The Sun. — London, England, 1830-02-13 00:00:00

att.l lter Ribaantial enmity. For my part, I never could un derstand the policy which made this country send an Ambas sador to Constantinople. Then look, my Lords, to the position to which the conduct of the British Government reduced th e Ottoman Porte. After the Russians passed the Balkan, they wade an offer of treating with the Turks—to that the Covet oneent of - Constantinople sent no answer, good or bad, nt•t even an attempt at an evasive reply. The Sultan did that whielt Louis XVIII. did on the return of Buena parte from Elb.t ; he said, " I will never desert my capi t 1, 1 will contest its safety to the latest moment." He weal die within the secret] precincts of St. Sophia, and a vast deal more such balderdash—(A laugh)—and how did all this end ? Just as such boasting generally does, in complete submission—victory succeeded victory, and -all this time what was passing in the mind of the Turk ? He must hive soliloquized somewhat after this fashion— Tree lam in great jeopardy—l am encompassed with daneer and difficulty—the enemy is at my gate ; but then I have en old friend, an ancient ally, who has employed the strongest expressions which his language affords, to prove how strongly he feels bound to preserve the integrity of my empire by every obligation of honour and of interest —how necessary the maintenance of my empire is to the preservation of the balance of Europe ; and now, since I have lately become better instructed in the customs of the Christians, I learn that the preservation of that balance of Europe is the sole and only reason for keeping up a stand ing army"—as he might easily have seen from the pre amble to the Mutiny Act. He then might go on to say— . My ally and faithful friend, has not, it is true, large armies at his disposal ; hut then he is master of a powerful fleet, and capable of transmitting assistance in more forms than one ; and as a proof of the sincerity of his desire to afford me the necessary aid when the proper moment shall arrive, he has sent the brother of his Reis Effendi to con• cult with my Ministers for the safety of my throne and my dominions, and to give them the benefit of his advice and information. Besides, the-mere name of my ancient ally will te, in itself, enough to intimidate the foe—like Achilles, his shout from the walls will suffice to put the hostile army to flight."—(Hear, hear, hear.). — Well then, my Lords, the brother of the Reis Effendi goes out as an Ambassador, awl, after a few secret communications, and so on, the British Ambassa dor gives his final advice, and what does that turn out to be ?—After all that was said about ancient treaties, and the balance of Europe, and the necessity of preserving Turkish infinecce in European affairs, what is the advice of the British Ambassador ?s—nothing snore or less than unconditional submission.—(Hear, hear.)—" Nothing for you to do," says he to the Sultan, " hut to submit totally, with the best possible grace, to your invaders—intrust your fortunes to the magnanimity of the most unreason able and despotic monarch in Europe."—(Hear, hear.) — This reminds me of a story in some of the writings, I think, of Dean Swift, in which Don Diego, on being con sulted by a friend in jeopardy and distress as to what he hail best do—" My dear friend," sail the party consulted, " your ease is desperate ; I promised to assist you to the utmost of my power, both with advice and in every other possible way, but the only advice that, in the present emergency, I can offer, is—to hang yourself—(Great laughter, and cheering)—yes, my friend, hang yourself, and in the dusk of the evening I will repair to the spot aid cut you down." But what does this honest friend do?--tie goes, and instead of cutting down his unhappy victim, pulled him by the heels for the purpose of tighten ing the noose, and rendering complete the destruction of his victim.—(Hear, hear. )—One point still remained, which might be urged for the interest of Turkey.— the were nominal sovereignty over Greece, and the pay ment of a small tribute. Yet even that paint was struck out, and the intereste of Turkey totally disregarded, and all this time the British Government told the Turk that they could not help what was going forward ; and then when those hostilities ended in the perfect humiliation of the Turkish power, the Minister comes to Parliament, and says he has great satisfaction in announcing the ter mination of hostilities, and such a termination, too, in the annihilation of their old and faithful ally. Such are the speeshes of his Majesty's Ministers. They say, "He is our old friend, a very old friend of the family—the re ams of this affair is extremely painful and unfortunate— our pour old friend got into a terrible quarrel with a hot sturdy fellow, notorious for fighting sanguinary duels.— (A laugh.)—Our friend has been unfortunately knocked down ; he has kern rolled in the kennel ; he has been licked and cudgelled till scarcely a hope is left for him"— (Great laughter)--and what does the faithful friend and ancient ally do next? He goes about to his neighbours and acquaintances, rubbing his hands, and saying,— ,Oh I have good news for you—all the nasty quarrel b e twe e n joy friend and that formidable fellow is quite over. True, my poor friend has had the worst of it, but then I have great satisfaction in being able to in f.: et you that hentilities have been terminated."— (Cheers.)—Now, my Lords, is not this a fair illustration of the conduct of his Majesty's Government in the po sition into which they have brought this country with re. 'talon to Turkey, and I should gladly be instructed as to the manner in which that position can be made to consist with the true intereet of the country, the justice of Parlia ment, or the honour of the Crown, however convenient to themselves his. Majesty's Ministers might have supposed it. Having occupied so much of your Lordelsios' time, I shall not row go through the various coasiderations that suggest themselves as to the manner in which these pro ceeliuge are likely to effect our relations with Russia. As respects France itwas extremely ill-timed, calculated to ex cite the most injurious suspicions, and likely to alienate, us fratu the government and inhabitant of that country to an extent the consequences of which we yet severely experi ence. There is one observation with respect to Russia, which I cannot avoid making, that much stress has been kid upon our trade with the Black Sea. Now with the ex, eption of Azaf, which can scarcely be considered ne cessary- to except, we had no trade with the Black Sea while it was in the hands of Turkey; bat from the mo ment tiusaist got possession of it, we might be will to have the command of the Black Sea, for one ship of this ceun try that before traded to the Black Sea, thirty-four were stow found in its port. The whole of our policy to wards Russia has been, during this contest, such as almost to exceed the bounds of credibility, did not the facts stand upon evidence at most unquestionable. Our conduct with respect to that country was the acme of imbecility. I will apply to this case the lines of a writer, Ausonies, wise, though he writes in verse, is not very poetical, yet with some success he contrasts a wise sal foolish man—. Quid pruilentis opus ? cui possis none mem, • Quid stulti proprium est ? non posse et relic isossar t s." . We showed our teeth without the power of biting, or rattle with every disposition to indulge hostility and exe eite all possible evil. We displayed our gumless jaws in all the impotency of malice. My Lords, the day will come when we shall rue the errors a which our Govern.. meta have been guilty—when our treatment of France— whets our neglect of the opportunity of adding Candle to the territories of Greece; and when our omissi o n to strengthen the young state, by means of Egypt, will re, net upon ourselves with a force of which no man can see site remote consequencee. I think, my Lords, I have already /aid sufficient grounds to justify the assertion that this Government has acted disingenuously. ; now come ttea part of the subject on which it is necessary that I should acknowledge I speak a good deal front conjeettme. 1 have no private sources of information—no access to titticial pipers—no man hi the House has taken less pains than l have to ascertain what is going on. I really know seething but what is derived from tin current conversa tion of tie clay, and from the newspapers—for, my Lorde, newspapers will continue to write, noteithetand ing the prosecutions of the Noble Duke. In this way efsests rums - Jars have been put Lento to which lam anxious to call the attention of Parliament. They are to this effect : that there is an intention to cooteut within still narrower limits the territory of Greece then gy,eg those within which it was first understood that the hountleries of the young State were to be confined ; and I the mama pa.tects larly address myself to this, as there is at the pteseut mo ment a civil war going on in Cen.dia, of a kind the most disgraetiol to humanity; and as, apart from other reasons, that island bast Greeks for the swijoe part of its inhabitants, I conceive that those who had to deal with the Istsundaries of Greece were guilty of an egregious error, in not nege cisting for the Ciusdia's being included within its limits. But I understand it has gegen into a maxim, that this anatter of Greece is a bad itusioaes altogether; and that our best &Aurae was to fall on come expo Bent by which to let as little mitathief come of it as possible it was enough llOr us to have to execute the treaty of the 6tia Of July, and that even in doing that w had better do it, if possibie, without plucking a feather from the Turk—to do him, tics short, as little injury as possible.-e-( Hear, hear, hear.) As to our conduct towards Russia, it stress little less than downright madness—it was not fair with row e l; to any Government, and it was peculiarly impolitic with regard to such a one as that of Russia. The greet principle, my Lords, for which I have been contending is this, that we have be en guilty of the grossest error in not securing to Greece a strong Government and'ette'rritory sufficient for the miinterritiee OfitsOttele indejAdence. The . tatabliehrnent of telifetsik'power in the-Mediterranean is worse than nuetatnry. The narne4f an Illustrious Prince has been mentioned' in cotineethow with this subject. The intellectual - quelifleationt'of: that illustrious personage for the sitesetion'in question ere well known. Ile has had the cileantage of ten or twelve years' experience of free insti tutions in this Count r y, an d it:jg rumoured that !leis , still ' designated by the wishes of the people of Greece, as the individual most to be desired, and that he even was so before the Protocol of the 6th of July. Of this, Loci ever, I profess to know nothing ; but the general rumour upon this subject is so strong, and the concurrent evi Bence in its favour proceeding from every quarter, that I cannot entertain any doubt as to the wishes of the Greek people. I believe that the Greeks have too much sense to adopt any other f,rrn of Government than that of a limited Monarchy ; but let us reflect upon the cruel situa tion of the head of that Government, if, before he takes upon himself that authority, the affairs of Greece, in the most extended sense, are not completely settled. Observe what is the present condition of Candia, in the nominal possession of the Turks. It is peopled by Greeks, who are now in a spate of insurrection; the strong places are in the bands of the Turks, but commotions already pre vail, and a general civil war is on the point of breaking out in the island. However wise, how ever pru , tent, however just the new head of the Greek Government may be, Ire will be a stranger to the people, and you may compel him to adopt a line of conduct he would not otherwise choose. He must, in the first in etance, either connive at his own subjects carrying on clandestine intercourse with the insurgents in Candia, and then the predatory warfare, with all its outrages revolting to human nature, must he continued, or he must openly espouse the cause of his oppressed brethren and subjects. If such be his determination, what, then, will be the con sequence? Peace? No—a new war, which may em broil all the Powers of Europe in the dispute, and then the Treaty will have to be re-settled, and all that has been done, having been undone, will have to be done again. The Sovereign of Greece may take a third course—he may say, " I will maintain a strict neutrality, and prevent the consequence of any assistance from my Empire." I suppose that he will be allowed to pursue vessels on the high seas, that have left his ports for the purpose of earry ing arms or stores to Candia; and, if he maintains that strict neutrality, what is it but folding his arms in apathy before him, and seeing his brethren in language, in man ners, and in country, murdered and massacred by whole sale? If any, the slightest, suspicion be felt that such will be the situation of the Potentate of Greece, it is the duty and right of Parliament to interfere, and to express a decided opinion before the great work is attempted to be completed. There is ameher report which I have heard somewhere, and which I earnestly hope is without founda tion ; but it has been hinted somewhere—perhaps the suggestion of the Evil Genius which seems to have hovered unseen over all who have interfered in this question— Infert se septus nebula, mirabile dictu, Per mettles, miscetque viris ; neque cernitur ulli— that care is to be taken that the Government of Greece shall be in a particular form—that whoever may hold the reins of authority, he is not to consult the wants and wishes of the people, but is to obey the dictation of others. Some fears of the Pope or of the King of Naples (for I suppose Austria does not venture to stand forward and avow her own apprehensions on the subject), are supposed to have led to this determination. Such an abominable, such a disgusting principle of action I hope in God will never guide the Ministers of this country. Ido not and cannot suspect them of it ; but I think, nevertheless, that Parlia ment ought to interpose, in order to put them on their guard, and to declare, in the words of my Resolution, that the Government of Greece ought to he established " with full powers to adopt laws and institutions suited to the wants and wishes of the people." I have gone at greater length than I intended into the state ment of my views, and I have therefore to apologise to your Lordships; but I maintain the unioubted right of the House to adopt this course as the hereditary Coun- • sellors of his Majesty. It was said that such a course was unprecedented. I thought I remembered instances of the kind, but I would not trust my memory, and looking through the Journals, I found precedents enough to over whelm any body. I shall not, therefore, further fatigue your Lordships by producing or erepldning any of them ; but I will conclude by moving--" That no pacification or settlement of Greece will appear to this House permanently advantageous to the interests of Europe, or honourable to his Majesty's Crown, which does not give to that country a territory sufficient for national defence, both by land and by sea, and does not establish a Throne and Government, with full powers to adapt the laws and institutions to the wants and wishes of the people, and to protect the sub jects of Greece from all foreign interference in their do mestic concerns." The question having been put, The Earl of ABERDEEN said—l had hoped that the declaration in his Majesty's Speech, by which Parliament was informed that the King had concerted measures with his Allies for the pacification and final settlement of Greece, and the expression of a confident hope on the part of his Majesty that it would be in his power speedily to lay before Parliament the particulars of that arrangement, would have been sufficient to repress, for a time at least, the impatience of Noble Lords to enter into a discus sion on this subject. But the Noble Baron having been unable to resist the temptation of such' an in viting topic, in my opinion has brought it before the House in a manner certainly most unusual, and which can only be justified by a well-founded suspicion of those whose duty it is more immediately to advise the Crown. To warrant such a proceeding, the Noble Baron must suppose, with apparent reason, that we are either indifferent to the honour of the Crown, or unwil ling to carry into effect the stipulations of treaties by which we profess to be bound. Nov where, let me ask, is the proof to justify any such suspicion? What right has the Noble Baron to entertain it, and has any thing that. has occurred since his Majesty was advised by his present Ministers led to any such conclusion ? The Noble Viscount who spoke on a former night (Goderich), inte rested as he naturally was on the execution of that Treaty, which now engages attention, and which your Lordships ale desirous to be fulfilled, admitted with the fairness and candour that belong to him, that the acquiescence of Great Britain in the French expedition to the Mores was a sufficient proof of the desire of this Government to see its provisions adopted. Had we not been disposed to at tend to the spirit of that Treaty, meat certainly by the letter of it we might have forbidden the departure of a single soldier from France. 'We gave this proof, therefore, of cur desire to see it carried into execution, and in the whole of our conduct we have afforded no ground what ever for the suspicion the Noble Baron entertains of our sincerity, But if his motion be extraordinary after the assurances from the Throne, and in the present state of our foreign negnciations, it is still more extraordinary when we come to examine its real character and. nature. By proposing a vote, that in constituting this New State we shall give it certain capacities, dimensions, and powers, he sanotions an act of wanton spoliation on a friendly n a tio n , without thy slightest pretext to justify it. The Noble Baron speaks as if there were some huge, newly discovered, continent to be partitioned, and forgets the real stipulations of the Treaty of London. He forgets _that that Treaty does not profess to have in view the in dependence of Greece to any extent. It is a Treaty for the pacification of Greece. I see in it the expression of various tuoti:ses oprating upon the high contracting parties, not one of which has relation to the independen ce of Greece. If, then, from a change of circumstances. we have been able to deviate from the strict line of the Treaty, and have uniformly deviated in favour of the Greek popu lation, it cannot be said that we have been reluctant to carry into elfeet the stipulations of the Treaty of London. So much the contrary, that we have gone beyond the ex pectations of the mo - st sangui?:ke friends of the Greeks.— Tho , e who framed the Treaty never cult.l hive entertained the shadow of a hope that we should have been aide to go so far. The Noble Baron also charged us with in:meet:- $.7.1 - 3.5 and, as he contended, intentional delay in the execu doh of Ws work. Without wishing to object to the Treaty to which we are parties, and without wishing to criticise too narrowly, I must request your Lordships can didly to reflect on the nature of the Treaty; observe how undefined it is in its object, how unnecessSrily uncertain in its means of execution, and then you will be aware how extrem4y difficult it must be to give immediate effect to desires so vagtkely specified. Recollecting who are the parties to the Treaty, wd adverting to the progress made under it, your Lordships will tuit»t that in two years as much has been done as could be reasonably eaeoted in a won*. of this nature. But the Noble Baron says tluit we are iadebted for that progress to the arms of Russia ; but he is greatly naistakerr. There no doubt, not a shadow of doubt, that but for the OCCLO r PII;2 of the war with Turkey, the object of the Treaty would have licep more speedily accomplished. As it is, the result of the war w , ll not have operated on the execution of the terms of the Treaty. The Noble Baron has given a recital of facts, but so ineo,:re4 and confused, as to the time and manner in which events of-cep-ell, that it is very difficult to follow him ; but he has accused I4ioisters of not giving imme diate effect to the Treaty after the coqict in the bay of Nayarin. Although the Noble Baron protesi. - e.., ;o be so imperfectly informed, I apprehend it sufficiently notorious to all the world, th*t.the present Ministers had nothing to do with the affairs of Governmar;t till some time after that event; when, too, he stigtnatises the centluct pursued towards thf.., Gallant Officer engaged on that occasion, he may have beard, hontever imperfectly informed, that the present Ministers sent out au inquiry, and are not in any way responsible for the result. As to the gallantry dis played at klavarin, no man ever entertained a doubt—the doubt was as to the justification in taking such a step. The Noble Baron has said, that when first the proposal was made to send troops to the Morea, Ministers objected to it. They unquestionably did so in the first instance, and why? They objected because a plan had been already concer'ed by three Powers, by which the same object wai, to be attained by naval means,—by means of a naval blockade. Were not Ministers, then, justified in object ing ? Did not the Convention between the English Ad nairal and the Paella of Egypt actually effect the evacuation of the •Morea before the arrival of the French troops? This fact establishes that we were right in resisting the expedition, on the ground that it was not necessary, f u r means existed of accomplishing that object independent of any expedition. In one part of his speech the Noble Baron has urged, in very strong terms, the necessity of extending the new• State of Greece, so as to include the island of Candia ; and having declared that he would with pleasure have seen a Russian army in possession of Con st intinople, of course he cannot lie expected to feel any difficulty regarding the transference of Candia. But look. ing still to the Treaty of the 6th July as our pride, I may :may that I consider the honour of the Crown to be con ' cerned in the execution of the engagements of the Crown. The Noble Lord seems to have some notion that the new State should be of certain dimensions, and that to make them so the island of Candia must be taken front Turkey. Upon that part of the subject, as well as all the rest, the Noble Baron seems to be very imperfectly informed. The existence of any %var at all in Candia is to be attributed to • ourselves and to our Allies ; at the date of the Treaty of London that island was tranquil; a mountainous district, indeed, was always in that state of insubordination which is too frequent in Turkish provinces ; but Candia, at the date of the Treaty of London, was as tranquil as it had ever been under the Turks. In the execution of the blockade it was found necessary to establish the blockade of Candia ; and what was the effect of it ? The Greek pirates were chive!' to take refuge with their brethren in the mountains ; and this was the signal for ex cesses and the commencement of a civil war. By means of assistance of money and men from the Provisional Go vernment of Greece, a war was kept up, which is not yet entirely at an end. That was a state of hostility, as I said, arising out of the Treaty of London and the conduct of the Allies. The Noble Baron has also alluded to a re port, if possible, more inaccurate than most of those on which he has founded his motion : he has supposed that here is some intention to interfere with the establishment of the form of Covet nment most desired by the Greeks, and this design he has gratuitously attributed to that demon that seeums to haunt his Lordship's thoughts whenever he talks of foreign politics, and which, he imagines, has in fluenced us to adopt a course he holds in abhorrence. If he allude to Austria, I can assure him that Austria has had about as much to do with the settlement of Greece as he has had—or not so much, indeed. I deprecate any in terference with the internal government of the new State ; for Gods sake let the Prince and the people settle their institutions for themselves. We must not force a Consti tution upon then, but give them full liberty to act as they please, and to found one for themselves adapted to their wants and wishes. On that head, therefore, the Noble Baron need not be in any state of uneasiness. The Noble Baron has not omitted to renew his charges, in consequence of the opinions expressed by my Noble Friend near me (the Duke of Wellington) and myself, upon the importance of preserving the Turkish empire. Those opinions I have no objection to repeat; and I therefore regret the change re cently effected in the relative position of that Power, as compared with its neighbours. Ido not regret it from any love of the Turks or of the Turkish Government—God forbid ! I have seen and know the effect of the barbarous rule existing there : and nobody can be more alive to the horrors with which it abounds. But give me leave to say, that the improvement of Turkey may be purchased at too dear a rate ; and I still think that the conquest of that country would be paying dear indeed for the amelio ration of its condition. The power of Turkey has been considerably weakened, and it remains to be seen how it may be affected by the change, and whether the appre hensions entertained are warranted. The Noble Baron treats these opinions with ineffable contempt—as notions sot to be tolerated in a Member of this House; but surely he must have forotten that they are not only not new but that they have been always entertained by this Govern ment. By no man have they been more strongly felt than by a Right Hon. Gentleman for whom the Noble Baron naturally feels the greatest regard and the highest venera _ _ Lion—the late Mr. Fox—who declared that - he was not only most anxious for the independence of the Turkish Empire, but that he was ready to guarantee its integrity. With this authority on our side I do not think the Noble Baron is again likely to treat us with such supreme scorn because we profess the same opinions, not for the sake of the Turks, but for the sake of the peace of Europe. The Noble Baron has also drawn a bumourous picture of the futility of our friendship and influence in the progress and termination of the late war : upon that point it does not become me to speak decisively ; but with all the Noble Baron's affectation of imperfect in formation upon that subject, I beg to refer him to the sources I know he possesses. Let him learn from those sources the efficacy of our interference. If, as the Noble Lord supposes, we had given the Sultan encouragement in his resistance, from a jealousy of Russia, we might in• some degree have been responsible for the issue of the war.! But I defy him to prove that we did give him the slightest encouragement : so much the contrary, that at the com mencement of hostilities, and throughout their continu ance, by all the means in our power (having at one period no Minister at Constantinople) we invariably warned Tur key of the consequences. Even after the first campaign, when many in this country thought that Russia had ex perienced a failure, we never for a moment were deceived, nor did we vary the tone of our advice and remonstrance, that pacific overtures should be made. If, therefore, through obstinacy or infatuation, Turkey has been reduced to a state not to be looked at without uneasiness by the rest of Europe, we are not to blame and cannot be re sponsible. -The Noble Baron has severely characterised the conduct of Government on this and other matters con nected with foreign policy ; he has said we have brought disgrace upon the country, and lowered it in the estima tion of the world—that our conduct has been marked by imbecility and pusillanimity. Give me leave to say, that these are merely gratuitous assertions; and although they might at one time have produced a painful effect on the minds of your Lordships and on myself, yet I have been so long accustomed to hear such charges during the five and twenty years that I have bad a seat in Parliament, that they cease to produce any impression. I have heard them in peace and during war—when we stood alone opposed to all the powers of Europe, and in the course:of the triumph_ ant progress of my Noble Friend, until it ended in the I signature of a Treaty of Peace in the capital of our enemy. Whatever change took place, still our foreign policy was degrading and disgraceful ; and the Noble Baron must ex cuse me, if I attend more to his proofs than to his asser tions. It is surely little credible, while the Councils of his Majesty have been followed with such signal success at home, that abroad they should have been marked only with imbecility. What, let me ask, is the advantage of the vast strength and inexhaustible resources of this coun try, if not to enable us to pursue a course which, to a feeble power, would be impossible. . I am greatly mis- _ . taken if the Noble Baron himself thinks that our conduct has been misunderstood by the States with whom we have had to deal, On this point, let him apply to the best sources of information, and he will find, if he does not already know, that Great Britain has lost nothing by the intemperate, steady, and even course of policy she has pursued, which has enabled her to 'preserve peace, and still maintain the honour of the Crown. During all the difficult negociations in which she has been engaged, the T d co of Europe has hardly been endangered, and never broken; and I will venture to assert that we are most re spected by those Powers by whom the Noble Lord would lead us to believe we are most despised. Above all, let us refrain from a restless meddling policy, which would in. evitably embroil us and all the lest of Europe in hostilities. During his whole speech the Noble Baron seemed to feel that hp had laid no gr oun d for this vote, and he satisfied himself, therefore, that it was not without a precedent. Feeling, therefore, that it is at present impassible f or me to explain the particulars of existing arrangements, which are promised in the Speech from the Thron e speedily to be laid upon the 'fable, I cannot correct all the errors of the Noble Baron in the clear and decisive manner I should r„E, to enable the Rouse to understand the real merits of thncast, ; must entreat your Lordships not to adopt the Resolution on conrctu r res manifestly un founded, and on circumstances which do no not warrant slightest suspicion. I beg leave to move the previous question. Th e Marquis of CLANRICARDE supported the Reso lution, to which be had net kcq.rd any r ea l an d ser i ous ob jection. If the Ministers wanted to preserve the integrity of the Turkish empire, they ought, at least, to have made some more prompt and efficient (flint to controul the Russians. The INl;nisters said that they had acted from a io;:ie of mace ; but lie did rot think that the tendency of the course senit,h they had adopted was calculated to pre serve peace, and had, probably, t.,_asioned the Russian war. The Noble Secretary of State had said that his Noble Friend was incorrect in all his statements; but he had not adverted to any one of the points in particular, and had shown in what respects it was incorrect. He would mention one thing to which be was anxious to get a distinct answer. Ile was informed that when the Rus sian troops were at Adrianople, a despatch was sent to the Russian Goyernment by our Ministers, in which they stated; that if the Rusiiins should advance and take pos session of Constantinople, our fleet would enter the Dar danelles. :Was this true? If it was, then the Ministers had incurred the risk of a war, when it could be of no use. The object of this resolution was, to raise a barrier to the power of Russia in the east of Europe, and there could be no better mode of doing it than by making Greece a great, powerful, and independent State. Lord Viscount MELBOURNE likewise supported the Resolution. The Turkish empire might be considered as completely humbled and deprived of its power, and its total dissolution would be an easy task ; and the only pro per plan to form a barrier to the power of Russia was to wake Greece a great and independent State. The Mi nisters did nut seem to have settled in their own minds what course to take when the war broke out between Rus sia and Turkey ; but if they interfere at all, they ought, without reference to any other power, to have declared at once, that they would not see with patience the Turkish power too much reduced. He agreed with his Noble Friend, that the language of the Ministers in Parliament had a tendency to encourage the Turks in their resistance to Russia by the hope of support from this country, and, therefore, instead of securing the integrity of the Empire by peace, they published their famous manifesto, and hurried into war with the greatest violence and obstinacy. lie certainly was not satisfied with the past conduct of the Ministers : but, in looking to the future, it was evident to him that Greece ought to be made an independent and powerful State—a Power which would be able, both by its extent of territory and its means and situation, to main tain its integrity and independence. Since the Treaty of London was made, the situation of things had altered, and it had become necessary to unite all the States of Greece, and so to form a power which would be a support, and not a clog to you. He was highly gratified to hear from the Noble Secretary, that it was not intended on our part to interfere with the Greeks in the free choice of their form of Government, nor throw any impediment in the way of any improvement which they might think consis tent with their circumstance's and situation. But there was no good reason for refusing to concur in this Reso lution, and one of the same character had been adopted by this House, in the reign of Queen Anne, in 1707, and was supported by the most eminent of both the Whigs and Tories of the time. Lord GODERICH—As the Noble Lord has alluded to some observations which I made on the first day of the Session, I think myself called on to make a few remarks on the present subject. I most heartily concur in the opi nion of the Noble Secretary of State, that we ought not to throw impediments in the way of the Greek people in their choice of such a form of Government as should be satisfactory to themselves. But when the Noble Secretary said that our Government would throw no shackles on the Greeks in their choice, I should have been more gratified if the Noble Lord had said that the Government of this country would interfere to prevent any shackles from being imposed upon them by others. As far as he has gone, however, I highly approve of the principle of cur abstain ing from interfering with the free choice of the Greeks as to their own form of Government. But I have my suspi cion, that although we may throw no impediment in their way, others may attempt to do it ; and I most earnestly hope that Ministers will use all their influence to prevent it ; for, after what has been said this night, I should most extremely regret if the Greeks were to be so fettered as not to be allowed even a shadow of choice in the matter. I certainly think we ought to hesitate before we interfere very earnestly in procuring improvements to he made in the old Governments of Europe, and that it was better to allow the people and Governments to settle these affairs among themselves. But Greece stood in an entirely dif ferent situation, for theirs was a new Government, and we would be abandoning all the principles of our own Con stitution, unless we were to do every thing in our power to secure to the Greeks a free system, and thereby show to the world that we were attached to our own institutions because we were sensible of the benefit of them, and not because we were born under them. This is the more important, because I know that an opinion prevails in some foreign countries that we submit to our institutions as a grievance, rather than value them as a blessing. If, by the means of England, Greece should be settled on the basis of a Constitutional Government of their own choice, it will not only be a great object gained for Greece, but will highly redound to the honour and fame of England, and highly increase the influence of our country both in these regions and all over Europe. Ido not see any reason why we should not pass these resolu tion, but I do not think it necessary to enter upon any comments on the past, for that is not required, for the purpose of proving the expediency of passing such a reso fution. Ido not mean to discuss whether the Ministers, in their past conduct, were more or less in error, or more or less in the right: what I look to is the future ; and I hope the Ministers, in case any attempt should be made in any quarter to oppose the free choice of the Greeks, will be anxious to gain a victory over that opposition, and I hope that the result will be favourable. Whatever scruples we might have to put ourselves forward, and meddle with the affairs of the old Governments of Europe, the Greeks stand in a different situation. It is not a question of change in the form of Government; it is a new Guile' u !tient to be created where there was none, or next to none, before; and here, therefore, we can have no such scruples; and I most anxiously hope that the expectations of a happy result, which have been produced in my mind by the dis cussion of this evening, will not be disappointed. The Duke of WELLINGTON—AIthough I am com pletely satisfied with the answer and explanation which has been given by my Noble Friend (Earl of Aberdeen) near me, I yet feel desirous to say a few words in reference to what has fallen from the Noble Lord opposite. The Noble Lord cannot but have observed that his Majesty, in his Speech delivered by the Royal Commissioners on the first day of the Session, states that he had concerted measures with the other Allied Powers for the execution of the Treaty of the 27th July, for the pacification of Greece ; and his Majesty there promises that he will shortly lay before your Lordships the documents, which will afford you most ample information as to these transactions. But what does the Noble Lard say ? He says to your Lord ships, don't wait for the production of the document which his Majesty has promised to lay before you, but, before you are in possession of the requisite information come forward at once with the plan stated in this Resolution, and declare that nothing else than the adoption'of that plan will satisfy the Greeks, or be consistent with the honour and dignity of this country. And he calls on your Lordships to do this without either he or your Lordships having any information whether the measures for the pacification of Greece have not been already formal :7 concerted and finally settled on another basin. Is it consistent to pass such a resolution without knowing whether the matter has not been al ready finally arranged, so as to make it impossible to alter it? A Noble Viscount on the other side said that a resolution of this kind had passed in 1707. If that was the case, it was a most absurd and ridiculous proceeding ; and I know of nothing to match it, except the resolution which has been proposed this night. But the Noble Lord dwells on his want of confidence in his Majesty's Mini sters, and especially in me; and in order to lay some shadow of a ground for his resolution, he takes statements which he has found in newspapers, and argues upon them with an utter contempt of dates. My Noble Friend (Melbourne), if he will allow me to call him so, on the second bench, has said that we encouraged the Turks in their resistance to the Russian propositions for peace, and to issue the Hatti Sheriff or Manifesto, or whatever it might be called, which showed their determination not to yield till the last extremity. But the Noble Viscount forgets that that Sheriff was prepared, if not published, before Par- - . lisment :net, and long before I was in office ; and neither by direct recommendation to themselves, nor by the language which we held in Parliament, nor by the language of his Majesty's £peech, did we encourage the Turks to resist. The HattiSheriff„though not published immediately when prepared, was known at Elsineur before the late Ministers went out of office. To blame Ministers for that, there fore, is what I must really call too bad.—( A laugh.)— With respect to the circumstances that preceded the battle of Navarin, and the transactions relative to the blockade of the Dardinelles, and some other matters to which the Noble Lord had referred, I really had no more to do with them than I had to do with the Hatti Sheriff. The in structions to the Admiral, and those relative to the blockade, were given by the former Government; and I think that in the latter respect they acted rightly. It was not to be a belligerent blockade, but merely such a one as circumstmees might require, in order to prevent the extension and continuance of barbarous hostilities. I do not reproach the Noble Lord for his want of confidence iu the Ministers, but I must inform him that the Ministers ;vete not the originators of these measures and transac tions, but only followed the example of others. Hut the Noble Lord has accused rue with reference to a variety of transactions, which it is utterly impossible to discuss at present with effect, because the proper documents and papers have not been laid before your Lordships. I can at present only tell him that the documents, when laid on the table, will show, that with respect to every one of these transactions the Noble Lord is completely mistaken ; but as these papers are not before your Lordships, I will refrain from entering into a detailed discussion of their contents. The Noble Lord blames us for not having suf ficiently urged on the Turks the folly of resistance to Russia, and for thereby having enc mraged the Russian war. But he should have looked at the dates before he made the charge. The Ambassadors of the three Powers had quitted Constantinople in the month of September, and I did not come into office till January, and we had no op portunity of communicating directly with the Turkish Government. But then we had the means of communi cating with them through the Medium of another Power, and we represented to them the injury which they had done to themselves by issuing the Hatti Sheriff, and strongly advised them not to suffer matters to come to extremities, so that it was not our fault that the war took place. This advice we repeated to the Ottoman Govern ment in the course of the war, for I never anticipated any other termination of it, than that which has actually hap pened, and which, I think, ought to have been produced in the fist campaign I always urged the Porte to make the concessions which the Russians had a right to demand by treaty, and by so doing, to preserve peace, as they were sure to be losers by the war. But then, says the Noble Lord, " Why did you not put yourselves in arms to prevent it?" Now I firmly believe that, notwithstanding the distresses of the nation, temporary as I hope they will be, the country was never i❑ such a high state of prepa ration for war at any period within my memory as at the present moment. Never, in my time, was its credit higher, or its power and efficiency for foreign war greater—not even at the period when we were con• tending against the world in arms.—(Hear, hear.). — It was never in a state of superior• preparation for war; but when the Noble Lord asks why we did not take arms to prevent the Russian war, then came the questions, would it be a just war: I say it would not. Would it be a politic war ?—I again answer no. We were at the time engaged in a treaty with Rus sia and France for an object which we have now in a great measure attained, and it would have been impolitic at that time to have given up the advantage of the Russian co operation. It would have also been a breach of faith, more especially as the Russian Government always pro mised to make peace at the first possible opportunity, Our taking arms against Russia would have revoked the whole arrangement; and it would have been obviously unwise, impolitic, and unjust, to have done so. Notwithstanding the disasters which the Porte has by its perverseness, brought upon itself, it still exists as a power—and it may yet be so reinstated as to be able to act its part in the polities of Europe. Then the Noble Lord blames us for the measures which we adopted with respect to the Greeks, particularly with not having engaged in active hostility with the Turks, in order to effect the object of Grecian pacification. But the principle of avoiding active hostility was the very one to which we and our predeces sors most strongly adhered. It was the principle most strongly recommended by every motive of justice and expediency, and it was the principle on which the Treaty for the pacification of Greece was founded—that we should not mix ourselves with the belligerents. It was for that reason that his Majesty, in his speech, called the battle of Navarin an unfortunate or untoward event; for that battle was an act of hostility that might have had a very unhappy effect on the ulterior measures for the pacification. But then, it was asked, why we had at first opposed, and then permitted, the sending of the French troops to the Morea ? It is true that the Gallant Admiral had made an arrangement for the evacuation of the Morea by the troops of the Paella of Egypt ; but then that was not known when the French troops were sent. I am, perhaps, more to blame than the Noble Lord oppo site for my want of recollection of dates, but the papers when they were produced would explain why the French troops were sent to the Morea, and why they were not sent sooner. He at one time proposed a blockade; but that did not take place, and then troops were sent. But I say, that in the whole of these transactions we were guided by the spirit of the Treaty, and the spirit and object of the Treaty was the pacification of Greece, and not the making a great State of it, and that object had now nearly reacheri a final settlement. Then the Noble Lord says, Oh, but the Greeks ought to have the island of Candia. The island of Candia, however, was not included in the Treaty, and the Noble Lord does not know if it can be included now. He says you may now mate a new arrangement ; but he does not know but the affair may be already settled on the old terms. I shall say nothing about that at pre sent ; but I do say that if Candid is to be given to the Greeks, it must be first conquered from the Turks, and we are not bound by the Treaty to conquer any thing for the Greeks. By that Treaty we made an arrangement for the pacification of Greece, but it was not contemplated to include Candia in the Grecian territory. My Noble Friend near me has really given as complete an answer to all the objections of the Noble Lord as can be given at pre sent, in the absence of the documents ; and I really hope that the Noble Lord himself will see the propriety of with drawing his Resolution. Lord HOLLAND—Perhaps, my Lords, I shall not give your Lordships the trouble of a division ; but I will not withdraw the Resolution, as lam anxious that it should be entered on the Journals of this House. Now, one word as to what the Noble Secretary of State says about the sentiments of Mr. Fox on the subject of the Turks. I really do not know from whom the Noble Earl has his information, when he says that Mr. Fox wished to keep up the power of the Turks, and even expressed an opinion that the integity of their power ought to be gua ranteed by the country. I had an opportunity of being well acquainted with the sentiments of Mr. Fox ; and I know, that both as a citizen of the world, and as one who felt the deepest in the glory and honour of this country-- and no man valued both more highly—he was most anxious that the Turks should be driven out of Europe. That Mr. Fox may not have said something to warrant the Noble Secretary's inference, on some particular emer gency or contingency, is more than I can take upon my self to say ; but, most certainly, his general sentiments were such as I have stated them to have been. Does the Noble Earl pretend to know what were Mr. Fox's opi nions better than I do? I know not from what document the Noble Earl derived his information ; perhaps it may have been from some printed speech of Mr. Fox; but if it was from a speech, then I say that the speech has not been correctly reported. It certainly is not likely that Mr. Fox should have taken the part of the Ottoman Empire; and I should doubt whether there is any Statesman, except a French one, who does not consider it as highly desirable that the Turks were out of Europe. The Noble Duke says that he was not in office when the instructions were given which led to the battle of Navarin, and endeavours to explain his conduct as to the blockade of the Dardanelles; but I can hardly think that the Noble Duke has been quite accurate. It is true that a proposal was made to blockade the Dardanelles, and we deferred our decision on the point, but we did not ob ject to it. The Noble Duke says, and says truly, that dates are great things. But the gist of my argument has little to do with dates. To be sure I cannot produce do cuments and despatches to show that the Ministers encou raged the Turks to refuse coining to terms with the Rus sians; but what I contended was, that the whole tenour and spirit of the language of his Majesty's Speech, and of the language of the Ministers in Parliament, were calcu lated to buoy up the hopes of the Turks. and led them to take that obstinate and perverse course which has led to their present state of degraded humiliation. The Turks manifestly expected that if they resisted we would shield them from destruction. The Noble Duke says that in structions to Admiral Codrington were given by the late Ministers, but it was not they who spoke of the Turks as our ancient ally,—and called the battle of Navarin an un - toward event. Then the Noble Duke found that he could not act as he was bound by the Treaty, but I say that in consequence of the breaking out of the war between Russia and Turkey, we had the liberty of withdrawing from the Treaty if we thought p►oper. We were bound only as long as the Russians waived their r 7 ghts as belli gerents to blockade the Dardanelles ; but they did not waive them. The Noble Duke says, that to pass a Re solution cf this kind was absurd and ridiculous, because, for any thing I know, that matter may have been already arranged on a different basis ; but I am willing to share in the ridicule and absurdity, which was just as well merited in 1707, by Lord Nottingham, at the head of the Tories, who proposed a Resolution of much the same de uription, which was supported by Lord Somers, and all the most eminent of the Whigs of that day. It was a Resolution for an address to the Queen about excluding the Pretender from certain territories on the Continent of Europe, particularly from the dominion of the Duke of Loraine. The same arguments were then used against ft as were now used by the Noble Duke. The Queen 'had no right nor means to compel the other Powers to exclude the Pretender ; and it was inconsistent with the dignity of Parliament, and the respect due to her Majesty, to address her to do an act which she had no power to enforce. The Lords, how ever, over-ruled the objection, and the Resolution was passed ; so that such a Resolution, however ridiculous and absurd in the Noble Duke's estimation, is at least awt un precedented. As to the sending out the French troops to the Morea, the Noble Duke says that I was wrong as to dates, but my argument did not depend on dates. The Noble Duke had at first opposed the expedition, and then did he afterwards agree to their being sent, and then sti. pulate that they should not act beyond the limits of the Morel.. As to Candid, I understand it was at one time in contemplation that a line from the Gulf of Volo to Arta should he the limits of the Greek territory ; and I after wards heard of another arrangement, and the one might be as good as the other ; but I do say, that Candia ought to belong to the Greek State. Before we can gibe that island to the Greeks, says the Noble Duke, we must conquer it frosts the Turks, and we are not bound to coeu for the . _ Greeks.. The Noble D u k e an d I AM Neither of us young ~ men, but I think we 'nay yet live to see 'tile day , when Candia shall be no longer in the poWer of the Turks.' if the three Powers were •to make the proposal fur i s cession to the Greek territory, I do not belies', t'iat it would be difficult, in the actual situation of the Turks, to procure their consent to give it up without the ''' , ccessity of going to war. The Noble Duke says that the 'oject of the Treaty was the pacification of Greece. True ; 1 -at I say that Greece will not be pacified without inde- 1 , aulence ; and, with independence, the means and the p ,wer to support it. lam not sorry that I have occasion ti, bring forward this discussion; and I am glad that the Ministers, since they will not agree to the Resolution, have taken the method of " the previous question" to get rid of it—a method which, I believe, in Parliamentary practice, implies that a proposition ought not to be entertained, not because it is not true in itself, but because it contains opinions which, at the particular time, it is not expedient to express. I hope his Majesty's Ministers will adopt Ruch measures as will make Greece great abroad and happy at home, and by so doing increase the fame, honour, and influence of their own country, not only among the Greeks, but among all the nations of Europe—a consequence which must follow if, through the means of this country, the great wock should be consolidated. The Earl of ABERDEEN, in explanation, stated that he did not derive his intelligence as to the opinion of Mr. Fox from a speech, but from an official answer written by himself to a dispatch from Talleyrand, in 1806. Talley rand had said, that it ought to be a great object of policy to preserve the integrity of the Turkish empire, and even to guarantee it—to which Mr. Fox assented. The previous question was then put and carried ; after which the House adjourned. HOUSE OF COMAIONS—(LAST NIGHT.) ILLUSORY APPOINTMENTS. On the motion of the SOLICITOR-GICNERAL, the Bill to ' amend Illusory Appointments was read a first time and ordered to be printed. The Learned MEtraEa then brought in the other Bills, of which he gave notice last evening, which were severally read a first time, and ordered to be printed. THE LINCOLNSHIRE PETITION. Colonel SIBTHORPE presented a petition from the city of Lincoln. The Honourable Member said, that the petition was most numerously and respectably signed and it complained that so little attention was paid by his Ma jesty's Ministers to the distresses of the country, sad prayed, before the House went into a Committee of Supply, it would cause a moat rigid inquiry to be made into the burdens of the people. The petition also prayed for a ' reduction of the Assessed Taxes. The gallant Ca lonel, after going into a statement of the general distress that existed, concluded by saying the petition had his hearty support. He hoped every attention would be paid to this subject by the public Press.--(Hear, hear.) After a few words from Mr. FA ZAKERLEY, the petition was seconded, and ordered to be printed. TRADE WITH INDIA. Sir BYAM MARTIN presented a petition from Ply= mouth, against the East India Company's Charter. Mr. STANLEY presented a similar petition from the merchants, manufacturers, and others, of the town of Manchester. The petition was most numerously and re spectably signed. NEW WRITS. A new writ was ordered for the borough of Fowey, in the room of the Hon. R. H. Eden, who has accepted the Chiltern Hundreds; and another for the borough of Wen lock, in the room of Cecil Forester, Esq. whohas accepted the office of Groom of the Bedchamber. MALT TAX. Mr. WODEHOUSE presented a petition from a pa rish in the county of Norfolk, praying fur a repeal of the Malt Tax. Mr. O'CONNELL presented four petitions from the county of Cork, against the Vestry and Sub-letting Acta. VESTRY ACT. The Hon. Member gave notice, that on Wednesday the 17th inst. he should bring in a Bill to repeal the Vestry Act. LONDON BRIDGE. The Sheriffs of London presented a petition from the Lord Mayor, Aldermen, and Common Council of the City of London, praying for leave to bring in a Bill to amend the London Bridge Act. They also presented another petition relating to City Lands. FORGERY. Mr. Secretary PEEL gave notice, that on Wednesday the 18th of March, he should bring in a Bill to atuend and consolidate the laws relating to Forgery. ESSEX PETITION. - • Mr. WESTERN rose to present a petition from the county of Essex, with which, though he agreed in softie points, he was far from concurring in all. The Hon. Member than entered into a history of the mode in which this petition had been submitted to the meeting, after an other had been previously moved by two most respectable gentlemen of the county. It had been carried undoubt edly by a majority of the meeting; and though, as he hid before stated, there was much in it of which he approved, there was also much of which he strongly disapproved. It called for a reform in Parliamens--of that he approved; it called fur an equitable commutation of the present sys tem of tithes—of that he had been always a supporter; it called also for a new distributitin of the revenues of the Church—but that was a project to which he could never yield his assent. It also contained many unjust and inJie critninate charges against the higher class of society, to which he could never consent to put his hand. It was signed by the High Sheriff on behalf of the meeting,—a practice not unusual ; but it would have been mote sa tisfactory to him if it had been signed by the persons who attended the meeting. If that had been done, he was certain that no one gentleman of known consi deration in the county—he did not mean for property, but for caution, and judgment, and talent—would Lave subscribed his name to it. He then read the petition which was rejected by the meeting. After he had con cluded it, he said that not a single individual in the large and respectable meeting which attended yesterday at Chelmsford had been found bold enough to deny its state ments. Never was there a more entire concurrence than ..--- that shown at the meeting as to the universal and severe distress which now oppressed all the industrious , In order that he might not have occasion to intrude again upon the notice of the House, he would say that he eoukl not give his support to the resolution which was that night to be moved by his lion. Friend the Member for • Cumberland. The adoption of his resolution would not remedy the existing distress: nothing could do that ex cept a cautious mitigation of the Act of 1819, which was a robbery upon all the debtors and tax-payers in his Majesty's dominion. The House had, in his opinion, only this alternative before it,—either to sacrifice the measure of value to the country, or else to sacrifice the country to the measure of value. He then moved that the petition be brought up. Mr. D. W. HARVEY could have wished that the Hon. Member for Essex had had the prudence to defer presenting this petition until the irritation had subsided which had been occasioned by the defeat which he had suf fered yesterday. The Hon. Member had called the meet ing of his constituents a large and respectable meeting, and yet had impeached their prudence at the very moment in which he admitted their patience. Patient indeed the meeting had been, for it had listened to the Hon. Member for an hour, whilst he had been amusing himself by re• peating once more his stale and often-told story respecting the currency. The meeting was indeed a most respect.- ' able meetinm, for it disdained all party motives, and would not allow itself to be converted into a party meeting. Fur whilst it stated the existence of great buffering and dis tress, it denied their universality, stating its opinion to be that the distress was so great, that unless some wise measures were adopted to relieve it, it would soon be over wbelming. It had declared its opinion to be, that though, much was to be done upon that subject within the walls of Parliament, much also was to be done without It' had declared its opinion that there was as great relief to be derived to the agricultural classes from a diminution of rents as from the boasted panacea of the Honourable Member himself. He thought that if the landed gen tlemen in that House could feel themselves ju s tifi e d i n calling for a reduction of the salaries of all officers; from the highest to the lowest, do a•n to the scale of 1793, their tenants had a right to call upon them to reduce their rents in the same proportion.—(Loud c ries of hear.)--The rental of the country was 50,000,094/ and if the landlords would take off 25 per cent„ jt tivQuht equal in amount to a fourth part of our present tax:ttiom relieve the agricultural clas s e , s )f o E f l , 2 ex ,s l 9 ,a o ,l ,o d o e o o L i ( t' l ks as the support and (qua :tedv i t i o ich be " l ' e 4 d ° I I ) t y ‘tvlaiesitiflagan4lortdlige, amt had chosen in their county court to say that which they dared nut utter in the hulls their as that o cb : o v ol n idu l , at a ,n t d , k l en u ) s p a: : them ly ytle. much irritated with n eae i n d n fult:tclwhich weretf the oeni Member haul ri r s u )b p ;o p e er e r i :s t , Edl c v a es e a n is n ets t . t l x : oi n biw w i o , at sh t t i st i a o nt them. They had no desire to break faith with the national creditor, —quite the reverse : their object was to maintain the national faith unimpaired. They called upon' the House, after reducing taxation as low as possible, to lay upon the country, SO far as should be necessary for the maintenance of our honour and security, a judicious'y gra-, The the tabl, Mr. Chants, and oct I.:88ex, Mr. h e woul tak - en p in India The the Ord, Inittee On tl Mr. tunity b of the c visible i