The Sun. — London, England, 1856-03-14 00:00:00

IMPERIA lAMENT. HOUSE OF LORDS—(YESTERDAY). The LORD CHANCELLOR took hie seat on the woo] sack at five o'clock. TORTURE IN INDIA.. - The Earl of ALBEMARLE stave notice that on Monday, the 14th April, he should present a petition from certain inhabitants of Madras, complaining of the infliction of torture by the officers of the Government, attributing the practice to the weight of the assessment `required for the Government revenue, and praying for protection. The noble lord said it was afterward his intention to resolve, " That, by the report laid on the table of the house, it is proved to our conviction that torture, or the infliction of pain by way of punishment, or to induce confession, or for the purposes of extortion, has been practised and continees to be practised by native officers for the realisation of the public revenues, or in the administration of the criminal law, to a greater or less extent throughout the presidency of Madras. That the aforesaid torture, although clandestinely practised, has been known to the constituted authorities in India, as shown by public documents. That this house views the practice of torture, extending over many millions of her Majesty's Government, whether as an instrument for the realisation of the public revenue, or in the administration of the criminal law, as repugnant to the principles of national justice, abhorrent to humanity, and highly disgraceful to the character of the nation. That this house pledges itself to _ _ adopt the most speedy and effectual means in its power for the utter annihilation of the odious and barbarous practice of torture within the above -mentioned Government and Presidency of Madras." The noble lord gave notice that it was his intAn tion, immediately after the Raster recess, to inquiro of her Majesty's Ministers whether they had received any account from the Government of Madras respecting 14 cases of torture within the presidency in a particular district, inflicted at as recent a date as July, 1855, by a Government collector, in order to realise some Govern ment dues, and in relation to a certain tax. The noble lord then gave notice of his intention to move for a series of other papers, relating to the practice of tor ture in Madras. THE FALL OF KARS, The Earl.. of ELLENBO ROUGH, pursuant to notice, asked the noble lord the Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs whether the omissions in the rapers produced upon the subject of the capitulation of Kars, to which he bad called attention on a previous evening, would be supplied ? Lord WODEHOUSE was understood to say it was unusual for the Government to comply with such a reqnest. The Earl of ELLENBOROTJGFI expressed his sm.- prise that the Secretary for War had not given the ex planation on this subject. It was perfectly well known that before the investment of Kars nothing whatever was done by the allies for the defence of the place, and now he wished to know what had been done by them after the fortress had been in vested. During the last war the Government never made the slightest objection to lay the amplest informa tion with respect to military affairs before Parliament. In reply to the Earl of INIALUESBURY, Lord WODEHOIJSE stated that a correspondence had taken place between hell'lVlajasty's Government and the Turkish Government with respect to General Wil -1 iams. THIRD READINGS, The Mutiny Bill. the Marine Mutiny Bill, the Con solidated Fund (26,000,0001.) 8111, and the Drainaqe Advances Act Amendment Bill were read a third time and passed. MARRIAGE WITH A DECEASED WIFE'S KISTE R. Earl ST. GERNIANS brought in p.. bill for the leg; 1 nation ofniarriav with a deceased wife's sister. The bill was 14,,(1 Eir.t time. JUDICIAL STATISTICS. Lord BROUGHAM rose for the purpose of resuming the debate noon the resolutions he had !aid before the house on the 31 instant. The noble and learned lord urged the importance of correct information on the subject. France was not the only , country which was superior to this in judi . tial statistics. Belgium and the Sardinian states were also provided with accurate judicial statistics, and he thought the happiest eff:!cts would a-ise to this country by a like system being adopted. Tile noble lord con cluded by movim the resolutions on t'le subject. The LORD CHANCELLOR said the resolutions should leave their most serious consideration. Of course he could say nothing further at present. EDUCATION. In answer to the Earl of SHAFTESBURY, E trl GRANVILLE exp'ained the ♦arious parts of the bill he had introduced into their lordships' house with respect to education, but he thought it would be prudent before they proceeded any further with the measure to await the result of the resolutions of Lord J. Russell in the other house. The Earl of TIARDIVICKE called the attention of the noble lord to the system of education for the army and navy. Earl GRANVILLE said the Government were perfectly aware of the importance of the snbject. The Earl of 5H..4.14.7E58URY said he believed there were upwards of two millions of children uneducated, hut it must be remarked that there were facilities for educating half as many more children as now attended the schools. He thought the Government would have to attempt compulsory education. The subject then dropped. Their lordships shortly afterwards adjonmed. HOUSE OF COMNIONS.—(YESTERDAY.) Th• SNEAKER took the chair at the usual hour. PRIVATE BUSINESS. The following bills were severally read a second time, and ordered to be committed :—Colonial Bank, East of Fife Railway, Knottingly Gas, and London Docks bill. EXCHEQUER BILLS. Mr. SPOONER moved for a return of the amount of Exchequer-bills changed and the amount of Exche quer-bills paid in money, in the months of March and June in the years 1852. 1353, 1854, and 1855, and in the month of March, 1856, and the amount of Exchequer. bills now outstanding.—Agreed to. REGISTRATION ACT (SCOTLAND). In reply to Mr. ALEX. HASTIE, Lord DUNCAN said that the cost of the book; for carrying into effect the registration act in Scotland wat 3,0001. The charge for those books now averaged about 2,0001. per annum. There was now a great im provement in the cost of those books for the present year in comparison with those for 1355. The total cost of carrying into effect the registration act in Scotland amounted to 18,0001., with 3,0001. for postage, which was merely drawing from one public department and paying over to another, REGISTRATION OF DEEDS. Mr. DUNLOP moved for a return of all the records or registers, general and particular, in Scotland, other than books or courts for the registration of deeds, twines, habitations, adjudications, protests, and every other legal instrument or writ.—Agreed to. BANK RETURNS. Mr. GLYN moved for a return of any banks being► banks of issue previously to the passing of the act 7t;t and Bth Victoria, chap. 32, which had cea3ed to issue their own notes, and of the amount of circulation of such banks respectively, made up to the present date.--- Agreed to. EDUCATION (SCOTLAND). In reply to an Hoar. MEMBHR, The LORD ADVOCATE said he bad intended before the Easter recess to have statsd the course he proposed to adopt with respect to education in Scotland. He now begged to give notice that on the 31st of March he should move for leave to bring in a bill for regulating the parochial schools in Scotland, and also for the pro motion of education in the burghs of Scotland. VIE BALLOT. Mr. BERKELEY gays notice that shortly after Easter he should bring forward his motion with respect to the ballot. THE ATTACK ON THE REDAN. Mr. F. FRENCH gave notice that o• the motion for the adjournment of the house to-morrow he should put a question to her Majesty's Government as to the failure, of the attack on the Great Redan on the Bth of Sept. LOCAL MANAGENIENT ACT. Viscount CHELSEA. rose to ask the Attorney- General whether he had not given it as his opinion that by the provisions of the Metropolis Local Management Aat 18 and 1Q Victoria, c. 120, eec. 8, all existing ves tries, whether general or otherwise, were super, eded, and their powers transferred to the vestries constituted under the said act. The noble lord proceeded to make a statement relative to as interview he had had with the Attorney-General, amidst interruption from several hon. members, and resumed his seat by moving the adjourn ment of the hour.. The ATTORNEY-GENERAL said he was not pre pared for the observations of the hoe. member. He had given the opinion the hos. member had stated on this question, but the noble lord must have misunderstood him if he thought that opinion was given without di-. trust in its soundness. The whole matter was in the greatest confusion, and further leg,islation on the subject as absolutely necessary. Mr. DIINCOMBE asked the Attorney-General if he was to Understand that the Amendment Bill would not be proceeded with ? He complained of this bill being brought in do late, and read a first and second time so speedily, seeing that its provisions annihilated the powers of the old vestries. The subject then dropped. CRIMEAN TARTARS. Mr. HOLLAND asked the First Lord of the Tres.. sury whether the attention of her Majesty's Goveril ment had' been drawn to the position of the Crimean Tartan in the event of peace being established, and the allied forces, towards whom they had shown themselves friendly disposed, being recalled. Lord PALMERSTON said that according to the custom of war no doubt the usual amnesty would he granted to the subjects of all the powers who had been engaged in this war. IRON ORDNANCE, &o. In reply to questions from Colonel BOLDERO, Mr. MONSELL said there would be no objeotinn to lay on the table of the house the contract entered into with Messrs. Grissel & Co. for the supply of iron ordnance, and the correspondence thereon. In one of the trials with an ordinary charge a mortar burst, and on trying them with hydraulic pressure some of them were found dtfective. The contractor had been paid for the ord s:Lnce that bad been passed. PRIDEAUX'S PATENT VALVE. Mr. HUTCHINS asked the First Lord of the Admi shy whether he would have any objection to lay upon the table of the house the report of a series of experi ments made in June, 1855, under the superintendence of Captain Denman, on the effect produced of Prideaux's Patent Valve, both as to the saving of fuel and the re duction of temperature at the firing-places ? Sir C. WOOD repeated the statement he made on a former occasion, that the experiments, not being com plete, he could not comply with the request. PURCHASE IN THE ARghr. Mr. EWART inquired of the First Lord of the Trea sury whether the commission about to be appointed on the system of purchase in the army would have power to inquire into the system of promotion, and the sys tems of education and examination on appointment and promotion adopted in foreign armies ? Lord PALMEUSTON said that in the investigation alluled to na inquiry must of necessity be made into the system of foreign countries. IRON PLATE FOR GUN-BOATS. Sir G. TYLER asked the First" Lord of the Admi ralty whether any experiments had been made as to the relative power of resistance between hammered and rolled iron plates for the construction of gun-boats ; and if so, whether there was any objection to state there sult of those experiments ? Sir C. WOOD said that the report had not yet been made to the Government. ITALY AND SARDINIA. Mr. BOWYER asked the First Lord of the Treasury whether there was any truth in the report that the at tention of the Paris Conference would be directed to the affairs of Italy ; and, also, whether the S3r,linian Government had suggested or requested that any and what matters of Italian politics might engage thu atten tion of the Conference ? Lord PALINIERSTON declined to give any answer to the questions. PRUSSIA. Mr. DISRAELI asked a question relative to a ru mour that was in circulation in regard to Prussia having, been invited to take part in the Paris Conferences, and who were the distinguished individuals that were to re present that country at the Conferences ! Lord PALMERSTON declined to answer the qus tion. SIR CHARLES NAPIER AND THE BALTIC FLEET. Sir C. NAPIER (who, from speaking with his beck to the gallery, was very indistinctly heard) rose to move for e select committee to inquire into the operations of the Baltic fleet in the years 1854 and 1855. In making this motion ho stated that his only object was to call attention to what had taken place, and to vindicate his own character. He urged that after so much had been said about what hail been done by the Baltic fleet while under his command, what might have bean don*, and what was not done, he thought it only fair that there should be an inquiry whether or not the admirals had done their duty ; so that if cot, they might be brought to account and punished, or if the fault lay with the Admiralty, that they might be made to bear the blame, and not shift it from their own shoulders upon those of others. He (Sir C. Napier) had served Lis country for 50 years, he had served under four sovereigns, and believed he hail always der, his duty faithfully and. honestly. He had commanded not fleets only, but armies ; and he had at all times shown himself ready to undertake any service to which ho might either have been appointed by his Government or recommended by them. It had been said by the late Sir R. Peel, that, iu two minutes, he had overthrown a dynasty; hut whether that was so or not he took credit for having done 5:3,10 s riled in expelling the usurper Don Miguel from the kingdom of Portugal, and establishing the constitutioual sovereien upon the throne. He would endeavour to :tete his case with moderatien and prefect,. Ho had a plsin, Eraightferward tale to tell, and had nu occasion to resort to exeggeration or subterfuge, and he hoped that all who fel , owed him would follow his example, and cuntite them selves to the kelpie truth. (Cheers.) On the 211.11 of Nev., 1854, the then First Lord of the Admiralty (iir J. Gres here) communicated his intention to appoint him (Sir C. Napier) to the comnierel of the Baltic fleet in the event of a war with lhassia. At that, time it was known to every man in England, and he believed to ever, man in Europe, except the Britieh Government, that war was inevitable. He received his appointment to the command on the 25th February; but before that, after he hail been told that he was to have the command of a fleet, he drew attention to the importauce of having that fleet well manned. Ile made representations to Lord Aberdeen, rind he believed also to Lerd Clarendon, of the unpreparedness in e hieh our navy was for war. He also applied to the First Lord of the Admirdty, but ho declined to see hint. Well, on the 25;1 of February he was appoints 1 to the command of the Baltic fleet, and every member of that house would be aware that ho felt proud at receivieg such an :appointment ; fur there were many other officers in the service, probably, who, from their greater capability, or other circumstances, were more entitled to the dis tinction. But at this time what was the state of o u r naval forces ? Wo had three ships of the line at Lisbon, and several steamers and small vessels; while at home the only force we had available besides wis three sail of the line to take care of the ordinary, cold fit for harbour, duty, They had three Week ships, one at Portsmouth, one at Plymouth, and one the teuder to the Excellent gunnery ship. He admitted that the Government the moment war was diclared made the molt strenuous exertions to fit out an efficient naval farce —but it was impoedble to man the chips properly by t lse neseus to which they resorted. The only available bands were the coastegnerdstnen anti the dockyard rigger., sad of the former many were not sailors at all, having b on sepeinted to the coast-guard service by influener. There were two tel or 9d-gun ships, the St. J ean (l 'A cre and the Princess Royal, and another, a three-decker, he believed, at Sheerness. The great difficulty was to roan the fleet Every naval officer knew, anal every Lord of the Admi ralty ouget to know, that if the eeuntry suddenly passed from peace to war, and an increase of 5,000 or 6,009 men iu the navy became necessary on the instant, nothing was more difficult than to procure them. Well, he (sir Charles N a pi er ) appea l e d to the right hon. baronet, to issue a proclamation, under the act of Parliament, which empowered her Majesty to do so, and offer to all seamen who would at once come forward and eater del bier bounty; bat the right hon. baronet did not think pro per to do so. He thought the right hon. baronet well wrong ; and he believed other members of the Admiralty Board and some of the Ministers with whom he had o nn municated also thought he was wrong. They knew per fectly well that the Russians had an effective fleet of 28 sail, of the line in the Baltic, well manned, and organised, and regularly exercised, which was a force not to be despised, and, feeling himself responsible far the safety and character of the fleet, he felt it his duty to make the representations he had done. He would pass over the celebrated banquet at the Reform Cltab—that glorious banquet where such fine speeches were made—speeches that stirred up the country to such a pitch of expectation that if he had sic ceeded in capturing Cronstadt and St. Petersburg, and bringing home the Emperor of Russia prisoner, they would scarcely have been satisfied. (Laughter.) But ho would pass that over. (Hear.) The fleet was composed of two three deckers, the three block ships, two 81 gun ships,and, he thought, another ship from Sheerness—altogether there were nine ; and when this fleet was ready for sea at Spit head, her Msjesty and almost all England —at all events, all who could bear the expense —went duwa to see it start ; and of course everybody thought that to such a force Ceonstedt au , l St. Petersburg would surrender the rnomentthey saw it. (Clear.) He sew the position he was in with this half manned fleet from which so much was expected. He gave the highest ere tit to the various officers for their zeal and their efforts in bringing their ships into a proper state of discipline as far as the defective means at their lisp sal would allow. (Hear.) After referring to the suddenness of the order he received to sail, and the personal inconvenience he was subjected to in consequence, he observed that the (sorerninent hail, with their usual foresight,procured pi'ots from Hull and the eastern ports of England who were sup posed to be acquainted with the navigation of the Baltic, who were to take the fleet in safety up to St. Petersburg ; but when they got to the Downs all the pilots except eight left them, and these eight knew so little of Baltic naviga ti ea that one by one they were also sent back. He did not blame the Admiralty for this, for they ded their best under the circumstances ; but what he did complain of was that no steps had been taken to obtain properly qualified pilots beforehand. He wrote from. the Downs that they had no North Sea pilots in the fleet, but he was ordered to sail the next day, and of course he went. During the last war no ship of the line was allowed to go to sea without three pi lets on board. But this the Governmentprobably couldnot provide ou the inst ant. Well, the fleet sailed, and, happily, reached the Sound in safety. Then it arrived at Hango Sound, where he was directed by the right lion baronet to take it, and there await further orders. About this time he received an order from the Foreign Secretary co to dispose of the ships under his command that no Russian steam-ves sel should escape by the Baltic. Now, tlmosewho know any thingaLout the Balti c wou ld b e aware &at Hango Sound was not the place to prevent steamers coming np the Baltic; but many people here did not know what the Baltic was. He had to consider then how.he was to execute these oppostiug or ler!. If he lied remained at Hango Sound and the Russian fleet had put to sea and arrived at Copenhagen, emitting off his only means of getting back, whet would have been said by the Government, by the house, and by the country about his incapacity and neglect ? He would have been told, "Yon had your orders from the Secretary of State, and ought to have obeyed them as being superior to those of the Fi rs t L or d o f th e Admiralty." Well, he obeyed the Secretary of State's orders, anal having very active admirals under him, Admiral Plumridge and others, he placed the steamers amongst the rocks and shoals to contrnaud the passage there, and passed with the main body of the fleet through the Belt without, accident or loss. On the following night they were obliged to anchor in the Cattegat, iu the open sea, the wield blow ing so hard that the ships could not keep their sails furled, and the men could not go out upon the yards. He should observe that many of the men had never been aloft before, aid that altogether the fleet was in a most in efficient state in regard to the manning, and this where they had a difficult service to perform. in a dangerous sea arid against a powerful and superior force. Well, when he arrived at Kioge Bay he received a letter from the Admi ralty directing his attention to the (order he had received from the First Lord, and intimating that he had left the station appointed for him to remain at without sufficient reason. However, they afterwards found out, he supposed, that he had sufficient reason, for there came to him no Imps than four letters from their lordship's, which, he supposed, as they were connected with the secret department, he must not read, but which the house might imagine the purport of —one approving of his condeict—another complimenting him on the successful passage of the Belt. On the nth of April he received a letter from the Admiralty corep7iment ing him upon his having passed the Belt under all the circumstances. Now what that me int he did not know, unless the Admiralty had forgotten their own erder. He (Sir C. Napier) wrote a letter to their lordships in reply to the one he had alluded to, calling their attention to the order he had received from the Secretary of State to place hi s ships at the head of the Sound, and prevent the Russian fleet from getting out; and he added, "I did my beet to obey that order, and you blamed me for so doing." Well, that passed off, and having succeeded in getting the fleet coaled and watered, ou the 12th of April he sailed with 12 sail of the lire for the Gulf of Finland. He had had by this time experience of the danger arising from the ves-els inadoquetely manned. Ile and the officers under him did all they could in exercising the men, and teaching them their duty, but everybody must know that it was not in a day or two, or even in two or throe weeks, that a fleet even when manned by seamen, could to got into orderand efficient discipline ; but such had been our neglect of naval affairs during peace, that n o had very rarely had a fleet at sea, and thou only for a short time, and the cimeequenc a was that when the necessity arose, man were not to be found. What would a Board of Admiralty, careful of the interests of the country, have done Under such circumstances If they could not have got six or eight sail of the line properly manned, they might have got six or eight frigates, or if not, six or eight sloops, which would have cost less money. But in his fleet he believed there was not a junior officer, a lieu tenant, or even a captain that had ever sailed in line before. That, however, was not their fault. They had hail no op portunity. It was no easy matter for shies to sail in line within one or two cables length of each other. It was cliff cult in the daytime, and much more so at night, This being the condition of the fleet under his command, he na turally hesitated in going into the Gulf of Finland so early in the year, the entrance being at all times difficelt from the vast number of rocks and shoals which abounded, and especially so at that early period of tho year, when the navigation was scarcely yet open. Upon this he re ceived a letter from the Admiralty, which he thought rather sharp, but he bad written a letter to them which, be was afraid, was rather sharp too. Hear, and a laugh.) The moment,. however, that he discovered his error, he acknowledged it. Nevertheless he 'was afterwards ac cused of disobeying orders, and treating the board with disrespect. He confessed that ho had adopted a tone in that letter which was not altogether proper, but it was his failing to go sometimes too fast and sometimes too slow. (Cheers and laughter.) He ought to have stated that ho received a letter before he left Kioge Bay from the right hon. baronet statiug— lam entirely satisfied with your proceedings. Neither Lord Clarendon nor I anticipated your movement inside the Belt, and believed that you would watch in the Cattegat the entrance of the Sound and of the Belts until you received orders to enter the Baltic, You judged, however, wisely, and the time which you have gained has been very precious, and the passage of the Belt in fine vi caterer and in safety has been a most successful exploit. You will also have been enabled to exorcise your officers and men to great advantage, with the certainty that tire enemy is in front of you, blocked up in the ice for some time to come, and that your reinforcements will arrive, and that your discipline will be improved. When the state of the ice permits, I conclude that you will establish close blockade of the Gulf of Finland, dividing the enemy's squadron at Crenstadt and at Sweaborg, and intercepting the trade of Revel and Riga. I rely on your prudence in not knocking your head against stone walls prematurely, or with out the certainty of a great success, or the fair prospect of attaining corns most important object worthy of the risk and of the loss, which when you attack fortresses with ships are serious and inevitable, Of course he naturally felt pleased at receiving this lamb tory letter from the right lion. baronet. After he had made this mistake in writing to the Admiral as he had done, ho received the following letter from the right hon. baronet, which was especially satisfactory to him : I have received your letter of the 19th, off the entrance of the Gulf of Finland. I am glad that you decided not to pro ceed to Sweaborg. The weather is still broken, the ehannel is not clear of ice, and your force is not yet concentrated. A safe anchorage within the Gulf of Finland would seem to me yarnr greatest and most pressing necessity. I had hoped that Port Baltic might be available for this purpose ; but if it be commanded from the shore, er if for any other reaeoe you reject it, still I trust that you will be enabled to este blish and to hold a dose, b`lockade of the Gulf of Finland, and to cut off the comeennication by sea between Sweabo-g and Cronstadt. Your force, I hope and think, will be large enong,h to render the escape of any Russian squadron from the Baltic impossil le, and to leave us quite at ease in Eng land, although we may have no large reserve ready oa our own shores. It will be best, in the first instance. to feel your way, and to make good your he'd in tire Gulf of Finland. When I say this, I by no means contemplate au attack either on this or that place (mentioning two pieces). I have a great respect for stone walls, and have no fancy for rue/ling teen screw line-of-battle chips against them. Because the public here may be impatien', you most not - be rash ; because they, at a distance from clanger, are foolhardy, you must not risk the loss of a fleet ire an impossible euterprise. I believe both to be all but impregnable from the sea, Sweaborg more especially; and none but a very large army could ee . ..alienate by land efficiently. If, then, you have no means except naval at your commauvi, you must pause long and consider well before you attempt any attack on the Russian squadrons in their strongholds, and I am afraid they are much too cautious to come out . and meet yell. Had yon been weaker, they might have dune so ; now they will wait and watch an opportunity, in the hope that yea wi 1 seriously cripple your fog C 2 by knocking your head against their forts, when they may take you at a serious disadvan tege, and haillet a fatal blow. These coasideratioes must not he overleeked by you. I recall thorn to your mind, lest in the eager desire to achieve a great exploit, and to satisfy the wild wishes of au impaticut multitude at home, you should yield to some rash impulse, and fail in the discharge of one of the noblest of duties, which is the moral conrag to do what you. know to be right, at the risk of being accused of having dens wrong. It is enough to present this view to dAhera,te attention ; you wi'l reflect on it, and I am certain that your judgment will not err. Thinkiug, then, that it was not right to go into the Gulf of Ululated at. that early'period of the year, he went into the Harbour of Eifsnahen with the intention of looking to the rigging of the ships, and getting in water, but it cause on to blow, and had nothing but a succession of gales fur several days, so that ho was detained for ten days when ho expected only to be detained f or t wo . Considering the shoals and rocks ithont Elfsnaben he was never Mors anxious in his life than during this time. Had it come on to blow hard, the danger wonl ! hare been imminent ; but by the me-cy of Providence all the ship+ got safely out, of this trap—;or such ho might call it. In this difficulty, which was in creesed by a thick fog, the greatest seal and energy were exhibited by officers and men. There was no wavering, no want of decision on the pert of the captains, and the rea diest obedieace on the part of all the subordinate efficees and the seamen, and, as he had said, every vessel was brought safely through. But he would leave hon. gentle men to suppose what a state of anxiety he was in until the signal was made in the afternoon that all were in safety. He felt he was fully juetified in going into Elfsneben, seeing that there was no roadstead off Sweaborg. He then wrote to the Admiralty stating that he intended- to proceed to the tipper part of the Gulf as soon as he ceuld get together a eufficient force, but how it was to be done with 20 sail, some of which were not fit to go into action, he did net know, but all that could be done with the meens at his disposal he would do. To this letter " My lords" re plied, " Their lordships are satistied that you will do all that you can do. It is to be regretted that, by your letter of the 23,1 silt., you consider some of the ships under your command aro unfit to go into action, an my lords eau not but feel surprised that such a statement on your part should have been nn:sccompanied by detailed re ports of the condition of the vessels to which you allude." He read this letter, because wham his noble and learned friend behind him (Mr. Malins) made a motion on this sub ject the right hon. baronet read this letter and said he had had no reply to it. He (Sir C. Napier) did reply to it. The letter was to the effect, " the.t,he alluded to the ships which had lately come from England which had not seen a shot fired ; they were poorly manned, but the, admirals had been indefatigable, and the captains had done their best to put them into a state of discipline." Why the right hon. Bart. made that statement unless to bring him into had *dour he could not conceive. How could he be astonished that the ships were not in proper order its two months, when every experienced officer know that it could not be done in less than 12 months, or even two years? He (Sir C. Napier) wrote also to his hon. and gallant friend (Admiral Berkeley) as follows. The hon. and gallant gentle. man then read the letter, to the effect "that be had doss all io his power to get the ships ready for battle, but that it must not be supposed ships could be made perfect in a day, whereas the Russian ships were in excellent order." Ho wrote another letter complaining that " the ships were without subordinate officers, mates, masters as sistants, midshipmen, and cadets, and that there were young men who might have been sent out." He mentioned this because there were so few officers of those ranks in the navy generally, and it would have been easy to have picked up from the numerous steam-vessels in tee mercantile marine young men for:thos; ranks, on the under standing that they were not to stay in the service sinless they were found quite capable. But that was net clone, and there were too few of those officers, without whom it !vas no easy matter to carry on the duties of a ship. After this ho returned to Hango Sound with fourteen sail of the line, the Russians having eight or nine sail of the line at Helsingfors. By the by, he must say it was moat extra ordinary that though wo had a minister at Copenhagen, a minister in Sweden, a minister at St. Petersburg, p minis ter at Hamburg, and consuls all over the Baltic when the fleet sailed, it was not known where the Russian fleet war, and a gallant officer now no more was sent from England to poke his way up to Revel, and a very extraordinary way he did it in ; for he put his vessel's bows against the ice and bored her through it, and one very break he pushed her stern through it. That was that gallant officer Captain Lyons (the son of Sir E. Lyons), who wag now unfortn tenately no more. (Hear.) His (Sir C. Napier's) object in going to Hango was to endeavour to coax the Russian fleet, and, following the example of Nelson, he went in, hoping that the Russians, seeing his fleet in one of their own har bours, would have had the courage to come out. Bat they did not, and remained snug in their harbours. He then went to Sweaborg to examine the Russian fleet there. There he received a letter from the right hen, baronet of the roost complimentary kind : but preparations ought to be made for She next year. He was sure that thirteen such mortars would do it ; and, although it would be at a great expense, yet if they wanted the war to be carried on successfully, that ought not to be considered. He could excuse the Go:arm - neat and the Ad miralty iu 1354 for not having gun-boats fitted out, for in the sudden transition from peace to war they could not be aware that mortars would be wanted, and they probably never read how Martinique was taken. Tho weather was nose settled, and the ships were assembler] in Faro Sound. The French fleet were there too, and a beautiful sight it was to see 27 sail of the line in a Russian port, and pitiable to think that they were all useless. Ho wrote to the right hen, baronet his opinion in a letter dated after that of the 18th July, which the Admiralty denied that they had received. Tho letter was to the followin: effect—" that he had received. the Duke of Newcastle's despatches and his (Sir J. Gra ham's) instructions, and he believed that they could be car ried ant. He had been told that there was to be a complete blockade of the Gulf of Finland, and that was done ; he had been told to look to the Aland Islands, and send home the soundings and Capt. Sullivan's report. There were three courses which might bo followed—firstly, to make the ser vice one of blockade, but that would not please the peo ple of England; secondly, to go to Cronst a dt an d o ff er battle to the liaissian fleet, which they were not likely to accept, unless you went into their harbours, where the channels were so narrow that only ono ship could go in at a time; or the Aland Islands were to be attacked; but if that was done and there were no troops, the ships might go in as near as they could and land all the marines, French and English, and attack Eornarsund, for which purpose 10,000 seamen might be put on shore and turned into soldiers. He could propose this to the French admi ral, and, if he did not assent, they could go up to Cron stadt. The French admiral had doubts about the at tack on Bomarsund without troops, and that it would be bettter to go to Cronstadt. That being his view, it was determined to go to Cronstadt." It was no doing of his that 10,C00 men were sent to attack the Aland Isles. All he wanted was 2,0i0 or 3,000 men ;- bat the Glareernmeat sent 10,000 French troops. The right hon. baronet wrote to him in reply as follows : If anything can be done you will discover the best means of doing it, but no rash experimentx must Be tried which do not hold oat a reasonable prospect, of success. lam anxious to hear your opinions ai.d intentions when you have looked at Sweaborg and entered the Gulf of Finland. lam afraid that the Russians will not pluck up courage and come out to meet you. Some gentlemen might perhaps think that ho (Sir C. Napier) ought not to read these because they were partly private ; but it /should be recollected that they were on the public service ; and when he i tad the evidence of the right hon. baronet before the Sebeetsopol committee, that he had right to turn officers' private letters into public ones, ho (Sir C. Napier) did not see why he should not do the same. (Hear, hear.) His hon. and gallant friend opposite (_Ad miral Berkeley) would, he her l ead, excuse hien if he read setue of his. (lie then read a letter of Admiral Berke ley, o , 27the Jane,' exproseing the satisfaction of the Admiralty with his conduct a art their reliance on hie judg ment.) Now, he of course fete pleasure at ree& via; these communications from his superiore, and if any one thought he was wrong, they must remember that he considered that he had been sent adrift and disgraced, and he must be ex eased in any eifertm he matte tees retrieve his character. On the 19th the fleet sailed for Cie - dist/At, and arrived before it on the 22d. The French eduii.:ral and himself reconnoitred tat. fir; tress. Now he had seen. strong fortificetiene ; he hail seen Toulon, Cadiz —he had no. seen Brest—but he had seen Cherbourg ; but net one of them was to be compared as fortifications or w:th regard tea strength with Crouetedt. it was hot merely a lot tress, for if those stone 4-deckers were in au open sea, and could be box, at, he would not have hesi• b tel tueugh he haii to try alt it e against stone walls ; but the danger seas in going iu tia , ae. The soundings iu the only channel showed the deptie iu the passage to be quarter less three. Herr -urea could a ship drawing 27 ieet of water go through such a p , ssage where the depth of water was only Tier ter Its,s three ? Both he and the French adeeiral were of of inien that t Was impossible, and he Led never cheirged his opinion. ;Elie wrote to that effect to the and he also sect ,e plan, which be had formed, for atteeking the place, 'which of course ho c Add net ilia c,(m. The Admiralty wrote, to him in reply. In thet letter they celled " attention te an able nut well-executed survey of the approaches tc. Croustade; they expressed coatirteece iu his judgment; they were aware that ha had offered battle to the enemy, boat it.would b:, of no avail to attack au impregnable fortress; that he must bear in mind that the great object was to render the Russian fleets useless. The troops, must be removed witeout less of time ; that the primaiy ject was a close blockade o f the Gulf of Finland; and teset having a /sufficient force to keen the enemy in check, be must bring up the troops frees Fero Sound without ,rely." Thome were his in structions ; and when lie causes to examine them he found it itep.ssible to execute the.r. lie was to take care of Cronetadt, to watch Swett berg, and to go to Faro anti embark the troops. H.%ew was it possible to do it all ? Ha did what he thought best, and instead of going elsewhere he brought all the teroope to Ledsund. Ho there received the following letter Irom the right hon. baronet : I am glad you have gone up to Cronstadt, to 500 with your own eyes what it may be possible to do there. Whatever man can do I am certain will be done by you; and, if you are restrained by a sense of duty Lem embarking iu any despe rate enterprise, on your return. to Fare Sanaa you shall re seive furl isetiet..tious from me ;respecting an attack upon the Alaad Islands. It went on thus : I had anticipated your retuxa to the westward after an offer of battle, which I felt certain the enemy would decline ; and it now remains for you to blockade the Gulf of Finland, to keep the &len; at Cronstadtamt Helsingfors disunited, and to await the arrival of the French ti•oeps, when you and tie French admiral and general must deli oorate on the operations to be undertaken by the combined farces. Bomarsuud will clearly be within your reach. Sweabon, if it were possible, would be a noble prize; but on no ac-count be led into any Oespe rate attempt, and above all things avoid the least risk of the Russian fleet slipping out of the Gulf of Finland whoa your back is turned ; and be slow to land your marines, without whom your limo of battle is disabled. The Russians, thou4h shy, are crafty ; and if they can catch you at a disadvantage they will be down upon you. . With 50,000 troops and 200 gun-boats you might still do something great and deci sive before the cud of Sept.--T am, my dear Charles, yours sincerely, J. G. GaAIIAM. In another letter it was said " that the Admiralty had waffshed all his proceedings with approval." He left Cron stadt on Aug. 3, and on the 6th arrived before Bonearsund. Ho sent a squadron of 9 sail of the line to take care of the Hessia❑ fleet while he was at lionianund. When he was there he got the following letter from the eight hon. ba ronet : Admiralty, Aug. 1, 1854. [Recd. 6th.] My dear Charles,--By your foresight and g,od arrange ments, the whole of the French army will have joined you off Bomarsund before the and of this week, and I hope that you will send back the line-of-battle ships wuich carried them to you as soon as possible. . . lam aware that Borearsumt presents difficulties, but I feel certain that you will overcome them. The next move must be well considered, but the fall of Bomarsund will be no bad beginning. —I am yours very truly, J. G. GRAHAM. Tho whole of the troops havingarrived at Ledsued, on their way to Boinarenncl, there being a very intricate channel to that place, he sent Admiral Clads to survey the ground before Bomarsund. The French troops arrived on the 3dth July, but the stores did not arrive till sth Aug.;and lie would show that no ti me was l os t, f or on th e 7th Cho troops were transshipped, and came on to Bomarsund ; on the Bth a landing was made simultaneously at t..ro places; on the 10:1 the guns were lauded, and dragged by sailors three or four miles into the country ; batteries Ireee established, and on the 14th two towns on the island surrendered ; and en the 16th the fortress of Bomarsund also serren dared. It was expected that it would have hell out for some time, but to their astonishment it surren dered at the time he had stated. It would have been easy to have run the chips up to Bomarsund be ' fore the troops arrived, but it would have been at a loss of a great many men, and perhaps of some of the ships. But the French had sent out an army, and if be Lied attempted anything before they were ready, they would naturally have been imgry and disappointed. The French Admiral thought that Annarsiund ought not to be attacked before the guns were placed iu position. He had now brought the history of the e.inipeign down to the taking of 1 3emarstind. Afterwards the Admiralty wrote to him to the fol lowing effect :—" Your report of the combined military and naval operations 'Befoul Bomarsund has afforded us the utmost satisfaction, and we cordially approve of the admir able and judicious arrangements which you. adopted." The right hon. bart. wrote thus : Portsmouth, Aug. 22,18 M. My dear Sir Charles,—l congratulate you sincerely on the success of your operationsbefore Bornarsund,and I highly com mend your prudence and wisdom in effecting the capture of this stronghold of the eneraywithout the loss of a ship or mAnylives. You have judged well in every respect, both in detainiug the line-of-battle ships aad steamers, mil then in sending them home laden with prisoners. —I am, yours vary truly. J. G. GRAHAM. I am well pleased with all your operations, and the con centration of your force at the entrance of the Gulf of Fin land, in a safe harbour where you can command fresh water, appears to me a judicious operation. I conclude that you will leave a squadron before Helsingfors sufficiently strong to prevent the escape of the Russian squadron within the har bour, and proceed with the rest of the combined fleet to the neighbourhood of Cronstadt, which I am afraid you will find unassailable. If the Russian fleet will not come out to meet you, and if you find that you cannot reach them, after having well reconnoitred the works and ascertained what it is pos sible and impossible to do, your return to the more open sea below Helsingfors would appear to be a judicious measure, every necessary precaution being taken to prevent the re union of Itho Russian force now divided at Cronstadt and Helsingfors. lam well aware of all the difficulties of your position, and of the impossibility of triumphing over au enemy who will not fight you on fair terms; but you will discipline your fleet and make your officers and men ready for any service. It is a disgrace to Russia that she dare not show a ship in her own waters, and that sh 3 is driven to seek for safety under the shelter of her fortresses. It would be madness to play her game, and to rush headlong on hor granite walls, risking our naval superiority, with all the fatal consequences of defeat, in an unequal contest with wood against stone, which in tho long run cannot succeed. I had reliance on your prudence which was doubted. Your bril liant courage was proved long ago. You will now show to the world that you possess a eonibination of those great virtues which aro necessary to make a consummate Commander-in- Osier. On the 25th of August the right hon. baronet wrote again as follows : Devonport, Aug. 25, 1854. ,- - - My dear Sir Charles,---I am more than satisfied with your proceedings. lam delighted with the prudence and sound judgment which you have evinced. It would have been a miserable want of firmness had you yielded to clamour, and risked your Clips, and sacrificed many valuable lives, in an at tempt to destroy, by naval means, works which were certain to fall to an attack by land. Your reasoning also, in favour of tbe immediate and entire destruction of the forts at Bomaisuncl, is irresistible, and I hope you will take care that the destruction is complete, and that not ono stone is left upon another. lam well pleased also with the promptitude with which you have sent back the line-of-battle ships and steamers. The work has been, well done, and I gladly give you the utmost credit for it. I ' write in great haste, but that which presses is the order for destroying Bomarsund. at greater leisure,, and in a few days, I will write to you on the subject of your ulterior ope rations, and of the preparations for an early retreat from the Baltic before winter. —I am yours, very sincerely, J. G. GRAHAM. Those were the whole of the commendations he iceeived ; but op to this time every act ho performed was approved. After that the French Admiral and General went to Swea borg, and gave it as their opinion that it could not be at tacked with success. General Jones, the English com manding officer of engineers, was of opinion that it could be attacked by laud with 5,0v0 troops. The French general was of a different opinion. lie commenced the embarka tion of tha troop ; General Niel, the French engineer, was, however, of opinion that ten sail of the line could knock down Sweaborg. lie (Sir C. Napier) might as well say that he had received other letters of approbation which he would not read.—[Thc hon. gentleman, however, read one or two, which was not. of importance.] —But now Caine the difficnity. When the right hon. baronet hoard that the Reach Admiral had decided that Botnersond was to he destroyed, ha wrote to him (Sir C. Napier) on the 29tb of August as follows : fie went to examine Sweaberg and to rise if it was possible to do anything, and he wrote to the First Lord of the Ad micalty the following letter. The letter was to the follow ing effect : " That he had taken sounding' abent Sweaborg, awl he would have undertaken to carry the ships up as far as a certain channel, but it was inspeesible to get them up to Sweaborg, fer the passage wag not wider than the leng',l:l of a ship and a vessel was sunk across it, while the smoke of the steamers alone without that of the gnus was suffi cient to defend the harbour ; it was only by moans of a large military force occupying the islands and seeding shells into the fortress, that it was asseilable." Various plans were sent to him by the Admiralty —some of them ridiculous enough—and OR the 18th of July he wrote to Sir Janees Graham the following latter, which he wrote to him personally, as he did not wish it to go before the Board of Admiralty. The later was to the fellowing ef fect, "that the only euclessful manner of attacking Swea borg that he could Mee, after great con,ifieration and con sultation with Admiral Chads, who was well acquainted with gunnery, was fitting out a great numlesr of gun and mortar boats, each carrying one gun with a long range, end stationing theta west of -zveeaborg ; then every shell wou! , l tell, that force being backed by the fleet to relieve the uioa as they required it. By phis means Sweahorg and Ilel singfors might have been Lid in ashes. The ships could not have been destro3ed,for they could have moved out of the way. }ll was at the siege of Martinique, and then they could not take Fort Bourbon until 5) mortars wore used to shell it, when it soon surrendered. He had sent tome copie, of all the plane propese 1, and he thought they weir, laid before artillery and engineer officers they Won Id agree that it was the on ly way to d es t roy th e for I tress. it was too late in the 'num for that to be done, My. dear Sir Charlcs,—The Emperor has sent orders to Gen. Baraguay When we know what arrangement is to be made with respect to the French arny we will concert measures with France for the gradual withdrawal of the lint from the BAltic. You should begin by sencitng home, with out much delay, Use sailing three-deckers, the least weatherly of the sailing line-of-battle ships, and the slowest and worst of the block ships. This will do for a beginning, and, by de grees, you must withdraw to the southward, leaving the Gulf of Bothnia open, and watching only the Gulf of Finland with a squadron of obsr:rvation. Kiel, I conclude, will be your first halting-place; but this is on the assumption that the French army is with lrawn for winter quarters at home. I am, &e., J. G. GRAIIIM. Any psrso reading that would have concluded that was an authority for zeialin3 home tha bad sailing ships and the three-decker.. lie (Sir C. Napier) knew that it was right, for Aoguet in the Baltic was not like Au- , itLizi, England. But when it was known in England that too Emrich army was coining horno , meetings were held to blatna the Go. vernuicnt. be‘catTie Cron , tailt was tot taken, or Sweaburg, or evz.n S!ba.s'ol•ol. The right hon. baronet got alarmed, and he turned about to see who was to bear the blame, and he thought I .'.e would place it on him (Sir 0, Napier), THE SUN, LONDON, FRIDAY EVENING, MARCH_ l4 , 1856. and out came an order for him to hold a co unc il o f war with the Fren c h admiral and his own admirals, in order to ascertain whether anything further could be done against Sweaborg. Well, the council of war 'net on board the Duke of Wellington, and it was unanimously decided that at that season cf the year, and with the means at their disposal, nothing further could be done against such a fortification as Sweaborg. Well, then, the right hon. baronet felt his border blood begin to boil. Ho forgot his " Dear Sir Charles," and turned that address i n t o " D ear Ad m i ral. " He forgot having called him (Sir C. Napier) a consummate commander in -chief,", and having expressed satisfaction with all his arrangements. He forgot that, only a few weeks before, he had recommended caution with regard to attacking stone walls, and had expressed the opinion that Sweaborg could not be attacked with less than 200 gen-boate and 50,000 men ; and now he wanted him (the wimiral) to attack it with Bor 10 sail of the line. Sir James also for got that he had written, "I am commanded to acquaint you that yourinstructionsare not to control your discretion as to any joint operation ; it is your duty net to undertake any operation which your own judgment does not entirely approve." Could the house believe, than, that the same right hon. gentleman who had told him that he was " on no account to risk her Majesty's fleet," was serious now in wanting him to attack Sweahorg with 8 or 10 ships of the line? No, the right hon. gentleman was not serious;' but there was a commotion in the country, and the Government looked about to soe upon whom they could throw the blame. It was a mere flash in the pan, by which the right lion, baronet tried to cover his ownsolitical cowardice. (Hear, hear.) This ho (Sir C. Napier) was able to prove. On the sth of September the French Minister in London applied to the Admiralty for steam-vessels to tow the French ships with the troops home. Notwithstanding that, and althongh the Government here must have known that - General Beraguay d'Hilliers had got orders to evacuate the Aland Isles, they sent out an order to him (Sir C. Napier) to call a council of war ' and ask th e F re n c h genera l , a marshal of Fr ance , to take General Jones's plan into con. sideration. Now, what had General Jones done ?He had gone with the French general of engineers to look nt Sweaborg, and had come to the opinion that by landing 5,000 men upon the Island of Bakholmen, which was strongly fortified, and within - pistol shot of Gustaysvarn, the strongest of the forts, with three batteries upon it, not knowing the number of troops in it, with a Russian three decker lying in the passage between them, almost touching each shore, and with eight Russian sail of the lino lying in the harbour of Sweaborg, covering the whole of the island, and mance), perhaps, by 6,000 or 7,000 men, besirlee tin garrison —by landing in such a situation, the attack might be made. Now ho (Sir C. Napier) would put it to any military or naval officer, whether such a thing would be safe? els asserted that it would not be safe; and that if he and the French admiral and general hat been foolish enough to attempt suc h a thing, athough the weather was so bad that they positively could not have effected a land ing with their guns and stores, not one roan would have come off again free : every man jack of them would have been made prisoner. (A. laugh.) That was as clear us pos sible to him : there could not be the slightest doubt of it. Well, the French general laughed at such a proposal, and left the place ; so that he (Sir Charles) could not call the council of war, because the French general and all his army were gone. After that scheme was repudiated came an other order, in which he was referred to the opinions of General Niel, the French general of engineers, a very clever man, who lied been opposed to the plan of landing 5,000 French troops, but, after examining. the place, was of *pi nion that if eight or ten sail of the lino were anchored abreast of the bath-hies of Sweahorg, which were stronger than Gibraltar, and wore said by officers who had seen Sebaitopol to be stronger also then the latter place, they would he able to knock it down ; but, like a sensible mac, General Niel added that he should think it a desperate at ' tempt, end that lie did not consider it within his province to recommend it. Why, that was condemnatory of the whole project; for General Niel spoke as an engineer, and would no more undertake to tell a bailor where he could place him ships, than he (Sir C. Napier) would undertake, as a sailor, to tell a military engineer where to place his batteries in besieging one of the strongest towns of Europe. (Hear.) Well, the French admiral felt excessively indig nant at being desired by the English First Lord of the Adirdr, lty to reconsider his opinion, or to consider the opinion of Gen. Jones. The French admiral would 'stay no longer, but said, " I have given my opinion, and if I were to go with y ou now, and you undertook' anything there, I should be obliged to assist yon. and if it failed I should be to blame for having been so weak as to juin you in it." So Admiral Pareovel was naturally very much irritated, although he (Sir Charles) tried to pacify him as well on; he co dd. , The right hon. baronet at the Admiralty, however, was still full of fight, arid wrote to say that "British steamers in fins weather, and in the earlier part of September, might be more gloriously em• ployed than in towing home French troops." Now what sort of fine weather was it the fleet were at that time en joying ? They were pitching at the bows in a gale oi wind, for five days together. It was impossible, then, to think of landing troops at an anchorage which the ships creald hardly get into in the best weather. Sir James Graham said at ths same time—" We know nothing with certainty respecting the return of the French fleet from the Baltic." Now, that staternenecoald not bs correct—for tie French admiral received his orders on the 30th August to return to Cherbourg, and showed him (Sir Cbarl'es) his orders on the Ist Sieternber, and also a letter, in Which it was stated that the French charge d'atTaires in England had immix nicated to the English Government the fact that the French fleet was ordered home. The GOvernment seemed not to know that the French fleet was going to winter-in the Baltic. There was no end of the plans which they ap peared to think were feasible. One was, that he (Sir Charles) should get two dredging machines to deepen the passage at Sweaborg, by which 15,000 tons of rubbish wore to be raised in two days; and it was suggested that ho should take advantage of the smoke and fog to work them unobserved by the enemy. Another plan sent out for his consideration was to blast the ice in the winter when the sea was frozen between the islands and the mainland, to prevent the Russians from marching over. He was also informed by the Admiralty that ho could anchor all over the Baltic in winter in any place, which certainly did go far beyond his seamanship. Aft er quo ti ng some other letters of Sir .Jas. Graham's rbeut the end of September, and showing that, they were contradicted by the orders he received from the Admiralty about sending home the sailing ships, the hon. and gallant gentleman gave an account of his recon noitring Sweshorg in the Driver, piloted by Captain Sul livan, in consequence of which he wrote to the right hon. bart. a description of the formidable obstacles which would have to be encountered if Sweaborg were attacked by the fleet alone, and concluded by saying, ". Whether this attack would succeed or not, it is impossible to say; but we must calculate on ships being set on fire by red-hat shot and shells, of which there would be abundance; and whe ther successful or not, it is evident the ships would he in no condition to beat the Russian fleet afterwards, and if the attack were made at this season of the year, when you cannot depend upon the weather, Ido not know what would be the result ;" he went on to say, " I beg you wilt not suppose Sweaborg cannot be attacked ; I think it can, but it must be with caution and judgment." There were thus two distinct opinions which he had, upon different oc casions, gieen abort an attack on Sweaborg. One opinion related to the supposition that the ships alone wore to attack; and in that case he pointed out the inadequacy of the means, arid the dangers which would render almost certain the loss of a large part of them. Another opinion, or plan of his, related to an attack with mortars and gun b rats, and with the whole of the fleet. It was on the 4th October that the hoax arrived in England, the rumour of Sebastopol being taken ; upon which Sir James Graham wrote to him, quoting his letter written after the last re connaissance of Sweaborg, and interpreting it with the endeavour to persuade him that he had committed himself by that letter to the opinion that Sweaborg could be taken with the means which he then had. But this was putting a roost impertinent construction upon his letter, He (Sir Charles) had never said that the attack by the ships, which he had described to the Admiralty, would succeed ; on the contrary, he had distinctly asserted that if he at tacked with the ships alone, he would lose a great number of ships, and not be certain to succeed ; but what he had said was, that if he attacked with the mortar-boats and gun-boats which he had asked for, he was quite certain that Swoaberg would be laid in ruins. (Hear, hear.) He could not really believe that at that time of the year, the 4th of October, the Board of Admiralty, consisting of a civilian First Lord and five or six sailors, seriously intended that the French fleet should return, and the English fleet go up without it into the Gulf of Finland at the begin ning of the winter season. Ho hart no hesitation in saying that if all those heavy three-deckers had gone up the Gulf of Finland at that date, to remain for the purpose of undertaking any operations, there would have been an end of them. After reading some of the cor respondence which ensued upon his representing to Sir J. Graham the uncertainty of the weather, and the advanced season of the year, iu reply to which the right hon. gentle: man argued that those objections were not insurmountable, and having advised him to calculate the chances, and not to lose an opportunity, ended by - sayin g . " Bet the final decision m us t res t ent i re l y with yourself," the gallant ad miral said that if, during the summer, such a goading letter as that had been sent to hhn, instead of the cautious ones he then received, he should not have hesitated for a single moment to go into Sweaborg, let the consequences be what• ever they might, because no officer could etniure to be writ ten to in such a style. But he was perfectly certain, in Oc tober, it was a piece of mere ins inity ; he was convinced that She Admiralty themselves could never have intended it, and if they did, he would denounce them as totally unfit to manage the British navy. But when the rumour came that Sebastopol was taken, all England ran wild, and the Admiralty shared in the excitement, and under its influ ence that letter was written, with a proposal which his own better judgment repudiated. But that tho people in autho rity should be capable of writing such a letter, whether to destroy him, or out of their own folly, was disgraceful to the public department over which they presided. (Hear.) He next read a letter from a gallant officer holding a corn nsand under him in the Baltie fleet, whose name he did not mention, agreeing in the testimony that nothing could be done at that season of the year, and that so far from then thinking of an attack upon Sweaborg, he thought the fleet was lying in a most dangerous position even where it was at that time. Two, or three letters of his own addressed to the Lords of the Admiralty in the month of April, Sir Charles Napier then road s in which he strove to impress upon their lordships the roughness and severity of the Baltic winter, and explained also that the plan proposed by him (the admiral) in August was, firstly, that Sweaborg should be well bombarded with mortars, shells, and rockets by the gun-boats, and that afterwards the ships should go in anti finish the work. On the 9th Oct news came to England which undeceived the Government and the public as to the rumour of the capture of Sebesto pol, and, without waiting for his reply to their orders, the Admiralty at once telegraphed that the ships wore to go dome, both French rend English, and that they were no longer to attempt to attack Sweaborg. Constant gales of wind prevailed at this time, the fleet lying at Nargen ; and it was a pity the First Lord of the Admiralty was not on board then, that he might have picked out a favourable day at that season for the fleet crossing over to attack Sweaborg. (A laugh.) But the right hon. gentleman was as much of a gunner as he was a sailor, for he actually fan cied that with long gnus he could throw shot in the wan ner of vertical firing, as from a mortar, that was with an levetion of 95 degrees. To be sure, he might have learned better than that if he had gone down to Portsmouth to see the practice of the Excellent. The gallant admiral thou read a letter from the Lords of the Admiralty, which he received in October, before quitting the station, in which they said, "My lords are fully satisfied with the reasons 'you have assigned for not undertaking to attack Sweaborg after it became known to you that the ships under Admi ral Parseval had been withdrawn, anti tney might also have been satisfied with the decision adopted by you on the joint report of the officers, had not your own letter of the sth S.mtember expressly informed their lordships that you had formed a plan for an attack." Now that state ment wai not true. Ho never gave such an opinion. His reason for not taking Sweaborg was that it was impossible. In hhi letter of the 9th Aug. he said be had sent them Gen. Jones's opinion, but he hail nothing to do with it. As he had said, it was perfectly impossible, and he might Ad well, if Gen. Jones had sat down before Sebastopol, for in stance, bar, told him they were all wrong, aud that that was not the way to take Sebastopol, but that the only way to take Sebastopol was to do so and so. He would now read au extract fro:n a letter which he wrote in reply, in which he sail, "I beg, to cone; tide this letter by most aolein nly protest ing againat the interpretation that theirlordships have put on my letter." Their lordships replied to this in a most jesuitical manner—he could not call it anything else—and that reply must have been written by the tight hon. gen tleman himself, for no one else could have written it. (Laughter.) "My lords have already (Teetered themselves satisfieel with the reasons assigned by you for not attacking Sweaborg." Here again they were assiguieg reasons that he never gave. " But considering the conflict of authority, and the reports brought before them, their lordships can not look with satisfaction on the decision not to attack Swsaborg." Now, how could they write him such a letter ? Why, in May ho had not seen Sweaborg, and their lord ships had sent him plans of Sweaborg, and a Swedish en gineer also sent him plans, and on looking at them he thought it impossible to take it. In hi j answer to that comesunic Aion he said it was unfair for the Admiralty to take the first part of his letter and issue the rest, and he protested. against it. Their lordships raised a new question. They said that in 3,Lay he sent them plans. This was quite true. His judgment was formed from the plans sent to bins from the Admiralty. But their lordships had forgotten Ad miral Chat's report, sent to Sir J. Graham on the 11th of June, and bi , report on thelBth of July, after seeing Swea borg. Their lordships alluded also to a report he sent home on the 24th July, and they referred to the Lancaster guns not being sent. Ho was aware that the Lancaster gnus could net be sent that year, and his observations regarding there hagi reference to their being sent out thle following year. In reply ho wrote as follows : Kiel, Oct. 27. My dear Sir James, —So far back as Aug. 29, I announced to you the intention of the French General to withdraw his troops. I agreed with the French General and Admiral that Sweabo , g could not be attacked at this season of the year, an I I have no hesitation in saying, had we move I the troops and ships up to Miele Roads, and landed 5,000 men, we should nothave brought off one man, and how many ships wo would have lost I cannot say. After the capture and destruction of Bemarsund till I left Nargen, there h .ve not been three days fit for operations that required seven or eight, and then the ships and transports must have lain amongst the rocks and shoals of Miele Roads—a position that might have done for a general, but certainly not for an admiral. Shor.ly after the troops sailed, I communicated to you that the French ad ei ral had received orders to go to Cherbourg, that they were dated the 30th of August; so that the decision was not taken on the spot, as you suppose. General Jones's report made no change whatever in our opinions. You say the French gene rals partook of General Jones's opinions ; then why did he not carry them cut I Surely, Sir James, you could not have rca I them ; they are quite opposite. The French generals thought the fleet could knock down Sweaborg in two hours. General Jones required a combined movement, which would require seven or eight days. The French general, in his letter to me, says :—" Noes partageons l'opinion de M. le General Jones, Sweaborg pent etre attaque et pried par los flottes si elles vaulent faire contre cetto forteresse une attaque serieuse." He went en, after some other observations, to say— All summer, Sir James, you were cautioning me, and so were the Government, not to risk my ships against stone wails, for which you had a great respect, and praising me for the manner I had conducted the fleet ; now wiuter.is come, you are dissatisfied ai r my net doing impossibiliti es ; an d as the people are not safTs3eil, the Government are preparine to abandon me, because I will not follow the advice of a general, oeutrary to that of my cram admirals, and diametrically oppo site ti the opinion of the French general of engineers, and attack a fortress at a season of the year when it is mere than probable _I should _have—lost—hal this explanation at great length ; it has given me much pain. I am conscious of having done my duty, and, if you aro dis satisfied, you can bring me to a court-martial, or remove ma, as I before mentioned to the Admiralty. lam very far from well, an! I assure you this correspondence bas not improved my health, and I am suffering muck from cold. Well, they were Rot satisfied after all that explanation ; and after all the trouble ha had taken to show the position he was in, Sir Jamas Graham said— My dear Sir Charles,—You refer to my letters at the end of Aug ist, as contemplating then the early tercnina.t;ou of active operations in the Baltic for this year. 1 was not pre pared, even at that time, for the immediate departure of the French army after the capture of Bomarsaud ; and I pointed oat to you Abo, Sweaborg, and Revel, as points which, with miiita y aid, were open to attack. Much less was I prepared for the withdrawal of the Fre,ch squadron from the com bined naval operations almost simultaneously with the de parture of the army, as soon as Boinarsund had been de strzyed. These decisions were taken on the spot-- I believe, with your consent, bet without any reference to the English Government. They were no such thing an taken an the spot with his con. sent. They were taken by the Tench Government anti communicated to our own Government. Sir James went But is August we had not seen the report of General Jones on Sweaborg, which you forwarded to us from Led-nnd on the 29th of August, and which was in your hands before either the French army or the French fleet had left the Aland Islands. The report is entitled respect. It made a great impression he-e, and raised a strong presumption that with the aid of the military force then present, with the fleet, in seven or eight da3 s the works at Sweaborg might be destroyed, and that the month of September afforded ample time for tho operation. On the sth of Septembar you sent us the obser vations of General Baragnay d'Hilliers and of General Niel on the report of General Jones. general Baragnay d'Hilliers says expressly, after having reconnoitred Sweaborg together with general Niel :—" We partake of the opinion of General Jones, Sweaborg msy be attacked arid taken by the fleets, if they think fit to make ou that fortress a serious attack." General went further, and said that, without any military co-operation, eight or ten sail of the line could lay the works in ruins in two hours, by a bombardment near at hand, on tie sea front, where the works are weakest; and ho intimated very distinctly an opinion that the attack ‘klught to be made. Now he presumed Sir James Graham understood French General Niel said, " Sweaborg pent-etre attaque et prig par, lee flottes, si elles veulent faire coutre cette forteresse une attaque serialise." The right hon. gentleman translated this to mean that an attack onghtto he made. Sir James went on to say : In the face of these reports, and within a week after re ceiving them, the intelligence that the French ermyaud French fleet had left you, without a shot being fired, except at Bo marsund, was both a surprise and disappointment. Then came your own second reconnaissance of Sweaborg, and a plan of naval attack, which you considered practicable. We were anxious, if the French and English forces could be united, that it should have been tried even this year, before the im mense fleet which had been assembled retreated from the Bal tic ; but our own sailing ships having gone to Kiel, and the French squadron being on its way home, the opportunity was lost, and nothing now remains to be done but gradually to withdraw the line-of-battle ships, and to await the moment whenico shall enclose the Russian fleet within the Gulf of Fin land for the winter. Where were the 50,000 men and the 250 Swedish gun boats ? Then the right hon. gentleman came back again to " My dear Admiral." I am very unwilling to be involved in a written controversy with you, but you have brought it on yourself, by your re, port of the 25th of Sept., after your second reconnaissanc3 of Sweaborg. That report appeared to me to be entirely at variance with the opirions previously expressed by you, and I certainly understood you then to say, that if yon had mor tars, rockets, and Lancaster guns, you consi lered Sweaborg assailable by sea. In May you declared it to be unassailable, by sea and land, and the Admiralty did not send to you the appliances which, in September, yofi declared to be wanting, because they believed, from your account, they would be nse. less against a place which in the first instance you pronounced to be impregnable. I could not bring myself to believe that the want of Lancaster gnus, or even of morta r s, rend ere d a sea attack, on your plan of the 25th of September, impossible, if you had 25 sail of the line re-assembled before the place, with all their means of vertical fire. I am sincerely sorry to hear that you are unwell. 1 hope that - Kiel Harbour and milder air will restore your health. This was the answer : I can assure you, Sir James, it is far from my wish to enter into a controversy with you, but I will not admit that I have brought it on myself; there is not a word in either my pub. lie or private letters that justifies the construction that you and the Admiralty have thought proper to put upon them. My letter in answer to their lordships' last despatch is plain enough ; ebut if their lordships think proper to deliberate on ono past of my letter, and ignore another part, I can only protest against it • and I am quite' prepa re d t o d e f en d my self against any unjust attacks that are made against ma. I have documents enough in my possession to justify my con. duct. Enough has not been done to satisfy an impatieut public, as you called them—some one must be blamed, and I am the chosen ono ; but I will not allow myself to be crushed because I could not do impossibilities. All this stir has been caused by the reports of two engineers (one French and the other English), diametrically opposed to each other ; in ad. dition to which was the report of the capture of Setastopol, not yet taken, though the fleet there is assisted by an army of 70,000 men, in a fine climate ; and I have been expected to take places much stronger with a fleet alone; and the same people, who so often warned me against unnecessarily risk ing my fleet, are now dissatisfied because I did not expose them to certain destruction. I presume you have seen Cap tain Sullivan by this time ; he is capable of opening the eyes of the Government, if they are not hermetically scaled, I have gone through the world with honour and credit to my self; and just as I am about to leave it unworthy attempts are being made to ruin my reputation ; but they will fail, and recoil ou themselves. A. full report of the state of Sweehorg was made by him to the First Lord of the .dmiralty, because he did not wish it to get into the hands of the clerks ; and the hones would be astonished to learn that that report was never laid before the Beard of Admiralty, and the board knew nothing about. it. The Admiralty wrote to him accusing him of falsity ; it would have been more honourable in them to have written to him and said they mistook his letter, and to have made him an apolOgy, and there would have been an end of this difference. Now he did netlike to make use of hard words, and this was not the time to accuse a person of high treason, but it appeared to him that the then First Lord of the Admiralty was never serious in the Russian-. war, because he gave him orders not to attack Sweaborg in the summer time ; and if he had written to him inthe summer the letters that he wrote . to him in the winter he should most decidedly hare attacked Sweaborg. But the moment winter came the right hon. baronet forgot all that he had written to him in the summer, and tried to goa i him on to attack those fortifications, when he had told him that if he did so the fleet would probably have been lost. If the Emperor of Russia had been First Lord of the Admiralty he would have given him just the same orders that the First Lord of the Admiralty did ; he would have forbade him to attack the fortifications when it was just possible to succeed, and he would have ordered him to do it when it was impossible. Well, they came away from Nargen and went toKiel, and shortly afterwards the whole fleet arrived safe in England, after a most arduous campaign in a sea that had never been navieetted bymuchafleet before. When they arrived in England he wont, as in duty bound, to pay his respects to the First Lord of the Admiralty, and he must say that he was received iu a sneering way. They knew how the right hon. baronet could sneer when he chose. It was with the greatest difficulty that ho (Sir C. Napier) kept hie temper. Sir Jas. Graham said to hilt " You may tell me what you please, but I shall make no reply." That was tho language used to him by the First Lord of the Admiralty. When he got back to Portsmouth he received an order to haul down his flag, and after that interview he was not surprised at it. IHs did nut expect to be sant to the B.►]tic again, and he never would have served again under the right :ion. baronet after what had taken place between them. Fie considered that nn man's honour was safe in the right hon. baronet's li,nds, and the board wrote to him a letter in which they said, " Though their lordships have on some occasions not had that satiß faction in reading your reports as on others, they have only to repeat that no censure has been passed on your conduct with reference to the operations under your orslers, and their lordships have already exp , eased their sense of your services iu the manner customary with an officer of your rank. Their lordships do not feel themselves called upon to enter a second time into a diamaion on ~~_-~_ maters which have already been the subject of controversy between you and them, and still less to enter into a discus 'don ou documents which have not been laid before them." He had written for a court-martial, and they said they do clieed a:controversy. They had heard of the praise —the lavish praise —which they had bestowed upon hien. " But from the moment you left Wingo Sound. which you did without orders"—after themselves saying that, he was right in so doing—after his conduct in that respect had been ap• proved by the First Lord of the Admiralty and the Seem tery of State—they went on to say that he had not treated the board with respect. He did not deny it. They had ac cused him of cowardice almost, and he considered it was perfectly impossible that any man could have restrained himself and not have written us severely to them as it was possible to do. He did not complain of their not again giving him the command, of the Baltic fleet; the Queen had a right to choose whom she thought fit to command her fleets ; but he complained of the unworthy manner in which they had behaved to him, trying to throw the whole of the blame upon him. He had now done with 18'3, and he would come to what took place in 1855. The house was aware that he recommended a large fleet of mortar and gun-boats to be sent to the Baltic when the fleet was fitted out again. He did not blame them for not sending thorn in 1854, but after the intimation received Irons him of the mode to be pursued to take Cronstadt and Swea borg, it was the greatest neglect—it was worse than ne glect, for the Government to send to the Baltic, in 1855, only sixteen gun-boats and sixteen mortar-vessels. There was no excuse whatever for want of time, because, a mortar vessel was built and ready the other day in three weeks from the time she was laid down. What instruc tions were given to the commander of the fleet he did not ki.ow, but it was very evident that no instructions could have been given him to go to Sweaborg and attack it with the whole of the force, because part of the gun boats went up to Cronstadt, where they remained a consi derable time to examine Cronstadt, and see what could be done with it. They must hays known perfectly well that Cronstadt could not he attacked by the force they had sent, but he thought Sweaborg might. In /854 the fleet was sent out without gun-boats and mortars, and in 1855 the gun-boats and mortars were sent out, and the fleet was sent away. Now, he did not blame Admiral Dundes in the least. Ho was erfectiv aware that without a large fleet of gun-boats and mortars it was ier pos-ible to attack Sweaborg with success. Had the whole of tke fleet, and the gun-boats and mortar-boats, been assembled before Sweaborg, nod not a single vessel been sent to Cronstadt, he thought the admiral would have been perfectly justified in expecting to destroy Sweaborg ; but it appeared that after a bombardment of 38 hours the whole of the mortars wore split, not owing to the badness of the mortars, but because they were tired so fast. The admiral had but for mortars, and he was desirous of trying the experiment to long as he could. Ho thought Admiral Dandas would have been wrong, seeing that his mortars were split, to have taken the fleet in. Ho thought, after the example of 1854, Government ought to have sent into the Baltic as large a force as they possibly could; they ought not to have thought of the expense. It was necessary to do it in order to put an end to the war. He believed that if the same exertion had been made in 1855 that was now being made for 1856 the war would have been finished in 1815 with honour and glory to this country. Y• doubt Swea borg would have been destroyed. As to Cronstadt he had no hope of the kind. He thought the house would see that the Admiralty had treated him in the most scandalous manner; they had put into his mouth words that he Dever used, which was not worthy of a man in the position of the right hon. baronet. He hoped that some notice would be taken of this in order to prevent this kind of conduct again. He must say he was never more eurprised then to see Admiral Berkeley's name to such a document. He (Sir Charles Napier) could not see any reason why the Government should hesitate to give him the committee for which he asked. Two general officers had complained of the report of a commission which had impinged their cha rd-ler, and a new cerinnission had been appointed to exa mine into the whole case in order to sea whether these gal lant officer- , were right or wrong. He (the gallant admiral) considered he had an equal right to an inquiry. If he bad been guilty of misconduct let him be punished ; bat how could it be ascertained whether he had been in fault unless a committee was appointed to investigate the conduct of the fleet in 1854 and 1855? He had now told hie tale, nod he put his case into the hands of the Government and of the house, trusting that they would act towards him with justice and fairness. Thanking the house for the attention with whch they had heard hire, he would conclude with the , motion fur a committee, of which he had given notice. After a short pause, Admiral WALCOTT. said he never could see a brother efficer adrift without throwing him out* tow rope. (Lingh ter and cheers.) Ho did not see any one disposed to second the motion, and he would therefore do so himself. (Hear.) At the same time, he thought that whatever disappoint' meat or personal reproach might lie at the door either of the gallant admiral or the right hon. gentleman the mem ber for Carlisle, they had themselves justly incurred it. Before a fleet was despatched to the Baltic both the right hon. gentleman and the gallant admiral ought to hays considered the course which it was right and proper to pursue. The difficulties of navigation in the Bal tic, the prevalence of shoal water, the intricacies of the entrance to the harbours, and the strength of the fortifica tions, must have been known, or at all events ought to have been known, to them both ; and both had therefore been to blame, the right hon. gentleman for not having provided adequate means of attacking the Russian forts, and the gallant admiral for not having seen that the means supplied to him were sufficient. (Hear, hear.) He con sidered, too, that they were also to blame, the one for his speech at the Reform Club, and the other for his celebrated signal for having led the country to expect successes which it was not probable would be ob tained. With respect to the question which had arisen on the subject of mortar boats, he did not think that suffi cient use had been made of the experience of the last wax tie (Admiral Walcott) happened to have served in Vie Baltic during the years 1808 9; and he thought that tete experience of that period might have suggested the sort of force that would be necessary for services such as the Hoot would be required to perform. He remembered three as SS in particular. The first was one in which the boats of the Bellerophon attacked ti.e sea batteries at Hango Head, ar td destroyed them. In the second the boats of the squadron, under the command of a most sagacious and intrepid offi cer, Sir Byam Martin, to the number of 17, manned with 270 men, attacked a flotilla of 12 gun-boats and a large armed ship, with a convoy of 12 ships, laden with previ sions and ammunition, all of which, with the exception of one gun-boat, were captured or destroyed. The third was a similar exploit performed by an officer named Forest, whe brought out three gun-boats of the •enemy. Those cases showed clearly what might have bean done had there been a naval force adapted to the difficulties of the ca se; (Beer.) If the object of sending our ships into the Baltic was merely to blockade those of the Russian Government. no success could have been more complete than that which had attended the gdlsnt admiral. He had before now pro tested against charging the enemy's fleet with fear, bemuse it had not Come out and fought with our own. To have done so would have been a great error; because, the ene my's fleet being composed of sailing vessels, to have given battle to our screw line-of-battle-ships would have been in trusts. a most senseless act. The courage which our foes had shown at Sebastopol had redounded greatly to their hononr, and it ought to secure them from all attacks upon their gallantry. He thought it was the duty of a Government to select officers upon whom they could rely, not only for their valour, but for their wisdom and discretion ; but hav ing done so, it was no less their bounden duty to repose in them the fullest confidence. There was much sagacity in the maxim cf that greatest of all modern authorities, the first. Napoleon—" Let the men of the sword bo made to depend as little as possible upon the men of the pen." About 100 years ago a very admirable farce was acted. by our gallant and witty allies. In it an English courier was represented, very protuberant before and also at the stern (Laughter.) The commending officer seeing hina,r " What have you got there before you ?" " Your orders. sir." "That is all right," continued the officer, " but what have got behind ?" "Your counter-orders." " The devil !" exclaimed' the officer, "then it's all up." (Laughter and cheers.) So long as orders and counter-orders were given disasters must ensue. (Hear.) With respect to secret orders, on which some observations had been made, he was not among those who denial that it was right to give such orders ; but he thought that if secret orders were read against an officer he ought to be at liberty also to rend them in his own defence. He thought the gallant member had done quite night in bringug this subject before the house; for he would not give that (said Admiral Walcott, snapping his fingers) for an officer who did not value his honour more than his life, and the verdicts of his country even more. (Hear.) The country no doubt desired greater success than had been gained in the Baltic, but still he thought that when a dispassionate view was token of the services of the navy during the last two campaigns it would be allowed that they had been most meritorious. Those services in the Black Sea had been most creditable consider ing the means the fleet had had at its disposal. The pro ceedings, too, at Kertch, in the Sea of Axoff, and at Kin burn—the manner in which nearly 100,000 troops had been transported by a fleet which covered nearly 16 miles of sea without the loss of a ship or a man—the behaviour of the fleet in the attack on the sea batteries of Sebastopol, and the manner in which the historic Agamemnon went into action, were worthy of the best period in the history of the British navy. (Cheers.) If the investigations of the preferesed committee should remove any misconception which the public might entertain, or even, if having shown the con dition of the Service to he faulty, it should load to its im provement, he for one should rejoice that this discussion, unsatisfactory as he thought it was, had taken place. Sir C. WOOD said the hon. and gallant member who had made this motion did not seem to anticipate that he (Sir C. Wood) should take upon himself the task of replying to his speech. Nor would ho do so, but he must say that the gallant officer had road extracts from despatches not laid before Parliament, and from private letters, and he had stated the confidential opinion of foreign officers and officers in her Majesty's service in a manner and to an extent which he (the right hon. baronet), after a quarter of a century's experience, had never seen done before. (Cheers.) Last session when a similar course, though to a very limited ex tent, was taken by the hon. and learned member for Wal- lisgford (Mr. Ma lins), be (Sir C. Wood) stated his opinions in similar terms, and the house then seemed very much to concur with him. (Cheers.) Tho hon. and learned gentle man withdrew his motion, and it was much to be regretted that the gallant admiral should now hero taken a step which he could not but regard a►s one very prejudicial to the public service. (Hrar.) He would not follow the gallant gentleman into a single point which he ha raised upon the correspondence he had so read, for, so far as it would be necessary to do so. his right hot:. friend beside him (Admi ral Berkeley) alsd his right hon. friend the member for Carlisle (SirJ. Graham), who were cognisant of all the fasts, would no doubt do so ; but he should be sorry if they should think it incumbent upon them, in defending their own characters, to ft llow the gallant admiral in a courseso extremely mischievous on all accounts. It was indispen sable, not only that secret orders should be given to com manding officers, bat that perfectly confidential mistiest' should exist between them and the First Lord of the Admi ralty. Even in his (Sir C. Wood's) short experience he had experienced the greatest possible assistance from receiving suds confidential communications ; and the admirals bad been good enough to say that they had also found great advantage in the private letters ho bad addressed to them. But it was obvious that if it might be brought forward in the manner the gallant admiral had done, there would be an end to confidential correspondence, and he ventured to say that in that case the public service could not he ad vantageonely carried on. (Hear.) With respect to the gal lant admiral's motion, it was not enough that an hon. member should ask for a committee; but some public ground must be shown why one should be appointed. He would appeal to any hen. geetletnae in that house whether the gallant admiral who Lad toads the motion, or the gal lant admiral who had seconded it, had given the slightest ground f 4 gairpajg/ A.ZI did not e lbeg it n depend u for Carli Sir C. of this 114 Adinir the rule. sensible " order." Sir C. seconds e one that aware th once haN Bee that 4 does not Dear orrespot between 'starting returned P POntalle nPod not lag that 'natl, hoe and, had Possessio to you. Idea of w facts of treason. O R the Charles nsks Sir Charles. Sir, Rive thol be en ace When it When th, rattnerst house ; is the co had I do eXpresse lest her s erves iT be Was sueee t ake up C , ll, sed Queen's were I i not thin to T he ho altount his poe 11 ; 41, Y h b public & Advanc e over n] e•aniste Propriel