The Sun. — London, England, 1854-04-01 00:00:00

able to the Russian alliance." Yes, his grace was favourable to the Russian alliance ; and why ? For the same reason that he always thought me to be favourable to it—because ho always thought that alliance was favourable to the interests of England. No one more deeply regrets the rupture of that alliance than I do, though we are forced into a war which I consider under the circumstances was inevitable. I neverthe less deeply regret the severance of those relations of amity between this country and Russia, which have so long existed, as I believe, to the advantage of both nations. Not only was his grace always favourable to the Russian alliance, but I be lieve and hope every man who has at heart the interests of his country was equally favourable to that alliance. But it would not do to criticise the Duke of Wellington's Government on that account. No, that honour is reserved for me. But this journalist continues Sir Robert Peel, full of tariffs, was entirely governed, with respect to external politics, by Lord Aberdeen. It was definitively settled in 1844, between the Emperor of Russia and the English Government, that the partition. of Turkey, when it became necessary, should be transacted by Great Britain and the two imperial courts, without France." The writer of this article, my lords, knew Sir R. Peel well when he talks of his thinking of nothing but tariffs. But my lords, I have already said that the Duke of Wellington's opinion as to this memorandum was shared in by Sir R. Peel, and I humbly endeavoured to act with them, and to this hour it is my endeavour to profit by the precepts and examples of those eminent men—(hear, hear)—in all things it is my wish to be governed by the example of their lives and to act upon their principles. (Hear, hear.) My lords, I confess for myself I have no intention for a moment of contending with the noble earl in respect to the numerous topics he had adverted to, but as regards this me morandum having the sanction of these two great statesmen —and though not drawn up—yet sanctioned and approved by them, I care very little what may be said by or what may be the opinion of others. (Hear, hear.) I think, my lords, I have said sufficient upon this point—(hear, hear)—and I have only need to add that being now engaged in this war, I shall think it my duty to press it forward with all energy and vigour, and with all the power of the Government ; and I trust we shall meet with no opposition in our endeavours to carry it on in such a manner as shall enable us to bring it to that which is the only legitimate end of all wars, viz., a peace b ase d o n justice, and therefore likely to endure. (Cheers.) My lords, I may add that even at this moment I do not think it inconsistent with our position, or with my duty, to say that my first object, my great desire, is peace. (Hear.) The re attainment of that great blessing is never out of my thoughts, and I do not think that, in entertaining that desire and en deavouring to accomplish it by all honourable means, that I am acting at all inconsistently with my duty of carrying on the war with energy and vigour. (Hear.) Your lordships will recollect that most virtuous character in our civil wars —the man who, perhaps, of all others was most devoted to the cause in which he was engaged, while arming himself for the combat, still murmured to himself the words " peace," " peace I" Peace is the desire always uppermost in my heart, and while I hope that we shall be supported in our determi nation to carry on the war while it continues with all the spirit and energy that becomes this great nation, still my hope, and I fervently trust that hope is shared in by every one of your lordships, is peace. (Cheers.) The Earl of MILMESBURY expressed his r egret at the tone assumed by the n o bl e ear l , an d conten ded that he had not answered any of the objections made to his policy. After some explanations as to the memorandum of 1844, with the view of showing that the late Government did not approve of the policy which it disclosed, the noble earl said ho should offer no further observations upon the question, but as a loyal subject he should cordially support the address. After a few obiervations from Earl GRANVILLE, Lord BROUGHAM expressed his opinion that the cont es t would neither be short nor easy. Earl GREY was disappointed with the terms in which the address was framed , and said that, as his opinions on the sub ject of Turkey were unchanged, he could not give it an unre served support. At the same time he did not think sufficient means had yet been provided for bringing the war to a suc cessful termination ; and ho intimated that in the course of next week he should bring this subject under their lordships' consideration. The Earl of HARDWICKE expressed some fears as to the strength of the British fleet in the Baltic, and hoped too much would not be expected from it at first. Besides the force in the Baltic, we ought to have a reserve of twenty sail of the line. We should find seamen enough to man them if they were well paid. The Marquis of LANSDOWNE expressed his regret at the mode in which the policy of the Government had been criti cised. Taking his share of responsibility, ho denied, on their behalf, that, they had shown a want of appreciation of the difficulties of the contest, or of' the means necessary to carry it on successfully. They had certainly felt it their duty to endeavour to avoid war by means of negociation ; but from the moment it became evident that the maintenance of peace was doubtful,, it could not be shown that they had not acted as became the Government of this country. Without saying anything of the terms upon which peace would be made, he was strongly of opiniaa that the aggrandisement of Russia could not be carried further without danger to the peace, happiness, and safety of Europe. The war might be a long one, but it was satisfactory to think it was neither a dynastic nor a religious war, while we were indebted to the Emperor of Russia fora combined action between England and France, which would hereafter be attended by the greatest blessings to the world. The address was then agreed to. The Earl of ABERDEEN having announced that her Ma jesty would receive it on Monday at three o'clock, their lord ships adjourned HOUSE OF COMVIONS-(YESTERDAY.) The SPEAKER took the chair at four o'clock. PRIVATE BUSINESS. The three following bills were read a third time and Passed : —Enniskillen Waterworks; North London Rail way ; Whitehaven Junction Railway. PETITIONS. Mr. BROTHERTON presented a petition from Swan see, in favour of the establishment of Reformatory Schools. Mr. HINDLEY presented a petition from the Fisher men of Faversham, complaining of the dues charged by the corporation of the city of London, on oysters brought to London by sea. Mr. MOWBRAY presented a petition from Durham, against the Oaths Bill. Sir J. V. SHELLEY presented a petition from Mr. George Bailey, of Wrexham, complaining that the Board of Inland Revenue had refused to stamp a local monthly publication, and praying that steps might be taken to compel that board to administer the law impartially. Mr. HADFIELD presented a petition from the legal profession, praying the Courts at Westminster might be removed to the immediate vicinity of the Inns of Court. Mr ' L. RING presented a petition from Kingston, com plaining of the toll charged for crossing Kingon•bridge, and praying that steps might be taken with the view to its abolition. Mr- WARNER presented a petition from Norwich against the Oaths Bill. Mr. C. BRUCE presented several petitions from various places in Scotland against the Education (Scotland) Bill. Mr. BRIGHT presented a petition agreed to at a meet ing, held last night in the Music-hall, Store-street, com plaining of the secresy observed in our Foreign Affairs, and PraYing for a committee to inquire into the conduct of Foreign-office with reference to Turkey, and that hostili ties be suspended until such committee should have made its report. (Hear, hear, and laughter.) Mr. CRAUFORD presented petitions from Cheshire and Lancashire against the M e di ca l P rac titi oners Bill. Sir J. V. SHELLEY presented a P etitio-i from a public meeting of stone-masons against the fourth clause of the Friendly Societie s Bill. Sir B. HALL presented a petition from the Society for the Protection of Trade in favour of the Judgment, Execu tion, Szc,, Bill. DUNGA.RVON ELECTION. Mr. NAPIER brought up the report of the Dungarvon Election Committee, declaring Mr. M agu i re to be duly elected, though bribery and treating were carried on at the election in 1852, but without the knowledge of the sitting member. The committee also reported that a peti tion was presented against the return of 1852, hut it was subsequen tl y comprised, and the enquiries of the com mittee had, therefore , been only of a limited c h aracter. The report was ordered to lie on the table. NEUTRALS. Mr. PHILLIMORE gave notice that after Easter he should call the attention of the house to the doctrine which the Government had adopted with regard to neu trals, with the view of eliciting a declaration from the house that the maxim, free botto'ns make free goods, was inconsistent, as a general rule, with the honour and in terest of the country. MAD DOGS. Sir J.V. SHELLEY said a momorial had been presented to the Home-office, from the Royal Agricultural .ncrease Society, pointing out th a t ma d d ogs were g r t - on the increase in the neighb our h oo d of the metropo li s, and requesting that additional precautions might be taken for protecting the inhabitants against such rabid animals. He wished to know what has been done in this matter 9 Mr. FITZROY said, in consequence of this memorial, the noble lord at the head of the Home Offl.ce had given in structions to the police to keep a vigilant look out for all dogs of suspicious character or vagrant habits. (A laugh.) ROYAL ESCORTS. Mr.WARNER asked the Secretary at War, whether the Government are willing to c ons id er t h e expediency of en trusting the ordinary escort duty of her Majesty to the Queen's Guard of the Hon. Corps of Gentle man at Arms, instead of employing a cavalry regiment? Mr. S. HERBERT said in consequence of having re ceived notice of this question, he had caused inquiry to be made into the subject, and as he found that the corps re ferred to had not been in possession of horses fbr the l as t incapacitated from years—(a laugh)—he wa s afr a id it w as from undertaking the duty which was performed by the Guards. IRISH REFORM BILL. Mr. T. FRENCH asked the noble lord the member for the City of London when the house might expect to receive the Irish Reform Bill. Lord J. RUSSELL said the bill was in an active state of preparation, but he was afraid it would not be ready in sufficient time to admit of its being laid on the table before Easter. THE OATHS BILL. In reply to Mr. SPOONER, Lord J. RUSSELL said it was not his intention to pro ceed with the Oaths Bill until after Easter. (Hear.) WAR WITH RUSSIA.-ADDRESS TO THE QUEEN. The SPEAKER having read the proposed address to the Queen, Lord J. RUSSELL said—Sir, in rising to move an an swer to her Majesty's most gracious message, I have a deep sense of the solemn, I may say the awful importance of the motion that I am about to make. It is now more than half a century since a message of a similar import was brought to this house. It is nearly 40 years since this country has been in the enjoy me nt of the blessings of peace. Those blessings have been never more widely nor more extensively felt. The privileges of the people have been increased, their burdens have been diminished, and, with an increasing and prosperous commerce, wealth has been diffused throughout the country. We have had lately a n exhibition of the pride, pomp, and circumstances of war ; but it is impossible to think of war without thinking at the same time of the bloodshed that it causes, of the prosperity that it inter rupts, of the misery that it induces. (Hear.) It is, there fore, sir, only from a paramount sense of the necessity that we should engage in this war that I appear here to advise this house to reply in terms of assent and encouragement to her Majesty's most gracious message. (Hear, hear.) In performing this task I will endeavour to avoid, as much as I am able, consistently with doing justice to the subject, —I will endeavour to avoid those questions which we have discussed on former nights of debate—questions with re gard to the conduct of the Government —whether more or less of protracted negotiations should have beau under taken—whether the tone which was adopted by the Go vernment at certain periods of that negotiation was the best fitted to secure that honourable peace at which we aimed. I shall endeavour rather to point to the course which Russia has pursued, and to show that, unless we are content to submit to the further aggrandisement of that power, and, possibly, to the destruction of Turkey— whose integrity and independence have been so often de clared essential to the stability of the system of Europe— we have no choice left us but to interpose by arms. (Hear, hear.) Sir, in referring in the first place to the affairs of Turkey, I should beg the house to remark that a great change has taken place in the internal position of Turkey during the last twenty or thirty years. We are all ac quainted with the system of violence and misrule which used formerly to prevail, and those who have watched the conduct of Lord Stratford will be aware what has been the advice which he has given, and what the beneficial effects that have:flowed from it. (Hear, hear.) Long acquainted with the affairs of Turkey, having deeply at heart the main tenance of that empire, he has constantly said (not yester day nor the day before, but during a long series of years), " The independence of Turkey cannot be maintained with out the assistance of the other powers of Europe ; that assistance cannot be maintained unless Turkey shall adopt with regard to her subjects in general, and with regard to her Christian subjects in particular, those general rules of justice and fair treatment which are established by the public opinion of Europe." (Hear, hear.) That advice, though not immediately nor fully adopted, has yet been so far followed that there has been a great improvement in the treatment of the subjects of Turkey—that the Christian subjects of the Porte, in particular, have de rived great advantages from those changes—that they have enjoyed the:free exercise of their religion, that they have prospered in their trade, and that their welfare has greatly increased under the Government of the Sublime Porte. (Hear, hear.) Sir, this is a very essential and important part of this question ; because, if I am not mistaken —and it is no new opinion of mine, for I have held it at least from the commencement of the discussions of last year—it is not the prospect of the decay of Turkey, it fs not the fear of her immediate dissolution, cwohinscihstehnast withincited her independence, theßuss Russian Government and t v a ernme o n a t g t g o r adnecTisein ands el t subversive of her territorial limits—(Hear, hear)—but it has been the fear that the old system of Russia, of making progress gradually, of depriving Turkey of her dominions one after ano ther , of interfering more and more with her internal go vernment—(hear, hear)—would not be success ful—it has been the fear that the Ottoman Government, instead of declining, has exhibited to Europe a Govern. men t of internal concord within and of s t reng th w i thout —it has been this fear which has impelled Russia to what I believe will be found an unsuccessful, and what I be lieve Russia herself will consider a premature, attempt a gainst the Ottoman Empire. (Cheers.) If, sir, we look to Russia, we shall observe that while all the powers of Europe have been, during this interval of peace, with more or less success, attempting to improve their internal organisation—whil e they have considered questions of commerce, questions of legislation, with a view to improve ment, with a view to the future welfare of their subjects, it has been almost the sole object of the Government of Russia to form and to maintain an overpowering army— to complete her military organisation, and to be ready on any occasion to throw the sword into the balance in her transactions with the other powers of Europe. (Hear, hear.) We have therefore, at the present moment, with out even the immense effort which has been made during the past y ear — we h ave an immense military power on thee part of Russia, prepared, and as we have heard within these two days, already commencing an attack upon the terri tories and upon the existence of Turkey. On the other side, if we have not at the present mometft the material assistance, we have at least the moral approbation of all Europe, approving of the efforts which have been made to resist the aggression of Russia. (Cheers.) We have, joined together in arms, to resist that attempt, the most powerful sovereigns at the head of the civilised nations of Europe, which have tested—by conflict in arms, by rivalry in peace —the great qualities which each possesses, and we have learnt from that con flict and that rivalry, the honour, the courage, and the patriotism of both. (Cheers.) Sir, I will now proceed to state, not in detail, because the house, having had the op portunity of studying the papers on the table, and having debated the greater part of them on past occasions, is fully informed with respect to those details—but I will no w proceed to state the great outline of what has occurred with respect to the question now under the consideration, of the house. I may as well, however, just say first, that in treating of this subject I shall keep wholly out of view the dispute which has furnished, not a cause but a pretext for the Emperor of Russia. (Hear.) I shall keep out of view the question of the holy places. I will not touch upon the silver star, or the key of the great gate, or the key of the little gate, or any of those questions which were put forward as a matter of dispute. All these matters of dispute, whether they deserved the contention that took place about them or not, were settled by the agreement of all the powers concerned. What I have to treat of are other questions and other matters. Now, sir, in referring to the relations between Russia and Turkey, we must al ways keep in view that the Empress Catherine, after a successful war, obtained from the Sultan an article which is couched in these terms with respect to, the Christians generally of the Sultan's empire. We must recollect, also, that some territory was given up by the Empress by that treaty of peace, and that she declared to her subjects that the peace was glorious and successful because she had ob tained an assurance of protection for those who belonged to the same religious community as herself. The seventh article of the treaty of Kainardji runs thus :—" The Sublime Porte promises to protect constantly the Chris tian religion and its churches, and it also allows the Ministers of the Imperial Court of Russia to make, upon all occasions, representations as well in fa vour of the new church (which is spoken of in Article 14) at Constantinople, as on behalf of its officiating ministers." That is the 'whole of what is con tained in the seventh article of the treaty of Kainardji. We perceive at once the promises that are made in the former part of this article—first, that there is an assurance that the Porte will protect the Christian religion of its subjects. And if there had been any persecution of that religion—if the Christians had been deprived of the power of resorting to their places of Divine worship, if they had been injured and slain because they held their religion, the Emperor of Russia might j us tly ha ve comp l a i ned of? the infraction of the treaty. But there is another thing like wise very obvious, namely, that there is no especial detail with regard to any privileges or immunities which the Christians held—no interference stipulated for with the ordinary administration of the affairs of the Sultan in his territories. (Hear, hear.) There is a protection stipulated for, but it is a protection of an exceptional kind, and not to be used without some special cause, some great neglect, or some maltreatment of the Christian subjects of the Porta. (Hear.) Now, sir, coming to the events which took place last year, the house will have perceived that no sooner was the question of the Holy Places settled than further :demands, which had already been put forward, were insisted upon by the ambassador of Russia. In the first place, according to rumour, these proposals had taken the shape of a treaty offensive and defensive. They after wards took the shape of a convention. After this there was a formal document requiring the Sultan to give certain pledges to Russia. Again, a note was insisted upon, but a note which was to be an agreement with Russia, a stipula tion with Russia that the privileges and immunities which the Christians held in the Turkish empire should be enjoyed for the future without molestation. The Sultan's Ministers had at first refrained from asking the opinion of her Ma jesty's charge d'affaires, and afterwards of her Majesty's ambassador, with respect to these proposals. They had been alarmed at the manner in which the proposals were made, and the threats which were used in case the proposals were not adopted. And here, sir, I cannot but refer to the statements that were made at a particular date by Count Nesselrode in a despatch written by him to Baron Brunow, and which was communicated by the desire of the Rus sian Government to her Majesty's Government. On the 7th of April, after enumerating various other demands which according to rumour had been made by Russia at Constantinople, all of which Count Nesselrode denies, he at length ends with saying, " that all the rumours relative to the hostile and threatenine language held to the P or t e by our ambassador are not only exaggerated, but destitute of any sort of foundation." On the 9th of April, two days after that date, Lord Stratford writes, saying, with re spect to the Turkish Ministers, " This combination of alarm, seeking for advice, and of reluctance to entrust me frankly with the whole case, is attributable to the threat ening language of Prince Menschikoff, and to the character of his proposals." (Hear, hear.) I cannot doubt that Lord. Stratford's assertions were perfectly well founded I cannot doubt that the language used to the Porte during the whole of that mission of Prince Menschikoff was of a threatening character—threatening, in the first place, in case the proposals should be divulged, with, at the same time, great and tempting offers of support —threatening, in a later period of the mission, that in case the preposals were refused, that great calamities would e n su e . (H ear .) Therefo re , sir, in stating to Lord Clarendon, on th e p ar t h o f o s t t h i l e e Russianr e G a t o e v n e i r a n g m l e a n n t g: u t a h g a e t was th e a r u r m e port o the wh o ll use y d e o s . f titute of any kind of foundation, Count Nesselrode did but pursue twat syste m of deception and concealment which has unfortunately been the character of Russia in these negotiations. (Hear, hear.) But at the same ti me that these proposals had been made at Constan tinople—proposals, as I have said, in the first instance of a tempting character, and offering the ships and the vvas of a very di fferent hear.) speaking troops of Russia in aid of the S u lt an, if the terms of Russia were a g reed to— the language h e ld t o h er m a jesty's minister atSt.Petersburg character. (Hear, In of the conduct of the Russian Government on a formes occasion, I certainly used very strong languag e of re p robat ion. I do not now think that that language was at all too strong. (Cheers.) I cannot—although the words were uttered in debate —I cannot, upon reflection, say that the terms I then used at all exaggerated the character of the transactions to which I grinhdiar done en me at then all u d e d . (Cheers. ) B u t these appear to have excited the St. verygreat Petersburg, honours a t hofe ordering Emperor of Ii ueasstia an article to be inserted in the Journal of St Petersburg, in which reference was made not very fairly, and certainly very unexpectedly, to the confidential communications which had t a k en p l ace between the Emperor an d th e Bri tish Minister. Such was the nature of that article, that it made an impreseion—an impression which was eagerly seized by the abettors of Russia in the different Courts of Europe—an impression that the English Government had been some party to or had listened favourably to proposals for the partition of the Turkish empire. It therefore be came necessary that we should lay before Parliament and this country what really had taken place. (Hear, hear.) And to the divulging o f th a t which, out of regard for a foreign Sovereign we had not before thought ourselves justified in producing. We have no reason, sir, to regret the publication of that correspondence. ( Cheers.) From that correspondence, it appears that the Emperoi of Russia having in the year 1841 declared that the time might come when the dissolution of the Turkish empire might take place, and that in that case he should be anxious to learn the desires and views of England upon the subject, in 1853, insisted, and insisted against all reason, that the mo ment of the dissolution of the Turkish empire was at hand and that it was necessary that the English Government should agree with him as to what was to be done in that case. The answer which her Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs gave to that overture is before the world, and it is in substance that we could not be parties to any project of the kind. But, at the time that that correspondence was taking place, I took occasion, in this house, because there were symptoms in this and in other countries that men's minds were all tending in that direc tion, that the dissolution and fall of Turkey was at hand, I took the occasion of declaring, in answer to a noble friend near me (Lord Dudley Stuart), that to such a partition of Turkey as might be imagined by those who had taken part in other partions, England would never be a party. Lord Clarendon, who succeeded 'no in the office which he now ill; with so much ability, replied to the sameeffea In spite of what then looked like an offer of part of the Turk ish territory for ourselves, he replied in terms as decided that our policy was to maintain the Turkish empire, to support her independence and her integrity, and that we h*l no wish to share in her dowpial. (near, hear.) Now, sir, it might be that the Emperor of Russia from his ob servation of Turkey, had arrived at the opinion that the fall of Turkey could not really be prevented, and that it was advisable, in order to prevent war, that some arrange ment should be entered into with the great Dower of Eu rope. That may have been his intention. But I think the natural impression was that which Sir Hamilton Seymour evidently derived from the conversations which he held with the Emperor of Russia—namely, that if the Emperor of Russia appeared to be so convinced that the fall of Turkey was at hand, he contemplated that the fall of Turkey should take place. But be that as it may, whatever was the real meaning of the Emperor of Russia in these conversations, her Majesty's Government had hoped that when England entirely refused to be a party to any such pro ject it would have been relinquished by Russia, and that she would certainly calculate the consequences of having all Europe opposed to her in case she should proceed to an armed aggression. (Hear.) I will now again refer to the mission of Prince Menschikoff. Prince Menschikoff ended with a de mand for certain privileges and immunities for the Chris tians. The Turkish Minister, in alarm, had recourse to the Ministers of the Four Powers at Constantinople, ask ing their advice and assistance. Lord Stratford was dis posed to agree with the Turkish Government, that these demands were dangerous to the independence of Turkey. But the four representatives came to the decision that it was a question which so nearly touched the free action and the dignity of the Porte, that it was not proper for them in their then situations to offer any advice or instruction. When that decision was communicated to the minister of the Sultan, he declared that the Porte had already come to a decision, and that that decision was adverse to the claims put forward by Prince Menschikoff. Prince Men schikoff having, as I said, pronounced threats of the cala mities that would follow the rejection of his terms—threats, by the bye, totally inconsistent with the language that he had before held to her Majesty's Ambassador—Prince Menschikoff having pronounced these threats, proceeded with great state and ceremony to leave Constantinople, and returned to the Russian territory. Upon this intima tion, her Majesty's Government, thinking that the time had arrived when there was danger to the independence of the Porte, directed that her Majesty fleet, then at Malta, should proceed to the neighbourhood of Constantinople, and her Majesty's Ambassador was directed, if it should be necessary, to bring the fleet up to Constantinople. Now, sir, I think that step was an irrevocable proof of the desire of her Majesty's Government to support the independence of the Sultan. (Cheers.) If terms had been obtained which were honourable to the Sultan—which would have maintained the independence of his authority and the integrity of his dominions—the fleet would pro bably have returned to Malta ; but whilst de mands were insisted upon which could not be sub mitted to, while those demands were to be enforced by arms, still more was it impossible for her Majesty and the Emperor of France, in concert with whom her Majesty ac ed, to withdraw their forces from the support of the Sultan. (Cheers.) I lay the more stress upon this circum stance, because it was at the time a matter of inquiry in this house. A fear was expressed—a fear in which I did not participate—that a sudden invasion would take place, directed immediately against Constantinople. Bat this at all events was clear, that the house approved of the de monstration which was then made, and approved of the declaration which I made at that time—that it was a proof that her Majesty was determined to support the Sultan against unjust aggression. (Cheers.) Sir, when the intel ligence arrived at St. Petersburg that the last demands of Prince Menschikoff had been refused, it was decided that a message should be sent, conveying a letter of Count Nesselrode's demanding in the most peremptory terms that Prince Menschikoff 's note should be signed within eight days, and announcing that, in default of such signa ture, the Principalities, part of the Sultan's territories, would be occupied by Russian troops. It was quite im possible for the Sultan, with any regard to his honour, to assent to such terms. The invasion by Russian troops im mediately took place. The question then arose, what was the Sultan to do under these circumstances ? Lord Strat ford— as I have always said, the truest and best friend of the Porte — (hear)—advised the Sultan not to exercise his right of making it a cactus belli, but recommended him to renew negotiations, in the hope that honourable terms might be obtained, and in the mean time to strengthen those places by sea and land the defences of which during peace had been greatly neglected as well as greatly dimi nished. That advice was taken by the Porte. It was in conformity with the opinion of the four powers, of Eng land, of France, of Austria, and of Prussia. Fresh nego tion accordingly took place. The Sultan sent, by the ad vice of his Ministers, fresh terms of peace. These terms arrived at a moment when a note had been agreed upon by the representatives of the four powers at Vienna, and, therefore, the Sultan's terms were set aside, and the other proposal was sent forward. The Sultan agreed to those terms, with some modifications. lam not going to enter into verbal niceties as to the question of the Vienna note. But what is perfectly plain—thatlany one who reads it will, I think, admit at once—is, that the Vienna note, as modified by the Porte, as altered in some respects by the Porte, conveyed to the Emperor every se curity he could have wished as to the privileges and im munities of the Christian subjects of the Porte. The Sul tan said that he considered it due to his own honour to maintain unimpaired and unviolated the privileges and immunities of his Christian subjects. He was ready to make this declaration in a note to the Minister of the Emperor of Russia. Therefore the sole difference, and yet a difference upon which all these subsequent demands of Russia have been made—the difference was this, that, ac cording to the proposal of the Sultan, the Christian sub jects of the Porte would have enjoyed all their privileges and immunities—they would have had them under the sanction of solemn documents, confirmed by the Sultan, as their Sovereign ; they would have had them under the sanction of a declaration that it was due to his own honour to preserve them ; they would have had them under the sanction of an assurance given to all the great powers of Europe—to all the five powers of Europe—to Russia also, but to Russia no more than to any other power. (Hear, hear.) The Russian proposal, on the contrary, was, not for increasing the immunities and privileges of the Chris tian subjects of the Porte—whose privileges and immuni ties had not been diminished, but increased of late years —but that all those privileges and immunities should b.. 1 confirmed by a special treaty with Russia, and thereby the Russian Minister would have had the power, on every question of spiritual, nay, on every question of civil privi lege, of interfering between the Sultan and 12,000,000 of his subjects. (Hear.) Therefore the question was not, as the Russian Government has repeatedly put it, a question of a religious desire on the part of the Emperor to protect the Christians of his own community in the Sultan's domi nions. (Hear, hear.) That was not the question. That security was afforded—that security was amply afforded. But the question was, whether the sovereigi4y of these 12,000,000 of people should be transferred from their own sovereign, the Sultan, to a foreign sovereign who possessed an overwhelming force. (Hear, hear.) Sir, the position which was taken by her Majesty's Government at that time is stated so clearly in the circular of Lord Clarendon, dated the 13th of June, that it is one of those few documents which I shall take the liberty of reading to the house. My noble friend says :—" The repeated assurances of the Russian Government, given both to the Government of her Majesty and to the French Government, that Prince Menschikoff's mission to Constantinople bad reference solely to the Holy Places, had led her Mejesty's Government confidently to hope that the satisfactory arrangement of that long-pend ing question would have removed all grounds of difference between Russia and the Porte. Bat, under the plea of confirming ancient treaties, further demands were put for ward by the Russian ambassador, involving a protectorate of the Greek Church in Turkey, not only as regards the spiritual, but also the civil rights and immunities of its members. Every concession which could be made was offered by the Turkish Government, who, throughout these trying negotiations, displayed a most moderate and conciliatory spirit; but it would have been impossible for them to have complied with these last demands without derogating from the sovereign rights of the Sultan, and virtually surrendering the independence of the Ottoman empire ; and her Majesty's Government have, therefore, entirely approved the advice given by Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Porte. In these views and opinions there is a complete agreement between her Majesty's Government and the French Government ; and the English and French fleets, which have been ordered to approach the Darda nelles, will act in concert under the orders of the respec tive ambassadors of the two countries. In taking this step her Majesty's Government are actuated solely by the desire to uphold the independence of the Turkish empire —an in dependence which the Great Powers are deeply interested in upholding, and which has been acknowledged by them as necessary to the balance of power in Europe." (Cheers.) Such, sir, was the position taken up by the English and French Governments. Now, when the note of Vienna, modified in the manner-I have stated, reached St. Peters burg, the Emperor, who had agreed to the ori g inal note, and had agreed to it even as a lt ere d w ith a view to make the sense of it more clear to the Cabinet in London, refused to accede to that modified note. Not long after wards there appeared that which the Russian Government had declared to be a confidential despatch, but which ought not to have been confidential, because it showed the spirit in which the Russian Government were prepared to agree to the Vienna note—it showed that, while they ac cepted every word of that note, they did not affix to it the sense which was affixed to it by all the Four Powers—(hear) —they did not affix to it the sense which the English Go vernment in particular had affixed to it--and therefore the intention of the Russian Government clearly was, accord ing to their own explanation of their intentions, to accept the terms according to one sense at Vienna—according to one sense in London, in Petersburg, at Vienna, and at Berlin—and afterwards t o en f orce th em i n ano th er sense at Constantinople. (Hear, hear.) Why, sir, I say that, in agreeing to sign that note, if such was their intention, they not only ought not to have made their explanation of it confidential, but they should have told the powers with whom they were treating, under whose sanction this note was to be signed, what interpretation th e y p u t u p o n it. (Hear, hear.) And, therefore, the proposition to sign that note, knowi ng per f ec tl y we ll , admitting themselves that they and another e s especially e c i senseal l y to o y i thet themselves, English which tGovernment,hey knew, what was the sense affixed to it by the four powers, proposition anythingto afterwards—(hear, less than what I described it to bo in at eSpotelei much blame has been attached—a this interpetration war.• (Cheers.) I should say that Neeselrode. It is said toghva given in a cote signed by Count written by a subordi nate in the Foreign-offi ce raburgh, but Count Neeselrocle has assumed its res Sir iatai u, shouldt h e b modi fiedbe note having been thus rejected b arose whether any further effort at leltgYitsiquestionfar from r om made. Even then the Sultan's Government were far being adverse to a settlement of the question. But an eve nt occurred of the utmost imp or t ance. A step was taken by Turkey from which she thought she could no longer refrain—l refer to the declaration of war by Tur key. (Hear, hear.) Sir, it is always in the power of tyrannical Governments to endeavour to impose upon others unjust terms ; but it is not in their power to pre vent that attempt exciting th e indignation and provoking the anger of the party against which the attempt is directed. Principalities,a_ainseffectof the • • • t Turkey—such was the (Cheers.) Such was the effect of the attempt of Russia the Sultan. The fanaticism, if you choose to call it so— containing. four . millions of the subjects of the enthusiasm, as the Turks would call it, of their nation was reused , they hastened to the standard of the Sultan, and thousands of men appeared in arms on the banks of the Danube to resist the aggression. The Sultan had from the first moment of the entry of the Russians into the Principalities a just cause of war ; encouraged and excited by his subjects, he thought he could no longer—after this first proposal of peace had been rejected, he thought he could no longer refrain from a declaration of war. Well, sir, it is hard for us to blame the conduct of the Sultan in that respect. (Hear.) The wrong was with Russia ; the wrong arose from the conduct of the Russian Govern ment. It might be imprudent in Turkey at any time to resist that force of Russia; but, sir, it was an impru dence which we must all honour—it was an imprudence which arose from a just sense of independence, and resent ment of the wrong which had been done. Sir, when that war was declared, of course the negotiations become more and more difficult; still, terms of great moderation And THE SUN, LONDON, SATURDAY EVENING, APEIL 1, iss4. great fairness, which were recommended by the four re presentatives at Constantinople, were adopted by the Porte, and transmitted to Vienna as the basis of negotiations. Upon considering these terms, the representatives of the four powers at Vienna, including the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Austria, were entirely agreed with respect. to their moderation, and they were forwarded to St. Peters burg, with a recommendation from the Austrian Govern ment, in the name of Austria, and in the name of the other powers, her allies, requesting the assent of Russia to these fair terms of peace. The first impression at St. Petersburg was, that no answer should be given to this request. The step actually taken was little short of that determination. It was setting aside all these proposals recommended by the four powers, to propose other terms, those terms con taining in substance the Menschikoff note which the Porte had originally rejected, and containing, besides, an article, regarding refugees which had not hitherto been proposed. The Vienna Conference assembled, and they declared that these terms were inadmissible. Still Count Buol, anxious —and to his honour it should be said—anxious for the preservation of the peace of Europe, suggested to Count Orloff that other proposals might be made, that prelimi naries of peace might be transmitted to Vienna, might be there considered, might be modified according to the views of the four powers in conference with the Russian Mini ster, and might be transmitted to Constantinople for the assent of the Sultan. Well, this proposal was not assented to, but preliminaries were sent—pretended preliminaries of peace, preliminaries as inadmissible as the former, although the article referring to the refugees was not contained in them, and it was not insisted that the Turkish plenipotentiary should go to St. Petersburg or to the Rus sian head quarters, but, in all other respects, terms which could not have been assented to. Again the conference rejected these terms as inadmissible, and declared that they could not transmit them to Constantinople. We have, then, the agreement, not of England and France, but of all the four great powers of Europe, that with respect to this dispute between Russia and Turkey, Turkey has proposed and is ready to assent to fair and moderato terms of peace, and that the terms of peace proposed by Russia are unjust, intemperate, and inadmissible. (Hear, hear.) I think, sir, after this, considering how much connected Austria and Prussia have been with Russia now for many years, that the three northern powers were connected on many occasions of European difficulty—l think that it will not be denied that in this contest Turkey must have been greatly in the right in order to have such an agreement of the four powers. (Hear, hear.) The moderate proposals of Turkey on the one side, and the inadmissible proposals Russia on the other, seemed to preclude all hopes of an amicable termination of these negotiations. The remain ing question was, therefore, whether or not we could any longer maintain the position which we had maintained—a position showing our interest in Turkey, and our sympathy with her in her struggle, but at the same time taking no active part in her support. Sir, it is obvious that, after the court of Russia had rejected those terms, it must intend to prosecute the war, The intelligence we have now received puts that intention beyond doubt ; but there was moral evi dence of it without such intelligence. We therefore con sidered with the Government of France what step remained for us to take. We came to the decision that we might propose to Russia to evacuate the principalities within a certain number of days, at the same time informing her that her refusal to do so would be considered equivalent to a declaration of war. That step we have taken ; but of course no one would expect that the Emperor of Russia, having refused reasonable terms, would yield to a summons so peremptory. He has declined to give any answer to that proposal, and it remained for her Majesty and the Emperor of the French to consider of any other step, and what, re mained. They considered that no course but war did re main. (Hear, hear.) They considered that, having held forth a promise of assistance to the Sultan, they were bound to fulfil that implied promise of aid. They consi dered that the safety of Europe depended upon the main tenance of the equilibrium of which the integrity and in dependence of Turkey form a part. They considered that it would be impossible to hope to maintain that integrity and independence if Russia was allowed unchecked and uninterrupted to impose her own terms upon Turkey. It was therefore decided by her Majesty's Government at once to address this house—to advise Majesty to send down a message to the Houses of Parliament, •and at the same to issue a declaration of war. That declaration of war has been issued. We can none of us be insensible to the gravity and importance of such a declaration—(hear, hear)—we should all have been glad to avoided it—(hear, hear)—but I hold that, consistently with our position, consistently with our duties to Europe, consistently even with lithe general interests of this country, we cannot permit the aggrandisement of Russia to take any shape that her arms might enable it to assume. Sir, there are, I imagine, but few in this country who think that any other course was open to us. There are, I know, some who think that this country might remain altogether apart from the conflicts of other European nations ; that we might be indifferent when the independence of a power is assailed, when a country may be obliterated from the map of Europe, and some power already great may obtain a fearful preponde rance over the others. These persons, indifferent to the triumph at one time of democracy, at another of despotism, and to the aggressions that are made in the name of one or the other, think it right to say, like the philosophical husbandman of Vigil, " Illum non populi fasces, non purpura regum Flexit et insides agitans discordia fratres; Aut conjurato descenders Dacus ab Istro: Non res Romanis, perituraque regna." But we, sir, who are following the maxim which, since the time of William 111., has governed and actuated the coun cils of this country—we who have believed that we have a part in the great question of the liberties and independence of Europe—we who believe that preponderance cannot safely be allowed to any one power —we who believe it is our duty to throw our weight into the scale in these con flicts—we who have seen our country rise to power, rise to reputation, rise, I may also say, in moral greatness, by the assertion and maintenance of those doctrines—we who have seen the country support burdens and incur sacrifices in the maintenance of these maxims—maxims which I believe to be connected not only with your honour and your dignity, but with your very safety as a nation—we are not prepared to abandon our position in Europe, and we ask you, by agreeing to the address of to-night, to be firmly prepared to maintain it. Sir, I may be asked two questions, sup posing that the house is prepared to assent to this address —questions which I will not deny the privilege of any mem ber to ask—to which I should be glad if I could give full and satisfactory answers, but to which I can only give such answers as my duty will permit. I may be asked in the first place, with what allies are we about to undertake this contest? Now, sir, in the first place, we have, as I have repeatedly assured the house, acted throughout these trans actions, we are acting in this last and final step, which ends negotiation and begins war, in cordial concurrence with France. I have not been able to lay upon the table any formal agreement. We had proposed a formal agreement to France ; in the then state of affairs, another form of agree ment was thought by the French Government to be pre ferable—that was only a provisional agreement, and there fore I cannot lay anything in the shape of a convention before the house ; but the two Governments are agreed that their concurrence should be put in the shape of a con vention, and I hope before long to lay a formal instrument of that nature upon the table_ (Hear, hoar.) Buis while I say this with respect to a formal document, the house may rest assured that with regard to the spirit of the agreement, with regard to friendly intercourse, with regard to frank communication, no two Governments were ever more allied than the Governments of England and France are at this moment. Then, sir, we have to consider the position of those other two powers with whom we have agreed in the negotiations—with whom we have agreed, not only in tile protocols that have been signed, but so far that the Go vernments, both of Austria and Prussia, recommended to the Emperor of Russia to accede to the terms that were proposed, and to evacuate the principalities at our demand. But, sir, I must say that I can add but little to the state ment I made on a former occasion—that while it is per fectly clear to us what the interests of these great German powers demand, we have no document, no formal agree ment that we can lay before the house, or even an assurance that these two powers will take part in the war against Russia. At the same time, the communications made by the Emperor of Austria and his Government have been most frank and direct. They have expressed an entire agreement with us as to the necessity of maintaining the independence and integrity of Takes ,- ; but when we asked, as I think we were bound to ask, some short time ago, what, in case of a rupture, would be the conduct of Aus tria, the answer of Austria for the moment was of a satis factory nature. It reserved an application to the Govern ment of Prussia, and my belief is that if the Government of Prussia had acceded to the views of Austria, I should have been able now to make a most satisfactory communi cation to the house. It did not appear to the Prussian Go vernment that they could accede to our proposals, The Prussian Government has stated to the world its views upon this subject. I must say, those views at present seem to me to be too narrow. (Hear, hear.) I had al ways thought that Prussia was a European power—l had always considered her as one of the principal powers of Europe ; but in the document to which I refer, allusion is made only to Getman interests, and tht duties of Prussia to wards Germany, and there is no allusion whatever to her duties towards Europe. I trust, however, that a short time may bring us communications of another kind. I cannot but think that if Prussia means to maintain her position in Europe, distinguished as she has been distin guished as she is, both in arts and in arms, she can hardly allow that the disturbance of the balance of power of Eu rope, and the immense aggrandisement of Russia which would ensue, can be matter of indifference to Germany, still less to Europe. (Hear, hear.) But, sir, I state the case to the house as it is—that negotiations are still going on, and that even the passage of the Danube by the Rus sian troops has not brought from Austria an immediate declaration that she will be in arms to oppose Russian aggression. I have stated that I think she would have been so prepared were it not for an apprehension that, Prussia not concurring in her course, danger might sur round her if she proceeded to that step; but I repeat again that which I have always thought with respect to this subject—that it is impossible that this war should proceed, and that the great German powers should not feel that it is their bounden duty—that it is their interest, fully as much as it is the interest of England, to assert their independence, and to check this unjust and unprin cipled attempt. (Hear, hear.) Such, sir, is my belief— such is my hope on this subject. The other question which may be asked of us is with regard to what we ex pect as the object and termination of the war. (Hear.) Now, air, I have said that I can state no more than that which I consider it my duty to state, and I consider that I should be departing from that duty—grossly departing from that duty—if I at all restricted the Government of England from at any time assenting to terms of peace which that Government thought honourable and just. For my part, I should not think any terms hononrable and just that did not provide for the security of the Turkish empire ; but with regard to the manner in which that security is to be provided, we all know what are the chances and contingencies of w a r, we all know how quickly the aspect of Europe may change from one month to an other, and I think it would not be right, it would be a course not only w a nti ng i n p ru d ence , b u t in justice to the people of this country, if I were to specify the details of any terms that were to be procured as the terms upon which peace would be concluded. (Hear, and cheers.) This house well knows that if terms were agreed to which it should think insecure and dishonourable, this house has it in its power to rebuke and censure the Ministers who should make such peace. This power has been exercised — whether wisely or not is not the question — but this power has been exercised, and the Ministers who signed a peace censured by this houso were driven from office for agreeing to such terms of peace. I think the house may be satisfied to leave the question in this position—that, having taken up arms from necessity, for the sake of sup porting an ally, our first object must be resistance to the aggressor and protection to the ally, and that we shall continue in arms so long as that ally is threatened by his formidable opponent. I know not, therefore, sir, that I can add anything to the statement which I have made in respect to the course which these negotiations have taken with respect to the causes of the war and to its object. That object is plain and simple. An ally, one of the powers whose integrity and independence :are sanctioned by the public law of Europe has had his provinces assailed and endangered, and is required to sign dishonourable terms of peace as the price of the evacuation of these provinces. He refuses to agree to these terms which he considers dis honourable ; we go to his support in resisting that aggres sion. We have already agreed to a convention with Tur key, a convention which, not being ratified, I am sorry that I cannot lay before the house, but which provides that Turkey shall not make peace without the concurrence and consent of England and France. The convention does not contain—l think it would have been very wrong if it had contained—any stipulation with regard to the internal Government of Turkey. (Loud cries of "Hear.") We have proposed no such convention to the Porte. We have proposed to her a convention in the nature of a mili tary convention, and which, when it is laid upon the table of the house, I think will be sanctioned by the ap proval of the house as well as of the country. Well, then, I leave the case as it at present stands in the hands of this house, fully convinced that the great majority of this house have at heart the honour and greatness of this country • that they will all lament, as I do, that th e ne cessity Of war should be brought to us, but convinced also that they will not be disposed to shrink from a con test which is honourable to us, and which I trust will end in securing the independence of our ally. The noble lord concluded, amid loud and continued cheering, by moving the following draught of an address : "Most Gracious Sovereign,—We, your Majesty's most dutiful and loyal subjects, the Commons of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland in Parliament as sembled, beg leave to return to your Majesty our humble thanks for your Majesty's most gracious message, and for the communication of the several papers which have been laid before us in obedience to your Ma jesty's command. We assure your Majesty of the just sense we entertain of your Majesty's anxious and uniform endeavours to preserve to your people the blessings of peace, and of our perfect confidence in your Majesty's disposition to terminate the calamities of war whenever that object can be accomplished consistently with the honour of your Majesty's Crown and the interests of your people. That we have observed with deep concern that your Majesty's endeavours have been frustrated by the spirit of aggression displayed by the Emperor of Russia, in his invasion and continued occupation of the provinces of Wal lachia and Moldavia—in the rejection of equitable terms of peace, proposed under the sanction of the four principal powers of Europe—and in the preparation of immense forces to support his unjust pretensions. These preten sions appear to us, your faithful Commons, subversive of the independence of the Turkish empire ; and we feel that the trust ,reposed in us demands on our part a firm deter mination,. h co-operate with your Majesty in a vigorous resistance to the projects of a Sovereign, whose further aggrandisement would be dangerous to the independence of Europe." Mr. LAYARD might say most unfeignedly that no man in that house had listened on morethan one occasion to the noble lord the member for the city of London with more pleasure, with more satisfaction,,indeed, he might say, on some occasions, with more enthusiasm, than he himself had done; and if the noble lord would not think him presump tuous, he would say that on the three occasions upon which the noble lord had addressed the house upon this most momentous question they had heard speeches worthy of the occasion, worthy of the noble lord's great reputation, and worthy of a Minister who ought to have, at such a moment, the affairs of this country under his direction. (Hear.) He had listened to the sentiments so nobly ex pressed upon all these occasions with a pleasure which would be unmixed were there not other considera tions at the same time forced upon him. He (Mr. Layard) was bound to inquire whether these sentiments were the individual sentiments of the noble lord, or whether they were the sentiments of the Ministry with whom ho was acting. He was bound to ask whether, at this moment, in another place, the noble earl at the head of the Government was not expressing sentiments, if not diametrically opposed, at least very strangely at variance with the sentiments which they had just heard in this house. He was bound to ask whether the right hon. gentlemen on the very bench occupied by the noble lord participated in that noble lord's sentiments. He regretted to say there were good grounds for his asking that ques tion, and, were there not, he should not have obtruded himself on the attention of the house on the present occa sion. Ho felt the solemn responsibility under which he spoke at the present moment, but, at the same time, he had a duty to perform from which he could not flinch. When a man was convinced that he had a right course to pursue, and did not pursue it, then it almost invariably happened that he found cause for regret. He made this remark, because under similar circumstances to the pre sent he, last year, yielded to the advice of those in whom he had great confidence, and at the request of the Govern ment refrained from pressing on the question relative to Turkey and Russia. He, however, now solemnly believed that the discussion of the question at that time might have evoked an expression of opinion in that house and the country, which, perhaps, would have gone far to prevent the unfortunate result to which the negotiations had now led. (Hear.) At nearly the beginning of the session it was his painful duty to review the conduct of the Mini sters in regard to the Eastern question. He disagreed to tally with their policy, and he felt also that that policy was carried on in a way not worthy of the diplomatists and statesmen of this country. At the conclusion of his speech on that occasion, he stated that if the Government would only adopt a policy which he (Mr. Layard) believed to be equal to the occasion and worthy of the circum stances in which the country was placed, then he would give the Government his most cordial though humble support. Since that period, however, circumstances had materially altered. Documents of an important na ture, which had thrown an entirely new light on these transactions, had been published ; and he, there fore, felt bound at the present moment to recur to the subject. Upon the occasion to which he had just alluded he was taunted with not bringing some definite question before the house, and therefore he would at once state what it was his intention to do. He would be the last man, on such an occasion as the present, to pro pose any amendment or take any step which might in the slightest degree impede the general expression of loyalty to her Most Gracious Majesty, or have a tendency to show that this country was not united as one man in supporting the Crown in the struggle about to commence. (Hear.) But if it should be the feeling of the house, after what he should state to them, that the conduct of the Ministers should form the subject of a Parliamentary inquiry or dis cussion, he, humble as he was, should not shrink from the duty thus imposed on him, and he should be ready to ask the Ministers to fix an early day on which the matter might be brought forward. (Hear.) The noble lord had stated that the papers on the table had been so often dis cussed that it was scarcely of any use to recur to them. It was very true that the papers first laid before Parlia ment had been discussed, but nothing had as yet been said with respect to the most important papers subsequently laid on the table of the house. He believed that those documents would go far to prove the justice of the views he should submit to the house when those papers should come under discussion. In 1829 the noble earl, now at the head of the Government, was Minister for Foreign Affairs in this country. At that period, as at the present moment, Russia was engaged in a war with Turkey. The troops of Russia succeeded in crossing the Balkan, and the Porte was obliged to m a ke a di sas t rous treaty' with General Diebitsch. The noble earl at the head of the Government claimed, within the last few days, the honour of framing that treaty on which was mainly based the pretension which Russia put forward for privileges and rights in re spect to the Greek population in Turkey. (Hear.) In 1842 the same noble earl was at the Foreign-office, and at that time a most important revolution took place in Ser via, the governor of that country being expelled in con sequence of Russian intrigues. The Porte at that time had the undoubted right to confirm the nomination of the prince of that country, and to perform other acts, but Russia upset that order of things . France at that time was willing to go a l ong with this coun try, but the noble earl now at the head of the Go vernment, approved the conduct of Russia, abetted that Power in all its acts, and made the most extraordi nary statement, to which he had alluded on a former occa sion, that Russia had a right to put her own construction on her own treaties,—an assertion which would justify fully and completely every step taken by Russia in the present war. (Hear, hear.) In 1844, when the noble earl was again at the Foreign-office, it was not surprising that the Emperor of Russia should have visited this country, and taken the opportunity of proposing to the Government of this country a scheme which was part . o . f the hereditary t o b f et t l li ve e e E n mhpime rpeorliceyf oßfußssuiassiagreementThe vis and her Majesty's Government, which agreement had now been laid on the table of the house. It was not now the endeda time to discuss that agreement, but it contained some monstrous propositions, involving all the principles now contended for by the Emperor of Russia ; for it was stated that the policy of Russia and England would be to main tain the existence of Turkey as long as possible • but in case it should be foreseen that th e fall of Turkey must come to pass, then that the two countries should enter into a previous concert relating to a new order of things. He did not know whether that memorandum was accepted as a true statement in this country; but it so happened that near the beginning of last year a change took place in the Government of this country, and the noble earl (Aberdeen) found himself at the head of the Administration. The moment the Emperor received intelligence of this change of Government he renewed those proposals which he had opened in a former visited to this country. (Hear, hear.) He (Mr. Layard) intreated th e a tt en ti on o f the house to very important documents laid on the table, because he wished to show the extraordinary divergence of opinion then and now existing between different members of the Government. The first proposal was made on the 11th of January, 1853. The Emperor of Russia congratulated Sir H. Seymour on the return to office of a nobleman for whom he felt a great regard, and had had an intimate acquaint ance with for 40 years, and almost in the very next breath was mentioned the plan for the partition of Turkey. (Hear, hear.) It was not explained very dis tinctly on that occasion, but it was a few days after brought to Sir H. Seymour's notice in plain and positive terms. Sir H. Seymour in communicating this extraordinary proposition to the Government, pointed out very ably the dilemma in which the Go vernment would be placed if they received the proposition or took no notice of it. In the one case, he observed, they would be called on to take part in the proceeding, and in the other they would have it imputed to them that they had tacitly sanctioned the policy of the Russian Emperor. That despatch was received in England on the 6 th of Feb. last year, and on the 9th of Feb., three days after , the date was important, the noble lord who had just spoken return ed an answer, which, though perhaps not equal to what might have been expected, was quite sufficient to make the Emperor of Russia believe that the English Government could not entertain his proposal. Consequently, in the next despatch from St. Petersburg, it was, stated that the Emperor was very sorry to see that the English Government would not listen to his proposal, but shortly afterwards Sir Marchl(Ba 53, H. Seymour had a most important and interestin._,, inter view with the Emperor. On that occasion the Emperor explained his views very fully on the subject, an d made an offer in order to induce the English Gove rnmen t to join in his nefarious project, Sir 11. Seymour l os t no t i me in send ing to England an account of this int erview, b ut, though a form or despatch ohadtheab been ine t answered untilthe 13 within th three 1 ° t answer was returned to this de s p a t c h for 19 days, nor was no itsubmitted be ing 7 days after its receipt. But what did the noble earl, naiPe Secretary for Foreign Affairs, say in answer to that despatch ? Instead of rejecting the proposal, as the noble lord his predecessor had done, the noble earl began his de spatch by stating— " I need not assure you that the opinions of his Imperial Majesty have received from her Majesty's Government the anxious and deliberate consideration that their importance de mands; and although her Majesty's Government feel compel led to adhere to the principles and thepolicylaid down in Lord J. Russell's despatch of the 9th Feb., yet they gladly comply with the Emperor's wish that the subject should be further and frankly discussed." When the Emperor received this intimation, he expressed real and sincere satisfaction—and no wonder. (Hear.) The result was, that that memorandum to which he (Mr. Lay ard) had referred, and which he conceived did contain da maging admissions, was presented, (Hear,) Ile had heard in that house some talk of a policy of connivance or credulity. As an Englishman ho should revolt at the appearance of connivance, but the circumstances of the case were so ex traordinary that he could not understand them, unless it was that, as there was two opinions in the Cabinet, there had been both connivance and credulity, and that out of that unnatural union was begot the bastard policy which had brought the country to war. (Hear, hear.) He wai going to refer to the 'Times newspaper, but not for the opinions of that journal, because if there was any opinions, he might quote them on all sides from hour to hour; but when be found the opinions expressed there were those of two members of her Majesty's Government, an importance attached to them which could not be denied. (Hear, hear.) This was a momentous question, and he did not wish to exaggerate it, but he would undertake to prove that these secret and confidential• despatches were communicated, if not the very day after their arrival, at least two or three days after, and furnished materials for leading articles in the Times. They were not communicated by any clerk in the Foreign-office, because they could not at the time have gone beyond the knowledge of one or two members of the Government of this country. (Opposition cheers.) There were, however, evidently men in this country endeavour ing to bring the country to consent to the nefarious tran saction to which he had alluded. In February and March, last year, there appeared an extraordinary series of articles in the Times newspaper, declaring that the time for the dismemberment of the Turkish empire had arrived, and that it was necessary to take into consideration whether some arrangement could not be come to relative to the partition of that country. He remembered being particu larly struck with those articles, which came out without any purpose that he could make out, nothing having oc curred to lead to them ; but when these secret papers be came known, he recognised in them expressions which had appeared in the articles published in the Times. Together with a member of that house—a dispassionate man, but not agreeing in his (Mr. Layard's) views—he referred to the Times, and, to their astonishment, they found, in an article published in the commencement of last year, the very same words used by Lord Clarendon in one of these despatches. If this were so, the question was one of the utmost importance, for the interests of the empire were at stake if the secrets of . the Cabinet, which could not be divulged to the House of Commons, were to be made use of to defeat the friends of the true interests of the country, who were struggling to maintain its interests as well as the interests of Europe. (Cheers from the Oppo sition.) The first of these secret despatches was received in this country on 23d Jan., 1853, and on the 26th of the same month appeared in the Times the first of those articles to which he had referred. The next despatch was received on 6th Feb., 1853, and on the 11th of the same month, four days afterwards, there appeared an extraordinary article in the Times, from which he would now quote. In one part of the article it was stated— " We do not suppose that it is the intention or the policy of Russia to accelerate a catastrophe in the East, and the good offices of this country will again be employed to lessen the perils of a situation which is becoming critical. We cannot, however, forget that the attempt to prolong the brutal and decrepit authority of the Turks in Europe is purchased by the surrender of fine provinces and a large Christian popula tion to barbarous misgovernment ; and we shall rejoice when civilisation and Christianity are able to repair the injuries of ' the Ottoman conquest." Again, it was stated in the Times on 23d Feb., 1853, after various comments on the exhausted state of Turkey : " With the utmost political cadacity, with a total want of ability and integrity in the men who are still its rulers, with a declining Mussulman population, and an exhausted trea sury, the Porte unites, as if by way of derisory contrast, a dominion over some of the most fertile regions, the finest ports, and the most enterprising and ingenious people of southern Europe. . • It is hard to comprehend how so great a positive evil can have been so long defended by poli ticians as a relative good ; and, though we are not insensible to the difficulties attending any change in the territories of so huge an empire, we are disposed to view with satis faction rather than with alarm the approach of a period" --How did the Times knew the period was approaching I— " when it will be impossible to prolong the domination of such a Government as that of the Porte over such a country as that which is now subject to its authority. Perhaps that period is less distant than is commonly sup posed ; and it may be the part of wise statesmen to provide against such a conjuncture, which it is beyond their power indefinitely to postpone. We do not believe, and we do not mean to imply, that any combination of Austria and Russia, hostile to the territorial claims of the Ottoman empire, is now in existence, or is likely to be formed without the knowledge of the other European Powers. We have strong grounds to believe"—When the Times says that, we know what it means —" that Prince Menschikoff is sent from St. Potersburgh to Constantinople upon a special embassy, for the express pur pose of declaring, in the name of the Emperor Nicholas, that as head of the Greek church he cannot submit, or allow the Eastern church to submit, to the conditioni of the firman recently obtained by the French ambassador with reference to the Holy Shrines in the Land." Now, the first intimation of Prince Menschikoff's mis sion was contained in Sir H. Seymour's despatches, re ceived February 14 and February 21. , It was important to observe that on the 6th of March, 1853, arrived the despatch giving the whole of the Emperor of Russia's plan for the partitioß of Turkey. The answer to it, as he had before said, was not returned before the 23d of March, and no Cabinet Council was held until the 13th of March, though certain members of the Government had seven days previously received the Emperor's proposal. That proposal was not submitted to their colleagues till the 13th of March, but it had been previously submitted to the Times, for on the 7th of March, the morning following the receipt of the despatch, which then could not have been known to more than two or three members of the Cabinet, and which could not then have been seen by any clerk in the Foreign-office, there appeared a particular article in the Times. (Hear, hear.) The article said, among other things, that " The state of the Turkish empire and the relations of the European Powers to the East are subjects on whieh it may be useful for reflecting politicians and the independent press to form and express opinions, though the consummation to which these opinions point be still unwelcome and remote. Statesmen, bound to transact the business of the day, and to recognise at every turn the obligations of what is called State necessity, are restrained within narrower limits, and would probably be unable to give effect to any novel and original con ception, if it had not previously been entertained by the mind and reason of the public." He entreated the noble lord to mark the words which fol lowed, for they referred to the objection which he had offered : " We are therefore !by no means surprised that, in ad verting to the differences which have lately taken place in Turkey, especially on its European frontiers, Lord John Russell should have expressed his dissent from the opinions which have been recently put forward on this subject, and should have repeated in his place in Parliament, speaking under the weight of official responsibility, the old story of the integrity and independence of the Ottoman empire. We ourselves, however, are not affected by similar considera tions." e How did the writer know that the noble lord dissented ? (Hear, hear.) The article proceeded : "We do not, therefore, concur in the opinion of Lord J. Russell, that no greater calamity could occur to Europe at the present time than the necessity of considering what ought to be done in such a case as the dismemberment of that empire. It would, we think, be a far greater cala mity"—mark these words, because they occur in the Em peror's communication—" that the dismemberment com menced before any such consideration took place." Again, he asked the house to mark these words, because they oc - cur in the Emperor of Russia's communication. Why this remark about the dismemberment having commenced, was that the Emperor told us himself. The article went on to say :—" And here we must be allowed to express our surprise that any statesman should, for an instant, confound the policy which it might be proper to pursue in the event of a dissolution of the Turkish empire with that which led to the partition of Poland." The next article appeared on March the 10th ; and what does it say ? I will give you the exact words :—Prince Menschikoff arrives in a more strictly diplomatic capacity, and we have reason to believe"—the hotise knows what that means (Laughter) " we have reason to believe that his instruction are more conciliatory than those of Count Leiningen." Now I find that on March the 6th, in the despatch of Sir H. Seymour, sent to the Earl of Clarendon it is said : " His Excellency (Count Nesselrode) wished to assure me that the instructions with which Prince Menschikoff would be provided were of a conciliatory nature." No Cabinet Council was held till the 19th, when the dispatch received on the 9th was discussed and an answer returned on the 23d March. That answer commenced with the following words :—" Although her Majesty's Government feel com pelled to adhere to the principles and the policy laid down in Lord John Russell's despatch of the 9th of February, yet they gladly comply with the Emperor's wish that the sub ject should be further and frankly discussed." To the hon our of the British press, although it could not command that brilliant and epigrammatic pen which almost shook a colonial minister from his place, it rejected with indigna tion the nefarious proposal that the Times wished it to ad vocate. Well, after the appeal of the nines to the public mind, we have, the very same clay after th e d espa t c h that had been kept back from the Cabinet Council for seven days was sent to St. Petersburg, we have it announcing that the proposition for the partition of Turkey had failed— (Murmurs.) I would read all the articles on this subject, and if I did it would only add to the strength of my case ; but surely, surely—(a laugh) —no man in this house will tell me, after what I have re a d, th at the person who wrote those articles' was not acquainted with these despatches. Well, putting aside the charge against the person who made these communications to the newspapers, I ask what must have been the effect of these articles in Russia, where the greatest care is taken to examine every shade of opinion in this country ? -Agai n , d o you think that Baron Brunow was not aware of these conversations between Sir H. Say • mour and.the Emperor of Russia, and of what passed at St. Petersburg, h abd what mu s t h ave b een hi s surpr i se to find almosrevery 'day after the receipt of these despatches that the information and opinions contained in them were re-echoed by the Times? (Hear, hear) I may be told that after all,ialthough this information is of such a nature as almost to 'preclude any doubt as to its origin, that it is only evidence of a mere coincidence. I confess, sir, that no doubt whatever remains upon my mind. Mark, I am now endeavouring to show that there were two parties then in the Cabinet, and that there are t wo p ar ti es now , an d that the se discordant elements have been trying to counte ract the influence of each other, and that one of these par ties wishes to pursue a policy which I, and I believe the country, most completely concur in. (Hear.) A very curious thing occurs with regard to the speech of the Earl of Clarendon, on the 25th of April last, in the House of Lords, when the Marquis of Clanricarde asked a question with reference to the alarm that had been excited at Con stantinople by the demands of Prince Menschikoff. The noble earl said, after he had received all these despatches, secret and otherwise—"lt is not for me to say that the Emperor of Russia is to be blamed for not keeping the public informed with regard to his envoy's proceedings. There is no disguise on the part of the Emperor with re spect to his embassy at Const an ti nop l e, an d no hesitation in answering our questions. I c an on l y sa y that her as Ma jesty's Government feels pr ec i se l y th e same confidence_ . my noble friend in the h onour an d i n t egr ity of the Em peror of Russia." This was after all these secret commu nications ; and the nobl e ear l a dded—" Exaggerated i re ports of recent events h ave b een c i rc ulated during the last four days which are calculated to e xcite alarm, but your lordships will be pleased to hear that her Majesty's Go vernment have r ecen tl y rece i ve d a despatch from L or d Stratford, dated on th e d a y a fter his arrival at Constan tinople, in which he states that he has great'reason to be lieve that the views of all parties upon the question are such as to ensure a satisfactory result." Now, I want to allude to a very extraordinary fact. The date of the de spatch has been changed. But I suppose there is some ex planation of the circumstance; but the Earl of Clarendon made a mistake, and more than that, he deceived the country. Does Lord Stratford de Redcliffe assert that all parties believe that the disputes between Turkey and Russia will be brought to a very satisfactory conclusion ? Ha says the very contrary. I suppose it was the despatch that Lord Stratford sent on the day of his arrival at Con- atautinopla that Lord Clarendvu meant to quote, but he j certainly quoted the despatch received on the day after he made his speech. The despatch written on the day of Lord Stratford's arrival consisted only of half a dozen lines, and was written before he could have had an oppor tunity of seeing anybody. Well, (lid the despatch justify Lord Clarendon in the confidence he expressed ? After announcing his arrival that day, he says : 2 —" I have only to add that while the Turkish minister intimated a strong sense of anxiety and alarm as to the eventual in tentions of Russia, the impressions of the Austrian lega tion, founded on the language of the Russian ambassador, are favourable to the .existence of moderate views on the part of that power, and to a friendly solution of the pend ing question." I ask what must Russia have thought, what must have Baron Brunow thought ? Why, that there was a party in the Cabinet who were screening him and his Government—a party keeping the country in the (lark. (Hear, hear). There was a very remarkable fact : whilst all this was going on, on the 22(1 of March, Lord Clarendon, writing to Lord Cowley, expresses his regret and condemns the French Government for sending their fleet, and says that her Majesty's Government were dis posed to place reliance on the Emperor of Russia and in his solemn assurances that he would uphold the Turkish em pire, and that if any change took place in his intentions, he (the Emperor) would communicate it to her Majesty's Government without reserve. And'yet her Majesty's Go vernment had received all these secret despatches. He goes on to say :—" No such communication having been made, her Majesty's Government were b oun d to believe, until they had proofs to the contrary, that the mission of Prince Menschikoff was not of a character menacing to the independence and integrity of Turkey." On the 23d of March he says, writing to Sir H. Seymour—" Her Ma jesty's Government have felt no alarm, and have not shared the apprehensions which the facts above alluded to (the reports current about Prince Menschikoff's mission, he.) might appear to justify, for on more than one occa sion they had received personal assurances from the Em peror of Russia that it was his determination to maintain the independence of the Turkish empire, &c." Thus jus tifying the whole proceedings of Russia, and screening her. I may be told that, although the despatches just published show grounds for distrust in Russia, yet that the assurances in the secret despatches given by the Em peror, on the word of a "gentleman," were such as to re move all apprehensions. But I find in the secret de' spatches, as well as in the public, that Sir H. S e y mour re peatedly warns the Government of the double-dealing of Russia—warns them that she is preparing the dis solution of Turkey. The word " fradulent" has been used with regard to the conduct of the Emperor of Russia ; and if I had not seen these secret despatches, I should have said his conduct was fraudu lent. But I do not wish to screen the Czar, and I say that he has been guilty of gross fraud. But then that is the policy of his country, and a policy that has been pursued by Russia for years, and almost for centuries, as every body who knows anything of the policy of Russia must be well aware. But what I complain of is this misleading of the public in a solemn manner before the most august as sembly in this country, the House of Lords, and the put ting forward o f op i n i ons di rectly contrary to ' the facts. I will not press the same argument from the conduct of the Government d ur i ng th e recess, when greater latitude s perhaps u se d, an d t hi ngs said " i that a Minister would n ot always like afterwards to be bound by. But I remember reading the speeches delivered by the noble lord (Lord J. Russell) in Scotland, and by the rightjhon. gentleman the Chancellor of the Exchequer in Manchester. The noble lord's speech led everybody to believe that the integrity and independence of Turkey would be maintained, but the , right hon. gentleman expressed a diametrically opposite opinion ; and there was the greatest difficulty in coil et ing what was the policy of the Government. Here then were the eminent members of the Government giving opinions of a diametrically opposite nature on a question of the most momentous importance. I might continue this line of observation up to the present moment. Her Ma jesty's speech at the beginning of the session was a docu ment almost unworthy of the occasion. It spoke of the quarrel as if it involved no. great principle ; but the noble lord (Lord J. Russell), in the debate upon the address, made a speech to which I listened with intense plea sure, and I thought after all it was perhaps better not to place in the mouth of the Sovereign any strong expres sions of opinion, and that the noble l or d' s s p eec h was t o be taken as indicating what the Royal speech meant. There fore, I do not rise to move any amendment or make any remarks on the address. But my astonishment was 11W bounded when I found that thenoble earl at the head o f the Government, in another pl ace , h a d quite different language — stating that we were at peace—that he hoped to maintain peace—and that peace was the policy of the Government. The true policy of a great country ,was neither peace nor war, but the maintenance of its honour and its interests. Similar declarations were made by the Premier at the Mansion-house and elsewhere about a policy of peace. (- 4 ' laugh.) But the question was—were we at war ? If one noble lord says we are at war, and another noble lord sale we are at peace, who are we to believe ? Ido not want to hear any inflated proclamation • but let the-people of Eng' land be told plainly that they have great interests at stake, and tell them what we are going to war for Let them know that this is a question not only of eivilisTtion, but of our material interests, and that if it is not taken up noe4 it will have to be taken up by and by, and that in the meantime it may lead to disasters which nothin g that We can do will be able to avert. (He ar , hear.) Early in the session, when I expressed my opinion of the mismanagement of this great question by her. Majesty's Government, the right hon. gentleman at the head of the Admiralty got ttP and admitted all that I had said. He said, "It is veil true we may h ave b een vac ill a tin g ; b u t see what we hale I done ? Why, we have got Austria and Prussia with us. ; (Hear.) That was the triumphankresult of all their too' porising. But where are Austria and Prussia now ? What has the noble l or d t o ld us to - n i g h t ? No man can coup upon the armed neutrality of Austria, which means no' thing at all. (Hear, and a laugh.) But were we everjug' tified in believing that Austria would join with us. I n the memorandum of 1844, long before Austria was under her present obligations to Russia, the Emperor of Russia said , that between Russia and Austria there exists already an entire conformity of principle with regard to the aff a irs of Turkey. This is repeated distinctly in two, or three, o f four clespatches.of Sir H. Seymour's, in all of which he tea l us that he (inspects there exists a distinct understanding be,' tween Russia and th e A us t r i an Government. I believe suet an understanding existed as early as 1842 between Austria and Russia; with regard to the manner in which thef would jointly deal with the Turkish empire. And what have we got now? In one of the last despatches that have been placed on the table, which is very i m p or t an t in s ole respects, I find a most extraordinary paragraph :—lt is to I this effect :—" I wrote on the 18th of last month abort these measures (the accumulation by Austria of forces gee the Turkish frontier), upon which tranquilising assurance s were given to the Po r t e th a t th ey were not of a hos tile nature, but were intended to preserve the frontier from iv' suit and to prevent the contagion of insurrection frole spreading; and that even if armed intervention on the part of Austri a b ecame i n di spensa bl e, i t would be carrie; out with a firm i n t e nti on t o preserve, i n all respects, tlt status quo of existing treaties between Ru ss i a an d the , Porte." I a s k th e G overnment, h ave they agreed to air y such proposal ? (H ear, h ear. ) A re we, I ask, to go I ' l war to restor e o ld treaties' and the status quo ? (Hear' Is that the understanding we have entered into with Al; tria ? (H ear , h ear. ) B ut o b serve the dangers into whie,,, this divergence o f op i n i on h as led us. If it were merel y confined to debates in the Cabinet, it might be all ve r . f t well; but look to the state we are in with regard to 0 „,.`" 1 preparations for war. (Hear, hear.) In making these 7, marks I make them with a deep sense of the responsibili" I that I incur in making them ; but I can state, for inforte d r tion I have rec e i ve d w ithi n t h e last two hours, that in Cr,: stantinople no adequate preparations have been msel Not a sack of corn h as b een got, not a horse has been g° i to assist in the moving of the troops. (Hear) And t :. Malta we are t o ld th a t t h e troops are living fourteen gather in a small and miserable garret, not fit for the commodation of one or two men. (Hear.) From the counts that have arrived, we find there are small cano, tents, in which fourteen or fift een men are living togetlieto Why, I ask, should they expose fine men, with prospe 0 no way brilliant, to the damp and dew. (Hear.) The • an account is given of the rain falling upon the Ilig, a lenders, and how they are suffering; and it is asked if the;,, be no ordnance or hospital board to see how these men 9 ,,, e lodged ? Then look to the fleet. Every day I see in ~.",t papers that the fleet is at Beycos Bay. (A laugh.) NS T ' o f I ask, is the fleet doing at'Beycos. (Hear.) We hes ( „J the Russian fleet go i ng out to sea, and landing troops ai'',o stores on the Cir cass i an coast. It is true we are told e;rt that they are not at sea ; but then we have heard a ren° lo that the men h ave l eft the forts—that the Russian P 0 have been set on fire—that, very wisely, they have talt e t away from them the garrisons that would become an en prey; and more than that we are told that they h ave lanu'l troops and st ores our , while fleet is at Beycos Bay. The ° o am told that our fleet have no coals. Why, they have b e j,l lying there these two months doing nothing, and why sho f they remain for two months without coals. (Hear.) %, said, on a f ormer occas i on, that we should have some ee planation about Sinope, and the right hon. gentleman ,'d First Lord o f th e Ad m i ra l ty on that occasion contradio of me when I said th a t un d er th e i nstructions of the 8t11,43 October the fl ee t cou ld h ave acted. I say now they ovot have acted under those instructions; and if they could 13 0 1 have acted und er th em, I ask why the Government toles that we should h ave an exp l anat i on ? (Hear.) I see a in spatch which contains a communication that w as made it the British Mi n i s t er a t C onstant i nop l e to the 0tt00,04 Secretary of St a t e, t o w h om h e pu t s categorical questi e o f respecting the fortifications at ISinope, and the sending p the fleets there. It is rather curious language to use t,„ ° e Prime Minister. H e asks th e P r i me M inister for infoll'd tion on these subjects—he asks to be fully informed •m these points ; a nd b egs , if R esc hid P acha cannot give 'o{o the required i n f orma ti on a t once, that he will take sterol', get it. I want t o kno w w h ere a f ter t h a t cora mun i o p oo is the independen ce o f Turkey? He asks who i s t o bl: oe t for sending the fle e t s there ; but (lid that justif y our Poo remaining in the Bosph orus while the Turki s h fleet 'er destroyed? He a s k s w h o sen t th e Turki s h fl eet to Sio°Joa; but that is not what wo want to know ; we want t o 10 1 0 ' why ourjleet (lid not prevent the massa cre at Silad Brit what has b een th e con sequence of a ll th is delay ? ,e'V Russians are crossi ng the Danube. (H ear. ) The isoP - o f ance of the position of sKalafat is misunderstood—it j- 4 / 4 , prevent them getting at Servia, for if they g ° ale political as well as of military importance. It is imP t ° to ant to ma y raise an insurrection. The Russians Servia they bound to keep a large army at ICalafat, for if it be ell ec o ti' fully attacked, and if they defeat Omer Paeha, ConsO t ee It is stated that we are going to eas),;',V nople will be in the hands of the Russians in three Int tie at G ll' ' a ip oh to save the capital ;but 'the, camp p the heeds of the Russians, where is c o te alle (Hear, ntTreunr ck h he e ey a ls. r ic . 3 ) ain in use of saving the capital. It is said that Lord strat' o a' has been hammering out of the unfortunate Turks co cessions in favour of the Christians, but is that gell e , r i , ° eo Wear, hear.) Is it fair, for the assistance we give r .,. fit is: to get out of them concessions in favour of the ‘''ei tians ? (Hear, hear.) Is it politic, I ask ? (Hear( f,teethe„ You have got at the head of the Turkish Governinol l ' t et most enlightened of Turkish Ministers. He is a man fe l " will mak e concess i ons ; but give him time, other-11 , 0 ° 0 os' will undermin e hi s authority and strengthen the fa i l ib i t el e party in Turk ey, and the result may be that you will or a rebellion in Turkey. (Hear.) I read a letter frool oe stantinopl e i n which it is stated that some delay hasope lfj curred in th e s i gn i ng of the convention between EOgeot France, and Turkey —that the conditi ons were pr ot i to against ' —that it was said that they had b e tt er give 'lf:, the Missians at once, for then they would only ha thorn' master—that no doubt it would b e mor tif y i ng to psi but that submit they must. I ask, is that politic? . t oll you are doing all y ou can to prevent these Chrl s s eil having th ese p r i v il eges . (H ear, hear.) You area O the Turki s h G overnmen t t o put the Christians int ° o tre: A army, and to subieit them t o conscr i p ti on. If you 0 01 r'„ to check the progress making by the Christians, °.. plie' t render them miserable, you could not devise a bet4e l ., e° i than that. (Hear.) What will be the result ? You 1 331 : 1 " t tll j take advantage of these conventions and articles, b l i 6 0 French and the Austrians will do so, and you "e l ders' persons going to the French and Austrian aunbas s ' o se a and seeking their intervention; and we shall have 13 0 r of interventions every day. Then it is said they ol o g abolish the c a pit a ti on t ax ; b u t remem b er the g reat t Of Kernine yen cell upell the Turkish GroTeraul — fir_