The Sun. — London, England, 1854-02-15 00:00:00

THE SUN, LONDON, 'WEDNESDAY EVENING, FEBRUARY 15, 1854. satisfied, required its ministers at Paris and London to ob tain written explanations, to know if a system of recipro city and an armistice was to be established iu the Black Sea, and if we were to remain neutral, which we certainly were not. The British and French fleets were there for the protection of the Turkish territory and flag, and to in sist that a weak power shonld not depend upon the will a a pewerfnl nation. To have declared ourselves neutral would have been to stultify ourselves, and to tie our hands for the future, and injure the very cause we wished to sup port. But my noble friend seems to complain that Russia was not allowed to transport her forces from one Russian port to another. Why, if we had permitted that, we should have had to remain passive spectators whilst large forces were being conveyed from Russian ports to Erzeroum and the most distant parts of the Black Sea, or to have passively witneased.the spectacle of the Tnrkish fleet inter fering with such an expedition and insulting it. That, my lords, would have been an anomaly ; but certainly Ido not think it so great an anomaly as the occupation of the Danubian principalities without a declaration of war, in order to obtain a power which could not be rightfully demanded or conceded without the sacrifice of the indepen dence of the Sultan. (Hear.) And although my noble friend takes the part of the Emperor of Russia, and says he has been very ill used, I think what has taken place cannot be very new to the Emperor of Russia, for I will which occurred • lordships' attention to a case analogous to it, wla occurred in the year 1850, and of which my noble friend must be more cognizant than myself, for he was a member s of the Government at the time. In 1850 the Emperor of Russia declared that he had constituted himself a pacifica tor between Austria and Prussia—that he wa s about to propose certain terms of arrangement to Prussia, upon which peace might be negotiated ; and when Prussia re jected the proposal, the Emperor of Russia declared that, although it would give him much pa in t° ° PP°sect to his ally Prussia, yet, that if she persisted in _ her rejection of the terms propos e d, he (the Emperor) should consider it a CaM3 belli; and further than that, he requested that the British squadron should be sent to cruse in the Balticwith the Russian fleet, in order to show thati were ld be were were determined that the disp ute son sett led, and all further resistance put down. Therefore Ido not thi n k that the Emperor of Russia can complain o f this as a ve r y new proceeding. (Hear , hear) I must apologise to your lordships for taking up so much your t ime, but I wished to notice the points to which my noble friend has adverted. My noble friend has rather treated with levity, or at least has viewed as insignificant, the attempts whi c h we h ave made to secure and cement the alliance between this coun try and France with Austria and Prussia ; but, my lords, 1 must say that even since the last occasion when I had the honour of addressing you, we have had fresh reason to be satisfied with the conduct of these two countries. My noble friend the other night complained of the deference which we have shown to them. [The Marquis of Clanri carde here made a remark which did not reach the gallery.] my noble friend even complained of Vienna being selected a s the place for holding the conference, although it was the mediation of the Austrian Government that had been asked for by the Russian Government, and one of the proceedings on which he based his objection was, because of the extra ordinary astuteness of the Russian minister at the Court of Vienna. I can only say that I wish that the same astute ness, or, as I should rather say, wisdom, had been displayed by the Russian Government itself ; for this minister ap proved of the Turkish modifications, and recommended his Government to adopt them ,• and if his advice had been followed I do not think that Russia would have stood in the isolated and unenviable position which it now occupies. But Austria and Prussia have come to three determina tions, which are recorded in separate acts—first, that the war, prolonged to whatever extent it.may be, shall not be suffered to alter the geographical limits previously settled between the belligerent Powers ; next, they have recom mended the terms of an honourable peace, which they say ought to be accepted by Russia ; and thirdly, they have recorded their conviction that the minter propositions of Russia are not such as to be worthy of being sent to Con stantinople. Therefore, through the joint action of Eng land and France, as well as Austria and Prussia, the means of assenting to an honourable peace have been placed in the hands of Russia. And, whilst I do not wish to pro nounce any unjust or harsh judgment, I must still say that there can now be no doubt what will be the individual opinion of mankind with respect to that Power which ap pears determined to plunge Europe into the incalculable horrors of war, when, with honour to herself, she might have averted it. (Cheers.) Certainly, Austria and Prussia, as I took the opportunity of saying before, a few days ago, have met the proposals of Russia in a manner becoming the dignity of independent Powers. Whilst England and France are preparing to go to war with Russia, and are determined to do so if necessary, with Austria and Prussia it rests to avert war, or, at least, to render it of short duration. (Hear, hear.) And, undoubtedly, the interests of these two Powers are in harmony with a noble and generous course which will bring safety abroad as well as at home, for they will have with them the universal opinion of Germany ; and revolution, my lords, will not rear its head, nor will England refuse its simpathy to countries which are faithfully endeavouring to perform their duties and obligations. (Loud cheers.) My lords, the answer of Austria was that so long as Russia main tained a defensive attitude, so long Austria did not feel it incumbent on her to act ; but now that Rus sia appears determined to go forth, and to push her intentions beyond that which she had led Austria to ex pect, Austria would be governed by a sense of her own in terest and dignity, and she had sent a large portion of troops to the frontier, first taking care to give satisfactory assurances to Turkey with regard to the object of this measure, and declaring that if armed intervention should become necessary to maintain the strictly legal and terri torial status quo, she would not refuse to join in it. The answer of Prussia was quite as dignified and decided • and an account of this intention of Prussia being known, I be lieve Count Orloff did not extend his mission t., Berlin ; and therefore I think that your lordships will be of opi nion that our endeavours to secure the alliance of Austria and Prussia, and our deference to those powers, have not proved in vain or been misplaced. I believe that the peo ple of this country, who, I must say in passing, have dis played the most admirable discretion during several months of great excitement and continuous misrepresentation. have not come to any decision on this subject, still less have they passed a judgment upon the Government under im perfect inf , rmation. And I say I cannot help believing that the people of this country, now that the flicts are fully before them, and they are possessed of proper infor mation, will not regret to find all the labour which the Government has spent in the cause of peace, but that, on the contrary, they would even now, at the eleventh hour, be desirous of preventing war, could it possibly be pre vented consistently with the honour and dignity of this country. (Hear.) And if it should be our duty to inform them that peace on those terms cannot be maintained, sure I am they will come forward in a manner worthy of Eng lishmen, worthy of the cause described by my noble friend, and worthy of the ally by whose side they will then for the first time find themselves ranged; that they will stop short at no sacrifice, at no effort to obtain such a peace as was glanced at by my noble friend—such a peace as will be consistent with the national honour, and will establish those principles which we are determined at any risk to maintain. (Cheers.) [The noble earl was occasionally only imperfectly heard.] The Earl of ELLESMERE wished to call their lord ships' attention to a subject of considerable importance. It appeared that, in consequence of the occurrences connected with the return of the fleets to Constantinople, there seemed to be an impression that a censure upon the admi rals was implied. This country was embarking in a wor thy cause—troops were being sent out which were never sent in vain, more particularly when sent for the protection of a weak State against the oppression of the strong, and he trusted that they would not be despatched upon any principle which would allow civil or diplomatic agents to interfere with the professional judgment of their com manders. Such cases had been known in English history, and the result had been disastrous. A gallant English general who had died for his country had been thwarted in his plans by such a system, and, their lordships knew that if it were not practised upon the greater man who suc ceeded him, it was only because he never would submit to it. He entirely concurred with his noble friend as to the great ability of our ambassador at Constantinople, and he thought it would he paying him a very bad compliment to extend his control to naval or military operations. With regard to the return of the fleets to Constantinople, it seemed to be generally allowed that they could not have remained at any plase more adapted for favouring the views of Russia than Siuope, and it was advisable to pause before taking any step which might en:ist in the service of Russia the fogs, the lee shores, and the ens rents of the Black Sea. The Earl of MALMESBURY hoped that the noble lord the Secretary for Foreign Affairs, would do him the justice of admitting that neither during the last session of Parlia ment, nor at the commencement of the present, had he pressed the Government, against their wishes, to lay any papers before their lordships when they declared that to do so would be to the prejudice of the public service. He had already stated to their lordships the reasons which led him to believe that her Majesty's Ministers had not taken the course best adapted for preventing the evils with which at present the country was threatened. He had at the close of the last session pressed the noble lord, the Secretary for Foreign Affairs to lay on their lordships' table a paper which was not of the same nature as the other papers, but which would have enabled him to give the country some idea, some notion, of the animus which guided the policy of her Majesty's Government The noble lord thought proper to refuse to produce even t,,hat_document whi c h was an answer t o th e c i rcu l ar i ssue d uount Nesselrode ; and it, therefore, appeared as if the noble ear l h a d not answered that circular,' while the French Government had done so. He (Lord 31alb could not, on perusing mesurY) the papers now before their lord ships' see any reason for refusing to roduce his reply to tb. bes4e t circular, that reply did the greatest credit to the noble earl. Still l reason w as th ere f or no t pro ducing the reply t o the first circular, because much had been said w , dch ought to have been l answered before the face of all Europe. There must, he wa s aware, be imper fection in the books as they were at present, because events had taken place since heyzdere first printed and laid upon the table; but a correspondence most intimately ceunected with what followed Lehr rt.% thee been pro duced at the same time. He referred .aunt Leiningen to Constantinople, and he pcieuelmlinsnsoidtontcohoanft veive thee such a mission could have taken the Emperor of Russia would not have observed its w ith jealousy, and have endeavou re d t o put himseleronrsea par in that Court as regarded any claim, or pretended claim, upon the Turkish Government. He also felt ju n _ tified in saying, after a careful perusal of the papers which had been laid upon the table, that the Russian Govern ment had been in the first place deceived as to the inten tion and feelings of her Majesty's Governnient ; and, in the second p l ace , that they had been confirmed in that opinion by the evident and positive want of identity of action be tweon England and France. This assertion with respect to the. impression of the Russian Government as to the feeling of the English Cabinet was confirmed by anextract from a despatch of Lord Stratford de Redcliffe after Prince Menschikoff made his first demand. Prince Menschikoff was feeling his way, in order, if possible, to have the co-operation of Lord Stratford ; and it appeared that that noble lord himself thought the opinion of Prince Menschikoff was not only that the British Government would not oppose his demands, but that they were actually inclined - to assist them. Now, when confidence was reposed in any person, it was always the result of some train of argument ou the part of those who so reposed it. What, than, could have been the reasons 'which induced Prince Menschikoff not only to believe that the) English Government would remain neutral in this Twitter, but that they would positively assist the Emperor ba his endeavours? What he had just read was the first symptom in these books of the impression—the unneces 'LlU and erroneous impression— which Russia bad that we 'should assist her. Still, there must have been some lan guage held elsewhere • there must have been some in ducement for the Russian Government to adopt these opinions and to inoculate Prince Menschikoff with these views. The next charge he had to make against the Go vernment wee with respect to the sending for the fleet. Colonel Rose, it appealed was quite justified in the alarms which had induced him to send for the fleet; he had been warned by all the consuls in the south of the Russian dominions and the north coast of Turkey that Russia was arming both by sea and by land ; and he was warned that Prince Menschikoff had ac tually threatened the Ministers of the Porte that Russia would consider it an act of hos tilitynegotiations proposed to them was r repeated e t a h t e ed fm t b o i e t c h t e o E f n a v n Ksh or the French ambassadors at Constantinople. This w as at once suspicious, and it was very natural that Colonel Rose, hearing this, and that Prince Menschikoff was, all it were, ashamed of hi s o wn propositions, and wished to keep them secret—it was most natural that he should ask for the fleet. But Colonel Rose did not ask that the fleet should go to the Dardanelles ; he merely requested that Admiral Dundas should advance to a fort open to every one, and where, he believed, our u fleet went every summer. Her Majesty's Government, however, differing , from Colon e l R ose an d a l so f rom t h e E m peror of the French, commanded Admiral Dundas to remain at Malta, and the consequence of that command he (Lord Malmesbury) maintain e d s till (and this book he thought proved it) was, that Russia was confirmed in the delusion under which she laboured—namely, that England and France were not on the same line. The noble marquis (Clanricarde) had read to their lordships the thanks which the Prime Minister received on that occasion from Count Nesselrode; and similar thanks were also given in the same letter to his noble friend (the Earl of Clarendon) who was looked upon a s a novas h omo, in whom Count Nesselrode had great hopes f or th e f u t ure, an d i n whom he t h oug h t h e might put great confidence. Count Nesselrode not only did that, but actually congratulated the Government on the want of unity in the two allies. Nothing, he thought, could confirm more than did all these transactions—espe cially this letter of Count Nesselrode to Baron Brunnow— the justice of the reproaches he (Lord Malmesbury) had directed to her Majesty's Government on a former occasion on this point. Although, however, the consuls had de clared these military preparations were going on—although Prince Menschikoff was convicted of attempting to conceal from the English and French ambassadors the negotiations he was commanded to open up at Constantinople—all this did not open the eyes of the noble lord the Secretary for Foreign Affairs. He (Lord Malmesbury) should have thought that after the noble earl's (Clarendon's) experience in Spain and in Ireland, the credulity inherent to the most generous mind might at least have been shaken by what he heard from the various sources open to him. Not at all. Long after these events had taken place his noble friend, on the 18th of April—a month after Colonel Rose had been so alarmed, and two or three months afterthe reports of the consuls, said : " I told Count Walewski that the same information had been communicated to her Majesty's Government by Colonel Dose, but I had reason to believe that the treaty in question would be a written agreement with respect to the Holy Places, and the mode of conducting divine worship and religious ceremonies there by the Greek and Latin communities." Well, if it was to be a written agreement with respect to the Holy Places—a subject with respect to which his noble friend (Lord Derby) and Lord John Russell had declared the English Government had no interest —if it was merely that, why should Prince Menschikoff attempt to conceal his proposals to the Turkish Government ? It would have been only fair to suppose that, had the Holy Places alone been the subject of his mission, he would have had no object in concealment, when it had been declared that the English Government had no inte rest in the matter. (Hear, hear.) His noble friend the Secretary for Foreign Affairs still, however, continued to believe in the good faith of the Russian Government. He (Lord Malmesbury) agreed that no policy could be so in jurious as a policy of suspicion, but however this might apply to the frequent expression of suspicions, it was a very different thing from their being entertained in the mind of a Minister from whom the utmost. vigilance and watchful ness were to be expected, and he was surprised at the con tinuance of the noble earl's delusion until the film was actually torn by force from his eyes. He (Lord Malmesbury) had said there had been a want of unity of action between the two Governments of England and France almost from the beginning. With respect to the calling up of the fleet by the ambassadors, it was, of course, a matter of discus sion in the English Cabinet whether that authority should rest with the Government at home or with the ambassa dor at Constantinople, and it was at last, and he thought very properly, given to Lord Stratford. When, however, had it been given ? It was given, according to this book, on the 2d of June ; and at that moment it did not appear, from these papers, that her Majesty's Government were aware that the French ambassador had had authority to call up the fleet of that country since the 22d of March. Now, that the French ambassador should have had that power must have been as well known to the Russian am bassador at Constantinople, and to the Turkish Government and everybody else concerned, as it was to himself ; and this example of want of unity of action must have made a strong impression upon the Russian Government, and have contributed to encourage the delusions and ambitious dreams of an obstinate man, who perhaps only wished for some such excuse to continue in the course he had entered upon. But there were other things which ought to have made the noble earl suspicious of the real objects of Russia, for Russian misrepresentations were not con fined to stating what was certainly not the fact with respect to the mission of Prince Menschikoff, but there were all sorts of misrepresentations made at different times with respect to the ambassadors themselves. A most gross accu sation was made in the first volume of these papers against Lord Stratford, who was charged by Count Nesselrode with having been the primary cause of the rejection by Red schid Pacha of Prince Menschikoff's demands. Such a charge was wholly unfounded, and Count Nesselrode, probably not believing his informant, refused the only remedy he could honourably have given—namely, an investigation into the source of this gross and undeserved accusation against an ambassador. That was not all. Strange misrepresentations were made as to the conduct, words, and actions of Lord Westmoreland at Vienna. All this ought to have convinced I her Majesty's Government that the cause which required such support could not have been a just one. Still, how over, they continued a course of negotiation ; and if he (Lord Malmesbury) were an older diplomatist he should say that that negotiation resulted in an accident in diplo macy which would never be forgotten. The Vienna Note was composed by men of undoubted talent and experience, and they, of course, as honourable men, wishing well to Turkey, and wishing to defend it against the aggressions and the unjust claims of Russia, framed such a note as they believed would answer the purpose. That note was forwarded to both parties, and. was at once accepted by Russia, Count Nesselrode saying, very suspiciously, that the Turkish Government ought to take it aux mains jointes. Redschid Pasha, however, refused to adopt it, and sug gested modifications. When the noble earl (Clarendon) sent the note to Lord Stratford, this was what he said about it— " Her Majesty's Government have, in preference to all other plans, adhered to this project of note as the means best calculated to effect a speedy and satisfactory solution of the differences. They consider that it fully guards the principle for which throughout we have been contending, and that it may, therefore, with perfect safety be signed by the Porte ; and they further hope that your Excellency, before the re ceipt of this despatch, will have found no difficulty in pro curing the assent of the Turkish Government to a project which the allies of the Sultan unanimously concur in recom mending for his adoption." That was the opinion of her Majesty's Government, but what was the view entertained by our ambassador? Lord Stratford wrote— " Though I scrupulously abstained from expressing any private opinion on the merits of Count Buol's Note while it was under consideratien at the Porte, I think it incumbent on me to state frankly to your lordship that the decision of the Council has in no degree surprised me. In making this avowal I have exclusively in view those passages of the note to which the Porte objects. It really appears to me, with all deference to your lordship's superior judgment, that the first two of the objectionable passages could hardly stand as they are without exposing the Porte to inferences not borne out by facts, and eventually to pretensions that it would be equally inconvenient, if not dangerous, to admit or to resist." Such was Lord St ra tf or d' s opinion an contradistinction to that of tho Ministry, who had said it could be accepted with perfect safety. Then the noble earl at the head of the Foreign-office wrote :-- "Her Majesty's Government are :far from denying that these modifications arc in themselvos unobjectionable ; but they do not consider them of that vital importance, nor that they offer such additional security to• Turkey, as to counter balance the risks to which the Ottoman empire is exposed by further postponing the settlement of this unfortunate question," So the noble earl stuck to his opinion, notwithstanding the representations of Lord Stratford , and, of course, he (Lord Malmesbury) concluded that tl se other diplomatists who drew up the Note remained of the same opinion as the noble earl. Who, however, tun sed out to be right ? The question must have remained a. :matter of opinion to this moment but from a starling despatch from Count Nes selrode himself, interpreting the °tip nal Note which his Government had accepted, and refasi ng and scouting the Turkish modifications. The Porte wars, therefore, justified in the eyes of his would-be friends fo r refusing to accede to the Vienna Note. He (Lord Malrnessbury) could imagine the extraordinary confusion which w ould be caused in this body of diplomasts at Vienna at 1 earning that they had composed a Note in direct contradict ion to what they had meant it to be. Then, as events vre:nt on, there was ano ther, and he thought very remakab le proof of disunity of action between the French and English Governments —a disunity which was at once la id before the Rus sian Prime Minister, and was main rally remarked upon by him—he referred to the order evon with respect to the objects of the fleets in being sent to. the Black Sea. It ap peared that when the fleets were so sent it became the duty of the ambassadors at Constantin.nde to acquaint Count Nesselrode with the fact. The de snatch which contained this intimation was by direction of th e French Government to be road to the Count by Genera Castelbajac, but the substance only was to be repeated to. him bySirG.Seymour. Both Governments stated that the. :fleets were going into the Black Sea to defend the territc ,r 3• of Turkey, and at the same time the English Governmen - t a.lded that they would do their utmost to prevent the Tui •Itissh fleet from making any attack on the Russian fleet. T ha t, however, was omit ted in the French despatch. Now. -their lordships would see at once the very great different e in the orders given, and that difference had evidently s na de a deep impression upon Count Nesselrode, who point ed it out to Sir G. Sey mour. Then, there was another d iscrepancy as to the ob jects of the fleets which he (Lord! M.) as totally unable to account for. In a communicatio a to Baron Brunow, the noble earl (Clarendon) said the fleets ; had made the move ment in question to avert the da tigers which seemed to threaten the lives and property of bier Majesty's subjects. Five days afterwards, Oct. 7, the - noble earl had, however, to write to our ambassador at Pars a mpon this subject, and his words were these : " It, therefore, appears advisable. to her Majesty's Govern ment that general instructions shoe dd be given to the ambas sadors and admirals to employ the combined fleets in what ever manner, and at whatever plact !, they may think neces sary for defending the Turkish te: rri tory against direct ag gression. If the Russian fleet were to come out of Sebastopol the fleets would, as a matter of tour pass through the Bos phorus." It was not, therefore, for the excl asi ve object of defending her Majesty's subjects in the Blac' tS ea, but positively (and he was very glad to say so) to del em I the Turks and to de fend their just claims. Why, the n, in the name of all that was straightforward—why not t ell Baron Brunow that? He was the very man who ought to have been told ; his mind ought to have been stroi ly impressed with the fact that the fleets were to mains ia in the independence of Turkey, the status quo, and the t irritorial arrangements of Europe. Such an omission on t ho part of the Govern ment only reac t e d upon themsely et ,• the Baron, of course , tl transmitted to his Governmen t that statement • and it tended f ur th er to deceive the I iu ssian Government as to the vigorous course which her Mrsje sty's Ministers were at last determined to follow. The sae se infirmity of purpose and want of courage pervaded the 1 whole of their policy luring these transactions. How • did the noble earl treat that event which must be regarded as one of the most important in the whole series—the invasion of the princi palities ? With the same excessive politeness, the same extreme tenderness, the same --4 se had not language to express the manner in which the not de earl had treated the question of the invasion of the prig cipalities. What was the language of the noble earl on the occasion? One might have supposed that an English Minister would have mani fested his opinion of so gross a violation of treaties, of so gross an outrage upon humanity—upon justice, in terms of the most emphatic condemnation, however civilly and courteously framed. But what said the noble earl in com municating to Sir G. Seymour the conversation he had had with Baron Brunow on the 22nd of July ? " I have communicated to Baron Brunow the substance of my despatch of the 19th inst. to you, and informed him that I had not alluded in it to the evacuation of the principalities as a necessary and immediate consequence of an arrangement of differences between Russia and the Porte, because I thought it would be little less than an insult to the Russian Government to suirpose, after the public assurances that bad been given on the subject, that any portion of the Turkish territory would be occupied by Russian forces for a day longer than was necessary for their evacuation, when the question at issue between the two Governments was amicably settled." Rosily, this language of the noble earl reminded him (Lord Malmesbury) of a very timid master of the ceremonies in a town near his residence, who, upon being requested one night at the assembly to turn out a very ferocious looking personage who had entered the ball room with his hat on, replied,—" Oh, have patience ; no doubt he'll take his hat off by-and-by." (Much laughter from the Opposition benches.) Neither was there mention of the occupation of the principalities in the famous Vienna Note, an omission of the most extraordinary description. (Hear.) He trusted that none of their lordships would suppose that he was blaming the Government for not having taken hostile measures sooner ; it was not that he complained of ; he did not compiain of the efforts they had made to maintain peace—an object he valued as much as any of their lordships ; what he conceived was, that they had mistaken the best way of obtaining the Object. They should have borne in mind that they had to deal with a man of absolute power, a man of strong feelings, of strong passions—a man who had an hereditary fixed idea firmlyimpressed on his mind that it was decreed that either he or his descendants should occupy Constantinople. Having to deal with a man full of these feelings and this prejudice, and of the most obstinately determined cha racter, the English Government should have seen, at the outset, that he was only to be deterred from his purpose by having it distinctly manifested to him, in the most emphatic language and manner, that dangers greater than any glory or advantage he could hope to gain from his ob ject would inevitably befall him as the result of attempting it. Hear, hear.) They should have made him from the very first distinctly understand that the existence of an independent Sovereign at Constantinople was a political necessity to England and to France, fully equal to that which he might deem Russiain postession of Constantinople to be, and that England and France were resolute, at all cost, to - vindicate that necessity. (Hear.) It had been lightly asserted, and by a man of eminent ability, too, that it was matter of little consequence to whom Constan tinople belonged, and that there was no sort of political objection to its being in the hands of Russia. Now, in his (Lord M.almesbury's) conviction, not merely with reference to our supremacy as a maritime Power , but with reference even to our security as an empire, it would be as fatal to us to have Constantinople in the hands of Russia as it would be to have Ireland in the hands of an in dependent Sovereign. (Hear.) We knew that Russia had, at this moment, 27 sail of the line in the Baltic, and 15 sail of the line in the Black Sea. Without spending one farthing more than at present on her navy, Russia might have 37 sail of the line in the Black Sea, and how, then, could the great force be kept from being avail able against us, if the Autocrat so desired ? Onoe in pos session of the Bosphorus, thus rendered impregnable, this fleet so unassailable from without, might rush, at any moment into the Mediterranean, and then in what posi tion would Malta or Corfu be, with such garrisons as we had there now ! In what a position would English power in the Mediterranean be, maintained by five or six sail of the line we had kept up for some years past ! Nor would the relative position of France, in such a contingency, be better than that of England, for it was quite fallacious to say that France had a less interest than we in the posses sion of Constantinople by the Russians. Their lordships would at once perceive this when they reflected what would be the position of France when she had 37 Russian ships of the line within four or five days' sail of Toulon and of her Algerine colonies. Unquestionably, then, it was pre-eminently worth while for these two great nations to apply their utmost efforts, how great soever the calami ties and the cost of war, to avert such a catastrophe as the occupation of Constantinople by Russia. Had it been timely declared to the Autocrat that England and France were resolute to defend the independence of Turkey with their last soldier and their last shilling, he would then have comprehended the gravity of the undertaking he had entered upon, when, without the least provocation, he urged upon Turkey a series of demands which no inde pendent Sovereign could with dignity accept, and which no independent nation should have heard of without utter and open indignation. (Hear, hear.) Lord GLENELG thought that no documents had ever been produced by any government which on the whole were more satisfactory than these. He look at them generally, and spoke of their general effect. Government had a good cause, and he thought it highly creditable to them that negotiations having been carried on for so long a time, and in so many quarters, that they should be able to produce such documents. They deprecated war as the greatest of evils, but they knew that there were evils to which war itself was not to be compared. They condemned war, but they thought war essential at the same time they had endeavoured to avert war. And what was the main objection? Why that they had delayed it too long. There were men who treated the calamity of war with comparative lightness. He could not blame Government for having so long deferred war, from having tried every expedient by which they could escape from war. That was the position in which the Government was placed towards the country at this period. The objections made by the noble earl (Malmesbury) resolved themselves intotwo. One was that the noble earl at the head of the Foreign office showed too much timidity, and the other was that he had expressed himself in a despatch with too much tender noses. He would appeal to any assembly of gentlemen in England, if they could find fault with any one for having confidence in the assurances which were made by a man remarkable for not deviating from his representations —by a man who has been marked by wisdom and moderation, and given too under circumstances which commanded the belief not only of this Government, but of every Govern ment of Europe. He concurred most cordially in every word that had been said by the noble earl (Clarendon), and he considered the conduct of Lord Stratford de Red cliffe in this matter had placed him in a favourable light among diplomatists. He considered that Government had acted wisely in incurring delay rather than rush into the calamities of war. Many statesmen had rushed into war and gained great glory who would afterwards have given worlds to have prevented it. What was it that made Sir Robert Walpole so popular in succeeding generations ? It was because he resisted war, and, though condemned by the country at the time, posterity had since done him ample justice. He thought the verdict of posterity would be pronounced in favour of the course which the Govern ment had pursued ; and, if we were to have a war, he hoped it would be carried on with vigour. (Hear.) Earl GREY said the fault of the Government was in having permitted themselves to be drawn into the original quarrel between Turkey and Russia; and arguments were not wanting to show that they ought to have pursued a more pacific course. Because Russia had done wrong, it did not follow that we should interfere on behalf of Tur key, as we had no treaty to entitle us to do so. But it was said that our interference was required upon grounds of national policy, because it was of European importance to maintain the independence of Turkey. It was bitter mockery to talk of the independence of the Ottoman em pire; and he called upon the Government to define what they meant by it. Did they mean by it the authority of the Sultan over his subjects. The character of the Turks was that which it had always been. This was proved by their harsh and cruel treatment of the Christian population, in which it was hopeless to anticipate any permanent improvement. This, he contended, was the expectation entertained, as appeared from their respective despatches, both by the Foreign Secretary and Lord Stratford de Redcliffe. He quoted Mr. Layard to show that the Christians were treated with extreme tyranny and a total want of faith. Such being the character of Turkey, he asked whether the mainten ance of the Ottoman empire, which would perpetuate such evils, could possibly be an object for which this c o unt r y ought to make any sacrifice whatever ? But it was said that Turkey must be maintained as a security against the aggressions of Russia. Now he was unable to concur in the popular apprehensions of Russian aggression— first, be cause a nation of slaves could never become really formid able ; and next, because corruption and peculation were destroying the efficiency of the public service of Russia. He ridiculed the notion of a Russian invasion of India ; and, adverting to the despatches, expressed an opinion that peace would have been preserved if Turkey had been allowed to accept the Russian ultimatum. He drew a pic ture of the evils to Turkey and her allies, resulting from the adoption of the opposite course, and suggested the pos sibility of a Greek insurrection aided by Russia. Should such an event occur—and it was far from improbable— would the people of England and France consent to inter fere 612 behalf of the Mahometan, while Russia defended the Christian population ? He thought not. The inevit able result of such a rising must be the destruction of the Turkish empire ; and where then would be the utility of our interference ? What should we have gained by it ? Having dwelt upon the inexpediency of interfering with the affairs of other countries, the noble earl concluding by declaring that in his opinion the course which her Ma jesty's Government had entered upon was pregnant with danger. The D eke of ARGYLL rejoiced that the speech of the noble earl had been 4, elivered, because, from the facts on which he relied, it was possible to educe the strongest argu ments in. favour of the policy adopted by the Govern ment. The Government was not officially responsible for the Turkish rejection of the Menschikoff ultimatum. That was the act of Turkey alone ; but, at the same time, Russia had no right to demand the Menschikoff note, and therefore the question was whether the weaker State should be sacrificed to the stronger. The object of the Government was to maint a i n th e s tatus quo of Europe; for, if Russia had succeeded in fixing new engagements upon Turkey, she would not only have endangered the existence of the Turkish empire, but would have inter rupted the progress of the Christian population. The real issue before the house, however, was, whether peace would have been better secured by what was called more ener getic action. Glancing at the circumstances, he argued that the sa.fest measures had been taken to secure this ob ject, both diplomatically and with regard to the move ments of the fleet. It was perfectly true that there might be some danger of a rising of the Christian population ; but he reminclod the house that it was made the condition of giving the Ottoman empire an European guarantee that she should secure the privileges and immunities of its non- Mussulmau subjects. Nothing had occurred to lead the Government to regret the course they had pursued. In conclusion., the noble duke vindicated the Earl of Aber deen from the attacks made upon him for his efforts to maintain p 3aCe. The Earl of DERBY—My lords, I thought after the discussion that has taken place that there wasnothing of a practical character to which I should have to draw your attention, but I feel that the observations which fell from the noble d uke call for some reply from those who do not altogether share in his views—very natural as they are— of the po'li'cy and of the skill with which those diplomatic relations h ave been conducted. (Hear.) I think it must be gratifying to the noble earl, whose defence the noble duke undertook at the close of his speech, and it must be a somewhat agreeable surprise to that noble earl to hear himself charged with not being sufficiently pacific. (Laughter.) The noble earl was charged by a noble lord on the lifers r bench with having indulged too much in the spirit of Iva ,r, and with not being sufficiently pacific, and I see the noble earlaccepts the compliment, and is somewhat penitent tha t he has not done more to preserve the peace of Europe. The noble earl might have done more, I admit, than he has done to preserve the peace of Europe, but he should have done it in a very different manner from that which bac been adopted. (Hear, bear.) My noble friend on the cross benches has made an eloquent statement, and indulged in declamation on the horrors of war, which no person is contesting, and he compared the noble earl and her Majesty's Ministers to Walpole, without his little pec cadilloes—(laughter)—or his Parliamentary corruption, from which they are all free. (Laughter.) My noble friend, said the noble earl, was another Walpole—not the warlike Minister which another noble lord considered him to be, and which the noble earl seemed disposed to consider himself to be—(laughter) —my noble friend said the noble earl was another Walpole, but more successful and happy in the issue; and then, said my noble friend on the cross benches, if a different course had been pursued—if you had prematurely gone to war, and used violent language and taken violent measures, the country would have been plunged into the horrors of war, from which the successful diplomacy of the Government has preserved it. if they have not preserved the country from the horrors of war, where is the truth of the eulogium which the noble lord has passed on the noble earl opposite ? (Hear, hear.) He s ays—Were it not for the successful diplomacy of the noble earl, we would have been plunged into war—where are we now ? (" Hear, hear," from the Opposition benches.) Are we plunged into war, or are we not ? (Hear, hear.) It is very like war. (Laughter.) The noble lord the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs is too cautious in his language in this respect to tell us whether we are at war or at peace (Hear, hear.) He says it is a very natural question we ask, and he informs us, most truly, that it is not very easy to give a distinct answer to it. (Laughter.) He says, we certainly are not at war—we certainly cannot be said to be at peace, says my noble friend ; and he says also that, when we consider the course of the negotiations, and what has taken place in the Black Sea, and the passing of our fleet there, we cannot be supposed to be a neutral power. (Laughter.) I want to know what is the state of the country, when we are neither at peace nor at war, nor neutral. (Laughter.) My noble friend has given us a new phrase in Parliamentary or diplomatic language; we are not at war, nor at peace, and we are not neutral, but we are drifting towards war. (Laughter.) We are drifting to wards war, and drifting very fast towards war. (Hear, hear.) When we are sending out the most powerful fleet that England ever equipped to the Baltic—when we have another fleet in the Black Sea—when a considerable de tachment of troops are to land some way or other in a foreign country. I suppose not for pacific purposes, I think the symptoms are very strong that we are drifting somewhat rapidly towards war. (Hear, hear.) No infor mation havi•l; been given to us of the grounds on which the noble earl—the warlike Minister of this country — (laughter)—founds his hopes of maintaining peace, I must, come to the conclusion that a fortunate result to the Wal polean policy has not been arrived at, and that they have landed this country into a war. (Hear, hear.) The ques tion is not whether peace in the abstract is desirable, or whether Government is to be charged for having used every effort to maintain peace. As long as they endea voured with honour, and a due regard to the interests of the country; to maintain peace, every man must commend them for using every exer ti on for the preservation of peace; but they must tell us whether the course they pursued was likely to effect that object. On that subject I concur in the opinion which was expressed in the month of July last by one in whose praise the house has been unanimous —to whose praise I can add nothing, except my cordial con currence in every word that has been said in laudation of his discretion, firmness, and judgment, and whose opinion, I suppose, will be received with respect by her Majesty's Ministers (Hear.) I concur with Lord Stratford de Red. cliffe in thinking that " our intense anxiety to maintain peace, notwithstanding the progress of circumstances preju dicial to its contiivance, though derived from our best feel ings, may eventually go far towards frustrating the object, without preventing the occurrence of a war." In the month of July last, Lord Stratford de Redcliffe used this lan guage : "In no direction is the prospect a cheering one. Negotiation, if not in despair, appears to beat fault ; and, should a resort to force be unavoidable, the struggle must necessarily be sharp and the issue uncertain. In any case, nothing can be worse than a hesitating, uncalculated course. It is, no doubt, a misfortune for Europe to be dragged, when least expecting it, to the verge of an arena from which it is difficult to recoil, and upon which it is almost impossible to enter with any limitation of conse quences. But let it be remembered that an evil which is postponed or evaded is liable to recur with more inconve nience and danger at no remote period, and that by ven turing at once to look it in the face, we afford ourselves the best chance of viewing it in its true proportions, and employing the most judicious means for its correction." My noble friend the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs expressed great satisfaction that this subject should have been brought on for discussion ; but at the same time he regretted that my noble friend the noble marquis, who has entered into a most able and eloquent analysis of those papers should have felt it necessary at this moment to dis parage the conduct of her Majesty's Government. No doubt it would be a very agreeable mode if the discussion of public papers, involving two large volumes and the whole of the conduct of the Government, were to take place, subject to this provision, that no person who takes part in the dis cussion should say a word to disparage her Majesty's Go vernment ; but if the noble earl thinks that such a doctrine should be held, I cannot join with him in the opinion that he expressed, that it would be necessary to bring the sub ject before Parliament at all. The noble earl the Secretary of Foreign Affairs , in another part of his speech, says you have an ex poet facto wisdom and judge of events after the occurrence has taken place, but, he says, put yourselves in the position we were in at the particular time, and then say whether we were to blame or not. Now, my lords, I will call the attention of the house to the intimation which we received on the 25th of April last, at which period the noble earl assured the house that there n3ver was the slightest apprehension of any disturbance on the side of Turkey, and that the peace of Europe was subject to no risk in that quarter. On what did the noble earl then found the assurance given to the house, that there was no apprehension of a disturbance of the peace of Europe on the side of Turkey ? The as surance was given by the Russian Government so re peatedly and constantly that it was impossible for him to admit into his mind a moment's hesitation of their com plete veracity. But the question is not whether the Go vernment received those assurances from Russia, but whe ther reports of their various ministers coincided with those pacific assurances and declarations. (Hear, hear.) I shall bring very shortly under the notice of the house the in formation of which the Government was in possession on the 20th April, when the noble earl assured us there was no apprehension of any disturbance of the peace of Europe on the aide of Turkey. (Hear, hear.) I will not go back to an earlier period further than to say, that from the very moment of the change of Administration, by which the noble earl's colleagues took office—from that moment, and I believe in one instance before that time, intimations were given to the Government that, for the promotion of its objects, military forces were preparing on the part of Russia. (Hear, hear.) That information was given so early as the 6th of January, and again on the 7th and Bth of January. On the 6th of January, page 56, Sir George Seymour says—" I believe that measures have been taken by the Russian Government to ensure that the fifth corps d'armee shall be placed in a state of actual service"— The Earl of CLARENDON—That arrived here on the 19th. The Earl of DERBY—On the 7th of January there came an account of the amount of force that was pre paring to move, and again on the Bth of January, Sir George Seymour writes that that was all that Count Nes selrode could tell him—of the extent of those armaments Count Nesselrode was not prepared to speak with cer tainty—that orders were given to the sth corps to march, and that directions were issued to the 4th corps to hold itself in readiness, and his Excellency Count Nessel rode expressed his belief that affairs would be brought to a satisfactory conclusion if efforts were used in Paris and Constantinople to advance the rights which his Go vernment claimed, and to discountenance the pretensions of the french Cabinet. (Hear, hear.) Again, on the 7th of April, there was a similar note as to the preparations made for war and the movement of troops, and though Count Nesselrode did not then feel at liberty to give to Sir George Seymour any assurance respecting the military preparations, he did not hesitate to declare that the nego tiations at Constantinople would be brought speedily to a happy conclusion. (Hear, hear.) You have from Sir George Seymour accompanying that a declaration on his part that the answer of Count Nesselrode on the subject was evasive to the last degree—you had from Col. Rose, and from your consuls in the neighbourhood, notifications that the Russians were concentrating upon the frontier, or were evidently to be moved upon the frontier, and ready to cross the frontier at a moment's - notice. (Hear, hear.) At pages 60 and 61 you will find one of those warnings. A further intimation was given lby Sir George Seymour to the effect that he had heard, from good authority, that the head-quarters of the 4th corps had removed to a place close to the boundaries. On receiving that statement the Secretary of State waited for the receipt of further de spatches, before replying to the communication respecting the removal of the 4th corps. It was hoped that the dis cretion of the Emperor would prevent him from taking so warlike a step ; and it was said by Lord John Russell that this hope appeared to be well founded. In answer to a communication from St. Petersburg, to the effect that the 4th and sth corps were on the borders of the Turkish fron tier, and prepared to enter into the provinces at any mo ment, Lord John Russell said that this confirmed the hopes he entertained that the Emperor of Russia would never take so warlike a step—(hear, hear)—" that since the question of the holy places had been noticed by the Rus sian Minister to the Earl of Malmesbury it had assumed a new character ; that the acts of injustice towards the Greek Church, which it had been desired to prevent, had been perpetuated, and consequently that now the object must be to find a remedy for these wrongs; that the suc cess of the French negotiations at, Constantinople was to be ascribed solely to intrigue and violence—violence which had been supposed to be the ultima ratio of kings, being, it had been seen, the means which the present ruler of France was in the habitof employing in the first instance." And Sir Hamilton Seymour further stated that Count Nesselrode said that " when his Majesty's resolution is finally taken it will be made known to Baron Brunow, who is desired to communicate with your lordship, and to ob lain the approbation of her Majesty's Government to the steps about to be taken by the Emperor for securing his acknowledged rights." What I wish to show is, that the language of Russia was over and over again the same, and it showed that it was determined to carry out the objects it had in view, and the only difficulty which it saw in its way was, as has already been stated, the union which it hoped would not exist between the English and French Governments, and the nature of its hostile intentions to wards Turkey —or, rather, its violent intentions—con stantly coupled with assurances of confidence in the inten tions of her Majesty's Government, and with repeated at tempts to sow dissensions between the English and French Governments, as the union of the two Governments would, it was felt, render success uncertain. The noble dukeoppo site had reminded the house that their lordships ought to draw a distinction between the course of proceedings as between England and France in the earlier period of the transacti on and the later times. I admit the propriety of tho distinction drawn by the noble duke, as far as relate to the time at which the question was confined merely to that of the holy places ; because not only the present but the preceding Government had declared their opinion that so long as the question was confined to a dispute as to the holy places, so long as there was no object requiring the interference of England, so lone. her Majesty's Government was determined to hold themselves p aloof from the dispute except so far as the dispute might in any way affect the interests of this country. But then the question as sumed a very different aspect when the subject of the dispute of the holy places was to be settled not by dip lomacy, but by the collection of troops upon the Turk ish frontier. And under these circumstances it was that so early as the 28th of January M. Drouyn do Lhuys, through the French ambassador, had called the attention of the Government to the necessity of there being a perfectly correct understanding of the respective positions of the two Governments, the necessity of a good understanding between England and France, and for concerting measures, not for the purpose of settling the question of the holyiplaces, but for the purpose of opposing a successful remonstrance to that threatened measure of war on the part of Russia, indicated by the constant col lection of troops near the Turkish frontier. And that I am not misrepresenting the views which were taken of the question at the time will be found from a declaration already quoted of the noble lord the Secretary for Foreign Affairs, to the effect that, at that time, the 2Ah of Jan., he saw cause for thinking that it was absolutely necessary that the two great powers should understand each other, and that he would take into his immediate consideration the measures in consequence. (Hear. hear.) What, then, becomes of the argument of the noble deice, that until after the mission of Prince Menschikoff the English and French Governments had acted separately and alone, and that the question of the holy places only was in discussion, when his colleague acquiesced in the view of M. Drouyu de Lhuys of the 28th of January, that it was absolutely necessary that England and France should act in accord ance with each other, not, undoubtedly, for promoting the views of France with respect to the holy places, but for the purpose of providing against a contingency which they expected might arise from the course pursued by Russia ? Now, I am told that there was no end of assurance from Russia—such assurances, indeed, as it was impossible to doubt—that there was but one object, and one alone, which Russia had in view. Now Ido not wish to defend the course taken by Russia. I cannot defend the course of proceeding or conduct of that power; but this I must say, that from the first to the last of Count Nesselrode's despatches, it was distinctly stated that the question of the holy places, in the view of Russia, always involved the protectorate of the Greek subjects of the Porte. The two points were never kept separate a single moment in the view of Russia. The Emperor of Russia contended that under the treaty of Kainardji, he was entitled to the pro tectorate over the Greek subjects of the Porte. It was contended that it would not be a violation of the in dependence or integrity of the Ottoman empire that such a protectorate should exist in the hands of Russia. I do not mean to say that both these positions on the part of Russia were not utterly untenable, and if she obtained such a sight as she assumed they would be fatal to the integrity and independence of the Porte ; but, from first to last, that question upon which we have finally come to issue—the protectorate to be exercised by Russia—was never dissociated from the question of the holy places. No man in his senses could suppose that it was the mere possession of this key of a grotto—(a laugh)—that was alone influencing the conduct of Rnssia. The object of Russia was, that her protectorate which she said, and falsely said. had been violated—should, in point of fact, be exercised over the whole of the co religionist subjects of the Turkish empire. Russia asserted over and over again that she had no desire to overthrow the Turkish empire. Certaidy not, because nothing would snit the purposes of Russia better than that Turkey should remain as she now is —that she should not be divided into a number of independent principalities which would exist on the frontiers of Russia—that there should not be esta blished in its place a principal Byzantine empire—and that the kingdom of Turkey should not be split up into a num ber of free republics. But so far as the control of Russia was concerned, it was much better for her that she should have the opportunity and plausible righ • of interfering with her power over ten or eleven millions of the subjects of the Sultan, and most of all that that right should appear to be confined to her by new and extended constructions given to the treaty of Kainardji. Upon that it was that Russia founded her pretensions, and that she wished to enforce them. Russia never concealed this, but at all times in variably claimed it in her demands with respect to the holy places. It was not in connection with Prince Menschikoff's mission that for the first time that claim was raised. You had been told over and over again, before the 25th of April, that the question of the holy places was a secondary object only, and the information had reached the noble lord the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, before he made that speech to which I have alluded. Before that speech of the 25th of April was made, you had information to this effect from Colonel Rose and from Lord Stratford de Radcliffe. Col. Rose distinctly told you that whatever Russia might tell you, she was endeavouring secretly to negotiate a treaty at Constantinople, which was to be kept secret from the powers of England and France, and that she was seeking to enter into an alliance offensive and defensive with Turkey, and that, in return for the protec torate to be established in her favour, Russia was ready to give a fleet and four hundred thousand men to Turkey if she ever needed aid against any Western Power what ever. Now that intelligence had reached the noble lord at a time when he assured us that he placed implicit re liance and confidence in the assurances and statements. of Russia, and that upon the side of Turkey not the slightest danger of a rupture was to be feared. (Hear, hear.) Whatever might have been the assurance of Russia, she would reconcile this assurance with the present state of things by the declaration to which I have referred—that she does not now desire the dismemberment of the Turkish empire, that she founds her claim upon the treaty of Kai nardji, and contends that under that treaty she has the right to the protectorate, and that all these questions are in cluded in the settlement of that regarding the holy places. That is the argument of Russia. But whatever might have been the assurance of Russia, you received the intelligence on one and the same day of the disclaimer on the part of Russia of any hostile attempts on the independence of Turkey, and a notification from Colonel Rose of the conclu sion of the attempts to establish a secret treaty, to which you were to be no party, and from which you were to be sedulously excluded; and you received also at the same time statements from two of your consuls of formidable Russian forces being collected upon the frontiers of Turkey. You received on one and the same day these three notices, and you tell us on the 25th April that you have a perfect, absolute, and unhesitating reliance in the friendly assur ances of Russia. I have, according to the wish of the noble duke, thus placed her Majesty's Government in the position in which they desired to be placed, not as we view events now, but as the Government must have seen them on the 25th of April. Subsequent to that time Sir Hamilton Seymour had a long discussion with Count Nesselrode, though by no means a satisfactory one, on the subject of a previous despatch of the noble earl the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs; in this communication Count Nes selrode had said :—" That from the substance of his de mands his Imperial Majesty would not recede, and a dreadful responsibility would be assumed by any Go vernment which, by counselling the rejection of the demands, might bring about the downfall of the Ottoman empire." This was subsequent to the mission of Prince Menschikoff, and when seeking to establish openly the protectorate over the Turkish empire which it had been all along the object of Russia to obtain. Writing to Sir Hamilton Seymour, on the 7th of June, the noble earl states, " Your despatch of the 27th of May"—this is the despatch which intimates the intention of the Emperor not to recede from his demands—" has been the cause of great surprise and regret toher Majesty's Government. It is a source of deep regret to her Majesty's Government that upon questions of such a nature any misunderstanding should have arisen with the Government of his Imperial Majesty. But my despatch of the 30th ultimo will have placed you in possession of the views of her Majesty's Go• vernment upon the subject, and further comments are unlikely to lead to any useful result, while they might produce feelings of irritation, which it is the anxious desire of her Majesty's Government to avoid. On the 30th of May, just previous to the occupation of the princi palities, Sir. G. H. Seymour, writing to Lord Clarendon, said :—" At the close of our conversation Count Nesselrode observed that it could not be denied that the state of affairs was very alarming—that the position of the Emperor was one from which it was impossible for his Majesty to recede —and that he would not conceal from me that a continued rejection of the terms offered to the Porte would be fol lowed by the issue of orders for the entrance of the Russian armies into the Principalities. His Excellency was desirous of remarking to me that war could hardly be undertaken by the Sultan under more disadvantageous circumstances than when it was brought about by a refusal of those condi tions the acceptance of which was so warmly desired by the whole Greek population of Turkey, and which carried with theta the sympathy of the co-religionists of that country." That is a distinct statement, not only that the Emperor of Russia will not recede, but that he will enforce his demands by marching his troops into the Principalities. It is utterly inconsistent with the friendly feeling professed by the Em peror of Russia. But when was the first notification made which produced any effect on her Majesty's Government ? What was the language in which you met that threat and an nouncement ? Remember it was not then a fait accompli. It was announced that in the course of a certain time —six Weeks—these instructions would be carried out ; that in the event of the rejection by Turkey of the treaty which your Minister, in concert with all his colleagues in Constan tinople, had declared to be degrading, derogatory, and fatal ' to the independence of Turkey— that in that case the troops would march forward and occupy the principalities as ‘, a material guarantee" for the fulfilment of those demands against Turkey. Now, what is the language used by her Majesty's Government in reply to this threat ? Is there no remonstrance made ?—no attempt made to point out the gross nature of these proceedings ?—no attempt to throw upon the Emperor the responsibility, if such a step were taken, of drawing the whole of Europe into a collision ? or no attempt to tell him that, if he was the first to draw the sword, he would be responsible for the fatal conse quences which might ensue ? Quite the reverse. The lan guage of the noble earl opposite was :—" The Emperor cannot doubt the warm feelings of friendship towards himself enter tained by our gracious Sovereign, and his Imperial Majesty must be also aware that it is alike the duty and the desire of her Majesty's Government to maintain the most cordial rela tions with Russia, feeling how essential such relations are to the peace of Europe, and viewing, as they do, with alarm and abhorrence whatever may tend to the interruption of that peace." Her Majesty's Government, I repeat, do not believe that Europe can be in danger of the terrible calamity of war from a qusstion such as that which is now pending at Con stantinople ; they do not believe that the door will be finally closed against an arrangement which to them appears to be still practicable ; and they venture, therefore, to hope that the demands of Russia may be confined to the recapitulation of existing treaties, and their due fulfilment, but without seeking to extend that influence over the Greek subjects of the Porte that Russia must always and necessarily exer cise." This my lords, so far as these papers are concerned, was the sole remonstrance—the sole representation—made by a British Minister against the flagitious occupation, in time of peace, of the Wallachian and Moldavian principalities, with out a particle of excuse, except that of obtaining a material guarantee for the fulfilment of conditions which Turkey had announced she was prepared to resist, and should never be able to concede—nay, more, which your Minister, acting under your authority, had encouraged Turkey to resist and to refuse, and had promised by material assistance to sustain her in refusing. (Hear, hear.) That was the tone and that the language by which you hoped to be able to act on Russia, and to turn the Emperor from his purpose. (Hear, hear.) My lords, the language of the Emperor had been consistent throughout, and that which he asked had been put in a posi tion from which he could not recede. (Hear, hear.) In one of Count Nesseh-odo's conversations with Sir Hamilton Sey mour, he stated that, " Warmly attached as he was to peace, and anxious as he was, upon personal grounds, that peace should be preserved, the condition which was now proposed, that the Emperor should recede from the position which he had taken, was a condition which it was impossible to enter tain, and to which he could not advise him to assent." (Hear, hear.) No ; not after he had crossed the Truth— (hear, hear)—not after he had advanced his troops—(hear, , hear)—not after he had committed himself to war—(hear, hear)—hut if you had addressed him, not " with bated breath," and iu the language of this despatch—not with violent or threatening language, which I should be the Last to advocate, but in firm, and temperate, and proper terms—if you had pointed out to him that the course which he proposed to take was one which it was impossible that England and France, acting cordially together upon this question, could ever view with indifference, and which they would feel it their duiy to resist—if you had done this before he had com mitted himself to such a step as the occupation of the principalities with his troops, I believe that such lan guage, firmly and temperately put, would have had the effect of checking this unparalleled invasion of a neutral country in violation of the law of nations. (Cheers.) That would have been the language to have used to the Em peror of Russia at that time—appealing to his sense of justice, appealing to his sense of right, yet not concealing from him the fact that such au attempt as that which he had then in contemplation would bring down upon him the united resist ance of this country and France. (Cheers.) I believe that if that language had been used, the peace which you say yon are so anxious to maintain would have been preserved. (Hear , h ear .) I believe that the Empero r wou ld h ave abandoned his j intention, and that a pacific solution of the difficulty would have been secured, if he had not already gone so far that it was in fact impossible for him to recede ; and if he had not, on the other hand, believed, whether rightly or wrongly, that you and France were not acting cordially together, and above all, if had not entertained the opinion which he has here ex pressed, that England would never upon such a question be drawn into a war. (Hear, hear.) My lords, I will not enter into the argument brought forward by the noble earl who sits on the cross benches (Earl Grey), that we ought to have in terfered at all. (Hear, hear.) It is possible that if the course which the noble earl suggests had been pursued, peace might have been preserved, but it would only have been for a time. (Hear, hear.) By pursuing that course, we should have given the assent of Europe to the monstrous interpretation which Russia was prepared to put on her existing rights And we should have given to that power such a hold on Turkey as would have prevented our ever interfering hereafter effectually in her defence, and would have led from the protectorate of the Christian subjects of the Porte to the ultimate incorpora tion of the whole of Turkey into the Russian empire. (Hear, hear.) I cannot look upon such a possible, or probable con tingency, with the same complacency, as the noble earl. (Hear, hear.) 1 think it would be fraught with great danger, that Russia should have such preponderating power, both in the north and south of Europe, as to be absolute master of its destinies. The noble duke who spoke last vindicated the policy of the Government in separating from that of France [The Duke of Argyll interposed an observation, which was inaudible in the gallery.] Not entirely. Perhaps the noble duke does not vindicate our expressions of regret to the Emperor of Russia. (Hear, hear.) —perhaps he does not vindicate our expressions of regret at the hasty step which France had taken, at sending her fleet, not into Turkish waters, but to occupy an advanced position, n order that it might be ready to act, if the necessity for action should arise. If you were not taking an altogether different line from France, it was a most extraordinary pro ceeding that, while you were acting together—and while your Foreign Secretary was giving out that there was a perfect un derstanding between you and France as to the course to be pursued—his successor should have written a letter to the Emperor of Russia, regretting and apologising for this move ment of the French fleet as a " hasty step." If I remember rightly there is a despatch in which the noble lord, or his pre decessor, announces to the Emperor of Russia that, in point of fact, the only question which raised any embarrassment in Europe was the position which France had taken, thus throw ing the whole blame of any possible occurrences, not on the Emperor of Russia, but on the premature movement which had been made by the Emperor of France. But the noble duke, having vindicated the separation from the policy of France on that occasion, and the adoption of a different line of conduct proceeds still further to vindicate the Vienna note. He tells you that that note is not open to the objec tions which had been made to it,—that it does not bear the interpretation which Turkey and Russia put upon it—that he stands by its whole phraseology, and was prepared to advise its acceptance, but that Turkey declined to accept it, and we backed up Turkey, and, in consequence of having backed up Turkey, we were now opposed to Russia. (Hear.) Did ever any human being hear such a reason as that assigned for a great war ? The abandonment of a note to which you see no objection—by every word of which you are prepared to stand —the abandonment of that note to be the cause of a great war—and the foundation on which you rest the whole of these warlike preparations which the country is called upon to make. (Cheers). I am not about to enter on a vindication of the Vienna note. When these two volumes reached me, I was so bewildered with notes and projects, and counter projects—(hear, hear)—with proposals by Austria, and France, and England, and Turkey—with one set of diplo matists sitting at Vienna, and another set of diplomatists sitting at Constantinople, the diplomatists at Vienna dis agreeing with the diplomatists at Constantinople—that I gave up the attempt to wade through that labyrinth of notes and projects, and counter-projects, proposals, and counter proposals ; but I thought I saw through the whole of this legitimate cause of quarrel—the assertion by Russia of rights which were inconsistent with the independence and integrity of Turkey, and dangerous to the peace of Europe—put for ward, I must say, in a most violent and arbitrary manner. (Hear, hear.) I thought I saw in the course pursued by Rus sia a necessity now, if at any time, for cordial co-operation and active union among the other great Powers of Europe, to prevent the dangerous consequence to which the course pur sued by Russia would be certain, if unchecked, to lead. (Hear, hear.) Having said so much of the past, I cannot look with the slightest hope to the realisation of the wishes of the noble earl, that war may yet be averted. When negotiations are closed—when military preparations have been commenced— when diplomatic intercourse has been broken off—l am at a loss to understand on what he founds the slightest hope that there can be even a possibility of peace being still preserved. (Hear, hear.) He is not going, I presume, at this moment, after all that has taken place, to abandon the cause of Turkey, and to advise her to submit to the conditions imposed on her by Russia. (Hear.) What, then, does he expect ? That, in the presence of these preparations, and of all these hostile movements, the Emperor of Russia will suddenly recede, and abandon the position he has taken ? Why, my lords, if that should be the case, if the noble lord believes that, it would be the strongest possible commendation of the policy pursued throughout. (Hear, hear.) If you believe that the Emperor of Russia, having taken up his position, will recede from it through fear of the hostile preparations of this country and of France, on what ground will you contend that if you had taken at the outset a line as bold and decided as that which you have taken now, you would not have saved the country from all the anxiety of the last ten or eleven months, and the imminent danger of war ? (Great cheering.) One word more with respect to what the noble duke says as to the protection of the Christian subjects of the Porte. He says it would not have been for the welfare of Turkey if the right of foreign countries to interfere to a certain extent for that protection was not admitted. He seems to have for gotten that the Sultan has throughout expressed his readi ness to allow the utmost degree of liberty, and has even gone so far as to confirm, by a firman, the rights and immunities of all the Christian subjects of his empire. The noble duke seems to think that we ought to insist on the protection of those Christian subjects as a cuudition of our alliance. I will not enter into that, but I say that such general protection as would be exercised by the united European powers, granted to them by Turkey as a condition of admitting her into their alliance, is a widely different thing from the protectorate which Russia, a single Power, and the most powerful neigh bour of Turkey, is now endeavouring to establish on the foun dation of ancient treaties. Ido not agree with the noble earl (Earl Grey) that we could have avoided interfering at all, And although I do not blame her Majesty's Government for endeavouring to the last to maintain peace, I disapprove of the course of policy which they have pursued as not being the best adapted, in my judgment, to attain our common end. The house is called upon to express an opinion upon past transactions, and I cannot but say that I censure and disap prove of that course. But now I believe war to be inevitable, and that everything depends upon the vigour and energy with which the efforts of this country and of France, and I hope of other European Powers also, may be directed to wards bringing about a satisfactory settlement of these com plicated and difficult matters. From this moment I discard all past considerations, and if the Government are now in earnest in embarking in this war—just and necessary as I believe it to be—with a determination to carry it forward in a manner worthy of the cause which they have in hand, of the dignity of the country, and of the importance of the end to be attained—l say if that is the case, it will be my anxious and earnest desire—sacrificing all other considerations, and waiving all other questions—to give them the best support in my power. The Earl of ABERDEEN.—My lords, I think, from the character of some of the speeches we have heard to-night, there can be but little doubt as to the degree of censure which would have been cast upon her Majesty's Government, no matter what might have been the course pursued by them. (Hear.) If the negotiations which have been entered into had been sooner brought to an abrupt close, war would have been owing to our rashness, or our timidity, or our blunder ing conduct ; and, had they ended in peace, of course, in bringing them to that issue we should have equally sacrificed the honour and interests of this country. (Hear.) After all the asperity, however, with which the noble marquis (of Clanriearde) has described our conduct, followed up, as it has been, by the noble earl (of Derby), I am a little surprised at the nature of the motion which the noble marquis has thought it proper to lay before the house. With such opinions, with such convictions as the noble marquis entertained, I should have thought it would have been nothing less than a censure upon the conduct we have pursued. But what is the mo tion ? The noble marquis moves for a few additional papers, without describing what they are, and without knowing what it is he moves for—(laughter)--but desiring to have some papers on the subject of the cessation of diplomatic relations with Russia. Now, as these papers have been already laid upon the table, the noble marquis has made a motion without the slightest knowledge whether anything exists of the kind for which he moves, and without knowing what information he will receive. This, I think, is a very lame and impotent conclusion to a speech which stigmatises every stage of the conduct of her Majesty's Government throughout the whole of these transactions. My lords, instead of this crude motion now brought forward, the least I should have expected would have been a direct vote of censure upon the conduct of the Government. Indeed, a higher tone has Fes taken by those who entertain similar opinions with the no marquis and the noble earl who has just spoken, and *lave heard loud threats of impeachment even against la .3r Majesty's Government for the course they have pursued. Now, I don't deny that in the course of these transactions I have spent many anxious hours and many sleepless nights in con sequence of the difficulties with which we have been sur rounded, but I must say that the apprehension of impeach ment never entered into my thoughts. (Hear, and a laugh.) What has had considerable effect upon the noble marquis, and upon those who, like him, are prepared to pronounce sentence upon her Majesty's Government, has been, as they allege, the production of the papers now upon your lordships' table. To my personal knowledge, however, many of those who are most disposed on other occasions to censure her Majesty's Government, have had the candour to admit that the produc tion of these papers has materially changed their views. (Cheers.) I think, therefore, the noble marquis has done wisely in modifying a vote of either impeachment or of cen sure into the motion with which he concluded. My lords, I understand what is the spirit of the policy which is objected to by the noble earl (of Derby), but I confess I do not exactly know what is the precise step that ho would have recom mended her Majesty's Government to pursue. He has thought proper to refer to declarations made by a noble friend of mine, not now in the house, and others, who consider the continu ance of peace impossible. Now, I must again repeat that I do not consider, and cannot consider, the preservation of peace impossible so long a s war i s not declared and actually existing, believing, as I do, that of the Powers concerned in this dispute, even the Emperor of Russia himself, by his con duct for many years, has afford e d a proof that he knows and fully estimates what the serious consequences of war must be to Europe in general, and believing, also, that his exertions in former years in preserving peace make it not at all impossible that he, on whom depends in a great measure the decision in this case, may take such a view of the existing difficulty as may possibly end in peace. It is a subject for great congra tulation that the other great Powers of Europe may be con sidered to') .ve acted in unison on this question. This is no small adva sta ge, and whether the issue of the question be peace or war, it is, I repeat, matter for congratulation that the union of the great Powers should have been accom plished so far as it has been accomplished. I concur in what has been said by my noble friend who has left is the house (th e E ar l of Ellenborough), that th e people importance country are not su ffi c i en tl y i m p resse d with the and the magnitud., of the war in which they may and this, I thi n k, mus t b o a pp ar ent to your be engaged; lordships. In fact, we have b een so l ong w ithout having had any experience of the hor rors an d th e m i ser i es of war, that it is but too com monly looked upon now as a species of pleasurable excite ment; and I verily believe that if, by the blessing of God and our endeavours, we still should be enabled to preserve peace, l a very great disappointment would ensue—(No, no)—in many quarters. I don't say in this house or , who now among enlightened men, but I do say, among e in ass thought lessly but very numerously,cl look forward with real feelings of excitement to the event which we must still deplore. I agree in thinking that the public feeling in this country rous feeling—(hear)--and thoautg must ensue—inevitably ensue h the people generally do not look to the consequences that —if war should take place, yet still the feeling which exists i to resist aggression and injustice s a natural and a generous one. But, my lords, it is not for us to encourage that; on the contrary, it is the duty of the Government to resist these feelings, very natural and very generous though they may be, and to direct them into the course of prudence and of policy. (Hear.) In adopting this course I know very well I must sub mit to the epithets which have been bestowed upon my exer tions to maintain peace—such as cowardice, vacillation, and treachery. All this I must submit to, but, at the same time, it seems to me that her Majesty's Government have shown more moral courage in resisting strong popular impressions, because we thought them irrational and carried to a mischie vous extent, than in yielding to those common-places which I am ashamed to hear applied by the noble earl. It is very well to say that war should not be entered into for its own sake. Everybody, even the greatest conquerors that ever have af: flicted mankind, have always professed to love peace and only to make war to arrive at peace. This is language which is used upon ail occasions ; but when war ensues we must look to that language which is really opposed to war, rather than to the mere declamation of persons who profess not to go to war for its own sake. When I say that the popular feeling to which I have alluded is irrational and carried to a greater. extent than is wise and prudent, I must also include a cer tain number of persons in this country who are really bent upon war, who think and who maintain, and who have at meetings declared, that war is to regenerate Europe, and that that is the mode by which Europe is to be regenerated. To be sure, such declarations are usually coupled with an allusion to the guillotine, and 1 don't know what part that has to play in the regeneration of Euro e otherwise than by bring ing about additional misery, desolation, and ruin beyond that which ordinary warfare wonld necessary entail. But, my lords, the real question is, practically, what the noble earl would wish us to have done. He speaks, and he has repeatedly spoken before, of what the noble marquis also calls our infir mity of purpose and our lack of vigour. If we had been more vigorous and less infirm of purpose, says the noble marquis, we might have brought matters to another issue; and the noble earl brings the same accusation. I wish just to show your lordships that the step taken by the Emperor of Russia —the only step, the only act with which he could deal—was the invasion of the principalities. Now, what would the noble earl have had us to do in that matter ? He would have had us threaten the Emperor with results the only practical mean ing of which was war. Now, I will put it to the house whe ther, if we had held such language and taken this course, under the circumstances in which the occupation of the prin cipalities took place, we could have hoped for the sanction of Parliament or of the country? (Hear, hear.) For, what were the facts ? The Emperor had invaded the principalities, and occupied the principalities, he said, as a material guaran tee for the claims he had made on Turkey. He announced that the occupation was but temporary, that he did not de clare war, and that he did not intend to make it war. Tur key, at the same time, determined not to make it a case of war, and abstained, therefore, from declaring war, being, in truth, utterly unp re p are d t o ma k e war. Underthese cir cumstances, if we had made such an appeal to the Emperor of Russia as would have produced war, I ask whether we should not have found in noble lords opposite the most inex haustible fund of censure and attack which it is possible to conceive ? (Hear, hear.) Whether we had found it or not, I tun quite sure we should have deserved it. If you look early into the negotiations, you will see what Lord Strat ford thought of this very point of the invasion of the principalities. In describing the interview which ho had had with the Sultan, he relates that the due position which it was conceived the Porte should maintain was that of moral resistance. It is all very easy after one course has been taken, the event of which is known, to point to some other course which, in the opinion of the suggester, might have been taken. I can only say that, looking over the whole transaction as it has taken place from the outset since nego tiations began, I cannot charge myself with any reason to lament any step that we have taken in the whole course of the transaction. (Hear, hear.) The noble earl is of opinion that I have been more of a war Minister than I intended. In saying this he has put forth more truth than he, perhaps, contemplated ; for I can assure him, in good truth, that if I have any misgiVing at all as to our course, it is certainly not that we have been too precipitate. (Hear, hear.) But we have done the best we could to preserve peace, in our earnest desire to accomplish that object. I believe the course we have pursued has been that which was perfectly justifiable, and I will say further that, on full consideration, I should feel disposed to repeat it were the occasion to recur. (Hear, hear.) lam totally of a different opinion from those who sty that the exertions to preserve peace have been continued too long. I think that every additional day that peace has been maintained has been an advantage, and I do not in the least regret the time which has been spent in following out these endeavours to effect peace. (Hear, hear.) The noble earl has also found fault with us for not having at an earlier period established an entire concert with France in the conduct of these transactions. My noble friend behind me has shown that so far as the Holy Places question was concerned, we could not act with France, not only because we were in a dif ferent position on the whole subject, so far as English in terests were concerned, but also, in truth, because we thought that Russia had some ground of complaint on that subject, and it was, therefore impossible for us, at that time and on that subj ec t , to establish a concert with France ; but so anxious were we that nothing should prevent us from act ing in strict concert with France, that noble lords will have seen that, when Lord Stratford left England, in the instruc tions which he carried with him, drawn up by my noble friend behind me, my noble friend instructed him, as he passed through Paris on his way to Constantinople, to inform the French Minister for Foreign Affairs that the English Govern ment had great satisfaction in believing that the interests of France and England in the East were identical, and that nothing need prevent their cordial co-operation in main taining the integrity and independence of the Turkish empire. (Hear.) These instructions were written before Lord Stratford left England, and yet the noble earl has the courage to find fault with us for not having sufficiently early cultivated concert with France. (Heat.) Now, let me say, there is in the whole of this transaction, let it end how it may, nothing which gives me greater satisfaction than this very concert which the noble e trl finds fault with us for not having, as he says, entered early into - (hear, hear) I say further, from the outset, when Lord Stratford took those in. structions to Paris, up to this hour, we have maintained the most entire and cordial concert with France - (hear, hear) and we have had every reason to be satisfied to the utmost with the perfect loyalty, honour, good faith, and cordiality with which we have been met by France. (Cheers.) Let this negotiation end as it may, it will always, I say, be a source of the utmost satisfaction to us that we have esta blished that concert and that mutual kindness and goodwill between the two Governments. (Cheers.) That concert, and that mutual kindness and goodwill will, I trust, continue, and no endeavours shall be wanting on our part to preserve, and, if possible, to strengthen, these frank and friendly feelings. (Cheers.) The great object for which we first entered upon these negotiations was the pro ection of the Turkish empire against the aggressions of Russia an object which we have deemed of an importance paramount to any other considera tions connected with the question. Ido not look without apprehension to the consequences of a war, let it end how it may ; for there is so strong a feeling of disaffection in the Turkish dominions, and the condition of the Government is such, that even a successful war wouldbe attended with great danger to the future condition of that empire. Therefore it is—wishing to preserve the existence of that empire as a Eu ropean necessity —that I am doubly anxious to preserve it, if possible, from the continuance of war. The noble earl has made merry with the answer given by my noble friend near me to a question which he said was of very deep importance, whether we are at peace or war. The noble earl said that, being neither at peace nor war , and not being neutral, he did not very well know in w h a t position we are. At all events, let that position be what it may, it is very far from being unprecedented. We have been in it before, and very likely we may be in it often agai n . L oo k a t what happened in the year 1827. Our ambassador was then withdrawn from Constantinople; we blockaded the Turkish ports; we had our Sinope too. (Hear, hear.) We destroyed the Turkish fleet in harbour, with an immense loss of life, and we were not at war. Not at all. There was no war, and things continued for a year and a half in that state. We were not at war, although there had been demonstrations such as have not yet taken place between this country and the Russian empire ; for as yet we have not struck a blow or fired a shot at the Russian forces, and therefore we cannot be said to be so much in a state of war with Russia as we were at the time to which I allude with Turkey, with which we professed to be at peace. Therefore, difficult as it may be to describe our position, at least the noble earl will see that it is not unpre cedented. There are other instances of a similar kind. We subsequently joined with the French; the French army be sieged Antwerp ; we blockaded it ourselves, but we were not at war with Holland. Neuertheless, these demonstrations took place, which, I say, were much more energetic than any thing that has yet taken place between us and the Russians. I could very much desire that we had seen the worst of this state of things, be it war, or be it peace—(hear, hear)—but, although I have ventured to say I did not thimk war inevi table, I never said I expected that war would not take place. I not only hope, but most ardently pray, that war may not take place; but all I have said is, that it was not inevitable. I cannot abandon this hope slender as it is—even now. What I may hope, or expect, or think, is not a matter of very deep importance, but what is of importance is this that her Majesty's Government are making every possible prepa ration for war, as if it were inevitable.. (Hear, and cheers.) That is all the country candesire, they may l eave me and athers to indulge, our hopes and our prayers as we think proper ; but every o:fort will.be made, and is making at this moment, to carry (tar ,If.l.war there must be—in such a manner as becomes st e character, and aignity, and power of this country. (Cheers.) My lords, at this hour of the night I will not fatigue you by saying more, but I am so far glad th .t this motion has been brought forward, because Ido think that, ie addition to the papers laid upon the table, the clear justification of my noble friend, who has had the prin cipal management of these transactions, must have been such as to satisfy your lordships that no prudence, or foresight, or skill has been wanting in the management of these most difficult aid complicated negotiations, and I have not the least hesitation in appealing not only to this house, but to the country, not merely far an acquittal of her Majesty's Govern ment, but I will almost venture to trust that we may ha ve their approbation. (Cheers.) After a few words in explanation from the Duke of A ny. The Earl of ALBEMARLE said they had had seven hours and a half's discussion upon one of the most unprofit a b le questions that had ever come before them. They h a d b een debating on the past conduct of the Government, but they had not beard what was to be .heir future policy. For his own part, he should give his support to that future p o li cy, A w zo h r et . h t e h r s , provided that it was suitable to the honour and dignity o f th e country. (Hear, hear.) What he now wished to know was whether we were going to war upon the status quo, or as in R guy y a f h u a t d ui tow erra ma n d g e om all en t t rea t t h ie e s E m urd ere n wa e a s n te d p t a h p : r, common p ro p e rty of mankind, were to be k ep t closed at the bidding of a despot ? (Hear, hear.) nature The Marquis of CLANRICARDE made tu a few u b e s a el n •V d ati c o o n n s . n h o e t m sp ov ec e i d fy fo in r g . thein reply. The noble earl at the head of the G overnment had wipa o tp f he t ra h h a im t w i h n foi f ar o necessity which he what would there Why, if he h a d b een tents i o foundpos s ess i on have been for his making the motion at all I What he asked for was, that he and the country should be put in possession of such papers and such information as would enable him to t st a a n t d eff i e n et wi it t e h oui re d p h r ar d di t y o Turks lwhys:t and sin the m a e k x a c i n g t a position n we toe follow that ho was bound at the same time to move a vote of censure upon the Government. At all events, the motion he had made, whatever was its fate, would have this effect, it support in a Government ern theremenwtatshbruout would satisfy the wo r ld th at there was but one determination in up h o e rt throughout this i o s f m it o , m a e n n d to t u h s at st w ru as gg r e in which we were about to embark—(hear, hear)—at the same ra p on u t . e off o fe n e a t w Russiab cooluduf as r h o s n wv t eoi e t do h n e hp e ar a vo i e • d l y ui e p ne a ed r t if obn t l y h t e h s time he could not h e l p repeating his conviction, that if we had n aele precluded ngdotniaf tt him anEs a f r s uP o ca n t h" taking any daring steps against Turkey. The experience of the last 23 years should have satisfied the Government of the upon nature of the d es i gns which Russia had ever and still enter tained Turkey, while the same experience, if it had been well lo o k e d into, would have taught them that Russia had never ventured to make a single step to advance her ag gressive views so long as she felt that the Western Powers wore opposed t o h er. No doubt the end of the contest would h o the withdrawal of the impudent demands made by Russia; but if England and France had evinced a decided opposition to them in the first instance, much of the anxiety which we had recently felt in the affair would have been spared us. (Hear, hear.) And even now, there was an uncertainty as to whether the allied powers meditated meeting Russia With An armed reel France and E had once dei warn the nob if that really disposed of, a precedent he There must b Turkey wonk lad much lon were our for though ardor the banks of existing state war of a mos no man conic easily predict and much na went should policy, they E ject of the wl tied. (He ar not a posith deny, or else having comet the matter tc do something should event ' vigour and p were that the a determinat Prance been stance, he y lost ground. peace being what chance making this of censure ul nation of thi the motion Ships he wot The motio Their lord BOTJSE The SPEA Lord PA Staffordshix On the rc ordered to 1 room of M The Am Maybole J Quays and port, and 3 time and 01 STOCKP On the Whaley Br Mr. ILI time this d was very i the district cheater, Sh already ell sanction o would exec more adva prepared tc Mr. GE aidered it Sheffield C difficulties were at pr to avail the Lament. Mr. C. and Sheffit dertaking t reading. Mr. LO Mr. BO from the u these bills mittee. The ame the bill wa =Med. Mr. 0. Ebrington, be issued fi The peti read by th, . the Societ Minister's Mr. DE profession the nary r brethren ii Mr. IN against th Mr. W. prietor of peal of the Mr. BA of Derby Schools. Mr. T. the 28th subject of Mr. Li 3 call the at relations 1 Mr. PI 28th iu.st: to amend wit( Wa Ben Go' Vail