1 agst Mice Mowbray (taken). 7to 1 agst Bourton (taken). 12 to 1 agst La Gazza Lacks (taken). 12 to 1 agst Half-and-Half (taken). 20 to 1 agst Lady Arthur (taken). 25 to 1 agst Cockcrow (taken). 25 to 1 agst Abd-el-Kader (taken.) 25 to 1 agst Oscar (taken). NORTHAMPTONSHIRE STAKES.. 12 to 1 agst Red Lion (taken). 20 to 1 agst Marc Antony (taken). 25 to 1 agst Daniel O'Rourke (taken). -- 25 to 1 agst Diomedia (taken). METROPOLITAN STAKES. 18 to 1 agst Vingt-un (20 to 1 also laid)u 18 to 1 agst Ariosto (taken). 20 to 1 agst Lindrick (taken). GREAT NORTHERN HANDICAP.. Bto 1 aget Aquila. 20 to 1 agst Lough Bawn (taken). 20 to 1 agst Virago (taken). CHESTER CUP. 18 to 1 agst Newminster (take 2(1 fo 1). 18 to 1 agst Star of Surrey (offered).. 30 to 1 agst Peggy (taken). 1000 to 30 agst Tom (taker). 1000 to 25 agst Marc Ant.oly (taken). 2,000 GUINEAS. 7to 2 agst Ruby (taken freely). _ Bto 1 agst Phaeton (taken). DERBY. . . sto 1 agst Autocrat (taken). 13 to 2 aget King Toni. 16 to 1 agst Dervish (taken and offered. 20 to 1 agst Rub (Laken). 25 to 1 agst Acrobat (taken). 50 to 1 agst Bessus (taken). sto 2 agst the two leading favourites (taken). OAKS. Bto 1 apt Omno (taken). Although several members had left town for N otting ham the room was numerously attended. COUNTRY MARKETS. VESSELS SPOKEN WITH. The Regina (Dutch barque) bound South, Dec. 21, lat. 22 S., long. 28 W. The Heloise, of Bordeaux, bound to Monte Video, Jan. 5, lat. 3 N., long. 23 W. The Margaret Gibson, from Liverpool to Port Natal, the same day. The Holyrood, from London to Australia, the same day. The Mermaid, from Liverpool, Jan. 7, long. 46. The Laura Estelle, from Gironde to Calcutta, Jan. 7, lat. .7 N., long. 24 W The Screamer, from New Orleans to Liverpool, Jan. 26, lat. :30 N., long. 79 W. The Oscar (barque), of Stockholm, from Hartlepool to Pointe de Guile, Dec. 27, lat. 2 N., long. 79 W. The Vaillant, from Bordeaux to Melbourne, Deo. 28, lat. 3 N., long. 20 W. The Bergman, steering to the southward, Dec. 29, lat. 3 N., long. 21 W. The Ariel (Swedish barque) showing an orange coloured flag, with 55 on it, same day. The Queen 'barque), of and from Glasgow to Valparaiso, Jan. 2, lat. 6 N., long. 23 W. The Charlotte Ann, for Bristol, Feb. 4, lat. 43 N., long. 13 W. ' 20 days out. The Czar, from Bristol, Feb. 5, lat. 45 N., long. 12 W. The Betty and Emma, from Liverpool, same day. The Panama (American ship), from Liverpool to New York, Feb. 9, lat. 47 N., long. 20 W. The Bottle (s.), from Liverpool to New York, Feb. 10, iat. 53 N., r' 15 W. The Thotiiitsßowell, from Canton to London, Nov. 27, lat. 34 S., long. 27 E. Feb. 13, lat. 38 The atu, from Bristol to Charlesto wn, N., long. 11 W. DEPARTURES Fon AUSTRALIA.—Tho departures from the port of London for the Australian colonies during the past week show an increase. They have comprised altogether 7 vessels—four to Port Philip, with an aggre gate burden of 3,180 tons; two to Adelaide, with an ag gregate burden of 1,101 tons ; and one to Sydney, o f 1,022 tons. Their total capacity Nis consequently. , 303 tons. No material variation has occurred in the rates of freight. CHELMSFORD-FEB. 17. Most of the wheat on offer to-day was greatl r out of condition, and fine my samples made as much money as last week. Inferior, however, were is cheaper, and but little business was transacted. Spring corn of a ll sorts the turn cheaper. Prices to-day were as follow :—Wheat, white, o Id 70s Od to 853 Od, new 70a to 85s ; red, old 58s to 80s, in ror 61s to 80a ; barley, 28s to 36s ; chevalier, 35s to 408 ; iprindittg, 21s to 30s ; malt, 61s to 65a ; chevalier, 64s to 7 AB ; oats, 22s to 29s ; peas, partridge, 4us to 45s ; white, 48 . s to 53s boiling s)s to 61s ; dun, new, 41s to 448 ; beans, tick, 40s to 42s ; Harrow ticks, 38s to 44s ; Mazagan, 38s t 41s. COLCHESTER -FEB. 18. Prices to-day were as follow :—Wheat, white, 80i to 90s ; red, 76s to 84s ; barley, 40s to 46% ; oats, 28s to 32s „. beans, Mazagan, 40s to 44s ; middle and small, lts to 581%; peas, white, 60s to 64s ; grey, 46s to 50s. Official Statement of the Quantities of Corn, &c., received in the port of London, from the following port 6, from the 13th to the 18th February, both inclusive. 1111. 101 A 4 - 60 - 37 40 78 - 170, 0 30 - - 844 r - 84 980 Colchester Harwich 2,1 7-1 - 1861 _771 554 Leigh Maldon 13% 2(16 SET.—FIB. 20. ,he close of the market Wallsond, COAL MA' Price of Coal per ton at t' a. d. Buddle W. Hartley 23 0 _ a. d. Carr's Hartley 22Leverson .21 0 Dean's Primrose 2l 61Se11 - .. 25 0 Hasting's Hartley 23 0 Belmont Holywell 25 6 Haswell 27 0 Hartlepool West Hartley 2t) 0 Stewart's 27 0 Old Adairs 2l 0l Cassop „ZS 6 Stobart's Hartley 22 6 Hunwiek .:21 6 Tanfield Moor 2l 6 Tees 27 0 Tanfield Moor Butes 21 6 Whitworth .21 0 West Hartley ...22 0 'Low Bitchburn .I`.l 0 Ships at market... 475 I Sold ... 53 SEABORNE It A I LS. (N enmities that the maile are sent from t h r Generar roe, once .7 the night—and M by the morning —dispatch.] ....•••••••• !Day wnpn na•te ti; I From elm Vl7hen COUNTRIES in General Port e Its In Ottice, Lalinn.. flltilltche,i. England. 4.1 knierica(byttrit.pack)N Every F'tidcy Lverpom . 'Eat b Mon. America (by United Sts. packet) ..........N Liverpool . ' kmerica (by U States, 1 packet) .... NI • . Sou; harm, .• I .A.rr s r. ed Australia (via South -I ampton) .......... Nfarch 4 I Sonthampt Feb.., 20 Ditto (via ktatseilles) N March 8 Ditto (via Cape of '.loud Hope) ............ N Feb. 4 .l Li verpool rta'll Africa ( West Coast).. N '134 of the month . !Plymouth .. !Am • •eti Alexandria N g, ' 24, &30of m 'Dover .... ri‘b. 16 Alexandria.......... M 4th & 20th of mon. Southampton Feb. t 20 Bahamas kt 17th of the montl.,Senth • mono,. Feb 6 Belgium ............14 1 iaily ............ !Dover ...... Daily Brazil 9th of the month .. 'Soul hampion Art ed Buenos Ayres ........ ki 9th of :he month.. Southampton Felt lit Cape of flood Cone N 14th of the moat' Plyinowit .. Feb- .46 Cape of Good !lope -IV 14th of the month. Southampton! Cape de Vents 14th of the month Plyin, utn .. Feb- -6 Ceylon (see India) Ceylon :14th of the monti. Plymouth .. IFeb. '25 Channel Isles ........N.Mon.,Wed.,&Frid. Southampton Tu 7lb .plat M 2d & 17th of month S4uthamptot, Feb.. 16 China (see India) Constantinople ......N17,8,17,24,&27 of m. Dover •••••• I • Constantinople ;4th & 20th of mon. Southampton Feb, .20 C mt. of Europe M & NiTwice daily Dover Tw icodatly Egypt (see India) 1 France .... M & N!Twice daily.-- Dover Trelkimtitty Gibraltar ........ 31,4, 7,17, 20, 27 of m. ciJuthamp ton Feb- .16 Greece (see India) Greytown ..... 2nd & 17th of mon. Southampton Feb. :16 Hamburgh ..........N s Tuesday & Friday London ..... F• • Ilavannah ....• ..... M 2nd of the month Southampton, Hard.!; 1 Holland ... Daily.— • • ...... Dover ... • • .. Honduras m.l7th of the month. Southampton FebM ebb 14 India (vlaSonthampt.)M 4th & 20th of mon. Southampton, Feb. :20 India (via Marseilles)M Bth&24th of month Dover _ _ .• •• •• Feb. 116 lonian Isles (see India) 7, 17, & 27 of mon Dover...". I Holyhead •. Twic daily Ireland & N Twice daily Liab0n..............M 7,9, 17, & 27 of in. Southampton Feb. .16 Madeira •• •• •• • • •• 1419th of the Month Southampton Feb. 16 Madeira N ;23d of m on th Plymouth • .. Feb. 14 Matta (see India) Malta .....• N 17,17,19,27, 30 of m. Dover Mauritius (see India) Mauritius ..........N 14th of the month Plymouth 'Feb. T 6 31 eat co ....... mind of the month. Southampton Mar eh 1 Naples .• • • •• •• ....N bth I hth2Mhofmon Dover Feb. 111 New Granada ......si,2d St 17th of month Southampton Feb- 16 New Z ea1and.......... lily private ship Various ports ; Under tabs. Papal States „Nlsthlbth2sithofinon. Dover 1 _Peninsula ..... .....mlthi7th2Bthofinon. Southampton Feb. 1 6 reru & 27th of mon Southampton Feb. 1.6 Pert Natal ..........N,l4th of the month Plymouth Sicily ..............ksthlisth2sthormon. Dover Tuscany 15th25thottnon. Dover Venezuela ....ml2d & 1 7th of month South ampton Feb. ill 6 Van Diemen's Lt;nd (seel Australia) on Arrived . S & 17th of month outhall:t West Indies ........ M o * When any of these dates tali on a Sunday, the malls wll be dispatched on the following day, with the exception of the Ind!, t via Southampton), and the Malta, both of which will be diapatche I the day preceding. BIRTHS. OF A BON. On tho 18th inst., at Haven-hoase, Ealin g , tho wife , of John Fenton, Esq. On the 20th inst., at Lower Clapton, Mrs. T. T. Curia en. OP A DAUGHTER. . . . ----• On the 19th inst., at Brixton-hill, Mrs. Henry Evil!. On the 17th inst., at 5, Rectory-villas, Shacklewell, Mrs. Maclaren. M RRI ED. On the 12th ult. at tho ty ou ll a Ch urc h , B om b ay, F. T. Cornewall, Esq., ult., C.S., Pon of H. Cornewall, Esq., of Delbury-hall, Shropshire, to Eiiza Susan Annabella, daughter of Major Edwardos, K.H., late of the 3d Light Dragoons. On the 20th inst., at St. Mary Abtotts, Kensington, Major H. Stamford late of tho Bomb a y Army, t o L a , only daughter o f R. Wesbrook, Esii., formerly of W in' chester, Berks, and Fanham's-hall, Herts. DIED. On the 7th November, at Melbourne, Victoria, S. Cary Esq., M.D., aged 43. On the 17th inst., at Queen's-square, Bath, Mary Anne Boddam, daughter of the late R. H. Boddam, Esq., fur merly Governor of Bombay. On the 17th inst., at 33, Lansdowne-place, Leamington, Elizabeth, widow of the late J. Fletcher, Esq. On the 18th inst., at Harrow-on-the-Hill, Mr. John Woodbridge, aged 50. LONDON: Printed and Published by MIIIIDO YOUNG, of No. 112, Strand, Printer, at The Sun Office, No. 112, Strand, in the Precinct of the Savoy, in the county of Middlesex, Tuesday, February 21, 1854. 1