The Sun. — London, England, 1856-05-02 00:00:00

HOUSE OF LORDS--(YESTBRDA.Y). Their Lordships did not assemble this evening, in con sequence of its being Ascension-day. HOUSE OF COMM° NS. --(YESTERDAY.) The SPEAKER. tlnk the chair at the usual hour. PRIVATE BUSINESS. The Dewsbury, Batley, and Hecknaondwike Water 13111 and the Scarborough Water Bill were severally read a third time and passed. EAST KENT RAILWAY. On the motion of Mr. BROTHERTON the order for the committal of the East Kent Railway Bill was read and discharged, the bill having been withdrawn. IMPERIAL HOTEL COMPANY BILL. On the motion of Mr. BROTHERTON the order foi the committal of the Imperial Hotel Company Bill was read and discharged, the bill having been withdrawn. THE CHARGES AGAINST. MR. AITKIN. Mr. COWAN asked when the papers and correspon dence relating to charges preferred by Governor Ken nedy against Mr. W. N. Aitkin, late colonial surgeon at Sierra Leone (for which an address was voted on the 26th of May last) were likely to be laid on the table of the house ? Mr. J. BALL said the papers would be laid on the table next week. POSTAL COMMUNICATION WITH IRELAND. Lord NAAS asked whether it was intended to make any alteration in the present mode of conducting postal communication in the north of Ireland ? Mr. WILSON said he presumed the question related to Ballymena, Coleraine, and Londonderry ; difficulties bad existed with respect to the line of railways iv that part of Ireland, but they had been overcome, and an im proved postal communication would commence on the 9th inst. Captain L. VERNON asked when the vacancy of Colonel Commandant in the Royal Engineers, caused by the death of General Wright on the sth of March last, would be filled up ? Mr. F. PEEL said it was intended to fill up the vacancy. The Commander-in-Chief had not yet made his selection. . CA: DUNNE asked when the Land Transport Corps would be disbanded I Mr. F. PEEL said the subject was under the consi deration of Government. THE CRIMEAN INQUIRY. Mr. PALK asked the Under-Secretary for War whether the examination already taken before the court of inquiry now sitting, and presided over by Sir• Alex. Woodford, would be laid upon the 'table of the house, and when ? and whether her Majesty's Government con templated any measures for the more efficient organisa tion of the Medical and Hospital Staff, and of the Com missariat, or whether it was intended to reduce those departments to the same peace establishment which was found so inefficient at the breaking out of the war ? Mr. PEEL said by the warrant constituting the Board of General Officers, they were to transmit their report to the Horse Guards ; but nothing bad yet been sent from the board. It was, of course, intended to reduce the army in consequence of peace, but it would be maintained on a secure footing. Mr. LIDDELL asked whether the attention of her Majesty's Government had been called to the refusal of the Spanish Government to refund to the firm of Messrs. Clementson (Newcastle-on-Tyne) the amount of the ex cess of duties levied at Tarragona in October last upon a cargo of iron shipped by them to that port ; and whether, after the repeated remonstraLces that had been addressed by Lord Howden to the Spanish Government upon the subject, her Majesty's Government were pre pared to take steps to insure the payment of the money, and to protect British merchants in future from the ex torbious of the Custom-house authorities of the Spanish ports ? Lord PALMERSTON said the subject alluded to had occupied the serious attention of the Government et home and her Majesty's Minister at Madrid. The justness of the demand had been admitted by the Spanish Government, and they had promised that the overcharge should be repaid. That promise, be was sorry tosay, had not been fulfilled. The noble earl the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs had been in communication with the Spanish Minister on the subject, but it was perfectly well known that Spain was not the first of the powers to recognise any pecuniary claim. (Hear, hear.) The Spanish Government had not shown that prompti tude which they ought to have done on the subject, but hon. gentlemen might rely that every exertion in this or similar caves would be used to obtain the fulfil ment of all just demands. THE DANUBE. Sir H. WILLOUGHBY asked whether the First Lord of the Treasury would lay upon the table of the house any plan describing the proposed boundaries on the north of the Danube between Bessarabia I Lord PALMERSTON said the boundary was so clearly laid down in the treaty of peace that with the aid of a good map it could be traced. The boundary bad not yet been laid down, on that ground but a com mission was about to go out to do so. Mr. FRENCH asked whether the islands of the Danube would he restored to Turkey t Lord PALMERSTON s.id the islands at the mouth of the Danube had been excluded from the Russian boundary. They would of course belong to Moldavia. THE FIREWORKS. Mr. T. DUNCO MBE said he had been requested to put a question to the first Lord of the Treasury ; it was whether be would state when the metropolis was to be entertained by the display of fireworks which the Home Secretary had provided for them ? (Laughter.) Lord PALMERSTON said it would take place on the Queen's birthday. THE ORDERS OF THE DAY. On the motion that the adjourned debate takes prece dence of the other orders, Mr. DUNLOP complained of the injustice they would inflict on the business of the house, and particularly of private members, in delaying their proceeding with their bills. He thought it absurd to prolong the debate on the fall of Kars, the question having been virtually de cided by the division on Tuesday night. This debate was continued -merely to allow certain honourable members to make speeches, which would in all proba• bility be improved by delay, and reserved for another oceasion. Mr. MALINS also made a similar complaint. Lord PALMERSTOJ said he had no control over the course the house should pursue on this occasion. FALL OF KAItS. The debate upon this subject was resumed by Sir E. B. LYTTON, who spoke as follows : —Afier what has just taken place with respect to the postponement of orders of the day, I feel that I ought to assure the house, and more especially 'those hon. gentlemen whom my motion for the adjournment •f the debate on Tuesday last may have inconvenienced, that when I rose to make that motion I was totally unconscious it would have been opposed by the noble viscount at the head of the Go vernment. In making it I had no particular wish of my own to gratify, for I would willingly submit to have been silent ; and I may say it is not now my intention to oc cupy the time of the house at any considerable length. But I was pressed to move the adjournment of the debate by hon. members who were desirous to prolong the die etissinn, and whose wish I considered to be entitled to re spect. I naturally thought, casting a glance upon the benches opposite, and seeing that gentlemen who are accus tomed to adorn our debates had notes yet expressed their opi nions upon this important subject, although they were to some extent arraigned ; seeing, also, that we had only one address from a Cabinet Minister—the right 'non. gentleman the Chancellor of the Exchequer—and that at an hour when the house was so empty that very few gentlemen could have profited by listening to his elaborate and able defence of the Government and to the very iateresting memoir of the Turkish loan by which that accomplished, distinguished, and historical critic endeavoured to relieve the dreary chronicle of the decline and fall of Kars; seeing all this, I naturally thought that when I ro-e at haV-past twelve o'clock onTuesday night to move the adjournment of the debate, that motion would be acceded to as a matter of course—(Hoar, hear)—and I certainly was never more surprised than when I found that, for the second time in my life, I had occasioned a degree of angry excitement— whether real or well simulated I know not —in the case of the noble viscount at the head of the Government, which for a moment almost overcame his habitual urbanity. I feel that the beat proof I can now give that I am not dis posedto abuse th e pr i v i lege by which I am allowed to ad dress the house, at the expense of other hon. gentlemen, will be to condense as much u possible the observations shall have t o make, to refer as little as I can to the nowfa l fa miliar extr ac t s f rom the blue books, to what may be a f a i r reply to the arguments and to confine myself hon. gentlemen opposite. My hon. ,urae n t s em pl o y e d b y friend eu.ii the member for Aylesbury told the h ouse that heo better defence for the Gov ernment than t m h ake a much de for themselves. But it appeared t o me thatenay had h d o m f the defence he did make rested on an exaggerated estimate the charges which are brought in thi s case. My h ° of friend, with the candour of a good advocate, e e re i tt , ; ed that the Government had committal very serious mis takes; but added that lie thought it would be nn fair to assert that the fell of Kars was solely ettei butable to a want of energy and foresight on their parts. But the resolution before the house does not say that the fall of Kara was owing exclusively to a want of energy and foresight on the part of the Government ; if it did, it should not have my support. Tho question is, whe ther, among other causes, a want of energy and foresight on the part of her Majesty's Government did not contri bute to that result. The correspondence laid before the house shows that a difference of opinion had prevailed be tween the English Government and the English ambassa dor at Constantinople from the month of Sept., 1854, to the month of Sept., 1855, as to the amount of support to be given to the English commissioner in Asiatic Turkey. Now that commissioner had bees sent out not only to report upon the state of disorganisation to which the Turkish army in that quarter had been reduced, but also to use all the means at his disposal for the purpose of ameliorating its condition; and this blue book all goes to show that the English Government and the English ambassador between them failed to place at the disposal of that commissioner any adequate means for the fulfilment of his mission. The Government itself took great pains to publish that fact. The blue book showed that from the 11th of Jun., 1853, to the 21st of November, a few days before the fall of Kars, little or nothing had been sent to that city by the Government, except a few ball -cartridges. My hon. and learned friend the member for Enniskillen referred in terms which seem to use too severe to the statement of Lord Cla rendon, that "the neglected garrison of Kau would at MPERIAL PARLIAMENT least have the satisfaction of knowing that their sufferings ' troubled the sleep and repose of the Turkish Ministers,who, in default of all ordinary measures of relief, never ceased to pray for their safety and snceess." But the question arises whether there are not other bliuisters besides those of Turkey whose " sleep and repose" those sufferings might have disturbed, and in whom that neglected garrison might have inspired not only the piety ofprayer, but the humility of repentance. (Hear.) Now my hon. friend the member for Aylesbury dwelt with great praise on the despatches of Lord Clarendon; and my hon. and learned friend the At toruey-General said that these dispatches were a sufficient proof in themselves of the energy and the honesty of her Majesty's Government. My hon. and learned friend asked what more the Government could do than that which they had done ? Well, in much of the praise that is given to these despatches, I most cordially concur. I think that many of these despatches of Lord Clarendon are most ex cellent ; I will go further, and say that if despatches or, in other words, it letter-writing could have saved Kann Lord Clarendon would have saved it. (" Hear, hear," and laugh ter.) But if the Government ought to have been aware of one thing more than any other, it is that despatches or letter-writing were wholly insufficient alone to effect that purpose—(hear ' hear)—and the inventive geni us o f . h er Majesty' nneinisters might surely have devised some other mode of provioing for the defence of Kars and the security of Asia. It is perfectly true that Lord Clarendon did faithfully report to Lord Stratford all the complaints of General Williams—complaints that he wanted cavalry, that he wants , gunners, that he wanted artillery-men, that be wanted reinforcements, that he wanted ammuni tion and provisions ; and, above all, that he wanted money—(hear, hear)—and Lord Stratford vary fully explained that for all these purposes the revenue and re sources of the Sultan were totally inadequate. He also stated very lucidly the reasons why the corruption and peculation which had been the habit of Eastern Govern ments for generations could not be reformed in a day, or in anything like time sufficient to enable Tur key to provide for the defence of Kars. There is one important feet . which comes out of this mass of correspond. ence with which the right hon. gentleman the Chancellor of the Exchequer has wholly failed to grapple, and that is, that if any moderate sum of English money had been placed at the disposal of the English commissioner in good time, notwithstanding all the vices of Turkish pecula tion and corruption, a sufficient amount of ammunition and of provisions might have been thrown into Kars, in defiance of the Russian blockade. (Rear.) How did Kars fall at last ? It fell from no superiority of force on the part of the enemy, for at the time of its capture there was a greater proportion of force in the garrison than in the be sieging army. Every one knows that Kars was conquered by fanatic. The blue book tells us that the Russian general would have raised the siege when Omer Pacha entered Georgia, if be had not learned from an Armenian spy that there was only a fortnight's provisions in the gar rison. And yet, while England was cheerfully taxing her. self to the utmost to save the empire of the Sultan, not one shilling of our money went to the aid of General Wil liams, who wee holding that fortress on which, in the opi nion of her Majesty's Government, and of Omer Pacha, although not of the Chancellor of the Exchequer, the safety of the Turkish capital depended. Let me remind the Chan cellor of the Exchequer, who seems to have doubts upon that point, that General Simmons, in a despatch to Gen. Williams, says that the Government informed Omer Pacha that if Kara should fall, there was no force to prevent the Russians marching directly on Constantinople—(hear, hear) —and Omer Pacha credited that information. I think that evidence chows that the Chancellor of the Exchequer might have placed himself in more confidential communi cation with the noble lord the Secretary for War ; and then, perhaps, he might have told us with that unvar nished severity of candour with which he so often tells us very disagreeable truths, that he was about to raise so many millions for the vigorous prosecution of the war, but that such had been the energy and foresight of the united cabinet' that they had pre-determined that not one six pence of the money was to go to the relief and defence of that fortress which commanded the great key of Asia Mi nor. (Hear) " But," said the right hon. gentleman the other night, "if Kars is lost, what then ? Why," says the the right hon. gentleman, " the easiest military operation would be all that is needed to recapture it." (Hear, and laugh.) Now let ma appeal to him, not as a military author ity, but as a Chancellor of the Exchequer, and let me ask him whether he does not think, as a matter of pounds, shillings, and pence, that it would be much cheaper to save than to recapture it? (Hear, hear.) The right hon. gentleman the Chancellor of the Exchequer, alluding to the statement that he might himself have come down to Parliament and asked expressly for a sum in aid of Kars, said that be could make no such aoplicatien because the sum required was so s ma ll. The right honourable gentleman seemed to think that et would be beneath the dignity of a Chancellor of the Ex chequer to ask the house for so contemptible a sum as 100,000/. or 200,000 L Now it appears to me that the question of dignity, in such a case, depends not so much on the amount of the sum to be raised, as on the purpose to which it is to be applied. Dr. Sandwith tells us that if Gen. Williams had had the absolute control of the commis sariat Kers would have been saved. But if the Govern ment Lad placed a sum of money at his disposal, that cnn trul he must necessarily have acquired. If no money, how ever, was to have been given expressly for the defence of Kars I want to know how it was that the Turkish loan had been deferred until August, although the Goverment had long before been aware, from the in formation furnished to them, by their own ambassador, that the pecuniary resources of Turkey had been ut terly exhausted? lion. gentlemen opposite may say that any objection of that kind comes with a bad grace from gentlemen who opposed that loan. Now, that may be a very good House-of-Commons argument, but it is not an argument for common sense. I was not myself in the house at the time, as I had paired off during the latter part of the session. But I think that if I bad been here, 1 should have voted for the Turkish loan, and I must observe, that in looking at the debates, I find the principal objection urged to the proposal was made, not to the loan itself, but was made on account of the form of our joint guarantee with France. I will appeal to the candour of the noble lord opposite, and I will ask him whether he really thinks that if he had come down to the house, and said that pecuniary :lid of that nature was absolutely ne cessary for the security of Kars, and that without it the honour of the British name must be tarnished in the East —I will ask him whether he really thinks from the expe rience he bad already acquired of hon. gentleman on this side of the house, or even of those hon. gentlemen *be were warm advocates of peace, that, however they might have urged their objections to the form of the loan, they would have pressed their objections to a hostile division? (Hear, hear.) I say that either by a direct grant, or by means of a Turkish lo ,n, or—and that would have been the best and simplest mode of all—by sending money to your commissioner himself, expressly for the purpose of being employed in the defence of Kira—l say that by aoy one of these modes that city might have been saved. (Hear, hear.) But when Lord Ellonb)rough, in the month of Aueust, called the attention of the House of Lords to the distressed state of Kars, and the neglect of the war in Asia, Lord Panmure replied, that Turkey. in that quarter, was well able to defend herself. (Heir, hear.) Turkey able to defend herself ! That was the statement of Lord Pan mine, in the teeth of the information contained in those despatches which have been published for the purpose of showing how dcfeuceless Turkey was at that very lime; and the statement was made on the very same day— namely, the 3d of August—on which Lord Clarendon, in a despatch to Lord Cowley, sail it was clear that without assistance the whole Turkish force in Asia must be de stroyed or captured. (Hear.) And was it becoming in my hon. friend the member for Aylesbury, who scarcely ever addresses the house without making some com plimentary allusion to his own peculiar frankness, ho nesty, and straightforwardness—(a laugh) - was it becoming in him, not only to excuse, but to eulogise that assertion of Lord Panmure, on the express gr o u n d. that it was a falsehood? Can he eulogise a British Minister who deli berately deceives Parliament and the country, in order that he might, at the same time, endeavour to practise a hollow deceit on the Russian General besieging Kars? (Hear, hear.) My hon. friend, in the course of his ad drear, compared himself to a dog at a race course —(a laugh)—who was shunted at hem both sides until the race began, when he was whistled off, for fear he might throw down a favourite. Now that remit:de me of a well-known canine saying —that "Brag is a good dog, but that Hold fast is a better." I believe that on our side of the coarse we shall always be willing to follow Holdfast ; but lam afraid we must leave it to the other side to offer to Brag more enticing attractions. (A. laugh.) I will touch upon another point which, though it did not directly affect the fall of Kars, will show what WAS the bias in the mind of the noble lord the Secretary for War, a hich, I think, did affect the fall of Kars. No sooner had the Eng lish commissioner arrived in Anatolia than he informed the Government that 10,000 or 1'4,000 persons had perished for want of proper medical assistance in the hospitals. He then asked for medical relief, and the Duke of Newcastle, who, whatever might be his faults, was always ready to listen to the claims of humanity, directed that an inquiry should be instituted for the purpose of ascertaining whether the Turkish Government would permit a few English army surgeons to be sent t o s up er intend the hospitals at Kers and Erzaroune. That inquiry having led to no effectual result, Lord Clarendon, with equal humanity, forwarded, through Lord Wodehouse, to Lord Panmure, in the month of April, a despatch from Gen. Williams, and a medical re port from• Dr. Sandwith, and suggested to Lord Panmure whither it would not be advisable to send out some surgeons to the Turkish army. Lord Panmure replied " that be did not see much prospect of being able to send medical aid to the Turkish army in the province of Anatolia; but he would endeavour to do so to a limited extent, as soon as he had provided for the army of Omer Pacha and the Turkish Contingent." Now I will venture to say, that if the noble lord had inserted at that period an advertisement in the -Times newspaper, offering a good remuneration to young surgeons for their services in Anatolia, he would have re ceived applications by the hundred in reply. I remember that at the time I myself wag asked by several young stir geons to aid them in obtaining employment in the Crimea. The English Government complained that the Turkish au thorities did not attend to the representation of their , com missioner, and 'yet when he made a request directly to themselves in a matter over which they had absolute con trol, the noble lord the Secretary for War treated that re quest with as supreme an indifference as any pacha in the East. While you attempt to throw all the blame in this case on Turkish mal-administration, do not forget that that mid-administration, with all its Orientallanguor and all its constitutional vices, did great things before you sent your mighty aid to its defence in Asia. Do not forget that on the Danube it had gallantly coped with the whole might of Russia. What was the aid which you sent to Turkey in Asia, and what h as b een th e resu lt o f th a t a id ? Y ou too k ' 2 . 0 .000 Turkish soldiers into your pay • but when these () Mime were urgently wanted for the relief of Kars, not a man of them could move. (Hear, hear.) I clo not attempt I must tetlweTLord Stratford de Redcliffe's neglect in this case. and adher e to ck ei l) havebhaeard so mach already upon that score that will not allow u s n the generous practice of this house, at who is not present°t: true constitutional principle which saddl e all our blame on a diplomatist poses of the Geyer-era .eneftend himself. It may suit the pur glect, but it should be re constantly to complain of his ne have thought proper to retain him that they themselves in his office. I will not undertake to censure them for d en e t ci t ability, and I must Redcliffodobt, a man (re doing. Lord Stratford de • leave to them theft esponsibiLtymelen dut the house constitu of retaining him in the service of the State'tiF., on the policy would not hold to the principles of the English tion if, while they attack the agent, they alow i to t ? n ese un censured the men by whom he was employed. singular circumstance that although Lord Stratfordaavlecsor3dr in language the most pointed to be inf orme d what was the extent of General Williams s powers, and how far it was thought desirable by her Majesty's Government that his • commands should be obeyed, without reference to any doubts as to their expediency, no answer seems ever to have been returned to that question. (Hear, hear.) But it may be said that such was the surpassing energy of Ge neral Williams, that in spite of every difficulty, and by his own individual exei Cons, he succeeded in provisioning Kars for four months. Yes, but General Williams stated in his despatches that if within the four months aid did not come to him the only perspective of Kars was THE SUN. ON DON, FRIDAY EVENING, MAY 2, 1856. the vanishing point of starvation, and yet that aid was never sent. I find that when Omer Pasha pressed the allied efierals and admirals to consent to the adoption of his plan for the relief Kars, and founded his arguments on a despatch of General Wil liams's, dated the 23d of June, showing the urgency and the importance of sending aid to the Turkish force is Armenia, the allied generals absolutely refused to give any opinion upon the subject, on the ground that they had no informa tion from the ambassadors of their respective Governments at Constantinople which could lead them to suppo , e that the affairs of Asia were in a precarious position. That was the species of concert which seemed ty prevail between our agents in the East. Is it for the menl who have so signally mismanaged our interests in that quarter to come forward now and throw on Turkish mal-administration the blame of any calamity that may have arisen ? I cannot but think that her Majesty's Government strikingly failed in the duty of providing early in the summer some plan for the em ployment of the army of Omer Paella, whenever it might be found that. that army could ho sent to Armenia. I shall not, in an assembly of this character, and seeing as I do before me many distinguished British officers, presume to allude to strategical faults; but as a man of common sense, I say, wby were you not provided with some kind of strategy ? Your attention was repeatedly called to the embarrassments which must necessarily arise under a cer tain state of circumstances in the direction of which events were fast tending, and it was your bounden duty to have provided some plan by which the anticipated evils might have been met. (Hear.) But where was this organised conception of yours ? I think it has been said by a mili tary authority of the greatest eminence that a good gene ral may be defeated, but cannot be sunarised. Such a say ing also is applicable to a. minister for war. lie ought to think of a choice of plan's, and be ready to adopt one or another when the monaunt for action arrives. Bat more than that, it ie his duty to consult with his generals as to the feasibility of tlie plan he proposes, and if if is capable of altemtion—capable of modification, with re spect either to the time or to the circumstances, to come to a decision in accordance with the necessity of the case. But, above all, it was his duty to ba ready when the emergency arose. (Hear, hear.) It was this want of attention to preliminaries which led to the unparalleled admixture of hurry and delay, energy and torpor, in the month of July, which prepared the way for the catastrophe which ultimately resulted. (Hear, hear.) Can anybody doubt that had money been forthcoming when required—had troops been supplied as they ought to have been, the fate of Kars would have been wholly different? I cannot but think that such would have been the. case. (Hear, hear.) It was not until the month of July that out of the cloud of the despatches there did at length ' emerge the awful form of our Mitester of War. Tho Greek poet tells us that the advent of the Olympian Jove, in the struggle before the beleaguered city, was productive of order in the confusion ; but the advent of my Lord. Pan mure in the struggle seemed to render the confusion still more perplexed and complicated. The only question being how to stir for want of means, Lord Panmure writes ora cularly to General Vivian, and tells him to do—what? To uphold the British reputation ! (Laughter.) But does he provide the smallest aid? Certainly not. Does he even sug gest the means? No. (Hear.) If, in the month of July, all these preparations were required to place Kars in a proper position of defence, why was not the money forthcoming, which would have been the hest countenance we could have given to the prosecution of the war in Asia. If you were so careful of the British flag, why permit it in ' the month of September to succumb to the Russiens before Kars? Why, in the month of July, were you provided with no moans to sustain it? The right ho nourable gentleman deludes himself if be supposes that the honour of the English flag was not concerned in the surrender of Kars. By that time the eyes of England nay, the eyes of Europe—were fixed with unalloyed ad miration upon the noble attitude of the bravo English sol dier, who, witu the assistance of three or four of his countrymen, was upholding—embodying—the renown of the whole nation. (Cheers.) Kars and General Williams could not be divided in the mind of any one. Kars was that Englishman, and that Englishman was Kars—(loud cheers)—and to have evinced energy and foresight in pre paring for the defence of Kars would have been to have closed the war with glory, not only to General Williams, from whose renown nothing can detract, but to England. (Renewed cheering.) " Organisation ' " says Lord Pan mure—" organisation is as necessary to an army as sup ply." Can anything be more severely true? But, says General Williams, "added to organisation supply is ab solutely necessary to the defence of Kars." What does Lord Panmure say with respect to supply ? Contrast, the account of the state of .the Russian array before Kars with its defenders. Behold the soldiers in their com fortable tents, with decent fireplaces, and the officers' in their huts, with glazed windows, and surrounded by luxuries. Contrast the condition of those men, whom we are accustomed to coloider as a sort of semi-barbarians, with the miserable, ill-clad, famished spectres, who for months withstood every effort of the ens ny, and who were left to struggle and to starve with all the wealth of England at their disposal, wealth ex pended so lavishly, too, elsewhere. (Hear.) And yet, fore knowing what must happen, the English Minister of War could not devise a single measure of prevention until he himself sees that it is too late. What is the popular argu ment which hon. gentlemen opposite now make use of to shield the Government from the consequences of its inac tion? The war, they - say, is over. But if the war is over its consequences remain. The Chancellor of the Exchequer says, " We shall not tight the question again when we come to discuss tho articles of peace." Bat will any one wh3 calls himself an Englishman tell ma that if a war should break out again with Russia in defence of Turkey, and that war should happen to have for its theatre the Asiatic frontier, the surrenderofKars on this occasion will not have the greatest moral effect in weakening British prestige. Bat, sir, are we to bo told that because the offence is over the offender is to be freed from his responsibility ? That is not the line of argument adopted by the right hon. gentle man with respect to the Ottoman Porte. H. uw does it agree with the demand on the part of the En glish Government for the dismissal of Salim Pacha. His dismissal was dermtn,led, and he was dismissed. Might not the Porte have said, "Oh that's over ' • Kars is gone and the offence has passed." (Cheers.) What was the offence of Salim Pacha? Why, procrastination ; and if that is to be punished by less of office, what, I should like to know, is the &miens infer- Puce? (Hear, hear.) The Attorney-General turns to the art'cles of peace triumphantly, and asks —What more could we have done ? That there were faults no one can doubt. One gentleman says, they rest with the ambassa dor; another, that Omer Pacha was to blame ; a third, that it was the Ottoman Government; but if you ask me to make a direct charge, all I can say is this :—Here are the applications which General Williams made to you; have you attended to them ? (Hear.) He is a man in whom you place the utmost confidence, and who in circumstances of great difficulty makes three requests. First, he asks for money; secondly, for surgical aid ; and thirdly, to increase and extend his personal authority. The money you do not send ; even the surgical aid you do not send ; and with respect to extending his personal authority, you, through your ambassador, in effect decline to do it. Your general cannot stir a stop because he does not receive the information he is in want of ; when he asks for some ad ditional force, we are reminded that France might have been an obstacle. Has any hon. gentleman on the part of the Government shown that there was ever any consulta tion with the Preach Government as to what should be done should such a contingency as the siege of Kars by the Russians arise? No one has done so, and I think, there fore, that I am entitled to say such a contingency ou,ghtto have been contemplaied and provided for, not that it should be, as it was, left to the chapter of accidents. When lam asked, what court the Government do ? I say on the other hand, whA had the Government done? It is no ans Ter to turn to the despatches. I grant that you could not have written better ; but I cannot conceive any case in which you could have acted worse. I confess I am prepared to find a majority against me. Of course there are many hon. gentlemen who honestly think there is no case against the G o v ernmen t. S cme no d ou bt th ere are influenced by a laudable attachment to ministers, others who will be seduced by those seductive touches ofpatbetic eloquence in which the Attorney-General reminds us that the Government have concluded the war by an honourable peace, although it may be a peace which I do not think has been greeted with any great manifestation of popular en thusiasm. (Hear.) Some there may be who will vote for the Government from their admiration of the noble lord nt the head of the administration, in which admira tion lam free to s a y th a t I p art i c i p ate. But, upon the whole Ido not think the majority will be great. If there is one of her Majesty's Government who, when he goes into the lobby, ventures to ask souse friend in a cautious whisper, " Now, don't you think that this charge is unjust and that the Government have . shawl' great energy and foresight for the preservation and relief of Kars ?'' my be lief is that his friend will reply in an equally cautious whisper, " If that be your idea of energy and f,rosight, I trust, for Heaven's sake, that in future you will try to direct it into some other channel." (Laughter.) lam not altogether in the position in which I see some of my friends ' around me and many hon. gentlemen on the other side— I am not tied by the ties of party, hut can afford fully, freely, and fairly to do justice te the grdat qualities of the noble viscount at the head of the Ministry, and also to Lord Clarendon, who has evinced in his despatches the deepest sympathy for General Williams. I grant that the words of thane despatches must have been as gleams of sunshine to the gallant soldier in his desolation and trial; but if those letters come to cheer and encourage him, there are others which tend to sadden and depress the gallant defender of Kars, and which, like the gloomy apparitions of the poet, ;' Show his eyes, and grieve his heart, Come like shadows—so depart." (Cheers.) Giving to the Government, however, all the praise to which they can fairly lay claim, I ask the hon. gentleman who can give a fearless opinion whether it is not to such causes as want of energy and foresight on the part of our Government that we are to ascribe the fall of Kars? In almost every letter General Williams tell you of the evils of procrastination—in almost every letter he tells you you must not rely upon the resources of the Pelt° alone, and yet to the last you procrastinate, to the last you con fine him to those resources—not One step do you take, not ono remedy do you provide, not one stratagem do you con coct, until at length you are overwhelmed with the logical consequences of your own improvidence and neglect, and history, drawing her moral from the pages of this blue book, will record with inflexible justice that the fall of Kars in the two years' war was attributable, and attribu table alone, to the procrastination and neglect of the Bri tish Government. (Loud cheers.) Mr. V. SMITH would not attempt to follow the hon. baronet in those flights of fancy by which ho had adorned the discussion ; bat he might lie permitted to thank him for tho honourable contrast which his address presented to the speech of the hon. and learned gentleman who made the original motion. The hon. baronet complained of some thing like a want of courtesy by his noble friend at the head of the Government on the occasion of the adjournment of the debate last Tuesday. He assured the hon. baronet no discourtesy whatever was intended, and least of all would it become any member of the house to evince dis courtesy to him who was as much distinguished by his ur banity as his eloquence. (Hear.) But the hon. baronet would recollect the circumstances of that evening, and the feeling of listlessness and languor that existed. His noble friend had alluded to the circumstance of the withdrawal of the motion in the other house, and he (lir. V. Smith) must say, considering that a great part of the discussion hied re solved itself into an attack upon Lord Clarendon and Lord Panmure, it would have been more generous for them to have pressed it in the House of Lords and abandoned it in the House of Commons. It did appear to him that there Was an obvious intention to evade the division. They trusted for a time to the hope that the amendment of which notice was ,given by his hon. friend the member for Leomi ns t er would be de b ate d , .b u t h e h av i ng de .',nod to b r i ng it forward they were i n a dil emma , irem, which they sought to escape by putting up an hon. m 3 libel. to mov e a resolution with a view to evade the shire h a d m wha d vi'ion, and acco rdin g t ly had been called the previous the hon. member for Reset questlon, but whi c h , if carried, would be the mos t idl e sad mischievous resolution that could be imagined, because it would affirm th , inexpediency of entertaining, the question of the fall of Kars before discussing the articles of peace. No one wore leniented that calamity than he did; but he looked upon it merely as au incident, of the war, and by no means fraught with those political consequences which the hon. and learned gentleman so much dreaded. No doubt sufficient means would be taken to disseminate the news of its fall throughout Asia Minor, and Russian agents would represent it as a great Russian triumph. But with the news of its fill would go forth that of the desperate assault and repulse of Mouravieff on the 9th of S sptember, and it would become known that it was famine alone, and not the arms of the enemy, that induced it to surrender. The same newsman who conveyed the intelligence f its fall to the remotest parts, would spread far and wide the immortal name of General Williams, and the knowledge that he was an Englishman would go fax to maintain our prestige throughout the whole of Asia Minor. He re gretted that the honourable and learned gentleman should have spoken in so contemptuous a tone of the " doctor." No one who had read the blue book could fail to ob serve that Dr. Sandwith had rendered the moat es sential service, and really he thought that after the noble self-devotion shown by that gentleman in re lieving the suffering of the troops, the hon. and learned gentleman would have been ashamed to have spoken so slightingly of the "doctor." But the hon. and learned gentleman had poured the torrent of his indignation upon Lord Stratford ; and, after continuing his attack as long P.B he could with any decency, he turned his attention to Lord Clarendon. Now what was the whole gravamen of the case as against Lord Stratford de .Redclitle —that he did not answer Gen. Williams's despatches. Nothing, he ad mitted, could excuse that, whether resulting from negli gence or any other cause ' • but he put it to the house whe ther, when they looked to the important results which would follow, it worth' justify the Government iu recalling the noble lord. Lord Stratford de Redcliffe was a diplo matist of the most distinguished abilities ; he was em phatically the right man in the right place, and it was ac knowledged upon all hands that he p messed au authority in Turkey which noother man could possess— an authority little short of that of the Salter', and it was absolutely necessary for the interests of the State to maintain him in that position. If he had been recalled it would have been said directly that an entire change had taken place in the views of the British Government, and the con sequence might have been disastrous. He admitted that so fa• as the non-answering of General Williams's dee p atches-was concerned, a case had been made ag-siust Lord Stratford de Reecliffe ; bus he utterly denied that it was such a case as would warrant her Majesty's Government, under the circumstances, to recall the Ambassador. Tue fall of Kars had no influence upen the result of the war. This was proved by the protocols. No doubt every achievement in war added to the power of those who ef fected it. But it was clear that Kars must, be aurrenlered on the restoration of peace • and the restoration of peace had really r es ulted from the taking of Sebastopol. The French had not attached' great impedance to Kars, an I sent not ellen a oonamissioner there. The- discussion of the question was justifiable, but it should not have been made a means of disp!acing the Government. (A. laugh.) There was no fairness in thus fastening on a particular part of the conduct of the wr.r. Lord Maltnesbury had shown that ho had come to this opinion by withdrawing his motion on the subject in another place. He (Hr. V. Smith) knew that the people of England deeply lamented the fall of Kars. (Lund cries of " Hear, hear.") He him self had had lamented it most intensely. Bat the people of England had also cause to rejoice at the fall of Sebas topol, ant they could not be a eta for it ; and they ware unwilling t rake up bygones, and would recoil hem such motions as this, and wore reluctant to encourage party attacks. If in the management of delicate alliances and amidst great difficulties, the Government had com mitted some slight error in reference to Kars, he appealed to the gene osity of the people to be grateful for a war, on the wh de, well conducted, and a peace well concluded. (Ministerial cheers.) No member rose for.some moments, and there were cries of " divide, divide," when Mr. VANSITTART rose, saying that he should not have spoken, but that no other memberappeared disposed t ad dress tee house. He . bse. ved that the defenders (..f the Government, backed by what they fondly thought to be a majority, had actually arrogated for their entire credit an immunity from blame in the conduct of the war. Now, to that view he could not assent ; and the contrary feeling would dictate his vote. The Government were not justi fiable for perilling the British name by sending a " com missioner' to Kars, with the appearance, without the reality, of power, and leaving him to inevitable defeat, backed up neither by meo, money, nor materials. It would have been better to have left the Turkish Govern ment with the sole responsibility of the defence of Kers, and not to have associated it with the British name. Kars might have fallen a mouth or two sooner ; but though the Russians might have gained the same success, England would have escaped seine disgrace. (Hear, hear.) Captain LAFFAN desired, as a military man, to address the house. He dwelt upon the importance of the siege of Sebastopol. What could the Government have withdrawn forces from the Crimea and sent them to Kars, for as object the French considered purely English—the defence of the route to India ? It was impossible to send English troops to Kars; and all that could be done was to advise the Turkish Government as to the use of the forces uuder their control. The plan of Omer Pacha was utterly impractic able. The supposed force for the purpose existed in a great degree only upon paper, and the rest was incongruous and he erogeneous. The two main charges against the con duct of the war as to Kars was the discouragement of this expedition by Georgia, and the recommendation of the route by Trebizond. But in both of these courses the Government ha 1 shown their sense and judgment. Approv ing of the conduct of the Government in a military point of view, ho thought them politically wrong in not having sent money to General Williams; for with money at his command that gallant officer would have saved Kers. (Hear.) But ha could not bring himself to believe that any amount of " foresight and energy" on the part of the G,v.rnment could have saved that fortress. Colonel DITNNE did not think the hon. and gallant member who h el just spoken had been more successful in his defence of the Government than hon. members who had preceded him. (Hear.) The defenders of the Go vernment'contended that Kars was not a place of great military importance; but in his (Colonel Dunne's) opinion Kars was the lever by which a peace, neither acceptable nor grateful to the °country, had been brought about. (Hoar.) He believed that this country had suffered a great diminution of glory by permitti ng th a t f or t ress t o b o taken. (Hear.) With regard to the strategical operations, the Mi nister of War had said that the march by Trebizond was the proper method of proceeding ; but every military man bad expressed an opinion adverse to that view. (Hear.) The road by Trebizond was not practicable for the passage of cannon. It would take 30,000 men three or four months to march to the scene of action by that route. (Hear.) No military man doubted that the proposition of Omer Pacha ought to have been carried out. The march by Erze n,um was not practicable; that by Soukup.' Kaleh was, and the Government was greatly in fault for delaying pre deeding by that route so long. (Hear.) Had the contingent of General 'Vivian been sent to Balaklava, Omer Pacha would have taken his troops to Asia Minor, and Kars would have been sav e d. N ot hi ng h a d prevented O mer Pecha's advance by Kutais but the lateness of the season and this delay was owing to the indecision, the want of foresight, and the incapacity of those entrusted with the arrangement of the operations. It was a most flimsy argu ment to say that the contingent was not sent to Balaklava because it was unfit. In his opinion, the guilt of the fall of Kars rested on the War Department of this country. If the War Department were tried by a jury of military men, he felt assured that its condemnation would be more signal than in the House of Commons, or in the country. He felt no eloubt as to the opinion of the nation being in accord ance with the resolution of his hon. and gallant friend the member for Enniskillen. Without going into the earlier portions of Lord Stratford's conduct, he must be permitted to state his regret that the ambassador had not answered General Williams's letters. (Hear, hear.) In extenu ation of the ambassador, however, it ought to be remember* I that Gen. Williams was not placed under him, but under Lord Raglan; that Gen. Williams occupied the same position as did Col. Rose with Gen. Pelissier. But the Government were responsible for the conduct of their ambassador, and the War Department g uilty of the fall of Kars (Hear.) As yet he h a d h ear d no defence of the con duct of the Government. Ou the contrary every speech uttered had confirmed him as to their guilt. (Hear.) Mr. COWAN stated his intention to support the Go. vernment. Mr. LIDDELL said he had no hesitation in voting for the amendment of the hon. member for Dorsetshire. With regard to tho resolution of the hoe. and learned member ' for Enniskillen, he could have hoped to have seen it dif ferently worded, and less forcible iu its meaning; but while he could not agree in all the censure which that resolution east upon the Government at home, yet if asked whether the f ill of Kars was or was not attributable to the want of fore sight and energy, he must vote in the affiruaative. A pause of some moments ensued, during which no mein her rose to address the house, and calls were raised for a division. At length, Sir J. GRA.HA.3I rose. He said —T know not whether the hon. and learned member for Greenock (Mr. Dunlop) is iu his place, but. I can assure him and the house that it is never my wactice, even were it in my power, to make a speech for display; and it is only a sense of duty and the feeling that I ought not to give a silent vote on ibis im portant question which induces me to rise on the present oc casion. I shall take the hint which was offered by the hon. and learned member for Greenock, and shall endeavour to compress into the narrowest space the observations which it will be my duty to submit to the house; and I am bound to state that, like the hon. gentleman who has just sat down, I have had some doubts with respect to ,the vote which I ought to give upon this occasion • but,-both in public and in, private life, in a case of doubt, I think the rule a safe one to do as ono would be done by ; and having lately been a responsible servant of the Crown during the conduct of the present war, I am bound to remember the difficulties with which her Ma jesty's Government have had to contend. My own expe rience has taught me that it is a very difficult operation to conduct a great war, whether by sea or land, with forces under commanders with a divided authority. Now, what is the experience of the greatest commanders in this respect ? I think it is an observation of the great Napo leon that even one bad general is better than two good ones at the head of the same army. He makes also an other reflection—that an army composed of different na tions will Lot bo long before it commits great mistakes. What, again, was the experience of the Duke of Welling ton in the Peninsular war ? He felt the difficulty of a divided command to so great an extent. that almost imme diately after his landing in the Peninsula he thought it not only requisite to put at the head of the Portuguese army en officer secon d only to himself, but he thougt it also indispensably vecessary that he should be the gene ralissimo of that army, holding, as it were, both the first and the second commands in it. At Talaveia he did not command, a n d a t S a l ama nca he had only an imperf ec t command, and f e lt d eep ly the inconvenience of a divided authority. Th ere i s a rema rkable letter of the Duk e f Wellin g t on ' s wr i tten when Al e xander, Emper o r of R uss i a, proposed t o sen d a corps d' ar ee to the Peni,,sula, t o b e placed p ar ti a ll y under the command of the Duke of Wel lington, which set s f or th the opinion of that great man upon the difficulties attendant upon a divided command. In a despatch of the Duke of Wellington to Lord Bathurst he says : "I must not say h ow mu ch I am flattered by the dispo sition of the Emperor of Russia to place bis troops under myccommand.lf the E m peror should carry this int e n• tioninto execution, I beg leaye to recommend not only that the Emperor should place them under my command, but that he should accept of my services (with the permis sion of his Royal Highness the Prince Regent) as a general officer in his service of rank senior to the general officer who should he sent in command of his Imperial Majesty's troops, and that, although the discipline and interior eco nomy of his Imperial Majesty's troops should be carried on under the direction of the general otUoar who would come to the Peninsula with them, all reports, &c., regarding them and their operations should pass through my hands. I mention this now, because, having for some years com manded an allied army composed of very discordant mute ;leis, and having had the good fortune to preserve the utmost harmony among them, I am anxious that, in case his Majesty the Emperor should be disposed to carry his intention in t • execution, his views should not be frustrated by want of attention to the occurrence of one of those ro cidents which experience has shown are too likely to occur in the employment of allied troops in the seine scene of action." I have now, Sir, shown the house what was the opinion ex pressed by two of the greatest commanders of modern times with regard to th e diffi cu lti es of commanding combined armies. It is title that in our history we have bright ex amples of achievements by combined armies. Pe-mollies and Blenheim at once occur to our recollection, but still the diffi culties of a command over a combined army are great in the extreme. I, sir, have had the advantage of being from early youth a friend of the late Lord Raglan, and I say that in valour, courtesy, firmness, and honour he was a bright example of an English general. (Hear.) He had, upon the ground to which I h ave re f erre d , great d i ff i cult i es to contnd against, but by his courtesy he won the esteem of two Marshals of France—(hear)—in a combined operation. His valour was proved when he led—a circumstance new in our annals—British troops side by side with French to the storming of a strong po s iti on , d e f en d e d b y b rave sol diers, worthy of the adversaries against whom they had to contend. (Hear.) He had, I say, great difficulties to con ' tend with, but thanks to his courtesy, the alliance roma' ned unbroken. Although his conduct during some part of his command has been made the subject of adverse copiment, I think that, taken all in all, we shall not for some time look upon his like again. (Hear.) As regards General Williams, who is more immediately connected with the subject of this debate, he has displayed qualities of the highest character, and has proved that for the future the brightest hopes may be entertained of him. (Hear, hear.) If Kars could have been saved by Gen. Williams I believe it would not have fallen, but, while I say thus much, I must also bear my testimony to the manner in which Lord Clarendon supported the authority of Gen. Williams. I will state to the house a circumstance which has not yet been mentioned, and which I think will show that the merits of Gen. Williams, great as I believe ,them to be, were not unobserved by the Earl of Aberdeen. IA the year 1843 it was the duty of the Secretary for Foreign Affairs to select an officer for the important post of a commissioner to arrange the frontier between Turkey and Persia, and Lord Aberdeen, after fell inquiry, appointed Gen. Williams to that office—(hear, hear)—and I must say that the conduct of that gallant officer on that occasion gave the greatest se tisfaction to the Turkish end English Governments. When it became necessary to appoint a commissioner to the Turk ish army in Awe. Lord Aberdeen, remembering the s-srviees of Gen. Williams, recommended Lord Clerend4n to a point that gallant officer to the post, and L. d Clarendon, with the concurrence of the Cabinet. maee that isopoietrnen t (bear.) It was not my intention to have riser so early this evening, and I deeply regret that I ern obliged to speak in the absence of an hon. gentleman, because I ,hould have liked him to hear the answer I am about to make to some of his observations—l mean the hon. member for Aylesbury. I Now, sir, I must say that it is extremely easy to kick adi ad anim ii--(iaughter) —and, as the hon. gentle oven has been engaged, and I hope p ro fit a bl y engage d , in researni. s eon neeted with peop:e long since dead, I can quite imagine that he would prefer kicking a defunct administration to coming in collision with a Ministry in ease. (Hear.) I say, sir, that the comments of the hon. gentleman on the Govern ment of Lord Aberdeen are most unjust. The hon. gentle man says that the Administration of Lord Aberdeen en tirely overlooked the importance of the Asiatic frontier of Turkey, and the danger to Turkey of the advances of Russia in that direction. Now, sir, I will not trouble the house with more extracts than I can help, but I must remind the house that the despatches to which I shall refer were written by the Duke of Newcastle as the organ of the Government, and I think that the statement of the hon. gentleman that the Government of Lord Aberdeen was indifferent to the state of the Turkish army in Asia will fall to the ground. I will not refute that position by many extracts, but will confine myself to three. I would bee the house to rememb er th e d a t es . Th e D u k e o f N ewcastl e lett the Admiuistration with Lord Aberdeen towards the end of January. In the preceding October Lord Claren don wrote to Lord Stratford de Redclifre—au 1 it is con sistent with my own knowledge that the despatch was written in concert with the Duke of Newcastle—in the blowing terms : - " Her Majesty's Government have a direct interest in the effective state of this army (that is, the army of Kars and ou the Asiatic froutier), as it is likely that military operations upon a large scale will be carried on in Asia next year ; and they must therefore again insist upon the necessary measures being taken without delay." On the part, therefore, of Lerd Aberdeen's Cabinet, I must say that there was the earliest indication of foresight with reference to the probable course of military events in the trly part of 1855, The date of the despatch is important —it is the 21st of October. It is immediately consequeut upon the hope entertained confidently by Lord Raglan and Alareh .1 Canrobert that the bombardment of Sebastopol, which was to take place on the 17th of October, would bi successful, and it clearly shows that the policy of Lord Aberdeen's Government was that, if happily that bom bardment should be successful, part of the allied forces would be directed on Asia. Here is the matter most in dispute between the hon. gentleman and myself. Un doubtedly her Majesty's Government—l believe the pre sent as well as Lord Aberdeen's—did attach primary importance to the Crimean operations, and regarded as secondary, although most important, the military move ments and events on the Asiatic frontier. The hon. gen tleman takes an opposite view. He thinks, I believe, that the operations in the Crimea were secondary to the move ments on the Asiatic side, and therein differs on a point of strategy from the conclusions at which the Government ar rived after giving the matter their most careful considera tion, and consulting with those best qualified to advise them. But new I would ask attention, as a proof that the Duke of Newcastle and Lord Aberdeen's Government never departed from the view which they took with reference to the importance of the Asiatic frontier to a despatch which, I think, was partially read by the hon. and learned member for Enniskillen. It is from Cul. Mundy to Lord Wodehouse, and is dated 6th November : " The Duke of Newcastle is of opinion that it will be found almost an impossibility for the English and French forces to co operate with an army in the state in which the Turkish array in Asia is represented to be, unless a complete change of system be effected. His grace further directs me more especially to re quest that your lordship will call Lord Clarendon's attention to the statements of Col. Williams with retard to the arrturg of pay due to the Turkish soldiers, and the evil results arising therefrom, not only causing distress .and privation iu the army, but encouraging desertion from its ranks; the want of clothing among the troops of all arms, and the absence of medicine for the sick and want of properly qualified surgeons." That does nor point so directly to an intention of sending further military assistance with a view to more active opera tions in the spring of 1855. I think Lord Aberdeen's Go vernment left office in the end of January, and there is a despatch from Lord Clarendon to Lord Stratford da Red c.iffe, dated Jan. 11, which also is a despatch that I know was written in immediate concert with the Duke of New castle. Lord Clarendon says : " But this is all that has been done for the relief of the army, not withstauding the repeated and urgent remonstrances of her Majesty's Government, which are of a date long ante rior to the departure of Gen. Williams from this country. The Porte was well aware of the anxiety felt by her Majesty's Go vernment on this subject, and of the importance they attached to the army at Kars being in a fit state to take the field next spring." Here is an indication of the policy of the Government _and the measures of precaution they thought it expedient to take, officially communicated as early as January to Lord Stratford de Radcliffe. (Hear.) Now, sir, I think I shall riglitly divide the subjects of blame imputed to the Govern meat into two—first, that there being reason not to be altogether satisfied with the conduct of Lord Stratford de Radcliffe, they failed to recall him ; and, secondly, thee trey omitted to send aid to Kars in the summer of 185.5 These appear to me she leading topics of attack, and, with the permission of the house, 1 will direct Mr attention to then consecutively. And, first, with regard to the con duct of Lord Stra.‘ford de Radcliffe. I agree with the At torney-General that it is impossible altogether to vindicate in the earlier stage of these proceedings, particularly to wards the end of 1851 and the comweucement oc 1653, the neglect to answer the letters of Geu. Williams—(cheers) and to give him th e f u ll aut h ority which was necessary to sustain him; and I think that there can bo no doubt that there was a mi sun d ers t and i ug between Gen. Williams and Lord Stratf or d de Reicliffe, whi c h was no t con d uc i ve to the gocd of th e p u bli c servica. (Cheers.) But, having said ver that much, I thi n k t h ere are circumstances with reference to the pa s t lif e an d conduct of Lord Sratford which would have uns m e a n d t e to it ! e a fatal error iemrroirroomn Constantinople. t ti o n f o h p e le r . ( Majesty's aear.l G t is said that he neglected to -answer as many as 61 letters; but it appears that on one morning 17 despatches arrived to gether, e luiring probably only one answer. I will not, however, deal with the question in that manner. I have admitted that 1 think there were parts of the conduct of Lord Stratford tie Radcliffe fairly repreheushle ; but, ou the other hand, I agree with the honourable and gal officer who spoke on the opposite side that there, perhaps, were d e f ects i n t h e or i g i na l arrangement. G en . Williams was sent as military cemmissioner, placed more mune iiately under the orders and direction of Lord Rag lau, and not s o i mme di ate l y un d er t h e contro l o f eh British ambava for, (He a r, hear.) P r ob a bly, too, his powers and functions were net strictly defined ; and under these circumstances, although it is certainly to :10 regretted, it was not very unnatural that in the first in stance, some misunderstaudi rig should have Alison between Lord Stratford and General Williams. But agaiuib that I beg the house to set the services rendered by Lird Strat ford de Radcliffe to the couutry: Recollect how he stood as a sentiuel, almost a l on e, opposing a constant front to the spi r it of Rusiiau aggression in that quarter, and to what wa s no less deluge' ous than Russian aggression — the corruptive influence of Russia iu a capital where her seduc tions have not always been thrown away. Let me also re mind the house of the influence acquired by Lord Stratford, over the Turkish Government. He himself tells us of the corruption which prevails in every department of that q.- Vernthent, and let us not forget how his honesty and in tegrity have stood proof against the baneful influence, and to what noble purposes he has directed the ieflaence gained by honour and uprightness. The papers which have just been presented to Parliameut show how successfully he has exerted himself in favour of the Christian subjects of the Sultan. I attribute mainly to the influence of Lord Stratford, constantly and nobly exerted, that hatti - sheriff which gives such important privileges to the Christian P-Pulation in Turkey. He assures us that no subject of the T ur k w il l be molested ou account of his reagious opinions, or punished on account of the abancionment of any faith whi c h h e s h a l t renounce. Th at es t a uli s h es religi ous liberty in Turkey ; and that hattiesheriff, so important, is referred to by name in the treaty which has been laid on our tabl e ; it i s th e con di t i on on wh i c h T ur k ey i s a d mit t e d within the pale of civilised Europe; it will give to the Eu ropean Powers, if it be not observed, either collectively or individually, a r i g ht o f remonstrance; an d I d o no t think, all circumstances considered, a better or more sa lutary arrangement could have been made. More than that I believe there was error in the conduct of Lord Stratford de Radcliffe in the earlier part of the transac - I tions with General Williams, but will the house recollect • in justi ce t o L or d Stratford, what were the e :for ts he m a d e a ft er the commencement of 1855? I beli eve he was earneA fur General unremitting in his exertions to obtaie or General Williams every possible assistance from the Divan. Well, si r , un d er a ll these circumstances , co nsidering his ability, the length of his services, his conduct, his cha racter,. I am disposed to say that the Horatian with regard to poetry is equally applicable to political services— " Verum übi plura intent in carmine, non ezo paucis "Offender maculis, quas aut incuria fudit, " Aut humane parum cavit nature." This accusation, I grant, more particularly applies to Lord Aberdeen's Government, because the offence was committed in the beginning of the year 1855 or at the close of the year 1851. But if it be an error that Lord Stratford was not recalled, had I remained a member of the Admi nistration I should have partaken of the councils of my o 'heaves, and I should have resisted to the utmost the ez.dl of Lord Stratford. I come now to the second point, I which is the omission of sending aid to Kara in the sum. mer of 1855. It is impossible to overlook the earnest de sire of the Turkish Government to send assistance to the army - beleaguered at Kars, and more particul irly I must advert to the recommendation and' conduct of Omer Pacha. I think gentlemen who have read the minute of Omer Pacha must be of opinion that his abilities in council hardly fall short of his distinguished merits in the field. Butt, sir, I have already s t a ted th a t b o th the English and French Governments, though th e y attached inenite im portance to the defence of Kars, as I think rightly, re garded that operation as altogether secondary to the capture of Sebastopol. That was the primary object, and it would have been folly and weakness to disregard the primary object in the hope of promoting or even carrying a second. Will the house bear in mind the precise time when Omer Pacha made his recommendation ? It was after the 18th of June—a day ever memorable in the annals of this country, and not tarnished, as I contend, by the adverse circumstances of the 18th of June, 1855. Still that day in that year is remarkable for the failure of a great military effort on the part both of the French and English armies, and it cannot be matter of surprise that after such an event the generals and admirals responsible for the safety of the united army should have hesitated in weakening the forces immediately present at that great military operation, the siege of Sebastopol. I de not think it has been read, but it appears to me very important that the letter of General Simpson with refer ence to the refusal of the wishes, stated to them by Omer Pasha, to withdraw a portion of the forces then under their combined command, should be brought to the recollection of the house. This letter is dated the 16th July, about a month after the assault on the Redan, and a considerable time before'the brilliant success which carried the Kaiak hoff and ended in the taking of Sebastopol. I will not trouble the house by reading the whole, but allow me to read a portion of this letter:— "At a conference which was assembled at the French headquarters on Saturday the 14th, at the request of Omer Pasha, and at which he, General Pelissier, General La Mar mora, Vice-Admiral Sir E. Lyons, Vice- dmiral Bruat, Rear- Admiral Stewart, and myself were present, his Highness sot .forth his reasons and views on the subject in question ; he also produced a very large sheet of paper, whien contained, as he affirmed, the instructions of his Government; but, on being asked for a translation of which, he said that it would take a fortnight to wake one. The arguments used by Omer Pasha were those set forth in the correspondence, and failed to produce any effect ou the minds of the other members of the Conference, who all, without exception, entertain the strongest objection to the withdrawal of any troops from the Crimea at this moment." We have, therefore, the united opinion of all the admirals and all the generals that not only f rom B a l kl ava , b u t from Kadikui, Kertch, and Eupatoria, under the circum stances a hich then existed, it was not expedient to with draw a singlemau. Omer Pasha, being dissatisfied with the decision, went to Constantinople to obtain a reversal of it, and General Simpson writes to Lord Stratford— " I earnestly, therefore, beg your Excellency to use your powerful influence with the Porte to cause our opinion to prevail over that of his Highness; for great public interests are at stake, and serious consequences might result from his success." Surely, sir, in the face of that appeal we may well under stand how very unwilling the Governments at Paris and at London must have been to reverse a decision, taken on the spot by the must competent authorities, by orders di rectly opposed to what on the spot was thought necessary, not only for the honour and success, but absolutely for the safety, of the forces there employed. (Cheers.) It must not be concealed from the h .use, and it has not been con cealed, as I think rightly, by the responsible Ministers of the Crown, that there was a great inslisposition on the part of the French Government to favour any operations else where until success at Sebastopol had been obtained. It may be a matter of question whether that disinclination was not carried to excess ; still, in operations of such deli cacy and difficulty, it will be a bold measure if the House of Commons, after such a result, pass comlemnation on the Government, upon the exercise of discretion in very nice, trying, and difficult circumstances. (Cheers.) Again, let us see what the great master of the art of war in our time, the Duke of Wellington, says. General Cooke held a com mand at Cadiz; the Duke was commanding on the banks of the Douro, and in one of his instructions he said, " It is inexpedient to give peremptory orders from a distance. I would not do it. I would not gladly, if they were given to we, submit to them." Ido not stand here to say that mistakes have not been committed. Ido not believe that gentlemen on the Treasury bench, considering the large extent covered by these transactions, will be prepared to say that no errors have been committed. It is iuipo-sible that in such immense transactions some oversights should nut occur. I say frankly, I think there was too much of telegraphic communications and telegraphic orders. .(Cheers.) I agree with the hon. and learned member for abiskillen in disapproving that particular telegraphic despatch, which give peremptory orders to abandon Kars and Erzerouin and fall back upon Trebizoud ; and if recommendations were to be conveyed by telegraph at all I should not have recommended any other recouneues don to Gen. Simpson than to remember Kars. Teat was not the instruction, but, perhaps, the end would have been much happier had it been so. Still, lam bound to say that, whatever those instructions may have been, it was quite open to the Government to yield to the strong re presentations made by the commanders of the allied forces, and not allow any deeachmout,e to be sear, I cannot fail, however, to express my sympathy with Gen. Williams and my admiration of his conduct. it is heartrending to reed some of these despatches. (Hear.) He says that he thought his army was left doomed to destruction, that he was absolutely forgotten, that his position was isolated and neglected ; and yet, while he felt the neglect, his manly and noble spirit, nothing daunted, persevered iu spite of every disappointment. Hope even was dead within him, yet did not that spirit so entirely fail that he was unwill lug to meet the enemy to whom he was oppme l with only three of his countrymen by his side, and lead a Turkish army, under circumstances of unexampled diffi, lily to almost unexampled victory. (Hear, and Cheers.) There may be many things to regret in toe war now happily close], but do not let us under such cir cumslivic ,s cease to be proud of the noble conduct of a handful of our countrymen on two occasions of almost equal danger and difficulty. I look in vain to the annals of modern warfare for a parallel to the defence of Silis tria or Kara—both iu the wain (owing to the courage, the skill, the constancy, and the example of British officers) leading to that triumphant success which, when we eeme to confer with him who was our enemy, and is now, I hope, our friend—long may he continue to be so—l mean the Russian—will tell us that the defence of Silistria and Kars rendered the English name, with which they were associated, illustrious and ever memorable in the recollection of his countrymen. (Cheers.) I said it was heartrending to think what Gen. Williams must have endured. Here is a truing instance. It is said the honour of the seeland class of the Bath is conferred upon him. He receives it with a faint smile, his spirits are sunk, and that noble hea tis almost broken. (Cheers.) I may be wrong in expressing my opinion, but I do not think, as yet, the gratitude of this country to that distinguished man has.been sufficiently marked. The second class of the Beth is a proud distinction, but I cannot think his services are rightly measured by that distinction. The thanks of Parliament, considering the failure, cannot, according to precedent, be given, but if my noble friend will advise her Majesty, the fountain of all grace and favour to the mili tary profession, to confer some solid mark, in which we may partake, in reward of the services of Gen. Williams, I do not believe there is a man in this house who will not hail it with satisfaction. (Loud cheers.) Now, sir, I shall be asked, am I then prepared to say that no errors were committed? I have already shown that some errors were committed ; it will now be my duty to point out others. I have read a despatch of the Duke of Newcastle, in which it is suggested that medical aid might be afforded to the army at Kars and that pecuniary assistance might be given. And this brines me to the question of p ecuniar y assistan ce , And here I confess I think that some blame is due to the. Government. (Opposition cheers.) It will be, perhaps, contended, that I and some of my colleagues in Lord Aber deen's Government who left office were opposed to the Turkish loan. Sir, this is not the occasion to argue that question over again. But before I left Lord Aberdeen's Government, and ever since, I have been opposed to th e system of loans. I remember that iniunctioe, wh ic h i s valuable to nations as to individuals :- 4, Neither a lender nor a borrower be, For loan oft loses both itself and friend." (Loud cheers.) I was opposed to the joint and several liability for the Turkish loan. I objected to the mortgage of Egypt. I retain that objection. I think that the sub ject of the loan may give rise to grave discussions between France and England. (Hear.) But I never was opposed, and I do not thinkthat any rational man would be opposed to giving pecuniary assistance. (Cileurs.) I differ irem the member for Aylesbury on some points, but I agree with him in ono point, and I do thick that a credit might have been given to General Williams, either upon our Ambas sador at Constantinople or upon the Treasury in England for a moderate amount, and that for a sum of 10a,0J0/. the army at Kars might have been supplied with all the provisions necessary. (Cheers.) lam also of opinion with the hon and learned gentleman (Mr. Whiteside) that if a few hundred cavalry ha been sent to Kars, they would, as General Williams says in describing his brilliant vie• tory, hava enabled him to destroy the Russian army. Again, I think that although General Williams had guns in sufficient quantity, yet that when he asked for a few hunched artillerymen and cavalry they might have been sent to him. I cannot but believe that in the early part of the summer of 1855, without detaching any troops from the Crimea, there might have been sent from Coustanti nnple to Erzerourn sense assistance of this kiad which would have borne most essential results. Here is another point upon which I have a strong opinion. Ii It were iti exuedient to weaken the force on the plateau in front of Sebastopol, still there were no insuperable objections to meeting the wishes of Omer Pasha and allowing him to withdraw from that po itiou the Turkish ♦eterans he was accustomed to command, and supplying their place by the Turkish Contingent. (Hear, hear.) It may be said that the troops were not sufficiently disciplined, but the house will pardon me if I again refer to the highest authority— the Duke of Wellingtm. He had experience in these matters, Then in Portugal he had to use similar tr mps constantly, when they were very imperfectly disciplined, and he has put upon record in his own pithy ma nner a dictum which the house w'll allow me to read. It refers to the effect of long training and discipliuo upon such troops compared with their being well paid, well fed, and well cared for, and it shows that these attentions go far in making troops efficient in the field. The Duke is writ ing of Spanish troops when under British officers. His letter is dated : " Lisaca, July 25 1813. a Th e Sp a nish troops do n o t want discipline, if 2 by disci pline is meant instruetion, so much as they do a system of order, which can only be founded on regular , pay and food and good care and clothing." Now, the Turkish Contingent had these advantages for some time, and My own judgment would be that, at that time, when the question of withdrawing the Turkish troops from Balaklava was mooted, their place might have been advantageously an d sufficiently supplied by the Turkish Contingent so officered. (Hear.) The Dukegoes on to say:— " These British officers could not giVe them, and, notwith standing that the Portuguese are now the fighting cocks of the army, I believe we owe their merits more to the care we have taken of their pockets and bellies than to the instruc tion we have given them." Showing that the opinion of the Duke of Wellington was that instruction and long training with reference to the efficiency of foreign armies are to a considerable ezLeiit supplied by British pay, feeding, and care. The Turkish Contingent having had these advantages might, I think, have been sent up to Balaklava so as to have liberated the troops of Omer Pasha. And, sir, there is no use in not very frankly stating my full opinion to the house, since they are so indulgent as to listen to me. (Hear.) I h ave another objection which is of a somewhat deli ca t e charac ter. l am h oun d to say that, with every desire to main tain the French alliance in its full integrity and to run no risk of a misunderAtanding with that country, and feeling bound to admit thdt the Emperor of that great nation hay acted with constant fidelity—(cheers)--and with a degre, of good faith and firmness that entitles him to the grad.. tude of this country, yet I cannot but think that too much was conced , d to the prejadices which. I mukt say, were not well founded on the part of our French allies. After Sebas topol had fallen and after Kars had fallen there was the Turkish Government displaying an earnest, natural, MD a anxious desire to withdraw a portion 'of their army from the Crimea, and to occupy Trebizond without - delay after the fall of Kars, in order to prevent the dander of the fur ther advance of the Russian army. As late as the 14th of December, Lord Stratford writes to the Earl of Clarendon to say : I learn from M. de Thouvenel that permission has at length arrived from Paris for Marshal Pelissier to assent to the departure of the Egyptian infantry at Enpatoria for Trebizoncl. lam informed, however, that the ,Turkish commander had declared his determination to embark the troops without waiting for any further communication." This bears incidentally upon a part of the case of the Go vernment. They have been blamed for adhering t o the view taken by General Williams himself, and preferring the auxiliary troops from Turkey to the division of Omer Pacha. The local knowledge of the hon. member for Aylesbairy has made this perfectly intelligible, and he has shown that in the ear ly p ar t o f t h e summer the road from Trebizond to Batoum was more direct in a military ria t of view, and more suitable except for artillery. But after Sebastopol had fallen, the question was whether a portion , of the army ought not to evacuate the Crimea and go to Trebizond. Hear what Sir W. Codrington, our Com mander-in-Chia 1, says with reference to this subject Writing on the 10th December, he says " I wrote to Marshal Pelissier in the general Use of your letter, expressing to him the great object it seemed to be to get the Turkish troops to Trebizond, and that , if done at all, it should be done at once, and offering nil assistance, if I could, by communications with our nail: farther this object. His answer was, that be could not consent to their leaving Enpatorie without the express sanction of the E m p eror o f th e F i er oh." , (Hear, hear.) Th a t i s t o say, t h at the opinion forme d by the general comm an di ng -i n - c hi e f , b acked by th e e arnest desire of the Tu r ki s h G overnment, was dependent oa the will of the Emp eror a t P ar i s, communicated ' by tell" grapte This is delierategrounci- (cheers)—but I speak with every desire to show th e u t mos t d eference to the Empero r of the French. Lord St ra tf or d wro t e to say —" The T ur k s a re sadly mortified by the embargo which appetite to have been laid on the Egyptian troops at Eupatoria." That feeling of soreness and disappointment was both natural and well-founded. (Cheers.) But I may be asked -- " Why, if you find these faults, do you not vote for the motion of the hon. and learned member for Enniskillene (Opposition cheer s .) Th a t, i s a f a i r question, an d I will proceed to answer it. I will first take the amendment of my hon. friend the member for Dorsetshire (me. K. Sey mer). If the, previous question had been moved at an early stage of the discussion, I do not know whether, with ' the view I take, I should not have voted for it. But since the discussion has been opened, I cannot regard the amendment of my hon. friend exactly in the light of * motion for the previous question ; although it is a reason able amendme n t, as ki ng, no t that no verdict shall be pro nounced, but that there shall be delay in pronouncing s verdict ; and he asks for delay upon the assumption that we are ignorant of the terms of peace, and that we aught to be made acquainted with th em , an d t o considerthem before we pronounce our verdict. With respect to the original motion, I cannot regard the question which it raises as an abstract question ; even if I did so regard it , r ' could not bring myself—it may be from prejudice, it M a y be from kindly feelings towards old friends—to say, as an abstract proposition, that I think Lord Clarendon deficient • in foresight or Lord Palmerston deficient in energy ; (Cheers.) But this i s no t an a b s t ract quest i on ;it must '- regarded with reference both to circumstances and to time. Now, with regard to circumstances, there was great truth and justice in the opinion pronounced by an impartial • and intelligent spectator, General Manstiel 1, that the cause of the f a ll o f K ars i s qu i te o b v i ous. He says that it was necessary, until Sebastopol had been taken, to keep concentrating in front of Sebastopol every English, eveq French, every S ar di n i an, every Turkish so l d i er thst could be obtained ; that the campaigns in the Crimea • and on the Asiatic frontier, including Kars, must be Fe'' garded as a whole; that the centre and key of the en tire operation was Sebastopol, to which Kars, however iMPe r : tent, was but secondary ; and that the result was not s: L all surprising we succeeded at the point where our unites energies are concentrated, and we failed at the extremi t ii to which we cou ld no t di rect any assitance. Genera Mansfield adds th a t h e h a d pre di cted the result ; b u t, tha t the gallant feat o f arms b y w hi c h Kars was enabled to ' hold out prevented the advance of the Russian army on e , yard farther th an K ars, an d t h at if Sebo s topol he'd not fallen we should, thi s spr i ng, i n consequence o f the de fence of K a r s , h ave opene d t h e campa i g n in Aeia with the ' brightest prospects. Then, in considering this rnetioh! time is not to be disregarded. Ido not wish to autieir s° the discussion u p on th e ar ti c l es o f peace, b ut I cann ot for get that peace is ratified, that it was proclaimed yester c n that we are cognisant of its terms and, looking at the,!l. terms, I must say that, in my humble judgment, all the ( . 1 ? jects, the principal objects of the war, have been fully achieved, an 1 that the peace is honourable to the c ountry (Cheers.) Without wasting the time of the house by en tering at any length into this subject, I must give them in a short summ ar y o f th e t erms we have obtained. 14e Principalities--the occup a ti on o f w hi c h b y R uss i a was - pretext, the cause of the war—are rescued from the grail! of Russia, and to them is added the half of Bessarabia; the fort of Ismnil, long occupied by Russia, is restored r the Principalities ; the free navigation of' the Danube 1: guaranteed ley Europe ; th e commerce o f th e Euxine opened to the world ; the Russian fleet in the Euxine rs annihilated, no military arsenals on the coast of the Eux• ine, no military f or t ress on it s E as t ern s h ore w hich hs!e been destroyed, are t o b e re b u ilt , th e s t an di ng menace to Sweden, Borna.rsund and the Aland Islee, is not again to be fortified ; the standing menace to Turkey, Sebastopol, is in ruins ; Kars is restored to the Turks without an equivalent, the progreas of Russian aggrandisement is ar rested, the independence and integrity of Turkey ar e sesured under the guarantee and panoply of Europe. (Cheers.) These are the leading conditions of peace- I have, without partiality, censured wherever I thought censure was due ; but I think it would be un generous to the Administration which has conducted the war to a conclusion, upon such a day as this, under circum stances such as I have feebly described, to declare that it is altogether unworthy of the confidence of the ciiuntry sad' has failed in fore s i g ht an d energy. • For these reasons I shall neither vote fur the amendment nor fur the motion. Mr. DISRAELI said—The right hon. gentleman the member for Carlisle has thi s n i g ht t empere d j us ti c e with mercy. (Laughter.) He has spoken against the Weil tors, and he intend s t o vo t e f or th em. (Laughter.) The right kon. gentleman seems to have put with considerable force and Parliamentary experience the main points that tell against the Ministers; but, remembering that the/ ware once h;s colleagues and stil his friends he says th at he will resist the irresistible inference that on this ocessi °l/ ,, they are to blame. Th e y are , i n t h e opinion of the r ight hon. gentleman, sinners to be condemned, but that, We stractelly considorel, th ey are i nnocent. (Laughter.) We have just terminated a great war, and just concluded a ll important peace, and during that space of time an ev ell has occurred - which, in the view of many persons, has a' ercised an influence on public affairs, and has been ,at- tended with circumstances which enlist the deepest 1 1 131- pathy of the people of this country. There has been s Pr e• valent belief that men distinguished by all those qualities and virtues which Englishmen are prone to ' .clueire hay' V been deserted by the Governor int ; and now, after a for bearance not morethan due to the state of thei country en d to the embarrassing duties of the Administration—after s forbearance which reflects credit on this housie we arq told because the attention of Parliament is called to those cir• cumstances, and because we presuthe in the House of Cora• mons to discuss this question of national and universal in' terest, which for a long period has touched the hearts of the whole country, that we are taking a p Art which Po tion only could have inspired, and the most sal' fish anal sordid sentiments only could. have prompt' d. (He ar , h ear. ) B e f ore th e main 'business of the night commenced an hon. member rises a member for Scotch burgh, the member for greenock,.. and he says that this debate is only continued for the sake •of a few speeches, and that, it is entirely a factious move ment. Is that the opinion of the people of England ? Is ithere a man in this country who does not feel that the sie.g e and f a ll o f Kara ought, and d eserves to be, the subject or Parliamentary dis• cession. (Cheers.) It is not only that tine Scotch member who presumes to give this opinion on :the conduct of the House of Commons. The house still eels oes with the plain tive oration of the member for Ayr ; and what is the eau" why ho addressed such langu age as he did to gentlemen on this (the Opposition) side of the house f What is WS griev ance ? reason against the continuani cc of 'this debate /0, that he will thereby be prevented from introducing a bill. And what is the history of that bill ? Some fortnight ago another golden opportunity was lost by i~ hat hon. and learned gentleman. He came down to the hol Ise to expound his legislative opinions, but unfortunately' there was no house. (Hear, and a laugh.) Really I do not t tti nk that there is any great grievance on the part of the hon. '7lnember. He has had his chance,'and a member having a bill. to introduce and not making a house is not a member who 'ought to complain of an adjournment of the debate. But tb ereis a third me mber fir Scotland, who represents the eapit a:t of that great court' try, the successor, and, I believe, the s - t tccessful rival, of one of the greatest ornaments of British lite rature, and formerly one of the greatest ornaments of this h o use—l mean the hon. member for Edinbu gh. He declares :all this discussion to be vain and worthless, and says it is .only an assault on the Treasury bench. Does he mean to say that there is in the city of Edinburgh, which, by some strange anomaly, he represents—(a laugh) —such a total want of sympathy with all that has happened at Kars— with those strange and romantic in cidents which will bo remembered when the war is forgo•i:ten, and when this .eaty of peace is a dusty document- --does he mean to say that there is in that city such an ex ti •aordinary absence of sympathy with the gallant William s, and all those heroic achievements which form the subjeet c If discussion this night? (Hear, hear.) Does he represent faith ft the feelings of his constituents when he says that any di le ussion on this subject is vain, futile, and selfish ? I have a -3 nigher opinion of the educated, intelligent, and accomplishes i inhabitants of modern Athens. (Hear, and laughter.) I ch not believe that the hon. me ober on this point faithfully t presents his constitu ents, for I am sure the subject of our discussion must excite among them the deepest interest. (Et 3ar.) But unf ,rtn nately, it is not only of such small deer' as these vituperative members of the sister kingdom , (a lau g that we have to complain to-night. A Cabinet Ministc , whose speech, lam bound to say (as he spoke of contrast),. was most favourably contrasted with the speech of another m ember of the Cabinet in this debate, because he did justice to the subject before us, and because he least admitted its im port:thee, described this motion as an attempt to upset the ML tistry. I think ho should not have touched on that point. I think it becomes the House of Commons to have some more clear idea. , of th e position of an Opposition in this country,. and of the ( tuties it has to fulfill, than appears to be prevalent among son 03 hon. gentlemen, and even among right hon. gentlemen o n the Ministerial bench. I confess it appears to me that tl to duty of an Opposition i s t o v indicate its principle s , w h e at they deenait necessary and convenient, and to assert them N ritbout the slightest reference to what may be the conse quen ea of a division rthink, in the second place, that it is tit( para" mount and peremptory duty of an Opposition to offer . cri ticisms on public affairs, when they think that the cond sic tof the Ministry demands observation, without the slightest : ference to the consequences of a division. If the duty of s Opposition is only to be tested by the success which upsets a Ministry, it is very easy to see that the sphere of oppositio 1 knew it of the c jurions palliate only ku permit we both duct—( aisted, to allot Majesty howeve guilty s went. Inerstor 'Which ( with th of Lord the sub lotion. Sir J, Mr, not refe a much happen the Pi says Iv ‘. upsei present not the anent Iv the nol plain n *lir pri press il bitia a Eef is not has n,