The Sun. — London, England, 1861-03-12 00:00:00

put on board men •of-war, coming if their services should be wanted for that purpose ? (Hear, hear, from Lord C. Paget) I understand the noble lord by his cheer to confirm that statement. Lord C. PAGET—They are disposable. Sir J. PAK INGT ON—I am very glad to hear that there is so large an available force ; I only regret it is not larger. In connection with this I must express the great satisfac tion with which I heard the concluding part of the noble lord's statement, in which he informed the committee that the Admiralty has decided without loss of time to erect bar. racks for our seamen in port. I think preceding Boards of Admiralty are open to some censure for not having at an earlier period undertaken this improvement, and I am happy to hear from the noble lord that the necessary operations are really to be commenced. I will now turn to what fell from the noble lord with respect to the reserve force. lam sorry to say I don't think this part of the noble lord's statement so satisfactory. In speaking of the new reserve force, his prospective calculation was 7,000 men. Lord C. PAGET—The actual number is 4,000. Sir J. PAKlNGTON—Precisely. 7,000 is the number my noble friend hopes to have at the termination of another twelvemonth, but the present numher is 4,000, and he cal culates the expense of these 4,000 at £107,000. Lord C. PAGET—The cost of the 7,000 is taken in the estimate. Sir J. PAKINGTON—I am very glad to hear that. There is another part of this important subject—the only part—on which lam bound to say the noble lord was not perfectly clear. I allude to the number of boys in training. In the training ships he said there were 2,000 boys, and subsequently I understood him to state that there were 9,639 boys. Lord C PAGET—We have 2,000 boys in training ships specially devoted to boys, but we have on board receiving ships, flag-ships, and the fleet generally a total of 9,639 boys. Sir J. PAKINGT ON—that makes the statement of the noble lord much less satisfactory. In our training ships there are 'only 2,000, and the number of 9,639 includes all the boys who form part of the crews on board our ships. While I do not at all undervalue the great importance of the Naval Reserve recommended by the Royal Commission on Manning the Navy, and think the Admiralty only doing their duty in carrying out that portion of their recommen dation, I must say I myself have attached more interest and importance to the recommendation of the Royal Commis- sion with reference to training boys. (Hear.) I believe the best and most effective means by which we can insure the manning of the navy is by training boys on a large scale. (Hear, hear.) And, bear in mind, the recommendation of the Royal Commission relative to the training of boys for the Royal navy went to training boys round the coast with a double object. One object, no doubt, was to assist in the best manner to man our navy ; but another object, only secondary in importance to that, was to improve our mer cantile marine by training boys in such a manner as to in sure that improVement as a national advantage of first-rate importance, an advantage which would react in a most valuable manner on that body of sailors to which in times of emergency we must look for recruiting the Royal navy (Hear.) With these opinions, I confess I was sorry to hear by the statement of the noble lord that the Admiralty were doing so little. I am afraid from this statement I must infer they are doing nothing towards carrying out this portion of the recommendation of the Royal Commission—by far the most important part of their valuable report. All that most interesting portion of my noble friend's statement with regard to the great and important question of iron plated men-of-war I heard with the most unqualified satis faction and approbation. Ido not put my opinion in com petition with that of my noble friend, he being an experi enced naval officer, but I hope without presumption, from the attention I have been obliged from my official position to give the subject, I may say the noble lord has not ex pressed an opinion hero in which I do not entirely concur. The only portion of his statement to which I have any dis position to take exception is with regard to the delay which occurred in the case of the Warrior. The noble lord stated that the contractors were to blame. I cannot allow this opportunity to pass without saying that I think that delay most unfortunate. When the late Board of Admi ralty entered into the contract for building the Warrior the contract was that she should be launched in May last. Then we were told she would be launched in August ; but the event did not take place till the end of December. The noble lord says that was the fault of the contractors ; but unless I have been misinformed, I am inclined to think that one cause of the delay had been the alterations which, from time to time, were adopted by the Admiralty and enforced on the contractors. Lord C. PAGET—I said that the contractors were to blame for the delay as to the iron ships generally ; I did not particularise the Warrior. Sir J. PAKINGTON--I am informed that a sum of £lO,OOO or £12,000 was expended on an alteration of the plates of the Warrior, in consequence of the Admiralty de• termining that, instead of their being placed in contiguity tcleach other, they should be turned and grooved. The expense of these vessels is, we know, enormous, but I be lieve that their value will be proportioned to their cost. (Rear.) The Admiralty are right in proceeding to build a number of them ; but, as the noble lord himself admits, in this complete change in the reconstruction of our men-of war we have in all probability much to learn. The late Board of Admiralty took the greatest pains to ascertain the most promising mode of constructing these vessels. and I doubt not the present Board have done the same ; but still the whole matter is experimental. (Hear.) I deeply re - gret, therefore, that there should have been any delay not only in launching the Warrior but in fitting her out and sending her to sea, in order that it might as soon as possible be tested before great sums were expended on other vessels, how far the model adopted for her gives you what I trust you have, but what I believe the French have not—viz., not only an armour-covered ship but a good seagoing man-of war. I have great hopes that the Warrior and ships built on her model are as fit to be sent across the Atlantic, or to any other part of the world, as any other class of vessel. I doubt whether as much can be said for La Gloire. I believe that all the noble lord has stated as to the superiority of iron over woods in these ships is fully borne out, and, notwithstand ing the criticisms that have been offered, I think we are right in leaving the bow and stern of these vessels unpro tected with plates, with a view to insure those ether im portant desiderata, speed and good seagoing qualities. La Gloire is, I believe, simply a wooden ship plated with iron and very much what our own floating battery, the Trusty, was in point of construction, and as regards the application of 41-inch plates. Another important distinction between the ships building in England and those being built by con tinental nations is this, that while La Gloire is a wooden ship covered with 41-inch plates, the Warrior is an iron ship, not only covered with 41-inch plates, but with la inches of teak intervening between the armour and what is called the skin. The noble lord also pointed out with great truth that we do not know yet of what thickness the iron may be that will give the required resistance ; and therefore it will be a great advantage to have vessels with such a floating capacity that if thicker armour should be necessary they will be able to carry it. With respect to the building of other iron-covered ships of considerably smaller tonnage, the subject is one on which I think we may fairly ask for further information. The late Board of Admiralty decided on building ships of the gigantic size which they adopted, because, after the most anxious consideration and consulta tion with the most able scientific men in England and Scot land, they believed it to be impossible to combine in smaller vessels all the requisites essential to such a man-of-war. Last year the noble lord told us the present Board of Admi ralty had determined on building ships of what he termed the " Resistance" class. The two ships of these reduced dimensions are the Resistance and the Defence. I was struck with that intimation, and I inquired what advan tage had been sacrificed, for, according to the information we received, something must be given up to enable ships of that reduced size to be built. The answer I obtained was, "Yes, it is true we have made some sacrifice in order to get a reduced size, and consequently a reduced cost, and that sacrifice is the speed of the ship." Now, I believe that to make these armour-covered vessels what they ought to be, effective men-of-war, you must have a good rate of speed—(hear)—and I therefore think it most unfortunate that the Admiralty should have determined to sacrifice that important desideratum. I hope the noble lord will be able to give some satisfactory explanation on this point, with reference not only to. the Defence and Resistance, but to two other ships about to be laid down, because, if I am rightly informed, two other ships out of six, if not exactly of the same size as the Defence and Resistance, are at all events to be of 'greatly reduced dimensions compared with the Warrior. In proposing to try the experiment of building one armour-covered ship of the 11 , arrior class in one of their own dockyards I think the Admiralty are acting wisely. (Hear, hear.) The objection to having timber ships built by contract-.-namely, that it is almost impossible to secure that the materials shall be well seasoned, cannot apply at all to iron ships, or, at least, not in the same ratio ; but if the Admiralty find that they can build these iron ships as economically and as well in their own yards as by contract it will be advantageous to do so. The noble lord's explana • Con of the very considerable redaction in the number of hired labourers was, I think, quite sa:isfactory. I certainly heard with pleasure that the Admiralty intend to ask for a much larger vote to increase our stack of timber. I agree with my - noble friend that it is a visionary idea that iron will entirely supersede wood in the construction of ships ; and, to band your ships properly, you ought not to allow your ate*of timber to get so low as it has been during .the last two or three years. The noble lord took some credit for giving " a frank ?'esunt eo f the amount of work done in our dacta.)ards, durhag the past year. I ern afraid, however. that his statement in this respect was not so generally intelli gible as was to be desired . desired . He told us, indeed, the number of tons built and the numbe r of the informathin Irga:eu s "eighths" completed, but would, t I believe, be found more valuable when it goes forth the public if, instead of being so technical as only to lie und ers t oo d by ersons who have transacted business with the Admiralty , it showed how inany o f eac h class of ship s h as bee , launched during the year. (Hear, hear.) r—You h ave only to divide by eight and Lord C. PAGE you will get the enact number of ships y 0 ,,,,,, aut. (A laugh.) Sir J. PAKINGION—I beg my noble friend's pardon, but I hardly think even that will convey to the public a el-tar idea of what ki. bean done, because within the year way LiAve been eemeaenced, soma DAay , have s ~ti been continued, and some completed, and I think it would be much more satisfactory to know what has been the ac tual addition to the navy during the year. (Hear, hear.) In former years it was pointed out that our navy was deft• dent, especially iu frigates, as compared with the force of other countries. The noble lord's statement wilLscarcely enlighten the public as to the addition made to that class of vessels. Lord C. PAGET—It is given in the returns now on the table. Sir J. PAKINGTON—I was much gratified with that part of the noble lord's statement in which he announced the intention of the Admiralty on the subject of the increase of the dockyard accommodation at Chatham. During the short time that I had the honour to be at the head of the Board of Admiralty there was no subject which occupied more of our attention ; and the more we considered it the more we approached to that decision to which the present board has arrived with respect to Chatham being the place at which it was desirable the addition should be made. (Hear.) I would here close the few remarks that I have ventured to address the house, were it not that I feel ob liged to allude to another part of the subject, which I con fess I cannot approach without great hesitation and doubt, but which, at the same time, I consider perhaps the most important point of all. I mean the present state of disci pline in the navy. Again I say that I approach this point with a sense of its delicacy and difficulty; but I am so strongly impressed with its overwhelming importance and so struck with statements that have reached me, and which it is impossible for me not to believe, that I cannot help calling the noble lord's attention to it. I hope my noble friend will believe me when I say that I do so in no party spirit, but through a sincere sense of duty ; because I be• ieve that it is essential to our best interests that everything should be done to make this great arm of our war service as efficient as possible in all respects. (Hear.) On a former occasion, in reply to an observation made by an hon. mem ber, the hon. gentleman opposite, who is one of the Lords of the Admiralty (Mr. Whitbread), gave it as his opinion that as soon as certain bounty men were got rid of the state of discipline would be satisfactory. The noble lord (Lord C. Paget) had adverted to this matter again this evening in terms which I heard with great satisfaction ; for of course in my noble friend's position his sources of information are better than those at the command of private members. That being so, I am not to be understood as impeaching the assertions of the hon. gentleman or the noble lord ; but I am bound to say that the statements which have reached me are of such a character 1 hat I cannot help fearing that the officials of the Admiralty may have been in some degree misled. The public are already excited and alarmed, and I hope the Admiralty may be able to make a statement that will allay the uneasiness on the subject. (Hear.) Palpable facts are within the knowledge of all who read the news papers. Every one has heard of the unhappy mutiny which occurred about a year ago at the paying off of the Princess Royal, and that was followed shortly afterwards by the mutiny on board the Liffey, in the harbour of Portland. If these were isolated cases they might not be regarded in so serious a light, but we have all read in the newspapers that a squadron of ships of the Royal Navy could not proceed to North America to accompany the heir to the British Crown to that part of her Majesty's dominions without losing by desertion a considerable portion of the crews. (Hear.) If report be true, those ships were deterred from going to the port of New York lest further desertions might take place. Some time ago I moved for a return of desertions ; and from the paper laid on the table it appears that in 1858 the num ber was 1,811; in 1859 1,873 ; while for the nine months of 1860 it was 2,322, showing a very great increase. (Hear.) I have here letters which have been written by officers in command of our ships in different parts of the world. I think I had better abstain from reading them—(hear)—but the statements which they make on the subject of desertions —and especially desettions in the Mediterranean—are very distressing. As to the appointment of Admiral Martin to the command of the Mediterranean squadron, I believe it would have been impossible for the noble duke at the head of the Admiralty to select an officer more likely to restore good discipline. (Hear.) But the state of discipline in our ships has become a subject of comment not only in this but in other countries. I have in my hand the translation of a pamphlet entitled " Reflections on the Navy," and written by a Capitaine de Fregate—Capitaino L. Foillouy. Refer ring to the various measures adopted in this country from time to time during a considerable period for alterations in our rules as regards the sailors aboard men-of-war, the writer observes:— " Experience will show what degree of success may attend these measures, directed, be it said, by an imperious neces sity ; but it is already easy to perceive that granting certain concessions to the habits and tastes of English seamen has sensibly weakened discipline and lowered the bearing of the crews cn board their ships." I have conversed lately with several distinguished naval officers who have had an opportunity of watching the dis cipline on board ships of war, and they have assured me that the statements which I have received are not exag gerated. Some of those officers are now unemployed, but others are in command of ships. (Hear, hear.) The noble lord and the hon. gentleman told us that the evil was to be attributed to the inferior sailors whom the high bounty offered by the late Board had induced to enter the service. If that be so, as the bounty has been lowered, the cause may be removed ; but I find that many attributed the deterioration of the discipline to this fact—that, rightly or wrongly, there does exist on the pait of tho ofGoo , , In Ow British naval service a dread that if they resort to ;hose measures that often are necessary to maintain discipline on board a ship they would not be supported by the Board of Admiralty. If this be a true statement it is one that affects not the present Board of Admiralty only, but also those that have preceded it. I bring it forward in the hope that the noble lord will turn his attention to it, and be able to diminish the public anxiety clothe subject. I cannot resist the conclusion that some such feeling as I have re ferred to exists; and I think it is of tke highest importance that no pains should be spared to bring the crews of our ships back to that high state of discipline that used to dis tinguish them, and which is so essential to the security of the country. (Hear.) The noble lord adverted to the state ment of my hon. and gallant friend (Sir J. Elphinstone), that dissatisfaction exists among the officers of the navy, and expressed his opinion that no feeling of the kind exists to any such extent as would prevent them doing their duty to the country. In that opinion I cordially agree with the noble lord ; and I am sure that nothing would give my hon. and gallant friend greater pain than to have it supposed that anything he said implied a doubt as to the officers of the navy doing their duty to their country. (Hear.) It cannot be denied, however, that there are serious doubts as to the condition of the crews, and to that subject I earnestly hope the attention of the Admiralty will be directed. Mr. BAXT ER had listened with great pleasure to the statement of the noble lord, but he nevertheless was of opinion that there ought to have been a still greater reduc tion of the navy estimates. He held that this country ought to have a navy superior to that of any other maritime i State. To lose our maritime supremacy would be poor economy ; but at the same time it was impossible not to see that our naval expenditure was increasing to an extent far greater than the necessities of the country required. During the last four years the navy estimates had increased from £9,000,000 to £12,000,000. On a comparison with the French navy it was found that the preponderance of vessels was immensely on our side, and we were at this mo ment expending 30 per cent. more in naval preparations than the two greatest maritime nations combined. He had understood the noble lord the Secretary to the Admiralty to say on a former occasion that France had 15 iron-cased vessels approaching completion, but to-night he had stated that four were block ships and four were gunboats. Lord C. PAGET—Five gunboats and ten large ships. Mr. BAXTER—That was four block ships and six large ships, which tallied with the statement of the hon. member for Sunderland (Mr. Lindsay). He had last year made in quiries and derived information from sources quite distinct from those to which the hon. member for Sunderland had access, but the results were nearly the same. He found that the French had La Gloire afloat; another was to be completed in the present year, and the Magenta and Sol ferino were expected to be launched in the course of 1862. In confirmation of what had been said of the little ac tivity that prevailed in the French dockyards he referred to the report' of -a gentleman who had been sent out by the Scotsman newspaper. He reported that at Cherbourg there was general tranquillity, that there was but one large ship in the harbour, the Areole ; one frigate was building, and La Normandie was receiving her plates. At Brest there were but three ships. At Lorient there were four frigates ; at Rochefort only four small brigs, a steam tran sport, and a frigate in course of construction. At Toulon pthi There o r e , wereewisetre were also o n as l hi y s i : two to n u l L a m r a g bfi r eevessels:m approachingniltransports, building,ene e o t r ab h u e ptl l et n thi t oe r nr e e - . e e G r l o o were not 50 men at work in the large forging house. Now with respect to the comparative number of men in the French and English navies, he had iaade inquiries, and he found that last year there were in the French Imperial navy 30,588 men and boys. Parliament had last year voted for the English navy 84,000 men and boys, but it now appeared that only 81,000 had been employed. The fact was, how ever, that the number voted, 84,000, was greater than all the seamen in the merchant service of France. It might be asked how could that be, seeing that in 1860 there were 156,000 names upon the maritime inscription of France ; but he had made inquiries, and found that that number not only included all the men and boys in the Imperial navy and merchant service, but also all the workmen in the dock yards, all the fishermen on the coasts, and all the boatmen upon the navigable rivers. Indeed, statistics clearly showed that the mercantile marine of France was in a state of deca dence, for in 1859 the French had 42,000 tons less of ship ping than they possessed in 1857. In order to prove still more the fact of the decadence of the French mercantile marine, he would refer to returns made to that house, which 'howed that the total value of French goods imported into his country was i 13,271,800. In 1859 the value of French oods imported into this country exceeded £16,000,000, eing an increase of £3,598,000. - There was, however, a I;reat decrease in the tonnage of French vessels. In 1858 the number of French ships entering our ports was 7,010, dill°, in 1859, they had fallen off to 5,946. There was, in Let, a steady progress downward in the mercantile power f France. He believed the French had laid down no great vooden ship, whether line-of-battle ships or frigates, since . 85 6. (Lord Pa!marston.—They launched one the other LaY.) Ile had said they had not laid one down since 1656, J {' ~ '- '~ and he believed he was correct. He did not object to build ing a few Warriors and Black Princesibut it was impolitic to persist in building so large a number of ships. The diffi culty of manning the navy was matter of general complaint, and that was an additional reason for not going on build ing more ships. He had risen to make these remarks in no unfriendly spirit to the Government, but, believing that their Naval Estimates had been based on an exaggerated notion both of the naval preparation and naval strength of France, he had, he thought, given the committee reasons for reducing trom. (Hear, hear.) He trusted that this extravagant fit of the nation would soon be over, for the house and the Government were not alone to blame. Per- haps, sooner than they might expect hon. members would be called to account and blamed by their constituents for this enormous, unwise, and unnecessary expenditure. (Hear.) Mr. BENTINCK could not agree with his right hon. friend (Sir J. Pakington) in his statement that the disci• pline of the navy was in a very bad state. He did not pre tend to say it was either what it was or what it ought to be. (Hear, hear.) It was susceptible, no doubt, of great im provement, but neither was it, according to all the information he could obtain, in so bad a state as has been described by his right hon friend. The right hon. baronet ascribed the deteriorated condition of the discipline of the navy to successive Boards of Admi ralty. That might be true to a certain extent, but the real culprits were those whom he had now the honour of addres sing—the members of the House of Commons. The falling off in the discipline of the navy had been owing to claptrap harangues in that house and to unmeaning speeches about flogging. It was a most painful duty to perform when com manders in the navy felt themselves obliged to inflict that punishment ; but it should be borne in mind that flogging was advocated by all the best seamen, though they were themselves liable to the punishment ; and that in the muti- nies at the Nore and at Spithead, when the fleet was under the command of the men, the amount of flogging was greater than at any other period. The hon. member, who last spoke, complained of the increase in the British navy _ . within the last four years. That, however, was only owing to the increase of the French navy, and to the necessity thus occcasioned for maintaining the relative position and strength of this country. The hon. member described the invasion panic as a mere delusion. If it were, it was one in which at any rate nineteen-twentieths of the people of this country participated. The hon. member also talked of the cost of the French navy, but how was it possible for the hon. member to vouch for the accuracy of the figures he quoted with regard to a country circumstanced like France? 1 he expenditure on the French navy might be £15,000,000 for aught the hon. member knew to the contrary. This country required a great navy on account of its distant colo nies and extensive commerce ; but what could the French want a navy for, except at some time or other for the pur- pose of invading this country ? In reference to what had fallen from the noble Secretary to the Admiralty he wished to call attention to the subject of the naval coast volunteers. It had been suggested that some small vessels should be as signed to those men to enable them to train on board for a certain number of days during summer. This involved an important consideration ; for it appeared to be decided that the Volunteer force was to be a cheap means of defence to this country, and therefore too much encou- rangement could not be offered to any description of Volun teers. He hoped his noble friend the Secretary to the Admiralty would be good ensugh to state to the house on what ground it had been decided to build the iron frigates wall-sided in stead of at an angle, which they were informed would render them practically impervious to shot; also, when it was intended to send the Warrior to sea, in order that her capabilities might be test ed ; and whether opinions had not been expressed by some competent judges unfavourable to the lines on which the Warrior had been built, and par ticularly as to the amount of her displacement. Sir M. SEYMOUR regretted that the Naval Estimates were so large in amount, but did not believe they exceeded the amount reasonably required for the navy. Expendi ture in former years had been allowed to fall so low that a very large outlay was required to prepare our fleet for the possibility of war; and political considerations required that especially at present we should have a formidable force afloat. It was true the commercial marine of France had considerably diminished of late years, but every man had been more or less trained to service on board ships of war and was ready to serve when required; so that at any moment the naval power of France was capable of large development. Allusion had been in the course of the dis cussion made to the discipline of the navy, and he, for one, while regretting that there should be any cause of com plaint on that score, found it impossible to say to what the incidental irregularities which had been commented on were to be attributed. They might be owing to the fact that a large number of men were on board vessels lying a good deal in harbour, and to the degree of indulgence which was allowed, but at all events he felt assured they were not of such a naturo as to prevent our navy from doing its duty with accustomed loyalty and gallantry whenever occasion arose. Mr. LIDDELL expressed a hope that the statements which had been made by the hon. member for Montrose would not be allowed to pass unnoticed by the Government. Indeed, it was, he thought, the bounden duty of Ministers to reply to them, and, if possible, to show why the naval estimates ought not to be reduced. (Hear, hear.) Passing from that subject to what had fallen from the noble lord the Secretary for the Admiralty, in - the - course - of - his observa tions in introducing the estimates, he felt called upon to express his satisfaction that officers of the merchant service were to be permitted to enrol themselves among the mem bers of the naval reserve, inasmuch as the two services would thus be brought together in a manner which could not fail to be productive of the greatest advantage. But while he had listened with pleasure to the statement to that effect which had been made, he was sorry to find that no notice had been taken of that which constituted the gist of the recommendations of the Royal Commission, the estab lishment of training ships at some of our chief ports. They were told that 2,000 boys were now being trained in the training ships at Portsmouth and Plymouth, and yet the noble lord spoke of turning out 2,900 per annum. Where were the other 900 boys to be trained? [Lord C. Paget— In receiving-ships, flagships, and the fleet generally.] Our mercantile marine was not now in a position to supply the proportion of seamen for which we formerly looked from that source ; for while, during the last 10 years, our ton nage had increased 33 per cent., our seamen had only in creased 10 per cent. Mr. LINDSAY said that as to the number of ships of war owned by England and France respectively there did not appear to be any difference between himself and the noble lord ; but the public had a vague impression that France meant mischief to England (hear), and was prepar ing vast armaments for the purpose of invading this coun try. That impression was formed upon information which came from the Treasury Bench. What were the facts as to the armaments of France? Of efficient war-steamers France had 75, while England had 140. In fact, England had a larger number of efficient steamvessels not only than France, but than all other countries in the world. (Hear, hear.) It had been said that the whole seafaring popula tion of France, numbering some 1:56,000 men, was at the disposal of the Minister of Marine ; but it would be found that, after deducting dockyard labourers and " novices," there were not 80,000 seamen among the whole. We had at that moment, in a time of peace, at least as many men as France could muster even with her reserve, and in the hour of danger three times as many would be at our command. (Hear.) In regard to frigates, taking into account the numbers and character of the vessels, we were decidedly superior to France. The same remark might be made as to iron ships. Of the 15 which France was said to have five were gunboats carrying two guns, and four block ships, which were, in many respects, unfit for sea. Only one of the other six was ready, and before they were all completed which could not be in less than two years, we should have seven fit for sea. (Hear.) The Secretary to the Admiralty had admitted that the Warrior was double the sire of La Gloire and able to carry double the weight of metal. He believed the Black Prince was not inferior to the Warrior. It followed that the two iron-cased vessels which we had already launched would be a match for four ships like La Gloire. We had, therefore, n,othing to fear from the French as far as iron-cased vessels were concerned. He had stated what he believed to be the facts of the case. It was possible that his information might be erroneous, but in that case the Government ougbt to lay the truth before the committee. Lord C. PAGET took it for granted that they were all de sirous of arriving at the truth. The Government had no wish to overstate the naval resources of France, or to un derstate those of England. All the apparent discrepancies arose from the different views which hon. gentlemen took of naval matters. Somo supposed that a ship of 6,000 tons should always be able to capture two ships of 3,000 tons ; others, with snore reason, thought that two ships of 3,000 tons were more formidable as warlike engines than one ship of 6,000 tons. (Hear, hear.) He admitted that oar iron-cased vessels were much finer than those which had been built abroad ; but the difference between the navies of England and France was not so great as some hon. gentle men seemed to imagine. We had 53 screw line-of-battle ships afloat and 14 building and converting, making a total of 67. The French had 35 afloat and two build ing, making a total of 37. We had 31. screw and nine paddle frigates afloat and 12 building, making a total of 52. The French had 21 screw and IS paddle frigates afloat and eight building, making a total of 47. Of the smaller class of steamships, the French bad 260 afloat and 01 building, making a_ total of 327; while we had 505 afloat and 57 building, making a total of 562. It thus appeared that we were in a very satisfac tory condition, and it was for that reason that the Govern ment had thought it incumbent on them to reduce the shipbuilding expenditure for the coming year. The dock yards had been reduced to their normal state, and the only reason why the reduction had not been carried much further was that the Government wished to replenish the stock of timber and stores, in order to be ready for any emergenoy. He had already stated the facts with respect to the French iron-cased ships. He believed that the two largest—the Solferino and the Magenta—would be ready to be launched in a very short period, and might be sent to sea within a few months. Of the four frigates one was already at sea, and the others were almost ready to be launched. The four floating. batteries, a powerful class of vessels, were also in an advanced state, and might be sent to sea in the course of the present summer , These vessels, acoortlhig to the state- ment of the French themselves, were intended for the de fence of their coasts, and he could only hope that such was indeed the purpose to which they were to be put. He had reason to believe that the French had, in addition, five iron •cased gunboats, which, although mounted with only two guns each, would prove formidable vessels in the event of war. The facts with regard to men might easily be stated. According to the best accounts, there were now about 35,000 men in the French navy. Of that number 10,000 belonged to the conscription, and were able-bodied men from the maritime provinces; the remaining 25,000 belonged to the inscription, and were drawn from the sea faring population of the coast of France, who were all liable to serve in the navy. His honest belief was that the French could add 25,000 additional men to their navy in the course of a month, or at furthest six weeks. He could not deny that it would he very much damaging their mercantile ma rine, but he believed the French could add another 25,000 men in the course of three or four months. These were the figures taken from French officers. He believed that, sup posing a mandeinent were placed on every seafaring man, France could produce in no very long period a force not far short of 85,000. (Hear, hear.) Of course, there would have to be deducted from that a certain number of men serving abroad in distant colonies, but he believed it repre sented something like the actual force of France. (Hear.) He would now turn to the subject to which the right hon. baronet the member for Droitwich had alluded—viz., the disturbances which had occurred on board several of her Majesty's ships. The right lion. gentleman had expressed himself in extremely guarded language ; and he was sure that the object was to call the attention of the Government to the disturbances with a view to correct any errors which might exist. He very much regretted that those proceed ings should be brought before the House of Commons. The bringing these things continually before the public naturally raised a presumption that the navy was deteriorating—that the officers were not so zealous as to discipline as they used to be —and that, in fact, the navy was in an unsatisfactory state. He believed that there was no cause whatever for alarm. What nad t hey done ? They had succeeded in creating a force which was always supposed to be impossible. He was sure that his gallant friend the member for Christchurch would tell them that for many years it was supposed to be impossible to keep a fleet on the coast of England—that the men would all run—that discipline could only be maintained by severe conduct on the part of the officers as in former years. They had, however, succeeded in creating such a force. It was true that there had been disturbances which he greatly re gretted, but they were incident to a young fleet—to a great body of men being hasily thrown together without petty officers and loading seamen to teach them their duties and how to behave themselves. (Hear, hear.) It was true that there had been very lamentable disturbances in the fleet, but he could assure the house that satisfactory accounts had been received from the gallant Admiral who commanded the Mediterranean fleet. With the permission of the house lie would give them an idea of what these disturbances really were. Every one, he believed, misbehaved himself more or less on Christmas-day. (Laughter.) Last Christ mas-day there arose disturbances on board two of the ships in the Mediterranean squadron. In one of them a certain number of men made a noise on the lower deck. In short, they behaved extremely ill, and richly deserved punish ment. It was on board the Neptune. What happened to those men? Two of them, the ringleaders, were reported by the petty officers of the ship. The petty officers requested the boatswain to express to the captain the horror of the ship's company at the bad behaviour of some of their com rades. Those men received corporal punishment by sentence of a court-martial, and there were no further disturbances in the ship. It arose out of the circumstance of the men having somehow or other smuggled into the ship a quantity of liquor. The other case was in the Orion. He believed the right hon. gentleman alluded to that case. It was a much more serious disturbance. The men behaved extremely ill. I hey commenced throwing shot and other things about, and in former days it would have been a very serious disturbance. In these days it betokened a want of discipline, but nothing amounting to disaffection. The petty officers did not behave as they ought to have done. They did not report the men. The result was that the Admiral thought it right to distribute all the men who had been concerned in the, riot among the various ships in the squadron. The ship herself was sent to sea to cruise. There had been no complaint since, and the report of the Admiral received today stated that the whole of the disturbances had passed away, and nothing could be better than the beha viour of the ship's company. One man in the Orion was the ringleader. Who was he ? lie was a teetotaller. (Laughter.) He was a teetotaller who got drunk on Christmasday. (Laughter.) Vice •Admiral Martin on the 4th of January reported :—" Having made every en deavour to elicit the true cause of the disturbance, I may state my opinion that it was not caused by disaffection or discontent, but that the men had succeeded in smuggling on board or otherwise obtaining more than the ordinary quantity of spirits, and that the noise and uproar were after a fashion too frequent on shipboard on the afternoon of Christmasday." (Hear, hear.) He thought the House would see that these disturbances were magnified. Every little occurrence was noticed in the press, whereas ho was old enough to remem ber that when these things occurred, as they did occasion ally in past times, there was no court-martial. The men who misbehaved themselves were corporally punished then and there upon the spot. Nobody heard of it, and there was an ens oe rt. knear, mear.s see 113 .05 mean to say that that was a better plan than the present. Ho wished these things to be made public. He desired no mystery about corporal punishments. But he wiehea et__ that these occurrences did nit deserve the epithets be stowed upon them in the House and out of doors. (Hear, hear.) So far from there being any cause for alarm, he believed that the fleet was getting into a very good state of discipline, and that, although there might be some dissatis faction, the state of the fleet was extremely satisfactory. (Cheers ) Sir J. ELPHINSTONE said that as the discussion had turned on the relative forces of this country and France, there was one point to which he wished to direct the attention of the Cemmittee, and it was the extraordinary position in which the French had placed themselves all over the world. Therewas not a single artery of communica tion with our great colonies, or a single course where our stream of trade flowed, which the French did not command by some possession. They had Reunion. They had islands which commanded the entrance to the Red Sea. They had failed in establishing themselves at Cochin China through 'ho bad climate, but they would have an estab lishment somewhere in the north of the China Sea. And they had Otaheite, which commanded Cape Horn. In the last war a miserable ship, the Essex—an American frigate, with 32 carronades—stationed r.ff Cape Horn, destroyed 50 or 60 South Sea-men and com pletely cut up our South Sea trade before she was taken. That showed what might be done again. The object of the French in having these positions dotted all round the world was to draw away our fleet from the Channel. The whole of oar American, West Indian, East Indian, Chip nese, New South Wales, and West Coast of African trades must be guarded by separate squadrons, and at every point we must have a squadron superior to the French. (Hear.) This vote turned upon the number of men. Between 2,000 and 3,000 seamen, in a high state of efficiency, were com ing home from China, and he would suggest that they should be retained in the place of an equal number of the worst men in our fleet. (Hear.) He had been accused of suggesting measures which would cost a great deal of o know,and menif theinlndi aGovernment and China,main tained why they should not call on the Government of India to pay some portion of the exp e nse of that supplement al squa dron. With regard to boys, the Naval Commission cer tainly contemplated a much larger number than 2,600. They did not specify the exact places where school ships should be placed, but at least 20 were thought desirable, and vessels might easily have been draughted for the pur pose, in which 100 to 500 boys might have been trained. This would have given 7,500 ; and if boarders had been taken they would have helped to pay the expense, as well as gone far to supply good, well brought up handy boys, young men of good education, fit to take their place as mates in the merchant service. With regard to troopships, he would suggest that they should be constructed in such a cylindri cal manner that when they run on coral reefs they would not fill so rapidly as they now did. He looked upon the vic tualling of seamen as a most important point. The life cf a seaman was very much shorted by the nature of his food. The practice of continually filling up salt beef casks and carrying them from one commission to another as long as the beef was of a good colour and not corrupted tended to abstract the gelatinous and nutritious parts of the beef. Hence scurvy, debility, sore legs, ulcers, and those other diseases to which seamen were so liable. These were all the effect of a low state if constitution brought on by the consumption of deteriorated food. He would advise his noble friend to take the advice of some eminent chemists on this subject, fur he believed the addition of some saccha rine matter to the food of seamen would check the tendency to scorbutic affections and be the means of prolonging the lives of sailors. Ho considered barracks most important, but they should be built on a comprehensive and systematic plan. He did not know whether the vote for Devonport was judicious or not, but hewas quite certain that the conversion of the convict barracks at Portsmouth would neither be popular nor effectual. It would not do to hang the tailors' hammocks in corridors; the barracks must be constructed with every convenience which had been introduced into military barracks. The great object was to humanise the men—to place them during some part of their service under an influence which wculd make them give up their roving and uncertain habits, which now made them so difficult to manage. He protested against any partial manner of in troducing barracks. He recommended the Government to consider the question well—whether it was not absolutely necessary that barracks should be confined to docks with ex ercisingand playgrounds, and that money should be takento purchase land at once. It would not do to build barracks at Plymouth, and not at Portsmouth, or vice versa. The bar rack system wouLl introduce a very great and radical change in the habits of seamen, and their adoption should not be piecemeal. That would neither be beneficial to the country nor satisfactory to the seamen. He had intended to touch on the discipline of the navy in a former debate, but when he came to look into the accounts he had received he quite shrunk from it. He agreed with his right hon. friend the member for Droitwicla, He w as quite convinced of his own knowledge that the discipline of the navy was below par, and the sooner it was brought up to the proper point the better. He believed the cause of this laxity of discipline was very much that the Admiralty took on themselves other duties besides their own. If they left captains of ships to do their own duty they would very soon bring their ships into good order. lie was flee to declare that disturbances which had taken place in some ships were utterly uncalled for ; the men had nothing to complain of, and the leaders and participators in those outrages ought to have received condign punishment. They had been let off a great deal too easily. The best men in the navy knew that unless proper discipline were maintained they had to do the work of the lazy fellow and the skulker, and nothing was so unpopular in the service as a ship managed on a system of no punishment. So long as the navy existed, so long as they had a community of 400 or 500 men inclosed in one ship, flogging must continue. There were no other means of keeping the blackguard, the thief, or the skulker, and punishment must be administered when it was deserved, or the good men suffered for the bad. Mr. W. MARTIN contended that the country could not look with safety to a reduction on votes 1 and 2. Though there were now pretty nearly the same number of men en rolled in the navy as at the end of the Russian war, yet we had to pay half-a-million more for them than then. It was bad economy and ruinous to the service to be continually reducing the number of men employed. The falling off in discipline which had been generally admitted was owing in some degree to the sense of injustice which had been created by the manner in which the men were dismissed at the end of the Russian war. We had to pay more, and we got a worse quality of men. Admiral WALCOTT pressed on the Government the ex pediency of giving the Surveyor of the Navy an honorary seat at the Board of Admiralty, so as to insure him greater independence and to preserve him from improper interfer- ence. He recommended also the establishment of a com mittee of officers of high standing, to whom should be re ferred all plans which were from time to time submitted to the Admiralty, so as to secure that all suggestions made for the improvement of the navy should be properly con sidered, and also to prevent idle experimentalising. (Hear, hear.) He was sorry to see that there were only 2,000 boys to be taken into the navy this year. He had always recom- mended that at least 4,000 boys should be taken in and well trained under good officers, so es to insure a constant supply of efficient seamen. There ought also to be a training ship at every port of any importance. He was sorry to have to concur in much that had been said of laxity of discipline, and he could not too strongly reprehend the absence of loyalty and impropriety of con duct which was shown by that falling off in discipline. He could not help thinking that if the Channel fleet had been sent more to sea, instead of remaining in port till the ships, in sailors' phrase, " grounded on their own beef bones," the discipline would have been more satis factory. When the men were idle the "sea lawyers"—the worst description of men ever created—(laughter)—gained an influence over the men's minds, and led them into breaches of discipline. (Hear, hear.) Another cause was the little encouragement which was given to the petty officers, who were to the navy as essential as good sergeants and corporals were to the army. (Hear, hear.) With regard to iron ships and other improvements, the Admiralty must be deterred neither by expense nor labour from keeping ahead of the rest of the world. Considering the immense interest England had in preserving her naval superiority it would be little other than treason if they did not take good care in every way to make a descent on her shores or a naval re pulse impossibilities. (Hear, hear.) Lord C. PAGET, alluding to the marine volunteers, said that so anxious were the Admiralty to give every possible effect to the great volunteer movement, that they had sent down to all the various coastguard st•ttions to ascertain what facilities they could give with a view to assist the volunteer practice, and it was possible they might be able to make some arrangements that would give satisfaction to the country in this respect. He had been asked whether the lines of the Warrior were such as he approved of. Now, he did not construct the Warrior, and although she was a very fine ship, he did not entirely approve of her lines, and could not say that she was perfection. In hieopinion, a very flat midship section was the best form for all vessels which carried heavy weights. With regard to the shipping masters, who were said to be inadequately paid, the Admi ralty were in communication with the Board of Trade on this subject with a view to increase their pay where it was obviously just to do so. As there would be several oppor tunities for discussing these iron-clad ships, he should not now enter further into this subject. Mr. BRIGHT—The discussion has been a very interest ing one as far as it has gone. I am not sufficiently acquainted with the details of the question to enable me to enter into it at any length, but I wish to call the noble lord's attention to one or two omissions in his speech in reply to the observations of my hon. friend (Mr. Lindsay). The noble lord told us a great many things, but he did not answer that part of my hon. friend's speech which referred to the 18 vessels built more than 20 years ago for conveying mails across the Atlantic—a commercial under taking which did not succeed, and which ended in the ab sorption of those vessels into the French navy. In the list which he gave us he reckoned those vessels as if they had been first-class frigates, and made no allowance for my hon. friend's statement. Then, with regard to these screw-fri gates, which were stated to be many of them of only 200- horse power, the noble lord made no reply whatever on that subject. These are points of considerable importance, if we are to discuss this question with any regard to the figures nffpred ua nn both aides nf the Channel. Rnt-T haves r_nrna to the conclusion that the Secretary to the Admiralty, and First Lords, and all the rest of them, are themselves in a great quagmire and puzzle respecting this question. (A laugh.) I find a classified summary of the Royal Navy in April, 1859, published in a book which is an authority with many people, and this gives the whole number of vessels as 751. We know that an enormous sum of money has been voted within the last two years, and that shipbuilding has been carried on faster perhaps than it has ever been carried on before; yet we come to a return now laid on the table, and find the whole number of vessels set down as 688. There fore, according to the Admiralty returns, the more you build and the more you spend, the fewer ships you have. (A laugh.) Ido not think you are a bit the worse for it, because either of the numbers I have given is far beyond what any rational Minister would ask for or any rational Parliament would permit to exist. (Hear.) Again, in a report of this very session it appears that there have been as many ships under repair during the last year, within one, as the number given us as constituting the whole navy; that is, of the whole navy, consisting of 688 ships, 687 are put down as under repair. (Hear.) I have come to the conclusion that the house can place extremely little reliance upon those statistics, and I suspect there are many ships of which the house knows nothing, and probably the Admi • ralty itself knows very little. There is another point in the noble lord's speech which I think is worth notice— where he referred to the Lumber of men which the French Government could in a certain time put on board its navy. If I recollect right, he said that there were 25,600, that other 25,000 might be added, and after that about 25,000 or 30,000 more—the second 25,000 in the course of a month, and the last 25,000 or 30,000 in the course of three or four months. What was his object in making "that statement ? Was it to convey a true or a false impres sion to the country ? I should be the last man to charge the noble lord with endeavouring to create a false impression, because I have always regarded him as one of those mem bers—and there are many such in this house—in whom you see at once, or imagine you see, entire frankness and honour and honesty. (Hear.) But such is the effect of official life that a man getting upon that bench somehow or other takes another colour, as it were, from the very atmosphere he lives in, and the food he exists upon. (Laughter, and hear, hear.) The Treasury Bench seems to be not " the bourne from which no traveller returns," but the bourne from which no honest man returns. (A laugh.) In making this statement the noble lord has done that which, read by per sons in the country, must give them an incorrect impres sion of the facts. It was no use his telling us about 75,000 or 80,000 men unless for the sake of showing that, under certain circumstances, in one, or three or four months, the French Government would have this number of men on board their ships. But the noble lord was obliged to admit that when this happens every man now in the Im perial navy will be there, and every man engaged upon the coasts of France in maritime affairs or in fishing boats, every man from the French fisheries on the other side of the Atlantic, and every man in French merchant ships all over the globe. What does this suppose? Why, that the 1,000,000 tons of which the French mercantile navy is composed would be all in port. Not a single ship bearing the produce of France would leave her ports, or bearing the produce of other countries to France would be upon the ocean. But this is an absolute impossibility. Everybody knows it to be so. Even the hon. member for Norfolk (Mr. Bentiack) knows it. (A laugh.) It would be just as practicable for the First Lord of the Admiralty and his confederates in this vast extravagance to call home from all parts of the world 300,000 or 400,000 English sailors, or whatever is the number which might be obtained if all the English mercantile marine was denuded of its crews. I protest against that kind of argument. (Hear, hear.) When the noble lord says that in the French navy the number of men does not exceed 31,000, and that it varies from 30,000 to 34,000 (I believe the number voted this year is smaller than either of these figures), the proper course is to compare that number with the figures voted by this house. I have heard not from the noble lord, but from his predecessors in 'office, and from every First Lord for the last 18 years, that the number of men is the proper gauge by which to estimate the naval power of a country and the expense which is incurred for the navy for the service of the year. Now, we have 78,000 men this year, and last year had 84,000. The utmost that the Government naval officer who is kept at Paris to report upon these matters — the utmost that he can make of the number of men in the French navy is 34,000. If it be true, then, that we have had 81,000 and they but 31,000 sailors, and that in order to bring them up to our number every French fisherman and every sailor in every part of the world must be included in the calculation, I want to know \ why it is that this alarm has been created during the last two years—an alarm which I do not hesitate to say is founded on a falsehood the most monstrous and the most criminal which any Government ever attempted to impose on a people. I say that Govern ment themselves are guilty of thus imposing on the people, levying upon them taxes for which there is not the smallest necessity. My hon. friend (Mr. Baxter) blamed the Go vernment and the house for this, but said he blamed the country also, because the country had been alarmed. But he knows perfectly well that what is called the country must necessarily take its opinions at second hand. Manu facturers, farmers, professional man, shopkeepers, artisans, and labourers do not con over these blue-books of ours and read the accounts minutely given in the French votes. They know very little of this. They take their opinions from what is stated in this house and in the public press. And, of course, when there are men in the high position of the noble lord at the head of the Government and others as- sociated with hlni, who have been in the service of the coun- ry for 20, 30, or 40 years, it is reasonable that the opinions which they express and the statements which are made in their hearing, but which they do not take the trouble to con- tradict, should sink into the minds of the people and become with them a fixed belief, although founded upon no know ledge whatever. I have never heard the noble lord at the head of the Government or any of his colleagues make a distinct statement. They don't condescend to particularize on this matter, but allow these alarms to exist and these asser tions to circulate throughout the country. They make use of them for the purpose of seizing on a time of popular delusion to add to the navy and to the expenditure of the country. Instead of that, if they were to tell the people the truth, which they know, which I know that they know, which to my certain knowledge their own officers send to them from Paris, they might have saved millions during the last few years. There is not a man in Paris, whether Bonapartist, Orleanist, or Republican, who does not en tirely disbelieve and disavow all the statements made in _ _ this house and in this country as to the gigantic naval pre- parations of France, and the disposition of its Government towards England. My hon. friend the member for Stirling called attention the other night to the public expenditure in connection with the present condition of the country—but it does not seem to affect the votes in the least degree. The diminution in the Estimates is altogether trifling. Every- body admits that you should not build any more wooden ships—yet a large sum is taken for timber, of which you have already great quantities in stock, that in all probabi lity will never be necessary. Surely, after what was done in consequence of the panic, excited when the right hon. menber for D!oitwich was at the Admiralty, and consider ing that this is a time of peculiar pressure, when a general discontent is arising in different parts of the country at this enormous expenditure, the Government might easily have reduced the Military Estimates of the year by four or five millions I And I don't believe there is a man in the king dom with the slightest knowledge of politics who would imagine that we were not quite as safe as we shall be when all this money has been voted. The noble lord at the head of the Government has disappointed the country and those who usually support him in this house in some things, but, seeing how little necessity there has been for our in terference by force in Europe during the last few years, when a war of very considerable magnitude has prevailed, surely he might have concluded that there was no likeli hood of our interference this year or the next, and might with credit to his Government and satisfaction to the country have touched these estimstes with a bolder hand, and given his Chancellor of the Exchequer the :means of making some amends in his budget to a heavily taxed nation for the other failures and shortcomings of the Ad ministration. (Hear.) Lord PALMERSTON.—The hon. member who has just sat down says it is remarkable how much hon, gentlemen who pass to these benches from other parts of this house are apt to change the opinions they may have previously enter tained on matters of fact. Now, that is perfectly true, and it arises from this simple circumstance, that those who speak on such subjects in other parts of the house are fre quently uninformed as to the facts on which their opinions are based—(hear, hear)—and that when they come to this bench and know the real state of things in a greater degree than before their views change with the change of their in formation. Why, so natural is that that if the hon, gentle man himself were to come and sit here among us, and be- come acquainted with all those details on which alone an opinion can properly be founded, and if he were, moreover, charged with that responsibility from which he is at pre sent free—(hear, hear)—l should not at all despair, know ing the power of his mind and the accuracy of his observa tion when the facts of any case are fully before him, of finding him one of the stoutest advocates for good naval and military establishments, quite adequate to defend the country from any attack to which it might be liable. (Hear, hear, and a laugh.) The hon. member says we are highly culpable for sitting still and not contradicting asser tions which we know to be erroneous. Well, I don't wish to be any longer sultjct to that reproach ; and therefore I rise to contradict the hon. gentleman's own erroneous assertions —(laughter and cheers)—as well as those of the hon. mem bers for Montrose and Sunderland. Those gentlemen came here propounding opinions based on extracts from some newspaper or other. I really think it was a Scotch news paper that one hon. member quoted. (A laugh.) They re count to us what they were told by friends whom they met at Paris, and they repeat the denials given there by persons excessively interested in misleading public opinion here— (hear)—and making us all believe that nothing can be more harmless than all the military and naval preparations of FraiiCe. Why, these gentlemen come here like the Trojan horse in order to deceive us as to the real possibility of dan ger to which we might be exposed. I say, " Equo ne credit .e Totted." (Hear, hear, and laughter.) How inconsistent is the argument of the hon. member for Sunderland to-night with what we heard him not long ago state in the l 'rosi l92l "eeeilite - terms 1 'who a oavn „„ an account of his conversation with the Minister of Marine in France, who endeavoured to persuade him that France h :d no navy at all—(No, no)—or only a very small one, when my hon. friend, like an Englishman, stoutly told the French Minister, and if I mistake not also told the French Emperor, that, whatever the French navy might, be, England ought to have, and England would have, double that amount of force. (Hear, hear) He said, " It is of no use for you to go on increasing your navy, be cause if you think that by that means you can get a supe riority I tell you you are totally mistaken ; for, whatever sacrifice may be necessary for the purpose, we are deter-„, mined to have double what you may have." (Hear, hear.) But my hon friend to-night makes it an accusation against her Majesty's Government that we happen to have, ac cording to his own statement, not quite double the amount of the French force, because he states that the French have 75 ships of a particular kind, while we have 140. There fore we have hardly yet come up to his own standard of what we ought to have in comparison with the French navy. (Hear, hear, and a laugh.) Really, Sir, it is shut ting one's eyes against notorious facts, to go on contending that the policy of France—of which I certainly do not now complain—has not for a great length of time been to get up a navy which shall be equal, if not superior to our own. (Hear, hear, and No.) Why, everybody knows more or less the result of that elaborate work L' .Enquete Parlemen tairc, published some years ago, and which studiously and laboriously aimed to inculcate that policy on the French Government. Ate instance of the way in which my hon friend the member for Sunderland has been misled by the recent communications be had at Paris is this :—He says there were 16 innocent mail packets built eat ressly for the passage between France and America, and these vessels nut being wanted for the purpose for which they had been des tined, the French Government knew not what else to do with them except to add them to its navy, although they were just as fit for warlike purposes as any of the Cunard lino. Now, I happen to know something about these 16 steamers, because I was at the Foreign-office at the time they were constructed, and we understood perfectly well that they were built for the purposes of war—that it was a mere sham to say they were Transatlantic packets. (Hear.) Well, it soon turned out as we foresaw when we heard of their construction. By a stroke of the pen they were all one fine day added to the warlike navy of France, and the pre tence of their being intended for the Transatlantic commu nication was henceforth entirely at an end. (Hear, hear.) Therefore, I say that as regards ships the French navy has been considerably increased; and we have hardly yet that double proportion which my hon. friend admits we ought to possess; and we ought to possess it for this plainest of all reasons—the French have very few colonial establishments. My hon. friend said their commerce is falling off, and there fore they have smaller interests to protect at distant stations. The hon. member for Portsmouth described how they are acquiring naval and military positions in different parts of the world where we have only commercial relations. (Hear.) By those means, in the event of any unfortunate difference between the two countries, the French forces would be on the spot and able to interrupt in the most serious manner all our extensive commercial operations. And at these stations they now have a naval force superior to ours. (Hear, hear.) On the other hand, we are obliged to scatter our naval force over every quarter of the globe. If we did not do so, and any interest should unfortunately suffer for want of pro. tection, I ask who would be blamed for the damage and disaster caused by the neglect ? (Hear, hear.) lam really sorry to be discussing the possibility of feelings of hostility between two countries that, I hope, will long remain friends —(hear, hear)—but it is with the object of impressing ou the house and on the country that there is no possibility of peace and friendship between two wealthy and powerful na tions unless each is on such a footing as to its defences that neither may invite attack by the other. (Cheers.) France, for her own defensive purposes, has no reason for scattering her naval force widely over the globe; and whatever navy she has she can concentrate it almost all, at the commence ment of a war, either on her own coast or on any given point, fur an attack, either in the Mediterranean or on these islands. (Hear, hear.) Now as to the number of man. France has 31,000 in her naval service now, and in a few months about 50,000 more can be added to that num ber. But then, it is said, to do that Franco must take into her navy all the fishermen of her coast, all her mercantile seamen, all her sea-faring men of every kind; and why should she not do so? (Hear, hear.) If a war took place she would naturally call on all her mercantile seamen. They would be of no use at sea for commercial purposes; she would take all within her reach, and put them into her war navy, to attack your commerce. It is no argu ment whatever to say that, to obtain the additional 50,000 men, it would be necessary to take all her mercantile popu lation into the navy, because thatis just what France would do—(hear, hear)—and ought to do. (Hear, hear.) And her power of doing that with facility should never be over looked. 'We have not the same means, because cur irsti- tutions do not give the Government the power of sweeping away into our navy so great a proportion of our civil popu lation. That power the French Government possesses. Our commercial seamen are scattered over every part of the world ; when hostilities began, many of them would pro bably bo at sea, and many might go to France as prisoners of war if taken by French frigates cruising in different parts of the seas. I only point out what has been stated, because I am glad the acknowledgment has been made that, in point of fact, our navy, as far as wooden ships are concerned, is in a satisfactory condition—(hear, hear)—that it is in the relation to the Ft ench navy we ought to occupy. And I think great credit is due to the right hon. baronet opposite (Sir J. Pakington) and to the present Government that they have taken the measures required to place it in that condi tion. (Hear, hear.) But there is one point in which our navy is not in a satisfactory condition ; it is with regard to iron chips. With the iron ships the French have already— they will, when those now building are completed, have a superiority in this point. We know the French Government has recently ordeied the construction of 10 vessels of the same size and force as La Gloire. At present, then, we do not stand in the same position as to iron ships as we do in wooden vessels. But the house must not suppose that iron ships will wholly supersede those of wood; we may depend upon it that in case of war, wooden line-of• battle ships will play their part, especially on distant stations. You cannot send the iron ships to keep the sea for any length of time where they cannot clean their bottoms of the incrustations and the veg e table matter that im ede the steering and management of the vessel. For this reason, in the Mediterranean France has a great advantage. Her ships can go to Toulon and there be put in pt oper eon dition, whereas oar iron ships in the same sea would have no port, except, perhaps, Malta, where any repairs could be done. On all distant stations wooden ships, especially frigates, will still be the kind of vessels required. There seems, then, no ground for saying that, large as I admit the demand is for the naval service of the country, it is larger than the interest and safety of the country require. (Cheers.) I am persuaded the country knows that. (Hear.) When I am told that the country knows nothing on this subject except what it is told from the Treasury Bench, I say it is a mistake. (Hear.) The country knows more of what passes in France than what it hears from those who sit on this bench, or from those who send information from Paris. The French make no secret of their preparations ; but when some well-intentioned gentleman asks them if they really mean to invade this country, if they really have any hostile intention towards us, of course they say, not the least in the world, their feeling is one of perfect sym pathy and friendship with us, and that all their prepara tions are only for their awn self-advancement. But in this country it is perfectly well known what exertions have been made by successive Governments of France to establish a powerful and formidable navy ; and we also know that France has an army six times as large as that of England. (Hear.) France has an army of 600,000 men; 400,000 are actually under arms ; and there are 200,000 men belonging to different regiments, on temporary leave, and liable to bo called back to the ranks in the course of a fortnight. (Hear.) And in estimating the number of men each country can bring into action, for a particular purpose,we must not throw the military establishment of France quite out of the ques tion. For operations in the Channel, and crossing from one shore to the other, soldiers would be almost as valuable as sailors for manning the ships required for the purpose. How ever much, then, we may regret that our estimates are .so large, the house and the country must remember that the magnitude of the expenditure is occasioned by changes and improvements in the construction of ships. That, to a certain extent, is a temporary increase. With regard to iron ships, it was well stated by the hon. member for Sunderland on a former occasion, that they do not require the same amount of repair as wooden vessels, and that, though they cost more at the outset, the expense of maintaining them is less. But whatever the opinions expressed, no one has pro posed any reduction of the vote ; I therefore hope the house will answer the expectations of the country, and give the Government the means of maintaining the naval force it thinks necessary. (Cheers.) The hon. member for Bir mingham seems to think there is some peculiar pleasure or advantage to a Government in proposing a great amount of expenditure. But if a Government could consult its own wishes, I believe it would reduce everything it possi bly could reduce. A Government can have no interest or advantage in proposing a large military and naval expendi ture. But on the responsibility of its position, that ren ders it a duty towards the country, every motive of a per sonal kind that can influence a Government would lead it to propose as low an estimate as it believed compatible with the safety and interest of the nation. (Cheers.) Mr. CONINGHAM saw in the commercial treaty of last year an emphatic assurance of the friendly disposition of the French Emperor towards England. The vote of 78,000 men, including 18,000 marines, was then agreed to, as were also votes of £3,122,580 for wages and £1,328,259 for victuals. Th. CHAIRMAN then reported progress, and The house resumed. RED SEA AND INDIA TELEGRAPH BILL. Upon the motion for going into committee upon this bill, Mr. KINNAIRD expressed his regret at the course the Government had pursued upon this matter. No one could reasonably doubt the validity of the contract, and it was the first time in the history of this country, in a case where the faith of the Government was distinctly pledged, that faith had been broken with those who had advanced their money upon a Government guarantee. The contract had been drawn up by the Solicitor to 'the Treasury, and then the Attorney-General had been employed to pick a hole in a oontract thus prepared. The Government could hardly be aware of the feeling that had been excited in the city by the course they had taken, and he was convinced it would have a serious effect in inducing capitalists to advance their money in future upon Government guarantees. Mr. AYRTON hoped the Chancellor of the Exchequer would be in his place when the bill was read a third time, as the present position of affairs was not quite clear. The effect of the bill would be to give to shareholders an an nuity for 48 years at the rate of 41 per cent. upon their capital, with something added for the expenses of the com pany. According to the present rate of Consols, the share holders would be receiving something like £lOO,OOO more than if, as provided under another article, they were repaid their whole capital. It was the duty of the Government to consider whether it would not be more for the benefit of the nation to repay the capital and take possession of the tele graph, worthless as it might be at the bottom of the sea. Mr. WYLD did not agree that the telegraph in its pre sent position was worthless. He understood that the Chan cellor of the Exchequer intended to propose a committee to inquire into the circumstances of the telegraph, and cer tainly both this country and India had a right to demand that they should enjoy any benefit that might be derivable from the money already expended. He was informed that by the expenditure of £200,000 is was possible to restore the telegraph to working order. Mr. CONINGHAM reprobated the conduct of the Go vernment in evading responsibility by handing over this question to a committee Sir H. WILLOUGHBY said that, whatever the original agreement might have been, it was contingent on the sanc tion of Parliament. lie should like to know was the atten tion of the House of Commons of the last Parliament called to that agreement when the bill was under considera tion ? _ _ . Mr. F. PEEL said the relations between the Govern ment and the company would remain the same under this bill as they had been before. Mr. VANSITTART suggested that the company was of no use now, and that no expense should be incurred for directors. Mr. DUNLOP added a few words of explanation in re spect of the course taken with the bill. The bill then passed through committee. On the motion of Sir G. LEWIS, the following members were nominated the select committee on Parochial Assess ments Bill :—Sir G. Lewis, Sir W. Jolliffe, Mr. Villiers, Mr. Cayley, Mr. Puller, Mr. C. Wynne, Mr. Alderman Salomons, Sir W. Miles, Mr. 11. Bruce, Mr. A. Egerton, Mr. L. Gower, Mr. Beach, Mr. Crossley, Mr. Humberstone, and Sir J. Shelley—five to be the quorum. The house adjourned at one o'clock. [ADVERTISEMENT.]-11olloway's Pills.—Good Spirits.-- Every one has frequently experienced the sudden personal change from gaiety to gloom. The wind and weather oftentimes receive the blame, when a faulty digestion is alone the cause of the depression. Holloway's Pills can be honestly recommended for regulating a disordered stomach and improving digestion. They entirely remove the sense of fullness and oppression after eating. They clean the furred tongue, and act as a wholesome stimulant to the liver, and as a gentle aperient to the bowels they health fully rouse both body and mind. Holloway's digestive Pills are the best known antidotes for want of appetite, nausea, flatulency, heartburn, languor, depression, and apathy, s;) characteristic of chronic derangement of the digestion. 13 IHTHS. B ITRDETT.—On the 10th inst., at Shrubhurst, (hied, the wife of Lieut.-Col. S. Burdett, of a daughter. HARDECGE.—On the 7th inst., at 10, Chester-square, the Hon. Mrs. Arthur Hardinge, of a daughter. PORTAL.—On the 10th inst., at 18, Chesham place, the wife of Wyndham S. Portal, Es q., of a daughter. MARRIAGES. BEALE— SANDEMAN.— On the 9th inst., at Brighton, Lionel John Beak, M.R.C.S.. of Long-acre, London, to Laura, fourth daughter of the late John Sandetuan, Esq., of Oporto, and 20, St. Swithin's-lane, London. Itor,lNsos —CRIBS.—On the 7th inst., at St. Mark's, Hamilton-terrace, Joseph Robinson, of Pineapple-place, Edgewarc-real, to Fanny Cribb, of Hamilton-terrace, St. John's wood. DEATHS. COLLIER.—On the 9th inst., James Collier, Esq., Castle Cottage, liomerton, and Yoster-street, Bishopsgate, aged 68. GI3BORIE.—On the Bth inst., at 1, Dartmouth-street, W es tminster, Lionel Gisborne, Esq , civil engineer, aged 37. JERVIS.—On the Bth inst., at Elackgang, Isle of Wight, Marian ' the wife of Sir Henry Meredy th Jervis White Jervis, Bart. MncLArNE.—On the 9th inst., at Cumberland. street, Hyde park, General Sir Archibald Maclaine, K.C.8., aged 80. LONDON : Printed and Published by MURDO YOUNG, at No. 112, Strand, Printer, at TILE SUN Office, No. 112,Strand. in the Precinct of the Savoy, in the County of Middlesex, Tuesday, March 12 7 1551. THE S _.~. ~,