The Sun. — London, England, 1861-02-06 00:00:00

.0 6ftmelk..l f;reat perplexity exists in the pu l alic mind , and on which we should hardly be doing our ( - silty to the country if on this occasion we did not make a ,ome inq' airy of the Govern ment.atry is 'extremely bewildered The mind of the coin as to the general state of affairrs and th e policy of the Govern ment. I know it may be, said. that, as the Government have undertaken to produce the pape rs on the subjects I refer to, the reguhar course would be to wait till those docu ments have been 'laid before us; but the most peculiar cir cumstance of 0 - se present state of affairs is that the perplexity in the publ'x mind concerning our foreign relations and the policy of the Government in regard to them 'does not arise from want of information, (Hear, hear.) I' t is rather in consequence of the information we possess - that the public mind is so bewildered, Therefore, on accour .t of the general mystification which prevails I think this 'is the constitu tion-al occasion which should be taken for addressing s'ome irequiries to the Government on the ma t ter. I remember 'some two or three years ago that there was a steong feeling in the country against what was calle fl secs-et diplomacy. To secret diplomacy were attributed 1 navy, if not all, of those evils to which States are subj' tct—unnecessary and expensive wars, costly and unprincipl ed establishments, the 'burden of excessive taxes, often the dishonour and some times the humiliation of nations. s cry was that, if the Minister would only take the put JUT into his confidence, allow them to know how thing s w ere going on, and wh a t :really were the points at issue between us and f ore i gn Powers, he would then be so gu . tded by the judgment and so encouraged by the support of'Parliament and the country that he would be preserved frof a falling into those errors to which he would otherwise be liable. It was shown that the proper mode of conducting pl ablic affairs and of winning ;popular applause for the Ge vernment was to publish all ethey knew. Such were the maxims of. what may be called the school of openness and candour. It is greatly to the credit of the Government t hat they have acted with great frankness to the House of Commons, upon the subject of our foreign relations. Their candour has often been excessive, and sometimes even unnecessary, 'What may have been the cause of so much openness on the part of the Government I will not stop to inquire_ The Ministry acceded to power, as we have been reminded by the hon. mover and seconder (of the Address, under somewhat peculiar and embarrassing circumstances. They were certainly unable to fulfil the chief pledges under which they accepted office, and the balance of parties made them naturally desirous to conciliate the eonfidence and sympathy , sf the House. To this, it has been hinted, we probably owe the extreme candour with which the Government conduc feel their foreign relations, and im parted to the house all 'ant information which was necessary to make us acquainted with their policy. There was no pro ject which had failed, no' scheme in which they had been dis appointed, no occas;.on. , on which they had been deceived, that they did not in the most ingenuous manner reveal to the house and make them partakers of their mortification and chagrin. (Alaugh.) Indeed, it may be said that during the /last year the House of Commons were really admitted to dim brooding meditations of statesmen. The noble lord the Secretary for Foreign Affairs came down to the house one evening, and with an appearance of much alarm, which he successfuldy imparted to the house, declared that the time had coma when it was necessary to look out for new allies for her Majesty. (Laughter, and hear.) 'We were all naturally surprised by such candour. What in old times—in the days of secret diplomacy—would have been a soliloquy ita Downing-street becomes now a speech in the House of Commons. (Hear, and a laugh.) That was the manner in which our foreign relations were conducted by the noble lord during the. whole of the last session, and cer tainly it was highly complimentary to the House of Com mons. There were riot wanting, however, some ignorant cavillers who attributed the candour of the noble lord to the wry worst motives, such as are always imputed, and nearly lways falsely, to public men. It was said that in the nice balance of parties it was the aim of the noble Secretary to conciliate, perhaps to cajole, the House of Commons. But subsequent events have vindicated the character and conduct of the noble lord, and proved he was not influenced in. the open course he followed by any of the improper mo tives imputed to him. Because, when the session was over, and during that interval in which Ministers, and especially the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, are supposed to have the privilege of acting with the least possible sense of control, the same candour was exhibited by the noble lord. 'We were told at the, end of August—a most unusual period of the year for disclosing a political secret—the policy then pursued by the Crown. Not satisfied with that, at the end of October we had further revelations on the same subject. Hence it is not true that it was merely during the session, from an improper desire unduly to influence the House of 'Commons, but from a pure love of candid behaviour on the ~part of the noble lord, that the old habits of secret diplo macy wore exploded, and the public admitted to the confi /fence of the Government. It is extraordinary, however, that, notwithstanding all the candour of the Government —notwithstanding all these confidences—the public are more perplexed, more bewildered as to the real state of our foreign relations, and the real character of the policy which the Government have pursued, than they ever could have been under the old system of secret diplomacy. (Hear.) At the present moment there is no one who really knows what is the policy of the Government with respect to our foreign relations—the subject which now entirely engrosses the public mind, or;what are the Fospects of the country, with regard to any of those great questions which arise out of them. I would, therefore, ask from the noble lord answers to a few natural inquiries. I should like, for example, to learn from the Government what is the real state of our relations with France. I should like to know whether we arse still conducting our external affairs generally by an alliance with France, or what is equivalent to an alliance, by that cordial and confidential understanding of which we have heard so much. Are we doing that, or have we found new allies ? Or are we attempting to find now allies ? And if we have found new allies, or if we are trying to find mew allies, I should like to know what is the principle upon which the now alliance is to be formed. Is it to be a dis turbing or a tranquillising principle ? Is it to be a revolu tionary or a Conservative principle ? Is it, is it not, a fact that the King of Sardinia, as we were told at the end of August, entered into a public engagement with our own Sovereign not to attack the dominions of the King of the Two Sicilies? Is it, or is it not a fact that the King of Sardinia, as we learnt at the end of October, having at 'tacked the dominions of the King of the Two Sicilies, re ceived the approbation of her Majesty's Government ? These are questions with regard to which this country na turally feels the liveliest interest. Was there a public engagement between the King of Sardinia and her Majesty, as the Secretary of State assured us at the end of August, not to do an act which only two months afterwards that King of Sardinia did, and received from her Majesty's Government their thanks and congratulations? Have we news or have we not interests in the Adriatic which it be comes us vigilantly to guard and watch? (Hear, hear.) Or, on the other hand, are our interests in the Adriatic, like the law of nations, at the bottom of the Bay of Naples ? (Hear, hear.) Is the policy of England, as we were in formed at the end of August, to maintain the power and the dominion of Austria in Venetia ? or is the policy of England, as we learnt at the end of October, to preach the principle of insurrection and promulgate a theory of insur xection ? These are subjects upon which the people of this country naturally require information, and without giving an opinion one way or other as to these contrary policies, still it is extremely desirable that we should at least be informed by the Government which policy it is that they are pursuing, because in consequence of the frank and candid manner in which her Majesty's Go vernment have conducted their affairs, and the elaborate methods which they have adopted to prevent there being any secrecy as to their intentions and as to their schemes, the public mind is so mystified and bewildered that I am not surprised that there are many who almost regret that the old system of secret diplomacy should have been su perseded. Under that system, although Parliament did not become acquainted with the conduct of a minister until the events of which he had the control were completed, yet that conduct, even though some might think it erroneous, was at least consistent. There was then some sense of decorum and some sentiment of dignity in the management of public affairs ; some regard for the interests and feelings of our allies, and some respect for the law of nations. (Hear.) I just new ventured to ask the noble lord as the organ of the Government, what were the nature of our relations with France. It appears to me that there is no subject upon which a clearer conception ought to prevail in Parliament than as to our relations with a Power so considerable as France—relations of which we hear so much, and which can exercise so considerable an influence upon our own in terests and upon the afiairs of the world in general. No man at present has a clear perception what are our relations with the French Government. If we were to be guided by the authentic publications that have appeared in the shape of despatches—if we were to be influenced by the speeches and communication which have been made by the Secre tary of State and by the First Minister in this house, one might be tempted to believe that our relations with France were not, as they are described in the gracious Speech, friendly and satisfactory, but very unfriendly and highly unsatisfactory. (Hear.) Now, if there be still a cordial and confidential undertaking between the two countries, the noble lord or some member of the Government will be able to inform us what policy this country is pursuing with re spect to these important affairs of Italy ; nay more, he will also be able to tell us what ishe policy which the French Government is put suing with respect to them. I have what aver on more than one occasion upheld I e n eldseintho reason is a h v o e n se wha is called the French alliance, an to regret the principles which I h endea voured to impress upon the house with ref a e v re e nce be t e o n of that subject. The most eminent statesmen have opinion that a good, cordial, and confidential undlaenrsdtawndaisnga between the Governments of France and Eng combination most conducive to the peace of the world, and therefore to the progress of civilization. They have believed that such a combination was not only politic, but that it was also practicable. I won't go back to rem ote or d times. I won't remind the house that tha t was the policy which was favoured alike by Bolingbroke and Wal p ole, or, tant at a more distant period, by such great sovereigns as Queen Elizabeth and Cromwell. I will confine myself t o modern times, and I say that ever since the Treaty of V ienna all statesmen who have at all influenced the Government of either of the two countries, all statesmen of eminence have believed in the policy of such a combination, and also in its Practicability; that that has been the great object of modern politics with respect to the foreign relations of those coun tries. But it was quite clear that so far as France was concerned that cordial and confidential understanding de pended upon two assumptions. It depended, first, upon the assumption that France, profiting by experience, was convinced that by the development of her internal resources and by the multiplication of her highly gifted population her power would be more securely increased than by any forcible accession of territory ; and, secondly, upon the other assumption, that that noble weakness of the French people, that " last infirmity of noble minds," the love of glory, might be fairly satisfied by feeling that whenever there was any international difficulty, their opinion would be solicited, and world greatly and in the main be decisive. More than this, sir, it was perfectly obvious to both French and English statesmen, that even if these assumptions were well founded, that alliance could not subsist without the exercise on both sides of great forbearance, and occa sionally the making of great sacrifices. For example, Eng land was not a country that sought any increase of terri tory. During the revolutionary war she had obtained all those outworks which were necoesary for her maritime and colonial empire. France, on the contrary, had lost a consi derable colonial empire, and was slowly constructing an other. France had also for a time, though but fora brief space, been in possession of great additions to her original ten itory, and had lost by arms what by arms she had obtained. It was clear, therefore, that there were occasions when in the course of international embarrassments and difficulties that might arise Franco would be called upon to sacrifice the hope of any increase of territory. What was the sacrifice that England would be called upon to make ? England world be celled upon to ir eke the concession that she would at least not promo'n a policy which rightly or w:ongly France believed to be adverse to her best interest. The noble lord assumed the office of Secretary of State, as I believe, an ardent supporter o a cordial understanding with France. I understood the noble lord to stete at the time he acceded to office that ho believed by so doing he had prevented a war between England and France. Her Majesty's late Government are still profoundlyinaware of the circumstances to which he refers, and labour under the impression that the relations between England and France were cordial when they quitted office. But I mention that to show the tone and temper with which the noble lord entered on the duties of his position, Teking office, however, as the warm supporter of this cordial end confi dential understanding with France, the noble lord—whose sense of duty I do not question—immediately felt himself called cn to pursue on foreign affairs a policy exactly con trary to that which France was favouring, and one which, rightly or wrongly, France believed to be hostile to her best interests. What has been the result ? The noble lord avowed himself An advocate of the unity of Italy. France declared that she was entirely opposed to the unity of Italy. The policy of France and the policy of the nobl_e lord were contrary and contradictory. The noble lord may, perhaps, say that he preferred the policy which he pursued favourable to referm, and that Mr. Canning, although he opposed me in an eloqiierat reed brilliant speech in 1822, yet at the end of that speech gave me greet hopes and encourage ment that if I went on I should succeed in my endeavours. Accordingly, in the course of time, Lord Grey was placed at the head of the Government, and, being an old Reformer, he desired those who were aesociated with him to frame a bill, which should be introduced into Parliament. My right hen, friend the member for Carlisle, to - rd Durham, Lard Bessborotigh, and myself werenamed for that purpose. We a prepared bill, and after a great struggle we were enabled to carry it in 1832. Am Ito lie told that it is any mortifi cation to me to find at the end of 30 years that the country is so well satisfied with the bill of 1832 that it does not ask for anything else ? (A laugh.) Sur el y it can be to great humiliation to me that the amendment which I then in • troduced into the Constitution has been PO successful, has produced such contentment, has given so intleh fairer a re presentation to the great seats of industry, that at the pie sent moment the people thank of other objects—of foreign politics, of commercial treaties, of church-rates, of various questions of detail—rather than lend their support to any plan of organic change. All I can say, therefore, is that when any further amendment is proposed I hope it will go, as all the bills I have had the honour to introduce have gone, upon the principle of making a supplement to the bill of 1832 rather than of attempting to disturb the foundations of an arrangement which was then established with the approbation of the people. (Hear. hear.) At all events, for this year I certainly believe our best course will be to give our attent:on to those various amend ments which her Majesty has referred to in her Speech. They wi'l occupy most usefully the time of this House; and if the right hon. gentleman opposite, after hav ing read the papers upon foreign affairs, wishes further ex planations from me I shall be always ready to give them, feeling for myself that it is a great security for the people of this country that the Government should be their organ in foreign politics, and that it is a great security for the Government to know that they have the support of the people in the sentiments which they express and the prin ciples which they uphold. (Cheers.) Mr. BRIGHT said he would thank his hon. friend the member for Brighton for the course he had taken in bringing that question to which the noble lord had so recently al luded before the house. His hon. friend did it in a speech which was full of matter, and which had very favourably impressed the house. He (Mr. Bright) was glad, too, that that speech had drawn from the noble lord the true confes sion—he presumed the latest was the true confession—of his sentiments on that question. He would, however, rather a good deal not have hewed that speech from the noble lord, and he felt a grief he cerld not express in being compelled to understand the noble lord meant precisely what he said. The noble lord reminded him of cases often exhibited in the commercial world, where men who had borne for many years obligations and pecuniary burdens which they were unable to satisfy, finally called their creditors together, ac knowledged a state of bankruptcy, and felt a perfect happi ness in having got rid, in some way or other, of the obliga tions they had incurred. (Hear, and laughter.) That seemed precisely the tone in which the noble lord had ad dressed the house to-night. He (Mr. Bright) would admit there was some force in the statement as to the difficulties of the noble lord's position in handling this question and bringing it to a sucessful issue. He had seen the noble lord shed tears on that very spot when withdrawing a Reform Bill, when that evening he had pursued precisely the same course with a jocularity—(a laugh)—that was absolutely contemptuous to those who had placed him in that very seat in order that he might advocate that very mea sure. (Hear, hear.) He (Mr. Bright) should not, because he felt it utterly beneath the feeling he had with regard to this question, attempt to lay hold of the noble lord, and show him when he thought the noble lord had failed with regard to this question in a hostile and unfriendly spirit, because, notwithstanding what the noble lord had said that evening, he might again find that question of use to his political objects. But he would turn rather to the house, and ask them what was their position with regard to this question, for that mattered more to England, and to the people of England, than the consistency of any particular member of the house, however old in the public service or eminent he might be. The noble lord had taken up that subject as far back as the year 1819. He would not ask the house to go back so far. He would only take thew back to the year 1851, just ten years ago. That was a period when the noble lord the Foreign Secretary first announced to the house his intended departure from that principle which he was supposed to have avowed—that the Reform B:11 was a final measure wish regard to the representation of the people. In 1851 the noble lord stated, in answer to Mr. Hume, then a Oistinguished member of the house, that he was prepared to consider the question with the view of introducing some bill for extending the provision of the Reform Act. In 1852 the noble lord did introduce such a bill; but it happened then, as it constantly happened, that there was a quarrel and an estrangement between him and the noble lord the first minister, and that mainly, together with other difficulties, caused the noble lord to retire from office. Immediately afterwards came in that wonderful apparition, at which the country was much surprised, the first Govern ment of Lord Derby. They did not commit themselves upon the question at all. Lord Derby said—he (Mr. Bright) was quoting from recollect ion' only—that he censideredit was a part of his great duty to " stem the tide of democracy." Whether he stemmed it or not time would show; but the go vernment which undertook that fearful task was overthrown, because the house disapproved of a not very skilful budget introduced by the right hon. gentleman (Mr. Disraeli). There then followed what was called the government o coalition, over which presided a man of singular moderation' singular love of justice, and singular liberality—the late Lord Aberdeen. That Government comprised the noble lord (Lord J. Russell) ; and he brought in a bill to extend the right of suffrage, and to give an amended representation to the people. That bill was not withdrawn from any doubt being entertained by the house as to its principles or details, but because two noble lords, at present seated together on that bench, had succeeded with their colleagues in involving the country in a war with Russia, and it was though better, during the excitement of that contest, not to proceed with a reform bill, and it was accordingly withdrawn. Well, by and bye the Government of Lord Aberdeen was over thrown, and was followed by that of the noble lord now at the head of the administration ; and not long after the ter mination of the Russ!an war, the noble lord, in reply, he (Mr. Bright) believed, to his hon. friend the member for Finsbury, admitted that the time was come for amending the representation of the people, and he promised that in the succeeding session the Government would be prepared to introduce a bill. But in that succeeding session there happened something, as frequently did happen, which was not expected in the preceding session. In the year 1858, almost immediately after the house met, the noble lord made a stumble in a matter connected with the French Govern ment, and on a motion brought for ward byhis (Mr. Bright's) right hon. friend the member for Ashton, the noble lard was ejected from office. The house did not complain that the noble lord did not bring in a bill, because no sufficient time had been allowed for the purpose ; but when the hon. member for Finsbury put the question whether the the measure had been considered, and a bill prepared, it came out at last, as the noble lord was frank enough to say, that no bill was ready to be laid upon the table. So far the noble lord did not seem quite to have acted up to his promise. Then came the second apparition of Lord Derby's Government. Well, so convinced were Lord Derby and the right hon. gentleman of the necessity of the measure, that they announced their intention, in the next session, to bring in a bill to amend the representation of the people. Assuming that altering was amending they did so ; and the right hon. gentleman taunted the noble lord with the small number of supporters his bill received ; whereas no body upon his (Mr. Disraeli's) side of the house was in favour of his measure. (Hear, hear.) It passed to a second reading, no doubt, but had it gone further the right hon. gentleman would have gone out into the lobby with his own official supporters only. It was a bill which altered the constituency and created confusion, but it did not mate rially extend the franchise. The right hon. gentleman said, indeed, that it would add 500,000 new borough elec tors to the list. That was a monstrous exaggeration; but the system of government which was to stem the tide of democracy, on its second accession to office, was prepared, according to its awn showing, to introduce into the elec toral body twice the number proposed by the bill of the noble lord. So that he (Mr. Bright) must say the second Government of Lord Derby must in the eyes of hon. gentle men opposite have been something far worse than the first. (Laughter.) There was this, however, to be said about Lord Derby's Government, that they had prepared their Reform Bill; and when the House of Commons rejected it on the special invitation of the noble lard the member for the City of London, the Government of Lord Derby did one of the two things, which, according to constitutional practice, they were enabled to do ; they did not resign, which they were not bound to do, but they advised the Queen to dissolve Parliament, and Parliament was dis solved. They appealed to the one million electors of the United Kingdom—that million whose votes were distri buted and manipulated in such a curious and antique fashion that their real opinions could not be taken at all. HQ had been told that in the new united kingdom of Italy a representative system was to be este.blisTheelp under which one member was to be returned foo 50,000 inhabitants, and under w hich there vrooulnd rae ob;PounrYr great constituencies like the West lading: r, o o r r Binning ! metropolitan districts, or Liverpool, ham, to be neutralised by the it encies consisting of some hand l le wa rd in those great altogether would not form e non, gentleman opposite and populations. He said the.righbat was es7f;inala:atlpviees of w h c o o ns takest it u the honourable thing his chief, Lord Derby, adrirlia7mheenirt in f o o r r a m e r B t i o ll. see Th w e h e e o t u h n er . — the the y ou d n i t s ry sol w ve o d uld thae , u P FP° etion was brought forward, and the in house that the question of re : or not, the house was against the Govern form was at issue wtrhyedtihdernottt ldvoassoielr b-y te y res igned office, and then the noble lord the me m ber for t h City of London was once more a member , • t h e Cabinet, a nd the noble lord themember for Tiverton - the ch i e f. Well, the reform question was considered, and there were public and private pledges given of the most „ p ecit character—(hear)— to members of this house on the subject. The Government were not called upon during that session of Parliament to introduce a bill, but the noble lord the member for London very fairly described what would be character of the measure which he would pro pose. The noble lord had, prev i ous ly, on the very night the Government of Lord Der-by announced a dissolution, described the principle of his measure, and consequently it was left to the whole electoral body to discuss, hint the re sult was that after the returns were made the right hon. gentleman (Mr. Disraeli) and his friends were sent to the other side of the house, and the noble lords were restored to the Ministerial bench. It could not be said that he (Mr Bright) had treated the noble lord unfairly. He did not condemn the bill of last session, but he told the house that it merely touched the fringe of the queation as to the dis position of seats. So far as he could he spoke in favour of the bill, and his opinion was that it would be a gre a t improvement on the bill of Lord Derby's Goa 'ernment, because it would enable the best part of the working classes to raise themselves to that line whi c h the noble lord had laid down. (Hear, hear.) Wen, the noble lord brought in his bill, and he was not going to blame the noble lord for what he did last session, because he knew they could not get twenty waggons all at once through Temple-bar, but the noble lord might have shown a stronger disposition to pass the bill. The noble lord had complained that two members on his side of the house—the hon. member for Salford and the hon. member for Edin burgh—had spoken against his bill. He (Mr. Bright) would say nothing about the hon. member for Salford, except that it was generally understood in his borough that he was an enthusiaslic supporter of the bill which the noble lord said he spoke against. The hon. member for Edinburgh had told his constituents that he was in favour of a £6 franchise. However, the hon. member when he was down with his constituents the other day had passed under an unpleasant cross-examination, andthat, at a meeting called by his own ft lends, was a very strong proof that his supporters did not approve of the course which he took last year. The noble lord the Prime Minister spoke on the second reading of the bill last year, and on both sides of Ithe house there was a belief that the noble lord was not in favour of Parliamen tary reform, and in fact that he and his colleagues would not mind if the bill introduced in the name of the govern ment should not pass the house. There was no apprehen sion or pain felt at the course the house might te KC with regard to it. (Hear, hear.) He had no doubt that the idea which prevailed led to a great deal of the opposition— persistett and irritating—which the bill encountered. (Hear, hear.) But what was the fate of the Lill after all ? He would appeal to all upon this point, that noi,,ody moved anything in opposition to it. An IiON. MEMBErt on the Opposition side of the house—Yes. The hon. member for Salford did. Mr. BRIGHT—No, he had an amendment on the paper, but he ran away from it just as your man did from hiS e (Laughter.) Well, the answer to all these questions must be that the representation of the people is very imperfect, and that with regard to many boroughs and counties it was purely a sham. The house knew that six millions of men were unrepresented, and amongst those who were in that position he would find 500 who would be able to debate every question which came before the house with just as much ability and soundness of argument as they did. The nole'..e lord said he wrote to the King of Neples, and advised him to do certain things, but he did not do them, and he was now shut up in the fortress of Gaeta. It did not follow that the same thing should happen in England, but the same feelings existed in the minds of all people, and the noble lord might some day receive a despatch from a continental sovereign containing advice that he should pursue a diffe-, rent course. (Laughter.) He would appeal to the house, and ask whether it would be right that the representation of the people should be amended some time, or would it not be right ? (Hear.) If some time, would it not be better to do it now than as it was done in 1832, and as it would be done a e a inil the house persisted in the course they were now taking? (Hear.) It had been declared by the noble lord the member for London as the leader of the Government at one time—by Lord Aberdeen, the leader of the Government, which comprised many great statesmen, at another—by Lord Derby, the chief of another Government, at another time—and by Lord Palmerston, the longest of all in the service of the country, at another time—that the represen tation of the people was so far imperfect that it was desir able it should be amended, and he would ask the house whether the small questions of Savoy and Nice, and ques tions still smaller than those, should interfere with this vast and more important question of the reform of the represen tation of the people. (Heat.) What did the House of Com mons think of the people of England, and what would the people think of the House of Commons? (Hear, hear.) The house had already passed a resolution in favour of the working classes being enfranchised to the extent of 120,000 of these classes—(hear, hear)—and now nothing more was to be done. He had stated at Leeds that at Rochdale there were undertakings representing a capital of £400,000, managed by four committees of eleven each, and of all the working men on those committees only two were possessed of the franchise. He knew many of those men and their worth, and one of them, in the employ of the firm in which he was a partner, had the care of a steam engine, and was a man of great intelligence and economy, and as respectable as any man he saw before or around him in that house. That man had succeeded in obtaining a vote for the county. Now those 6,000,000 men would not always be contented to be left out of the representation, and he should despise his countrymen if he thought the course taken by the Government was a safe one and could be maintained. (Hear, hear.) There was nobody could doubt for a moment that the class of persons which the noble lord proposed last year should have the franchise were equal in position and respectability to the £lO voters admitted in 1832. The last thirty years had produced * large improvement in the character and intelligence of the people of England. He did not speak of the agricultural labourers, but he did speak of artisans of Lancashire and Yorkshire ; but he spoke not more for them than for the house, for if it were good that they should be represented it could not be good for the house that they should be ex cluded from the franchise. (Hear, hear.) The noble lord, with a jocularity which he disliked, said nobody cared much about reform ; but he would give the house a warn ing, which he was not sure the noble lord had given him self, that there would not always be periods of tranquillity and acquiescence in the old system of things. Prior to 1831 the House of Commons was warned, and little notice was taken, and what was the consequence ? Why, they all ran for their lives, and conceive the danger they ran, for the country was within 24 hours of a revolution which would have given the people more than they got. (Hear, hear.) The other House of Parliament was in terror, and had to kiss the dust before those people of whom they had been speaking with contempt ; and when the Monarch threatened to exercise his prerogative, a certain party absented themselves from the house, while the other side passed the bill. (Hear.) He believel it was generally considered that this question must be set tled. The time was favourable, for there would be nothing before the house but the Attorney General's Bankruptcy . Bill, and one or two other measures, and if the govern ment wore not going to interfere with the Italian strife, surely this was the sessiws for the introduction of a short, moderate, and useful Reform measure, and it ought to tre presented to the house. (Hear, hear.) And if the noble lord at the head of the government hai said that it would be the bill of the session, and given the house to understand that its rejection would be followed by a change in the government or a dissolution of parliament—as the case of Lord Derby's government—it would hive passed the house. The Treble lord said it required a strong tide to carry it over the bar of the house of Lords; but there were men in that house who were not wholly oblivious to what passed around them, and he did not believe such a measure would have been treated with contempt and ig nominy by the other house. He had very god I reasons for thinking that if such a bill had passed the Commons, the other house would not have renr-,3d it their sanction. The speech of the noble lord had placed this question in a very different position, and, so far at least, those members who were instrumental in placing the government in office were absolved from any supposed obligation which consi dered them as supporters of the noble lord. (Hear, hear.) He grieved at this because he was most anxious that at least they should not have a change of government or a dissolution every two years, but that the government should remain in office a longer period. The noble lord had now repudiated all he had said before, and not with sorrow, but with satisfaction. (Hear, hear.) The noble lord obtained a dissolution of parliament, and a majority in favour of the proposition which he put forward and brought before the house, and there was no division upon his bill last year, and yet he came down to the house at the opening of this session—in which there would be almost nothing to do—and refused to do that for whic h the Governmet had been placed on the Treasury benches. (Hear, hear.) He (the hon. member) was content, like the noble lord, to wait till the time came when this measure would receive what he must call a more honest and states man like attention from the house, He believed that the time was not distant when the country would insist that something should be done with regard to it. The working classes were not like the members of that house, who had time to spare in the morning and in the evening, and at a good many intervals during the day. They had to work from six in the morning till six in the evening and sometimes later. They had no time, except when they were out of work or when they were in great distress, to make great political demonstrations. The million who had votes had declared themselves in favour of re forming the franchise; but the majority that there was amongst that million was as nothing compared with the majority there would be amongst the remaining six-sevenths of the nation who at present had no votes. And how were these six-sevenths to express their opinion ? Parliament would not call a convention, and allow them to decide whether it should deal with the question of reform. They would not let the country declare itself, but they con fined the vote to a small portion of the community, whom they hecuspocussed until that vote was of no value to them. Did they want the public wish to be expressed by enormous meetings ? The people had no other means of expressing their opinions ; and if they met in great excitement, those meetings must necessarily be often tumultuous. If they could have the hon. member for Glasgow come there and say "Mr. Speaker, I have just left 100,000 men meeting on Glasgow-green, and this is the resolution which they passed" —if they could have the hon. members for Manchester end Leeds and his hon. colleague and himself coming there.and telling the same story, their difficulties would all vani°J . _'2 _ as they had fled 30 years ago. Ministers, who wprl e n° l l l7 . calm and so conservative, would, especially 1 , n , the other brought them to the Government. bench! w as n . 1832 ; a bill house would become as obsequious as pened to sit on the Opposition side, rise h s ; waveytill it it li wil e :s ar„ hear.) He (the would be passed, perhaps more extene y e than many of the to see become law, members opposite advanced Liberal pa ty would no wh.vech( and d pr c e h s an eut ge d s re m ad ig e lt tteakespeaplakee the house wise counsVhich, f. shongh they might be stecioednyrthetisotn t h h e at w he ss wa w s gi ar slg s rofess to have the gift of prophesy distant--and he gia p evnertneless dangers that were ahead, bon.t en member ) ag a inst as to tiine--wer e e . f d e a lt nge an r: h t erre , had o vertaken the statesmen of every ust e rthi t s h q e u se esti t o hi n n ha gs d b i e n en vi su ew eh . and The cond uct them run the risk of losing, first , their own as to make the respect f the se oneer , e nd theno country. When that g us h t have T h e e proposed dsehurg e thisof their essi o a na if :::otncehrap p d ened in this kingdom a more unhappy and a thawth°—tilhead h ouse not more u npleasant crisis would have come than could possibly House of Commons, with great satisfac tiony, a rrive as the result of se judicious and moderate a raeasitre ob a ve s ee t niran he co l el l in o rt to the people, might in his opinion and tash etyh he a such ad have passed. (Hear, hear.) The house then divided— For the amendment . 46 Against it .. ........ Majority --53 The result was received wi •th some cheers from the sup. porters of the motion. The address was then agreed to, and a committee was appointed to draw it up. The house adjourned at five minutes to ten. of [ADVERTISEMENT.] rills and medicine invariably ag: frt avate and perpetuate diseases; their annoyance, die. appointment, and expense may be avoided by persona in indifferent health sending only their address to E. S. Barry, Req., 77', Regent-street, W., London, and they will receive gratis and free by post the " IrivAlans' Ows G limn," or Natural Restorer, without medicine or ex p'nse, of perfect digestion, strong nerves, sound lungs, and refreshing sleep, to the most enfeebled, insuring the removal of indigestion (dyspepsia), constipation, liver complaints, nausea, epilepsy, paralysis, debility, nervousness, palpitation, cough, asthma, consumption, dropsy, flatulency, diarrhoea, dysentery, biliousness, fevers, sore throats, catarrhs, colds, noises in the ears, rheumatism, gout, impurities, eruptions, hysteria, neuralgia, irritability, sleepl essness, acidity, I:alp:- tation, heartburn, headache, desp ondency, cramps,sp_ sinking, fits, brortobitfi,-,.• Unquestiona bly the safe st gui de to_health.'! . , - THE I . SON, LONDON, WEDNESDAY EVENING, FEBRUARY 6, 186: —that he valued the unity of Italy more than his intimate relations with the French Government. That is not the question ; it is not my desire to enter into any argument on that point. It was perfectly open to the noble lord to follow the policy which he preferred. Bat hes the noble lord obtained the unity of Italy ? He may be in that situation with the French Goverment that he is obliged to look out for new allies, by having forfeited—if he has forfeited — that cordial understanding mith them and that opportunity of pursuing the same policy. Has the noble lord succeeded in the policy which he preferred ? Have his efforts ef fected the tr-ky of Italy ? We hear—we know that a powerful French army is stronglyintrenclied in the centre of Italy. We know that the contemplated capital of Italy is not in possession of the Italians. In this age of jubilant nationality Rome is still garrisoned by the Gauls. (Hear, and laughter.) We know that "Venetia is bristling with Austrian artillery andswarming with German end Sclavo nian legion's. We know that even the King of the Two Sicilies, deprived of his crown by universal end unanimous suffrage, unfortunately followed by frequent insurrections, and martial law—(hear, hear)—is even at this moment in possession of the two prime strongholds of his kingdom. We know that in the south of Italy they have combined the horrors of revolution with the shade of conquest. These are not the characteristics surely of the unity of Italy. But the noble lord may say, perhaps, " All this is undeniably true, the unity of Italy is not effected,but great results like these are not accomplished with the rapidity you seem to expect ; you must wait, we are only in the beginning of the of. era tions ; much has been done, and the rest will be accom plished." The noble lord may say that the elections to tho Italian Parliament indicate a most hopeful temper on the part of the people as to the means by which union may be ultimately effected. I will not depreciate the possible advan tages which may accrue from these public elections. Unfor tuaately history shows us that new political institutions have very little power in times as critical as these. Old in stitutions that have existed for centuries, possessing an authority which has been gradually conceded to them as public necessity rendered it advisable—institutions which have aggregated round them the power of prescription, more important than armies or police, may control and even create events in an age of revolution : but we have, unfor tunately, no instance, as far as history can guide us, of new political institutions exercising this influence in an age and in a country where revolution prevails. But Ido not want to argue on these points. In order to obtain as accurate a view of our situation as we can, after the bewildering com munications that have been made to 119, I am ready to offer every concession, as far as argument goes, to the noble lord and to her Majesty's Government. I will grant that the union of Italy, if not already accomplished, may in time be effected. But how is this result to be attained ? I will admit that manipulating what is called the spirit of the age, with all the adroitness of English diplomacy, you may produce such a state of affairs that the Emperor of the French, whatever his original or present policy, may say--" On the whole this unity of Italy seems to be a resulV.that is practicable, and I will consent to it." But on what terms will the Emperor of the French, or any one who represents French policy, consent to such a result ? It will not be the moral influence of England that under these circumstances will have accomplished the unity of Italy—it will be the sword of France. (Hear.) It is the will of France that can alone restore Rome to the Italians; it is the sword of France—if any sword can do it—that alone can free Venetia from Austrians. If the unity of Italy is to be effected by such influences and by such means, are we to suppose that a Sovereign who is described as profound and crafty, and a people whom we know to be ambitious and quick-witted, will be prepared to make such an effort, and to endure such a sacrifice—such a surpassing sacrifice and such an enormous effort, with out obtaining some result ? Why, sir, it would belie every principle of human nature. We cannot impute it to that Sovereign, and to such a people as the French, that they would not after such exertions expect to obtain some great political and public advantage. And it is obvious what that result would be. Those who, under the circumstances I have stated, will free the nation will make their terms, and will be justified in making their terms. They will have an alliance offensive and defensive with Italy, and the Emperor of the French will then appear in the character which he has himself shadowed out, for which he has prepared the world, which the policy he has hitherto pursued with regard to Italy has shown that he has not too anxiously sought to fulfil, foreseeing its diffi culties as well as its glory. The Emperor of the French will then come forward in that character, as the natural head of the Latin race. He will find himself the eman cipator of Italy, at the head of a million of bayonets. (Hear, hear.) A million of disciplined and even distinguished soldiers will be at his command and behest ; and then it will be in his po'wer—you having forced him to a policy in Italy, which at first he was un• willing to pursue—to make those greater changes and to aim at those greater results which I will only intimate, and will not attempt to describe. Ido not wish in any way to offer these considerations to the house ; I am merely trying to place the state of affairs in its real light, after all the bewilderment which the public mind has undergone from the speeches and from the despatches of her Majesty's Ministers. Ido not want to underrate the object which her Majesty's Ministers propose to themselves in effecting the unity of Italy ; I am perfectly willing to admit that if the unity of Italy be practicable it would add greatly to the strength and splendour of Europe. But if a British Minister did conceive such a re-arrangement of ter ritory to be of paramount importance, if he believed it to be a policy of that sovereign character that the country to achieve it ought to be prepared to make every sacrifice, why thee. I think he ought to have attempted his object by other means than those which are called moral influence. If we had really interfered in Italy with a material agency, if we had ourselves assisted the Italians in achieving their free dom, their independence, and their unity, we should then have had claims oa their gratitude—(hear)—we should then have been in a position to leek on them as our natural and our grateful allies. But we have not taken' that course ; we have had before us a large but misty object, never prac ticable ; we have expended at great force a puerile and de clamatory diplomacy, and we have given to it the vain, the fruitless, and unsatisfactory title of " moral influence." (Hear.) I am not counselling the house to go to war to free Italy, nor have I ever counselled the house to such an ob ject. I think as a general rule we should leave countries to make out their own freedom ; but, when the freedom of a particular country is made the great political object on which the rival claims and the rival systems of great em pires are concentrated, I say it is of importance the house should understand that the country whose sword and will frees the enslaved land is the country which, not only by moral but material influence, obtains its future support, and commands its future resources. That is the position in which . it appears to me we are placed by the policy of her Italy usresreo p; ofwe i b ihoo n ai ar t t Majesty's Government. I shall wait with patience and curiosity for the papers which they have promised on tis w thih h iattei e es n cistuta l y:ta r est e iGo c o o fno l v l o e ef e r t u t m h o e u s t p h ee a c y h o e m s w ad h e ic i h u th th is e h m ou em se .. ; when I recollect the despatches distributed throughout affairs ta is, want of when ou our presento understand n de position . rsta n d w(Hear,)ha s the iw real the house that d w t e h o e o ocoun tryupy. (Cheers.) I think it will be found to positionupy one of great danger, and, perhaps, of great disappointment • but what ever it may' be,l think the c ase i s one that demands the g ravest attention of Parliament. (Hear, hear.) By the conduct of the Government we are placed in thi s dilemma —and it is a very serious one—either we must be content to ' fall back on an arrangement similar in principle to the Treaty of Zurich, that settlement against which, for the last 12 months, her Majesty's Government have been agitating in every Court in Europe ; or we must be prepared to meet that far more dangerous situation which is open to us when Italy is united—united by the sword and will of France— and has necessarily placed at the disposal of France all its resources. (Hear.) As to the first case, I think it would be disgraceful to this country, as represented by its Govern ment ; but the secend is much more dangerous—more dan gerous indeed, than one would at this moment attempt to describe. (Hear, hear.) The settlement made by the pre liminaries of Villafranca was not one that would have realised the youthful dream of the poetical statesman. (Laughter.) That I admit ; but it secured many interests which this country has always considered to be most im portant. No doubt, it substituted French for Austrian influ ence in Italy. Who denies that? That was a most natural consequence of a war between France and Austria in which France was signally victorious. We did not interfere in the war; but the preliminaries of Villafranca secured a great southern boundary t o Germany, and that I believe is an ob ject which no English statesman should despise. If it did not secure, it did not destroy the independence of the Pope, a consideration which the most eminent English statesmen of all parties have always held to be important. (Hear, hear.) It did not destroy the independence of Switzerland—Savoy and Nice remained still an appanage of the King of Sardinia. (Cheers.) There is a great responsibility on the Ministry, who, by efforts, active efforts, influential efforts, I believe none will deny, mainly defeated the accomplishment of that settlement. (Hear, hear.) Now, we r-e in this position —either we must fall back on a settlement similar to the Treaty of Zurich, or we must encounter a sae of affairs so dangerous that before its difficuries are solved every throne in Europe may be shaken, and which ap pears to me to be inevitably and logically brought about by the policy which her Majesty's Government have steadfastly, but, as I think, most injudiciously pur sued. (Hear, hear.) And, Sir, how do we know that it is in the power of the Englisa and French Governments, if they come to an understanding, to fall back on an ar rangement similar to the Treaty of Zurich ? Great influ ences have been at work during the last year—influences more powerful than French Emperors and British Minis ters. They had been slumbering in chaos ; but you called .fort those anarchical elements, one of which alone may be sufficient to produce a European war. What are these questions which are now agitating Europe, and from the agitation of which men shrank ? You have the rival claims of priests and kings, you have the rights of races and the boundaries of empires—questions, one of which alone caused a war of 30 years. All these questions have now been called forth while her Majesty's Government have been pursuing the phantom of a United Italy. (Hear, hear.) You have produced all those elements of anarchy, and he is a bold man who would say that it is in the power of Cabinets any longer to control them. (Hear.) This is a grave position of affail - a, and one of which we have a right to expect from her Majesty's Government some real expo sition. They have been treated by this house on the sub ject of their foreign policy with, I will say—speaking for boll sides, and claiming no party merit—generosity. The house has believed that the Government, ou their part, have treated it with candour. I will not deny it ; but I say that that candour has in its effects been most unfortunate, because it has been of a most bewildering nature. (Laughter.) The more the Government told us the less we knew. What was one day explained to us as the policy of her Majesty' s Government, was followed the next day by an exactly opposite one, and with contradictory speeches and conflicting despatches. I am using ne exaggerated language when I say that the public mind of this country is not informed on the precise nature of our foreign relations. (Hear.) I cannot find in the speech from the Throne any thing which gives us that information which I think we have a right to expect. (Hear.) On the question of our relations with France, it will be satisfactory to us to have some announcement from the Government. Are we pursuing with regard to Italy the same policy as is being adopted by that Power ? And if we are not, what in the opinion of her Majesty's Government must be the natural result ? Is there rivalry with regard to Italy, or is there harmony? These are questions to which the house has a right to invite the attention of the Government. (Hear.) I think it is idle to say that we ought to wait for the papers before we do so. 'When we read those papers we shall be able to form a judgment on the conduct in detail of Ministers with re • gard to particular transactions ; but their policy has been described by themselves, and it demeuds explanation. We have the policy of the Government; we have despatches, and we have Vattel the eminent jurist quoted by the noble lord. (Laughter.) That quotation from Vattel is the basis of the policy of the Government; and as it is only four lines I shall read it to the house. In October the noble lord informed us that— _ _ _ "That eminent jurist Vattel, when discussing the law fulness of the assistance given by the united provinces to the Prince of Orange, when he invaded England and over turned the throne of James 11., says The authority of the Prince of Orange had doubtless an influence on the de•• liberations of the States General; but it did not lead them to the commission of an act of injustice, for when a people for good reasons take up arms against an oppressor, it is but an act of justice and generosity to assist brave men in the defence of their liberties.' " Now, Vattel was a Dutchman, which the noble lord is not --(laughter)—and therefore ho had a right to quote Wil liam 111. Ido not depreciate Vattol's authority. I think that on a diplomatic instrument, or a diplomatic procedure, or on some question of the law of nations, he is a high autho rity and a correct and lucid writer ; but when it comes to a question of the political conduct of men, I think that the noble lord is as good an authority as Vattel, or better, -and that there are men in this house who may use their judg ment, though they do not agree with Vattel. However, the noble lord does not appear to be quite correct on this point. This opinion of Vattel is followed immediately afterwards by a qualifying statement, which I shall read to the house. He says,— " But we ought not to abuse this maxim, and make a handle of it to authorise odious machinations against the internal tranquillity of States: It is a violation of the law of nations to invite those subjects to revolt who actually pay obedience to their Sovereign, though they complain of his Government." (Hear.) Why, this is the conduct of Sardinia sketched by one not at all influenced by the passions of the hour, as he has long passed away from the earth. That is exactly what has been done by the King of Sardinia. A great necessity of State may, in the opinion of the King of Sardinia, and in the opinion of the noble lord, justify the conduct he has pursued—l will not enter into any arguments on that point at this moment—but certainly it was a most unhappy quo tation from Vattel which the noble lord selected for his de spatch of Oct. 27. (Hear.) I have placed before the house, without attempting to argue upon the propriety or impro priety of the conduct of the King of Sardinia, my views upon this subject, and looking at all the questions in con troversy, I have endeavoured to bring those views to a single object :—lf the unity of Italy is to be effected, it can be effected only by a Power which occupies Italy in great force, not by a Power which has no force there whatever. That unity cannot be effected under such auspices without results dangerous, in my opinion, to the pease of Europe. (Hear.) That unity can only be effected in such circum stances by placing the Emperor of the French at the head of at least a million of armed men, and making him master of all the resources of Italy. (Hear.) I want to know whether, with the probability of such a result as that, with such dangers as these impending over Europe and more than . Europe, inquiries and explanations have passed between the Governments of England and France as to the inten tions and policy of the French Emperor. 1 want to know whether the Government can inform the house what is the exact state of affairs in that respect, what are the true re lations of France with Italy, and what are the prospects on this all-important question which the Government can hold out to the people of England. (Hear.) Lord J. RUSSELL—Though the right hon. gentleman has a perfect right on this the firstnight of the session to ask for an explanation of the views of the Government with re gard to its foreign policy, and to express his opinion on that policy, yet he is not justified in complaining of want of in formation, when we have laid papers on the table of the house which to-morrow morning would enable him to settle all those doubts and obscurities of which he complains. The right hon. gentleman, however, having stated his views of the foreign policy of the Government, I have no objection to state in general terms what is the course which we have pur sued, and the opinions we have expressed, with reference to the Italian question. 'With regard to this mystery,of which it is curious enough the right hon. gentleman should complain, the policy of the Government was proclaimed about a year and a half ago by my right hon. friend the Secretary fir the Home Department at the Lord Mayor's feast, and every body knows that what is told to the Lord Mayor is prover bially told to the whole world. My right hon. friend on that occasion said it was the policy of her Majesty's Go vernment not to attempt to impose any form of government on Italy, but to allow the Italians to settle their internal affairs in the way they thought best. (Hear, hear.) That principle has been declared over and over again. It was declared in her Majesty's speech at the end of last session. It has been declared at the beginning of this session, and it has pervaded all the despatches and documents that have been laid on the table of the house. Now, I want to know whether the right hon. gentleman considers that a right principle or a wrong one—for the right hon. gentleman has never given an opinion as to whether he thinks it right or wrong that the people of Italy should be left to manage their own internal affairs. (Hear, hear.) The right hon. gentleman might have known that that was the principle on whicb her Majesty's Government has all along acted, and that the doubts and obscurities which he has conjured up have no existence in fact. (Hear.) When, some years ago, our views were in opposition, we declared ourselves in favour of Italian freedom and independence, the right hon. gentleman was always the leader of those who derided such notions as visionary—(hear, hear)—who contended that the best government for Italy was that of Austria, and who were accustomed to sound the praises of the late King of Naples and his system of Government. (Hear, hear.) Pre vious to the late war in Italy the Italians saw that they had no hope of assistance from England, but looked to France for aid in effecting their liberation. At that time the Government of the day,:which wasithagof Lord Derby, did not expect war, but as soon as they gained information which led them to expect that war was impending, they used their utmost efforts to prevent it. They were not suc cessful. I never blamed them for their want of success, and I always regarded their conduct as prompted by the best intentions and by a due regard to the policy which this country ought to pursue. But their efforts were not successful, and the war took place. Informa tion at length reached them that it was the intention of the French Emperor to liberate Italy from the Alps to the Adriatic, and that Savoy and Nice were to be trans ferred to France. Lord Cowley was instructed by Lord Malmesbury to inquire of the French Government if that intelligence was true, but he obtained no answer from the French Government. Soon after the French army was , inereased and entered Italy, and those events took place which are familiar to the house. We were then told that the French nation expected that Savoy and Nice should be transferred to the French Government. After this came the Treaty of Zurich. That treaty stipulated one thing, wHe the French Emperor declared another thing, which, Lough not totally inconsistent with the treaty, was prac tically adverse to it. The Treaty oZ Zurich said that the Duchies of Tuscany and Modena should be restored to their former rulers. The French Emperor said no troops.—Aus tiivn or French—should be allowed to effect that restora tion, and in consequence of that declaration the article in the Treaty of Zurich was not fulfilled. Her Majesty's pre sent Government then declared, not that the unity of Italy was their object—l shall show presently that from time to time that was not our object, but that we only wished the Italians to be free to choose their own rulers—that if the Grand Duke of Tuscany or the Duke of Modena were re ceived with the consent of the people our Government would see their restoration with pleasure, but that they could not approve Sand would protest against any attempt to impose on the Italians any government by force. (Hear.) Was that principle right or wrong ? I ask the right hon. gentleman again whether he approves or disapproves that policy ? (Hear.) Does he maintain that it would be right to force upon Italy a government not approved by the peo ple ? (Hear.) The right hon. gent!emr-r knows that Aus tria has declared that she will not go beyond her own fron tier to interfere in Italian affairs—that she will be satisfied with the territories left to her by the Treaty of Zurich, and that she was willing to be a party to the ancient prin ciple of non-intervention. This has been the policy which her Majesty's Government has endeavoured to act upon; and, so far as it has been in accordance with the policy of the Government of France, it has been successful. (Hear, hear.) But now as to the unity of Hely. We have de• dared that we have no wish that the Grand Duke of Tuscany and the Duke of Modena should not return. I have stated with regard to Naples, both in this House and in my communications with the Government of the Emperor of the French, that in our opinion the happi ness of Italy would be better secured by there being two kingdoms of Italy than one, and that if the King of Naples would have granted aconatitution we should have been glad to see two constitutional kingdoms in Italy. But still that was a question for the Italians themselves. (Hear.) It was for them to consider whether the Prince having hereditary right on his side was a Prince in whom they could trust— (hear, hear)—and they had the perfect right to regulate their internal affairs in such a manner as to secure theirown happiness. Was that a wrong principle ? We may have been wrong in our opinion that it would be better there should be two kingdoms in Italy, but we said that the Italians only ought to be the judges on that point. Well, sir, other events occurred, and the right hon. gentleman speaks of two des patches of mine. With regard to the first, it was published without my knowledge. I saw it translated into the Cologne Gazette. It was communicated by me to the Government of Sardinia, and I do not know how it obtained that notoriety. But I must say there have been three objects which her Majesty's Government have kept in view throughout these negotiations. One was that Italy should be left free to settle her own concerns. Whether she succeeded in obtaining two constitutional monarchies, or became one united Italy under one constitutional monarchy, we declared that it would be satisfactory to us to obtain either of those results, and that in our opinion in either case additional security would be given to the other States of Europe. Another ob ject we had in view was that the peace of Villafranca, with the conditions of which we had nothing to do, should be maintained as a security for the peace of Europe. I am un able to express to this house the importance I attach to the maintenance of the peace of Europe. (Cheers.) No one can say how far a war once begun may extend, what changes of Governments may not be produced, what alterations in the position of various Powers may not be caused, and how difficult it may not be for any country in Europe, and particularly this country,- which we are bound to cherish more than any other, to keep itself disengaged from such a war. (Hear, hear.) Not only, therefore, from a general hatred to war and unnecessary bloodshed, but for reasons connected with the dreadful aspect of such a war, we have been most anxious that the peace of Europe should not be disturbed. In August, therefore, I wrote in strong terms—some may think too strong, although I think what I wrote was calculated to do good at the Sardinian Court— recommending that, for the benefit of Italy herself, Sardinia should not rush rashly and madly to war, thereby bringing on herself great evil. It was in the interest of the Sar dinians, I urged, that the obligations of good faith bound them to keep the treaty of peace that they had concluded so lately—a treaty under which they bad given up Venetia while they had obtained Lombardy. Every consideration of regard to their own interest prevented them from leadir g their newly-formed and not numerous legions against the armies of Austria. I said her Majesty's Government trusted that the King of Sardinia would not make war on Naples; without the knowledge of the Sardinian Govern ment, but with the strong impulse of the people, an expe dition went out from Genoa to Sicily. Sicily was conquered. The people declared in favour of Garibaldi. He had only, some 1,800 men to lead against 20,000 or 25,000 soldiers of the Neapolitan army; yet he marched from one success to another. Garibaldi then landed in the kingdom of Naples. He went to Naples in a railway carriage with ten or twelve of his companions. He entered the town with those ten or twelve companions, a'though there were 3,000 to 4,000 troops of the King of Naples in the city. He was welcomed with general applause, and proclaimed himself Dictator. Now, if I look at a statistical account of the kingdom of Naples, I find that the king had 100,000 soldiers belonging to the regular army, and a reserve of between 40,000 and 50,000 men • that he had two ships of 90 and 80 guns, and a number of Other ships. Here was, then, a Sovereign who, one might have thought, would have laughed to scorn the attempt of a chief, who has been talked of in this house with much undeserved contempt—(cheers)—who, with nothing but his own valour and patriotism to council him, went with 1,800 men to assail so strong a kingdom. It might have been thought that it was madness to make such an attempt—that the ships, frigates, and corvettes of the King of Naples would enable him utterly to destroy such a force. Yet we all know the result. Well, the inference to which I came, and every man made himself, was that the King of Naples was not very strong in the affections of his subjects. (Cheers and laughter.) I ventured to suppose, not that 100,000 men were not able to defeat 2,000, but that they had no heart for the enterprise ; that the accounts of my right hon. friend the Chancellor of the Exchequer and others of the dungeons of the King of Naples, and the de scriptions given by our Consuls, were true ; and that the tortures impeseci on them had disgusted the subjects of the King of Naples, and had led them to welcome as a deliverer any man who came to free them from that rule. (Cheers.) I do not mean to defend the whole of the conduct of the King of Sardinia, but it was a question for him and his ministers to consider whet they should do. The right hon. gentleman thinks little of thatipotentate. I will. however, mention an opinion to which the right hon. gentleman may attach more importance. In 1821 the position of affairs in Italy afforded a great contrast to its present state. The So vereigns of Europe met at Verona. They laid down certain principles, from which no nation was allowed to depart, that Sovereigns might introduce improvements, and that if it pleased them to improve their laws they were at liberty to do so ; but that if it did not occur to any Sovereign that arbitrary imprisonment, that caps of silence, and dungeons where prisoners might be confined without trial for several years, were objectionable, he need not introduce any im provement in those matters. It was, however, laid down that any improvement introduced by the people was against the divinity of Kings, and was not to be permitted. Lord Castlereagh, on the part of England, did not think it necessary to declare on this account an armed resist ance on the part of England. This country had carried on a very long war, and the efforts she had made had been very costly. We had retained at a great sacriace the an cient limits of Europe. The sovereigns who met on that oc casion were chiefly sovereigns in alliance with Great Bri tein. They were sovereigns with whom and for whom we had encountered these perils and incurred these costs. But while Lord Castlereagh did not advise his country to go to war, he protested against the principle of this general super vision, and he said what, if the house will permit me, I am about read. His words appear to me to be so sound that it is worth the while of the house, although the extract is not a short one, to attend to them : " After baying removed the misconception to which the passage cf the circular in question, if passed over in silence, might give countenance, and having stated in general terms, without, however, entering into the argument, the dissent of his Majesty's Government from the general prin ciple upon which the circuler in question is founded, it should be clearly understood that no Government can be more prepared than the British Government is to uphold the right of any State or States to interfere, where their own immediate security or essential interests are seriously endangered by the internal transactions of another State. But, as they regard the assumption of such right as only to be justified by the strongestnecessity—(hear, hear)—and to be limited and regulated thereby, they cannot admit that this right can receive a general and indiscriminate applica tion to all revolutionary movements, without reverence to their immediate bearing upon some particular State or States, or be made prospectively the basis of an alliance. They regard its exercise as an exception to general pi in ciples, of the greatest value and importance, and as one that only properly grows out of the circumstances of the special case; but they, at the same time, consider that ex ceptions of this description never can, without the utmost danger, be so far reduced to rule as to be incorporated into the ordinary diplomacy of States, or into the institutes of the law of nations." Now, according to this opinion, in which I entirely concur, the question forthe King of Sardinia and his Ministers was whether the essential interests of Sardinia and of that part of Italy over which he was then the ruler were so endan gered by what had taken place in Naples that he could not remain a tranquil spectator of those events. What was that situation ? Garibaldi, as I have said, had made himself master of Naples and the greater part of the country. But he had not been able—even if be had the talents for go vernment, which he does not appear to possess—to found a solid Government in Naples. Everything was falling into anarchy. What would have been the consequences of that state of things ? Not that that anarchy would have con tinued, but that other Powers would then have said. We are willing to allow Italy to arrange her own affairs, butisee what a condition of anarchy ex i sts in Naples? (Hear.)i A. king unable to maintain his authority, a military chief mas ter of the State, everything in confusion. Now is the time, certainly, for Europe to interfere to establish the Pope in his dominions, to place Austrian garrisons in several of her pro vinces, and to show for ever that that dream of Italian in dependence has been a mere illusion which can never again be revived." (Hear, hear.) Well, in that position I really think the King of Sardinia could do no other than declare himself at once to be so deeply interested in what had hap pened, as well for himself and his States as for Italy, whose champion he avowed himself to be, that he would march with an army into Naples and establish that unity of Italy which hal long been the wish of so many of the people in all parts of that country. But, Sir, this act of his did not pass unnoticed. The right hon. gentleman says that on the 27th of October I wrote a despatch justifying that proceed ing. But that was not the first thing teat had taken place. The Powers of Europe very frequently when it suits them adopt that practice which the right lon. gentleman says was so new in this instance—namely, although their affairs are generally conducted with the utmost secrecy, they put forth declarations of principles signed by their Minister of Foreign Affairs, and which are intended to have an influence on the events of Europe. In ffs case Russia and Prussia had both thought it necessary to administer lectures to the Xing of Sardinia—to point out to him that he had departed from the law of nations, and that such an outrage had never been known in the history of Europe. Well, these preceedings were calculated to have a great effect. The Emperor of the French at the same time had withdrawn his Minister from Turin. Well, I certainly felt myself, end I found that her Majesty's Government wore also of opinion, that the King of Sardinia was defending a just cause when he had so taken up arms; and it was im possible, I think, with any regard to the dignity of Eng land, that we should maintain entire silence white Russia, Prussia, Austria, and France were doing all in their power, as far as their morel influence would extend, to extinguish the freedom and independence of the new Italian State. (Hear, hear.) That, therefore, was my reason for not or'y writing the despatch to our Minister at the Court of Turin, but, as the Russ'en paper bed been published, for allowing the despatch I had written t be published likewise. If the light hon. gentleman says that the Italians owe us no gra titude, I bedeve "-e'r own feeling is very different. (Hear, hear.) I believe their feeling is that the moral influence of England in their favour, while they had the moral influence of almost every other Power in Europe tv theist, was of great weight and importance. (Hear, h 'tee.) Sir, I have already said that we never nut roi yard the principle of the unity of Italy; hut it tl• s oae consatutioeal monarchy is the ;elm of government which the Italians thirk best fitted to seer"; their indeperd , is e, we should be the last persons to say we would tat 'ere to pi event them from accomplishing theie wishes. (Hear, hear. ) The right hon. gentleman tells us we an now between two darters ; those dangers are either that the Treaty of Zue:c'e should be carried into effect, or that, on the other hand, the sword of France will decide in favour of the unity of Italy, and thereby great results will follow — results so g:eat that he does not venture to specify what they may be. But he is now talking, neNof the actin." state of things, not of anything that is appa rent en the face of Europe, but he is borrowing from his imagination schemes and designs which he thinks will be carried into effect. New, I disagree with him on that sub ject. The danger against which we wish to provide is the breaking out of war in Europe. We may suceed in this. If we are fortunate enough to succeed, we shall be most happy. We may fail; and then I only hope we may be treated by the right hen. gentleman with the same candour with which we treat id him end his colleagues when they failed in maintaining the peace of Europe in 1859. But now, as to those two alternative cemingencies of which he speaks, one is, that a confederation should be formed )fa Italy; that the King of the Two Sicilies should be restored, that the Pope should get back ell his dominions except, I believe, Romagna; end that an Austrian Archduke should reign in Tuscany. Well, if there be any truth in what we hear, this would be very inconsistent with Italian feeling. It is not likely that this could be done except by force of arms, and against doing it by force of arms the Emperor of the French, as well as ourselves, is most deeply pledged. He has renewed that pledge no longer ago than yesterday. (Hear.) He has said, what is perfectly true, that acting on the principle of non-intervention may not exactly give rise to, but may allow of excesses which those who confine themselves to looking on may deeply deplore; but that, notwithstanding these excesses, notwithstanding the re sponsibility which may be thrown on other Powers, he means to keep steadfast to that policy. Well, then, on this high point Great Bi itain is entirely agreed with the Emperor of the French. The right hon. gentleman questions us as to our policy. I will say at once, in one word, that we are not now divided upon any great question, such as the war of 1793, or the -war of 1804. On a main principle of policy, then, we are entirely agreed with the Empe ror of the French. We are at the same time in close alliance and intimacy with the ether great Powers of Europe, end if there is any other quest'on on which it shoula appear to us that France was in the wrong, or was acting in that spirit of encroachment which has some times actuated a great military nation, then weshould form an alliance with them to combat her designs. And so I believe that the second alternative which the right hon. gentleman has mentioned is not likely to come to pass. The Emperor of the French has declaeed his strong disapprove' of any attempt on the part of Sardinia to break the treaty of Zurich and attack Venetia. I believe the French people will entirely support him in that declaration. I believe he has no intention of marching an army into Italy with the view of aiding the Italians in that attempt. But, if a war were made, it is impossible to say at this moment what pert France might take as new events arose. But let me state, in regard to this same question, that while I wrote that despatch of the 31st of August which the right hon. gentleman saw in the Cologne Gazette, I wrote about the same time a despatch to our )Minister at Vienna to say that we should entirely disapprove an attack by Sardinia on the Austrians in Venetia. We should entirely disapprove any aid given by France to such an attack; we should take care to have our opinion known at Turin and at Paris ; we trusted our influence would have its due effect, combined with other considerations which must be in the minds of the sovereigns of those countries; but, mind this, we can go no further; it is not our intention to take part in such a war if it should arise; we confine ourselves to what we have stated. (Hear, hear.) Now, sir, the right hon. gen tleman has asked me what are our relations with France. Sir, I agree with my hon. friend who seconded the Address with so much good sense and so much practical sagacity. (Hear.) The hon: gentleman said that the Commercial Treaty would have this effect—that it would make an alliance not only between the Governments of France and England, but Letween the people of France and England. (Hear, hear.) I believe that will be the case, and I render due homage to an hon. friend not now in the house,—l mean Mr. Cobden—(hear, hear)—who has devoted so niueh labour and, ' I am sorry to say, so much of his valuable health, in order to complete that work, and to unite these two nations in commercial relations which may tend to future peace and future alliance, and which I trust may be an enduring memorial to future genera tions. (Hear, hear.) Such, then, are our general rela tions with France. , But I stated in this house we did not mean to keep apart from other Powers and that declara tion, I remember well, was received with great favour on the other side. (Hear.) We have acted on that declara tion. We have always communicated confidentially with Austria, Prussia, and Russia with regard to :any affairs of Europe that arose. We have communicated our opinions to them ; they have communicated theirs to us. On some questions we were in entire accordance ; on others we had various opinions. But there is nothing in our relations with any of these Powers that should make any of them enter tain any feeling of restraint, far less of hostility, to this country. (Hear.) Sir, I can only end this part of the subject by saying that my hope and my belief is that, not withstanding the dangers that menace us—and affairs wore a far more dark aspect some time ago —notwithstanding these dangers, the peace of Europe may at this time be pre served. (Hear.) It will be for Austria to settle her affairs with Hungary, as it is for other Powers to settle their own internal affairs; it will be for Prussia and for Russia to settle the difficult internal questions which are now occupy ing their attention, but I do trust that none of the dangers which menace us may lead to actual conflict in arms. (Hear.) For. although some are sanguine enough to be- I Bove there might be a great war in Europe, in which we could not take part, yet I have the melancholy conviction that although war might be begun without us—although we might declare we had no concern in it—yet, in the course of that war events might take place which wouldlso seriously menace the independence of nations in which we take the deepest interest that we should hardly be able to be free from its complications and dangers. (Hear.) For this reason, therefore, I pray most earnestly that peace may be preserved ; and, whatever the right hon. gentleman may think of the inutility or utility of my exertions, I can only say, such as they are, they shall be devoted to that purpose—that almost sacred purpose in my eyes. (Hear, hear.) Sir, I will now say a few words as to the amend ment. With regard to the question of reform, I will state at once that I think it is perfectly clear no measure could have been brought forward with a chance of its being car ried, except a measure of a very trifling character ; and I believe, for my own part, that it is better for the Govern ment to leave that question entirely untouched than to bring forward a measure which would create great disap pointment among its supporters, many taunts on the part of its opponents, and which, whether carried or not, would occupy a great deal of valuable time without any valuable result. There is another consideration, which is, that on this question of reform I have always had considerable dread of what persons might be induced to do by way of compromise, We had franchises by the Reform Act which are secured to us so long as that Reform Act is not touched ; but if, by way of getting certain provisions, you give up certain other previsions, your loss is certain, while it is not so certain you would gain anything equivalent to it on the other side. Therefore, sir, I come to the opinion—we have had eight years now to arrive at that judgment—that in order to carry a Reform Bill that shall be actually of use to the country, and I should call no Reform Bill of use that did not admit great numbers of the working classes — (hear)—in order to carry such a Reform Bill there must be a great and favourable breeze of public opinion that will enable us to carry it in this house, and with a swelling tide over the bar of the House of Lords. (Hear.) Now I come to consider what has been the state of opinion during the last year. The right hon. gentleman has said truly that a great part of the opposition against the bill we brought forward came from gentlemen who sat on this side of the house, and who represented great bodies of constituents. There was one hon. gentleman, a friend of mine, the Chair man of Ways and Means, who, addressing his constituents at Salford, said he was in favour of a£s franchise. I thought if I produced a £6 franchise there was one gentleman in the House of Commons who would not think I had gone too far ; but my hon. friend made a speech entirely against it. Then there was the hon. gentleman the member for Edinburgh—he made a speech almost against the extension of the franchise. There was clearly an indisposition of members of the House of Commons on this subject. If these speeches had been made in 1831 by members representing great bodies of constituents, there would have been what the Americans call " indignation meetings" among their constituents, protesting that they had been misrepresented. But not a bit of it ; the country was quite dead on the sub ject. (A laugh.) My hon. friend the member for Edinburgh had to undergo some severe schooling from his constituents, but scarcely an ything was said about the Reform Bill, their attention being almost entirely confined to the Annuity Tax Repeal Bill. (A laugh.) Well, then, I say if such is the state of public opinion—if the Governments of Lord Aber deen, Lord Derby, and my noble friend, have brought for ward different plans of reform, and they have failed, from the general dislike that seems to affect them, I must come to the conclusion that for the present time, and I speak only for the present time—there is no such disposition in favour of the further amendment of the representatidn as ought to induce the Government, I might say to justify Government in proposing a measure for the reform of the representation. (Hear, hear.) However, the country has the matter in its own hands. It is not too late for indignation meetings. (A laugh.) If nothing will satisfy the country but a reform bill which, to use the language of the hon. gentleman, shall satisfy the just expectations of the people demanding it, they have only to insist that the hon. gentleman who moved these dol 'l(7 amendment shall take the place of my noble friend, ataifc,ic.,_ no doubt, will carry the Reform Bill to their the sa state of tion. (A laugb.) That would show completely the case; and till that is done I shall believe Cher people. right, and justly judge the disp osition m o/ motions e in the (Hear, hear.) Well, Sir, with re g ard I may be allowed to say one wo rd. With respect to Re form Bills I have had enough to l began with a induce me not of to be very eager in introducinghe 819, lam sorry to say 41 them motion on this subject in ml. tion in this house with years ago. I had as regard to the corruption emanation Grampound. Everybody agreed the case was proved. It suffrager o s "What,"toiveth . o t two me m was said, hers to Leeds, with a £lO of g i v i n g the representation to a new place 1" glad to find that opinion became more, " only think_ Well, sir, was _ ~.:.:~~ lis ind ing