The Sun. — London, England, 1854-12-13 00:00:00

b eginning it, he must havehad ample time forpreparation. (Rear, hear.) And what was the force sent out to the Crimea? -27,000 English troops. I believe the whole combined force did not amount to more than 50,000 men. I further believe, and the confirmation was forced upon / 1 31 e by subse quen t f ac t s , th a t th e grea t f orce was sent oat 'without Government having any knowledgeof the namber 'of Russian forces in the Crimea, or of the strength of the fortress intended to be attacked. (Hear, from the Opposi tic,n.) The great error that had paralysed all their efforts Was that of underrating the difficulty of the objects to be - aceomplished. lam confirmed in that view by the observa tions which fell from the Prime Minister at Aberdeen, who affirmed that in six months they had sent out a finer army 'than any ever commanded by the Duke of Wellington, and that they had commenced the expedition to Sebastopol in such a manner as to insure its success. I traced in these words of Lord Aberdeen that he was ignorant of the condition of the Russian armies in the Crimea, and that he underrated the strength of Sebastopol. It is perfectly clear to me that that force was pushed on the shores of the Crimea in the idea that they had nothing to do but to take Sebastopol. There was not sufficient provisions for the troops—nor sufficient foresight in providing reserves for the inevitable losses and contingencies of war. These 27,000 men were pushed on to the shore of the Crimea to take their chance, and they were left to take Sebastopol, if they could. The great faultof the Government was, as was obvious from the language of the Prime Minister, that they overrated its strength. It was perfect, said he, in all its appointments, but it was noto rious that the army was deficient in artillery, and almost without cavalry. And with regard to the equipments of War, ,tents, and other necessaries, they were almost for gotten, as was obvious from the description of their suffer ings the first days of their landing. They sent that army to attack the Crimea without any reserves to support it, and he called on the Government for an explanation of that circumstance. (Hear, hear.) Were they justified in sending out such an expedition without proper reserves to support it? That was a point where, he thought, the conduct of the Government was open to grave doubt—he was afraid he should say, severe censure—and they had a right to demand an explanation why it was sent without reserves, and afterwards left there without reinforcements. (Cheers.) He hoped her Majesty's Government would ex plain to the house why it was their army was left thus exposed. (Hear, hear.) He (Sir J. Pakington) had not certainly sufficient information on this subject which would enable him to judge of all the facts of the case ; he spoke only frOm these sources which were open to the public ; but he believed their army had received nothing worthy of the name of reinforcements from the time Lord Raglan, landed, in the beginning of September, until the arrival of the 46th Regiment in November, after the battle of Inker man had been fought. (Hear, hear.) He was open to correction if he committed any error, but he believed that was really the case. He was quite aware that shortly after that battle, 3,000 men landed at Balaklava, among whom was, .1,000 cavalry but that was all. He made no complaint against the Government for not sending a large force at first to the Crimea ; he was quite aware that the difficulty of conveying them would account for not forwarding a larger force than 27,000 men; but the 3,000 men sent a few days after did no more, he Was sorry to say, than to fill up the gaps caused by the casualties at the battle of the Alma, and from the time that army sat down before Sebasispol, and entrenched itself from Balaklava to Inkerman, though decimated by disease, and suffering from the effects of the climate, and exposure to cold and fatigue, it was left there, with the ex ception of a few draughts sent out, without any reinforce ment:until the arrival of the 46th Regiment. (Cheers.) * Under those circumstances, that gallant band of men dwindled day by day, until they were attacked by an over- whelming force on the sth of November. Let him ask her Majesty's Government what was the actual available force on that sth of November ? They landed, no doubt, 27,000; they got an addition of 3,000 in a few days after ; but at Inkerman they had 20,000—had they 18,000 sta tioned from Balaklava to the heights of Sebastopol—had they 15,000 effective soldiers? He (Sir J. Pakington) be lieved not e but this they knew, that the men who resisted an overwhelming Russian force, according to the authority of Lord Raglan himself, did not exceed 8,000 men. (Cheers,) The hon. gentleman who seconded the address talked of the fearful odds to which the British army was exposed • but why did they contend against this fearful - odds ? (Cheers.) Let us thank God that it was not utterly destroyed and annihilated ; and it was not teithe credit of the British Government that only 8,003 men were found to oppose such a force. (Cheers.) No doubt they were justified in praising the unexampled bravery and valour of their soldiers, and history hardly recorded so fearful oils° glorious a struggles bat was it not little less than miraculous that it terminated in such a result ; for it was only by th e mercy of God that such a band as that were able to rsist the Russian force. (Great cheering. ) Why were there only 8,000 men present ? Their valour unquestionably claimed the admiration and gratitude of a 11; it was not beyond that even ordinarily displayed by a British force ; it was not the mere courage of men tghting against men, but the more enduring, calm, gallant, intrepid courage, which enabled that band of heroes to withstand, hour after hour, almost for an entire day, under grievous privations and sufferings, the repeated and overwhelming attacks of the enemy, and it was, in his opinion; little less than miraculous, that they were now able to congratulate themselves that victory was theirs, instead of hsving to mourn the loss of their whole force. (Load cheers from the Opposition.) That was a grave matter for explanation, and they had a right to ask why that fearful odds existed. (Cheers.) His own belief was, that if her Majesty's Government had s h own a -p ro p er foresight ; if, upon their undertaking the expedition to the Crimea, they had sent proper reinforcements; if they had had an army of reserve, or instantly supplied the vacancies caused by battle or disease; if they had kept up the British strength, even to the small number of 21,000 men, it • was, he repeated, his firm persuasion, that no battle of Inkerman would have taken place. (Cheers from the Opposition.) They all knew the trite phrase which Used to be applied in the sister country towards this—and We believe that England's weakness on that occasion was Russia's opportunity, and that the Emperor seeing that, 'athered together his legions and sent them against a re eluced handful of men, who, brave as he knew they were, thought he would succeed in overpowering them. (Cheers.) Raving ' before that felt the effect of a British force at Alma, he (Sir J. Pakington) was firmly persuaded he never Would have risked the battle of Inkerman had the Go vernment et home displayed even common prudence. (Cheers.) But was that all? What had been the suffer ings of their men ? (Cheers.) They had been on those heights over Sebastopol under canvass tents, they were in the worst weather that possibly could be conceived, ex posed to the rigours of a severe climate; and the effects of that awful hurricane which was so fatal to our shipping, totally unprotected. (Cheers.) And how was that, but by the imprudence and want of foresight of her Majesty's Government—(cheers)--and they had a right to ask them for an explanation. That house found them liberally with supplies, and in sending forth an army as brave and gallant as ever faced an enemy, why did they allow them to perish with cold and exhaustion on the heights of Sebastopol? (Cheers.) Within the last two days he had himself seen a private letter from a distinguished officer of high rank in the Crimea; of course he was not at liberty to mention his name, but he pledged himself that he was an officer of high rank, and of unimpeachable cha racter fer veracity. The letter was written to a member of his own family, and containeilthese remarkable words : -" The spirit of the men is good, but their sufferings are almost beyond endurance." (Cheers.) He (Sir J. Peking ton) could hardly with calmness advert to such a state of things, for he could not see any possible excuse for such neglect. (Hear.) Let them read the newspapers of the day ; let them read Lord Raglan's despatche published that morning, giving an account of the weather, and to what a condition it reduced the ground on which the army were encamped, and then let hon. members ask if these brave men ought, at this season of the year, and in such a climate, to have been exposed under canvass tents ? (Cheers.) Her Majesty's Government could not plead in answer that they were taken by surprise—they could not allege that it was impossible for them to have foreseen these thing's, for they might, and could, and ought to have foreseen them. (Hear, hear.) The expedition did not leave Varna till September, and he was very much inclined to believe, looking at the whole history of that expedition, and if he could dive into the secrets of the Government, that it was originally intended to have taken Sebastripol by a coup de main. Perhaps it was possible that they could have done so, but it was equally certain that they had n• right in presuming that they could do so, and that they were, therefore, boundito be prepared for either alter native. (Hear, hear.) He maintained that her Majesty's Government had no right or reason to expect the capture of Sebastopol in such a manner. It was a great fortress, well stored and garrisoned, and no man could doubt but that the Czar would strengthen this, his stronghold, and be prepared to resist any attack. (Hear.) Was it likely then, or possible, that such a place could be e as ily t a k en , and that when the expedition landed in the Crimea they would succeed in taking Sebastopol by a coup de main. They had no right to expect a speedy termination to the contemplated attack, for they did notsend men enough to do so ; it may have been probable, but they had no right to assume that such would b'e the case. They had an army attacking a great fortress, but so weak in numbers that they could not invest it; on the contrary, 'they were only able to • occupy one side of it, leaving the enemy at liberty to come and •go, and .bring in supplies at the ether, just as often and largely as they chose. What right had they to suppose that it would yield without a struggle ? They may no doubt capture it, and he hoped in Heaven they would; bat when they were placed in such circumstances that they could not invest it, surely it was certain that the struggle must be protracted, and if so, it was equally certain that their soldiers would be exposed to the advent of winter in such a climate, and to the dreadful sufferings they have since endured, They were now re duced, by cold- and privation of every description, to an extent which left them physically unable to perform their duties ;..officers-were out on duty every two nights out of three, and yet nothing was done to alleviate their condi tion. If or Majesty's. Government may tell him that a Warm supply pf clothing had unfortunately been lost , in the Prince—and that, of course, no blame could attach to them ; but they had a right to be informed why that sup , ply was not sent out sooner, and why did it not reach the Crimea 'until the month of November —until the cold be came scrintenge that the men suffered the most cruel pri vations. (Hear, bear.) When were the huts to be sent out I and how long were the men to remain exposed under canvass tents! Why was i t the y we re going out in De camber! He had that morning met an officer of his ac quaintance, who was going out to superintend the erection of those huts, end under these circumstances it was i mpos . Bible the men could be relieved from the canvas tents until the end of January. What would be the consequenc es which, in the meantime, might ensue to the health of these brave men? (Hear.) It is all very well to speak in terms of praise in that house of theirbraveryo but it should be remembered they were not giving them even the com mon care due to humanity. (Cheers.) Under all these cir cumstances he thought he was justified in saying that that house would abandon its duty if it did not call on the Government to explain why these things should have hap pened. They had a right to an e xplanation, not only in the name of the people of this country, but in that of the army, to whose sufferings he adverted. If the Govern- meat gave them a satisfactory explanation, if they would show that hereafter they may not on l y rely on their good intentions, which he (Sir. J. Pakington) did not deny, but on their prudence and foresight, they would have no cause to fear from the Conservative party. (Hear.) They were not the - Whigs of 1790, nor the Coalitionists of 1853. (Loud cheers from the Opposition.) They desired nothing but the honour of their Sovereign and the welfare of their country. (Cheers.) Let her Majesty's Government ask for supplies, and they should have them with no niggard hand ; let them ask Parliamentary support and they should have it without meeting with any factions spirit. ( Hear , hear.) Bat if they made these conce ssions on the one an they must exact conditions on the o ther, namely, thahtthde War should be conducted with a vigour, a wisdom, and . foresight beyond that which they had hitherto shown. therefore (Hear, hear.) They asked the Go vernment, for these explan7-. 1; they were hound in duty to the country to give these. Parliament Would, no doubt, hear those explanations • it would ask how th e y intended to shape their future lcourse, and by the answer they g ave it would be seen whether the Souse of 'Commons b would THE SUN, LONDON„ WEDNESDAY EVENING, DECEMBER 13. 1 854, because I do feel that if it were true there was any thing like cold, systematic, heartless indifference mani fested by any department of the army, above all by the medical department, to whose care the wounded are especially entrusted, it would produce a bad feeling in the minds of the people of this country, and destroy that confidence in the administration of the army, which has of late years been engendered. Let me say one word- with regard to the general hospital of S cu t ar i. I w ill f ran kly admit I know no subject which has caused me so much anxiety as this, the distance from the scene of action being such that although you may send out medical stores you cannot insure their immediate application. I will now state what .I believe to be the truth. We have been told that at one time there was not such a thing as a pound of lint for an hospital containing two thousand men. That statement created the greatest horror in this country, and the greatest indignation was expressed against those who had had charge of this h os pit a l . I have accounts from medical men, which I will not read, to the effect that never for one moment was there any deficiency of lint or of any thing else. At the time when the army left Yarna the general hospital was there. An order was given that the stores there should be sent down to Scutari. That order, amid the hurry and bustle of departure, was never exe cuted. The principal stores remained at Varna. But it so happened that there were sufficient to meet the diffi culty of the moment. There never was positively a defi ciency of these things ; but one was apprehended. Un der these circumstances the medical officers accepted a loan from the Turkish government of linen, lint, and other materials. - A large proportion of the stores which were sent from home was not unloaded, because when the ship arrived there was such a pressing for reinforce ments as would admit of no delay. There was no positive deficiency, I say, though one was apprehended. I will tell you one evil which did arise. There had been engen dered during peace a cumbrous system of check and counter-check. The purveyor required all manner of forms to be observed before he would issue stores on the requisition of the medical officers. There was likewise at the head of the whole establishment an officer, not a medical man, who, though ho devoted himself indefati gably to the performance of his duties, vas not of a rank to ensure co-operation from those placed under his autho rity, or from the Turkish officials. I was not, therefore, by any means satisfied with this establishment. With plenty of stores, no one seems to have known where to lay his hand upon them, and the stores could never be ob tained with that rapidity which is necessary in hospitals. The moment we heard complaints we sent out a commis sion of inquiry, and in a private letter, received from one whose name if it were mentioned would show the . house that he was indisposed to criticise, it was observed that sufficient allowance had not been made for the difficulties of the case, and that it was impossible to prevent con fusion from attending - the sudden influx of a thousand wounded - men. As to the 'lady who - went out from this country to superintend the nurses, I receive, not only from medical men, but from others who have observed her conduct, testimony which,is, is fact, the highest praise that can be bestowed on any human being. I now return to the charge made by the right hon. gentleman against the Government. Let me first say, with regard to the reinforcements, that I have here a letter from Sir Henry Ward stating that, in a letter which he had received from Admiral Boxer, dated the 4th of last month, it was declared that 20,000 English and French had passed through the Bosphorus to reinforce the Allies. I have shown that the total number of men sent out from the first is 54,000 odd; and I ask, in what first year of any - previous war in which England has been engaged Las she ev er sent out suc h an army as this? (H ear , har.) It may be said, and with truth, that we have no reserve. The right hon. gentleman said he would some day ask the question why we ever went to Sebastopol at all. I will tell him why. We knew that that fortress was the stronghold of Russia in the Black Sea. (Hear, hear.) I admit that the enterprise was one of great hazard ; but next year it would have been impos Bible. Round about that mighty fortress was rising, almost day by day, further chains of forts ; and if it be not de stroyed or taken in this campaign it can never be destroyed or taken. I remember hearing, last session,*of as gentleman in the City saying, "The war ought to be carried on with the utmost vigour and determination; but at the same timeno risk must be run." (Laughter.) If that view could be re alised, we should have a golden age of war as well as of peace. I admit that there is hazard, but I say we ought to strike with vigour while the place is valuable, and if we succeed we shalt have destroyed the power of Russia in the south. I hope the right hon. gentleman (Sir J. Pak ington) is satisfied with that answer, which is the only one I can give him. Last session many , hon. gentlemen in this house spoke of the war in language which almost filled me with superstitious fears, en account of its arrogance and presumption. We did not enter 'upon this expedition in that spirit—(hear, hear)—and we have felt that our greatest difficulty is that -of haviiag to create an army and maintain it simultaneously. See the difficulties we have had to encounter. We have no compulsory service whatever in England except compulsory service for home defence. We have to trust, therefore, entirely to vo lunteers. You cannot create an army as other govern ments can by the stroke of a pen. You must get the men who are willing to come, bat on the other hand when those men do come you have got a material which no conscription in the world ever produced. (Cheers.) You have men, not dragged from their reluctant homes against their wills, and from peaceful pursuits, to be forced into scenes of blood and horror to which they were averse. You have got men animated with the highest s, a p i r b i i t ti o m n e , n a r d u y ng ouarnd ran d k v s eanrteu fi r o l l u e s d , a b c y t u ni x t e end whoby t can h never ightes say that any one of the hardships to which they were ex posed has been forced upon them by a tyrannical Govern ment. Well, you have had this difficulty, but you have had another: you have had for some time a large emigra tion from this country. You have had an emigration go ing on from Ireland especially, which has dried up the sources of population ; you have had at the same time great activity in commerce and manufacture. The recruit ing sergeant has had to compete against that; and when I look back to war times, and see what were th e means taken to get men, and th a t with all their efforts they could only raise twenty-four thousand men in one year ; and when I look at what has been done this year, a year not expired, and see that, including what has been raised for the East India Company, we have, by free enlistment, had come to our standard something like 40,000 men, I say that I do look with confidence to the augmentation of ' our army. We are getting men, not faster than they are wanted, but we are getting men very fast, and drilling them ready for service. Lord Hardinge has made this regulation, that he will not allow a man to go out till he is thoroughly ardi ie. n n i g i e a . s I e o h n a v t e h s e e f r a s v e h d i r t d o deprecia practised te i a n t s h t e e h o ns e e u tu rvi s i e n c o o d f s e the i o . n L - M c o h r i d n i and I have served others as commanders-in-chief, and I have been able to see what are Lord Hardinge's talents and powers under circumstances of very great difficulty. If you look at the nature of the suc . _ ces;e; which our army has achieVed in the Crimea, I think this will strike every man, that, next after the indomitable courage of the men, comes the skill with which they use their weapons, and the superiority of the weapons placed in their hands. If it had not been for Lord Hardinge, I do not .be lieve that you would have had a division arm e d w ith the Mime rifle. I do not mean that it was Lord Hardinge-that sent them out, but I' mean that 'Lord Harding°, when he was at the Ordnance, infused new 'life into that d e pa r tment, and threw aside old prejudices ent e rtained even by s uch a _man Sir Charles Napier to the latest day. of his lif e . Well, 1e Hardinge forced the Minie rifle into the service, while his re- 1 ime. gulation was, that no soldier sho u ld be s en t ou t who was i practised in the M ' What is the opinion of the army no to the use of that weapon ? Why, Sir George C a theart's divi sion in action at Inkerman, wh en th e y saw o th e r men Mu seized their Minis rifles and threw away their muskets. It is not so much the use of the weap on b u t th e con fidence . , of the men that is gained, and the re su lt i s, that instead of firingic a random as in old battles (and I think I have seen can lat. tions that only one shot i n 600 took effect) yousee the soldier use his weapon with th e same fac ili ty as a game keeper handles his fowling-piece - and with the distinct. ave in tention of making every sh o t tell. Well, I say, we have had this army to drill to a rms and to send out. M en are coming in rapidly. We shall be able to establish a large re serve at the Crimea, and I hope it will not be said, as T, said last year, that we p u t out our whole force and left nothing behind ; and that we have men at home whom We ought to have sent out. I h ave heard gentlemen say they have actually sent out a re i nforcement of four, five, or six regiments. What they have done now they could have done five or six months ago. C ould they ? In the first place, how long does it take to mak e a soldier ? But the regiments have been sent out. Some of these regiments came from foreign service, but were skel e t on regiments, more fitted for P rri " But son duty than anything else. Th ey had to be re f o rmed. some of these regiments were positively not in England' The Duke of Newcastle sent for them'from Canada and from India. And when you say this force could have been sent out three months ago, it did not exist three months age- And when you say you should have sent out battalions, you men, could not create men out • of n o thi ng, You must fi r st get you must then drill the men and form them into soldiers, or else the reputation of our arms would be lessened by sending m en w are insufficient for their duty. (Hear, hear.) ho sir, I hope the house will I think that the Government has not been neglectful in the matter of reinforcement% and that, at any rate, if it has not done that which no Government could do, everything which they wished, yet that without the material in their hands they have done their utmost. And aga in I repeat, look back to the expeditions in which the Govern ment has been engaged, look.at the expedition of 1793, at the Duke of York's, and at Sir Ralph Abercrombie's, look at the numbers then s en t and compare- them with the army sent out now. But, then, it is said that the army has been ex posed to privations, that they have been made to fight battleh of the most sanguinary description, which could have been avoided by foresight at home. No foresight at home could have strengthened the army more than it has been strength ened. It is true that sanguinary battles Shave been fought, but in former times England never went into a war but she came out of her first campaign with liar reputation none of the best ; but I want to know whether at any period of our history our military character stood so high as it does now ? (Cheers.) I want to know what the efact of pulic opinion in Europe h as b een on the manner in which our battalions have conducted themselves in this war. I want to know what has been the effect of public opinion in Russia—what has been the effect' on their own army? The critics, who say hat our men are exp osed unnecessarily to sanguinary battl t es, that Alma ought to have be en t urne d i ns t ea d o f bei ng taken, are persons who, I thi n k , can never have studied the map of' the country on which th e y h ave expen ded th e i r criticism, or they would have seen that the ground to the right of the Russians in that action was so steep and inac cessible that it was not worth the attention of the Russian commander ; and . if the military critics who have attacked the reputation of Lord Raglan for not turning the position had reflected for one moment, they would have seen that probably the commander of the Russians could have desired nothing better than to find the fleet, and the English and the French army, separated, and his own army posted between the ships and those armies. So likewise it has been alleged against Lord Raglan that he eight to have assaulted Sebastopol after the battle of Alma. Sir, I do not know that we who sit here are very good judges of that. (Hear.) I know that ve r y em i nent military meu view such an under taking as a hazard that could not be justified. Talk of lead ing flesh and blood against batteries, but would you have taken these men against a town in which it was impossible to say at that moment how many of Prince Menschikoff's army was still in it, of which the strength was not then known. Such a proceeding might have exposed them to be massacred in detail. I believe that eminent non who had command of that army knew better than those who say they are com petent, and give an opinion in their own chambers of military • affairs. Now, sir, is it true as asserted by the right honourable baronet that we took no precaution with regard to warm clothing ? why , the warm clothing of which unfortunately a large portion was lost in the Prince, and let me say, when I speak of that ship, the loss has been greatly exaggerated as to the value. The cargo has been said to have been worth half a million. I unders.aad it did not cost more than 180,0001, No doubt it was a heavy loss, but another ship immediately sneceeded it, a}ul I hail a letter, two or three days ago, from an onlocr ou the spot, who informed me that Captain Wetherell, who had been deputed by Lard Raglan to go to Constantinople to procure articles of clothing , h a d executed hi s commission with such success that it had more than compensated for the lees Of the FrinCel(Cheers.) But, mormero am 11 APPY to say, that when General Estcourt wrdte to inform me of the loss of the Prince, he said, " We have lost at one swoop all that your foresight, or the foresight of your office had pro vided;" but it so happened that Lord Raglan k.nd the Quar ter-master had applied for clothing, and the answer was, All has been ordered, a great part is finished, a great pain is at sea ; and the letter of Lord Raglan asking for supplies was forestalled by the supplies sent. I believe there is a g rea t misapprehension with regard to the manner in which the troops should be clothed. I have a letter from a gentleman: t who knows well the climate of the Crimea, who says °' Don't believe the,statements as to average temperature ; follow the custom of the country—clothe them in skins, not woolle n s: Then an officer who has had great experience in Arct i c searches came to me and said, " Have nothing to do with skins—stick to woollens." (Laughter.) I thought it safest to take the advice of both, and I hope that before long every man may have his change, not only of skins, but of woollens. I am not speaking of changes of the uniforms ; that is a matter of course. But besides that we have got for every man a sealskin cap coming well round the face and ears. We have for every man leggings which he can draw over the trousers, and a loose coat, and under that he can ,wear along with it a waistcoat of tweed lined with hareskin, and rabbit skin, and catskin. (Laughter.) A great coat, not of the usual pattern, but of the Canada pattern. We have got some boots called the Canada boots, and we have, besides that, a coat made from sheepskin. Government felt with regard to these, that time was everything. To build huts to send out was a process far from meeting the emergency. In the meanwhile we telegraphed to Lord Westmoreland and to Lord Stratford. Lord Stratford sent a gentleman to pro cure Austrian huts, constructed in that country; he also took measures to procure others from Malta and Constantinople. I trust, therefore, that they got an immediate supply, and if we send huts, I hope that our huts will be as luxuries, as ad ditions to what are already there. (Cheers.) I have given this point in detail, which is rather wearisome to the house, but it must be recollected what is the charge against us. The charge is a heartless neglect of on: duty, and indifference to the comforts of what I believe to be the bravest army that ever existed. Ido not believe that any action was ever more brilliant in point of attack than that of Alma. I do not be lieve that you ever had an instance of such signal self-reliance and confidence as the resistance to the charge of cavalry by the 93d Highlenders. The reginiant disdained to alter its for mation, but every man remained as he stood two deep, and when the Russian cavalry approached, the Russian horsemen would not face the encounter but fled. Then, at Inkerman, at the commencement of the battle the troops were surprised as, they were at the battle of Talavera—a battle which had been prepared for weeks. I believe that so far back as the 24th of October, it had been arranged at a council of war, immense efforts had been made to bring men and cannon to the Crimea for 100 miles and more. Not only every cart and bullock, but, they tell me, that every carriageland horse was employed to bring up the army post ; and even at the last day the army was moved at the rate of 42 miles a day, a feat which I believe is unparalleled in history. Everything was made to depend on that stroke. The Emperor was assured that the thing was certain, and after the battle came back the men who had been keeping their lonely watch, who had heard the bells tolling in the town, and the murmur of men at mass. That sight, no doubt, the religious ceremonies of the church had been used to invest the attack with a more sacred character, and appeals were made to the patriotism of these men. In the morning, favoured by the mist, these columns broke in on our men, some of whom were actually returning from the trenches, where they had spent the night, and who were compelled to go back without food, and I know not how many hours. 8,000 men withstood the attack. The right hon. baronet brings it as an accusation that' there were only 8,000 men, as if the whole army consisted of 8,000 men, and as if a commander's whole business was not to ooncentrate his force in' masses where the enemy was weak. Well, eight thousand English soldiers stood there for hours, beating back column after column brought up one after another, and hurling them into the ravines up which- they had ascended. Ido not believe that in the history of any battle, however illustrious, you will find an instance of au assault being successfully resisted under circumstances so adverse, for so long a periol, and of such immense loss. That was a soldier's battle. There you saw the character of the English soldier. The men stood by their regimental officers, but it was a battle of the soldiers standing in ranks. (Cheers.) I rejoice in the numbers of letters from soldiers that have appeared in the papers. I re- joice that the people of England should know of what mate rials their armies are composed. I ask you to look at the army in which the office of Judge-Advocate is a sinecure. (Cheers.) I ask you to read the letters of these men marked by a simple piety—men writing to their wives, saying that they have been preserved in answer to the prayers of their children. I saw a letter from a soldier at Inkermann, in which be says, as marking the quality of the officers, that eight officers were laid in one grave, and that there was not a dry eye. See these men showing all these gentle qualifica tions, men who have shown mercy to the vanquished, under circumstances of horrid provOcation ; and yet, as Sir William Napier says, speaking of one of the Peninsular battles when the British infantry is attacked by overpowering numbers then it is that yoU see with what strength and majesty they fight. There is one side of that picture which has been alluded to by the right hon. baronet, and I admit the full justice of the melancholylloss we have sustained in the death of General Cathcart. No man was more valued than he : he had qualifi cations of the highest order ' and his death is a public loss which cannot-easily be replaced. But it is indeed to the credit of Eng land to see not only the devotion and the courage with which these generals exposed themselves, but also it is impossible not lio struck, in reading the names of those who have fallen with the number who have gone from a sense of duty, and who have shownln this campaign how little even the posses sion of wealth and luxurycan impair the spirit of English gen tlemen and of the English people from the lowest to the highest rank. I lament as much as the right hon. gentleman the losses which we have sustained. I cannot look round without knowing that there are here the parents of some of those lant men who have so cheerfully laid down their lives in the service of their country. But England has suffered greater losses in former battles, like 'Talavera and Albnera, where 4,800 men fell ; while in these engagements, from beginnini , to end, less than 1,500 men have perished by the sword. The* • largest loss has been by disease—a loss more disheartening to the army than loss in battle, and carrying with it less of glory. There have died in hospital from disease and from wounds in tiv whole campaign 2,782, of whom about 150 have died from wounds ; killed in battle, 1,330 ; total loss, 4,l32—which is much less than the exaggerated statements that I have seen. And let me speak of the assistance which has been given by our allies. It is delightful to see men, placed in such a position, entertaining for each other such respect The English army cheered with a hearty cheer the advance of General Bosquet's division when it came to the relief of our shattered columns, and I believe the charge in which the French awl our men got mixed together was a good type of the union which binds the two nations together. (Cheers.) They say that each army is gaining qualifications from the ocher, that wo are acquiring the dash of the French, and that the French are acquiring the firmness of the English. I believe that the effect on the people of both countries is far greater than could have been produced by any diplomacy however skilfull, or by any treaty. I ask those who are desponding, and who are the persons perhaps who were so valiant two months ago, to reflect what was the condition of England at the commencement of this war, and what it was in previous wars. In previous wars we had alli- antes who took our money, and were not always true to their engagements, but now we have an alliance with the most military nation on the face of the earth, formerly our rivals and once our enemies, and which is now bound to us, I believe, by firm friendship. We have placed public opinion in Europe on our side, we have placed Russia in a state of complete isolation, her ports completely sealed, her flag not daring to show itself in any part of the Black See formerly her own. This is the effect of the first campaign, and I ask you to point out in the history of England any campaign in which you can point out such a result. (Cheers.) I ask those who assert that Government have omitted to do all that it was their business to do, and committed everything they ought not to do, and I ask them how this army was organise.' and sent out, this army which has never met the enemy ex cept for victory? I say the military power of England stands higher than it ever did, and if you think that you ought to trust us with these powers do so. .But the country is deter mined, at all hazards and at all costs that the army of Lord Raglan shall be supported. (Cheers.) If the House of Com mons does not answer to that feeling of the country, the House of Commons must take the consequences. We are engaged hi a war we have entered reluctantly ; we must carry it on vigorously. To obtain that which is the object of all war—peace—you must conquer it ; and I say no exertions should be spared to enable us by the vigour of pur operations to attain th . ose ends. I say, further, as far as the Govern ment is concerned, if you think that Government is to be en- . . trusted with these powers, you must enable them to carry out honestly the will of the nation, that the noblest army that ever left our shores shall have the means of a perfect triumph. (Loud cheers.) Mr. LAYARD said they had before them the alternative of avoiding all reference to what had taken place with reference to the war, Of to see what could be done for the future, and support the Government in carrying it out with the greatest vigour. With regard to the conduct of the Government, his feelings, as he believed was the case with almost every other member in the house, were conflicting. Either he must forget all that had occurred in the management of the present war, and place confidence in the Government for the future, without any reference to, their policy-past, present, or future—or, on the other hand, he ought to warn the coun try against those calamities which might be in store for it, and point out those neglects which had occurred, and thereby ob tain, if possible, from her Majesty's ministers such an expres- RIM of opinion as might warrant him in placing confidence in them for the future. There could be no 'doubt that at the present moment her Majesty's Government were making every effort to take the groat fortress of Sebastopol, and he gave the Government great credit for desiring to do all in ' their power to effect that object. But he believed the capture of Sebastopol, however gigantic that undertaking might be, was but the first link in the chain—the first step in the great war in which we were now engaged. He believed that very shortly we should have to choose between a peace which might be disgraceful and utterly inconsistent with the sacrifices of blood and treasure which we had made, and a struggle which, withrespect to its magnitude and results, had perhaps never been equalled in the history of the world. (Cheers.) Such being his convictions, he could not help saying that after what had passed he did not feel that confidence in her Majesty's Government which be wished he could feel. If he couid be lieve that the mismanagement that had occurred was merely the result of inexperience, and that for the future we might hope for better things, he would still place confidence in the 4 Government ; but he believed that that mismanagement was to be attributed to the want of a definite policy. (Hear.) He believed, moreover, that it was impossible for a Govern ment composed as the present was to have a definite policy. (Hear.) How could a definite policy be expected from a cabinet which included representatives of all the political par ties in this country—from a representative of the Holy Alliance down to a representative of the extreme of Liberal ism. (Cheers,) It was impossible to expect anything but a half-and-half policy from a cabinet so composed.; but a half and-half policy and half-and-half Measures would not do. What had taken place during the last two years in reference to this question ? During that period he had repeatedly endea voured to warn the Government and the country upon the subject ; but the same appeal was made to him over and over again as was made by the - tight hon. gentleman (Mr. S. Her bert) that night —namely, that the' appearance of dissension on this question should be avoided —. that they should show themselves to be a united nation. "We admit our errors," said the. Government. " Have confidence in us, and we will endeavour to bring the question to a satisfactory set tlement." (Hear, and laughter.) That confidence had been given by the House of Commons almost without debate. At the close of the last session he (Mr. Layard) ventured to warn the Government 'of the dangerous calamities which were likely to befal our army in the East. Again a similar appeal was u m on ly policy pursued by the Government was to yield to a pre ssure from without, then an y men whom would be equally capable with the present Ministers to admin ister the afftirs of the country. He believed that our allies, the French, had almo st taken the initiative in ever y move ment appertaining to the p resent war. • The Em p eror of the yo ma i g d h e t t o meet him b ; te but yro o u h Westminster asked whether H Hall a t u that a t Charing-crosss ta t e s manship 1 If the French, las Foreign "Minister, awl our representative at Paris, were en titl e d to great praise in reference to this war ; but our Government had only mismanaged it. Before the com mencement of the war her Majesty's Ministers did not believe that there would be a war. It was almost impossible to , i bring themselves to the conviction that a great potion had - - _ justified, or the people of this country satisfied, that the future conduct of public affairs should rest in the hands of the existing Administration. Sir R. PEEL justified the policy pursued both before hostilities commenced, and during the conduct of tie war, and eulogised the chivalrous bearing of the officers, and the indomitable courage of the men composing the British. army. They had now cemented with their blood an alli ance with Franca. They had entered into a friendly treaty with Austria, and, under these circumstances, he thought it was highly indecorous and reprehensible that M. Kos suth and M. Victor Hugo should be permitted, on public occasions, to attack their Allies. He appealed to the noble lord th© Secretary of State for Foreign affairs, Whe ther it was not his bounden duty to interfere as soonas possible? Mr. S. HERBERT said—The charges, sir, wfiich have been brought against the Government to-night are of so serious a nature that I hope,the house will grant me their attention while I endeavour to give an answer to tke state ments of the right hon. baronet (Sir J. Pakington) and give that explanation which he states it is his right as a member of Parliament to exact. I will do so by giving a plain his tory of the war in so far as it has come under the direction of the Government. The 11011.38 of Commons will then con sider whether the conduct of the Government has entitled them to ask for further power and further assistance to carry on the war with vigour. The charges, sir, as I under stand them, which have been made are many in number. The hon. baronet says the army was originally sent out by the Government without any specific plan or intention— that when at last they did decide on a plan, it was one not justified by the forces at their command or the informa tion they had received of the power and strength of the enemy they were about to attack. He further said that the army was too small, that it was an ill•appointed army, and this from want of due preparation by the Government that sent it out—that the army was sent out too late, that the reinforcements were not sufficient, and that by neglect at home it was allowed to dwindle down till it became in significant. Now, I cannot do better than state, in a few instances, what was the intention of the Govern ment when that army was sent into the field. I will show what that force was, what was its state of dis cipline and its efficiency, and I will then show how much truth there is in the allegation that; the army was suffered to become weak for want of reinforcements. 'ln the month of April instructions were sent to Lord Raglan as to the disposal of the force under his or ders—a force numerically much inferior to that now under his command. The intention of the Allied Govern ments—for no step was taken by this Government with out consulting our Allies. (Hear, hear.) Their good faith in council has been as signal as their gallantry in the field ; and the house will understand that when I shall speak of the Government, I mean not the English Government alone, but tbe Allied Governments. At the time that army was sent to occupy a portion of the Turkish territory, we had a large fleet in the Black Sea, there was a power ful Russian army in the Principalities ; but few encoun ters had taken place between the Turkish and Russian armies, and these most capable of forming an opinion had but little confidence in the power of the Turkish army to resist ; and it was feared that by a bold stroke on Con stantinople our fleet might be caught in the Black Sea, with the Bosphorus in the hands of the Ensperor of Rus sia. I now speak of what was possible; it was also possi ble that if the Turks failed to make a resistance at Kala fat, the line'of the Balkan might be turned and an army come down on Constantinople. English and French offi cers were sent to ascertain the best line of defence to save that capital from a coup de main. Lord Raglan then received instructions to take part of the army under his command to Unkiar Skelessi, not only on account of the salubrious character of the place, but because he was then placed within reach of the Balkan, if that line was menaced by the Russians, and also ready for an attack on the Russian territory if that was d e t erm i ne d on. I mention this to show that the Government had then three objects in view —first, to defend Constanti nople ; secondly, to defend the line of the Balkan ; thirdly, to make attack on and carry the war into some vital part of the Russian territory. The army was then sent further—what had been foreseen took place—the Russians crossed the Danube, and invested Silistria. Omer Pacha considered that he could not save the town unless the English and French made an advance, which would frighten the Russians and compel them to raise the siege. We all recollect the events of that siege ; we recol lect the gallantry of our countrymen in a miserable outpost of that fortress ; but it was not their heroism, nor the courage with which they inspired the Turkish troops, but the fact that a French army was gathering at Shumla and an English at Varna which convinced the Russian com manders that they could not retain their position. As to Silistria, there may be question whether the importance of relieving it was so great as to allow it to interpose be fore any other operation. No doubt time was lost by it, but we gained material advantages by it ; we gained for a Turkish army a great prestige ; we gained in the public opinion of Europe the advantage of destroying the prestige of the Russian arms in that campaign. It then remained for the Government to consider what enterprise would strike such a blow at the Russian power in the Black Sea as to place her neighbour in comparative tranquillity for the future. The siege of Silistria was raised on the 22d. On the 29th instructions were sent to Lord Raglan to spare no pains to ascertain the strength of Russia in the Crimea, and how far an attack on it with the forces at his disposal was likely to be successful. The officers in command of the two armies were men of great military experience ; the Government depended on them ; one is now no more, but in his successor and the sur vivor we place unbounded confidence. The right honourable baronet asks, did the Government give any positive instructions after receiving information as to the force in the Crimea ? If, sir, we had shown so little confidence in those selected for such responsible posts of command, as to say to them, " Whatever be the information you receive—attempt nothing till you have told us, .evho are six weeks distant from you (for that is the time it takes to receive an answer to a despatch), what are the grounds of your opinion"--we should have lest not weeks, but mouths tilt any expedition became im possible. These officers took every means of ascertaining the Russian force in the Crimea, they then held a council of war, and decided that the attack ought to be made. They knew the forces at their command, they knew also what force they might expect to meet with. aid Lord Raglan knew better than any man what the military capa city of the English was. From that moment the allied commanders applied every energy of their minds to make preparations for that mighty arinWent which conveyed their armies to the Crimea. Those who talk lightly of that expedition seam to me to think that it is a very easy thing to carry 50,000 men across the sea, and put them down on a hostile shore, without boats to land them, or boats to carry their heavy guns ; it is considered to be an easy ope ration, like landing them on a pier in time of peace. That operation took immense time—it owes great credit to these engaged in it; no expedition ever sailed' so complete in every respect; and happily no expedition ever conveyed so immense a force across any sea with so little loss and with success so great. (Hear, hear.) But was this army so insufficient for the purpose for which it was in tended ? Lord Raglan took with him to the Crimea 27,000 men, and our allies took a large force, not quite so strong as ours, but which united to it gave a total of about 50,000 men. They soon after met the whole force then in the Crimea, and met them entrenched in a position which an advantageenemy equal held t a o t that a o f a doubling position ours at Inkerman , bu t held it with a theirgave them nuemmbers. T as str d l ifferen as t result. But what else was there that d e el ry ayed the e xpedition ? Before it sailed from Varna a fearful pestilence broke out a mongst the men, which thinned our ranks grievously. That was an - enemy more depressing to the soldiers than any human one; but we were not the only sufferers. Our Allies suffered still more s h t as ate b o ee u n r e d x r e a a c d t fluolslgy, butfrom I kits now s o ;y ravages. that far greater than from any o ther circumstance. Lord. ur loss e m fro t m ina d h i disease Raglan and Marshal St. Arnaud had to make every exer tion to arouse their troops from the depression consequent on sickness, whilst they were preparing for the invasion of the Crimea. But, sir, I do not think it is very clear that if he had been enabled to land in the Crimea sooner we should have gained very much as compared with the enemy. The principal difficulty the Russians find in bringing up their reinforcements arises from the difficulty of moving over a soil that is broken up in bad weather; the longer therefore the fine weather lasted, the longer would they be enabled to receive reinforcements. But I must say that there never was an army moved on land so rapidly and so successfully as the corps of General Dannenberg. The right hon. baronet says we underrated the power of the enemy. Last session I made some observations on that point. I warned the public that on account of the re ult of the campaign on the Danube, in which no pitched battle had been fought, they choose to assume that the power of Russia was wavering, if not extinct, and would fall if attacked with vigour. I pointed out that the Russian soldier was a man of primitive nature, aid like all such sincerely attached to his native country. (Hear, hear.) The people of this country think that other nations who do not possess institutions like their own are insensible to patriotism and loge of country which they feel. We have now received a lesson in this respect, and those who have seen the defence of Sebastopol mast know how the Russian will defend his country. And now, sir, what is the truth of the statements—th a t th e army sent out was inferior in numbers and utterly without reinforce ments ? The army at first consisted of four divisions, the let, 2d, 3d, and light divisions, amounting to 22,680. In ,June, before orders were given to make a descent on the Crimea if circumstances were such as to justify it, a fifth division was formed and placed under the lamented Sir G. Cathcart. Now let us see what reinforcemOnts h ave b een sent. In June we sent 941 men, in July 4,588 m en , an d in August, 2,032, and new we are told that from the mo ment the expedition was decided the Government should have sent reinforcements—in September, 1,286 men ,• in October, 2 , 855, and in November 7,037 were sent. (Hear ) There are further reinforcements, but these are sent in consequence of late occurrences and Lord Raglan's de mands. This number may net please those who think Englishr. b a ttalions should be poured on the pl a i n like grater. But who are responsible for the fact, th a t Eng land, at the commencement of every war , is obliged to lte make a little war ? Since the peace the cry in every Parlia ment has been econom y , and the result is our force i s far too small get I a ni into as m trouble ueh t o a nd blame as sdifficulty.any one. I have been Secretary (Rear.) To speak at War for many years, and It has been d have brought forward my p eace estimates. the sam e twhheetnru we truth, administration, however they with all ministers. Every fered on other points , a g reed in the necessity of economy. You ask us to make great efforts at the commencement of a war, at once to create an army and to use it. When the Militia Bill was brought forward it was stated that our whole available force, after providing for the defence of our colonies, did not exceed 10,00 j men. I have shown what number of men were sent to Lord Raglan, and what reinforcements are on their way. 1,700 men are now w aiting for embarkation ; and if I add to these the regiments ordered fromthe different g whole diterraneau, the that will shortly have passed under Lord Raglan's command will to 54 736 men. I has believe the countryamount , not the smallest conception that the force is so great. We have d state- seen the stereotype ment that Lord Raglan but what does that mean 9 It has only 16,000 bayonetf; actually present in the means the 16,000 effective men duty, excluding all Pld, excluding all on detache 1 officers all artillery, commissionedcavalry, and non-commissioned of Waterloo ' the Duke of WYeird engineers. At the battle bayonets. If we are to take Wellington had but 18,000 British this mode force will appear very small on of calculation our country as to its amount. The re ? t ap h er, and deceive the with perfect truth and fairness that the. baronet has said no reason to complain of the House of Co Government has it. They have granted all our demands, Commons. I admit now is, whether further power should b7 d the ; question who, according to the right lion, haropet Kaye to those little wisdom in the use of the past. He 3k ave shown so duty of a member of Parliament to bo to le defined the port to a war if it is a just war, and to give to : o very 8 ". the u vernment conducting the war ext raor di nary ) o . requisite, lots of men and money. B u t if lie th inks ;if . Government will not use these resources With - the Prudence and foresight, I think it is the duty of a member of Par liament not to entrust them with such powers, but to give them to other men—(hear, hear)—who will conduct the war in a way to satisfy the country. The right hon. baronet, in the course of his criticism, has stated that the army was insufficient to undertake any campaign in the Crimea, and that we ' had neglected to send rein forcements. He states that when the troops landed in the Crimea they landed without their tents, and stated we sent them out without tents. Every regiment took its tents from England with them. Lord Raglan landed them without their torts, and they bivouacked for several days without them. They landed on the 16th September. .The first night was wet ; and I believe that a great deal of sick ness arose. Oar troops were on the left, the French on the right, and they thus advanced without their tents. The Spanish army, Wellington's, never had any tents. Lord Raglan i s bl ame d f or landing the troops without their tents—how justly I will now ask you to decide. A power ful army was known to be in the Crimea, and it was pro bable that he would have to encounter them immediately after his landing. If he had brought the tents he would have left several battalions behind them that occupied the room that would have been taken up by the tents. If he had brought the tents and left the men, what would you have said to him if for want of these few battalions the affair at the Alma, instead of a glorious victory, had been an undecided struggle ? What would you have said then to Lord Raglan? (Cheers.) Why, you would have said, " Why did.you fill your ships with ambulances and tents when you had got men, and such men, lying idle at Varna? You were entering upon an expedition in which you knew the first blow would be everything, and you should have gone in light order, you'should have sacrificed everything else in order to take men ; strong battalions should have been your only consideration." (Hear, hear.) The right, hon. gentleman seems to think nothing of the expedition to Borearsund ; he says it was merely a blockade. Let him recollect, however, that that expedition was directed against islands that were almost inaccessible—(hear, hear)—in which foundations were laid and fortresses marked out for the purpose of establish* another Cronstadt or Helsingfors. (Hear, hear, hear.) Now that the place has been taken, the right. hon. baronet thinks nothing of the brave soldiers and sailors having risked their lives to capture it. He thinks nothing of such small things. The Emperor of the French differs from him ; he gave a marshal's baton to General d'Hilliers. To come back, however, to the case of the Alma, the right hon. baronet says the tents were not pro duced. I hope the explanation which I have given —it is an explanation which must be obvious to every one—is satisfactory to the house. (Cheers.) I do not imagine that one iota of blame attaches to Lord Raglan on account of that proceeding. (Loud cheers.) I believe that he did what every man in his situation ought to do. He judged of the circumstances as they then stood. He did not pre tend to prophesy success at, the Alma; he adopted every means of insuring it. It is very easy to say now, " Your success is certain ; you might have left men behind, and brought the tents.' , I mast here diverge for a moment to meet a charge which the right hon. baronet has not made, but which has certainly been made elsewhere. On that subject I shall make a very frank statement to the house. I have no wish to deceive them in any ono respect ; nor will I defend what I think is indefensible, or condescend for one moment to conceal what I think, with respect to details which have, in my opinion, been unsatisfactory. (Cheers.) Now, I recollect that last session we had a good deal of discussion here as to the merits of the commissa riat. The commissariat ran the gauntlet of popular cri ticism. I believe the opinions which were then formed with regard to that department were exaggerated opi nions, and not founded in fact; but I am not prepared to say that at the end of along peace the commissariat or any other department of the army was in as perfect a state as experience and practice would make it. (Hear, hear.) I have no doubt, therefore, that up to a certain point there was ground for criticism on the part of those who were determined to find fault. But, sir, the commissariat has outlived criticism, and I believe it is now universally ad mitted that there never was an army better fed than that of Lord Raglan's. (Hear, hear.) Their rations have Wen increased ; the rations of meat are 50 per cent. larger than those of any previous expedition. (Hear.) When fears were entertained that the health of the men would suffer for want of vegetables, supplies of vegetables were immediately obtained from rieste and Smyrna for their use ; and when the Government were informed that these were to be sold I wrote to Lord Raglan that I thought that whatever was necessary to make the soldier efficient in the peculiar position in which he was placed, in conse quence of the nature of the service, ought toe be provided at the expense of the public. (Cheers.) Sir, it has been asserted that there has been great mismanagement with respect to the medical department of the army during this campaign. Now, lam very anxious that the house should know the exact truth with regard to this matter, because I think nothing- can be so detrime,etal to the public service as for the public to imagine that our brave soldiers expe rience heartless and contumelious neglect at the very mo ment when they have just earned for themselves a right to the utmost care and solicitude. Let me first state what was the amount of the staff which was sent out. There had not left the shores of England for a very long period an army so large, or, I believe, so well appointed ; cer tainly none had left it under circumstances so important, or to conduct operations so hazardous as those which were entrusted to the army of Lord Raglan. When that army was first organised the Government took the opinion of a gentleman on a matter of detail. It was but a matter of detail, and I refer to it only to show the care and attention with which these things were attended to. Mr. Guthrie, a surgeon of great eminence and talent, and of high character, told us there was an error in the organisation of the medical department. He said—" You have but three surgeons to a regiment, though you have a large staff The regimental surgeon has the strongest in terest in bringing men into a state of health as rapidly as possible ; the staff surgeon has no interest in clearing the hospital ; his interest is only to cure particular persons. Do not, therefore, make any additions tothe staff, but give a fourth surgeon to every regiment, and you will find the service more efficient." On the other hand, Dr. Andrew Smith, the head of the medical department, differed from Mr. Guthrie on that point. He said —" If you give only four surgeons to every regiment, the regiments which suffer most will not have enough, and must depend upon the staff." I consulted Lord Raglan as to which of these two suggestionshe preferred. He said—" I think Mr. Guthrie's right, and I prefer to have a fourth regimental surgeon." Now, what course did the Government adopt under these circumstances ? One great authority was for a small staff and a large regimental establishment ; the other was for a large staff and a small regimental establishment. We said to the one—" Take a large regimental establishment ;" we said to the other—" Take a large staff." Again, Dr. An drew Smith, who devoted himself to his duties day and , night, assembled at his own house a largo number of medi cal men, who were engaged in the army during the last war. These gentlemen drew up a report of what would be the proper amount of stores for the use of the army ; they recalled their recollections of the Peninsula ; they calculated everything at so much per head, and made a plan of •so much medicine, and so much of everything. (Hear, hear.) Ah argument founded on what was done in the Peninsula is not necessarily a sound argument on account of the improvements which have been made in the interval,' and I refer to these things to show that it was our object to make the preparations far the army as full' and efficient as possible. How many medical men were appointed to this army? The number of staff medical officers, in Turkey was '2BO, the number of regimental officers 192, the number of ordnance medical officers l4, haveultimately, been dwhende d since thenum ber was number27s. of making a total of 486. The staff of medical officers will h have joined, battle e b f e A l l 9 m s. e Upwardsh ewhen the of i d ee f i ro e m ffice th re e for jfcn :,h it e eur French I m fi ednarmyrn es c that was 270, that being the number for the whole of the army sent to Turkey and l an di ng o n the shores of the Crimea. If we had chosen to limit the medical staff to the number en gaged in the Peninsula, we should have fixed it atone to every 145 men; whereas the number was, in fact, one to every 77 men. This wassthe largest medical staff ever sent out with an English army. We had the greatest difficulty. in collecting it. We had tb draw from the medical depots all the men of the greatest experience, by which I mean experience in war. If you trust to mere civilians to attend upon troops, the result will be that they will attend to them till such a case as that of cholera arises, and then having a large number of patients claiming their services they - will tell yon honestly that they can no longer attend to a regi ment. We had the greatest difficulty in getting surgeons, and had to look for them in emigrant ships and merchant vessels. We have taken civilians without number; given them temporary rank in the army. We have not done more, because they do not wish to remain permanently, their only object being to obtain practice and experience. I think you will do Me the justice to admit that so far at least as numbers are • concerned, tne Government is not fairly chargeable with having acted in a niggardly spirit. Dr. Andrew Smith was indefatigable in his endeavours to supply the men with every possible comfort and even lux ury which it was possible for them to have in hospital's. I have here a list of the blankets, bedding, and sheets. There ' were 19,000 cotton sheets, and everything was on that scale. Ido not know that it is worth while to trouble the house by-reading it, but I wish to impress upon the house and the right hon. hart. opposite (Sir J. Pakington), if he is open, to conviction; that it has not been from heartless indifference to their sufferings that the troops have been exposed to privations. (Hear, hear.) Now the statement to which I alluded was that after the battle of the Alma a great deal of unnecessary suffering was inflicted upon the troops in consequence of a bad arrangement of the medical staff. will refer as little as I can to documentary evi dence ;1 but I think I could put the question to the house in a menner which would convince them that there has been gieat misapprehension and great exaggeration Of the evils which have existed and which during war must exist. It was stated that the wounded of the British army Jay on the field of Alma for two or three days ; that they' were brought down to the ships with their wounds undressed ; that they were put en board ship in such numbers as were not safe. I believe that a great deal of this statement arose from ignorance of what had happened in places beyond the observation of thOse who made the allegations. The French; army, composed of fewer men than our own, lay next tile sea; their wounded, who were fewer in number than our own, were carried immediately to the shipi. Our troops were four or five miles, I believe, from the sea. A field hdspital was established for them in some buildings which tvere found near the spot. All those of the wounded whose cases permitted them to be removed were removed into it ; all those whose cases did not permit removal were treated on the field, food being conveyed to them, their wounds dressed, and as much covering being put over them as couldibe obtained. I need not say that all the appliances which 'could be obtained on the field of battle were not sufficient for the comfort of the wounded men, but this is one of the stern necessities of war. (Hear.) I have seen evideneo which satisfies me that not a single man was al lowed to leave the hospital to be put on board ship with out, his hurts having been attended to or his wounds dres sed. It is quite true that the number of men placed on board the Kangaroo was beyond that which she could pro perly be allowed to carry. The statement, however, that 1,700 persons were put on board that vessel was an exag geration to the extent of more than one-half. I believe the number did not at any time exceed seven hundred, and those whom the Kangaroo could not properly take were Put on board another vessel. It has been stated that hundreds of men died on board of cholera. I believe the number of those who died on board the Kangaroo was under 40, and I venture to assert that e lle proportion of deaths to cases of sickness was far grater during the last summer in many of the London hospitals. I admit that the number on board was great, but it could not be avoided without leaving the m en on the field. Lord Raglan was obliged to remain two or three days on the his - a h e left wounded because he was aware they would be massacred by the Cossacks, ant when the board ship of courstheir sufferings e uien Were sect on were ;rust. Ithad been. said th at their wounis were not that time they were on hoard dressed during the whole by surgeonswho I - On that, point I am infoTiet.. . ,la e4sin g of guu-shc,,, wounds, that no accustcuned to the dr such wounds for th ree surgemi would think of redressing or four days, and that, the wound a being covered w ith lint, there should be great care at first not to disturb them. Sir, I have dilated rather at 1 01J, tb this subject, been ar i a( in between this country and Russia, and that that question I was surrounded with great difficulties. This ques might be divided into two distinct phases— the p eriod when peace was possible, and the period when it was i 2 npoisi Ile. Unfortunately her Majesty's Ministers did not percei vo that the Emperor of Russia, after the passage of the Pruth , hat pledged himself to a certain policy, and had under tafxen' a great task, from which he could not recede without mat'el • WA,' injuring his influence in the East. (Hear, hear.) Our Cloviarnrnent then unfortunately placed themselves in the hand. of Austria, instead of pursuing an independent course. The first step of our Government, after the declaration of war, was t o send troops to Malta, and then to Gallipoli, after the Empei sar of Russia, had revealed Ills policy. From Gallipoli the trc 'ops were sent to Varna, against his (Mr. Layard's) earnest ; remonstrances. At Varna the troops were decimated by dise &so. From Varna they were at length sent to the Crimea, , where no provision was: made for them not even a single d epot to fill up any v acanc i es that might, occur in the ranks. It was probable that had the British forces proceeded at own to Sebastopol that fortress might have been cap tured ; b at: Lord Raglan w as prevented from pursuing the R uss i a n aitt ny after the battle of the Alma, because there were no. ins of conveying. the wounded except by mlaambu lances, the management of which' had been entrusted to old pen sior .ers, whom days of active service had lone. s i nce 1) , tssa I, and whose sanctum was th e beersho P° and all of whom were affected by delirium tremens' lm mce was not one was able to ente r on th e duties The sense for which he had gone. out. And with regard t o th e medical officers, VMS it not notorious that after the battle of Alma from 600 t , , 10 wounded Russians were left to the charge of one man, Ii r.: Thompson, who had since died, attended by hi s diman named M'Grath—a name that des erve d servant, an Li immortality'. i iut, after that battle, one would have thought that the att enti am of the Government would have been tho roughly roused ~to the critical position of our army in the Crimea. lic•wcve r, the fact vms, our army was not prepared for a siege of sltell magnitude.: He remembered reading a speech delve re I seine time ago by a noble friend of his re-' lative to the e normous amount of ammunition supplied to the army. No w, in reference to that statement, all he would say was, that a upposing the siege continued to be carried on as it was on tl re first day when our fire could scarcely keep down the Russi an batteries, all that enormous supply of am-. munition wouli 1 have been exhausted in six days, while the whole number •of guns comprising our siege train, including the mortars, on ly amounted to 60, and these were opposed to almost inexh an slible resources. Last summer it was said that the Austrian Government occupying the Principalities would preyeett the Russians from reinforcing their army, and what eras the result of that trust in Austria? Why, that four corpsof the Russian army were transported into the Crimea, ;and our army had •to fight the battle of Inkerman. Arid what had happened in the Baltic ? He was one of those who did not wish to depreciate the services which had been re mfe:red to their country by the fleet, but he could not help pointing out how, after having destroyed the forti fications and decerting the place, a proclamation was issued to the inhabnant s calling upon them at their risk. not to enter into relations with Russia. Now the only tendency such a policy comic' have was to divert Sweden from join ing our alliance. Ire fact throughout all the proceedings the great want of our Go vernment is a definite policy. (Loud cries of " hear, hear.) It was the same in Greece, where we interfered to prevent Turkey demanding an indemnification !or all the injury done to her Christian subjects on the frontier of Greece. It was the same in Circassia, and the same in Persia, in both of which cases no means had been taken to secure co-operation against Russia. So that now, at the end of a year, the only result obtained is that our army has got a footing in the Crimea, and nothing else has been done towards the settlement of this great 'question. Austria had allowed Russia to send enormous reinforce ments into the Crimea. It, however, now appeared that we had concluded a treaty with Austria. He should like to know the terms of that treaty, for he confessed he had great misgiving as to the policy of Austria. If we even succeed in getting the Crimea, Russia might still refuse to accede to our terms, and oblige us to send a second expe dition out there. He conceived that peace was utterly impossible at the peesent moment, because any terms we could now offer Russia she could not, in her position, with honour and dignity accept. It therefore remained with us to determine what our policy really was, and how the war was to be carried on. He did not believe that the Govern ment were alive to the immense difficulties in which we were placed. He believed that their policy hitherto Was to meet emergencies at the moment—they did not look beyond the moment 4t hand. (Hear.) The Russians will shortly have nearly 200,000 men in the Crimea. (Oh, oh.) An hon. member said " No," but he was told some time ago that it was impossible for Russia to bring up any reinforcements. In the camp of the Crimea we were acting as if it were im possible for Russia to bring up any reinforcements—that it was not only physically impossible for her to do so, but it was im possible on account of the position which we were told that Austria had assumed. - Now what was the fact ? In one night we found 100,000 mete on our flank-60,000 attacked us at Inkerman. Of those we wore told that there was not one re giment that hadebeen engaged tin the battle of Alma. Well, then, there were 40,000 men at Alma; so that those two armies amounted to 100,000 ; 25,000 men attacked us at Balaklava, and 10,0 p made a sortie upon our left, and at the same time the batteries of Sebastopol were play ing upon ns. He would ask the house to make up the ac count of those different armies, and they would find that it would come nearer to 150,000 than 100,000. Having re moved our fleet from the Baltic, Russia can now send the troops she had stationed in that quarter to the Crimea. Did the house for a moment think that the Czar, when his honour, his empire, and his throne were at stake, would for a moment relax his efforts in the sustainment of the present war ? We are carrying on the war upon a new system. We had made an absurd attack upon Odessa—(hear, hear)—while we have left the great granaries of Russia untouched. Up to this moment there was no blockade in the Black Sea. On the 21th of September, when the troops were landed in the Crimea, when the Russians had sunk eight ships of the line at the mouth of the harbo\ur of Sebastopol, there was a report that Several of the Russian ships of the line had actually left Sebastopol. We were so ignorant of their movements— although in sight of theii harbour—that an order was issued for our vessels to prepare for action, and to follow the enemy out to sea. In respect to the trade of Russia, the only trade that was stopped was the corn trade. The trade in linseed, and other Russian articles,was still carried on in Constantinople. We must notconceal from ourselves the feet that we are in a critical position at present. Fresh troops were daily coming up to the aid of Russia, and fresh attacks were made upon us. But we shall ultimately succeed, for the honour of every English man was pledged to our success. Tho moment that Russia sees that the capture of Sebastopol is inevitable, they will withdraw their troops. They may leave a portion of them at Perekop, but they will take the remainder t..) Asia. General Bihiloff had 100,000 men in the neighbourhood of Persia. He (Mr. L.) warned the country that next year the most fatal results may be anticipated from the presence of the Russian troops in Asia. Now we had done nothing to prevent the march of the Russians into Persia. The moment that Russia obtained possession of the provinces in that quarter, it was im possible that we could expect the Czar to treat with us. The gigantic power of Russia extends from Kamschatka to the White Sea—it is advanced and strengthened every year. Tho question of Poland was the real question. It was in Europe that we must check the advance of Russia. In Asia, it was useless to attempt it. It was only by establishing an independent nation in the centre of Europe, that we could at all hope to prevent Russia pushing forward her ambitious views in the midst of Europe. (Hear, hear.) He warned the public against rushing into extremes. The present was not a war of temporary duration. The demands upon English charity would continue. Do not let them, therefore, waste their money in jams, marmalade, and things of that sort, which, after all, were not necessary. All their ' money would be required in process of time, so let them . husband their resources, and they would by and bye find them of real benefit to those upon whom they desired to con fer their favours. It was all very well for the Secretary-at- War to say the army was better provisioned now than it was in the Peninsular war. But had we not made progress since then 7 Why, in forty years the whole state of things had changed, and an army which was in no better condition than that would be no credit to the commissariat. This was. not the moment for wavering, and he said boldly we must alter the whole system, and cut down with the knife; It was useless to appoiut gentlemen to high , command simply because they had served' with distinction in the Peninsula. He admitted they were as fine and gallant men as ever existed ; but such appointments only exposed them to the loss of their well-earned reputations, by placing them in positions where they could not discharge their duties with credit either to themsOves or to the country. It was physically impossible, indeed, that they could do the work required of them. He warned the heuse solemnly, that, unless they adopted a definite and de, tided policy, greater calamities than those we had already experienced must inevitably occur. He believed that out of the whole number who had perished by disease, we might by common precaution have saved one-third. He 'entreated the Government to adopt porno policy, and let the house and the wintry know what that policy was; and especially he appealed to Lord John Russell, as leader of the great Liberal party, to induce the Government to adopt a policy which, although it might not perhaps reconcile the conflicting opi nions of a Coalition Ministry, would be more in accordance with the dignity, the honour, and the interests of the empire. After a considerable pause, during which no member of the Government seemed inclined to rise, Colonel DUNNE contended that'the army in the Crimea was not properly reinforced, and complained that instead of remaining at Varna until the month of September, it ought to have proceeded to Sebastopol before the land defences were constructed and completed. lie was of opinion that the war had not been prosecuted with sufficient vigour. Mr. DISRAELI—I agree with my hon, friend in the sur prise ho ins expressed that her Majesty's Ministers do not think it necessary to make some reply to the speech of the hon. member for Aylesbury. (Hear.) The hon. member for Aylesbury is not a supporter of those who sit on these benches. ' (Hear, hear.) Indeed, ho almost ostentatiously informed ;the Lord President of the Council that he was pe culiarly attached to him. (Laughter.) I have no wish to tamper with the allegiance of the hon. member for Aylesbury to the Lord President of the Council; nor can I reciprocate the animosity which he safs he feels towards the other section of the Cabinet. But whatever that hon. member may say, I should, when the opportunity offered, certainly give every attention to the remarks of a gentleman so much master of his subject. (Hear, hear.) I should not, moreover, forget that in his individual instance a man of genius was addressing the House of Co mmons —(hear)—and remembering that he has just come fresh from the scene of that memorable action which fills the minds and touches the hearts of the people of this country, and that he rose in his place to make serious charges against the Government, the fact that he has not been answered by any member of that Government is not one which will reduce the hon. member or the gravity of his charge one iota in public estimation. (Hear.) For so far as I can foim an opinion on the course of human life, from the past of an individual, I think the hon. member for Aylesbury will be remembered by posterity when a great portion of the existing Cabinet will be altogether forgotten—(hear, hear) —even though his neighbours or his enemies forget to an swer his' very int e resting speech. I should not myself t felt particularly anxious to address the house on this occa sion had I not thought, from something which dropped in the courp of this debate, that silence ou my part e might give b rise to misconstruction of my motives, or interpreted into acquiescence of the conduct of the Government. I ernment. did not expect, and I witnessed with great regret, the neces sity, that I should have felt it my duty to participate in the debates In this new session of Parlia ment which I thought ended in the last, and to vindicate once again the principle of freedom of discussion in this house. Remembering the state of the couutry—remembering what last occurred in this, I may term it, agitated chamber —remembering fu ture fate of this great empire was then sAbering that the stake—remember ing the thrilling events which have occurred since then—re membering that the people of this country, when Parliament was as sembled, looked to it, if not for redress, at least for some sympathy with the deep emotio ,, s by which they were moved —remembering these things, I say, I was greatly sur prised, I must confess, that Government should havcadvi a se n d d the Queen to assemble Parliament at this unusual period, then give orders to their creatures that all di scuesion should be not merely deprecated, but arrested. (Hear.) That they s hould attempt—rashly attempt—to gov ern the country for as long a time as they could without applying to the House of Common's, L can woll understand. Their difficulties are great—their embareasiments are mores, sing; and they might have thought that time and fortune woe 'ld place them, some two months later, in a more advantageou s position than that ~ they now occupy. But, having felt it to be their duty, or having deemed it to be their interest, to take the step they have taken, I was greatly surprised when th s honourabl t e gentleman who seconded the address, the brothel • of a Cabinet Minister, sought to impress upon the House of Commons the expediency of silence In reference to the present state of affairs. (Hear, hear.) But that was net. all ; the rare luxury of one Cabinet Minister only has it 'been permitted to us to enjoy in this debate ; and yet that eight hon, gate tleman filled his speech, not only with vino icationei ,of hia office—which, by the way, had been only very partially attacked —but also with a discreet admonition, to the effect that the loyalty of the House of Commons would be best proved, and its character for wise discretion most effectively este, by not expressing an opinion in the face of the 'country on the subject of that absent army which has suf fered so much,' and which, in all its deeds of high hereiti achievement, was sustained by the conviction, that when the hour came their wrongs would be criticised for the people of England. It may be a clever thing for the Lord President of the Council to be silent on this subject, and it may be discreet of his attendant Secretaries of State ;. but I assert they har e not acted with a full sense of duty in not seeking to obtain an expression of feeling, which is at once the soul and life of the House of Commons of this country. (Hear.) My ri g ht Lon. friend the member for Droitwich has taken a course, on this occasion which I consider is much to his credit, and one . which will be appreciated by the country, and had this deb a t e terminated with his speech I should have been silent. lie has indicated the course which it becomes a Conservative oppo sition, supporting th e Mi n i s t ry , t o t a ke. I cann o t un d erstand how right h on , gentlemen opposite can bring themselves to such a pitch of feeling or to rise and protest against the opinions of Parliament on the conduct of the Governineut. Last year I had to protest against this course. No measure was brought forward by the Govcimment—even though men• sures on which they were subsequently beaten—in which we were not told to put the question to a vote of cenfidence on the part of the House of Commons. We have been told to night by the Wa r S ecretary the same thing. "Do not,",he says, " indulge in capt i ous criticism upon our conduct, or of e want r h a p s o , tlife:tGhoevernmtry,ent:b" S t ir ; coun u pro pststee what, avote f had occasion last year to" notice that unconstitfitiOnal of Proceeding on the part of the Government, and te c Cho by reference' to high authorities; to Parr eUeary' s prat cedents, which have great weight, how such ' a course , it generally adopted, would strike at the root of all fieedOrn of all public discussion. (Hear, hear.) I hold fit to be the: privilege of members of this house to canvass the conduct of the Government, without having the e es ponsibilit cast upon them.. individually of asking a ehan i e of that Government. (Hear, hear.) If I recollect aright, it was in 1803 when this country had a Ministry which w as unpopular carrying on the war, and an Opposition supppo.. ing the policy of that war, while it disapproved of its conduct.' Un that occasion Mr. Wyndham, no mean authority, I pm. sume, a man of brilliant gen i us , qualified by large acquire ments and great experience, rose and said he trusted th a t the unanimity of the nation onthe subject of the war would not be mistaken for unanimity of sentiment on the conduct of the . Ministry, and that he s uppo r t e d th e policy of the war whil e he disapproved of the conduct of the Ministry, Mr. Wynd ham spoke that lei a member of the Opposition. He was followed by some of the most eminent members in the house, and no one impugned their privilege questioning the policy of the Government, or declared that they should be ,obliged to test their opinions by proposing a vote of confidenee or ne confidence to Parliament, (Hear, hear.) Yet, this repartee of last Session is 'now again brought forward to-night; and we are told by the Secretary at War, in speaking of minute- . details, not adverted to by my right hon. friend the member - for Droitwich—in answering an anonyznous accusation in the the public press—that if there was to be a question of the Ministeeistl conduct and policy, the sense, of the house ought to be taken as to the question of confidence. (Hear, hear.) I protest against this policy: (Hear, hear.) I see the object of it. (Hear, hear.) It is to stop all discussion. (Hear, hear.) It is to degrade and destroy the House of Commons by putting an end to that free discussion which is the element and the atmospuere of its system, and without which itcannot live. , There was an hon. baronet who bore anhonourable name, who rose early in the debate, and made use of a remarkable observation, founded on a misapprehension, which his acute mind should have avoided. He alluded to a speech made by me last session, in which I said, speaking of the causes of the war, that ou this side of the house we confined our selves to the propriety of discussing the causes of the war, but no capitous criticism would I hope be ever heard (I speak from memory) on the exertions of a future Wellesley ou the banks of the Danube, whatever were the difficulties he might have to encounter. That was an observation which referred to the military conduct of the war. It meantto say that we had not the presumption or the wish to criticise the abilities of those appointed to command, but that we should place in them. the confidence which the country was ready to place in those whom the Govern ment in their wisdoin appointed to those commands. Would the hon. baronet the member for Tamworth deny for a moment that it is the duty of the House of Commons to scan and scrutinise the military expeditions that are planned and concocted in the Cabinet of the , Sovereign ? I suppose he will not maintain that Walcheren expeditions are not to be criticised. He will not for a moment maintain that such convictions as Cintra and Saratoga are to be passed by in subdued silence. Why are we a House of Commons at all ? What 1 confidence have we of commanding the respect of the people if, when matters of national importance come before us, no national feeling is to be found in this house ; thsit we are to be mute, and a minister is to rise and say that if you discuss such a question at a period of difficulty to the Sovereign and the nation, we put on you the responsibility of a change of administration ? That was a principle dangerous to public liberty, and one which in a f they shouleelingd not sanction, that th e H ouse of Commons, of patriotism, should be silent. They were mow called on to decide if they would argee to the Address which we have heard moved in terms echoing the speech from the Throne, a speech in some circumstances the most remarkable that had ever proceeded from 'that source, inasmuch as it was the shortest we have yet heard, and con fined to almost one subject. Let me, however, remind the house that it commences with an admission of great import ance, and one calculated to excite the attention of the whole country. We have the announcement that the country is engaged in a great war. This time last year, when wo were on verge of war, when it was virtually, not formally, de clared, no minister would acknowledge that the war was a great war. The Lord President was then ready to re-organise this house, and the Chancellor of the Exchequer, in taking the votes for the expedition, brought forward a meagre esti mate for the conveyance of 25,000 troops to Malta and back in the course of the year, although the house was then willidg to place in the hands of the Government as much power as the Emperor of Russia obtained by his ukase. Sir, the Government had the most popular war, the most power fill ally, the most favourable combination of circumstances, with which any country ever had entered into war before ; • and I now ask the house to consider—not whether there were sufficient nurses or surgeons at Scutari—not what may have been the amount of marmalade sent out—(a laugh. and hear)—but what has been effected by this Ministry with such marvellous advantages I (Hear, hear.) You designed to attack the powerful ruler of Russia in two opposite parts of the world—almost at the extremities of his vast dominions; you fitted out armadas to attack him in two seas ; you sent out an army which was to baffie him. on the banks of the most important river in Europe; and what have you donee, (Hear, hear.) The Secretary lief War - sneered at the notice my right hoe, friend took of the achievements of the Baltic fleet ; but if the ideas of the Government as to national suc cess are to be measured by those achievements, we have less hope than before of a successful conduct of the war by the present Government. (Hear, hear.) Let me reeal to mind the strength of the fleete-greater than any that had ever figured in our anuals—zreater than the Alliedfleets of France and Spain which,met Nelson at. Trafalgar. Let me reeal the circumstances under which the command of that' fleet wan bestowed. It occasioned a debate in this house, (Hear, hear.) The head of the Admiralty—that prudent statesman —that experienced senator, who had so often presided over that department—(hear, _ and a laugh)- -was a guest at the public dinner given to the commander of that great enterprise. (Hear.) And the most experienced statesman of the country; one who had presided so .long,over our _foreign councils—a department which it is supposed imparts the peculiar charac ter of discretion to the human conduct--(hear, hear, and laughter)---that noble lord was present on that occasion; and in the face of all Europe, before admiring and reckless igno rance=(hear)—theee statesmen—the men of whom we are most proud.—te whom we look up with the greatest chief atest respect, e sts or even are—(a laugh) --they were tchleure,"to h inaugurate the g u at the banquet, given at a political club, captaincy of this great enterprise. And what were the ex pectationsto h • speeches led the . coun try cheris h We c their are at this time necessarily an d neutrally engrossed in the all important a ffai rs that have taken place in the Black Sea ; for more than two months the, feelinas of every heart ha ve b een a b so rbed in Sebastopol. But, sir,. at that time n o one th ought of Sebastopol or the Black Sea. (Hear) Those were m i nor matters i n comparison with the vast enormous armada waftedfrom our shores under the blessing and the benison of our most experienced statesmen, and which had the ad vantage of being commanded by "true reformer." (Laugh • ter.) Well, the Secretary-at-War pretends that the cepl'are of Bomarsund was all that was anticipated, or was , ea( n thought of, at the time when the noble lord (Palmerstoo) and his experienced colleague (Sir J. Graham) lent their great names and illustrious reputations to the inauguration of that great enterprise. (Hear.) I will not say that the noble lord had never heard of Bomarsund—he is such a well-informed gentleman that doubtless he knew all about it—(a l a ug h ) — and;incleed, I have an idea that it was settled that the forti fications of Bomarsund were to be destroyed before our fleet entered the Baltic. (Hear, hear.) Now, I hardly think it was worth while to sen d f or a M ars h a l of France and. 10,000 French troops to destroy a place which a f ew ia Tines would have destr o y e d i n a f e w hours. (Hearvas't hear . ) Certainly that was a sorry catastrophe for that enter prise in which the noble lord and wise colleagu e so occasion. deeply interested themselves on that memorable (Hear, hear.) Well, then, the expe dition to the Baltic was commensurate with the not one which obtained results at all If it were Ministry themse l ves. e epectato es created by the otherwise, noble lord (J. Russell) give no ticese, why did not the d • and officers thanks to t he admirals a to-night of a vote • o f engaged in the trans:deo us in the Baltic ? (Hear, hear.) If he had ventured to do so we mightlhave made some inquiries and gained some eel now come to the i g hteumout. Sir, I second of the two gr eat expeditions which this Government entered upon with a d v antages which no Ministry ever en- loved before, a ndwhich never can recur in the history of thi s country. What did you do with that army you sent to the vicinity of the Danube I Yon explain your cond uct ' their co urse, but you r exp lanations cannot chan ge the and cannot deny that you accomplished nothing— result ; you. nd that your plans have proved barren and. (hear, hea r ) — and ) You toll us that you werewatch ing all ( Hear, • that time the course of events; for the inactivity of such of your forces as escaped the pest, which it appears had not entered into your calculations al though it is au habitual tenant of that accursed soil. Yoa tell us that they would have acted at the right time, but that their presence influenced the Conduct of the Russian. armies. But you have never told us that, had it been neces sary for our army to have advanced on the Danube, you had provided the means by which that advance could be accom plished. (Loud cries of " hear, hear.") No minister has yet dared to meet that accusation. (Hear, hear.) It has been alluded to by the hon, member for Aylesbury (Mr. Layard), who has stated that you had no means, whatever might have been-the fate of Silistria, or the position of the Turkedi troops upon the `Danube, that you had no means to move your army there. (Hear, hear.) And you never dared to declare that you had. (Hear, hear.) But whether you made prepara tions or not, this you cannot deny, that, as on the Baltic, so on the Danube, you effected nothing. (Hear, hear.) And. what did you effect in the third, now the most important division of your designs ? Late in the autumn, with a force, as far as wo were concerned, of 20,0e0 or 25,000 troops, you. invaded Russia. You beleaguered a fortress as strong as Gibraltar, and perhaps better provided. Under what cir cumstances did you undertake the enterprise ? The Secretary at War told us that he did not desire to blink the policy of at the power of Russia in the Crimea. the enterprise, and that it was to strike a blow_ you attacka Brave words B u t place at the wrong time, and with inadequate means, the lan will be no apology for your general policy of your P. , 6 _ l4hos mewl the hoar.) hour, conduct. (Etear 6