The Sun. — London, England, 1831-02-23 00:00:00

IMPERIAL PARLIAMENT. ROUSE OF. LORDS, FEBlniar 22. Lord KING presented several petitions from places in Somersetshire against tithes ;, from the Rotunda, at Blackfriars-bridge, and from different parts in Ireland, to the same effect. The Duke of GLOUCESTER presented a petition from the corporation of Gloucester, praying for Parlia mentary Reform. The Duke of WELLINGTON presented a petition from Edinburgh, praying for the institution of some et, quiry into the condition of slaves. Lord FARNHAM presented petitions from parishes in Wexford, praying for a repeal of the Union ; also one from St. Lloyd's Guild praying for triennial Parliament. , to he held in Dublin. The Earl of DARNLEY presented a petition from Hyde praying for a repeal of the duty on sea-borne coal. The Noble Earl trusted his Majesty's Minister, would persevere in their intention of removing this tax. Tie Marquis of LONDONDERRY presented a petition from a place in Ireland, paying for an attestation in th, elective franchise, and for Parliamentary Reform. Th. Noble Marquis trusted his Majesty's Ministers would pause in the measures now about to be brought forward with reference to Reform, as he could not help thinking that they would not bu attended with those good effects which were anticipated. He also wished to know whether he was to understand, from the statement of the Nob'e Lord on the Woolsack, some time since, that the measure which was to be brought forward was one which had received his Majesty's sanction. He wished to know this, in consequence of its being to be brought forward by a Noble Lord not of the Cabinet. The LORD CHANCELLOR certainly was not pre pared to discuss Parliamentary Reform just now, but Reform in Chancery. With respect, however, to the for mer, he must say that it was a plan in which not only his Majesty, but all his Majesty's Ministers, fully con curred, and he trusted it would be found to be one that would not only inert with the concurrence of Parliament, hot of the whole country. The Marqui4 of LONDONDERRY felt grateful to the IS.,ble Lord fur Lie explanation. ABUSES IN CHANCERY. Lord WYNFORD presented a petition from an indi- Vdual of the namer of Joseph Harrington, praying for a Reform in the abuses of the Court of Chancery. Among other statements in the petition, it was alleged that the attorney's bill for the conduct of the proceedings in a Chancery suit in which the petitioner was engaged, was 7,0001. REFORM IN THE COURT OF CHANCERY. The LORD CHANCELLOR then left the Woolsack, and addressed their Lordships to the following effect : In rising, my Lords, to address your Lordships on a sub ject of the highest importance, I cannot dissemble to my aelf—l cannot dissemble to your Lordships, that I sin placing myself in a situation of no small peril, of no int censiderable anxiety ; and that I am laying myself open to numerous severe imputations. It may be said that the evils of the existing system have existed for so many years, and that it is so gigantic in its character, that any attempt on my part to expose their extent, or to propose for them any remedy, argues no inconsiderable presumption on my part. I answer that my duty, my double duty, as a Alm ber of the Legislature, and as the Judge presiding over the Court in which the evils alluded to arise, prevent me from justly incurring this charge of presumption; I shall also he told that wiser, and greater men, men of much more experience than myself, have sat in that Court dur ing Stile whole of their lives, without ever attempting, esen in the maturity of their experience and at the close of their career, what I am attempting at the very e, mmencetrent of mine. illy answer is this :—Those mat and !earned men, whose integrity was unspotted as their capacity IA as undoubted, have entered the Court of Chancery with the same desire that I entertain to effect a remedy of the evils which exist there. But such is the na ture of those evils, so great is their tendency to push up their shoots, to throw forth their ramifications, and even to let their roots spread so 1.9 to enclose anti entangle all neighbouring objects, that hardly has any Judge made the attempt to remedy them before he has felt encumbered and overwhelmed in the effnrt. This, my Lords, is their ex cuse for having passed so much of their lives in the Court without an endeavour. at Reform. But to me it would be no excuse—it would offer no palliation, if, wise by their expe rience, warned by their example, I were not, in the very beginning of my course, to attempt to do that from which I feel that a continuance in it would incapacitate roe. I state this, my Lords, at the outset, in order to meet the charge which I know will he brought against me, that I, who have held the Great Seal only a quarter of a year— it happens, by chance, that being appointed on the 22(1 of November, I ant addressing your Lordships on the :22d February—l, who have little or no experience, whose knowledge of the practice of the Court must necessarily be limited— I, a mere novice in the law of that Court, nevertheless begin with attempting what others to the very close of their career have not attempted—a change, an innovation, and to sum up all in one expression, so hateful, S 3 alien to long-established habits, so sore, so agonizing to the experienced practitioner—in one hateful word, " the head and front of ray offending,"—a Chancery Reform. Reform, odious and reprobated in all places, is especially odious anti especially reprobated there, where it appears as if it were a monster, composed of two parts an utterly irreconcilable and incongruous as Chancery Re farm. My answer to this charge is, that short as my ex perience has been in that Court, I almost already begin to feel those trfficinhies and those incuinbrances which have overpowered and mastered the good intentions of all my illustrious predecessors. I am already, as it were, attached to the soil. I am already in the course of seduction. I feel that I am getting involved in the integuments and en tanglements which I have been describing as forming the excuse for my predecessors. I, who came into the Court pi nine , out prayers for Reform, am almost already incapa citateda for am mining it, and if I remain there inactive a little loneser, shall be wholly so. " pesos finite, torpor gravis alligat artus Mottle cinguntur tenor prwcordia libro In frontion urines, in ramos brachia crescunt : Yes mot) tam velox pigris ratlicibus liceret : Ora cacumen obit : rernanet riitor onus in ilia." __(hear, hear, hear.) I feel that I am on the point, if I delay any longer , of becoming, in my flight from the day, fixed and rooted in the soil ; and that I shall flourish only like the laurel in the fable, a monument of her escape from the embraces of the gad of light. These, my Lord, , , are the considerations which induce me, while I may, to break loose from the entanglements in which I shall otherwise be involved. I now proceed to the subject. 'When I pro nounce the word Chancery, I fear, my Lords, that I shall recall to many of your Lordships' minds images of expence, of delay, of vexation ; I hope to none of more serious in jury. But, my Lords, the usages of Chancery are not all evil. Bad as they are, they are, like other matters, not quite so black as they are painted. In those evils which do exist, however, it is well worth our attempting to find one or two simple and safe remedies. I shall proceed, my birds, shortly to state to your Lordships the course which I mean to pursue in unfolding the existing evils, anti in re eau-unending what I consider to be the must efficient reme inedies fur them. To lead your Lordships through all the traces of Chancery litigation' and practice, would not be more tedious titan it would be treeless. I think I shall better spend the short sprite of your Lordship' time—l hope it will be tut a short space ; I know promises of that kind are more frequently made than kept, especially with refer ence to legal matters, but I hope it will be a short space—l say, my beds, I think I shall better spend the short space of your Lerd-hi s s' time which I am about to occupy, by laying down the prin4iples on which 1 think all judicial reforms onelit on proceed, and by then showiog the man ner in which those principles apply to the remedies waielt I am about to propose, My Lords, the first of these principles which I its,- down is this—that in all eases where there is a great judicial machinery, where the construction of a Count leaves it open to various abuses, it is much Letter on begin by ref - mining that Court rather that, by any charge in tints. laws or in that system of ju ti-prudence on which the rights and property of men de- IlLanl- My Lords,. it is better fur obvious reasons. In the first place it is safer; in ail changes the first and most cardinal consideration. If you do not take that course— if you substitute far the ills you have (the maxi:n is al most proverbial) a something which you are not perfectly santain you see Ineforelenud will riot prodsce greater or even eava l evils, you will not only do no immediate good, but you ',soil do retell eventual injury. Now nothing can be snore tenet than that a chang e in the construction of the Court will he a much more lenient, and a much more easy , eoa r.ae. ; and a curse which, it it should be found not to effect the comedy expected Irons it, it may be more easily retraced, than the adoption of any new laws, altering that s% stein by which the rights anti peop er ti„ of the King's anitriects are disposed of, anti the various grounds are pre ecrihenl on which those rightra and properties are held ; in all respee's a task of the greatest difficulty, and one which reqttircs the utmost care and deliberation. In order to see how much eatier it is to proceed by alterations in the censt lotion and the examination of the tribunals, than is the principles of jurisprudence and the established rights of property, one has only to consider that every alternation in these principle s, and in these rights, always has, more or less, a retrospective effect, and the consequences of an ex post facto law. An instance of a!thetigh by no means the strongest instance thy might he adduced, occurs in the case of the General Re gistry Bill, brought into the House of Commons by one of the Commissioners for the Improvement of Legal Pro cedure, and now in progress through that House. How ever valuate!e the improvement proposed to be carried into effect by that measure, it has a retrospective operation, and the effect of an s.c post facto law, for it attaches a forreiture to the want of registration, which did not apply to it before. - This is not the strongest instance o f t h e kind ; but even of the objection to this extent, the plan which I propose to follow is perfectly clear. Another grand advantage of this mode of proceeding is, that it is not only easy of being carried into operation, and ierolend more efficacious, but also that it tends to eradicate the evils and defects even of the principles of jurisprudence, which govern our tribunals, one by one, gradually, and progressively, and in a much safer manner than any other in which this great good could be effected. Accordingly you will find, that if the tribunals for the administration of justice be placed on a vood footing, the principles of jurisprudence, and the law itself, as applicable to person and property, will be improved, and that in the best and safest way, by means of improved experience and practice. And I do not scruple to say, that except in the case of our i very earliest statutes, the statute law has grown up by the improvement in the structure of our tribunals and Courts of Justice. How many of our best laws—how many of our best remedies for wrong and securities against op pression, have been owing to trial by jury, and some other admirable portions in the construction of our tribunals. Of all means of improvement, therefore, a change for the better in the structure and constitution of our tribunals is the safest and the most efficacious. The next principle on which I have proposed to myself to act is, that the judicial and ministerial functions ought to be kept as separate and distinct as possible. In the jurisdictions of some of our Judges the judicial and Ministerial functions are too much blended, and this I have attempted to do, in a Bill which I propose to submit to your Lordships for that purpose. A third principle, my Lords, is this—that, wherever it is possible (and in most cases I think it is possible), viva voce examination of witnesses should be substituted for examination by written interrogative. This of itself, my Lords, would, in my opinion, be a most invaluable im provement. I will, with your Lordships' permission, briefly state some of the inconveniencies and evils attend ant on the opposite practices, and they may be illustrated in this manner :—When a witness comes to be examined in a Court of Law—in the Court of King's Bench, for instance, where my Noble and Learned Friend has so long presided with so much credit to himself, and advantage to the country—lie is seen not only by the Counsel and the parties, but also by the Judge and the Jury, and the examination takes place in the presence of those who are to decide, and who are most competent to judge of the value of his testimony, as far as that depends on the man ner in which it is given, which is a most important cri terion in the means of estimating the weight of testimony. This advantage, which is so ordinary at,d common in courts of law, that it is generally thought worth while to mention it, as an advantage of the very highest import ance ; and yet, from this advantage, some of our tribunals are quite shut out. And then, when a person is ex amined on written interrogatories, they are put first, second, and third, and so on, while no opportunity is afforded, or offered, of framing a succeeding interrogatory on the answer to a preceding; so that the examination is conducted almost in the dark ; whereas, in a Court of Common Law, where the witness is examined viva voce , a second question is often founded on the answer to the first; and a third, on the answer to the second; and a ' fourth, on the answer to the third, and so on ; so that the examination is not conducted in the dark, but one ques tion arises out of another; and thus, with all the light and information obtained from the examination in chief, the cross-examination takes place ; and that, again, is followed up by the re-examination. It is scarcely ne cessary to point out, further than by the bare statement of the process, what an immense advantage this affords in eliciting the truth, and putting the case on its best footing. Mit from all this advantage the courts of equity are, in a great measure, shut out. Not a word of this applies to the Court of Chancery for instance. To be sure the plain tiff there has the advantage, if advantage it be, of the evidence of the defendant on oath ; but the defendant ha. not the advantage of the plaintiff's evidence on oath ; for although the answer is upon oath, the bill is not, but is merely prepared by Counsel, who states the best case he can for his client. Sometimes the cause is ripe for bear ing on bill and answer ; but when the parties are at issue in point of fact, then the issue is sent to be tried, but in a different form from that which takes place in a court of law. Now how is it tried? A Learned Counsel pre pares written interrogatories to be put to witnesses whom be never sees, and these are filed in the usual manner, and given out to the examiner, an officer of the Court, who reads them to the witnesses, and takes down their answers. The Counsel who drew the interrogatories bears none of the answers—he has no opportunity of founding his se coed interrogatory on the answer of the first; the third on the answer of the second, tend so on. The officer reads the formal questions, and takes down the formal an swers, and there the matter rests. All is done in the dark, and then what becomes of the cross-examination ; since, where the interrogatories and the examination are for one of the parties, the other party knows no thing either of the questions or the answers ? He does not know even the questions ; and how, then, can there be anything like a real cross-examination ? And yet, some. times, on these occasions, we have what, by a pleasant figure of speech, is called cross• interrogatories, on the be half of parties who hear nothing of the examination in chief, and who can know nothing of either questions or an swers. It is true that this method of cross-interrogation is sell: m resorted to, since it is found by experience to be too perilous, and generally quite as apt to serve the cause of the adversary as to prop up the case of him who has the rashness to u-e so indiscriminating and unmanage able a weapon. All then in these cases is done in the dark ; the witnesses are examined by an officer of the Court, who reads to them the interrogatories, and takes down the an swers, and returns the examinations to the Court, where they are kept in retentis till publication passes as it is called, and then, for the first thee, they are communicated to the parties. And the period of publication too is sometimes en larged for a long time, arid much delay, vexation, and ex pence are thereby occasioned to the parties. Even if the examinations were t iken down in the presence of Counsel and attorneys, that would not be nearly so good as the system at common law, where one Judge attends and hears the whole of the evidence, and has himself the opportunity of questioning the witnesses, and of assisting the Jury, who have seen and head all, with observations on the evidence. The 4th principle, and the last with which I shall trouble your Lordships at present, relates to the remuneration of the Judges and their subordinate officers, and they ought to he well remunerated; for where the highly intellectual labour is great, the remuneration ought to be correspond ingly ample. But what I say in point of principle is, that, generally speaking, the remuneration ought to be by salary, and not by fee-. When you remunerate a Judge by fees, on the steps of procedure, you expose him to the temptation of encouraging delay and expense in order to increase his own emoluments, and thus, in theory at least, if not in effect, set interest in opposition to his duty. To be sure, the Judges in the higher Courts are not apt to be swayed from the straight line of their duty whatever be the temptation. They are selected for their learning and their integrity, and are under the eye of a watchful public and a jealous bar. But in principle it is always un wise to suppose any man above the reach of being tempted ,—(Hear, hear)—and neither they nor any other functiorr aries ought to be placed in circumstances in which there must be a perpetual conflict between their interest and their duty. And although we should be in fact perfectly secure against malversation by the Judges, even under such cir cumstances, yet I thick that it would be a most objec tionable and unwise proceeding to place a Judge in a situation which would have, the effect of lowering him even in the eyes of the vulgar—to carry it no farther —and to subject him to suspicion, who ought to be not only pure in fact, but above all jealousy and suspicion. These are the grounds on which I say that even the higher Judges, who act under the eye of a watchful public and jealous bar, and who are themselves men of learning and integrity, the least likely to be swayed by interested and selfish considerations—tbat even they ought not to be placed in situations in which it is possible for any one to suspect that they can have any other object than that of the diligent, active, and impartial performance of their respective duties, But if this be the principle which in reference to the higher J lt ought l,,e s, to i th ise keptst still t i n u ore vi i e 4 , ortant to act upon it in refe rence to all inferior officers of justice. They do not stand upon such high and open ground—they are not so much in the view of the public—they are not so immediately responsible to Parliament—and they ought to be emphati cally excluded froita such situations, even if the Judges were nut. There is one nicety in regard to this point which might to be noticed. A Judge doing his duty under the eye of the public will be induced to perform it well and diligently, since upon that still depend his fame and estimation with the public, and this although he should be remunerated by a salary and not by fees. But it is no t a l ways the same with inferior officers; and I am told that some inconvenience has been felt from remune rating inferior officers by salaries instead of fees, for it is said that the consequence has been that these officers are disposed to earn their salaries as easily us may he, and do not perform their duties so actively as if their remunera tion depended on fees. But I think the true distinction may be made, and the line drawn somewhat in this di rection. Those officers may he made dependent on fees, where the multiplication of the fees does not depend on their own discretiou. Suppose, for instance, that the emolument of the Judge or the officer depends upon a fixed fee, such as 1/. for every cave decided, it is clear that it is the interest of the Judge or the officer to try as many causes as possible, and it is equally clear that this will not be productive of any undue delay for the purpose of multi plying fees, because the profits of judge or officer will be increased by dispatch. But suppose the officer is remu nerated by fees on the successive steps of a procedure, then it becomes his interest to multiply the steps of any given proceeding before the conclusion, because he thereby mul tiplies the fees which form his remuneration. But when the fees are made to depend on the conclusion of the whole business, then the officer has no power to increase their amount except by dispatch. It is en these principles that the Bills which I propose to submit to your Lordships are founded, and the purport of which I will mention gene rally, without going into details at present ; and your Lordships will, in the first place, have to consider whether the principles are in themselves sound ; next, whether the enactments are consistent with the principles; and lastly, whether the details and minutiae of the measures are such as can with reasonable facility he carried into operation and effect. Having thus stated the principles and the points to which I wish your Lordships' attention to be directed, I proceed to state to your Lordships very gene rally the nature of the remedies which I mean to pro. pose for certain inconveniences and evils which at pre sent exist, as connected with the Court of Chancery, or the functions of the Lord Cha nce ll o r. There is one great and remarkable branch of jurisdiction which has been at tached by the Crown to the Lord Chancellor —I mean the jurisdiction in eases of lun icy. The care of lunatics is part of the Royal prerogative, the exercise of which is entrusted to the person holding the Great seal for the time being. The Lord Chancellor, therefore, has the care of persons who are found lunatic, upon an inqui_ sition taken under his own authority, and which he alone has the power to order. Now very considerable inconvenience arises from the state of this jurisdiction as it at present exists. Whether we regard the very delicate nature of the trust which is to be executed with reference to the lunatics themselves, end the feelings of their relatives, of the amount of the property which, in consequence of this authority, is subject to the controul of the Keeper of the Great Seal, the jurisdiction is one of the very highest importance. The number of lunatics at present under the care of the Lord Chancellor is 400, all found lunatic by a Commission appointed by him to in quire and report on the subject ; and the amount of the property distributed among those lunatics, for whose be hoof the whole of the annual value of their property is not distributed, is 50,0001. a year ; and that comprises only those cases in which no more than a part of the property of the lunatics is allowed for their maintenance, exclud ing those for whom the whole of the annual produce is allowed, and that amounts to about 110,0001. more. So that the sum administered by the Lord Chancellor, in the care and fur the support of lunatics, amounts to about 160,0001. per annum. The whole amount of the for tunes of lunatics, subject to the controul of the person holding the Great Seal, is no less than from six to eight millions sterling—probably more nearly eight millions. This is a most anxious and fearful jurisdiction, and there fore it is that the Constitution has placed it in the hands of the Crown, who from very early times has been in the habit of entrusting it to an officer who is at the head of the law, and high in his Majesty's Councils, and who is particularly responsible to Parliament for the faithful dis charge of those functions which the Crown has appointed him to administer. The defects which, in my opinion, at present exist in this jurisdiction, and to which I wish now to call your Lordships' attention, are two—first, a defect in the mode of finding a person a lunatic; and secondly, a defect in the mode in which the person of the lunatic is taken care of. First, then, as to the construction or constitution of the tribunal by which a person is found to be a lunatic. In my opinion that tribunal is not felicitously constituted. I do not mean to cast any imputation on those gentlemen who were usually appointed Commissioners for holding these inquisitions-- God forbid that I should. But the novel mode of pro ceeding is to appoint, as Commissioners, three Chancery lawyers, who perhaps never before had occasion to examine a witness, and these gentlemen are called upon to decide tin the effect of the evidence in cases so delicate that it would be an arduous duty for the ablest and most experienced. Judges—and these Commissioners are paid by fees too, where, on my principle, none ought to be allowed. It is difficult, on any authority that can be found, to send the Commission to less than three. I am not aware of a ju dicial decision, nor of any statute on the subject, for all the authorities hold that the original regulation of time 17th of Edward the Second is not a statute but a pi ivate regu lation. A friend of mine—Mr. Illingworth—consented to make a search, and in this be proceeded in a very work manlike manner, and he was not able to find any instance except one, in which the Commission had been directed to less than three. Although the escheators in former times were Commissioners, or had.the power of appointing Com missioners, no instance had been found in which there had been less than three of them, except in a single in stance, in which two persons formed the Commission. Now, as by a late regulation an addition was made to the number of Judges, I think we ought to avail ourselves of that circumstance, in order to form an improved tribunal for holding inquisitions in cases of allegsd lunacy. I pro pose, then, that in cases of contested lunacy—such as the case of the Earl of Portsmouth, the case of Mr. Davis, and that of Mr. Brand—the person holding the Great Seal should be empowered to call upon one of the Judges to preside at th e h o ldi ng of theinquisi tions, in order that they may be tried with all the solemnities of the most important issues, and with all the advantages of great legal learning, and much judicial experience. This I take to be a very great improvement, and one which cannot be too soon carried into execution. I remember that Sir Chides Wetherell and myself attended in the case of Davis, at a ceffee-house, for eight days together, when the poor man was b roug h t up every d ay , an d placed in a room where a great mob assembled, under circumstances which were calculated to make him less sane than before, and all this at an enormous expence. And, as to the ease of the Earl of Portsmouth, it brought a scandal on the proceedings of the Court. The second defect, as I have already said, is the want of sufficient care of the person of the lunatics. These are, in number, four hundred persons, of rather considerable property. Your Lord ships know that in these cases there is a committee of the estate, and a committee of the person—the heir at law, where there is real property, being committee of the estate, as being the person who has the most interest to take care of it, and the next of kin being the committee of the person, as having the most interest to take care of the lunatic, to whom a liberal allowance is made out of the estate. Now, in these cases, the lunatic, in general, is taken to the country, and is kept very private, and the Lord Chancellor loses sight of him, and has no power to act, except when put in motion. And yet it is very im portant that the Keeper of the Great Seal, or some other proper authority, should at all times have the power to ascertain whether the lunatic is placed with relations who arc careful to watch every glimmering of returning reason and facilitate the cure—whether he is under the care of a person anxious to cherish every indication of recovery, and to put an end to the trust. It is important that he should have the power to take care that the lunatic should be in proper custody, and should not be entrusted to the care of persons more anxious to retard or prevent the recovery of the patient than to promote it, when they know that by the recovery they will lose their share of the 160,0001., which is distributed annually among the keepers of Chan cery lunatics. I have often asked myself whether, in this respect, things are in the situation in which they ought to be ; and the answer has been th it I am morally cer tain that this matter is not as I would wish it to be. An instance came before us in the Court of Chancery no farther back than last week, which affirds a remarkable illustration of the point to which I am now calling your Lordship's attention. A Rev. Clergyman of 6001. a year, was one of the Chancery lunatics, and there was a Committee of the person and a Committee of the estate. It happened that these two combined, and a proposal was laid before the Master fur allowing only 100/. out of the 61)01. for the purpose of transferring the lunatic from a comfortable situation near Bristol to a pauper fanatic asylum in the county of Lancaster. This circumstance was brought to my notice, for the Master thought this allowance remarkably em ill, and mentioned the matter to me, and a stop was put to the project in this instance. But it was a mere chance that the matter was brought under my notice. I might never have heard of it, and should not have heard of it, had it not been that the small ness of the proposed allowance excited the Master's sus picions, and induced him to cause inquiries to be made, I propose, then, to constitute a board, whose business will be to take care that time person as well as the pro perty of the lunatic are properly taken care of, and that the members of the Board should be paid by a commission of one-half per cent. out of the property of the lunatics ; and so much of their fortunes cannot be better bestowed. This plan appears to me to be one of peculiar utility and wisdom, and almost the whole of it prepared and matured • by my Noble Predecessor, who deserves the warmest gra-1 titude of the public for the steady course which, in spite; of all opposition, he has pursued in bringing to ma turity this great and original improvement. I come now, my Lords, to a still larger branch of my sub ject—l mean the Bankrupt Laws—in reference to which I had occasion to present petitions to your Lordships from the most influential persons in London, and another great and commercial city. The Commissionere of Bankrupt are seventy in number, and they are generally young men of good connections and ability, considered as men of only two or three years standing at the bar, and men who, when they have acquired more experience, may be very able lawyers. Nevertheless, if I were to say that in nine out of ten cases they are the best Judges that could be chosen, or if I were to say that they do not pay too little attention to their duties as Commissioners, and consider their offices only as steps towards business and advancement in their profession ; or if I were to say that men of very great age—one of them lately died at the ma ture age of 86—did not sit with young men of 21 ; or if I were to say that they were always appointed as the best Judges that could be found for the purpose ; or that the Lord Chancellor always appointed them for their fitness, and not because they were personal friends, or connections of personal friends, then I should be guilty of most grossly flattering the Commissioners, my predecessors, and myself. I appointed Commissioners as they were usually appointed before. I impute blame to nobody : it is the system, and it is the system only that is to blame; and, therefore, it ought to be as soon as possible destroyed. But, certainly, if I were to say that I had appointed persons most proper for the execution of the duties of the situation, or that my predecessors had always done so, I repeat, that I should be justly chargeable with the most overweening self-seeking on my own account, and guilty of the grossest flattery to my predecessors. The jurisdiction is one of the greatest importance. The subject is of the greatest importance to creditors, to assignees, to bankrupts, and to the COIITIDIS.• sioners ; and it is of the highest importance that the mat ter should be placed under the superintendence of the most competent Judges. The Commissioners had a most diffi cult duty to perform, both its the way of examination and procedure—a duty which it seldom fell to the lot of a Commissioner to undertake before his appointment to that situation ; and they had a still further duty to perform, which, to the same extent at least, did not often come in the way of the most experienced Judges. They had to wring the truths from those who were often extremely well disposed to concealment and fraud ; and, added to all this, they had the extraordinary power to commit to prison bankrupts and witnesses, for not answer ing to their satisfaction—a power fortunately controulled, however, by their liability to an action at law—a power, however, which no other tribunals possessed except the Insolvent Debtors' Courts—and one larger than is en trusted to those who have to administer the ordinary func tions of the law. Then as to the number who sat in one Commission, and the mode of administering the duties of the situation—there might be five of them at a sitting, al though three of them usually sit. Sometimes Counsel came to plead before them, who were generally men of much greater practice and experience than themselves, and it may be supposed that the business is not conducted with that dignity and efficiency whiish characterizes the pro. ceedings before able and experienced Judges, who have sufficient weight and authotity to keep Counsel in awe, and check their vehemence and irregularities. There are sonic Counsel whose principal practice is before the Com missioners. Mr. Serjeant Wilde has practised before them, and so has my friend, Mr. Pollock, and Mr. Mon tagu, leading members of the profession. Such men go to plead before young men of twenty-one, or old men of eighty-six, and they really decide the cases, and not the Commissioners. Then in case of an erroneous decision, or whether the decisions lie erroneous or not, the question comes before the Lord Chancellor, who has never seen the persons examined ; and it is sufficient to say of the system that one part is not worse than another. The system is so had, that it certaiuly ought to be altered; and then how is it to be altered? Will it be sufficient to cut down the number from seventy to thirty-five ? It may be a good excuse to say that it is impossible for the man who holds the Great Seal to find seventy qualified persons. Shall it be said that none shall be appointed Commis.. sioners, except such as have been of some standing and practice at the bar ? And shall they be remunerated by salaries instead of fees ? That, at least, would be some improvement, as it would place them beyond suspicion in that particular. And then shall it be made a rule that no Commissioners shall practice before other . Commissioners, for each of them, as the case stands, may practice before thirteen lists, and in this mode of practice they had an advantage? But, my Lords, the plan which I intend to propose does not stop at this. I say, my Lords, that no man is more cautious in the way of Reform than the individual who stands before you. I have been derided and taunted by heated reformists, both in and out of Parliament, as a timid reformer. I am, my Lords, a cautious reformer, anxious to tread upon sure and safe grounds, and I glory in the charge ; for what they call timidity I call wisdom. I prefer, my Lords, to sail with the lead in my hand when steering among unseen and unknown dangers, with breakers a-head and a rocky shore under my lee, upon which I might, but for this caution, be dashed to pieces. I love to proceed in a mariner of which the safety is undeniable; so that I may early retrace my steps, in case I should find it too perilous to go farther.— But, at the same time, I am no friend to half measures. What I propose is not a diminution of the number of Commissioners, nor the adoption of any of the other expedients which I have mentioned. I mean to pro pose that the system should be entirely abolished—that the whole should be swept away by one short and simp'e ooeration. But then it may be asked—what is to become of the vested rights of the Commissioners? My Lords, there are no vested rights here. We sometimes hear of the feebleness of certain estates and interests ; but of all estates and interests those of the Commissioners of Bankrupts are the most feeble. The whole depends on a letter sent from the Lord Chancellor's Secretary, inform. ing them that they are to proceed upon such a Commis sion ; but I inay refuse to send any such letter, and may confine myself to only one list, and then a Commissioner, who found that he was never employed, might say, what is the meaning of all this—is the bankrupt jurisdiction at an end ; in short the Commissioner has no interest but what depends on the person holding the Great Seal. A great hardship will, however, be suffered by the gentlemen who have hitherto filled the situation of Commissioners. Many of th e m are settled in life, with the idea that they are to retain their situation of Commissioners as long as they please, and therefore, I propose to allow them an ade quate remuneration on a large and liberal propert:on s for 1 have always considered it very bad reasoning not to g i ve full com p ensa tion in cases of this kind, when the good of the public requires it. The Comoussioners, I am bound to say, have put forward no claim. They have not held the slightest communication with me on the subject ; but how ever unpopular it may be, I do not think I can dep r i ve them of their situations without a fair and liberal compers cation. For popularity, in the ordinary sense of the word, I care not a rush. 1 look forward to honest praise for the conscientious discharge of the duty I owe to others and myself, and I desire no other public favour than that which I may fairly deserve. To the gentlemen whom I thus de prive of the emoluments of their situations, I think I should give compensation, and thinking so, I propose it. The public, however, will not suffer. That compensation will be paid out of the funds at the disposal of the Court of Chancery, and as the gentlemen lose the compensation by being promoted in their profession, as many of them un doubtedly will be promoted in the course of eight or ten years, the burden will be wholly removed. 1 repeat, I have always considered it hard for the country to refuse com pensation in cases of this kind. It has a tendency to check improvement by the difficulties it invariably throws in the w ay of those who attempt it. It, in many cases , converts a hive of drones into a nest of stinging hornets--(A laugh)-- and the consequence is, that it impedes the march of Refor mation. Parsimony in such cases is bad for the country and bad for Reform, and if any one more than another should counsel us to give compensation in such cases, it is the Reformer himself, for no money is better spent, nor is there any outlay which yields such a large and liberal return. ( Hear.) That lain not the only person who has held these opinions with respect to the jurisdiction of the Bankrupt Commissioners, I shall take leave to quote the opinion of a great and venerable law authority, w h om I d o not at present see in his } la ce (L or d Eld on), b ut f ur w h ose ac commodation, as well as for my own instruction and guidance, I have postponed on several occasions my present motion. In a report of the proceedings of the Court of Chancery, I read, my Lords, the billowing words :—" The Lord Chancellor, on taking his seat, expressed the strongest indignation at the practice of the Commissioners of Bank rupts, and at the frauds which were every day practised, and particularly in the country, under cover of the B ink eupt Laws." I read this from a report of the proceedings of the Court ; but I think it necessary to premise, that the want of checks in th e management of the proof of ilebts, be and . ,c t ,i l n re,fiissjori is choice of suedassigroteuet by a assignees, it frequently happens that t jobbingwho is chosen also as jobbin g ass i gnee , ani lie creditor, receivesoti; of the estate a large fictitious debt, whi di he probably hands over, at the first opportunity to the bankrupt him self. When, however, there are Judges appointed with a power to commit for prevarication, and to inquire tho roughly into and sift out the whole of the bankrupt's state of affairs, I have a confident hope that no such frauds can be successfully attempted. Your Lordships should know that the Comm iesioners are at present liable to action for attempting to perform their duty with that severity which justice requires. There have been two actions of this kind' l I lately against the fourteenth- list, which I am bound to say has been the ,only one which dared to perform its duty. I was counsel fur the plaintiff in one of these actions, and I received damages ; but I really must confess, that although a counsel in the cause I re gretted recovering these damages, and thought them unnecessarily severe. The consequence, however, has that these damages proved a lesson to all the lists of Commissioners ; and knowing that they are, by the de cision of the Court of King's Bench, liable to action for this exertion of their authority, none of then) do venture to hazard a commitment fel. the sake of forwarding public justice. I now, my Lords, proceed to finish the extract which these explanatory observations hays interrupted : " The Lord Chancellor went on to say, that the abuses which had crept into the administration of the Bankrupt country Laws were a disgrace to the administration of justice, and that he thought it would be better to repeal all the statutes on the subjects than to permit their continuance. No work it se mercytem le C we l dl'o o ab n te t Commissions i present, s n s ' i e o r n e ; ma tt e r NsVl t o l ' l V t n i o l t e fo trade for esta te.stnr possible the In the vain to themselves, and the least benefit to the estate ; and the so licitors sassignees gn eesto appeared to form their calculations on the number of Commissions which they could bring in to be worked by the partnership. Unless, indeed, this system was at tacked in its strong hold, he was satisfied it would soon become liable to some of the greatest abuses known to the laws." These their Lordships would perceive were the words of the late Lord Chancellor Eldon, uttered on the very morning when he first entered his Court as Keeper of the Great Seal ; lint it would be exceedingly difficult, in any of the proceedings of his long and remarkable tenure of office, to point out the instance of his following up the principles which were there laid down. And why was this? When his Lordship spoke he was but just installed in office; be was new in the soil, and he waited to ascertain some thing more of it before he attempted his reforms ; but he waited too long—he stayed till he became affected by the element of the Court of Chancery, and lie found the adhesiveness of the soil too strong for him—(A I tugh)—to allow any after effort for fre slom to prove suc cessful. Much as I myself might have done had I deemed a further and letter perception of the nature of its evils to be put in competition with the risk which was to be in. cursed in obtaining it. I, however, shook myself free from it. I escaped at once from the trammels which it might have thrown around me, and resorted to the re medies which appeared to me to be meet for the evils, be fore I became inoculated by the vice which I wished to ex tinguish.—(Hear, hear.)—The proposition I have to offer to your Lordships is then briefly this :—I propose that there be ten Judges on Commissions, if you please to call them so, appointed in the stead of the seventy Commis sioners of Bankrupts. I could have wished to name a smaller number, but after discussion on discussion—after taking into consideration the amount on business which they will have to transact, and looking at the degree of ability and information which will be required to fill the situation, and the time which they must devote to the duties of the office, for we intend that they should sit in vacation and out of vacation, in the long vacation as well as the short one, and throughout all the terms—looking at all these things, I have been compelled, most reluctantly I confess, to prefer a number much greater than I origi nally intended. One by one, however, I have been de serted by all whom I have consulted on the subject. Taking into consideration the nature of the work re quired, the qualifications necessary for the office, and the time occupied in its duties, they have one by one dropped off from me, with the assurance that ten was the very lowest number with which I could hope to effect my objects with respect to bankruptcy, and .1 was left at last alone. At first I was for six Judges or seven, but they maintain that ten will be absolutely the smallest number I can name to perform the duties. This was, in the opinion of all, the lowest number, and but few of them I consulted were disposed to agree to any thing so low. I was the more disappointed with respect to the numbers, because I felt the difficulty of selecting so many persons who were thoroughly competent to perform the duties of the situation ; but when I see fourteen lists of five Commissioners, three always sitting and relieving the others, and yet without giving any satisfaction in the despatch of business; and when I calculated the number of cases to be heard, and the circumstances under which they were to be heard, and when I looked forward to the prospect of a diminution of the business of the Insolvent Debtors' Court to such an extent, that we may hope to have it gradually transferred to the new Judges, and the three Judges of that Court entirely got rid of, I see that ten is the least number of Judges I can venture to pro pose. I wish it to be understood, however, that the fuse tions of these Judges are to he divided into two parts, the administrative and the judicial, and that they are to be composed of three descriptions of persons. The first Judge I propose to make the Chief over the whole admi nistration of the bankrupt laws of the country. In the second class I propose to place three senior Judges, persons chosen from the higher walks of the profession, and through whom, in conjunction with the Chief, I propose to have the whole of the contested points in bankruptcy ultimately decided. And in the third class, I place six junior Judges —men who are hereafter to rise to the higher rank, not as a matter of course, but in proportion as they may exhibit talent and learning to entitle theut to pro motion. To the whole of these Judges I would com mit the jurisdiction in, and the administration of, the whole of the laws connected with bankruptcy. I now proceed to show in what manner I propose to dispose of the business now transacted before the fourteen Lists of Commissioners. To a single Commission, a Judge taken from the third, or Junior Class, I would give the power of adjudication in all cases where there is no dispute re specting the choice of assignees, or the proof of debt, or any of the ordinary business. When, however, a question of that kind does arise, I give this Judge power to adjourn the Court, for the purpose of calling to his aid two others of the same rank with himself, or one of the Senior Judges, and they are then to have power to examine evi dence on oath, and to take down that evidence or not, as they think fit, in the ordinary manner in which it is practised now in the Courts of Law. If, on this exami nation, the dispute cannot he settled, and the parties, both of them I mean, agree to go to trial on an issue, they may do so at once and without any delay, before one of the Senior Judges, or the Chief Judge, assisted by a Jury, in the sane manner as in the Courts of Common Law. If, however, both the parties do not agree on an issue, but only one of them, then I give them the power to go before a Court composed of the Chief Judge and the three Senior Judges, sitting as the Judges of the Court of King's Bench do now in Banco, in order that they may there, as in that Court, determine the question of law. This appeal, however, I confine to the mere question of law. In the event of one party only agreeing to as issue, I do not allow the fact to be tried by less than three of the Judges, with the assistance of a Jury, and subject to all the ordinary rules and regulations, and motions for new trials. With respect to the examination of witnesses, I propose to give that power, in ordinary cases, to one of the junior Judges ; but if difficulties arise in the course of the examination, or if any obstacles or impediments are raised by ti , e witness himself, then I transfer the examina tion of three of the junior Judges, with full authority to commit any person who prevaricates, or refuses to give his evidence to the satisfaction of the examinants : an appeal against that commitment lying to the Chief Judge, but the Judges being in no instance liable to an action for da mages for their conduct towards the witness. One word with respect to appeals to the Lord Chancellor. I pro pose at once to cut off all appeals, except on matters of law. I conceive that if the truth in matters of law can not be got at by the exertions of three Judges in one case, or of one in another, and with the assistance of a Jury examining the evidence, and marking all the four viva vote testimony—how, in the name of God can it be dim coverel by the Lord Chancellor, with written depositions and interrogatories, and all the formula which accompany appeals. If they consider the direction for the issue wrong, they can apply to the higher Judge, as they do now in Common Law in Westminster Hall. If they are not satisfied with the verdict, they ,can move for a new trial, and what then could the Lord Chancellor do more than to order a new trial or refuse it, and what, I ask, would be the defence for per mitting an appeal to the Chancellor, save the desire to increase and to prolong their vexatious delays and ruinous expenses, which it is the whole object of the ar rangements to prevent.--(Hear.) I reserve the appeals on matters of law as well from the superior Courts in Bankruptcy as from the inferior, but I answer for it we shall not hear then of ninety-nine of every hundred of these appeals in bankruptcy which now occupy the Vice- Chancellor for two months in the year, and the Lord Chancellor for snore than one, and of which the number of arrears have been so much a subject of complaint. I am convinced, indeed, that under the new, and I hope I may say, improved system, the evils to which these ap peals have given rise, will be wholly eradicated. I would how, with your Lordships' permission, say a few words about the country Commissions. In conformity to the principl e o f act i on I have already laid down and explained, of actin g a t a ll times experimentally rather than attending too much in obedience to theory , I propose to make but a slight, although, I conceive, a very important change in the constitution of country Commissions. All that I have said of the delay, the embarrassment, and the direct prat tice in the proceedings under a metropolitan Commissde fell infinitely short of the mere outline of the workings! a country Commission. Those Commissions are, in true turned into a mere source of patronage and emoluments, the expense of the estate of the unfortunate bankrupt its his creditors. The law requires that there should bet:: Commissioners, and that tw o o f th e se should be Barr? et It is generally contrived, however, that the Commission shell he composed of thr ee s o li c i tors an d two barristers, be they always take car e t o se l ec t b a rristers re sident the metropolis, who, they are sure, cansto`, not attend, and the remaining three are left to act out restraint, or merely employ themselves by ever means in their power n o t t o decide the question lorool' before them, but t o contr i ve b y delays of every Lind-'f tea ,, they are paid by time and duration of sittingss-W ine or the profits which they always calculate on from the ena , to ote t o b i e meat of a Commission. It is not my intention to them the principles of the Act I now propose f re , metropolis, but at present 1 shall content myself b y. e • to ti m quiring that the Judges of Assize shall, front time the select and form a list of all such Barristers residing •_" to , county as they m a y thi n k competent f or the purpo se Il e gether with a f ew o f t h e more respectable solicitor:, 'er that the n ames o f t h ose persons b e returned to the I °r esi of the Gr ea t S ea l, in order that he may select fro nt t e three persons t o be • put on the Commission which the cases of bankruptcy may from time to time require' but, for my part, should prefer only one Commissioner; r, leaving that op en to cons id erat i on, I propose that to,Phesti sons thus chosen and recommended the country a le ,' at be for the present left for decision. These cases 1,070 in the present mom en t, on an average, not more than 7"•yely number, which, from th e prosperous an d c ompara ti we o healthy state of the country, i s , I am h ap py to say' m u ch than we have seen it for y ears . H av i ng sa id thus ' p ow with respect to the important poi n t o f b an k r uptcy, I d n e o f proceed to that other branch o f m y su bj ec t, the in ° or taking evidence and the fees of the office, and those causes of delay and expense in the administration of [the tice in the Court of Ch ancer y. I propose , then, tha t the Masters should no longer receive any advantage fl'a ° t ee taking of fees. Originally the Masters were naii Ps 3 n d by fees and partly by th e k eep i ng o f t h e su itors'su b - e ; which was entrusted to th e i r care . Thi s moll t oo were in the habit of l e tti ng out to interest for their: by, profit ; but in the year 1720 the Masters, tempts a nd visions of profit, speculat e d i n th e S out h S ee Stock , proving unfortunate, like many others, six of them w e r re oe ss dared to he defaulters, and im me di a t e l y on t hi s the 3's'ee were ordered to give security. [His Lordship th eti o e t b tered into a history of the various measures a dopted fro m respect to the salaries and emoluments of the Masters, . the Commission appoint e d by L or d Ch ance ll o r PrOrti'L e t ton, in 1740, down to the p er i o d w h en t h e Coelm itt ')..-- 1826 recommended that all f ees s h ou ld b e abolish e '; e :"„se Bottomed on these recommend a ti ons , an d in core - t ee with the desire of the country, I now propose 0 11 be ~, whole of the fees of the M as t ers i n Ch anc ery shal l r abolished, and that their clerk s s h a ll b e pa id a sun' ri ", jie s e r to exceed a maximum, but so co ll ecte d en d pa id as to give an interest in the m u lti p li cat i on o f exp'nees j e al delays to the suitor, a n d a t th e same t i me a fford t te , such a stimulus in th e w ay o f emo l umen t to tb e f li t se fortnance of their duties, and to the advancement staling proceedings of the caus e , a s wou ld k eep t h em from f d by asleep.—( Hear )—Looking at the emoluments enjoY e so d the Masters, he found that in 1791 both the Ma‘ t , e „ r i e ; the Registrar received large additions to their sai a ' . is s ' w an h d ie t h l i nc h t e th r e e y al n ly os t v ho p u o g s h se t ss a ed to l l , t o r o a o b / ly . a ha y t e id ar ,o o n n ie :ao al a b v ;o:se , for a gentleman.—(A laugh.) —One of the Mest e Y e r very excellent friend of his, of whom he spoke with ei c i oe spect, had above 4,700/. a year, and his clerk eni'l e l j ed income of 1,6001. a year; another of these clelk s v es 2,500/. a year, a nd one on l y 1 ,000 / . ; b ut h e ' e lid no t o pe fee~ 1s c o o l. it)yiremvoenr,yll.s, worst and,:a, l e h d o %: r e a v t e u r i , ty a m m o o n n g e) t!: os w e h'ch t be though he might find some other phrase for, it could o ' - sea s it anepl nature suitorthei ua s r e t: o r y n h ato c , a n wo ft d: h p ' t ‘2 o o ah i ire s d, e i occasiong to fa u tr : ty t h h a h enn ta t i t d f ml ob s ta r p e : e teoe : iv fr k .h . l s a i oc br and ttkk w T honn a l a r (ot s i th: : we' b nn b ap r e s i c u b b a tbt e oyh u l when s i eca s e , nat t ri h r h P o e r w h the allurement, would tend to destroy all its " P t e ° r r E alei v e l, i° .-e' lls effects. These gratuities have been denounced before. They were exposed so long hack as the time of °`' io to Romilly, who, in moving for a Committee to ineui re e fess the subject, obtained th e cas ti ng vote o f one o f the ' ters (who had never heard of the practice of taking o f tuities, and who w as di spose d t o trust to t h e assertiontba Mr. Perceval—that no such thingexisted), purely o ore private and so l emn assurance o f Si r Samuel, that th e sl, was beyond doubt. On the information of Sir Sa t e i rist that as much a s fift y poun d s was frequently rec eiv a sd the shape of a gratuity, this Master made inquiries, bes was assured in the most solemn manner that no s u° e re* yond five pounds had ever been taken, except on one - 0 0 sion, when extraordinary despatch was requisite, a nd , o ut he had ten pounds. Shortly afterwards the fact car a- e are through the means of a dispute, that this very made the denial had frequently received fifty pouro"' e ote on the examination of his hooks it appeared that hs! t be from this source were 1,500/. a year, in addition seven or eight hundred derived from legitimate sou rce d in From that moment, how ever , a ll gra t u iti e s cea r te t b e ee this Master's office. It is, h o w ever , th e duty of e t ars on whom the power devolv es , t o t a k e care that, r t he tires of this kind should cease in all. It , 1 " re te" bounden task of the superior net more to keep h i s ra re tires free from all sinister interpretation, but to ta ke b. that his subordinates should be also free from reP r e be The task, I k now , i s a d angerous one, b ecaus e I °l t re involved in a whirlwind of hatred and self-interes t • w ith an irksome one, because lam compelled to m eddle $ e t. the aff,irs of m e n, w ith many o f whom I am o n trr ia friendship—it is a laborious one, because I cannot h a r t , e a day, nor many days, nor even years, to bring lt eo aes full and satisfactory c o nc l us i on ; b ut i t i s the h e )/ tor duty of a man pl ace d i n m y s it uat i on to b eg i r d bin' e o ,seet the task—to bring whatever qualities he may Pock honestly and labori ous ly t o th e accomp li s h me nt of I l i ' an d ject—to let no means esc ap e him which can he f . ' llil ie r eeta lt honourably applied to the removal of abuses—if he with difficulties, to l a b our t o surmoun t th e re, bu" t t i litl events to let it he seen with whom rests the respou;e s lal of objection, on whom must fall the consequence s ato —to place, in fact, th e sa ddl e on t h e right herse' a n ° show that lat I. a st h ave pl a y e d m y part i n : the ' c r or e el reformation. I throw myself, therefore, on roY en: and on my country ; I call on them to s upport M el e silP if I fail, I shall a t a ll even t s l oo k i n t o my ow n boso n ' satisfaction, and conso l e myse lf w i t h t h e reflectio nl° th t approving conscienc e . Th ere f ore , as l ong a s I sit a il seat there shall be no gratuities—therefore there no charges—therefore there shall be no shade or s of turning—therefore it shall not be said, as of th e obi lt risees of old, that the cup of justice is clean withoutioere the inside is full of all mariner of uncleanness' shall be no r e pose— no re l axat i on i n my eff°,,r-v eh folding of the h a nd s t o sleep. I shall us e - e ij deavours, with th e assistance of Parliamen t a- be set' country, to put an en d t o t h ese cr ying 3 tri ple t , and if I do not affect all the R e f orm s I coP te iO ° d it shall not, at all events, be said o f me that I r / lt make the attempt to reform th e m. —(Hear, es ti° I I have hitherto show n b u t th e ou t s id e o f this Isi te rS e t business. I may be asked who pays it ? Why the 3 0 , 9 to be sure. Does he do it for nothing No, h e „ P y, , t for his client, and he t e ll s hi m i t i s expe dition W t b ' j shall come to that presently ; but here I would ' s ;; l cb of si t. • against payments of this ki n d, f or a ll p ur pose' see eh eS description, it is the duty of th e C our t t o protect s h issooll ot If the clerk can get rid of the busi ness quicker', b e e eel' l3 it possess a fair remuneration for doing so to all. It : u ltsr' o f do it without sacrificing the interestof some o ther b tite r !) , is doubly objectionable ; and under any view, w it : 1 . 1 1 3 0 1 public justice or expediency, it is ri g ht that it s o - ei tie r ., , , abolished. But then there is another ques tion el tsl , e l o with this matter. The c l e rk wh o re c e ives thi s to v o t or expedition money, has another function atta che re tis a ,ed office; on him falls the delicate and difficult oP e b e s Pt taxing the very bill of costs of the attorney 04:1° e yed' in him the money, of course on account of using e ovi bt) for his client.—(llear, hear.) Your Lordshir (fle a • to see the light thrown on those transactionsf-i'Citor'ete The judicious clerk has received from the s° e , e cei c oe very worthy man, and one who, it will be o r re ge , t ee knows how to invest his capital to adv a t of t o SUM of 50/. of expedition money on acconn c om e ire interests of the client, end then, when it Si on aer the turn of the judicious man, he repays th ; s •gbeii rs vi' e interest, to the w or th y man , an d pa ssing : - oth e- s ech some 100/. of his bill, which he might 00 : 11 be b o th be disposed to t a x w i t h so much lenity. It mill t hat therefore, th a t th e wort h y an d th e judiciou s e O 3 oci thrive by this means in their separate calli li f' re nen t tt ert the worthy man ' s see d s pro d uce d a m ost e t he abundant harvest—(Hear ! arid a laugh)---i"a`b I i s se e be ee perhaps, becaus e h e did no t pay as they fo r bo wore (Hear, hear.)—l now come to th e client , ' g o b hitherto kept pretty much out of view, a s ‘. object of the pay ments was k ept ou t of his sein e "' 00 the progress of the suit. Pay-day, bowev er t ' ae t pe r : b iog: then I suspect th e c li ent i s t h e on l y imPf lr , these a o°` the set. Ido n o t, I se i t reco ll ecte d, say t' ll3t t heY take place every day. Far from it—l b e lieve er e ot s frequent ; for th e c l ass o f so li c it ors are, ge l ' tha n t ins, a more highly respectable class of men