The Sun. — London, England, 1854-12-13 00:00:00

h eginning it, he must havehad ample time for preparation. (Hear, hear.) And what was the force sent out to the Crimea.?-27,000 English troops. I believe the whole combined force did not amount to more than 50,000 men. I further believe, and the confirmation was forced upon me by subsequent facts, that the great force was sent out without Government having any knowledge of the number of Russian forces in the Crimea, or of the strength of the fortress intended to be attacked. (Hear, from the Opposi tion.) The great error that had paralysed all their efforts was that of underrating the difficulty of the objects to be accomplished. I am confirmed in that view by ihe observa tions which fell from the Prime Minister at Aberdeen, who affirmed that in six months they had sent out a finer army than any ever commanded by the Duke of Wellington, and that they had commenced the expedition to Sebastopol in such a manner asto insure its success. I traced in these words of Lord Aberdeen that he was ignorant of the condition of the Russian armies in the Crimea, and that he underrated the strength of Sebastopol. It is perfectly clear to me that that force was pushed on the shores of the Crimea in the idea that they had nothing to do but to take Sebastopol. There was not sufficieet provisions for the troops—nor sufficient foresight in providing reserves for the inevitable losses and contingencies of war. These 27,000 men were pushed on to the shore of the Crimea to take their chance, and they were left to take Sebastopol, if they could. Tho great faultof the Government was, as was obvious from the language of the Primo Minister, that they overrated its strength. It was perfect, said he, in all its appointments, but it was noto rious that the army was deficient in artillery, and almost without cavalry. And with regard to the equipments of war, tents, and other necessaries, they were almost for gotten, as was obvious from the description of their suffer ings the first days of their landing. They sent that army to attack the Crimea without any reserves to support it, and he called on the Government for an explanation of that circumstance. (Hear, hear.) Were they justified in sending out such an expedition without proper reserves to support it? That was a point where, he thought, the conduct of the Government was open to grace doubt—he was afraid he should' say, severe censure—and they had a right to demand an explanation why it was sent ..without reserves, and afterwards left there without reinforcements. (Cheers.) Ho hoped her Majesty's Government would ex plain to the house why it was their army was left thus exposed. (Hear, hear.) He (Sir J. Pakington) had not certainly sufficient information on this subject which would enable him to judge of all the facts of the case ; he spoke only from these sources which were open to the public ; but he believed their army had received nothing worthy of the name of reinforcements from the time Lord Raglan landed, in the beginning of September, until the arrival of the 46th Regiment in November, after the battle of Joker man had been fought. (Hear, hear.) He was open to correction if he committed any error, but he believed that was really the case. He was quite aware that shortly after that battle, 3,000 men landed at Balaklava, among whom was) 1,000 cavalry— but that was all. Be made no complaint againit the Government for not sending a large force at first to the Crimea ; he was quite aware that the difficulty of conveying them would account for not forwarding a larger force than 27,030 men ; but,the.3,ooo men sent a few days after did no more, he was sorry to say, than to fill up the gaps caused by the casualties at the battle of the Alma, and from the time that army sat down before Sebastopol, and entrenched itself from Balaklava to Inkerman, though decimated by •disease, and suffering from the effects of the climate, and. .exposure to cold and fatigue, it was left there, with the ex ception of a few draughts sent out, without any reinforce. ment, until the arrival of the 46th Regiment. (Cheers.) Under those circumstances, _that _gallant band of men dwindled day by day, until they were attacked by an over whelming force on the sth of November. Let him ask her Majesty's Government what was the actual available force on that sth of November? They landed, no doubt, 27,000; they got an addition of 3,000 in a few days after ; but at Inkerman they had 20,000—had they 18,000 sta tioned from Balaklava to the heights of Sebastopol—had they 15,000 effective soldiers? He (Sir J. Pakington) be lieved not; but this they knew, that the men who resisted an overwhelming Russian force, according to the authority of Lord Raglan himself, did not exceed 8,030 men. (Cheers.) The hon. gentleman who seconded the address talked of the fearful odds to which the British army was exposed • but why did they contend againet this fearful odds ? (Cheers.) Let us thank God that, it was not utterly destroyed and annihilated ; and it was not to the credit of the British Government that only 8,000 men were found to oppose such a force. (Cheers.) No doubt they were justified in praising the unexampled bravery and valour of their soldiers, and history hardly recorded so fearful or so glorious a struggle, bat was it not little less than miraculous that it terminated in such a result ; for it was only by the mercy of God that such a band as that were able to resist the Russian force. (Great cheering.) Why w ore there only 8,000 men present ? Their valour unquesi ionably claimed the admiration and gratitude of all ; it was not beyond that even ordinarily displayed by a I tritish force ; it was not the mere courage of men fighting against men, but the more enduring, calm, phalli,, intrepid courage, which enabled that baud of heroes to withstas ad, hour after hour, almost for an entire day, - under gi devons privations and sufferings, the repeated and overwhs filming attacks of the enemy, and it was, in his opinion, little less than miraculous, that they were now able to I songratulate themselves that victory was theirs, instead of having to mourn the loss of their whole force. (Load ;hears Hem the Opposition.) That was a grave matter or explanation, and they had a right to ask why that fee rful odds existed. (Cheers.) His own belief was, that if her Majesty's Government had shown a proper foyesigh t ; if, upon their undertaking the expedition to the Cris nen, they had sent proper reinforcements • if they had ha , I an army of reserve, or instantly supplied the vacancif as caused by battle or disease ; if they had kept up the Brii ;dale strength, even to the small number of 21,000 men, it was, he repeated, his firm persuasion, that no battle o. I Inkerman would have taken place. (Cheers from the Opp 'coition.) They all know the trite phrase which used to be applied in the sister country towards this—and we beli we that England's weakness on that occasion was Russia 'a opportunity, and that the Emperor seeing that, gather , ad together his legions and sent them against a re duced handful of men, who, brave as he knew they were, thougi it be would succeed in overpowering them. (Cheers.) Ravin g before that felt the effect of a British force at Alma, he (Sir J. Pakington) was firmly persuaded he never would have risked the battle of Inkerman had the Go vernm sat at home displayed even common prudence. (Mee] s.) But was that all? What had been the suffer ings t f their men ? (Cheers.) They had been on those height et over Sebastopol under canvass teats, they wore in the w *rat weather that possibly could be conceived, ex posed to the rigours of a severe climate • and the offeete of that : swful hurricane which was so fatal to our shipping, total] y unprotected. (Cheers.) And how was that, but by tb e imprudence and want of foresight of her Majesty's Gove rnment:—(cheers)—and they had a right to ask them for a m explauation. That house found them liberally with supplies, and in sending forth an army as brave and galls at as ever faced an enemy, why did they allow them to p eris?.i with cold and exhaustion on the heights of Seba sit , opol? (Cheers.) Within the last two days he had bin:toe:if seen a private letter from a distinguished officer of I sigh rank in the Crienea ; of _ course he was not at liberty to mention his name, but he pledged himself that he :was an officer of b.'gh rank, and of unimpeachable cha racteir for veracity. The letter was written to a member of t.is own family, and containeilthese remarkable words : • c `Thei spirit of the men is good, but their sufferings are almost beyond endurance." (Cheers.) He (Sir J. Peking. boss) could hardly with calmness advert to such a state of thins, for he could not see any possible excuse for such - neglect. (Hear.) Let them read the newspapers of the day; let them read Lord Raglan's despatcha published that morning, giving an account of the weather, and to what a condition it reduced the ground on which the army were encamped, and then let hon. members ask if these Leave men ought, at this season of the year, and in such a climate, to have been exposed under canvass tents ? Cheers.) Her Majesty's Government could not plead in answer that they were taken by surprise—they could not :allege that it was impossible for them to have foreseen these things, for they might, and could, and ought to have - foreseen them.. (Hear, hear.) The expedition did not leave Varna till September, and he was very much inclined to believe, looking at the whole history of that expedition, and if he could dive into the secrets of the Government, that it was originally intended to have taken Sebastopol by a coup de main. Perhaps it was possible that they conld have done so, but it was equally certain that they /lad sm right in presuming that they could do so, and that they were, therefore, bound to be prepared for either alter :native. (Hear, hear.) He maintained that her Majesty's Government had no right or reason to expect the capture of Sebastopol in such a manner. It was a great fortress, well stored and garrisoned, and no man could doubt but that the; Czar would strengthen this, his stronghold, and be prepared to resist any attack. (Hear.) Was it likely then, or possible, that such a place could be easily taken, and. that when the expedition landed in the Crimea they would succeed in taking Sebastopol by a coup de main. They had no right to expect a speedy termination to rthe contemplated attack, for they did notsend men enough 'to - do so ; it nay have been probable, but they had no right to assume that such would be the case. They had an army attacking a great fortress, but so weak in numbers that they could not invest it ; on the contrary, they were only able to occupy one side of it, leaving the enemy :at liberty to come and go, and ;bring in supplies at the 'other just as? often and largely a s they chose. What right had they to suppose that it would yield without struggle ? They may no doubt capture it, and he hoped in Heaven they would; bat when they were placed in sach• circumstances that they could not invest it, surely it was certain that the struggle must be protracted, and if so, it was equally certain that their soldiers would. be exposed to the advent of winter in such a climate, anti to the dreeelful sufferings they have since endured. They were now re educed, by cold and privation of every description, to an extent which left them physically unable to peeform their duties; officers were out on duty every two nights out of three, and yet nothing was done t,. alleviate their condi tion. Her Majesty's Governmont may tell him that a warm supply of clothing hasl unfortunately been lost in the Prince—and that, of course, no blame could attach to - them ; but they had a right to be informed why that sup ply was not sent out sooner, and why did it not reach the Crimea until the month of November—until the cold be came so intense that the men suffered the most cruel pri vations. (Hear, hear.) When were the huts to be sent stout and how long were the men to remain exposed under 'canvass tents? Why was it they w ere going out in De cember? He had that morning met an officer of his ac quaintance,who was going out to superintend the erection of those huts, and under these circumstances it was impos• !Bible the men could be relieved from the canvas tentsuntil the end of January. What would be the consequences which, in the romntime, might ensue to the health of these brave men? (Hear.) It is all very well to speak in terms if praise in that house of their bravery, but it should be remembered they were not giving them even the com mon care due to humanity. (Cheers.) Under all these cir cumstances he thought he was justified in saying that that house would abandon its duty if it did not call on the Government to explain why these things should have hap pened. They had a right to an explanation, not only in the name of tbo people of this country, but in that of the :army, to whose sufferipgs he adverted. If the Govern ment gave them a satisfactory explanation, if they would show that hereafter they my not only rely on their good intentions, which he (Sir J. Pakington) did not deny, but on their prudence and foresight, they would have no cau se to fear from the Conservative party. (Hear.) They war e riot the Whigs of 1790, nor the Coalitionists of 1853. (Loud cheers from the Opposition.) They desired nothing 'but the honour of their Sovereign and the welfare of their country. (Cheers.) Let her Majesty's Gererament ask for supplies, and they shduld have them rith no niggard hand ; let them ask Parliamentary support and they should have it without meeting with any factious spirit. (Hear, hear.) But if they made these concessions on the one hand, they must exact conditions on the other, namely, that the war should be conducted with a vigour, a wisdom, and foresight beyond that which they had hitherto shown. (Hear, hear.) They asked the government, therefore, for these explanations; they were bound in duty to the country to give them. Parliament would, no doubt, heat those explanations ; it would ask how they i n te nded t o shape their futurelcourse, and by the answer they gave it would be seen whether the House of Commons would be justified, or the people of this country satisfied, that the future conduct of public affairs should rest in the hands of the existing Administration. Sir It. PEEL justiaed the policy pursued both before hostilities commenced, and during the conduct of the war, and eulogised the chivalrous bearing of the officers, and the indomitable courage of the men composing the British army. They had now cemented with their blood an alli ance with Franca. They had entered into a friendly treaty with Austria, and, under these circumstances, he thought it was highly indecorous and reprehensible that M. Kos sath and M. Victor Hugo should be permitted, on public occasions, to attack their Allies. He appbaled to the noble bird the Secretary of State for Foreign affairs, whe- 1 tiler it was not his bounden duty to interfere as soon 'as possible? Mr. S. HERBERT said—The charges, sir, which have been brought against the Government to-night are of so serious.a nature that I hope the house will grant me their attention while I endeavour to give an answer to the state ments of the right hon. baronet (Sir J. Pakington) and give that explanation which he states it is his right as a member of Parliament to exact. I will do so by giving a plain his- tory of the war in so far as it has come under the direction of the Government. The House of Commons will then con sider whether the conduct of the Government has entitled them to ask for further power and further assistance to carry on the war with rigour. The charges, sir, as I under stand them, which have been made are many in number. The hon. baronet says the army was originally sent out by the Government without any specific plan or intention— that when at last they did decide on a plan, it was one not justified by the forces at their command or the informa tion they had received of the power and strength o f th e enemy they were about to attack. He further said that the army was too small, that it was an ill-appointed army, and this from want of due preparation by the Government that sent it out—that the army was sent out too late, that the reinforcements were not sufficient, and that by neglect at home it was allowed to dwindle down till it became in significant., Now, I cannot do heeler than state, in a few instances, what was the intention of the Govern meat when that army was sent into the field. 1 will show what that force was, what was its state of dis cipline and its efficiency, and I will then show how much truth there is iu the allegation that the army was suffered to become weak for want of reinforcements. In the month of April instructions were sent to Lord Raglan as to the disposal of the force under his or ders—a force numerically much inferior to that now under his command. The intention of the Allied Govern ments—for no step was taken by this Government with out consulting our Allies. (Hear, hear.) Their go o d f a ith in council has been as signal as their gallantry in the field; and the house will understaud that when I shall speak of the Government, I mean not the English Government alone, but the Allied Governments. At the time that army was sent to occupy a portion of the Turkish territory, we had a large fleet in the Black Sea, there was a power ful Russian army in the Principalities ; but few encoun ters had taken place between the Turkish and Russian armies, and those most capable of forming an opinion had but little confidence iu. the power of the Turkish army to resist ; and it was feared that by a bold stroke on Con stantinopleour fleet might be caught in the Black Sea, with the Bosphorus in the hands of the Emperor of Rus sia. I now speak of what was possible; it was also possi ble that if the Turks failed to make a resistance at Kale fat, the line of the Balkan might be turned and an army come down on Constantinople. English and French offi cers were sent to ascertain the best lino of defence to save that capital from a coup de main. Lord Raglan then received instructions to take part of the army under his command to Unkiar Skelessi, not only on account ef the salubrious character of the place, but because he was • then placed within reach of the Balkan, if that line was menaced by the Russians, and also ready for an attack on the Russian territory if that was determined on. I mention this to show that the Government had I then three objects in view —first, to defend Constanti nople ; secondly, to defend the line of the Balkan ; thirdly, to make attack on and carry the war into some vital part of the Russian territory. The army was then sent further--S-what had been foreseen took place—the Russians crossed the Danube, and invested Silistria. Omer Pacha considered that he could not save the town unless the English and French made an advance, which would frighten the Russians and compel them to laic() the siege. We all recollect the events of that siege ; we recol lect the gallantry of our countrymen in a miserable outpost of that fortress ; but it was not their heroism, nor the courage with which they inspired the Turkish troops, but the fact that a French army was gathering at Shumla and an English at Varna which convinced the Russian com manders that they could not retain their position. As to Silistria, there may be question whether the importance of relieving it was so great as to allow it to interpose be fore any other operation. No doubt time was lost by it, but we gained material advantages by it ; we gained for a Turkish army a great pr es ti ge ; we gained in the public opinion of Europe the advantage of destroying the prestige of the Russian arms in that campaign, It then remained 'or the Government to consider what enterprise would strike such a blow at the Russian power in the Black Sea as to place her neighbour in oemparativo tranquillity for the future. The siege of Silistria was raised on the 22d. On the 29th instructions were sent to Lord Raglan to spare no pains to ascertain the strength of Russia in the Crimea, and how far an attack oft it with the forces at his disposal was .likely to be successful. The officer:, in command of the two armies were men of great military experience ; the Governmenfdepend e d on them ; one is now ne more, but in his successor and the sur vivor we place unbounded confidence, The right honourable baronet asks, did the Government give any positive instructions after receiving information as to the force in the Crimea? If, sir, we had shown so little confidence • in those selected for such responsible posts of command, as to say to them, " Whatever be the information you receive—attempt nothing till you have told us, who are six weeks distant from yea (for that is the time it takes to receive an answer to a despatch), what aro the grounds of your opinion"--- we should have lest not weeks, but months till any expedition became im possible. These einem took eVery means of ascertaining the Russian force in the Crimea, they then held a council of war, and decided that the attack ought to be made. They kneel' the forces at their command, they knew also what force they might expect to meet with. mad Lord Raglan knew bettor than any man what the military capa city of the English was. Irom that moment the allied commanders applied every energy of their minds to make preparations for that mighty armament which conveyed their armies to the Crimea. Those who talk lightly of that expedition seam to me to think that it is a very easy thing to carry 50,000 men across the sea, and put them +own on a hostile shore, without boats to land them, of boats to carry their heavy guns ; it is considered to be an easy ope ration, like landing them on a pier In time of peace. That operation took immense time—it owes great credit to those engaged in it; no expedition ever sailed so complete in every respect; and happily no expedition ever cohveyed so immense a force across any sea with so little loss and with success so great. (Hear, hear.) But was this army so insufficient for the purpose for which it was in tended ? Lord Raglan took with bins to the Crimea 27,000 men, and our allies took a large force, not smil e so strong as ours, but which united to it gave 's, total of a b ou t 50,000 men. They soon after met the whole force then in the Crimea, and met them entrenched in a position which gave them an advantage equal to that of doubli ng their numbers. The enemy held at Alma a positi on as strong as burs at Inkerman, but held it with a very different. result. But what else was there that delayed the expedition ? Before it sailed from Valeta a fearful thinned opestilenceur ranks g b r r i e o v k o e u siy out amongst .That a t s h se enemy n e , m y Which more depressing to the soldiers than any huinan one; but we were not the only sufferers. Oar Allies suffered still more dreadfully from its ravages. I am unable to state our exact loss, but I Jenow that our loss from disease has been far greater than from any other circumstance. Lord Raglan and Marshal St. Arnaud had to make every exer tion to arouse their troops from the depression consequent I on sickness, whilst they were preparing for the inveseieh of the Crimea. But, sir, I do not think it is very clear th a t if he had been enabled to land in the Crimea sooner we should have gained very much as compared with the enemy, The principal difficulty the Russians find in bringing ,up their reinforcements arises from the difficulty of neeviee, over a soil tkat is broken up in bad weather; the longer therefore the fine weather lastedpthe longer Would they be enabled to receive reinforcements. But I mot 13s.'y ths'e there - never was an army moved on hand so rapidl- and so successfully as the corps of General Deeeheenberg. The right hon. baronet says we underraittA the power of the enemy. Last session I made wome observations on that point. I warned the public that on account Of the reAllt of the campaign on the Danube, in which no pitched battle had been fought, they chooses to assume that the power of Russia was wavering, If sot extinct, and. would fall if attacked with vigou r . I pointed out that the Reagan soldier was a :;,an of primitive nature, and like all such sincerely attached to his native country, Wear, hear.) The people of this country think that, other nations who do not posses., institutions like their own are insensible to patriotism and love of Country which they feel. We hates. now received a lesson in this respect, and those - who have seen the defence of Sebastopol mast know how the Russian will defend his country. And new, sir, what is the truth of the statements—that the army sent out was inferior in numbers and utterly without reinforce ments ? The army at first consisted of four divisions ] the let, 2d, 3d, and light divisions, amounting to 22,680. In June, before orders were given to make a descent on the Crimea if circumstances were such as to justify it, a fifth division was formed and placed under the lamented Sir G. Cathcart. Now let us see what reinforcements have been sent. In June we sent 941 men, in July 4,588 men, and. in August, 2,032, and now we are told that from the mo ment the expedition was decided the Government should have sent reinforcements—in September, 1,286 men, in October, 2,855, and in November 7,037 were sent. (Hear.) There are further reinforcements, but these are sent in consequence of late occurrences and Lord Raglan's de mands. This number may not please those who think English battalions should be pourryhede cry yn intheeveprlyaipnarlliikae, water. But who are responsible for twhearf,acits, commencement the p o e f ac e e ve t nomy e and the result is outelorce is far has nthb littleeee been eaer went small when we get into trouble and difficulty, (re l m a n a k d e , ear.) To speak the truth, I am as much to blame as telly one. — I have been Secretary at War t for t :,sane years, an d have brought forward my peace es inett . es. It has been the same with all ministers. E T 'ver Ads" nistration, however th 'f eet fared on other points, agreed in the necessity of beehomy, You ask us to make great 'efforts at the eehimencenient Of war, at once to create, an a rmy and to use it: Whoa the Militia! Bill was 'wrought forward it was stated that otle• whole availa l .;lo forte, after pr &sidle% foe the defence of our eoloseies, did not exceed 10,009 ern. I have shown what numb e r o f Meta were sent to L or d Raglan, and what reinformatuts are on their way. 1,700 men are how waiting for embarkation ; and if I add to thet the regimente ordered from the different garritehe In the Mee diterranean, the whole that will Phertt, hate posed tinde Lord Raglan's commandwill amount to 54,78 thous I believe the country has etthe II At B.iteePtlen that the force is so great. We have Ma th% stereotyped state ment that Lord Raglan has seen bayonets; but what does that mean It only 16,000 actually present i the means the 16,000 effective men le es field, deteebed duty, excluding all excluding all on , commissioned I gtealltiallOtiat officers, all artillery, cavalry,an, LIOR of Waterloo the Duke of W and engineers. At the battle ellington h d b bayonets. If we are to take thin a ut 18,000 British a m force will app ear very small on ode of calculation out country as to its amount. The righ t rer, and &delve the with perfect tr u th an d fairness that t on, baronet has said he no reason to complain of the House of Government has it. They have granted all our demands,ommons. I admit now is, whether further power shoultiband the question who, according to the right hon. baronet,e given to those little wisdom in the use of the past. Hohashave shown so duty of a member f Parliament to be to iv defined the port to a war if it is a just war, and to g :very sup give o the Go vernment conducting the war extraordinary power requisite, lots of men and m oney. B ut if he thin ; if the Government will not use these resources with prude nee I and foresight, I think i its the Arity of a member of Par liament not to ent rt lit them with such powers, but to give them to ether men—(hear, hear)—who will conduct the war in a way to satisfy the country. The right hon. baronet, in the course of his criticism, has stated that the army was insufficient to undertake any campaign in fhe Crimea, and that we lied neglected to sendfirein forcetnents. He states that *hob. the troops landed in the Crimea they tended without their tents, and stated we sent them out, withoat tents. Every regiment took its tents from England with them. Lord Raglan lauded them without their tects, and they bivouacked for several days without them: . They landed on the IGth September. The • first night was wet ; and I believe that a great deal of sick ness arose. Our troops were on the left, the French OR the right, and they thus adVanced without their Write. The Sanish army, W e lli ng t on ' s , never had any tenth. Lord Raglan is blamed for landing the troops without their tents—how justly I will now ask you to decide. A power ful army was known to be in the Crimea, and it was pro bable that he would have to encounter them immediately after his landing. If he had brought the tents he would have left seve ra l b a tt a li ons b e hi n d them that occupied the room that would have been taken up by the tents. If he hat,l brought the tents and left the men, what would you have said to him if f or wan t o f done few ltattalions the affair at the Alma, instead of a glorious victory, had been an undecided struggle ? What would you have said then to Lord Raglan? (Cheers.) Why, you would have said, " Why did you fill your ships with ambulances and tents when you had got men, and such men, lying idle at Varna? You were entering upon an expedition in which you knew the first blow would be everything, and ybu should have gone in light order, you should have sacrificed everything else in order to take men ; strong battalions should have been your only consideration," (Hoar, hear.) The right hon. gentleman seems to think nothing of the expedition to Bornarsund ; he says it was merely a blockade. Let him recollect, however, that that expedition was directed against islauds that were almost inaccessible—(hear, hear)--iii which foundations were laid and fortresses marked out for the pnrpo e of establishing another Cr onstadt or Heleingfors. (Hear, hear, hear.) Now that the place has been taken, the right - . hon. baronet thinks nothing of the brave soldiers and sailors having risked their lives to capture it. He thinks nothing of such small things. The Emperor of the French differs from him; he gave a marshal's baton to General d'Hillions. To come back, however, to the case of the Alma the right hon. baronet says the tents were not pro duced. I hope the explanation which I have given —it is an explanation which must be obvious to every who—is satisfactory to the house. (Cheers.) I do not imagine that one iota of blame attaches to Lord Raglan on account of that proceeding. (Loud cheers.) I believe that. he did what every matt in his situation ought to do. Ho judged of the circumstances as they then stood. He did not pre tend to prophesy success at the Alma; ha adopted every means of insuring it. It is very easy to say now, " Your success is certain; you might have left men behind, and I brought the tents." I must here diverge for a moment to meet a charge which the right hon. baronet has not made, but which has certainly been made elsewhere. On that subject I shall make a very frank statement to the house. I have no wish to deceive them in any ono respect ; nor will I defend what I think is indefensible, or condescend for ono moment to conceal what I think, with respect to details which have, in my opinion, been unsatisfactory. (Cheers.) Now, I recollect that last session we ha l a good deal of discussion here as to the merits of the coinnaisee nat. The commissariat ran the gauntlet of popular cri ticism. I believe the opinions which were then formal with regard to that department .were exaggerated opi nions, and not founded in fact; but I am not prepared to say that at the end of along peace the commissariat or any other department of the army was in as perfect a state as experience and practice would make it. (Hear, hear.) I have no doubt, therefore, that up to a certain point there was ground for criticism on the part of those who were determined to find fault. But, sir, the commissariat has outlived criticism, and I believe it is now universally ad mitted that there never was an army better fed than that of Lord Raglan's. (Hear, hear.) Their rations have been increased ; the rations of meat are 50 per cent. larger than those of any previous expedition. (Hear.) When fears were entertained that the health of the men would suffer for want of vegetables, supplies of vegetables were immediately obtained f rom rieste and Smyrna for their use ; and when the Government wore informed that these were to be sold I wrote to Lord Raglan that I thought that whatever was necessary to snake the soldier efficient in the peculiar position in which he was placed, in cone°. guenme of the nature of the service, ought toj be provided at the expense of the public. (Cheers.) Sir, it has been asserted that there has been groat mismanagement with respect to the medical department of the army during this campaign. Now, lam very anxious that the house should know the exact truth with regard to this matter, because I think nothing c a n b e so d e t r i mep t a l t o th e public service as for the public to imagine that our brave soldiers expe rience heartless and contumelious neglect at the very MO meat when they have just earned for themselves a right to the utmost care and solicitude. Let me first state what was tho amount of the staff which was sent out. There had not left the shores of England for a very long period ' an army so large, or, I believe, so well appointed ; cer tainly none had ell it under circumstances so important, or to conduct operations so hazardous as those which were entrusted to the army of Lord Raglans When that army was first organised the Government took the opinion of a gentleman on a m a tt e r of detail. It was but a matter of detail, and I refer to it only to show the care and attention with which these things were attended to. Mr. Guthrie, a surgeon of great eminence and talent, and of high character, told us there was am error in the organisation of the medical department. He said —" You hare but three surgeons to a regiment, though you have a large staff. The regimental surgeon leas the strongest in terest in bringing men into a state of health as rapidly as possible ; .the staff surgeon has no interest in clearing the hospital; his interest is only to cure particular persons. Do not, therefore, make any additions to the staff, but give a fourth surgeon to every regiment, and you will find the service more efficient." On the other hand, Dr. Andrew Smith, the head of the medical department ) differied from Sir. Guthrie on that point. lie said —" If you give only four surgeons to even) regiment, the regiments which suffer most will not have enough, and must depend, upon the staff." I consulted Lord Raglan as to which of these two suggestionshe preferred. He said—" I think 51r, Guthrie', right, and I prefer to have a fourth regimental surgeon." Now, what course did the Government adopt under these circumstances I One great authority was for a small stall and a regimental establishment; the other was for ' large staff and a small regimental establishment. We said to the one- - " Take a large regimental establishment ;" we said to the other—" Take a large staff." Again, Dr. An drew Smith, who devoted himself to his duties day anti night, assembled at his own hoese a large number of medi cal men, who were engaged in the itruty dttritig the las, war. These gentlharerl dre* sip a feport of what would be the pro,pet ainetint of stores for the use of the army ; they recalled their recollections of the Peninsula ; they calculated. everything at so much per head, and made a plan of so much medicitits) aiid so much of everything. (Hear , * heait) All argument founded on what was done in t I Peninsula is not necessarily a sound arguneeht amconnt of the improvements which have been made in the interval, and I refer to these things to show that it was our object to make the preperations fer the army as full and efficient as poesihie... HOW many medical met' were appointed tes th 6 army? Thli 'Amber of staff medics,: officers in turkey *as 2W; the nanib6r Of regimental ofileees 192, the nuMbei pf Oidnaneh medical officers 14, making total 4./361 The staff of medical officers will ultimate l y, When all have joined, be 495. Upwards of 100 hates been added singe the battle of Alma, when the num ber was 275. I find from the Moniteur de l' Armee that the number of medical officers for the frendli army was 270, that being the number for the whole of the army sent to -Turkey and landing on the shores of the Crimea. If we had Chosen to limit the medical staff to the number en gaged in the Peninsula, *éshould hate fixed it at one to ever 145 men; l whereae the number was, in fact, one to In Mt t ctoh W l el i . e t c h mt an en o E i ft n . g t l h i le s v h ecr a rh r e m aa,t y i et . sot every 7f Menu This was the largest medical staff ever sent We had r f a i r d e o t m t h e o t e p, h g b e r y. e m a :e: i d s i i t e c h a d medical I ffi d e e puol meatytt3.sall experience in wan If meta tt4;.it to raete civilians to a.tteno ' upon tOeastki , , tl3e ititkiiofill be that they will attend to them till tut; >! fettte as that of 'cholera arises, and then having a llate tniniber of patiemts *Wining theit services they will tell you horreetlY that they bail tio longer attend to a regi men,t. ,We had the greatest diffi c ulty in getting surgeons, and had to look for them in emigrant ships and merchant vessels. We have taken civilians without number; given them temporary rank in the , armq We Have not, done more, because they do het *ieh to remain permanently, their only ohje4 Weihg to Obtain practice and experience. I think yost will do me the justice to admit that so far at least es numbest are 61101.11nd, tbh Government is not fairly chargeable With haviitg acted in a niggardly spirit. Dr. Andrew Sinith was indefatigable in his endeavours to supply the men with every possible comfort and oven lux ury which it was possible for them to have in hospitals. I have here a list of the blankets, bedding, and sheets. There were 19,000 cotton sheets, and everything was on that scale. Ido not know that it is worth While to trouble the house by reading it s but I wish td impress upon the house and the right hon. barb, opposite (Sir J. Pakington), if he is open to conviction, that it has not been from heartless indifference to their safferirigs that the troops have been exposed to privations. (Hear, hear.) NV, the statement to which I alluded was that awe the baffle of the Alma a great deal of unnecessary Suffering was inflicted upon the troops in consequen c e of a b a d arr a ngement of the medical stall. I will refer as little as I can to documentary evi dence; but I think I could ptit, the question to the house in a manner which would Convince them that there has been great misapprehension and great exaggeration of the evils which have existed and which during war must exist. It was stated that the wounded of the British army lay on the field of Alma for two or three t d h s e y i s r wo th td th s board ship ifsnumbers ac were not safe. 1 eylivenderrees6ehr.ughthtadtowtniletyo twheersehippus put on believe that a groat deal of this statement arose from ignorance of what had happened In places beyond the obserseation of these who made the allegations. The Freaeit army, composed of feWer men than our own, lay next the sea; their wounded, who *ere fewer in number than Out Own, Ntiere eariiod inimediately to the ships. Out troop§ *eta folk er five miles, I believe, from the sea. A ftgld hospital was established for them in some buildings which were found near the spot. All those of the worindeo into t whose ~ al i cases thosepermitted r hd themees t es d be riot d removed p treated bit Deb fldlti, food being conveyed to them, their o o Wounds dtessed, and as much Coveting being put over them ° e v r e m d i permit were were as et m removed couldjbe obtained: I need not sad that all the appliances Whibh rhiild a tibtain6d dn, the field of battle were not flefildient for the conifort or the Wounded men, but this is one of the stern necessities of war. (Hear.) I have seen evidence which satisfies me that not it single man was al lowed to leave the hospital to be put on board - ship with out his hdrte been ettetided to or his wounds Ores !tea. It is quite trite that the number of men placed on board the Kaiegatoo was beyond that which she could pro ia perly be allowed to carry. The statement, however, that M 00, PeEsOni Were put od board that vessel Was an exag gefittiori tot the number did not at any time exceed seven hundred , o extent ot snore than One - half . I believe and those whom the Kangaroo could not properly take were put on board another vussel. It has beet, stated that litindtedi iii Men died on board of cholera. I bel'ie've the number of those who died on board the itangaroo was under 40, and I venture to assert that the proportion of deaths to cases of sickness was far greater during the last summer in many of the London hospitals. ni admit that the number on board was great, but it could not he avoided'without leavin g the m en on the field . Lord a Eaglan was obliged to remain two or three days on the theyspot would be he was aware that if he l e ft hi s wo unded be massacred by the Cossacks, ant when the m en were serit on board ship of course their sufferings we re great. It had been said that their wounds were not dressed during the whole time that they were on b oar d. On that, point I am informed by surgeons who have been redressingsuch wounds for three surgeon would think of the wounds being covered with accustomed to the dressing of gun-shot wounds, that no or four days, and that, at length t hi s subjec t, on I) - them. Oil*, I have dilated rat h er lint, there ould be great eare ate first not to disturb THE SUN, LONDON, WEDNESDAY EVENING DECEMBER 13 1 because I do feel that if it were true there was any say, that when General Estcourt wrote to inform me of the 1 thing like cold, systematic, heartless indifference mani- loss of the Prince, he said, "We 'have lost at one swoop all fested by any department of the • army , a • bove all by the that your foresight, or the foresight of your office had pro medical department, to whose care the wounded are viOod;" but it so happened that Lord Raglan and the Quer especially (intruded ; it would produce a bad feeling in ter-master had applied for clothing, and the answer was, all the minds cf the peofile.of this country, and destroy that has been ordered, a great part is finished, a great part is at confidence in the administration of the aruiy, which has sea ; and the letter of Lord Raglan asking for supplies was of lite years been engendered. Let me say one word with forestalled by the supplies sent. I believe there is a ,great regard to the general hospital of Scutari. I will frankly inisappechension with regard to the manner in which the admit I know no subject which has caused me so much troops should be clothed. I have a letter from a gentleman anxiety as this, the distance from the scene of action being who knows well the climate of the Crimea, who says " Don't such that although you may send out medical stores you believe the statements as to average temperature ; follow the cannot insure. their immediate applicetion. I will now custom of the country—clothe them in skins, not woollens." state what I believe to be the truth. 'We have been told Then an officer who has had great experience in Arctic that at one time ttere was not such a thing as a pound of searches caine to me and said, "Have nothing to do with lint fur an hospital containing t wo th oesan d men. That skins—stick to woollens." (Laughter.) I thought it safest statement created the greatest horror, in this country, and to take the advice of both, and I hope that before long every the greatest indignation was expressed against those who man may have his change, not only of skins, but of woollens. had had charge of this hospital. I h ave ac counts from I am not speaking of changes of the uniforms ; that is a medical men, which I will not read, to the effect that never matter of course. But besides that we have got for every for ono moment was there any deficiency of lint or of any- man a sealskin cap coming well round the face and ears. thing else. At the time when the army, left 'Varna the We have for every man leggings which lie can draw over the -general hospital was there. An order was given that the trousers, and a loose coat, and under that he can wear along stores there should be sent down to Scutari. That order, with it a waistcoat of tweed lined with hareskin, and rabbit nanisi the hurry and bustle of departure, was never exe- skin, and astskin. (Laughter.) A great coat, not of the carted. The principal stores remain e d a t V a rna. But it usual pattern, but of the Canada. pattern. We have got so happened that there i wero sufficient to meet the diffi- some boots called the Canada boots ' and we have, besides culty of the moment. There never w a s positively a deft- that, a coat made from sheepskin. Government" felt with ciency of these things ; but one was apprehended. Um regard to then r, that time was everything. To huild e huts der these circumstances the medical officers accepted a to send mot was a process far from meeting the emergency. loan from the Turkish government of linen ' lint, and In the inelanwhile we telegraphed to Lord Westmoreland and other materials. A large proportion of the stores which to Lord Stratford. Lord Stratford sent a gentleman to pro- were sent from home was not unloselo.l, because when the cure Austrian butte, constrtected in that country; he also took ship arrive 1 there was such a pressing for reinforce- measures to procure other's Inoue Malta and Constantinople. month as would admit of nu delay. There was no positive I trust, therefore, that they got an immediate supply, and if his deficiency, I say, thistle!' one Wee apprehended. I will we send huts, I hope that our huts w:11 lie its luxuries, as ad tell you one evil which did arise. There had been ongen- ditions to what are already there. (Cheers.) I have given tiered during peace aea albratis SYSteln of check and this point hi detail, which is rather yai.ariseino to the house, counttsr-check, The purveyor required all manner of but it must be fecelieeted what is the charge against us. The forms to be observed bt'fOre he Whield isauo stores on the charge is a heartless neglect of on: duty, and inehTerenee to recieleition of deo Medical efticers. 'M e di a wee likewise a t the comforts of what I believe to b's the bravest army that the head of the whole establishment an officer, not a ever existed. Ido not believe that any action was ever more medical man, who, though he devoted himself indefrati. brifilaut id pellet of attack than that of Alma. Ido not be- gebly to the performance of his duties, was not of a rank lieve t hat y ou ever hail Sri instance of such signal selereliance to ensure co-operation from those Pliteed under his autho- and confidence as the resisfowee. to the charge of cavalry by 1 rity, or from the Turkish offici a l s . I was uot, therefore, the 93d Highlenders. The reearticat disdained to alter its for by any moins setisied with this establishment. with station, but every man remained as he stood two deep, and plenty of stores, no one semis to have known where to lay when the Poreeial cavalry approached, the Russian horsemen his hand uaon them, and the stores could never be ob- would not flee the encounter but fled. Then, et Inkerman, alined with that rapidity which is necessary in hospitals et the commencement of the battle tee troops were surprised The moment we heard complaints wa sent oaf A ceramic- as they were at the battle of Talavera—a battle which had sion of inquiry, and iii, a private letter, received from one been prepared for weeks. I believe that so far back as the whose stains if it were mentioned would show the house 24th of October, it hail been arranged at a council of war, that he was indisposed to criticise, it was observed that. - immense efforts bed boon made to bring men and cannon to sufficient allowance had not been m a d e f or th e difficulties the Crimea for 109 miles and more. Not oulw every cart and of the case, curl that it was impossible to prevent con- bullock, but, they tel me, that every carriage and horse was fusion from attending the sudden influx of a thousand emp'.oyed to bring up the army post; and even at the last day wounded men. As to the lady who went out from this the army was moral at the rate of 4e miles a day, a feat which country to superintend the nurses, I rece i ve , n o t o nly I believe is unparalleled in history. Everything was made to ' from reeadeal emu, but from others who have observed her depend ou that stroke. The Emperor was assured that the conduct, testimony which is, iu fact, the highest praise thing was certain, and after the battle wane back the men that can be bestowed on any human being. 1 now return who had been keeping their lonely watch, who lied heard the to the clatter° made by the right hon. gentleman against ial s tolling in the town, and the mermur of then at mass the Government. Let me first say, with regard to the Feet night, no tionbt, the religious ceremonies of tee church reinforcements, that I have here a letter from Sir Henry hail been used to Invest the attack with a inure sacrwl Ward stating that, in a letter which he hail received character, anal appeals \owe made to the patriotism of from Admiral Boxer, dated the 4 th of last month, it was these men: In the morning, emend by the mist, these. , leclered that 20,0a0 English and French had passed through ,olumns broke in oa our men, some of whom were the Boephorus to reinforce the Allies. I have shown that tetuelly returning from the trenches, where they had the total number of lima sent out froar the first is 51,000 spent' the night, and who were compelled to go back odd ; and I ask, in what first year of any previous war in withorit fool, and I know not how many hours 8,000 which England his b e en engaged hasshe ever sent out such men iritestocel the attack. The eight hon. baronet brings it an army as this? (Hear, hoer.) It may be said, and with as an accus at i on that ahem \two oily 3,000 meneas if the truth, that we have no reserve. The right hon. gentleman whole araiy consisted of 8,000 nice, mid as if a commander's said he would some day ask the owestiou why , we over went whole business was not to concentrate his force in masses to Sebastopol at all. I will tell him why. We knew that wher e the enem y was weak. W e ll, eight thousand: Hagfish that fortress was the stronghold of Russia in the Black soldiers stood there for hours, beating back column sifter Sea. (Hear, hear.) I admit that the enterprise was one column bm'oeght tip one after another, and hurling them into of great hazed ; but next year it would have been impos the -ravines up weasel they lead ascended. Ido not believe ruble. Round about that mighty fortress was rising, a l mos t that in the history of any battle, however illustrious, you Jay by day, further chains of forts ; a nd if it b e not de- will find an instance of an assault Meg successfully resisted I stroyed or taken in this campaign it can never be destroyed under circumstances so adverse, for so long A 1;0°1101, and of or taken. I remember hearing, last session, of a gentleman such Immense loss. That was a soldier's battle. Thare you , in the City saying, "The war ought to be carriedou with the saw the character of the English soldier. The mon stood by atmost vigour and determination, but at the same time no risk their regimental officers, but it was a battle of the soldiers must be run." (Laughter.) If that view could be re- standing in ranks. (Cheers.) I rejoice in the numbers of alissel, we should have a golden age of war as well as of letaers from soldiers that have appeared in the papers. I re peace. I admit that there is hasard, but I say we ought joice that the people of Englared should know of what mate to strike with vigeur while the place is valuable, and if we rials their armies are composed, I ask you to look at the succeed we shalt liars destroyed th e power o f R uss i a i n army in which the office of JudgesAdv ecate is a sinecure. the south. I hope the right, hon. gentl eman (Si r J. P a k (Cheers.) I ask you to read the letters of Me se men marked ington) is satisfied with that answer, whi c h is the on l y one by a simple piety—men writing to their wives, saying that I can give him. Last Session many hon. gentlemen in this they have boon preserved in answer to the prayers of their house spoke of the war in language which almost filled me children. I Say/ as letter from a soldier at Inkermann, in with superstitious fears, on account of its arrogance and which he says, as mailing the - quality of the officers, that presumption. We did not enter upon this expedition in eight officers were laid in one grave, and that there was not that spirit—(hear, hear)—and we have felt that our a 'dry eye. See these men showing all these gentle qualifica greatest difficulty is that of having to creates an army tions, men who have shown mercy to the vanquished, render and maintain it simultaneously. See the difficulties we circumstances of horrid provocation; and yet, as Sir William have had to encounter. We have no compul s o r y serv i ce Napier says, speaking of one of the Peninsular battles when whatever in t nglancl eleopt ceuiterfilery nereice f or h om e 'the British iofitatry is attacked by overpowering numbers lefence. We have to trust, therefore, entirely to vo- then it is that you ales with what strength and majesty they lunteers. Ton qliinet create an army as other govern- fight. There is one side of that picture which has been alluded meats can by the Rieke Of a pen. You must get the to by the e i g ht look. baronet, anei I admit the foil justice of men who are willing to &Mire VIA nit the other hand the melancholy:lots we have sustained in the death of General when these men do come you leave got 4 Material Cathcart. No man vale ware valued than hes he had qualifi which no conseriptioe in the Weald firer oroduced. cations of the highest order, arid his death is a pub - 6010as which (Cheers.) YOU hare Olen; net dragged frem, their reluctant cannot eeisilo be replaced. But it is indOed to the credit Of Errg homes against their *ale, aita mini ve., , ,foi iliits , dits, to be land tie see net iiitly the devotion and the courage with which forced into scenes of blood and horror to which they were these generals eXpesed themselves, but also it is impossible not averse. You have got men animated with the highest be strnek, SO reading the mantes of those who have fallen spirit, men youngand adventurous z actuated by the highest with the numbee Wed litre gone from it sense of duty, and ambition, and our ranks are filled by men echo can never who have shown in this caniyaiji/ hors- little oven the posses say that any one of the hardships to which they Wore ex- sion of wealth and luxuiTeau impale the 4itritofniglish gen '<seed has boon forced upon them by a tyrannical Govern- tlemen and of the English people from the lowest to highest ment. Well, you liav'ti had this diffichilty, ha you have rauk. 1 lament as much as the right hon. gentleman the losses had another: you have had fur scull° time at large emigre- which roe have sustained. I cannot look round without time from this country. You have had an emigration go- knowing that thole are here the parents of some of those gat ing on from Ireland especially, which has dried up the lant men Who have so cheerfully laid down their lives in the sources of population i you have had at the same time service of their doiintry: But Argland has suffered greater great activity in siomnierde and Mannfacture. The recruit- losses in fernier battle, like Talavera and Albuera, where erg sergeant has had to ccuripete egahret that; and when I 4,800 men fell ; while in thew) engagements, from beginning took back to war thneS, and see what *ere the Weems to end, less than 1,500 men have perished by the sword. The taken to get men, add that with all their eff or t s th e y cou ld largest loss has been by disease—a loss more dishearterflher to inly raise twenty-fotir thousand Men in oho year ;and the artily than loss in battle, and carrying with it less of when I look at what has been done this year, a year not glover. There have died in hospital from disease and from expired, and see that, indluding what has been raised for wounds in thd Whole campaign 2,782, of whom about 150 ,he East India COmpany; We liar e, by free enlistment, had have died from we :twig ; Balled in battle, 1,350 ; total loss, time to our standard something like 4ii3OCKI men, I say 4,l32—which is much less than the elaggeratecl statements :hat Ido leek with °Mifideride tee the angineritetida of that I have seen. And let me speak of the assistance which cur army. - *e mare getting rated, no* &Aar than theY are limit lieou given by our allies. It is -delightful to ciro men, wanted, but we are getting ?eon V4ry Cadt,.,and drllliug them placed id smasiti a "osition, entertaining* for each other &fah •eady for service. Lord Hardinge has made this'teplatithi, regpeCi• tit' gt4,lit§h army cheered with a hearty cheer the , s that he ill net a fidsv: a man to go out till he is thoroughly adVoinee of General' Boaquet's division when it came to the practised in the laic of thd Midie. It has been the fashion to relief of dtif s'init't,efed do•feterette, fled I believe the charge in lepreeiate the services of Lord Gaildidice, 1 have served Lord which the French and Mif users , got mired together was a Hardinge as commander-111'01dd, and I haVe derv*/ ethers as good type of the union which binds the bvfo nations together. commaudeis-sn:eleet, and I have been able to ge 'What :tee (Cheers.) They say that each army is gal/Stress qUalifications Lord Ilardhiiicl tileuff; • tinct lofovierg Octet: irelinislaridcs . of fiord the other, that we are acquiring the dash of thelFreneb, very great difficulty. if you Look at Lie etif 4 fd tit ti Vi c- arid tat the Weench are acquiring the firmness of the Eng/hale cee•es which our army has achieved in the Crimea, I thirft: f tieliefe that the effect on the people of both countries is this will strike every man, that, next after the indomitable far greater than Sioeid 'hale been produced by any diplomacy courage of the men,. comes the skill with w hi c h they use their however skilful! , or by self tfeaty. I ask those who are veapons, and thud glilierieritt s ef thtf reArns p l a ced in their desponding, and who are the perrea ra p erha p s who were, so 'sands. If it had not teen fa Lad HaralingZ / eld !toile- valiant two months ago, to reflect what veag rile condition of tieve that you would have had a division armed sfith that Miiiie Enticing at the commencement of this wet' seact what rifle. •I do not mean that it Wei Lord Hardinge that gefit it *a 111, ofeelone wars. In previous wars we fieki sill• them oat, but .I Mean that Lord Harolinee, when he was at ailed Who' I)+l'4 n'or' money, and were not always trite' air Charles Napiei to the Wed el4y eif hid life: the Ordnance, infueea nevi life ititd that department, and to their engagettielistie brit new we hare an alliance with the ;illation was, that no Seleier threw aside 014 prejtidicei entertained eats Wei Latch a man as most military nation on the fan'd cif the earth, formerly our Hardinge fereed tire ArlieW'clie &I'd rivals and once our enemies, and which it now bound to us, I solutes hide idtd,thd Yere;ia, !While Ilig iii- Wives by firm friendship. We have placed public opinion practised in the Minie. What is the opinion of the army Ik' eateriplictilselofiOtt i Isea ports completely sealed, her flag not gledrild vd scut bait 41,0 vo , iig not in Dirinie o'd oat!' tide, we have placed Russia id *state of not so much the rise df the eicapdri brit file coil:V.7m. ° to the use of that weapon ? Why, Sir George Cathcart's divi- daring to etre* itgeif in any part of the Black Son formerly ' sion in action at inkerman, when the saw other men fall, her own. This is the effect Of the first campaign,' and I ask seised their Minie rifles and threw awa y their muskets. It is you to point out in the history of tae lend any campaign in of the which you can point out such result. (Gheers.) I ask men that is gained, clod the result ies that indeed df firing at these who assert that Government have omitted to do all that random as iu old battles (and I think I have teed ea mile- if Wag' their business to do, and committed everything they able td Lions that Only. on e theo soldier use his Weapon with the same facility asi d gamier ri-dci sent °sits this army which has never met the enemy ghat i n OW ee c in effaco yen- gee' Oiigbi not to de s nt2(l I ask them how this army was organised relis h ex beeper haudlee his fowling-piece, and with the distinct in- cept for victory?' f say the military poWer of England stands teution of making every ' Shot tell. w e ll, I say, we have higher than ft (Wei did, and if you think that you ought to had this army to drill .td Ming and to dead out. Men are trust us with these poifere do Kr Diet the country is deter coming in rapidly. , We than be e gthwhele a large re-' mined, at all laurels and at all cods, tied the army of Lord serve at the Crimsa, ;aid last year, that we put out (kir Wilda' taiiii Sind 16ft thid i hdf , te h viill ndt' lee: sand; as Wag Raglan shall be supported. (Cheers.) If the Ifooec of Com ought to hay . e ._ s_en ,, to_u ,,. t ,. . a nsitxs.moWnthhast ago, h, , ,;:d ti.long does not answer to that feeling of the country, the 0 who'll tile Heinge Of Octane:am must take the consequences. We are stave actually sent tit five, or six it on vigorously. TO olefati that which is the object of all f a o V r e es h m e e a u r t d ogfenftolueim. en say they engaged ist A wikr We hieve entered reluctantly ;we must carry thine now they cou ' ld have done war—peace—you must gong:riff it t and I say no exertions r ri e v g e i m o r e . Could theYl fel the tint Ogee? how should be spared to enable us by the vigoato of our operations long does it take to make a soldier I But the regiirietf hare to attain those ends. I say, further s as far at the Govelt been sent out. Some of these re iments came from forei g n meat it carwerned, if you think that Government is to be en service, but were skeleton reeime g nts more fitted for garri - trusted with tfietW powers, you must enable them to carry mi y t son duty than atthiag • else. They ' had to be reformed.. honestly the will of the/ nation, that the noblest army that But some of theSe regimentsve t te positively n o t in England. ever left our shores s hall Life the means of a perfect the Duke of New cast l e seat fdi then! flee 'm eatta da and from triumph. (Loud cheers.) India. Arid When pant sly this fered ccihld have Wen sent Mr. LAYARD said they had before them the etternative of out three months ago, it did not dilit these Menthe agd. Avoiding all reference to what had taken place with feference And when you say you sh ou ld h ave sent out battaliong, you .14 the War, or to see what could be done for the future, sad could net create m en out of nothin You must first get suppdrt the Government in carrying it out with the greatest men, you must th en drill the men and form them into vigour. With regard to the conduct of the Government, his soldiers, or else the reputation of our arms would be feelings, as he believed was the case with almost every lessened by sending m ___ ite 'who are insufficient for their other member in the house, word conflicting. Either ho d u ty. (Hear, hear.) Well, sir, I hope the house will must forgot all that had occurred in the management of the think that the Government has not been neglectful in present war, and place confidence in the Government for the the matter of reinforcements and that, at any rate, future, without any reference to their policy—past, present , if it has not done th a t which' no ' Government could do, or future—or, on the other hand, ho ought to warn the came everything which they Wished, yet that without the material try ag ainst those calamities which might he in store far it, and in their hands th ey have done utmost. And again I point out those neglects which had occurred, and thereby ob repeat, look back to the expeditions in which the Govern- fain, if possible, from her Majesty's ministers such an expres (tient has been engaged, look at the expedition of 1793, at sien of opinion as might warrant him in placing confidence in the Duke of York's, and at Sir Ralph Abercrombie's, look at them for the future. There could bo no doubt that at the the numbers then sent and are them with the arm sent esent moment her Majesty's Government were making compare out now. But, th it is been every effort to take the great fortress of Sebastopol, and he en, - posed to privations, th at they have been made to fight battles gave the Govern ment g reat credit for desiring to do all in of the most sanguinary description, which could have been their power to effect that object. But he believed the capture avoided by foresight at home. No foresight at home could of Sebastopol, however g i g antic that undertaking might be, have strengthened the army mor e than it has be en strength- was but the first link in the chain—the first step in the great ened. It is true th a t sanguinary battles Shave been fought, war in which we wore now engaged. He believed that very but in firmer times England never went into a war but she shortly we should have to choose between a peace which might_ came out of he r fi rs t campa i gn w ith her rep u t a ti on none o f b e di s graceful and utterly inconsistent with the sacrifices of she best ; but I wan t t o know w hether at any per i o d o f our bl oo d and treasure which we had ma de, and a struggle which, history Our military character stood so high as it does now ? with respect to its magnitude and results, had perhaps never (Cheers.) I want to k now what the effect of publi c opinion equa lled been in the history of the wo rld. ( Cheers.) Such in Europe has b een on th e m anner in which ou r b a tt a li ons being his convictions, he could not help saying that after what have conducted themselves in this war. I want to know what had pas sed he did not feel that con fidence in her Ma j esty's has been the e ff ec t of public opinio n in Russia — what has been Government which he wished he could feel. If he couid be the eff ec t on t h e i r own army? The critics, who say • that our here that the mismanagement that had occurred was merely men are exposed unnecessarily to sanguinary battles that the result of inexperience, and that for the future wo might Alma ought to have been turned instead of being taken ' are hope for better things, ho would still place confidence in the persons w h o, I thi n k , omit never have studied the ma ' of Government ; but he believed that that mismanagement was the co un t ry on w hi c h they have exp end ed their critici p sm, to be attributed to the want of a definite policy. (Hear.) ' r they would have seen that the ground to the right He believed, moreover, that it was impossible for a Govern ef th e R uss i ans i n th a t action was' so steep and iliac- mont composed as the present was to have a definite policy. cessible that it was not worth the attention of the (Hear.) How could a definite policy be expected from a Russian commander ; and if the " military critics . • twhich included representatives of all thepolitieal par who cabinet a representative of the Holy hav9 attacked the reputation of Lord Raglan for not turning ties in this country—from the positi on h a d reflected for one moment, th ey would have Al li anc e down to a representat ive of the extreme of Liberal seen that pr o b a bl y th e comman derpf the Russia ns could have i sm . (Cheers,) It was impossible to expect anyt hin g b ut a desired nothing better than to f i n d the fleet, and the English half-and-half policy from a cabinet so composed ; but a halt ; and th e p rene il army, separate d , and his own army g t d and-half policy and half-and-half measures would not do. botweeu th e s hi s an d those armies. So likewise it has been What had taken place during the last two years in reference to alleged against Lord Raglan that b e ought to have assaulted this question 7 During that period he had repeatedly entice- Sebastop o l a ft er th e battle of Alma. Sir , Ido not know that voured to warn the Government and the country upon the we who sit here are very good judges of that. (Hear.) I subject ; but the same appeal was made to him over and over u know that very eminent military men view such an I r again as was made b y the ri g ht hon. gentleman (Mr. S. Her s taking as a hazard that could not be justified. T a lk of lead- bert) that night —namely, that the appearance of dissension Mg flesh and blood against batteries, but would you hare on this ' quest ion should be avoided ---• that they sh ou ld taken these men against a town i n which it was impossible sibleto show themselves to be a united nation. wWe admit our say at that moment hoe, many of Prince M enschikoff ' s errors," said the Government. " Have confidence in us, and was still in it, of which th e strength was not then kn a own rmy . we will endeavou r to bring the question to it satisfactor y set- Such a proceeding might have e x p o sed them t o b e massacred Cement." (Hear, and laughter.) That Confidence had been in detail. I believe that emin en t m en who had command of given by the Hous e of Commons almost without deba te. At that army knew better than those who say th ey e are com- the close of the las t session he (Mr. La y ard ) ventu r ed t o warn potent, and give an opinion in their o wn . chambers- tho Government of the dangerous calamities which were of military affairs: Now, sir, is it true as asserted likely t o betel our army in t he East. Again- a - similar appeal by . the right honourable baronet that we t ook no was - made to him ; but he asked whether that was states precaution with regard to warns clothing ? Why mans hip ? If the only policy pursued by the Government the warm clothing of which unfortunately a large portion was was to yield to a pressure from without, then any men whom lost in the Prince, and let me say, when I speak of that ship, you m ight meet between Westminster Hall and Charing -cross the loss has been greatly exaggerated as to th e va l ue. The' ) Would be equally ca p able with the present Mi nisters to admin. cargo has been said to have been worth half a milli on . I ister the affairs of the country. He believed that our allies, understand it .did not cost more t han 180' 0001e No doubt the French, had almost 'taken the initiative in every m ofovethe - it was a heavy loss, but anoth er s hip immediately succeeded meat appert a ining to the present war. Tire Emperor it, and I had a letter, ' two or three clays ago, from an officer French, his Foreign Minister, and our representative at Paris, on the shot, who informed nee that Captain Weth era w , who were en titled to great praise in reference to this war t i vi hn e t o o m e r . had. been deputed by Lord R ag l an t o go to Constantinople to Government had only mismanaged it. . t Before not believe procure articles of clothing, h a d executed his commission mencement of the war her Majesty's Minis ers . . a war. It was almost impossi ebl to with such success that it had more than compensated for the that there would be t loss of the Prince. (Cheers.) But, moreover, 1 AID. happy tn , bring themselv es t° the . c°l4vi " -ion -- that a great questien had - - # arisen ieetweea this . country and. Russia, and that that question} was ,finrrounded with great difficulties. This question might be divided. into two distinct phases I the period when peace was possible, and the period when it • was impossible. Unfortunately her Majesty's Ministers did not perceive that the Emperor of Russia, after the passage of the Pruth, 6d pledged himself to a certain policy, and had under taken a great task, from which he could not recede without materially injuring his influence in the East. (Hear, hear.) Our Government then unfortunately placed themselves in the hands of Austria, instead of pursuing an independent course. 'The first stop of our Government, after the declaration of war, was to send troops to Malta, and then to Gallipoli, after the Emperor of Russia had revealed his policy. From Gallipoli the troops wore sent to Varua, against his (Mr. Layard's) earnest remonstrances. At Varna the troops were decimated by disease. From Varna. they were at length sent to the Crimea, where no provision was made for them, not oven a single depot to fill up any vacancies that might occur in the ranks. It was probable that had the British forces proceeded at once to Sebastopol that fortress might have been cap tured ; but Lord Raglan was prevented from pursuing the Russian army after. the battle of the Alma, because there y were no means of conveying the, wounded except b ambu lances,- the management of which had been entrusted to old pensioners, whose days of active service had long since passed, and. whose sanctum was the beershop, and all of whom were affected by delirium tremens. The consequence was not one was able to enter on the dnties for which he had gone out, And with regard to the m e di ca l officers, was it not notorious that after the battle of Alma from 600 to 700 wounded Russians were left to the charge of one man, Dr. Thompson, who had since died, attended by his - servaet, an Irishman named M`Grath—a name that deserved 'immortality. But, after that battle, one would have thought that the attention.of the Government would. have been tho roughly roused. to the critical position of our army in the Crimea. However, the fact was, our army was not prepared for a siege of such magnitude. He remembered reading a speech delivered some time ago by a noble friend of his re lative to the enormous amount of ammunition supplied to the army. Now, in reference to that Statement, all he would SV was, that supposing the siege continued to be carried on as it was on the first day whoa our Ilre could scarcely keep clown the Russian batteries, all that enormous s - apply of am munition would have been exhausted iu six days, while the whole number of guns comprising our siege train, including the morhars, only amounted to GO, and these were opposecl to almost inexhaustible resciurees. Last summer it was said that the Austrian Covernmmt occupying the Principalities would prevent the Russians from reinforcing their army, and what was tho result of that trust in Austria? Why, that four corps of the Rus.ian army were transported into the , Crimea, .and our army had to fight the battle of Ink erman, And what had happencl in the Baltic ? He was ono of those who did not wish to depreciate the services which had been rendered to their country by the fleet, bat he could not help pointing out how, after having destroyed the forti fications and deserting the place, a proclamation was isFued to the inhabitants calling upon them at their risk not to outer into relations with - ltussia. Now the only tendancy such a policy could hava was to divert'Sivaden from join ing our alliance. In fact througheut'all the proceedings the gr.at, want of our Government is a definite policy: (Loud cries of " hear, hear.) It was the same in Greece, where we Interfered to prevent Turkey demanding an indemnificat:on for all the injury done to her Christian subjects ou .the frontier of Gret3ce. It was the same in Circassia, and the same in Persia, iu both of which eases no means had been taken to secure co-operation against Russia. So that .now, at the end of a year, the only r3sult obtained is that our army has got a footing in the Crimea, and nothing else. has been done towards the settlement of this great question. Austria had al:owcd Russia to send enormous reinforce ments into the Crimea. It, however, now appeared that we had concluded a treaty with Austria. He should' like to know the terms of that treaty, for he confessed he had great misgiving as to the policy of. Austria. If we even succeed in getting the Crimea, Russia might still refuse to accede to our terms, and oblige us to send a S3COUCI expe dition out there, He conceived that peace was utterly impossible at the present, moment, because any terms we could now offer Russia she could not, in her position, with honour and dignity accept. It therefore remained with us to determine what our policy really was, and how the war was to be carried on. He did not believe that tilt Govern ment were alive to the immense difficulties in which we were placed. He believed that their policy hitherto was . to meet emergencies at the moment—they did not look beyond the, moment at hand. (Hear.) The Russians will shortly have nearly .200,000 men in the Crimea. (Oh, oh.) An hon. member said " No," but he was told some time ago that it was impossible for Russia to brig up any reinforcements. In the camp of the Crimea we were acting as if it were im possible fOr Russia to bring up any reinforcements—that it was not only physically impossible for her to do so, but it was im possible on account of the position which we were told that Austria had assumed. Now what was the fact ? In one night lwe found 100,000 men on our flank-0,000 attacked us at Inkerrnau. Of those we were told that there was not one re giment that had been engaged /in tho battle of Alm. Well, then, there were 40,000 ,men at Alma; so that those two armies amounted to 100,000 ; 25,000 men attacked us at Balaklava, and 10,001 made a sortie upon our left, and at the same time the batteries of Sebastopol were play jug upon us. He would ask the house to make up the ac count of those different armies, and they would find that it would come nearer to 150,000 than 100,000. Having re ! moved our fleet from the Baltic, Russia can now send the troops she had stationed in that quarter to the Crimea. Did th house for a moment think that the Czar, when his honour, his empire, and his throne were at stake, would for a moment roles his efforts in the sustaiument of the present war ? We are carrying on the war upon a new system. We had made an absurd attack upon Odessa—(hear, hear)—while we have left the great granaries of Russia untouched. Up to this moment there was no blockade in the Black Sea. On ths; 24th of September, when tho troops were landed in the Climes, when. ihe Russians had sunk eight ships of the line at the mcn%th of the harbour of Sebastopol, there was a report that several Of the Russian ships of the lino had actually left Sebastopol. We were so ignorant of their movements— although in sight of their harbour—that au order was issued for our vessels to prepare faction, and to follow the enemy out to sex. In respect to the trail 3of Russia, the only trade OA was stopped was the corn trade. The trade in linseed, and othoßussiau articles ,was still carried on in Constantinople. We inu.uotoonceal from ourselves the fact that we are in a critical positions present. Fresh troops were daily coming up to the aid of Russia, and fresh attacks were made upon us. But Ire shall ultimately succeed, for the honour of every English man was pledged to our success. The moment that Russia gem that the capture of Sebastopol is inevitable, they wid withdriew their troops. They may leave a portion of them at Porekop, Taut Choy will take the remainder to Asia. General Bihiloff had 100,000 men in the neighbourhood of Persia. He (Mr. L.) warned tho country that next year the most fatal results may be anticipated from the presence of the Russian troops in Asia. Now we had done nothing to prevent the marsh of the Russians into Persia. The moment that Russia obtained possession of the provinces in that quarter, it was im possit)to that we could expect the Czar to treat wlt'i us. The gigantic power of Russia extends from Kamichatka to the Whits Sea—it is advanced and strengthened every yzar. The question of Poland was the real question. It was in Europe _ _ that we must check the advance of Russia. In Asia, it was useless to attempt it. It was only by establishing an independent nation in the centre of Europe, that we could at all hope to prevent Russia pushing forward her ambitious views in the midst of Europe. (Hear, hear.) He warned the public against rushing into extremes. The present Was not a war of temporary duration. The demands upon English charity would continue. Do not let them, therefore, waste their money in jams, marmalade, and things of that sort, which, after all, were not necessary. All their money would be required in process of time, so let them hueleand their resources, and they would by and bye find them of real benefit to those upon whom they desired to con fer their favours. It was all very well for the Secretary-at- War to say the army was better provisioned now than it was in the Peninsular war. But had we not made progress since Meet 1 Why, in forty years the whole state of things had changedyand an army which was in no better condition than that would be: no credit to the commissariat. This was not the moment for wavering, and he said boldly we must alter the whole system, and. cut down with the knife. It was useless to appoint gentlemen to high command simply because they had served with distinction in the Peninsula. He admitted they were as fine and gallant men as ever existed ; but such appointments only exposed there to the loss of their well-earned reputations, by placin g them• in positioes where they could net discharge their duties with credit either to themselves or to the country. It was physically impossible, indeed, that they could do the work required of them. He warned the heuse solemnly, that, unless they adopted a definite and de cided policy, greater calamities than those we had already experienced must inevitably occur. He believed that out of the whole smasher who had perished by disease, we might by common precaution have saved one-third. Ile entreated the Government to adopt some policy, and let the limo and the country know what that policy was ; and especially he appealed to Lord John Russell, as leader of the great Liberal party, to induce the Government to adopt a policy which, although it might not perhaps reconcile the conflicting opi nions of a Coalition Ministry, would be more in accordance with the dignity, the honour, and the interests of the empire. After a considerable pause, during which no member of the Government seemed inclined to rise, Colonel DUNNE contended that the army in the Crimea was not properly reinforced, and complained that instead of remaining at Varna until the month of September, it ought to have proceeded to Sebastopol before the land defences were constructed and completed. He was of opinion that tho war had not been prosecuted with sufficient vigour. Mr. DISRAELI—I agree with my hon. friend in the sur prise he has expressed that her Majesty's Ministers do not think it necessary to make some reply to the speech of the hon. member for Aylesbury. (Hear.) The hon. member for Aylesbury is not a supporter of those who sit on these benches. (Hear, hear.) Indeed, he almost ostentatiously informed the Lord President of the Council that he was pe culiarly attached to him. (Laughter.) I have no wish to tamper with the allegiance of the hon. member for Aylesbury to the Lord President of the Council; nor can I reciprocate the animosity which he says he feels - towards the other section of the Cabinet. But whatever that hon. member may say, I should, when the opportunity offered, certainly give every attention to the remarks of a gentleman so much master of his subject. (Hear, hear.) I should not, moreover, forget that in his individual instance a man of genius was addressing the House of Commons—(hear)—and remembering that ho has just come fresh from the scene of that memorable action which fills the minds and touches the hearts of the people of this country, and that he rose in his place to make serious charges against the Government, the fact that he has not been answered by any member of that Government is not one which will reduce the hon. member or the gravity of his charge one iota in public estimation. (Hear.) For so far as I can form an opinion on the course of human life, from the past of an individual, I think the hon. memb er for Aylesbury will he remembered by posterity when a grea t portion of the hoar) existing Cabinet will be altogether forgotten — ( l t o m g- solf have —even though his neighbours or his enemies f r ie et r' to an swer his very interesting speech. I should not my ybb; felt particularly anxious to address the house t it might give occa sion had I not thought, from something which o dropped in the course of this debate, that silence on my p be a • interpreted g rise to misconstruction of my mot o i f ves,or the Government. I into acquiescence of the conduct of the nces did not expect, and I witnessed w t participate ru e the site, that I should have felt it my lu grea t: . regret' ' ( .1* Lent which I thought debates in this new session of I ar again the • principle ended in the last, and to vindicate once o f discussion iu this house. Remembering the of freedom s tate of the country—remembering what last occurred in this, f I may term it, agita ted chamber —remembering that the Al tura fate of this great empire was then at stake—remember ing tho thrilling events which have occurred since then —re membering that the people of this country, when Parliament was assembled, looked to it, if not for redress, at least for some sympathy with tho deep emotions by which they were moved —remembering these things, I say, I was greatly sur prised, I must confess, that Government should have advised the Queen to assemble Parliament at this unusual period, and then give orders to their creatures that all discussion should be not merely deprecated, but sxrested. (Hear.) That they s hould attempt—rashly attempt—t o govern the country for as long a time as they could without applying to the House of Cannionfie I Can Mil !Auderotand. difficulties aro great-Ltheir embarrassments are increasi ag; and they ni . igbe have thought that time and fortune woul d place them, some two months later, in a more advantageoms position than that they now occupy. But, having felt it to be their duty, or having deemed it to be their interest, to take the step they have taken, I was greatly surprised When the honourable gentleman who seconded the address, the brother of a Cabinet Minister, sought to impress upon the House of Commons the expediency of silence in reference to the present state of affairs. (Hear, hear.) But that was not all ; the rare luxury of one Cabinet Min , eter only has it been permitted to us to enjoy in this debate; and yet that right hon. gen tleman filled his speech, not only with vinclications of his office—which, by the way, h td beenvenly very partially attacked —but also with a discreet admonition, to the effect that the loyalty of the House of Commons would be best proved, . and its character for wise discretion most effectively este bliished, by not expressing an opinion in the face of the country on the subject of that absent army which has suf fered so much, and which, in all its deeds of high heroic achievement, was sustained by the conviction, that when the hour came their wrongs would be criticised for the people of England. It may be a clever thing :ear the Lord President of the Council to be silent on this subject, and it may be discreet of his attendant Secretaries of State ; but I assert they have not acted withei full sense of duty in not seeking to obtain an expression of feeling, which is at MOO the soul and life of the Honse of Commons of this country. (Hear.) My right hon, friend the member for Droitwich has taken a course on this occasion which I consider is much to his credit, and one which will be appreciated by the country, and had this debate terminated with his speech I should have been silent. He has indicated the course which it becomes a Conservative oppe. salon, supporting the Ministry, to take. I cannot understand how right hon. gentlemen opposite can bring themselves to such a pitch of iecling or to rise and protest against the opinions of Parliament on the conduct of the Government. Last year I had to protest against this. coarse. No ineaettre was brought forward by the Governments—even though mea sures on which they were subsequently beaten—in which we were not teed to put the question to a vote of confidence on the part of the House of Commons. We have been told to night by the War Secretary the same thi sg. "Do not," he says, "indulge in captious criticism up en our conduct, or state what, perhaps, is the o pi n i on of the country, but pro pose a vote of want of eonSdenco in the G evernment." Sir, I had occasion last year to notice that unce.nstitationel course of proceeding on the part of the Govexament, and to show by reference to high authorities, to l'arliamenta7 pre cedents, which have great weight, how such a course, if generally adopted, would strike at the root of all freedom, of all public discussion: (Hear, hear.) I hold it to be the privilege of . members of this house to 021.17555 the conduct of the Government, without having the responsibility cast upon them individually of aski ng „ change of that Government. (Hear, hear.) If I recolle c t aright, it was in 1803 when this country had a Ministry which avas . unpopular carrying on the war, and an Opposition tupp ee t. big the policy of that war, while it, disapproved of its conduct, in that occesien Mr. Wyndham, no mean authority, I 13,6. same, a man of brilliant genius, qualified by large acquire ments and 'great experience, rose and said he trusted thet the unanimity of the nation on She subject o' the war would not be mistee ea for unanimity cf sentimene on.the conduct of the Ministry, and that he supported the poL cy of the war while he disapproved of the conduct of the elie istry. Mr. Wynd ham spok - e that as a member of the Opiosition. lie was followed by some of the most eminent menthers in the house, and no one impugned their privilege of quest outing the policy of the Government, or declared that they should be obliged to tot their opinions by proposing a vote of confidence or co condelence to t'arliament. (Hear, hear.) Yet, this repartee of legit Session is now again brought forward fo-uight ; and we are told by the Secretary at War, in speaking of minute details, not adverted to by my right two. friend the member fur leroitwich—in answering an anonymous accusation in the the public press—that if there was to be a question of the Ministerial conduct and policy, the sure of the house ought to be taken as to the question of coeddence. (Hear, heir.) I protest against this policy. (Hear, hoar) I see the object of it. (dear, hear.) It is to stop all discussion. (Hear, hear.) It is to degrade and destroy the li'ouse of Commons by putting an end to that free discussion which is the element and the atmospeere of its system, and witho - at which it cannot live. There was an hon. baronet who bore an honourable name, who rose early in the debate, and made use of a remarkable o.,sJrvation, founded on a misapprehension, which his acute mind should - have avoided. He alluded to a speech made by me last session, in which I said, speaking of the causesi of the war, that on this side of the house we confined our -elves to the propriety of discussing the causes of the war, but no capitous criticism would I hope be everheard (I speak from memory) on the exertions of a future Wellesley on tile banks of the Danube, whatever were the difficulties he might have- to encounter. That was an observation which referred to the military conduct of the war. It meantto say that we had not the presumption or the wish to criticise the abilities of those appointed to command, but that we should place in them the confidence which the country was ready to place in those whom the Govern ment in their wisdom appointed to those commands. Would the hon. baronet the member for Tamworth deny for a moment that it is the duty of the House of Commons to scan and scrutinise the military' expeditions that are planned and concocted in the Cabinet of the - Sovereign ? I suppose ho will not maintain that Walchereu expeditions are not to be criticised. He will not for a moment maintain that such convictions as Ciutra - and Saratoga are to be passed by in subdued silence. Why are we a House of leommons at all I What confidence have we of commanding the respect of the people if, when matters of national importance come before us, no national feeling is to be found in this house ; that we are to be mute, and a minister is to rise and say that if you discuss such a question at a period of difficulty to the Sovereign and the nation, we put on you the responsibility of a change of administration I That was a principle dangerous to public liberty, and one which they should not sanction, that the House of Commons, in a feeling of patriotism, should be silent. They were now called on to decide if they would argee to the Address which we have heard moved in terms echoing the speech from the Throne, a speech in some circumstances the most remarkable that had ever proceeded from that source, inasmuch as it was the shortest we have yet heard, and con fined to almost one subject. Let me, however, remind the house that it commences with an admission of great import ance, and one calculated to excite the attention of the whole country. We have the announcement that the country is engaged in a great war. This time last year, when we were on the verge of war, when it was virtually, not formally, de clared, no minister would acknowledge that the war was a great war. The Lord President was thou ready to re-organise this house, and the Chancellor of the Exchequer, in taking the votes for the expedition, brought forward a meagre esti mate for the conveyance of 25,000 troops to Malta and back e in the course of the year, although the house was theta willing to place in the hands of the Government as much power as the Emperor of Russia obtained by his ukase. Sir,, the Government had the most popular war, the most power ful ally, the most favourable combination of circumstanoes, with which any country ever had entered into war before ; and I now ask the house to consider—not whether there were sufficient nurses or surgeons at Scutari—not what may, have been the amount of marmalade sent out—(a laugh, and heat)—but what has been effected by this Ministry with such marvellous advantages ? (Hear, hear,) You designed to attack the powerful ruler of Russia in two opposite 'miler of the world—almost at the extremities of his vast dominions ; you fitted out armadas to attack him in two seas ; you sent out an army which was to baffle him on the banks of the most important river in Europe ; and what have you done f (Hear, hear.) The Secretary laf War sneered at the notice my right hoe, friend took of the achievements of the Baltic fleet; but. if the ideas of the Government as to national suc cess are to be measured by those achie'venrents, we have lest hope than before of a successful conduct of the war by the. present Government. (Hear, hear.) Let me recal to mind. the strength of the fleet—greater than any that had ever figured in our annals—greater than the Allied fleets of France and Spain which met Nelson at Trafalgar. Let me recal the circumstances under which the commani of that fleet was bestowed. It occasioned a debate in this house. (Hear, hear.) The head of the Admiralty—that prudent statesman —that experienced senator, who had so often presided over that department--(hear, and a laugh)--was a guest at the, public dinner given to the commander of that great enterprise_ (Hoar.) And the most experienced statesman of the country, one who had presided so long over our foreign councils—a department which it is supposed imparts the peculiar charac ' ter of discretion to the human conduct—(hear, hear, and laughter)—that noble lord was present on that occasion; and in the face of all Europe, before admiring and recklessigno rance--(hear)—these statesmen — the men of who m we are most proud—te whom we look eateohstioref guests gr th e 'or even awe—(a laugh) - th e y w u e p ro wi t t h h er t e h a e s at the banquet, given at a political club, to inaugurate the captaincy of this great enterprise. their speechesled country theto cherish I We . And what were the ex pectations are at this time necessarily and naturally engrossed in the all important affairs that have taken place in the Black Sea ; foe more than t w o months the feelings of every heart have bea m I absorbed in Sebastopol. But, sir, at that time no one thought o f aehastopol or the Black Sea. (Hear.) Those were minor matters in comparison with the vast enormous armada wafted from our shores under the blessing and the benison of our roost experienced statesmen, and which had the ad vantage of bell': commanded by a " true reformer." (Laugh ter.) W e ll, the Secretary-at-War pretends that the capture. of Bomarsund was all that was anticipated, or was arta thought of, at the time when the noble lord (Palmerston) and hie experienced colleague (Sir J. Graham) lent theirgredk names and illustrious reputations to the inauguration, of that great enterprise. (Hear.) I will not say that the noble lord had never hem of Bomarsund—he is such a well-Infornied gentleman that doubtless he knew all about it—(a laugh)— and, indeed, I have an idea that it was settled that the forti fications of Bomarsund were to be destroyed before our fleet entered the Baltic. (Hear, hear.) Now, I hardly think it was worth while to send for A Marshal of France and 10,000 French troops to destroy a place which a few ma rines would have destroyed in a few hews. (Hear, hear.) Certainly that was a sorry catastrophe for that vast! enter prise in which the noble lord and his wise colleague so deeply interested themselves on that memorable occasion. (Hear, hear.) Well, then, the expedition to the Baltic was not one which obtained results at all commensurate with the expectat!ons created by the Ministry themselves. If it were otherwise, why did not the noble lord (J. Russell) give no tice to-night of a vote of thanks to the admirals and ahem engaged in the transactions in the Baltic ? (Hear, hear.) If he had ventured to do so we mightihave made some inquiries and gained some enlightenment. Sir, I now come to the second of the two groat expeditions which this Government entered upon with advantages which no Ministry ever en joyed before, and which never can recur in the history of this country. What did you do with that army you sent to the vicinity of the Danube ? You explain you r cond u c t and their course, but your explanations cannot changeno the res ult ; you cannot deny that y ou accom plished (hear, hear) —and that your plans have proved har ren ta fru itl es s. (Hear, hear.) You tell us that you all that time the co urse of events ; that t his Were Watching Was the e xcuse for the inactivity of such of your forces calculations, al v" escaped the pest, which it appears had not entered into though it is an habitual tenant of that tell us that they would have acted at the ri ght accursed soil. Yon that their presence influenced the to have a dvanced lls ot ha th t e , ha Da d nu it h b e e , time, but armies. But you have never told conduct of the Russian neces sary for our army provided the means by which eynouhadPlished. (Loud cries of " he that advance could be aecona dared to meet that accusation. hear, hear.") No minititer has yet alluded to by the hen, (Hear, hear.) It has been who has stated . member for Alesbu bin Layard), that you had been the fate of Silistria, no mean s , . whatev er T might have upon the Danube that there. (Hear, hear.) you had. (H ear , 7 , o or the d position o s f t t o he : e x li on t roops you had ou n n o e m ve e r an dared il to deyclareratia army h ) But y whether you made that you ear. prepara tions or not , this you cannot deny, that, as on the Baltic, 80 on the Danube, you effected nothing. (Hear, hear.) And what did you effect in the third, now the most important division of your designs ? Late in the autumn, with a force, as far as we were concerned, of 20,0u0 or 25,000 troops, you invaded Russia. You beleaguered a fortress as strong as Gibraltar, and perhaps better provided. Under what cir cumstances did you undertake the enterprise ? The Secretary at War told us that he did not desire to blink the policy of the enterprise, and that it was to strike a blow at the power of Russia in the Crimea. Brave words: But if you attack a place at the wrong time, and w ith i na d eq uate means , the general policy of your plan will be no apology for your , conduct. (Rear, hear, hear.) )17 OM Wiz. Mewl the *ft, '