The Sun. — London, England, 1864-06-28 00:00:00

burg, hilt s line to the south of Flensburg, by which that important town might have been preserved to Denmark. I may say that my noble friend and myself, as the British plenipotentiaries, had thought that, after the fairness and impartiality which the Emperor of the French had shown throughout, and ccnsidering his friendliness to Denmark, and his wish to protect her, the Emperor was well-qualified to perform that duty. It was, however, laid down by one of the plenipotentiaries that no Power which was repre sented in the Conference, and which had thereby to a cer tain degree been committed as to the question before the Conference, could be accepted as a friendly power for the purpose of arbitration. It then appeared to us desirable that the question should be referred to the King of the Bel gians. The German Governments, however—Austria and Prussia—said that, although they might accept "good offices" of a friendly Power, according to the Treaty of P aris, they could not accept the decision of that friendly power as binding; and, in the meantime, they asked for a long period of armistice. Now, my lords, it appeared to us that, if that proposal were accepted, after two or three months of armistice, during which the naval operations of Denmark would be altogether suspended, there would be a decision pronounced which, if it in any way dis pleased the German Powers, would have been refused by them. (Hear, hear.) The plenipotentiary of the German Confederation confirmed completely our view of this question by declaring that in his opinion this territory of Schleswig belonged to the Duke of Auguetenburg, a a that they could accept na arbitration, and could not s'abmit to anything that might be decisive, and that every foot of ter ritory in Schleswig might be demanded at the end of the good offices by the German Confederacy. The course they pursued in this matter has, I am sorry to say, been in the usual manner of the German Powers. The refusal was not a direct and straightforward declaration. (Hear, hear.) They wished to have the appearance of accepting . the good offices, without really accepting them. The Delilah pletu potentiary, most imprudently as I believe, gave a decided refusal to the proposal. The proposal which I made did not certainly agree technically with the line of the Schlei; but nevertheless it was a proposal which the British plenipoten tiaries thought would be advantageous to Denmark. And now, my lords, there was only one more proposition made, and that originated with France, who had instructed her plenipotentiary to make it after all other means had failed. The proposition was this, that leaving the Danish part of Schleswig to the Danes and the German part to the Germans, that the line to be drawn in the districts which were still uncertain should be decided by a vote of the population taken in each commune'in some fair manner ; that that vote should decide whether the district was to belong to Germany or to Denmark. Lord DERBY—Was that vote to be taken during the occupation ? Lord RUSSELL--The French proposition decidedly was that the Prussian troops should abandon the district before the vote was taken. (Hear.) However, in the opinion of the Danes—an opinion which they have since repeated, and which I think is well founded in fact, although the popu lation of Schleswig are perfectly satisfied to remain united with Denmark, yet such had been the effect of the oc cupation, and such the agitation on the part of Ger many, that it was probable it would influence any decision made in the way proposed by the Emperor of the French. They therefore refused to accept the proposal. My lords, I must say that my noble friend and myself had received from France and the other neutral Powers the firmest support during the whole continuance of the Conference. (Hear, hear.) We had frequent meet ings—private meetings of the neutral Powers only—in which we discussed the proposals to be made, and there appeared nothing at those meetings but the most earnest desire to provide for the safety and independence of Denmark, and I must say the utmost harmony prevailed among us. Both the French, the Russian, and the Swedish plenipotentiaries did all in their power to contribute to the success of the pro posals which we made, and we shall therefore leave the Conference with a strong sense of our obligations for the support we received from them. A declaration was made at the last meeting of the Conference by the Prussian pleni potentiaries, and which has been made to-day by the Aus trian ambassador, that Austria and Prussia have no inten tion to carry on hostilities for the purpose of obtaining pos session of any territory beyond the duchies of Schleswig and Holstein ; that they had no intention of making a conquest of any part of the Danish territory on the continent or of the Danish ielands. That is a declaration voluntarily made. It is not a declaration in any way extorted by us. At the same time, my lords, while they make this declaration, I suppose that cannot mean, and we certainly cannot consider it, as one upon which, alter what has happened, we can implicitly rely. (Loud and prolonged cheering.) lam sorry to say, that greatly as 1 have respected Austria—greatly as I have re. spected Prussia—we can no longer rely as we did on the de• clarations they may make. (Renewed cheering.) But the question comes to this : What, now the Conference is ended, is our position ; and what is the policy which the Govern ment intend to pursue? And, without intending or being rile to pledge the Government in case of contingencies which have not arisen, I think it is due to Parliament and to the country, especially at this period of the session, to declare what is the view which the Government take of the position and of the interests and policy of England. With regard to the question of the honour of England, I conceive that she is in no way engaged to take pat t in the present war. There has been at no time a declaration or a pledge on the part of this country, on the part of her Ma jesty's Government or of the Crown, that material assistance would be given to Denmark by this country. Three times her Majesty's Government, while I have held the seals of the Foreign-office, have endeavoured to induce Denmark to accept propositions which, we think, would have been fa vourable to her independence. In 1862 I made a proposi tion, which was rejected. When Lord Wodehouse went to Denmark, he and the Russian plenipotentiary proposed that Denmark should at once repeal the constitution which she lad passed. She refused that proposition. Again, in the Conference lately, we believe that, if she had consented to the arbitration which we proposed, it would have given as good a position to Denmark as she could have expected. My lords, lam not blaming Denmark. I should be sorry to reproach her for anything in her present state of weakness. She has a right to refuse these propositions; but we, on our side, have a right to consider the duty and the interests of England, and not to make the honour and the known interests of England subservient to the interests of any foreign power whatsoever. Our national honour must be maintained, I cannot but think that if, in the month of December or January last, France, Great Bri tain, and Russia, with the assistance which they might have counted on from Sweden, had declared for the main tenance of the treaty of 1852, the succession of the King of Denmark, which had peaceably taken place, might have been peaceably maintained. Then, I think, the King of Denmark and his Government would have reme died all the grievances which his Gelman subjects had suffered. But such was nct the choice of the other Powers, with . the ex cept i on of Sweden, and I have to repeat what I sa ripen a r ecent occasion, that it has always been con sidered that the treaty of 1352 was not a guarantee treaty, and that the Government of France and Russia were, like ourselves, perfectly at liberty to acknowledge that treaty, I hut that was not acknowledging it as part of the general seystem of Europe. The French Government have repeat. edly, and within the course of the last 24 hours, intimated the views taken by the E mperor of th e F rench neon this question. He declares that it 19 essential to the interests of France to support a line of frontier for theking,dorn of Den mark, but that he does not think France will be disposed to go to war for such an object, and he adds that if France did so she would become involved in a war with G ermany, and a war with Germany was a war of the most serious importance to France. He aiso stated that her artniescould not be mar s h a ll e d f or t h e i nvas i on o f Germany without great cost and great risk, that if successful France would expect some compensation for her efforts, and that compen sation could hardly be obtained without exciting indigna tion in Europe and disturbing the balance of power- MY lords, I think there is great weight in these objections, and that the Emperor of the French is justified in following that line of policy. I cannot but admit that if France and Germany did go to war, it might revive some of those con tests which were terminated in 1814; and the Emperor of France having thus declared his policy, and the Emperor of Russia having constantly refused to join with us in giv ing material support to Denmark, our position, of course, must be greatly influenced by these decisions. Is it a duty that we alone should undertake the preservation of the ba lance of power in Europe as recognised by the treaties of 1815 ? There are many considerations which induce me to come to a different conclusion. I cannot but think that in such a war our commerce might suffer severely from the depredations to which it would be exposed. But there are other considerations. Would your interference bring the war to a close without military aid i Would it recover Schleswig and Holstein, or even rescue Jutland from the Prussian and Austrian forces ? I think that if we inter fered our interference ought to be clearly effectual, and that nothing it were more di m i n i s h t h e i n fl uence of this country than if were found that, although we had the dominion a t sea, yet that after some time, on the approach of winter, our interference had not produced the slightest effect, and we were compelled to withdr aw our f orces from the Baltic. The position and influence of thi s country should be con sidered by Parliament and the country—with all its great interests and mighty com p licati ons, with a ll our var i ous treaties and connections in various parts of the world. ':'here are other parts of the world besides Europe in whi c h our iutereitts are deeply involved, and i n which W 9 may one 'day find it necessary to maintain our honour and our essen tial interests. Let the civil war in America end how it may —whether it be in the establishment of an independent republic in the South or whether it ends, most unexpectedly to me, in rest or i ng the Union—still the United States of America, or the Northern States, whichever they may b e celled, would be in a totally different position from what they were s few years ago, A great army and a great navy will be maintained, and our relations with that power will be liable at any moment to interruption. Those relations must be taken into consideration, as well as the balance of power in Europe. Then look at our relations with China, which require a considerable naval squadron to protect our commerce; look at our immense possessions of India, and conceive how necessary it is that they should be main tained. But if these considerations are to be borne in mind, it may be said that other combinations might be made, and that the principle of nationality to which Prussia and Austria had appealed might be invoked against them. We might have sufficient ground of justification for such a course, if our object was merely to show Austria and Prussia that they are vulnerable on l,heir own ground. But it is the duty of the Government to :show greater attachment to peace thaa Austria and Prussic, not to allow the flame to extend all over Europe, but to endeavour to confine it, as far as possible, within the narrowest limits. Therefore, it is the opinion of the Govern ment that we should maintain the position we held before the Conference, and that we should be neutral in this war. I do not mean that contingencies might not arise in which our position might not be different and our conduct might be altered. It may be said, " Will you allow the German Powers, if they should decide to go with their combined forces to Copenhagen, and declare there that it is their ob ject to make Denmark assent to terms destructive to the independence of Denmark. Would you be entirely indiffe rent on that subject ?" I can only say upon that question that I think every Government of this country must retain a certain liberty, so long as it has the confidence of Parlia ment, with regard to the decision which it may be called on to give. All I can say is that if Government should think it necessary to come to any fresh decision, if the war should assume a new charaoter—if new circumstances should arise, and such a decision have to be taken, it would be our duty, if Parliament were sitting, undoubtedly to apply to Parlia ment, and if Parliament were not sitting immediately to call Parliament together, that Parliament might judge as to the conduct which her Majesty's Government should pursue. In the meantime I have given you an outline of the course of these negotiations, and of the efforts we have made for peace, which, like those made by the Government of Lord Liverpool in 1823, have not been crowned with success. If any party in Parliament should think as Lord Grey thought in 1823, that we should go to war, it will be competent for them to ask her Majesty to interfere on behalf of Denmark. If they think that we have in any respect failed in our duty, it is competent for them to take any line they think proper. But I say that we have maintained the honour of the country —we have done all in our power to preserve the peace of Europe—and although these efforts have failed, nothing has been wanting on our part which was required for the honour and interest of the country, or which it was our duty to do. (Cheers ) The Earl of DERBY—My lords, the almost unprece dented attendance of your lordships on the present occasion sufficiently indicates that you are deeply sensible of the im portance of the statement which has just been made by the noble earl the Secretary for Foreign Affairs. It is impos sible, my lords, to overrate the gravity of the matters in volved in that statement. Interests of such vast importance are hanging in the balance at the present moment—the peace of Europe—l do not say the present, but the ultimate peace of Europe—is fraught with such fearful peril, and anything that passes in this house may have for good or for evil so serious an effect, that if I have risen to follow the noble earl in the statement he has made, it is not for the purpose of going through the various topics upon which he has touched, or following him through the different portions of his speech, but for the purpose of expressing my earnest and anxious hepe that your lordships will see not only the propriety but the absolute necessity of abstaining on the present occasion from a partial and consequently an unsa tisfactory expression of opinion. The noble earl has entered at very great length upon three distinct topics, which he has treated no doubt with great ability and with great clear ness. He has entered upon a justification of the course which the Government have pursued ; he has entered upon a discussion of what has passed in the Conference, and he has stated with at least sufficient explicitness for the mo ment what is to be the policy of her Majesty's Govern ment in the position in which we are now placed. My lords, of the first part of the noble earl's statement I have no complaint to make. It was perfectly natural, in laying upon the table by command of her Majesty the protocols of the Conference held is London on the affairs of Denmark, that he should have brought under your lordships notice the circumstances under which it was appointed, and the position in which Europe stood at the period it assembled. I do net complain of the general statement the noble earl has made of that position, or of those circumstances, although no doubt there were some very material facts which he altogether omitted, and some circumstances to which per haps be gave a colouring with regard to which I cannot con cur. But, as I have said, lam not about to discuss the state ment of the position in which we are placed, still less (for that is a more important and totally different question) shall I discuss to what circumstance, to what conduct upon our part, as well as on the part of foreign nations--to what policy pursued by the Government it was owing that we were placed, at the period of entering upon the conference, in the unfortunate position in which we then stood. My lords, that question may, and probably will, form the sub ject of further discussion, if not in this, at all events in the other House of Parliament, and probably in both houses. (Opposition cheers.) But upon the present occasion your lordships will not deem it necessary to enter upon all the phases through which the Schleswig-Holstein question has passed since 1862. It is not expedient or desirable to enter, upon the present occasion, upon a discussion, without any ulterior or ultimate object, of all the various phases through which that question, simple in its origin but complicattd in its progress, has passed during these two eventful years. But I must say that the noble earl has, I think, taken a course this evening which is not in accordance with the ordi • limy practice or procedure of the house in giving an ac count of the various matters which passed in the Confer ence, and in reading from papers which are not in the han Is of your lordships, and with reference to which we are bound to accept the statements of the noble earl. My lords, the most important part of the question which Parliament has to consider is the course of policy which her Majesty's Government have pursued—whether they have taken the course best suited to effect their own objects—namely, to obtain a satisfact ,ry arrangement between the different belligerents, and at the same time to maintain inviolate the honour of England. While, however, this question is of the utmost importance, it must have reference to an earlier period —a period before the commencement of the Confer ence—to things which then had taken place, and of which we now know nothing. For with all respect to those noble lords and right hon. gentlemen who have stated that as soon as you could get the plenipotentiaries assembled round the table you would have no difficulty in coming to a satis factory conclusion, and without in the slightest degree dis paraging the ability and talent with which the two noble lords conducted the affairs of England in the Conference, yet I think I may venture to say that beyond the limits of her Ma jesty's government there were few who could anticipate, and there were many who did not wish, a different conclusion from that at which the Conference arrived—namely, a signal and lamentable failure. Well, what were those circum stances ? There were at that moment eight parties called to the Conference, which consisted of 13 gentlemen. Oi the four belligerents three were engaged on one side and one on the other. There were four neutrals—England, Russia, France, and Sweden. With regard to the belligerents, what was the position of affairs which they were invited to consider ? It is true that with regard to the three belli gerents on the one side, their ends, their motives, their ulti• mate objects were different, but they were all bent on destroying the neighbouring kingdom of Denmark. All three were not agreed as to the ultimate object with which that spoliation should take place, or the persons who should profit by a division of the spoil ; but the three were agreed to carry war and spoliation into the Danish territory. It was at that moment when, flushed with the triumph of their arms, and the glory which had been gained by the enor mous numerical superiority of military, materials, munitions and artillery— flushed with the glory which they thought they had obtained, and seeing before them nothing but a feeble and half-vanquished enemy, they consented most re luctantly to be arrested in that progress, and yielded to the pressing solicitations, not of the four neutral powers, but of England alone—(hear, hear)—for a temporary suspension of hostilities, although they would not consent to an armis tice. On the other hand, there was the kingdom of Dol -1 n 'ark—a small and gallant nation, who were fighting with the utmost determination and with the courage of despair on behalf of all that they held most sacred—on behalf of their homes, their constitution, their king, their families— fighting agains t overwhelming o dd s; see i ng themselves the w h ole European community, from which, deserted by whether with or without reason, t h ey had no doubt entertained a Ban noille hope that they should receive sup port. They found themselves pressed to the very utmost - . They found that they were deserted by all, and I say, in their position, the courag e of despair might have induced them to refuse to enter upon a suspension of hostilities un favourable at the moment to themselves, and to say— " Rather than enter into discreditable and disgraceful terms let us die in the face of day—let ua die in the face of Europe —to the shame of Europe, that permits us thus to suffer." with discordant (Hear, hear.) These were the circumst ances under which the belligerent s came i n to the Conference views on the on e s id e , an d with a feeling on th e part of the small and weak ki ng d om o f Denmark that th ey Were made the subject of o pp ress i on an d v iolence. The f our neutral powers entered into the ques tion without the slightest pre vious agreement b e t ween t h emse l ves e ither as t o what he should ask, recommend, or insist upon, The eight different interests were collected together at the Conference in the middle of the excitement of a war, without any previous basis of negotiation being agreed upon, or anything being settled, except that memorable basis which the noble lord at the head of the Government is reported to have stated, namely, that the basis of the Conference was to procure the peace of Europe. Upon that basis they met, without any previous communication or agreement or understanding, and yet you profess to bs astonished that that Conference, so inaugurated, has led to nothing but a confirmation of the divers opinions entertained in it. (Hear, hear. ) There fore, although we have not the papers, that is a matter of comparative indifference. The noble lords charged with the interest of England at the conference may have conducted its affairs with more or less ability, and with perfect since rity, I have no doubt, to maintain the peace of Europe ; Prussia and Austria may have been more or less unreason able ; Denmark may have been more or less firm ; the Diet may leave placed itself more or less in opposition to the pre vious d eclarations of the proper parties to that conference ; but with respect to all this it makes no difference, because from the time it began to sit it was in my judgment a doomed conference, from which it was impossible to hope that any beneficial results could arise. Therefore the absence of the protocols does not place us under any disadvautage in judg ing of the policy which h as b rought the country into its present position, Still, I will not now, upon the imperfect statement just made, and with the imperfect information THE STJN, LONDON, TUESDAY EVENING, JUNE 28, 1864. and knowledge we have of the facts of the case, express any opinion whatever upon that most important decision at which it appears har Majesty's Government have arrived, viz., in the present state of affairs to remain perfectly pas sive. At the commencement ;of this session I ventured to express as strongly as I possibly could the infinite danger in even the possibility of a war with Germany—that power with which we have been for so many years associated— our natural ally, which is or has been, unless modern ag gressive principles have too far prevailed, the great con servative centre counterpoise to the ambition of the Bast and the West—(hear, hear)—our natural ally, which has been connected with us by many ties, with whom a war would be productive of the most serious and lamentable consequences, not only to them, but to ourselves. (Hear, hear.) But, my lords, what I expressed also was this—my fear that her Majesty's Government, by the course which they pursued, have placed us in a position in which we should be either subjected to the lamentable consequences of such a war, or to the discredit in which we should be held—in which, I fear, we are held—(hear, hear)—by the whole of Europe, not for having abstained from war now, but from having for a long period of years held out to both contending parties menaces on the one hand and encouragement on the other—a course altogether inconsis tent with that policy which her Majesty's Government now professes, and very properly professes —an earnest desire and determination to maintain unbroken the peace of England, so far as it can be preserved with honour. (Hear, hear.) That is a question on which serious discussion must take place—that is a question the decision upon which will solve whether, in the opinion of Parliament and the country, her Majesty's Government have maintained inviolate the hon our of the country—(hear, hear)—or whether, on the other hand, their policy has not been such as to expose them to the charge of a feeble and vacillating opposition—yielding at every step where encroachment was threatened—always anticipating that that encroachment would be met with firm resistance, and whenever encroachment took place yielding and protesting that no further encroachment should be allowed to take place, (Hear, hear.) That is the charge against which her Majesty's Government will hereafter have to defend themselves. This is a feeling which is ,prevalent in the minds of the people of this country—this is the feeling which has taken deep hold of Parliament and the country ; and if I wanted any confirma tion of the course which her Majesty's Government have pursued, and of the course they may be expected to pursue, I should find it in the concluding portion of the noble earl's speech, in which, alter elaborately discussing all the disad vantage and danger of going to war, all the injuries we might sustain, the loss of commerce, all the consequences which might arise to a country like England, including even the contingency of the war leading to a rupture, at some distant day, with the Northern States of Ames ica—(a laugh)—the noble earl, to my utter astonishment, concluded by saying, that while nothing on earth would induce him to go to war while we should hold ourselves aloof, because our interests are so vitally concerned, because our commerce is so exten sive,because our relations are so various, because our treaties are so numerous, that England must keep the:peace, and we appeal to the country to give us credit for maintaining it in a state of peace and of internal prosperity and wealth—but the noble earl said, we reserve to ourselves, if further steps should be taken, the perfect right of altering our course, and sacrificing all those considerations on which he laid so much stress, and of entering on that war that he so justly and seriously deprecated, and of altogether departing from the principles on which he acted for the last two years. (Hear.) That is exactly what the noble earl and the Government have been saying for two years. First of all, Germany was to take into serious consideration the danger of incurring all the responsibilities of federal execution in Holstein. Then Denmark was recommended—as this is only a federal exe cution, we advise you to submit to it; but if the Germans should go beyond Holstein, if they should cross the Eider, if they should only enter Sleswig, if the Diet turn federal execution into an in ternat ional question, then the question will be altogether altered—then her Majesty's go vernment may see the necessity of departing from the course they have hitherto laid down, and in certain contingencies afford material assistance to you. Again, Sleswig is occu pied. We are assured that Sleswig is only taken as a mate rial guarantee for the fulfilment of other engagements. "Oh, if Sleswig is only taken for fulfilling other engage ments," says the noble lord, " that alters the question ; but if the occupation is to be a permanent one, that is a thing which her Majesty's Government cannot tolerate for a single moment." (Laughter.) Well, Sleswig is perma nently occupied. But, says the noble lord, you must never think of passing into Jutland. (Laughter.) Well, into Jut land walk the troops, for strategical reasons, it is alleged. This the noble earl does not presume to justify; but he says it is not a sufficient reason for inducing her Majesty's Go vernment to depart from their course. Well, my lords, may I ask what is the contingency which is to override all the considerations which the noble earl has laid before us ? I think Parliament is bound to have some answer given to this question. We will not go to war, says the noble earl, but we may sea reason to alter our course. I think the noble earl went so far as to say that it Copenhagen was bombarded and blockaded, then possibly, to prevent its capture—possibly —(laughter)—her Majesty's Government might consider that the contingency had arisen which would induco tho Government to depart from their resolu tion. But short of the capture of Copenhagen, will the noble lord tell us how far he will consent to . be driven before he departs from his prudent resolution—for Ido not deny that it is prudent if it can be maintained with honour. (Hear.) I hope I may be pardoned for having gone so far as this— to point out the question to which it will be the duty of her Majesty's Government hereafter to give a distinct answer, upon which I hope Pailiament will insist not oily in having a distinct answer, but in passing a distinct judgment, (Hear,) But for the present I confess I should be very sorry that this discussion should take place now —perhaps I have gone almost beyond my own intention, perhaps I have gone beyond what might be desirable— (hear, hear, from the Ministerial benches)—in the tempta tion to follow the noble earl for the purpose of pointing out not what wo aro to discuss now, but what we are to discuss hereafter. For the present I earnestly hope that neither with regard to the past nor the more important future, will your lordships be led upon a partial statement, which is all that is before us, to enter upon an unprofitable discussion, or to pledge yourselves individually or collectively to any line, to pass any confirmation of the past, or to assent or dissent from the course which has been pursued, (Cheers.) Earl GRAN VILLE said-4 think there should be a clear understanding as to the course intended to be pursued, and that the house should adopt the course recommended by the noble earl at the beginning, and whichhe repeated at the end of his speech, that we should not .his evening go into a de bate on this great subject without having the necessary papers in our hands. The noble earl, however, did not adopt the course he himself suggested, but touched upon all the points which he considered to be most vulnerable in regard to the policy of the Government. The noble earl made statements with regard to the Conference, and used argu ments which were applicable to any Conference whatever, called together to establish peace between aweak and a strong nation. (Cheers_) We may go on on both sides usir g decla matory statements and arguments without any result except to create popular prejud ice, which cannot affect the reason of the country. (Cheers.) The noble earl went on to put into the mouth of my noble friend statements which he never used in the course of the negotiations. (Laughter.) Why should the noble earl put to us this alternative —either to declare to Europe and the world that, whether our interests or honour were concerned, we would not go to war, or pledge ourselves to what may be a convenient demand on the part of a member of the Opposition, but what it would be unjustifiable in those who represented the people in this house to exact—every possible contingency, without know ihg the accompanying circumstances, which should induce us to go to war? (Hear, hear.) The noble earl said he did not wish to enter into a discussion. If the house is of a , different opinion we are ready to debate the whole question now; but I hope it will not be discussed in a piecemeal way. (Cheers.) After a:few words from Lord BROUGHAM, which were in audible in consequence of the noise created by peers leaving the house, the subject dropped. Their lordships adjourned at a quarter to eight. HOUSE OF COMMONS—Last Evening, The SPEAKER took the chair at four o'clock. PRIVATE BUSINESS. The following bills were read a third time and passed : The Belfast Central Railway, and the Kilkenny Junction Railway. OPEN SPACES FOR PUBLIC RECREATION, (kc. Sir J. SHELLEY presented petitions from different parts of the metropolis, praying that the space already occupied for the enjoyment and recreation of the commu nity should not be infringed by the ground of the same being let for building or other purposes. (Hoar, hear.) THE ACCIDENT AT EGHAM. Sir R. BULKELEY asked the President of the Board of Trado whether his attention bad been drawn to the evi dence given at the inquest on the sufferers by the late rail way accident at Egham, by Mr. Robert A. Scott, traffic I manager of the South Western Railway, in which he says " Ordinarily, I think, there would not be the slightest dange r in starting them (the trains) at an interval of five minutes, allowing the first train to make a first stoppage at a distance of eight miles. It is quite an ordinary working of the trains. Some lines allow only three minutes :" also to the evidence of Thomas Gibbard, office-porter at Egham, whose duty was to note the arrival and departure of the trains, and who stated "That the Royal train (containing their Royal Highnesses the Prince and Princess of Wales) passed through Egham in the morning a t 12'51, and that Lee passed through at 12.47 Whether the President of the Board of Trade would in form the house on what lines trains were started at intervals of three minutes only : whether starting trains on the same line at intervals of three minutes was done with the know ledge and sanction of the Board of Trade : and, whether he considered the safety of their Royal Highnesses was sufil. ciently protected in allowing a heavy passenger train to precede them by four minutes only ? Mr. M. GIBSON explained that the Board of Trade had no power in the matter. THE CONFERENCE, APPEARANCE OF THE HOUSE. From an early hour both the floor of the house and the galleries were crowded to excess, and the proceedings were invested with that animation which only arises from great political excitement. The strangers' gallery was full to overflowing, and that portion of it reserved for distinguished foreigners was occupied by the leading diplomatic representatives of the principal European states. Lord PALMERSTON—Sir, I rise to move that these papers be printed, and, in doing so, I am quite ware there never was an occasion possibly upon which a Minister of the Crown had to make a statement—short and simple as I intend to make it—to this House of Parliament, and through it to the public, upon which the feelings of the country, the sympathies of the country, the aspirations, I may say the anxieties of the country, were more deeply engaged than on the question with regard to which it is my duty during a short time to detain the House. For the sympathy which the British nation has felt in the cause of Denmark will do honour to them in all times. I stand here, however, not to excite those sympathies, or to profit by them. I stand here on this occasion simply to communi cate to the House, in a short abstract, the substance of those proceedings at the Conference which are recorded in detail in the papers now laid upon the table. And I may say that, although on Friday I doubted whether the record of the proceedings of Saturday would be sufficiently ready to be laid in conjunction with the preceding papers upon the table, I am now able to say that they will be delivered to mcrrow morning equally with the other papers relating to the Conference. (Hear, hear.) And among them will be found an abstract of the proceedings of the Conferenee, drawn up by one of the plenipotentiaries, which will greatly assist honourable members in making themselves masters of the more detailed contents of the protocols. But to explain more fully, and to make the House understand completely the nature of the questions treated of in the Conference, it will be necessary for me to go a little farther back, and to make Some remarks upon the Treaty of 1852, out of which the subsequent controversy originated. The House, however, is sufficiently familiar with that trans action and its origin to make it unnecessary for me to do more than give a general outline of the transactions to which I allude. The Treaty of 1852 was, I should say, a treaty negotiated by myself ; by Lord Granville who succeeded me; and concluded by Lord Malmesbury, who succeeded him, So far, therefore, as the policy of that Treaty is concerned, all parties in this country are equally bound up. (Hear, hear.) It was founded upon European considerations; it did not originate simply with England—(hear, hear)—it was an arrangement dictated by European interests. The state of the matter was this. The law of succession in Den mark admitted the succession of females ; the law of succes sion in Holstein confined the succession to males. If; therefore, any case should arise in which there was any default of issue male in Denmark, it was clear that by the operation of those conflicting laws Denmark and Holstein would be separated. But the late King of Denmark, ad vanced in years, had no offspring, and the Prince who would have been his immediate successor, had he outlived the King his uncle, had no offspring either ; and therefore the Powers of Europe thought it necessary to take into consideration the means of preventing the splitting up of the Danish monarchy, which they felt to be inconsistent with the gene ral interests of Europe and the balance of power in the North. For this purpose it was necessary to assimilate the laws of succession in the two parts of the Danish monarchy. To alter the law of succession in Holstein was impossible, because it formed part of the law of the Germanic Confede ration. The other expedient was adopted, and it was deter mined that the lex regict of Denmark should be altered, and that males only should succeed to the Danish crown. It was also provided that the King of Denmark should have the power of naming his successor to the crown of Denmark ; and an arrangement should be made by which his successor should also succeed to the Duchy of Holstein. These arrange ments were the objects of the Treaty of 1852. The King of Denmark chose as his successor Prince Christian of Glucksburg, and there being a question of the rights of the House of Augustenburg to the Duchy of Holstein, that right was commuted fora pecuniary indemnity. The Duke of Augustenburg, having been in rebellion against the King of Denmark upon a former occasion and his estates having been confiscated, the value of those estates was given to him on condition of his renouncing for himself and his suc cessors all claims to the duchy of Holstein. The Treaty of 1852, therefore, provided, so far as the powers of foresight of the parties could go for maintaining the integrities of the Danish monarchy, as it was then constituted, by the poses sion, on the part of Denmark, of the duchies of Schleswig and Holstein. That treaty was greatly approved of by all parties concerned in it. A question, however, arose whe ther, as Holstein was affected by that treaty, it should be submitted to the concurrence of the Diet at Frankfort. The asking for that accession was objected to at first by all the parties concerned--by Germany, Russia, Sweden, and Den mark. My noble friend, Lord Granville, who then held the seals of the Foreign-office, did, however, propose that that treaty, before it was concluded, should be submitted to the Federal Diet. On the contrary. it would be seen by the papers on the table that some parties expressed dismay at the proposal, their dismay arising from the delay that would attend such an application ; and a different mode was adopted, namely, that whereas the Diet consists only of re• presentatives of the different Germanic Powers, application should be made to those Powers themselves to accede to the treaty which had been coneluded. That application was made, and several of the Powers agreed to it; but it is right to say that some other Powers, including Bavaria and Baden, declined to assent to the treaty, in consequence of feelings connected with German opinion as bearing on the duchies of Schleswig and Holstein. Well, s'r, that treaty was preceded by certain diplomatic communications be tween Germany and Denmark which led to various ar rangements; but the material part of the communication was this, that whereas, on ono part, the great object of Denmark had always been to incorporate Schleswig with Denmark; and whereas, on the other haud, the great object for which the Germans had always contended was the poli tical and administrative union of Schleswig with Holstein, both should give up their respective pretensions; that the King of Denmark, on the one hand, should agree not to incorporate Schleswig with Denmark, and, on the other hand, that the Germans should agree no longer to recognise the political union of Schleswig. with Holstein. Such was the state of matters at the conclusion of that treaty ; and it all parties had been equally animated by that spirit of con for both, lam not awar e th at any serious complication c c o il u ia ld tio h n a , v a e n a d I rise m m ay sayßu of ju s ti ce, i t wou ld h ave b een b etter But during the ten years which elapsed between the conclusion of that treaty and the death of the late King of Denmark a series of mutual complaints arose. The Germans concluded, and I am afraid not without some reason—(hear, hear, from the benches behind Ministers) — that the Danish Government had not acted fairly in their treatment of the German population in Schleswig ; that in their extreme anxiety to extend Danish power they had in some degree interfered with the free exercise by the German population of Schleswig of those privileges which belonged to the subjects of every free State. Also it is to be borne in mind that there was, in March of last year, a patent— that is, a constitution—proclaimed by the late King of Denmark for Holstein, which the Germanic Confederation declared in its details to be at variance with the general laws of the Confederation; and, moreover, in November last, a constitution was passed at Copenhagen for Denmark and Schleswig, which the Germans contended was at variance with the engagement entered into in 1851 and 1852 by Denmark, not to incorporate Schleswig with Denmark. The late King of Denmark died while those questions were under discussion in Germany and Denmark, the patent of March remained in force; and the present King found it necessary, upon considerations connected with internal matters arising from his recent succession to the throne, to give his sanction to that constitution of November, which at that time had not received the royal assent. Germany remonstrated against both these arrangements. In October the Diet had passed a resolution that Fe. deral troops should enter Holstein, for the purpose of compelling the Duke:of Holstein, the King of Denmark, to revoke the patent of March. I will deal with that question first. Her Majesty's Government, thinking that there were grounds for the German objections to that patent, urged the Danish Government to revoke, and to place themselves in the right thereby. (Hear, hear, from the benches behind Ministers). The Danish Government did so. (Counter cries of Hear, hear, from the Opposition benches.) But the Diet came to change its ground. Instead of contenting it self, as it had done at the death of the late King, with dis puting the right of the Duke of Holstein to give that con stitution, which they considered was at variance with the general law, they took another ground, and contended that the question had fairly arisen who should be Duke of Hol stein. A proposal was then brought forward in the Diet that Holstein should be occupied by Federal troops until that question had been decided. They denied that the pre sent King of Denmark had succeeded legally to the duchy of Holstein, and a proposal was made to the Diet to occupy Holstein until the question had been decided by the Diet, It is my opinion the Diet had no right, and has no right, to consider and decide that question. (Hear, hear.) There is nothing, in my opinion, either in the treaty of 1815 which constituted the Diet, which gave it its birth and origin— there is nothing in that treaty, and there is nothing in the final Act of 1820, which completed the arrangements which entitled the Diet to determine who should succeed to any State within the Confederation. (Hear, hear.) And lam quite sure that when the Emperor of Austria resigned, and was succeeded by a member of his family, the Diet did not claim any right to sa) who should succeed him : but Aus tria and Prussia moved in the Diet, not that the Federal troops should not enter Holstein, but that the entrance of those troops should be what is called an execution, and not an occupation. Now, by " execution" is meant the action of the Diet, in accordance with the rights of the Diet and with German laws, to compel any sovereign of territory belonging to the Confederation to adapt legislation to the laws of the Confederation, if those laws should have been broken. Austria and Prussia carried that proposal, and the Diet resolved, not that the entrance of the troops should bear the character of an occupation to hold the duchy of Holstein until the rightful heir should be deter mined, but that entrance should be an act of execution to compel the then existing Duke to alter the patent or revoke it, and make it in accordance with German legislation. The entrance, therefore, of the Federal troops into Holstein as e measure of execution was a distinct acknowledgement by the Diet at the time that the King of Denmark was Duke of Holstein, and it was to compel the King of Denmark to re voke the patent of March that that execution took place. (Hear.) There is also this to be remembered that, whereas it would have been perfectly legitimate for that execution to take place if the King of Denmark had persisted in re voking the patent, in point cf fate that patent had been re voked before the troops entered Holstein, and consequently that entrance was unjust in itself, although founded on a plea which, if that plea had held, would have rendered it a justifiable act. (Hear.) Well, those ttoops hating entered upon the distinct understanding to compel the King of Den mark to revoke the patent, those proceedings took place which led to the supercession of the King of Denmark, and a declaration in favour of the Duke of Augustenburg, Then came the question of the constitution of November, uniting to a certain degree, as we were campelled to admit ) Schles wig with Denmark. Her Majesty's Government felt all the evils arising from that occupation. I should say the Germans contended that, although the Government of Den mark had engaged to act on the suggestion of England, and I believe of other Powers, to take the earliest means con etittstionally possible to revoke that constitution—the Ger mans determined to enter into and take possession of Schleswig as a material guarantee for the performance of that engagement, We proposed that some diplomatictrans action, some engagement on the part of Denmark, taken in the presence of the ether Powers parties to the treaty, should be accepted by the Germans as a sufficient security that the engagement should be fulfilled. But this was not accepted and the German troops entered Schleswig. When the Federal troops entered Holstein, the Danish Govern ment, partly from advice and partly from considerations of prudence, refrained from offering any resistance to the entrance of the Federal troops, and there was no war arising out of that occupation. When the German troops entered Schleswig the feelings of the Danish nation were too strong to admit of a similar course being pursued, and resistance--an obstinate and heroic re sistance—was made against the very superior numbers which Germany brought to bear on that occasion, Up to that time all the parties who had signed the Treaty of 1852 continued to admit its validity and to be bound by its en gagements as far as they related to the acknowledgment of the right of the King of Denmark, and that all the terri tories held by the King should be maintained. Up to that thee even Prussia did not dispute the binding nature of that treaty, But it is fair to say that she intimated that if resistance should arise, and different events should take place, then possibly the German Powers might have to reconsider the engagements of the 'treaty of 1852. Well, now, sir, not to trouble the house with the recital of mili tary operations, with which all are familiar, the course of the war led to the occupation by the Germans of the whole of Schleswig, and such parts of Jutland as they thought fit to occupy. In that state of things it occurred to the Powers who were parties to the treaty, and who were not engaged in that war, that it was desirable that a Conference should assemble of the plenipotentiaries of the belligerents and the four neutral Powers, England, France, Russia, and Sweden, to consider the means of re-establishing peace upon a solid and permanent footing. That proposal was agreed to, and on the 25th of April the Conference met. It continued its labours until last Saturday. The first proposal made in the Conference was for a suspension of hostilities, because it was felt by what 1 shall now and hencefor ward call the neutral Powers, that until fighting should cease there was no fair prospect of coming to an amicable conclusion. We had wished suspension of arms should precede the Confer. ence, but that it was found impossible to obtain. Well, after some delay and a good deal of discussion, a suspension of hostilities was agreed to, to take place on the 12th of May and last for a month. The next thing was that the belligerent Powers were asked upon what condition they were respect • ively willing to put an end to the war and come to a mutual agreement. The Germans, of course, were the parties to whom that question was addressed. There was some delay in ex tracting from the German powers what their conditions were They first proposed that, still maintaining the principles of integrity of the Danish monarchy as defined by treaty of 1852—at least not departing from it in words—they pro posed, or in substance were thought to do so, that there should be a political and legislative union between Schles wig and Holstein, and that the connection of that united duchy with Denmark should be the link simply of the crown. But they coupled that with another condition, that this arrangement should be reserved for the approbation of the Diet, and there was some reason to suppose that under the reservation it was intended to give a discretionary power to the Diet to determine whether Schleswig should continue to be united to Denmark, or whether the claims of some other Pretender should be set up. Well, that proposal was rejected by the Danish Government. They then proposed a different mode, but one still objectionable, namely, that Schleswig and Holstein should be separated from the Danish monarchy. Of course the Danes could not agree to that. The neutral Powers conferred among themselves, and saw that Schleswig and Holstein were in possession of an over poweting force—that it did not meet the views of France or Russia to take any steps to dislodge them. Denmark alone was unable ; and I need not say that England was not wil ling to enter singly into that undertaking—(cheers from the Ministerial side)—the neutrals agreed to propose to Den mark the separation of Holstein from the Danish ground, together with such a partition of the southern part of Schleswig as might be agreed upon. The line proposed by the neutral Powers was a line running from the Schlei to Frederickstadt. Well, that proposal, coupled with other conditions which I shall not trouble the house with, was accepted by Denmark, Denmark said, however reluctant to make a territorial concession, she was willing to agree to that. (Cheers from both sides of the house.) She felt all the inconvenience of the perpetual disputes between Denmark and Germany. She wished to be quit of all interference by the Diet with her affairs, and, pro vided she had assigned to her a frontier which in a military and commercial point of view was consistent with her interests, she was willing to adopt and agree to that sug gestion, and to separate Schleswig and part of Holstein from Denmark. The Germans objected to that arrange ment. They said that line would not include a sufficient number of the German population, that there would still be a large number of the German population under Danish rule, and they wished that the great bulk of the German population should be associated with Holstein. Now, the fact with regard to Schleswig I believe to be, that the ex treme northern part is entirely Danish, and the extreme southern is mostly German. Between the two is a district of large extent, in which the population are mixed not only by villages, but even by streets in those villages, so that it is absolutely impossible to draw any line in the centre of Schleswig that shall entirely separate the German popula tion from the Danish. Consequently the ground taken by the Danish Government appeared to be a fair one, that the line should be drawn—it being impossible that the line could be drawn with reference to nationality—should he drawn so as to give Denmark such a frontier as should be susceptile!te of military defence, and secure her those com mercial advantages which she claimed. (Hear, hear.) The Danish Government, I say, accepted the line from the Schlei to F re d er i c k s t a dt. Th e German plenipotentiaries having handsomely given up—at least having given up— (laughter) —the whole of Schleswig, they consented to a partition drawn from Apenrade to Tondern, a place on the west coast. Between those two lines lay a district of very considerable extent, as compared with the extent of Schles wig—of course in a commercial, though not in a European, point of view, a district of great importance to Denmark. In the course of these negotiations the Prussian Plenipoten tiary, Count Bernstorff, stated on his own autherity that, seeing the wide difference between the parties, he would undertake to represent to his Government to depart from the northern line at Apenrade, and to take a line to the south, from Flensburg to the western coast. That recom mendation was not accepted, and he was obliged to disavow it, and say that his Government and the Austrian Govern ment adhered to the line originally proposed, from Apenrade to Tondern. But meanwhile, time pressing, the neutral plenipotentiaries urged upon the parties a prolongation of the armistice—a suspension of hostilities. I will not say armistice, because a distinction is drawn between armistice and suspension of hostilities. That was to expire on the 10th of June, and, by great difficulty, the Danes were per suaded to agree to an extension of that time. The German Powers were willing, as might not unnaturally be expected, to extend the armistice until the beginning of winter. (Hear, and laughter.) The Danes, on the other hand, begrudged every fortnight of the summer that was withdrawn from their naval operations, and therefore they said they would not prolong the armistice beyond a fortnight, unless in the meantime some arrangement should be come to which would lead them to suppose that the negotiations would end in a peaceful manner. The suspension was, therefore, extended for a fortnight, which ended yesterday. I may say in the whole course of these negotiations, as will be shown by the protocols laid on the table, there was perfect unanimity between the neutral Powers—between Eng land, France, Russia, and Sweden—(hear, hear)—and, although my noble friend, Lord Russell, was chosen by the Conference at the outset as president of the Conference, and although it may have fallen to him to make several proposals that were made, those must be considered as the proposals of the neutral Powers, because they were the neutral Powers before the proposals were made in the Con• ference. (Cheers.) That is a very important matter. (Hear, hear.) Well then, sir, it appearing that there was no pos sibility of bringing the Germans and Danes to agree upon any middle line between the two lines which they respec tively stood upon—the Schlei and Frederickstadt on the one hand, and the Apenrade and Tondern by the Germans —a last attempt was made by the neutral Powers to induce the belligerents to agree to refer the question in dispute to arbitration. The dispute had really been narrowed to a comparatively small end, It was no longer whether Hol stein should be governed in a peculiar manner; it was no longer wheher Schleswig should be politically and adminis tratively united with Holstein under the crown of Denmark. The Danes had consented to an alienation of territory ; the Germans would be content with that arrangement ; and the only question was whether that arrangement should be cerrie , !. out by dividing Schleswig in one part or by dividing it in another , and it appeared to the neutral Powers that the territory lying between those two lines was not so im- Portant to either party as to justify the resumption of war, and that they might fairly, in accordance with the recommendation of the Conference, submit the question to tht arbitration of a neutral Power. (Cheers.) Accordingly ley noble friend, as the organ of neutral, Powers, did pro pose that arrangement to the plenipotentiaries. Each:party naturally took time to refer that question to his respective Government, and on Friday the answers were corainuni- cated. The answer of the German Powers was that they looked to the words of the Conference at Paris, which re commended the good offices cla friendly Power, and that protocol having been quoted by the neutrals, they accepted that reference—the reference of the question in dispute to a friendly Power—provided that they were to reserve their decision—(laughter)—as to whether they would accept or reject—(laughter)—the line that friendly Power might assign. (Cries of " Oh, oh.") Well, that was at 'sari ance with the proposal of my noble friend and all the neutral Powers—(hear)—Lecause my noble friend, as the organ of the neutral Powers, in recommending the adop tion of reference suggested by the Conference at Paris, dis tinctly stated that it was for that purpose that a friendly Power should decide and determine between the two par ties. (Dear, hear.) Therefore the answer of the German Powers would have been more frank and candid if they had simply declined the proposal, instead of accepting it with a proviso which made it null and void, (Hear, hear.) The Danes, on the other hand, who throughout the whole trans actions have Certainly clung more to their ;decisions than they have shown, perhaps, great aptitude in adapting them selves to the force of circumstance—altogether declined the arbitration. They said' they had accepted the line of the Schlei, and ,further north they would not consent to go. (Hear, hear.) This seemed to put an end to all further attempts towards a good understanding, but the ambas sador of France, by order of his Government, made another and a last effort. He proposed that, whereas the Danes agreed to give up the Schlei, and the Germans would not come further south than Appenrade, an appeal should be made to the population of the mid districts in order to ascer tain first of all the relative nationality of districts, and then what their wishes were. To that proposal the Prussian plenipotentiary agreed, but that proposal was negatived by Denmark. A proposal of the same sort had been made in the earlier stages of the negotiation, and had not found favour with any party except Prussia; but Austria and Russia decidedly objected, as well as Denmark, to ascertain the wishes of the population in the matter. Thus, then, the labours of the Conference were brought to a close. We had laboured by every possible means, in conjunction with the other neutral Powers, to endeavour to bring the two parties to an agreement. We felt it as a calamity, as everybody must, that war should begin again for a matter which might so easily, have been adjusted, and for a question not involving the existence of a nation or of a government, but simply relating to the division of a com paratively small district of territory. Well, then. that having unfortunately happened, it became the duty of her Majesty's Government to take into serious consideration the course which it behoved diem to adopt. We felt great sympathy for Denmark. We felt that, although she had in the beginning been in the wrong, yet as another sove reign had succeeded to the throne, as a different Ministry had the direction of her affairs, and as there had been ma nifested by acts a strong desire to set that right which had been wrong—(hear)—we felt from the beginning to the end of these last events, and from the first to the last, that she had been ill. used—(cheers)—that might had overridden right. We knew also that the sympathies of almost the whole British nation—(hear)—were in favour of Denmark, There is a natural disposition in all mankind who have pro• per feelings to take part with the weak against the strong— (cheers)—especially if the weak are oppressed, and if the strong are unjustly oppressing the weaker party. (Hear.) We should, therefore, for these reasons, have been glad to have found it possible to recommend to our Sovereign to take part with Denmark in the approaching struggle. But then, on the other hand, it was to be considered, whatever wrongs Denmark had sustained—and they were many— that she had in the origin been wrong herself. (Hear.) That she had at the end, and at the very last Conference, rejected a proposal reasonable in itself, which, if it had been accepted by the two parties, would necessarily have led to a peaceable solution of the difficulty. (Hear.) Her fault in that indeed was equally shared by her antago nists—(hear)—but still, in considering the position which England ought to adopt, that matter could not be left out of sight. Well, then, it was to be considered what really was the matter in dispute for which hostilities were to be gin, and it did not appear that that matter was one of very great importance to the independence of Denmark, as it went very little beyond what she herself had agreed to, and consisted simply in the question to whom a portion of ter ritory should belong. On the other hand, any men who were considering what advice in a very important—l do not disguise its importance—European question should be given to their Sovereign and recommended to Parliament, could not possibly lose sight of the magnitude of the object, and of the magnitude of the resistance which had to be over come, and of the comparative means which England and its supposed antagonists would be able to bring to bear on the question. It had been ascertained early in these transac tions that France, for reasons of which she was entitled to be the judge, had declined to take any active measures in support of Denmark. We knew that that disposition still continued unchanged. We had ascertained that Russia, for reasons et which she also was entitled to be the judge, was not inclined to take any active measures in support of Denmark, The whole brunt of the effort, therefore, what ever it might have been—namely, the effort to dislodge the German troops and those who might come to their assist ance from the rest of Germany from Schleswig and Holstein would fall upon this country alone, (Hear.) Well, sir, we have not thought that it was consistent with our duty to give our Sovereign advice to undertake such an enter. prise. (Hear, and murmurs.) We know the honourable sympathy which the people of thisnation feel for the unhappy conditicn of Denmark; at the same time we did not think it consistent:with our duty to recommend that Parliament and the country should make those great exertions, and to undergo those great sacrifices, which would be the conse quence of entering into such a conflict with the whole of Germany. (Hear.) I assume that in the present state of things, upon which our decision was made, the real contest lies between Germany and Denmark, with regard, I am afraid I can hardly say that part of Schleswig in dispute, because it is impossible to say that the dispute may not apply to the whole of Schleswig—it will be more honourable on the part of the German Powers to be content with that which they demanded; but we know that strength and success frequently carry men beyon.: that line which, on cooler re• flection, they might stand upon—but still the conflict is as regards Schleswig, and not as regards the independence of Denmark or the capital of the Danish monarchy. Ido not mean to say—and I think it right to put in that reservation —that if the war should assume a different character, that if the existence of Denmark as an independent Power in Europe should be at stake—l do not mean to say that if we were to find reason to expect that we should see at Copen hagen the horrors of a town taken by assault, the destruc tion of property, the sacrifice of the lives not only of its defenders, but of its peaceful inhabitants, the confiscation which would arise, the capture of the sovereign as a pri soner of war, or eventsof that kind—l do not mean to say, if any of these events were likely to happen, that the position of this country might not possibly be a fit subject for recon sideration—(oh, oh, and Ministerial cheers)—or that other counsels might not be taken. But this I say, on the part of the Government, that if any change of policy were thought desirable, such change would be communicated to Parlia ment, if Parliament were sitting—and if Parliament were not sitting, the earliest opportunity would be taken of ask ing for the judgment of Parliament on the subject. I have to apologise to the house for having detained it so long. It is not my wish to provoke discussion. My desire was to explain as fully as I could the state of the matter. The papers which will be in the hands of members to-morrow morning will contain a full account of all that passed in the Conference. All events which took place bet ore the Con. ference are already recorded in the papers which have been some time before Parliament. Every member, therefore, will by looking at those documents be capable of forming a proper opinion as to the conduct of her Majesty's Govern ment in the management of these difficult negotiations. (Hear, hear.) Mr. DISRAELI—I quite agree that it would be inconve nient that the house, on this occasion, should be led to enter into a general discussion respecting tho transactions which have taken place between Denmark and Germany, and the relations which the English Government bear to those transactions. I trust the house will not be induced to enter into a desultory discussion on that important subject. One of the reasons why I rise to-night is to remind the house of the exact position which it occupies with reference to this matter. The house will recollectll hat, as far as the nego tiations of the Government in these questions between Den- mark and Germany are concerned, the house has incurred no responsibility whatever. (Hear.) Since the end of the last session the house has given no opinion on the subject. As I had some part in bringing about that position of the house, perhaps it will not be considered presumptuous on my part now to remind them of it. On the first night of the session I reflected the feelings of gentlemen on this side of the house in expressing my want of confidence in the foreign policy of her Majesty's Government (Conservative cheers)--and my disapprobation of the manner in which negotiations had been carried on, especially in the North of Europe, and the results which even then had been realised. Had the papers been presented to the house on the meeting of Parliament, according to custom, there would have been no difficulty, probably before the month of February had elapsed, in asking the opinion of the house upon the con duct of these negotiations. Indeed, what has occurred in the Conference, judging from the narrative, perspicuous though not satisfactcry, given by the noble lord of what otherwise has undoubtedly met the ears of many g en tl emen what has happened in the Conference has really very little to do with the great question on which I think the its - house ought to come to a decision. Th e C on f erence was a -the mee ti ng which I think, by-by, h as not b een in origin accura t e ly represented by th e no b le lord. That Conference was not called at the desire of the neutral Powers, but by one neutral Power alone, viz., Great Britain. It met without a hope, and it closed without a hope. It met without a basis, and therefore it led to no result. Let me remind the house that from the period Parliament met until the meeting of the Conference, the house had given no approbation whatever of the conduct of the Government with respect to these transactions. On the one occasion alone that any opinion was sought by a formal motion in the shape of a vote of want of confidence by an hon. member opposite —on that occasion I myself interfered, and moved the previous question, on the ground that the circumstances which then pre%ailed rendered it, in my opinion, not expedient that Parliament should give any opinion on the subject. Therefore her Majesty's Ministers did not enter the Conference with the confidence of Parliament, but with the previous question. That was the position, as far as Parliament was concerned, upon which they entered into that discussion, It is necessary the house should understand clearly that they are not is any way committed to any approbation of the conduct of her Majesty's Ministers in these matters. I think, however, that the time has now arrived when some opinion of the house ought to be given. (Cheers and counter cheers.) I myself, although five months have elapsed since the period which, as it now appears, that opinion might conveni ently and properly have been taken, do not regret ike de lays which have been occasioned, because they were claw' sioned by feelings on both sides of the house which le' honour to the House of Commons. I have always thought that one of the principal reasons why the House of Com mons has been successful in its practical character, and so marked out from all other popular assemblies, may be foun d in the respect which it en t er t a i ns f or th e prerogative of t he Crown and for the fun c ti ons o f cons tit u tional Ministe rs therefore I think the cou rse w hi c h we then pursued wa s It wise, a temperate, and a p a t r i o ti c course . At the game ti me I must say it is my o pi n i on th a t we s h ou ld forfeit all claim s ' to the respect of our countrymen, and not fulfil one of the highest functions of Parlia men t, if i n the present cr itica position of affairs we hesitated to give our opinions upon the conduct of her M a j es ty' s Mi n i s t ers in this resp ect (Opposition cheers.) Having said so much on several o casions, I must now say that it i s my i n t en ti o n on an ea rl y —I will say on the earliest— occas i on, t o t a k e the opinion of the house on that question. (Renewed cheers and counter cheers.) I daresay I shall find no difficulty raised by the noble lord (Palmerston) in fixing up on a period which I may think most convenient. I should have said no wors) had it not been for the closi ng o b serva ti on o f the noble lor d , which it appears to me ought not to pass unnoticed. (h ear ' ) I must say I heard them with astonishment. Are we, then , to be taught to •night by the noble lord that it is the islands of Denmark alone that are necessary to the inde pendence of that country ? Then why i s it we h ave been com mitted to a policy which h as so l ong an d s o pertina ciously declared that the possessio n o f S c hl esw ig and 11 ° 1° stein by the crown of Denmark were necessar y t o the balan ce of power, and to the mainten ance o f th e p u blic law ° Harope ? (Cheers.) It is too much f or us now to hear, un der those circumstances, that w ar ma y b e i m p en ding at anY moment, and that Parliament, w hi c h i s soon to be pro rogued, may be suddenly c a ll e d t oge th er aga i n , b e cause th e noble lord and his collea gues , w h o f or a cons id era ble perio d have been defining the g roun d s upon w hi c h t h e b a lance o f power and the maintenance of the public law of Eilr °o :, alone depend, and ought to be a d voca t e d, now a t the I° B ' moment find, while he recedes from the vital conclusion, that possibly a smaller issue may arise which in the interval may agitate Europe and disturb and distract the Pub lic ' mind, I must say I can only, after the experience we b ac ?, had on this subject—and it is s ome conso l a ti on to atop" that view of the question—look upon this as a continuan ce of those senseless and spiritless menaces—(hear, hear):' which have lately impaired the influence of this country in the councils of Europe, and, by impairing that just indn' ence of this country in the councils of Europe had really diminished the most effective means of maintaining Pea ce : (Cheers.) I think the noble lord might have spared that contingent menace to the house, to the country, and to Europe. Judging from the past, I myself would prefer that the affairs of this country should be conducted on the ril l " ciple avowed by the hon. members for Rochdale and Bir mingham, than by the policy which is avowed and an nounced by the noble lord (Palmerston). I think in that case, as the conclusion of those hon. members is 9 101 ) 15 the same, our position would be more consistent, more Pr°' Cable, and more really dignified, for at least they would 1 1 ° t threaten only—(hear) —at least, they would not tell Denv mark that "if she is a tt ac k e d , s h e w i ll not find h e rsel' , alone"—(cbeers)—at least, they would not exasperate Ger many by declaiming in the Parliament of England again st w the aggravated outrages of her p o li c y — a t l east they would not lure on Denmark by delusive counsels and fallaciou s hopes. (Hear, hear.) I declare that, in my opinion, the position of England would be more dignified if the policy , which those hon. gentlemen profess conducted our affairs rather than the policy,which the noble lord professes. Have we not, indeed. for months upon months, been menacing almost every country in the world; and yet when we think that we have at last secured the blessings of peace, an d when we pass over the gloomy narrative of those disar pointments and discomfitures which we have received this evening, that at last we are in an intelligible position, 013 d might enj 3y rhat some may consider to have been purchased at great coat, but which was really and clearly to result in the possession of peace—we are at the same time not merely to have that announcement accompanied by the continua' tion of those unsatisfactory menaces, but absolutely at this moment the whole country is to be agitated with the possi • bility of Parliament being called suddenly together, in order that the noble lord may commence a policy of action which , if it were justified and called for, ought to have been com menced long ago. (Opposition cheers.) I trust that these questions will be entered into fully and completely. When I listened to the narrative which the noble lord has favoured us with of these transactions, of the continued sacrifices of Denmark, and of the continued approaches of the enemies of Denmark, I was not surprised to find that the nable lord entirely omitted any notice of the inducements which had made Denmark submit to those sacrifices. cr of the menace! , to the aggressive Powers which have always been treated with contempt. I should like to have had, when the precis of the proceedings was given by the First Minister, soma account of the causes of the dreary consequences which he narrated. We shall soon have an opportunity of entering into that matter. I expect from the courteous promise of the noble lord that he will make no difficulties with respect to the day when I shall venture to ask the opinion of the house upon the policy of the Government, and I will take care that no unnecessary delay occurs before I avail myself of that opportunity. (Cheers.) The motion was then agreed to. THE ANNUITY TO THE KING OF GREECE. On the or ler for going into Committee of Supply, Mr AYRTON moved a resolution that the grant to the King of Greece of an annuity of £4,000 out of the moneYg belonging to the Consolidated Fund by treaty not made subject to the sanction of Parliament, is a violation of the privileges of the House of Commons. Upon an explanation by the CHANCELLOR of the El - CHEQUER, he withdrew the motion. Mr M. SMITH called attention to the buildings and shed ° used for the superior courts of law and equity, and the inadequate accommodation afforded by them; and also to the delay on the p ar t o f th e G overnmen t t o i ntro d uce their promised measure for providing new courts of justice. A discussion followed, in which the ATTORNEY GENERA -1 ' and Mr COW PER indicated the views and intentions of th e Government on the subject. Mr ADDERLEY, who had given notice of a resolution that it is inexpedient that detachments of British troops should bo stationed upon exposed posts on the Canadian frontier unless adequately supported by Canadian forces , discussed at considerable length the policy pursued coward s Canada. Mr CARD WELL concurred in the proposition contained Mr Adderley's r e so l u ti on , an d agree d i n many of his ob:ervations. He stated the changes made in Canada, esPe" dally with reference to the militia, the training of ofEcer a y and the prelimina r y arrangemen t s f or th e organ i sat i o n of a good defensive native force. Some remarks by Lord R. C ECIL upon th e danger to which Canada was exposed were answered by Mr FORTESCUE, who stated that preparations had been ma de and were making to meet future danger. Mr CAVE called attention to the conduct of the Gus toms authorities of the linked States at New York ill refusing clearances to British ships engitgeeli;legitima t° trade between that port and Jamaica, except upon the most onerous and unusual conditions; and asked whether instructions would not be sent to Lord Lyons to protest against such proceedings. Mr LAYARD said the conditions referred to were b• yond the competency of the United States to impose protests had already been made, and the subject would not be lost sight of. Col. DUNNE called attention to the subject of recruit ing for the army, and to the causes of the unwillingness of men to enlist, which created a diffioulty, he Bald, in keeping up the numbers of the troops. He noticed some of the causes which he considered to be removable, and b gested the encouragements that should be g iven. The Marquis of HARTINGTON sai d he was very glad ary, o afnd ore the house, be little recruiting 132 1 " l t i h t tate causet r h ae i csvr euriytnconsiderable subject amountenne c brought ess misapprehension ex isted regarding it, As to t he fallin g off i n recruiting, very chinery had been lately disused. The number of men re cruited had been, however, sufficient to meet the wants of the year . He thought it unnecessary, therefore, to discuss the reasons which prevented men from enlisting, for there was no present want of men, The house was at length able to go into a Committee of Supply upon the remaining Civil Service Estimates, tho discussion of which lasted till past midnight. The report of the Inland Revenue (Stamp Duties) Bill gave rise to a short debate. The Chimney -sweepers' Regulation Bill was read a third time and passed. The Greek Loan Bill passed the Committee, after much discussion. The remaining orders were disposed of, and the house adjourned at a quarter past 2 o'clock. Persons in debt may obtain instant protection against imprisonment or seizure of their goods, and an entire release from all debts and liabilities without publicity, by application to Messrs. Marshall, solicitors of the Court of BankrupteY , Charges under L 5 payable by easy instalments. Offices-- (established 1830), 12, Hatton-garden. City branch --6. Moor gate-street, Bank—ADvT. [ADVERTISEMENT.] —HoIIoway's Ointment and Pi lls have over and over again proved the best friends to persons afflicted with ulcerations, bad legs, sores, abscesses, fistula s, and other painful a nd complicated complaints. Printed and very plain directions for the application of the ointment are wrapped round each pot. 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